journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 5–6 introduction marta malska (1), dmytro kadnichansky (2) (1) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: malskym@ukr.net (2) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: dimakad@ukr.net citation malska m., kadnichansky d., 2016, introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 5–6. transformations of a political, social and economic character that have taken place in central and eastern europe after 1989 (cf. balázs et al., 2014; birch, 2003; michalski, 2006; shleifer, treisma, 2014; staehr, 2011; sztompka, 2004; wendt, ilieş (eds.), 2001) have also affected the changes in land development and tourism in this part of europe (cf. cudny et al. (eds.), 2012; dugulan et al., 2012; hall et al. (eds.), 2006; tuţă, micu, 2014; wyrzykowski, widawski (eds.), 2012). hence, the current issue of the journal of geography, politics and society is dedicated to problems related to the generally understood aspects associated with tourism. presented in this issue articles fall into two main parts. the first one is dedicated to general problems and contains three articles. the first, by t. tökölyová, is dedicated to nation-branding in the development of tourism, as it is still a relatively poorly recognized problem in european post-communist countries. new zealand has been selected as a case study. it seems that this issue will be increasingly gaining popularity also in the countries of central and eastern europe. the next two articles are already devoted entirely to countries of the region. a. tarasionak points to the geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination, while m.  malska et al. discuss ecotourism and geotourism in ukraine. both of these countries are still relatively little known worldwide as tourist destinations. but, as the authors of these articles show, this may change. in the second part of the issue, devoted to particular problems, there are articles relating to international tourism. this is a significant issue because during the period of socialism this type of tourism practically did not exist in central and eastern europe. the part opens with a paper by y.  zhuk that discusses the impact of the border on development opportunities of small border cities (based on the example of small towns of the lviv region). it is followed by an article by e.  atasoy and j.a.  wendt devoted to the determinants and changes in the international tourist traffic (based on the example of poland and turkey). in this section, there are also four articles that discuss the tourist attractiveness at the local and the regional level. the first three of them are devoted mainly to natural attractiveness. hence a.  khovalko focuses on the attractiveness of the national park “podillia speleoregion”, m.  kadnichanska on the yavoriv national natural park, and g.v.  herman et al. on “valea rose” in the bihor country. this part finishes with a paper by n.  pankiv dedicated to an 6 marta malska, dmytro kadnichansky analysis of the anthropogenic attractiveness of small towns (based on the example of the ivano-frankivsk region). the last two articles are dedicated to the issues of accommodation, in particular to hotels. their comparison seems interesting, because i. pandyak’s paper refers to the future, and t.  zavadovsky and d. kadnichansky’s article is dedicated to the past. authors of the articles come from six different scientific centres of the six countries. however, the issues presented in the articles often go beyond the borders of those countries. the editors thank the authors for preparing their papers and the reviewers for their work. at the same time, we hope that the problems addressed in this issue will be of interest to the reader. marta malska, dmytro kadnichansky references balázs  p., bozóki  a., catrina  ş., gotseva  a., horvath  j., limani d., radu b., simon á., szele á., tófalvi z., perlaky-tóth k., 2014, 25 years after the fall of the iron curtain. the state of integration of east and west in the european union, publications office of the european union, luxembourg. birch s., 2003, electoral systems and political transformation in post-communist europe, palgrave macmillian, hampshirenew york. cudny w., michalski t., rouba r. (eds.), 2012, tourism and the transformation of large cities in the post-communist countries of central and eastern europe, łódzkie towarzystwo naukowe, łódź. dugulan  d., popescu  i.c., vegheş  c., 2012, as assessment of the relationship between the cultural heritage, travel and tourism, and sustainable development in the central and eastern european countries, annals of the university of oradea, economic science series, xxi, 1141–1147. hall  d.r., smith  m.k. marciszewska  b. (eds.), 2006, tourism in the new europe: the challenges and opportunities of eu enlargement, cabi publishing, oxfordshire-cambridge. michalski  t., 2006, a geographic approach to the transformation process in european post-communist countries, [in:] t. michalski (ed.), the geographical aspects of the transforamtion process in central and east-central europe, wydawnictwo “bernardinum”, gdynia-pelplin, 7–26. shleifer  a., treisma  d., 2014, normal countries: the east 25 years after communism, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/ shleifer/files/normal_countries_draft_sept_12_annotated.pdf [10.10.2016] staehr  k., 2011, democratic and market-economic reforms in the postcommunist countries. the impact of enlargement of the european union, eastern european economics, 49(5), 5–28. sztompka  p., 2004, eastern europe: at the crossroads of three historical processes, [in:] m.  niezgoda (ed.), the consequences of great transformation, wydawnictwo uj, kraków, 14–19. tuţă  l., micu  c., 2014, analysing tourism flow indicators in central and eastern europe, lucrari stiinfice seria i, management agricol, xvi(4), 58–64. wendt j., ilieş a. (eds.), 2001, chosen problems of political geography in central europe, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk. wyrzykowski  j., widawski  k. (eds.), 2012, geography of tourism of central and eastern europe countries, institute of geography and regional development university of wrocław, wrocław. 1. introduction the most recent trends and forecasting studies by the world tourism organisation indicate that cities will continue to be in high demand by tourists of all sorts, and the problems associated with the handling of these tourists will have to be more systematically tackled by all parties concerned. cities face, therefore, a double challenge. firstly, they have to be able to respond to the expectations and needs of the growing numbers of tourists who are attracted to their rich and varied array of cultural, business, entertainment, shopping, sports and other attractions; furthermore, they need to continuously renovate and improve such facilities in order to maintain their share in the competitive tourism market and the benefits resulting from it. secondly, cities have to ensure that tourism is developed and managed in such a way that it benefits the resident population, does not contribute to the deterioration of the urban environment but rather to its enhancement, and does not become a financial burden to the local authority. towns play an important role in the spatial organization of the society and form the largest group among all urban settlements. they are especially important for the further development of tourism. historical towns are especially highlighted in this category. every small historical town, especially in the western region of ukraine, is a separate page in the annals of ukraine. journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 34–38 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.025.5812 prospects for tourism development in border towns of lviv oblast yuriy zhuk faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: jurijzhuk@gmail.com citation zhuk y., 2016, perspectives for tourism development in border towns of lviv oblast, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 34–38. abstract the definition of the sustainable tourism is considered. the purpose of the integrated spatial formation of the cbr, and its priorities are considered. the criteria for tourism development are analysed. the options for the development of touristic agglomerations are proposed. the problems that hinder the development of effective tourism and recreation industry are analysed and key objectives of local policy to encourage the development of tourist activities are identified. key words lviv oblast, town, sustainable tourism, cross-border region, touristic agglomeration. prospects for tourism development in border towns of lviv oblast 35 the objects of the research are border towns of lviv oblast. the aim of this work is to consider border towns as a centres of tourist agglomerations. lviv oblast is the old settled area, which is located at the crossroads of important trade routes. the ancient system of settlements, which arose first as a fortresses and were strategical points in the defence system around the community were formed, subsequently started to concentrate handicrafts and manufacturing. a significant influence on the formation of towns of lviv oblast have natural factors: topography, climate, forested areas, soils, mineral resources. in combination with the features of historical development, they played a decisive role in the shaping of the settlement system. the topography and proximity to groundwater affected the location of the settlements, their size and other features in elevated areas. the towns of lviv oblast have a rich architectural, historical, and cultural heritage and for a considerable historical period were comfortable for human residence. 2. ukrainian-polish cross-border region border areas of the lviv oblast are the part of the ukrainian-polish cross-border region (cbr). it embrace: from the ukrainian side, volyn and lviv regions, from the polish side – lublin and podkarpackie voivodeships. the total area of the ukrainian part of the cbr is 42.000 km2, and the population is about 3.8 million people. the polish part of the cbr has the total area of 63.000 km2 and the population amounts 5.5 million people (губеня, 2013). the purposes of the integrated spatial development of the cbr: • overcoming the negative trends of social, economic and environmental development, which have occurred in the past; • maintaining an efficient sociallyand ecologicallyoriented use of natural and historical-cultural identity, resources, demographic, and production capacity; • effective use of complementary capacities of the ukrainian and polish parts of the region; • increasing the attractiveness of the region for people’s lives and investments, its competitiveness with the european and the global community. in modern conditions and in the framework of the cbr, a priority task can be the spatial organization of the of 30-km strip of land along the border which is a subject of the regime of simplified crossing of border for citizens of ukraine. the regime was imposed in 2009 (mały ruch graniczny…, 2009). there is an increase in the intensity of tourist traffic (from the polish and ukrainian sides), and there is a certain recovery in business activities. the length of the state border within lviv oblast is 258 km. the border crossings are at: rava-ruska– hrebenne, krakovets–korczowa, shehyni–medyka) and in one checkpoint local value (smilnytsia– krościenko). the crossings (except krakovets–korczowa), arethe road and rail transport. in lviv oblast the border strip covers a large part of the territory of sokalskyi, zhovkivskyi, yavorivskyi, mostyskyi, starosambirskyi and turkivskyi rayons, has an area of over 7500 km2 and the population of 537 thousand people. there are 15 cities, 9 towns, and 708 villages (kawalko, 2011). among the urban settlements, there are historical cities: belz, dobromyl, zhovkva, rava-ruska, staryi sambir, sudova vyshnya, famous resort areas – nemyriv and shklo, and the main city of the lvivvolyn coal basin – chervonograd. there are various elements of historical and architectural heritage: the remnants of the ancient downtown fortifications, defensive yards, the elements of planning, landscape and architectural complexes. individual monuments have been preserved in more than eighty settlements. the criteria for the tourism development are the presence of objects that respond to the following requirements: • uniqueness, singularity, the absence of analogues in other regions; • wide popularity; • cognitive value, relationship to important historical events, prominent personalities of the world history; • the high artistic value of the object itself and it’s environment; • conservation of the objects and theirs preparedness to show; • usability and accessibility of the location of these objects. 3. sustainable tourism and touristic agglomerations development according to the definition, sustainable tourism can be define as a tourism that takes full account of its current and future economic, social and environmental impacts, addressing the needs of visitors, the industry, the environment and host communities. sustainable tourism development guidelines and management practices are applicable to all forms of tourism in all types of destinations, including mass tourism and the various niche tourism segments. 36 yuriy zhuk sustainability principles refer to the environmental, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of tourism development, and a suitable balance must be established between these three dimensions to guarantee its long-term sustainability. sustainable tourism should: • make optimal use of environmental resources that constitute a key element in tourism development, maintaining essential ecological processes and helping to conserve natural heritage and biodiversity; • respect the socio-cultural authenticity of host communities, conserve their built and living cultural heritage and traditional values, and contribute to inter-cultural understanding and tolerance; • ensure viable, long-term economic operations, providing socio-economic benefits to all stakeholders that are fairly distributed, including stable employment and income-earning opportunities and social services to host communities, and contributing to poverty alleviation. sustainable tourism development requires the informed participation of all relevant stakeholders, as well as strong political leadership to ensure wide participation and consensus building. achieving sustainable tourism is a continuous process and it requires constant monitoring of impacts, introducing the necessary preventive and/or corrective measures whenever necessary. sustainable tourism should also maintain a high level of tourist satisfaction and ensure a meaningful experience to the tourists, raising their awareness about sustainability issues and promoting sustainable tourism practices amongst them (making tourism…, 2005). strengthening of european integration processes contributes to the growth of interest in visiting the border areas. there are several touristic agglomerations, which, under the apropriate management, are able to serve to the travel needs of visitors. between the settlements on both sides of the border, near the checkpoints, works regular socio-economic relations which are based on the service of cross-border tourist traffic and it is a initial stage of the formation of small cross-border agglomerations (tab. 1). rava-ruska touristic agglomeration has a significant natural and historical-cultural potential (the landscape of roztochia, unique mural painting in the wooden church in the village of potelych, the wooden church in the village of volya vysotska, ensemble of the krekhiv monastery, nearby is situated belz – one of the oldest cities in ukraine). yavoriv touristic agglomeration is known for it’s therapeutic resorts – nemyriv and shklo, scenic views of yavoriv national park and “cosmic landscapes” of the abandoned sulphur mines. “yavoriv lake” is the largest recreation waterbody in lviv oblast, which is a flooded sulphur quarry. here in the village of prylbychi was born andrey sheptytsky tab. 1. touristic cross-border agglomerations ukraine poland the centre of agglomeration rava ruska tomaszów lubelski border crossing rava ruska hrebenne settlements uhniv, belz, potelych, volia vysotska, krehiv, rava ruska lubycza królewska, bełżec, tomaszów lubelski the centre of agglomeration yavoriv jarosław border crossing krakovets korczowa settlements nemyriv, shklo, cherchyk, nahachiv, yavoriv lubaczów, radymno, munina, jarosław the centre of agglomeration mostyska przemyśl border crossing shehyni medyka settlements sudova vyshnia, volytsia, tvirzha, malniv, buhovychi, hostyntseve, husakiv, mostyska krasiczyn, żurawica, przemyśl the centre of agglomeration dobromyl ustrzyki dolne border crossing smilnytsia krościenko settlements khyriv, nyzhankovychi, stara sil, nove misto, skelivka, staryi sambir, dobromyl solana, lesko, ustrzyki dolne source: жук, 2014; посацький, 2010. prospects for tourism development in border towns of lviv oblast 37 – metropolitan of ukrainian greek-catholic church. famous writer osyp makovey was born in yavoriv. wooden churches were preserved in the villages of voroblianychi, hrushiv, velykopole. mostyska touristic agglomeration offers the objects of fortification lines of the first and second world wars and numerous architectural monuments. compared to other parts of the border zone here is the most developed service infrastructurefor the international traffic, but its facilities are primarily concentrated along the motorway shehyni – lviv. dobromyl touristic agglomeration is characterized by the interesting landscape of the carpathian mountains foothills, picturesque villages, historical monasteries (khyriv and dobromyl), monuments of sacral architecture (жук, 2013; посацький, 2010). the concept of cross-border tourist agglomerations formation is provided for their accession to larger urban entities in the western part of lviv oblast which belongs to the cbr. such border tourist agglomerations are linked by the common status of border crossing, local border traffic. subsequently, there will be the ability to build a specific infrastructure of tourist services at the border zone, which will create jobs for the local population. positive effects of tourism in small towns of lviv oblast: • creates employment opportunities for local people; • promotes cultural awareness and can help preserve local culture and traditions; • income from tourists can be used to develop local infrastructure and services; • foreign currency can help local people; • natural features that attract tourists in the first place can be protected using income from tourism. the analysis of the status and prospects of development of tourism and recreation in small towns showed the problems that hinder the development of effective touristic and recreation industry: • unsatisfactory condition of the general infrastructure of small towns (roads, water supply and sewerage, heat supply, contamination by the domestic waste) and inadequate development of communication infrastructure (availability of telephones and communications, informatization and access to the internet, transportation); • lack of qualified personnel and low quality of training of existing staff; • insufficient informational support and promotion of tourism; • low level of business activities in touristic and recreational sphere in small towns owing to excessive tax burden; • problems of preservation and maintenance in proper condition of cultural and historical sites, which are representing the touristic value, owing to lack of public funding; • lack of coordination of planning documents for the recreational sector in small towns; • lack of cluster formations in the tourist and recreational sector, which would allow to accumulate financial, human and logistical resources to provide comprehensive travel services (васильців, 2014). 4. summary sustainable tourism is about re-focusing and adapting. a balance must be found between limits and usage so that continuous changing, monitoring and planning ensure that tourism can be managed. this requires thinking long-term (10, 20+ years) and realising that change is often cumulative, gradual and irreversible. economic, social and environmental aspects of sustainable development must include the interests of all stakeholders including indigenous people, local communities, visitors, industry and government. conversion of small historical towns into modern tourist centres is a complex task that can be solved only by joint efforts of all stakeholders, municipalities and the national government (програма розроблення містобудівної документації…, 2011). only with this cooperation are possible quick improvements. the key objectives of local policies that will stimulate the development of tourism are: • creation of hotel, transport and service infrastructure in small towns; • formation of characteristic tourist products; • development of local institutions to support tourism; • search and attraction of internal and external resources; • protection and lobbying of common interests of small historical towns. effective actions for the development and promotion of tourism will contribute to the sustainable development of these territories. the historical past of border towns is a good prerequisite for their development. a skillful management of tourism agglomeration will contribute to the development of border areas of the two countries. 38 yuriy zhuk references kawalko b., 2011, wybrane problemy polsko-ukraińskiej współpracy transgranicznej, barometr regionalny, 2(24), 47–50. making tourism more sustainable – a guide for policy makers, 2005, unep and unwto, paris, madrid. mały ruch graniczny (mrg), 2009, ministerstwo spraw zagranicznych rp, https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/informacje_konsularne/maly_ruch_graniczny/ [21.09.2016] васильців т., 2014, напрями підвищення інвестиційної привабливості прикордонних територій західних регіонів україни (на прикладі львівської області), аналітична записка, київ. губеня с., 2013, українсько-польська транскордонна співпраця в контексті європейської інтеграції. україна та польща: минуле, сьогодення, перспективи, [in:] науковий часопис інституту польщі східноєвропейського національного університету імені лесі українки, луцьк, 1–5 жук ю., 2014, проблеми та перспективи розвитку туризму в малих історичних містах львівської області, [in:] матеріали х всеукраїнських наукових таліївських читань, харківський національний університет ім. в. каразіна, харків, 66–71. посацький б., 2010, передумови формування транскордонних туристичних агломерацій на прикладі львівської області, [in:] збірник наукових праць. досвід та перспективи розвитку міст україни, 18, 96–103. програма розроблення містобудівної документації у львівській області на 2011–2015 роки., 2011, рішення львівської обласної ради №168 від 24.05.2011, львів. 1. introduction one of the reserved objects of the highest rank on rostochchia is yavoriv national natural park (ynnp) – nature-protected, recreational, cultural and educational, scientific and research institution of national importance, established to preserve, reproduce and efficiently use of natural complexes and objects of roztochchia which have special ecological, healthy, historical and cultural, scientific, educational and aesthetic value. the activities of this nature-protected area, including the development of recreation are published in numerous papers by park staff and researchers of various scientific and research institutions in lviv. in particular, works by i. markovych and o. hrebelna (маркович, гребельна, 2011), h. ross (рось, 2011), j. zinko (зінько, мальська, 2007). 2. take into consideration some aspects of tourism and recreation on the territory of yavoriv national natural park the basis for the development of recreation and tourism on the territory of the park comprise natural resources. yavoriv national natural park is located on the territory of ukrainian roztochchia. according journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 52–56 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.028.5815 aspects of recreational and tourist activity in yavoriv national natural park myroslava kadnichanska tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: myrosjakadn@ukr.net citation kadnichanska m., 2016, aspects of recreational and tourist activity in yavoriv national natural park, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 52–56. abstract the peculiarities of the development of tourism at yavoriv national natural park (ynnp) are highlighted, tourist and resource potential of the park is evaluated. ynnp – nature-protected, recreational, cultural and educational, scientific and research institution of national importance, established to preserve, reproduce and efficiently use of natural complexes and objects of roztochchia which have special ecological, healthy, historical and cultural, scientific, educational and aesthetic value. the problems and perspectives of tourist development and recreation at this ecological territory. yavoriv national park has significant recreational potential for the development of eco-educational, historical, cultural, and sacral tourism, and sports (equestrian, cycling and skiing) tourism, and at the surrounding areas – qualified tourism (hunting, fishing). the park already operates a number of walking and bus routes, ecological and cognitive trails fixed places for rest are equipped. key words natural reserve fund, yavoriv national natural park, tourist resources of ukraine, ecotourism potential of rostochchia. aspects of recreational and tourist activity in yavoriv national natural park 53 to physical and geographic zone it’s roztotskyi district of roztotsko-opilska geobotanical region of the west ukrainian province of forest-steppe zone (зінько, мальська, 2007). relief of the park is characterized by a combination of steep outcrops and plateau-like elevations with a wide, sandy flat marshy hollows. plateau-like elevations are dissected by deep (sometimes up to 80–100 m) branched ravines, which are called by local citizens as “debras” (маруняк, семеряк, 2011). through the territory of the park goes the main european watershed, dividing the basins of the black and baltic seas. in the western part of ynnp flows the vereshchytsia river that flows into the dniester. on the territory of the park start left tribulates of vereshchytsia – stavchanka and stara rika (old river). in the north of the park are the origins of the rivers derevianka year and svynia (pig) (western bug river basin). for yavoriv national park as well as for roztochchia is characterized by high forest cover. among forest formations dominate young and middle-aged states. on a more fertile low-ashed soils hornbeamoak forests are formed. the most common are fresh and moist hornbeam oak groves, that are presented by associations of hairy aspen and goutweed oak hornbeam (геренчук, 1972). yavoriv nnp also has historical and cultural resources – unique historical and cultural objects that are located within the park and near its territory. a number of unique archaeological objects are opened here. the most famous among them is prince’s settlement shchekotyn, located near modern village hlynske. also near yavoriv national park are gems of ukrainian sacral architecture – wooden churches of yavoriv district – church of the assumption of the blessed virgin mary in the village lelehivka (1739), church of the holy virgin in village zhornyska (1877), nativity of the blessed virgin in the village stavky (1928), church of st. paraskeva in the village krekhiv, zhovkva district (1724) and one of the best galician churches in village stradch (1795). outstanding monuments of sacred art are basilian monastery of st. nicholas at krekhiv (xvii century), trinity church (1614) with the bell tower of the xix century and the church of the ascension of the lord (1831) in the town of ivano-frankove, and the ruins of the church of st. michael in the former village vyshenka velyka on the territory of polygon (каднічанська, 2009). all these resources the administration of the park actively involves into the development of recreational and tourism activity. in the park there is a department of recreation and environmental education, which workers, in particular, create the conditions for people’s rest on the places of stationary recreation that are defined as “project of territory organization” as well as carry out the excursion and eco-educational activity, constantly keep in touch with public and educational institutions of different levels (tab. 1). in the department of recreation and environmental education created ecological educational center (the village ivano-frankove, zelena str., 23), which includes a conference room for seminars and conferences was established and exposition stands were designed. in addition, here is the library with large fund of literature in nature, environmental classroom for classes, class of biodiversity, which introduces the landscapes, typical and rare species of plants and animals of the region and cabinet “roztochchia by eyes of artists” for the organization of changing exhibitions. environmental and educational center has a physical infrastructure that allows to carry out activities of modern level (маркович, гребельна, 2011). tab. 1. visiting the territory of yavoriv national natural park year number of visitors, people zone of regulated recreation zone of stationary recreation buffer zone total number for the territory of the institution 2006 2642 3659 6301 2007 3342 6952 10294 2008 2059 6060 1081 9200 2009 1879 6426 8305 2010 1627 5701 7328 2011 2539 6152 8691 source: according to the materials of the department of recreational and ecological education the village ivano-frankove, zelena str., 23. 54 myroslava kadnichanska recreational and tourist activity of the park has such main areas as (маркович, гребельна, 2011): • holidays (general, cultural and educational, short-term from 5-10 hours to 1-2 days from with tents and fires in specially equipped and designated areas); • excursion activity (tour by marked ecological paths and routes to outstanding religious buildings and places of memory of the region, exhibitions, museums, etc.) (fig. 1); • tourist activities (thematic hiking, ornithological, ethnographic, cycling, equestrian, water as well as utilitarian tourism – picking mushrooms, berries, etc.; • amateur and sport fishing. the park has four stationary recreation zone “vereshchytsia”, “lelehivka” “kozulka”, “serednii horb” („middle hill”) and attracting recreation facility “oselia roztochchia”, ecological trails, eight tourist routs, five recreational lakes. the zone of stationary recreation “vereshchytsia” is located near village vereschytsya, yavoriv district, lviv region, its area is 17.6 hectares. this area is arranged and adapted for long holidays. two recreational lakes is built here, zone of stationary recreation is connected to power supply system, the network of water supply and drainage is formed, treatment facilities are installed, zone of recreation is equipped with canopies (16 pieces), forest furniture, four summer recreational houses are built, there is also a beach, rescue post built fence, piers and bridges for sport fishing. fish is put into a lake. floatage is bought – 3 boats and 2 water bikes (маруняк, семеряк, 2011). the zone of stationary recreation “lelehivka” near the village lelehivka, yavoriv district, lviv region (area – 2.5 hectares) is equipped with summer canopies (15 pieces), barbecues, small architectural forms, forest furniture, trash containers. the zone of stationary recreation “kozulka” near the village kozulka, zhovkva district, lviv region (area – 6.6 hectares) is located in northern part of the park, near krekhiv monastery and is equipped with recreation canopies (10 pieces), barbecue, small architectural forms, forest furniture, trash containers. lakes for swimming, sport and amateur fishing are prepared. fish is put into a lake. the access road is renovated by own forces. water supply is regulated. floatage is bought – 2 boats and 1 water bike. the zone of stationary recreation “serednii horb” (“middle hill”) is located near the village middle hill, yavoriv district, lviv region (area – 3.5 hectares) is equipped with summer canopies (3 pieces), barbecues, trash containers (маркович, гребельна, 2011). recreational and attractive object “oselia roztochchia” is located near the village dubrovytsia, yavoriv district, lviv region (area comprises 2.4 hectares). here in the enclosure are descendants of the wild tarpan – polish horses (6 horses). fig. 1. dynamics of the excursions on the territory of yavoriv national natural park source: according to the materials of the department of recreational and ecological education the village ivano-frankove, zelena, s. 23. aspects of recreational and tourist activity in yavoriv national natural park 55 there is also a building that previously served as the household for woodman (3 beds); the room of antique objects of the ukrainian village; apiary; farmyard (sheep, pigs, rabbits, ducks, geese); well of 38 miters depth; 3 relaxation sheds on the territory. the first steps are made for the development of horse tourism: equestrian trails are marked, the chaise, the sleigh, the horse harness are purchased (маркович, гребельна, 2011). environmental and educational trails „the path of ivan franko” and „krekhiv sanctuaries” are laid through the park. the ecological and literary „the path of ivan franko” of 1.1 km of length runs through the forest near the village lelekhivka. time for passing along the route with 15 minutes stops on the observation points is about 1.5 hours. the trail is equipped with small architectural forms, forest furniture, park sculptures and compositions of characters of ivan franko’s works. an important observation object is the white rock – steppe guest of roztochchia. the path ends with the cascade of the black lakes (маруняк, семеряк, 2011). the natural-religious path „krekhiv sanctuaries” of 2.5 km of length runs through the forest near krekhiv monastery (the village krekhiv, zhovkva district, lviv region). the time of route is 1.5 hours. the trail runs through a picturesque tract rubania near the mountain pobiina near krekhiv monastery – sanctuary of ukrainian people, famous among pilgrims from abroad. the trail is equipped with “soldsout” notices, signs and information attributes. here in the great stone of timosha monks launched the monastery (the end of the xvi century); an important historical and sacred importance has holy spring of the blessed virgin mary (маруняк, семеряк, 2011). four ecological and cognitive routes: “vereshchytsia”, “lelekhivka”, “holuby”, “by the main european watershed” are laid through the territory. the ecological and cognitive route “vereshchytsia” of 4.4 km of length runs through the forest near the village vereshchytsia. the time for passing along the route with 15 minutes stops on the observation points is 3 hours. in places of observation stops the route is equipped with forest furniture and information attributes (information sign – a schematic map of the route, sold out in places of observation stops, signs). it passes through beech forest, where you can see some species of orchids. among others attractive objects – mount pryslin (the place of early medieval settlement), rocky outcrops of ratteen limestone, ancient rural well “vovcha yama” (“wolf hole”), burial of german military prisoners during world war ii. variety of amazing ephemeroids cover all around like the carpet in early spring (маруняк, семеряк, 2011). the ecological and cognitive route „lelekhivka” of 4.5 km of length runs through the forest near the village lelekhivka. the time for passing along the route with 15 minutes stops on the observation points is 3 hours. the route is equipped with small architectural forms and forest furniture, it also has the necessary information support, on the one of the route observation point is excursion and recreational complex memorial of “the paths of ivan franko”. the route introduces unique and its typical natural complexes of roztochchia, typical representatives of flora and fauna. at different seasons there are rare and interesting species of flora, especially among orchids (neottia nidus-avis, dactylorhiza majalis, platanthera bifolia and others). the overall atmosphere, which is created by local scenery, gives a feeling of harmony and peace of mind that adjusts to the environmentally oriented recreation (маркович, гребельна, 2011). the ecological and cognitive route “holuby” (“doves”) of 3.5 km of length runs through the forest near krekhiv monastery (the village krekhiv, zhovkva district, lviv region). the time for passing along the route is 2.5 hours. the route is partly equipped with forest furniture, “sold-out” notices and signs, and is stretching by forest path and presents wonderful nature of roztochchia. the ecological and cognitive route “by the major european watershed” is 4 km of length, and runs in the area of the village mlynky, yavoriv region, lviv district. the time for passing along the route with 15 minutes stops on observation points is about 3 hours. the route has some information support (schematic map of the route, “sold out” notices, signs, wood furniture). the trail runs through the ridge of the main european watershed, where numerous rivers of roztochchia (fijna, kyslianka, vereshchytsia, stavchanka and other) originate, carrying their water into the basins of the black and baltic seas. the final observation point of the trail is recreation and attractive centre “oselia roztochchia” (маруняк, семеряк, 2011). the park staff also designed hiking trails: three foot routs (“up to the mount berezniaky”, “up to the mount bulava”, “up to the mount kubyn”) and five foot routs and by bus trails (“stradch-chorni ozera”, “on the ways of roztochchia from yaniv to krekhiv”, «yavoriv military polygon: past and present days”, “yavoriv suburbs”, “the age story of yaniv”), that attract resources of the outskirts of the park. the tourist route №1 “up to the mount berezniaky” (staryj majdan – mount berezniaky – the lake malishevske – staryj majdan) has the length of 25.7 km. the route is characterized by marked hilly and valley course by average complexity. passing the 56 myroslava kadnichanska route can take several days and involves tents and observing nature. the tourist route №2 “up to the mount bulava” (the village lelekhivka – the tract majdansky lis – the mount bulava) has the length of 8.8 km and it has a dividing slope-type of medium complexity. it is mostly one-day route. the tourist route №3 “up to the mount kubyn” (the village lelekhivka – staryj majdan – the mount kubyn) has the length of 13.2 km and it is characterized by hilly and valley course of average complexity. the time of route is passing several days with tents and observation the nature (маркович, гребельна, 2011). to organize recreational tourism and ecoeducational activity the department of recreation and environmental education is working with lviv travel agencies, a number of educational institutes, including ivan franko national university of lviv, that is the scientific curator of np of yavoriv, lviv state agrarian university, ukrainian state forestry university, lviv state environmental polytechnic, institute of ecology of the carpathians of the nas of ukraine, ivano-frankivsk asts №14, lviv higher college of restaurant, hospitality business and tourism, state natural museum nas of ukraine. the collaboration presupposes researches on the territory of the national park, organization of students’ practices, writing course and diploma papers on the basis of np as well as the organization of excursions. the cooperation is established with schools of villages ivano-frankove, dubrovytsia, domazhyr, riasna-ruska, krekhiv, lozyno, porichchia and novoyavorivsk secondary schools №1, 2, 3 and lyceum in novoyavorivsk and lviv city children’s ecological center. seminars for senior pupils are conducted, as well as the lectures on environmental topics, environmental lessons, and other actions. event tourism has recently become popular at yavoriv national park. the employees of the department of recreation and environmental education are organizing various celebrations and events involving large number of visitors. these are, in particular, series of religious festivals, celebrations jordan, easter songs, kupala wreath; festivals: etnofestyval “roztochanski festyny” youth festival of ukrainian tourist song “indian summer” (рось, 2011). 3. summary yavoriv national park has significant recreational potential for the development of eco-educational, historical, cultural, and sacral tourism, and sports (equestrian, cycling and skiing) tourism, and at the surrounding areas qualified tourism (hunting, fishing). the park already operates a number of walking and bus routes, ecological and cognitive trails fixed places for rest are equipped. there are favorable conditions for the development of agro-tourism in the surrounding areas. border and suburban provision increases the value of recreational resources. roztochchia region is the main place for rest for residents of the city and surrounding area for over 100 years. the park is located near the border with poland that is why it has great importance for international tourism. references геренчук к.і., 1972, природа львівської області, вид-во львів. у-ту, львів. зінько ю.в., мальська м.п., 2007, проблеми і перспективи розвитку природоохоронних об’єктів на розточчі, [in:] концепція туристичного загосподарювання нпп “яворівський” і прилеглих територій, логос, львів, 38–41. каднічанська м.я., 2009, географія і туризм: європейський досвід (львів–брюховичі, 9-11 жовтня 2009  р.), [in:] особливості туристично-ресурсного потенціалу яворівського національного природного парку, вид-во львів. у-ту, львів, 60–62. маркович і.м., гребельна о.б., 2011, організація рекреаційно-туристичної діяльності у національних парках заходу україни (смт івано-франково, 2011  р.), [in:] ефективність використання рекреаційних ресурсів яворівського нпп, київ, 257–260. маруняк с.м., семеряк і.і., 2011, організація рекреаційнотуристичної діяльності у національних парках заходу україни (смт івано-франково, 2011 р.), [in:] природничі та історико-культурні умови українського розточчя та яворівського нпп як основа для розвитку екологічного і активного туризму, київ, 202–216. рось г.я., 2011, організація рекреаційно-туристичної діяльності у національних парках заходу україни (смт івано-франково, 2011 р.), [in:] українські традиції у масових заходах яворівського нпп, київ, 257–260. 1. introduction where we live has an influence on our health and life span. the differences concern continents, and also countries, which is understandable due to racial, civilization and climatic dissimilarities. the incidence rate of various kinds of cancer is different among ethnically and racially diversified citizens of the usa, and the differences can even rise to four times (prostate cancer, afroamericans 255.5 vs native american indians from alaska 68.2) (national…, 1975–2004). the standardized incidence rate for malignant cancers in polish voivodeships also varies. for example, in 2010 it was between 302.5 (men) and 249.3 (women) in the pomeranian voivodeship and 208.6 in men and 175.9 in women in the podlaskie voivodeship (didkowska, wojciechowska, 2015). the authors of this information suggest that inadequate reporting of the cases in the voivodeships where the rate is low is the reason for the differences. however, this is contradicted by relatively low standardized coefficients of morbidity in the podkarpackie voivodeship, for which they estimate the completeness of registration at 100%. there are also reports about differences between poviats within the same voivodeship, which seems journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 49–55 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.006.6205 unexplained, significant disparities in the incidence of lung cancer in men and breast cancer among neighbouring populations of the pomorskie voivodeship maciej krzanowski bielska 166a, 43-400 cieszyn, poland, e-mail: makrzan@wp.pl citation krzanowski m., 2017, unexplained, significant disparities in the incidence of lung cancer in men and breast cancer among neighbouring populations of the pomorskie voivodeship, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 49–55. abstract significant, unexplained disparities in the incidence of lung cancer in men and breast cancer among some neighbouring populations of the pomorskie voivodeship poviats were revealed. they were not found for lung cancer in women. examinations were conducted on data from the pomeranian cancer registry. a hypothesis was put forward that the observed accumulation of certain surnames in certain poviats argues for the repetitive occurrence of certain features of the genotype in populations inhabiting these areas, which may have an influence on the emergence of certain cancers and play a role in the emergence of the above mentioned disparities. key words lung cancer, breast cancer, medical geography, local health disparities, pomorskie voivodeship. 50 maciej krzanowski especially intriguing – because what different causes of cancers could be found in people who live in close proximity, in a country that is ethnically uniform and in which everybody has similar access to medical care, and where people do not differ drastically with respect to their social and economic status? but the crude coefficients of incidence of invasive breast cancer in the świętokrzyskie voivodeship in the years 1999–2012 was between 42.9 (kielce poviat) and 82.9 (skarżysko poviat) (góźdź, macek (ed.), 2015), and in poviats of the podkarpackie voivodeship in 2010 it fluctuated between 25.4 (tarnobrzeg poviat) and 132.9 (lesko poviat) (grądalska-lampart et al., 2013). the authors do not comment on these differences. the weakness of these reports is that the presented data have not been standardized, and the differences have not been verified with the use of statistics. low and high incidence rates in a voivodeship cancel one another out and remain unnoticed. this is why the examination of differences between counties can create more premises for further exploration than examining only the voivodeship data. also, it is easier to spot some other differences that might be connected with the incidence rate of cancer in small populations rather than in big ones. 2. the aim the aim of this study was to examine whether the standardized incidence of lung cancer c34 (international…, 2016) and breast cancer (c50) in a long period of time may differ among some neighbouring poviats to a significant degree (p<0.05). the problem was examined based on the example of the pomorskie voivodeship. fig. 1 presents its division into poviats1. it means that the presented study becomes part of analyses having as their object the internal diversification of the demographic, social and health situation of the voivodeship population in its spatial frame (see: czapliński, szymańska, 2013; michalski, 2002a, 2002b, 2012; michalski et al., 2011; nowicki, 2012; ocena…, 2011; rydz, 2012; strategia…, 2001; szmytkowska et al., 2010; szymańska, 2012; tarkowski, 2014; tarkowski et al., 2014a, 2014b; zagożdżon, zaborski, 2002; zaborski, zagożdżon, 2002). the pomeranian voivodeship is situated in the north of poland on the baltic sea. its area is 18,310 1 poviats in poland (nuts-4) divide into administrative districts (on maps and sketches their names begin with small letter preceded with the small letter p and on cities with poviat’s rights (on maps and sketches their names start with the capital letter). square km. it consists of 20 poviats, including four towns that function on the basis of poviat rights. gdańsk and gdynia are seaports for ocean going ships. the voivodeship is inhabited by 2,300,000 people, with 51.3% of the population being women (bdl gus). the voivodeship has a particularly high incidence of malignant tumours, and the percentage of histopathologically verified cases is high  – 96–97% (didkowska, wojciechowska, 2015). the completeness of registration of diagnosed tumours is estimated by national cancer registry at 100%. interestingly, not all of public health parameters here are poor. there is a higher than in the country demographic dynamics coefficient, which in 2014 amounted to 1.222 per 1,000 inhabitants and fewer deaths (8.75) per 1,000 inhabitants in the year (less than in poland), and the air in gdańsk, the largest accumulation of population3, belongs to the less polluted in the country (ochrona…, 2016). 3. research material and methods the research material consisted of the information included in the bulletins of the pomeranian cancer registry (nowaczyk et al. (ed.), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) for the period of 2006– 2013. for each of the cancers, each poviat and each year they contain the number of new registered cases, the crude rate and the standardized rate. the analysed material, after its standardization, comprises 2,051 cases of women and 4,365 cases of men who would develop lung cancer as well as 4,819 cases of women who would develop breast cancer providing the age structure in populations where they live was standard. it is important to add that new cases and deaths are reported in poland in the place of residence of a given person and not where he/she was treated or died. for every kind of examined cancer, every sex, every year and every poviat, the virtual number of new, modified by standardization cases was calculated. it was done by multiplying their absolute number by the coefficient of standardization and dividing by the crude rate (cr, absolute incidence)4. 2 at the same time for poland it was 1.00 3 at the end of 2015 it was inhabited by 32.4% of pomeranian voivodeship population (bdl, gus). 4 for example, from information for the poviat of starogard, where “n” (new cases) in 2007 was 61, the crude rate was 100.99, the standardized incidence coefficient was 87.66, its corrected by standardization virtual number of new cases in 2007 was 52.9. after the adding the numbers of 8 investigated years and rounding the sum to the nearest integral number the sum was 336. unexplained, significant disparities in the incidence of lung cancer in men… 51 the number of residents of a given sex was averaged for the study period. the numbers of cases corrected with standardization were related to the numbers of residents of the same sex. they were then compared with other poviats using the principle “each with each” with the use of the chi-square test. to avoid errors resulting from synchronous testing of the so-called “family of hypothesis”, the bonferoni adjustment was applied (abdi, 2007) by multiplying the primarily obtained levels of significance by the number of possible comparisons, which in this study is 190. to check whether the reports of new cases are adequate, their numbers and numbers of deaths were tested with the correlation coefficient. 4. results figures 2–4 present the standardized incidence of the given cancer in pomeranian poviats and numbers of new standardized cases in an 8-year period of observation. numbers of new cases and deaths for each of both tested cancers have shown a high degree of correlation (r≥0.994), which seems to be proof of adequate reporting. table 1 presents the summary of results tending to prove the thesis of this study. 5. conclusions, proposals, discussion in discussion with persons interested in cancer incidence one gets an impression that they consider the possibility of differences in adjacent populations to be improbable and rather due to local negligence in reporting. it was shown in this study that the differences really exist. what has been noted in raw material between data from 2006 and 2013 is a significant growth in the number of new cases of lung cancer in women (up to 37%), of breast cancer (up to 55%) and a slight drop (5–7%) in lung cancer in men. as the situation is so dynamic, it forces researchers of the presented phenomenon to compare case numbers from the same time period. what should be the next step with findings presented in this paper? looking for other common or fig. 1. administrative division of the pomorskie voivodship into poviats in 2016 source: own study based on gus. 52 maciej krzanowski [n] = anticipated numbers of new cases in the period 2006-2013 which would occur if the population in a given poviat had the same age structure as the population accepted as standard. fig. 2. the mean year standardized incidence of lung cancer (c34) in women (per 100,000 women) in the pomorskie voivodeship poviats in the period of 2006–2013 source: own study based on the pomerania cancer register (nowaczyk et al. (ed.), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). [n] = anticipated numbers of new cases in the period 2006-2013 which would occur if the population in a given poviat had the same age structure as the population accepted as standard. fig. 3. the mean year standardized incidence of lung cancer (c34) in men (per 100,000 men) in the pomorskie voivodeship poviats in the period of 2006–2013 source: own study based on the pomerania cancer register (nowaczyk et al. (ed.), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). unexplained, significant disparities in the incidence of lung cancer in men… 53 absent features in populations where a given cancer was especially frequent or not. it would be reasonable to check whether the frequency of smoking, particularly in poviats with high incidence of lung cancer, does not correlate one with another. the role of smoking, dominant among cancerogenes, was probably the reason for rather small disparities in lung cancer found in this study. one has to observe whether the differences in the incidence of breast cancer shown in city of gdańsk, sopot and gdynia continue. if yes, populations with higher incidence should be submitted to screening procedures helping early diagnosis. as we know, one of the agents playing a role in cancer development is genetics. poland is a country with relatively low mobility of its residents, especially its older generations and those in its pre-1939 areas. people reproduce and die not far from the place where they were born. this may explain the endemicity of lchad, a rare genetic disease that occurs in the world at 1:153,000 people, and which is 10 times more frequent in kashubia. the carriers of the [n] = anticipated numbers of new cases in the period 2006-2013 which would occur if the population in a given poviat had the same age structure as the population accepted as standard. fig. 4. the mean year standardized incidence of breast cancer (c50) in women (per 100,000 women) in the pomorskie voivodeship poviats in the period of 2006–2013 source: own study based on the pomerania cancer register (nowaczyk et al. (ed.), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). tab. 1. results of comparisons important for the thesis tested in this study cancer tested populations significance level lung cancer in women standardized incidence in p. nowy dwór gdański vs city of słupsk p>0.05, the difference not significant lung cancer in men standardized incidence in p. słupsk vs p. lębork p<0.029, the difference is significant (adjacent poviats) standardized incidence in p. słupsk vs p. tczew p<0.04, the difference is significant standardized incidence in p. kartuzy vs. p. tczew p<0.026, the difference is significant breast cancer standardized incidence in p. słupsk vs city of gdańsk p< 0.000004, the difference highly significant standardized incidence in city of sopot vs p. słupsk p<0.006, the difference highly significant standardized incidence in p. słupsk vs city of gdynia p<0.00038, the difference highly significant standardized incidence in p. słupsk vs p. wejherowo p<0.023, the difference is significant source: own study. 54 maciej krzanowski mutated gene c.1528.g>c, which is responsible for lchad, were found in 22 of 862 samples examined in the kartuzy poviat, while in its neighbouring poviats wejherowo and kościerzyna the number was significantly lower (1/154 and 6/1030) (piekutowska-abramczuk et al., 2010). one may presume that similar differences in appearance of some genetic arrangements resulting in promoting or defending against malignancy may occur. another sign of the low mobility of poles is extremely frequent occurrence of certain surnames in certain areas and their absence in other part of the country. the portal “mapa nazwisk. podział nazwisk w polsce. moi krewni.pl” (the map of surnames/the distribution of surnames in poland/my relatives), which was created on the basis of k. rymut’s dictionary (rymut, 2003) of surnames used in poland at the beginning of the 21st century), informs us, for example, that at the time when the portal was being created, there were 601 persons with the surname ceynowa in poland, and 421 of them lived in the poviat of puck (70%), while and in the next as to the frequency city of gdańsk and poviat of wejherowo only 6-7%. contrariwise, the surname stenka appears 1,778 times in poland, 29.6% of them in poviat wejherowo and less than 2% in the puck poviat5. the dna testing of people who have the same surnames in england conducted by king and jobling (2009) from leicester university shows that about 25% of them had common ancestors. this grew to more than one third in people whose names were extremely rare. obviously, common ancestors mean, to some extent, common genes. king and jobling (2009) consider surnames as markers of kindred. people in england have had surnames for about 700 years; today the surname brown is more or less the 25th generation of the founder of the name. both in england and poland the surname is inherited from the father, and chromosome y is scanty with genes unrelated to sex. still, the phenomenon of high frequency of the same surnames in certain areas allows us to assume that there are numerous blood relationships among the population that lives 5 the problem does not concern only pomerania. in 2000, 1,748 persons with the surname legierski lived in poland, and one third of them in the cieszyn poviat, while in koniakow, one of the poviat’s villages 13.15% of the inhabitants carried the surname legierski, whereas in the adjacent village (jaworzynka) only 2.6%. one may meet legierskis in other 60 polish poviats and in the remaining 220 there are none at all (rymut, 2003). interest in the problem of a connection between a surname and over-normal frequency of some genes among theirs carriers is growing and finds some practical application in forensic medicine. it is hard to say whether it could bring any benefits in screening in oncology. there and that it is true irrespective of the sex. this allows us to assume that the so-called inbreeding (the term used in zootechnics) concerns to some extent polish populations. references abdi h., 2007, bonferroni and sidak corrections for multiple comparisons [in:] n.j. salkind (ed.), encyclopedia of measurement and statistics, sage, thousand oaks. bdl gus – bank danych lokalnych gus, https://bdl.stat.gov. pl/bdl/start [20.06.2016] czapliński p., szymańska w., 2013, the features of economic behavior of the urban population in the ethnic the region of kashubia (kashuby/cassubia), miscellanea geographica – regional studies on development, 17(2), 30–37. didkowska j, wojciechowska u., 2015, nowotwory złośliwe w polsce w 2013 roku, centrum onkologii, instytut im. m. skłodowskiej-curie, warszawa. góźdź s., macek p. 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rozwoju regionalnego, słupsk-warszawa, 115–127. tarkowski m., 2014, jakość życia w centrach i na peryferiach regionu – przykład województwa pomorskiego, [in:] w.  szymańska (ed.), elementy rozwoju społecznego regionów nadmorskich, wydawnictwo „bernardinum”, gdańsk-pelplin, 60-72. tarkowski m., nowicki m., hildebrandt a., susmarski p., woźniak w., 2014a, atlas jakości życia w województwie pomorskim. iii edycja, instytut badań nad gospodarką rynkową, gdańsk. tarkowski m., nowicki m., hildebrandt a., susmarski p., woźniak w., 2014b, atlas jakości życia w województwie pomorskim. iv edycja, instytut badań nad gospodarką rynkową, gdańsk. zaborski l., zagożdżon l., 2002, umieralność na nowotwory złośliwe w województwie pomorskim, [in.] t. michalski (ed.), zróżnicowanie przestrzenne sytuacji zdrowotnej, systemu bezpieczeństwa i usług medycznych w województwie pomorskim, wydawnictwo ejb, gdynia, 31–37. zagożdżon p., zaborski l., 2002, zróżnicowanie terytorialne chorób układu krążenia w województwie pomorskim, [in.] t. michalski (ed.), zróżnicowanie przestrzenne sytuacji zdrowotnej, systemu bezpieczeństwa i usług medycznych w województwie pomorskim, wydawnictwo ejb, gdynia, 24–30. 1. introduction the cognitive aim of the work is to present the relationship between satisfaction associated with visiting a tourist destination and the intention to recommend this destination to friends and family. the study can also be applied to the identification of the factors determining satisfaction with a tourist trip and its role in facilitating the tourism policy. the analysis clearly suggests that introduction of hospitality management and understanding of visitors’ preferences becomes necessary in order to increase the level of satisfaction and to build a brand. the analysis was based on information from the 2017 annual report on tourism in gdańsk. that year was chosen due to the availability of the report as a publicly available document presenting the latest results of the conducted survey. at the same time, the choice of gdańsk as the analyzed space was dictated by its role as a tourist destination in pomerania. apart from the values of recreational tourism typical of the polish coast, there are numerous examples of cultural tourism values in gdańsk, whose perception journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(1), 37–43 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.1.05 the impact of the number of visits and the level of satisfaction on the intention to recommend a tourist destination. the example of gdańsk tomasz wiskulski faculty of physical culture, gdansk university of physical education and sport, górskiego 1, 80–336 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-7802-721x e-mail: tomasz.wiskulski@awf.gda.pl citation wiskulski t., 2021, the impact of the number of visits and the level of satisfaction on the intention to recommend a tourist destination. the example of gdańsk, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(1), 37–43. abstract the article focuses on examining the intention to recommend gdańsk as a tourist destination to family and friends. the study was based on the results of a survey (bęben et al., 2018) conducted among 2,508 respondents visiting gdańsk in 2017. the method of cluster analysis was applied, thanks to which it was possible to divide the respondents into three clusters. then, logistic regression was used to analyze the variables influencing the intention to recommend a destination. the study shows that for the entire sample the level of satisfaction from a visit to gdańsk remains the factor supporting the decision to recommend a destination. importantly, the total number of visits to gdańsk is negatively correlated with the intention to recommend the destination, which proves only partial loyalty. key words gdańsk, satisfaction, tourism, cluster analysis, logistic regression. received: 24 november 2020 accepted: 19 january 2021 published: 31 march 2021 38 tomasz wiskulski does not depend on the tourist season. on the one hand, this results in an obvious dispersion of the volume of tourist traffic throughout the year; on the other hand, the diversity of values contributes to an increase in the volume of tourist traffic on an annual basis. the socio-demographic nature of the surveyed respondents is not without significance for the segmentation of tourist values. on the basis of such elements as, for example, gender or education, differences in the perception of the tourism space become discernible. this knowledge allows adopting certain criteria in the management of space for tourism purposes. 2. literature review in many countries, tourism is considered to be a tool in attracting investments and raising the standard of living of the inhabitants. these benefits are largely noticeable in areas with large tourist centers (mckercher et al., 2015). the main goal of the tourism industry is to profit from the services offered to tourists. these include, among others, services related to transport to a tourist destination (khadaroo, seetanah, 2008) and in the destination (albalate, bel, 2010), accommodation and information (chen, soo, 2007), catering (galvez et al., 2017), culture and entertainment (de lucia et al., 2019) and commerce (janke, taraszkiewicz, 2018). also in the case of large cities, where the tourism function does not play a leading role and is only complementary to administrative, cultural, scientific and economic functions, it has a significant impact on shaping the management policy of recreational space (matoga, pawłowska, 2018). different opportunities for the implementation of the tourist function are available in the areas located in the coastal zone (andriotis, 2006). taking into account the geographical conditions of the polish coast, in particular the climatic conditions, it should be stated that tourism in the coastal area is of a seasonal character (radlińska, 2017). due to its functions as a cultural, scientific and economic center as well as a transport hub, being an important center of maritime economy and fulfilling an administrative function, gdańsk is less susceptible to the seasonality of the tourist traffic. it is difficult to distinguish in the statistics typical tourist arrivals, related to leisure tourism, from arrivals of a learning, exploratory character which depend to a large extent on cyclical mass events (e.g. st. dominik’s fair) or incidental ones (e.g. sports competitions and music concerts) or non-tourist arrivals (michalski, 2020). another problem is the distinction between typical tourist arrivals, for which the place of the survey is the ultimate tourist destination, and those for whom it is only a certain stage in greater tourism activity (wendt, wiskulski, 2018). the lack of seasonality characteristic of typical tourist destinations only slightly eliminates the negative effects of tourism on the supply side, and in some cases causes their intensification. higher costs of running a business which are caused by a need to maintain a certain level of reserves (baumann et al., 2017; guidetti et al., 2020), a number of employee (wei et al., 2013) and the inability to fully use tourist attractions off the main season (figini, vici, 2012) are offset only to a small extent by mass events occurring out of season. the historical character of the city and the elements of development that attract tourists outside the main tourist season also have an influence (figini, vici, 2012). by contrast, the negative effects of seasonality intensify in the case of too many tourists during periods of increased traffic, which may lead to overloading the area many times a year and creating cyclical threats to the local ecosystem (bazzanella et al., 2019). in order to optimize the level of satisfaction with the provided services, sh.-h. tsaur and ch.-ch.  huang’s study (2018) suggested that hospitality management and the creation of marketing strategies for businesses and local authorities should become necessary. it is essential to find out tourists’ preferences, with particular emphasis on the assessment of the possibility of traveling around the city by car (van exel, rietveld, 2009) and public transport (le-klahn et al., 2015), the level of safety (bianchi, 2016), the general atmosphere of the city (isa et al., 2020), friendliness of the inhabitants (moal-ulvoas, 2017), the cultural offer (de frantz, 2018), the entertainment offer (petrick et al., 2001), the sports and leisure offer (ratkowski, ratkowska, 2018), cleanliness of the city (baloglu, mccleary, 1999), accommodation facilities (an et al., 2019), catering facilities (adam et al., 2015), shops and shopping malls (janke, taraszkiewicz, 2018), signage in the city (vareiro et al., 2019) and guide services (mak et al., 2011). learning about the assessment of individual elements will enable the construction of a model aimed at determining the level of satisfaction and correlating it with the intention to recommend a tourist destination (chen, chen, 2010; patrick, backman, 2002). features describing a destination create a certain image of the place. these include beliefs, ideas and impressions of getting to know your destination. on the other hand, the degree of complexity of the described place depends on the elements that make the impact of the number of visits and the level of satisfaction… 39 up the tourist product and its elements (carvalho et al., 2015). after taking into account the literature on the subject, the following hypotheses were adopted for testing: • h1: tourists with different socio-demographic profiles perceive the attributes of a place differently; • h2: satisfaction with the visit has a positive influence on the number of returns to the destination. 3. study methods the research method used in the article was based on the analysis of a survey conducted by a team of the pomeranian scientific institute (bęben et al., 2018). the survey involved 2,508 respondents who visited gdańsk in 2017. in order to examine the probability of recommending a tourist destination to family and friends, the respondents’ contentment with the elements shaping the level of satisfaction with the destination and the total number of visits to gdańsk were taken into account. in order to analyze the data, the spss ver. 26 statistical software was used. the following methodology was applied in the study: 1. a non-hierarchical cluster analysis with the use of with the k-means clustering algorithm based on euclidean distance (cf. chandan, vinzamuri, 2014) was run for 14 items measuring the attributes of gdańsk. 2. the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics were compared with the groups obtained in the cluster analysis from the first step. 3. a logistic regression analysis was applied (cf. hosmer et al., 2013) in order to analyze the variables influencing the intention to recommend gdańsk to family and friends. 4. results and discussion 4.1. tourists’ socio-demographic profile the main characteristics of the respondents’ sociodemographic profile are as follows. the majority of the respondents were male (51.36%). the main group of respondents were people aged 25–34 (28.55%). 33.41% of the respondents had secondary education, and 46.21% higher education. the least numerous group were people with lower secondary education or less (4.51%). in terms of occupation, the most numerous group were persons in employment (68.14%), while the least numerous group were unemployed persons (0.4%). in terms of the financial situation, the greatest number of people declared that they were doing rather well (54.59%). in turn, only 0.2% of respondents believed that they were doing very badly. 4.2. cluster differences it is known that the level of satisfaction with a destination is influenced by the respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics. bearing in mind the above, the method of cluster analysis was applied. in order to minimize the variability of the feature within individual clusters and to maximize the inter-cluster variability, a non-hierarchical approach to grouping was used (k-means). this approach was applied with the assumption of three numbers of clusters (n = 3, 4, 5). the obtained results were compared with one another, and a solution based on the three clusters was selected for further analysis. it was a consequence of the biggest differences between the clusters. the comparison of intra-group variability was based on the average distance of each respondent from the cluster center of gravity (table 1). the data showed that clusters 1 and 2 have the highest level of discrepancy, and clusters 1 and 3 show the greatest similarity. tab. 1. intragroup variability cluster 1 2 3 1 3.235 1.677 2 3.235 1.965 3 1.677 1.965 source: own calculations based on: bęben et al., 2018. the analysis between individual clusters was conducted on the basis of the average result for 14 items measuring the tourist attributes of gdańsk (table 2). the obtained results indicate that the share of all the included components was statistically significant for the definition of clusters (p  value <  0.01). the elements that differentiated the clusters to the greatest extent were: “shopping malls and shops” and “signage in the city”. on the other hand, such elements as “safety”, “cultural offer” and “entertainment offer” had the least influence on variability. the estimated clusters can be characterized as follows: cluster 1 – in this group, the lowest rated elements include “driving a car around the city” (3.89) and “cleanliness of the city” (3.94). the “general atmosphere of the city” (4.39), “friendliness of the inhabitants” (4.31) and “cultural offer” (4.31) were rated the highest. in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, it has the highest percentage of men. in this 40 tomasz wiskulski group, the highest share of people with secondary education was also recorded. cluster 2 – in this group, the lowest rated elements include “driving a car around the city” (3.41) and “cleanliness of the city” (4.01). the highest rated elements include the “general atmosphere of the city” (4.79) and “cultural offer” (4.54). the demographic profile of the respondents is characterized by the highest percentage of people with higher education and a breakdown by gender similar to the entire sample population. cluster 3 – in this group the lowest scores were given for “driving a car around the city” (3.32), “public transport” (3.76) and “shops and shopping malls” (3.76). on the other hand, the “general atmosphere of the city” (4.48) and “friendliness of the inhabitants” (4.18) were among the highest rated. this group is characterized by the highest percentage of women and the lowest percentage of people with lower secondary education or less. taking into account the adopted h1, which refers to the different perception of the attributes of a place depending on the socio-demographic profile, it should be stated that h1 has been positively verified. 4.3. intention to recommend logistic regression analysis was used in the analysis of variables affecting the intention to recommend a visit to gdańsk to family and friends. following the literature review (antón et al., 2014; chen, chen, 2010), the following variables were selected: the level of satisfaction and the total number of visits to gdańsk. the average level of satisfaction with the fourteen attributes of a place was taken as the level of satisfaction. in order to determine the intention to recommend gdańsk to family and friends, a 10-point scale was used (table 3.). tab. 3. satisfaction, the number of visits to gdańsk and the intention to recommend visits to gdańsk to family and friends total sample average scores satisfaction 4.09 number of visits to gdańsk 3.30 intention to recommend to family and friends 9.13 source: own calculations based on: bęben et al., 2018. in the logistic regression model, the model parameters were estimated using the maximum tab. 2. perceived attributes of gdańsk cluster 1, n=1166 cluster 2, n=494 cluster 3, n=848 average scores driving a car around the city 3.89 3.41 3.32 public transport 3.95 4.13 3.76 safety 4.05 4.11 4.05 general atmosphere of the city 4.39 4.79 4.48 friendliness of inhabitants 4.31 4.39 4.18 cultural offer 4.31 4.54 4.27 entertainment offer 4.03 4.22 3.98 sports and leisure offer 4.17 4.19 4.02 cleanliness of the city 3.94 4.01 3.81 accommodation facilities 4.11 4.27 3.93 catering facilities 4.27 4.45 4.17 shopping malls and shops 4.04 4.33 3.76 signage in the city 4.26 4.43 4.04 guide services 3.99 4.04 3.85 * p < 0.01. source: own calculations based on bęben et al., 2018. the impact of the number of visits and the level of satisfaction… 41 likelihood method. cox and snell and nagelkerke’s pseudo r2 statistics and the -2  log likelihood were applied to measure the model fit. the results for the entire research sample are presented in table 4. tab. 4. correctness of the model fit to the data of the entire sample total sample cox and snell r2 0.255 nagelkerke r2 0.380 -2 times log likehood 763.566 source: own calculations based on: bęben et al., 2018. cox and snell and nagelkerke’s pseudo r2 statistics are reasonable values amounting to 0.255 and 0.380. however, one must remember to interpret them with caution, as none of the statistics explains the variance in the same way as the r2 coefficient in a linear regression model does. the results of the analysis for the entire population of respondents are presented in table 5. the parameter values indicate that satisfaction is an important element in motivating visitors to recommend gdańsk to their family and friends. this variable has a significant impact on the intention to recommend at the confidence level of 95%. tab. 5. the relationship between the explanatory variables and the intention to recommend gdańsk to family and friends estimated parameters constant -10.33* satisfaction 2.603* number of visits to gdańsk -0.15 * p <0.05. source: own calculations based on bęben et al., 2018. based on the conducted study, h2 can be accepted. this means that the intention to recommend gdańsk to friends and family is positively correlated with the tourists’ satisfaction. 5. conclusions the main purpose of the article was to analyze the elements influencing the intention to recommend gdańsk as a tourist destination to family and friends. elements such as satisfaction with the visit and the total number of visits to gdańsk were taken into account. differences between socio-demographic groups in perceiving the elements shaping the level of satisfaction with the visit were also examined. the method of cluster analysis was used in the study. on its basis, three clusters were estimated. in the first one, 1,166 respondents were classified. these were people who assessed the level of satisfaction with the visit to gdańsk as average. in the second cluster there were people (494 respondents) who rated the attributes of gdańsk the highest. on the other hand, in the third cluster (848 respondents), gdańsk’s attributes were assessed the lowest. despite the lack of homogeneity of ratings between individual clusters, it should be concluded that the level of satisfaction with the visit to gdańsk was assessed as high (4.09). in order to capture the variables that affect the probability of recommending gdańsk to family and friends, a logistic regression analysis was carried out. the conducted analysis allows concluding that not all of the elements included in the study play a decisive role in the intention to recommend gdańsk. it turned out that the level of satisfaction with the visit is the factor that determines selecting the destination again, but the total number of visits to gdańsk is not. references adam i., adongo ch.a., dayour f., 2015, international tourists’ satisfaction with ghanaian upscale restaurant services and revisit intentions, journal of quality assurance in hospitality & tourism, 16(2), 181–201. doi: 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studies of the industrial geography commission of the polish geographical society, 32(1), 7684. doi: 10.24917/20801653.321.6 1. introduction security is one of the basic needs of man and society. it is assumed that its implementation depends on three factors: the state as the creator of social security, the community shaping social capital and the individual taking care of the development of human capital. it is difficult to define clearly which of them is the most important, because the success of social security depends on each of them. these elements also determine the quality of micro-enterprises and, at the same time, success in shaping social security. the aim of the article is to analyse the theoretical relationship between the development of micro-enterprises in the state and stabilization of social security. in order to understand the concept of security, we must consider its two basic assumptions: survival and development. the first of them clearly refers to the ability to survive physically. this relates not only to the state’s military potential, but also, more importantly, to its capabilities in the field of welfare activity (e.g. the quality of and access to healthcare, “contribution” to the demographic development of the society, ageing processes or migrations). thus, looking from this perspective, security is defined as the product of certain values and goals which determine it, such as: the security of existence, satisfying journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(4), 17–22 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.03 the role of micro-enterprises in shaping the social security of the state. a theoretical analysis danuta plecka (1), agnieszka wlazły (2) (1) department of administration, higher school of management personnel, zagórowska 3a, 62–500 konin, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-8504-279x e-mail: danakar1@wp.pl (corresponding author) (2) department of economic and technical sciences, state higher vocational school in konin, przyjaźni 1, 62–500 konin, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-7370-3554 e-mail: kancelaria@abakusplus.com.pl citation plecka d., wlazły a., 2020, the role of micro-enterprises in shaping the social security of the state. a theoretical analysis, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(4), 17–22. abstract the article presents considerations regarding the functioning of micro enterprises on the market and their impact on the social security of the state. the concept of micro enterprise and social security has been explained in detail. social security threats and the role of micro sector companies in shaping this area of state security were also discussed. the considerations highlighted the importance of small business in creating conditions for economic stability and development guarantees for local communities. key words micro enterprises, social security, social threats, local community. received: 13 october 2020 accepted: 17 november 2020 published: 31 december 2020 18 danuta plecka, agnieszka wlazły basic needs, protection against the loss of livelihood, balance, and a sense of well-being and satisfaction. as may be noted, the presence and tasks of the state in this respect are essential, because, in today’s world, they guarantee that the other assumption of security, i.e. development, will be met. it may obviously be interpreted from the angle of individual development, but it would be quite limited then. there is a type of feedback here: if an individual does not develop, the society does not develop either; if the society does not develop, its members are not likely to develop either. therefore, when talking about security, it should be pointed out that it provides an objective guarantee of inviolable survival and development (ferguson, 2018). security defined in this way does not exist in vacuum – it must relate to the concepts of different social sciences and humanities. without drawing on the past experience, one cannot shape its relations with neighbours, i.e. security in the international context. without knowing social behaviours and political mechanisms, it is difficult to shape the feeling of safety and form the best possible political system, i.e. the one that will ensure survival and the highest degree of development for both individuals and communities. naturally, development is related to economy. finally, military potential is inseparably linked with the knowledge of the rules of physics and chemistry (dean, 2019). these few examples are sufficient to show how high potential of interdisciplinarity security has as a scientific field. social security is one of its platforms and has become a significant part of the discourse on the quality of life of individuals and social groups. it encompasses all legal and organisational efforts undertaken by the authorities both in the national and international dimension which “are aimed at ensuring a proper living standard for people, families and social groups and preventing them from being marginalised and socially excluded” (leszczyński, 2011, p. 22). it would be oversimplification though if we considered governments to be the only bodies responsible for action in this respect. also citizens play a very important role in shaping social security. therefore, if the established social goals are to be achieved, responsibility must be shared between the authorities and the society. otherwise, people acquire a sense of helplessness and fall into the habit of expecting others to solve their problems; thus, they gradually lose the ability to cope with hardships, such as the loss of job, natural disasters, etc. at the same time, “learned helplessness” may lead to abusing the state’s help and, consequently, to its withdrawal from the sphere of pro-social activities (marszałek-kawa et al., 2018). in the literature on internal and national security (leszczyński, 2011; plecka, rutkowska, 2016), the social dimension of security is often narrowed down to welfare issues and the state’s tasks related to them. thus, a number of important aspects of social security are ignored. among them, one of the most vital areas is the problem of development, i.e. human capital, which involves people’s qualifications, knowledge, skills, etc. another important aspect refers to the dimension of societal security, seen mostly in the context of social capital and the related culture of social trust, citizens’ participation and other elements, such as the ability to cooperate in crisis situations or the development of civil society. this does not mean that problems located in the traditional sphere of welfare security do not concern its social dimension. however, it must be emphasised that they are only one of the components of social security and, as important as they are, they are only a supplement to its developmental and community dimensions (leszczyński, 2011). it seems justified to say that it is not possible to effectively introduce welfare security without developmental elements, such as human capital. this capital has low shaping potential if the society is devoid of the dimension of societal security whose the integral component is social capital. such a phenomenon is relatively new in the debate on citizens’ security in the political system. it is connected with various aspects, the most important of which seems to be the increasing number of social threats that negatively affect both the consolidation of democracy and citizens’ development prospects. at the same time, it may be noted that the category of social security has supplanted the term social policy in the awareness of both politicians and individual (stiglitz, 2015; piketty, 2015). moreover, both concepts are often seen as synonyms in public space. the categories of social security and welfare security are perceived as equivalent concepts even more frequently. it is obviously inconsistent with the characteristics and definitions of the phenomena, and they should not be considered to be synonyms, but as separate concepts. social security involves a wide array of activities performed by different entities, while welfare security refers to the state’s activity in the sphere of welfare policy only. while m. leszczyński’s definition (leszczyński, 2011) of the category of social security that we adopted in this paper comprehensively focuses on the issue of the diagnosis of threats and possible solutions to problems – through the state’s intervention and social or developmental capital, the concept of welfare security or welfare policy refers only to the state’s role in ensuring social security. thus, the role of micro-enterprises in shaping the social security of the state. a theoretical analysis 19 these phenomena address the problem in a small segment of activities which are necessary for a citizen to function properly in the society. therefore, it may even be stated that it is one of the pillars of social security, which is obviously essential, but not the only one. it has formal instruments and is managed by state institutions. however, without the participation of the community and individuals, in the long-term, they may become inefficient when it comes to efforts undertaken for the sake of social security. not only do the consequences affect the state budget, but they also (or perhaps first of all) influence individuals, who become clients rather than citizens: people dependent on aid institutions instead of being the creators of their own life. this is why it is so important to implement and use the pillars of social security in the welfare, community and developmental dimension. otherwise, social security will be narrowed down to the issue of social engineering, which focuses on the technical solution to a specific social problem instead of shaping the feeling of safety in the community. thus, it may largely contribute to the reinforcement of the habit of expecting others to solve their problems and the attitude of “learned helplessness”. this leads to the increased activity of the state as the only participant of social security. thus, it may significantly contribute to the strengthening of a demanding attitude or “learned helplessness”. it leads to the intensification of the state’s efforts as the only participant of social security. the state’s activity aimed at stimulating the development of micro-enterprises is one of the forms of preventing or combating demanding attitudes among citizens. 2. the essence of micro-enterprises enterprises, just like households, constitute the main entities of the state’s economic sphere. an economist, a. krajewska (2018), defines an enterprise as a set of people and material and cash resources, established with an aim of running a specific business activity and distinguished from the technical-service, legal, technical-production, economic, spatial and organizational perspectives. the essence of the existence of enterprises lies in business activity, based on the principles of economy, i.e., seeking the return on investment and profit. from the point of view of economic sciences, running one’s own business concerns any human activity, undertaken with an intention to adapt one’s resources, means and surrounding, to produce new goods or transform the products already made, separate and consume them (stachowiak, 1998). in economic terms, an enterprise thus focuses on manufacturing processes and the division of goods. when analysing the issue of an enterprise from the economic perspective, many different types of business entities are distinguished. they are organised in different ways, but the economic orientation of their activity is the same (vetrivel, 2017). taking the above into consideration, an enterprise has the following characteristics (nasiłowski, 2016): unchangeable, clear roles arising from the analysis of the environment and the company’s strengths and weaknesses, and from its position in the market surrounding; its activity is targeted at fulfilling consumers’ needs in return for money and obtaining economic surplus; it has financial resources; it makes independent decisions under the legal and economic conditions of a given country; it operates in the market at its own risk, often within the scope of csr (corporate social responsibility); its actions should be marked with continuity and invariability. what distinguishes enterprises from other entities functioning in the market surrounding is seeking a profit as the main priority, maintaining a top market position, and the pursuit of constant development. a business entity which hinders its own development in a dynamic ever-changing environment will definitely collapse (białoń, 2019). micro-enterprises have a significant influence on the condition of national economies today. they also contribute to the acceleration of the pace of economic growth of a given region. they positively affect the mobilisation of human resources by encouraging people to seek employment in a local labour market as a result of which the unemployment rate decreases. what is more, they offer professional services targeted at the inhabitants of a specific area and introduce goods and services into the local market (czajkowska, 2013). micro-enterprises are usually considered on an equal footing with an enterprise as they may also be connected with the factories that are its components. due to their strong link with and influence on the local environment, enterprises are considered as the stimulators of regional growth. therefore, the establishment and growth of modern and competitive companies and the promotion of entrepreneurial culture is one of the most important spheres of the state’s “interference” with the local policy of economic development. the state authorities and self-government units often participate in the development of the micro-enterprise sector. micro-companies are inclined to run business operations within the territory of the region, but they are also able to cooperate with local self-government and other entities in the region. through the spatial decentralization 20 danuta plecka, agnieszka wlazły of micro-enterprises, this branch of economy also strongly contributes to the improvement in ecological conditions (strużycki, 2004). micro-enterprises are usually founded in the place of residence of their owners, who fulfil their tax obligations there, take advantage of local resources, and create favourable conditions to investment. micro-companies adapt to market demands in the quickest possible time and without any major difficulties. they increase the competitiveness of the economic sphere and stimulate economic development (czajkowska, 2013). the existing body of literature in the fields of law, economy and management provides a number of different measures to classify business entities according to their size. n. daszkiewicz and k. wach (2013) indicate that the concepts of micro-, small or medium enterprises are differently defined across countries, mainly because of differences in the pace of economic growth. experts emphasise that the division of companies into micro-, small, medium and big enterprises is determined by the economic development strategy of a given country. in order to classify business entities, both quantitative and qualitative indicators can be used. qualitative variables present the condition or position of a firm in a specific industry. t. łuczka (2001) introduced the following division of qualitative criteria: the owner-entrepreneur’s legal autonomy; the owner’s relevant function, according to the principle of personal management; the traditional organizational structure of a company; separate financial management and sources of financing. other qualitative indicators used for describing the sector of micro-, small and medium enterprises are, among others: effectiveness, productivity, innovativeness, creativity, combination, predictive ability and the strength of influence upon the environment. these criteria are based on the level of knowledge of the market, the owners’ network of contacts and influences, and their ability to adapt and establish close, long-term relations with customers (czajkowska, 2013). in general, a few, easily measurable qualitative indicators, based on widely available statistical data, are applied. they include (łuczka, 2001): the number of employees, the amount of sales (annual turnover), the value of assets (assets versus liabilities, i.e., the balance-sheet total), the level of annual income (minus tax and insurance), the average bank account balance, and the length of time on the market. in january 2005, under the new law regulations arising from poland’s accession to the european union, a new type of business entities – micro-enterprises, employing no more than 10 people – was introduced. companies belonging to this category have the following characteristics: they have a uniform business profile, they operate in one sphere of business activity, usually focusing on commerce, services, building, transportation or real estate market (czajkowska, 2013). under the act – entrepreneur law (journal of laws of 2018, item 646 as amended, art. 7, par. 1, p. 1) (ustawa..., 20218), a micro-entrepreneur is a trader who in one of the last two fiscal years has employed no more than 10 employees and his net turnover from sale of goods, services or financial operations does not exceed the pln equivalent of €2,000,000 or if assets at the end of either fiscal year do not exceed the above amount. the fact whether a given entity is classified as a micro-, small or medium company is not determined by its legal form – no matter whether it is a natural person, a legal entity or an entity with no legal personality, but holding full legal capacity. however, natural persons conducting business activity prevail among micro-enterprises (horosz, antoniuk, 2009). table 1 presents a new typology of business entities divided into micro-, small and medium enterprises, as established by the european commission. bearing in mind the european union’s demand for statistical data, in the annual reports prepared by eu member states, various types of studies take into account only the quantitative criterion – the size of employment on the basis of which the following tab. 1. the division of business entities in the european union into micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises type of enterprise employment size 1996–2004 2005–to present maximum amount (in million euro) balance revenue balance revenue micromax 9 lack of adopted definition 2 2 small 10–49 5 7 10 10 medium-sized 50–249 27 40 43 50 source: commission recommendation of 6 may 2003 concerning the definition of micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, recommendation 03/361/ec. official journal l124 of 20 may 2003; act of 6 march 2018 – entrepreneur law (entrepreneur law (journal of laws of 2018, item 646 as amended, art. 7, par. 1, p. 1–3) (ustawa..., 2018). the role of micro-enterprises in shaping the social security of the state. a theoretical analysis 21 entities can be distinguished (daszkiewicz, wach, 2013): self-employed people (no employed workers irrespective of the type of contract); micro-enterprises (no more than nine employees); small enterprises (from 10 to 49 employees); medium-sized enterprises (from 50 to 249 employees); big enterprises (from 250 employees). 3. the role of micro-enterprises in counteracting threats to social security the visible role of micro-enterprises mainly stems from the fact that they constitute the dominant group among all economic entities and that they have a substantial share in the creation of new, different – in terms of education and abilities – workplaces (especially for the community of a given region). a favourable situation in the sphere of micro-, small and medium-sized companied affects both the local-regional development and the cohesiveness of the society (szramowski, 2018). the strength of the sector of micro-enterprises is the fact that it creates the biggest number of jobs, more than big corporations. micro-companies dominate when it comes to the use of local material resources, raw materials and staff, which makes them an effective tool for fighting unemployment in small cities and towns. the lack of industrial production in such areas contributes to an increase in the unemployment rate; therefore, micro-enterprises also play a key role in combating unemployment in the local community. for many jobless people, such companies are an ideal solution because of their dynamic operations in the market and flexibility in adapting to the constantly changing environment (nowak, szałański, 2013). entrepreneurial activities in the sphere of enterprises are created by an individual and his or her relations with other people, and with the environment. although entrepreneurship has a social and economic aspect, it is mainly reflected in the context of a given business entity and in the actions of people working there. the success of individuals translates into the success of the whole community (koźmiński, 2005). in the economic and social surrounding, microenterprises also play an essential role at the regional level from the perspective of: technological progress, the creation of new workplaces, the minimization of harmful influence on the natural environment, the intensification of the manufacturing process on a local scale, effective crisis management in times of an economic slump, recession or crunch, no special requirements concerning the location, the effect of the mobilisation of financial resources, and the transformation effect (dominiak, 2005). to conclude, the role of micro-enterprises in shaping social security consists in: creating additional, mainly specialised, modern workplaces by way of setting up one’s own business or recruiting employees; participating in the generation of gross domestic product and regional income by contributing to the creation of favourable events or increasing the efficiency of the existing business spheres (the socalled multiplier effect); an effective use of regional resources, e.g. raw materials, human resources, infrastructural background, landscape or culture. what is important for the shaping and improving social attitudes, micro-companies show a high degree of independence in coping with problems arising and satisfy their needs by acting rather than waiting for institutional aid. as regards the social pillar of security, micro-enterprises initiate and implement investment projects to serve the inhabitants of a given region and they can quickly adapt to the changing market circumstances. from the local perspective, they often become instruments for initiating changes in the sphere of innovation, mainly owing to the accumulation and use of the available intellectual, economic, material, financial and social resources of regional economy. they also participate in dedicated programmes, use grants and subsidies promoting the development of human resources, financed both form public and private sources, and minimise the effects of disturbances in economic stability. all these factors make micro-enterprises become a component of two pillars of social security: developmental and community security. thus, they unburden the state when it comes to social security. owing to this, with properly conducted welfare policy, the state can be more effective in the social sphere, and the aid goes directly to those in who need it the most. 4. conclusions there is a feedback loop between all three elements of social security: social, community and development security and the success of micro-enterprises in the country: on the one hand, micro-enterprises largely contribute to the development of social security; on the other hand, the development of individual economic competences, the culture of social trust, which are necessary to talk about community and social capital. finally, the legal and fiscal stimulation of the state allows for 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policy), wydawnictwo uniwersytetu łódzkiego, łódź. daszkiewicz n., wach k., 2013, małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa na rynkach międzynarodowych, (eng. small and medium-sized enterprises in international markets), wydawnictwo uniwersytetu ekonomicznego w krakowie, kraków. dean h., 2019, social policy, policy press, bristol. dominiak p., 2005, sektor msp we współczesnej gospo darce (eng. the msp sector in the modern economy), wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, warszawa. ferguson i., 2018, global social work and political context, policy press, bristol. horosz p., antoniuk j.r., 2009, prawne podstawy przedsiębiorczości (eng. legal basis of entrepreneurship), wydawnictwo wolters kluwer, warszawa. koźmiński a., 2005, zarządzanie w warunkach niepewności (eng. management under uncertainty), wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, warszawa. krajewska a., 2018, produkcja i koszty w przedsiębiorstwie (eng. production and costs in the enterprise), [in:] r.  milewski, e. kwiatkowski (eds.), podstawy ekonomii (eng. basics of 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(eng. social security of poles in the face of the challenges of the 21st century) , wydawnictwo difin, warszawa. łuczka t., 2001, kapitał obcy w małym i średnim przedsiębiorstwie (eng. foreign capital in small and medium-sized enterprises), wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, warszawa-poznań. marszałek-kawa j., plecka d., hołub a., 2018, social security. selected aspect, wydawnictwo adam marszałek, toruń. nasiłowski m., 2016, system rynkowy. podstawy mikroi makroekonomii (eng. basics of microand macroeconomics), wydawnictwo keytext, warszawa. nowak a.z., szałański m., 2013, mikrofirmy siłą napędową gospodarki mazowsza (eng. micro-enterprises as a driving force of mazovia’s economy), wydawnictwo naukowe wydziału zarządzania uw, warszawa. piketty t., 2015, ekonomia nierówności (eng. the economics of inequalities), wydawnictwo krytyki politycznej, warszawa. plecka d., rutkowska p., 2016, societal security as an instrument for creating populist attitudes, political preferences, 13, 45–61. doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.4284650 stachowiak z., 1998, ekonomia. zarys podstawowych problemów (eng. outline of the basic problems), wydawnictwo wyższej szkoły informatyki stosowanej i zarządzania, warszawa. stiglitz j.e., 2015, cena nierówności. w jaki sposób dzisiejsze podziały społeczne zagrażają naszej przyszłości (eng. the price of inequality. how today’s social divisions threaten our future),wydawnictwo krytyki politycznej, warszawa. strużycki m., 2004, małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa w gospodarce regionu (eng. small and medium-sized enterprises in the economy of the region), polskie wydawnictwo ekonomiczne, warszawa. szramowski d., 2018, kapitał ludzki w mikro i małych przedsiębiorstwach (eng. human capital in micro and small enterprises), wydawnictwo cedewu, warszawa. ustawa z dnia 6 marca 2018 r. – prawo przedsiębiorców (eng. act of 6 march 2018 – entrepreneur law), 2018 (dz.u. z 2018 r. poz. 646 z późn. zm.). vetrivel, k., 2017, performance of micro, small and medium enterprise, omniscriptun gmbh&co, ryga. 1. introduction the boundary of the cemetery – trench, wall, earthwork – separates the two spheres: the sacred and the profane. it designates two areas: designed for the living and the dead. this boundary is therefore extremely important; separating these two worlds has almost always had not only a practical role, but above all socio-cultural and closely associated with religious rituals and rites (cf. duma, 2010; komorowski, 2011). in the years 2015–2016, 93 cemeteries of two religions: christianity and judaism1, were inventoried. during the research, attention was drawn, among others, to the cemetery borders and the issue of their variability over time as well as the effect of 1 49 jewish cemeteries in the silesian voivodeship, 30 protestant cemeteries in the elk lake district, 13 protestant cemeteries in pabianice poviat (lodz voivodeship), and 1 historic catholic cemetery located in lelów (częstochowa poviat, the silesian voivodeship) were inventoried. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 60–69 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.008.6207 surface prospection of burial grounds and new research tools (on the example of the study of changes in cemetery boundaries) anna majewska department of political and historical geography and regional studies, the faculty of geographical sciences, łódź university, s. kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland, e-mail: anna.majewska@op.pl citation majewska a., 2017, surface prospection of burial grounds and new research tools (on the example of the study of changes in cemetery boundaries), journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 60–69. abstract basing on own experiences in studying cemetery space, the possibilities of using lidar visualization in acquiring information on changes in the boundaries of christian and jewish necropolises were demonstrated on selected examples. the application of the methods indicated in the article comprises the significant supplementation of terrain inspection, considerably expanding knowledge about a given site. the use of digital elevation models has been popular since their introduction, especially in the archaeological community, as it allows for feature recognition without conducting invasive prospection, including excavation. as it has turned out, in the course of the research conducted by the author, the use of lidar tools should be an integral part of the geographical analysis. this highlights the need to promote interdisciplinary in the research on cultural heritage sites. key words lidar, jewish cemetery, protestant cemetery, catholic cemetery, boundaries, inventory, cultural heritage. surface prospection of burial grounds and new research tools… 61 socio-cultural determinants and environmental conditions. detailed surface prospection resulted in numerous observations, including those related to the methodology and directions of the conducted analyzes, as well as the possibility of using new research tools for their purpose. therefore, on the basis of the research, it was decided to present the question of the use of surface area visualization techniques to recognize the relics of the site boundaries and observe the change in their course. laser scanning data used for this purpose are now successfully employed especially in terms of recognition of archaeological features, for instance, trenches, and settlement and defense features2. this article presents the use of new techniques from the perspective of geographical research on cultural heritage sites, namely cemeteries. the aim of the paper is to identify the possibilities of using the currently widely available lidar3 elevation 2 this issue is discussed by, among others: p. franczak and w. jucha (2015), c. sobczak (2015), f. wałdoch (2014); and the use of geoportal in the studies (but without the analysis of the lidar module) by h.lepionka (2014). 3 abbreviation for light detection and ranging (wałdoch, 2014, p. 151). lidar is a method of obtaining three-dimensional image of surface terrain from airborne laser scanning models in the study of changes in the boundaries of burial sites, especially if the researcher struggles with a lack of historical data and historical indications on necropolis they are interested in. ready elevation models widely available through geoportal cover approximately 80% of the country (fig. 1). they have been prepared in several versions (http://www.geoportal.gov.pl/dane/numerycznemodele-wysokosciowe). in this study, models resulting from the information system of the national guards (isok) project were used. they are now the most accurate among the available ones. the first one is imaging of the detailed terrain at ground level generated by grayscale hillshade. important for the correct reading of these images is the information on the direction of the light. in this model, the rays illuminating the area were projected from the northwest. this means that, if the south-east area of the feature is shaded, it is a convex form of terrain, for example, a hill or earthwork. in the case of cemeteries, graphics obtained in this way allows for acquiring information about their composition: the distribution data (more information here: http://www.lidar-uk.com/usage-of-lidar/ [24.09.2016]. fig. 1. range of visualization of digital elevation data for the area of poland, available through the geoportal platform source: www.geoportal.gov.pl [26/09/2016]. 62 anna majewska of individual quarters and avenues, if the layout remains apparently blurred by, for instance, a disorderly vegetation succession in the area of the cemetery. the second type of the available elevation model is an image which changes depending on the settings of scale and spatial range the researcher is interested in. this is a visualization of the terrain designed according to the characteristics typical of hypsometric maps, but with a dynamic color scale. both types of image allow for the accurate identification of the terrain profile of the given feature and its documentation. 2. the use of airborne laser scanning in the analyzes of the boundaries of cemeteries the analysis of terrain visualization obtained from laser scanning data (lidar system) combined with terrain observations allows for diagnosing suspected processes of spatial development of selected cemetery complexes, about which little is known within preserved historical sources. this hypothesis was confirmed in the results of research on jewish and christian cemeteries. the findings broaden knowledge not only about the cemeteries themselves but, above all, about the history of the community managing them until world war ii. a very clear example on which the application of lidar technology in the studies of the necropolis’ range can be demonstrated is an analysis of the area of the jewish cemetery in żarki. a seemingly unified layout of the necropolis in the form of a rectangle, with no apparent internal divisions visible during the terrain inspection as well as observation of aerial photographs, changes significantly after the application of the shading layer proposed by the isok project4. in the north-western part of the cemetery, a clear spatial structure in the shape of a square having about 80 meters per side is visible (fig. 2). moreover, in the central part of the southern boundary of the feature, a regular, less regular elevation shape (perhaps the outline of the original gate building) and the line leading from it (perhaps a negative trace of the communication route leading in the direction of the current southern border of the cemetery) can be seen. the borders of the structure are probably constituted by the remains of a stone wall and/ or stone foundations. the genesis of the form is not 4 the study used a ready-made digital elevation models developed for the platform www.geoportal.gov.pl under the isok project – information system of the national guards) (http://www.geoportal.gov.pl/dane/numeryczne-modelewysokosciowe) . clearly explained. wojciech mszyca, the guardian of the cemetery, is of the opinion that this may be the boundaries of the first jewish cemetery in żarki. according to his hypothesis, after filling the first jewish cemetery, the jews from żarki bought land for a new cemetery, which is now an old devastated cemetery. however, after filling up the new burial place, they returned to the first jewish cemetery, expanding its area towards the south and east. although matzevas older than the date of creation of the new jewish cemetery have not been found there, the theory may hold true because employees of the institute of jewish studies of the jagiellonian university who conduct inventory research concluded that there is a likelihood of the occurrence of older burials in this area5. the author of this paper proposes the hypothesis assuming that the quadratic form is the cemetery area, which was fenced in the 19th century6. it is supported by the evident regular drawing of the boundaries of the quadratic form discussed. it should be noted, however, that it is extraordinary even in the case of the preserved stone cemetery fences. the author presumes that the form does not have medieval origins. the first cemeteries were not so regular. the first late-medieval and early modern cemeteries took on rather irregular shapes, they were surrounded with ditches or earthworks, and later they were also fenced. it is doubtful that the original boundaries of the cemetery have survived in such a good condition until today. in addition, it would have seemed unnatural to establish the first cemetery at a greater distance from the town center than the cemetery now known as „the old”. in the area of the modern silesian voivodeship, reverse trends prevailed, where as settlement expansion and village development proceeded, cemeteries, especially jewish ones, were pushed in time to areas away from the buildings7. the history of the new jewish cemetery, whose land was a matter of dispute, which began in 1836 between the jews and the pauline monastery of leśniów, should also be taken into account. it started at a time when they wanted to surround the cemetery with a wall. the jewish community maintained that they had founded the cemetery with the knowledge of the land owners on the manor grounds, not monastery grounds. however, it turned out that the land belonged to the monks8. the cemetery area is a com5 information obtained from the guardian of the cemetery – w. mszyca. 6 the cemetery was founded in 1821. according to the record in the inventory card, however, it was the third jewish cemetery founded in żarki (mszyca, /no data/). 7 more on this subject: a. majewska (2016). 8 the information about the site’s history derives from the inventory card of the new jewish cemetery in żarki drawn by surface prospection of burial grounds and new research tools… 63 pletely sandy hill, perhaps this is why the relics of the old cemetery wall are so clear (lack of high vegetation, among others). after settling in żarki in the 17th century, the jews probably founded cemetery at the site of the currently old cemetery. after filling it up, in the search for another location, they established a new cemetery in 1821. it should further be noted that in the lidar imaging, this feature is the clearest anthropogenic surface form throughout the town and its immediate surroundings. w. mszyca mentioned that, under the relics of the stone wall, there are probably broader foundations. unfortunately, these speculations cannot be confirmed any time soon because conducting archaeological surveys is not possible due to the nature of the site and principles of jewish religion. therefore, non-invasive methods which have not yet been fully used in this field remain. undoubtedly, the spatial arrangement of the new jewish cemetery site in żarki is unique in the voivodeship and it is worth conducting detailed research on its origins. another interesting case illustrating the change in the spatial arrangement of the site is the jewish cemetery situated in janów near żarki. little is known about the history of this burial site. the available information, however, provides knowledge about the fact that this cemetery was established earlier than the necropolis of częstochowa, probably in the 17th century, becoming the burial site not only for the local jewish community but also for jews from częstochowa (http://www.sztetl.org.pl/pl/article/ w. mszyca. it was made available from the author’s collection. janow/5,historia/). since this is the only jewish cemetery in janów, the author guesses that its area could be expanded by purchasing additional land. the necropolis has undergone considerable devastation during the world war ii, therefore, the terrain inspection did not result in much information. nevertheless, during the inventory, the author recorded the existence of the relics of the oldest burials in the southern part, and younger burials, probably prewar (traces of walled tombs/box graves), on the northern edge of the cemetery complex. in addition, near the southern border of the modern cemetery wall, the remains of probably the original cemetery fence, which was made of chipped limestone, were identified (fig. 3). only the image obtained through the airborne scanning laser shows what cannot be seen on the orthophotomap and in the terrain due to the dense vegetation of the cemetery. in the lidar visualization, there is a clear outline of the earlier boundaries of the cemetery. its area before the expansion was approximately two thirds of the current surface9. the shape of the preserved foundations may also indicate the location of the funeral home, which probably was the gatehouse object. it should be noted that the current fence was built in the 90s of the 20th century. at that time, the southern border of the cemetery, which is confirmed by the inspection, was redesignated, that is moved south and laid 9 inside, an even smaller regular form is visible, which may suggest that the surface of the cemetery has been changed twice. fig. 2. new jewish cemetery in żarki: site plan and lidar image source: own study on the basis of the maps www.geoportal.gov.pl [24/09/2016]. 64 anna majewska out parallel to the road (on the inside of the fence, there is a clear free space). interactive visualizations allow for detailed analysis of the terrain, including the designation of the range of burial grounds, which were used in the first place. extremely useful in this regard is the hypsometry tool with a dynamic color scale (available through geoportal10), thanks to which, a very detailed picture of the terrain can be obtained. this method was used for analyzing the surface of, among others, the old jewish cemetery in cieszyn and the catholic cemetery in lelów. in the case of the first cemetery, within its range, what is clearly visible in the visualization is the escarpment and post-exploitation pit lowering, where burials were conducted in subsequent stages of the operation of the cemetery. this elevation over the escarpment is a primary part of the complex (fig. 4). the same situation occurs in the catholic cemetery in lelów, where the highest point of a former castle hill comprises the oldest burial place (fig. 5). the hypothesis was further confirmed by the detailed inventory of the cemetery, which resulted in the designation of the alleged range of 19th-century cemetery on the basis of the distribution of the oldest burials (information contained in the inscriptions was the key determinant)11. conducting research using lidar 10 view service wms. 11 research was done within the project places of memory and forgetting. interdisciplinary research on the northern part of jura krakowsko-częstochowska implemented within the data is especially promising in relation to the objects on which information cannot be obtained through other methods, for instance, when archival search does not produce effects and excavation exploration is impossible for various reasons. however, the use of laser scanning visualization in the burial studies does not always bring satisfactory results. out of 49 jewish cemeteries on the territory of the silesian voivodeship, which the author had analyzed, only in a few cases, information was obtained about the change of borders. this was related to the fact that jewish cemeteries, for the most part, were founded on the outskirts of urban areas, and with their development, most of them were found in the built-up area. thus, their peripheral boundaries were often subject to minor changes (for example, change associated with the expansion of communication routes), and the same boundaries have rarely preserved to this day in the form of earthworks, which would represent clear terrain forms. what is more, the areas of jewish cemeteries were mostly severely devastated during world war ii and in the postwar period (cf. majewska, 2016). the situation is different in the case of the protestant cemeteries, national programme for the development of humanities of the ministry of science and higher education under the direction of dr. olgierd ławrynowicz in collaboration with students of archeology: mateusz grzelak (university of łódź), konrad kempa (uł), ewelina miksa (uł), bartosz puliński (uł), aleksandra uniszewska (university of wrocław), dominika węclewska (uł), piotr zwierzchowski (uł). fig. 3. jewish cemetery in janów: lidar image and the relic of the original cemetery boundary (stone wall) source: own study on the basis of the maps www.geoportal.gov.pl [24/09/2016]. surface prospection of burial grounds and new research tools… 65 fig. 4. old jewish cemetery in cieszyn. view of (from left): orthophotomap, terrain in lidar visualization, terrain in the hypsometric image with a dynamic color scale source: own study, on the basis of the maps www.geoportal.gov.pl [09/24/2016]. fig. 5. old catholic cemetery in lelów – spatial development of the cemetery (thumbnails: lidar graphics and hypsometric image with a dynamic color scale) source: own study on the basis of the maps www.geoportal.gov.pl [24/09/2016]. 66 anna majewska especially those which were established away from buildings and which today are found in a similar spatial context. this applies especially to woodland within which human intervention since the end of the operation of the cemetery has been small (excluding the devastation caused within objects). for 32 out of 43 inventoried protestant cemeteries, it was possible to analyze their boundaries using lidar data. visualizations extremely clearly showed their course, and this is because they have mostly a character of earthworks or trenches which have been preserved in a good condition. the use of this method in conducting research was particularly useful because of the difficulties in conducting surface prospection of multiple objects. ełk lake district cemeteries, such as płociczno, młynik, and przykopka (fig. 6), are located away from the towns, in the thicket of the forest. many-year vegetation succession in the areas of usually small evangelical cemeteries often resulted in almost complete obliteration of the relics of the former spatial arrangements. this reduced considerably the possibility of documenting in the form of drawings and photographs, as well as taking the necessary measurements for further research. often it was possible to draw up the basic characteristics of the object only through the graphical visualizations, especially in the cemeteries to which access was difficult or impossible, for example, if they are surrounded by wetlands or wire under voltage. during the inventory of the evangelical cemetery in krokocie, no above-ground relics of burial space division were observed due to dense vegetation. only anomalies reflected in the digital elevation models (fig. 7) allowed for full interpretation of the studied site. two internal divisions of the necropolis are clearly shown on the maps in the form of earthworks. the first one is located at a height of one third of the current cemetery area on the west side, and the other more or less in the middle of the site. line objects are located on the north-south axis and their relative heights are equal to the external cemetery earthen ramparts. this may be the evidence of the development of the cemetery and at least two-stage expansion of its borders from the west side (the highest point of the elevation of the local land) to the east. this hypothesis is further supported by the existence of the road which previously led to the cemetery from the west12. in addition, during the inventory of the cemetery area, it was found that preserved tombstones appeared only in the eastern part of the site (marked on the plan – fig. 7). next to the few tombstones whose origin was determined to date back to the end of the 19th century/beginning of the 20th century (having, among others, inscriptions from the year 1912), there were tombstones from the years 1923, 1924, 1935, 1936, 1939, and the post-war years of 1947, 1964, 2012. in the eastern part, there are also 2 war graves: one of an unknown german soldier and two of unknown russian soldiers, who died in 1914. it is worth noting that the burials of the fallen were carried out at that time in the youngest, unused part of the burial ground, which further supports the rightness of the hypothesis. perhaps conducting another terrain inspection during the fall or early spring13, when vegetation is most scarce, would reveal the presence of the relics of older burials in the western part and finally confirm the suspicions. sometimes the relics of the original boundaries of the cemetery leave only a slight mark on the ground and cannot be read from the lidar maps. this was the case, among others, with evangelicalwar cemetery located in bechcice in pabianice county. visualization of laser scanning clearly marked the boundaries of the cemetery originating from the time of world war i, but only terrain verification enabled accurate outlining of the range of world war 12 the road is marked on: topographische karte, 1:25000, sheet lyck (ełk), 1937. 13 the inventory of the cemetery was carried out on 01.08.2016 fig. 6. examples of the borders of the ełk lake district protestant cemeteries in lidar visualization source: own study (lidar data from the isok project: www.geoportal.gov.pl [09/24/2016]). surface prospection of burial grounds and new research tools… 67 i burials and the border line of the evangelical cemetery. it turned out that part of the war cemetery with a monument crowning the central axis of the cemetery is located in the former religious necropolis. it was evidenced not only by the relics of the tombs of different origin (associated with the protestant cemetery – probably from the 19th century) but also by the former border trench which is very difficult to see on the ground (fig. 8). on the above examples of the use of lidar system modules for prospecting the surface area of the cemetery, it can be concluded that the new research tools discussed here should be a constant element employed in studies of this type. it should be remembered, however, that the scanning visualizations available through the isok project, provided by geoportal, have been developed based on the scanning accuracy of 4 points per m². these data are not sufficient when trying to identify smaller surface objects (for instance, mounds whose relative heights sometimes do not exceed 0.5 m, smaller ditches, relics of forest trails, or economic roads) showing slight hypsometric differences14. unfortunately, certain inaccuracy in the land surface mapping results in limitations in the interpretation of the analyzed surface objects, and therefore, an integral part of the research should be, above all, terrain inspection allowing for verifying any doubts. 3. conclusion many of the cemeteries which have been closed off for burial purposes, especially those managed by jewish and protestant communities until world war ii, are now in poor condition. the holocaust and population resettlement resulted in the lack of 14 the issue of problems with the accuracy of laser scanning measurements is raised by c. sobczak (2015, pp. 43–44, 52–54). based on his own research, he gives tips worth considering when planning airborne measurements and tips on the subsequent processing and interpretation of received images. fig. 7. spatial development of the cemetery on the example of the site in krokocie (ełk county). thumbnails (from left): hypsometric image with a dynamic color scale, lidar image source: own study (lidar data from the isok project: www.geoportal.gov.pl [09/24/2016]). 68 anna majewska community which had had a direct relationship with the given sites. they are dependent upon the mercy of people who, in varying degrees, are sensitized to the need of saving the cultural heritage of the lands on which they live. additionally, cemeteries are areas easily subject to modifications, where even the smallest human intervention can change the spatial context and scientific interpretation of the objects, for instance, as a result of cleaning up the land (by cutting once purposely placed plantings). therefore, there is a need to develop non-invasive methods of studying burial sites, owing to which information can be obtained, among others, about the structure of the original cemetery, especially in areas difficult to access. a useful, and above all, effective tool in obtaining this type of information is lidar, which has been justified by the examples presented in the article. the results of research on the cemeteries conducted by the author would certainly be much poorer if had not been for the processed data from laser scanning. it would be impossible to outline many plans of the objects, without which the analysis of the cemetery is very difficult and does not bring 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semiconductor market frans lavdari department of business and management, luiss guido carli university, viale romania, 32, 00197 rome, italy, orcid: 0000-0002-0137-0818 e-mail: frans.lavdari@outlook.com citation lavdari f., 2023, tsmc: a pest analysis of semiconductor market, journal of geography, politics and society, 13(1), 22–29. abstract with the advent of the pandemic and the outbreak of individuality in inter-state politics, semiconductors, products that have become widely used by high-tech companies, have led to an increase in worldwide demand. but growing nationalism has led nations not to cooperate on the successful joint and equitable growth of these innovative technologies. this research analyses through a pest analysis the political, economic, social and technological consequence of these choices for the largest semiconductor company, tsmc. the results show how, to date, the international chessboard poses four choices facing tsmc’s future, each based on how nations will approach future collaborative choices. key words tsmc, pest, international relations, market conflicts. received: 30 january 2023 accepted: 22 february 2023 published: 31 march 2023 1. introduction the semiconductor market has undergone strong fluctuations and instabilities during the pandemic. the introduction of new medical and non-medical devices requiring such technology has not only increased dramatically, but has, as a result, created a significant increase in international demand. however, the supply in the markets for such products is not able, to date, to meet the demand. the consequence of this has been a new ‘arms race’ on the part of the major international powers to open up new investments in high-tech infrastructures for the production of semiconductors, but the great mistrust that the pandemic has brought with it and the individualisation of each state’s national policies to defend its own population from the others has led nations to nationalise their policies for investment in these products. this study aims, through a pest analysis, to understand how international attitudes and understand how nations will turn their gaze towards tsmc, the taiwanese semiconductor company that holds 57% of the global market to date. in the need, therefore, to understand how political, economic, social, and technological dynamics will influence tsmc’s approach internationally in shaping its expectations in the market, the following study will consider not only tsmc and consequently taiwan, with its delicate political relationship with china, but also the international behaviour of the united states, the european union, and india, the first two markets developing towards these new technologies, while the last, india, a country that has understood the great importance in developing this technology in its own territory for national and international interests. tsmc: a pest analysis of semiconductor market 23 2. methodology this research uses the pest approach as a method of analysis. this methodology was considered to be the most suitable for carrying out the research as it is able to offer a general overview that includes all the information essential for understanding the behaviour of a subject on several fronts, namely political, economic, social and technological. as indicated by t. sammut-bonnici & d. galea (2015), it is seen as a “powerful and widely used tool for understanding strategic risk. it identifies the changes and effects of the external macro-environment on a company’s competitive position.” 3. pest analysis 3.1. political factors: taiwan china united states european union on the political level it is necessary to consider the following variables: 1. the tsmc – taiwanese government report; 2. relations between taiwan and the people’s republic of china (or also cross-strait relations); 3. relations between china and the united states; 4. united states taiwan relationship. there are two major political problems for tsmc: the first relating to the possible invasion of taiwan by the people’s republic of china, and on the other the conflict over trade tariffs between china and the united states. 3.1.1. people’s republic of china on the first point, it should be noted that the current president of china, xi jinping, has decided to embark on an uncompromising path with taiwan, with the aim of national unification of the «two chinas», as it is considered «inevitable» (dickey, 2019; to, 1989). the situation is also accentuated by the constitutional reform conducted by the national people’s assembly of the prc on 11 march 2018 which abolished the limit to two presidential terms, making the current president of beijing re-eligible for life (always with the consent of the congress) and consequently decreeing the concrete possibility of a political continuity of the «hard fist» by beijing towards taipei (bbc, 2018). this condition could have serious negative repercussions on tsmc as the company holds two of its foreign subsidiaries in china, shanghai and nanjing (hao, bu, 2022), and in july 2021 the company decided, after obtaining the consent from the commission for investment of the taiwan ministry of economic affairs, to undertake a 2.89 billion dollar investment in china for the expansion of production of the plant in the city of nanjing. the consequence of this is that the chinese state could endanger the investments in place in the country, also due to the particular relationship between tsmc and the taiwanese government, as demonstrated by the representation within the tsmc board with the figure of mr. ming-hsin kung, minister of the national development council (ndc) and minister without portfolio since 2019 (tsmc, 2021). 3.1.2. united states on the second point, the current political and trade tensions between the us and the prc have affected not only products, which have seen prices rise, but also companies in various sectors, particularly manufacturing and technology. the us has threatened to extend huawei’s sanctions to its nonus chip suppliers, which is a risk considering that huawei is currently tsmc’s second largest customer. as tsmc relies heavily on the us market, these sanctions could lead to potential losses (momoko, 2020). on the other hand, however, the trade conflict has created new opportunities for tsmc, as the trade sanctions against china have challenged the import/ export market between the prc and the us (cigna et al., 2020; fajgelbaum, khandelwal, 2021), resulting in many sectors, including semiconductors, where the us and other advanced industrial economies no longer fully trust the supply of high-tech products and services from the prc. the coronavirus pandemic has only exacerbated this growing distrust. for example, for the pharmaceutical and biomedical industries, a bipartisan group of us senators has called for measures to reduce us dependence on products, medicines and ingredients from the prc (warren et al., 2019). the implication of this is that this growing mistrust means, at the very least, that the us government and many us-based companies will look to diversify their supply chains over the next three to five years to reduce dependence on chinese supply and with a subsequent wider resonance as other governments (feigenbaum, nelson, 2021), especially in western europe and japan, consider whether to follow suit. confirming this, the us has approved a $52 billion semiconductor manufacturing investment plan for the next 10 years (xinhua, 2021), with the us willing to create an ‘onshore’ supply 24 frans lavdari chain to decrease foreign dependence on chips, and foreign semiconductor companies, such as tsmc, have been excluded from the funding (cheng, lauly, 2021), leading to the need for the company, in order to remain competitive in the us market, to triple its investments, as happened in arizona, where tsmc is currently building a $12 billion chip plant. tsmc could build up to six plants in the area, some of which could use its most advanced technology (scmp, 2021). the decision to fund these new hubs in the us is closely linked to the military support extended by washington to taipei. taiwan also hopes that such moves will translate into greater support for its efforts in other areas, such as a presence at the world health organisation (who) (laskar, 2021). 3.1.3. european union tsmc seems to envisage a possible investment in germany, the czech republic, slovakia and lithuania. however, in addition to sporadic meetings with eu delegates, this investment does not seem to take shape yet, also due to the unclear diplomatic relationship between taiwan and the countries of the european union (johansson, 2021). furthermore, the possible frictions for industrial and technological interests between european nations could interrupt this path of modernization of the european technological infrastructure. tsmc president mark liu himself called the european plan «unrealistic» during a speech at tsmc, adding that it would lead to a great deal of «unprofitable capacity» (gooding, 2021). 3.1.4. india tsmc is also in contact with the indian state for the opening of a hub in the area. this project seems to be interesting and possible, both for the possibility of india and taiwan to create a free trade agreement (regional fta) (laskar, 2021), and for the presence of a rapidly growing indian local technological infrastructure that could support and facilitate the opening of the new headquarters (thanks to tenyear government investments) (india today, 2021), and also for the good diplomatic relations between taiwan and india. furthermore, the tax burden on chinese companies due to the tariff war with the united states has prompted many companies to relocate production sites out of china, to india and other southeast asian nations, making these nations increasingly attractive to do business (xie, 2019). susana hashmi, of the institute of international relations at national chengchi university in taipei, said the advancement of economic ties falls within the framework of unofficial relations between india and taiwan 3.2. economic factors the economic crisis unleashed by the covid-19 pandemic has positively influenced the global demand for semiconductors leading to a significant increase not seen since 2010 (wsts, 2021). the semiconductor industry association (sia) announced in december 2021 that worldwide semiconductor sales were $ 48.8 billion in october 2021, an increase of 24.0% from the october 2020 total of 39.4. billion dollars and 1.1% more than the september 2021 total of 48.3 billion dollars (chang, 2021) (fig. 1). regionally, year-over-year and month-to-month sales increased across all major regional markets: americas (29.2% yoy, 2.6% yoy), europe (27.3%, 2.8%), japan (23.7%, 1.1%), asia pacific / all others (22.6%, 0.2%) and china (21.1%, 0.3%). below is the market forecast data from world semiconductor trade statistic (table 1). faced with a rapidly expanding market, tsmc proves to be the market leader with a production equal to 54% of the global total (platzer et al., 2020). additionally, it began investing in building a 12inch wafer fabrication facility in arizona, which is expected to begin series production in 2024, and has partnered with sony to build a new manufacturing facility in japan for 22 and 28-inch chips. nanometers with production starting at the end of 2024 (sony, 2021). 3.3. social factors for a. villard et al. (2015), the semiconductor industry will play an increasingly important role for future companies. as taiwan’s most profitable and high-profile company, tsmc takes social responsibility to strengthen its brand image. for this reason, tsmc has placed a lot of emphasis on employee training and green transition (tsmc, 2020). on human capital, tsmc has invested over 3.4 million dollars in training in 2020 and 3.72 billion dollars (+ 26%) in research and development. on the environmental level, the company has been able to take significant steps ahead of the competition: tsmc: a pest analysis of semiconductor market 25 fig. 1. worldwide semiconductor revenues 2021. source: ravi, 2022. tab.1. numbers in the table are rounded to whole millions of dollars, which may cause totals by region and totals by product group to differ slightly. fall 2021 amounts in us $m year on year growth in % 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 americas 95,366 118,835 131,084 21.3 24.6 10.3 europe 37,520 47,126 50,467 -5.8 25.6 7.1 japan 36,471 43,581 47,621 1.3 19.5 9.3 asiz pacific 271,032 343,419 372,317 5.1 26.7 8.4 total world $m 440,389 552,961 601,490 6.8 25.6 8.8 discrete semiconductors 23,804 30,100 32,280 -0.3 26.4 7.2 optoelectronics 40,397 43,229 45,990 -2.8 7.0 6.4 sensors 14,962 18,791 20,913 10.7 25.6 11.3 integrated circuits 361,226 460,841 502,37 8.4 27.6 9.0 analog 55,658 72,842 79,249 3.2 30.9 8.8 micro 69,678 79,102 83,980 4.9 13.5 6.2 logoc 118,408 150,736 167,396 11.1 27.3 11.1 memory 117,482 158,161 171,682 10.4 34.6 8.5 total products $m 440,389 552,961 601,490 6.8 25.6 8.8 source: wsts, 2021. 26 frans lavdari • built the world’s first water recovery plant for industrial effluents (shilov, 2021); • it was the first semiconductor company in the world to join re100; • achieved 100% renewable energy consumption in tsmc offices in taiwan and overseas, and net zero emissions for global offices through carbon credits; • it achieved the 95% waste recycling rate for six consecutive years and only <1% of the waste was sent to landfill for 11 consecutive years. these policies have ensured that the company has reduced its emissions of air pollutants per unit of product by 46% since 2015, reaching the sdg 2030 earlier than expected and demonstrating how a successful environmental policy can also be conducted by a company with strong social and market responsibility (tsmc, 2020). 3.4. technological factors as the most advanced foundry in the world, tsmc focuses more than half of its production (in terms of revenue) on the most advanced nodes, such as 5nm and 7nm (tan, 2022) (fig. 2). in particular, given the particular demand for 5nm models for iphones and laptops by apple, fig. 2. on the left, market share required by production process; right, billed for semiconductor manufacturing processes of 7nm and beyond. source: tsmc q3, 2022. the largest buyer of chips for tsmc, the latter has decided to focus more and more on this model (nuttall, 2020). furthermore, given the market demands, investments in research and development are aimed at the construction of advanced 4 and 3 nm chips (james, 2020; wang, 2021). 4. motivations behind the combination of the factors examined it is believed that these factors provide tsmc with a clearer picture of the delicate political and market situation in the semiconductor industry. particular attention was given to the political situation as the sector, given its importance, is subject to strong politicisation by states, particularly in the taiwanchina-united states triangle, where the delicate geopolitical relationship has become increasingly unstable in recent times. taiwan is suffering, on the one hand, from increasing territorial interference by mainland china, which is pushing, as has been pointed out, for a unification it considers «inevitable»; on the other, the united states has realised how weak the american semiconductor market is and is now pushing for greater autonomy from the market. and while taiwan is trying to strengthen its relationship with the us by investing, through tsmc, in the construction of new plants for ever more advanced chips, as the us is currently the only country able to balance chinese power (which is why there is talk of a g2 between the two nations), tsmc is trying to exploit the strong market demand coming from the states for semiconductors in order to create new commercial relationships with international powers that will lead, on the one hand, to greater profits, and on the other, to a greater recognition on the international chessboard of taipei with new political-commercial relations with powers capable of clashing with china, as demonstrated by the increasingly intense relations with india and european nations for investments in the opening, in these two regions, of hubs for the production of chips and the creation of free trade zones (in particular with india). 5. tsmc: understanding alternative futures the four possible futures that are hypothesized are: 5.1. tsmc investment only in the european union and creation of a commercial agreement (20%) in this event we see the possibility of tsmc to undertake contractual relations only with the european union. the result of this possible choice is the diversion of international investments in hubs and production centers in european countries, such as those hypothesized during some official meetings between tsmc and eu delegates, with the aim of achieving a series of strategic objectives both for the ‘company as well as for taiwan. for the first: the possibility of increasing the production of waffle chips to be placed on the market and thus respond to the growing world demand; the possibility of seeing economic aid in the construction of production centers thanks to community investments estimated at 150 billion euros. for the second: the possibility of strengthening international relations with new powers belonging to the g20, such as germany, france and italy; the possibility of seeing a favorable vote of these in the recognition of taiwan within the who and therefore, consequently, a growth in political alliances contrary to beijing. 5.2. tsmc investments only in the united states and strengthening of diplomatic relations (25%) in this scenario, it is believed that tsmc may be willing to divert international investments to the united states. this can happen for multiple reasons both related to tsmc as well as taiwan. for the former, investments in the us would have the ability to increase tsmc’s power in the regional market, at the expense of competitors such as intel, and strengthen its leadership in the global market. furthermore, the need for semiconductors would lead the us government to accept in the coming years an opening to foreign companies to use federal investment funds. for the second, the strengthening of tsmc would lead to a greater dependence of washington on the taiwanese market and the need to defend it more from the increasing attacks of beijing, with the result of inducing a stronger international alliance on the pacific which, thanks to the particular friendship between the us and japan would also lead this superpower to support the taiwanese cause against beijing. 5.3. prc invasion of taiwan and transfer of the company to chinese hands (10%) in this scenario, it is believed that mainland china may decide to engage in an armed confrontation with taiwan to conclude «national unification». this would bring tsmc under the leadership of beijing and, consequently, its control of the largest semiconductor market in the world. 5.4. balancing tsmc’s investments between the united states, the european union and india and strengthening the international position. (45%) in this scenario, tsmc’s strategy will be focused on a fragmented investment between several world regions: united states, eu and india. this decision would have strong international repercussions for tsmc and taiwan, as: for the first, it would mean the control of the regional markets of the largest powers capable of investing in semiconductors; the ability to stop the creation of future competitors that could arise from government investments, again in these regions; the possibility of expanding production centers in more locations and consequently increasing research and development thanks to new local minds (r&d). for the second, this would mean expanding commercial relations with almost all of the major international powers and the possibility of lobbying for greater recognition in international institutions and diplomatic agreements. 6. conclusion tsmc’s strategic choice is closely linked to the political decisions taken by the taipei government. this implies that tsmc will have a strong subjection in its international manoeuvres, which may change suddenly as the global geopolitical changes vary. as a result of this, it is believed that the company should undertake an international strategic policy that has as its perspective the opening of new foreign offices that give the greatest political impact at the regional level. influencing markets such as india and the eu, which are among the most important in the world, would result in the possibility of stemming beijing’s interventionist policy. for this reason, the choice of which strategic line tsmc will have to undertake in the future will have a serious impact not only on international semiconductor supply chains, but will have a strong tsmc: a pest analysis of semiconductor market 27 political impact on taiwan and the power of the people’s republic of china that tsmc cannot. do not consider and face. the chances of event n.3 (invasion of taiwan) happening are minimal. given the need for the united states to prevent china from increasing its economic and productive strength, the former will protect the island in every way from any chinese war intervention. the possibility that event n.1 will take place is given at 20% as the agreements between tsmc and the eu have stalled and, having arrived in january 2022, did not lead to the hoped-for novelties. the possibility of event n.2 occurring is given at 25% since, given the information of substantial investments already undertaken for the next 10 years by tsmc, they demonstrate a concrete desire to focus on the us regional market. the chance that event n.4 will take place is given at 45% as, given the information of multiple international relations of tsmc and taiwan in multiple regional markets (eu, usa and india, but also china mainland itself ) it is shown how the most efficient strategy for the company may be an investment with several national players to be able to control local semiconductor markets. 28 frans lavdari references bbc, 2018, china’s xi allowed to remain ‘president for life’ as term limits removed, bbc news, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-china-43361276 (accessed 2 january 2022). bbc, 2019, xi jinping says taiwan ‘must and will be’ reunited with china, bbc news, retrieved january 2, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174 (accessed 2 january 2022). chang b., 2021, pandemic supply chain issues semiconductors, airworldwide, https://www.air-worldwide.com/ blog/posts/2021/12/pandemic-supply-chain-issuessemiconductors/ (accessed 3 january 2022). cheng t.f., lauly l., 2021, tsmc urges u.s. to include foreign firms in chip industry support, nikkei asia, https://asia. nikkei.com/business/tech/semiconductors/tsmc-urgesu.s.-to-include-foreign-firms-in-chip-industry-support (accessed 2 january 2022). cigna s., meinen p., schulte p., steinhoff n., 2020, the impact of us tariffs against china on us imports: evidence for trade diversion?, ssrn electronic journal, https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.3749362 (accessed 15 december 2021). dickey, l. 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(accessed 2 january 2022). 1. introduction the tourism development is impossible without these components: capital, technology, labor, natural, cultural and historical resources of tourism. however, possessing the capital, technology, highly professional staff is not enough for the successful development of tourism. the availability of applicable resources area – one of the basic prerequisites. the practice of recent years shows the artificial tourist resources creation – the great thematic parks, tourist facilities, attractions and more. so, if within a certain territory there are no tourist resources, people can create them. however, the availability of own tourist resources contributes to the tourism industry and determines the specific development of tourism in the region. an important role is given to the fuller use of tourism opportunities in small historic towns, which themselves are often centers of certain areas tourism resources. this creates the possibility of economic and cultural renaissance of the research area, but the absence of specific mechanisms for the laws implementation and regulations at the local level, inefficient use of tourist resources, inconsistency, and sometimes the lack of tourism infrastructure in small historic towns of ukraine with the international standards – all this requires re-evaluating their place in the social settlement relations system of the investigation area and their tourism potential usage level. the issues of social and territorial subjects of urban settlements involved many scientists specialists journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 63–71 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.030.5817 tourist resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region and their use natalia pankiv tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: pankivnatalya@gmail.com citation pankiv n., 2016, tourist resources of small historical town of ivano-frankivsk region and their use, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 63–71. abstract it was studied the cultural and historical tourist resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region. it was analyzed the problems of the historical and cultural heritage current state of the research region and its possible future use. it was specified the priority of cultural and historical tourism resources of small towns in terms of their tourist use and indicated the main obstacles and challenges that complicate the process. key words small historical town, cultural and historical resources, historical and cultural heritage, tourist use, ivano-frankivsk region. 64 natalia pankiv in social geography: m.d. pistun (пістун, 1996), yu.i. pityurenko (пітюренко, 1983), a.v. stepanenko, a.p. golikov, ya.b. oliynuk (голіков et al., 1996) and others. geographic, socio-economic, managerial aspects of small towns are elucidated in the works of f.d. zastavnyi (заставний, 1994), g.m. lappo (лаппо, 1997), o.v. zastavezhka, d.v.  tkach (заставецька, ткач, 2010) and other scientists. analysis of tourism activity is considered in the works of v.f. kyfyak (кифяк, 2003), i.v. zorin, v.a. kvartalnov (зорин, квартальнов, 2003), s.p. kuzyk (кузик, 2010), a.a. lyubitseva (любіцева, 2002), v.i. matsola (мацола, 1997), v.k. fedorchenko (федорченко, дьорова, 2000), t.a.diorova (2000) etc. the tourism potential analysis of small historic towns and the features of its use are described in the writings of o.o. beyduk (бейдик, 2001), k.d. didenko (діденко, 2014) and other scientists. 2. analysis the aim of the research is to elucidate the historical and cultural heritage of small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region, evaluation of the potential tourism opportunities of its use. perceptions of people about the territory value as a promising tourism method are traditionally associated with tourism richness of nature and its cultural and historical heritage, which is considered primarily as architectural attractions, historical sites, architectural monuments and more. historical heritage is the cultural potential of some area that can provide the successful development of tourism in the region. the historical and cultural tourism resources are ones of its components. historical and cultural tourism resources – are monuments of history and culture, created by man that have social and educational value, cognitive interest and can be used in the tourist activity. the composition of historic and cultural resources are attractions of history, architecture, art, ethnographic sights and folk art attractions (гуменюк, 2000). historical and cultural sights serve as a subject of study for many scientific disciplines. in most cases, they are considered as some buildings, objects, memorable places associated with the historical events, works of material and spiritual culture, which have historical, scientific, artistic or any other cultural value. in our view, the historical and cultural attractions that make and can join the tourism resources must be considered not only as individual objects with some historical or cultural value, as well as a combination of the respective types of historical and cultural resources, with high attraction, can play an important role in shaping the outlook of people and together form the historical and cultural tourism potential of the settlement (паньків, 2011). in the complex of tourist and recreational resources situated in the small historic towns cultural and historical resources that are past epochs remnants of social development take a special place. they serve as a prerequisite for the organization of cultural and cognitive types of recreational activities and on this basis optimize tourism in general, doing some serious educational functions. created with the cultural and historical sites the small towns to some extent determine the location of streams and recreational areas excursion routes (замки та фортеці: альбом, 2007). historical and cultural attractions are an essential part of the rich cultural heritage of small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region. they play an important role in the history knowledge, education of patriotism sense and commitment to their own land. historical and cultural sites have always had an impact on working conditions and recreation of people. depending on the socio-political conditions, the level of construction equipment, availability of building materials, nature-factors a variety of buildings and structures with different functionality were created. studying of the historical and cultural resources can help solve today›s pressing problems related to the formation of modern settlements identity, the creation of appropriate conditions for comfortable life. undoubtedly, all useful and valuable from our past should be used in the present and the future. the traditions of our predecessors are tied to social, economic and technological advances of our society (малюк,1997). among the cultural and historical sites leading role is given to the attractions of history and culture that stand out by the most attractiveness and as a result serve as the main means of meeting the needs of cognitive and cultural tourism. depending on the main features of historical and cultural sights are divided into five main types: historical, archeological, of urban planning and architecture, artistic, documentaries attractions. we should include other objects related to the history, culture and modern human activity to the cultural and historical potential: the original companies of industry, agriculture, transport, scientific and higher educational institutions, theaters, sports facilities, botanical gardens, zoos, oceanariums, ethnographic and folklore groups and also preserved folk customs, rituals and holidays, etc. (замки та фортеці: альбом, 2007). tourist resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region and their use 65 small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region are rich in historical and cultural resources, including: 1) sights of history and culture – ancient castles, old churches, residential and public historical and cultural attractions (pniv and galych castles). 2) four ancient rus cities (galich, tismenitsya, snyatin, tlumach) with the complex of historical and cultural sights. 3) places of birth and activity of known in ukrainian history and culture people (including a monument to marko cheremshyna in snyatyn, in the town bolekhiv – a memorial plaque to n. kobrynska, a memorial sign to ya. lopatynskyi in dolyna). 4) places of outstanding historical events (opryshky movement, the national liberation struggle of the ukrainian people) – yaremche, galich. 5) centers of traditional ukrainian crafts (‘pysankarstvo’ (easter eggs painting), ‘lizhnykarstvo’ (woolen blankets making), ‘kylymarstvo’ (carpet weaving), ‘vyshyvannya’ (embroidery), woodcarving,’goncharstvo’ (pottery), etc.) – kosiv, yaremche. historical and archaeological research confirms the settlement of most of small historic towns of ivano -frankivsk region even during the stone age. in the towns there are a lot of cemeteries and settlements – of the kievan rus and galicia-volyn principality times (гуменюк, 2000). today, most small historic towns in the region have taken distinct european look, while retaining its own unique history. a list and the brief description of some valuable sights of small towns of ivanofrankivsk region is given in table 1. in addition to architectural attractions and sacred sites, industrial and engineering construction objects are also interesting – salterns late 19th – early 20th centuries in dolyna and bolekhiv – the only example of saltern buildings in ukraine that have survived until now. in dolyna area wooden mills and forges are remained. among the engineering structures we should mention the railway stone bridge across the dniester in galych. in the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region 28 churches and 4 synagogues are protected by the state. churches are mainly distinguished by baroque style and marked with majesty and monumentality (the church of 1760 in gorodenka, church of st. nicholas in rohatyn, church of the holy panna maria christmas in dolyna, old synagogue in bolekhiv). monasteries are also under the state protection, three of them are currently used for the primary purpose, the former basilian convent in rohatyn is used as a hospital. all of these historical and cultural resources only partly serve as a basis for the educational, scientific and other types of tourism development not only of local, but also national and international importance. the study of cultural and historical resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region, allows us to set the main directions of rationalizing their use as: • reconstruction of existing and creation of new recreation centers; • improving the recreational and tourism infrastructure in the region, increasing the level of tourist complex institutions comfort; • inclusion of traditional crafts in the system of attractional recreation facilities in the region; • establishment of natural history and ethnographic recreational areas where the complex use of natural and socio-cultural tourism resources is planned. analysis of a large number of various historical and cultural sites that make up the cultural, historical and recreational resources, from the standpoint of tourism and recreation sector entities shall cover their list, description and the typology. the name of the object, its location, marking, owner, literary and other sources of the object, the location schema and a brief description of the object should be indicated in the list and characteristics of the cultural and historical sites. today the cultural and historical heritage of small historic towns does not have the basic and full list, however the objects of cultural and historical heritage are in the state register. accounting, protection and preservation of the small historic towns of the region is provided by the law of ukraine “on protection of the cultural heritage”. one of the components that characterize the tourism potential of the small towns in the region are historical and ethnographic zones. the ethnic group is a group of people belonging to a particular ethnic group. it retains the traditional elements of the household culture and dialect differences in language and forms the historical and cultural community. the emergence of ethnic groups is due to the historical peculiarities of a particular nationality or nation local groups, their social and political status, geographical conditions, occupations that has been reflected in the culture and everyday life of these groups. in the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region under the feudalism there were many ethnic groups. among them the ethnic groups of boyki and hutsuli kept their features the best, the representative settlements of which in the research region are bolekhiv and dolyna, nadvirna and kosiv. preservation of ancient customs and rituals, the main 66 natalia pankiv branches of traditional economy, their presentation on the tourism market of ukraine and europe is a priority for national tourism organizations. in the small historic towns of the region there are a significant number of architectural monuments, a detailed study and analysis of which is of great importance in terms of the conservation and their involvement in the tourism and recreation industry. by the number of monuments of architecture and urban planning the small towns of the region occupy one of a leading position in ukraine. one of the most attractive tourist architectural landmarks components of the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region are fortification buildings (tab. 2). tab. 1. the most prominent historical and cultural sites of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region no object name date of foundation description location 1 panteleimon church 12th c the complex of the cathedral belongs to the roman-byzantine style. construction of the church was completed in 1194. inscription on the stone of the southern facade western pilasters serves as the confirmation of this. galych 2 assumption cathedral 1157 a western portal, decorated with two pilasters and completed with a fronton, tympanum of which is decorated with the carved in stone composition „assumption of the virgin” has the considerable artistic value. galych 3 the heart of jesus church 1904 german stone church was built, by that time it was a wooden one on this place. dolyna 4 the virgin mary immaculate conception church 1760 the church was the first work of meretyn. gorodenka 5 church of the holy trinity 2000 the inside temple artwork was made by the artists of arts lviv academy. church was designed by the architect i.melnyka from ivano-frankivsk. tlumach 6 museum of the carpathian architecture and everyday life 1979 the museum became a part of the national reserve „ancient galych”. galych 7 the museum of wooden architecture – church of the holy spirit 1650 the basis of the museum-temple interior is the renaissance fivetier iconostasis of the 16th c. rogatyn 8 ethnographic museum „boykivshchyna” 1998 the museum exhibition „boykivshchyna” introduces the nature, history and culture of the carpathian boikivshchyna. dolyna 9 historical and ethnographic museum „beregynya” 1987 the museum exposition presents the ethnography and culture of historical and geographical area – opillya. burshtyn 10 kosovo museum of folk art and crafts of gutsulshchina 1969 the museum’s collection includes about five thousand exhibits. the museum exhibition presents the folk art of the 19th and 20th centuries. kosiv 11 carpathian regional museum of the liberation struggle 1963 today the museum presents the historical process stages of yaremchanshchina. yaremche 12 history museum of nadvirnyanshchyna 1995 the museum was created to play back the historical truth about the heroic struggle of ukrainian people for their independence on the territory of nadvirnyanshchyna. nadvirna 13 starostyn castle 14th-18th c to this day pentagon tower and the walls with loopholes are partially preserved. traces of hasty repairs, laid with bricks loopholes and entrances to the basements can be seen in some places. galych 14 pniv castle 16th c a niche for the drawbridge, the remains of a wooden block, on which chains were wound are preserved on the facade of the tower until today. nadvirna source: туризм в івано-франківській області, 2015. tourist resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region and their use 67 fortifications of the small historic towns are closely linked to their historical past, they have witnessed many events. by our time the former mighty castles have turned into ruins and castles in rohatyn and snyatyn disappeared altogether. protection and restoration of existing fortifications is necessary for the purpose of their use in tourism and for the preservation of these historic sites for future generations. a certain number of architectural monuments, registered for the accounting and protection of the state, are the objects of civil engineering, which include administrative and public buildings as well as residential and commercial buildings. the highest building of this type with height of over 50 meters is built in snyatyn (city hall). other facilities of this type include the railway station in galych, burshtyn tps building. with the construction of burshtyn tps (1962–1969) the appearance of burshtyn itself was radically changed: the high-rise residential and public buildings were built there (малюк,1997). the tourist centers «hutsulshchyna» in yaremche and kosovo, built in hutsul style, attract the attention among the public buildings of wood. they indicate the artistic tradition, taste and talent of architects. in addition, the study of all architectural monuments of small historic towns of the region has considerable importance for the study of life and household, occupation of population, especially its culture and spirituality (грабовецький, 2001). despite the fact that the number of civil construction is not so great, they can be used in tourism, including in tourist routes. museums, which are numerous in the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region, occupy an important role in the structure of architectural attractions. history of ukrainian museums begins in the second half of the 19th century when there was the formation of nations period in europe. there were great political and social changes laid in the recognizing an important cultural past of their own people by the national elite. small historical towns of ivanofrankivsk region attract tourists not only with its history, attractions of wooden, stone and sacred architecture, but also with collected numerous museum collections of materials related to the peculiarities of people’s life, their culture, traditions, art (tab. 3). tab. 2. list of the fortification buildings of the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region no object name date of creation location brief description 1 starostyn castle 14th c galych located on castle hill, on the right bank of the dniester, where the pier was located in the past. 2 pniv castle 17th c nadvirna located in the foothills of the carpathians. castle resembles a quadrangle with towers. 3 castle in gorodenka 17th c gorodenka built in the early 17th century by christopher strzhemskyi, the nobleman. located in the northern part of the downtown, on the high right bank of the yamhoriv river. 4 the remains of the castle-fortress 16th c burshtyn the famous architectural monument of the 16th c. source: малюк,1997. tab. 3. the museum heritage of the small towns in ivano-frankivsk region no name of museum location date of foundation 1 museum of galych history galych 1960 2 museum of the carpathians architecture and everyday life galych 1979 3 museum of wooden architecture rogatyn 1650 4 ethnographic museum „boikivshchina” dolyna 1998 5 historical and ethnographic museum „bereginya” burshtyn 1987 6 museum of gutsulschina folk art and everyday life kosiv 1969 7 carpathian regional museum of the liberation struggle yaremche 1963 8 museum of nadvirnyanshchyna history nadvirna 1995 9 state museum of bolekhiv history bolekhiv 1967 10 marko cheremshyna museum snyatyn 1949 11 snyatyn art and memorial museum of v. kasian snyatyn 1982 12 museum-estate of mykola uhryniv-bezhrishnyi rogatyn 2001 13 museum of tysmenytsya history named after stepan gavryliuk  tysmenytsya 1992 source: туризм в івано-франківській області, 2015. 68 natalia pankiv more than 380 thousand of exhibits are preserved in 35 museums of the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region. during the year they are visited by nearly 560 thousand people. in total in the museums of small historic towns of the region are opened more than 240 exhibitions, organized more than 7000 tours. due to the lack of display space the museums exhibit only 2% of their collections, so an issue of the museum collections show remains urgent. number of visits to museums in the small towns varies annually (tab. 4). tab. 4. museum fund dynamics of the small towns of ivano-frankivsk region year number of museums (including branches) [units] number of visits to museums for the year [thousand] 1995 8 199.2 1996 10 242.9 1997 11 228.4 1998 12 267.3 1999 13 280.0 2000 15 326.4 2001 15 347.3 2002 15 375.7 2003 15 402.0 2004 16 505.9 2005 18 447.5 2006 17 426.5 2007 17 448.3 2008 16 431.2 2009 18 422.1 2015 21 449.1 source: статистичний щорічник івано-франківської області, 2015 small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region have quite a large number of typical museums. among them are historical, architectural, literary, of local history and others. the systematization of all museums by their type was carried for a more detailed analysis (fig. 1). thus, it is clear that the historical museums form the largest number then go the museums on local history, and the same number of literary memorial and art museums. popularity of historical museums is related to the history of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region and the evidence of historical events that took place in the area. most of the monuments of architecture and urban planning are included in the tourist routes and are actively visited by tourists. however, there are those that require restoration and reconstruction, but due to the lack of budgetary funds are still in the state of emergency. small historical towns are very interesting for the tourist with their numerous attractions of the spiritual religious architecture. age of the architectural monuments does not serve so much as an important values indicator as the style signs, which hide the age of the building or the artistic value of the object. complexes of the religious buildings are mainly located in the big cities. the beginnings of the ukrainian churches emergence date back to the princely times. clearly, there were fraternities at the churches who conducted the cultural and educational work among the ukrainian population. uniting around churches, the ukrainians defended the sacred rights to their own language, religion, way of life and cultural environment. small town are rich in historical monuments of sacred architecture which is a real historical, cultural and religious value. the church architecture of small historic towns of the region is the embodiment of the national experience for centuries (tab. 5). fig. 1. the museums typical characteristics of the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region source: музеї івано-франківської області, 2015. tourist resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region and their use 69 the church architecture of the small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region which is the embodiment of national experience for centuries, traditionally proves the perfect technique of the craftsmen. thus, the historical and cultural tourism resources occupy an important place in the structure of tourism resources, which is the basis for the development of tourism of each territory. historical and cultural sites of the small historic towns practically are not evaluated as the tourist resources, many attractions are not included in the tourist routes, which leads to their use in the limited extent. this significantly affects the national tourism industry, which with the proper advertising can provide the significant economic and social impact. the problematic aspect in the towns of ivanofrankivsk are the regional differences in the historical and cultural resources locations, their inefficient and wasteful use, the inadequacy of existing tourism industry and its development potential. the volume of services does not meet the capabilities of the small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region, since they concede the optimal estimated number of tourists, which the regional towns can host. the territorial differentiation of cultural and historical resources is to allocate the main zones of tourist demand. small historical towns have a sufficiently large number of historical and cultural objects that are or may be used in the tourist routes. however, there are many small towns that have a small number of historical and cultural sites, which reduces their demand in the regional tourism market. it is advisable to divide towns into three main types to analyze the regional differences: 1) towns with many historical and cultural sites. 2) towns with an average number of historical and cultural sites. 3) towns with a small number of historical and cultural sites. all the small historical towns that are investigated have a different number of historical and cultural sites (fig. 2). so the towns with many historical and cultural sites – galich, snyatyn, kosiv, rohatyn, dolyna. towns with the average number of historical and cultural sites tlumach, bolekhiv, gorodenka, yaremche. towns with a small number of historical and cultural sites – tysmenitsya, burshtyn. tab. 5. sacral heritage of the small towns in ivano-frankivsk region no name of the church location date of foundation 1 st. panteleimon’s church galych 1194 2 the assumption cathedral galych 1586 3 christ nativity church galych 10th c 4 the nativity of the virgin church rogatyn 1642 5 st. nicholas catholic church rogatyn 1666 6 st. spirit church rogatyn 1598 7 the immaculate conception of the virgin mary catholic church gorodenka 1760 8 the assumption of blessed virgin mary church gorodenka 1763 9 armenian catholic church gorodenka 18th c 10 st. nicholas church gorodenka 1879 11 the holy trinity church tlumach 2000 12 nicholas catholic church snyatyn 15th c 13 nativity of the virgin mary church dolyna 1648 14 catholic church of holy panna maria navity dolyna 1835 15 heart of jesus church, heart of mary dolyna 1904 16 pious assumption cathedral dolyna 17 all saints church and priestmartyr josaphat burshtyn 2001 18 church of the holy cross exaltation burshtyn 1802 19 catholic church of the holy trinity burshtyn 1770–1774 20 transfiguration of the lord cathedral burshtyn 2002 21 church of the blessed virgin mary assumption yaremche 1938 source: туризм в івано-франківській області, 2015. 70 natalia pankiv 3. conclusions tourism potential is the basis for the formation of strategic directions of the tourism development in small historic towns of ivano-frankivsk region, creating the new tourism products (including the necessary infrastructure), environmental conservation, upgrading the existing tourist offer. analyzing the historical, cultural and sacred heritage localization in the region the attention should be focused on its uneven spatial distribution with the greatest potential in galych, kosiv, snyatyn and rohatyn. however, the main reasons that complicate and impede the development of tourism in the small towns include the insufficient socio-economic development of settlements, poor quality of modern transport, social and tourist infrastructure. this situation sometimes makes it impossible to use the tourism potential of the small towns of ivano-frankivsk region. considering the foregoing, it is evident that a significant cultural and historical heritage of small historic towns of the region is a leading factor in the development of the tourism industry. however, the irrational use of the small towns tourism potential, poor level of tourist infrastructure in general and the lack of a comprehensive approach to the cultural and historical heritage makes it difficult to accelerate the development process of the tourist and excursion area of the small historic towns of the investigated region. references бейдик о.о., 2001, рекреаційно-туристичні ресурси україни, впц «київський університет», київ. голіков а.п., олійник я.б., степаненко а.в., 1996, вступ до економічної і соціальної географії, либідь, київ. грабовецький в., 2001, івано-франківськ в пам’ятках історії і культури, лілея-нв, івано-франківськ. гуменюк г.м., 2000, формування національної свідомості серед учнів засобами туристично-краєзнавчої роботи, галичина, івано-франківськ. діденко к.д., 2014, роль історичних міст україни в розвитку внутрішнього туризму, український географічний журнал, 3, 52–56. замки та фортеці: альбом, 2007, мистецтво, київ. заставецька о.в., ткач д.в., 2010, географія населення україни, тнпу, тернопіль. заставний ф.д., 1994, географія україни, світ, львів. зорин и.в., квартальнов в.а., 2003, энциклопедия туризма, финансы и статистика, москва. кифяк в.ф., 2003, організація туристичної діяльності в україні: навч. посібник, зелена буковина, чернівці. кузик с.п., 2010, географія туризму, світ, львів. лаппо г.м., 1997, географія городов, владос, москва. любіцева о.о., 2002, ринок туристичних послуг, альтерпрес, київ. малюк о., 1997, замки і фортеці західної україни, світ, львів. мацола в.і., 1997, рекреаційно-туристичний комплекс україни, інститут регіональних досліджень нану, львів. музеї івано-франківської області, http:// uk.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ [03.04.2016] паньків н.м., 2011, туристичне ресурсознавство: навч. посібник, український бесцелер, львів. fig. 2. the historical and cultural sites percentage of the small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region source: туризм в івано-франківській області, 2015. tourist resources of small historical towns of ivano-frankivsk region and their use 71 пістун м.д., 1996, основи теорії суспільної географії: навч. посібник, вища школа, київ. пітюренко ю.і., 1983, системи розселення і територіальна організація народного господарства, наукова думка, київ. статистичний щорічник івано-франківської області, 2015, обласне управління статистики в івано-франківській області, івано-франківськ. туризм в івано-франківській області, http:// uk.wikipedia. org /wiki/ [03.04.2016] федорченко к.в., дьорова т.а., 2000, історія туризму в україні, навч. посібник, дніпро, київ. 1. introduction the covid-19 pandemic, which started in china in january 2020, initiated a major crisis affecting various types of human activity, including tourism (niewiadomski, 2020) and hospitality (napierała et al., 2020). in the pandemic era, the possibility of traveling in many regions of the world was significantly reduced (chinazzi et al., 2020; dinarto et al., 2020; voth, 2020). restricting the possibility travel for tourist and recreational purposes necessitated looking for alternative ways of rest and recreation. family allotment gardens fulfill many functions  – in the polish literature, allotment gardens journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(4), 49–57 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.06 allotment gardens (ag) in the days of the covid-19 pandemic. the case of “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna and “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola (poland) roman szkup department of urban geography, tourism and geoinformation, university of łódź, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-1605-5335 e-mail: roman.szkup@geo.uni.lodz.pl citation szkup r., 2020, allotment gardens (ag) in the days of the covid-19 pandemic. the case of “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna and “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola (poland), journal of geography, politics and society, 10(4), 49–57. abstract family allotment gardens (ag) are a place of rest and recreation for residents of mainly large cities. the covid-19 pandemic, which started in china in january 2020, launched a major crisis affecting various types of human activity, including tourism and hospitality, and limited travel opportunities. for many people, especially the poorer and professionally inactive ones (including retirees and pensioners), activities on plots of family allotment gardens have become the only form of active recreation. on november 5, 2020, on the official website of the international organization office international du coin de terre et des jardins familiaux, operating since 1926, representing national organizations and associations of gardeners from 14 european countries, the following information was published: “the pandemic has confirmed it: allotment gardens are more important than ever”. this article is an attempt to verify this thesis by answering the question: if and to what extent did the covid-19 pandemic influence the behavior and recreation of allotment garden users? this was verified by a questionnaire survey conducted among users of two gardens located in the western part of the suburban area of łódź. the analysis showed that the covid-19 pandemic affected the behavior and rest of allotment garden users; however, the impact in the case of the studied gardens was not as large as could be expected. key words allotment gardens (ag), allotment gardening, recreation in allotment gardens, covid-19 pandemic. received: 16 october 2020 accepted: 25 november 2020 published: 31 december 2020 50 roman szkup are described, among others, as places of social activation conducive to the activity of professionally inactive people (including pensioners and retired persons) and as places of recreation and active rest (duś, 2014; mokras-grabowska, 2020; szkup, 2013; szkup, pytel, 2016). family allotment gardens play important social functions; they are the “green lungs of cities”, and for many city dwellers, a stay on a plot of land is the only opportunity to have direct contact with nature. it is also a meeting place for close and distant families, fostering their integration. family allotment gardens also facilitate wider social integration – their specificity in this respect lies in helping to establish closer contacts with neighbors and to create small local communities (matczak, szkup, 2010). for many people, especially the poorer and professionally inactive ones (including retirees and pensioners), activities carried out on plots in family allotment gardens are the only way to rest actively (matczak, szkup, 2010; szkup, 2013; szkup, pytel, 2015). in the english-language literature, great emphasis is put on the benefits of using allotment gardens; many authors mention groups of economic, social, cultural, educational, health benefits as well as benefits for the natural environment (among others, nettle, 2010; drescher et al., 2006; perez-vazquez et al., 2005). an important and increasingly more often discussed issue is the relationship between the plot and health. most often authors discuss the health aspects of the functioning of allotment gardens, including their positive impact on their users’ health (van den berg et al., 2010), and they analyze the health significance of allotments (e.g. armstrong, 2000; bell et al., 2020; brown, jameton, 2000; twiss et al., 2003; turner, henryks, 2011; wakefield et al., 2007). the following information appeared on november 5, 2020 on the official website of the international organization office international du coin de terre et des jardins familiaux, operating since 1926 and representing national organizations and associations of allotment gardeners from 14 european countries: “the pandemic has confirmed it: allotment gardens are more important than ever”(allotment..., 2020). this article attempts to verify this thesis by answering the question: dis the covid-19 pandemic influence the behavior and rest of allotment garden users and to what extent? the answer to this question has become the main goal of this study. 2. materials and methods the research was carried out in two allotment gardens located in the cities of the łódź agglomeration. the common feature of both cities is their location in the western part of the suburbs of łódź, along the railway line connecting łódź with ostrów wielkopolski, wrocław and poznań. stefan żeromski family allotment garden (“żeromskiego” ag) is located in the town of łask, in the kolumna district, in miła and przedwiośnie streets. the garden complex borders only on clusters of single-family residential houses. a large forest complex and the łask-kolumna railway station are nearby. the garden was founded in 1962 on the initiative of local residents who wanted to create a garden to grow their own vegetables and fruit. the garden area was originally a wet wasteland that was drained and reclaimed. over time, a pond was dug in the garden. the garden lands have belonged to the state treasury since its creation. currently, “żeromskiego” ag has 135 plots, with the total area of the garden being 5,775 ha. the garden is mostly used by the inhabitants of łódź. family allotment garden “wolinka” (“wolinka” ag) is located in the city of zduńska wola in lipowa street. next to “wolinka” ag, there are singlefamily houses, a city bypass, a fire brigade station, a heat and power plant and a large housing estate. a few hundred meters away there are large industrial plants – wola and zwoltex. planning of the creation of “wolinka” ag began in 1967, and the garden itself was opened in 1970. “wolinka” ag was created on the rising tide of mass opening of allotment gardens intended for the working class in socialist poland, on the initiative of the central authorities. trade unions from the wola plant largely contributed to the creation of “wolinka” ag, as employees of this plant were mainly the first users of the plots. currently, “wolinka” ag has 237 plots, with the total area of the garden being 7,420 ha. over 90% of the garden is used by the inhabitants of zduńska wola. research in both gardens was carried out at the end of the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic in poland, at the turn of august and september 2020. the main material was obtained through the questionnaire method (a questionnaire interview). a field inventory of both gardens was also carried out. due to the fact that there is no database of legal holders and actual users of allotment gardens in poland (moskalonek et al., 2020), the survey was not representative. despite the lack of representativeness, a significant number of questionnaire allotment gardens (ag) in the days of the covid-19 pandemic… 51 interviews were conducted – 117 (tab. 1), i.e. almost 1/3 of all users of the surveyed gardens were interviewed. as the questionnaire interview was conducted in direct contact with the respondents, despite maintaining social distance (2 m distance) and protective measures in the form of facemasks or visors, some people refused to participate in the study (in both gardens there were about 15% of such refusals). it should also be noted that despite multiple visits to the gardens, about 1/3 of the plots were not used during the research period (there were no users on the plots). among 117 surveyed plot users, there were no people living permanently or with registered residence abroad. almost 40% of users lived in łódź. among the respondents, there was a significant advantage of men (58.1%) over women (41.9%), which may indicate that men are more active during the covid-19 pandemic. this conclusion is related to the research conducted by the present author in łódź allotment gardens in 2008–2014 which showed that the gender structure of users of łódź gardens is very similar to the gender structure of łódź inhabitants, where there is a slight surplus of women over men (szkup, 2013; szkup, pytel, 2015). the surplus of men in this study was most clearly visible among garden users aged 50–79; the median age of the respondents was 60.3 years and was higher by 2 years in the case of “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna. the advanced age of allotment garden users is related to their professional activity. the dominant share belonged to professionally inactive users – retirees or persons on a disability pension constituted 59% of the users, people with vocational education (48.7%), having a large family (72.6%) and describing their financial situation as average (71.8%). 3. results and discussion due to the covid-19 pandemic, a number of restrictions were introduced in the gardens under study. all events and competitions organized annually in the gardens, such as allotment plot day, garden day, or competitions for the best-developed plot, were canceled. contacts with the management of gardens were limited to a minimum, and the use of common parts of the gardens was subject to an obligation to maintain social distance and to use protective masks. the restrictions related to the covid-19 pandemic in poland were reflected in the way the plot users tab. 1. percentage structure of the surveyed users of the studied allotment gardens total “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola total number of plots 372 135 237 number of surveyed users 117 54 63 percentage of surveyed plots 31.5 40.0 26.6 sex: male 58.1 57.4 58.7 female 41.9 42.6 41.3 age: median age of the respondents [years] 60.3 62.8 58.2 under 40 years old 6.9 0.0 12.7 40–49 years old 12.8 7.4 17.5 50–59 years old 23.1 22.2 23.8 60–69 years old 35.9 53.7 20.6 70–79 years old 16.2 16.7 15.9 80 years old and more 5.1 9.5 professional status: unemployed [%] 4.3 0.0 7.9 employed [%] 36.8 29.6 42.9 retirees and pensioners [%] 59.0 70.4 49.2 place of residence: łódź [%] 38.5 83.3 0.0 other towns of the łódź agglomeration [%] 61.5 16.7 100.0 source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 52 roman szkup reached their gardens. it should be emphasized that the studied gardens are characterized by strong differentiation in terms of the places of residence of their users: the garden in łask-kolumna is mainly used by “visitors”, i.e. residents of łódź and the cities of the łódź agglomeration; the garden in zduńska wola is used almost exclusively by the inhabitants of this city. therefore, despite the fact that both analyzed gardens are located near railway stops, only in the case of “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna, the train played any role (tab. 2). going to the garden by train was declared by as many as 68.5%, which was, however, 18.5% lower than before the pandemic. as the reason for the decrease in the share of commuting by rail, the respondents declared the need to travel in protective masks and the fear of contact with strangers. because of the pandemic, there was an increase in arriving by private cars, especially to “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna (an increase by 17.9%). in the case of “wolinka” ag from zduńska wola, significant increases were recorded in the case of arriving on foot (increase by 7.0%) and by bicycle (increase by 2.1%) with a significant decrease in commuting by public transport (decrease by 9.8%). changes in the methods of getting to allotment gardens indicate a significant, conscious resignation of plot users from public transport in comparison to the period before the pandemic. the surveyed users of allotment gardens were asked whether the plot in the allotment garden was their only place of rest and recreation during the covid-19 pandemic and whether this was the case in the period before the pandemic (tab. 3). the collected research material indicates that only for 2/3 of users the plot was the only place of rest and recreation during the pandemic. compared to the period before the pandemic, the significance of the plot as the only place for recreation increased by only 9.4%. during the pandemic, the greatest increase in the importance of the allotment garden as the only place of rest and recreation was in the case of women – an increase by 12.2%, middle-aged people: 40–49 years old – an increase by 20% and 50–59 years old – an increase by 18.5%, people in employment (professionally active) – an increase by 16.3%, residents of other towns than łódź – an increase by 18.1% and the least educated people. the pandemic did not change, or changed slightly, the importance of gardens for seniors over 60 years old and for the professionally inactive persons – retirees and pensioners. in their case, both before and during the pandemic, a plot in the garden was the most important place of recreation. the surveyed users of allotment gardens were also asked whether the covid-19 pandemic changed the way they spend their leisure time on the plot in any way. only slightly more than 1/4 of the users answered “yes” to this question (fig. 1). for 72% of the respondents, the pandemic did not change recreation on the plot in any way, despite the obvious limitations resulting e.g. from restrictions on the use of common parts of the garden. the most numerous group of respondents who said that the pandemic changed their forms of recreation in the gardens were young people up to 40 years old (50%), women (36.7%), especially single mothers, people with higher and secondary education, and people not living in łódź. the pandemic had the least impact on the opinions of people with primary education, people aged 40–49 and residents of łódź. despite the fact that only every fourth surveyed garden user indicated that the covid-19 pandemic affected the change in rest and recreation on the plot in any way, in their free opinions more than 80% of the respondents indicated at least one change or limitation in the use of gardens that directly resulted from the covid-19 pandemic (fig. 2). tab. 2. the way users reach (arrive at) the studied gardens the way of arriving at the garden “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna* increase / decrease due to the covid-19 pandemic “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola* increase / decrease due to the covid-19 pandemic [%] by private car 92.6 17.9 42.9 0.7 by train 68.5 -18.5 0.0 0.0 by bike 9.3 0.6 31.7 2.1 on foot 0.0 0.0 28.6 7.0 city transport 0.0 0.0 4.8 -9.8 * more than one answer could be given source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. allotment gardens (ag) in the days of the covid-19 pandemic… 53 tab. 3. answers to the question: was/is the allotment garden the only place of rest recreation before the pandemic and during the pandemic? before the pandemic in 2018–2019 during the 2020 pandemic increase / decrease 2020 / 2018–2019 yes no yes no [%] total 57.3 42.7 66.7 33.3 9.4 sex: male 61.8 38.2 69.1 30.9 7.4 female 51.0 49.0 63.3 36.7 12.2 age: under 40 years old 12.5 87.5 12.5 87.5 0.0 40–49 years old 20.0 80.0 40.0 60.0 20.0 50–59 years old 40.7 59.3 59.3 40.7 18.5 60–69 years old 76.2 23.8 81.0 19.0 4.8 70–79 years old 78.9 21.1 84.2 15.8 5.3 80 years old and more 83.3 16.7 83.3 16.7 0.0 education: higher 37.5 62.5 50.0 50.0 12.5 secondary 48.8 51.2 53.7 46.3 4.9 vocational 61.4 38.6 71.9 28.1 10.5 primary 81.8 18.2 100.0 0.0 18.2 professional status: employed 25.6 74.4 41.9 58.1 16.3 retirees and pensioners 78.3 21.7 82.6 17.4 4.3 source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% other municipalities of the łódź agglomeration łódź retirees and pensioners employed persons primary education vocational education secondary education higher education 80 years old and more 70–79 years old 60–69 years old 50–59 years old 40–49 years old under 40 years old female male “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna total yes no fig. 1. answers to the question: did the covid-19 pandemic change the form of rest and recreation on the plot in any way? source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 54 roman szkup in the respondents’ opinions, the most frequently indicated limitations directly resulting from the covid-19 pandemic included restricting the possibility of common feasts (84.6%) and limiting the possibility of social meetings on the plot (75.2%), and only then – limiting the possibility of resting with the family (53.8%), limiting contacts with other allotment gardeners (53.0%). a very small percentage of the respondents pointed to difficulties in getting to the garden as a limitation (2.6%). the respondents were also asked to indicate how the covid-19 pandemic influenced their frequency of visiting allotment gardens (fig. 2). only 5.1% of the respondents stated that the pandemic reduced the frequency of their visits, while 43.6% of the respondents stated that the pandemic had no impact on their frequency of visiting the plot. the claim about the great importance of rest and recreation in allotment gardens in the pandemic era was confirmed by the opinions indicating the increase in the frequency of visits to the gardens – this opinion was expressed by more than half of the respondents (51.3%). the surveyed users of allotment gardens were also asked to answer the question – is there 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% increasing the frequency of visits to the plot neither increasing nor reducing the frequency of visits to the plot reducing the frequency of visits to the plot limiting the possibility of common feasts limiting the possibility of social meetings on the plot limiting the possibility of resting with the family limiting contacts with other gardeners restrictions on getting to the allotment garden 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% other municipalities of the łódź agglomeration łódź married couple with a child / children married couple without children single parent single retirees and pensioners employed persons primary education vocational education secondary education higher education 80 years old and more 70–79 years old 60–69 years old 50–59 years old 40–49 years old under 40 years old female male “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna total yes no fig. 2. changes and restrictions in using gardens due to the covid-19 pandemic in the respondents’ opinions source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. fig. 3. answers to the question: can you be infected with coronavirus during your stay on the plot? source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. allotment gardens (ag) in the days of the covid-19 pandemic… 55 a possibility of contracting coronavirus during the stay in the allotment gardens? (fig. 3). more than 3/4 of the respondents stated that, in their opinion, there is no such possibility, while 23.1% of the respondents noticed the risk of contracting the virus. the lack of possibility to become infected during their stay on the plot was most often indicated by the oldest people, aged 60–79 years. a similar opinion was also expressed by users of plots living in łódź (93.3%) and those using “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna (92.6%). the possibility of contracting coronavirus was most often indicated by young men using the “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola, those working and with higher education. the possibility of infection was also indicated by single parents. another question that the respondents had to answer was their assessment of whether or not their allotment garden is – in the context of the covid-19 pandemic – the only safe place for recreation. only 0.9% of all respondents indicated that their allotment garden is, in their opinion, not a completely safe place (fig. 4), which in the context of the answer to the previous question may be surprising. there is a paradox – despite the fact that every fourth user sees a possibility of contracting coronavirus while being in the garden, over 99% of the respondents consider this garden as a completely safe place in the context of the covid-19 pandemic. as a dangerous place in the context of the possibility of coronavirus infection, the garden was identified especially by people aged 40–49, professionally active persons and holders of plots in “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola. at the opposite extreme, there is “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna, where none of the users stated that, in their opinion, staying in this garden was pandemically dangerous. the respondents’ opinions showing that during the pandemic the allotment garden has become the only safe place to rest (fig. 4) are also a significant result of the research in view of the above question. this was declared by 47.0% of all respondents and as many as 75.9% of users of “żeromskiego” ag in łaskkolumna who permanently live in łódź. the oldest users, especially those over 80 years old (75.0%) and poorly educated people made similar statements. the last issue raised in the questionnaire interview with allotment garden holders was the problem of using the safety measures recommended during the covid-19 pandemic in the gardens (fig. 5). the conducted research clearly shows that hand disinfection is common among plot users (81.5%), and other safety measures are generally observed only in common parts of the gardens. in the common areas, social distance is kept (89.7%), and protective masks are worn (82.1%). however, it is not common to wear protective gloves (13.7%). on the 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100 % other municipalities of the łódź agglomeration łódź retirees and pensioners employed persons primary education vocational education secondary education higher education 80 years old and more 70–79 years old 60–69 years old 50–59 years old 40–49 years old under 40 years old female male “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna total the only safe place one of many safe places is not a safe place fig. 4. safety assessment of stays in allotment gardens source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 56 roman szkup other hand, pandemic recommendations are generally ignored when the respondents are on their plots – only about 3% use protective masks or visors. this clearly shows that almost every plot user in the studied allotment gardens feels completely safe on their plot. 4. conclusions the analysis of the collected research material shows that the thesis: “the pandemic has confirmed it: allotment gardens are more important than ever” should be verified only partially positively. the covid-19 pandemic influenced the behavior and recreation of allotment garden users; however, in the case of the studied gardens, this impact was not as large as could be expected. the state of development and the look of plots in the gardens indicate that a significant part of both gardens (approx. 1/3 of the plots) is not used. it cannot be authoritatively stated on this basis that only the pandemic has a direct impact on this situation. it seems, however, that the pandemic situation in the country discouraged a significant number of users from visiting allotment gardens. the fact that only for approx. 66% of the respondents, the allotment garden has become the only place to rest in the pandemic era, even though the safety of such rest is highly valued, is also a confirmation of only partial verification of the thesis postulated in the introduction. the paradox is that despite the fact that every fourth user sees a possibility of contracting coronavirus while staying in the garden, for over 99% of the users this garden is a completely safe place in the context of the covid-19 pandemic, where precautionary measures against the pandemic, such as social distancing, protective masks and visors, and hand disinfection are commonly used (especially in common areas). according to the author of the article, the research should be repeated in the spring of 2021. it is highly probable that the research results presented in the article and the attitudes of allotment garden users in poland were influenced by the very timing of the research – the turn of august and september 2020, i.e. at the end of the first wave of the pandemic. at that time, the restrictions were significantly loosened and official messages from polish state authorities indicated that the covid-19 pandemic in poland was under control. acknowledgment students of the university of łódź who collected materials for their bachelor’s theses, aleksandra marczyk (“żeromskiego” ag) and magdalena rosiak (“wolinka” ag), participated in collecting data. references allotment gardens: where urban farming is old-school, 2020, office international du coin de terre et des jardins familiaux, 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introduction the dynamic development of offshore wind energy started at the beginning of the 21st century, when in 2001 the middelgrunden farm with a capacity of 40 mw was connected to the grid in the øresund strait. earlier in europe, small projects had been developed, often of an experimental or research nature. despite market fluctuations, the accumulated capacity in the offshore sector has been growing exponentially over the last 10 years. according to the “global wind energy council” report (global..., 2020) on development of the global offshore wind market, a total of 6.1 gw of new offshore wind generation capacity will be installed globally in 2019. this makes offshore farms the most dynamic sector of renewable energy sources (res) not only in europe, but also in china and the united states. in the first half of 2019, the international renewable energy agency indicated in its report “renewable power generation costs in 2018” (anuta et al., 2019) that between 2018 and 2020, wind farms became cost-competitive journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(1), 6–15 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.1.02 the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms piotr biniek institute of spatial management and socio-economic geography, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 18, 70–383 szczecin, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-5953-1987 e-mail: piotrbiniek.bin@gmail.com citation biniek p., 2021, the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(1), 6–15. abstract offshore wind farms have become one of the fastest growing renewable energy technologies in recent years. projects developed in the area of the polish exclusive economic zone (eez) are considered crucial for the future of the energy sector in poland. one of the arguments for the development of this sector is the common opinion among investors and decision makers that offshore wind farms are much less exposed to the risk of social conflicts compared to onshore installations. due to the lack of completed investments in the polish eez area and restriction of possible construction of farms to baltic shoals only, explicit exclusion of the risk of protests seems wrong. the article identifies the factors of offshore wind farms owf localization and the most important social groups at risk of participating in social conflicts. the delphi method research indicates that, above all, numerous conflicts with other users of the maritime area should be expected, and the groups most vulnerable to conflict are fishermen, environmentalists, media and residents of coastal municipalities. key words offshore wind energy, offshore wind farm, polish exclusive economic zone, south baltic sea, renewable energy sources. received: 17 january 2021 accepted: 13 march 2021 published: 31 march 2021 the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms 7 compared to conventional power generation. the dynamically growing sector is responsible not only for increasing the balance of renewable energy, but also a clear stimulus for developing the maritime industry. wind europe estimates that 75,000 people are directly employed by the industry (walsh, 2020). note that despite still significantly higher investment costs than onshore, owf are increasingly competitive. this is due to the following features of this technology (anuta et al., 2019; blažauskas et al., 2012; czapliński, 2016; lewandowski, 2010; sobolewski, 2010; wiśniewski et al., 2012): • wind on large open waters blows with greater speed and less variability than on land, which significantly improves not only the utilization coefficients of the wind energy source itself, but also the stability of the power system; • no space limitations allow for the installation of larger wind turbines; it is also easier to transport large components by sea from the production site to the installation site; • offshore wind farms do not arouse such strong emotions in the society and do not cause extreme social conflicts. poland has one of the largest economic potentials of offshore wind farms in the baltic sea. given the natural, economic and military constraints, the total area where offshore wind farms (owf) can be built was initially determined by the maritime institute as 3590 km2, which corresponds to a technical potential of 35 gw. the act of 21st march 1991 on maritime areas of the republic of poland and maritime administration (act ..., 1991) and its amendment of 2011 limits the construction of owf only to the area of the polish exclusive economic zone (polish eez). commissioned by the ministry of transport, construction and maritime economy, a map was developed (fig. 1) designating the northern and northeastern side of the słupsk bank, the south and southwestern side of the middle shoal and the northern side of the eastern boundary of the pomeranian bay as the location of future farms. although no wind farm has been built in the polish eez area so far, that investors are highly consistent in the development of specific projects. the total capacity of the 13 offshore wind farm projects which have already been granted the conditions is nearly 7100 mw. the main players on the market are polenergia sa, pge energia odnawialna, pkn orlen and the baltic trade and invest capital group. considering that offshore wind energy (owe) plays an increasingly important role in europe and in the world, it can be expected that this energy sector will move from the planning phase to the implementation phase also in poland (purta et al., 2016; stryjecki et al., 2013). although one of the features of offshore wind energy is the lack of social conflicts related to the nimby effect, british experience in particular shows that specific locations may arouse strong opposition fig. 1. the map of sites intended for the location of wind farms in the polish eez source: own study based on: matczak, psuty, 2017. 8 piotr biniek from various groups (todt et al., 2011). whereas on land the protests against the construction of wind farms come primarily from local residents, at sea it is mainly fishermen and environmental organizations who come out in force. although power plants in the polish eez area cannot be built too close to the bird routes, it is difficult to determine the actual impact of the owf on the baltic avifauna at the planning stage. the list of potential sources of environmental and social conflicts is certainly unknown, especially that the studies of the impact on the environment and fisheries to date are ambiguous and even full of contradictions (see: morska farma ..., 2015; stryjecki et al., 2013). once built, the offshore wind farm is a navigational obstacle and marks an area closed to ship traffic (except for service ships). vessels are forced to bypass the farm at a sufficient distance, and the owf are defined as sea structures threatening the safety of maritime traffic (gucma, mattac, 2002). numerous potential areas of conflict have emerged in the course of this research. the scale of offshore installations and the theoretical freedom to configure and locate turbines, currently overlooked or even unknown risks regarding environmental impact, such as noise emissions or impact on birds, may be even more important than in the case of onshore wind farms. variable elements, such as wind, sea state or visibility, are important elements influencing the occurrence and significance of environmental collisions of this technology. this article analyzes the risk of social conflicts with the delphi method in light of the assessment of owf location factors. the spatial dimension of the research focused on the relationships between the indicated locations, their relations with other forms of using the polish eez and the natural environment. the social dimension of the research concerned groups at risk of participating in social conflicts resulting from the development of owe. the basic research question concerned the determination of which factors of owe localization are the most important in terms of the risk of social conflicts. the research hypothesis assumed that, in practice, most of the owe localization factors are characterized by high sensitivity to social conflicts; however, particularly important factors can be identified. 2. methodology of research on owf location factors the adoption of the delphi interviews as the key research method for the location factors of owe required, apart from establishing a list of experts, also the preparation of an appropriate questionnaire. in this paper, a set of questions – in particular, regarding the location factors – was developed primarily on the basis of the available, extensive literature in this field, including g. rowe and g. wright (1999), m. matejun (2012), and j.w. creswell (2013). however, due to the limited use of the classic division of industry location factors, a decision was made to conduct additional research in the form of unstructured indepth interviews with three industry experts. based on the interviews, a detailed list and breakdown of the location factors was prepared, and consequently a list of survey questions was sent in two rounds to a group of experts selected on the basis of observations of professional activity and recommendations of the polish wind energy association. in addition, experts answered the question about the possibility of implementing solutions mitigating the effects of social protests from onshore wind energy. 21 people responded to the invitation to participate in the study. the questionnaire was prepared in the google forms tool, whose main feature is the effective management of the information collection process, as well as the ongoing modification of the questionnaire while protecting data that is stored on an external server. the questions, arranged in sections, related to the forecasts of owe development in poland. experts identified conflict areas in the physical space of the polish eez and social space and assessed social groups due to the risk of conflict or collision. the detailed sensitivity of individual social groups was assessed using a linear scale. the basic task of assessing the location factors was carried out using a multiple-choice form. one of the sections contained questions about conflict management and assessment of the possibility of implementing solutions mitigating the effects of social protests. the research results were used to assess the significance of the owe localization factors with regard to the risk of social conflicts in terms of time and space. the quantitative and qualitative data were collected simultaneously and in parallel in each round of the research. the ibm spss statistics 25.0 software was used to develop the results of the analyses. the first forms were dispatched in january 2020, the second round in march 2020. in the course of the research, the necessary technical correction of the questions was made and, on the basis of expert advice, it was decided that respondents should complete the form themselves using an online survey, which was due to the covid-19 pandemic. the inevitable loss of content and data that could be obtained during personal free interviews has been minimized by increasing the number of specific questions as well as open-ended questions relating to the key research topics. the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms 9 the phenomenon of social conflict in owe is related not only to specific location factors but also to stakeholder groups, sometimes referred to as players or actors of the conflict. identification and determination of mutual relations between groups was important not only as regards the analysis of factors and forecasting social processes, but also as a basis for presenting tools to mitigate the effects of experts’ protests. as part of the research, the results of surveys on diagnosing social groups were analyzed using friedman’s analysis of variance in order to compare the estimates of the probability of involvement of given groups in a conflict. the consulted experts rated the probability on a scale from 1 – negligible probability, to 5 – very high probability. the conducted analysis showed significant differences between the groups, χ2(17)=157.29; p<0.001. in order to determine the nature of the differences in assessments between the analyzed social groups, an additional post hoc analysis was conducted using the dunn’s test with bonferroni correction of the significance level. 3. owe location factors and social conflicts fig. 2 presents descriptive statistics for the assessments of the compared social groups and other stakeholders of the current and future owe sector. as shown in the figure, the highest-rated conflict probability was assigned to the group of fishermen, pro-ecological entities, media and residents of coastal municipalities. the results of the research confirm experts’ forecasts expressed in open questions. note that mainly fishermen expressed their objections in public discussions, who pointed to the impediment to access to fisheries and the closure of trawling areas due to the construction of underwater cable routes (morska farma ..., 2015). according to representatives of fishing groups, owe locations in the polish eez may significantly hinder or completely prevent the use of the fishing quotas allocated to poland. the owners of recreational fishing cutters also have many concerns, arguing that the owf will limit access to popular areas used by recreational and angling sea tourism operating, inter alia, in the northern part of the słupsk bank. as an introduction to the analysis of owf location factors, the shoals were assessed for the likelihood of social protests. the same statistical method was used for the study as for the assessment of social groups. friedman’s analysis of variance showed significant differences in the assessment of shoals, χ2(2)=8.94; p=0.011. in order to determine differences, an additional post hoc analysis was performed using dunn’s test with bonferroni correction of the significance level. the average rank in the analyses is 4.26 5.26 5.26 6.43 7.45 7.48 8.24 8.29 9.17 9.62 9.64 10.76 11.14 11.14 12.17 13.17 15.40 16.12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 cable installation companies logistics and transport companies manufacturers of components for offshore wind farms companies involved in the construction of offshore wind farms energy market operators tourists of coastal (beach) municipalities tourists, sailors and sea sports scientific institutions / entities from the r&d sector army entities that submitted localization applications supreme organs of state administration (government of the republic of poland, ministers) investors local authorities of state or local administration* ports and shipping residents of coastal municipalities media environmental entities fishermen * – provincial governors, marshals, district governors, mayors, as well as maritime authorities fig. 2. average rank of the probability of a conflict related to owe source: own study based on research. 10 piotr biniek calculated in such a way that the data are sorted from the smallest to the largest – they are assigned ranks (consecutive natural numbers) and then an average is created for such data. the analysis showed that the probability of social protests in the middle shoal was assessed lower than in the case of the słupsk bank. nevertheless, after considering the correction for multiple comparisons, this difference ceased to be significant (p=0.098). the differences in the assessments of the słupsk and the odra banks turned out to be insignificant (p=1.000), just as between the middle shoal and the odra bank (p=0.173). in experts’ opinions, such a result suggests that all three shoals show a similar degree of probability of social protests. the results of the analyses are presented in fig. 3. experts pointed out that the potential risk of conflicts at owe depends not only on a given shoal, but also on the investment stage, as well as on individual project characteristics, such as the size and the type of turbines, the type of foundations and the energy transmission technology. the delphi research in the field of location factors assessment was aimed at diagnosing a hypothetical future that may concern the development of owe in the southern baltic sea. due to the large number of theoretical location factors, they were divided into 5 groups. the first one comprised environmental (natural) factors, the second one – technical factors (including infrastructural and spatial ones). the next groups were social and economic factors, and factors defined as “other”, including political, military or maritime cluster ones. 21 experts took part in the study, and their task was to select the most important factors from each group in terms of the risk of social conflicts. detailed results of the analyses are presented in fig. 4 to 8. of the environmental factors (fig. 4) which may affect the risk of conflict, experts most often indicated the impact of the project implementation on birds and sea animals, as well as the presence of protected areas and visual effects. the shape of the bottom, the impact on the operation of radars and acoustic effects were the least frequently indicated. it is interesting to draw experts’ attention to the importance of visual effects as a conflict factor. note that, according to polish law, wind farms must be away from the shore outside the territorial sea zone (over 12 inm). with such a large distance, even farms located on the border of the polish eez will be visible during the day only in very good weather conditions. however, as experts note, at night, wind turbines are a source of strong flashing red light which can be seen, for example, from rooms in high-rise seaside hotels. additionally, the visual effects may be detrimental to sailors for whom it is also a difficult and dangerous navigational obstacle. some experts also pay attention to the influence of turbines on radars. this factor may be much more important after the first investment is completed. the experience of the british army shows that constructions of this type can have a significant adverse effect on operating this type of equipment. of the important technical factors (fig. 5) experts pointed to the proximity of the proper port, energy collection and the shape of the bottom to cable routes, as well as access to the port and the presence of mined areas. the technology currently available was the least frequently indicated factor. note that the ‘port proximity’ factor relates not only to issues related to fishermen’s protests, but also to the impact of farms on shipping. some locations will require changes to traditional routes, with increased costs. the issue of energy consumption is also an important source of potential social conflicts from the group of technical factors. in order to connect and evacuate power from a wind farm, it is necessary to implement a number of onshore grid investments. cable routes, transformers, connections to highvoltage power lines require large areas and severely limit the development of other activities – in particular tourism. 1.58 2.18 2.25 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 middle shoal odra bank słupsk bank fig. 3. the average rank of the probability of an owe-related conflict on individual shoals source: own study based on research. the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms 11 note that as many as 95.2% of respondents indicated that fishing activity is the conflicting factor from the group of social factors (fig. 6), followed by the activity of environmental organizations. the experts least often indicated the activity of sailing tourism. as a group exposed to protests, fishermen are also most often mentioned in reports on owe in the polish eez area. in the public consultations, this group points to the impediment to access to fisheries and the closure of trawling areas due to the construction of underwater cable routes. according to representatives of fishing groups, owf locations in 4 6 8 10 11 12 13 21 0 5 10 15 20 shape of the bottom impact on the operation of radars acoustic effects generated by shovels, including infrasound noise underwater noise and vibration destruction of natural spawning grounds visual effects presence of protected areas (distance from areas) effects on birds, sea animals 21 4 6 8 10 11 11 11 12 12 0 5 10 15 20 technology currently available the proximity of other technical facilities availability of ancillary infrastructure construction and transportation costs shaping the bottom for cable routes access to the port mined areas and archaeologically valuable areas the proximity of the proper port energy reception 21 fig. 4. number of indications for environmental and natural factors influencing the risk of conflict source: own study based on research. fig. 5. number of indications for technical, infrastructural and spatial factors influencing the risk of conflict source: own study based on research. 12 piotr biniek the polish eez may significantly hinder or completely prevent the use of the fishing quotas allocated to poland. the owners of recreational fishing cutters are also concerned. popular areas used by recreational and fishing sea tourism are located, i.a., in the słupsk bank. the general postulate of the fishing community is to postpone the issuance of location decisions for the owf until the actual impact of the turbines on the ichthyofauna, including the life cycle and migration routes of fishing species, is examined. however, this postulate was not fulfilled – the prepared development plan in practice left areas for the development of owe on baltic shoals. however, in the group of economic factors (fig. 7), the profitability of the investment as well as the size of the wind farm itself turned out to be the most important. both factors are strongly correlated: polska grupa energetyczna estimates the cost of building offshore wind farms with a capacity of approx. 1,000 mw for approx. pln 12–14 billion. such high investment costs generate wide interest from many entities who see both their opportunities and threats in this sector. in the delphi survey, one of the additional questions was: “please indicate possible motivations of investment opponents why can they protest, what are their interests, what values guide them?” experts had no doubts that the most common reason for involvement in the protest was precisely the economic factor. experts indicated, inter alia, law firms and pr companies as a group of particular interest when it comes to motivating participation in protests. lawyers or specialists in social communication may, of course, simply be employed by the parties to conduct activities related to extinguishing (or strengthening) conflicts, but according to experts, an active role cannot be ruled out either. it is a truism to say that such entities “live off conflicts”, and one can imagine a situation where the motivation (even unconscious) is the desire to constantly fuel it. energy supply forecasting and wind measurement costs were the negligible economic factors. in the group of factors referred to as “other” (fig. 8), experts most often point to the significance of central political decisions as a risk of conflicts. another important factor was the plans for the development of energy networks. proximity to borders and the presence of a cluster of offshore wind farms were indicated least frequently. the motives of the military representatives (military aspects factor) may be interesting. this factor was not highly rated in expert surveys, but in informal discussions (journalistic off-record strategy), survey participants, especially practitioners, drew attention to systemic, often legally and substantively unjustified, blocking of investments by representatives of the army, who are not involved in planning work related to the future of polish eez. 5 8 8 11 14 20 0 5 10 15 20 sailing tourism activity past social protests in the area affected by the investment tourist traffic volume ("beach tourists") experiences of local communities regarding onshore wind energy activity of environmental organizations to date in the area of investment impact fishing activity in the area of the investment impact 21 fig. 6. number of indications for social factors influencing the risk of conflict source: own study based on research. the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms 13 2 2 7 8 8 8 12 13 15 0 5 10 15 20 wind measurement costs forecasting energy supplies the costs of the port service of the investment windfall analysis and owe productivity for a given location shape of the bottom work progress for specific projects distance from the shore the size of the wind farm investment profitability (general) 21 2 3 11 12 13 14 17 0 5 10 15 20 presence of a clustef of offshore wind farms the proximity of the borders attitude of local selfgovernment authorities no coherent policy for the baltic sea military aspects plans for the development of energy networks central political decisions 21 fig. 7. number of indications for social factors influencing the risk of conflict source: own study based on research. fig. 8. number of indications for other factors influencing the risk of conflict source: own study based on research. 14 piotr biniek 4. conclusions the research on the factors of owf location in the baltic sea directly relates to three shoals indicated as areas for the development of this technology. statistical analysis shows that some of the factors are considered extremely important by experts, in particular: “impact on birds, marine animals” from the environmental group, or “fishing activity” from the group of social factors. the factors related to the presence of protected areas and “underwater noise and vibration” were of great importance. the correctness of the assessment of these factors by experts is confirmed by the british experience, in which these very threats were most often used by the opponents of the imf construction. the importance of factors directly related to fishermen as a social group is confirmed, inter alia, by the seanergy2023 project financed by international energy efficiency, as well as by the roadmap for maritime spatial planning (2008) prepared by the european commission and the sectoral development plan for owe in scotland (blue seas green energy, 2011), indicating the need for a detailed study of the impact of investments on fisheries. subsequently, the sectors of tourism and maritime transport, as well as the mining industry, are mentioned as groups at risk of conflict. the qualitative data obtained in expert interviews clearly show a high risk of social conflicts at owe in the polish eez area. the data obtained in the form of qualitative conclusions may be the basis for the development of universal assumptions for the development and, consequently, implementation of mechanisms and tools mitigating the effects of possible protests. according to the authors, preventive action is much more important. the current state of advancement of investments in the polish eez is the proverbial last chance for educational campaigns aimed at the broadly understood society. the case of onshore wind energy, the development of which has been halted for many years due to social protests, should be a clear warning for both owe investors and decision makers, especially that the difficulties, delays or blockades of investments due to possible protests are much more severe for the owf. references anuta h., ralon p., talyor m., 2019, renewable power generation costs in 2018, international renewable energy agency, abu dhabi. blažauskas n., włodarski m., paulauskas s., 2013, perspectives for offshore wind energy development in the south-east baltics, klaipėda university, klaipėda. blue seas – green energy: a sectoral marine plan for offshore wind energy in scottish territorial waters, 2011, marine scotland, the scottish government, edinburgh. creswell j.w., 2013, projektowanie badań naukowych (eng. designing scientific research), wydawnictwo uniwersytetu jagiellońskiego, kraków. czapliński p., 2016, problemy rozwoju morskiej energetyki wiatrowej na południowym bałtyku (eng. problems of development of offshore wind power in the southern baltic), prace komisji geografii przemysłu polskiego towarzystwa geograficznego, 30(3), 173–184. global wind report 2019, 2020, gwec global wind energy council, brussels. gucma l., mattac m., 2002, wpływ lokalizacji morskich elektrowni wiatrowych na bezpieczeństwo żeglugi (eng. impact of the location of offshore wind farms on the safety of navigation), polskie stowarzyszenie energetyki wiatrowej, szczecin. lewandowski wm, 2010, proekologiczne odnawialne źródła energii (eng. pro-ecological renewable energy sources), wydawnictwo naukowo-techniczne, warszawa. matczak m., psuty i., 2017, projekt planu zagospodarowania przestrzennego polskich obszarów morskich w skali 1:200 000. zebrane dane i analiza uwarunkowań (eng. draft spatial development plan for polish sea areas on a scale of 1:200,000. collected data and analysis of conditions), instytut morski, morski instytut rybacki pib, gdańskgdynia. matejun m., 2012, metoda delficka w naukach o zarządzaniu (eng. the delphi method in management sciences), [in:] e. kuczmera-ludwiczyńska (ed.), zarządzanie w regionie. teoria i praktyka. (eng. management in the region. theory and practice), oficyna wydawnicza sgh, warszawa, 173–182. morska farma wiatrowa bałtyk środkowy iii. raport o oddziaływaniu na środowisko (eng. central baltic iii offshore wind farm. report on environmental impact), 2015, grupa doradcza smdi, warszawa. purta m., marciniak t., rozenbaum k., 2016, rozwój morskiej energetyki wiatrowej w polsce. perspektywy i ocena wpływu na lokalną gospodarkę (eng. development of offshore wind energy in poland. prospects and impact assessment on the local economy), mckinsey & company, poznań. roadmap for maritime spatial planning, 2008, commission of the european communities, brussels. rowe g., wright g., 1999, the delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and analysis, international journal of forecasting, 15 (4), 353–375. sobolewski, m., 2010, perspektywy wykorzystania odnawialnych źródeł energii w polsce (eng. increasing the usage of renewable energy sources in poland), bas studies, 1(21), 267–290. stryjecki m., wójcik m., sokołowski j., biegaj j., bojanowska b., gabryś a., 2013, program rozwoju morskiej energetyki i przemysłu morskiego w polsce (eng. programme for the development of offshore energy and maritime industry in the risk of social conflicts in the south baltic area in light of the location of factors of offshore wind farms 15 poland), fundacja na rzecz energetyki zrównoważonej, warszawa. todt o., gonzález m.i., estévez b., 2011, conflict in the sea of trafalgar: offshore wind energy and its context, wind energy, 14 (5), 699–706. doi: 10.1002/we.446 ustawa z dnia 21 marca 1991 r. o obszarach morskich rzeczypospolitej polskiej i administracji morskiej (eng. act of 21st march 1991 on the maritime areas of the republic of poland and maritime administration), 1991 (dz.u. 1991 nr 32 poz. 131). walsh c., 2020, offshore wind in europe key trends and statistics 2019, wind europe, brussels. wiśniewski g., ligus m., michałowska-knap k., arcipowska a., 2012, morski wiatr kontra atom (eng. sea wind versus the atom), greenpeace polska, warszawa. journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(4), 1–7 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.01 transformation of the conditions of socio-economic development of azerbaijan in the post-pandemic period (by september 2020) ismayilov chingiz department of economic and social geography, baku state university, academician zahid khalilov 23, az 1148 baku, azerbaijan. e-mail: ischingiz@gmail.com citation chingiz i., 2020, transformation of the conditions of socio-economic development of azerbaijan in the post-pandemic period (by september 2020), journal of geography, politics and society, 10(4), 1–7. abstract the global economic crisis and the spread of the pandemic virus in a short period have radically changed the world around people. the curtailment of production, the closure of different kinds of services, self-isolation, and the distribution of virtual contacts has become characteristic in the state of almost every country. depending on the level of socio-economic development, not all countries are equally experiencing this difficult period of crisis in modern civilization. the spread of covid-19 and the global economic crisis, accompanied by a sharp drop in oil prices, have had a significant impact on the socio-economic condition of the oil exporting countries. azerbaijan, such a country facing these emerging problems, has taken steps to prevent the spread of the pandemic beyond the metropolitan region. thanks to a balanced fiscal and monetary policy of the government, as well as the availability of sufficient foreign exchange reserves, the negative impact of the above factors has been minimized. the implementation of the oil strategy of the republic has created favorable conditions for the development of the non-oil sector of the economy. participation in international transport and logistics projects contributed to the development of inter-district and intra-district transport infrastructures. an extensive network of transport and communication systems has favored the economic development of the regions of the republic. despite the changing conditions of social economic development of the country, the process of creating infrastructure facilities continued. of course, the new conditions have adjusted the implementation of state programs for the construction of new economic and socially significant facilities. large financial deductions from the sovereign oil fund of the republic allowed for the shortest possible time to put into operation mobile hospitals, enterprises for the production of medical masks, as well as subsidies to support small and medium enterprises. the new picture more actualizes the development of the non-oil sector of the economy, especially the agricultural sectors. with this in mind, when developing a new strategy for the future development of the republic, one should take into account the lessons of the occurrence of previously unforeseen risks. this will mitigate the blow of new possible cataclysms and get out of the crisis situations with the least social and economic losses. key words transformation conditions, economic development, post-pandemic period, oil industry, azerbaijan. received: 26 june 2020 accepted: 11 november 2020 published: 31 december 2020 2 ismayilov chingiz 1. introduction the ongoing processes of globalization are expanding the area of human activity, which largely depends on the level of development of interstate economic contacts. the extensive network of international logistics infrastructure has played an important role in the growth of human mobility. due to the high pace of development of population mobility, a process of “compression” of the area and its accessibility in time was taking place. the acceleration of trade operations and the interchange of goods have gradually changed the picture of perception of the scale of the area. due to the expansion of the transport communications network and the transport accessibility of the territory, practically of any place on the earth, people gradually ceased to objectively evaluate in reality the scales of extending areas. of course, as in life, at a high speed of movement, it is difficult to evaluate the scale of the area surrounding us, and only by stopping, we can “see” the world around us in reality close to the truth. all of the above can be projected onto our world today, in the context of a growing, and still completely incomprehensible to us, global economic crisis, coupled with the ubiquitous spread of the covid-19 virus pandemic. the spread of the pandemic in almost all countries of the world has made it necessary to conduct relevant research. scientific publications considered the development of epidemiological models and the medical aspect of the issue (galvani et al., 2003; gumel et al., 2004; lipstich et al., 2003; wang et al., 2006; yu et al., 2007) and also analyzed the impact of the pandemic on all aspects of public life (brief#2:..., 2020; keogh‐brown et al., 2010; kneips, 2020; nicola, 2020, wilson, 2020). analysis of these publications showed that there is no definite answer to the duration of the period of the spread of the disease. the development of economic relations of azerbaijan, both with neighboring countries and with distant foreign countries, has largely become possible thanks to a balanced foreign policy, implementation of oil strategy programs and the consistent realization of effective measures for the social economic development of the country. the gradual increase in the level of well-being of the population of the country contributed to the expansion of the geography of international relations of the republic. a comparative analysis of the features of the socio-economic development of the republic with neighboring countries, as well as with countries where the oil industry plays a decisive role in their economic development, revealed certain similarities and differences in the strategies for transforming their economy. so, what are the features of the transformation of the conditions of socio-economic development of azerbaijan in this challenging and unpredictable period of the spread of the covid-19 virus pandemic? 2. the value of area is changing, the structure of the economy is being transformed, and the importance of suburbanized zones is growing the current conditions of loosening the foundations of the sustainability of the global economy are determined by the revision of certain provisions of the views of the founder of modern economic science, milton friedman, who believed that the most important locomotive of economic development is to ensure profit. obviously, it is necessary to take into account the cardinal nature of changing the configuration of the functioning area of the world economic system. gradually, features of the fragmentation of the global economic area began to emerge. most countries have begun to implement measures to ensure their economic security. for this purpose, a number of countries began to close their borders and temporarily nullified all types of economic ties. those countries that, contrary to the spread of the pandemic, continued to maintain economic relations faced the emergence of foci of the spread of the virus primarily in the border areas. the spread of the pandemic revealed at first glance the loss of the threat of the nationalistic aspirations of the developed countries to maintain their advantages, due to years of established privileges in solving international political and economic problems of the world. creation of various political and economic alliances, with the involvement of developing countries, created the illusion of the complete erasure of the characteristic features of nationalism. the globalization processes of “blurring” of the borders as if became an additional confirmation of these shifts. however, the migration processes of the population, increase of financial and economic crises, the uneven socio-economic development of individual countries within the union associations, clearly showed the fragility of the created union structures. an example of the beginning of such processes was the british exit from the eu (brexit). fundamental disagreements between the eu member states on the issues of refugee acceptance, distribution of financial resources, structural reforms and other issues have become the prerequisites for shattering the eu’s foundations. the desire to impose the vision on the implementation of reforms and future development strategies, without taking into account transformation of the conditions of socio-economic development… 3 the particularities of the development of each country, has caused concern among potential candidates who have been trying to become eu members for many years. an example of this is turkey, which no longer seeks to claim this role. disappointment in the eu is also evident from some participants in the “eastern partnership with the eu” program. in particular, azerbaijan, in accordance with its national interests, within the framework of the proposed projects, expressed its desire to re-discuss certain provisions of cooperation with the eu. the spatio-temporal scale of the spread of the virus pandemic plunged the world community into global shock. most of all this was felt by people employed in the service sector. in this regard, countries with the dominant share of the service sector turned out to be a kind of hostages of the situation, where this sphere of human activity during the period of strict self-isolation to a large extent became unclaimed. as a result, the social situation of people in the service sector has sharply worsened. taking into account the growth rates of this industry, one can imagine the consequences of economic damage to the global economy. “according to the world bank (wb), the average share of the services sector in the structure of the world’s gdp from 1997 to 2019 increased from 50% to 55%. the largest economies of the g20, whose total share in world gdp by the end of last year amounted to 78%, have significant differences in the distribution of sources of wealth: in the same period, the service sector expanded from 57% to 62%, and the share of the “real” economy dropped below 40%” (zelcer, 2020). in leading industrialized countries, the share of the service sector varies between 65–77%. one can imagine what the consequences of the spread of covid-19 will be for macau and hong kong, where the share of the service sector in gdp is 94% and 89%, respectively. according to a number of experts (bloom, 2020), a pandemic and economic downturn in the entertainment industry alone over the course of 5 years will cost $160 billion. in contrast, the changing picture of international economic relations most clearly showed the importance of the real economy. it is known that the development of the service sector characterizes the growth of social welfare. however, without the development of the real economy it is impossible to ensure the sustainable development of the country; therefore, it is very important to implement measures to promote the development of this sector of the economy. paradoxically, the threat of a possible shortage in the supply of food to the population has put on the agenda a review of the issue of ensuring food security in each country. the pandemic showed the degree of socio-economic vulnerability of those countries that are most dependent on food imports. therefore, a full use of the natural resource potential, with the aim of developing the agricultural sector, will contribute to solving the problems of ensuring the food security of the country. it is known that each country usually has its own weaknesses that determine their vulnerability in the case of econo mic crises and new challenges. in the south caucasus region, economic development largely depends – in azerbaijan on export of hydrocarbon raw materials, in georgia on the development of the tourism sector, in armenia – on external financial borrowings. all of these sectors were mostly affected by the current crisis. the volatility of oil prices hardly surprises anyone, and the restoration of the tourism industry and attracting potential investors is a more complex and time-consuming process. therefore, the exit of the countries of the region from the state of recession will require a longer time. having a sufficient volume of its foreign exchange reserves, azerbaijan continues to implement the next state program for the development of regions, with the aim of putting into operation new stations for power supply of peripheral zones and developing a network of transport infrastructure in districts of the republic remote from the center. along with this, the creation of new farms in rural areas contributes to the opening of new jobs, which favorably affects the increase in the attractiveness of rural settlements. although the economic crisis and pandemic impacted farms, at the same time it attracted the attention of urban residents. the spread of the pandemic in the republic, mainly within the agglomeration of baku, has become an additional factor in increasing the attractiveness of suburbanized zones. as in many countries, the citizens rushed to the provinces for temporary residence for the period of self-isolation. by the closure of aviation and the practical impossibility of leaving the country for vacations, citizens began to rent cottage housing in suburbanized areas and in mountainous areas of the republic from april-may. a sharp increase in demand in the domestic tourism market led to a corresponding increase in prices in the services sector. according to our calculations, the monthly cost of house renting in the summer cottage area increased by 2–3 times. the ongoing shifts in the revaluation of the cost of space in rural areas may serve as a new regulator for a more complete and efficient use of the natural resource and human potentials of the regions of the republic. as indicated in the development concept “azerbaijan2020: a look into the future” (“azərbaycan.., 2012), one of the main directions of 4 ismayilov chingiz the future development of the country is to promote the development of the non-oil sector of the economy. the current development of transport, construction, tourism and agricultural production, as the leading links in the non-oil sector, play an important role in the socio-economic development of the regions of the republic. 3. reconstruction and adaptation to new conditions of socio-economic development one can say that the distribution of covid-19 is becoming a tool for changing people’s lifestyles, which is clearly manifested in relation to education, the service sector, recreation and leisure. but most importantly, consumer needs are radically changing, which is reflected in the implementation of financial costs. therefore, it can already be argued that we are witnessing a paradigm shift in people’s lives. the global economic crisis, plus the spread of the pandemic and, as a result, large-scale measures for self-isolation, will consistently reorient our attitude to the outside world. the satellite images which testify to the improvement of the ecological state of the air in highly urbanized areas of europe allow us to optimistically assess the natural possibilities of selfhealing of the natural environment. however, the relaxation of quarantine and self-isolation conditions showed the restoration of the previous picture of environmental degradation in the most urbanized zones of developed countries. in view of this, the issue of changing the priorities for the development of resource use was on the agenda. in this direction, azerbaijan is consistently implementing state programs to promote the development of sectors of the non-oil sector of the economy. in accordance with the future development strategy of the country, it is envisaged to comprehensively ensure the socio-economic development of the regions and increase the competitiveness of the economy, using the benefits of the economic and geographical position of each region and the available natural and human resources. these goals are reflected in the “development concept of azerbaijan 2020: a look into the future”, which was approved by the decree of the president of the republic at the end of 2012. the fundamental direction of the socio-economic development of the republic was to promote the development of industries in the regions of the republic and ensure growth through the introduction of innovative technologies. thanks to the support of the agricultural sector, viticulture, cotton growing, tobacco growing, grain growing, sugar beet production, and others began to revive. the main goal of the concept was to increase the gross domestic product in the republic by twofold by 2020, mainly due to the development of the nonoil sector (“azərbaycan.., 2012). however, the next global economic crisis in 2014–2015 and the subsequent volatility of hydrocarbon prices, coupled with the ongoing process of the spread of the pandemic (covid-19), did not allow us to achieve our goals. we should not lose sight of the fact that the oil industry is still maintaining its leading position in the country’s gdp structure. as a result, the decline in oil prices, of course, still affects the implementation of state socio-economic programs and the solution of the tasks. the erupted economic crisis and the pandemic of the virus extremely complicated the conditions for economic reform, the functioning of production processes and the service sector. in order to provide state support to various sectors of the economy, including entrepreneurship, on the basis of an order of the president of azerbaijan, “on a number of measures to reduce the negative impact of the coronavirus pandemic (covid-19) and the sharp fluctuations caused by it on the world energy and stock markets, on the economy of the republic of azerbaijan, macroeconomic stability, employment issues in the country and business entities”, 10 support programs have been developed. the government of azerbaijan allocated 2.5 billion manat to implement these support programs (the order..., 2019). along with this, protecting the health and ensuring the safety of the population have become an important task in preventing the spread of the virus. we have witnessed how most countries have banned the export of protective medical masks and necessary disinfectants. with this in mind, against the backdrop of the threat of the spread of the dangerous virus, the government has taken steps to eliminate the shortage of medical masks, protective and disinfectant means. so, laric chemical launched the production of hand sanitizers in late march, and the production of medical masks was started in sumgait chemical industrial park in early april. 3.9 million manat ($2.2 million) of investments were spent on the establishment of a medical mask production enterprise, and 1.2 million manat ($700 thousand) of soft loans were allocated to the enterprise through the entrepreneurship support fund under the ministry of economy of azerbaijan. the daily production volume is 100,000 masks, and after the opening of the second line, the daily production volume will reach 220,000. this will fully cover the domestic demand for medical masks. transformation of the conditions of socio-economic development… 5 4. consequences of the interference of the global economic crisis and the spread of covid-19 the all-encompassing scale of the spread of the virus has shown the helplessness of even the powerful, i.e. a wealthy, class of society that faced with the intractable tasks of preserving and securing its advantages. thus, prerequisites arose in leveling the previously deepening trends of social polarization in society. at the same time, the slowdown in the “speed” of people’s livelihoods, especially in urbanized areas, gradually revealed the significance and value of everyday things, which had previously been neglected. having a large length of free time during the period of self-isolation, most people obviously realized the degree of vulnerability of society to such global excesses. despite advances in healthcare and the growing scale of the introduction of innovative technologies, the global community was unprepared to prevent the planetary spread of the virus. even countries with a high level of health care development have not been able to prevent the massive spread of the virus and numerous casualties. the state of the world economy and the indicators of the socio-economic development of most countries by the end of 2020 will certainly be significantly reduced. in individual countries, the magnitude of the decline in gdp will differ significantly from each other, which will be determined by the degree of readiness of the countries for the crisis and the effectiveness of measures taken to curb the spread of the pandemic. according to the world bank forecasts, in 2020, the economy of the planet is expected to decrease by 5.2% and this decline will be the deepest since the second world war, and the decline in per capita production over the period from 1870 will affect the largest share of countries (covid-19 to plunge..., 2020).however, perhaps the predicted indicators will turn out to be incorrect since it is still not completely understood when the pandemic will end, and how quickly the world economy will emerge from the state of recession. according to the state statistics committee of the republic of azerbaijan for the period of januarymay, the gdp amounted to 27,479.9 million manat (16,164.64 million dollars), which decreased by 1.7% compared to the same period in 2019. moreover, the decrease occurred both in the oil and gas and nonoil sectors (within 1.2–2.0%). along with this, the cost of consumer goods and services in the country slightly increased. in the first five months of 2020, inflation in the republic, compared to the previous year, increased by 2.9% (2020ci ilin yanvar.., 2020). at the same time, in may-june, due to seasonal factors, the growth rate of consumer prices in azerbaijan began to decline and even slight deflation was observed. however, the signs of stagnation in the economy still make themselves felt, which is manifested in a decrease in the volume of retail trade and the foreign trade turnover of the republic. despite all the negative manifestations in public life being the consequences of the spread of the pandemic, countries of the world are struggling with the epidemic with various successes, and they implement a set of necessary measures by taking into account the who recommendations. some communities have dealt with the crisis much better than others. according to archon fung (2020), “we might well find that success came in states where government, civic and private-sector leaders joined their strengths together in a spirit of self-sacrifice for the common good”. an example of this is the course of processes in the countries of the south caucasus. if in armenia the situation with the spread of the pandemic is depressing, then in georgia and azerbaijan it was possible to resolve the issues of minimization of the spread of the virus more successfully, which affected the change in the magnitude of the main economic indicators. in particular, in the first quarter of 2020, gdp in azerbaijan even increased by 0.2%, and by the beginning of june, as expected, the economy of the republic, as mentioned above, went into a recession. such dynamism became possible as a result of the effectiveness of measures taken to support entrepreneurship in the republic. despite all the complexity of economic difficulties, the government continued to support entrepreneurship in the regions of the republic. thus, the process of establishing agro, techno-industrial parks, mainly outside the metropolitan area, creates an opportunity for entrepreneurs to use the natural resource potential of the regions, which has been insufficiently used. in the changing economic conditions, it is obviously necessary to reconsider the conditions for attracting potential investors, entrepreneurs and businesspersons to new territorial entities. this is especially true for the alat free economic zone, located 70 km south of baku. the establishment of the alat free economic zone near baku creates favorable conditions for the development of transit railway cargo transportation, which, of course, will increase the attractiveness of the baku-tbilisi-kars railway. this free economic zone, located at the intersection of east-west and north-south transport corridors, will operate as the largest logistics center in the caspian region. in the near future, due to the interest in the region of 6 ismayilov chingiz china, afghanistan, pakistan, central asia and the middle east the importance of the international sea trade port of alat is expected to increase noticeably. in the development of transport infrastructure and the solution of tasks to stimulate the development of farms and the use the natural resource potential of the regions of the republic will be a positive prerequisite for the establishment of the lyaki-gabala railway line. the annual increase in the number of tourists, especially foreigners, in the gabala zone led to the development of resort and recreational services, which pushed the corresponding development of the service sector. however, as anywhere in the world, the crisis has exposed the vulnerability of national economies mainly focused on providing services. in an economic recession, telecommuting and virtual contacts have become an integral part of a survival strategy. the consequences of the psychological shock and the lack of society’s preparation for the perception of such cataclysms, of course, have already affected workers’ productivity. this is approximately the same as stopping a continuous production process, when restarting and restoring it requires additional funds and time. in order to eliminate such changes, greater flexibility and stability should be given to the culture of labor organization in conditions of self-isolation and remote work. working out a new concept for the future development of azerbaijan undoubtedly involves the changing realities in the post-coronavirus period to be taken into account. in this regard, we can agree with the opinion of the un secretary general antonio guterres, set forth on march 26, 2020, during the extraordinary g20 virtual leaders summit on the covid-19 pandemic, where he said: “we must respond decisively, innovatively and together to suppress the spread of the virus and address the socioeconomic devastation that covid-19 is causing in all regions” (guterres, 2020). 5. conclusion based on the above, several conclusions can be formulated on the transformation of the conditions of socio-economic development of the country in the new realities: 1. in the post-coronavirus world, as the real course of change has confirmed, the technological basis for building relationships will play an extremely important role. at the same time, expanding the ability to connect to the main communications operating system will largely depend on the availability of various applications. 2. in the changing realities of modernity, the head of state can optimize a new strategy for future development, in which improving the welfare of citizens will remain the main task of the socioeconomic development of the republic. 3. in order to revive the economy, the opening of external borders should be consistent with the removal of restrictions on relations within the internal borders. accordingly, the construction of new transport and communication systems should be continued. 4. emphasis should be placed on the choice of “growth poles” in working out a new concept for the future development of the republic. the selection of such centers and the promotion of their development will contribute to solving the problem of decentralization of the economy of the republic. 5. when developing programs for organizing new territorial and economic entities (agricultural and industrial parks, free trade and economic zones, extended platforms, etc.), priority should be given to peripheral regions, which will help to level out territorial differences in the scale of socio-economic development of the regions of the country. references “azərbaycan 2020: gələcəyə baxiş” inkişafkonsepsiyasi (eng. development concept “azerbaijan 2020: a look into the future”), 2012, https://president.az/files/future_az.pdf (accessed 15 june 2020). 2020-ci ilin yanvar-may aylarında ümumi daxili mеhsul istehsalı (eng. gross domestic product in january-may 2020), 2020, azərbaycan respublikası dövlət statistika komitəsi, https://www.stat.gov.az/news/index.php?id=4609asıdır (accessed 12 june 2019). bloom d., 2020, pandemic, downturn 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www.imperial.ac.uk/news/196514/the-economic-impact-coronavirus-analysis-from/ (accessed 02 november 2020). yu h.-l., kolovos a, christakos g., chen j.-ch., warmerdam s., dev b., 2007, interactive spatiotemporal modelling of health systems: the seks-gui framework, stochastic environmental research and risk assessment, 21(5), 555–572. doi: 10.1007/s00477-007-0135-0 zelcer m., 2020, kto poslednij? kakie strany vyjdut iz krizisa pozže drugih (eng. who is last? which countries will emerge from the crisis later than others), forbes 25.05.2020. https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/401205-ktoposledniy-kakie-strany-vyydut-iz-krizisa-pozzhe-drugih (accessed 05 june 2020). 1. introduction currently, many countries are facing the issue of emigration of highly skilled workers. this phenomenon is often referred to as “brain drain”. it causes not only economic losses, but also social one, from both a society–wide and a business perspective. however, these negative effects only concern permanent migration. in the case of temporary migration, it is possible to talk of an opposite effect, “brain gain”, i.e. if qualified workers return to their country of origin after a certain period of time, they usually bring know–how and gained experience. this leads to the appreciation of human capital. d. guellec and m. cervantes (2002) as well as r.  daugėlienė and r. marcinkevičienė (2009) used the term “knowledge economy” or “knowledge– based economy era” to designate the trend when economy is increasingly dependent on highly qualified persons. human capital is a supply of skills and talents, which is reflected in the educated and qualified workforce in a region (čuhlová, potužáková, 2017). journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(3), 31–37 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.3.03 applied governments’ strategies for brain drain prevention eliška nacházelová department of economics and management, jan evangelista purkyně university in ústí nad labem, moskevská 54, ústí nad labem 400 96, the czech republic, orcid: 0000-0001-8700-6648 e-mail: eliska.nachazelova@ujep.cz citation nacházelová e., 2022, applied governments’ strategies for brain drain prevention, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(3), 31–37. abstract currently, many countries are facing the issue of outmigration of highly skilled workers. based on different strategies and policies, this paper proposes a regulatory framework for brain drain. in this article, we focus on the formats and support instruments through strategies and government policies, followed by their critical assessment. the methodology, based on the review of relevant literature, aims to reflect the academic discourse regarding the issue of brain drain and, particularly, the goal of return migration. diverse strategies are presented, ranging from financial approach to technology parks, innovation hubs, and talent markets. moreover, the problems caused by migration, such as brain waste, are investigated. the investigation is based predominantly on european strategies. future research could precisely focus on the application of strategies adopted and tested by a different country where positive results have already been detected. this work could serve as a stepping stone for the investigation of this phenomenon, the subsequent analysis of strategies and future impact. key words brain drain, governments’ interventions, regulation, prevention. received: 30 june 2022 accepted: 09 august 2022 published: 28 september 2022 32 eliška nacházelová with skilled workers, the investment in their education also moves abroad (economic losses of the country) and, simultaneously, these people leave the local labor market (loss for employers). in some countries, the brain drain phenomenon causes considerable difficulties because a large number of young and usually educated people emigrate. for many years, scientists and governments have been working on strategies to bring back both highly qualified workers and students. an overview of brain drain strategies used around the world and their implications is crucial. “government policies alone rarely cause people to return, but they certainly do contribute to the decision” (zweig, 2006, p. 67). based on different strategies and policies, this paper proposes a regulatory framework for brain drain. there is an intense debate concerning ways to help; who is actually benefitting or, on the contrary, who is overlooked in this process. in this article, we focus on the formats and instruments of support through strategies and government policies, followed by their critical assessment. the methodology, based on the review of relevant economic literature, aims to reflect the current academic discourse regarding the issue of brain drain and particularly the goal of return migration. research questions: which strategies are successful for brain drain prevention? what disadvantages might these strategies and government policies face? firstly, this work includes a broader context regarding the regulation issue and the phenomenon, particularly in the oecd countries. next, we list governmental interventions and strategies of various states encouraging the return of their citizens or their engagement in international activities, which however does not cause their permanent departure. this review is mostly based on the strategies of the following authors: m. cervantes (2005), r. čuhlová and z. potužáková (2017), r. daugėlienė and r.  marcinkevičienė (2009), h. lipovská and j. fisher (2015), a. muthanna and g. sang (2018), l. semiv and y. hvozdovych (2012) and d. zweig (2006). later, a discussion of gained knowledge and diverse approaches of selected countries follows. 2. governments’ interventions we mentioned the ideal and desirable state of the economy, i.e. the knowledge economy. the workforce is “upskilling” both in terms of the average level of education of workers and in terms of the diversity of employment types. employment growth is supported by white-collar and highly qualified workers. without this workforce, neither states nor businesses can properly develop and innovate. this regards not only specialized sectors focused on knowledge, but work is increasingly qualified across sectors and across occupations (pont, 2001). in general, a profession can be described by the following characteristics: it requires a specific skill, partially or fully developed through academic training, and provides a service requiring a high degree of integrity. some professions, particularly lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, notaries and architects, seem to be relatively highly regulated (garoupa, 2011). in the 1980s, independent regulators began to employ new regulatory techniques, including more precise rules. statute law used to have a limited role, while self-regulatory rules were created by professional associations throughout europe. at present, state intervention by governments and competition authorities has redesigned the regulatory background for professions across europe (garoupa, 2011). “these requirements of education (a specific diploma) and traineeship may be determined by both the government and the professional body” (garoupa, 2011, p. 460). it is, therefore, a matter of regulating education that these conditions and their enforcement are balanced, or better outweighed, by revenue and overall social welfare (garoupa, 2011). within the eu, these measures are softened; education is recognized between countries, making it easier to move from one member state to another. therefore, there is a greater space for the creation of the brain drain phenomenon. 2.1. general framework in the oecd countries numerous studies explore the brain drain phenomenon (freeman, 2006; petroff, 2016). central and eastern european countries strongly affected by this problem include, for example, slovakia (lipovská, fischer, 2015) and poland (white, 2010), but also ukraine (semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). however, the most affected countries are in southern europe, e.g. portugal (heitor et al., 2014), greece, but also spain and italy (bartolini et al., 2017). in northern europe, especially lithuania is trying to tackle this issue (daugėlienė, marcinkevičienė, 2009). oecd (2015) clearly maps the distribution of highly educated migrants by region of origin according to the grouping of states. migrants in the oecd countries became more educated between the years 2000–2001 (7.5 mil.) and 2010–2011 (11 mil.). in 2010–2011, 11 million migrants in oecd countries (27% of all migrants) were highly educated and coming from non-oecd countries – 777,000 (35%) (oecd, 2015). applied governments’ strategies for brain drain prevention 33 furthermore, a significant growth in the structure of educated migrants can be seen in the oecd countries. according to r. d’aiglepierre et al. (2020), the share of immigrants in the total population and immigrants with tertiary education in specific countries is following: about a half of  oecd countries have a very small difference between the share of immigrants with tertiary education in the total population and among the tertiary educated people. for some key destinations (the us, germany, france, etc.), there is a negative difference. however, there are some countries, where the share of foreign-born among the tertiary-educated is significantly higher than in the total population. these countries are, for example, luxembourg, where 63% of those with tertiary education are foreign-born, which is more than in the total population (d’aiglepierre et al., 2020). table 1 shows the top 4 countries of residence of immigrants with tertiary education and, for an overview, it presents the same data for central europe and germany, as for the neighboring countries of the czech republic (incl.). we can notice top corridors towards oecd countries in 2015–2016 (d’aiglepierre et al., 2020). when it comes to the distribution of tertiary-educated people, some countries exhibit a very low share (mex– usa 7%), but other corridors connecting asian countries to the usa are showing a major share (ind–usa approx. 80%; korea–usa and philippines–usa 60%). the main destinations for the highly educated in 2010–2011 were the united states, the united kingdom and canada (together 62% of highly educated migrants in the oecd) (oecd, 2015). certainly, covid-19 has had a major impact on migration flows, but in past years, an increasing trend was registered. one of three immigrants coming to oecd countries holds a tertiary degree. generally, international students came from asia (6 out of 10) and from europe (approx. “2.5”) in 2018 (oecd, 2020). the number of highly qualified foreigners in the czech republic has steadily increased since 2003 (czech statistical office, 2019). it is a result of the ongoing establishment of branches of western companies in the czech republic, which began in the 1990s. another impact is the growing attractiveness of the czech republic due to the rising standard of living. in 2018, a total of 44,846 foreigners, mostly from the eu, studied at czech universities (particularly from the following countries: slovakia – 21,292, germany – 829, uk – 547). outside the eu, mostly students from the russian federation (5,782) and ukraine (3,347) studied in the czech republic (czech statistical office, 2019). 2.2. governments’ interventions for brain drain prevention one of the best strategies, especially for young researchers and teachers, is funding their research through grants and scholarships. these opportunities are offered, for example, by programs such as marie curie actions, eureca, tempus–tacis, and others (cervantes, 2005; daugėlienė, marcinkevičienė, 2009; muthanna, sang, 2018; semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). due to the adoption of the bologna process many countries are facing brain drain. this has expanded opportunities for personal development, strengthened cooperation between institutions and researchers at an international level, as well as improved universities and research activities. such an opening of borders and opportunities caused the mentioned brain drain, paradoxically affecting students who were allowed to go abroad to study. the study is usually the first step towards emigration from one’s home country (semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). according to r. daugėlienė and r. marcinkevičienė (2009), in lithuania, especially students consider the possibility to migrate (almost 90% of the tab. 1. country selection and number of immigrants 15+ in oecd countries, 2015–2016 country of residence (oecd) foreign-born population 15+ (thousands) tertiary educated (%) canada 7,738 59.5 israel 1,744 49.3 australia 5,791 47.4 luxembourg 0,228 45.8 czech republic 0,415 29.4 austria 1,494 25.9 germany 12,011 21.7 poland 0,565 21.2 slovakia 0,160 20.9 source: own processing according to r. d’aiglepierre et al. (2020, p. 17). 34 eliška nacházelová respondents), then managers (40%). the case study also examines foreign students in kaunas universities, where approx. 70% do not want to stay in lithuania. lithuanian students deem the creation of international centers or technological parks important. also, answers of foreign students reveal a solution in the increase of state funding for highly skilled professional activities. h. lipovská and j. fisher (2015) also analyzed the degree of brain drain when it comes to students, but this time from slovakia. they created a profile of students who come to the czech republic to study and tend to stay there. only 6% of slovak doctoral students are considering returning to slovakia. slovakia is fighting against brain drain with the ministry’s strategy, specifically through a grant program “home-coming” which offers scholarships (lipovská, fisher, 2015). taking into account the above-mentioned data (2.1), we could assume that the czech republic has no problem attracting foreign specialists. so how does the czech republic approach this issue and what strategies and policies are in place to attract not only its citizens back, but also foreign workers to the country? many countries, such as the czech republic, hungary, estonia (semiv, hvozdovych, 2012), use the national reform program to encourage the process of returning of their citizens. for example, in the czech republic, there are particular migration programs according to which the government approves the incoming applications (government of the czech republic, 2020). the migration program prioritizes (with decreasing importance) highly qualified employees, key and scientific staff, and qualified employees. migrants belonging to these programs can apply for a long-term residence permit. their countries of origin are usually in a very difficult position with regard to attracting citizens back. every country has a different approach to entrepreneurs and especially young people, as these are more and more interested in start-ups. therefore, one of the strategies to help starting entrepreneurs and to create attractive places are innovation hubs (european court of auditors, 2014), digital innovation hubs (government of the czech republic, 2020) or high technology parks (daugėlienė, marcinkevičienė, 2009). under the digital europe program, digital innovation hubs are helping particularly small or medium-sized enterprises by building an international network of the mentioned hubs (government of the czech republic, 2020). non-profit organizations are members of these hubs, focusing on the promotion of digital skills and knowledge. policies are often related to innovations and the creation of a new talent market for emigrant citizens (zweig, 2006; semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). but, first of all, the country has to have or “create” highly qualified workers as a foundation for such talent markets. they have to start with increasing investment in higher education. in china (zweig, 2006) and other asian countries (daugėlienė, marcinkevičienė, 2009), the government invested millions of dollars in the creation of world-class universities through, in the case of china, their nine already established universities. a major impact is generated by the information flow between scholars abroad and organizations in china in new magazines or websites (zweig, 2006; semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). they also established service centers and investment affairs department which may be construed as the innovation hubs in the czech republic (european court of auditors, 2014). according to zweig’s interview (zweig et al., 2004), these successfully transformed government policies have had a particularly great influence on the scientists’ decision to return to their home country. information flow or connection is crucial, as claimed by l. semiv and y. hvozdovych (2012). when it comes to knowledge migration, it is necessary to find ways to retain specialists by outsource, offshore or overseas consultancy. this is especially important in regard to the ict field. on the other hand, to attract foreign specialists, scientific programs on a grant basis are the answer. the same strategy for ict field and r&d is supported by m. cervantes (2005). other recommended policies are mostly related to law: changing universities’ autonomy at the level of international cooperation and mobility, simplifying the visa system for researchers, and the accreditation of diplomas abroad (semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). not only visas but overall a simplified process of entry for highly qualified workers and investors could be put in place (cervantes, 2005; daugėlienė, marcinkevičienė, 2009). d. zweig (2006) also focuses on strategies and thus on specific policies implemented by the chinese government. different government authorities, such as the state education commission, the communist party or the ministry of personnel have shifted many strategies over time. practical strategies have been introduced chiefly since 1992. for example, a recent policy includes the following steps: career centers for returning students, providing living spaces, allowing families to change residence to join their returning members, assisting with job search in china, increasing support for research and others. applied governments’ strategies for brain drain prevention 35 3. discussion for every country, it is necessary to collect and analyze data. after that, the government and universities will be capable of determining priorities and accordingly allocate resources to the main research areas. moreover, such new funding programs and extensive government efforts fit well with the growing interest of many people in returning to their countries of origin. china (zweig, 2006) was confident in the statement that it is more important to attract chinese emigrants than foreign workers to china. the country employed slogans and ideas such as: “building national strength through science and education” and “strengthening the country through human talent” (zweig, 2006, p. 70). that is why the chinese government mobilized even their people overseas to help their country abroad through many international projects (zweig, chung, 2004). this cooperation can also be used like lectures thanks to short-term visits where the country still benefits from this new policy. some of the main strategies to attract highly qualified workers are related to finance. these include a more suitable taxation system, solving housing problems or adequate salary, to name a few. but is it fair? in china (zweig, 2006), these practices reveal issues among non-migrants like the favoritism of “outsiders” or the overemphasis on returnees. in 2002 and 2004, interviews were conducted with academics and scientists from the chinese academy of sciences (zweig, 2006). their aim was to reveal views of both locals and returnees on the government policy towards returnees. questions regarding the overemphasis on returnees or the alleged returnees’ higher quality of life (i. e. funding, housing, etc.) were obvious (on average, 16% of local academics agreed against 3% of returnee academics). differences were also noted among scientists (zweig, 2006). on average, 27% of local scientists were dissatisfied with housing, funding, promotions, etc. compared to the benefits received by returnee scientists. based on these interviews (zweig, 2006), we prove that concerns about unfair treatment are legitimate. beside complaining about housing, one local phd declares: “the state had failed to promote its home-grown talent because of its excessive concern with returnees. (…) bringing in overseas talent was a sound policy, it was (also) demoralizing for locally trained scholars” (zweig, 2006, p. 85). so how should the government behave? do returnees really deserve such attention and privileges, when those who stayed “at home” have contributed with their knowledge to the country’s development all their lives? first and foremost, a system should be devised to provide equal opportunities for both those who do not consider migration and those who are considering it. of course, there is a big difference between political and financial reasons behind migration. another criterion should be an assessment of the “quality” of returnees, what experience they bring to the country and to which area? how can the country deal with them? is such an investment worthwhile in someone who, for example, spends most of his productive life abroad? people who stay at home do not only contribute financially to the state throughout their lives, and thus should have equal rights and opportunities. many authors have addressed factors that can affect both brain drain and brain gain. more specifically, they focused on what makes people return or what makes them leave. in other words, we refer to these as push and pull factors (gibson, mckenzie, 2009; eftimov, ristovska, 2019). according to l. semiv and y. hvozdovych (2012), immigration of young ukrainians is prompted mainly by pushing factors which are dominant over pulling factors. the push factors motivating the departure of young ukrainians with a university degree and scientific or innovative prospects include: mainly high unemployment in the country, negligible job opportunities in terms of specialization, lack of material and low technical level of scientific research, as well as income inequality, institutional barriers or insufficiently innovative infrastructure. in order to improve innovative infrastructure, we suggest the above-mentioned innovation hubs as an appropriate strategy even with a narrower focus. issues may arise as a result of financing failure, in particular limited helping procedures or limited follow-up assistance to start-ups. nevertheless, several problems were also confirmed in the european court of auditors’ audit (2014), which found that very little attention was paid to the effectiveness of business support functions or that monitoring systems did not provide sufficient management information. another approach which many countries adopt to deal with brain drain and which we have mentioned above is based on grant programs. however, not every grant program achieves equally “good numbers”. in slovakia, only a third of targeted students returned to the country (lipovská, fischer, 2015). the government has to improve not only at the financial level, but also other levels need to be considered. we all know that brain drain for one country means brain gain for another. in this case, it is mainly the czech republic which benefits from this slovakian loss. when slovakia adopts new measures and policies, the czech republic will face 36 eliška nacházelová a similar problem. it would be good to think about a consensus between these states. but what are actually the chances of slovaks leaving the czech republic? apart from the higher standard of living of slovaks in the czech republic, they do not have to deal with a language barrier, they are not perceived as migrants in a negative way and they are close to their families. consequently, we think that in the case of studying in the czech republic, there is a small chance of returning to their home country. slovakia should thus consider transforming its education system. grant programs offering the possibility of international cooperation represent a great opportunity for doctoral students and scientists. between 2000 and 2010, the growth rate of scientists’ cooperation in ukraine doubled (semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). as opposed to the desired effect, these temporary opportunities can be perceived as a “ticket” out of these types of countries. after coming back, researchers can realize their dissatisfaction with low income, the quality of life, and technical and scientific resources. therefore, they often pursue other international opportunities. related to the rejection of non-eu diplomas in the eu, another, quite unfamiliar, issue arises, the so called brain waist (anghel, 2019; nakamuro, ogawa, 2010; semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). failure to use the acquired knowledge and skills in their country will often force young people to go abroad. however, their diploma will not help them there, so they will often have to do menial work, but still for a higher salary than they would receive in their country. it may happen that returnees forget their knowledge or do not develop it at the very least. thus, in case of returning to their homeland after a long time, they do not represent such a contribution. but again, we return to financial strategies, which even here seem to be the best solution for retaining workers in their country. such strategies can be complemented by frequently used work–life–balance benefits. these countries have very limited state funding (semiv, hvozdovych, 2012). that is the reason why all financial support, for innovative or technological infrastructure and the launch of world-class universities, is very difficult. one of possible actions to accumulate more money for the mentioned policies is regulation, for example, of gambling or a change of taxation. some authors and specialists (zweig, 2006; semiv, hvozdovych, 2012) also recommend a new way of communication with migrants, such as the creation of websites, migration networks, virtual research centers or specialized centers where migrants can find helpful information about the labor market, vacancies, internship offers, etc. 4. conclusion each country must find the right approach to succeed when it comes to attracting and assembling highly qualified people, which may lead to the establishment of a knowledge-based economy era. r. daugėlienė and r. marcinkevičienė (2009) summarize the goals of strategies on different continents. while asian countries try to compete for professionals through venture capital and the creation of world-class universities, european countries try to reduce cultural barriers. in our article, we focus on the formats and instruments of support based on strategies and government policies, followed by their critical assessment. future research could focus precisely on the application of diverse strategies adopted and tested by a different country, where positive results have already been registered. next, researchers may draw inspiration from new approaches or possibly avoid their shortcomings. considering other possible outcomes, this work could serve as a stepping stone for the investigation of the brain drain phenomenon in a specific country and the subsequent analysis of employed strategies and future impact. limitations of this study lie in the fact 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[in:] oecd (ed.), education policy analysis. oecd publishing, paris, 99–118. doi: 10.1787/epa-2001-en semiv l., hvozdovych y., 2012, the intellectual migration of the youth in ukraine: the backgrounds for “brain circulation”, journal of international studies, 5(2), 72–81. white a., 2010, young people and migration from contemporary poland, journal of youth studies, 13(5), 565–580. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2010.487520 zweig d., 2006, competing for talent: china’s strategies to reverse the brain drain, international labour review, 145(1–2), 65–89. zweig d., changgui c., rosen s., 2004, globalization and transnational human capital: overseas and returnee scholars to china, the china quarterly, 179, 735–757. zweig d., chung s. f., 2004, redefining china’s brain drain: ‘wei guo fuwu’ and the ‘diaspora option’. paper presented at the 40th anniversary reunion conference: the state of contemporary china, the universities service centre for china studies, the chinese university of hong kong, hong kong. january 6–7, 2004. 1. introduction european educational policy considers the university as the centre for higher education provision, representing a unique institution to realise knowledge economy and bear special social mission (a new..., 2009). 21st century highlights that economic progress mainly depends on knowledge and its application. it is commonly known as knowledge economy. however, economic progress has always been subject to new ideas and innovations. ilia chavchavadze in his speech at the public meeting in 1885 mentioned “no doubt, that knowledge is the tool, but it is the wealth itself; it is the wealth that follows the man wherever he goes. it follows him without any additional efforts on the man’s side. no one is able to steal it not to stop it; nowadays, knowledge is everything: it has more market than money, it is sharper than sword and stronger than mil cannon” (chavchavadze, 1889). these words can definitely journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(2), 1–8 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.2.01 the role of the government in the university – enterprise cooperation george abuselidze (1), lia davitadze (2) (1) department of finance, banking and insurance, batumi shota rustaveli state university, ninoshvili 35, batumi & 6010, georgia, orcid: 0000-0002-5834-1233 e-mail: george.abuselidze@bsu.edu.ge (corresponding author) (2) department of european studies, batumi shota rustaveli state university, ninoshvili 35, batumi & 6010, georgia. e-mail: lia.davitadze@gmail.com citation abuselidze g., davitadze l., 2021, the role of the government in the university – enterprise cooperation, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(2), 1–8. abstract university–enterprise cooperation considers an active and efficient cooperation of the scientists, industry and the government. the university is a significant actor in this model as it not only produces knowledge, but also creates new opportunities, protects intellectual property and converts the research outcomes into a market attractive product. this cooperation ensures that educational programs equip students with the relevant competences, and entails research suited to the demand of the market and the government. this implementation helps the university realize its third mission – serve the country and support its economic development. this paper presents our attempt to describe the role of the regional government in the university– enterprise cooperation based on a regional university in georgia. despite the various studies regarding university–enterprise cooperation implemented in georgia mainly dealing with single components of the cooperation, we tried to highlight the significance of the government in this cooperation and its authentic character. key words university, enterprise, cooperation, government, expenditure. received: 22 february 2021 accepted: 14 march 2021 published: 30 june 2021 2 george abuselidze, lia davitadze be considered as a historic definition of knowledge economy in georgia that are still noteworthy. what has changed in today’s definition of knowledge economy is that for today’s economy knowledge is as important as capital and natural resources, and it is the national economic asset and the basis of national competitive advantage (peters, humes, 2003). therefore, education, especially higher education with its potential to strengthen productivity through research is considered to be the global panacea for of the economic policy. thus, nowadays, the university is not only the treasury of knowledge that focuses only on teaching and fundamental research. university activities have always been oriented on knowledge production that is expanded to the activity of the university to reinforce its activities to play its role in the society’s development. serving society describes the university’s third mission and states that the university may have: • a social mission (services without monetary benefits); • an entrepreneurial mission (university is interested in increasing the turnover of finances); • an innovative mission (through consultation contracts, through solving problems, etc.). universities with their triple role (as providers of higher education, the latest research and innovation) represent the driving organization of european development. they have potential to meet the european target to become the leader of knowledgebased economy and society. subject of the research – study of the importance of the government’s role in the university–enterprise cooperation based on batumi shota rustaveli state university technological faculty. object of the research: the government and university–enterprise cooperation practice process. 2. problem formulation and methodology 2.1. the research methods desk research – to study international studies in this field as well as and discussion and analysis of the world models of university-enterprise cooperation. qualitative research – in-depth interviews with administration of the regional university (3 people), with the representatives of the regional government (3 people), with academics from the technological faculties (12 people), representatives of the business world (8 people), scientific workers of research institutions (4 people), technological faculty graduates (10 people). the conclusions and recommendations of the research were presented to a focus group of 6 people: 2 of them were academics, one of them was a former accreditation expert and the other was acting faculty quality assurance service; 2 members represented enterprises and, the other two were the former graduates. selection – applying a stratifying method, the technological faculties of batumi shota rustaveli state university (bsu) were selected as well as the representatives of the enterprises named as the closet partners by the technological faculties. in order to select a particular respondent, a purposive type of non-probability sampling was applied. to find a selective unity, we contacted members of the general unity and identified people features interesting to our research, and then the following persons, etc. until the number of available members of the general unity was expired. the purposive type was given the advantage as the research was oriented on a depth analysis. research instrument – in order to conduct the research, relevant questionnaires were developed. for this we used the studies and the strategies developed by the ministry of education and sciences of georgia, as well as the profile of the participant university and its surveys. in order to verify the situation stated in the documents, and to understand the local specificity of each university, qualitative research was conducted with the university management and academic staff. semi-structured interviews were used for qualitative research. the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis work were presented to a focus group. discussions were held and considered in finalising the thesis work. 2.2. literature review new knowledge in the context of knowledge economy should be a prerequisite for economic growth and development. competitiveness, both of an enterprise, a region or the government, mainly depends on reflection of the scientific knowledge on the market and its transformation into a market demanded product. in order to implement this, proper functioning of three-dimensional helix model that conveys efficient mutual-cooperation of science, industry and the state is given priority (dzisah, etzkowitz, 2008). the university is an important actor in this mode, as it is seen not only to produce new knowledge, but also new opportunities to protect the created intellectual property and convert the research outcomes into a market attractive product. studies at european universities are developed in such a way that the graduates are equipped with the competences necessary for the market, and the research should be relevant to the market and state requirements, by which the university implements its third mission – to serve the community and facilitate the the role of the government in the university – enterprise cooperation 3 economic development of the region (country). the university that conducts market-ordered research, creates an innovative product that is economically profitable for each party. the university and entrepreneurial cooperation focused special attention after eu policy makers decided the eu to have the most competitive economy in the world. the concept of the “triple helix”: university–enterprise–government cooperation was introduced into sociology of knowledge innovative development by henry etzkowitz and loyet leydesdorff (2000) as a critical response to the concept of the second type of knowledge developed by gibbons et al. (1994). h. etzkowitz compares the triple helix of university–enterprise–state relations with alternative models that are used to explain modern research systems in their social context (etzkowitz, leydesdorff, 2000; gertsog et al., 2017; davitadze, 2019). according to the triple helix concept, a university is an organization capable of playing an enhanced role in innovation, especially in developing knowledge-based society. there is a so-called communication and expectation network in the university–enterprise cooperation that becomes prototype of science–economy–state cooperation. this network is generally based on verbal agreement or general memorandum, in reality. the triple helix is focused on overcoming these communication and future expectation networks that form a new (institutional) systematization between universities, enterprise and government agencies. moreover, there are a few more ways higher education affects economic indicators. in particular: 1. universities provide workforce that is an important point for economic growth (sianesi, van reenen, 2003; gennaioli et al, 2013). 2. universities propose innovations in various fields, e.g., in the managerial field (bloom et al., 2017; singh, 2016) and possibly, new economic subjects. 3. universities specify a demand for certain goods and services. 4. and finally, universities support the institutions sustaining the values related to democracy and economics (acemoglu, robinson, 2005; dimitrov et al, 2019). 3. results and discussion in 2005, georgia officially joined the bologna process and aimed at integrating the educational system into the european education system by reforming the educational system. to achieve this goal, university education fundamentally changed its approaches; new educational programs were developed; the approaches based on the interests of the state, student, labour market and the public were introduced. also, authorisation of higher education institutions and accreditation of educational programs was regulated at the level of legislation in the country that gives an efficient way to benchmarking of the selfesteem and quality of universities with international standards. despite continuous reforms in the education system, there is a low-product labour market that is a result of the so-called knowledge devaluation (vertical inconsistency), a mismatch between the type of work demanded on the modern labour market and the professions that young people get today at higher education institutions (amashukeli et al., 2017; beri, jain, 2016; ilina et al., 2016). international and local studies (darchia, 2009; andguladze et al., 2013; bregvadze, 2013; amashukeli et al., 2017; bregvadze et. al., 2017; javakhishvili, 2011) highlight the absence of communication between education and enterprises in post-soviet countries. in many cases, educational institutions do not realize the new, third mission of the university – to become a leader of knowledge-based economy and the society which has the role of a foremost performer in the modern world. on the other hand, neither enterprises nor organizations and the state itself consider higher educational institutions as a favourable and profitable partner. several studies on university-enterprise cooperation were implemented in georgia (darchia, 2009; andguladze et al., 2013; bregvadze, 2013; amashukeli et al., 2017; javakhishvili, 2011; bregvadze, dalakishvili, 2015). these studies mainly concern some aspects of cooperation, such as the impact of higher education on the formation of workforce, the strategic development of higher education and science in georgia, the possibilities of research commercialization in georgia, the role of universities in the development of the region, etc. the facets of this topic are reflected in different research carried out by the international institute of policy, planning and management of education (2008; 2013), in the steps taken by the government of georgia, documents, regulations and strategies issued by the ministry of education and science of georgia. the strategy 2016–2020 (government of georgia, 2017) states that despite many reforms, educational programs mismatch the employment market needs. the challenge is to develop programs and research so that graduates are equipped with the competencies necessary for the market, and the research should be relevant to the demand of the market and the state through which the university will 4 george abuselidze, lia davitadze perform its third mission – to serve the public and to promote the region’s economic development. the study of the university-enterprise cooperation has revealed that university academics believe the regional government and its structures to be the main partner of the university. considering this statement, this paper studies the role of the regional government in the university–industry cooperation and their interdependence. at the same time, the state mainly decides what studies can/cannot be conducted by university/research institutions. in several cases, the ministry of finance and economy / ministry of agriculture have addressed the research institutes of the relevant profile to study and implement a specific project1. in another case, the regional government (ministry of finance and economics of adjara autonomous republic, 2019) offered research institutes the research-based reimbursement that was rejected by scientific workers. the state officials consider that scholars simply do not want to agree on the offer because: • they prefer lower responsibility and less money; • they are not confident in their competence; • their research is largely irrelevant to the state needs. on the other hand, academics believe the offer is incompatible with law due to legal inconsistencies between the rule of selection on an academic position and the obligations the selection imposes on them. furthermore, according to the study, state officials do not have information on what research is conducted at the university. at the same time, they believe that the university does not take part in the implementation of the region’s policy for a given moment or only slightly participates in it. the position of the government officials in the region is as follows: the state is doing more for the university than the other way round. on the other hand, the academics who participated in our study indicate that the government is the cause of the research irrelevance taking into consideration that it is the largest partner of the university and does not provide information on the subject of necessary research. researcher masako ohkawa (1978, p. 4) stated: “all over the world, all governments are always deeply involved in higher education, since the latter offers public benefit to the whole community. 1 e.g. in 2013–2014 kobuleti phytopathology institute was asked to identify the quarantine organisms, including laboratory analysis of introduced forms samples from other countries on the quarantine organisms. finally, this cooperation terminated due to disagreement between scientific findings and state interests. later, the ministry of agriculture upgraded its lab and controlled the issue itself. in particular, the government always plays a leading role in determination of the number of students and students’ bodies. it also regulates the speed and direction of expansion of higher education institutions, as well as their current and capital expenditure methods”. according to the main data and direction document of the country, the state model of higher education financing is focused on strengthening the areas and specialties that are related to the country’s development, social life and economic growth (ministry of finance of georgia, 2019) as the state is the largest investor in the education system; 9,911.241 gel was invested in 2013–2018. obviously, the investment in education is expected to bring benefits. we believe that the economic profit should be measured in a public irr (abuselidze, 2019) and a cost efficiency ratio (cer) that can determine the effectiveness of state investments in education (abuselidze, 2019). these coefficients determine the efficiency of investments in education by the state. this coefficient determines the efficiency of investments on education by the state. in order to spend product funds effectively (abuselidze, beridze, 2019; abuselidze, mamuladze, 2020; abuselidze, surmanidze, 2020; abuselidze, mamaladze, 2021), it is reasonable to change the funding model. in this regard, we requested information from the ministry of finance and economy of adjara autonomous republic on the support of higher education development. based on the received information (letter №01-01-10/2290, 16/05/2019), it was established that the ministry of finance and economy has actually invested from the republican budget of the adjara autonomous republic (aar) (fig. 1). to meet the needs of batumi shota rustaveli state university, the following is assigned: subsidies (salaries of staff, scholarship, emeritus, program – muhajirs history and descendants of georgian muhajirs in modern turkey) and an increase in non-financial assets (improving material-technical base, books and scientific literature) (fig. 2). primarily, it needs to be mentioned that in addition to the direct investments in the bsu infrastructure or research projects, the regional government finances the higher education scholars support program as well as the study of the students abroad in order to give additional indirect assistance to hei. it should be noted that the study of the existing data, explanatory cards and reports revealed that a rule of issuance of funds from the budget is violated; there are no pre-determined results under which the budget is spent; moreover, there are no efficiency indicators (quantitative or qualitative), which in the role of the government in the university – enterprise cooperation 5 turn obscures the effectiveness of the state–university cooperation. some government officials stated that the university–enterprise–state cooperation would be interesting for them. they specified that the government may interest business in cooperating with the university to increase the student quota for the practice. however, no clear strategy exists for this cooperation. the state officials who participated in the survey confirmed that such communication channels are less efficient; moreover, they mentioned that the problem might also be that the government 2101.6 1590.5 1608.6 2301.6 2310.1 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 ministry of finance and economy of aar ministry of education, culture and sport of arr 1.774 1.072 1.194 0.953 0.968 0.319 0.243 1.271 1.342 0.221 0.1050.1050.105 0.0390.067 0.094 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 salaries of staff scholarship, emeritus program – muhajirs history and descendants of georgian muhajirs in modern turkey improving material-technical base books and scientific literature fig. 1. bsu assignations from aar budget (2013–2017) source: composed by the authors based on the data provided by the ministry of finances and economy of aar. fig. 2. bsu budget financing mln gel (2013–2017) source: composed by the authors based on the data provided by the ministry of finances and economy of aar. 6 george abuselidze, lia davitadze hardly looks into a number of issues and regulates them. moreover, as they claim, the government might not see a need of some research topics. despite the fact that there is a development strategy as a policy document, the regional governmental officials admit that the development of the region depends on the wishes of the investor, and, consequently, the irrelevance of the research due to the government decisions might be a reasonable argument. however, they still believe that the university is less likely to practice the applied research. the university administration and academics think that there is a logic in the opinion that the government is less likely to trust the scientific potential, perhaps, mainly due to fact that it may not be introduced to their scientific potential properly. yet, the university administration is interested in the scope and purpose of the studies the various ministries order at different organizations. they claim that the university should do research that should be used by the state as a recommendation. and, if there is no demand or application of the university studies by the government, there is a question – why are such studies conducted? the regional government officials mention that the government that feels responsibility towards the university would be easier to cooperate with than private companies. they assume the private business has no incentive to cooperate with a university. it would work if only there were relevant knowledge at the university. the business/government would see its need and engage in the preparatory stages of large projects both private and investment ones. generally, they are critical of the university’s potential referring that in private (consulting) companies that mainly carry out investment projects for the state, there is more knowledge than in the university: “why should private companies share their knowledge on modern technologies? the business should not bring knowledge to the university, but it should get the knowledge from there. and, why should business contribute to improving the quality of teaching of higher education or the qualification of lecturers who should be the authors of the innovations”. it is noteworthy that the university tried to cooperate with enterprise but it was either short-termed or unsuccessful. despite mutual interests, the crossing point is believed difficult to be found. “you bring them on site, show your product, e.g. during last visit we showed that we could introduce an ecologically clean product – juice to the kindergarten. they liked it and here it ended. the same is every time (moreover, the ministers change every year). somewhere the chain breaks. such an attitude. they are never interested in our studies”. the representatives of the state structures participating in the research, as well as academics, believe that the university may need a structural unit that will be responsible for the cooperation, be able to generate revenues, find research projects, etc., but the potential for implementation is not studied. the academics themselves admit the huge role of the government in the development of the university, but they state that the government is not sure about the cooperation mechanism. no business organizations have the knowledge/tradition/practice to apply the university if necessary. the role of the state is great in spreading this knowledge. the academics emphasize that the university has neither mechanism nor knowledge on the importance of cooperation in the context of modernization of the study programs and novelty of research. they see a necessity to promote cooperation by the government. at the same time, appreciating the government’s support, the university administration is concerned about government’s attitude that makes them think that government considers the money given to the university as a lost one. for example, the government has repeatedly attempted to join the research institutions that are currently under the university umbrella to the government structure. “the minister thought he should own this institute. as if it belongs to the other country”. in addition, the university administration underlines doubling of the state costs through establishing the state funded structures the studies of which are done by/at the university. 4. conclusions along with the other activities, the government plays the role of so-called facilitator of university–enterprise cooperation in the world practice, promoting enterprise–hei cooperation through the introduction of preferential policy for enterprises, etc. our research revealed that the regional government tries to replace the role of the enterprise in this cooperation and, in fact, represents the two sides of the cooperation triangle. in addition to direct investment in university infrastructure or research projects, the government finances programs to promote higher education and train students abroad. nevertheless, it does not consider the funding principles in accordance with the program budget. in particular, goals, action plans, outcomes, and outcome assessment indicators are not shown in the allocations implemented so far, which creates a ground for believing that budgetary resources are spent in an inefficient manner. concurrently, the government remains the main determinant which research universities/research the role of the government in the university – enterprise cooperation 7 institutions can/cannot carry out. it is sceptical about the use of university potential and believes that consulting companies which mainly implement investment projects have much more knowledge than universities. furthermore, there is no dialogue or mechanism that could let both sides see the need and possibilities of cooperation. at the faculty level, there is no structural unit/person that would focus on the university–enterprise cooperation activities and promote them. further, there is no knowledge neither at the university nor in the government how the university–enterprise cooperation works. based on the results and discussion of the study, the following recommendations appear: development/discussion of preferential policies for enterprises and companies that finance education and/or cooperate with the university through participation in the research, etc. creation of a structural unit at the university e.g. university-enterprise cooperation centre which would serve all faculties to continuously improve the quality of academic education, with the initiative of the mutual transfer of knowledge and technology between the parties to cooperation, with the desire for improvement and innovation, with the establishment of contacts and simplification cooperation between the university and community. it is important to establish communication channels: to organize the university–enterprise forum, to disseminate information for entrepreneurs about professional consultations and research competencies of the university; to create a television profile of academic activities at a regional public broadcaster. acknowledgment the original version of the article was presented at the 2nd international conference on teaching, learning and education, in november 2019 in rotterdam. references a new partnership for the modernisation of universities: the eu forum for university business dialogue, 2009, commission of the european communities, brussels, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/ com_com(2009)0158_/com_com(2009)0158_en.pdf (accessed 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http://www.mes.gov.ge/ upload/multi/geo/1231224818_reforma.pdf (accessed 12 june 2019). 1. introduction the health situation of the polish population is subject to relatively large changes. on the one hand, this results from the processes taking place in all of europe that have an impact on the health situation of the population, such as changes in health behaviours, progress in health care or ageing of the population. on the other hand, it is influenced by factors specific to european post-communist countries and journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 24–38 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.004.6203 changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union (compared to central and eastern european countries) elżbieta grzelak-kostulska (1), natalia sypion-dutkowska (2), tomasz michalski (3) (1) department of urban studies and regional development, nicolaus copernicus university, lwowska 1, 87–100 toruń, poland, e-mail: grzelak@umk.pl (2) spatial management unit, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 18, 70–383 szczecin, poland, e-mail: natalia.sypion@usz.edu.pl (3) institute of geography, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, e-mail: tomasz.michalski@ug.edu.pl citation grzelak-kostulska e., sypion-dutkowska n., michalski t., 2017, changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union (compared to central and eastern european countries), journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 24–38. abstract the main objective of study is to present the health situation of the inhabitants of poland. this was accomplished both in temporal and spatial depiction. the secondary goal is to show the health situation in poland in comparison to other european post-communist countries. to describe the health situation five variables are used: crude death rate, infant mortality, incidence of tuberculosis, incidence of hiv/aids, and life expectancy. the changes in the health situation in poland are generally positive. infant mortality and the incidence of tuberculosis are declining and the average life expectancy (for both sexes) is extending. worrisome is the increase in the number of seropositive persons, but this is not accompanied by an increase in the incidence of aids. also an increase in mortality is on the rise, but this process can be associated with the society’s ageing. the spatial differentiation of the health situation in poland is significant, the most pronounced in the case of infant mortality (taking nuts-4 as the base unit). comparing to european post-communist countries, the health situation of the polish society can be considered relatively good (the worst in the case of tuberculosis). key words health situation, crude death rate, infant mortality, incidence of tuberculosis, incidence of hiv/aids, life expectancy, poland. changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union… 25 related to the impact of transformation processes on health or to high emigration (especially from the new member states of the european union). the main aim of the study is to present changes in the health situation of the population of poland since its accession to the european union to the present day. the secondary objective is to present the current spatial differentiation in the population’s health situation. in any analysis of the health level almost always the so-called negative health indicators are used. this is also the case here. the available data on mortality (the crude death rate and infant mortality), the incidence of selected diseases (there is a wide range of diseases that can function as indicators of the society’s health condition; most commonly the so-called social diseases or civilization diseases are taken into account in analysis – the present study has been limited to two: tuberculosis and hiv/aids) and life expectancy (by gender). the statistical data used in the paper come from reports and databases, both polish (the central statistical office of poland, the institute of tuberculosis and lung diseases, the national aids centre) and foreign institutions (the who regional office for europe, the world bank). however, the final results of the analysis are somewhat distorted by the fact that when calculating the number of deaths or disease incidence per number of inhabitants, the official data provided by the central statistical office of poland were used, in accordance with which emigrants were included among inhabitants of poland (regardless of the time spent out of the country), while according to estimates, at the end of 2015 as many as 2.4 million inhabitants of the country stayed outside poland (informacja..., 2016). the available statistics on temporary emigration does not allow for eliminating the impact of the observed differences. conventional statistical methods were applied in the paper, such as regression models, the coefficient of variation (cv) and pearson correlation coefficient (pcc). 2. changes in mortality after its accession to the european union, we can distinguish two periods of changes in mortality (fig. 1) in poland. in 2004–2009 a very clear upward trend was observed, while in the period of 2009– 2014 large fluctuations were noted, with no clear changing trend. relatively high mortality rates for 2015, amounting to 10.3 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants may be either a continuation of fluctuations from 2009–2014 or a beginning of a new upward trend. a slowly decreasing level of infant mortality1 on the one hand and constant ageing of the population on the other hand suggest that the slight growing trend in the intensity of mortality (presented in fig.  1) will become more distinct2, even despite the further improvement in the country’s situation in terms of its health. regarding gender, a higher level of mortality among men than among women can be seen throughout the whole period. however, a reduction in the difference should be considered as a positive process, as in 2004 it was 1.93 deaths per 1,000 people of one sex, while in 2015 it was 1.44. this difference will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis of life expectancy. with a breakdown by urban and rural population, one can notice major changes. in 2004, higher mortality rates were among the rural population (10.0 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants) than among the urban one (9.2), but in 2014 the mortality rate in the rural population remained at the same level, while in the urban one it increased to 10.4 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. the diversity of mortality rates in poland in 2014 in spatial depiction (breakdown by poviats (nuts4)) is shown in fig.  2. with the values for poland at 9.8 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, it varied from 6.0 in the kartuzy poviat to 15.7 in the hajnówka poviat (bdl gus, 2016), and it was rather little diversified, as the cv value amounted to 15.1%. in fig. 2 one can see two general patterns. the first one partly results from history – in its effect areas of the former russian partition and the sudetes with adjacent areas manifest higher mortality rates. the second one is a consequence of the most modern processes – stemming from migration to suburban zones from major cities and an increasing percentage of the elderly in those cities, which results in an elevated death rate, while it is quite the opposite in suburban areas. fig. 2. shows this especially clearly in the case of the warszawa, poznań, and wrocław agglomerations. in 2004–2014 there were minimal changes in the structure of deaths5. in 2004 there were 363,500 deaths, of which 46.4% accounted for diseases of the circulatory system (i00-i996) and 25.3% for neo1 in 2004, the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 6.8; in 2014 it was 4.2 (bank danych lokalnych gus). 2 unless immigrants at a young age will come to poland in large numbers. 3 for women the rate was 8.6 deaths per 1,000 people, and for men 10.5 (bank danych lokalnych gus). 4 for women the rate was 9.6 deaths per 1,000 people, and for men 11.0 (bank danych lokalnych gus). 5 this is confirmed by the value of the similarity of structures coefficient, which is 1.00. 6 icd-10 (international statistical…, 2016). 26 elżbieta grzelak-kostulska, natalia sypion-dutkowska, tomasz michalski fig. 1. the mortality rate per 1,000 inhabitants in poland in 2004–2015 source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. fig. 2. spatial differentiation of the intensity of mortality per 1,000 inhabitants in poland in 2014 broken down by poviats (nuts-4) source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union… 27 fig. 3. the level of infant deaths per 1,000 live births in poland in 2004–2015 source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. fig.  4. spatial differentiation of the intensity of infant deaths per 1,000 live births in poland in 2014 broken down by poviats (nuts-4). source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. 28 elżbieta grzelak-kostulska, natalia sypion-dutkowska, tomasz michalski plasms (c00-d48). ten years later, among 376,500 deaths, it was 45.1% and 26.6%, respectively. the following groups of diseases also had a greater share in the structure of deaths: symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified (r00-r99) – 6.6% in 2004 and 7.4% in 2014, external causes of morbidity and mortality (v01y98) – respectively: 6.9% and 5.7%, diseases of the respiratory system (j00-j99) – respectively: 4.6% and 5.4%, diseases of the digestive system (k00-k93) – respectively: 4.3% and 4.1% (baza demografia gus). infant mortality is considered to be a fairly accurate indicator of the population’s health situation, since its level is influenced by many factors related to the parents’ pro-health behaviours (especially of mothers during pregnancy), living conditions and the quality of the medical care of the pregnant woman and then of an infant (cf. masuy-stroobat, 2006; szczyt, 2006). fig.  3. shows changes in the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births. we can see a very stable trend of reducing the intensity of infant deaths, which however slowly begins to level off. the stability of changes is also evidenced by small fluctuations in the share of neonatal and post-neonatal deaths. in 2004, 71.7%7 of infant deaths were neonatal deaths, and in 2015 it was 72.3%8. one can notice major changes in a breakdown by urban and rural populations. in 2004, the urban population manifested a higher rate of infant mortality (7.1 deaths per 1,000 live births) than the rural one (6.4); in 2015 the situation was reversed – the level of infant mortality in urban areas (4.0) was slightly lower than in the rural ones (4.1) (baza demografia gus). in spatial depiction (breakdown by poviats (nuts-4)), the diversity of the infant mortality rate in poland in 2015 was significant, because the cv value amounted to 64.5%. with the mean value for the country at 4.0 deaths per 1,000 live births, it ranged from no infant deaths (such a situation was recorded in 34 poviats) to as many as 17.3 deaths per 1,000 live births in the rypin poviat (baza demografia gus). 3. changes in the incidence of selected disease the incidence of tuberculosis (a15-a19) is related to the level of the society’s wealth, especially housing and sanitary conditions of the population and the degree of satisfying nutritional needs (in the sense 7 it differed slightly between the sexes, as it was 69.0% for girls and 73.8% for boys (baza demografia gus). 8 it differed slightly between the sexes, as it was 69.5% for girls and 74.5% for boys (baza demografia gus). of a lack of hunger). preventive efforts also have an impact9. an improvement in living conditions in economically-developed countries has caused a reduction in the risk of the disease; unfortunately, crises trigger the opposite effect. also the emergence of tuberculosis strains resistant to antimycobacterial drugs and the development of the hiv/aids epidemic are bringing a renewed increase in tuberculosis incidence (zielonka, 2014; sonnenberg et al., 2005; szczuka, 2000). analysing changes in the level of tuberculosis incidence in poland we see a clearly weak downward trend, disturbed only in 2011 by a slight increase (fig. 5), as a result of which the number of new cases decreased from 24.9 in 2004 to 16.7 per 100,000 population in 2015. analysing the diversity of the situation in 2015 in the spatial depiction (a breakdown by voivodships, nuts-2 (fig. 6), we find that it was highly heterogeneous, as the cv value was 31.0%. the lowest level of morbidity was noted in the relatively wealthy wielkopolskie voivodship (8.3), but it was followed by the considered as poor warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeship (9.3). by contrast, the worst situation was reported in the highly urbanised and wealthy śląskie voivodship (26.5) (gruźlica..., 2016). since the obtained results partly contradict theoretical considerations, one should presume that there are also other factors affecting the recorded level of tuberculosis incidence. the level of diagnosed cases of hiv in poland has shown an upward trend which slowly levels off (fig. 7). it increased from 1.72 cases per 100,000 population in 2004 to 3.38 in 2011, and in 2014 it was 3.31. in 2015 men accounted for 84.1% of new infections, women 14.5%, and for 1.4% there was no data (zakażenia…). although the level of aids (b20-b24) incidence in poland in 2004–2014 shows large year-on-year fluctuations, one cannot see that is has increased or decreased (fig.  7) as it has continually remained around the value of 0.34 per 100,000 population. in the analysed period the minimum was recorded in 2006 (0.31), and the maximum in 2011 (0.69). according to data, the number of aids cases amounted to 129 cases in 2015, of which 70.3% were males and the rest females. 40 deaths due to aids were reported, of which 72.5% were men and the rest – females (zakażenia…). analysing the diversity of the situation in 2015 in the spatial depiction (a breakdown by voivodships, 9 in accordance with the preventive vaccination programme, in poland the bcg vaccine is mandatory only for infants (komunikat..., 2015) changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union… 29 fig. 5. tuberculosis notification rates per 100,000 population in poland in 2004–2015 source: own study based on gruźlica..., 2016. fig. 6. spatial differentiation of the intensity of tuberculosis notification rates per 100,000 population in poland in 2014 broken down by voivodeships (nuts-2) source: own study based on gruźlica..., 2016. 30 elżbieta grzelak-kostulska, natalia sypion-dutkowska, tomasz michalski fig. 7. level of incidence of hiv and aids per 100,000 population in poland in 2004–2014 source: own study based on zakażenia hiv i zachorowania na aids w polsce. fig. 8. spatial differentiation of the intensity hiv infections notification rates per 100,000 population in poland in 2014 broken down by voivodeships (nuts-2) source: own study based on zakażenia hiv i zachorowania na aids w polsce. changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union… 31 nuts-2 (fig.  8), we find that it was very highly heterogeneous, as the cv value was 49.1%. in terms of spatial depiction (fig. 8), the most new hiv infections were found in śląskie (5.3 per 100,000 population), dolnośląskie (4.5) and mazowieckie voivodships (4.1), the least in lubelskie (0.4). but it must be kept in mind that for up to 4.6% of registered infections there are no data on the place of residence. it is slightly different in the case of aids incidence. here in 2015, the situation in breakdown by voivodeships was even more diverse (cv=79.3%). it was the worst in the dolnośląskie (0.93 per 100,000 population), podlaskie (0.76) and pomorskie (0.61) voivodeships. the best was in małopolskie (0.03) and lubelskie (0.05) (zakażenia…). 4. change in the average life expectancy biological determinants alone make the average life expectancy of males shorter than of females by one year to two years (abdulraheem et al., 2011; luty, 2003; ram, 1993). larger differences are already conditioned by non-biological factors. in poland in 2004–2015 the average life expectancy of a male at the time of birth was as many as almost 9 years shorter than of a female. however, there are two positive trends which can be noted in fig.  9. firstly, there is a steady increase in further life expectancy for a person born in a given year10. secondly, although very slow, there is bridging of differences between the two sexes11 (from 8.5 years in 2004 to 8.0 years in 2015). the average life expectancy of males at the time of birth in rural areas is still shorter than in cities – and, unfortunately, this difference is increasing, as in 2004 it was 70.3 years and 70.9 years, respectively, and in 2015 it was already 73.0 and 74.0 years. therefore, the difference to the detriment of men living in the countryside increased from 0.6 to 1.0 year. the opposite situation is in the case of the average further life expectancy for women at the time of birth. in 2004 women in rural areas could expect to live 79.5 years and in the cities 79.1 years. in 2015 it was 81.7 years and 81.5 years, respectively. this means that the difference with the advantage for those living in the countryside still remained, but it decreased from 0.4 to 0.2 year (bank danych lokalnych gus). fig. 10 illustrates the spatial differentiation of the average life expectancy of women [in years] born in 2015 in a breakdown by nuts-3. extreme values are designated by the katowice (78.9 years) and siedlce (83.0 years) sub-regions (bank danych lokalnych 10 for men born in 2015, it was longer by 2.9 years than for men born in 2004. for women it was respectively longer by about 2.4 years (bank danych lokalnych gus). 11 as evidenced by the coefficient values at 0.235 with the regression line for women and at 0.302 with the regression line for men. fig. 9. the average life expectancy of females and males [in years] being of 0 years of age in poland in 2004–2015 source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. 32 elżbieta grzelak-kostulska, natalia sypion-dutkowska, tomasz michalski gus), and the diversity of situations is very small (cv=1.0%). looking at fig. 9, we see two spatial regularities. firstly, a slightly worse situation is characteristic of numerous urban sub-regions, especially łódź and górny śląski. however, there are exceptions which include warsaw, kraków, szczecin. secondly, a better situation is clearly visible in the east of poland, especially in the voivodeships: podlaskie, podkarpackie, małopolskie and, to a lesser extent, lubelskie, świętokrzyskie and in the east of mazowieckie. in turn, fig.  11 illustrates the spatial variation of average life expectancy of men [in years] born in 2015 broken down by nuts-3. the extreme values are designated by the piotrków (70.8 years) and krakow (76.3 years) sub-regions (bank danych lokalnych gus). although the diversity of situations is also very small (cv=1.6%), it is still significantly higher than in the case of women. in the case of men there are not so clear spatial regularities as in the case of women. in general, one can conclude that longer average life expectancy occurs in the sub-regions that contain large cities (with the exception of łódź and górny śląsk) and in galicia. comparing differences in the average life expectancy between women and men, we find that at the average value for a person born in 2015 of 8.0 years to the detriment of men, the extreme values were set by the tricity and tychy (5.9) and siedlce (10.4) sub-regions. the diversity of situations was already high, because the cv amounted to 12.1%. in spatial depiction, the smallest differences between the two sexes occurred in most sub-regions containing large cities. the fact that the spatial situation of both sexes in the analysed period differs from each other is best proved by pcc, which is only 0.59. 5. situation in poland in comparison to european post-communist countries poland belongs to the group of european post-communist countries in which economic, social and political reforms have been successfully implemented (balázs et al, 2014; bąk, 2006; michalski, 2006; staehr, 2011; sztompka, 2004). in countries where no formal transformation took place or it was ineffectually fig.  10. spatial differentiation of the average life expectancy of females [in years] being of 0 years of age in poland in 2015 by nuts-3 regions source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union… 33 conducted, there is a whole range of factors negatively affecting the population’s health situation (cf. bobak et al., 2000; brainerd, 1998; domański, 2005; florescu-ciobotaru, 2006; hu et al., 2015; shakarishvili (ed.), 2005). although the standardized death rate could better reflect the impact of successful reforms on changes in the mortality level, as it does not take into account the impact of the population’s age structure, it was decided that showing the actual level of mortality would be more important, hence the indicator: crude death rate per 1,000 people was selected (fig. 12). comparing to other analysed countries, poland is in a relatively favourable position. nevertheless, differences in the level of the analysed mortality is a derivative of the diversity of the age structure and the advancement of the transformation process. the lowest level of mortality is in the countries that successfully introduced reforms (slovenia, slovakia, poland, czechia), but also those with a young society (albania, macedonia, montenegro) (see: grzelak-kostulska et al., 2012a, 2012b; meslé, 2004; michalski, 2012a, 2012b, 2016; philipov, dorbritz, 2003). again, in comparison to the analysed group of countries, in 2015 poland was characterised by a relatively low level of infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births (fig. 13). although in all european postcommunist countries a decline in infant mortality was recorded, but in those with a bad economic, social and political situation, it is still very high (see: aleshina, redmond, 2005; michalski, 2010, 2012b, 2016; pietrzyka, gadzinowski, 2007; zatoński et al., 2006; zetlin et al., 2015). in the case of spatial differentiation (estimated) of the incidence of tuberculosis, we see an even greater impact on a successful transformation process of spreading of this disease (see: arinaminpathy, dye, 2010; michalski, 2016; walls, shingadia, 2007). the best situation characterizes countries which successfully implemented reforms (plus albania). poland is the last country in the group of countries with the lowest level of tuberculosis incidence (fig. 14). countries in eastern europe and the former soviet union are amongst those affected the most by the hiv/aids epidemic. in view of the above, also this disease has been included in the study. since fig. 11. spatial differentiation of the average life expectancy of males [in years] being of 0 years of age in poland in 2015 by nuts-3 regions source: own study based on bank danych lokalnych gus. 34 elżbieta grzelak-kostulska, natalia sypion-dutkowska, tomasz michalski the detection rate of hiv is incomplete and largely depends not only on spreading of the disease, but also on the state’s policy on accessibility of detection tests and on the society’s attitudes to seropositive persons, a decision was made to analyse not only hiv infections but also aids. for the reasons given above, it is difficult to compare the number of patients with hiv between countries. data on the number of aids cases are more fig. 12. the diversity of the crude death rate per 1,000 in european post-communist countries in 2014 source: world bank open data (indicator code: sp.dyn.cdrt.in). fig. 13. the diversity of the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births in european post-communist countries in 2014 source: world bank open data (indicator code: sp.dyn.imrt.in). changes in the health situation of the population of poland following the accession to the european union… 35 reliable, and these data were compared (fig. 15). can say that poland has an very good situation in comparison to other european post-communist countries, with the worst being in countries of the former ussr (gokengin et al., 2016; hamers, down, 2003; von zachorka, 2003).12 12 for details of estimation methods see: global…, 2016. fig. 14. the diversity of estimated12 incidence of tuberculosis per 100,000 people in european post-communist countries in 2014 source: hfa-db… (indicator code: e040302.t). fig. 15. the diversity of the incidence of aids per 100,000 people in european post-communist countries in 2014 source: russia: национальный…, 2016; rest countries: hfa-db… (indicator code: e050312.t). 36 elżbieta grzelak-kostulska, natalia sypion-dutkowska, tomasz michalski most eastern european countries for many years have had much higher premature mortality rates for males than for females (michniewicz-ankiersztajn et al., 2013; michalski, 2010; watson, 1995), and in this respect poland is typical. fig.  16 synthetically shows life expectancy at birth [years] for both sexes together. we see that in this respect the situation in poland is one of the best. equally long life expectancy at birth is characteristic of other post-communist countries which successfully carried out the process of transformation. yet the case of albania raises eyebrows about the reliability of statistical data. 6. summary the health situation of the polish population is relatively good. this is clearly seen when comparing the crude death rate and the standardized death rate. if in 2005 the crude death rate in poland was 965 deaths per 100,000 population, in 2014 it was less by 13. at the same time, the standardized death rate dropped by as many as 168 (from 873 deaths per 100,000 population to 705 deaths) (kuropka, 2015). analysing the diversity of the health situation of the population of poland on the basis of the data presented in the study, it is difficult to find general spatial regularities. trying to place poland in the theory of epidemiological transition (wróblewska, 2009), we can fig. 16. the diversity of life expectancy at birth [years] for both sexes in european post-communist countries in 2014 source: world bank open data (indicator code: sp.dyn.le00.in). conclude that poland is at the hybrid stage, similarly to those european post-communist countries that have successfully implemented political reforms and have become members of the european union, with reservations for bulgaria, estonia, lithuania, 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traditional ideas about international security and forms of interaction between states (philipps, braun, 2020). multilateral cooperation institutions are experiencing a deep crisis. international law and other non-forceful means of regulating international relations are losing their effectiveness, which results in a demand for strict ruling to constantly grow. nontraditional threats are multiplying (mizutori, 2021), and those that have been on the agenda for a long time, as, for example, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, are becoming more acute (mìžnarodnij..., 2019). the beginning of the armed aggression of the russian federation (hereinafter referred to as the rf) on february 24, 2022, against ukraine, has journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(3), 51–58 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.3.05 the national security field under conditions of armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine in 2022 tetіana pavlenko (1), mariia korabel (2) (1) department of state legal disciplines, criminal law and process, н.s. scovoroda kharkiv national pedagogical university, alchevskaya 29, 61002 kharkiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-6019-1086 e-mail: pavlenkotatyana7@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) department of state legal disciplines, criminal law and process, н.s. scovoroda kharkiv national pedagogical university, alchevskaya 29, 61002 kharkiv, ukraine orcid: 0000-0002-8703-7003 e-mail: masher-k@ukr.net citation pavlenko t., korabel m., 2022, the national security field under conditions of armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine in 2022, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(3), 51–58. abstract this article touches upon the problem of organizing security space under the conditions of armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine in 2022. according to the understanding of the “security” concept, it is determined that the security space should put a state and its vital interests under protection from any internal and external threats. it is emphasized that in conditions of armed aggression, the central components of the security space should be international (global) security and national security. the main areas of international (global) security should include the development and control of weapons, the fight against international terrorism, the development by the international community of effective mechanisms for countering modern global security challenges (proliferation of mass destruction weapons, namely nuclear weapons). inclusion of military, state, information and cyber security is proposed as the main areas of national security. key words security, security space, international (global) security, national security, military security, information security. received: 27 may 2022 accepted: 11 august 2022 published: 28 september 2022 52 tetіana pavlenko, mariia korabel become the most serious aggravation of these problems since the end of the second world war. under such conditions, the priority is to ensure the integrity of our state, preserve sovereignty, and create conditions under which every person, every citizen of ukraine or another state will feel safe on the territory of our country [ukraine]. after all, the development of ukraine as a sovereign, independent, democratic, social, and legal state is impossible without the establishment of democratic principles, and the proper provision of human and citizen rights and freedoms. therefore, today the problem of creating a safe space for the state is acute. such a space is vital not only for ukraine and europe but also for the entire civilized world. 2. materials and methods the data of international organizations, in particular, the study of the international telecommunication union, united nations conference on trade and development (unctad), world economic forum, isaca, microsoft company, ibgroup, mcafee, cisco, as well as the materials of interpol and europol reports have been analyzed. the research methodology and the achieved results are based on the usage of the following general and special cognition methods: dialectical, systemstructural, methods of analysis and synthesis. 3. results and discussion the absence of threats to fundamental human interests, such as life, health and well-being, creates a sense of security in people. security is the basic need of any person, until a person feels safe. without it, it is impossible to take care of the needs of a higher order, i.e. social, spiritual, and cultural ones. by contrast, feeling safe, a person strives to deepen social ties, achieve self-realization, etc. it is clear that the category of “absolute safety” is purely theoretical and is probably a utopia concept, because, for example, no one can be safe from an accident or a carelessly committed crime. in addition, the level of personal security depends to a large extent on the behavior of the individual him/herself, his/her personal qualities, etc. however, human security also depends on those threats that objectively exist in society, which the state should counter. security is a rather vast concept. during recent decades, there has been a trend towards a humancentric approach in the security space. simultaneously, this trend fully relies on the concept of national security, which is focused on protecting the state from external threats, even strengthening and detailing security itself. the idea of primarily securing the rights and freedoms of individuals and society enables both a focused and holistic way of interpreting the problems and challenges humanity faces today. these include the pandemic that has covered the whole world, the climate crisis, social injustice, the threats that arise in cyberspace, physical violence, and armed aggression, which are the realities nowadays. this list can be continued because it is only the “tip of the iceberg” of threats in the security space. already judging by this, it can be stated that these threats have long ceased to be the problems of one or several states, but have a transnational character, although, of course, they have certain specificities depending on the region. according to the etymology of the word, the definition of “security” is “the absence of a threat”, that means safety of the individual, society and the state as a whole. in a general sense, security is a condition of protecting vital state interests from any internal and external threats. s. makinda (1998) defined security as the preservation of norms, rules, institutions and values of society. all institutions, principles and structures related to society, including its people, must be protected from military and non-military threats. “preservation” is an important component of this definition and it implies conscious, deliberate and determined steps and actions. thus, the perception of a society’s leadership determines its actions and directs its efforts, which is evident in the peculiarities of that society’s security program. the core of the “security” concept can be considered as the activity of people, society, the state, and the global community of peoples to identify, prevent, weaken, and avert a threat capable of destroying them, depriving them of material and spiritual values, causing irreparable damage, and blocking the ways of progressive development (ciganov, 2006). as for the security space, if judging from the meaning of “security” concept itself, a state of the vital country’s interests protection both from any internal threats and from any external threats should be created. therefore, it should include several aspects. during peacetime, for example, those are primarily public order, fire safety, medical assistance, etc. since february 24, 2022, it has become clear that the security space should be broader in terms of its content. and nowadays, international (global) and national security seem to be the main components of the security space. international (global) security covers the most urgent directions and problems of human development and means its protection from threats capable the national security field under conditions of armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine in 2022 53 of destabilizing the situation in the world or its key regions, causing a global crisis. in a broad sense, international (global) security is interpreted as a system of international relations which is based on the states-participants’ compliance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law. this also excludes the resolution of disputed issues and disagreements between the countries with the help of force or threats of force implementations (smolianiuk, 2016). in general, international (global) security is a form of protection from threats to the vital interests of humanity (in general), states, interstate and regional associations, which ensure the possibility of acting according to the country’s interests (danik, 2008). currently, we have witnessed the dire consequences of one country’s non-compliance with the principles and norms of international law and the actual creation of “quasi-disputed issues” that are later resolved by force. as it turns out, today the central areas of international (global) security issues should be the development and control of weapons, the fight against international terrorism, as well as the invention of effective mechanisms for the entire international community to face modern global security challenges1. of particular concern is the possibility of the use mass destruction weapons that could be done by the aggressor state. at the same time, the problem of the possible nuclear weapons use is particularly acute. firstly, kremlin’s statements indicate the transfer of deterrence forces, which also include nuclear weapons, to a special combat duty regime (february 27, 2022), and secondly, they confirm the possibility of using such weapons if there is a threat to the existence of the rf (22.03.2022). in addition, taking into account the situation that has developed in connection with the armed aggression of the rf, the issue of economic and social stability is reaching a new severity level not only when it comes to one state’s affairs, but also in terms of the whole world. this should be analyzed taking into account the matter’s connection with the globalization of the financial system and the diversification of quantitative and qualitative indicators of the world trade process and market structure. since february 24, 2022, the problem of migration has gained new momentum, which currently has signs of global human movements2, 1 of course, the protection of the environment should be in focus as well as illegal drug trafficking, and the prevention and settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts, and the preservation of cultural diversity in the modern world, ensuring the observance of human rights, space exploration, and the rational use of the earth’s subsoil and the resources of the world ocean, and others 2 as of march 22, 2022, the number of ukrainians who have whose consequences can have fundamental results for both donor and recipient countries. as for national security, its external dimension is important for clarifying the national security essence, that is, the state and conditions of the country’s society development in the international environment (černâk, pervìj, 2019). in ukraine, the concept of “national security” has gained crucial significance since 2014, and since february 24, 2022, every person, not only in ukraine but also in the whole world, is thinking about the mentioned issue. for the majority, national security is associated only with the activities of special services, equated with state defense, etc. (černâk, pervìj, 2019). and although we should not forget about the economic, political, moral and ethical and other non-force aspects of ensuring national security, today we can state that in the modern world, unfortunately, force methods remain the most effective, in particular, the military is a powerful lever power of the state, armaments and availability of mass destruction weapons. in a broad sense, national security is an indicator of the society and government’s ability to protect national interests independently or together with other friendly countries (peoples, nations), to restrain or eliminate internal and external threats to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, social order, economic development, other important elements of spiritual and material life activity, the degree of individual interests, society and the state protection from external and internal threats (sosnìn..., 2021). at the legislative level, national security is defined as the guarding of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional system and other national interests of ukraine from real and potential threats. since june 21, 2021, the law has not defined national security objects separately but listed the components of the state in art. 3, revealing the principles of state policy, which should be aimed at protection. this way, the specified legislative wording repeats the meaning of the concept of “national security objects” as it is stated in the law of ukraine “on the basics of national security of ukraine”. currently, state security is distinguished as a separate area. in paragraph 4, part 1 of art. 1 of the law of ukraine “on the national security of ukraine”, state security is defined as the protection of “state sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic constitutional system and other vital national interests from real and potential threats of a non-military nature”. in left ukraine since the beginning of the russian armed aggression is 3,528,346 (kìl’kìst’ bìžencìv z ..., 2022); every fourth ukrainian was forced to leave his home (malloch-brown, 2022). 54 tetіana pavlenko, mariia korabel fact, nowadays, state security is a narrower concept than national security. regarding the definition of other security types which compose national security as a whole, there is a diversity among views regarding the differentiation of individual types (directions) of such security. we second the opinion that it is firstly advisable to single out those types (components) that are directly defined in the normative legal acts of ukraine (doronìn, 2020). traditionally, economic and informational security are distinguished as separate types of national security, since the importance of their provision is emphasized by the provisions of part 1 of art. 17 of the constitution of ukraine. according to the provisions of part 4 of art. 3 of the law of ukraine “on the national security of ukraine”, which defines the principles of state policy in the national security and defense spheres but does not provide an exhaustive list of individual security types that compose national security, military, foreign policy, state, economic, information, environmental and cyber security are distinguished in ukraine, etc. that means, in fact, that the legislator does not limit the provided list. today, military security comes to the fore for ukraine. the term “military security” is actually considered by the legislator as a dichotomy with the term “state security”, distinguishing the difference only by the nature of the threats. in particular, military security is considered to be the protection of “state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the democratic constitutional system and other vital national interests from military threats” (clause 2, part 1, article 1 of the law of ukraine “on national security of ukraine”). that is, the objects of protection are the state itself and its components, but unlike state security, the purpose of protection is the presence (existence) of threats of a military nature. in the future, military security is terminologically used in art. 28 of the specified law, which regulates the development and adoption of the military security strategy as a planning document (doronìn, 2020). obviously, the understanding of military security should be based on the understanding of the concepts of “aggression” and “military power”, which are threats of an immediate or prospective nature. this issue became particularly relevant on february 24, 2022, when our state faced open armed aggression from the rf. the very concept of “aggression” in international law includes the use of armed force by one state against another state or people (bojko, 2010). among the types of actions considered as manifestations of aggression, 5 out of 7 directly involve the use of armed forces (opredelenie agressii ..., 1974). in addition to the “armed forces”, the use of other “groups of violent nature” is also considered aggression (doronìn, 2020). under any conditions, aggression is carried out by the state (its relevant bodies). it is clear that the classic “instrument” of aggression is the armed forces of the state, understood as military formations of “regular” and “irregular” nature. under such conditions, ensuring security in the military sphere is primarily aimed at preventing, diverting, and repelling aggression against the state. also, one of the important components of national security today is information security and cyber security. thus, on december 28, 2021, at the level of the decision of the national security and defense council of ukraine, which was approved by the decree of the president of ukraine, it was determined that the information security of ukraine is defined as an integral part of the national security of ukraine, the state of country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional system, other vital interests of an individual, society and the country’s itself protection. among the constitutional rights and freedoms of a person are the following: right to collect, store, use and distribute information as well as access to reliable and objective information. this should be properly ensured. there also exists an effective system of protection and countermeasures against harm due to the spread of negative information influences, including coordinated dissemination of unreliable information, destructive propaganda, other information operations, unauthorized dissemination, use and violation of the integrity of information with limited access. it should be noted that in the 21st century the process of using the worldwide internet network and the latest technologies is gaining tremendous momentum. it was particularly significantly enforced from the end of 2019 to the beginning of 2020, which coincides with the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. in general, this is a manifestation of technical progress, digitization of the modern world, and, on the one hand, it is an undoubted achievement of mankind. on the other hand, such a process is accompanied by a number of negative manifestations, such as a low level of security culture, an increase in the number of online users who are dependent on digital infrastructure, the spread of unwanted content (in particular, that promotes violence, incites enmity, contains calls to armed aggression, etc.), there is an increase in cases of cyber fraud, data leaks, unauthorized access to information. there is rapid, global development of cyber terrorism. also, crime in the field of banking is increasing, the number of unauthorized interventions in the work of computers is increasing. that is, the significant criminalization of cyberspace is obvious the national security field under conditions of armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine in 2022 55 and it requires an adequate response from the state, the development of an effective strategy for countering informational threats, especially in conditions of armed aggression. according to interpol, cybercrime is one of the fastest growing areas of crime (interpol, 2018). this is confirmed by the reports of many organizations, for example (international telecommunication union (itu), united nations conference on trade and development (unctad), world economic forum, isaca, microsoft company, ibgroup, mcafee, cisco, etc. in particular, the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) internet organized crime threat assessment (iocta) 2021 report states that the exceptional covid-19 crisis has led to an increase in cybercrime in all its forms, while shadow economy contributes to the spread of crime. it is noted that the accelerated digitization associated with the pandemic has significantly influenced the development of a number of cyber threats, in particular the following are highlighted: ransomware affiliate programs allow a larger group of criminals to attack large corporations and government institutions, threatening them with multi-level extortion methods, such as ddos attacks; mobile malware is evolving with attackers trying to bypass additional security measures such as two-factor authentication; online shopping has led to a dramatic increase in online fraud; outspoken, self-created material is of increasing concern and is also distributed for profit; criminals continue to abuse legitimate services such as vpns, encrypted communication services and cryptocurrencies (europol, 2021). the level of cybercrime is increasing in ukraine as well. thus, as of october 2019, it was established that the number of information crimes had increased by 2.5 times over the past five years (za ostannì..., 2019). the growing trend of cybercrimes continues. thus, during the same four months of 2021, compared to 2020, the number of cybercrimes increased by 25%; more than 1,100 incidents were recorded (kìl’kìst’ kìberzločinìv …, 2021). since february 24, 2022, fraudulent activities using the internet have been observed, for example, in the field of volunteer assistance to both the civilian population and the armed forces of ukraine (hereinafter – the armed forces). in addition, the unauthorized dissemination, both intentionally and due to carelessness, of information about the armed forces poses a serious threat to the national security of ukraine. so there is every reason to strengthen information security in ukraine. as for the definition of the term “information security” itself, it is provided at the legislative level in para. 2, paragraph 13 of the law “on the basic principles of the development of the information society in ukraine for 2007-2015”, and is defined as a state of protection of the vital interests of a person, society and the state, in which harm is prevented due to: incompleteness, untimeliness and implausibility of information that is used; negative information impact; negative consequences of the usage of information technologies; unauthorized distribution, use and violation of integrity, confidentiality and availability of information. in addition, as already noted, the information security of ukraine is an integral part of the national security of state. the protection of the ukrainian information space from destructive hostile information activities has been gaining relevance since 2014, and since february 24, 2022, the relevance of such protection has increased many times. today, this is one of the central tasks that state authorities are facing, in particular, the security sector. still, a significant problem is the comprehensive counteraction to destructive information activity, which is carried out either with the help of internal subjects of information activity, or through information channels whose owners are not directly subjects (residents) of ukraine, but at the same time carry out such activities in the country (foreign social services) state authorities, in particular, counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies, take measures to counter hostile information activities within their powers, but in many cases their actions are limited due to a number of factors. one of the important reasons for the lack of effectiveness is the imperfection of the normative and legal framework that would regulate countering informational subversive activities against ukrainian statehood. it should be noted that since the beginning of the armed aggression of the russian federation, the ukrainian legislator has significantly improved the situation in this area. thus, a number of significant reforms were made to the criminal code of ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the criminal code). in particular, criminal liability is provided for collaborative activity (article 111-1 of the criminal code) and unauthorized dissemination of information about the sending, weapons transfer, armaments and military supplies to ukraine, the movement, transfer or deployment of the armed forces or other military forces formed in accordance with the laws of ukraine formations, committed under conditions of war or state of emergency (article 114-2 of the criminal code of ukraine). such changes should have a significant impact on ensuring the protection of ukraine’s information space. in particular, in the context of ensuring information security, criminal liability has been established for public denial by a citizen of ukraine of armed aggression against ukraine, establishment and approval of the 56 tetіana pavlenko, mariia korabel temporary occupation of part of the territory of ukraine; for public appeals by a citizen of ukraine to support the decisions and/or actions of the aggressor state, armed formations and/or the occupation administration of the aggressor state; for cooperation with the aggressor state, armed formations and/ or the occupation administration of the aggressor state; for non-recognition of the extension of the state sovereignty of ukraine to the temporarily occupied territories of ukraine (part 1 of article 111-1 of the criminal code); for implementation of propaganda by a citizen of ukraine in educational institutions, regardless of the types and forms of ownership, with the aim of facilitating the implementation of armed aggression against ukraine; for establishment and confirmation of the temporary occupation of part of the territory of ukraine; for avoiding responsibility for the implementation of armed aggression against ukraine by the aggressor state, as well as for actions of citizens of ukraine aimed at on the implementation of education standards of the aggressor state in educational institutions (part 3 of article 111-1 of the criminal code); for organizing and conducting events of a political nature, carrying out information activities in cooperation with the aggressor state and/or its occupying administration, aimed at supporting the aggressor state, its occupying administration or armed formations and/ or at its avoidance of responsibility for armed aggression against ukraine, under absence of treason signs, active participation in such activities (part 6 of article 111-1 of the criminal code). it should be emphasized that the note to art. 111-1 of the criminal code of ukraine defines that in part 1 of art. 111-1 of the criminal code the public is considered the distribution of appeals or expressions of objection to an unspecified circle of persons, in particular on the internet or with the help of mass media. in addition, the legislator has a rather broad understanding of the concept of “political measures” (part 6 of article 111-1 of the criminal code). in particular, these can be congresses, meetings, rallies, marches, demonstrations, conferences, round tables, etc. it is worth noting that the legislator does not limit the scope of such measures, which, on the one hand, will enable law enforcement agencies not to limit, daresay, “their possibilities” when qualifying actions; on the other hand, again we are dealing with an evaluative concept that under certain conditions, can be interpreted very broadly. the legislator also clarifies what constitutes “information activity” (part 6 of article 111-1 of the criminal code), namely, it is suggested that this activity should be understood as the creation, collection, receipt, storage, use and distribution of relevant information. in addition, the legislation also provides for responsibility for the dissemination of certain information committed during a state of war or state of emergency (article 114-1 of the criminal code). such information includes information related to the sending, movement of weapons, armaments and military supplies to ukraine, including their movement through the territory of ukraine, if such information was not made publicly available by the general staff of the armed forces of ukraine or the ministry of defense of ukraine or in official sources relevant departments of partner countries; the movement or location of the armed forces of ukraine or other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of ukraine, if it is possible to identify them on the ground, if such information was not made publicly available by the general staff of the armed forces of ukraine. it is clear that such restrictions are aimed at ensuring the national security of ukraine. other criminal law regulations also provide for liability for certain types of subversive information activities. in particular, these are the norms established in part 2 of article 109, article 110, article 111, article 258-2, article 258-5, article 295, article 436 and 436-1, part 2. article 442 of the criminal code of ukraine. however, certain difficulties arise in the practice of their application, mainly, because of too broad wording, which seriously complicates proving the fact of committing a crime. 4. conclusion a human-centered approach in the security space is justified, since such an approach is fully consistent and negotiated. it strengthens the concept of national security, which is focused on protecting the state from external and internal threats. the security space of the state should create all vital state interests protection condition from any external and internal threats. one of the main components of the security space under the current circumstances of an armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine should be international (global) security and national security. international (global) security is a form of protection of vital interests of humanity (in general), states, interstate and regional associations, which ensures the possibility of the realization of these interests. under the circumstances of an armed aggression, the central directions of international (global) security are the development and control of weapons, the fight against international terrorism, the development by the entire international community of effective mechanisms for countering modern global the national security field under conditions of armed aggression of the russian federation against ukraine in 2022 57 security challenges, especially such as the possible use of mass destruction weapons (nuclear weapons). 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https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19#text 58 tetіana pavlenko, mariia korabel ukraine”) vìd 19.06.2003 № 964-iv. vìdomostì verhovnoï radi ukraïni. 2003. № 39. st. 351. zakon ukraïni «pro osnovnì zasadi rozvitku ìnformacìjnogo suspìl’stva v ukraïnì na 2007–2015 roki» (eng. law of ukraine “on basic principles of information society development in ukraine for 2007-2015”), https://zakon.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/537-16#text (accessed 02 april 2022). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/537-16#text https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/537-16#text journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(2), 1–7 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.01 implications of the war in ukraine on the belt and road initiative vladimir prebilič (1), vid jereb (2) (1) department of defense studies faculty of social sciences, university of ljubljana, kardeljeva 5, 1000 ljubljana, slovenia, orcid: 0000-0002-0576-4259 e-mail: vladimir.prebilic@fdv.uni-lj.si (corresponding author) (2) department of defense studies faculty of social sciences, university of ljubljana, kardeljeva 5, 1000 ljubljana, slovenia e-mail: vid.jereb@gmailcom citation prebilič v., jereb v., 2022, implications of the war in ukraine on the belt and road initiative, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(2), 1–7. abstract the war in ukraine will have broad implications for the european region and the world as a whole. it has already changed the intricate balance in the world order influencing great power competition rendering some geostrategic priorities obsolete while reinforcing others. the biggest geo-economic project of the people’s republic of china (prc): the belt and road (bri) initiative, will be no exception. the transport and energy flows of bri will be disrupted due to the new iron curtain descending across europe in the form of sanctions against aggressors in the war in ukraine. to balance this in the short term, the prc will have to reroute much of its bri cargo and projects into other corridors. in the long term, the prc will attempt to divert russian resources from the west to itself within the bri framework, thus rendering western sanctions ineffective and assuring the longterm success of the bri. key words belt and road initiative, war in ukraine, geopolitics, geo-economics. received: 23 may 2022 accepted: 02 july 2022 published: 19 august 2022 1. introduction the war in ukraine will certainly be remembered as one of the most significant geopolitical events of the 21st century. as such, it has changed the landscape and dynamics of great power competition, harming the prospects of some while also creating new opportunities for others. the war in ukraine and the consequent international isolation of russia, among many other outcomes, has put into question the success of the biggest international infrastructural project: china’s belt and road initiative (bri) and its mainland corridor, the eurasian land bridge. one of the main declared underlying goals of the bri is to promote peace through trade and connectivity. in this sense, the war in ukraine erodes one of the main pillars of the initiative. the causal relationship between trade and war has been observed for the past two millennia. in 100  ad, plutarch wrote that sea trade allowed one to cooperate and ‘redress defects’ in their relationships through a mutual exchange (stewart, 2020). since then, many studies mailto:vladimir.prebilic@fdv.uni-lj.si mailto:vid.jereb@gmailcom 2 vladimir prebilič, vid jereb have proven a positive correlation between peace and trade and a negative correlation between war and trade. this is largely due to harmful factors, such as embargoes, damage to infrastructure, the nature of the wartime economy, and many other hidden indirect costs, such as loss of human capital (glick, taylor, 2005). regardless, this crisis also presents opportunities that great powers, such as the prc, could capitalize on. despite the emphasis on peace, security was always an integral part of the initiative. the security component was never officially given the importance it plays in the initiative (russel, locklear, 2020) as it contradicts its declared goal of a ‘peaceful rise’ of the prc (peoples republic of china) (pan, 2006). many western countries have been skeptical and warned participating countries against the possible militarization of bri projects (russel, locklear, 2020), with the best example being the strategic ports in the indian ocean, which might serve a dual purpose within the chinese strategy of encircling india called string of pearls. even if those projects are not used militarily, they will serve indirect security goals, such as strategic depth, alternative supply routes, energy security, and increased mobility, among others (lintner, 2019). 2. geopolitics and geo-economics geopolitics is placed within the field of the basic science of geography, more precisely in the domain of social geography. nonetheless, the specificity of the study is significantly broader than the specialist sciences of social geography, which thoroughly investigate individual components of the human presence in geographical space (flint, 2017). the term geopolitics was coined in 1899, and its father is considered to be the swedish scientist, geographer and politician rudolf kjelln. since then the science has experienced an extremely rapid development of various concepts which have been (too) often the subject of instrumentalization of various ideologies (dodds, 2019). today, science has new research disciplines, among which geo-economics is the most current. the progress of humanity in terms of a general refusal to resolve conflicts through war and awareness of the extremely serious consequences of a global military conflict has put methods that are more acceptable within international community at the forefront of satisfying national interests. nonetheless, these methods bare not much less negative consequences for those who find themselves in the grip of projecting interests. r. blackwill and j. harris (2016, p. 20) defined geo-economics as: “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals”. a closer look at this definition reveals the instruments, or methods, of geo-economic actions of countries in the global order, as well as the goals of the latter stem from an important fact – the starting point of any geo-economic action is the possession of economic power, of which the prc has a lot. 3. belt and road initiative bri is the largest infrastructural project in history. in its plans, it encapsulates the supercontinent of afro-eurasia, with member countries representing more than 60% of the world’s population, 35% of the world gdp and 43% of the world trade. although the initial starting goal of the bri was to ensure the connectivity of asian markets, with chinese market at its center, more and more investments can be identified in agriculture, industrial development, trade, investment and financial sectors (kohli et al. (eds.), 2020). from the point of view of the geoeconomics of the people’s republic of china, the development of the bri concept years after its beginning makes more sense than ever. in the initial period alone, between 2014 and 2016, trade between the economies of the bri and the prc reached three trillion dollars with a far above average growth rate (islam, 2019). it is expected that the bri will further stimulate trade and thus economic growth of the prc for many years to come. the latest figures from march 2022 show that 146 countries have already signed bri memorandums of understanding with the prc thus becoming official members of bri. the countries of the belt and road initiative are spread across all continents: 43 countries are in sub-saharan africa, 34 bri countries are in europe & central asia (including 18 countries of the european union (eu) that are part of the bri), 25 bri countries are in east asia & pacific, 20 bri countries are in latin america & caribbean, 18 bri countries in the middle east & north africa, 6 countries are in south east asia (nedopil, 2022). the bri is necessary to understand from a geostrategic perspective through two important implementation components: the belt represents a land corridor, which connects the prc through central asia, the south caucasus and the russian federation with the european union countries. it consists of six economic corridors – southeast asian, south asian, implications of the war in ukraine on the belt and road initiative 3 two central asian and north asian corridors (fig. 1) (chatzky, mcbride, 2020). the initiative, on the other hand, equates the road with a maritime component whose mainstay is connecting the pacific and indian oceans via indonesia. in the period since 2018, the people’s republic of china has added another important corridor to the already mentioned corridors: the polar route. the route came to the forefront due to climate change and the melting of the arctic ice, thus providing the possibility of establishing a maritime route through the arctic. considering the amount of cargo, the maritime component of the bri project is significantly more important for the prc. it addresses three areas of conflict of interest and possible constraints on the prc’s strategic interests: the south china sea, the suez canal and the straits of tears (bad el mandeb) as entry points into the red sea and on to the suez canal (chatzky, mcbride, 2020). 4. the war in ukraine and the belt and road initiative russia played a very prominent role in chinese grand plans for the belt and road initiative. its plans within the country in 2020 consisted of 122 projects, the majority of which were within sectors of transport and energy. in 2020 russia was the highest recipient of bri investment of all its member countries at a staggering 287 billion usd (refinitiv, 2020). the covid-19 pandemic has restructured bri priorities, putting some projects on pause while accelerating others. the biggest such change was seen in the expansion of land transportation, making once too expensive land transport financially more viable in the light of problems within the shipping industry due to pandemic (iea, 2020). while bri has not yet fully taken its post-pandemic shape, it was disrupted again, this time by the war in ukraine. russia and china have a very long and complicated relationship. since the collapse of the soviet union, russia and the prc have increasingly deepened their relationship, which today can be described as that of strategic partners. despite this, there is a limit to every friendship and the war in ukraine has silk road economic belt new maritime silk road gas pipelines oil pipelines existing railroads proposed economic corridors planned ports with chinese engagement planned or under construction prpjects subsumed under china’s belt and road initiativekey asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib) members fig. 1. bri projects, routes and corridors. source: maçães, 2017. 4 vladimir prebilič, vid jereb tested the trust between the countries, leaving the prc leadership unsettled by the unilateral actions of its close ally. uncertainty of war, risks to the prc’s long-term strategy and reputational damage by the association are just some of the factors thus far damaging chinese international standing (politi, 2022). in the wake of the conflict in ukraine, the nato lead coalition of countries imposed unprecedented sanctions on russia and belarus, making russia, which has been already sanctioned since 2014 annexation of crimea, the most sanctioned country in the world with over 5,000 targeted sanctions. these sanctions, besides state actors, include the country’s sovereign debt, foreign exchanges, private individuals and entities, and even swift bank transactions (vuksic, 2022). despite russia being the target, sanctions rippled through world markets sending prices of commodities such as oil, gas, wheat, and fertilizers to new heights. sanctions also had a spillover effect on russia dependent economies and companies the majority of which are in europe and asia, the main theater of bri (van der merwe, 2020). the usa has already warned china that any form of help to russia, military or otherwise, will be understood as complicity and will be sanctioned as such (brant, 2022). in response to this, the prc has already paused many developments within the bri framework in russia, including some of its biggest projects, such as the 500 million sinopec’s gas plant, the integral piece in the bri energy corridor from russia to the prc. according to reuters (2022), beijing has repeatedly voiced opposition to the sanctions, insisting it will maintain normal economic and trade exchanges with russia and has refused to condemn moscow’s actions in ukraine or call them an invasion. despite this, behind the scenes, the government is wary of chinese companies running afoul of sanctions. as a result, the prc is pressing companies to tread carefully with investments in russia, its second-largest oil supplier and third-largest gas provider (aizhu et al., 2022). the prc has increased its imports from russia in a single year by an astonishing 56.6% from 2021 to 2021. the trend defies the us warnings to cut ties, as the largest increase happened since the invasion began by 13.3% in just over a month. the prc’s exports to russia, on the other hand, dropped by 7.7% as chinese companies remain too wary of sanctions (tang, wang, 2022). 5. energy sector while the prc puts its russian projects on hold to reassess risks and opportunities, russia does not have the same luxury of time. to shield itself from sanctions, which threaten its survival, russia will have to search aggressively for new markets and opportunities. the eu has already announced it will seek to ban russian energy imports as soon as it finds alternative sources, which would cripple the russian economy if it does not take advantage of a closing window of opportunity to reroute its energy exports elsewhere (edmond, 2022). the prc is the only market with big enough demand to absorb russian energy supply in the long term, but in the short term, russia cannot do much to change its export routes. the majority of 11.3 million barrels a day production in russia consists of 10 million barrels of crude oil, 960,000 barrels of refined oil, and 340,000 barrels of liquid natural gas. this means that russian energy exports are overwhelmingly dependent on oil and gas pipes, which cannot change their course overnight and take years, and some even decades, to be constructed. the 960,000 barrels of oil and 340,000 barrels of natural liquid gas are transported outside of pipelines, mainly on railways (broom, 2022). however, railways are already running at full capacity due to the covid breakdown in logistics and heavy demands of wartime logistics, which are providing support for russian troops in ukraine. it is, therefore, easy to conclude that russia will face great challenges in rerouting its oil exports away from european markets. another important aspect is how sanctions on russian oil and gas will work. due to the centralized nature of the planned economy, almost all former soviet republics export their oil through the former soviet, nowadays russian infrastructure, with pipelines from central asia and caucuses, with very few exceptions connecting to the russian infrastructure, thus creating an integrated and hard to distinguished web of the energy system (haddad, 2022). the sanctioning of the russian energy sector will, therefore, have an even broader implication on bri energy ambitions as it will also include countries such as kazakhstan, which lies at the center of bri infrastructure going to the middle east and europe. if the prc wants to move ahead in light of sanctions, it will need to physically separate the russian energy infrastructure and that of the former soviet republics even further, thus creating an alternative gravitating toward the prc instead of russia. such a move would be seen by russia as meddling in its sphere of influence and an act of open hostility that would undoubtedly sour the relations between the countries. nonetheless, russian power in central asia and many other places alongside bri is in decline and the prc’s power is rising and filling the void left behind by retreating great powers (yau, 2020). implications of the war in ukraine on the belt and road initiative 5 this is where the prc could capitalize on opportunities created by the ukraine conflict with synergies within its bri long-term strategy. western global oil majors shell, british petroleum (bp) and norway’s equinor pledged to exit their russian operations shortly after russia’s invasion on february 24 (aizhu et al., 2022). those companies were not just investors but also provided the russian energy sector with technical support and technological expertise. once the chinese energy giants, such as sinopec, china national petroleum corp and china national offshore oil corp, learn the fine print of sanctions and how to circumvent them, they will probably be able to replace and fill the void left behind by the retreat of western firms. the prc can also provide a much-needed lifeline to russia through its bri projects, keeping russian finances afloat while reaping the benefits of cheap energy supplies. despite the long-term potential of russian and central asian energy exports, whose energy infrastructure will take years to build, the prc will have to find a short-term solution to its growing energy demand. the most obvious solution lies with another bri ally: saudi arabia (sa). sa and the prc have dramatically improved their relations since the yemen war, in which sa felt abandoned by its longtime western allies, namely the usa. since then, sa has increasingly shifted its focus toward the prc and its bri projects. in 2022, sa exported 25% of its oil to prc making sa the main chinese energy trading partner (said, kalin, 2022). in light of upcoming restrictions on russian oil and gas exports, we can expect this trend to continue as russian oil exports to the prc dropped by 9% in the month following the invasion (reuters, 2022). the prc and sa are already planning for this within the bri framework. in 2022, the prc and sa began official talks for a new trade agreement in which the chinese yuan would replace us dollars for its oil sales (said, kalin, 2022). this would not only benefit the prc but also would significantly hurt the us dollar’s position as the dominant global currency, especially in light of the russian move to only accept rubles for its oil and gas, with which russia partially stabilized its currency in light of sanctions (hetzner, 2022). 6. implications for transport a refinitiv study (2020) estimates that transportation accounts for 47% of all bri projects. as a result, changes in this sector due to the war in ukraine probably have more overall influence on the prospects of the initiative than any other sector. the most influenced bri corridor will without doubt be the land-based new eurasian land bridge, which spans from the prc to europe, since the majority of this route travels through russia (fig. 1). at its current capacity, the majority of bri cargo travels by rail, forming the so-called iron silk road, almost half of which is located in russia. the number of freight routes increased from 40 in 2017 to 78 in 2021, almost doubling its capacity. the increase in cargo was even more exponential, as the value of chinese goods on this route increased from 8 billion usd in 2016 to 75 billion usd in 2021, with 336,000 containers arriving in 183  cities in 23 countries (umbach, 2022). in light of these numbers, we might conclude that bri is expanding and delivering on its promises both to the world as well as to the masterminds of the project in beijing. however, in light of the war in ukraine, some of the most reputable and respected western journals, such as foreign policy already called the war the turning point for bri with headlines such as “putin’s war has killed china’s eurasian railway dreams” (brinza, 2022). the war in ukraine and sanctions on russia that followed in its wake have indeed created a new iron curtain spanning from the black sea to the baltic sea. the sanctions at the time of this writing have not been expanded to include cargo traveling through russia. despite this, many companies such as transport giant maersk on their own accord preemptively already stopped new rail bookings from asia to europe traveling through russia, effectively suspending transit on the bri eurasian land corridor (umbach, 2022). suspensions and cancelations were not limited to land routes. bri maritime routes have experienced many complications due to the war in ukraine. europe, which at 95% of the global share dominates insurance and reinsurance markets, has denied insurance to russian ships, without which they cannot travel. while the argument that ships in the black sea cannot be insured due to travel within an active war zone is a logical consequence of war, many insurance companies also canceled insurances to ships leaving from russian baltic and pacific ports to stay ahead of fast-evolving sanctions regime (zeihan, 2022). in light of fast-increasing insurance costs for cargo being transported through russia and its neighboring seas (saul, 2022), the eu has announced it is considering a ban on insurances provided on ships carrying russian oil (steinberg et al., 2022). in the future, the russian state might find a way to ensure and guarantee the safe passage of ships in places such as the black sea, as it is in its vital interest to resume its maritime exports. even if europe bans russian goods, much of its essential exports, such as wheat and oil, might be loaded on cargo ships and 6 vladimir prebilič, vid jereb transported through the black sea to new markets, such as the prc and india (winck, 2022). the prc’s interests in the region might not be as vital as russia’s, but it might guarantee passage and insurance to transports carrying bri cargo nonetheless to keep the eurasian land bridge alive, save face, and wait for the war to finish and trade to resume. 7. conclusion as is often the case in geopolitics, things are neither as good nor as bad as many would like to believe. the majority of expansion within bri land routes since the covid epidemic can be attributed to deep systemic problems in maritime transport, which is still the cheapest, the most convenient and, as such, a much preferable option to land transport. land transport was never meant to play the role of the main route within bri but as a complementary alternative to the sea routes. its significance can mostly be attributed to security and strategy instead of economics, as alternative land routes may provide a lifeline to the prc in case of maritime blockade by western powers in a scenario, such as the invasion of taiwan. bri is often called the ‘project of the century’, and once it is understood within this timeline, a few lost trade routes do not mean a lot within the century long strategy. cargo will be diverted, and other so far neglected routes will gain importance. the war in ukraine will not end bri but it will significantly change the course of the project in the short term. in the short term, the prc will have to divert its resources into three other corridors which complement the eurasian land bridge to absorb the fallout of the war in ukraine (fig. 1). the first of them is the china-pakistan economic corridor, with which china can bypass land routes and load its goods directly to and from the indian ocean. the second one is the central asia-west asia corridor spanning from the prc through central asia to the middle east, thus absorbing parts of russian energy exports and compensating for the loss of energy with sources from iran. the third alternative is the middle corridor, which is the closest in proximity to the eurasian land bridge as it spans from the prc, through central asia, the caspian sea into caucuses through turkey to europe. the prc might also find synergies with its eurasian bridge and the middle corridor by connecting the two bypassing problems of the first corridor while rerouting its cargo into the second one. in the long term, the prc will try to divert russian resources, especially energy, from western markets to itself. to do this, it will intensify its bri projects leading into russia. this will only happen after the sanctioning regime stops evolving since any big announced projects to help russia at this point in time would undoubtedly find their way on lists of sanctions. this created a political paradox in which the western world pushed russia even further into the chinese sphere of influence. the soviet union never had the demographic and economic might of the prc, while china never had the advantages of geography and resources of russia. pushing the two 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https://www.businessinsider.com/china-india-saving-russia-economic-collapse-oil-gas-markets-imports-2022-4 https://www.businessinsider.com/china-india-saving-russia-economic-collapse-oil-gas-markets-imports-2022-4 https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/russia-and-chinas-quiet-rivalry-in-central-asia/ https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/russia-and-chinas-quiet-rivalry-in-central-asia/ https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/russia-and-chinas-quiet-rivalry-in-central-asia/ 1. introduction political and economic changes that have occurred in georgia in recent decades (after regaining the country’s independence in 1991), have brought a positive effect, which is confirmed by the available statistical data, e.g. the value of the gross domestic product (gdp) per capita in georgia (fig. 1). despite the initial fluctuations in the value of the rate in the first phase of the political transformation (i.e. in the years 1991–1999), reflecting the difficult and unstable social and economic situation in georgia in the 1990s, since 2000, its value has been gradually increasing. the exceptions are the years: 2009 and 2015. in 2009 the decline in the ratio was associated with the onset of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. moreover, in 2008 in georgia there was a war that by intensifying the migration of the georgian population from the breakaway regions to the central part of the country, directly contributed to the rise in unemployment. and the drop in the gdp per capita rate in 2015 resulted from a significant depreciation of the georgian currency compared to the us journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(2), 35–44 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.2.05 agriculture in georgia − the condition of the sector and its importance in the process of socio-economic development of the country and its regions julia kaczmarek-khubnaia faculty of human geography and planning, adam mickiewicz university, krygowskiego 10, 61-680 poznań, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-9749-8295 e-mail: khubnaia@amu.edu.pl citation kaczmarek-khubnaia j. 2020, agriculture in georgia − the condition of the sector and its importance in the process of socioeconomic development of the country and its regions, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(2), 35–44. abstract due to natural conditions (favourable climate and soil conditions) and the agrarian tradition, the agricultural sector in georgia has a significant growth potential. despite the fact that almost 40% of the population work in the agricultural occupations, this branch is not a priority for the georgian economy. literature, strategic documents prepared by the authorities of the country and the available statistical data indicate numerous problems blocking the development of the sector, thus inhibiting the development of the country and its regions, largely inhabited by the rural population. the aim of the study is to present the condition of the agricultural sector and its importance in the process of socio-economic development of georgia and its regions. the survey was expanded with the analysis of demographic data for the rural areas in georgia. key words agriculture, rural areas, socio-economic development, georgia. received: 14 april 2020 accepted: 03 june 2020 published: 20 november 2020 36 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia dollar (29%). this fact is confirmed by the lack of the above-mentioned drop in the case of the gdp per capita rate in 2015 expressed in the national currency (mzhavanadze, saha, 2016). despite a number of good decisions of the government that increased socio-economic development of the country exhibited by available economic indicators, georgia is still undergoing transformation processes (gvindadze, 2017; papava, 2013; brodowski, 2019; bti..., 2020). in many cases, the reforms appear to be insufficient. for example, the unemployment rate in 2019 totalled 11.6% and its value since 2012 is falling annually. independent sociological research conducted in georgia mentioned in a publication by v. papava (2013) showed, however, that approx. 70% of questioned citizens considered themselves as unemployed (most of them (55%) are self-employed, but their incomes are so low that they do not consider them as a form of income)1. in 2018, the percentage share of the population of georgia living under absolute poverty line was 20.1%. for the sake of comparison, in 2004 this share was 34.3%. the economic situation of the inhabitants has improved in the last few years, but the number of people living in extreme poverty is still too high to assess the current situation positively. the scale of the problem of poverty is also confirmed by the observations and surveys carried 1 in the period described by papava (publication of 2013), the unemployment rate for georgia was 15%. out in the rural areas of georgia by the author of this study. due to the low value of pension benefits, the oldest group in the population (retired people) have often defined themselves as unemployed, still looking for gainful employment. as indicated by the georgian researchers (kharaishvili et al. 2015) 55% of the country’s poor population lives in rural areas. an important problem in the process of shaping the sustainable development of the country is strong differentiation in the level of development of the georgian regions. disparities are most apparent when comparing the capital and the regions in which the largest cities of the country are located (batumi, kutaisi) and the rest of the country. differences in the level of socio-economic development shown in the values of gpd per capita or average earnings of the inhabitants of individual regions affect the size and direction of internal migration, as well as the process of depopulation of the poorest areas, i.e. mountain and peripheral areas (rodriquezpose, hardy, 2017; analysis…, 2016; fuenfzig, 2013). furthermore, above differences are visible in the level of poverty of the regions (welton (ed.), 2013). in view of this continuing difficult economic situation of the inhabitants of the country (as shown by the statistics mainly for rural areas) it is reasonable to conduct in-depth, multi-dimensional analysis of the socio-economic development of georgia. references to individual sectors of the economy allow for the detailed identification of the shortcomings of the system, i.e. those areas of the country which 0 1 000 2 000 g d p p e r c a p it a , u s d 3 000 4 000 5 000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 fig. 1. gross domestic product of georgia in the years 1990–2019, per capita (usd) source: own elaboration based on the world bank data. agriculture in georgia − the condition of the sector and its importance… 37 require reform. they are also helpful in the identification of the sectors with the biggest impact and the greatest “potential” in the development process of the country. on the one hand, available macroeconomic data suggest that agriculture is not currently one of the most important economic sectors of georgia. for example, the largest share in the structure of the national gdp in 2018 was recorded for trade2 (13.9%), real estate activities (11.4%) and manufacturing (10.2%). on the other hand, however, taking into account the fact that approx. 40% of the population of the country is significantly involved in the agricultural sector (rural areas are inhabited by more than 40% of the population and almost 40% works in agriculture), it is justified to analyse its condition and the impact it can have on development processes. 2. main objective and scope the main aim of the study is to present the condition of the agricultural sector and its importance in the process of socio-economic development of georgia and its regions. in order to provide a broader context, the study included the demographic characteristics of georgian rural areas, which significantly determine the current condition of the studied industry. the spatial scope covers the territory of georgia, with the exception of breakaway regions, i.e. abkhazia and south ossetia3. moreover, the studies partially disregard the capital of georgia, tbilisi, which despite its special status of a city/region de facto has a marginal impact on the georgian agricultural sector. the data for the capital city were quoted only where it was necessary for the proper understanding of the processes occurring in georgia, e.g. demographic conditions or the employment structure4. 3. methods and data as part of the research, selected statistical methods were mainly used, consisting in the description and relativization of quantitative data (macroeconomic 2 wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods. 3 this area is not covered by analysis due to no access to statistical data. 4 the presentation by the georgian statistical office of data on the capital city on a par with the other regions causes that due to the economic importance or population density of tbilisi, aggregate data often differ significantly from the statistics for individual regions. the situation hinders the proper evaluation of the situation. and agricultural) on a national and regional scale. in addition, the desk research method was used (during the analysis of strategic documents or legal acts) and graphic methods of presenting statistical data. the article was enriched with the characteristics of the population situation in rural areas, based on the presentation of basic demographic measures. the author of the article used secondary data sources. unless otherwise indicated, all data quoted by the author in the study originate from the website of the national statistics office of georgia (geostat). because of the gaps in regional statistics (part of the data is aggregated which makes them unusable for the purpose of this study), analysis was based primarily on the results of the general population census 2014 and the agricultural census 2014, but where possible, this timeframe was extended. moreover, strategic documents (e.g. analysis of regional disparities in georgia) and legal act (law of georgia on general education) were examined. 4. demographic characteristics of georgian rural areas the population of the rural areas in georgia in the last quarter century decreased by 34.2%5. at the beginning of 2019, the rural areas of georgia had a population of 1.54 million people (41.3% of the total population). in 1994, at the beginning of the presidency of eduard shevardnadze, in the period of the actual economic decline of the country, the number of rural population was 2.28 million (46.2% of the total population)6. data for previous years, dating back to the time of affiliation of georgia to the russian empire and the soviet union, clearly show that the reduction of the share of the rural population in the population of the studied country with a simultaneous significant increase in the level of urbanisation is a long-term process (fig. 2). the capital and the largest city of the country − tbilisi is characterised by the smallest share of the rural population7. in 2019, it was inhabited by 5 the decrease in the number of urban population in the years 1994–2019 was 17.7%. 6 this period was characterised by a lack of political and economic stability. long power outages, corruption, widespread poverty and the resulting criminalisation of the society have become the everyday reality for the inhabitants. even small farms, due to the possibility of food production, often saved the lives of their owners. to this day, residents of georgian cities and towns, remembering this period mention that having family or friends in the country was often the only chance to survive the first years of transition. 7 the largest increase in the share of rural population in tbi38 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia 1.17  million people, i.e. approx. 31.4% of the total population. it is worth noting that in 1994, the residents of tbilisi accounted for a quarter of the population of the country. the movement of people (largely rural) from regions to the capital has for years been influenced by many factors, from economic issues (a greater chance of finding a job, higher earnings) to political conditions (the influx of displaced persons from abkhazia and south ossetia). the second region mostly inhabited by the urban population (56.6% of total population) is coastal adjara8. in other regions on average more than half of the population now lives in rural areas. in the east of the country, in kakheti, since soviet times regarded as lisi from 0.01% to 2% occurred in 2007. this exception was associated with a change in the borders of regions. the rural population growth in the capital city by approx. 37 thousand people was caused the incorporation of the territories previously belonging to mtskheta-mtianeti and kvemo kartli. to a large extent, these were areas involved in agriculture. 8 the region in which in subsequent years the urban population may exceed 50% is imereti. currently it is sligthly dominated by the rural population (its share in the total population is 50.8%) “the agricultural heart of georgia”, the share of the rural population is as much as 77.3%. the natural increase rate in georgia in 2018 amounted to 1.2 ‰ (2.5‰ for cities and 0.6‰ for rural areas). this demonstrates the shrinking of rural communities where currently the number of deaths exceeds the number of births. for the sake of comparison, in 1995 the rate for rural areas was positive and amounted to 0.5‰. in regional terms, the highest value of the rate in 2018 was recorded in tbilisi (6.34‰) and adjara (6.24‰), and the lowest in racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti (-11.3‰), and imereti (-5.06‰). as many as 7 out of 11 regions covered by the analysis were characterised by negative population growth in rural areas, and in the mid1990s this problem concerned 5 regions. the largest increase during this period was observed in adjara (9.6‰) and kvemo kartli (6.3‰), and the lowest in racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti (-14.7‰), and imereti (-3.3‰). this means that the problem of depopulation of the rural areas is deepening over the years. 84.7% 15.3% 1897 1989 2019 1926 1959 77.7% 23.3% 57.6% 42.4% 44.6% 55.4% 41.3% 58.7% urban population rural population fig. 2. percentage share of the rural population in the total population of georgia in the years 1897–2019 source: own elaboration based on geostat data. agriculture in georgia − the condition of the sector and its importance… 39 the most numerous age groups in the georgian rural areas in 20149 were: (1) people from the youngest group i.e. under 25 years of age whose share in the rural population amounted to 30.1%, and (2) people from the oldest group in the population i.e. above 65 years of age (16.3% of the total population)10. the data in the regional breakdown show that most regions were dominated by people under 25 years of age (the largest share was recorded in kvemo kartli and adjara). an exception is racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti where the most numerous group of residents were people over 65 years of age. it is worth noting that highlander community for many years struggling with the negative effects of depopulation caused by difficult living conditions (poor transport, accessibility especially in the wintertime, unemployment and natural conditions such as terrain, climate). with regard to the gender structure, a larger group in the rural areas were women, although their number slightly outnumbered males (the difference was 0.2%). for comparison, in the georgian cities in 2014, women accounted for 53.8% of the total population. in most regions the percentage share of men and women was balanced and accounted for approx. 50%. the regions little dominated by men included: mtskheta-mtianeti (51.1% of the total population), adjara (50.1%) and kvemo kartli (50.1%). in 2014, the rural areas in all regions of georgia were dominated by complete general education11 (i.e. secondary education; 44.7% of the total population). other most common indications of respondents were vocational (17.5%), higher (13.6%) and basic education (11.6%). the least people living in georgian villages have no education (3.5%) or education at the primary level (7.1%).12 this seemingly positive condition is largely the fruit of the reform of the communist era and the universal combating illiteracy, which is continued until today. it should, however, be noted that the quality of education in the areas of georgian villages and cities is significantly 9 data on the age, gender and education structure of the rural population are from the last agricultural census conducted in 2014. yearbooks and publications from later years do not include data broken down by region or information contained in them is highly aggregated, making it impossible to compare all regions. 10 people in the age groups over 55-64 and 65 account for 29.6%. 11 under the “law of georgia on general education” (2005), there are three levels of general education: primary education (six years), basic education (three years) and secondary education (three years). 12 the remaining 2.1% are: illiterates (0.7%) and people who did not state the level of their education (1.4%). different, which is mainly caused by a lower level of knowledge of rural teachers. many students who want to continue their education at universities, before the exam of maturity must use the help of tutors or attend private compensatory courses, which, due to widespread poverty, are unattainable for many of them (chankseliani, 2013). in addition, the level of education and the scope of knowledge possessed by the inhabitants of the georgian rural areas is insufficient to apply the latest technologies and innovation in their farms (kharaishvili et al., 2015). the region with the highest number of people with higher education in rural area was rachalechkhumi and kvemo svaneti (17.2% of the total population), while the largest share of people with no education was recorded in: kvemo kartli (5.5% of total population) and samtskhe-javakheti (4.6%). 5. condition of the agricultural sector and its importance in the process of development of georgia and its regions the agricultural sector in georgia was significantly modernised during the affiliation of georgia to the soviet union. moreover, it was subject to collectivisation. the need for change was the result of, among others, a low13 level of mechanisation of agriculture, small acreage of arable land and strong fragmentation of farms. despite the favourable climatic and soil conditions, the presence of mountains and areas that require drainage (e.g. the marshes of colchis) or hydration (e.g. the area of kakheti), caused that in terms of agriculture it was difficult for the georgian soviet socialist republic to catch up with other union republics, for example ukraine, whose natural conditions contribute to the development of this sector (bondyrev et al., 2015; tielidze, 2019). however, georgia found its niche. an important role in that period was also played by coastal cultivation, in particular of tea (approx. 95% of the entire ussr) and citrus fruits. furthermore, viniculture was very popular in the eastern part of the country (dawitaj (ed.), 1967; maryański, 1987). after regaining independence, georgia was subject to numerous structural reforms, including those related to agriculture. collective a n d state farms were replaced by private farms. in the absence of demand, because of the low quality of georgian brands the production of tea very popular in the soviet times was reduced (seturi,todua, 2019). 13 compared to other union republics. 40 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia the weaknesses of modern agriculture in georgia are noticed by its authorities. the strategic document “regional development programme of georgia” for the years 2018–2021 points out, among others, the following issues: • small acreage of arable lands; • low level of agriculture modernisation (old machinery, agriculture equipment and technologies); • absence of logistic; • high level of self-employment in rural areas (regional…, 2017). the above factors inhibit the development of the agricultural sector, thus negatively affecting the socioeconomic development of individual regions and the entire country. the “rural development strategy of georgia” for the period 2017–2020 emphasises that the rural areas have an important role in shaping the sustainable development of the country. as with the previously mentioned programme, the strategy refers to the issues of insufficient use of technology and knowledge, and poor condition of farm machinery. moreover, the authors mention low productivity of the agricultural sector, inadequate access to funding, unemployment in rural areas and growing disparities in the standard of living of the inhabitants of urban and rural areas (rural…, 2017). the information contained in both documents indicates that the georgian agricultural sector is currently confronted with many problems which often greatly reduce the quality of life of people living in the rural areas. the statistics presented later in the study are to illustrate the current condition of the georgian agriculture and its importance in the development of georgia and its regions. in 2004, agriculture land occupied 3,035.8 thousand ha, which accounted for 43% of the country. 25% (767.3 thousand ha) of its area was privately owned14. there is the issue of a formal census of agriculture land as only 20–30% of the land used by agriculture is officially registered (kharaishvili et al., 2015). the structure of agricultural land in georgia in 2004 was dominated by pastures (approx. 59.5%), and it is worth stressing that a significant majority of them was owned by the state (95.3%). the results of the agricultural census of 2014 indicate that private farms comprised 842.3 thousand ha, of which 787.7 thousand ha had the status of so-called agriculture land. in 10 years (i.e. between 2004 and 2014), the surface area of private agricultural land increased by 20.4 thousand ha. most of the land forming part of 14 approx. 11% of the country. private agriculture holding in 2014 included arable land (47.9%), and natural meadows and pastures (38.0%)15. an exception was the region adjara with the leading role of permanent crops (45.7% of the total land used by agriculture). the biggest percentage share of arable land in the total agriculture land in the region was recorded in imereti (77.6%), one of the most developed regions of the country. with regard to natural meadows and pastures the largest share was recorded in samtskhe-javakheti (61.5%) and kvemo kartli (57.3%). the size structure analysis showed that in 2014 as much as 73% of the georgian farms had a surface area of less than 1 ha. there were only 954 large farms, i.e. with more than 100 ha, representing only 0.2% of the georgian farms. interestingly, 57.8% of them were located in kakheti. the regions with the lowest number of the largest farms were: adjara (0.2% of all the biggest farms in the country), racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti (0.4%), and guria (0.7%). given the nature of the ownership of farms, georgia is dominated by households (approx. 99.6%). these data indicate that the georgian agriculture is characterised by a strong fragmentation of farms and marginal share of agricultural enterprises (managed by local entities). the small size of farms adversely affects mechanisation and productivity. the virtual lack of large companies means that agriculture is not a lucrative business in georgia, but rather a way to survive for small family farms, as evidenced by the marginal involvement of foreign investors in the sector analysed. the share of agriculture and fishing in the value of foreign direct investment in 201916 was the lowest considering the remaining sectors of the economy, and amounted to approx. 1.1%. the mountainous topography of georgia strongly hampers cultivation (the lowland zone occupies only 46% of its territory). data from 2014 on the number of wheel, caterpillar or mini tractors (machinery having a higher degree of sophistication) per 100 ha of agriculture land show that the regions with the highest level of agricultural mechanisation were: shida kartli, for which the above ratio was 5.1, and samtskhe-javakheti (3.0). the value of the indicator for the country (1.7) proves that the georgian agriculture is characterised by a low level of mechanisation. the problem concerns not only high mountains, but also plains. despite many reforms, insufficient technical equipment continues since soviet times. this situation is not solely due to terrain, but also (and in many 15 available data concern on private property only. taking into account the structure of all agricultural land in georgia, as in 2004, pastures certainly had the greatest share. 16 preliminary data. agriculture in georgia − the condition of the sector and its importance… 41 cases primarily) the difficult economic situation of the rural population. the value of gross domestic product (gdp) generated by agriculture, forestry and fishing in 2018 amounted to gel 3,015.9 million, which accounted for approx. 7.8% of the gdp of the country. statistics for previous years and the most recent pre-published data for 201917 indicate that despite the moments in which the share of the agricultural sector in gdp increased, e.g. in 2010, the general trend should be regarded as declining (fig. 3.). the phenomenon of decreasing percentage share of agriculture in the gdp of the country, as noted j. bański (2007), testifies to its slower pace of development in relation to other, non-agricultural sectors of the economy. this means that its impact on the economy of the country is becoming more and more limited. with respect to the gdp in the individual regions, the highest percentage of the agricultural sector in 2018 was recorded in the typically agricultural kakheti (36.7%), shida kartli (25.0%) and samtskhejavakheti (22.4%), and the lowest in adjara (4.2%), interestingly one of the most developed region of the country (fig. 4). 17 final data for 2019, i.e. after adjustment, will be published by geostat in november 2020. in 2018, the output value in the agricultural sector amounted to gel 510 million, which accounted for only 1.2% of georgia’s total production. since 1999, the share of agricultural production in the total production of georgia is negligible, ranging between 0.4% and 1.2%.18 in regional terms, the largest proportion of agricultural production in the total value of production was recorded in the poorly economically developed, mountainous racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti (on average 10.2%) and kakheti (on average approx. 7.4%). agricultural production is dominated by animal breeding, which is associated with topography and a high proportion of pastures in the structure of lands used by agriculture. this is a positive phenomenon as “products of animal origin with a higher degree of processing achieve relatively higher prices than products of plant origin” (bański, 2006, p. 101). the dominance of livestock production is characteristic for the highly developed countries. particularly noteworthy are data on the share of income from the sale in the total income of agriculture household, which in 2018 amounted to only 5.5% (on average gel 57.4 per month). taking into account the average monthly income in georgia in 18 average for the period 1999–2018 is 0.9% of the total georgian production in that period. fig. 3. percentage share of agriculture in gdp of georgia in 2010–2019 source: own elaboration based on geostat data. 42 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia 2018 (gel 1,068.3) this is a small amount. this indicates that most farmers produce for their own needs. in 2018, the georgian agricultural sector employed (including self-employed and hired employees) 659.2 thousand people, which accounted for 38.9% of all people employed in all sectors of the economy. the analysis of previous years shows that, like in the case of the percentage share of agriculture in the national gdp, this value is gradually decreasing. in 2014, the share of employment in agriculture in the total number of people employed amounted to approx. 46.6%, and in 200519 the share was 54.3%. with regard to regions, the highest share of people employed in the agricultural sector in 2014 was recorded in guria (72.2% of total workforce) and rachalechkhumi and kvemo svaneti (71.5%). the least people working in agriculture in the studied period were recorded in tbilisi (1.3% of total workforce) and adjara (43.4%). taking into account the population density of tbilisi and the fact that it is a city included in georgian statistics on a par with the regions, it should be emphasised that the small number of people employed in agriculture in this typically urbanised unit (the capital city) significantly affects the value of the above rate for the country. in fact, in all regions of georgia (with the exception of adjara) 19 the figures come from a recent publication geostat on the georgian labour market. in 2005, the sector consisted of agriculture, hunting and forestry (excluding fishing). more than 50% of people are employed in agriculture, hunting or forestry. data for the country on the size of unemployment suggest that the inhabitants of cities are statistically more likely to be affected by the problem of unemployment, where the average value of the unemployment rate in the years 1998–2018 amounted to 24.3%. in rural areas, the average for the preceding years amounted to only 5.4%. a careful analysis of the results of general population and agricultural censuses confirmed the author of this study in the belief that the situation with regard to employment in rural areas is not in fact so positive. given the type of employment, in 2018 only 23.8% of the total number of people working in cities were self-employed. in rural areas in the same year, there were 891.4 thousand employees, including 650.5 thousand self-employed people (approx. 73%). data from the last agricultural census (2014) show that in two regions, i.e. the mountain area of rachalechkhumi and kvemo svaneti, and the coastal guria, the share of self-employed persons with their own farms in the total number of employed amounted to almost 70%. worrying is also the issue of significant disparities in the income of the residents of urban and rural areas. wages of people working in agricultural occupations (mainly rural population) are the lowest compared to other sectors of the economy. average earnings in the georgian agricultural sector in 2018 amounted to 701 gel, which accounted for 65.6% fig. 4. percentage share of agriculture in gdp of georgian regions in 2018 source: own elaboration based on geostat data. agriculture in georgia − the condition of the sector and its importance… 43 of the average earnings of the inhabitants of the country. on the basis of the quoted statistical data, especially those related to the size of farms, employment and earnings it can be concluded that poverty in the rural areas of georgia is a common concern. 6. summary despite the numerous social and economic changes, georgia is still in the process of transformation. an insufficient level of reform is reflected in strong regional disparities and persistent poor quality of life, particularly in the rural areas. macroeconomic data (e.g. structure of national gdp, value of foreign direct investment, production volume) suggest that agriculture is not currently the leading sector of the georgian economy. the results of the extended analysis of the condition and the importance of the agricultural sector in the development process of the country and its regions have shown, however, that in the case of georgia, it is particularly important, taking into consideration the population distribution of the country (41.3% of the total population) and its potential resulting from the natural conditions and the agrarian tradition. the most important problems of the sector reported on the basis of the data also mentioned by the georgian researchers and the authors of the national strategic documents include: low rate of growth compared to other sectors of the economy, marginal foreign investment in agriculture (approx. 1% of the total fdi), low value of production (only 1.2% of national production). a small acreage of arable land, a low level of mechanisation of agriculture, outdated technical infrastructure; insufficient use of new technologies, in particular affecting the efficiency of production. predominance of small subsistence farming, the lack of universal registration of lands. a high level of self-employment in agriculture (in many cases, taking into account the size of farms, de facto meaning unemployment), significant disparities in the earnings of those working in agricultural occupations in relation to the rest of the economy. inappropriate education of people employed in agriculture (the lack of technical preparation). analysis of statistical data broken down by region confirmed that the development kakheti still to a large extent depends on the condition of its agriculture. since the soviet times, this region has played an important role in the functioning of the georgian agricultural sector, especially due to the type of cultivation in its area (the unit is famous for grapevines). another region strongly associated with the agricultural sector is racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti. however, its specificity is different, mainly due to natural factors such as topography or climate. agriculture there is more primitive and agricultural land is more fragmented. the level of agriculture directly affects the development of the entire region (it is one of the poorest administrative units). a similar situation can be observed in other typically agricultural regions of georgia, e.g. guria, which, like racha-lechkhumi and kvemo svaneti, on the one hand lacks large urban centers, which are the driving force of socio-economic development (a significant portion of the region’s population lives in the countryside and works in agricultural occupations), on the other hand, its agricultural sector, which is in fact a key branch of the economy, is underdeveloped. the most developed regions, i.e. adjara and tbilisi, are the least involved and dependent on the agricultural sector, and understandably the importance of agriculture in tbilisi is marginal. statistics show that the situation of rural areas in adjara is different from those located in other regions, as evidenced by the largest positive natural increase rate or the dominance of permanent corps in the structure of agricultural land use. in conclusion, because of the numerous problems and the fact that georgia is dominated by the rural population, the georgian agricultural sector requires a comprehensive reform based on the existing potential. as shown by historical conditions, despite the corrective actions taken, the sector is still struggling with many problems. on the national scale, agriculture does not play a significant role in shaping the country’s economic growth, so it is not a leading branch of the georgian economy, as evidenced by available macroeconomic statistics. however, there are regions for which it is the main source of income. taking into account regional disparities, regional specialisations (key role of kakheti for agriculture) and the continuing difficult economic situation of the rural population, it seems necessary to take the modernisation of the sector as a priority. improving the quality of life of more than 40% of the population of georgia will increase both the level of development of individual regions and the whole country. acknowledgements the study is the result of research project no. 2018/31/n/ hs4/00178 funded by the national science centre. 44 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia references analysis of regional disparities in georgia, 2016, ministry of regional development and infrastructure of georgia, tbilisi. bański j., 2006, geografia polskiej wsi (eng. rural geography of poland), pwe, warszawa. bański j., 2007, geografia rolnictwa polski (eng. geography of polish agriculture) pwe, warszawa. bondyrev i., davitashvili z., singh v., 2015, the geography of georgia. problems and perspectives, springer international publishing, cham. brodowski j., 2019, gruzja po rewolucj iróż (eng. georgia after rose revolution), księgarnia akademicka, kraków. bti 2020: georgia, 2020, bti transformation index, https:// bti-project.org/en/reports/country-dashboard-geo.html (accessed 10 may 2020). chankseliani m., 2013, rural disadvantage in georgian higher education admissions: a mixed-methods study, comparative education review, 57(3), 424–456. doi: 10.1086/670739 dawitaj f.f. (ed.), 1972, związek radziecki. gruzja (eng. soviet union. georgia), pwn, warszawa. fuenfzig m., 2013, regional disparities in georgia: evidence from microdata, mpra paper, 76694 university library of munich, munich, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen. de/76694/1/mpra_paper_76694.pdf (accessed 12 may 2020). geostat, national statistics office of georgia, tbilisi, https:// www.geostat.ge/en (accessed 20 march 2020). gvindadze d., 2017, the transformation of georgia from 2004 to 2012. state building, reforms, growth and investments, palgrave macmillan, tbilisi. kharaishvili e., erkomaishvili g., chavleishvili m., 2015, problems faced by the agricultural sector and agribusiness development strategy in georgia, world academy of science, engineering and technology international journal of industrial and systems engineering, 9(11), 3833–3837. law of georgia on general education, 2005, ministry of education and science of georgia, https://matsne.gov.ge/ en/document/download/29248/56/en/pdf (accessed 17 march 2020). maryański a., 1987, geografia ekonomiczna związku radzieckiego (eng. economic geography of ussr), pwe, warszawa. mzhavanadze g., saha d., 2016, the exchange rates of the georgian lari and the armenian dram in comparison, 2014-2015, technical note [tn/01/2016], german economic team georgia, iset policy institute, berlin-tbilisi. papava v., 2013, georgia’s socio-economic development: prospects over the medium term, [in:] georgia-abkhazia on the road to 2020. discussion paper, international alert, london. regional development programme of georgia 2018–2021, 2017, ministry for regional development and infrastructure, https://mrdi.gov.ge/pdf/5d11c43dcd7cc.pdf/20182021%20regional%20development%20programme%20 of%20georgia%20%28unofficial%20translation%29.pdf (accessed 10 march 2020). rodriquez-pose a., hardy d., 2017, firm competitiveness and regional disparities in georgia, geographical review, 107(2), 384–411. doi: 10.1111/j.1931-0846.2016.12180.x rural development strategy of georgia 2017–2020, 2017, ministry of agriculture of georgia, http://enpard.ge/en/ wp-content/uploads/2015/05/rural-development-strategy-of-georgia-2017-2020.pdf (accessed 10 march 2020). seturi m., todua t., 2019, analysis of the georgian tea brands, european cooperation, 4(44), 7–14. doi: 10.32070/ ec.v4i44.59 the world bank, https://www.worldbank.org (accessed 5 august 2020). tielidze l. (ed.), 2019, geomorphology of georgia, springer international publishing, cham. welton g. (ed.), 2013, comparative analysis of agriculture in the south caucasus, undp georgia, tbilisi. 1. introduction geoeconomics gained great importance in the system of modern science, because of the development of global economic processes, participation in which determines the success of the national economies, interstate organizations and individual businesses, ranging from large multinational corporations to small and medium-sized enterprises. however, tourism (including international) was not part of the problem field of modern geoeconomics. lack of research on geoeconomic topics in tourism restricts adequate assessment of the main factors influencing the development of tourism in belarus. one of these factors is the geographical position between russia and the european union. the state tourism development programs emphasize that belarus is located in the center of europe, which allows us to develop intense tourist flows. however, the actions taken by the state to develop tourism do not give the expected results, and the performance indicators of the tourism development programs are mostly not achieved. at the same time the national management system in belarus is not taking the geoeconomic potential of tourism into account. therefore, the aim of this article is to evaluate the geoeconomic position of belarus as a tourist destination and to justify the potential base vector of the future tourism policy. 2. the content of geoeconomics in tourism the place of geoeconomics in the system of modern science is defined in terms of its development as a separate sphere of scientific knowledge. the journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 15–26 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.023.5810 geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination aliaksandr tarasionak department of tourism management, belarusian state economic university, swerdlowa 7, 220050 minsk, belarus, e-mail: a.tarasionak@gmail.com citation tarasionak a., 2016, geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 15–26. abstract the paper summarizes the theoretical foundations of geoeconomics in tourism industry. the current status of tourism industry in belarus is analyzed. belarus is behind in its development in comparison to the tourism economies of the european countries. overview of the countries in the polarized world tourism market is performed. belarus is located in the geoeconomic periphery of the tourism market. the paper justifies the strategy aimed at country’s transition from the periphery to the semi-periphery of the world tourism market. key words geoeconomics, destination, geoeconomics of tourism, tourism in belarus. 16 aliaksandr tarasionak historical aspect of the appearance and development of geoeconomics was analyzed by e. haliżak (2012). the goal of his research was not the periodization of the history of geoeconomics, but the evolution of its content. on the basis of his research, we distinguish the main stages of the formation of geoeconomics as a science: 1. mercantilism and european colonialism (17th-19th centuries). main concepts and effective economic instruments were introduced to impact the external and internal markets. the economic aspect started to compete with the political, religious and military goals on the governmental management level. 2. us economic imperialism, neo-colonialism and international economic integration (end 19thend 20th centuries). a number of theoretical concepts was formulated: geoeconomics, international competitiveness, globalization, etc. economic mechanisms have shown their practical superiority compared to the political, military and ideological instruments. we can also see it from the results of the two world wars and the “cold war”. 3. turbo capitalism (1990s.). geoeconomics emerged as a separate science and immediately became an important basis for developing strategies for the national economies. currently, geoeconomics is seen as a successor of geopolitics. the reason for that is the transition of global interests of the regional integration structures and major countries from the military and politics to the economic sphere. the term “geoeconomics” was first mentioned in 1926 in the article “a science of geonomics” by whitbeck published in the annals of the association of american geographers (whitbeck, 1926). however, the essence of the scientific sphere (geoeconomics, or geonomics) defined by whitbeck in principle corresponds to the modern economic geography. the modern concept of geoeconomics was formulated by the consultant of the us national security council and the us department of state edward luttwak, who saw it as a new paradigm of the foreign policy, which came after the era of the “cold war” (luttwak, 1990). he developed this concept in the framework of the system analysis of the concept “us – rest of the world.” k. jean and p. savona (жан, савона, 1997) considered geoeconomics as a science that studies different aspects of international competition, where the protagonist is the state, and the main task of geoeconomics is to develop strategies that will allow the state to provide “home” companies and “home” economic system as a whole maximum competitive advantage in comparison to “foreign” companies and economies. the same point of view share the representatives of the russian school of geoeconomics dergachev and kochetov. according to w.a. dergachev (дергачев, 2002), geoeconomics is a science of the national development strategy aimed at achieving global or regional advantage using primarily economic instruments. geoeconomics is regarded as a modern geopolitics that defines the world economic integration of the country and the creation of competitive regional economic conditions influenced by globalization and regionalization. russian scientist e.g. kochetov (кочетов, 2010) formulated the definition of geoeconomics, emphasizing its global aspect, and determined that geoeconomics appears in three forms: conceptual views on interpretation of the global world, a system of global economic attributes and economic relations, and a concept of political science. according to geoeconomics as a concept success of a state is determined by inclusion of its national economy and economic entities in the international economic reproduction and its participation in the formation and distribution of the world‘s income on the basis of advanced geoeconomic technologies. tourism was left out of the problem field of the modern geoeconomics research, despite the fact that it is a form of international economic relations, regional development factor and the most dynamic socio-economic phenomenon of the 20th-21st centuries along with urbanization, industrialization and informatization. further evidence gives statistics (unwto…, 2015): international tourism ranks fourth in the world export after fuel, export of chemical products and food, and exceeds export of automobile and light industry. countries and regions are involved in competition in a variety of industrial systems (energy, hightech, food, raw materials, labor and social sphere, financial and investment sector, military industry, etc.). one of them is a tourism system, which is formed by tourists’ and visitors’ flows, expenditures, seasonal labor, investments in the hospitality industry, and informational flows regarding destinations, tourist services, tourist goods, etc. according to bieger’s model (bieger, 2004) the structure of the tourism system consists of four subsystems: the tourist demand, intermediaries (travel agencies, reservation systems), transportation, and destinations. destinations are places to meet recreational demands, and subsystems of intermediaries (retailers and transport) provide them with a direct link to consumers (demand centers). the tourism system is open and interconnected with external economic, social, political, environmental and technological systems. geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination 17 from the point of view of geoeconomics, the main beneficiary of the tourism system is a destination. destination is a specific target object for a particular geographic group of tourists. the research on destinations was developing in 1970–1990-ies. (kaspar, 1982, 1991; laws, 1995; althof, 1996). a comprehensive definition of this concept was formulated at the beginning of the 21st century by t. bieger (2002), who summarized the existing points of view on this issue. according to bieger a destination is a geographical area (location, region, country), which is the purpose of travel for visitors (or segment of visitors), has the necessary infrastructure for accommodation, nourishment, entertainment, informative and recreational activities, and is a subject of competition in the tourism market and a strategic business object. based on these research premises the geoeconomics of tourism can be defined as a science of spatial and economic relations, which involve destinations that have a goal to successfully compete for consumers of tourist products and to maximize income from tourism. functioning of the tourism economic system leads to the formation of the tourism economic space. the world tourism market is characterized by a polarized structure, which includes individual regions or typological groups of countries that differ in their level of tourism development, tourism and recreational specialization, dynamics of development processes of the tourism industry and intensity of the tourist flows. development of a tourist destination depends on its inclusion in the global tourist, investment and innovation flows, i.e. geoeconomic position of the country. the polarization of the world tourism market is an objective process of forming the world‘s travel centers and zones with different levels of concentration of tourism demand, capital and innovations. in principle, the whole world is a global geoeconomic system that includes centers of tourism development, semi-periphery and periphery. the position of a country as a destination in the geotourism space largely determines the dynamics of its development. the further away is the destination from the world centers of tourism market, the slower is its development. here we do not mean the physical distance between a theoretical world center of tourism and a destination, but its status in the hierarchical structure of the global tourism industry. the polarized world system of tourism industry includes center, semi-periphery and two peripheral zones (пирожник, 1996; александрова, 2002). the model of pirozhnik reflects the polarization of the global tourist market with 22 mesoregions of unwto. the model of alexandrova shows the polarization of the tourism market based on the typological groups of countries and approach of the worldsystems analysis (wallerstein, 1987). the centers of tourism development are hubs, where the main tourism demand is formed and satisfied, service standards are formulated, and tourist infrastructure and flows of visitors are concentrated. semi-periphery and periphery are progressively applying the hospitality standards, innovative technologies of creation and promotion of tourist products as well as consumer preferences. the application speed reduces from the semi-periphery to the deep periphery. the research of i.i. pirozhnik dating mid-1990s determined that central and eastern europe, and therefore also belarus, are in the peripheral zone of extensive development that is also located in a close proximity to the centers of international tourism development (пирожник, 1996). the study showed that with an improved socio-economic situation, tourism market liberalization, improvement of investment climate, enhanced exchange with the countries of central and western europe, the mesoregion of central and eastern europe will become an intensive development zone, i.e. experience transition from the periphery to the semi-periphery. now the situation has changed. the countries of central and eastern european were developing implementing different socio-economic and business models. the mesoregion, which once was homogeneous due to similar conditions and mechanisms to reform national economies, lost its uniformity because of multi-directional integration processes (east and west). on the one hand, the countries of central europe entered the european union, and on the other hand, the eurasian economic union was formed in the east of the region. 3. tourism in belarus belarus is behind in developing its tourism industry in comparison to the neighboring countries. relatively weak development of tourism business in belarus is due to the permanent postponement of economic reforms and liberalization of the national business environment (nikitsin, 2009). the development of tourism in belarus is characterized by both positive and negative processes. among the positive processes are increase in the number of accommodation facilities and the number of tourist companies, business development in the area of rural tourism. however, in recent years, we can witness reduction of occupancy rate, balance 18 aliaksandr tarasionak deficit of tourism, increased dependence on the russian market. the following analysis of the tourism sector is based on the national statistics (туризм и туристические…, 2016). the number of enterprises in the tourism industry in the period from 2000 to 2015 has significantly increased: the number of travel agencies tripled and equaled 1364 businesses, the number of accommodation facilities (hotels, resorts, holiday homes, tourist centers, etc.) increased by 1.7. the peak of foreign visits to belarus was observed in 2013 and equaled 6.24 million visitors, of which nearly 4 million tourists were from russian and 2 million visitors were eu citizens. in 2015 the statics shows the negative trend: the country was visited by 4.36 million people, including 2.6 million tourists from russia and 1.3 million visitors from the eu. we can see changes in the structure of in-bound tourism: if in 2005 the flow of visitors from eu countries and russia was almost the same, in 2015 the number of visitors from russia was twice as big. the annual number of guests staying in accommodation facilities in 2010-2014 has slightly changed and at the end of the period equaled ca 2.6 million. in 2015, this number experienced a further decline and equaled 2.37 million visitors, of which 60% were belarusians, 6% of visitors were from the eu, and 34% of tourists were from russia and other countries. the agrotourism has recently become the fastest growing segment of belarusian tourism market. the reason for that was the liberalization of economic relations in this sector, i.e. the declarative principle of market entrance, simplified (symbolic) taxation and low-cost credits. as a result, the number of farmhouses increased from 34 in 2006 to 2263 in 2015. the agrotourism market maintains positive dynamics. only 56 out of 539 hotels and other accommodation facilities, which is only10% of the total amount, are certified. occupancy rate in 2015 decreased to 29% in comparison to 34% in 2014 and 40% in 2013. it is obvious that such an occupancy rate makes the hotel industry unattractive for investors, and therefore its further development is impossible without any incentives. the table below (table 1) gives information on the accommodation capacity, which indicates a low level of development of the tourism industry in belarus in comparison to the other countries. tourism is not among geoeconomic priorities in belarus and is not considered as a tool to improve the geoeconomic situation of the country (дайнеко, 2011). tourism, tourism industry and tourism complex are out of scope of research on the level of the national economy: the tourism sector is not considered a part of economic complexes of the national economic system and external potential (шимов et al., 2012). tourism is only fragmentary mentioned in the text of the national strategy for sustainable socio-economic development of the republic of belarus until 2020 and is not accompanied by any economic estimates or projections (национальная стратегия, 2004). and this is done despite the fact that the index of tourist activity of the population can act as an important indicator of the quality of life in the country. the new national strategy for sustainable socio-economic development until 2030 has a section «tourism» (национальная стратегия, 2015) but the figures however are far from the parameters of sustainable development of this sector. that is the result of underestimating tourism as a socio-economic and geoeconomic factor of the country›s development. on the national level tourism is not used as a compensation tool to reduce the effects of the currency crisis or the negative influence of the economic sanctions. which are geoeconomic instruments. for example. the devaluation of the national currency makes the national tourism product more affordable and can be considered as a method of stimulating tourism. however. during the devaluation of the belarusian currency in 2011, 2012, 2014 tab. 1. accommodation capacity in number of beds per 1000 inhabitants country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 armenia 7.85 9.25 9.74 10.23 10.68 belarus 2.70 2.81 3.06 3.03 3.20 germany 21.79 21.49 21.87 21.95 22.09 georgia 4.26 4.8 5.91 7.58 7.41 latvia 12.02 13.10 13.05 13.33 12.68 lithuania 7.69 7.92 8.58 9.07 9.21 poland 5.82 6.39 6.72 7.09 7.37 russia 3.39 3.69 3.98 4.32 4.74 source: yearbook of tourism statistics, 2015. geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination 19 and 2015 no marketing actions were taken to promote belarus as a destination on the foreign markets. other examples include lack of administrative support in stimulating inbound shopping tourism as a compensation for russian sanctions in relation to eu products. and a failure to promote sales of motor fuels produced in belarus in the border areas as a compensation for an unfavorable export price of oil products. on the contrary. restrictions on the frequency of traveling abroad imposed on personal vehicles for the citizens of belarus led to the country’s economic losses from lower fuel sales in the border regions. western sanctions in response to the russian foreign policy led to losses in the belarusian economy. which could have been compensated with the effect of “invisible export” of tourism. 4. position of belarus in the polarized tourism market according to the previously mentioned models of tourism market polarization a country can be identified in a polarized structure of world tourism space as one of the 22 unwto mesoregions or as one of the typological groups of countries based on the world-systems analysis. however. given the network structure of the geoeconomic space and the internal polarization within mesoregions or typological groups of countries. it is problematic to determine geoeconomic position of individual countries based on these models. in this regard. we propose an alternative methodological approach. which allows determining zones in the “center – periphery” system. which are not solid regions. but network formations consisting of individual countries. for structuring the international tourism market space we will use key performance indicators that determine the prospects of tourism development as a form of consumption. the basic factors affecting tourism development are. first of all. the welfare of the population. which determines the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the tourism demand. and. secondly. effective national economic system that provides favorable conditions for realization of the recreational needs by assigning the available resources for the development of public infrastructure. safety and investments in the tourism industry. these factors are reflected in the index of gdp per capita. the level of tourism development depends on business opportunities in the hospitality industry. i.e. opportunities to develop services. diversify. expand. and ultimately increase the tourism attractiveness of the country as a destination. as a result. the level of tourism development. including domestic and inbound. is reflected in the development of accommodation facilities. it takes time and intensive capital investments to build accommodation facilities; hence they are created. where tourist flows and business environment are sustainable. ultimately accommodation becomes one of the major service providers to create an integrated tourism product. therefore. the development of tourism infrastructure and the importance of the tourism industry for the national economy is well reflected in such indicator as available accommodation capacity (bed-places per 1000 inhabitants). thus. the inclusion of countries in the “center”. “semi-periphery” or “periphery” group is based on the analysis of gdp per capita and available capacity of accommodation facilities. data on population. gdp and gdp per capita were taken from un human development report (human development report, 2014). and data on accommodation capacity from the bulletin of unwto (yearbook of tourism statistics, 2015). the analysis of these indicators allowed us ranking the countries and identifying leaders and outsiders of the world tourism market. to differentiate resulted continual series we used the method of constructing cumulative series based on population for both types of ranked series. i.e. series showing the difference in the level of gdp per capita. and series indicating the accommodation capacity. this manipulation was done in order to apply the pareto rule to determine the typology criteria. based on the pareto rule the leaders were determined among the countries. which in each of the continual series accumulated around 20% of the world population. it helped to determine the thresholds for gdp per capita (18 000 us dollars) and the number of bed-places per 1000 inhabitants (9.7 beds per 1000 inhabitants). thresholds allowed dividing the countries with different combinations of analyzed indicators into 4 groups (fig. 1). countries allocated to the group “center” include major leaders of the world tourism market and smaller players with a well developed tourism industry (attachment 1). in the graph they are concentrated in the upper right quadrant. where gdp per capita is more than 18 thousand dollars and accommodation capacity is more than 9.7 bed-places per 1000 inhabitants. the group “semi-periphery” includes leading countries of the world. that are major players. successfully creating tourism infrastructure. and that have a great weight in shaping global tourism demand and developing domestic tourism (attachment 2). countries in this group are very close to the “center” (“close semi-periphery”) and may eventually be included in this group. countries in the “distant 20 aliaksandr tarasionak semi-periphery” group are mainly developing countries that are strong tourist destinations and that are successfully satisfying domestic tourism demand (attachment 3). the peripheral zone ( lower left quadrant) includes countries with different levels of socio-economic development. scale of the economy and economic structure (attachment 4). some countries. such as china and brazil. are considered to be strong players in the global tourism market. but they also have a strong imbalance in the development of the tourism sector. which means that its development is not proportional and relatively small opposed to the giant economies of these countries. in principle. all countries in this group are characterized by one common feature – tourism development does not meet qualitative and quantitative parameters of the national economy. this group includes also belarus. polarized geoeconomic structure of the world tourism market with its uneven spatial and economic processes is presented in figure 2. 5. perspective directions of tourism policy in belarus position of belarus in the polarized hierarchical structure of the global tourism market represents an objective reason for introducing changes in belarusian tourism policy. it should be aimed at strengthening international relations with the western neighbors. this statement is based on the following logic. the level of economic and political integration of belarus and russia is higher than integration processes with the european union. therefore. the most accessible regional center for innovation in the tourism sector for belarus is moscow. economic and political integration has become one of the most important factors (along with language. economic proximity and common culture) that lead to the implementation of russian approaches (e.g. organization of tourism business and legal framework) in the belarusian practice. however those approaches and innovations are coming to russia from the centers of the global economy. thus. the peripheral position of belarus towards the main russian market determines the later implementation of innovations. though belarus is closer to the eu geographically. from the geoeconomic point of view. it is more distant from the centers of tourism development than russia. and even further away from poland. lithuania and latvia. this implies that belarus has difficulties in competing with these countries for tourists using acquired benefits. which are the main factor of competitiveness at the present stage of development of the world economy. in general geoeconomic position of belarus today can be described as “peripheral” in spite of the declared geographical position in the center of europe. transit position of the country fig. 1. groups of countries according to accommodation capacity and gdp per capita source: the graph is built based on the statistical data from: yearbook of tourism statistics (2015) and human development report (2014). geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination 21 on the border with the european union is an important prerequisite for improving geoeconomic situation of the country by making a transition from the “periphery” to the “close semi-periphery.” this requires an open tourism policy and liberalization of the business sector in tourism that would speed up the flow of innovations and investments in tourism and hospitality bypassing the “intermediaries” from the “semi-periphery”. 6. summary synthesis of theoretical foundations of geoeconomics. research on destination topics and concepts of the world tourism market polarization made it possible to determine the geoeconomics of tourism as a science of spatial and economic relations. the subject of which are destinations with the ultimate goal of successful competition and maximization of income from tourism. geoeconomic approach allows looking at the tourism market as a spatial hierarchical system. in which each country has a definite place either central. peripheral or semi-peripheral. changing geoeconomic position of the country by moving from the periphery to the semi-periphery or from the semi-periphery to the center can be one of the goals of the state tourism policy. assessment of the country’s position in the polarized tourism space will help to determine the right strategies to achieve this goal. evaluation of position of a destination in the world polarized space can be based on the typology of countries according to their position in the system “center periphery”. by structuring the world tourism market based on two key indicators – gdp per capita and available accommodation capacity – it is possible to identify “center”, “close semi-periphery”, “distant semi-periphery” and “periphery” groups. belarus is in the “periphery” zone despite its central location in europe. based on above-mentioned factors. the perspective strategy for belarus is tourism integration with the eu. otherwise belarus as a tourist destination will be on the “sidelines” of the world tourist traffic. references althof w., 1996, incoming-tourismus, oldenbourg, muenchenwien. bieger t., 2002, management von destinationen, oldenbourg, muenchen-wien. bieger t., 2004, tourismuslehre – ein grundriss, haupt verlag, bern-stuttgart-wien. haliżak e., 2012, geneza geoekonomii – ideowe i materialne przesłanki, [in:] e. haliżak (ed.) geoekonomia, wydawnictwo naukowe scholar, warszawa, 17–29. human development report 2014. sustaining human progress: reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience, 2014, undp. new york. kaspar c., 1982, die fremdenverkehrslehre im grundriss, haupt, bern. kaspar c., 1991, die tourismuslehre im grundriss, verlag paul haupt, bern-stutgart. laws e., 1995. tourist destination management: issues. analysis and policies, routledge. london. luttwak e., 1990, from geopolitics to geo-economics: logic of conflict. grammar of commerce, the national interest, 20, 17–23. fig. 2. polarized structure of the world tourism market, 2013 source: the graph is built based on the fig. 1. 22 aliaksandr tarasionak nikitsin v., 2009, tourismuspolitik und tourismusplanung in transformationsländern – untersucht am beispiel von belarus und litauen. paderborner geographische studien zu tourismusforschung und destinationsmanagement, universität paderborn, paderborn. unwto world tourism barometer and statistical annex. vol. 13. june 2015., 2015, unwto. madrid. wallerstein i., 1987, world-systems analysis, [in:] a. giddens, j. turner (eds.), social theory today, polity press, cambridge, 309–324. whitbeck r., 1926, a science of geonomics, annals of the association of american geographers, 16(4), 117–128. yearbook of tourism statistics. data 2009 – 2013, 2015, unwto, madrid. александрова а.ю., 2002, структура туристского рынка, пресс-соло, москва. дайнеко а.е., 2011, геоэкономические приоритеты республики беларусь, беларус. навука, минск. дергачев в.а., 2002, геоэкономика (современная геополитика), вира-р, киев. жан к., савона п., 1997, геоэкономика: господство экономического пространства, ad marginem, москва. кочетов э.г., 2010, геоэкономика. освоение мирового экономического пространства, норма, москва. национальная стратегия устойчивого социальноэкономического развития республики беларусь на период до 2020 г., 2004, юнипак, минск. национальная стратегия устойчивого социальноэкономического развития республики беларусь на период до 2030г., 2015, экономический бюллетень ниэи министерства экономики республики беларусь, 4(214), 6–99. пирожник и.и., 1996, международный туризм в мировом хозяйстве, белгосуниверситет, минск. туризм и туристические ресурсы в республике беларусь, 2016, http://www.belstat.gov.by/ofitsialnaya-statistika/solialnaya-sfera/turizm/publikatsii_9/index_5110/, [30.06.2016] шимов в.н., александрович я.м., богданович а.в., бобровская ж.в., бондарь а.в., боровик л.с., быков а.а., валевич р.п., воложинец в.в., дорина е.б., жудро м.м., киреева е.ф., крюков л.м., полещук и.и., рогач п.и., румянцева о.и., седун а.м., соколовский н.к., сорокина т.в., шимова о.с., шмарловская г.а., 2012, национальная экономика беларус, бгэу, минск. geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination 23 attachment 1. countries included in the group “center” of the geoeconomic tourism space country gdp. million dollars 1 population. million people2 accommodation capacity. beds2 bed-places per 1000 inhabitants2 gdp per capita. thousand dollars1 rank according to the number of bed-places per 1000 inhabitants rank according to gdp per capita australia 985077 23.3 632257 27.1 42.3 36 16 austria 366682 8.5 601483 70.8 43.1 10 13 andorra 3163 0.1 34062 340.6 31.6 1 31 antigua and barbuda 1671 0.09 15525 172.5 19.7 2 57 argentina 890259 41.4 634874 15.3 21.5 62 52 bahamas 9082 0.4 29672 74.2 22.7 9 47 bahrain 52855 1.3 15501 11.9 40.7 70 21 belgium 438428 11.1 181231 16.3 39.5 61 23 brunei darussalam 28432 0.4 4648 11.6 71.1 71 6 hungary 221460 10 173156 17.3 22.1 58 48 germany 3470588 82.7 1827060 22.1 42.0 49 17 hong kong 362095 7.2 194118 27.0 50.3 37 12 greece 281840 11.1 773214 69.7 25.4 11 41 denmark 232534 5.6 76458 13.7 41.5 64 19 israel 235620 7.7 128707 16.7 30.6 60 33 ireland 197427 4.6 157284 34.2 42.9 27 14 iceland 11566 0.3 23738 79.1 38.6 7 24 spain 1463186 46.9 1874896 40.0 31.2 21 32 italy 2053748 61 2233823 36.6 33.7 25 29 canada 1428698 35.2 1888855 53.7 40.6 15 22 cyprus 32668 1.1 83274 75.7 29.7 8 34 cuba 225000 11.3 111904 9.9 19.9 76 56 latvia 44581 2.1 26004 12.4 21.2 68 53 liechtenstein 3500 0.037 978 26.4 94.6 39 2 luxembourg 43294 0.5 15012 30.0 86.6 30 3 malaysia 650341 29.7 523818 17.6 21.9 57 50 malta 11359 0.4 37814 94.5 28.4 6 37 monaco 5748 0.036 4642 128.9 159.7 4 1 netherlands 713210 16.8 244145 14.5 42.5 63 15 new zealand 145620 4.5 221978 49.3 32.4 19 30 norway 314290 5 187243 37.4 62.9 24 7 portugal 266018 10.6 297962 28.1 25.1 34 42 san marino 1940 0.032 1680 52.5 60.6 16 8 saudi arabia 1462781 28.8 708556 24.6 50.8 44 11 seychelles 2315 0.1 6490 64.9 23.2 12 46 singapore 385965 5.4 137545 25.5 71.5 41 5 slovakia 140454 5.5 92261 16.8 25.5 59 40 slovenia 57527 2.1 49351 23.5 27.4 47 38 united kingdom 2189191 63.1 1571120 24.9 34.7 42 28 usa 16279966 320.1 12316358 38.5 50.9 22 10 trinidad and tobago 37812 1.3 17105 13.2 29.1 65 36 turkey 1360708 74.9 729747 9.7 18.2 78 58 finland 205762 5.4 123655 22.9 38.1 48 25 24 aliaksandr tarasionak france 2319558 64.3 1277774 19.9 36.1 54 26 croatia 85768 4.3 161957 37.7 19.9 23 55 czech republic 286043 10.7 317916 29.7 26.7 31 39 switzerland 415473 8.1 271298 33.5 51.3 28 9 sweden 401664 9.6 235752 24.6 41.8 45 18 estonia 31454 1.3 31989 24.6 24.2 43 43 japan 4449263 127.1 3516309 27.7 35.0 35 27 1 2012. 2 2013 source: the table is built based on the statistical data from: yearbook of tourism statistics (2015) and human development report (2014). attachment 2. countries included in the “close semi-periphery” group country gdp. million dollars 1 population. million people2 accommodation capacity. beds2 bed-places per 1000 inhabitants2 gdp per capinta. thousand dollars1 rank according to the number of bed-places per 1000 inhabitants rank according to gdp per capita kazakhstan 352698 16.4 92053 5.6 21.5 99 51 korea 1454104 49.3 222395 4.5 29.5 105 35 kuwait 286239 3.4 15365 4.5 84.2 104 4 lithuania 70662 3 27793 9.3 23.6 80 44 oman 148634 3.6 22521 6.3 41.3 95 20 poland 845863 38.2 281774 7.4 22.1 88 49 russia 3310675 142.8 676810 4.7 23.2 102 45 chile 371342 17.6 151668 8.6 21.1 82 54 1 2012. 2 2013 source: the table is built based on the statistical data from: yearbook of tourism statistics (2015) and human development report (2014). attachment 3. countries included in the “distant semi-periphery” group country gdp. million dollars 1 population. million people2 accommodation capacity. beds2 bed-places per 1000 inhabitants2 gdp per capinta. thousand dollars1 rank according to the number of bed-places per 1000 inhabitants rank according to gdp per capita albania 29578 3.2 32004 10.0 9.2 75 96 armenia 21873 3 31780 10.6 7.3 73 108 barbados 4590 0.3 15475 51.6 15.3 18 70 belize 2531 0.3 13015 43.4 8.4 20 101 bulgaria 113314 7.2 262196 36.4 15.7 26 68 grenada 1179 0.1 2879 28.8 11.8 32 81 dominica 963 0.1 2818 28.2 9.6 33 95 dominican 114566 10.4 205626 19.8 11.0 55 88 cape verde 3156 0.5 15995 32.0 6.3 29 113 costa rica 64146 4.9 116583 23.8 13.1 46 78 lebanon 79243 4.8 123694 25.8 16.5 40 64 maurice 19433 1.2 25105 20.9 16.2 52 65 maldives 3381 0.3 30073 100.2 11.3 5 87 mexico 1974411 122.3 1344592 11.0 16.1 72 66 palau 302.4 0.021 3565 169.8 14.4 3 74 panama 64955 3.9 47144 12.1 16.7 69 63 geo-economic position of belarus as a tourist destination 25 peru 352731 30.4 386842 12.7 11.6 66 84 romania 373978 21.7 276119 12.7 17.2 67 61 samoa 987 0.2 4318 21.6 4.9 51 120 saint vincent and grenadine 1027 0.1 5190 51.9 10.3 17 92 saint lucy 2048 0.2 12118 60.6 10.2 13 93 thailand 910262 67 1350220 20.2 13.6 53 77 tunisia 116732 11 240249 21.8 10.6 50 91 uruguay 61084 3.4 33200 9.8 18.0 77 59 fiji 6797 0.9 23845 26.5 7.6 38 104 montenegro 8424 0.6 34935 58.2 14.0 14 76 ecuador 155430 15.7 157591 10.0 9.9 74 94 jamaica 23579 2.8 49705 17.8 8.4 56 102 1 2012. 2 2013 source: the table is built based on the statistical data from: yearbook of tourism statistics (2015) and human development report (2014). attachment 4. countries included in the “periphery” group country gdp. million dollars1 population. million people2 accommodation capacity. beds2 bed-places per 1000 inhabitants2 gdp per capinta. thousand dollars1 rank according to the number of bed-places per 1000 inhabitants rank according to gdp per capita azerbaijan 149347 9.4 33951 3.6 15.9 112 67 algeria 500937 39.2 93454 2.4 12.8 125 79 angola 157939 21.5 43574 2.0 7.3 130 107 bangladesh 370202 156.6 7565 0.0 2.4 158 137 belarus 158559 9.4 29908 3.2 16.9 115 62 benin 17376 10.3 30022 2.9 1.7 119 144 bolivia 60455 10.7 44391 4.1 5.7 106 116 bosnia and herzegovina 34899 3.8 25270 6.7 9.2 91 97 botswana 28886 2 15804 7.9 14.4 83 73 brazil 2865920 200.4 925598 4.6 14.3 103 75 burkina faso 25823 16.9 14565 0.9 1.5 140 148 butane 5992 0.8 5572 7.0 7.5 89 105 venezuela 536317 30.4 286312 9.4 17.6 79 60 vietnam 450430 91.7 812000 8.9 4.9 81 121 gambia 2817 1.8 6743 3.7 1.6 109 147 guatemala 108345 15.5 119778 7.7 7.0 84 110 guinea 14227 11.7 5808 0.5 1.2 150 155 georgia 28771 4.3 32165 7.5 6.7 87 112 egypt 877239 82.1 399478 4.9 10.7 101 90 zambia 43355 14.5 73579 5.1 3.0 100 130 zimbabwe 18852 14.1 12081 0.9 1.3 142 152 india 6323105 1252.1 150706 0.1 5.1 156 119 indonesia 2213114 249.9 664843 2.7 8.9 121 100 jordan 82782 7.3 49157 6.7 11.3 90 86 iraq 491013 33.8 2273 0.1 14.5 157 72 iran 1196681 77.4 219505 2.8 15.5 120 69 yemen 97502 24.4 75793 3.1 4.0 116 128 26 aliaksandr tarasionak cambodia 42114 15.1 87079 5.8 2.8 97 133 cameroon 56887 22.3 42170 1.9 2.6 133 135 kenya 93640 44.4 47019 1.1 2.1 139 140 china 14924298 1385.6 2705013 2.0 10.8 132 89 colombia 564482 48.3 316663 6.6 11.7 92 83 comoros 1045 0.7 556 0.8 1.5 147 149 congo 24776 4.4 25020 5.7 5.6 98 117 ivory coast 55764 20.3 46510 2.3 2.7 127 134 kyrgystan 15659 5.5 4615 0.8 2.8 143 131 lao pdr 29838 6.8 52301 7.7 4.4 85 125 lesotho 4973 2.1 4846 2.3 2.4 126 136 madagascar 31556 22.9 35398 1.5 1.4 136 151 macedonia 24587 2.1 15744 7.5 11.7 86 82 mali 24587 15.3 12666 0.8 1.6 144 145 morocco 226974 33 207566 6.3 6.9 94 111 mozambique 51269 52.8 45403 0.9 1.0 141 156 moldova 14511 3.5 5811 1.7 4.1 135 127 namibia 21013 2.3 8570 3.7 9.1 110 98 nepal 59242 27.8 22871 0.8 2.1 145 139 niger 15735 17.8 3414 0.2 0.9 154 158 nigeria 944384 173.6 367972 2.1 5.4 129 118 nicaragua 25949 6.1 19850 3.3 4.3 113 126 palestine 19900 4.3 13902 3.2 4.6 114 124 paraguay 49062 6.8 25281 3.7 7.2 111 109 rwanda 16272 11.8 14658 1.2 1.4 137 150 salvador 46904 6.3 11051 1.8 7.4 134 106 sao tome and principe 567 0.2 609 3.0 2.8 118 132 swaziland 7094 1.2 2910 2.4 5.9 124 115 senegal 30653 14.1 34196 2.4 2.2 123 138 serbia 110077 9.5 55729 5.9 11.6 96 85 syria 107000 21.9 56527 2.6 4.9 122 122 solomon islands 1178 0.6 3890 6.5 2.0 93 142 sudan 128060 38 12893 0.3 3.4 151 129 surinam 7587 0.5 1913 3.8 15.2 108 71 sierra leone 9675 6.1 4720 0.8 1.6 149 146 timor-leste 1997 1.1 871 0.8 1.8 148 143 togo 8745 6.8 8000 1.2 1.3 138 153 uzbekistan 135975 28.9 57396 2.0 4.7 131 123 ukraine 376606 45.2 178506 3.9 8.3 107 103 philippines 590892 98.4 80090 0.8 6.0 146 114 car 4434 4.6 1403 0.3 1.0 152 157 chad 25638 12.8 2380 0.2 2.0 155 141 sri lanka 188761 21.3 46734 2.2 8.9 128 99 ethiopia 114614 94.1 25294 0.3 1.2 153 154 south africa 633019 52.8 163750 3.1 12.0 117 80 1 2012. 2 2013 source: the table is built based on the statistical data from: yearbook of tourism statistics (2015) and human development report (2014). 1. introduction surfacing 20,273 km² with 2,066,000 inhabitants (est. 2014) slovenia count to smallest european countries. thanks to geographical location between alpine arc, dinaric mountain ranges and hills, carpathian basin and edge of mediteranean, many geographical descriptions named the country as geographical laboratory (adamič orožen, 2004), due to variety of different landscapes coming close together on short distances and making a pitoresque paysages. sure, that slovene traditional settlement territory represent a culturally contact area between the italian, german, hungarian and croatian ethnic area. while the classic geographical impressions of the slovene cultural landscapes give major importance to the contiguity of natural geographical units, the modern way of understanding these features should merge more to past and recent dynamics of social and economic processes. within these-ones the political borders and border regimes are playing very important role, while in the frontier areas represent certain a key factor. the contribution will take attention exactelly to these “border” factors and border landscapes, which has been influencing particularly during last three decades. the border areas are a special type of cultural landscape, the creation of which is due to local characteristics and in particular the wider hinterland and international circumstances. they represent the resultant of internal and external forces of closer and wider hinterland. ethnic minorities assume a special role therein as in the last century having gone through the different stages of relationships, i.e. the journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 10–18 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.002.6201 slovene border landscape transformation jernej zupančič department of geography, faculty of arts, university of ljubljana, aškerčeva 2, si-1000 ljubljana, slovenia, e-mail: jernej.zupancic@ff.uni-lj.si citation zupančič j., 2017, slovene border landscape transformation, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 10–18. abstract the paper is analyzing the contemporary processes inside border areas. due to different political destinies trough near past, the distinct border sectors developed various types of borderlands: mainly open and structurally asymetric in the west and north and close-like and symetric on the east. the border toward croatia is the youngest and therefore still in turbulent accomodation to the border-situations. the paper take special attention to recent spatial processes: from close and rich crossborder cooperation to ignorance or abandonding of planning measures and avoidance. second main attention is taken to the minorities settled inside borderlends and their influence to borderlands. key words slovenia, borders, crossborder relations, minorities, political geography. slovene border landscape transformation 11 competition, genocidal policies and ignorance of participation (zupančič, 2008). in this context, the structural characteristics of border areas are an important or even crucial factor in passive fostering these relationships. positioned in southern part of central europe, slovenia is a true „border country“: a good half of state territory lies inside of 25 km – border belt. slovenia is bordering to four neighbour countries: italy, austria, hungary and croatia. the total border length is 1,334 km; almost exactely half of slovenia‘s land border is with croatia: 670 km, 25 % with austria, 17% with italy and 8% with hungary (national atlas of slovenia, 2001). by another recapitulation, the borderness can be measured by share of km of international border-line per 100  km² of state surface: slovenia is the second country in europe with 5.7  km of border/100  km² (bufon, 2004). the slovene maritime border (towards italian and croatian territorial water in upper shelf sea) is still (in 2016) disputing. the decision should be done by international arbitrary court during next years1. the second question here is the influence of recent geopolitical features in regional neighbourhood. this might be area of collaboration (collaborative area) or regions and states of competition or, in some cases, to a potential conflict. that’s why the relevant attention must be done to these regional factors. this contribution examines the influence of minority groups in three key-studies: the slovenianitalian (gorizia – nova gorica), austrian-slovenian (radgona – gornja radgona), slovenian-hungarian border and with some special remarks, the longest of them, with croatia. based on a comparative analysis of the border area structure, the effects of motherland and minority policies and the activities of minorities, the main processes in the border areas are outlined by means of five indicators monitored, namely political climate, spatial paradigms, socioeconomic development, protection of minorities and activities of persons belonging to minorities. 2. the recent geopolitical features of slovenia and neighbourhood slovenia lies in a strategic bridgehead and slovenes are a nation at the crosswinds. for the review of modern geopolitical picture of slovenia and for the determination of the main premises of its situation we can use the three main parameters: the 1 both diplomatic representatives, slovenian and croatian, agreed in 2012 to abjure the boundary decision (maritime and terestical in whole) to international arbitrary court. macrostructure of slovene space, elements of traffic transfer and the involvement of the country in international connections. all these can reflect to the border-situation and their various functions directly and indirectly. the first parameter is mostly structural and therefore plays a passive role, the other two being functional; therefore the national policy can evidently put the directions and manage the challenges that come from close and wide. findings of the geopolitical situation has also assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the management skills of slovene politics with natural and acquired spatial and social elements. the starting point for it are demographical features, education, employment skills, the mentality in a very general and large understanding, as well as the organization (administrative, social, safety and in this context especially military security). problem free ethnic relations are an important cornerstone of stability and social cohesion and therefore always subject to geopolitical assessments of the country. the minority issues are almost ever relevant directly to border features due to historical reasons. first we have to asses macrostructure of slovene state territory. in the center of the state lies ljubljana where around a third of the population, around 700,000 people are concentrated in the urban agglomeration. ljubljana’s central location gives the town an undisputed primacy and the role of macroregional center. it is directly linked to transport and industrial axis with gorenjska kranj (43,000 inhabitants) and jesenice (20,000 inhabitants). in the direction to the south is dolenjska with novo mesto (28,000 inhabitants). the third largest city is celje (50,000 inhabitants) in the narrow valley which has a weak hinterland. maribor, the second largest city (100,000 inhabitants) lies close to the border with austria and faces regional competition of much stronger graz; maribors’ hinterland is predominantly peripheral and rural. at the edge of the state there are also nova gorica (20,000 inhabitants) and koper (26,000 inhabitants). the first was formed close to the border because of political defiance. after its industrial development failed it has become a leading gambling city in the region. seaside city of koper is close to the italian and croatian borders. despite less favorable conditions, it has become an important northern adriatic port (zupančič, pipan, 2012). the weakest is the eastern part of slovenia. murska sobota (15,000 inhabitants) does not constitute a proper development center. due to the prevalence of hilly and mountainous physical geography slovene state territory is divided internally, certain areas have poor access to major centers and the residents of them have poor access to the appropriate 12 jernej zupančič services. in the light of border issues it is to note that more than half of regional urban centres are quite close to the border and some municipal cities like nova gorica, sežana, radgona, metlika, ormož, dravograd, jesenice, brežice, rogaška etc. beside directly or very close to international border-lines. that’s why the border issues are of a vital importance in national context. a special part of the state macrostructures represent political boundaries and with them related cross-border relations. slovene italian border on the north ridge to the south of gorizia and trieste takes place in the middle of the inhabitable space and has at many border crossings highly cohesive character. most of the austrian border runs along natural barriers (mountain ridges and rivers) and is by its nature thus separating. however, in recent history it has nevertheless predominantly integrating character and like the slovene-italian border has distinguished itself by a high degree of cross-border cooperation. minorities play an extremely important role. slovene-hungarian border runs at an average at the lowest ground, but due to the past policies (the iron curtain) was distinctly separating and poor transient border region which was also passive. border with croatia is the youngest in its status, but is in individual sectors (more than two thirds) significantly older. as it had in the past have only administrativepolitical character it was developed as a serpentine line adjusted on legal-property and not primarily on the security situation. therefore, in many sectors it is open to local traffic, but due to recent regional policy, most of the border area is strongly peripheral and economically passive, and thus sensitive (zupančič, 2015). the second strategic element is geopolitical situation of slovenia which is predisposed as a transitional territory – bridgehead – and this despite of the mountainous character described above. the shortest route between the north sea or the baltic coasts in the north and the upper adriatic, thru the heart of the european continent to the edge of the mediterranean sea passes thru slovene territory. in between there lies industrial and economically strong central european core (germany, austria, the czech republic and poland) where central portion of the european population and economic axes are located. iberian economic arc which reaches areas of northern italy, southern france in spanish catalonia begins in northern italy. slovenia is on the edge of the area, but the ljubljana hub brings together 9th pan-european ten corridor with trans-alpine region. on the way from northern italy it crosses the postojna gate, which lies 600 m above the sea and represents the broadest and lowest natural gateway to the entire alpine-dinaric arc!tauern-corridor passes thru ljubljana, while pyrin road passes thru in maribor. pyrn roads. 9th ten corridor leads towards the east to budapest and further into eastern europe. other transport corridor represent the line that follows from the baltic to adriatic, which extends from the north of central europe to the northern ports. parts of the slovene state territory are included into this old transport route from vienna to trieste (and now the port of koper) and also as a gateway to rijeka in croatia. transalpine roads continue east to the balkans. slovenia has a relatively dense and high-quality motorway network, which corresponds to the transit nature of its territory. however, key nodes are to modestly equipped and therefore the economic benefits from transit are not adequate, especially if the environmental pollution is taken into account. the railway network is relatively dense, but very outdated and itsthe modest inter-modality is inhibited already in transit traffic, so that it is not able to service and promote economic development. the country has three airports, but only ljubljana airport has appropriate european macro-regional character. the location of this airport is far from the city and has no direct railway or/and highway connection. in contrary, there are three important regional airports very close to slovene borders: in zagreb (croatia), graz (austria) and ronchi – trieste (italy). port of koper has developed a modern maritime transport strategy and acquired a wide hinterland, but highway and rail infrastructure does not support it properly. the third parameter of the geopolitical position slovenia represent the inclusion of slovenia in international flows and organizations in the recent period. central european position of slovenia is usually proven by its membership to cultural circle in central european cultural circle, which historically meant political affiliation with the habsburg monarchy, industrial regions of central europe and vibrant cultural communication with the northern area. an important element is also catholic and to a lesser extent protestant provenance as the foundation of the most of slovene society, although extensively hidden by the newer socialist doctrine and atheism. the socialist era was also a time of attachment to the yugoslav or the wider balkan area. independence also meant return to the concept of central europe, accession to the eu (2004 pragmatic upgrade of the previously established economic and cultural ties. membership in nato (2004) and later in the eurozone and the schengen area of europe (2007) concluded the main range of new alliances and slovenia positioned itself in the international arena. this sequence reads like a successful transition story. slovene border landscape transformation 13 slovenia was also the first country of eastern europe to preside eu, thus demonstrating confidence in in the international environment. no less important is symbolic construction of the western balkans following the formula: former yugoslavia minus slovenia plus albania. achieved external success had experienced a break during the international financial crisis from 2008 onwards. since then not only economic, but also internal political crisis has escalated. it cannot be interpreted simply as a reflection of the instability of western economies. it is necessary to look for much deeper reasons in the political and economic structure of the country and, ultimately, in the mentality of executives in politics, economy and public administration. however, one should also take into account large, even radical geopolitical changes after 2008, at which none of the key actors (eu, nato) did not show a successful response, which only deepen the crisis. crisis of these associations have consequently impact particularly on slovenia. furthermore, in 2015 came the completely new political challenge: the immigrant influx. enormous masses of people from large areas in near east and northern african countries and regions (most of them have any documents for exact personal and therefore regional / national identification) were driven trough the “balkan way” to central europe. slovene-croatian border is there second (first is greek-) “schengen-border”. in a short period, the nature of former open or even not-controlled border line has been changed radically. after several months of different attempts how to control and secure the border line and border zone, the slovene policy followed the hungarian example: they put the border razor-wired border fences along whole border-line. after a decade of open border and philosophy of crossborder collaboration these lines became the frontiers and securization the main principle, not easy, but anyway largerly accepted principle. 3. the creation of slovene national boundaries and border-typology recent slovene political borders have a rich history behind. almost a half of total border-line have their roots deep in 18th century. they are direct or indirect successors of inner austrian lands-borders. the “lands” were relatively large administrative units in former hapsburg empire, austrian part. it was after the first and second world wars and the collapse of yugoslavia in 1991 when the slovenian political boundaries were formed. the border with italy was drawn in 1954 provisionally and have been fully accepted in 1975 by the treaty of ossimo (klemenčič, 1987). the border with austria was agreed upon with the st. germain peace treaty in 1920, and a year later the border with hungary with the treaty of trianon (celar, 2002). subsequently, there has been no alternation thereof. the border with croatia was established by proclamation of independence and mutual recognition of the two countries in june 25th, 1991. however, there are still some outstanding border issues on land and at sea between the two countries. a significant milestone as regards the border issue is the slovenia’s  and hungary’s accession to the eu (2004) and further into the schengen area (2007); namely when direct military, police and customs control of the boundary have been abolished. the border area structure dynamically reflected the general modernisation processes and at the same time was adjusted to the influence of national centres. as minorities had certain influence, the border area was therefore structured in a specific way. the border areas examined belong to three different types of border areas, namely cohesive, passive and isolation border areas. the slovenian–italian border stretches between the foothills, the karst plateau and the friuli plain, whereas one part is drawn in a way the natural obstacles taken into account (mountain crest and reef ) and the other crosses the densely populated and economically active area. longitudinally, it goes through densely populated area of the friuli plain in italy and the vipavska valley in slovenia. old political boundaries (between the habsburg monarchy and the venetian republic and its successor, the kingdom of italy) were held slightly to the west. therefore, the area was for centuries characterised by intensive cultural and economic contact. urban centres are in the middle of the soča river valley. a regional centre of nova gorica was established, directly on the border, demonstrating the defiant nature of these decisions. as regards the structure, the areas are complementary as certain forms of cross-border cooperation are required that results in the dependence thereon. thus, the area represents a type of cohesive border. in this respect, the slovenian minority is an essential factor in increasing the cohesiveness as a result of many familial ties and friendships local population has a lot of personal motives for cross-border cooperation. moreover, the 10th european transport corridor crosses the city and the region. beside this, the border is crossed by many daily working commuters from slovenia to italy, while the opposite flow is much less evident (zupančič, 2002). the slovenian–austrian border in the section bad radkersburg – gornja radgona is an example of passive border. the geographical structure of areas on 14 jernej zupančič both side of the border is quite similar. the broad plains along the mura river represent the central part thereof, and dense, but highly dispersed populated hills dominate in the background. the area has quite agrarian character and there are two smaller centres, i.e. bad radkersburg (slov. radgona) and gornja radgona, the latter nestled directly along the border. as the areas are self-sufficient, the crossborder communication was limited for decades. the border was drawn exclusively with respect to watercourses; one part along the mura river, which was due to its role fortified with embankment in order to maintain the flow, and then on the stream kučnica, flow of which was adjusted to the agreed border. similarly, there was a negative attitude to minority by both sides. while the german population of the apaško polje was mostly banished, the slovenian minority in radgona / radkersburg area remained practically ignored for decades (zupančič, 1999). the border between slovenia and hungary represents the type of isolative border. the border is drawn across relatively ethnically homogeneous and entirely agrarian area. the northern part follows the watershed and the eastern part, however, goes through some settlements. decades of separate development accelerated depopulation and peripherization of the area. as, due to the specific policy of separation, the border was extensively fortified (military infrastructure of the iron curtain) and controlled, cross-border contacts were practically prevented. even though the structure of the areas on both side of the border is quite similar (agriculture and industry) and represent the periphery of slovenia or hungary, their development was entirely separate. even after the accession of both countries to the eu and the “schengen area” the features of separation are preserved; on both sides the passivity is canned with the designation of protected areas. almost exactly half of slovenian border line is with croatia. this is the type of developing border, due to rapid changes of border regimes and border situations during last 25 years. the border is mainly drawn along the old line of the administrative border2, which was formed between the 16th and 18th centuries (zgodovina, 1979). in spite of somewhat different competences, the conditions had been provided for the formation of a settlement structure, traffic order, property law and other public and 2 the perception, that political borders between yugoslav federal units (republics) have »only« administrative character, is completely wrong. the federal repuplics have large autonomy and competences and were, first among all, political entities and were structuralized like states (countries). but they were not securized trough army, police and custom. private regulations, forming the cultural region. life was different, but due to relatively close languages and the same (catholic) cultural provenience, there were many contacts, as well as many mixed marriages. the regions lived in intense contact. towards the end of the 18th century, the cadastre measurement began to form, which differed in details (technique as well as surveying starting points). in region of žumberak (recent gorjanci mountain) the border line was drawn according to the possession of land-owners residence and adopted the line “meandering” a lot, making in the area some enclaves (or exclaves) (celar, 2002), perhaps because of special right of the settlers there, a real “frontiermen” – s. c. uskoki3. once the double monarchy was formed according to the austro – hungarian agreement (1866), the introduction of the internal economical control between hungarian and austrian lands saw the implementation of partial harmonisation and straightening out of the border line: legal heritage of today’s “cadastre” border (zajc, 2006), which later, in the yugoslav era, went through several redrawings; those are where most of the non harmonised cases of the cadastre route of the border line of the current slovenian – croatian border stem from. the border on the mura river was drawn inside one common cadastral measurement (hungarian part of austrohungary), so that the contemporary differences were done later during yugoslav period. in the sector of istria, the border is entirely new and was formed with agreements after world war ii. this part is still a subject of debate and dispute due to a series of unclear aspects within the border line drawing process itself (kristen, 2006). beside this, the area of istria was long under republic of venice and has therefore, a venetian juridical tradition. austrian authorities just adopted them after conquering the area in 18th century (zgodovina, 1979). another source of border issues stems from mainly erosion accumulation processes by drava, mura and sotla, which changed the subject characteristics and access to property. the third source of issues is the layout of the infrastructure, especially traffic related one, since it crosses the border line several times and there is no clear competence regarding maintenance and control. a series of open question relates to energy facilities (hydroelectric power plants, nuclear power plant krško) directly at the border or close to it. the fourth group of problems includes interventions, which were formed after the establishment of the 3 uskoki – people mainly serbian ethnic origin, who were refugees from areas under ottoman rule, and settled the frontier of habsburg empire. they have special competences and rights for compensation of military border service. slovene border landscape transformation 15 countries. there were several shortages because of border. all these circumstances significantly influenced the considerable dynamic of changes of the border cultural landscape. 4. minorities as a decision factor in borderlands minorities are the result of demarcation processes, no matter what were the criteria thereof. the creation of political boundaries was primarily a reflection of the military and political power of national centres that conquered the territory for strategic reasons. the negotiators often relied on criterion of ethnic homogeneity of the future countries, this was however often neglected. minorities are thus the reality of border areas, minority policy is a reflection of the political wisdom of the political elites as well as the realisation of humanistic principles that is consistently proclaimed by all diplomacy, yet with great difficulty realised. the areas examined are typical heirs of the european nationalisms that considered minorities as a foreign body, a suspicious element that is meaningful to assimilate. the result was indisposed, cautious and often even aggressive attitude towards minorities and their settlement areas. according to italian official estimations there is in italy close to 52,000 slovenes, while slovenian authors estimates by linguistical criteria their population from 80,000 to more than 100,000. in austria, the last census in 20014 counted around 13,000 of them in the carinthia, the estimations are evidently higher: 45,000 in the same province. in hungary, there are close to 3,000 and in croatia 17,000 by census in 2002, while still a decade before there were more than 25,000. the slovenian community in croatia is much more a dispersed urban diaspora and just in smaller part a real territorial minority. otherwise, in slovenia there are around 3,000 of italians and close to 10,000 hungarians by estimations, while the official number is smaller. beside this, there are round 10,000 roma and relatively strong serbian (around 60,000), croatian (43,000) and bosniak (40,000) diaspora (zupančič, 2004). before ww2, the strongest ethnic minority were the germans; to some estimations around 45,000 (zupančič, 2004) or even more (karner, 1998), due to its much larger number at last census in hapsburg monarchy in 1910; there were around 105,000 germans on recent slovene national territory, according to the linguistical criteria. in contrary, the motherland considered a minority from viewpoint of demographic, cultural and 4 the census in 2011 has no linguistical evidence. often also political potential and occasionally territorial pretensions. in this light, mostly, patronising and generally ethno-centralistic policy was held. minorities were the object of instrumentalization of bilateral relations, convenient to occasionally raise an “issue” or to “sacrifice” a minority for the higher interests of bilateral relations. due to their competences to cope with the language, culture, customs, traditions and in particular by the existence of social networks, which evolved through controlled political borders, members of minority groups provided in particular services. minorities and their social and spatial functions were directly and indirectly affected by certain policies related to border and border areas. support for minorities either by the countries or motherland proved to be a valuable investment in terms of improved international relations. minorities can play economically and culturally unifying role in various fields and are an important development factor. 5. recent border landscape transformation: the case studies comparison of the critical times (1949, 1978, 1990 and 2004) outlines the time-section of four different periods of modern european economic and political history, which is strongly reflected in the marginal and minority policies. this was a time of nationalist europe that evolved from almost half a century geopolitical polarisation towards the current integration phase. a decade after world war ii was characterised by the beginning of geopolitical polarisation and the creation of the concept of closed borders. in the gorica region, as an act of defiance, a parallel regional centre was established, directly on the border with the street system, facing the „old“ gorizia, as if it was a single location. in the pic of geopolitical competition, a border became a cut-off point; the term “iron curtain” developed as a concept of strongly secured cumbersome border. in our case, the concept did not long persist, except on the border with hungary. after the cominform resolution of 1949 there was a deterioration of relations between yugoslavia and the soviet union and its political satellites. consequently, the border with hungary was hermetically closed; it became a real „iron curtain“ with two little frequented border crossings, and even less in particular after the soviet intervention in hungary in 1956. the border with austria was also strongly controlled since it was legally and politically reconstructed only with the state treaty for austria of 1957. 16 jernej zupančič in the seventies, the border regimes experienced major changes. according to the constitution of 1974 the republics of former yugoslavia had greater autonomy, which enabled slovenia to focus primarily on the markets of the european economic community (eec). border regimes were liberalised, the frequency of transitions increased. italy and austria were among the most slovenia’s important partners. as a result, there was a great increase in cross-border traffic of goods. the treaty of ossimo in 1975 enabled the concept of open borders. only in the gorica region there were 28 crossings of different grades or one to 2.3 km, which is an exceptional density in the world! with the active participation of the slovenian minority in italy, cross-border activity rapidly increased, in particular in the fields of education, agriculture and trade as well as providing services to companies. investment and innovation entered in the border area. in contrast to industry, a tertiary paradigm of economic development evolved. the gorica region became an elite winemaking, culinary, tourism and gambling region, although slovenia was then in the culmination of agrarian-industrial paradigm of development. on the contrary, the eastern border in the prekmurje region vegetated along the closed iron curtain and minorities were isolated from the core-centres. ten years later, the border area experienced the following series of changes associated with the dissolution of the bloc, the collapse of yugoslavia and the creation of new political boundaries. due to the economic and political crisis and lack of resources, the border areas in italy and austria specialised in shopping tourism of exceptional character. minorities assumed therein a very important role because of language competence, which also contributed to their affirmation. the decisive turning point occurred on the border with hungary. the concept of the iron curtain was interrupted and construction of cross-border relations began to accelerate. here, this process took place much more slowly. since there were no habits of border areas developed and even less capacity available for successful cross-border communication, they remained at least at the beginning rather passive. now a completely different picture can be observed. after joining the eu and the schengen regime there were transitional borders in place. the political climate was improved and cross-border cooperation became a political imperative of local and regional elites, minorities were recognised their role of importance not only as the medium but also a catalyst for cross-border communication. in the gorica region, incentives for cross-border cooperation were not at all needed as there a wealth of diverse contacts between the minority and the local population had already been in place. gorica (it. gorizia) and nova gorica developed elements of building common urban policies. as regards the border area with austria, some forms of employment in austria and project performance were developed and strengthened. the border area with hungary remained however largely passive and there was a strong need for incentives and assistance. starting regional development was based primarily on motherland interventionism. a perception of „protection“ of the border area was preserved; the role of the „iron curtain“ and the area dotted with bunkers was perfidiously dominated by the logic of large-scale protected areas. finally, what happened along slovene-croatian border since both countries became independant? briefly: markation and demonstration first, followed by internal and international pressure to securization, symbolization in-between, then quick attempts to economization and distinct attempts to close border area: abandoning any touch due to avoid possible confrontation in the north and intensive border urbanization as well as parkization, all close together in the southern, coastal space! the most obvious sign of the establishment of border is its symbolic marking and the establishment of institutionalised control. at the points of road and railroad crossing, wide installations of border infrastructure were set up, border crossings of various ranks in the presence of police, customs and sanitary control. many local paths and roads were closed, or the transition thereon was allowed exclusively in a limited and conditional scope. the securing of the border line triggered the formation of two types of zones in the border area: intensification zones along the traffic corridors and peripherization zones in the areas with less traffic. in the case of the slovenian – croatian border, the investment pressure in the first type of areas increased after the end of the balkans interethnic conflicts in 1995; then, the traffic increased rapidly. this was followed by the tertiarization of the border area, which replaced the older industrial – agricultural paradigm. on the other hand, the new infrastructure was provided to entirely remode areas in the gorjanci and kočevsko regions. due to military – strategic reasons, several roads were renewed and built5 in a shorter period of time, with other forms of technical infrastructure being installed, which was meant to aid the local population and, at the same time, be at the disposal to the security forces in the border control function. 5 two completely new local roads, built exclusively for supplying small military base on gorjanci mountain slopes. slovene border landscape transformation 17 the second significant change is of a mainly symbolic character. the border area is important for countries and thus, frequently, if not always, also an area of symbolisation. the border is marked with boards and signs directly on the border line as well as the traffic corridors, which cross the border. gradually, a symbolic aspect can evolve for the elements of the cultural and historical heritage and natural monuments: all of them speak of “our” country. these elements are generally also attractive and thus subject to visits. symbolisation then gradually leads to the expansion of services in border areas and in the case of the slovenian croatian border culture, too, it was so. a special variation of symbolisation is the establishment and maintenance of parks, wider understood as a strategy of protection of the border area, specifically in the phase of the removal of control. the protection of the border area, wherein various “valuable” elements of living and unliving nature are recognised, as well as material cultural heritage, makes sense at first sight, as it neatly complements the visibility of the local environment and contributes to its tourist promotion. however, protection is also a form of new, indirect control over the border area, for which a particular part of other development perspectives are heavily restricted and control is increased. with this, the national care and the tutorship of the state over the local environment is highly increased, with the motive being mainly national and thus conservative: it attempts to maintain the border area such as it is. thus, next to the mura and drava rivers, most of the area is within “nature 2000” while certain smaller reservations have an even stricter regime. along the sotla river, there is the kozjansko park, jovsi, and in a certain way also upper sotla river area, the design of which, however, goes back to the 80s, similarly to gorjanci, kolpa river area and snežnik mountains. somewhat differently: more than two thirds of the border area is under a certain protection regime. doubtlessly the most interesting habitat of all are the salt pans of sečovlje, the maritime part of which continues into the shallow and actually sensitive area of the northern adriatic: the piran bay. but this has, due to its border position and two decades of a border dispute, resulted in an entirely different way: with symbolisation. both countries, in their rush to prove the ownership of this sea area, attempted to prove the “slovenianness” or “croatianness” of piran bay. while slovenia declared the protection of this area and also limited it, croatia exposed another name (savudrijska vala) (kladnik et al., 2014), the need to develop mariculture (by far the most intense in the entire area of western adriatic), development of tourism (two casinos directly by the border and according to slovenian convictions already in the area of protected nature) and finally also construction work of areas which have previously been entirely vacant, of the cape of savudrija, with exclusive villas and an appartment settlement (zupančič, pipan, 2012). the third form of influence in the border area is represented by the abandonment of any use. this is especially present in the “mature” phase and later, when the broad range of border infrastructure if not necessary any more. to avoid border disputes in a time, when the question of borders in a subject of international arbitration, the countries abandoned the use of it; for example the border sand quarries on mura and drava rivers. but they have also abandoned the maintenance of anti-flood enbankments and thus, due to problems, farm use in certain periphery is also abandoned. the exploatation of sand, rubble and lignite deposits by mura has nearly ceased. to keep the energy buildings in use, many compromises had to be made. the use of railway by sotla river was nearly abandoned6, and mainly the care for it: as it is on the border. with the entry of croatia into the eu (2013), the need for the use of broad border infrastructure should slowly be reduced, with said infrastructure being abandoned and possibly decaying. it seemed so in 2013. but development in the wider european area with a large immigrant influx to central europe turned the colaborative ideas and easing of border controls on its head. the security question became primary common issue. in the last months of 2015, slovenia, in order to provide the so-called schengen border control still acceptable, introduced a high wire fence along almost whole slovene-croatian border. despite considerable initial outcry and public opposition, this new securization infrastructure remained. 6. conclusion in the changed conditions due to european integration, globalisation, informatisation and accompanying processes, the mobility of the population significantly increases. regarding establishing and maintaining ties members of minorities, despite small in number, have significantly contributed to an increase in cross-border cooperation in various fields. due to the changing role and power, the protection of minorities by the motherland is a priori expected to be reduced and replaced with a functional one. a comparative analysis of the four border areas 6 this railway is in bad technical condition and probably out of use. 18 jernej zupančič indicates the persistence of spatial structures. despite their true efforts, local authorities are however susceptible to the heritage of the past. slovenian borderlands reflects the long and rich history, where the dominant factors influenced from their centres: austrian, venetian, later italian, hungarian (and strong russian-soviet influence during socialist period, either) and, of course, the yugoslavian. the minorities settled there have been important “inner” factor: sometimes understood as “bridgemaker” and quickly thereafter a nonwishable menace. but they survived. the borders were places of contact and confrontation, memories, demonstration of power and violence still some decades ago, became then a good reasons for cooperation and stimulated by new european friendship-spirit, a real crossborder cooperators. the cities grown beside the border, despite it and against it. now, they are close to some common spatial decisions, but still far away from common management. they remain spaces of double-interests: inner (or local) and central – ones. 2015 and beyond the slovene – croatian border facing with completely new challenge: the immigration influx. in less than half a year (2015) the border has been crossed by nearly 800,000 refugees and migrants on their main routes through turkey and the balkans. their goal is to reach primarily the areas of rich countries of central europe and scandinavia. due to the extreme pressure of migrants, the slovenian government followed the hungarian example: to limit the uncontrolled immigrant influx they installed protective razor-sharp wire fencing. the securization of outer eu schengen-border became and remain until recent times the ultimate goal. security measure has been effective, although it has been criticized and several public protests has been done by some political groups. references adamič orožen m., 2004, about slovenia, [in:] o. adamič orožen (ed.), slovenia: a geographic overview, zrc založba, ljubljana, 7–10. bufon m., 2004, slovenia as a european contact area, [in:] o.  adamič orožen (ed.) slovenia: a geographic overview, zrc založba, ljubljana, 21–26. celar b., 2002, slovenija in njene meje, visoka policijsko-varnostna šola, ljubljana. karner c., 1998, die deutschsprachige volksgruppe in slowenien, verlag hermagoras / mohorjeva, klagenfurt, ljubljana, wien. kladnik d., pipan p., gašperšič p., 2014, poimenovanja piranskega zaliva, založba zrc sazu, ljubljana. klemenčič v., 1987, državna meja na območju sr slovenije in obmejna območja kot geografski fenomen, razprave in gradivo / treatises and documents, insitute for ethnic studies, 20, 57–81. kristen s., 2006, meje in misije. dileme slovensko-hrvaške razmejitve v istri v vojaškem, političnem, diplomatskem in obveščevalnem primežu ii. svetovne vojne, založba 2000, ljubljana. national atlas of slovenia, 2001, rokus publishing house, ljubljana. zajc m., 2006, kje se slovensko neha in hrvaško začne. slovenskohrvaška meja v 19. in na začetku 20. stoletja, modrijan, ljubljana. zgodovina s., 1979, cankarjeva založba, ljubljana zupančič j., 1999, slovenci v avstriji / slovenes in austria, series: geographica slovenica, 32, institute of geography, ljubljana. zupančič j., 2002, grenzüberschreitende pendelwanderung aus slowenien nach österreich und italien. mitteilungen der österreichischen geographischen gesellschaft, 144, 145–157. zupančič j., 2004, ethnic structure of slovenia and slovenes in neighbouring countries, [in:] o. adamič (ed.), slovenia: a geographical overview, association of the geographical societies of slovenia, založba zrc, ljubljana, 87–92. zupančič j., 2008, značaj in funkcije političnih meja v evropi, ars & humanitas, 2(1), 82–96. zupančič j., pipan p., 2012, slovensko morje in obala: severni jadran v geopolitični perspektivi ter problemi razmejevanja med italijo, slovenijo in hrvaško, [in:] d. ogrin (ed.), geografija stika slovenske istre in tržaškega zaliva, znanstvena založba filozofske fakultete, ljubljana, 13–35. zupančič j., 2015, disputed and transformed: recent changes in the slovenian-croatian border landscape, [in:] m. sobczyński (ed.), geographical-political aspects of the transborder conservation of natural and cultural heritage: borderlands and contemporary changes of the politics in border regions, region and regionalism, 12(1), 151–159. journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(4), 23–32 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.4.03 russian news journalism: neglect of standards and common sense yurii nesteriak (1), yuliia nesteriak (2) (1) national academy of communication study, illenka 36/1, 04119 kyiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0003-2333-5965 e-mail: nesteriak.yuriy@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) department of social communication, institute of journalism, national taras shevchenko university of kyiv, illenka 36/1, 04119 kyiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-00028637-4980 e-mail: nyulia@ukr.net citation nesteriak y., nesteriak y., 2022, russian news journalism: neglect of standards and common sense, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(4), 23–32. abstract the rules of news presentation are independent of time and space. it is about using professional news journalism methods in order to reflect reality, despite the shortage of time and finances. messages are formulated according to professional standards of unbiased event coverage. this means that journalists must present the events as impartially as possible. own assessments are inadmissible; the presentation must be based on facts. the russian information agency (ria novosti), which is part of the international information agency (mia rossiya segodnya) violates news standards as well as principles of news agencies and cannot be a true and reliable information source. key words news journalism, professional standards of unbiased event coverage, information agencies principles, fake news, news standards violation. received: 14 june 2022 accepted: 07 august 2022 published: 30 december 2022 1. retrospective propaganda “news” analysis the origins of the propagandistic foundations of news journalism in russia are based on the russian mass media traditions, which became definite and intensified during the wartime periods. the information component has always been considered by russian ideologues as an extremely important aspect of a military campaign. despite the fact that de jure censorship in russia was abolished in 1905 (october manifesto), before the beginning of the first world war, the “provisional regulations on military censorship” were issued in order to let the government use whatever means needed in the fight against objectionable mass media under the guise of martial law (how russian..., 2022). the beginning of the so-called “great patriotic war” in 1941 became the impetus for creating another ussr information body, which operated according to the principle of a news (information) agency – the soviet information bureau (radinformbiuro), the predecessor of the modern russian information agency (ria) novosti. it was founded on june 24, 1941, under the council of people’s commissars of the ussr based on the resolution of the cpc of the ussr and the central committee of the cpsu(b) “on 24 yurii nesteriak, yuliia nesteriak the creation and tasks of the soviet information bureau’’ (apn ot sovinformbûro..., 2001, p. 6). the resolution provided for “entrusting the soviet information bureau with: managing the coverage of international events and the internal life of the soviet union in the press and on the radio; organizing counter-propaganda against german and other enemy propaganda; covering front-line events and military actions, compiling and publishing military summaries based on the main command materials.” the radinformbiuro managed the work of the all-slavic committee, the anti-fascist committee of soviet women, the anti-fascist committee of soviet youth, the anti-fascist committee of soviet scientists, and the jewish anti-fascist committee. it is clear that all radinformbiuro activities were essentially propaganda. in 1944, a special department of propaganda for foreign countries was created in the radinformbiuro structure. through 1171 newspapers, 523 magazines and 18 radio stations in 23 countries around the world, soviet embassies abroad and other radinformbiuro organizations introduced readers and listeners to the anti-fascist struggle, and later to the main directions of the internal and foreign policy of the soviet union during the post-war period. in 1961, based on the radinformbiuro, the press agency novosti (apn is an acronym for the ukrainian agentstvo presy novosti) was established. it was the first non-state public information agency in the history of the soviet mass media. soviet journalism was quite proud of this fact since public and private ownership of the media went beyond the soviet (communist or totalitarian) press theory described by f. sybert et al. (1998). among the founders of the press agency novosti were the union of soviet journalists, the council of soviet friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries (voks is an acronym for the russian “vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo kul’turnoi sviazi s zagranitsei”), and the all-union society for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge. the purpose of the created agency was to inform the international public about the soviet union life. its motto was: “information for the sake of peace, for the sake of the friendship between nations.” the non-state founders created the illusion of independence and objectivity of the agency compared to other soviet mass media. information centers or bureaus, departments, branches or correspondent points of the press agency novosti were located in 120 places around the globe. the agency’s reporters sometimes found themselves in one or another country before their colleagues from the telegraph agency of the soviet union (tars is an acronym for the ukrainian “telegrafne agentstvo radianskoho soiuzu”), embassy, or consulate arrived there. by 1990, the press agency novosti had 27 representative offices in europe, 20 in north and latin america, 15 in asia, 29 in the middle east and africa, australia and new zealand. the former chairman of the press agency novosti board b. burkov stated: from the very beginning, it was clear that the name “news” (rus. novosti) did not impose on the agency the obligation to be a super-operational organization, to some extent competing with the telegraph agency of the soviet union. on the contrary, it was strictly defined that the press agency novosti is not a telegraph agency; the telegraph agency of the soviet union copes well with this (apn ot sovinformbûro ..., 2001, p. 4). according to richard paul and linda elder, such a biased presentation of the news, given the low level of the audience’s critical thinking, shapes its view of the world, and determines which countries are friends and which are enemies. researchers also emphasize the close connection between bias and propaganda (paul, elder, 2008). the scientists note that the logic of news presentation is parallel to the logic of writing a story. in both cases, there is simultaneously a vast background of facts for the events covered and very limited actual display of those facts. the result in both cases is the same: 99.9% of the “facts” are never mentioned at all. it is the facts manipulation that creates news bias. on july 27, 1990, following the decree of the president of the ussr m. gorbachev, the information agency novosti (ian) was established based on the press agency novosti. a computer data bank containing more than 250,000 documents was created. since 1991, the tape of operational information infonovosti has been published. ian offices were located in 120 countries, the agency published more than 60 illustrated magazines and newspapers in 45 languages with a one-time circulation of 4.3 million copies. in 1989, a television center was opened, which was later reformed into the tv company tv-novosti. in september 1991, based on ian and the russian information agency, the russian information agency (ria) novosti was created, which at that time was supervised by the ministry of press and information of russia, with about 80 foreign bureaus and correspondent points, more than 1,500 subscribers in the cis countries and about 100 abroad. since 1993, ria “novosti has become a state information and analytical agency. the agency also participated in the creation of the radio channel ria-radio and the tv channel kultura. in may 1998, russian news journalism: neglect of standards and common sense 25 based on the decree of the president of the russian federation (rf), the holding all-russian state television and radio broadcasting company (vgtrk is an acronym for “vserossiyskaya gosudarstvennaya televizionnaya i radioveshchatelnaya kompaniya”) was created, which included ria novosti under the new name – russian news agency vesti, keeping the well-known ria novosti brand in the information environment (apn ot sovinformbûro..., 2001, p. 166). since 2001, ria novosti has transferred the distribution of news information to the ria.ru website, which has the following options: geolocation, geotargeting and integration into social networks. that allowed the platform to gain leadership in the number of viewers in russia among news resources. on december 23, 2003, the ria news agency vesti was removed from vgtrk by a government decree of the russian federation and subordinated directly to the ministry of press of the russian federation. on april 1, 2004, the federal state unitary enterprise russian news agency vesti was renamed as the federal state unitary enterprise russian agency of international information ria novosti. the agency turned into a group of media companies, which united several independent, but closely interacting multimedia mass media. on december 9, 2013, the president of russia v. putin signed the “decree on measures to improve the efficiency of the state media,” according to which ria novosti was liquidated, and the founder’s rights and property rights were transferred to the international information agency (iia) russia today. d. kiselyov was appointed the ceo of the new structure. by the same decree, the russian state broadcasting company voice of russia was liquidated, the property of which was also transferred to russia today (rt). according to the decree, the main direction of activity of the federal agency russia today is to cover the state policy of the russian federation and public life in russia for a foreign audience. iia russia today combines radio broadcasting, news feeds, information portals, multimedia international press centers, production and distribution of photo content and infographics, information platforms in social networks and production of mobile applications content. information resources of ria noviny, prime, r-sport, ria nedvizhymost, ria reyting, inozmi are part of iia russia today. the agency is considered to be a leader in terms of citations among russian mass media, social networks and the blogosphere. in november 2014, iia russia today launched a new brand – sputnik multimedia group. sputnik (sputniknews.com) – a news agency and radio with multimedia information hubs – includes websites, analog and digital radio broadcasting, mobile applications and pages on social networks in dozens of countries around the world. during the study “news as a weapon”, prepared in 2019 by researchers from london’s kings college, more than 10,000 messages from russian news agencies and more than 150,000 messages from the british media were analyzed. the authors found that out of 2,641 articles analyzed by the russia today and sputnik news agencies about events in the uk, the usa, france, germany, sweden, italy and ukraine, 2,157 (81.7%) mentioned political failures, conflicts etc. at least once. 80% of all mentions of nato that russia disseminated in the british media also contained negative key messages. in these reports, nato was most often described as an aggressive expansionist threat to russia. often, the messages were devoted to conflicts within nato as well as to the negative effects of membership for member countries and arguments to justify russian aggression (82% novyn..., 2019). 2. standards of news journalism in modern conditions according to the head of the institute of journalism and communication of the university of hamburg, prof. z. vaishenberh: there is still a consensus among society members and journalists about news journalism principles and the need to preserve them. these principles can be formulated as news reporting rules that ensure a certain quality of events coverage and serve as a guideline for journalists and the general public (vaishenberh, 2011). rules for news presentation are independent of space and time. we are talking about professional methods by which news journalism, despite the time and financial shortage, can provide a reflection of reality, which will enable the modern multifaceted society to constantly observe itself. this journalism function causes the fundamental problem of any observation. observation relies on discrimination, which directs the gaze to one side of the phenomenon, eliminating the other. even if both sides were heard (audiatur et altera pars), as required by the professional rules of objective events coverage, news journalism by definition remains “one-sided”. messages are formulated in accordance with professional standards of objective events coverage. this means that journalists must present as impartial a picture of events as possible. own assessments 26 yurii nesteriak, yuliia nesteriak are inadmissible, the presentation must be based on facts. this applies to both the informational and entertainment branch. “subjective journalism” is allowed only when it comes to one’s own opinion (vaishenberh, 2011). therefore, “most researchers agree that journalists should have clear guidelines that will help them make decisions in ambiguous situations,” reports prof. v. ivanov, ukrainian media researcher. various countries’ codes from the usa to belarus have such provisions. at the same time, the emphasis is placed on the fact that a journalist must serve society, his main duty is to provide objective information, on the basis of which it is possible to create a picture of the world that would most closely correspond to reality. the spj code of ethics explicitly states that “journalists shall be free from any obligation other than the public’s right to reliable information” (vaishenberh, 2011). the ukrainian institute of mass information has defined six basic standards of news journalism, which, according to media experts, “are universal features of any quality journalistic material. their non-compliance or violation in information journalism leads to receiving either a low-quality material (‘production defect‘) or a fundamentally different product (‘jeans‘ – propaganda, pr)” (žurnalìsts’kì standarty..., 2011): 1. a balance of opinions and points of view. life consists of big and small conflicts. every journalistic topic is either conflictual or, at the very least, ambiguous. this requires us to clearly define who the parties to each conflict are or who a competent and independent expert on each covered topic is. the standard of opinion balance requires us to present the opinion of all parties of the conflict, without exception. only then does the audience receive the full picture and have enough information to draw their own conclusions; 2. promptness of information delivery. the standard of promptness requires information journalists to submit any information without postponing it “for later,” which means covering the topic in the nearest news release / issue of the newspaper. at the same time, information should be provided as completely as possible and be of the highest achievable quality form; 3. reliability (references). the reliability of information means the qualitative verification of each fact in sources competent for this fact. a journalist should always use several competent sources to verify any fact. and for this, while dealing with this or that topic, the competence of certain officials or experts must be clearly defined. the last requirement of the reliability standard is as follows: the journalist must clearly inform his audience about the source of this or that fact or opinion; 4. separation of facts from comments and opinions. in such a “pure” and conservative information genre as news, a journalist has no right to comment on the material at all. so, without commenting or evaluating in any way, he gives his audience, first, the facts. secondly, the opinions of the participants of the event. thirdly, the opinions of experts. every fact comes from a competent source. each opinion is voiced by a specific author. the journalist informs the audience about the sources of facts and authors of opinions. in this situation, facts are automatically separated from conclusions and personal evaluation; 5. accuracy of information presentation. this is the cornerstone standard of informational journalism. it means that any reported fact corresponds to the reality fact, and that any opinion is quoted accurately and out of context; 6. comprehensive presentation of facts and information on the issue. any topic needs to be covered as completely as possible, which means presenting a wide range of facts and opinions. therefore, the journalist’s task is to find the competent sources to provide it. when russian president vladimir putin ordered the invasion of ukraine on february 24, journalists from the english-language publication kyiv independent started a live blog with constant updates for ukrainians and readers around the world. the kyiv independent, ukrainska pravda and a number of other ukrainian news outlets continue to cover the war with a dogged commitment to the truth despite being targeted by the russian military forces (fighting for…, 2022). the ukrainian institute of mass information also monitors and records facts about russia’s crimes against journalists and the media since the attack on ukraine on february 24, launching a special information resource “media crimes of russia in the war against ukraine (updating)” (medìjnì zločini …, 2022). foreign social networks were the first to feel the restrictions. on february 25, moscow partially restricted access to facebook. on march 5, roskomnadzor, russia’s communications regulator, completely banned access to facebook across the country. access to twitter was also restricted after the network blocked the pages of russia today and sputnik, russia’s state media channels (shemakov, 2022). on the same day, the state duma of the russian federation unanimously adopted a resolution on punishment for “fake news” within the country. a person who spreads information about the russian military forces, a “special operation” in ukraine, or calls for sanctions, which has not been officially announced by the government, can be sentenced to 15 years in prison. the duma cited several examples of serious misinformation that should be punished, including publishing “documented” photos of burned military equipment, reports of attacks on civilians, and assessment of the russian military personnel losses. the fake news law was adopted as a result of russia’s restrictions on media reports that “disrespect the government” back in 2019, although the punishment was much lighter three years ago. a fine of up to 1.5 million rubles ($22,900) and 15 days in prison could be imposed on anyone who disseminated “unreliable” information about public officials and violated public order. as a result, access to foreign mass media was significantly limited. at the request of the prosecutor’s office, roskomnadzor “restricted” access to bbc, meduza, deutsche welle and radio free europe. bloomberg, the guardian and bbc suspended the work of their journalists in russia. the international association of investigative journalists occrp was also placed on the list of “undesirable organizations”. the opposition mass media in russia have largely fallen silent. echo of moscow, znak.com, the village, taiga.info, dozhd, tomsk tv 2 and many other channels ceased their activities due to strong pressure and the threat of prosecution. znak.com refers to “a large number of restrictions that have recently affected the work of the mass media in russia”. those who have not stopped their activities are personally persecuted. for example, on the morning of march 5, the editorial office of the newspaper pskovskaya guberniya was searched; because of this, the website of the newspaper is blocked. publications that have not yet been closed are forced to delete news and report only official government messages. 12 russian publications, including the bell, vpost and the blueprint, have announced the cessation of all war coverage reports. winner of the 2021 nobel prize in journalism, novaya gazeta deleted most of the articles about the war (shemakov, 2022). meanwhile, at least 150 journalists left russia urgently after the start of a full-scale war against ukraine. the main reason for the departure of media workers is the introduction of military censorship in russia. this is reported by rbk-ukraine with reference to the center for strategic communications and information security spravdi (z rf pislâ počatku…, 2022). a large number of journalists from many mass media companies left the country, among them almost the entire team of moscow editorial office meduza (about 20 people). journalists from dozhd, echo of moscow, and novaya gazeta also fled. in addition, the russian service of the bbc temporarily stopped working in russia. now its journalists will work from abroad. it should be noted that on march 4, 2022, the president of the russian federation v. putin signed a law according to which media workers face 15 years in prison if they publish information about the invasion of ukraine that contradicts the statements of official bodies. russia included the german media company deutsche welle, whose broadcasting in russia was banned at the beginning of february, to the list of “foreign agents”. this was a precautionary measure in response to the ban on the activities of the russian propaganda channel rt in germany (rosìâ vyznala…, 2022). the russian ministry of justice added nine journalists and three media organizations to the register of mass media “foreign agents.” radio svoboda journalists were included in the list. also journalists from the nastoyashchee vremya tv channel were added on the list. “the bellingcat” investigative project, dozhd tv channel journalist danyla sotnikov, bbc russian service correspondent andriy zakaharov, journalist evgenii simonov, and lawyer and head of the media rights protection center galyna arapova were also included in the list. russia’s invasion of ukraine demonstrates the importance of the free press to protect against the arbitrariness of tyranny. this is stated in the new special report prepared by the nieman foundation for journalism at harvard university (viprobuvannâ…, 2022). in russia, the free information stream and dissemination of alternative opinions were seen as a significant threat to the regime of vladimir putin that the pocket parliament (the duma of the russian federation indeed) introduced a criminal penalty of up to 15 years in prison for a reliable description of the events taking place in ukraine. this decision allowed the authorities to silence almost all independent and oppositional voices in russia. in other words, the war contributed to the creation of such a media environment in russia that joseph goebbels himself would have envied. at the same time, journalists from various independent mass media accept the challenge posed russian news journalism: neglect of standards and common sense 27 by the war and, at great risk to themselves, describe the bloody massacre of the local civilian population in ukraine. such reports are vitally necessary in order to get western countries to respond objectively to the war and, what is most important now, to resolve the humanitarian crisis caused by russia’s actions. “russia’s invasion of ukraine was a stark reminder of the vital role these [independent] journalists and their newsrooms play, and how fragile press freedom has actually proven to be in the face of aggression from putin and other authoritarian leaders around the world,” the nieman foundation reports. according to its official website, the foundation sets itself the task of “promoting and raising the standards of journalism, educating and supporting those who are ready to make an important contribution to its future” (viprobuvannâ…, 2022). 3. interpretation of ria novosti news standards from february 24 to april 1, 2022, 3,534 out of 16,425 publications on the ria novosti information agency website had keywords “ukraine”,, “special operation”, “war”. the first flash message was published at 5:50 a.m. moscow time: “putin announced a special military operation in donbas” (putin ob”âvil..., 2022). first of all, it should be noted that the agency does not call a full-scale invasion of ukrainian territory a war, using the concepts of “special military operation” or “ukrainian crisis” introduced into the information space by v. putin. this publication outlines the main goal of the invasion: “the protection of people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the kyiv regime for eight years, and for this we will strive for the demilitarization and denazification of ukraine....”. two minutes later, at 5:52, an extended statement of russia’s intentions regarding ukraine was published. putin stated that a clash with ukrainian nationalist formations is inevitable, since such grouping, “ukrainian nazis”, would supposedly go to war with crimea, sooner or later. in the same statement of russia’s president, he accuses ukraine of possessing nuclear weapons. therefore, “russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist with a constant threat coming from ukraine”. at the same time, putin placed responsibility for the bloodshed on “the conscience of the regime ruling ukraine”(putin zaâvil…, 2022). during the investigated period, the propaganda resource of russia disseminated the following messages in the context of a full-scale invasion of ukraine: • about the successes of russian troops; • introduction of sanctions against russia; • support for russia’s actions inside the country and around the world; • actions taken by the ukrainian authorities; • deterioration of the economic situation of european countries; • placement of us-funded biological laboratories on the territory of ukraine; • ukraine’s development of nuclear weapons; • war crimes committed by the ukrainian armed forces and territorial defense brigades, especially against the civilian population. the agency paid special attention to the dissemination of information about the support of the president’s actions by citizens of russia. the first message appeared already on the first day of the invasion. putin’s press secretary d. peskov stated, without specifying the percentages, that the russians support the military operation in donbas and suggested that this support is growing (peskov zaâvil…, 2022). reporting on support for russia’s actions abroad, the agency resorts to unfounded generalizations: “the lion has finally roared. brazilians about the military operation in donbas” (“lev nakonetc…, 2022), “stop putin? stop biden. in spain, they stood up for russia” (“ostanovit’ putina?…, 2022), “in china the special operation of the russian federation in donbas was called a ‘correct action’“ (v kitae…, 2022), “shut up already: the british were outraged by the rebuke from the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of ukraine” (“da zamolči…, 2022), “the usa urged zelenskyy not to resist and accept neutrality” (v sša…, 2022). the mentioned publications are not about the results of relevant surveys of citizens of brazil, spain, china, great britain, but about the private opinions of media readers, referring to the readers of the brazilian newspaper folha de s. paulo, the spanish publication el pais, the british daily mail, american sky news. at the same time, vague wording is used: “many readers”, “many users”, “some readers”, “hundreds of comments”. and the readers to whom the information resource refers can be attributed to unidentified sources, since they are signed with the nicknames lu318, guan_15857017352877, madpom01, etc. sometimes the agency resorts to quoting completely unidentified “readers” who do not even have nicknames. in the publication “the french were angered by the consequences of anti-russian sanctions”, readers of the newspaper le figaro are quoted: “wrote in the comments”, “another user”, 28 yurii nesteriak, yuliia nesteriak “other readers”, “summarized a frenchman”. the last wording in general raises many questions, since the readers of le figaro may not only be french. by spreading a lot of false information, ria novosti is using the principle “the best way to defend is to attack”. within a difference of a few days (from 28.02.2022 to 01.03.2022) on the agency’s tape appeared the publications with a reference to kateryna mizulina, a member of the commission for the development of the information society, mass media and mass communications of the russian federation. the agency reported that 100 new fakes appear approximately every 20 minutes (nebenziâ rasskazal…, 2022). information about the declared number of fakes is not confirmed by any research results or other reliable data (v op zaâvili…, 2022). the topic of ukrainian fakes about the “special operation” is promoted in “expert: ukrainian fakes about the special operation became memes due to their absurdity” (èkspert: ukrainskije fejki…, 2022). the so-called “expert” is the curator of the people’s movement “cyberfront z” aleksey (an: the agency does not even provide his last name). he describes the stories about the tanks with a painted letter z on them, about the downed russian plane, using the photo of an american plane, etc. all these “debunkings” are not based on any documentary evidence and do not have any source references. it is worth adding that, according to the agency, the organization “cyberfront z” was created on february 24, 2022 (an: the date of the beginning of the fullscale russian invasion of ukraine) to fight fakes on the internet about the “special operation” of the russian federation in ukraine. one of the agency’s common techniques is the use of so-called “experts”, including former ukrainian officials and retired military personnel, who voice the messages needed by the agency. among such experts is former prime minister of ukraine mykola azarov (putin spas…, 2022), retired us army colonel (amerikanskij polkovnik…, 2022), former fugitive ukrainian president viktor yanukovych, etc. (ânukovič zaâvil…, 2022). the propaganda resource pays special attention to people’s persuasion to believe in the urgent need for ukraine to accept moscow’s conditions. for this, ria novosti together with radio “sputnik’’ used various methods: multiple repetitions, appeals to authorities, half-truths, etc. in the message “military expert: zelenskyy must agree to moscow’s terms”, the agency quotes expert o. khrolenko, who categorically stated that “zelenskyy’s office should agree to completely adequate terms of surrender”, because “the kyiv regime should not count on some miraculous rescue from the usa and nato” (voennуj èkspert:…, 2022). it should be noted that the “military expert” is a participant in more than one “russian special operation”, a graduate of the lviv higher military and political school. it is symbolic that in 2014 he became a military columnist for ria novosti and radio “sputnik”. it was in 2014 that russia started a war in eastern ukraine. the subject of ukraine’s capitulation on russia’s terms received further explanations in the article “prime minister of israel advised zelenskyy to accept moscow’s terms”. it refers to the telephone conversation between israeli prime minister n. bennett and v. zelenskyy, in which bennett allegedly advised the ukrainian president to agree to moscow’s terms (premer yzraylia..., 2022). this information, according to the version of ria “novosti”, became known to the american publication axios, which then referred to a ukrainian (an: unidentified) source. the article, however, states that, according to axios, a representative of the head of the israeli government called the published details of the conversation between bennett and zelenskyy untrue. the published version of the conversation between the ukrainian and israeli politicians was distributed by numerous russian and ukrainian media, including the publications novoe vremya, fokus, espresso tv channel, and the online publication ukrainian pravda. it is noteworthy that this information became widespread on the eve of the speech of the ukrainian president in the knesset amid the rather uncertain position of israel since the beginning of the war. ria novosti uses the publications about the alleged “low standards” of western journalism as an excuse for its own violations of news standards. thus, in v. kornilov’s article “western mass media have lowered the standards of journalism to unprecedented depths”, the world journalism is accused of using double standards, mass production of anti-russian fakes directed against everything russian (zapadnуe smi…, 2022). as an example, the author says that the western media “do not cover the shelling of donbas cities by the armed forces of ukraine at all”, “boycott some topics”, such as the topic of “suspicious activities of secret us biolaboratories on the territory of ukraine”. according to the “media expert”, the western mass media “do not write anything about the water that, thanks to the actions of the russian military, began to be supplied to crimea”. regarding water, the author does not say that ukraine stopped supplying water to crimea in the russian news journalism: neglect of standards and common sense 29 spring of 2014. such a decision is caused by the fact that according to international law, the country that occupied it and de facto controls it – that is russia – is obliged to provide for the needs of the occupied territory. the russian authorities have not been able to solve the problem of water supply to the peninsula for eight years. during the military invasion of ukraine, the russian army is trying to do this by force. without verifying the information, ria novosti relays the opinion of the russian authorities about the non-existent crimes of the ukrainian armed forces against the civilian population, residential buildings shelling, infrastructure destruction, obstruction of the civilians evacuation, violation of the humanitarian corridors regime, shelling of refugees convoys, etc. thus, in several publications in a row, the ukrainian armed forces are accused of blowing up the road bridge over the desna river in the direction of kyiv, and of shooting civilians (mynoboronу rf…, 2022), and all this despite the fact that world news agencies (russian forces…, 2022), in particular reuters reports on the commission of these and other crimes by the russian military (uk military…, 2022). occasionally, materials that cannot be classified as characteristic of the news genre are published on the news feed of ria novosti. an example can be the publication of the following: “there are many shows, there is not enough bread. is the world threatened by hunger riots”, in which judgments prevail over facts, there are no references to sources of information, emotionally colored and spatial vocabulary is used, vague wording (“terrible forecasts almost certainly covered the loophole”) (zreliŝ mnogo…, 2022). the apogee of the violation of news standards and common sense is the article “what russia should do with ukraine”, published on april 3, on the 39th day of russia’s attack on ukraine (čto rossiâ…, 2022). the author unequivocally and irrevocably declares that, quoting, “nazi, bander ukraine, the enemy and tool of the west for the destruction of russia, is not needed”. and then a step-by-step plan for the so-called “denazification” of ukraine is outlined: ideological repression; strict censorship not only in the political sphere, but also in the spheres of culture and education; neglect not only of the sovereignty of ukraine, but also of the right even to the name of the country (“denazified country cannot be sovereign”). after “denazification”, the next stage should be “deukrainization”, as it is said, ukraine is not supposed to exist as a nation state, because ukraine is an “artificial anti-russian construct” that “does not have its own civilizational meaning”. the civilized world is presented in the material as “the designer, source and sponsor of ukrainian nazism.” therefore, “denazification” is also equated with “de-europeanization”. 4. conclusions the origins of the propagandistic foundations of news journalism in russia are based on the russian mass media traditions, which became definite and intensified during the wartime periods. the information component has always been considered by russian ideologues as an extremely important aspect of a military campaign. despite the fact that de jure censorship in russia was abolished in 1905 (october manifesto), before the beginning of the first world war, the “provisional regulations on military censorship” were issued in order to let the government use whatever means needed in the fight against objectionable mass media under the guise of martial law (how russian..., 2022). analysis of the activities of the news agency ria novosti in historical retrospect and modern practice proves that the status of an information agency does not oblige this russian media source to adhere to news standards, providing consumers with verified, accurate, objective and unbiased information. among the most common violations recorded during the investigated period, the following can be distinguished: • lack of opinions balance; • violation of reliability principle due to the use of unreliable sources of information; • a mix of facts with comments and personal assessment statements; • violation of the news journalism genre forms standards and neglect of the news materials structure. the messages disseminated by the agency are based on false and distorted information, for example, messages about the placement of usfunded biological laboratories on the territory of ukraine; ukraine’s development of nuclear weapons; war crimes committed by the ukrainian armed forces and territorial defense brigades, especially against the civilian population, etc. violations of the news standards of ria novosti are covered up by publications about the allegedly low standards of western journalism. thus, the news agency ria novosti, which today is part of the iia russia today, violates news standards, the principles of the news agency’s activities and cannot be a source of true and reliable information. 30 yurii nesteriak, yuliia nesteriak references „da zamolči ty uže”: britancy vozmutilic’ uprekami ot glavy mid ukrainy (eng. “shut up already”: the british were outraged by the rebuke from the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of ukraine), 2022, ria novosti, https:// ria.ru/20220306/uk raina-1776914527.html?fbclid=i war2nzxlj0etyrn5ys7m6thzhdovsxwm_ekkrrsl_ j6kkcxagv8pyamy2txg (accessed 07 april 2022). „lev nakonetc rуknul.” brazil’cy o voennoj operacii rossii v donbasse (eng. “the lion has finally roared.” brazilians about the military operation in donbas), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20220224/ donbass-1774802903.html?fbclid=iwar0_bsqvwgxgg ofqwmq25m2z4wywdmiby5dujyadjq9jfa1rq9vhoqn7 r_g (accessed 07 april 2022). „ostanovit’ putina? ostanovit’ bajdena.” v ispanii vstali na zaŝitu rossii (eng. “stop putin? stop biden.” in spain, they stood up for russia), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20220224/ ispaniya-1774838504.html?fbclid=iwar3nqknnwy_ m l u q i q n v e d 9 n b s l y i w g p r h y 8 _ txznrhjvfimxz4ruednukgc (accessed 07 april 2022). 82% novyn pro ukraïnu ta kraïni zahodu, âki rosìâ poširûê v brytanìï, prisvâčenì polìtičnim provalam (eng. 82% of the news about ukraine and the countries of the west, which russia spreads in britain, is devoted to political failures), 2019, vidrodženâ, https://www.irf.ua/weaponizing_ news_pres/ (sccessed 07 april 2022). amerikanskij polkovnik sravnil ukrainskikh voennуh s islamystami (eng. the american colonel compared the ukrainian military with islamists), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20220304/putin-1776460878. html?fbclid=iwar29d8rdv_yyyyq8o3i15dunibgerujt nc38b1zthjs79iv4vpcdgf5t7kg (accessed 07 april 2022). ânukovič zaâvil, čto predlagal zelenskomu plan uregulirovaniâ v donbasse (eng. yanukovych said that he offered zelenskyy a plan for donbas question resolution), 2022, ria novosti, h t t p s : / / r i a . r u / 2 0 2 2 0 3 1 4 / y a n u k o v i c h 1 7 7 8 1 2 8 7 5 1 . html?fbclid=iwar3apd_ehqmoaanxhjuwffax27v8u_ quyzazbknvuywx8u5jecp704xiwns (accessed 07 april 2022). apn ot sovinformbûro do ria novosti: 60 let na pole informatcionnogo naprâženiâ (eng. press agency novosti from sovinformburo to ria novosti: 60 years in the field of information tension), 2001, ria “novosti,” moskva. čto rossiâ dolžna cdelat’ s ukrainoj (eng. what russia should do to ukraine), 2022, ria novosti, https://ria.ru/ amp/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html (accessed 07 april 2022). èkspert: ukrainskije fejki o specoperacii stali memami iz-za absurdnosti (eng. expert: ukrainian fakes about special operations became memes because of their absurdity), 2022, ria novosti, https://ria.ru/amp/20220323/ feyki-1779741661.html (accessed 07 april 2022). fighting for a free press in ukraine — and beyond, 2022, nieman reports, https://niemanreports.org/articles/ ukraine-russia-war-press-freeedom/ (accessed 05 april 2022). how russian propaganda works in the media, 2022, ukraïner, h t t p s : / / u k r a i n e r. n e t / r u s s i a n p r o p a g a n d a m e d i a / (accessed 07 april 2022). medìjnì zločini rosìï u vìjnì proti ukraïni (onovlûêt’câ) (eng. russia’s war crimes against media in ukraine (updated continuously)), 2022, ìnstitut masovoï ìnformatcìï, https:// imi.org.ua/monitorings/medijni-zlochyny-rosiyi-u-vijniproty-ukrayiny-onovlyuyetsya-i44098 (accessed 05 april 2022). mynoboronу rf: vsu rasstrelâli prosivših ob èvakuacii černigovcev (eng. ministry of defense of the russian federation: the ukrainian armed forces shot those chernihiv residents who asked for the evacuation), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/ amp/20220324/sbu-1779963496.html (accessed 07 april 2022). nebenziâ rasskazal v oon o fejkah pro voennuû operatsyû v donbasse (eng. nebenzya told the un about fakes about the military operation in donbas), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20220228/oon1 7 7 5 4 5 8 9 5 3 . ht m l ? f b c l i d = i w a r 3 2 w 2 b v i tq a q f j h p2nn7gnjo5pfzezezeefff8825nyumquat-v1ke5t8) (accessed 07 april 2022). paul r., elder l., 2008, the thinker’s guide for conscientious citizen on how to detect media bias and propaganda in national and world news, 2008, the foundation for critical thinking, tomales. peskov zaâvil, čto rossâne podderživaût voennuû operaciû v donbasse (eng. peskov stated that russians support the military operation in donbas), 2022, ria novosti, https:// ria.ru/20220224/donbass-1774758895.html?fbclid=iw ar3hc0wypbebboaliudbvdpeavmyhchfn0lwzu8qo cy_ybgrllqq23cmcsk (accessed 07 april 2022). premer yzraylia posovetoval zelenskomu pryniat uslovyia moskvу (eng. the prime minister of israel advised zelensky to accept moscow’s conditions), 2022, ria novosti, https://nikvesti.com/news/politics/243381 (accessed 07 april 2022). putin ob”âvil o spetcial’noj voennoj operacii v donbasse (eng. putin announced a special military operation in donbas), 2022, ria novosti, https://ria. ru/20220224/operatsiya-1774620380.html?fbclid=i war3cq3o0b9v9o4nfnrngudu13d2wnkbp_bu-rybh3ycg79utt9vj5nlah8 (accessed 07 april 2022). putin spas sotni tуsâč žizniej, zaâvil èks-prem’er ukrainу (eng. putin saved hundreds of thousands of lives, as the exprime minister of ukraine says), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20220304/putin-1776460878. html?fbclid=iwar29d8rdv_yyyyq8o3i15dunibgeru jtnc38b1zthjs79iv4vpcdgf5t7kg) (accessed 07 april 2022). putin zaâvil, čto rossiâ budet stremit’sâ k demilitarizacii ukrainу (eng. putin said that russia will strive to demilitarize ukraine), 2022, ria novosti, https:// r i a . r u / 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 4 / d e m i l i t a r i z a t s i y a 1 7 7 4 6 2 0 5 3 3 . html?fbclid=iwar0sbgzf0_d2nd6lz7hocufq76m1m f9tanvmyxmh3venwhmhm9xofmha29k (accessed 07 april 2022). russian news journalism: neglect of standards and common sense 31 rosìâ vyznala “ìnoagentom” vydannâ deutsche welle (eng. russia recognized deutsche welle a “foreign agent”), 2022, gazeta.ua, https://gazeta.ua/articles/life/_rosiyaviznala-inoagentom-vidannya-deutsche-welle/1078872 (accessed 05 april 2022). russian forces cut off ukraine’s chernihiv city, mayor says, 2022, reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainianc i t y c h e r n i h i v c u t o f f by r u s s i a n fo rce s re gi o n a l governor-2022-03-25/ (accessed 07 april 2022)]. shemakov r., 2022, following invasion of ukraine, russia declares war on its citizens, global voices, https:// globalvoices.org/2022/03/06/following-invasion-ofukraine-russia-declares-war-on-its-citizens/ (accessed 05 april 2022). sybert f., shramm u., pyterson t., 1998, chetуre teoryy pressу (eng. four theories of the press), vahryus, moskva. uk military intelligence says russian shelling, missile strikes continue in chernihiv, 2022, reuters, https://www.reuters. com/world/europe/uk-military-intelligence-says-russianshelling-missile-strikes-continue-2022-03-31/ (accessed 07 april 2022). v kitae nazvali “pravil’nуm postupkom” spetcoperaciû rf v donbasse (eng. in china, the special operation of the russian federation in the donbas was called a “correct action”), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria. ru/20220224/donbass-1774835143.html?fbclid=iwar 3yzofzx6lm18pytus5v7imowbj7bkbrtzzotwcugnig 6j_jwmr0arzd2q (accessed 07 april 2022). v op zaâvili o 1,3 milliona fejkov o specoperacii na ukraine (eng. the public chamber reported 1.3 million fakes about special operations in ukraine), 2022, ria novosti, https:// ria.ru/20220301/feyki-1775756347.html?fbclid=iwar0d yn7y1ggqhftpucseku6lufyzsmhxfxhpkaohs6imhhxx 2azkqu2b0-m (accessed 07 april 2022). v sša pryivali zelenskogo ne soprotivlât’câ i „prynât’ nejtralitet” (eng.the usa urged zelenskyy not to resist and accept neutrality), 2022, radio sputnik, https://radiosputnik.ria. ru/20220310/zelenskiy-1777561333.html?fbclid=iwar2y lww6g2wb9od92rv7w2jgmcaouuxbvg1vfkjjvn2bxy qlwuvymcnfjgu (accessed 07 april 2022). vaishenberh z., 2011, novynna zhurnalistyka (eng. news journalism), akademiia ukrainskoi presy, kiïv. viprobuvannâ na mìtsnìst’ dlâ nezaležnih zmi v ukraїнì ta ìnših prifrontovih deržavah (eng. durability test for independent mass media in ukraine and other frontline states), 2022, eurasianet, https://russian.eurasianet.org/ (accessed 05 april 2022). voennуj èkspert: zelenskomu nado soglašat’câ na usloviâ moskvу (eng. military expert: zelenskyy must agree to moscow’s terms), 2022, žurnalistskaâ pravda, https:// jpgazeta.ru/members/alexander-khrolenko/ (accessed 07 april 2022). z rf pislâ počatku vìjny proti ukraìni viïhalo ŝonajmenše 150 žurnalìstìv (eng. at least 150 journalists left the russian federation after the start of the war against ukraine), 2022, rbk-ukraïna, https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/rf-nachalavoyny-protiv-ukrainy-vyehalo-menshey-1646896571. html (accessed 05 april 2022). zapadnуe smi opustili standartу žurnalistiki do nebуvalуh glubin (eng. western mass media have lowered the journalism standards to unprecedented depths), 2022, ria novosti, https://ria.ru/amp/20220316/standarty-1778338104. html (accessed 07 april 2022). zreliŝ mnogo, hleba ne hvatit. grozât li miru golodnуe buntу (eng. there are many circuses, but there is not enough bread. do hunger riots threaten the peace?), 2022, ria novosti, https://ria.ru/20220331/khleb-1780881553.html (accessed 07 april 2022). žurnalìsts’kì standarty: ìnformacìjna dovìdka (eng. journalistic standards: informational reference), 2011, ìnstitut masovoï ìnformatcìï, https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/ jurnalistski-standar ti-informatsiynadovidk a-i28623 (accessed 05 april 2022). 32 yurii nesteriak, yuliia nesteriak journal of geography, politics and society 2023, 13(1), 1–10 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2023.1.01 the status of women in the soviet union eka darbaidze (1), tamila niparishvili (2) (1) institute of political sciences, ilia state university, chavchavadze n 32, tbilisi 0162, georgia, orcid: 0000-0002-6919-9420 e-mail: ekadarbaidze@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) institute of political sciences, ilia state university, chavchavadze n 32, tbilisi 0162, georgia, e-mail: info@iliauni.edu.ge citation darbaidze e., niparishvili t., 2023, the status of women in the soviet union, journal of geography, politics and society, 13(1), 1–10. abstract for centuries, many women have been at the forefront of the struggle for emancipation and political changes. efforts at integrating the idea of emancipation into society was an important part of the bolshevik ideology; thus, the october revolution of 1917 brought women new hope and new expectations. the soviet union was the first country in the world to successfully open the door to new economic and educational opportunities for women. in 1917, the bolshevik legislative initiatives provided them with full political and civil rights while new legislation made women legally equal to men. the constitution adopted in july 1918 secured the political and civil equality of women and men. however, the gender policy developed and implemented by lenin significantly changed after his death. until the second half of the 1930s, the soviet union remained the world leader in terms of providing women with equal rights. however, after the new leader of the soviet union, stalin, came to power, the government policy on women and equality substantially transformed. during stalin’s rule, the concept of “a new type of woman” was created. the early bolshevik policy, which started with a radical liberal vision of individual freedom and women’s rights, devolved into an abyss of cynicism that burdened women with a disproportionate responsibility for unpaid work in the household. the purpose of this work is to study the role of women during the early soviet period and to examine legal and political changes in women’s status. the study aims at explaining what the main goal of the soviet gender policy was in fact, whether it actually changed the status of women and what crucial changes it ultimately brought to them. using the method of content analysis, the content of official documents, press and scientific literature was analyzed. at the same time, attempts were made to identify and analyze the positive and negative results of the soviet policy by applying the method of critical research. key words women in the soviet union, bolshevik revolution, communism, gender policy. received: 20 december 2022 accepted: 29 january 2023 published: 31 march 2023 1. introduction in the 1920s, women’s labor was essential to the growth and development of almost all the most important sectors of the soviet economy. such widespread women’s participation in the workforce became possible due to specific circumstances and a number of prerequisites. first, according to the basic principles of the communist ideology, “the firstclass oppression coincides with that of the female sex by the male”. k. marx and f. engels located the root of women’s oppression in their role within the nuclear family in class societies. they understood that women’s role as biological “reproducers” results in their subordinate status inside the nuclear family, and consequently throughout society. in capitalist societies, women in property-holding families reproduce heirs; women in working-class families reproduce generations of labor power for the system (karl..., 1950, p. 36). consequently, soviet theorists saw the bolshevik revolution as an opportunity to liberate women from centuries of slavery. the revolution of 1917 removed all the legal restrictions that had kept women at a low rung on the status ladder, acknowledged gender equality and guaranteed women’s economic empowerment by providing employment. article 22 of the soviet constitution of 1918 proclaimed equal rights for all citizens of the soviet republic, irrespective of gender, race or nationality, and article 64 established the right of women to elect and be elected on equal terms with men. in 1920, abortion was legalized (1918 constitution..., 2018). these provisions were once again incorporated in article 122 of the new soviet constitution of 1936 that decreed equal rights for women and their equal standing with men in all spheres of economic, political, social and cultural life (1936 constitution..., 1996). all these changes seemed feasible at first glance, since lenin himself was interested in emancipating women and giving them equal rights, for he was convinced that the socialist revolution could not be carried out without participation of the significant part of working women. lenin argued that it was necessary to win over millions of working women in towns and villages to the side of communism. he believed that women should be interested in proletarian class struggle and would gladly participate in it. but first, their attention and trust had to be won, and this could only be done by making a point that real freedom for women is possible only through communism. lenin stressed that women must be made conscious of the political connection between communism and their own suffering, needs, and they must realize what the proletarian dictatorship means for them: complete equality with man in law and practice, in the family, in the state, in society; an end to the power of the bourgeoisie (lenin, 1918). lenin considered the status of women to be the same as one of the slaves, and they could only be saved through socialism. in his opinion, true emancipation begins only with transition from small-scale private property farming to large-scale socialist farming, which is a rather challenging task. for this purpose, lenin decided to create a political organization of women workers and peasants, for as he explained: the experience of all liberation movements has shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the women take part in it. the soviet government is doing everything in its power to enable women to carry on independent proletarian socialist work (lenin, 1918). the first step of soviet government in this direction was the liberation of women from “domestic slavery” by passing from petty, individual, domestic economy to large-scale social economy. after the above-mentioned reforms, lenin proudly declared that all traces of inequality between the sexes and classes had already disappeared and no longer existed in soviet russia (lenin, 1973). lenin’s gender policy and the civil code adopted by the bolsheviks in 1918 granted women a full range of civil rights and freedoms and created equality between men and women under the law (family law of the rsfsr, n.d.). however, a new political leader who came to power after v. lenin’s death in 1924 transformed the existing gender policy by placing on women a double burden of waged work outside the house and most of unpaid labor within it. when stalin came to power in the soviet union, he was ready to implement lenin’s ideas on the role of women in a communist society, urging women to rally round the communists. stalin stressed that women must fully support the proletarian revolution and that in human history there was not a single great movement of the oppressed masses without participation of female workers (stalin, 1954). at the same time, stalin’s main goal was to use female labor at collective farms and factories. in his speech on international women’s day, stalin noted that women toilers – working women and peasant women – are a vast reserve of the working class. this reserve constitutes a good half of the population. the side that it takes – for or against the working class – will determine the fate of the proletarian movement, the victory or defeat of the proletarian revolution, the victory or defeat of the proletarian power. consequently, the first task of the proletariat, and of its advanced detachment – the communist party, is to wage a resolute struggle to free women, working women and peasant women, from the influence of the bourgeoisie, to enlighten them politically and to organize them under the banner of the proletariat (stalin, 1954, p. 1). however, stalin’s initial theoretical views had subsequently undergone a major transformation. the bolsheviks’ goal was to transform the society and create a new ideal world where all people would be equal. this concept of equality, of course, included 2 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili women who, at the time, were limited to performing household chores. in bolsheviks’ opinion, women were supposed to be part of the workforce, so their role in family was also determined by the new soviet vision. and in that vision, women were supposed to gain independence and be liberated from the traditional roles they played in the past. 2. research problems the main research question of the article is: what political and legal reforms were carried out under bolsheviks’ rule? what were the real reasons for the transformation of women’s role and creation of the concept of “a new type of woman”? did these changes affect the status of women in the soviet union? the hypothesis presented in the article is that changes in women’s status were brought about by the second world war. stalin needed to create “a new type of woman” who would be first and foremost a model mother but at the same time would be ready for war and hard work in factories. this was a life focused on productivity both at home and at work. to pursue this goal, the soviet government actively promoted women workers who became tractoroperators, snipers or welders and their contribution to the development of the soviet society. 3. theoretical basis and methodology western sovietologists used ideology in its instrumental capacity to explain all political innovations in the soviet union. in the totalitarian school of historiography, ideology was considered an important armament in the bolshevik arsenal, and, along with the use of terror, it was primarily seen as a means of ensuring social obedience and control. the issue of women in the early bolshevik state was based on f. engels’s “the origin of the family, private property and the state” (engels, 1884). this work focuses on the discussions on women’s oppression in a context of class inequality. f. engels identified the source of women’s oppression in the development of class society that arose from economic necessity in primitive equalitarian society. f. engels believed that the division of labor according to the worker’s sex was a historical basis of women’s oppression. according to him, the advent of agriculture gave rise to a need for male physical strength, thus keeping women away from gathering and limiting them to household work. consequently, the accumulation of excess property and the emergence of private property led to the male control of female sexuality. b. wolfe (1984) evaluated the bolshevik revolution primarily as a relentless pursuit of power. he believed that the marxism-leninism ideology was structural: organization, centralization, monopoly of economic and spiritual power, permanent dictatorship and absolute and unlimited power. lenin’s faith in his own theoretical views in the end led to a grotesque distortion of marxism. other historians from the totalitarian school reiterated this basic tenet and viewed marxism-leninism as a means of legitimizing relations of domination and upholding social hierarchies in the soviet union. r. daniels (1960), who considerably distanced himself from the older interpretations by claiming that the october revolution was more an accident than a planned coup, nevertheless concluded that stalinist ideology divested itself of its marxist intellectual content to more effectively drown both the individual and society in a sea of false consciousness. western scholars considered the concept of “women’s issue” to be an independent social problem for the communist party that could be solved or eliminated through firm political actions. many historians enthusiastically supported the main idea of marxist feminism which was to increase women’s participation in the labor market. they believed it necessary to democratize the patriarchal family and eliminate gender inequality in both the private and public spheres. according to w.z. goldman (1993), in the 1920s, bolsheviks adopted some sort of a traditional social family policy. eventually, this policy made it easier to strengthen a traditional nuclear family, rather than to create actual welfare states. thus, the revolutionary rhetoric on gender equality, although incompatible with the party’s ideology and reality, was an important element of the soviet experience. soviet women’s advocacy was defined by a literary style characterized by excessive exaggeration, fantasies, lies, and distortions. this study is based upon primary electronic archival documents, scientific literature and materials of the leading periodical press of that period, such as articles of propaganda content of the newspapers pravda and izvestia, posters dedicated to women who fought at the front during the second world war or were engaged in the internal front. in these materials, an important place is given to the promotion of women’s labor and women’s roles during the war. the study also examines and analyzes various legal documents, including soviet legislation. based on the major research question, the method of content analysis of quantitative research was used in the article. during the research, a variety of primary and secondary sources was analyzed, the status of women in the soviet union 3 which allowed determining the real reason for the liberalization of ussr legislation, establishment of equality between men and women and providing women with new roles. the critical method helped us to identify and analyze outcomes of the soviet gender policy, to determine factors underlying this policy and the real results it brought for women. the time frame of the study is 1918–1953. after lenin’s takeover, the emancipation of women in ussr was more or less successful, because it was with him that women were granted a number of rights and freedoms. however, after his death and since stalin’s coming to power, the soviet gender policy radically changed. there was a radical transformation of the soviet government’s views on women’s rights, which started with lenin’s radical liberal vision of individual freedom, abolition of family life and the institution of marriage and, following the adoption of the new constitution of the ussr of 1936, ended with a government policy directed to strengthen and preserve the institution of family, which required from women to bear “a double burden”. 4. literature review over the last few years, interest in studying women’s rights and their status during the soviet period has greatly increased; therefore, the study on the soviet past in the context of political and cultural memory has become relevant. although stalin stressed the importance of women’s contribution and promoted women’s employment, in fact, he limited women’s access to self-development and prevented a rise in their intellectual capacity. a number of scientific studies have revealed a real position of women in the soviet union. for example, an article by professor k.b. usha (2005) of the center for russia and central asia “political empowerment of women in the soviet union and russia: ideology and implementation” demonstrates the real-life situation of soviet women. the researcher points out that despite the measures implemented to empower women politically, there was a continuously low political representation of women and that despite a high employment rate and a high percentage of educated people among soviet women, the ussr did not succeed in changing the male-dominated culture and eliminating inequality between women and men. in her opinion, stalin chose a strategy where he sacrificed women’s right to national interest, when the need to promote a population growth became particularly acute after the outbreak of the war between the ussr and nazi germany. observations of this kind were described in hutton’s work resilient russian women in the 1920s & 1930s, where m. hutton (2015) studies female leaders of that period. the author goes into great detail about their lives and careers, rise and fall, honors and persecutions under the soviet rule. according to the author, revolution did little to eliminate the existing patriarchal culture. in the early bolshevik state, divorces and abortions became easier to obtain; however, effective birth control was limited, and the concept of sexual freedom in reality meant more sexual freedom for men than for women. the transformation required for true equality was pushed aside by the political agenda created by communist leaders, such as lenin, trotsky and stalin. the author tries to prove that the end result of the policy, pursued by the soviet government, was negative for the political and social position of women despite all the windows of opportunity opened up for them. 5. feminist interpretation of bolshevism feminism nowadays is still undergoing constant changes because it continues to be one of the growing ideologies in the modern world. this is why people define and interpret feminism differently. there is no doubt that freedom and equality are two most important concepts of feminism. specifically, by equality one refers to the equality of opportunities, opened for men and women alike, and freedom is understood, first of foremost, as freedom from assigned gender roles and freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle. examples of policies that promote gender equality are those that guarantee equal pay, universally accessible education, etc. as for stalin, he ignored the need to provide such a policy. during the early stalin period, the zhenotdel operated in the soviet union, an organization that protected women from discrimination in the workplace. zhenotdel, the women’s section of the communist party, was created to ensure equal rights and opportunities for women (stites, 1976). at the same time, the number of women with higher education considerably increased, as education became more accessible for women. in 1935, an impressive 38% of soviet women were enrolled in higher educational institutions, compared to 13.6% in germany in 1935 and 25.7% in england two years before (racioppi, o’sullivan, 1995). freedom, in comparison with frequently mentioned and discussed equality, is a much more complex concept, due to its generality and abstraction. at first sight, stalin promised to liberate 4 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili women from the oppression and protect them from exploitation by giving them absolute freedom. it is obvious that stalin and his associates did not deny the necessity of women’s emancipation, although they did not recognize difficulties that women encountered. while stalin’s public statements on women’s issues were positive and attractive at first glance, the issue of whether his actions were consistent with his principles remained an object of controversy. it was clear that soviet leaders, and especially i.v. stalin, supported the policy of empowering women, but the only real purpose of such a policy was to make heavy use of female labor force. to carry out his plans, stalin did not appoint women to key political positions. moreover, he abolished the zhenotdel, the women’s section of the central committee of the communist party, established by lenin in 1918 (racioppi, o’sullivan, 1995). thus, gender equality in the soviet union meant that women were involved in hard work, from coal mining and foundry to cleaning streets and ditches. under stalin, women’s status was not quite the same as described in bolshevik statements and pamphlets. despite passing new laws, women continued to be treated unequally. the attempt to create “a new type of woman” also changed woman’s behavior, although it does not necessarily mean that they became equal to their male counterparts. in fact, women were not liberated from their family roles; they were given additional responsibilities both within family and outside it. world war ii cost the soviet union a great number of lives, destroying a whole generation of strong young men, which lead to a serious male-female population imbalance. the grand industrialization made a shortage of labor evident. the soviet government took measures to promote women’s full participation in the economy: stalin’s five-year plans increased the number of women in heavy industry. the soviet legislation gave women equal rights and equal pay (article 122 (1936 constitution..., 1996)). women took active part of the war effort, participated in agro-industry and had an active role to play in the process of restoring the post-war soviet economy. in 1943, women comprised 57% of the non-agricultural workforce, in 1945 – more than 80% of the labor force in collective farms (buckley, 1981). but, in the end, it was the war with fascist germany that had far-reaching economic implications: the ussr decided to mobilize all possible resources to win the war, and women had to carry out difficult physical labor, instead of men. when world war ii resulted in heavy losses of men as labor force, the marxist doctrine of gender equality proved to be an extremely effective instrument of the soviet policy. the state required women to work in the iron and steel industry: by 1944 women comprised 40% of the labor force, which is 15% more than in 1939. women accounted for 30–40% of the workforce in the oilfields, and, as the soviet newspaper “pravda” proudly reported, in certain mines women constituted the majority of miners. women became welders, builders, loaders and janitors (dodge, 1966). today, there is no doubt that the soviet economy would not be virile without the work of women. the fact that by 1959 there were 20 million more women than men showed evidence of heavy losses of war. women accounted for half of the workforce and were involved in the most complex and responsible activities. for example, by 1954, half of the workers in mechanical and electrical engineering were women. women accounted for 64% of drivers, 70% of tower crane operators and 42% of locomotive engineers (schuster, 1971). in the post-war soviet union, most women were still engaged in manual labor. women, mostly unskilled, mostly performed part of manual labor in collective farms and state farms, especially less attractive agricultural work. for example, between 1947 and 1959, women accounted for more than 90% of poultry farmers, herders and dairy workers, while the percentage of women among industrial and administrative workers was only 21%. in public transport, 57% of subway, tram and trolleybus drivers were women (dodge, 1966, pp. 174–177). women also played an important role in the education system. they accounted for the majority of teachers at primary and secondary schools, while the share of women in academia was considerably lower. by the end of 1956, female professors, docents, and department chairs accounted for 41%, the share of women among the heads of institutions, deans and other high academic posts was only 15%. in general, the smaller proportion of senior positions held by women was very noticeable (schuster, 1971). while a great number of activities and professions was open for women, their opportunities and prospects for promotion were not favorable. soviet researchers claimed that women had the same knowledge and skills as men in almost all disciplines, including natural sciences and mechanics; however, women professionals were mostly concentrated in the lower echelons of management. this is clearly illustrated by the low number of women in party leadership bodies. the status of women in the soviet union 5 6. from a theoretical debate to reality and creation of a new image of mother in the soviet union women had a double task. they had to work as hard as men in factories and fields and, upon returning home, they were to spend several hours a day in endless lines at the grocery stores. women had to cook and clean because soviet men (to preserve their masculinity) refused to share domestic duties (liu, 2019). in a new soviet culture, gender equality and respect for women were falling apart; therefore, everyday life and the existing reality of the soviet union remained detached from the communist ideology. it is clear that bolshevik leaders originally had other ideas in mind. in his speech, delivered at the fourth moscow city conference of non-party working women, september 23, 1919, lenin said: “you all know that even when women have full rights, they still remain factually downtrodden because all housework is left to them. in most cases, housework is the most unproductive, the most barbarous and the most arduous work a woman can do” (pravda, № 213, p 45). nevertheless, women remained in the subordinate position before and after lenin’s death. indeed, in a sense, the situation of many women may have even worsened, since most women found themselves assuming the “double burden”, doing both domestic and public work. the 1930s were marked by a strong wave of industrialization in the ussr. in 1930, the party launched a major campaign to encourage women to join the workforce: four times more women went to work in industry than in 1929. between 1929 and 1935, nearly four million women took up a paid job, 1.7 million of them in industry. by 1935, they represented 42% of the industrial workforce. the state planners bureaucratically reorganized the division of work between the sexes in different branches of activity, following norms that had been fixed in advance (goldman, 2002). in the 1920s, communist activists, both men and women, advocated equality between the sexes in all areas of public and private life. by gaining the status of wage earners, women would have real economic autonomy from their husbands and families. the relationship between the sexes would thus cease to be a subordinate relationship and would transform into a relationship based on love and mutual respect. the marriage contract, which institutionalized economic inequality, would not be needed any more. men and women would live in a “free union” and would be able to break up whenever they wanted. they would no longer have any domestic duties or economic functions, so the concept of family would “disappear” over time. in the traditions of marxists, bolsheviks developed a number of concepts of women’s emancipation. accordingly, a new life under socialism was to transform the relationships between the sexes, in particular, to enable women to participate fully in social life on an equal footing with men (kollontai, 1920). thus, one of the bolshevik revolution’s principal tasks was to transfer family affairs from the private to the public sphere, “liberating” women from family labor. to that end, first of all, it was necessary to liberate women from household chores by transferring such chores to the public sphere. collective laundries, kindergartens and communal kitchens, where women worked for salaries, were to take over the tasks that were previously performed by them at home without any remuneration. here is what alexandra kollontai, the people’s commissar for welfare, wrote: “instead of the working woman having to struggle with the cooking and spend her last free hours in the kitchen preparing dinner and supper, the communist society will organize public restaurants and communal kitchens” (kollontai, 1920). the civil code of 1918 abolished religious marriages and required civil ceremonies in order to gain a legal status as a married couple. illegitimate children were afforded the same rights as legitimate ones (family..., n.d.). the divorce, unthinkable under tsarist russia, could be easily obtained based on a joint application of spouses. however, it turned out that the mindset was not as easily changed as legislation. indeed, radicalism of 1920 against family and gender relations was often exaggerated. lenin and other party members considered family, first and foremost, a key socio-economic unit. soviet scholars believed that at a time when the state did not have the resources available to secure the welfare of its citizens, family had to play an important role in this area. moreover, by the late 1920s, the attitude of the population and even of the communist activists towards the women’s issue had changed. the population expressed a kind of fatigue against the background of various social experiments, including those that affected family and individuals’ private lives. various forms of family breakdown were perceived by a majority of the population as a social evil and moral chaos. trade union instability made life difficult for women. an increasing number of women called for tougher laws to protect marriages. the public debate about discrimination against women died out after 1933. in any case, after 1934 there was no organization left that was interested in 6 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili studying challenges women faced in the workplace. that year saw the disbanding of the committee for the improvement of the living and working conditions of working women (mespoulet, 2006, pp. 5–6). the 1930s also marked a turning-point in the family policy. as a result of the drop in the birth rate and the slow population growth, the soviet state introduced policies aimed at encouraging people to have children. a new concept appeared in the language used by political leaders and lawyers, namely of the “strong socialist family”, presented as a basic cell that was essential for the construction of socialism and characterized by a stable marriage, a high fertility rate, and a reinforcement of parental authority. “new soviet women” had lost their rights over their own bodies due to their roles as mothers or potential mothers. stalin violated the feminist principle of freedom in 1936 when abortion was forbidden, and divorce was made more difficult and more expensive (mespoulet, 2006). the soviet woman was “a mother and a citizen”, bearing the responsibility of birthing and raising the next generation of citizens, while at the same time being part of the labor force. various measures were directed to the aid for mothers, for example, a toughening up the enforcement of child maintenance and increasing allowances to families with many children. strengthening the family was treated as a step to a normal life after inevitable shock of the first post-revolutionary years. after stalin had deprived soviet women of a number of their basic rights, he did not stop using massive propaganda to create and promote the desired image of women. consequently, he developed a policy to encourage large families, and in 1944, the presidium of the supreme council of the ussr established an honorary title and order “mother heroine”. the honorary title “mother heroine” was awarded to mothers bearing and raising 10 or more children (the ussr..., n.d.). in their analysis of the status of women in the soviet era, russian sociologists identify the 1930s as the period when the “basic contract between the genders in soviet society” was signed, a contract that they characterized as that of the “working mother”, who had to take on simultaneously a full working day, the upbringing of her children, and the organization of everyday life. taking into account the fact that housing conditions and the provision of goods were not improving, the rise in the number of births meant at the same time an increase in the difficulties of everyday life for women. consequently, in spite of the risks run by both women and doctors in contravening the law, backstreet abortions increased (mespoulet, 2006). the pronatalist and pro-family propaganda of the 1930s helped to shape the image of women as builders of socialism. soviet leaders praised women in public speeches and in the press for their sense of self-sacrifice and resistance. in official speeches, they were presented as the pillars of the family. working-class and rural women faced particular difficulties in solving everyday problems. time spent overcoming these difficulties prevented them from actively participating in public organizations or party activities. thus, the proportion of women in the komsomol, which was 34% in 1935, was more than twice the number of women in the party, since the komsomol members were mostly young and unmarried women (buckley, 1981). 7. women in politics the objectification of women is evident in official speeches and letters of soviet leaders. they expressed concern for women’s development but regarded them as inferior creatures, lacking the capability of self-development. according to the last census of 1913, conducted before the october revolution, 83% of women in russia could not even read and write. of the remaining women, almost all were members of the upper class, and it is likely that most of them were exiled during the revolution. accordingly, immediately after the revolution, the proportion of literate women fell to about 5% (hutton, 2015). the bolshevik government wanted to introduce the idea of gender equality, whose real purpose was to attract as many women as possible to compulsory work outside the family, that is, to use female labor and energy. therefore, they did not expect that women would bring a big change in thinking and political processes. in the soviet union, the communist party played a irreplaceably leading role, for it was the basis of the real political power. although about 20% of communist party candidates were women, the party’s highest posts were still occupied by men (dodge, 1966, p. 213). this situation was attributed to several factors. clearly, the attitude of male superiority persisted as men received more education and training and were given better positions. the explanation that women did not spend all their energy at work and were mainly occupied with caring for the family was, in reality, nothing more than a simple attempt to justify discriminatory treatment that lead to women being mainly recruited into the middle and lower ranks. due to the time and effort spent at work and on domestic chores, most soviet women were more the status of women in the soviet union 7 engaged in economic and social roles rather than political ones. although in the most industrialized countries women were less politically active than men, in the ussr the problem was compounded by the fact that a high percentage of women worked full-time, often in physically demanding jobs, and husbands were not usually engaged in housekeeping and raising children. thus, many women simply were not able to participate in political meetings, because party meetings and discussions required an unreasonably large amount of time from them. at the same time, many soviet men without a “double burden” often “complained” in the press that political engagement was time-consuming. weighed down by family responsibilities, young women had little time or energy for political activity, while bolsheviks wanted women workers to support the soviet regime. yet, political activists in the delegatki and zhenotdel groups often felt used and without proper direction. some complained that the bolshevik propaganda in the papers was ineffective and unhelpful. one argued: “the stranichka in pravda is awful. i am a worker myself and we hope to receive something for directing our work. but there’s nothing in the women’s pages for us. there are only agitational little articles which would have been useful three years ago for the factories” (hutton, 2015, pp. 35–36). despite all this, many women actively participated in local and regional events. women were more politically active close to home due to the fact that conflict between economic, family, and political roles was the least likely in this space, and thus proximity to home gave women an opportunity for some political activity. for example, women made up 49% of deputies in rural, city, district and regional councils, while their representation at the level of the union republic decreased to 35%, and in the supreme soviet it was only 32% (buckley, 1981). it is interesting to note how women made up a third of secretaries of the primary organization of the party and only 4% of city and district party secretaries. above this level, women were virtually absent from the party elite (buckley, 1981). although the proportion of women in the communist party increased over the years, women were still underrepresented in leadership positions within the party. for those women who entered the party and government elite, generally, their careers differed from those of their male counterparts. while men in the regional elite were selected and appointed from outside the region, later they were already successfully appointed to various posts within the same bureau. women represented local residents and were not transferred from the bottom to the top, so their professional growth and promotion to leadership positions did not occur. moreover, the appointment of women was often symbolic (buckley, 1981). however, one should not lose sight of the fact that, in parallel with the growing concern about the working and living conditions of women, the soviet press began to focus on institutional arrangements for work with women. the soviet leadership was always reluctant to create special women’s institutions, initially on the grounds that they might smack of “bourgeois feminism”, become independent of the party, and thereby serve to divide the working class. lenin argued that: “we derive our organizational ideas from our ideological concepts. we want no separate organizations of communist women! she who is a communist belongs as a member to the party, just as he who is a communist” (lenin, 1977). all the complexity and contradictions of the cultural project of women’s emancipation were revealed during the process of increasing women’s participation in political decision-making, and especially during the activities of the so-called zhenotdels. zhenotdel was the women’s section of the cpsu, which turned out to be the only mechanism of women’s political activity from 1919 to the early 1930s. zhenotdel was established to raise women’s political awareness and encourage their participation in the public sphere (hutton, 2015). zhenotdel, which had striven to protect women and their interests, was subsequently repeatedly targeted by the bolshevik authorities. while for a time the organization was independent from the party, it was soon abolished. one of the leaders of zhenotdel, alexandra kollontai, declared: “here in moscow there are weekly meetings of women delegates from large factories. but women are encouraged to go to all political meetings and to work in conjunction with and on an equal footing with men” (hutton, 2015, p. 36). the abolition of the zhenotdel was based on the idea that it was time for a woman to advance not as a woman, but as a worker, as a developed and full-fledged member of society. the zhenotdel was not the only “victim” of the authorities, since by that time a number of women’s organizations had ceased to exist. the only women’s organization that survived was the “committee of soviet women” (the successor to the antifascist 8 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili committee of soviet women), which mainly focused on fighting nazis abroad. stalin justified his decision to abolish zhenotdel by claiming that the “women’s question” had already been resolved, and there was no more discrimination against women, which meant that there was no longer any need for women’s departments. however, after stalin’s abolition of the “women’s departments” in 1929, a “special commission for women’s affairs at the local and regional level” was created under the auspices of the trade unions. similarly, so-called “women’s councils” were set up in factories and farms, linked to local party committees, whose task was to mobilize women on issues of concern to them. although these organizations were not independent women’s organizations, at the time they offered some limited institutional channels for women to discuss women’s issues and advance their interests. consequently, under stalin, a cultural icon of a woman was created, and along with the concept of “a new soviet man”, the so-called “new soviet woman” appeared. the concept of “a new soviet woman” contained two major elements: productivity and reproductivity. productivity specifically refers to industrial productivity including efficiency of manufacture industries, production of heavy metal, and more importantly, assembly of military weapons. stalin also believed that the “new soviet woman” should bear the duty as a mother and demonstrate the virtues of being a mother by bringing multiple children up to be the hope of the country’s future. stalin successfully used the concept of the “soviet woman” as a tool to achieve his ambitious economic goals. he knew how urgently the nation needed industrialization and a higher birth rate when a war was on the brink (harrison, 2008). thus, instead of the promised and desired freedom, state communism for women turned into some kind of oppressive system that imposed productive and reproductive roles on women. it was a heavy and mandatory burden of double, economic and family work. unfortunately, the glorification of the woman’s role and the depiction of a strong proletarian women on numerous posters that were part of state propaganda did not reflect the real situation of women in the soviet union. 8. conclusions the relevance of the women’s issue and any changes in its status are closely connected with the processes taking place in the foreign and domestic policy. when stalin came to power, he radically changed the early bolshevik state’s gender political course, for he looked to create a new type of woman who would be, above all, an exemplary mother, but at the same time would be ready for both war and active participation in the state economy. the propaganda of women who became welders, snipers and miners helped to attain that goal. the mentioned concept was only some kind of praise for the abilities and contributions of women. stalin’s policy towards women had a common starting point, which, instead of focusing on protecting women’s rights and expanding their economic opportunities, was aimed at mobilizing them to secure the national economy and better prepare the nation for world war ii. stalin’s concept of “a new soviet woman” required women to play a dual role as mothers and workers, while men could be only the latter. stalin failed to ensure the desired equality and freedom for soviet women either at work or in the family, because women’s rights and their problems were never part of his political program. such mobilization could not ensure real equality and freedom for women. stalin deliberately chose to ignore and turned a blind eye to gender discrimination in the workplace in order to focus on drawing as many women as possible into the workforce. his indifference to gender discrimination certainly violated the fundamental principle of feminist equality. proof of this lies in stalin’s abolition of “women’s departments”, whose purpose was actually to improve the living conditions of women and to support the struggle for gender equality. the problem is that that the promotion of women and the solution of their problems was never in stalin’s interests, because his main concern was to accelerate the industrial development of the country. therefore, he ultimately failed to provide women with real equality. formal equality, which was established at the legislative level and reflected in a wide range of opportunities provided to women, was not enough to eliminate discrimination between sexes. the vision of emancipation which prevailed in the post-revolutionary years was never realized. instead, a set of social expectations were formed, obliging women to work in the public sphere, while the tradition dictated them to create a family, and thus, women in the soviet period were loaded with a double burden. the status of women in the soviet union 9 references 1918 constitution of the russian soviet federated socialist republic, 2018, https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/ government/constitution/1918/index.htm (accessed 10 february 2022). 1936 constitution of the u.s.s.r., 1996, http://large.stanford. edu/history/kaist/references/marx/beard/c2/ (accessed 17 july 2022). buckley m., 1981, women in the soviet union, feminist review, 8, 79–106. daniels r., 1960, the conscience of the 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mayor of san salvador was elected on a ticket from gana (la gran alianza por la unidad nacional), the center-right party in parliament. this was due to the fact that bukele’s newly formed party, nueva ideas (new ideas), was not yet registered for the presidential race. with what many interpreted as an agenda appealing to the masses, based on fighting crime, gang violence, and corruption, bukele ran against the two dominant parties, fmnl and arena (alianza republicana nacionalista) (monitoreo, 2019). on one hand, under bukele’s presidency, more resources have been allocated to schools, social welfare, and health care; the country has managed covid-19 well, and his approval ratings have been between 85% and 95%. he closed his first year with an approval rate of around 90% (la prensa grafica, 2021). on the other hand, bukele has not only been accused of running an election with a populist agenda, his presidency has also been blamed for taking journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(2), 16–26 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.03 nayib bukele: populism and autocratization, or a very popular democratically elected president? martin nilsson department of political science, linnæus university, georg lückligs väg 4, 35195 växjö, sweden, orcid: 0000-0003-2806-7680 e-mail: martin.nilsson@lnu.se citation nilsson m., 2022, nayib bukele: populism and autocratization, or a very popular democratically elected president?, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(2), 16–26. abstract this article is about nayib bukele’s presidency in el salvador, and to what extent it is a case of populism, and if it has contributed to a negative democratic development between 2019–2021. by using the concepts of democratic backsliding, autocratization, and populism, three main conclusions are made. first, actions taken by bukele during his presidency has directly contributed to a negative democratic development. second, both during the electoral campaign and in office, there are also signs of populism, such as anti-pluralism, hijacking the state, mass clientelism, and a feeling of a less democratic civil society and free media. consequently, bukele has pushed the country into a process of autocratization, where the future destiny toward less democracy is still uncertain. key words democratic recession, autocratization, populism, president bukele, el salvador. received: 24 may 2022 accepted: 22 june 2022 published: 19 august 2022 mailto:martin.nilsson@lnu.se nayib bukele: populism and autocratization, or a very popular democratically elected president? 17 anti-democratic actions, e.g.,  when members of the supreme court and the general attorney were dismissed. bukele’s presidency has been discussed heavily regarding various aspects, such as his regular twitter use and communication style (ruiz-alba, mancinas-chávez, 2020), the executive and legislative relationship (tobar, 2020), authoritarianism (gavarette, 2021), polarization and populism (masek, aguasvivas, 2021) and populism in relation to other latin american leaders (díaz gonzáles et al., 2022). few studies have really connected bukele’s presidency or his actions directly to the concepts of populism and democratic recession as a possible part of a wider procss of autocratization (baldovinos, 2021). this article is about president bukele’s presidency and to what extent it is a case of populism, and if it has contributed to a negative democratic development in el salvador between 2019–2021. one could ask whether bukele’s presidency is symbolized as variant of pure populism, including democratic backsliding, or if it is a case of democratic recession and wider ongoing autocratization, as has been seen in other third-wave countries such as nicaragua, hungary or turkey. it could also represent a combination of these two; one could understand el salvador’s government as a case of a very popular leader who has won the presidency and the majority in parliament by a landslide, but where democracy will remain and is only backsliding temporarily. the article is divided into four remaining sections. the second section covers the two analytical concepts used (democratic recession and populism) in relation to the case. the third section deals with el salvador’s democratic development and challenges and the extent to which they can be connected to bukele’s presidency; the fourth mainly is about the extent to which bukele’s presidency could be seen as populism. finally, some conclusions are made. 2. analytical approach: democratic recession and populism democracy’s worldwide backsliding or regression over the last decade or so is not a new phenomenon (freedom house, 2022b; v-dem., 2022). in “state of the world 2020: autocratization turns viral,” the relatively new v-democracy institute reached the conclusion that, while the world is still more democratic than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, we demonstrate that the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2020 is down to the levels around 1990. the “third wave of autocratization” is continuing, currently affecting 25 countries and 34% of the world’s population (2.6 billion) (hellmeier et al., 2021, p. 1053) a vast number of approaches have been used to tackle this theme from an analytical point of view. all sorts of obstacles to democracy or facilitators of nondemocratic or autocratic behavior have been related to issues such as populism and right-wing parties in advanced democracies, new self-confidence in authoritarian countries within non-western cultural spheres, and shifting geopolitical balance between democracies and their authoritarian rivals, also acting as a de-consolidation process (diamond et al. (eds.), 2016; puddington, roylance, 2018; kendall-taylor, lindstaedt, frantz, 2019). in 2021, christian welzel argued that democracy still belongs to the future despite worrying authoritarian behavior, concluding that, consequently, the backsliding of democracies into authoritarianism is limited to societies in which emancipative values remain underdeveloped. contrary to the widely cited deconsolidation thesis, the ascendant generational profile of emancipative values means that the momentary challenges to democracy are unlikely to stifle democracy’s long-term rise (welzel, 2021, p. 132). from a slightly different point of view, the concept of democratic backsliding has been used in recent years to analyze when a country is going through a process of implementing less free and fair elections, decrease of civil and political rights and weakening of rule of law, or when national security becomes a main issue to respond to perceived antagonists (diamond, 2014; ginzburg, huq, 2019; kendall-taylor, lindstaedt, frantz, 2019; puddington, roylance, 2018; waldner, lust, 2018; levitsky, ziblatt, 2019; haggard, kaufmann, 2021). in recent years, since anna lührmann and staffan lindberg’s article, “a third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?” (2019) was published, the trend has moved toward another somewhat different understanding of the pattern, in which we are witnessing a wider, longer-lasting process of autocratization. autocratization includes phases such as democratic recession, democratic breakdown and, when autocracy is in place, and further autocratic consolidation (see also lührmann et al., 2021). as a consequence, the analysis of the case of el salvador and president nayib bukele will be accomplished in two steps. first, one needs to establish to what extent democracy in el salvador has lessened, using the democratic backsliding indicators of degree of free and fair elections, decrease of civil and political rights and weakening of rule of law. the second issue is to what extent this pattern could be linked to policies or actions accomplished by 18 martin nilsson president nayib bukele during 2019–2021, including to what extent prioritization of national security becomes the way to cope with internal political opponents. if democratic backsliding could be linked to bukele’s actions, one could understand the case as a wider process of autocratization, in which democratic recession is the first part of this process (lührmann, lindberg, 2019; hellmeier et al., 2021; vanessa et al., 2021). second, the issue of populism will be explored. the academic field contains a variety of versions of populism among historians, sociologists and political scientists, such as the popular agency approach, the laclauan approach, the socioeconomic approach or a political strategy or style of politics (mudde, kaltwasser, 2017). in recent years, some have called it an overstretched and misused concept (brett, 2013) in relation to the far right or the left, demagoguery and something of a new force, but often in a negative sense. however, the most common way to frame populism is with an ideational approach in which a group appeals to the people, critiquing the ruling elite or having an antiestablishment attitude (mudde, kaltwasser, 2017). it also includes a binary view of politics with one good side, the people, against an evil side, represented by a corrupt elite. consequently, populism could include all sorts of ideological stands and cannot automatically be positioned on a right–left scale (see an overview in mudde and kaltwasser 2017). in latin america, for example, fujimori was in favor of a more liberal and conservative ideology with his neoliberal project, while left-wing leaders such as chávez represented the opposite, with socialist and communist perspectives. in this article, however, the approach jan-werner müller (2017) takes in what is populism? is used to discuss to what extent president bukele is a true populist and how populism is connected to democracy, as well. one main point of müller’s (2017) contribution is the issue of populism through discussing most populists’ key characteristics and what happens when a populist enters an official office, which is highly relevant in the salvadorian case. three main characteristics are used: critique of elites, antipluralism and the idea of forming identity politics. the first condition is that populists are critical of elites, who are seen as corrupt or morally inferior. often, populists understand themselves as innocent and hardworking, in contrast to the corrupt elite. the second condition is antipluralism, which means that populists claim that they are the only ones who could represent real people in terms of morality. the competing parties or leaders are immoral, corrupt or not a part of the real people. as müller (2017) understands it, “they, and only they, represent the people” (2017, p. 20). a third condition is that populism is form of identity politics, in which the populist claims to stand for the proper (the only) way to understand the people and real problems in society, therefore tending to pose a threat to democracy. however, when a populist is in office, müller (2017) adds three other important dimensions. in office, populist tend to continue fighting against the elite and appear as victims, maintaining the polarization of the debate and society overall. ultimately, populists look for a crisis, e.g., an existential threat to allow them to act. the first characteristic of a populist in office relates to “hijacking the state,” which means that populists will pack the bureaucracy with their own people loyal to the leader or to the party, including lifting the independence of the judicial system and the courts. a second characteristic is mass clientelism or corruption, which means giving favors to loyal people, who also can represent real people. it is a step away from the principle of rule of law, representing “discriminatory legalism”. finally, in office, populist leaders tend to diminish the role of a free civil society and free media; by certain actions, the state takes control of these sectors directly or indirectly. to summarize, the key questions are, first, to what extent bukele’s policies can be connected to democratic development in el salvador during 2019–2022. the second issue is whether bukele himself can be seen as populist. 3. democratic development during bukele’s presidency the background of the current situation can be traced back to civil war (1980–1992) and its aftermath. el salvador is known to most people because in the 1980s, the left-wing guerrilla group fmln and the government, supported by the christian party and the arena, fought a civil war of revolution, which was also part of the cold war between communism and capitalism. the fmln was directly or indirectly supported by the soviet union, cuba and nicaragua, while the government received political, economic and military support from the united states (mcclintock, 1985). the civil war claimed more than 75,000 lives and forced more than a million people to leave the country. after the catholic church, the president of costa rica and the un acted as mediators, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in january 1992 under the auspices of the un, which opened completely free and fair elections in 1994 (karl, 1995; paige, 1997; wood, 1995). nayib bukele: populism and autocratization, or a very popular democratically elected president? 19 meanwhile, the former enemies arena and fmln alternated in power of the presidency, and as the largest parties in the parliament, after the 1994 election, two problems gradually developed: gang-related crime and corruption (colburn, 2009; colburn, cruz, 2014; meléndez-sánchez, 2021; wolf, 2009). both the parties were to blame for this development, and neither of them tried to tackle the issues. rather, political corruption grew in both parties, and by 2022, several former top politicians were facing allegations of political corruption, including all former presidents from arena and fmln. moreover, during this period, checks and balances in the political system were relatively successful, and democracy was developing (freedom house, 2017– 2022a). the supreme court managed to ensure that the executive and legislative branches followed the constitutional order, and arena (together with smaller right-wing parties) generally prevented further, deepening social and economic reforms, simply because the fmln lacked a significant majority in the parliament. when nayib bukele, as mayor of san salvador for fmln, faced possible expulsion for having criticized the leadership of fmln, it prompted momentum for a new party between fmln and arena, particularly at a time when gang-related crimes had risen to an unprecedented rate and in light of the charges against top officials of the two dominant parties since the end of the civil war. thus, nueva ideas was founded with bukele as the top figure (meléndezsánchez, 2021). however, nueva ideas was prevented from achieving legal status to place a candidate in the 2019 presidential election. instead, bukele become candidate for gana. meanwhile, nueva ideas grew as a party across the country and finally won by a landslide in the 2021 legislative elections, with a clear majority of seats. for the first time, el salvador faced a reality in which one party controlled the presidency and a majority of parliament with at least 56 out of 84 seats (freedom house, 2022a). to analyze to what extent president bukele has contributed to a democratic regression or democratic backlash in el salvador since he took office, one first must elaborate on the degree of democracy before and after he took office, between 2016 and 2021. one must also consider this period as a longer perspective of democratic development (between 1994 and 2021) to understand if the pattern of democratic regression might be even longer. bukele won the election in 2019 and has been the president since june 1, 2019, which means that the period of 2016 to 2018/2019 came before his presidency; 2019 and beyond represent his time in office. before bukele became president, el salvador’s democratic rate peaked between 2014 and 2017. based on v-democracy’s electoral and liberal democracy index, figure 1 illustrates a decline of democracy after 2017 (interval from low to high, 0–1), with the index of 0.67 for electoral democracy (year 2014–2017) and 0.47 for liberal democracy year (2014–2017, see v-dem., 2022). besides the electoral democracy index, the liberal democracy index also includes civil and political rights and the rule of law. after 2017, the democratic rate decreased to 0.64 and 0.44 for 2018–2019, respectively for electoral fig. 1. democratic decline in el salvador (2014–2021). source: v-dem institute index el salvador, 2022. 20 martin nilsson democracy and the liberal democracy index (see v-dem., 2022). this means that the negative democratic path had already begun, and the question is therefore what the problems were during this period. looking at various democratic reports, most democratic problems could be traced to widespread corruption or gang-related issues. these two problems led to democratic issues with the rule of law as well as self-censorship among the media and politicians (freedom house, 2017-2022a). therefore, it must not be a coincidence that the entire background and ideas of bukele’s presidential campaign as well as the emergence of nueva ideas represented a fight against corruption and against the political pact of the left’s fmln and the right’s arena. the idea behind the campaign was also to gain control of the country over gang-related activities, another key problem with democracy in el salvador. however, the decline of democracy has continued during bukele’s presidency, and by 2020, v-dem’s electoral and liberal democracy index was 0.58 respectively 0.37. during 2021, the democratic rate decreased even more; the rate for electoral democracy fell down to 0.47, while the liberal democracy index fell to 0.21 (see v-dem., 2022). from a longer perspective, as figure 2 (scale: 0–1) shows, el salvador’s 2020 democratic rate returned to the level of 1994, around the time when the civil war ended, and the country held its first completely free and fair elections. figure 2 also shows that el salvador made the transition to an electoral democracy during the 1994 election, the “election of the century”, when the civil war had ended with a peace agreement and when the left, represented by fmln, participated in the election for the first time. the second issue in this section is elaborating on how this negative democratic development could be connected directly to bukele’s policies or actions during his time in office. one part of the answer seems clear, and there are some signs connected to bukele’s misuse of the principles of democracy. the first few signs include the norms of the electoral democracy and the rule of law component and surfaced after bukele’s nueva ideas won a supermajority in the parliament election in 2021, enabling the administration to sack disloyal judges, assign new judges to the supreme court and install a new attorney general, all loyal to the president and nueva ideas (freedom house, 2021, 2022a). however, it gets a bit trickier here. in reality, the checks and balances between the executive, legislative and the judicial branches diminished, which could be seen as a part of the autocratization and the democratic recession. nevertheless, these actions still aligned with the constitutional order of el salvador. the constitution (and the ideas extending from it about the construction of the political system) never involved the assumption that one dominant party or coalition would gain both the presidency and two-thirds of parliament, which indirectly lifted most of the checks and balances in the system. however, staging national parliamentary elections and presidential elections every third and fifth year also allows the political game to change, and the constitution states implicitly that a president can only serve one term, not seeking reelection in a consecutive period. fig. 2. democratic development in el salvador (1990–2020). source: v-dem institute index el salvador, 2022. nayib bukele: populism and autocratization, or a very popular democratically elected president? 21 the idea is to prevent any president from gaining too much political power over time, thereby upholding the principle of checks and balances, and preventing, for example, a process of autocratization. the problem is that article 154 of the constitution only states that the “presidential period shall be of five years, and shall begin and end on the first of june, without the person who exercised the presidency being able to continue in his functions one day more” (constitution de la républica de el salvador, 1983, art. 154). it does not tell us anything about seeking reelection per se. article 152 of the constitution of the republic (1983) states, [the following] shall not be candidates for the president of the republic:—he who has filled the presidency of the republic for more than six months, consecutive or not, during the period immediately prior to or within the last six months prior to the beginning of the presidential period. this means that a president could resign a few months ahead of the next election and run again for the next presidential term. no one has done that, but president bukele has announced that he will run again in 2024, based on this premises. the supreme court, loyal to bukele, has also certified that it is within the constitutional order to seek election in another period if the candidate has been away from the office for six months, in accordance with article 152 of the constitution. in this case, bukele is using a constitutional loophole, and the supreme court, loyal to bukele, makes it possible. however, a more critical supreme court could have denied the move for other reasons, e.g., though the constitution does not explicitly forbid any president to run again, but a former supreme court decision made it clear that 10 years must pass before seeking reelection. this decision is not a part of the written constitution per se and could therefore be reinterpreted by a new supreme court. all together bukele’s ambition to run again in 2024 extends far beyond acceptability, since the idea behind the entire constitution was to establish a system with a one-term presidency. bukele knows, this of course, and is therefore demonstrating another sign of autocratization as a part of the country’s democratic recession. another worrying sign of el salvador’s status of free and fair elections is that during 2021, both formerly dominant parties’ (fmln and arenas) party offices were raided, and several party figures were arrested on corruption charges. according to freedom house (2022a), there were also reports that the police failed to inform the arrested of the charges against them, and they were denied access to layers. the opposition understood this operation as a sign of a political climate increasingly hostile to the opposition, who had been denied access to preview legislation in the parliament. the next step of autocratization will be harder restrictions on political parties, perhaps prohibition of some parties and more extensive harassment of political parties and candidates. another key incident prompting authoritarian alerts, including both rule of law and the security aspect of democracy, involved bukele in early february 2020, before he had a majority in the parliament. bukele occupied the parliamentary buildings and surrounding areas with military and security forces to force parliament to approve funds for his master plan of security funding related to plan cuscatalan, bukele’s master plan of future political and socio-economic reforms. the action was declared unconstitutional by the supreme court, which was not fully loyal to the new president at the time. the entire scene must be seen as an authoritarian move in which the president purposefully violated fundamental political and civil rights, rule of law and used security forces to enhance his political agenda against his opponent in parliament. this incident includes most aspects of the concept of autocratization, as a part of a larger process of democratic recession. some other signs of autocratization and violations of civil rights and the rule of include anticovid-19 measures accomplished by the bukele administration during 2020 (freedom house, 2021; hellmeier et al., 2021). several governments around the world have taken up anti-democratic covid-19 measures during the pandemic in 2020–2022, but it does not excuse bukele’s actions. according to freedom house (2021), bukele’s administration resisted judicial complaints about the strict lockdown in march to june 2020, when people were forced to stay at home and threatened with arrest if caught outside. several hundred people were detained for violating covid-19 regulations in poor sanitary conditions that violated basic human rights, according to the supreme court. in addition, the administration avoided making information public, despite common demand. finally, a lot of the policies proposed by bukele and confirmed by parliament involve the greater cuzcatalan plan, including all sorts of infrastructure projects, social issues and security-related issues (plan cuscatlán, 2019). yet, these policies have not included a wider campaign to silence the opposition by force, though there are some signs that this might happen or that some principles of democracy are about to vanish. for example, during bukele’s war against las maras, launched in late march, there 22 martin nilsson were also new additions to the penal code. graffiti related to gang issues was forbidden, sanctions were set for media and other actors that published overly positive images of gang activities and gang members were labeled officially as terrorists on bukele’s facebook and twitter accounts (nayib bukele, 2022a, 2022b). all of these actions can be seen as a violation of freedom of expression, or at least as bukele stretching the concept of democracy to define a terrorist and establish how to treat criminals (amnesty international, 2022; human rights watch, 2022). furthermore, during the campaign against the gangs, photos of gang members have been published through social media and on the president’s official facebook account, actions one does not normally see in liberal democratic societies but more in authoritarian states such china, russia and belarus. to summarize, though el salvador’s democracy might only be backsliding temporarily, it seems rather like bukele is following the path of autocratization, since his policies have contributed to weakening the possibility of free and fair elections, individual rights and the rule of law. additionally, his emphasis on security might escalate into further decreasing the opposition’s possibility to act politically, both during his first term and in forthcoming elections. 4. populism during the campaign and in office during the presidential campaign and his time in office, nayib bukele has been recognized as everything from a millennial boy, a social media star, a populist and a maverick to a millennial dictator or someone at least related to millennial authoritarianism (baldovinos, 2021; meléndez-sánchez, 2021; perelló, navia, 2022). bukele was elected as mayor for fmln in the small town of nuevo cuscatlán 2012 and the capital of san salvador in 2015, but was forced to leave the party in 2017 after frequent criticism of fmln leadership. many saw him as a doer who achieved impressive and visible projects, mostly related to infrastructure and social benefits. since he decided to run for office in 2018, his popularity increased, mostly staying between 40% and 60% two months before the election (fundaungo, 2018). in office, his approval rate has been around 90% most of the time, which makes him into one of the most popular democratically elected presidents ever in el salvador and around the world. however, there have been clear signs of populism both during the campaign and under his presidency. first, most of the presidential campaign consisted of various types of criticism of the ruling elites. one type was his campaign against corruption within the entire political system, but more precisely, of the two dominant political parties since the peace agreement in 1994, arena and fmln. the top level of corruption involved at least two former presidents, tony saca (arena), imprisoned for ten years due to money laundering of over $300 million in public funds, and mauricio funes (fmln), accused of embezzling around $351 million. funes fled to nicaragua, where he applied for asylum (monitoreo, 2019). in the campaign, bukele used slogans such as “there is enough money when nobody steals it” (the guardian, 2019). concerning concrete plans for dealing with corruption, he also stated that el salvador should use a system similar to the international corruption commission, which was implemented in guatemala with great success. however, bukele’s criticism of political elites goes beyond corruption; he heavily criticized the entire political system of the post-1992 peace-agreement political development with arena and fmln. the two former enemies from the civil war later developed a political elite pact during the 2000s, which no one expected. at the same time, both parties have been connected to corruption scandals at all levels and have not been able to prevent gangs controlling city neighborhoods. however, when bukele was about to launch his campaign, el salvador had fallen somewhat on transparency international’s index of corruption among countries, from 39 points (100 is the top, 0 the bottom) around 2014–2015 to 33 points by 2017 (transparency international, 2014–2022). this means that corruption increased in the country, or at least, people saw it as an increasing problem. furthermore, in the 2019 election, the two other major presidential candidates from arena and fmln campaigned somewhat against corruption. together with gangrelated issues, it was one of the main foundations of the entire campaign (monitoreo, 2019). monitoreo (2019), the center for transparency and democracy, published a comprehensive report on the main candidates’ messages on television and in newspapers and other channels during the campaign. carlos callejo, the arena candidate, often used phrases such as “vote,” “all people,” “the family” and “good,” and he brought up topics related to social problems, education, health and internal security. callejo’s campaign has been measured as combination of what is best for the party and his personal messages, and to a lesser extent, about the party platform. fmln’s candidate, hugo martínez, used different phrases, such as “salvador,” “vote,” “the governments,” “the country,” “the people” and “the president,” and he talked about justice, social and health issues. his campaign message was more https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/nuevo_cuscatl%c3%a1n nayib bukele: populism and autocratization, or a very popular democratically elected president? 23 about the party and its platform, and less about his own personal image. from this perspective, bukele’s campaign message stands out; he more frequently emphasized phrases such as “the country”, “the flag,” “new ideas”, “change”, “the same”, “as always”, “robbery”, “not traditional” and related topics such as modernizing the country, including social and health issues, control of territory, education and fighting corruption and the robbery of common goods. bukele´s campaign message was almost exclusively related to him as a person. in this sense, despite the extent to which the three top candidates talked about social issues, education and internal security, bukele’s campaign had a much more populist stance against the political elite, the corrupted political system and the established politicians behind it. consequently, the bukele campaign also had features of antipluralism and posed identity politics as the solution, i.e., implying that bukele and his movement were the only solution to tackle the situation in el salvador after decades of misbehavior from the old right and left governments. the foregoing allows us to infer that bukele’s campaign was largely emotional and intended to arouse emotions such as confidence and the hope of a better quality of life based on the election of a candidate from a “non-traditional” political party. bukele often claimed that he could best represent and understand the people’s needs, and that the combating fmln and arena candidates represented the old traditional and corrupt system (monitoreo, 2019). still, an electoral campaign is a unique situation; the populistic approach does not automatically apply in office. however, with bukele, it has followed the same path. to a large extent, his entire time in office (between 2019 and 2022) has followed a populistic path. first, there are very clear signs of “hijacking the state,” at least in the judicial arena, including lifting the independence of the judicial system and the courts. after nueva ideas won a super-majority in parliament in 2021, bukele sacked former members of the supreme court and packed it with his own loyal supporters. the same thing occurred with the attorney general, who is supposed to be loyal to the country rather than a government-aligned attorney, and this tendency has been repeated across the country in lower courts. as recognized by freedom house (2022), for example, this trend means that at least part of the judicial system can be criticized for being aligned with nueva ideas and president bukele rather than being independent from the political system. in addition, it is a clear sign of mass clientelism and could favor corruption. second, during the campaign, bukele promised to fight corruption among politicians and civil servants. he has done that to some extent, but there are also worrying signs of corruption related to the government. some of the former members of the fmln and arena governments have been prosecuted for corruption, and some are under corruption charges. bukele has also been criticized heavily for several reasons. one is that the authorities have raided the opposition’s campaign offices to find evidence of corruption, but the opposition has rather interpreted these actions as illegal attempts to silence and weaken them. in addition, while the bukele administration officially emphasizes the fight against corruption, its efforts have been criticized by the international community. for example, when prosecutors found evidence of illegal public contracts related to the covid-19 pandemic, the newly controlled national assembly issued immunity for all contractors during the pandemic. the us department issued a list of salvadorians engaged in corruption at the highest level within the bukele administration in july 2021, but bukele dismissed the allegations and decided to leave the oas-sponsored international commission against impunity in el salvador (cicies) to assist salvadoran prosecutors in their effort to fight corruption. as a consequence, freedom house concluded that bukele has contributed to the politicization of anticorruption efforts across the entire political system (freedom house, 2021, 2022a). a third characteristic of populism while in office is that civil society and the media feel less freedom than before. when it comes to these issues, however, there has not been any significant decline during bukele’s presidency (freedom house 2019, 2022a). civil society operates more or less under the same conditions as before bukele took office. however, there is a feeling among civil organizers that civil society has been more excluded from policymaking under bukele. in addition, during 2021, nueva ideas dominated the legislative assembly and set up a commission to investigate the previous year’s ngo state funding. criticizers are afraid that this might be a step toward more state control over civil society, not only for funding, but also about their ideas and other anti-government activities. still, however, civil society operates as freely as before. the same goes for the media, though one of the most dominant challenges for journalists is self-censorship after risking harassment or violence for covering issues related to gangs or corruption charges. as in other countries, other challenges relate to social media, a high concentration of media ownership and fake news (freedom house, 2021, 2022a). 24 martin nilsson 5. conclusions when bukele won the presidential election in a landslide in 2019, all salvadorians hoped for a change. gone from the presidential seat were the two dominant parties, fmln and arena, and after nueva ideas won the parliamentary election in 2021, the trend became even clearer. president bukele now had massive popular support for his policies and has maintained a very high popular rate (over 80%) during his time in office. that said, bukele could basically do whatever he would like and can quite easily accomplish what he wants in terms of political and socioeconomic reforms, since he has a two-thirds majority in the legislative assembly. if bukele is a true democrat, he does not have to lean toward autocratic behavior or use populism, as a way, to accomplish his political agenda per se. unfortunately for democratic development, his style and decisions have contributed to the decline of democracy between 2019 and 2022, with the result that el salvador’s democratic status is back to what it was before 1994’s breakthrough democratic election. bukele’s decisions and behavior (firing the supreme judges and others, as well as the attorney general), his accusations against the media and his populistic rhetoric have showed clear signs of autocratization, rather than just somewhat democratic backsliding. in addition, during bukele’s time in office, there have been very clear signs of hijacking the state in the judicial arena and worrying signs of corruption within the government. there is also a sense within various organizations as well as the press and tv establishments of less freedom than before. altogether, it means that bukele fits into the category of populism. together with the negative democratic trend and a form of autocratization, in which his policies are clearly connected to negative anti-democratic actions since 2019, these forecast the overall picture for the democratic development in el salvador in a very bad light. the 2022 war against the gangs also seems to strengthen this trend of pure populism and autocratic behavior (see, amnesty international, 2022; human rights watch, 2022). in a wider sense, bukele seems to follow the same path as other populistic and autocratic leaders— one-time democratically elected leaders—in latin america as well as in europe, such as hugo chávez in venezuela, daniel ortega in nicaragua, recep erdogan in turkey and victor orbán in hungary. while nayib bukele is a very popular and democratically elected president who has accomplished several important reforms in el salvador, his legacy will remain as someone who pushed the country’s democracy in the wrong direction, toward more autocracy and less democracy, as a result of some of his decisions. hopefully, it will not end with a full-scale autocratic rule, as in the case of chávez, ortega, erdogan or orbán, but if bukele runs and wins another term unconstitutionally, the assumption is that democracy will vanish in el salvador, at least for the time being. references amnesty international, 2022, el salvador: state of emergency has created a perfect storm of human rights violations, 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democratization: the negotiated resolution of the civil war in el salvador, ph.d thesos, stanford university, stanford. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0011 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x09990149 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x09990149 1. the concept of identity. individual and collective types of identities the concept of identity (lat. identicus – the same, identical) was introduced into socio-humanitarian discourse scientific circulation in the 1960s by an american psychoanalyst erik erikson (vakulova, 2014). identity is a key individual feature that determines relations between a persona and his or her social environment. when considering the identity phenomenon, traditional approaches focus on the concept of journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(s1), 6–15 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.s1.02 basic differences between ukrainian and russian political identities halyna mykhaylivna kuts department of political science, sociology and cultural science, h.s. skovoroda kharkiv national pedagogical university, alchevskyh 29, 61002 kharkiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-7263-1958 e-mail: kuts.niss@gmail.com citation kuts h.m., 2022, basic differences between ukrainian and russian political identities, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(s1), 6–15. abstract the article is devoted to identifying key differences between ukrainian and russian political identities. it is ascertained that the basic parameters for ukrainian political identity are individualism, rejection of the authoritarian principle, love of freedom, etc. the idea of freedom has been long embedded in the mentality of ukrainian people. by contrast, as regards the russian people (muscovites) mentality, slavish obedience has long been considered a virtue. according to eyewitnesses, muscovites considered deception to be a proof of great intelligence. they are not ashamed of lying. ukrainian political identity representatives should not be expected to automatically submit to the authorities, as the reputation and legitimacy of the leader are important for them. ukrainians can force an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally to relinquish the power. the bearers of russia’s political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. this state of russian political culture, where decision-making is delegated only to rulers, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism. atomization, that is, the disunity of society, is one of the dominant features of russia’s political identity nowadays. due to the atomization of society and people being unable to trust each other, all sorts of significant protests or rallies in russia are impossible. key words ukrainian political identity, russian political identity, national identity, identity, political culture, maidan, ukraine, russia, muscovites. received: 07 may 2022 accepted: 03 july 2022 published: 25 november 2022 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7263-1958 mailto:kuts.niss@gmail.com basic differences between ukrainian and russian political identities 7 individual (own, personal) or collective (national, social, etc.) identity (kuts, 2007). it is quite difficult to make a conceptual demarcation between the concepts of individual and collective identity because it is not always possible to clearly distinguish certain parameters. in its traditional sense, collective identity mainly refers to a person’s self-expression in national / regional / territorial and other contexts. manifestation of such self-expression is the awareness of one’s own involvement in a particular community and in the system of values shared by this community (melnyk (ed.), 2014). at the same time, new forms of individual involvement in certain communities that are not related to territorial or time constants are emerging today. an individual, immersed in information flows, chooses certain forms of communication or such types of communities (prioritizing them in such a way) that can eventually significantly change his or her collective identity. the modern human being “tries to declare his or her own existence through communication, identifying himor herself with segments of certain networks and, as a result, with virtual communities” (yakubina, 2014, p. 236). this means that stable (sustainable) identities are complemented by temporary (flexible) identities in the modern world. according to m. guibernau (2012, p. 10), “the defining criteria of identity are continuity in time and differentiation from others”. it should also be noted that the correlation of its parameters with spatial, value, semantic and temporal forms is important for the integrity of identity (kyrydon, 2017). in our understanding, the content of the concept of collective identity will correlate with the concept proposed by j. gray. criticizing the enlightenment’s “abstract concept of man”, detached from culture and transformed into zero, the theorist noted that such a person is “devoid of history and nationality, has no attachments, which determines our identity in the real world” (gray, 2003, p. 19). thus, the concept of collective identity refers to a certain set of attachments: ethnicity, religion, culture, nation, and so on. shattering such attachments can be painful for an individual who is forced to reject that perception after identifying himor herself with a certain community or mentality for a long time. in such a context, the voiced opinion of v. hösle should be considered: despite the severe danger of instability caused by the collective identity crisis, it is impossible to assess the latter exclusively negatively. if there were no identity crises, there would be no progress for individuals and institutions; hence, it is necessary to face identity crises and to use them for development (hösle, 1994, p. 122). therefore, identity crises should be perceived as normal phenomena that contribute to the transition to a new level of relations. the issue of collective identity is especially relevant in the modern world. according to i. wallerstein, this is due to the fact that the world has entered a new era – a period of the capitalist world economy disintegration. no ideology will be able to exist during this period, because no individual is able to survive among the structures that are disintegrating (because man will not even be able to express himself ). hence, “it is no coincidence that the question of ‘group identity’ has come to the fore on a scale previously unknown to the modern worldsystem” (wallerstein, 2003, p. 228). a.d. smith noted that individual identity for a person is a discovery of oneself, and, in accordance with the collective identity problem, each “i” for the individual “is also a social self, category and role” (smith, 1994, p. 12). this means that collective identity is quite diverse; it includes different roles, namely: family, territorial, class, religious, ethnic ones and so on. according to a.d. smith, ethnic and religious identity are closely correlated, having many common features. together, these identities can assemble and sustain strong communities. national identity often appropriates other types of collective identities (class, religion, ethnicity) due to its multidimensionality. thanks to multidimensionality, “national identity becomes such a flexible, unyielding force in modern life and politics and can be effectively combined with other powerful ideologies and movements without losing its own character” (smith, 1994, p. 25). in general, collective (national) identities are an acquired phenomenon. they are not something natural; on the contrary, they are artificial phenomena that change historically over time. in communities, the formation of a collective identity is based on the following three parameters: communication, experience and memory (yakhtenfuks, kolyer-kokh (eds.), 2007). the commonality of these principles ensures the emergence of traditions that contribute to the formation of long-term collective identities. 2. problems of national identity according to e.m. thompson, there should be a distinction between protective nationalism and aggressive nationalism. the protection of national identity is the basis of protective nationalism, while aggressive nationalism is aimed at exporting its own national identity to conquered territories. for example, “russian nationalism is both aggressive and 8 halyna mykhaylivna kuts defensive, and its aggressive form has been transformed into an imperial desire to colonize lands adjacent to ethnic russian territories” (thompson, 2006, p. 19). literature, art, theater, and other forms of culture bearing a reprehensible attitude to the recognition of other nations’ identity (that were part of these empires) were involved in the formation of dominant identities in empires. such rhetoric implicitly suggested that “deprived national groups deserve condemnation by the very fact of their identity differences” (thompson, 2006, p. 26). in the scientific socio-humanitarian discourse, there is still a point of view that the growth of national consciousness in colonized nations is perceived in a negative light, and the processes of self-identification based on nationalism are considered a kind of disease. in fact, devaluing the national identity of enslaved peoples is one way of subjugating them. in such cases, aggressive nationalism often imposes a kind of stigma on politically weaker nations as “those guilty of nationalism” and, at the same time, justifies force demonstrations of politically stronger nations. protective nationalism preserves national identity. however, quite often representatives of imperial identity describe it as xenophobia or as antisocial behavior, seeking to neutralize its mobilizing potential for a particular nation. for example, during stalin’s rule in the soviet union: the integrity of nations was recognized and even encouraged if it served leisure and manifested itself in folk art, dance and music; however, the aspect of nationalism that highlighted differences between nations was condemned regardless of its source (thompson, 2006, p. 259). accordingly, all attempts to use national identity as a mobilizing force were punished severely enough to prevent the liberation of this nation from imperial oppression. in this context w. kymlicka’s point of view on the issue of national identity is rather interesting: western states misjudged the stability of the minorities’ national identity. external signs of national identity can change in a short time – for example, national heroes, myths and traditional customs. however, identity itself – the feeling of belonging to a nation with its own national culture – is much more stable (kymlicka, 2001, p. 34). thus, national identity is quite stable. national identity is characterized by a versatile force, determined by the multi-vector functions that national identity takes on in terms of communities’ and individuals’ lives. according to m. guibernau (2012, p. 20), national identity means “a collective feeling based on a belief in belonging to one nation and in the commonality of most of the attributes that make it different from other nations”. national identity, according to the theorist, “has five dimensions: psychological, cultural, territorial, historical and political” (guibernau, 2012, p. 20). analyzing the phenomenon of national identity, a.d. smith (1994) defines its following basic features: (1) historical territory (native land); (2)  myths common to the nation and historical memory; (3) public (mass) culture; (4) rights and responsibilities that are common to all community members; (5) common economic space. a.d. smith singled out the external and internal functions of national identity. external functions include territorial, economic and political functions. after all, nations provide control over territorial, economic and many other resources. “by defining membership, boundaries and resources, national identity makes it possible to rationally justify the ideals of national autarky” (smith, 1994, p. 25). from a political point of view, the most important political function of national identity is the legitimation of the existing legal institutions in the country. this includes uniform legal rights and responsibilities that determine the priority values and the character of a nation. thus, in the political context, national identity is the main means of legitimizing public order and solidarity. the internal functions of national identity are the unification of individuals into a community, which is facilitated by a standardized state mass education system. “the nation is also supposed to develop social ties between individuals and classes, creating a set of common values, symbols and traditions” (smith, 1994, p. 26). the use of symbols (flags, coins, anthems, monuments, ceremonies), which reminds us of the common cultural heritage and cultural kinship and strengthens the sense of common identity, plays an important role in the formation of national identity. e.m thompson (2006) also emphasizes the importance of the symbolic component of national identity. she notes that the basis of national identity is a set of myths, the formation of which has its own specifics when it comes to each nation. most often, such a set of myths was created by a certain elite group, because education in ancient times was a privilege given to few members of the upper caste. subsequently, mass education, as well as technology development, contributed to the widespread introduction of these myths in modern society. however, neither education nor technologies became decisive in this process for empires. “the futility of attempts to accelerate the formation of nations, such as the yugoslav, soviet and czechoslovak, is explained by basic differences between ukrainian and russian political identities 9 the lack of a set of symbols that could be common to these false taxonomic groups” (thompson, 2006, p. 30). empires were unable to secure the loyalty of colonized peoples due to the absence of common memory models. in order to form a common set of symbols, a powerful group of authors and artists must be introducing common national myths through literature and art for a long time. it should be understood that changes in culture do not happen at once. as f. fukuyama rightly points out, “official rules can easily change as a matter of public policy; cultural rules only change after a considerable time, and therefore it is much more difficult to control their development” (fukuyama, 2006, p. 58). another quite important condition for the introduction of common myths in the public consciousness is the availability of free time in groups of people who create myths. for example, in the pre-industrial era, people did not have enough psychological freedom or free time to create a nation. therefore, nationalism appeared quite late by historical standards (only two centuries ago). accordingly, nationalism is not only a phenomenon of the modern era, but also a promising trend of the future era. according to e.m. thompson, that is the reason so many new nations have emerged in recent decades. it should be noted that this position contradicts the widespread expectations among nationalist theorists that nationalism will completely disappear and wane from the political arena. according to e.m. thompson, the active development of the national literature / art / cinema contribute to the formation of a stable national identity. “literature is a very important ‘building block’. at the same time, it is a means of expressing national identity” (thompson, 2006, p. 31). the reflection of the past in literature shapes the attitude of nations towards victories and defeats. moreover, wars played a decisive role in the formation of national identity, and it does not matter whether they ended in victory or defeat. the only thing that matters is the attitude to these events, which is reflected in the literature / cinema / theater. for example, poles have lost nearly all wars since the 18th century. the only exception was the polish-soviet war they won in 1920–1921. however, such a continuous chain of national catastrophes only strengthened polish national identity. as for ukraine, e.m. thompson (2006) noted that the ukrainian set of myths is still in its infancy as ukrainians restore their self-assertion, which their russian colonizers have tried to deprive them of. thus, the category of experience, in particular, common positive experience, becomes important in the formation of national identity. in this regard, it should be noted that ukraine has a lot of powerful ideas, historical facts, events, personalities, based on which it is possible to form a stable national identity. 3. key parameters of ukrainian and russian identities: historical background the basic characteristics of ukrainian identity are individualism, rejection of authoritarian principles, love of freedom, etc. the specificity of certain values is often determined by the basic features of the national character. in order to identify the essential fundamental features of ukrainian national identity, some of the oldest reported by eyewitnesses characteristics of slavs who lived on modern ukraine lands in ancient times should be analyzed first. thus, in strategikon – a script dating back from 6th-7th centuries which was devoted to military affairs – there are accurate descriptions of the essential features of slavs’ character who then inhabited the territory that is nowadays modern ukraine. the authorship of strategikon is attributed to maurice – a byzantine emperor (582– 602). this work includes descriptions of routines, social order, habits of individual peoples, including slavs, antes and persians. the aspiration for freedom and love of freedom have long been characteristic of the slavs. thus, the strategikon of maurice states that “the tribes of the slavs and the antes are similar in their way of life, in their customs, in their love of freedom; they can in no way be enslaved or subjugated in their own country” (strategikon, 2004, xi.5). that means that already in the sixth century foreigners noted a desire for freedom in slavs which has been embedded in the identity of ukrainians since ancient times. this raises parallels to the correlation of essential features of ukrainian identity with the fundamental postulates of the political ideology of liberalism, for which the concept of freedom is basic. the strategikon of maurice also states that the slavs do not have a military system and a single commander; they do not know how to obey or fight (strategikon, 2004, ix.3). accordingly, the slavs of that time (living on the territory of modern ukraine), on the one hand, had a feature of a certain rejection of power and disobedience to authority. on the other hand, the roots of the proverb “where there are two cossacks, there are three hetmans” can lead to the character of the slavs. this means the absence of a single leadership (that is, the lack of obedience to only one person), which was typical of the slavs. however, the strategikon of maurice states that the inability of these people to obey only one person 10 halyna mykhaylivna kuts can be successfully exploited. if there are many leaders among the slavs “and there is no agreement between them, it is good to attract some of them to their side with things or gifts” (strategikon, 2004, xi.5), making sure that not everyone obeys one leader. similar observations have come down to us from procopius of caesarea, who lived in the justinian era. he described the military campaigns of the slavs in the eastern roman empire (6th century). procopius of caesarea noted that “these tribes, slavs and antes, are not ruled by one man, but have long lived in democracy (democracy), and therefore their happiness and unhappiness in life is considered a common cause” (kuts, 2011, p. 116). in general, it is noted that the slavs are good people and not villainous at all. the essential features of the muscovites (modern russians) are described by an eyewitness, namely a german diplomat johann korb (1701) in the work diarium itineris in moscoviam perillustris. this diary was published in 1701. johann korb was the first foreign author to describe muscovy of petrine times. subsequently, almost all copies of the diary were destroyed at the request of the muscovites. according to j. korb, muscovites form a nation for slavery; they hate even the shadow of freedom (korb, 1701, p. 204). these people are placid when oppressed and they all willingly admit that they are serfs of their sovereign. when addressing the nobles, muscovites have a tendency to call themselves diminutive names, serfs or vile, contemptuous slaves of the grand duke (korb, 1701, p. 203). they consider all their property not their own, but the sovereign’s. muscovites have long sold their own children. in j. korb’s diary it is noted that the power of the father in muscovy is considerable and is very burdensome for the son (korb, 1701, p. 206). the law allows a father to sell his son four times: this means that if a father sells his son once, and he somehow frees himself or his master grants him freedom, the father can sell him again according to the father’s right. and then he can make the same sale again. but after the fourth sale, the father loses all rights over his son. unfortunately, this attitude towards their own children has not changed, in terms of russia’s modern war against ukraine! for some reason, parents in modern russia do not persuade their sons not to go to war in ukraine. instead, they expect profits, payments and looted bloody “trophies” of their sons. the value of their children’s lives is still equivalent to some material goods. and ukrainians are surprised that russian mothers do not stand for their sons who are in captivity in ukraine. because russian mothers are waiting for payments again. it turns out that it is better for them if their children die, because it has long been normal for russians to get money for their own child. muscovites, as j. korb states, are devoid of any good manners. therefore, in their own opinion, deception is proof of great intelligence. they are not ashamed if the lie becomes detected. “the seeds of true virtue are so foreign to this country that even sin is glorified in them as dignity” (korb, 1701, p. 204). 4. mediation of ukrainian political culture between west and east in modern ukraine, there is a coexistence of two cultural traditions, namely “western” and “eastern” ones (tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003). moreover, the western cultural tradition is the basis of socio-political interactions, while the eastern tradition is christianspiritual in its core. the “eastern” cultural tradition (or byzantineorthodox) has become crucial in shaping not only ukrainian’s spirituality, but also a specific world perception. regarding the “western” cultural tradition, it should be noted that it “has become dominant in the field of social experience and practice: the political and social structure to which ukrainian people organically aspire, primarily related to the principles of european political development” (tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 287). it is worth emphasizing the fact that the “eastern” cultural tradition extended mainly to the spiritual level of ukrainian culture. the rejection of byzantine traditions is most often evident on the socio-political level. in particular, it concerned the rejection of the ideas of restriction of individual freedom, autocratic despotism, expansionism, etc. finally, “intertwining and interacting “eastern” (byzantine-orthodox) and “western” (democratic) cultural traditions has determined the nature and course of ukrainian socio-political sentiment development” (tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 288). going back to the characteristics of russian culture in the outlined context, it becomes noticeable that it was more influenced by the byzantine tradition in comparison with ukrainian culture. first of all, this applies to the socio-political level of russian culture, to which the “eastern” (byzantine) cultural tradition has spread its influence. it should be noted that russian and ukrainian cultures show significant differences in the socio-political dimension, in particular, in the perception and the attitude of carriers of these cultures towards government. thus, it is typical of ukrainian mentality to be distrustful of all kinds of power. this causes the necessity of relying on one’s own, contributing to the strengthening of basic differences between ukrainian and russian political identities 11 individualistic tendencies. instead, russian culture is dominated by the communitarian principle. this is explained by the natural conditions of the formation of the russian ethnic group: on poor podzolic soils, in conditions of difficult-to-pass swampy forests, only large communities could survive. the conditions for the formation of ukrainian culture were exactly the opposite: fertile black soil (chernozem) dating back to the ancient trypillian agrarian culture ensured the survival of small associations of people, such as farms, or even separate families (tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 301). the intertwining of “eastern” and “western” traditions in ukrainian culture periodically led to various forms of confrontation (religious, electoral, sociocultural, etc.). the facts of such confrontations can be found in ukrainian history if we delve, for example, into the problem of religious vicissitudes. the modern confessional diversity of religion in ukraine is not least caused and determined by the binary nature of the “west-east” paradigm. the schism of christianity in 1054 not only initiated the orthodox and catholic traditions in the religious life of europe, but also led to the unique existence of two dissimilar cultural worlds in the bosom of european christian culture. throughout history, the idea of restoring the unity of christianity has periodically emerged, manifesting itself not only in the concepts of leading philosophers of various eras, but also in church life. these ideas were embodied in the religious life of ukraine, determining not only its religious diversity, but also the search for ways to interfaith dialogue and tolerant coexistence. the process of self-identification of ukrainians living between the eastern and western neighbors is inextricably linked with the evolution of religious self-determination of ukrainian people. historically, ukraine is on the borderline of two cultures: eastern and western. it was this “transitory” that contributed to the emergence of greek catholicism in ukrainian culture. a peculiarity of the ukrainian greek catholic church, which was established in 1596 at the brest church cathedral, is a combination of the catholic and orthodox dogma, which preserves orthodox rites. delving into the details of the “eastern” and “western” value confrontation problem, long-standing differences between latin and byzantine morals are faced. according to fareed zakaria, classical latin values are a strong family, religious norms and perseverance (zakaria, 2004). byzantine values are most often associated with paternalism and behindthe-scenes solutions. latin values mean the reliance on own strength in solving various problems, but byzantine values, by contrast, imply that the state should take care of a person, and an individual puts all his hopes on the highest wisdom of the ruler. the theory of “byzantinism” was developed by a russian philosopher k. leontiev, believing that byzantinism is able to protect power from all sorts of innovations (grosul (ed.), 2000). in his opinion, byzantinism could protect russia from the pernicious influence of the west, from the destructive european progress, while preserving russian identity. for pope john paul ii, the coexistence of two traditions in europe was obvious: western latin and eastern byzantine. he believed that “europe is a unity and its abundance lies in the multitude of cultures that form it” (modzheyevski, 2008, p. 133). latin culture is more sensible and logical, while the eastern tradition is more mystical and sensual. to describe these two traditions, john paul ii sometimes used the allegory of “two lungs”, noting that without one of the lungs, europe could not breathe. he called ukraine “the border and gateway between east and west”, because there was a crossroads of different cultures. it is on ukrainian soil, as pope john paul ii said, that the church “two lungs of eastern and western traditions” breathe (modzheyevski, 2008, p. 133). in his opinion, christianity as a common denominator of european self-determination is the constitutive factor of europe. the mediation of ukrainian political culture is not a bitter fate; it is a purpose the benefits of which the bearers of ukrainian political identity have yet to grasp. 5. ukrainian political identity vs russian political identity: modern aspects the revolution of dignity (winter 2013–2014) and the hybrid russian-ukrainian war, which began in 2014 and has continues to this day, had a strong influence on recoding the modern national ukrainian identity. the intense phase of russia’s aggression against ukraine shifted from a hybrid to an open form in february 2022. it should be noted that the usage of the concept of “russian-ukrainian hybrid war” is approved by national security scientists of the national institute for strategic studies of ukraine, who were among the first to introduce this concept into scientific circulation (horbulin (ed.), 2017). revolution of dignity is the name of the events of november 21, 2013 – february 22, 2014, happening on the maidan in kyiv and in many cities of ukraine, which were accompanied by large-scale demonstrations and rallies, which led to the reformatting of power in the state. the reason for the revolution of dignity was the refusal of the then 12 halyna mykhaylivna kuts president of ukraine v. yanukovych to sign the “the eu-ukraine association agreement”, although he was the one who constantly declared his commitment to ukraine’s european integration course. in the mass consciousness of ukrainians, ukraine’s course towards the european union meant the real (rather than pretense) development of democratic institutions and the dismantling of the clan-oligarchic model of political relations. for most ukrainians, the eu is associated with the rule of law, respect for the individual, transparent rules for the functioning of the political system etc. therefore, ukrainians expected to peacefully build democracy in their country by joining the family of european nations. that is why ukrainians turned a blind eye to the government’s corruption, oppression of freedom of speech, and lack of transparent rules of the game in all spheres of public life, hoping that the government’s declared european integration course would bring ukraine closer to democratic standards. the reason for the emergence of the revolution of dignity was similar to the cause of the orange revolution (2004), which was a definitive rejection of double political standards. many ukrainians describe this maidan (euromaidan) as a revolution of dignity, believing that this is where the test of humanity took place. the revolution of dignity united people of different ages, places of residence, social status, ethnicity, religious and ideological views. there is a demand for politicians who are sincere in their actions, decent and truthful. populism was absolutely not accepted. the revolution of dignity was not peaceful. authorities periodically suppressed popular protests, leading to bloodshed and death as well as to disappearance of many people. finally, a wave of popular outrage reformatted the government in ukraine. the revolution of dignity, like the former orange revolution, has reaffirmed that ukraine has a strong demand for transparent and fair rules of the political game. the revolution of dignity outlined the prospects for the formation of a new network-corporate identity. everyone who came there at least once noted the presence of cohesion, friendliness, sincerity, high self-organization and order. each individual could create their own interesting ideas, fitting into the overall structure of the diverse projects of the maidan, which were organized by its participants. this synthesis of multilevel network-corporate relations has contributed to the emergence of various self-governing initiatives. regarding the analysis of the influence of maidan’s ideas on the formation of ukrainian identity, we turn to o. zinchenko, according to whom “maidan has become a rubicon between epochs and a tectonic shift in the minds of ukrainians. we are completing gestalts that were not closed a hundred years ago” (zinchenko, 2016). in the 1920s, the proclamation of the independence of ukrainian people’s republic and the bolshevik aggression against it took place almost simultaneously. a similar situation repeated at the end of february 2014. that is, both times there was a need to rebuild the ukrainian army almost from scratch. but the positive thing today is that there is no discussion in ukrainian society about whether an army is needed or not. accordingly, this gestalt is completed. also, according to o. zinchenko (2016), “we (ukrainians) have closed another gestalt: from the belief in the messiahs we are gradually moving to the realization of civil liability.” according to german historian karl schlögel, “the maidan has answered the question of how to create a political nation based on very different parts of ukraine. it seems to me, it is very important for europe to understand it as well. this awareness would be a condition for ukraine’s support abroad” (oharkova, 2016). after all, the influences of different former empires and different cultures can still be seen in ukraine even today. the history of the cossacks and the grand duchy of lithuania, of poland and the habsburg empire, the russian and ottoman empire and others are intertwined in the history of ukraine. there is a certain complexity in such a diverse combination, but it is also the historical wealth of ukrainian people. a certain liberation from paternalism is also a positive process of a new post-maidan ukrainian identity formation. however, ukrainians still tend to over-trust populist ideas. in general, such categories as self-organization, solidarity, and trust began to take an important place in the ukrainian collective mentality. thus, on the one hand, the recoding of ukrainian collective identity is related to the present-day and, on the other hand, to the future. after all, ukrainian identity is being reformatted in such a way as not only to survive the war and defend an independent ukrainian state, but also to preserve positive gains for effective development of the country (volunteer activities to help the army in the russian-ukrainian war, public aid, self-sacrifice phenomenon, etc.). the main goal of the hybrid russian-ukrainian war, which began in 2014, is not so much the conquest of territories as the struggle for people’s minds (rushchenko, 2015). hybrid wars, as the ukrainian experience shows, begin with a strategy of divisions that are specifically introduced into different groups (social, ethnic, religious, territorial, etc.) of a country. in split strategies, the main emphasis is on recoding basic differences between ukrainian and russian political identities 13 the identity of a community, demonstrating its “superiority” over other groups, which, in the end, only accelerates conflicts. it should also be noted that there is a stratum of people in ukraine for whom it is quite painful to recode identity in the context of the russian-ukrainian hybrid war. mostly, these are the people of ukraine who are characterized by a predominance of prorussian or soviet thinking models. a moment will come when these people will have to clearly answer only one question: “whose war is this?”. because during a war there are still two sides: allies and enemies. if a person is convinced that this is not his or her war, then the following conclusion immediately arises: this is not his or her country. that is, over time, people with borderline identities will still be forced to seek a way out of their own collective identity crisis. of course, it is desirable for this way out to be constructive for both the individual and the state. in general, ukrainian political identity is characterized by individualism, love of freedom, and rejection of authoritarian principles. these values correlate with the values of liberalism to a certain degree. on the other hand, there is also some correlation with the principles of conservatism, since the peculiarity of ukrainian culture type is mostly predetermined by the fact that ukrainian territory belongs to the area of ancient agricultural settled culture, which for many centuries, if not millennia, found its roots in traditionalism (tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 277). individual freedom is important for ukrainian political culture. carriers of ukrainian political identity should not be expected to automatically obey the governors, as the authority and legitimacy of the leader are important for ukrainians. ukrainians can get rid of an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally. this was witnessed, for example, during maidan (2013–2014), when the president of ukraine viktor yanukovych, who completely lost his legitimacy in the eyes of ukrainians, was forced to flee to russia. if necessary, ukrainians are able to “function without a chairman at all, having horizontal relationships and on terms of agreement” (starodubska, 2022). the bearers of russia’s political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. this state of russian political culture, when decision-making is delegated only to governors, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism. that is why in russian society “any autonomy and awareness of the responsibility and consequences of every citizen’s actions is not publicly encouraged and punished” (starodubska, 2022). moreover, the population accepts even the unworthy and criminal behavior of rulers, because expressing their own opinion (if different from the one of the authorities) is punished by harsh condemnation at the public level. this leads not only to the manifestation of the “herd instinct” in submission to decisions dictated by the ruling elite. this situation eliminates the responsibility of russian society representatives for their own actions: if committing a crime is ordered by the authorities, they do not consider themselves responsible for their criminal behavior. the manifestations of collectivism are more characteristic of russian identity than individualism. for the russians, it is important not only to be different, but to dominate the inferior members of the group (up to violence and coercion) and to demonstrate the status that gives an opportunity to interact with people of a similar status (starodubska, 2022). in russian society, manifestations of individualism are observed among those who have reached the highest positions in the government structure. one must “live up to it”, deserve it. only a person at the top of the power hierarchy has the right to express his own point of view, has the right to self-expression. in such a culture of political relations, it is considered the norm to give up one’s own interests for the sake of group interests. such behavior from the carriers of russian political identity is expected as a default option, something natural. for ukrainian society representatives, the “willingness to give up one’s own interests for the interests of the group (even the relevant one) is always a conscious choice, not something ‘automatic’ ” (starodubska, 2022). for russians, representatives of other communities are considered strangers. the concept of “strangers” in their perception are not considered to be “different”, but often means “hostile”. by contrast, for the ukrainian political identity carriers, representatives of other communities are perceived as “foreign”, but they are not necessarily “hostile”; they are simply “other” communities. in general, for the representatives of the ukrainian political identity, the centralized decision of the government is not important if this government has lost its legitimacy in their opinion. in critical situations, ukrainians quickly self-organize in small groups and make decisions themselves. for russians only centralized government decisions are important; they are not ready to make decisions on their own, as it causes public condemnation and is considered unacceptable. russians perceive other nations 14 halyna mykhaylivna kuts judging from this point of view as well. for example, they mostly call the ukrainians’ ability to self-organize anarchy, not realizing that, for example, various ukrainian volunteer communities during the war act in an orderly rather than anarchic way: they help the government solve problems where the government does not have time to solve them. because of this misunderstanding of other communities by russians, attempts to interact with russia on terms of “horizontal” relationships (agreements, mutual concessions) will not only be ineffective; it will be perceived as a manifestation of weakness and a signal to increase aggression, because this society understands only the logic of “vertical” practices: force, influence, coercion and significantly prevailing and unavoidable dominance (starodubska, 2022). powerful maidans in ukraine (2004 and 2013– 2014) demonstrated the ukrainians’ ability to selforganize on a horizontal level. russia’s aggression against ukraine, which began in 2014, has led to an extensive network of small communities that have taken responsibility for providing for the ukrainian army, helping refugees and more. these communities operate independently from the authorities and often help the government. atomization, which is the disunity of society, is one of the dominant features of russia’s political identity nowadays. the reason for this is again the long tradition of authoritarianism in russia’s political system. after all, “people’s ability to interact on the basis of consensus, agreement and responsible choice” (starodubska, 2022) is suppressed under conditions of authoritarianism. due to the atomization of society, all sorts of significant protests or rallies in russia are impossible, because people are unable to trust each other. 6. conclusions the key differences between ukrainian and russian political identities and the basic parameters of ukrainian and russian national identities in the historical perspective have been analyzed. it has been stated that the basic ukrainian political identity characteristics are as follows: individualism, rejection of the authoritarian principle, love of freedom, etc. the idea of freedom has long been embedded into the mentality of ukrainians. instead, in the mentality of the russian people (muscovites), slavish obedience has long been considered a virtue. according to eyewitnesses, muscovites considered deception to be a proof of great intelligence; they are not ashamed of a lie to be detected. historically, ukraine is on the borderline of two cultures: eastern and western ones. delving into the details of the “eastern” and “western” value confrontation problem, long-standing differences between latin and byzantine morals are faced. classical latin values are a strong family, religious norms and perseverance. latin values mean the reliance on own strength in solving various problems; by contrast, byzantine values imply that the state should take care of a person, and an individual puts all his hopes on the highest wisdom of the ruler. carriers of ukrainian political identity should not be expected to automatically obey the governors, as the authority and legitimacy of the leader are important for ukrainians. ukrainians can get rid of an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally. the bearers of russia’s political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. this state of russian political culture, when decisionmaking is delegated only to governors, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism. atomization, which is the disunity of society, 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https://dt.ua/history/navischo-potribniukrayinci-abo-yak-rozirvati-kolo-istoriyi-mi-zakrivayemostolitni-geshtalti-i-nagaduyemo-yevropi-pro-yevropu-_. html (accessed 18 march 2022). https://dbc.wroc.pl/dlibra/publication/152048/edition/109708/content?ref=l3b1ymxpy2f0aw9ulzixmdy0l2vkaxrpb24vmtg4mdy https://dbc.wroc.pl/dlibra/publication/152048/edition/109708/content?ref=l3b1ymxpy2f0aw9ulzixmdy0l2vkaxrpb24vmtg4mdy https://hromadske.ua/posts/nimeckii-istorik-karl-shlogel-knizhka-ukraina https://hromadske.ua/posts/nimeckii-istorik-karl-shlogel-knizhka-ukraina https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/03/27/7334943/ https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/03/27/7334943/ https://dt.ua/history/navischo-potribni-ukrayinci-abo-yak-rozirvati-kolo-istoriyi-mi-zakrivayemo-stolitni-geshtalti-i-nagaduyemo-yevropi-pro-yevropu-_.html https://dt.ua/history/navischo-potribni-ukrayinci-abo-yak-rozirvati-kolo-istoriyi-mi-zakrivayemo-stolitni-geshtalti-i-nagaduyemo-yevropi-pro-yevropu-_.html https://dt.ua/history/navischo-potribni-ukrayinci-abo-yak-rozirvati-kolo-istoriyi-mi-zakrivayemo-stolitni-geshtalti-i-nagaduyemo-yevropi-pro-yevropu-_.html https://dt.ua/history/navischo-potribni-ukrayinci-abo-yak-rozirvati-kolo-istoriyi-mi-zakrivayemo-stolitni-geshtalti-i-nagaduyemo-yevropi-pro-yevropu-_.html journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(4), 1–11 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.4.01 feminevil: the chechen black widows’ symbolic terrorism jonathan matusitz (1), demi simi (2) (1) nicholson school of communication and media, university of central florida, ucf downtown, 500 w. livingston, communication and media building (171c), orlando, fl 32801, usa, orcid: 0000-0001-8078-3663, e-mail: matusitz@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) nicholson school of communication and media, university of central florida, ucf downtown, 500 w. livingston, communication and media building (171c), orlando, fl 32801, usa, e-mail: demi.simi@knights.ucf.edu citation matusitz j., simi d., 2022, feminevil: the chechen black widows’ symbolic terrorism, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(4), 1–11. abstract this paper examines the chechen black widows and how they carry symbolic terrorist attacks against russian targets – the authors’ newly created concept of feminevil. by and large, feminevil is a growing phenomenon of girl-militancy in human violence. the theory used in this paper is symbolic convergence theory (sct). developed by bormann (1972), sct posits that a group can unite to form a collective culture so as to achieve ambitious objectives. whether it is a word, phrase, narrative, or physical symbol, each tenet – (a) fantasy theme, (b) symbolic cue, (c) fantasy type, and (d) saga – merges with all the others to recognize anything that helps generate, increase, and sustain a rhetorical society’s awareness. key words black widows, chechnya, feminevil, gender, groups, russia, suicide bombings, symbolic convergence theory, symbols, terrorism. received: 21 october 2022 accepted: 17 november 2022 published: 30 december 2022 1. introduction this paper examines the chechen black widows and how they carry symbolic terrorist attacks against russian targets. a term coined by the russian press, chechen “black widows” are female suicide bombers and exemplify the authors’ newly created concept of feminevil. by and large, feminevil is a growing phenomenon of girl-militancy in human violence. it is the ultimate violation of traditional femininity that, through unconceivable violence, engenders a more extreme form of feminism that calls for the end of male domination in a certain domain (i.e., here, the domain is terrorism). put another way, feminevil is akin to gender role reversal in terrorism. there are three main reasons why chechen women are committed to feminevil: (1) they live in an islamist society – one that gives little room for women’s rights (e.g., strict dress codes) and harsh punishments for bringing shame to the family (e.g., being subject to honor killing for being raped); (2) chechnya has tried to remain a separatist state (from the russian confederation) for two decades, which has engendered two devastating wars with russia; and (3) during chechnya’s wars of independence, russian soldiers not only raped women and deported locals, but they also killed thousands of their husbands in the process, leaving a collective social disturbance that still resides in the psyche of black widows today (wilhelmsen, 2005). put simply, feminevil is a societal reaction to both inside and outside forces. this is what makes symbolic convergence theory (sct) ideal for conducting this analysis. developed by e.g. bormann (1972), sct posits that a group can unite to form a collective culture so as to achieve ambitious objectives. whether it is a word, phrase, narrative, or physical symbol, each tenet – (a) fantasy theme, (b) symbolic cue, (c) fantasy type, and (d) saga – merges with all the others to recognize anything that helps generate, increase, and sustain a rhetorical society’s awareness. for example, by adhering to radical islam, the chechen black widows believe that dying in the name of allah will restore their honor (fantasy theme) by being granted the opportunity to regain their virginity forever and by being able to pick the best looking man in paradise (fantasy type). one important conclusion is that under the slogan, “women’s courage is a disgrace to that of modern men,” the chechen black widows are able to show superiority over men overall, regardless of their losses. this is commonly conveyed with the “nothing to lose” fantasy type, where nobody can stop the widows’ madness. 2. feminevil: a definition feminevil is a growing phenomenon of girl-militancy in human violence. it is the ultimate violation of traditional femininity that – through unconceivable acts of violence like suicide bombings – engenders a more extreme form of feminism that calls for the end of male domination in a certain domain. in this context, that domain is terrorism – which, in many parts of the world, largely remains a male-led undertaking. this is analogous to “amazon feminism”, which rejects the idea that particular traits or interests are fundamentally masculine (tandon, 2008). in the case of chechen terrorism, feminevil alludes to terrorism committed by women as a result of violence caused by the russian government or military. hence, from the chechen women’s perspective, and explained through the tenets of symbolic convergence theory (sct), chechen black widows are bound to become feminevil, and not suddenly or accidently turning so. by tradition, women have been assigned supporting roles in society. this traditional allocation of fixed roles to women is called “homosocial reproduction”, a term developed by r. kanter (1977) to describe the process whereby certain expectations of societal power structures are preserved from generation to generation. through its longestablished rules and institutions, society rarely prescribes women’s roles within the boundaries of militancy. women are seen as wardens of traditional culture and are typically regarded as “life-givers” rather than “life-takers”. feminevil, then, breaks these time-honored boundaries and, consequently, “rocks the boat” by threatening the order and stability of the culture (ryan, 2002). in a sense, feminevil is akin to gender role reversal in terrorism. the actual black widow spider itself is something to behold. the female black widow spider is very poisonous. in comparison to its male counterpart, the adult female’s bite is toxic to humans. it also lives longer than the male and can sometimes consume the male after copulating with him (rajan, 2011). with this said, it is important not to paint chechen female terrorists with a broad brush because there is no universal “chechen women’s perspective”. let us consider the march 29, 2010 dual attack against the moscow metro. djennet abdurakhmenova and mariam sharipova could not have been more different; one was an adolescent with merely a high school education and the other held a master’s degree and taught computer science (bloom, 2012). of equal relevance are (1) the disparity across the spectrum of the different categories of women and (2) the distinctions between those who “signed up” to be suicide bombers and those who may have been forcibly recruited. in like fashion, chechen terrorist violence was not only a reaction to the russians’ rapes, adverse actions, and policies. for example, another notable explanation for chechen female terrorism lies in the role played by outside agitators (e.g., al-qaeda) who were instrumental in the radicalization process. a certain percentage of chechens were also radically religious prior to the russian “invasion” and the presence of outside agitators (toto, 2015). 3. chechen culture: general description chechnya is a southern russian republic that wants to break away from the russian confederation. while soviet republics like georgia and armenia became independent after 1991, chechnya has persistently tried to gain its own separate state (johnston, 2008). chechen culture lionizes independency and weaponries with solid codes of integrity that usually extend to bloody crusades. as g.m. derluguian (2005) puts it, chechen society was made natively egalitarian – a principle relating to private possession and joint security of the land. such traditions have often been misconstrued by the russians, and have 2 jonathan matusitz, demi simi consequently been posed as evidence of revolt, mutiny, and terrorism (russell, 2005). when the soviet union officially collapsed in 1991, a chance for independence became apparent. even with moscow repudiating chechnya as a self-governing state, dzhokhar dudayev, the first chechen president, was granted authority from the new parliament to make decisions toward freedom and state democracy (williams, 2000). chechens saw a unique opportunity to make their voices heard when a revolution against the russian government occurred in moscow. this is when they gathered to defend themselves against the perestroika (i.e., the communist party under soviet leader mikhail gorbachev) and the glasnost (i.e., gorbachev’s open policy reform) (johnston, 2008). the first chechen war occurred from 1994 to 1996, and the second chechen war started in 1999, but has not officially ended. to make their separatist objective well promoted and justified, many chechens have relied on islamic fundamentalist tactics. 4. chechen islamists and cultural brainwashing conventional wisdom holds that the perseverance of religious faith during battle is affected by a renowned apparatus: in times of disparity, people look to their god. considering the chechen situation, islam is not just a means of personal security; it is politically essential for understanding and organizing extreme events. the central islamic stimulus behind the two chechen wars did not stem from the general population itself, but a collection of warlords and politicians who attained prominent positions in chechnya due to war (moore, tumelty, 2009). using and accepting islamic slogans has been a beneficial tactic for mobilizing others. salman raduyev, a dangerous chechen separatist warlord, institutionalized the “jihad as allah’s path” and the “duty of every muslim to die while following that path” slogans that many chechen fighters memorized and enacted (wilhelmsen, 2005, p. 37). in chechen separatism, allah-ordained martyrdom in holy combat has continually been a religious zeal, which can only be inculcated through discipline and order (wilhelmsen, 2005). in fact, wilhelmsen (2005) contends that the creation of sharia courts during the first chechen war served to mold martyrs-to-be. the lack of state structure compelled the emergence of islamic policies where chechen presidents and leaders like yandarbiyev used them to fix the state. allegiance to islam is also an important resource for funding terrorist attacks according to warlords like raduyev who received financial assistance from various arab nations to strengthen jihadi forces (garner, 2013). other times protecting homeland would be the second objective. events like the attempted assassination of maskhadov, killings of media analysts, and the 1994 grozny terrorist bombings make this quite evident (lapidus, 2002). in 2002, chechen suicide bombings became a widespread tactic, mostly executed by chechen women called “black widows” – leaving putin to label chechens as the most violent terrorist group in russia’s history (wilhelmsen, 2005). understanding why so many chechen women participate in terrorism requires looking at their cultural treatment as a whole. 5. the treatment of women in chechnya before salafism or wahhabism emerged in chechnya in the 1990s, chechen women were never required to wear a hijab or cover themselves like many traditional middle eastern women. chechen women had more freedoms and were able to wear contemporary western apparel (eluding anything that showed cleavage) (speckhard, 2008). yet, sharia-compliant laws have become stringent to the point that campaigns like “headscarf is a chechen woman’s pride” are placed around the country (lokshina, 2012, p. 1). arranged marriage is another issue where women can sometimes be forced into marrying a man who has more than one wife. just recently, a chechen teen in moscow was mandated to be the second wife of a man roughly 30 years older than she was (holodny, 2015). women who do not comply with islamic codes in chechnya (and many other islamist countries for that matter) can be a victim of honor killing – a practice that is becoming more acceptable in that region. honor killings occur when women are accused of doing something shameful to the family, such as adultery, breaking rigid dress codes, or being rape victims (matusitz, 2012). chechen women are also employed in many occupations where men are incessantly by their side. this can lead to a life of traumatization (speckhard, 2008). chechens, on the whole, have agonized countlessly throughout the two wars of independence as russians occupied land and deported people, making it a collective social disturbance that resides in their psyche. by exploring how women in chechnya seek resistance and retaliation via suicide bombings, the authors hope to convey that feminevil is a societal reaction to both inside and outside forces; chechen women have become just as fierce as men, especially as there feminevil: the chechen black widows’ symbolic terrorism 3 is some kind of symbolic meaning – being their unity. this is why symbolic convergence theory (sct) is useful for communicating how groups rise and develop stronger bonds through symbols and shared stories. 6. symbolic convergence theory (sct): a description symbolic convergence theory (sct) is a communication framework that explains how groups form a customary symbolic cognizance to deliver a meaning, sensation, and intent to act. in essence, sct describes how people come to disclose a common symbolic truth (matusitz, 2021). developed by e.g. bormann (1972), sct shows how groups can unite to form a collective culture or mutual exposition of events. this can be done by telling stories or narratives where particular symbols emerge. then, as meaning develops, convergence transpires (terry, 2001). at the core of this human interaction is the concept of “fantasy”. sct postulates that fantasies are essential for explaining and interpreting experiences (shields, 2000). the goal is to recognize anything that helps generate, increase, and sustain a rhetorical society’s awareness (sovacool, brossmann, 2010). fantasy is a method that individuals use to embrace their social reality. consequently, they get closer by discovering meanings behind events that satisfy their psychosomatic and rhetorical desires (bormann, 1982). such symbolic realities may involve dogmas, positions, prophecies, and perspectives (sovacool, brassmann, 2010). to grasp the essence of sct, e.g. bormann (1972) developed four crucial tenets that are important to know so as to understand this study. they are fantasy themes, fantasy types, symbolic cues, and sagas. 7. fantasy themes a fantasy theme is any story that a group beholds in relation to what it considers a real experience (arsenault, 2013). within this theme lies a story that voices certain dramatic messages. this includes vivid event perceptions, character roles, dramatic personae (i.e., significant people or sentimentalized objects that appear within group exchanges), settings, and behaviors (bormann, 1996). like a theatrical play, these elements act as criteria for grasping content within a word, sentence, phase, slogan, document, or speech. from there, a rhetorical community is likely to arise as audience members start believing certain versions of a story to pass along. at this venture, fantasy themes convey a group’s rhetorical visualization or global perspective, which is ideal for comprehending the intent behind their purpose and supporters (bormann, 1972). to further extend and maintain group consciousness, members may also choose to impart symbols within or outside the group to improve an idea (arsenault, 2013). for instance, chinese muslim groups like the virtue prayer have “islamic anti-violence” and “nature of god’s knowledge” fantasy themes to help increase empathic communication and group commitment with symbols that set their identity apart from other violent groups (matusitz, 2021). 8. symbolic cues as with many storylines, members pledging to a certain fantasy theme will cultivate or reprocess code words, expressions, mottos, or nonverbal signs and signals that activate from prior common fantasies (terry, 2001). such cues are symbolic cues. they are said to stimulate crying or induce resentment, hate, love, affection, happiness, and many other emotions. as groups embrace particular fantasy themes, alongside their dramatis personae and symbolic cues, the separate themes usually merge into a grander storyline known as a rhetorical vision. this vision epitomizes the realization of the fantasy theme’s followers, generating a pretentious community with its own discrete global perspective (gunn, 2003). d. simi and j. matusitz (2014) found that female war rape survivors in the democratic republic of congo (drc) try circumventing sexual violence by acknowledging the forest as a symbolic cue; it invokes fear and eventually gets them to see that the forest is a place that must be avoided at all costs. 9. fantasy types fantasy types emerge when an amount of comparable storylines, characters, and scenes are pooled repeatedly among members in a given community. bormann (1996) cites that it can be a typical setting reiterated time and again by the same actors. fantasy types also imply that groups have many collective fantasy themes that suit a specific category. “the american dream” inkling contains many dramatic parts (e.g., hard work and determination) that end in a shock scene enhanced by the tale of “rags-to-riches” (terry, 2001). from a more political context, f. vultee (2012) analyzed 4 jonathan matusitz, demi simi forum comments about president barack obama on foxnews.com. many comments portrayed the president as evil under the fantasy type “the end is near” (p. 58). this coincides with the extremity of presidential assassination, describing a collective group of people who want to take back their country. as this suggests, online forums like foxnews.com create a new familiar environment: a symbolic reality constructed from interpersonal dialogues, media memorandums, and elite gestures that individuals utilize in a manner demanded by their surroundings (vultee, 2012). 10. saga a saga portrays a set of accomplishments that happened in the past, remains alive today, and will continue to endure in the future. it is a sort of testimonial that involves telling and re-telling the undertakings and trials in the existence of a person, group, society, or something larger like a nation (csapó-sweet, shields, 2000). the concept of accusation and relooking at historical messages typify the saga – a vivid explanation of past events; it works as a pivotal idea at which point members come together and create common compassions. l. frey (2005) suggested that groups may condemn or place the blame on out-group members to structure and manipulate negative actions held by in-group members. hence, the saga can be seen as a created and shared rhetorical vision that brings a group together through meaning by way of common fantasies (terry, 2001). for instance, establishing effective associations like the inter-congolese dialogue (icd) can lead to national harmony where leaders like ruth sando perry represent a saga by inspiring war rape survivors in the congo to manage their own civil rights groups (simi, matusitz, 2014). as we will see with the chechen black widows, symbols are used to depict the enemy (i.e., the russian government) and to seek vengeance against them. 11. applying sct to examine the chechen black widows’ feminevil several news accounts have emasculated the traditionally dominant roles of men and their involvement in chechen terrorism. this is largely because, since 2002, chechen women have executed many suicide terrorist attacks. under an operation called the “garden of the righteous,” admirers of shamil basayev – one of the most dangerous chechen islamists – are the utmost responsible for enlisting islamic feminevil fighters (kecskés, 2013). since the moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002, the chechen black widows have heightened their outbreaks against russian targets (cunningham, 2007; speckard, 2008). in fact, a. nivat (2005) claims that in comparison to women fighting in the palestinian conflict (5%), more chechen women appear to be actively partaking in the separatistjihadist conflict. considering the 23 suicide attacks within and outside chechnya since 2000, over 50% have been committed by women (andreescu, cosea, 2013). surpassing the global average by over a double the number killed (cunningham, 2007), the functioning triumph of chechen feminevil is worth examining. to begin, the “black fatima” story is something to behold. a “black fatima” is a woman teaching other women how to excel at feminevil; it is a mature woman covered in dark furs with a hook nose that enlists, teaches, uses drugs, and then grooms young chechen females to become suicide bombers. conversely, “zombification” codifies the anguish and mourning of chechen women after experiencing their husbands’ death at the hands of the russian forces (cunningham, 2007). russian officials also like to refer to them as young, widowed, frantic for vengeance, or as ill-fated targets coerced into assaults through extortion or rape. yet, this is not always the case according to many observers (abdullaev, 2004). as n. abdullaev (2004) puts it, it is not a profile that subsists; it is a group willing to smear this highly elevated and valued contract. through fantasy types, symbolic cues, fantasy types, and sagas, the actions of chechen black widows prove how dangerous feminevil can be. 12. fantasy themes chechen culture is one that involves fighting for revenge (speckhard, ahkmedova, 2006). revenge, in of itself, is a fantasy theme held by chechen black widows who believe that terrorism should be employed to destroy the enemy in response to any injustices (e.g., rape by russian soldiers and the thousands of chechen men who continue to disappear, receive torture, and die). feminevil is created out of a logic behind a cause, payback, and retaliation for (1) the demise of a loved one, (2) the desire to belong in a group or society that condones self-sacrifice, (3) the communal support for martyrdom that leads women to commit suicide bombings, and (4) the urge to break long-established boundaries imposed by a male-dominant society. feminevil has a positive correlation with the feminevil: the chechen black widows’ symbolic terrorism 5 symbolic concept of blood feud, whereby vengeance justifies getting even with the adversary. according to j. matusitz (2014), blood feud symbolizes a highly significant cleansing ritual where blood sterilizes indignity, killing rinses away dishonor, and vehemence obliterates degradation. therefore, with jihadism being cultivated by chechen rebel groups, chechen women engage in feminevil by repetitively fantasizing “revenge” against the russians by means of suicide terrorism. a certain number of chechen women view feminevil as a type of reversal of societal structure. this coincides with what c.e. gentry and k. whitworth (2011) called the black widows’ “narrative of desperation”, whereby women act as symbols of their own actions and pride. looking at a collection of black widow tales reported by victims of the 2002 moscow theater siege, female hostage takers imparted that their lives were broken and tormented. here is what one captor (who lost her brother and husband) had said: “nothing to lose, i have nobody left. so i’ll go all the way with this, even though i don’t think it’s the right thing to do” (cited in gentry & whitworth, 2011, p. 155). this sentence affirms women’s reactions and struggle for the entire despondency of the chechen nation. desperation overall becomes the spur for taking up the torch and becoming a suicide bomber. from 2000 to 2005 alone, close to thirty chechen women resorted to suicide attacks and 500 other women had already been prepared for this cause (speckhard, akmedova, 2006). the experience of rape and sexual violence by russian soldiers has been another inveigling factor. as m. bloom (2011) pointed out, the social stigma derived from a woman’s involvement with sexual violence in a male-ordered culture turns into a vigorous reason why she would want to react violently. looking at the third fantasy theme, “restoration of honor,” many black widows attack to regain the sacredness of their body. some of them feel the need for organization or motherhood depending on whether they are married with children or not (bloom, 2007). the incapacity to fulfill traditional social roles – like having children – places shame on women in islam, which may lead them to divorce and be labeled as an unmarriageable woman. to fix this dilemma, committing acts of feminevil permits women to reestablish individual and household pride (matusitz, 2014). this is one of the reasons why women are more likely to appear harmless (e.g., pretending to be pregnant) and pass through body searches and security checkpoints (berko, erez, 2007). m. gronnvoll and k. mccauliff (2013) maintain that female terrorists often disguise themselves as expectant mothers to cover explosives and sweet-talk their way through security, thereby potentially making the female gender a dangerous hazard. j. matusitz (2014) also mentioned that, besides being raped and pretending to be pregnant, women symbolically resort to feminevil to become role models for other women, escape emancipation, and retaliate due to infertility caused by sexual violation, singlehood, and the embarrassment of not conceiving. this explains the suicide bombers who could not bear children and brought down the russian jets in 2004 (alakoc, 2007). from this vantage point, the female body apexes a substantial quantity of cultural anxiety – the idea of breaking traditional norms of femininity. other than perceptions of honor, social structures that endorse female disparity and enslavement afford more burdens that could fascinate a radicalized female to suicide terrorism. opening one’s life to radical islam, together with men, can be viewed as a technique for women to surpass men in certain societal roles. this is akin to the aforementioned concept of gender role reversal. this is where islam and gender coincide, especially in regards to the last fantasy theme of “equality between men and women.” in this context, feminevil alludes to standpoint feminism – a position where women feel ameliorated to oversee and judge the system that raised them. black widows, then, can join forces to promote gender equality (and even superiority) via martyrdom (matusitz, 2014). regardless of fighting due to losing loved ones, chechen women like to compete and succeed at the same tasks as their male counter parts, which is prevalent in their high participation rates. individual loss and retribution – coupled by “revenge,” “desperation,” “restoration of honor,” and “equality between men and women” – become encouraging symbolic factors for women to use feminevil as the extent of self-ritual murder. in the next section, readers will find how chechen black widows plan attacks by picking certain symbolic calendar days and slogans. 13. symbolic cues victory day – a holiday launched by the soviet union who defeated germany during wwii on may 9th, 1945 – is something to behold in chechnya. looking at many suicide bombings that occurred in chechnya in 2005, one of them was carried out by three female suicide terrorists. one attacked in grozny while her companions went to assinovskaya. they had planned to attack on may 9th, but were 6 jonathan matusitz, demi simi caught beforehand, thus detonating themselves to prevent capture. former chechen president akhmad kadyrov was also killed on the same day in 2004 (speckhard, akhmedova, 2006). picking victory day is highly symbolic for chechen black widows because it gives them an opportunity to diminish military inclination. yet, military insurgents are not their only targets. under the slogan, “women’s courage is a disgrace to that of modern men,” black widows bear superiority over men as a whole, regardless of their bereavements (bloom, 2007, p. 99). however, if we had to choose the main symbolic cue to tie chechen women in general, it would reside in the term “black widow.” black widow is the epitome of feminevil as it is a code word for the extremist female chechen nonconformist. this label helps mythologize the chechen fatality in contemporary public imagination while deducing support for those women’s struggle by comparing them with violence to invoke fear among the masses. the “black widow” label was attributed by the russian press to women in chechnya (russell, 2005) due to their revenge (fantasy theme) for the demises of their spouses, fathers, siblings, or children (bloom, 2007). notwithstanding, chechen women are expected to show lunacy, ferociousness, and eerie-gendered behaviors that impend russian manhood. apprehensions about the impulses and schematic aptitude of chechens are emulated in their prognosis as black widows, referring exactly to metaphors of the actual black widow spider itself. the female black widow spider is very poisonous. in comparison to its male counterpart, the adult female’s bite is toxic to humans. it also lives longer than the male and can sometimes consume the male after copulating with him (rajan, 2011). feminevil can mean destroying the male counterpart, as it is reflected through the activities of chechen women insurgents. this is comparable to what has been proposed as an atrocious, abnormal condition of femininity. similar to the real black widow spider, chechen black widows live longer than their husbands; the average age of the chechen terrorist is close to thirty. this age difference is, in part, attributable to the fact that they have become widows of men killed by russian forces (matusitz, 2014). thus, female longevity seems like a kind of fortitude and durability in the façade of battle that is menacing to masculinity overall. such predispositions can be credited to the picture of the spider mating and devouring its mate because it touches the outrageous action of the cannibal – a person who parades manners that are cold-hearted, primitively visceral, remote, and certainly distorted against the average feminine comportment (e.g., traditional western representations of native women who ate western men). hence, by categorizing female chechen suicide bombers as black widows, it renders them as adept to murdering, cannibalizing, and, most of all, symbolically enervating the male gender altogether (rajan, 2011). 14. fantasy types upon considering all reasons why women turn to suicide bombings, many usually oversee homegrown elements that may enthrall women to a particular community. looking at the chechen symbol, the “she wolf,” f. banner (2006) recalled it as one’s ransom for the pack. he further explicated that the rational leeway of this figure of speech encompasses a female martyr who lacks feelings of self-worth, religion, and traditional hymns where national philosophies transform into habits of shaping the psyche via fantasies. when these philosophies mingle with outside events like the russian exploitation of the chechens, the fantasy theme of desperation will reenact as black widows share and converge through their experiences (banner, 2006). a case in point is the fact that many perpetrators will carry out acts according to time. in a study conducted by a. speckhard and a. akhmedova (2006), over 50% of suicide terrorists executed an attack six to eight years after a life-threating experience, particularly because harrowing disclosure in war ameliorates over time as one retrieves ideas from radical islam. nonetheless, elza gazueva is an extraordinary exception. she set off a detonation three months after watching her husband and brother being afflicted and murdered by russian authorities. boldly, she rushed to the head military agency and confronted the district commandant geidar gadzhiev who sentenced the torture and said, “do you remember me?” while killing the both of them (speckhard, akhmedova, 2006, p. 129). on the contrary, lida khildekhoroeva detonated a bomb on an armed bus in mozdok (north osetia) without any knowledge of who killed her family. killing people that may be innocent intersperses to formulate a common enemy script that has been repeated by 83% of suicide terrorists before setting off an explosive: “our revenge is to our enemies for killing our community members” (speckhard, akhmedova, 2006, p. 132). overall, these cases of chechen personal revenge embrace the “she wolf ” by indicating that feminevil is an apparatus of war feminevil: the chechen black widows’ symbolic terrorism 7 that condones complete annexation and violence – intentionally directed beneath the omens of the better moral or the praises of allah (denike, 2003). by extension, mass rapes are not rare in chechnya. black widows have pronounced sticking ammos to their midsections – a deed uncannily resonant of martyr behaviors – in order to exterminate themselves in place of becoming rape victims (banner, 2006). such desperation not only helps restore the honor of women (fantasy theme) who have become victims of russian violence or help women achieve equality (fantasy theme), but convey the tenacity that there is really nothing to lose. looking at several black widow attacks, the fantasy type of “nothing to lose” has been a recurrent script to show that nobody can stop their madness. although most of them are fighting politically for an independent chechen state, they tend to dress in long black muslim clothes and maneuver russian trucks jam-packed with explosives in dwellings of premeditated status, chiefly in army centers and residential locations (andreescu, cosea, 2013). many experts in terrorism (e.g., kurz, bartles, 2007; matusitz, 2014) also suggest that women tend to explode themselves because they are unproblematic when it comes to intimidating, doping, and psychologically derailing. russian news sources like nezavissimaya gazeta assert that women who hold a weapon are more dangerous as opposed to men, stating that women “have nothing to lose, and they are ready to take revenge, even at the price if their own lives” (shcheblanova, yarskaya-smirnova, 2009, p. 259). carrying out this objective, chechen black widows will convince others to retaliate against the government using brainwashing. looking back at the events in beslan, dubrovka, and nord ost, all terrorists were known to recap an extreme statement to hostages similar to the following: “your government doesn’t care about you, your lives are worthless to them” (speckhard, akhmedova, 2006, p 140). to sound even more literal, some hostage takers held up money to brag about how they made it past fraudulent representatives and to communicate to the hostages that they were being sold for money – all to show that the russian government does not care for the chechens (shcheblanova, yarskaya-smirnova, 2009). for those chechen women who adhere strictly to militant islam, there are some incentives for executing jihad, especially during the afterlife. matusitz (2012) cites that in the hadith (i.e., the second holiest scripture in islam), pious muslim women who become martyrs in holy war are promised to choose the most attractive man in paradise (fantasy type). this counteracts the collective suffering that black widows have faced with their daily experiences with men. as such, the main gist of “nothing to lose” can be best described by another hostage taker from the moscow theater crisis: “we have come to die. our motto is ‘freedom and paradise.’ we already have freedom in moscow. now we want paradise” (bloom, 2011, p. 46). if we combine the “nothing to lose” fantasy type with that of “paradise,” the chechen black widows did not intend to slaughter the hostages or conflict with russian militia being at war too long. rather, bloom (2007) says that they had sought for president vladimir putin to openly announce a chechen war finale so that russian forces could depart from the region – leading back to a united rhetorical vision of chechen independence. 15. sagas conveying the tenacity to resist by exploding one’s self is the apotheosis of chechen black widows. regardless of how they achieve their goal, they tend to have a role model that inspires them to stick together and propagate their extremist ideology successfully. this is highly apparent in the testimony of the first female chechen suicide bomber, khava barayev, who murdered close to thirty soldiers on a chechen military establishment (bloom, 2007). beforehand, she released a suicide video (a common tactic among many islamic martyrs) to express the collective black widow desire of national impartiality. she not only threatened russia, but she also inveigled men to participate for the cause. thirty-two men responded after hearing her state that they should “not take the women’s role by staying at home” (rajan, 2011, p. 74). by doing this, she attempted to bridge the gender gap and behold the third fantasy theme of “equality among men and women.” her influence has been so powerful that chechen revolutionaries even compose sonnets and tunes about her (bloom, 2007). one popular song portrays religious and national values along with black widow resentment: dear chechnya is filled with blood and became blood-red. our sisters are dead in flames of fire, but these sacrifices will not be useless. jihad is happening, for rescuing our homeland, maybe the whole nation will become shahids (cited in speckhard & akhmedova, 2006, p. 136). 8 jonathan matusitz, demi simi r.a. pape et al. (2010) further maintain that barayeva is reckoned accountable for provoking the black widow movement. indeed, about 25 chechen women from ages 15 to 37 have projected suicide assaults, counting the most severe – the orchestrated explosions of two airplanes in 2004 that ended in roughly 90 fatalities and the subway detonations in 2010 that decimated around 40 civilians. barayeva’s final statements, conferring to eye witnesses, emulate and extend upon the fantasy type of paradise: “i know what i am doing. paradise has a price, and i hope this will be the price for paradise” (cited in kecskés, 2013, p. 144). this sustains the notion of “nothing to lose,” and it gives other chechen women the opportunity to fictionalize about what they really want in life and in the afterlife. relating this to a story of another saga, one will find that failure can also be induced when young chechen females are sold into slavery, thereby losing their humanity and giving them no choice but to accept their mission. one black widow heroine reported that it was difficult to fight, especially when she conformed to wearing unfavorable fatigues (i.e., military trousers) in which she wore a skirt over. to restore their honor (fantasy theme), chechen women believe that dying for allah would grant their “humanity” back eternally upon entering paradise (ward, 2010). to explain such conformity, one has to understand that young muslim girls romanticize having affection with jihad warriors. many chechen women see their husbands’ martyrdom as something optimistically constructive (nemtsova, 2013). by joining the efforts behind their lost husbands, every black widow becomes a saga, in a sense, by becoming individual leaders for all women who want revenge (fantasy theme) for what they have endured. leaving with the words of one sochi olympics terrorist suspect, “i am ready to do anything. i can blow myself up, together with all these nonbelievers” (nemtsova, 2014, p. 1). this statement illustrates the apex of feminevil. 16. discussion what this paper has demonstrated is that sct can expose how feminevil is cultivated through the chechen black widows’ collective scripts – their fantasy themes, symbolic cues, fantasy types, and sagas – that increase the desire and impact of suicide attacks against the russian government, army, and even innocent civilians. as we have seen, with fantasy themes like “revenge,” “desperation,” “restoration of honor,” and “equality between men and women,” feminevil becomes the chechen black widows’ most efficient way to get even with russian soldiers who killed their husbands (and brothers) during the two chechen wars – an idea buttressed by blood feud. suicide terrorism not only helps a woman restore her honor; it also helps her break long established societal barriers, a phenomenon known as gender role reversal. feminevil serves to inveigle other women – particularly those raped by russian insurgents – to join martyrdom operations and answer a new call. more importantly, symbolic cues like russia’s victory day motivate chechen women to carry attacks on a russian sacred day so as to ruin the significance of the russian military. like the black widow spiders in north america, chechen women embrace their given “black widow” label to justify their retaliation for all they have lost – rendering them prone to being man-eaters and killers (bloom, 2007). sct illustrates how chechen black widows collectively relieve themselves from their own misery. many of them will carry out attacks regardless of whether they know the reprobates. they repeatedly tell victims that revenge involves killing those who murder anyone in their circle of trust. they mutually think that they have “nothing to lose” (fantasy type) as they try to convince others that the russian government could care less about them. martyrdom further mitigates their shame of being rape victims by believing that allah will renew their virginity indefinitely and allow them to choose the most attractive man in paradise (fantasy type). for that reason, the concept of feminevil helps explain how, from the chechen black widows’ perspective, committing extreme acts like suicide terrorism is acceptable as long as it is done in the name of allah. dedicated to the separatist-jihadist struggle, it is a saga like the one of the khava barayeva story that inspires chechen women to not only combat for an independent state, but also fight to maintain gender equality. conventional wisdom holds that men are the main perpetrators of extremist violence. yet, this analysis of chechen black widows proves that the female gender can be just as violent. above all, feminevil attests to the fact that the nature of female participation in terrorism is changing. what this also implies is that the terrorist or suicide bomber no longer has a clear profile. with this in mind, it is the authors’ hope that this analysis has edified readers on a rising form of violence that has aggrieved innumerable 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memory in the 1994–1996 and 1999–2000 russo-chechen wars, history & memory, 12(1), 101–134. doi: 10.2979/his.2000.12.1.101 feminevil: the chechen black widows’ symbolic terrorism 11 journal of geography, politics and society 2023, 13(1), 42–54 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2023.1.05 technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports (finding innovations to accelerate the implementation of electric regional aviation) ejike okonkwo school of management, regional studies, university of vaasa, wolffintie 32 p.o. box 700, fi-65101 vaasa, finland, orcid: 0000-0003-4622-5785 e-mail: ejike.okonkwo@uwasa.fi citation okonkwo e., 2023, technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports (finding innovations to accelerate the implementation of electric regional aviation), journal of geography, politics and society, 13(1), 42-54. abstract accelerating technological transitions (tt) from carbon-based aviation to electric regional aviation (era) is contingent on increased awareness and innovative ideas. finding innovations to accelerate the implementation of electric regional aviation (fair) aims to facilitate tt to electric aviation in the kvarken-nordland region of finland, sweden, and norway. this paper reviewed 13 reports used in the fair project. these reports suggest that tt will provide many socioeconomic and environmental benefits. these include increased connectivity to new areas with zero operational carbon footprints, reduced cost, and travel time. however, most of the investigations in the fair reports focused on economic and technical aspects. studies suggest that tt is also contingent on human factors such as public engagement and participation. therefore, this paper notes that it is imperative to increase the knowledge of era among young people in higher educational institutions in the region, particularly given that they constitute an integral part of the aviation market. in addition, although the three universities participating in the fair project have energy-related studies, which are essential in advancing knowledge on tt, they lack aviation-specific courses. this paper proposes that, in their next agenda, regional actors could advocate for the introduction of a multidisciplinary aviation-centred course into the university curriculum. the idea is that such inclusion not only will increase the knowledge of era and the chances for accelerated innovative ideas in the implementation process but could also motivate and spur increased engagement in climate actions among young people. key words electric regional aviation, fair reports, technological transitions, kvarken region. received: 05 january 2023 accepted: 03 march 2023 published: 31 march 2023 1. introduction the fair project (finding innovations to accelerate implementation of electric regional aviation) began in 2020-2022 to support “the early and efficient commercialisation of electric regional flying in the kvarken-nordland region» of finland, sweden, and norway (final..., 2022, p. 2). many actors participated in the fair project, which has four main objectives: determining the best location for era implementation, examining the potential business and financial models for era implementation, and promoting the market for era by increasing public awareness (the kvarken..., 2022). the major financer of the project was the eu funding through the interreg baltic-atlantic program. at the same time, the national and regional government, as well as the nordic council of ministers, and municipal and private organisations, constitute the co-founders (the kvarken..., 2022). the project is broad; hence, the scope of this paper only covers 13 reports used in this phase of the project. fair catalyses the kickstart of a lengthy process of implementing era. this paper suggests the possible areas to be considered by the regional actors, especially if they have not been considered in the broader project plan transcending the reviewed reports. in other words, the paper captures only the aspects presented in the reports. figure 1 below shows the regions that constitute the fair project and the participating universities: technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports 43 ostrobothnia, southern ostrobothnia and central ostrobothnia, finland; västerbotten and the municipality of örnsköldsvik, sweden; the county of nordland, norway. kvarken-nordland region universities in the fair project nord university university of vaasa umea university implementing electric regional aviation research institutes of sweden fig. 1. . regional actors in the fair project source: final..., 2022, p. 2. the fair project reinforces the claim that energy transition “by region” is driven by institutional actors that collaborate towards co-creating knowledge and finding possible solutions for accelerated decarbonisation (coenen et al., 2021). the increasing demand for sustainable and lowcarbon transportation indicates the evolving societal preference for shifting business strategies to less emitting technological solutions (mäenpää et al., 2021). in that case, the aviation sector is increasingly gaining attention because considerable decarbonisation gains are expected if the right strategies and policies that enable the transition to electric regional aviation are established (final..., 2022). electric regional aviation (era) is “a new fast and clean mode of transportation, with zero emission alternative optimal for small volumes, and serves as a tool for regional accessibility” (mäntynen et al., 2021, p. 4). the adoption of new sustainability measures will contribute to technological transitions (tt), which consist of a “change from one sociotechnical configuration to another, involving the substitution of technology, as well as changes in other elements” (geels, 2002, p. 1258). the kvarken-nordland region has favourable conditions that support the transition to electric regional aviation (era) and potential benefits from such transitions. for instance, the region is already a hub to different energy companies interested in sustainable energy solutions; hence, they are expected to boost the actualisation of era (mäntynen et al., 2021). the region also has solid cross-border collaboration within the kvarken region (löfmarck et al., 2022). an electric-powered ferry was recently launched as an offshoot of the collaboration. the aurora botnia ferry is regarded as an environmentally friendly travel vessel and operates between vaasa and umeå (wasaline, 2020). by leveraging the outlined favourable conditions, many positive impacts could accrue from the shift to electric regional aviation (era). these include reduced travel time due to long waiting and transfer 44 ejike okonkwo periods for big airport passenger planes, reduced emissions, and improved east-west connectivity challenges between finland and sweden (mäntynen et al., 2021, p. 14). similar studies reinforce the claim that era can substantially reduce or halve travel time due to the direct take-off and landing and high flexibility regarding the location of its operational facilities (westin, 2021a). in addition, era is very suitable in regions separated by water or areas lacking rail connections (smedberg et al., 2022, p. 29). the strait in kvarken is an excellent example of a potential beneficiary with the implementation of era as it will facilitate competitive travel time across the waters separating some cities such as “örnsköldsvik, umeå and skellefteå on the western side of the strait with jakobstad and vaasa on the eastern side” (westin, 2021b, p. 21). in other words, electric regional aviation (era) will ensure the crossborder interconnection of areas within relative proximity in the kvarken region. despite the outlined potential benefits, the aviation industry in the kvarken-nordland region is still characterised by a demand and supply gap, a high price level, significant passenger focus, lack of competition, and long travel time (ibid, p. 4). currently, “the time in the air in conventional aircraft is approximately 160 minutes, adding transfer time to include two aircraft changes at airports, the total travel time could reach 380 minutes, at an average door-to-door speed of 200 km/h” (westin, 2021a, p. 3). effective governance driven by different international institutions can accelerate the implementation of era (smedberg et al., 2021). notwithstanding the array of institutions in the aviation industry, some governance challenges still linger in the tt process (ibid, p. 20). for example, there is still an absence of a standardised regulation for electric aviation infrastructure in determining the battery utilisation lifespan (smedberg et al., 2022, p. 30). also, there are long bureaucratic procedures concerning regulatory issues and the testing process of emerging technologies (westin, 2021b). electric regional aviation is an emerging area. regional actors working in the fair project are better situated to provide governance that could influence how the knowledge of electric regional aviation (era) is communicated or spread in the region, especially at the citadel of learning. this paper is a review of reports from the fair project. figure 2 below highlights the three nordic countries, norway, sweden, and finland, constituting the kvarken-nordland region. the yellow area indicates the routes for the planned implementation of electric regional aviation. the narrow space between finland and sweden is the kvarken strait, and era will ensure connectivity across the waters that separate both areas. fig. 2. the area for era in the kvarken-nordlad region source: the region..., 2022. technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports 45 this paper aims to find aspects considered vital towards implementing era that has received little or no attention in the fair reports, as the underexplored aspects could also contribute to the aviation industry’s technological transitions and decarbonisation process. in addition, it seeks to understand how regional actors, i.e., the universities participating in the project, can strengthen the implementation of era. hence, the following questions guide the study: why is an introductory multidisciplinary course on era important in the technological transition process in the region? how can this introductory course accelerate the implementation of fair in the region? theoretically, this study will advance the application of technological transitions theory for an increased understanding of factors that can accelerate innovative ideas towards the implementation of era. empirically, the study reveals an existing gap that should be the focus of regional actors in their next agenda towards the implementation of electrical aviation. the paper comprises the following sections: introduction and background to era, theoretical underpinning, materials, and methods, followed by a review of the fair reports, discussion, and conclusion. 2. theoretical framework for technological transitions (tt) regional energy transitions are complex and involve changes in the technological landscape (coenen et al., 2021, p. 221). technological innovation is also considered a vital energy transition pathway (hess, sovacool, 2020; coenen et al., 2021). technological transition (tt) is a major “long-term technological transformation in the society; it involves not only technological changes but also changes in elements such as user practices, regulation, industrial networks, infrastructure, and symbolic meaning” (geels, 2002, p. 1257). other scholars alluded to the claim that different factors or heterogeneous sets of elements must align or combine to ensure tt (huges, 1987; rip, kemp, 1998). for instance, human factors accelerate energy transition through policies that change technology trajectory, public engagement, and participation (sovacool et al., 2020). research suggests that people take more climate action and will likely participate in the tt process when they are better informed (dickson, 2005). regional actors act as agents of change that construct and influence the energy transition process (coenen et al., 2021). the academic institution is essential to collective action in the transition process (creutzig, kapmeier, 2020, p. 1). therefore, having a well-informed public is imperative to overcome the many factors that create a communication gap and affect the knowledge of transition initiatives within society. these factors include misconceptions, misinformation, lack of interest, and limited access to information (creutzig, kapmeier, 2020, p. 1). in other words, education on climate change and transitions can accelerate effective response (heiss et al., 2013). the fair reports is one way in which regional actors disseminate scientific knowledge towards the implementation of era. without their input in conjunction with other stakeholders, the goal of tt in the aviation sector will likely not be achieved because the technology requires human agency or actions to become meaningful and valuable. in other words, “technology has no power, does nothing, only in association with human agency, social structures and organisations do technology fulfil functions” (geels, 2002, p. 1257). while the dissemination of scientific research contributes to bridging the knowledge gap on the energy transition trajectory, it has been criticised for being inadequate in encouraging effective climate action on various levels, such as among individuals, due to its linear information-theoretic model (ibid). this model assumes that the recipient learns information provided by the sender and that communication fails if the information is not correctly decoded by the recipient (ibid, p. 1). the studies further suggested that participatory communication is a more effective way to increase understanding of climate change and tt. participatory communication often occurs in classrooms at educational institutions where students can actively learn about society’s socioeconomic and technological trends. thus, having a varied source of information can enhance knowledge construction and possible climate action (nerlich et al., 2010). empirical inquiry suggests that some context has embraced the introduction of climate and transition-related education into the school curriculum (chang, pascua, 2017). the focus of this paper is to look at the need for introducing an aviation-centric course in the curriculum of the three partner universities in the fair project because this will not only complement the scientific reports on the transition to era but will also contribute to participatory communication, increased awareness, and innovative ideas vis-àvis technological transition within the university community, particularly among international students and staff who may be unaware of the tt trends and development in the region’s aviation 46 ejike okonkwo sector. theories contribute to advancing contextual understanding of new realities within a geographical context (gong, hassink, 2020, p. 475). this paper extends the application of tt theory to the context of the kvarken region, where electric regional aviation is an emerging new reality; hence, it becomes imperative to facilitate the understanding and analysis of this phenomenon through a theoretical lens. 3. materials and methods this paper is a case study of the fair reports using the narrative literature review approach. a case study ensures an in-depth analysis of a phenomenon of interest (crowe et al., 2011). by focusing on a single case (the fair reports), it was possible to analyse and interpret the information in the reports to generate new knowledge that can contribute to accelerated innovation for implementing era. a narrative literature review is a “comprehensive narrative synthesis of previously published information; this type of review is typical in social science research” (green et al., 2006, p. 103; juntunen, lehenkari, 2021, p. 2). there is no standardised structure or procedure for a narrative literature review; however, the review should be conducted to align with the journal structure (baumeister, leary, 1997; ferrari, 2015). the key steps prescribed for narrative review were followed here (ferrari, 2015). they include stating the scope and rationale of the review. the fair reports were selected because they are among the most comprehensive context-specific studies on the technological transition in the kvarken region’s electric regional aviation (era). to determine the scope, the webpage kvarken. org was navigated to become acquainted with the fair project. then, the final report (summary) was read, which contained an embedded hyperlink to other individual reports utilised in the project. as part of the inclusion criteria, only the reports published between 2020 and 2022 were selected. thus, 298 pages from 13 reports and information sheets publicly available in english on kvarken. org used in the fair report were reviewed. all the reviewed reports were cited and referenced to ensure the information was credible, verifiable, and valid. the summary of each document used in the fair reports was presented; afterwards, the trends in the content of the reports were identified. after that, the findings were separated and categorised based on their relationships. from the review, five categories were identified, and a code was developed for them: technical – t, historical – h, strategic – s, contextual – c and practical & innovative – pi. by so doing, it was possible to highlight the aspect covered by the reports and identify essential areas that the regional actors in the implementation process of era can consider. accelerating innovation for era via participatory communication in the university setting is one aspect that regional actors could consider. studies suggest that this communication or information dissemination approach is more engaging among young people (creutzig, kapmeier, 2020). to understand how regional actors, i.e., the universities (nord university, umeå university, and the university of vaasa) participating in the project can contribute to accelerate innovative ideas for era, the english-based study programmes and courses available on the university’s websites of the three universities that participated in the fair project were scrutinised to ascertain if there are aviation-related courses based on their learning outcomes. energy, transportation, climate change, innovation, and sustainability-related programmes were included because they are relevant to the study, i.e., they can support tt to era. also, the aviation industry is within the transport sector; hence, the search criteria for courses offered at the three universities in the fair project were based on courses that revolve around the elements in the sociotechnical configuration in transportation (cf. geels, 2002, p. 1258). for easy access, the findings were added as a hyperlink in table 1. the investigation enabled supporting the proposal for an introductory course on era in the curriculum. lastly, the technological transitions theory was used as an analytical approach to facilitate the understanding of technological transition in the aviation industry in the region and to make sense of the findings. it also facilitates the understanding of how the university, as one of the actors in the fair project, can contribute to participatory communication, which could strengthen the implementation of era in the kvarken region. 4. a review of the fair reports this section provides a narrative literature review, i.e., a summary of the fair reports to ascertain areas that could be added to the next agenda of the regional actors in the implementation process of electric regional aviation (era). the reports were reviewed under the following categories based on their key arguments; the historical and technical background of the aviation sector, the practical and technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports 47 innovative aspects which cover the prerequisites for era and ways to optimise the services, and lastly, the strategic aspects, which focus on leveraging the existing regional energy transition strategies to maximise the potential benefits of era. in addition, part of this section scrutinised the courses currently offered at the three universities participating in the fair project. the findings reveal how these actors can strengthen the search for innovative ideas towards accelerated era implementation. 4.1. technical and historical aspects one of the fair preliminary studies examined essential technological components of an electric aircraft (smedberg et al., 2020a). three types of electric aircraft based on their energy storage systems were identified. these include battery electric aircraft, fuel cell aircraft (hydrogen), and hybrid electric aircraft; the latter are of two types: a parallel hybrid and a serial hybrid (ibid, p. 1). a parallel hybrid is a “plane with an electrical and an internal combustion engine. in a serial hybrid, the propellers are powered by one or several electrical motors. the electricity comes from batteries or fuel cells and a generator powered by a turbine engine” (ibid, p. 3). electric-powered engines are more costeffective because they require less operational infrastructures, such as shorter runways, primarily because of their ability to take off and land vertically. these innovative technologies are also efficient and have faster acceleration, reduced noise, and emissions compared to carbon-based aircraft (ibid, p. 1). the challenge remains that it can only travel within a short range due to its energy storage capacity. the study also highlighted the leading industries and contexts where these aircraft are manufactured. pipistrel (slovenia), magnix (seattle, us), zeroavia (u.k. and u.s.), h2fly (germany), and ampaire (u.s.). the subsequent investigation provided an overview of the energy carriers used in the development of electric aviation and the challenges in the development of battery technologies which are a crucial component in electric aircraft (smedberg et al., 2020b). according to the report, batteries and hydrogen are the two leading energy carriers and can be combined with other energy sources. despite the importance of batteries, their current storage capacity and the production cost are the two main hurdles in the development process. the absence of international regulation on the length of usage or the lifespan of batteries in the industry constitutes an additional challenge (ibid, p. 1). beside the regulatory issues, there are other ethical and sustainability concerns regarding where and how table. 1. summary of findings from the review of the fair reports reports areas covered category smedberg et al. (2020a) evolution of electric aircraft. advantages & challenges (storage issues) t smedberg et al. (2020b) overview of energy carriers governance challenges, ethical and sustainability issues t smedberg et al. (2021) prerequisite for era (charging infrastructure &effective governance) t westin, beijar (2022) historical accounts of aviation in the kvarken region h mäntynen et al. (2021) driving factor for era (pandemic, global electrification in the aviation sector) c westin (2021a) the reason for the absence of era (prioritisation of profit for international routes) c westin (2021b) pros of era (reduced emissions, low energy consumption & less disruption on the landscape by infrastructure development c smedberg et al. (2022) prerequisites for era (charging infrastructure, & funding) pi solvoll & hanssen (2022) the obligation of the public service (mapping out the energy requirements, learning from others, collaboration) pi peeters et al. (2021) prototype for the management of air travel pi mäenpää, kalliomäki (2022) s3 economic strategy a boost for era implementation s mäenpää et al. (2021) the potential impact of era (cross-border cooperation, potential new routes); next steps s technical – t historical – h strategic – s contextual – c practical & innovative – pi source: own study. 48 ejike okonkwo the raw materials required for battery technologies are exploited. the study suggested that recycling will contribute to the battery industry’s sustainability and reduce the raw materials needed to produce new batteries and other essential technologies. follow-up scrutiny also provided a technical overview of the infrastructural requirements for era (smedberg et al., 2021). charging infrastructure, charging standards, electrical grid, and fuel cell infrastructure are some of the vital infrastructures that can support the implementation of era (ibid, p. 17). moving on to other inquiries, the historical accounts of aviation within this context have been investigated to appreciate better the planned technological transitions to electric aviation in the kvarken region (westin, beijar, 2022). three key dates are significant in the historical evolution of aviation. these are 1918, when the first flight passed the strait of kvarken, 1951 when the first commercial flight began in the region, and 1960 when regular aviation was initiated by one of the biggest commercial operators, and finnair/aero o.y. began operating in the region (ibid, p. 3). 4.2. contextual aspect studies by j. mäntynen et al. (2021) include the covid-19 pandemic as one of the factors that accelerated a demand for a new form of sustainable aviation and a transition to era in the region and globally. the pandemic led to less demand for air travel due to travel restrictions, especially on leisure trips, and the substitution of many business trips with virtual meetings. consequently, this led to the government’s collapse and bailout of most airlines; that being the case, sustainable measures are expected to salvage the industry. another driving factor is the electrification agenda, a current trend in the global aviation industry. electrification suits smaller aircraft, which fit into cross-regional travel within proximities. also, the pandemicorchestrated crisis has opened new opportunities to test sustainable fuels and new technology vis-à-vis electric aviation. furthermore, the report posits that era in the region is a sustainable and cost-effective tool for meeting the mobility demand and supply; for example, it will contribute to solving the connectivity challenges in the region via a new business model focusing on a smaller number of passengers. additionally, era will also serve as a link to the global and international markets. most notably, it will provide new supplies that were once limited, such as new routes. lastly, era will support economic activities, such as the export and tourism industries and improve the competitiveness of industries domiciled in the region. these changes will not be drastic but slow-paced due to many interdependent factors in the industry (mäntynen et al., 2021, p. 6). despite all the expected benefits of era that can be leveraged, l. westin (2021a) examined the reason for the absence of era. the prioritisation of profitable international routes is one of the challenges. the reason is that electric aircraft are small and do not provide the same profit margin compared to conventional carbon-based aircraft with larger passenger capacity. the unavailability of era thus exacerbates the transportation challenges around the kvarken strait, which not only lacks road and rail connection to the cities around the strait but is also confronted by irregular commercial aviation routes despite the vast potentials and opportunities regular aviation could have provided compared to other modes of transport that are still non-existent (ibid, p. 1). the study also reinforces the claim that reduced travel time will be one potential benefit of implementing tt in the industry. it argues that achieving a sustainable era will be contingent on adopting the right strategies to create the needed market, such as increasing the region’s population. subsequent research reinforced most of the points from preceding investigations on the driving factors, opportunities, and challenges of electric aviation (westin, 2021b). these include how the change within the sociotechnical landscape in the health sector (covid-19) facilitated the societal demand for tt towards greener and sustainable mobility. for example, the reduced travel and air traffic orchestrated by the pandemic resulted in a significant reduction of emissions, thus indicating what could be achieved with the transition to electric aviation. the claim that era will ensure reduced travel time within the region is reinforced, even though the storage capacity of batteries persists and limits long travel destinations. it concurs with previous studies, which claim that the region’s population size, inhabitants’ income levels, the region’s attractiveness for tourism and other investment purposes, the general travel preference among the residents and the cost involved are some of the determinants for the demand of era in the region. currently, the population size, to a large extent, does not support the needed market for regular and profitable era. hence, measures to attract more people to the region are imperative. one option is increased industrialisation, which leads to job creation and added value to regional assets (ibid, p. 10). the supply side for era is contingent on the cost of the airline, offered fares, and airport fees. the technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports 49 region could also benefit from shifting from being only a consumer of aviation services to a producer of electrical aviation products by leveraging the emerging battery production in the nordic cluster (ibid, p. 12). as a point of departure from previous inquiries, the studies claim that the justification for tt in the industry is due to the environmental impacts and other existing challenges of carbon-based aviation, such as operational greenhouse emissions and the weak east-west connectivity in the region, which has been unabated by the traditional aviation system (westin, 2021b). 4.3. practical and innovative aspects subsequent examination analysed the regional prerequisites for era (smedberg et al., 2022). charging infrastructure (stationary, mobile or a battery backup solution) is identified as one of the main requirements; their electrical demand and charging time vary (ibid, p. 14). the report argues that an airside connection point is currently the most suitable due to the absence of a global charging standard because this provides charging flexibility at airports. also, they posit that more gain from this infrastructure will accrue to airports that own and operate the charging infrastructure (ibid, p. 30). further investigation into the national aviation goals and the ownership structure of airports in the kvarken region reveals a variation in ownership. for example, in comparison, norway has more stateowned airports, followed by finland and sweden being the last. these variations impact regional airports’ era infrastructural, financial support and investment trajectory, and policymakers face the concomitant challenges (ibid, p. 28). lastly, the report notes that international efforts and agreements establishing international standardised rules for charging infrastructures are vital to curbing emissions in the industry. furthermore, financial assistance to regions will contribute towards developing these infrastructures. one option is via support from the connecting europe facility (cef) fund of the european union (ibid, p. 17). the subsequent studies by g. solvoll, t.e.s. hanssen (2022) suggest that the public service must fulfil an obligation towards implementing era. the key argument is that the government can facilitate era in the region by ascertaining the power and energy requirements. some ways to achieve this involve establishing strong communication, crosssector and institutional stakeholder cooperation and collaboration; this could be between suppliers and subcontractors (ibid, p. 7). in addition, learning from others is considered a binding obligation that can contribute to the development of era. that being the case, intra-sectoral success stories or experiences in the tt within the transport industry in the region can provide valuable lessons across sectors. while the advantages of era have been highlighted earlier, further enquiries suggest an innovative, albeit imaginary, idea that can be used to manage air travel to increase travel flexibility (peeters et al., 2021). the study introduces fair volta, a booking website for an imaginary airline volta, specialising in electric air travel in the region (ibid, p. 1). volta is “an imaginary 10-seater electric airline that offers volta on-demand travel with flexible departure times and prices for the kvarken region” (ibid, p. 1). volta provides services that are different from what exists in traditional airlines, such as «door to door, or address to address, instead of airport to airport» booking to ensure the use of the closest airports for trips (ibid, p. 1). secondly, the services will provide flexible times and prices, meaning «planes can leave at any time, and the schedule will be based directly on the demand of passengers» (ibid, p. 1). stakeholders are evaluating volta to determine its pros and cons in regional aviation. 4.4. strategic aspects a. mäenpää, h. kalliomäki (2022) provided a different dimension to the fair project. they examined the potential role of smart specialisation in implementing electric aviation in the region. smart specialisation (s3) is a place-based economic strategy developed by the european commission so that regions can align their development trajectory to suit their existing strengths, potentials, capabilities, expertise, and knowledge (mccann, ortega-argilés, 2015). one of the main goals of the region is to transition from carbon-based to green mobility; hence “electric aviation would fit alongside forthcoming battery production activities, as well as the aurora botnia ferry project for the transport of human and material resources” (ibid, p. 3). they argue that new areas for s3 are emerging in the region, such as the push for electric aviation and the establishment of the fair project to facilitate the implementation process. other areas include the emergence of battery clusters and regional networks, such as the nordic battery belt, to accelerate crossborder cooperation. era could benefit by leveraging these energy transition trends, and the s3 strategy can thus contribute to identifying the potential path for the shift to electric aviation in the region. lastly, stakeholders’ view on the potential impact of era and its effects on cross-border cooperation, business models, potential new routes and the 50 ejike okonkwo possible next steps have been examined via a surveybased investigation (mäenpää et al., 2021). many respondents believe that era could have a positive impact because it will increase accessibility to the region, especially to smaller cities and rural areas. also, it will ensure several flexible and smaller costeffective planes that support commuting to work from multiple locations across the region, support business operations and cooperation, e.g., increasing collaboration via face-to-face meetings crucial for building trust. all these can be accomplished with little or no environmental footprint. furthermore, different business model could be adopted for era, such as «hybrid models with scheduled flights and charter options» (ibid, p. 16). finally, regarding new era routes, some of the most preferred suggestions are a line between skellefteå and kokkola, followed by a line between vaasa and umeå (ibid, p. 16). the report reveals that the possible next steps to support the early implementation of era can be concrete (fast-paced) measures, such as infrastructural development, or research-based (slower-paced) measures that involve organising “competitions (hackathons) at universities for developing business models” (ibid, p. 17). the report concluded that the potential impacts are expected to vary and cannot be all determined now, probably due to its early stages and evolving nature. as shown in table 1, there are similar areas of alignment between the reports. most of them provided background-related information on era in the kvarken region. in contrast, others focused similarly on the technological evolution within the aviation sector, the challenges, and the possible benefits of technological transitions in the industry. the identified benefits of era reoccurring in the reports include improved regional connectivity and cooperation, low operational costs, reduced emissions, and travel time. demographic-related issues and the need to create more attractive opportunities towards increasing the potential market for era also constitute a recurring theme in the reports. other similar focus areas in the reports are the emphasis on the existing institutional gap in terms of the absence of standardised international regulations on charging infrastructure and battery lifespan or usage, which constitutes some of the challenges that could hinder the implementation of era. while these reports covered a broad scope, particularly the technical aspects of era, an important point to note is that only the online survey in the inquiries by a. mäenpää et al. (2021) directly involved the opinion of staff working within the university context concerning era and the possible educational needs and measures in the implementation phase of era. the suggested measure or next steps include organising competitions at the universities. 4.5. programmes and courses at the three universities in the fair project this paper proposes that the regional actors in the fair project should work towards ensuring the introduction of a basic introductory multidisciplinary course on electric aviation, herein referred to as era_101 into the university curriculum of the three partner universities in the fair project. table 2 below indicates that many of the courses and research at these universities already deal with energy transitions, sustainability, and transportrelated areas; however, none are explicitly targeted at conferring the basic knowledge of era in the region. era_101 will further increase the knowledge of era and the chances for more innovative ideas for accelerated tt in the aviation industry. 5. discussion changes in the technological landscape contribute to energy transitions within the regional context (coenen et al., 2021, p.221). in addition, different factors or heterogeneous sets of elements combine to ensure tt (huges, 1987; rip, kemp, 1998). the fair reports, on the one hand, provide an insight into various technical, historical, and economic factors essential in era’s implementation. studies suggest that human factors accelerate energy transition e.g., through policies that change the technology trajectory, public engagement, and participation (sovacool et al., 2020). hence, the collaboration by regional actors in the fair project enables the exchange of ideas and knowledge essential for accelerating innovation for the technological transition from carbon to electric-based aviation. the participation of regional actors in the project also reinforces the claim that “technology has no power, does nothing. only in association with human agency, social structures and organisations do technology fulfil functions” (geels, 2002, p. 1257). on the other hand, the fair reports provided little coverage on accelerating the knowledge of the current trends in era via a participatory approach at the universities. only the studies by a. mäenpää et al. (2021) covered issues relating to the role of education and research in the implementation phase of era in the region. it notes that one option for enhancing the knowledge of era can be via organising “competitions (hackathons) at universities for developing business models” (ibid, p. 17). technological transition to electric aviation in the kvarken region: a review of the fair reports 51 even though the paper supports the claim that education and research will play an integral role towards generating knowledge that can be translated into practicalities in era, such as battery-related research and training, it did not provide a deeper insight into when and how to integrate education and research into the university curriculum in the implementation process of era. the study only concluded that “more knowledge is needed, but it is also important to connect experts of varying fields to gather global knowledge and implement it in the kvarken region” (ibid, p. 18). the introduction of a multidisciplinary course on electric aviation, herein referred to as era_101, into the curriculum of the three universities, as shown, is essential in the technological transitions (tt) in the kvarken region. against this backdrop, regional actors such as universities can act as agents of change, which can influence the energy transition process (coenen et al., 2021). hence, the rationale for this proposal firstly stems from the prevailing contextual conditions which shape transitions trajectory (coenen et al., 2021). for example, the planned increase in the population and demographic size in the region is geared towards providing a market for a sustainable era (westin, 2021a). that being the case, young people in higher educational institutions will probably constitute a sizable portion of the projected future new arrivals in the region. with the ministry of education and culture’s (2016) strategy of increased internationalisation of studies in finland, many young people will probably be migrating from outside the region, thus forming a large part of future residence. most of them will not be well informed about era due to several causative factors. for instance, misconceptions about the complex systems in the region on climate change strategies and policies. also, the different socioeconomic system they will be immigrating from, which differs from the prevailing realities in their new region of residence, is another militating factor. earlier studies show how the stated factors influence knowledge and behaviours regarding climate and environmental issues (creutzig, kapmeier, 2020, p. 1). the highlighted factors could impact young people’s decisions and choices towards a greener transportation alternative when they have inadequate knowledge. as f.w. geels (2002, p. 1257) observes, “tt involves not only technological changes, but also changes in elements such as user practices, regulation, industrial networks, infrastructure, and symbolic meaning”. hence, an introductory multidisciplinary course on electric aviation could increase the knowledge and interest in era among students who will constitute an integral part of the aviation market. table 2. energy, climate, transport, and sustainability courses. universities courses and programmes in english scope university of vaasa sustainable and autonomous systems smart energy, industrial management industrial systems analytics strategic project management ict, digitalisation, business studies, supply chain management, technology management, & innovations, data analysis, project implementation in energy, logistics, transportation, operations management, smart & flexible energy system. nord university business models for circular economy energy management business & governance in the arctic geopolitics and energy innovation and change processes sustainability in practice considering sustainability sustainable resource management, energy governance and business, energy policies, sustainable development, green transition, geopolitics, innovation. umeå university environmental science transportation design advanced materials analyses of environmental changes environmental governance sustainability, destinations & regional development gis for transportation solar cells. sustainable & regional development, renewable energy, policy making & implementation, transport networks & flows, design of innovative technology * + biannual teacher training to integrate the sustainability perspective into their courses and programmes at umeå university. source: own study. https://www.uwasa.fi/en/education/international-masters-programmes/sustainable-and-autonomous-systems https://www.uwasa.fi/en/education/international-masters-programmes/smart-energy https://www.uwasa.fi/en/education/international-masters-programmes/industrial-systems-analytics https://www.uwasa.fi/en/education/international-masters-programmes/strategic-project-management https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/2015h/pages/maenm.aspx#&acd=learning+outcomes-header https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/2019h/1/pages/eco5020v1.aspx https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/exhsu#&acd=learning+outcomes-header https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/2018h/2/pages/en304ev1.aspx https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/2018h/1/pages/org50o0v1.aspx#&acd=course+description-header https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/2022h/2/pages/sam5012v1.aspx https://www.nord.no/en/student/study-plans/2021h/5/pages/eco2009v1.aspx https://www.umu.se/en/education/master/masters-programme-in-environmental-science-with-focus-on-sustainable-development/ https://www.umu.se/en/umea-institute-of-design/education/programmes/masters-programme-in-transportation-design/ https://www.umu.se/en/education/courses/advanced-materials2/ https://www.umu.se/en/education/courses/analyses-of-environmental-changes/ https://www.umu.se/en/education/exchange-students/environmental-governance/ https://www.umu.se/en/education/courses/sustainability-destinations-and-regional-development/ https://www.umu.se/en/education/exchange-students/gis-for-transportation/ https://www.umu.se/en/education/courses/solar-cells2/ 52 ejike okonkwo an introductory multidisciplinary course on electric regional aviation will increase the chances for accelerated innovative ideas in implementing era. for instance, from the online survey conducted in the preceding study by a. mäenpää et al. (2021, p. 6), respondents were drawn from different organisations such as public organisations (airports, cities, regions, municipalities), companies (50+ personnel), sme (less than 50 personnel), regional development organisation (vasek, into seinäjoki.), ngos (chambers of commerce) and higher education institutes or research organisations. however, only five respondents were from higher educational institutions. these respondents represent experts in their various fields. understandably, students are nonexperts; hence this explains why their views are not represented in the report. that being the case, engaging students via participatory communication in the classroom will provide an opportunity to ascertain students’ opinions regarding era and can serve as a practical approach for increasing knowledge and collective action. one way to achieve participatory communication is by introducing the basics of era into the curriculum at the universities, which will ensure that more students are abreast with the trends of tt in the aviation sector. by so doing, this will likely translate to accelerated knowledge, interest and understanding of decarbonisation within the industry. an introductory multidisciplinary course on electric aviation could be a source of motivation and spur increased engagement in climate actions among young people in the educational context. the success of decarbonisation hinges on the collective action of different groups in society (creutzig, kapmeier, 2020, p. 1). studies suggest that people take more climate action when they are better informed (dickson, 2005). that being the case, education relating to climate change will “promote learning about its causes, effects and possible responses, thus providing a cross-curricular and multidisciplinary perspective” (heiss et al., 2013, p. 4). technology and innovation are one of the energy transition pathways (hess, sovacool, 2020; coenen et al., 2021). the planned transition to electric aviation in the region is a mitigative response to the impact of climate change. although there are many programmes and courses on climate change, energy, and sustainability at the universities, as shown in table 2, courses on era are still lacking. the proposed new course on era could cover the various areas highlighted in the fair project and other socio-technological developments in the region, such as the emerging nordic battery belt. finally, the introductory course will complement and broaden the scope of aviation knowledge beyond the traditional aviation schools domiciled outside the kvarken region, e.g., the finnish aviation academy domiciled in pori, among others. lastly, it is imperative to note that the introductory course on electric aviation being advocated for in this study is only a starting point. the idea is that this practice can be extended to other universities in the region that are not participating in the fair project. 6. conclusions the role of regional actors in the implementation process of electric regional aviation (era) must go beyond the current focus on the historical, economic, and technical aspects, as obtainable in the fair reports. the next step in the implementation agenda should also focus on increasing the knowledge of era within educational contexts because there are potential benefits to leverage towards achieving an accelerated technological transition (tt) to electric aviation. one option is to work towards introducing a multidisciplinary aviation course, herein referred to as era_101, into the curriculum of universities participating in the fair project. the rationale is that young people in higher educational institutions will continuously form an integral part of the aviation market. hence, as they become increasingly aware of the tt trends in the region’s aviation sector, they can contribute more innovative ideas to the implementation process of era. in addition, increased awareness could influence collective action, such as making sustainable transport choices in favour of greener alternatives. as a narrative review, this paper contributes to an increased understanding of the role of regional actors in the decarbonisation process. theoretically, the paper advances the application of the technological transition perspective for understating energy transitions within the kvarken regional context. regional actors may consider and include the proposal from this paper as one option that will complement its planned engagement strategies, such as hosting events, conferences, and seminars. this paper does not provide an insight into how the regional actors may perceive the suggested next step in their subsequent agenda-setting, nor other areas in the project that are not in the reports. future research could engage the regional actors via a semi-structured interview to gain deeper insight into any recent development vis-à-vis accelerating innovative ideas that may have emerged at the end of the publishing the 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cooperation among regions in germany, poland and russia, known as the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum (tomczyk, 2011; haliżak, 2006) will be the subject of analysis in the present paper. in this paper, the term of ‘region’ (which can be defined in numerous ways) has been specified as an area, land, a part of a larger area (from the latin word regio, regione) and rule, manage, administer (latin rego, regere) (kumaniecki, 2002; wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). the term region in social sciences is understood as a territorial unit of state organizational structures, having their administration status with established borders and assigned tasks (wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). on the other hand, according to the definition accepted on december 4th, 1996 by the assembly of european regions aer – a region is ‘a unit of territorial administration one step below the level of state, with its own government executing its political power. it guarantees its autonomy, journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(2), 16–25 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.2.03 the initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation teresa astramowicz-leyk institute of political science, university of warmia and mazury in olsztyn, szrajbera 11, 10-007 olsztyn, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5881-2325 e-mail: teresa.astramowicz@uwm.edu.pl citation astramowicz-leyk t., 2020, the initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(2), 16–25. abstract the research concerning cross-border cooperation initiative between regions presents international relations that are often formed upwards and have their roots in bilateral relations of the regions. a research hypothesis was positively verified on the basis of the conducted research, according to which the examined subject is a form of cross-border cooperation at the level of regional parliaments: german federal states, kaliningrad district of the russian federation and selected polish voivodships. coherently with the purpose of the study, an institutional and legal analysis, analysis of source materials and a questionnaire were conducted. the paper contains an investigation of the genesis, objectives and the scope of substantive works concerning the cross-border cooperation formula within the regional parliaments of the south baltic region. a special nature of work within the forum was also presented; the most important substantive issues introduced by the partners in resolutions adopted by acclamation are discussed, as well as the results of own research are presented. key words regional parliamentary forum, south baltic, cross-border cooperation, region, international cooperation. received: 20 april 2020 accepted: 19 june 2020 published: 20 november 2020 the initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation 17 identity, competences and organizational structure’ (deklaracja…, n.d.). in the following analysis, region is defined as an administrative unit of a state territory, with its elective government, specified borders, having its own policy, legal identity and own budget (wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). the term of ‘international cooperation’ is also ambiguous. for the sake of this paper, a liberal approach has been adopted; it claims that the state is not the only party in international relationships because out of state participants play an equally important role (haliżak, 2006). the term of international cooperation in this paper will mean all socio-economic activities in which border and cross-border location of territorial government units will play an important role in building the administrative potential capable of servicing international contacts (młodzi o polityce…, 2009; wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). due to decentralizing international cooperation, the number of participants in international relationships in the recent decades has grown (buczkowski, żukowski, 2014; zasada, 2018). the term cross-border cooperation also appears; it has been coined by the european council on the 21st of may 1980 in european outline convention on transfrontier cooperation between territorial communities or authorities, and therein it is defined as ‘each action taken together in order to strengthen a further development of neighbour partnerships among communities and territorial authorities of two or more partners as well as concluding agreements and accepting the conditions to implement them. cross-border cooperation is possible within the frames of communities and territorial authorities characteristics which are defined by inner regulations’ (europejska konwencja…, 1993). in this paper, the term of cross-border cooperation is defined as related to keeping up mutual relationships between the units located near state borders (wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). the aim of the following analysis is to present an international policy initiative in a cross-border perspective, namely the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum and the analysis of international cooperation within its framework. the research referring to the international cooperation initiative, whose subjects are regional parliaments of the southern baltic sea, is a vital voice in the discussion about forms, effects and barriers in international cooperation at the level of regions. carrying out the aforementioned research is advisable not only due to theoretical reasons but also for the practicality of using hence resulting conclusions in political practice. they can prove useful in forming further relationships between members of the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum. in the analysis, the term the southern baltic sea regions parliamentary forum has been used instead of the southern baltic sea parliaments forum, which was used in the first editions. the author believes that the original name might have suggested the cooperation of state parliaments of the analysed area. the leading research methods applied in the following analysis include institutional-legal and questionnaires methods. the following research hypothesis was formulated: the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum is a form of cross-border cooperation at the level of regional parliaments: german united countries (mecklenburg-western pomerania, free and hanseatic city of hamburg and schleswigholstein), kaliningrad district of the russian federation, and polish pomeranian, warmian-masurian and west pomeranian voivodships, based on common interests and priorities aiming at developing the regions of the southern baltic sea and eu policy coherence in search for common identity and respect for differences (grzelak, 2016). the following basic research problems have been formulated: what were the aims of establishing the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum? who initiated it? what is the role of the forum with reference to the eu policy? are there any relationships between the forums’ meeting topics and the eu policy? what were the basic forms of cooperation? what kind of inner teams-subjects were created and what was their role in elaborating on the main effects of cooperation – the resolutions? what part did youth workshops play? which forms of cooperation are worth continuing? what is the role of the regional parliament of scania (sweden) as a member – observer? in order to prepare this paper, the author used key literature on the analysed topic, the main sources being resolutions of forums and questionnaire results. 2. the origin and subject matters at forums the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum is an initiative of cross-border cooperation among regions, which resulted from bilateral contacts of german lands of mecklenburg-western pomerania with polish west pomeranian voivodship and the land of schleswig-holstein with pomeranian voivodship. the initiative appeared just before 2004 – the year of expanding the european union – the biggest one in history of the community. on 26–27 april 2004, a meeting of representatives of the four above-mentioned parliaments was held in gdańsk. a joint declaration on interregional 18 teresa astramowicz-leyk cooperation of parliaments was adopted on the second day, at the end of the meeting. this document assumes that the southern baltic sea forum is established as a result of numerous contacts of regional parliaments of the baltic sea, the cooperation in the framework of baltic sea parliamentary conference1 (25-â parlamentskaâ..., 2016) since 1991, intergovernmental cooperation of the states of the baltic sea region within the council of the baltic sea states (cbss)2 (śmigerska-belczak, 2012; makarychev, sergunin, 2013), numerous significant initiatives of the baltic sea states subregional cooperation (bsssc)3, 1 the baltic sea parliamentary conference (bspc) was established in 1991 as a forum for political dialogue between parliamentarians from the baltic sea region. bspc aims at raising awareness and opinion on issues of current political interest and relevance for the baltic sea region. it promotes and drives various initiatives and efforts to support a sustainable environmental, social and economic development of the baltic sea region. it strives at enhancing the visibility of the baltic sea region and its issues in a wider european context. bspc shall initiate and guide political activities in the region; support and strengthen democratic institutions in the participating states; improve dialogue between governments, parliaments and civil society; strengthen the common identity of the baltic sea region by means of close co-operation between national and regional parliaments on the basis of equality; and initiate and guide political activities in the baltic sea region, endowing them with additional democratic legitimacy and parliamentary authority (the baltic sea…). 2 the council of the baltic sea states (cbss) is an overall political forum for regional cooperation. consisting of 11 member states (denmark, estonia, finland, germany, iceland, latvia, lithuania, norway, poland, russia & sweden), as well as a representative of the european union, it supports a global perspective on regional problems. these include politically and practically translating the un sustainable development goals, the paris climate agreement, the sendai framework on disaster risk reduction, the palermo protocol and the un convention on the rights of the child, into regional actions on the ground. in addition, the cbss functions as a coordinator of a multitude of regional actors in the areas of its three long-term priorities: regional identity, sustainable & prosperous region, safe & secure region. set up in 1992 to ease the transition to a new international landscape, the organisation today focuses on themes such as societal security, sustainability, research & innovation, as well as countering human trafficking (o radzie państw…; council of the baltic…). 3 baltic sea states subregional cooperation (bsssc) was founded in stavanger, norway, in 1993. its participants are regional authorities (level directly below the national level authorities) of the 10 baltic sea littoral states: germany, denmark, finland, sweden, norway, poland, latvia, lithuania, estonia and russia. the bsssc is a political network for decentralised authorities (subregions) in the baltic sea region. the main bsssc event is the annual conference held each year in early autumn (september – october). the bsssc co-operates closely with other key baltic sea region and european organthe union of the baltic cities (ubc)4 and the association of baltic chambers of commerce association5, and with the aim of enlarging the european union on may 1, 2004 (wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). the declaration set out the objectives of cooperation, i.e. a need to promote interregional and crossborder cooperation in accordance with the assumptions of the northern dimension of the european union and the policy of sustainable socio-economic development, sharing common interests, strengthening the socio-economic cohesion of the community by bringing the “old” and “new” eu members closer together and cultivating cultural identity respecting its diversity (wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). representatives of the regional parliaments of the southern baltic forum meet systematically since 2004 once a year in particular regions forming this cooperation initiative. in 2008, the forum was joined – in full partnership – by warmian-masurian regional assembly and kaliningrad district of the russian federation duma, and in 2009 by the parliament of the free and hanseatic city of hamburg. the swedish region of scania has been an observer of the forum since 2004. the 16th forum in olsztyn hosted the lithuanian region of klaipeda as an observer – it did not participate in the next – 17th forum in schwerin. isations and institutions. the bsssc has renewed its declaration of common interest with the committee of the regions in 2012 and opens its network for other bsr organisations on local and regional level to become participants (baltic sea states…; subregionalna współpraca…; baltic sea states…, 2014). 4 union of the baltic cities (ubc) is the leading network of cities in the baltic sea region with member cities from denmark, estonia, finland, germany, latvia, lithuania, norway, poland, russia and sweden. founded in 1991 in gdańsk, ubc is a voluntary, proactive network mobilizing the shared potential of its member cities. ubc works through seven commissions: cultural cities, inclusive and healthy cities, planning cities, safe cities, smart and prospering cities, sustainable cities, and youthful cities (związek miast…; union of the baltic…). 5 the baltic sea chambers of commerce association (bcca) serves to unite the chambers of commerce of denmark, estonia, finland, germany, latvia, lithuania, norway, poland, russia and sweden. the bcca was established in june 1992 in rostock-warnemünde, germany, in order to give the business community of the region a united voice for common concerns. the bcca represents more than 450,000 companies belonging to all sectors of the northern and north-eastern european markets. the threefold task of the bcca is to protect and uphold the interests of private entrepreneurship by advising policy-makers in business related affairs, offering services to the business community and providing facilities for contacts, debates and meetings in the region (the baltic sea chambers…). the initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation 19 the consecutive meetings of the forums take place in various regions involved in the creation of the cross-border cooperation initiative; 17 forums have taken place so far and the next one has been scheduled to take place in gdańsk in 2020. the leitmotif of each forum is suggested by the region hosting the main conference. the first forum (the founding one/26–27.04.2004 gdańsk – pomeranian voivodship) was devoted to passing a joint declaration of the parliaments in the southern baltic sea area (wspólna deklaracja…, 2004). the main subjects so far have been: the priorities in regional policy – structural, tourist and directed to youth (19–21.09.2004 – międzyzdroje/west pomeranian voivodship) (rezolucja ii…, 2004); tourist, youth and integrated marine policies of the european union (18–20.09.2005 – binz/mecklenburg-western pomerania) (rezolucja iii…, 2005); the input of the southern baltic sea region into european marine policy (21–23.05.2006 – köln/schleswig-holstein) (rezolucja iv…, 2006); tradition and innovativeness in the baltic sea region (20–22.05.2007 – gdynia/pomeranian voivodship) (rezolucja v…, 2007); scientific research as an integrating factor and a chance for economic development in the southern baltic sea regions (18–20.05.2008 – kołobrzeg/west pomeranian voivodship) (rezolucja vi…, 2008); implementation of european strategies in the southern baltic sea region (5–7.07.2009 – schwerin/mecklenburg-western pomerania) (rezolucja vii…, 2009); sustained development of the southern baltic sea region (21–23.05.2010 – elbląg/warmian-masurian voivodeship) (rezolucja viii…, 2010); evaluation of the european union strategy and implementation for the baltic sea region, in particular in tourism, education and multi level governance, policy of partnership and good neighbourhood practice (3–5.07.2011 – gdańsk/pomeranian voivodship) (rezolucja ix…, 2011); strategy of the development for ‘southern baltic region 2020’ (11–13.03.2012 – köln/schleswig-holstein) (rezolucja x…, 2012); renewable sources of energy and developing energy infrastructure (2–4.06.2013 – schwerin/schwerin/ mecklenburg-western pomerania) (rezolucja xi…, 2013); southern baltic region – a new tourist centre of europe (19–22.05.2014 – kaliningrad/kaliningrad district) (rezolucja xii…, 2014); cooperation of university level science representatives in the baltic sea region (19–21.04.2015 – hamburg/free and hanseatic city of hamburg) (rezolucja xiii…, 2015); agricultural and marine economy – innovativeness and cooperation in the southern baltic sea region (12– 14.06.2016 – köln/schleswig-holstein) (rezolucja xiv…, 2016); european tracks of culture in the region of south baltic sea – development, creation and promotion in europe and worldwide; stimulating entrepreneurship particularly among the youth (28–30.05.2017 – szczecin/west pomeranian voivodship) (rezolucja xv…, 2017); smart specialisations – smart regions – smart specialisations of regions, their input and role in creating a dynamic development of southern baltic sea region (13–15.05.2018 – siła near olsztyn/warmian-masurian voivodship) (rezolucja xvi…, 2018); digitalisation of the southern baltic sea region – threats and opportunities (23–25.06.2019 – schwerin/mecklenburg-western pomerania) (rezolucja xvii…, 2019). 3. procedures of passing resolutions by the regional parliaments participating in the southern baltic sea regional parliamentary forum in the landtag of mecklenburg-western pomerania (germany) a project of a resolution is discussed by the state government and boards/committees respectively associated with the subject matters (economy, agriculture, energy), which discuss motions referring to the contents of the resolution. then the resolution is approved by the state parliament as a group motion and presented to the state government6. in mecklenburg-western pomerania, the priorities specified in resolutions are presented during the meetings of parliamentary committees, which debate upon and deliver particular recommendations. in order to introduce the decisions into life, the parliament of mecklenburg-western pomerania – in cooperation with all political options – votes on the matter of accepting the resolution, which shows that the resolutions of the forum and work on them are of non-political nature. after having submitted the resolution to the state government, the latter regularly reports on the progress in its implementation to the parliament. all provisions regarding the resolution are regularly passed on to the european institutions (european parliament, european council and european committee), which inform mecklenburgwestern pomerania about the relevant matters. ‘the proposals of the parliamentary forum, as opinions presented during consultation and conferences of stakeholders which were organised by the european committee, were taken into consideration in union strategies in the past; an example may be the strategy for the baltic sea. the matter refers mainly to tourist brand. moreover, the resolutions were sent for the information of other gatherings associated with the baltic sea e.g. to southern baltic sea 6 straetker georg – mail from 26.02.2018. 20 teresa astramowicz-leyk parliamentary conference and council of the baltic sea states’ (schlupp, n.d.). in the landtag of schleswig-holstein, a resolution is signed by the chairman of the landtag or the chairman of the representatives. after being signed, the chairman of the landtag passes the information to the public (landtag members – the government). then all groups (clubs) discuss the resolution during meetings, afterwards there is a following discussion on the resolution content during a plenary meeting – this ends with voting. after the resolution is passed (there was no case of not passing one), it is transferred to the government, which informs the landtag about the consecutive decisions (which institutions got the resolutions, etc.)7. in the council of the free and hanseatic city of hamburg (germany), a new project of a resolution discussed by representatives is voted upon as a joined motion of many parties in the parliament, and then it is accepted as a standpoint8. in pomeranian voivodship, the draft of a resolution is discussed at a meeting of the committee for interregional and foreign cooperation, and then it is passed on the plenary meeting of the pomeranian regional assembly. all assembly members get the draft of the resolution and information about the forum and the content of the approved resolution9. in west pomeranian voivodship, the draft of the resolution is discussed at the meeting of the committee for the forum issues, headed by the chairman of the assembly, and at the meeting of the committee for development and international affairs. the forum resolution is approved by the voivodship assembly in the form of acceptance10. in warmian-masurian voivodship, a draft is discussed at meetings of the committee for international cooperation of the assembly. the head of the committee takes part in the work of the editorial team at each forum. the resolution is accepted by acclamation of the committee for international cooperation. information about each forum meeting and the resolution content are presented at the assembly meeting – in the section of miscellaneous matters. resolution of the forum of 2010 organised by warmian-masurian assembly was accepted at the meeting of this assembly11. 7 phone conversation with a landtag employee 16.03.2018. 8 luenzmann friederike – mail from 27.02.2018. 9 phone conversation with the head of assembly chancellery, łukasz grzędzicki, 26.02.2018. 10 phone conversation with the vice-head of assembly chancellery, beata tokarzewska 26.02.2018. 11 phone conversation with the head of assembly chancellery, wiktor marek leyk 26.02.2018. in the kaliningrad district of the russian federation duma, the draft of a resolution is discussed at the meeting of the committee for international and regional cooperation of the district duma. the motions for the resolution, after being approved by the head of duma, are attached to the draft of the resolution; the representatives of district duma have the authority to approve and vote on the resolution during the plenary meeting. the resolution, as a document, is presented to the district duma and the district government to be implemented henceforth12. the assembly of the scania region (sweden), which has the status of a regional parliament observer, discusses a draft of resolution during a joined meeting of the assembly and management leadership, then the resolution of the forum with an included report from it, are discussed at the assembly meeting13. 4. youth participation in the work of the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum from the first forum, youth participation in the work of the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum has been a priority for the highest regional self-government authorities. youth representatives, from the initial forum in gdańsk up to the 8th forum in schwerin, coming from the first four and then six partner regions, participated in interregional conferences. it is worth stressing that young people from the regions forming the forum actively participated in the working groups, preparatory meetings and two youth projects “youth, region and parliament” and “a step towards democracy” (młodzi o polityce…, 2009). at the first forum in gdańsk, a decision was made to invite young people to the next forum with youth policy as one of the leading topics during the meeting. the cooperation with youth was established within the frames of workshops in miedzyzdroje in 2004 with the participation of politicians from the four regions. issues of establishing youth representations as well as areas and forms of interregional cooperation were discussed. moreover, the draft project “youth, region and parliament” was adopted, which was then implemented in 2005–2006 (młodzi o polityce…, 2009)14. it included study visits 12 bełkov vladimir – mail 27.02.2018. 13 phone conversation with a.m. myszka-gustafsson 9.02.2018. 14 young people from the partner regions of the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum were involved in the project. the initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation 21 of young people to the parliaments of partner regions and their involvement in work related to the topics covered by the forum (grzelak, 2016). according to the final resolution, it is encouraged to (rezolucja ii…, 2004; młodzi o polityce…, 2009) involve youth in political decision-making processes, make proposals concerning visits and youth exchange programs to german and polish deputies in order to know the political procedures, extend partnership with schools as part of the parliaments’ cooperation, overview the youth political activities under partnership agreements at the government level, invite young people to conferences within the forum and take into account their position, promote a creation of regional youth councils in the south baltic area and joint programs aimed at strengthening cooperation and cross-border exchange of young people. in consistence with young people’s interest in the subject of forums, since 2007 (the 5th forum) the way of youth participation has changed. while initially young people took part in special workshops, since 2007 (the gdynia conference) they have been allowed to participate in discussions of parliamentarians and to meet with experts. apart from this, youth representatives participated in two preparatory meetings of the 6th forum with experts. due to the costs of the event, young people from mecklenburg -western pomerania had the opportunity to participate in the meeting of the “energy” group in schwerin, while young people from the west pomeranian voivodship participated in the meeting in szczecin. the self-government of the west pomeranian voivodship, considering the will of the forum participants to involve young people to the work of the forum, has taken the initiative of submitting an application to the national agency for international programs for youth in order to obtain financial support for youth activity within the southern baltic parliaments (młodzi o polityce…, 2009). it aimed at promoting the participation of youth in political processes, developing a youth cooperation network, discovering their own region, as well as developing attitudes of better understanding and respect for people and cultures of neighbouring regions. young people from germany, poland, sweden and russia (kaliningrad district) took part in the project. the uniqueness of this project lies within its participants (in total 11 young people) who conducted study visits to their native regional parliaments in november 2005. during the visits, they became acquainted with parliamentarians’ work and the functioning of the regional parliament. then, in january-february 2006, 8–10 days’ study visits of young people were organized in partner parliaments. therefore, each participant could not only be acquainted with the work of their regional parliament, but also to compare the activity of the partner parliaments. youth workshops, despite their important role, were not organized during the editions of the forum from 2011 until 2017. this practice was resumed in szczecin in 2017 and since then the youth have been able to join the work of this important cross-border international cooperation. 5. the analysis of questionnaires results for the sake of finding answers to research questions of this analysis, the author concentrated not only on the primary sources (resolutions of particular regional assembly’s conferences formulating a discussed initiative) but also on the conducted questionnaires (kotlega, n.d.; musewicz, n.d.; myszka-gustafsson, n.d.; pietrzak, n.d.; schile, n.d.; schlupp, n.d.; tode, n.d.; grzelak, 2016)15. the survey included seven questions. the answers were obtained from regional representatives – one person from each region – representing the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum members. the answer to the first question about the motivation behind creating the forum and its initiator, all the respondents claimed that the origin of the forum was preceded by a bilateral cooperation between the parliament of mecklenburg-western pomerania and the west-pomeranian voivodship assembly; schleswig-holstein and the pomeranian voivodship assembly. sylvia bretschneider – the president of mecklenburg-western pomerania parliament was claimed to be the initiator of the forum existence. thereby a long history of bilateral contacts gave the foundation to transform them and give them a multilateral form. the second question of the survey referred to the aims of creating the forum and reasons for its foundation indicated by the respondents (regional representatives). it was stressed by beate schlupp from mecklenburg-western pomerania that incorporating new member countries into the eu in 2004 (including poland) not only influenced good relationships with the neighbouring countries of the southern baltic sea area permanently but also was a strong stimulus for their development. in her opinion, the initiators of creating the forum were focused on the idea of uniting inhabitants of border areas closer – in a time perspective. they also aimed at using the potential of the regions better by defining common goals as well as making the regions more prominent on the european arena. when the 15 the representative of the pomeranian assembly did not answer the question in person but authorised to use his analy sis (grzelak, 2016). 22 teresa astramowicz-leyk same question was asked of the representative of schleswig-holstein landtag, he stressed the accuracy and validity of aims approved in the founding declaration from gdańsk (2004), including the necessity to support interregional and cross-border cooperation coherent with the conditions sketched in the northern dimension policy of the european union and the policy of sustainable socio-economic growth, finding and associating mutual interests, enhancing socio-economic cohesion of the communities by uniting ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the eu at the level of regions, cherishing cultural identity respecting its diversity. as stated by the representative of the council of free and hanseatic city of hamburg, this region joined the forum with the aim of creating a stronger network of connections between already existing bilateral partnerships and other forms of mutual relations at the regional level. a similar response can be found in an already quoted text of pomeranian voivodship representative grzegorz grzelak. jerzy kotlęga from west pomeranian voivodship pointed out that finding common aims and priorities for the southern baltic sea regions was the rationale behind creating the forum. zbigniew pietrzak – the representative of the third of polish member regions of the forum believed that his region had the same rationale as the above-mentioned ones. he also stressed that the region has limited resources and possibilities of development, and integrating it with the neighbouring voivodships and other regions opens the options to have a common and coherent regional policy and better representation of opinions, necessities and interests. russian federation kaliningrad district duma (assembly) saw the aim of joining the forum as finding joined interests, businesses and priorities in the development of the southern baltic sea region. being totally separated from the russian federation by countries of the eu – poland and latvia – and by international marine areas, kaliningrad duma was interested in joining the forum in order to cooperate in economic, humanitarian and cultural aspects and exchange information with the eu countries. one of the priority tasks for both kaliningrad district and other representatives of the forum was creating an option for a visa free travel between the russian federation and the european union (musewicz, n.d.). anna maria myszka-gustafsson believes that the aim of accessing swedish scania was the intention to create a strategy of innovative solutions for issues connected with cultural-economic development of this region, enhancing and directing international cooperation as the basis for a balanced development of scania and neighbouring regions economy. in addition, a cooperation in the area of health prophylaxis and a sustainable development of cities and urban areas were crucial (myszka-gustafsson, n.d.). in the third question, the respondents were asked to evaluate the topics of the consecutive meetings of the forum. all respondents evaluated their selection positively because it resulted from the needs and interests of their regions. the fourth question asked about indicating which form of the hitherto cooperation (experts’ meetings, youth workshops, procedure of accepting a resolution, plenary meeting) is the most effective and whether the forms of cooperation need any improvements. the questioned pointed out that the forms of cooperation had been created throughout the years of work for the forum. meeting with experts, however, enjoyed the greatest appreciation. beate schlupp emphasized it that a three-step form of work (hearing experts, editorial conference and annual conference of the forum) meets the needs of the forum participants. only sven tode from hamburg was doubtful if so many as three meetings are necessary. in his opinion, one devoted to the resolution and one devoted to the forum itself would be enough. the respondents stressed that youth workshops played an important role for the forum and should become a permanent element of the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum. the youth generate new impulses and strengthen the sense of unity and cooperation. the forum enables young people to be acquainted with cross-border parliamentary work. the next question asked what the most important achievement of the forum for a given region and for partner regions was. in the provided answers, the respondents stressed that throughout the years of the forum’s existence the scope of its interest was broadened. this initiative slowly turned into the process of international cooperation, ability to search and formulate joined opinions on the most important issues and priorities of the region, including port infrastructure, cooperation in the matters of ecology and renewable energy, improving transport and logistics, cooperation in the area of tourist routes, youth exchange programmes, as well as medical, scientific and university education areas. moreover, the forum had its input into introducing local border traffic. an indisputable achievement of the forum is the establishment and maintenance of good relations among member regions. the forum creates opportunities of more effective representation of common interests among participating regions of southern baltic and presenting them to national governments and union institutions. crossborder cooperation has also an input in maintaining the initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation 23 peace and unity among regions in the era of facing constantly new solutions. when the respondents were asked the last question referring to the issue of what should be in the scope of interest of the forum in the future, it was clear that apart from continuing the hitherto activity, the issue of immigrants admission, eu migration processes (inner migration and emigration) their causes and effects were seen as important. moreover, joined youth policy, labour market, development of inhabitants’ partnership, spatial development plan for the baltic sea, clearing the baltic sea bed from the post-war debris (metal waste, unexploded clusters, chemical waste), human resources and social infrastructure management, civil society including migration issues – with refugee problem among others – these were other crucial issues. from the respondents’ perspective, the prospectively interesting issues would be rural development, food sector and strategic aims in youth policy in the southern baltic sea region. in addition, the matters associated with the development of the eu and its institutions with reference to their decisive power and effectiveness were of interest. the topics associated with climate changes, health and health prophylaxis in member societies of the forum found interest in the respondents’ eyes. 6. conclusions as a result of the analysis, the research hypothesis has been verified positively. for the aim of the present paper and to answer the research questions, three tools were used – legal-institutional analysis, resource texts analysis and questionnaire research and survey methodology. the main aims of the southern baltic sea parliamentary forum were and still are supporting interregional and cross-border cooperation coherent with the eu policy, creating stronger bonds resulting from bilateral partnerships and transferring these into interregional reality. the participants of the forum stress that the aim of their partaking in it is the intention to institutionalise the cooperation, to search for common interests of the participant members in the context of expanding the european union and the will to present the matters of the southern baltic regions to the eu. the topics of subsequent conferences were strictly associated with the regions of the southern baltic sea, which are part of the eu (besides the russian federation kaliningrad district). the resolutions which were worked out and approved were addressed to the state authorities and other organisations dealing with cooperation of countries in the baltic sea region and other institutions of the european union. common aims and objectives for all participating regions were sought – coherently with the policy and law of the eu. the subsidies of the eu financing youth cooperation programmes within the framework of the forum. the participants of the research project stressed that the youth must be included into work of the forum. during the first – constituent – meeting, in gdańsk in 2004 a decision to invite the youth to the next forum was made. during the 2nd forum in binz the decision to invite the youth again was upheld. the respondents positively evaluated projects ‘youth, region, parliament’ and ‘a step towards democracy’ as well as the participation of youth in the preparation of final resolutions. in the years 2011– 2016 youth workshops were not organised. in 2017, the west pomeranian assembly invited the youth again and organised the youth forum. in the years 2018 and 2019 young people participated in the forum again. the representative of scania saw direct benefits for her region in strengthening and targeting international cooperation which creates the basis for sustainable development of scania economy and economies of surrounding regions. moreover, it is a fact that the cooperation within the framework of the forum in both official and personal contexts adds to the development of democracy and guarantees peaceful solutions to problems. the conducted research proves that there is a big interest of participating regions in the continuation of this type of cross-border cooperation. the list of formulated topics for the future that the members of the southern baltic sea regional assemblies are planning to take up suggests that the forum will remain a meeting spot for all participants to search for solutions to their problems and cater for their needs. the research is worthwhile to be continued to verify if currently suggested directions for the forum development will prove to be useful and meaningful in cross-border cooperation practice in the southern baltic sea regions – from hamburg to klaipeda. references 25-â parlamentskaâ konferenciâ baltijskogo morâ. vysokoe kačestvo obrazovaniâ i rabočej sily – buduŝee regiona baltijskogo morâ (eng. the 25th baltic sea parliamentary conference. high quality education and labour – the future of the baltic sea region), 2016, http://www.bspc.net/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/bspc_raport25_ru.pdf (accessed 24 march 2020). 24 teresa astramowicz-leyk baltic sea states subregional cooperation, https://www.bsssc. com/kopi-av-bsssc (accessed 17 march 2019). baltic sea states subregional co-operation. terms of reference, 2014, https://docs.wixsta 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2006, kilonia, germany, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja ix forum parlamentów regionalnych południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 9th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 3–5 july 2011, gdańsk, poland, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja v forum parlamentów południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 5th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 20–22 may 2007, gdynia, poland, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja vi forum parlamentów południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 6th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 18–20 may 2008, kołobrzeg, poland the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja vii forum parlamentów południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 7th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 5–7 july 2009, schwerin, germany, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja viii forum parlamentów południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 8th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 21–23 may 2010, elbląg, poland the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja x forum parlamentów regionalnych południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 10th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 11–13 march 2012, kilonia, gerthe initiative of southern baltic sea regional parliaments cooperation 25 many, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja xi forum parlamentów regionalnych południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 11th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 2–4 june 2013, schwerin, germany, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja xii forum parlamentów południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 12th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 19–22 may 2014, kaliningrad, russia, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja xiii forum parlamentów regionalnych południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 13th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 19–21 april 2015, hamburg, germany, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja xiv forum parlamentów regionalnych południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 14th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum), 12–14 june 2016, kilonia, germany, the manuscript is available at the chancellery of the warmian-masurian regional assembly in olsztyn. rezolucja xv forum parlamentów regionalnych południowego bałtyku (eng. resolution of the 15th southern baltic sea parliamentary forum ), 28–30 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parliamentary forum – hamburg), manuscript in author’s own collection. tomczyk r., 2011, współpraca parlamentów regionalnych w obszarze południowego bałtyku (eng. regional cooperation of parliaments in the south baltic area), przegląd zachodniopomorski, 26(55)/1, 125–138. union of the baltic cities, http://www.ubc.net/ (accessed 17 march 2019). wspólna deklaracja o międzyregionalnej współpracy parlamentów w południowym basenie morza bałtyckiego z dnia 27.04.2004 r. (eng. joint declaration on the interregional cooperation of parliaments in the southern baltic sea of 27.04.2004.), manuscript in author’s own collection. zasada m., 2018, współpraca międzynarodowa samorządu terytorialnego na przykładzie jednostek samorządowych regionu warmińsko-mazurskiego (eng. international cooperation of local government on the example of local government units of the warmian-masurian region), phd thesis defended at the faculty of social sciences of the university of warmia and mazury in olsztyn. związek miast bałtyckich. strategia 2016–2021 (eng. the union of the baltic cities. strategic framework 2016– 2021), http://www.ubc.net/sites/default/files/ strategia_ zmb_2016-2021.pdf (accessed 17 march 2019). 1. introduction tourism is one of the fastest developing services sector nowadays. its size and the directions of travelling of tourists are dependent mainly on two factors, the economic situation in poland and the destination country as well as tourist assets and the security of tourism destinations. in the years 2005–2015 all these factors experienced and still keep experiencing significant changes that affect the decisions of polish tourists. during this period the major events which had an impact on tourist behaviour and changes in the chosen destinations were the global economic crisis in 2008–2010 and events of the arab spring which affected among others countries such as egypt and tunisia – two important tourism destinations from the polish tourist industry’s point of view. other external factors determining the directions of polish tourist movement were the economic crisis in greece and spain as well as the accession to journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 39–44 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.026.5813 changes in tourist traffic from poland to turkey on the background of other major directions of travel emin atasoy (1), jan a. wendt (2) (1) faculty of education, uludağ üniversitesi, 16059 nilüfer, bursa, turkey, e-mail: geograf1969@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) institute of geography, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, e-mail: jan.wendt@ug.edu.pl citation atasoy  e., wendt  j.a., 2016, changes in tourist traffic from poland to turkey on the background of other major directions of travel, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 39–44. abstract the development of outbound tourism from poland to turkey after 2010 can be divided into three periods. the first one is connected with a stable increase in the number of departures. the second period includes the growth in the number of trips which served as a replacement for vacations in greece, egypt or tunisia. the last period started in 2014, when the number of visitors rapidly declined as the result of terrorist attacks and the military coup in turkey. due to concerns about the security after numerous terrorist attacks, the traditional destinations of polish tourism such as france and morocco lost their popularity. there was the inexorable decline in trust toward countries such as egypt and in particular turkey, where the numbers of tourists fell by 63% after the terrorist attacks and military coup. in first half of 2015 we have about 209.2 thous. polish tourists in turkey, and in 2016, the same time, only 82.7 thous. what gives decrease of nearly 60.5%. undoubtedly, the tightening of internal policies after the unsuccessful military coup will deepen the decline in interest in turkey by polish visitors. key words tourism, polish tourists, turkey, tourist destination, destabilization, terrorist. 40 emin atasoy, jan a. wendt the european union by poland in 2004 and in subsequent years by countries such as bulgaria, romania and croatia. an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in europe, which took place in belgium, france, germany or the uk, is also worth mentioning since it caused a decline in the number of tourists visiting these countries to some extent. the development of outbound tourism from poland to turkey after 2010 can be divided into three periods. the first one is connected with a stable increase in the number of departures. the second period includes the growth in the number of trips which served as a replacement for vacations in greece, egypt or tunisia. the last period started in 2014, when the number of visitors rapidly declined as the result of terrorist attacks and the military coup in turkey. due to the nature of tourism research, it faces a number of problems. one of the most serious problems is related to the definition of tourism. this is not only theoretical but also methodological issue. depending on the accepted definition, we can estimate the size of tourism in a broader or narrower terms. the broad definition describes tourism as all forms of movement that are not related to work or the change of the place of residence, in home country and abroad. the united nations world tourism organization (unwto) states that tourism includes all activities of people who travel and live outside their everyday environment for leisure, business or other purposes for no longer than a year without a break. so we can consider a tourist as a person who stays in a given place at least one day and uses at least one night’s accommodation. the definition of the unwto from 1993 (wendt, 2011) was useful for research of economists and common use by politicians and tour operators, and was designed primarily for statistical purposes. while working on the issue of tourism, the unwto’s aim was to create a definition that can be used across the world. it had to be simple, clear and consistent with applicable international standards. over the years many definitions of tourism have been created by representatives of various scientific disciplines, resulting in a number of established definitions of this term coming from different research approaches (zhakupov et al., 2015). the research uses the classical research methods in the study of tourist movement. the work is based on the statistical analysis of the size of tourist movement and analysis of the impact of political events on tourism in greece and turkey. the analysis uses data presenting tourist traffic from the „turystyka” for the years 2014–2015 and data presenting the polish charter flights to turkey released in october 2016 by the civil aviation authority in poland (caa). 2. polish tourist movement in 2010–2015 because of the difficulties in finding out the motives for tourist departures, the analysis of changes in the size of polish leisure tourist movements leads to a problem of naming their main destinations. among over ten million polish citizens who spent the 2010–2015 period abroad, many of them travelled for professional reasons, to work or to visit relatives and friends (tab. 1). however, as already stated above, it is difficult to separate a stay with the family from a traditional tourist trip, which is understood as departures for leisure purposes in a rented accommodation that has to be paid for. therefore, to determine the main directions it has been assumed that they are the ones which include over 57% stays (average for travel motivation in 2015) which are motivated by reasons described in the research as “holidays, leisure, recreation”. data was collected with use of the survey research methods, which leads to large differences in assessment of the size of tourist movements. practically, it is impossible to fully estimate this size in the cases of countries like austria, croatia, hungary, italy, which can be easily accessed by a private car without any border control that would allow to find out the exact number of travellers crossing the border. however, these numbers are easily attainable in the case of air transport, especially charter flights, which naturally include mainly outbound tourism. in the second group of countries there are the destinations serving as a traditional labour market for poles after the accession of poland to the european union. these are mainly the united kingdom, ireland, the benelux and the scandinavian countries. the third group consists of polish neighbours. countries which share their borders with poland can be further divided into two additional categories if the difficulty in crossing the border is taken into consideration. the first one includes countries of the schengen area, in which it is difficult to obtain data on the cross-border movement size as well as on the motives for travelling, some of which are shopping trips. lithuania, slovakia, the czech republic and germany share this trait. in the research concerning changes in the tourist movement size in germany and lithuania the additional problem is related to the large number of poles visiting their relatives and friends (tab. 1). in the case of germany, it is also the number of people who work in the local market. countries belonging to the second group of polish changes in tourist traffic from poland to turkey on the background of other major directions of travel 41 neighbours are russia, belarus and ukraine. it is also impossible to precisely determine the size of tourist movement in these countries because of the difficulties in division between the trips aimed to visit family (polish in ukraine, belarus), to do shopping or even those related to the illegal transport of items having high excise tax in poland (cigarettes, alcohol, fuel). data presented in table 1, concerning 10  141.1 thousand tourists, presents 93% of the whole foreign tourist movement of poles. other tourism destinations popular among polish tourists such as kenya, morocco, thailand or balkans make up to 7% of tourist flow, which estimates 765.3 thousand departures. this data shows that twelve countries were the main destinations chosen by polish tourists in 2015. ten the most visited countries were chosen as the holiday destinations by 180 thousand poles. countries which reached these top ranks were italy, croatia, greece, spain, austria, turkey, france, hungary, egypt and bulgaria. in the other two destinations, portugal and tunisia, the number of visits reached respectively 90 and 80 thousand in 2015. in the years 2010–2015 the number of foreign departures from poland increased by 53%, but this growth was even higher when the period tab. 1. foreign trips of poles (aged over 14) in thousand in 2015 countries total holidays, leisure, recreation business visiting friends, relatives other holidays / total (%) total 10 906.4 6 239.2 800.5 3 338.0 528.6 57 main tourists destination – over 57% travels for holidays, leisure and recreation italy 879.0 666.7 22.9 103.4 86.0 76 croatia 632.3 604.6 4.5 11.4 11.8 96 greece 545.6 522.3 6.5 10.6 6.2 96 spain 499.5 410.4 16.7 57.1 15.4 82 austria 375.0 244.1 30.4 82.5 18.1 65 turkey 369.8 355.7 5.2 2.6 6.2 96 france 356.9 209.4 53.4 68.2 25.9 59 hungary 243.3 220.4 11.3 5.7 5.9 91 egypt 240.1 239.4 0.8 0 0 100 bulgaria 184.0 172.5 8.3 1.5 1.6 94 portugal 88.0 71.4 3.9 5.5 7.3 81 tunisia 79.3 78.7 0 0.6 0 99 travel for all other purpose – less than 57% travels for holidays, leisure and recreation united kingdom 855.5 115.5 47.8 671.0 21.2 14 sweden 248.5 105.4 21.2 115.0 6.8 42 norway 243.3 97.6 22.3 118.5 5.0 40 netherlands 177.9 49.1 27.7 93.3 7.9 28 ireland 152.2 16.1 4.6 130.4 1.1 11 united states 123.3 32.2 17.8 56.1 17.3 26 belgium 109.1 20.8 31.2 53.1 4.1 19 denmark 95.0 35.7 17.0 37.2 5.2 38 switzerland 69.1 23.1 7.5 37.7 0.8 33 poland neighbouring countries, travels for shopping, work, visit relatives and others germany 2 198.7 451.7 278.3 1 357.0 111.8 21 czech republic 584.7 487.4 39.9 39.9 17.6 83 slovakia 354.1 296.0 8.5 27.4 22.3 84 lithuania 150.1 94.8 13.0 16.8 25.5 63 ukraine 145.5 30.2 9.5 90.9 14.8 21 belarus 72.0 24.5 4.8 36.8 5.9 34 russia 69.3 23.2 14.7 24.9 6.5 33 source: own elaboration based on: turystyka… (2015, 2016). 42 emin atasoy, jan a. wendt 2011–2015 was taken into account. during that time an increase of 73% was achieved. in the group of countries chosen for analysis of the changes in the size of tourist movement, the biggest growth was experienced by hungary. this is mainly due to the relatively small number of tourists in 2011, and an increase of 143 thousand people in 2015 compared to 2011 accounted for more than two-fold increase in the number of visitors. the second and third positions in terms of the highest percentage growth were reached respectively by france (238%) and italy (220%), traditional travel destinations of polish tourists. such a high position is due to a well-known cultural and historical attractiveness. additionally, italy is also a popular pilgrimage destination of poles. the next spot in this ranking was taken by bulgaria, a new destination in polish tourism, known by many polish citizens from the period before 1989, when holiday trips to bulgaria were one of the most popular within communist states of the eastern bloc. the fifth spot was reached by greece, which despite the economic crisis, or possibly because of it, experienced a return of polish tourists. the economic situation of greece was the main factor determining a decrease in hotel prices. an unchanging high position in terms of percentage increase in the number of polish tourists was taken by croatia (181%). it is the country with fantastic environmental attractions located by a warm sea, which can be reached from southern poland even within one day. croatia has relatively low prices, a language easy to understand and is close to poland in terms of its religion and culture. the next four countries are a classic winter tourism destination – austria, summer destinations – spain and turkey, as well as a year-round popular country – egypt. however, the last one, as the only one out of the top ten tourism destinations in polish outbound tourism, reported a 20% decrease in the number of polish visitors (tab. 2). 3. charter flights from poland different data for the size of tourist movement from poland is supplied by the civil aviation authority (ucl), which offers detailed statistics of flights, including charter flights – the most interesting information in the research concerning changes in tourist movement, what makes this data the most reliable. as it can be clearly seen (tab. 3) charter flights are served by the airports in turkey, greece, bulgaria, egypt, and spain – the main directions of polish tourist movement. despite excellent natural conditions, rich cultural heritage as well as well-developed marketing, which plays a crucial role in conquering the tourist market (herman, wendt, 2011), in the years of 2010– 2015 there is a clearly visible significant decline in the number of charter flight passengers at the airports in egypt and monastir in tunisia, in contrast to a dynamic growth in the canary islands and turkey. among the spanish airports a decrease was recorded only in palma de mallorca (wendt et al., 2016). an increase in tourist flow from poland also took place in israel, bulgaria, morocco and greece. a similar growth of polish tourist movement was in croatia (wendt, 2012), however in their case car transport played a significantly more important role (wiskulski, 2013; wendt, wiskulski, 2015). airports that served the charter traffic smaller than 50 thousand were gran canarias, funchal, malaga and barcelona. in the years 2010–2015 passenger charter traffic from poland increased from 3.108 million (2010) to 3.663 million (2014), despite the economic crisis in europe. however, it experienced a slight decrease to a level of 3.657 million in 2015. data of the civil aviation authority (ucl) concerning the information about air transport of polish tourists using charter flights clearly shows (tab. 4) that greece takes the first place, followed up by turkey and spain. egypt takes the fourth place despite a fall in the numbers of tourists. the top fifth rank belongs to bulgaria. tab. 2. main destinations of polish tourist movement in 2010–2015 in thousand countries 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015 / 2010 (%) bulgaria 100 100 200 150 162.2 184.0 184 greece 300 300 250 550 470.7 545.6 182 croatia 300 350 350 800 570.3 632.3 211 turkey 250 350 300 400 360.4 369.8 148 egypt 300 300 350 200 236.4 240.1 80 total 7 100 6 300 10 000 12 950 10 243.0 10 906.0 154 source: own elaboration based on: janczak, patelak (2014); turystyka… (2015, 2016); ilieş, wendt (2015). changes in tourist traffic from poland to turkey on the background of other major directions of travel 43 tab. 4. number of passengers using charter flights from poland in 2015 country number of passengers share in the total air passenger traffic greece 1 056 794 28.89% turkey 712 125 19.47% spain 567 471 15.52% egypt 369 413 10.10% bulgaria 258 755 7.07% source: own elaboration based on data of the ulc (2016). as online tourism portals inform, in 2016 poles preferred the domestic travel rather than foreign trips, which was influenced by information about the numerous terrorist attacks taking place in europe. the countries which returned to being the most frequently declared tourist destinations of polish tourists were poland (+146%), the czech republic (+131%), austria (+122%) and croatia (+94%). halfway through 2016, greece also experienced an increase in interest on the polish tourism market (bednarz, 2016) and was declared to be the holiday destination of 5% more tourists than in 2015. increases were also experienced by bulgaria (41%), spain (41%) and italy (47%). due to concerns about the security after numerous terrorist attacks, the traditional destinations of polish tourism such as france (-28%) and morocco (-46%) lost their popularity. there was the inexorable decline in trust toward countries such as egypt (decrease of 73%) and in particular turkey, where the numbers of tourists fell by 63% after the terrorist attacks and military coup (tab. 5). comparison 1q 2015 to 1q 2016 we can observe degree from 3.7% to 0.7% and in 2q 2016 from 21.2% to 9.8%. in first half of 2015 we have about 209.2 thous. polish tourists in turkey, and in 2016, the same time, only 82.7 thous. what gives decrease of nearly 60.5% (tab. 5). undoubtedly, the tightening of internal policies after the unsuccessful military coup will deepen the decline in interest in turkey by polish visitors. tab. 5. charter flights from poland to turkey in 2010–2016 year number of passengers share in the total air passenger traffic 2010 598 294 19.25% 2011 681 688 21.00% 2012 586 752 18.53% 2013 583 981 19.62% 2014 702 752 19.19% 2015 712 125 19.47% 2015* 13 807 3.70% 2015** 195 391 21.18% 2016* 2 221 0.74% 2016** 80 534 9.78% *1q **2q source: bednarz (2016). tab. 3. changes in the charter traffic from poland to chosen tourism destinations in the years of 2010–2015 destination (airport) country 2010 [thous.] 2015 [thous.] 2015 / 2010 (%) antalya turkey 444.3 458.5 103 heraklion greece 144.6 215.5 149 rodos greece 110.2 185.9 169 burges bulgaria 67.0 183.0 273 hurghada egypt 558.6 167.9 30 zakinthos greece 40.0 156.6 392 bodrum turkey 86.2 138.6 161 kos greece 40.4 137.0 339 fuerteventura spain 47.2 134.1 284 corfu greece 39.9 130.8 328 tenerife spain 61.8 120.4 195 sharm el sheikh egypt 408.9 108.9 27 marsa alam egypt 38.4 91.5 238 chania greece 53.7 89.4 166 warne bulgaria 58.1 75.5 130 dalaman turkey 70.7 72.2 102 palma de mallorca spain 72.0 71.7 100 source: own elaboration based on data of the ulc (2016). 44 emin atasoy, jan a. wendt in 2010 the most desirable destinations of polish tourists were italy, france and spain, with the number of visitors reaching 400-500 thousand. they were followed by egypt, croatia and greece with 300 thousand tourists and turkey with 250 thousand people. the economic and political crisis in greece led to turkey taking over part of the tourist flow, advancing the country to the top three polish tourist destinations. however, the 2015 terrorist attacks in turkey and the military coup in 2016 may greatly decrease the size of polish tourist traffic in this country. 4. summary in 2015 italy, croatia and greece were the most popular destinations. greece gained the tourists’ attention and interests on visiting it as the average price of hotel rooms fell in comparison to last years, despite rising rates in many parts of the world. the decreased holiday costs were also observed. what is more, the worsen security situation of other countries located by the mediterranean sea and the growing threat of tourists contributed to the rising popularity of greece as a polish tourism destination. austria has also high position as one of the commonly declared travel destinations due to its relatively cheap and well-prepared resorts and many facilities like e.g. ski trails. however, similarly to turkey, which has become less popular since the beginning of 2016, austria is not being visited by polish tourists as frequently as it used to be. despite the low levels of security, but relatively low prices, egypt still retained much of its popularity, even though it reported a 20% fall in interest in staying there. in 2015 bulgaria and hungary became the leaders in the growth of interest and the number of polish tourist arrivals. trips to the countries neighbouring with poland enjoy persisting popularity, among which germany remains the leader. the high level of participation of countries such as the czech republic and slovakia results from cross-border tourism as well as winter ski holidays. many trips to belarus, lithuania and ukraine are related to visits to relatives, as in each of these countries a large polish diasporas exists. the second, equally important reason for visiting these countries, primarily ukraine, belarus but also russia, is shopping tourism. foreign trips to germany, which is a leader of every ranking can be explained by numerous reasons. the large polish of nearly one million people residing in germany encourages many travellers to visit their relatives and friends. these reasons include also travel for work purposes and cross-border tourism. all these motives do not allow for recognition of germany as a typical destination for polish leisure tourism. similarly, the large number of trips to the united kingdom, ireland, sweden and norway indicates that they are places of polish labour migration, and they do not serve as holiday destinations. the situation of italy is different. on the one hand, the state has outstanding cultural values and develops pilgrimage tourism, but on the other hand, italy remains a traditional destination for polish labour migration. however, because of the relatively high percentage of visitors justifying their trips to this country using typical tourist motives, similarly to france, italy can be recognized as the tourism destination. references bednarz p., 2016, polska turystyka zagraniczna odporna na zamachy? http://biznes.onet.pl/wiadomosci/turystyka/ polska-turystyka-zagraniczna-odporna-na-zamachy/j0lr77 [19.07.2016]. herman g.v., wendt j., 2011, development and promotion of tourism, an extra chance in maintaining and asserting the identity and specificity of oaş land, geojournal of tourism and geosites, 1(7), 87–95. ilieş a., wendt j.a., 2015, geografia turystyczna. podstawy teorii i zagadnienia aplikacyjne, wydawnictwo awfis, gdańsk. janczak k., patelak k., 2014, uczestnictwo polaków w wyjazdach turystycznych w 2013 roku, łódź, czerwiec 2014, http:// www.msport.gov.pl/statystyka-turystyka/uczestnictwopolakow-w-w yjazdach-tur yst ycznych-w-2013-rok u [15.10.2016]. turystyka w 2014, 2015, główny urząd statystyczny, warszawa. turystyka w 2015, 2016, główny urząd statystyczny, warszawa. ulc (urząd lotnictwa cywilnego), 2016, http://www.ulc.gov. pl/pl/publikacje/statystyki-i-analizy [20.10.2016]. wendt j.a., 2011, zarys geografii turystycznej. wydawnictwo uniwersytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk. wendt j.a., 2012, changes of polish tourist flows to the eastern adriatic, [in:] p. jordan (ed.), regional development and regionalization in the adriatic space, verlag osterreichischen akademie der wissenschafte, wien, 159–165. wendt j.a., chroń m., jaźwiecka m., wiskulski t., 2016, differences in the perception and evaluation of tourists attractions of menorca by its residents and tourists, geojournal of tourism and geosites, 1(17), 21–31. wendt j.a., wiskulski t., 2015, dostępność komunikacyjna wybrzeża chorwacji, ekonomiczne problemy turystyki, 2(30), 217–231. wiskulski t., 2013, dostępność transportowa centrów turystycznych chorwacji na przykładzie transportu lotniczego, [in:] t. wiskulski, m. pilarski (eds.), współczesne zagadnienia, problemy i wyzwania w badaniach geograficznych, tom ii, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk, 165–172. zhakupov a.a., saparov k.t., mazbaev o.b., dzhanaleeva g.m., musabaeva, m.n.,yeginbayeva a.e., atasoy e., 2015, fundamentals of recreation-geographic assessment for tourism development, oxidation communications. series: ecology – remediation of water and soils, 38(3), 1530–1539. 1. introduction – on small states in international relations small states got to the centre of international relations especially in the 60s of the 20th century when their foreign policies were analyzed especially from the aspect of their relations to the superpowers, and/ or larger players. but the roots of their definition can be sought even in the 19th century, when under the influence of events in europe (especially the congress of vienna) the term „superpower” started to be used. a breakthrough in examining small states from the internationalpolitical perspective was the publication of the small states during the second world war (fox, 1959), which was devoted to the analysis of some of the countries identified as small states mainly from the military-security standpoint, particularly in terms of neutrality as a strategy to cope with relationship to the great powers in the period. this work was followed up, influenced by neorealistic approach to the analysis of international relations in the 60s and 70s, by further studies that approached the examination of foreign policy of small states in the context of the cold war and decolonization process, and later they led to studies analyzing international political situation after the collapse of bipolarity, which brought new „small” actors1. this development requires a deeper analysis examining small states not only in economic or geographical terms, but especially from a global international political perspective, which should point out and 1 studies focused on chosen aspects of foreign-politics of small states see for example in: east (1973), fox (1959; 1969), keohane (1969, 1971), vandenbosh (1964), and others. journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 7–14 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.022.5809 nation – branding in small – states foreign politics tatiana tökölyová university college of international and public relation prague, education and consultation institute in bratislava, bárdošova 33, 833 12 bratislava, slovakia, e-mail: tokolyova.fses@gmail.com citation tökölyová t., 2016, nation – branding in small – states foreign politics, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 7–14. abstract the article deals with nation-branding under specific conditions of small states and their foreign relations. the first part is devoted to identification of the main specific features of small states from international relations point of view focusing to problems with classification criteria and instruments of their foreign policies. the following part of the article is devoted to analyse the role of nation branding in small state foreign policy based on example of new zealand being traditionally identified as small state fulfilling all the above characteristics. key words small state, foreign politics, nation-branding, prestige, power. 8 tatiana tökölyová reflect the underlying determinants and factors of the foreign policy of the countries studied this way. individual studies have been mainly focused on the importance of international organizations for the foreign policy activities of small states, which should serve as a platform for dealing with similar problems, the aggregation of common interests as well as sharing the information necessary for the development of a state. it is possible to state that approaches to research small states in international relations prove several common denominators, and that the best conditions for exploring the foreign policy of a small state is its overall practical framework, i.e. examining all manifestations of foreign policy (including political leaders and their influence on the formation and implementation of foreign policy), and the second assumption is in exploring a small state through its policy of balancing the power, for example through bandwagoning in its interaction with stronger (jeopardising) superpower, i.e. through particularly security-military aspects of the implementation of its interaction in the global system, confirming the thesis that a small state can be defined only in its interactions within the hierarchy of actors (states) in the power area of international relations, i.e. in the context of its relationship with the great powers (powers) and middle powers, as documented for example in relation of a small country to a neighbouring middle power (as for example relations of new zealand with australia). therefore, as one of the most important features of a small state foreign policy is a determination of its national identity, it could be considered as a group of features characterizing the state arising from its history, ethnic or cultural aspects. understanding the national identity, i.e. seizing and representation of common underlying motives and expressions of the nation is either an objective factor (i.e. naturally developed over the independent development of the country’s internal political environment), or national identity has evolved as a subjective response to the foreign policy challenges of the country. in this context, analysis of this should also consider the tasks of various prime ministers and top political representatives who are actively and knowingly involved in defining and shaping national identity. this is the point for deriving the most important foreign policy tool of a small state. this tool is called nation-branding, i.e. identification or selection of logo or phrases which represent the country outside. studying small states in their external interactions, security determinants should be examined from the security aspects of a state, i.e. application of power through its military capabilities using a variety of techniques of power -balancing, such as aliening or bandwagoning in response to its (mostly) direct security environment. as evident in this paper, foreign policy of a small state cannot be examined as a narrowly defined problem, for example just in economic terms, which provides only a partial determinant of the overall state´s position. in foreign policy small states have a special position due to different prevailing determinants of their direct power potentials (regional, i.e. for example small size of the state, economic, i.e. by gdp and other indicators, demographic, i.e. population to 3-5 mil., etc.) comparing to stronger players that defines them rather narrow space for their foreign policy decision – making in the form of several alternatives, in economic or military security terms. therefore, in their foreign policy in the process of continual balancing of various power potentials which are small states exposed to, they must turn also to areas which „bigger” actor do not (or may not) devote any (or rather no) special importance (such as for example the analyzed nation -branding) due to the different historical and economic-political reasons. thus, the international environment has been of more significance for small countries however it offers the state less alternatives in decision-making than is the case with the great powers (hey, 2003). the assumption that the global society is much more important in small state´s interactions than for the great powers is important to be seen, because they are not evolving much more pressure in terms of expectations for the decisions. small state is because of its size and other socio-economic factors more vulnerable, and thus its system provides far fewer options to resolve the issue. the theory of small state foreign policy a identifies some characteristics of a state which is in active partnership with the superpower and middlepower (in case of new zealand for example usa and australia). foreign policy of such a state is based on the same behaviour in foreign policy which is based primarily on bilateral relations with its partners. literature has identified several approaches to the foreign policy of a small state, such as geographical position (as keohane or mahan), or through security-risk analysis, and others. these approaches generally examine small states either in europe (sweden, luxembourg or slovakia) or within so-called acp countries, i.e. at three levels, at the level of african countries, caribbean, and pacific states. for this reason and because of the neoliberal institutionalism in 90s of 20th century, small states started to be analysed in economic terms, i.e. based on their share and the impact on the world economy. as already mentioned, 90s were a significant turning point in examining the small nation – branding in small – states foreign politics 9 states when several new players in europe were joining various political, economic as well as security organizations and became a part of the integration processes in europe. they were relatively unexperienced actors which in pursuit of the most effective foreign policy could turn to a „pattern” of the already established small countries and based on their experience. this process of establishing new societies and their manifestations within the integration efforts turned the attention of international relations experts to analyze issues of small states, i.e. their characters and roles in the global political system. a significant moment was the entry of constructivism which representatives undertook to an examination of small states through identifying their standards and identity, stressing that these are the main moments, which, altogether with geographical and economic aspects, determine the direction of foreign policy of that country and its prestige in the selected areas (for example, in addressing environmental issues, etc.), illustrated by various scandinavian countries. the common aim of each of the above approaches was to develop a concept of small state foreign policy which would be applicable as widely as possible, i.e. as a framework for examining either the foreign policy of a small state through its relationship with the great powers (or „bigger” player) or approaches analyzing specific features and expressions typical for small countries in one particular region. the most common for analysis of small states is an economic approach, since it serves as the basis for developing a methodology for several international organizations in development aid (in the examined context is that of the world bank). therefore, small state theory provides a theoretical framework for assessing the foreign policy behaviour of a small state (e.g. new zealand, slovenia or slovakia), its conduct its bilateral relations undertaken with different actors of international relations, whether with middle powers or superpowers or in the context of cooperation with the various international and regional organizations. in general, the basis of this theory lies in the assertion that the limited resources of small states limit their ability to pursue a comprehensive foreign policy and based on this it is possible to predict their foreign policy behaviour. thus, the classification of small states relies on the specifications of the primary determinants of the foreign policy position of the state in the global political system, as well as on the understanding of the power potentials of enforcement and defence of own interests and goals. according to o.  krejčí (2007), the power by which the state is in its foreign policy interaction with other actors has been affected by the material and spiritual factors. material factor expresses the underlying assumptions of foreign policy, such as geographic location, self-sufficiency in natural resources, which builds its industrial capacity and related military-technical potential. the last significant moment of material aspect of power potential of the country is the population, i.e. currently the most widespread and most applied criterion of the theories defining small states. 2. role of nation branding in soft power applied in small state foreign policy generally, currently a soft power is given much greater importance than in the past, i.e. power of the state, which is in a direct contrast to the hard power (i.e. use of power resources, such as war) based on determinants such as military force, gdp and population size. currently, a use of soft power by small states within their foreign policy, as illustrated below on example of new zealand´s nation-branding, is associated with the growth of their economic potential, increase of its scientific and technological and cultural influences in its immediate region and the global society (for example, in international institutions and organizations). it follows that while dealing with various foreign policy issues, the country relies on its commitment to world or regional community in the manner that it shares the same common values and highlights the uniqueness of their cultural aspects and principles of justice in international relations given to the forefront (here important role played also by sharing moral aspects of politics). legitimacy of foreign policy led in this manner is ensured through public debate, i.e. via work with public opinion, which is an expression of the quality of government (and governance, as well). the following part of the article is to analyse the role of nation branding in small state´s foreign policy based on example of new zealand being traditionally identified as small state fulfilling all the above characteristics. in this context, soft power can be considered as presentation of own culture and language (especially of their specifics, as in the case of new zealand maori culture in a secured natural environment), cooperation with the media and emphasizing cooperation not only in international relations, i.e. emphasizing the principle of so-called perception of “us – we” (we-ness) while accompanied with an active use of diplomacy. it is clear from the above, that soft power is a way of using the power of the state (i.e. ability to convince other actors on how to act in accordance with our beliefs) when the 10 tatiana tökölyová state effectively influences behaviour of other actors in international relations without using any form of coercion or violence. as given by a. butcher (2012) in his study on application of soft power in new zealand´s foreign policy, the world society perceives an interesting destination or country through its sports activities (rugby world cup), educational areas through exchanges or study visits of foreign students, tourist –veryattractive country in terms of nature connected with presentation of the culture linked to the film industry (e.g. movies lord of the rings and the hobbit; see. fig. 2). these areas, respectively the activities used here by butcher prove to have more stable and long-term effects, rather than using the hard power. according to a. butcher (2012), possible soft power in the case of new zealand share the aspiration (expressed in the national anthem) perceived in its relationship with australia, and the nearest region and culturally represented by demographic movements and migration from the pacific islands and asia. in accordance also with butcher, it can be concluded that soft power is used by new zealand for example in close cooperation with its partner countries in the asia-pacific region, i.e. in the counter terrorism activities in the region through participation in various projects aimed at supporting the development of civil society. this activity is financed by the ministry of foreign affairs and trade, through the asia security fund. this fund provides finances for example for training centres to combat terrorism in jakarta, kuala lumpur, and bangkok. the goal in this area is for example to help the pacific countries to adopt legislation to combat terrorism, and to this end the pacific islands forum working group on counter-terrorism has been convened by new zealand since 2005. another instrument, important for understanding the nation-branding process, is a sharing and/ or activation of development aid in the region, since new zealand in the framework of its small state foreign policy is proved to be an active un member and a member of the economic and social commission of the united nations for asia and the pacific. (http://www.un.org/en/ sections/...) in this area, new zealand points out that its position as a major player in the pacific is perceived principally through its active work in different regional groupings such as south pacific commission (regional organization that provides assistance to the countries with a nonself governing region of the south pacific under their administration), south pacific forum, and others (new zealand is a member of the pacific forum with south pacific states, australia and papua new guinea). in this context of nation-branding, it is needed to state that new zealand, unlike australia, defines itself as a pacific nation. this fact has led to a perspective radically different from the australian one on several issues, including immigration; trade, as well as relations with the us. from the beginning of its formal independent statehood, new zealand has already profiled as southpacific nation, as evidenced by not only by close constitutional relationships with the cook islands, niue and tokelau. their citizens are also citizens of new zealand while cook islands and niue are fully self-governing states in free association with new zealand. tokelau is a dependent territory of new zealand without full selfgovernment, even though the development goes towards its connection to association with new zealand. the above is necessary for understanding that new zealand´s nation-branding is, in many aspects, rooted in indigenous people and their role in the society. also strategy of nation branding via developing and promoting tourism is related to aspects of the original indigenous peoples. maori element is particularly lively in all areas of life of new zealand society. it is a manifestation of understanding supporting a torque moment of identity of the country the indigenous maori population. engaging the indigenous maori population in new zealand tourism (as in fig. 1) is one of the most spectacular moments and original approaches to address the situation of indigenous peoples while building and promoting the branding. in contrast to the so-called „new” minorities as the indigenous people of the country are historically entitled to different conditions and treatment. fig. 1. indigenous culture and traditions as used in nation-branding source: tourism nz unveils…, 2015. nation – branding in small – states foreign politics 11 as reported by a.a.  giannopoulos et al. (2011), one of the main characters of the today’s globalized world is a competition of individual countries fighting for attention or confidence by potential visitors tourists, i.e. customers or investors and representatives of other countries. just a positive branding, which stands on a solid strategy, can be a comparative advantage for the country also in international relations. in that regard, in my opinion, tourism should be seen as one of the most visible and most tangible manifestations of good nation branding. the above activities could be classified as nation branding activities, which in this context are identified as one of the most effective instruments of soft power, as evidenced by the example of new zealand, developing the branding of countries, especially in areas such as māori the relationship with their cultural roots; tourism; introduction to the country through the film industry (the above-mentioned films like lord of the rings and the hobbit; fig. 2) as well as the presentation of the country through its relationship with the environment (symbol 100% pure new zealand; one hundred percent pure new zealand). the new york times magazine in 2005 in the issue called „year in ideas” introduced the idea of using national brand to increase the prestige of the country (as one of the foreign policy instruments) as one of the most extraordinary ideas applying anholt´s statement that “just as companies have learned to „live the brand,” countries should consider their reputations carefully because (...) in this interconnected world (...) the state’s reputation is therefore of critical importance” (risen, 2005). the author is mainly based on anholt´s argumentation that national governments have been well aware of the use of the brand in international relations, when brand somehow allows them to gain control over their image by taking an advantage of its strength in the cultural, economic or political sphere. one of the programs under this activity was to organize the world championships in rugby in 2011, thus the country was offered an extraordinary opportunity to present to the world just the best and most interesting what the country could offer to a wide variety of tourists. in practice, this meant connections between iwi and other maori groups and state and public institutions, which brought a clear support of maori business (https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=kwowe_n-2gw), and the principal effect is that “new zealand is one of the most respected and desirable countries in the world and the pure nz brand successfully represents many of the positive images, assumptions and expectations people have of the country. the tourism campaign around the pure nz brand has undoubtedly been a success and has helped to make new zealand one of the most highly sought after tourist destinations and one that is high on people’s ‘must-visit’ lists.” with proving the preliminary results yet, when stating that “our 100% pure new zealand campaign (...) is changed and evolved but still aims to make new zealand one of the most desirable destinations in the world for our target market. the markets are different (...) the message is the same: it’s our special combination of activities, landscape, people and culture that makes new zealand a unique holiday experience. we call that experience 100% pure new zealand. (...) we continue to market new zealand internationally as a tourism destination through our 100% pure new zealand campaign. it’s at the heart of our advertising, international pr, online marketing, event and sponsorships“. (http://traveltrade.newzealand. com/en/working....). as pointed out by s. anholt (2004), the ability of how a state can attract some of the positive specifics at the present is expressed just by a real strength of its brand which is indicated by the success of the country in competition with other countries in the vast diversity of various natural beauties, living standards fig. 2. famous movie as a tool for nation-branding source: http://www.newzealand.com/int/home-of-middle-earth/ 12 tatiana tökölyová and cultural specifics in which just discreet „voice” expires. branding is therefore, in my opinion, one of the demonstrations of successful implementation of cultural diplomacy of a small state and as provided at official web site promoting campaign 100% pure new zealand: “the brand new zealand symbol is the fern (fig.  3). it features in our tourism new zealand corporate logo. it’s a trademarked country-of-origin brand, used by tourism and trade operators to promote new zealand internationally and within new zealand“. (http://traveltrade.newzealand.com....) although the founder of modern approaches to building a national brand, s.  anholt (2005) acknowledges that from its beginning every country is a trade mark in its essence (which is reflected in international relations for example as its prestigeone of the most important determinant of foreign interaction), and each of these brands is unique. in case of small states building of their own brand in the current international relations is one of the relevant factors, as they have at their disposal other historical, economic, cultural or social conditions comparing to superpowers for example. in case of small states, building of a national brand is a long-term, goal-oriented process in which a small state is expected to highlight its strengths, which would distinguish it among the other small states, which would be highlighted and compared also with the stronger actors, i.e. to highlight its unique identity as an essential attribute of power competition between states. building a national brand is a complex process since it involves several national players from different fields (such as in the case of new zealand combining entrepreneurial sector of tourism and film industry sectors working in the field of cultural or sports for a stable and united government). in my opinion, the strategy of identification, development and application of such national brand is clearly subject to the recognition and knowledge of own national identity, i.e. by a wide adoption of the moment, character or expression which the given nation is caught and which not only the political representation is identified with, but making the national brand a foundation of soft power or the prestige of the country requires also the population being identified with, because people are crucial in its practical implementation, and the process of stabilization of the brand around the world will be, in particular, contributed by their work. and this may, in my opinion, be identified as one of the weaknesses of campaigns of several small states in order to raise the profile prepared (e.g. campaign in slovakia entitled „slovakia little big country” aimed at promoting tourism in slovakia in the past). in cases such as slovakia or analyzed new zealand, states should, in my opinion, construct the building and stabilisation of their national brand so that it could fulfil an essential role in the foreign policy implementation) in a competitive advantage, i.e. to build it for example on a moment which is the key for the economy (swiss army knife or alpine milk chocolate, which promotes tourism to the region), being set to the context of the overall identity of the country. in the case of new zealand, the key brand is “100% pure nz” (one hundred percent pure new zealand; see fig.  4) which synthesized in itself not only a tourism linked to cultural heritage, but it is passed into international relations as a brand focused on anti-nuclear policy and nuclear-free pacific (in accordance with anholt´s the definition of national brands such as set of characteristics that perceived by people in the country in the six key areas of national identity expression, such as culture and heritage, residents and migration, government, tourism, investment and exports) (anholt, 1998) indentifying the country as offering “(…) 100% pure relaxation, 100% pure welcome, 100% pure adrenalin, and 100% pure you – all connected back to the core premise of 100% pure new zealand (...)” (http:// www.tourismnewzealand.com/about/....; see fig. 4). as reported by c. blain et al. (2005), determining the brand of a state is based on the identification of the main marketing activities such as creating a name, symbol, logo or words or other graphic representation that accurately reflect the major brand identity. properly chosen brand should immediately contact the beneficiary country and create an emotional connection with the country (i.e. destination). such a label is also 100% pure nz (see fig. 4) when the brand reflects a combination of map of the country, the country name and the expression of a one hundred percent quality. despite the fact that the expert literature, which is dedicated to branding, focuses primarily on marketing, in my opinion, it is important to perceive fig. 3. the fern – the brand new zealand symbol source: http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/about/whatwe-do/campaign-and-activity/. nation – branding in small – states foreign politics 13 national branding as a tool of public diplomacy, i.e. one of the instruments of foreign policy, not only of a small state. and although the main objective of the identification and use of the brand is to promote the country towards its own population (which thus acquires a unifying moment of own national identity) and residents of other countries (which should be for example a logo to evoke them to be interested in the country at least), it may not be confused with propaganda as in order to influence public opinion other tools and methods are usedbecause, in my opinion, it is rooted in the moment of the definition and promotion of the main aspects of own national identity of the country. 3. conclusion based on the above, it is in my opinion that a small state can effectively achieve its foreign policy goals in the interaction with other players (often the larger one) just through a well set nation branding, which shall integrate the main aspects of the country. national brands are (should be) indeed promoted mainly central authorities of the state directly (e.g. government and its various specialized departments) or through specialized bodies and agencies, namely in the long term perspective. as confirmed also by anholt in his book called from a competitive nation branding identity – the role of brand management as a “component of national policy” (anhold, 2008, p. 23), a national brand building is a part of the national policy as a whole, not just of one campaign or action. this aspect expresses the policy based on the idea of 100% pure new zealand, which only confirms the latest developments in research of linking the branding with foreign policy of a state, namely with public diplomacy (see gilboa, 2008). in conclusion i can say that in 2010 the brand new zealand was ranked as the third strongest brand in the world (in the 6th futurebrand country brand index, cbi that is elaborated in collaboration with bbc world news)2. the main areas to be considered in the long term were, inter alia, tourism, culture and heritage, quality business and living standards. the survey showed that new zealand draws on the beauty of nature (which becomes a metaphor for the identity; see for example bell, 2005) but also on freedom of expression and respect of finance. as explained by the tourism new zealand chair kerry prendergast, new zealand brand clearly proves a long-term growth and enhances the reputation of the country abroad, which facilitates its interaction with other states, proving a nation-branding to be an effective tool of small-state´s foreign policy (http://stoppress.co.nz/movingsshakings/kevin...). references anholt s., 2004, branding places and nations, [in:] r. clifton, j. simmons, s. ahmad (eds.), brands and branding, princeton, nj: bloomberg press, london, 213–226. anholt s., 2005, anholt nation brand index: how does the world see america? journal of advertising research, 45(3), 296–304. anholt s., 2008, from nation branding to competitive identity – the role of brand management as a component of national policy, [in:] k. dinnie (ed.), nation branding: concepts, issues, practice, butterworth-heinemann, oxford, 22–33. bell c., 2005, branding new zealand: the national greenwash, british review of new zealand studies, 15, 19. blain c., levy s.e., ritchie j.r.b., 2005, destination branding: insights and practicesfrom destination management organizations, journal of travel research, 43(4), 328–338. butcher a., 2012, students, soldiers, sports, sheep and the silver-screen: new zealand’s soft power in asean and southeast asia, contemporary southeast asia, 34(2), 249–273. east m.a., 1973, size and foreign policy behaviour: a test of two models, world politics, 25(4), 556–576. fox a.b., 1959, the power of small states: diplomacy in world war ii, the university of chicago press, chicago. fox a.b., 1969, small states in the international system 1919– 1969, international journal, 24(4), 751–764. giannopoulos a.a., piha l.p., avlonitis g.j., 2011, “desti–nation branding”: what for? from the notions of tourism and nation branding to an integrated framework, http:// www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2011/april/biec-roa-nua/desti-nation_ branding-_antonios_giannopoulos.pdf [4.9.2016]. gilboa e., 2008, searching for a theory of public diplomacy, the annals of the american academy of political and social science, 616(55), 55–77. 2 the top was ranked canada, followed by australia. see more online at: http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/tourism-news-and-insights/latest-tourism-news/2010/11/newzealand-third-strongest-brand/ fig. 4. 100% pure new zealand campaign logo source: http://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/ tag/pure-new-zealand/ 14 tatiana tökölyová hey j., 2003, introducing small state foreign policy, [in:] j.  hey (ed.), small states in world politics; explaining foreign policy behaviour, lynne rienner publishers, london, 1–12. http://traveltrade.newzealand.com/en/wor k ing-withus/100-pure-new-zealand/ [04.09.2016]. http://www.newzealand.com/int/home-of-middle-earth/ [04.09.2016]. http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/about/what-we-do/ campaign-and-activity/ [11.08.2016]. http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/tourism-news-and-insights/latest-tourism-news/2010/11/new-zealand-thirdstrongest-brand/ [04.09.2016]. http://www.un.org/en/sections/where-we-work/asia-andpacific/index.html [10.10.2016]. h t t p s : / / w w w. y o u t u b e . c o m / w a t c h ? v = k w o w e _ n 2 g w [04.09.2016]. keohane r.o., 1969, lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international politics, international organisation, 23(2), 291–310. keohane r.o., 1971, the big influence of small allies, foreign policy, 1(2). kevin bowler trades tourism new zealand for frucor. marsden inch. 9.8.2016, http://stoppress.co.nz/movingsshakings/ kevin-bowler-swaps-one-chief-executive-title-another-resigns-tourism-new-zealand-join-frucor. [10.08.2016]. krejčí o., 2007, mezinárodní politika, ekopress, city. pōwhiri welcomes ghost in the shell to wellington. february 24, 2016, http://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/ tag/pure-new-zealand/ [04.10.2016]. risen c., 2005, branding nations, the new york times magazine, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/magazine/ 11ideas1-5.html?pagewanted=print [11.10.2016]. tourism nz unveils new campaign with updated 100% pure identity via whybin\tbwa sydney, 2015, http://www.campaignbrief.com/2015/05/tourism-nz-unveils-new-campaig.html [08.10.2016]. vandenbosh a., 1964, the small states in international politics and organization, the journal of politics, 26(2), 293–312. 1. introduction the settlement system of cities in poland is characterized by a stable distribution according to the size of cities, where the relationship between the rank and the size of individual cities is consistent with the zipf rule of a linear relationship between the rank logarithm and the urban center size (dziewoński et al., 1977; sokołowski, 2003). it is considered to be one of the most mature, polycentric settlement systems in europe (bourne et al., 1984; rykiel, jażdżewska, 2002; smętkowski, 2010). based on the number and the size structure of cities in poland, k. dziewoński (1983) argued that during the period of the people’s republic of poland, three characteristic stages of transformation of polish cities could be observed: • development of small towns in the 1950s associated with the post-war development of the recovered territories (northern and western); journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(2), 20–33 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.2.03 dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 anna runge (1), jerzy runge (2) (1) institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, university of silesia, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-1271-5559 e-mail: anna.runge@us.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, university of silesia, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-2766-4926 e-mail: jerzy.runge@us.edu.pl citation runge a., runge j., 2021, dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(2), 20–33. abstract the study aims to present variability in the population of individual size classes of polish cities in 1950-2018, its determinants and consequences for the formation of the settlement system. the application of quartiles as the basic statistical measure allowed identifying which parts of particular size classes of cities had the greatest impact (progressively or regressively) on changes in the settlement system. in this respect, strong dynamics of the upper quartile of polish cities, lasting until the end of the 1970s, becomes apparent. in the 1980s, the dynamics of the upper quartile of large cities showed a shift during development waves in comparison to the culmination of these waves for medium-sized cities. however, since the end of the 1980s, there has been an increasing role of the lower quartile in determining the direction of changes in the size structure of cities, especially in medium and small cities. key words poland, city size classes, large cities, medium-sized cities, small cities, quartiles. received: 09 march 2021 accepted: 31 may 2021 published: 30 june 2021 dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 21 • development of medium-sized cities based on intensive industrialization, and creating regional and sub-regional growth centers – the 1960s– 1970s; • initiation of the process of metropolization in the 1970s, especially as regards warsaw. since the beginning of the 1990s, the city system was shaped in the new conditions related to deindustrialization, globalization of the market economy, as well as the process of metropolization of space, and then intensification of international population migrations (korcelli, 2018). due to the complexity in shaping settlement systems, the study of the directions of population changes cannot be limited to indicating pro-development tendencies in cities or to identifying the conditions and consequences of these changes. it is vital to define: • to what extent individual size classes of urban centers shaped a specific direction of transformations, • which parts (lower or upper) of these classes had a greater impact on the observed changes in trends, and • how stable the impact was over time. in other words, we ask, for example, the question: was the population growth in the class of mediumsized cities determined exogenously or endogenously? exogenous growth consists in the transition (promotion) of small towns to the class of mediumsized cities because of the dynamic population development of the former. on the other hand, endogenous growth means an increase in the population of the medium-sized centers themselves, which thus moved up in this size class of cities. the increase in the population of the large city class may result from the acquisition of a certain part of dynamically developing medium-sized cities (exogenous growth) or be a derivative of the development of cities within this size class (endogenous growth). then the question remains: is it an increase in the number of the largest cities or of the smallest ones in a given class? these trends are important not only in terms of cognition, but also they have a practical dimension, related to the optimization of the country’s settlement structure. the aim of the study is to distinguish the stages of development of polish cities in reference to factors that stimulate or inhibit this development and indicate its consequences for shaping the size structure of cities. this will allow identification of the share of individual size classes of cities in the ongoing changes in the country’s settlement system. 2. data sources and methods of analysis the study uses secondary data analysis, which is commonly used in both quantitative and qualitative research (see: macdonald, headlam, 2011). in this article, it was applied to the first of the distinguished data types (see: dale et al., 2008). the data from the national censuses provided by statistics poland (pl. główny urząd statystyczny) were used for analysis. the data for 1950–1988 came from publications of this institution (statystyka miast ..., 1967; struktura demograficzna ..., 1972; rocznik statystyczny miast, 1980; struktura demograficzna ..., 1992), while for 1998–2018 from the website local data bank (pl. bank danych lokalnych). as complementary information, data contained in the demographic yearbook of poland 2020 (rocznik..., 2020) was used. among the tools that allow studying the scale of the dynamics of the discussed phenomena, the most frequently used ones include absolute and relative increases, indices and models of fluctuations in time that enable defining the trend as well as seasonal and resultant fluctuations (sobczyk, 1995). slightly less attention is paid to the possibilities offered by the median and quartiles, especially in a comparative analysis of time series (fig. 1). if we compare two ordered data series using the median (me) as well as the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3), there can be a situation where: a. the second series of data compared to the first one is characterized by an increase in the size of all measures (me, q1 and q3); b. with the same size of me, the lower quartile (q1) of the second series is lower compared to the first data series, and the upper quartile (q3) is higher; c. the second series of data, compared to the first one, is characterized by a decrease in the size of all measures (me, q1 and q3), i.e. the opposite to situation a; d. with the same size of me, the lower quartile (q1) of the second series is higher than that of the first data series, and the upper quartile (q3) is lower, i.e. the opposite to situation b. the idea of these comparisons was used in an analysis of the subsystem of medium-sized cities in poland in the context of the national settlement system (runge, 2013) and with reference to the model of urbanization by m.s. geyer and t. kontuly (1993). the monitoring of further trends in changes in individual components of the size structure of cities in the changing conditions of the urbanization process enables revealing regularities in the course of this process. data from the period of 1950–2018 were used for the study, distinguishing 10-year 22 anna runge, jerzy runge sub-periods. the study was conducted not only for the general set of cities in poland, but also for its subsets, broken down into: • small towns (less than 20,000 inhabitants), • medium-sized cities (from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants), • large cities (over 100,000 inhabitants). the issue of the role of the lower quartile q1 and the upper quartile q3 in determining the direction and the size of population changes in individual size classes of cities was given more careful consideration using j. webb’s (1963) demographic typology, widely known in population geography. however, instead of the natural and migration increase/decrease, the axes in the graph represent the values of the lower quartile q1 and of the upper quartile q3, while the individual sectors from a to h represent the nature of the relationships in shaping the size and direction of changes in both statistical measures (fig. 2). generally, types a–d are progressive, regardless of whether the dynamics of q1 is greater than q3 or vice versa. in turn, types e–h are regressive, regardless of whether regress in q1 is greater than in q3 or vice versa. a c b q 1 q 1 q 1 q 3 q 3 q 3 me me me d q 1 q 3 me a b c d ef g h q 1 q 3 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 140 130 120 110 90 80 70 60 fig. 1. changes of the size of the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3) for selected data source: runge, 2013. fig. 2. types of dynamics of the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3) source: runge (2013) based on j.w. webb (1963). dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 23 3. the development of cities in poland in 1950–2018 – its determinants and consequences for the size structure of cities poland belongs to moderately urbanized european countries. the share of urban population in the total population of the country increased from 36.9% in 1950 to 61.2% in 1988, reaching its maximum level of 62.0% in 1991. since then, the share of urban population was gradually decreasing – to 60.1% in 2018. the number of cities and their population varied over time (tab. 1). in order to maintain the comparability of data, the table uses intervals of a similar span, while maintaining a specific trend in population changes. when a trend continued in the next decade, time intervals were generalized. this allowed distinguishing periods with different population trends in the development of polish cities (fig. 3). the period of dynamic population growth in the 1950s was related to rebuilding the cities after the war and to overlapping of the post-war baby boom with the declining stage of demographic transformation (the 3rd phase). the period of rapid urban population growth in 1960–1978 was associated with intense industrialization (mainly of cities) with a view to transforming poland from an agricultural country into an industrial one (transition from the agrarian to the industrial phase of economic development). this was extensive industrialization, based on traditional industries (among others: mining, metallurgy, shipbuilding, textiles) with a high degree of labor consumption (kuklinski, 1981; parysek, 2005). in consequence, by the end of the 1970s, urban labor markets grew rapidly, absorbing enormous resources of the young labor force flowing in from the countryside. from the then overcrowded and underinvested rural areas, enormous migration flowed into cities (dziewoński table 1. changes in the size structure of polish cities in 1950–2018 year cities 1950 1960 1970 1978 1988 1998 2008 2018 number of cities total 693 887 889 803 822 875 892 930 large 16 22 24 33 41 42 39 38 medium-sized 60 88 124 146 175 189 181 180 small 617 777 741 624 606 644 672 712 structure (in %) total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 large 2.3 2.5 2.7 4.1 5.0 4.8 4.4 4.1 medium-sized 8.7 9.9 13.9 18.2 21.3 21.6 20.3 19.3 small 89.0 87.6 83.4 77.7 73.7 73.6 75.3 76.6 population (in thous.) total 9 384.0 14 199.9 17 062.6 20 150.4 23 174.8 23 922.8 23 288.2 23 067.2 large 4 055.1 6 127.4 7 380.5 9 693.8 11 518.1 11 510.3 10 967.5 10 705.5 medium-sized 2 229.4 3 351.1 4 775.9 6 015.2 7 140.7 7 622.8 7 403.3 7 363.0 small 3 099.5 4 721.4 4 906.2 4 441.4 4 516.0 4 789.7 4 917.4 4 998.7 structure (in %) total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 large 43.2 43.2 43.3 48.1 49.7 48.1 47.1 46.4 medium-sized 23.8 23.6 28.0 29.9 30.8 31.9 31.8 31.9 small 33.0 33.2 28.7 22.0 19.5 20.0 21.1 21.7 year cities population dynamics in % (starting year = 100%) 1950-1960 1960-1970 (1970-1978) 1978-1988 1988-1998 1998-2008 2008-2018 1950-2018 total 151.3 120.2 118.1 115.0 103.2 97.3 99.1 245.8 large 151.1 120.5 131.3 118.8 99.9 95.3 97.6 264.0 medium-sized 150.3 142.5 125.9 118.7 106.8 97.1 99.5 330.3 small 152.3 103.9 90.5 101.7 106.1 102.7 101.7 161.3 source: own study based on: bank danych lokalnych; rocznik..., 1980; statystyka..., 1967; struktura..., 1972, 1992. 24 anna runge, jerzy runge et al., 1977; fierla, 1976; gawryszewski, 1989). in turn, population growth in cities forced their spatial development by expanding borders and absorbing the neighboring rural areas and even small towns. in the next period of urban transformation, two sub-periods should be distinguished: gradual weakening of the urban population growth in 1978–1988 and its inhibition in 1988–1998. in some industrial cities, especially those based on raw materials, population growth still continued. many small and medium-sized cities gained a chance for development thanks to the administrative functions of the voivodeship capital due to a new administrative division of the country in 1975. however, the scale of investment in industry ended in the mid-1980s, and symptoms of an economic crisis resulting from the malfunctioning of the centrally planned economy began to emerge. the migratory influx to the cities began to weaken (korcelli, 1988). the political and economic transformation opened poland to the world, but, simultaneously, it severely confronted its economy with the world economy. the collapse of the labor market in industrial cities which based their development on traditional branches of the resource-intensive and laborintensive industry resulted in difficulties in finding a job. this delayed young people’s opportunities to become independent and realize their life plans. the thus far weakly marked suburbanization process significantly accelerated in the 1990s due to the development of individual motorization and the construction of systems of access road to cities. there was a separation of places of work from places of residence (parysek, 2008). currently, increasingly more often not individual cities are analyzed but entire functional regions or metropolitan areas, as due to the suburbanization process, part of the urban population found itself outside the city but in a zone closely related to it (smętkowski et al., 2009; śleszyński, 2013). the period of depopulation of polish cities (population decline) occurred in 1998–2018. the intensifying social changes (an increase in the consumption lifestyle, the pursuit of one’s own life aspirations, and a sense of responsibility for supporting one’s family) and the persistent difficult situation on the labor market delayed decisions about getting married and having children. since the beginning of the political and economic transformation, both the migration and reproductive supply clearly began to weaken, and since 1998 both components of population changes took negative values (zborowski et al., 2012). the increasing outflow of residents of a city outside its borders – to the suburban zone – was accompanied by economic emigration of young people in search of work (jaroszewska, stryjakiewicz, 2014). initially, this outflow was directed to the largest agglomerations in the country with a diversified economic structure and growing foreign capital investments. after poland joined the european union, foreign emigration significantly increased, which mainly concerned young people (marek, 2008) who a – births; b – deaths; bb – baby boom. fig. 3. natural movement of the population in polish cities in 1950–2018 source: own study based on rocznik..., 2020. dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 25 started their families in other countries, the effect being a substantial reduction in the birth rate in poland and the emergence of a natural loss (kałużakopias, 2014). therefore, since the 1990s, the shaping of the components of the actual decline in city populations was affected by external conditions, such as the political and economic transformation, the second demographic transition, the processes of globalization and suburbanization, and the internal socio-economic situation of particular cities. population changes were also accompanied by changes in the number of cities. they took place not only because of dynamical urbanization, but also due to administrative reforms of the country implemented every few decades, with completely different assumptions: sometimes giving and sometimes taking away city rights, especially as regards the smallest settlements. this resulted not only in changes in the number of cities and in large diversification of their population dynamics, but also in changes in the size structure of polish cities, expressed in the share of large cities (over 100,000 inhabitants), mediumsized cities (20,000–100,000 inhabitants) and small town (below 20,000 inhabitants) – (runge, 2011). in 1950–1970, the number of cities in poland increased from 693 to 889, and then, because of a reform of the administrative division of the country in 1975, it dropped to 803 cities in 1978 (tab. 1). at the same time, the number of large cities increased from 24 to 33, and the number of small towns decreased from 741 to 624 in 1978 and to 606 in 1988. in 1975, while seeking to decentralize power, the country was divided into 49 small voivodeships, which gave some small and medium-sized centers a chance for dynamic development thanks to the administrative function of the voivodeship capital (among others, suwałki, łomża, ostrołęka, sieradz, skierniewice, ciechanów). in turn, in 1998, a smaller number of 16 voivodeships were restored, degrading the administrative functions of many cities. the enactment of the bill on local self-government in 1991 (ustawa..., 1990) restored local selfgovernment. this enabled smaller cities absorbed in the past decades by larger neighbors to regain administrative independence (incl. bieruń, pszów, rydułtowy, radzionków) (krzysztofik, 2006). as a result, in the following decades the number of cities increased again to 930 cities in 2018 (tab.1). a rapidly growing – both endogenously and exogenously – set of large cities encompassed the largest part of the population potential. in 1950, only 43.2% of the total urban population lived in 16 large cities (over 100,000 inhabitants), while in 1988 in 41 large cities, as much as 49.7%. since then, the population of large cities began to decline, which resulted both in a decrease in the number of large cities (to 38 cities in 2018) and their share in the population (to 46.4%). there is a certain wave pattern in the population development of large cities: after a dynamic development in the 1950s, there was a slightly weaker development in the 1960s. population development accelerated again in the 1970s as a result of intensive industrialization and administrative functions related to the new administrative division of the country. this also accelerated the development of many medium-sized cities, exceeding the number of 100,000 inhabitants. in the next decade, the development of large cities slowed down (the crisis of the economic development model based on forced industrialization), and the 1990s marked a slight regression (collapse of the labor market and then suburbanization), which deepened in the 21st century (the impact of strong suburbanization and the effects of an aging population in cities) (kurek et al., 2015; krzysztofik, szmytkie, 2018). the suburbanization processes occurring since the late 1990s developed powerful suburban zones around large cities (poznań, warsaw, kraków, łódź) where some of those cities’ inhabitants moved (raźniak, 2007; krzysztofik et al., 2017). medium-sized cities, from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, are an intermediate size class between large cities and small towns. in 1950–1998 the number of such cities rapidly grew (from 60 to 189 cities), but the share of their population in the entire group of cities merely increased from 23.8% to 31.9%. the development of medium-sized cities corresponds to the previously distinguished stages of the development of polish cities, the difference being that their development in 1960–1998 was more intense than for all cities. the dynamically developing cities at that time included, among others, those based on exploitation of raw materials (e.g. lignite: konin, or copper ore: głogów and lubin), developing industry (stalowa wola, mielec, dębica), or small towns which became capitals of voivodeships in 1975 (suwałki, łomża, ostrołęka, biała podlaska). however, when the industrial model of development was exhausted and the next administrative reform deprived them of the functions of voivodeship capitals and degraded them to the poviat level, their population growth markedly slowed down. in poland, small towns (with a population of less than 20,000 inhabitants) clearly dominate in numbers. they constitute 76.6% of the total number of cities and are inhabited by 21.7% of the population of the entire group of cities. the share of small towns in the total number of towns decreased from 89.0% 26 anna runge, jerzy runge in 1950 to 73.6% in 1988, but in the 21st century, it increased again to 76.6% in 2018. only 33.0% of the total number of urban residents lived in small towns in 1950, 19.5% in 1988 and 21.7% in 2018. the class of small towns developed the slowest, because, on the one hand, some of the most dynamically developing small towns advanced to the set of medium-sized towns, while new charters or restitution of municipal rights complemented this set “from below” with very small towns. the population grew dynamically only in strongly industrialized small towns (incl. łęczna, bukowno, połaniec). since the 1990s, the processes of suburbanization have intensified, significantly accelerating the development of satellites of large cities: reda (gdańsk), murowana goślina, pobiedziska (poznań), kobyłka (warsaw). 4. application of quartiles in the study of the dynamics of population in size classes of cities research on the dynamics of population processes is extremely important as it allows identifying regularities of shaping the country’s settlement system as well as making attempts at extrapolating changes in the future. in the national structure of the settlement system, three levels of the functional and spatial organization of cities are formed: local, regional and national (dziewoński, 1975). they correspond to the size classes of large, medium and small cities, among which the largest urban agglomerations play a leading role in the national settlement system. therefore, apart from the cognitive aspect, such studies have a practical dimension, constituting a premise for the creation of national, regional and local development strategies. information about the direction of population changes allows indicating the current and future needs in the field of housing, social and technical infrastructure in the city policy. using such measures as the median, the lower quartile (q1) and upper quartile (q3) in subsequent sub-periods, their variability in time (course) was plotted, both for all polish cities and for individual size classes of cities (fig. 4–7). as can be easily seen, both the direction and the scale of changes of the analyzed statistical measures in each series of data (total cities, large cities, medium-sized cities, small towns) significantly differ. this is underlined by an arrow showing for which quartile (q1 or q3) not only the direction but also the intensity of these changes in time was greater. thus, in the case of the entire set of polish cities (all cities), there is a clear division into two periods of transformation: 1950–1988 and the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries (fig. 4). in the initial period of the study (1950–1960), the role of the smallest urban centers was incidental (increase in q1), which resulted, among others, from the settlement in and development of the recovered territories as well as a large number of small and very small towns in all cities in the country (the median size of the population was only 4,000–5,000 inhabitants). in the 1970s, large cities, medium-sized cities and larger small towns played a leading role in the urbanization process. the industrialization processes in cities peaked at that time (the highest share of people employed in industry), and the administrative reform of the country gave medium-sized and even small towns a chance for development. this resulted in a strong fig. 4. changes of the size of the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3) of the population in all towns in poland in 1950–2018 source: own study. dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 27 increase in the population of cities above the median for the set. as a result of the administrative reform of 1975, many very small towns ceased to be urban centers, and hence the significant dynamics of the lower quartile q1 was maintained. yet, due to the collapse of local labor markets in the period of the political and economic transformation, this dynamics significantly weakened and began to show regressive trends. the dynamics of q3 was also weakening since the 1980s, and in the following years, the decrease in the size of the upper quartile (q3) was clearly marked. the extent of the regression after 1988 was large, despite a slight increase in the volume of q3 in 2008–2018. among large cities, changes in the quartiles sizes in time clearly fluctuated (fig. 5). in the 1950s and the 1960s, the pace of the demographic development of large cities was high; therefore, the highest increase in q3 appeared in the 1960s. in 1950–1960 and in 1970–1988, the set of large cities was expanding owing to dynamically developing medium-sized cities. this affected the lowering of q3 at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s. since the 1980s, the number of large cities has stabilized with a gradual slowdown in the development of the largest cities. the varied dynamics of the population of individual cities was accompanied by a slight increase in the upper quartile, which persisted until the first decade of the 21st century. however, in the last analyzed period, a decrease in the upper quartile was noticeable due to progressive suburbanization and aging of the urban population. these changes result from the varied dynamics of the population of individual cities, with a population above the median for the set, because the adopted research procedure is based on an interpretation of positional variables. a similar, but slightly milder character of the changes was visible among the smallest of large cities (q1). the policy of economic activation, especially in the country’s peripheral regions, implemented through the country’s administrative reform in 1975 and the location of industrial investments, resulted in the dynamic development of large cities concentrated around q1 as well as medium-sized cities being promoted to the group of large cities. in the set of medium-sized cities (20,000–100,000 inhabitants), the fluctuation (variability) of the upper quartile is characteristic, which until the 1980s played a leading role in the transformations of this group of cities (fig. 6). initially, cities above the median for this set were the most dynamic; therefore, in 1950–1960 there was an increase in the importance of the upper quartile (an increase in q3). due to the demographic development of medium-sized cities, some of them were moved to the class of large cities, and at the same time the set of medium-sized cities was expanded with dynamically developing small towns. this resulted in a reduction in the size of the upper quartile in the 1960s. simultaneously, within the set of medium-sized cities, the position of the cities changed, usually in the direction of the median or the upper quartile, which caused another increase in this quartile in the 1970s. during the 1980s, and the 1990s, the position of the upper quartile stabilized and in 2008–2018 it declined. for the lower range of medium-sized cities, the scale of the dynamics of q1 was bigger only in the 1990s. fig. 5. changes of the size of the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3) of the population in large cities in 1950–2018 source: own study. 28 anna runge, jerzy runge among small towns, the dynamics of the upper part of the group of small towns played an important role in urbanization changes, but the role of these towns decreased with time, as some of them exceeded the population threshold of 20,000 inhabitants and advanced to the set of medium-sized cities (fig. 7). only in the 1960s and the 1970s, the towns with a similar population (q1) played a significant role in the development of small towns. since the 1990s, their role has slightly increased because of the restitution of municipal rights in some very small towns. therefore, the following question arises: did the largest or the smallest urban centers in a given set decide about the dynamics of changes within the sets of cities distinguished here? as regards all polish cities until the political and economic transformation, the greatest dynamics of development was manifested by cities of the upper quartile (q3), i.e. the biggest ones. later, the regression of smaller towns from the lower quartile (q1) proved more significant in the dynamics of urban population. for the size class of large cities, the dynamics of changes in the upper quartile (q3) was dominant – it was alternately strongly progressive (1960–1970 and 1970–1978 as well as 1988–1998 and 1998–2008) and regressive (1950–1960 and 1978–1988). in the group of medium-sized cities (20,000– 100,000 inhabitants), until the 1970s, changes in cities concentrated around the upper quartile (q3) were more significant. in later years, cities concentrated fig. 6. changes of the size of the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3) of the population in medium small towns in 1950–2018 source: own study. fig. 7. changes of the size of the lower quartile (q1) and the upper quartile (q3) of the population in small towns in 1950–2018 source: own study. dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 29 around the lower quartile (q1) played a greater role in the dynamics of population changes. in the class of small towns (below 20,000 inhabitants), variables regarding the direction of transformation of cities concentrated around the upper quartile (q3), i.e. the largest cities in this size class, played an important role. in turn, the smallest towns, with several thousand inhabitants each, dynamized the entire set of small towns in the 1950s and after 1988. while in the first period these changes were progressive, in the 1990s they were clearly regressive. the presented picture of changes shows changes that are more dynamic in the upper quartile (q3) in each size class of cities (large, medium and small); however, the smallest scale of differences between the role of q1 and q3 is visible in the case of mediumsized and small cities. figure 8 shows changes in shaping the volume of q1 and q3 for all cities in poland and for the distinguished size classes (large, medium, and small cities). in 1950–2018, in the set of all polish cities, there is a clear transition of the relationships between q1 and q3 from progressive to regressive positions. a similar situation characterized small towns. on the other hand, large and medium-sized cities were characterized by significant variability in belonging to a specific type of a relationship between q1 and q3. however, a certain difference was noticeable here: large cities were first characterized by a transition from progressive to regressive types, and then this cycle was repeated. in contrast, in medium-sized cities, the development of the relationship between q1 and q3 initially represented a progressive type, and then these relationships became regressive, although in recent years they have stabilized among progressive types. this means that in the set of medium-sized cities after strong variability of the role of q1 and q3 in the initial period of the study, since the 1980s, their role was the closest to that of other analyzed city size classes. 5. discussion in the 1990s, many central european countries transformed from a centrally planned economy based on an industrial model to a market economy requiring industrial restructuring and developing the service sector. these changes took place at different times: in some countries quite early (bole et al., 2020), in others – with a significant delay (fakeyeva et al., 2018), also influencing the formation of the settlement structure. this was due to the fact that individual size classes of cities reacted to these changes 1 2 3 4 1. all cities; 2. large cities; 3. medium cities; 4. small towns. fig. 8. types of changes of town population in all cities in poland, and in large, medium and small towns in 1950–2018 source: own study. 30 anna runge, jerzy runge to a different degree – the strongest regression concerned large and medium-sized cities in romania (bănică et al., 2017). the regression was also clear in hungary, while the city system in slovakia proved to be the most stable (mezei, 2009). in bulgaria and hungary, administrative reforms also affected an increase in the number of small towns (mihaylov, 2011; pirisi et al., 2015). still, everywhere there is a noticeable increase in disproportions in the development of metropolises in relation to other elements of the settlement system. as m. smętkowski (2018) writes, the largest disproportions in this regard occur in the least developed countries (romania, bulgaria), and the smallest ones in the most developed countries (the czech republic, slovenia). in turn, p. dostál and m. hampl (2008) pointed out that while all cities in the czech republic developed at a similar pace in the industrial period, and the hierarchical structure of cities was stable, the transition from industrial to post-industrial economy resulted in a differentiation of the hierarchical system of cities into many levels in this hierarchy. as p. korcelli (2018) states, the development of metropolises strengthens polycentricism and spatial cohesion only at the upper level of the hierarchy of cities, counteracting the increasing concentration of development factors in one of its links – the capital city. maintaining the polycentric structure of the national system is possible thanks to clear de-concentration of functions performed by large centers in favor of medium-sized cities (kunzmann, 1992, 2000; pumain, 2000). meanwhile, this is the level of medium-sized cities – quite strongly strengthened in poland since the 1960s – that was most affected by the adverse consequences of the political and economic transformation and then globalization which manifested itself in a significant reduction in the economic base (śleszyński, 2017; krzysztofik, szmytkie, 2018). the reduction of this base limits the links between medium-sized cities and both the supra-regional and metropolitan level and the local and sub-regional level of the settlement system. therefore, the weakening of this size class of cities may pose a threat to the integration of the settlement system of cities. meanwhile, as pointed out by p. korcelli (2008, 2018), the strategic goals of the development of this system involve integrating the national settlement system, maintaining the polycentric structure of the system and strengthening the competitiveness of the main cities. as noted by d. szymańska (1996), research on shaping the development of the existing structure and the emergence of new cities results from two important premises: • firstly, from the proper functioning of the links in the settlement system at various spatial scales (local, regional, national); • secondly, from the need to study changes in the settlement structure, as the domination of traditional industry exposed industrial centers to huge changes during the political and economic transformation. 6. conclusions the number of cities and the number of their inhabitants significantly changed in the analyzed period. redistribution of these changes within individual size classes of cities varied from the point of view of both the structure of the number of cities and their population. in the total number of cities, the share of medium-sized and large cities significantly increased. the increase in the share of medium-sized cities in the population was slightly smaller. thus, medium-sized cities, usually identified with regional or sub-regional growth centers, showed the highest dynamics of development throughout the entire period under study. this allowed weakening the disproportion between the development of large cities and the smallest urban centers. the analysis of the size of the quartiles confirmed the variability of individual parts of the size classes of cities below or above the median. in general, the upper quartile (q3) of the set of large and mediumsized cities was the most dynamic. until the end of the 1970s, its dynamics had positive values, yet alternately in both size classes of cities. in 1950–1960, there was a regression in the upper quartile in large cities, but in the next decade it strongly increased. the crisis of industrial development in the conditions of a centrally planned economy weakened the pace of development of large cities, which resulted in negative values in q3 in 1978–1988. however, the largest cities in the country went through the economic transformation the best, intensifying the development of metropolization processes (growth in q3). the permanent and deepening natural loss associated with the transition to the 5th phase of demographic changes and the intensification of suburbanization and de-urbanization processes change the spatial systems of agglomerations. some of the residential and economic functions of endogenous importance are moved to the suburbs, and the development of managerial and control functions concentrates in a large city (śleszyński, 2007; dorocki et al., 2018). this also changes the layout of links of this city: it weakens the hitherto close connections with its hinterland (metropolitan area) in favor of dynamics of size classes of cities in poland in 1950–2018 31 superior, higher-order links with other metropolises, not only national ones. in turn, the dynamics of the upper quartile of medium-sized cities shows a shift in time of the development waves in relation to the culmination of these waves for large cities. in medium-sized cities, the first period (1950–1960) began with a progressive trend in the upper quartile, followed by its decline in 1960–1970. in 1970–1978, a strong increase in q3 was marked again, but in the following decades, the lower quartile mainly played a role in changes in this size class of cities, while the last period marks a clear regression of the upper quartile. the distinguished types of dynamics of the lower and upper quartiles have also been confirmed. large and medium-sized cities were characterized by high variability in the formation of progressive and regressive types, which was expressed in the transition from regressive to progressive types and the reoccurrence of regressive types. in the period of the centrally planned economy, with close internal ties and those within the eastern bloc, it was possible to control the development of the settlement system. development factors stimulated the development of most cities, and it was relatively easy to stimulate the development in a given city, e.g. by locating a large industrial investment in it. currently, processes often stimulated by external (global) factors that cannot be controlled from the level of a given city or even country take place in cities. significant 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approaches regarding the importance of natura 2000 sites’ settings in pupils’ education through geography. case study: valea rosie (red valley) natura 2000 site, bihor county, romania grigore vasile herman (1), dorina camelia ilieș (2), miron florin măduța (3), alexandru ilieș (4), maria gozner (5), raluca buhaș (6), iános-mátyás-tamás mihók-géczi (7) (1) department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: grigoreherman@yahoo.com (corresponding author) (2) department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: iliesdorina@yahoo.com (3) department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: fmaduta@uoradea.ro (4) department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: ilies@uoradea.ro (5) department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: mariagozner@yahoo.com (6) department of sociology, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: ralubuhas@gmail.com (7) department of sociology, university of oradea, university street 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: tamas_269@yahoo.com citation herman g.v., ilieș d.c., măduța m.f., ilieș a., gozner m., buhaș r., mihók-géczi i-m-t., 2016, approaches regarding the importance of natura 2000 sites’ settings pupil’s education through geography. case study:valea rose (red valley) natura 2000, bihor country, romania, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 57–62. abstract the setting of natura 2000 sites in order to conserve, promote and exploit them as distinctive areas, is both a prerequisite and an opportunity regarding pupils` education also through geography as a discipline. in this context, the present paper aims to outline some practical and theoretical aspects towards familiarizing pupils with the necessity of protecting the environment, to use and depict tourist maps, to use spatial orientation, to recognize various species of plants and dwelling within red valley nature 2000 site, in bihor county. key words tourism, setting, natura 2000 site, geography. 58 g.v. herman, d.c. ilieș, m.f. măduța, a. ilieș, m. gozner, r. buhaș, i-m-t. mihók-géczi 1. introduction ”natura 2000 is a european network of protected natural areas created in 1992, determined by the need to protect the nature and to maintain the natural resources necessary for socio-economic development on long-term„1. lately, as a result of anthropogenic impact increase over the environment, some species of plants and animals in europe, and beyond, are on the verge of extinction. to counteract this phenomenon, the european union through its directives, “birds” 79/409/cee regarding wild birds` conservation and “habitats” 92/43/cee regarding the conservation of natural habitats and species of wild plants and animals, created natura 2000 network consisting of avifauna special protection areas (spa) and of special areas of conservation (sci). regarding the number of natura 2000 sites, currently at european union level there are 26.106 natura 2000 sites covering about 20% of its territory, among which 381 sites are in romania covering 17.89% of the its surface (oug…, 2007). the legislative documents based on which a part of the romanian surface (17.89%) was introduced into natura 2000 sites network were: geo no. 57/20.06.2007 on the regime of protected natural areas, conservation of natural habitats, wild flora and fauna (oug…, 2007); order no. 1964/2007 ministry of environment and sustainable development regarding the establishment of community importance sites within a protected area regime, as an integrant part of natura 2000 european ecological network in romania; law no. 49 from april 7, 2011 on approving the government emergency ordinance no. 57/2007 on the regime of protected natural areas, conservation of natural habitats, wild flora and fauna (legea…, 2011); government ordinance no. 20 from august 26, 2014 amending the government emergency ordinance no. 57/2007 on the regime of protected natural areas, conservation of natural habitats, wild flora and fauna (ordonanţa…, 2014). red valley natura 2000 site, located on the territory of bihor county, northwestern romania is a specific area for asperulo-fagetum beech forest habitat. it has an area of 819 ha, of which deciduous forests occupy 86%, followed by surfaces occupied by forests in transition (5%), grasslands (5%), vineyards (2%) and orchards (2%). in this area, 14 species of rare plants included on the red list, species of amphibians and reptiles of national importance and a well preserved natural forest habitat are protected (covaciu-marcov et al., 2009; ghira et al. 2002; herman et al., 2016). 1 formularul standard nature 2000, 2007 (http://natura2000.mmediu.ro/) the existence of national and international importance species claims from stakeholders various efforts towards identifying the best ways and means of protecting them. in counterpoint, the existence of oradea city in its immediate vicinity, with its spatial needs, constantly expanding, is outlined as a risk factor for the red valley nature 2000 site. in this framework, educating pupils through geography represents a first step towards a sustainable exploitation of this area, based on tourism and ecotourism. currently, due to population density increase per spatial unit, while green spaces decrease, oradea needs a fresh space where its` inhabitants can escape from the daily city life, can find their inner balance in harmony with nature and within a short period of time. in contrast, red valley natura 2000 site aims to conserve and protect the asperulo fagetum habitat but also plant, amphibians and reptiles species, for which this space was introduced in natura 2000 network. the establishment and development of a responsible tourism and people`s education, of pupils in this case, towards a sustainable development, is the best solution both for oradea city, oradea metropolitan area, and also for red valley natura 2000 site. 2. methodology the unprecedented expansion of anthropic impact and the changes generated, both at local and global level, have led humanity towards identifying optimal possibilities regarding environment economic exploitation. therefore, on one hand, the present study aims to address a dilemma, namely “red valley natura 2000 site, between necessity and opportunity”, and on the other hand, to provide an opportunity in order to increase pupils` awareness regarding the need to implement a bio-economic recovery system for natura 2000 sites, in accordance with their preservation and protection needs. following this background, we wanted to highlight some aspects regarding the importance of natura 2000 sites settings and students` education through geography. we mention here: familiarizing students with environmental protection need, using and depicting tourist maps, spatial orientation, recognizing different species of plants and animals dwelling in red valley natura 2000 site. approaches regarding the importance of natura 2000 sites’ settings in pupils’ education… 59 3. familiarizing pupils with the necessity of protecting the environment according to the international union for conservation of nature (iucn) a protected area is “a clearly defined geographical area, recognized, designated and managed based on some legal documents or other effective means, in order to achieve a longterm conservation of nature and of environmental services and of associated cultural values” (dudley, 2008, p. 8). the concept of nature protection comprehends the implementation of “actions to preserve species and ecosystems in a more natural state, their protection against human actions` effects, which often leads to restrictions for human activities”. unlike the concept of protection, the conservation term relates “to a more complex and dynamic approach: could mean keeping in a more natural state rare habitats and species with no intervention on natural processes, but could also allow an active intervention in order to maintain natural values or could even require an active management of natural resources, especially regarding “secondary” ecosystems which resulted from human activities over the centuries (e.g. grasslands)” (stanciu, florescu, 2009, p. 6). the establishment and management of protected areas are a necessity because: “are the most effective preservation methods in-situ, since, being often delimited on relatively large, may include representative natural and semi-natural ecosystems and allow their conservation and monitoring; are model areas where natural and semi-natural ecosystems effective conservation actions, including sustainable use, can demonstrate that maintaining a satisfactory level of natural capital`s components, helps ensuring resources and services that underpin sustainable socio-economic development; are real “laboratories” where strict protection or active management actions aiming to conserve biodiversity allow the accumulation of valuable knowledge either on natural processes, or finding efficient “formulas” in order to ensure the transition from a profit-focused economic development to a sustainable development model” (stanciu, florescu, 2009, p. 13–14). at the same time, alongside with urban areas, protected areas can be considered real outdoor laboratories for promoting earth sciences (fregni, fioroni, 2007), where pupils can be taught about the importance of nature, conservation necessity and sustainable development. among the activities that can be performed within the perimeter of protected areas, including within red valley natura 2000 site we mention: using and depicting tourist maps, spatial orientation, recognition of different species of plants and animals dwelling in red valley natura 2000 site, sports and recreational activities, sports competitions etc. 4. the usage and depiction of tourist maps modern human needs, rehabilitation and recreation through tourism, and current tourism increase, have led to the need of using and interpreting tourist maps beginning from early school, based on education through and for the map (montello, 2002). in this context, the use and depiction of tourist maps related to red valley natura 2000 site imposes by itself, being the framework of spatial orientation, recognition of various species of plants and animals dwelling in red valley natura 2000 site etc. from a structural point of view, the tourism map related to red valley natura 2000 site (the printed and online version) (fig. 1 and 2) comprehends:”6 tourist trails proposed of a total length of 111.5 km (fig. 1); 6 graphics related to tourist routes, with the name of the route length, maximum altitude, minimum altitude, degree of difficulty; 5 photos with related information, which illustrate various aspects of the area defining the site, information on the morpho-hydrographic units; the locations of: 4 restaurants; 4 accommodation units; 4 points where you can practice other recreational activities; 2 equestrian centers; 1 monastery; 1 wooden heritage church; 2 areas with cellars dug into the substrate, registered as part of the cultural heritage, 1 place where one can practice pleasure flights, 4 points of interest and the locations where it is proposed to be placed: 8 observation gazebos; 6 places for picnic, 2 lookout points; 1 parking; 4 proposed tourist boards; 7 proposed tourist indicators” (herman et al., 2016, p. 29). the usage and depiction of the tourism map of red valley natura 2000 site, bihor county, romania by pupils can be done by using the printed version (fig. 1, 2) or the online version. using the printed version of the map is one of the simplest and accessible methods for pupils (ilieș, 2009; wendt, 2013; ilieş, wendt, 2015). from a methodological point of view, this can be done individually based on a careful reading of the map, possibly accompanied by some explanation offered by the companion regarding the importance of the red valley natura 2000 site, the importance of the tourist map and its purpose and objectives. contrariwise the usage of the printed version, using an on-line version is a more attractive and dynamic method at the same time. 60 g.v. herman, d.c. ilieș, m.f. măduța, a. ilieș, m. gozner, r. buhaș, i-m-t. mihók-géczi fig. 1. the tourism map of red valley natura 2000 site, bihor county, romania source: herman et al., 2016, p. 30. fig. 2. the tourism map of red valley natura 2000 site, bihor county, romania source: herman et al., 2016. approaches regarding the importance of natura 2000 sites’ settings in pupils’ education… 61 5. spatial orientation spatial orientation using the map implies the recognition of surrounding details from the field to the map and vice-versa, the recognition of details from the map to the field. given the cartographic material elaborated for red valley, the orientation or determination of the place where we are and where we want to go is quite simple because the north is indicated on the map. spatial orientation is done using field details, specified also on the map (cities, tourist paths, restaurants, accommodation facilities, picnic areas, cellars, crossroads, lakes, etc.) and which students can easily recognize (wendt, 2011). for the orientation of red valley natura 2000 tourist map in relation to field details, is necessary to know at least one direction or a visible landmark in the field, marked also on the map. at the beginning, one must identify on the map landmarks` position, represented by conventional signs which are specified in the map legend; then one must calibrate the map to the left or to the right, so that landmarks` position in the field corresponds to their position on the map. but, for various reasons, there are situations when we do not have a map or there is no cardinal point indicated on the map (on some older maps the north is not indicated); in these situations things get complicated a little bit, because one has to determine the north at a certain point, and following this direction, one has to determine other directions. even from primary school pupils are informed about different methods of orientation by observing specific things in nature. the simplest orientation methods, but also less precise are: muscles on tree bark and on isolates walls of rocks are facing north; snow lasts longer on the northern side of trees and buildings; the growth-rings of trees are closer to each other and tree bark is thicker on the northern side; at 12.00 o`clock the sun indicates south; the church altar faces east etc. (dragomir et al., 1970; ilieş, 2003; săndulache, sficlea, 1966; linc, 2004; valeria, 2005; benţe, 2000; grigore, 1979). 6. the recognition of various species of plants and animals dwelling within red valley natura 2000 site it can be an instructive-educational action that can take place both in the classroom, by using a specially elaborated album containing species of plants and animals within red valley natura 2000 site, and in the field, through direct contact with the reality. the red valley natura 2000 site album is a support material for geography classes, which aims to provide essential information, in an easily accessible way to pupils regarding the species of plants and animals that have their habitat dwelling in this area. to be more attractive, it is recommend a rich iconographic and photographic illustration that can meet textual information. furthermore, it`s substantial to emphasizing the practical and scientific importance of each species in maintaining a sustainable natural geographical environment, beneficial to humanity. red valley natura 2000 site is ”specific to beech forest habitat type asperulo-făgetum. besides the three species of amphibians and reptiles listed in annex ii directive 92/43/eec (triturus cristatus, bombina variegate, bombina bombina) within this site may be encountered other important fauna and flora species from which we mention: bufo bufo, rana ridibunda, aster sedifolius ssp. canus, cimicifuga europea, dianthus guttatus, leontodon croceus ssp. rilaensis, potentilla norvegica, rumex thyrsiflorus ssp. thryrsiflorus, vicia sparsiflora, rana dalmatina, alopecurus pratensis ssp. laguriformis, chamaecytisus rochelii, corydalis solida ssp. slivenensis, dianthus trifasciculatus ssp. deserti, orchis morio, rhinanthus borbasii, salvia amplexicaulis, natrix natrix” (standard form nature, 2000; herman et al., 2016, p. 30). assisting the discovery of above mentioned species and not only, we provide the 7 proposals regarding turrets holds location, specified within he touristic map of red valley natura 2000 site, bihor county, romania. they “create special opportunities for discovery by raising the observation act, both literally and figuratively speaking” (dincă et al., 2012, p. 310). alongside with pupils` familiarization regarding environmental protection, the usage and depiction of tourist maps, spatial orientation, the recognition of different species of plants and animals dwelling in red valley natura 2000 site, we can mention other issues such as: pupils` gateway in a natural setting less affected by pollution, with the benefits resulting from this, muscles toning, “contemplation, fusion with nature in the most purest and fulfilling form, joy for eyes and soul, proving each other physical capabilities, discovering some special natural components, some wild animals` behavior and certain humanized ensembles` detail traits” (dincă et al., 2012, p. 314). 7. conclusions the awareness increase among pupils from the corresponding administrative units in the immediate proximity (oradea, paleu, ineu, oşorhei), through instructive-educative actions which are specific to 62 g.v. herman, d.c. ilieș, m.f. măduța, a. ilieș, m. gozner, r. buhaș, i-m-t. mihók-géczi life and earth sciences, especially to geography, is an important step towards the conservation, promotion and exploitation of red valley natura 2000 site, bihor county, romania. the present study can represent a useful tool that can be used by all stakeholders in the proximity of natura 2000 sites. it aims to create a methodological framework, by highlighting some activities among which we can mention: pupils` familiarization regarding environmental protection, the usage and depiction of tourist maps, spatial orientation, the recognition of different species of plants and animals dwelling in red valley natura 2000 site, etc. each of these activities can be customized based on definitely aspects specific to protected areas and pupils involved in different actions in order to increase the awareness regarding these areas. furthermore, they can be 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[15.05.2016] formularul standard nature 2000, 2007, http://natura2000. mmediu.ro/upl//formulare/ rosci 0267%20-%20f.pdf [10.05.2016] fregni p., fioroni c., 2007, la citta un laboratorio didattico per la divulgazione delle scienze della terra, conference papers, [in:] atti convegno geologia e turismo, atti congresso g&t bologna, 1-3.04.2007, 86–91. ghira i., venczel m., covaciu-marcov s., mara g., ghile p., hartel t., torok z., farkas l., racz t., farkas z., brad t., 2002, mapping of transilvanian herpetofauna. nymphaea, folia naturae bihariae xxix, 145–201. grigore m., 1979, reprezentarea grafică şi cartografică a formelor de relief, academic press, bucharest. herman g.v., ilieș d.c., baias ș., măduța m.f., ilieș a., wendt j., josan i., 2016, the tourist map, scientific tool that supports the exploration of protected areas, bihor county, romania, geosport for society, 4(1), 24–32. http://natura2000.mmediu.ro/ [03.05.2016] ilieş a., wendt j.a., 2015, geografia turystyczna. podstawy teorii i zagadnienia aplikacyjne, wydawnictwo awfis, gdańsk. ilieş g. (coordonator), 2009, harti pentru copii. modele privind conceptia, productia si studiul hartilor tutristice pentru copii, presa universitara clujeana press, cluj napoca. ilieş m., 2003, cartografiere turistică computerizată, university press oradea, oradea. legea nr. 49 din 7 aprilie 2011pentru aprobarea ordonanţei de urgenţă a guvernului nr. 57/2007 privind regimul ariilor naturale protejate, conservarea habitatelor naturale, a florei şi faunei sălbatice, 2011, http://legislatie.just.ro/public/ detaliidocumentafis/127715 [06.05.2016] linc r., 2004, studiul hărţii, university press oradea, oradea. montello d., 2002, cognitive map-design. research in the twentieh century: theoretical and empirical approaches, cartography and geographic information science, 29(3), 283–304. ordinul no. 1964 / 2007 ministerului mediului și dezvoltării durabile privind instituirea regimului de arie naturală protejată a siturilor de importanță comunitară, ca parte integrantă a rețelei ecologice europene natura 2000 în românia, 2007, http://www.anpm.ro/anpm_resources/ migrated_content/uploads/45381_om_1964_2007_sci. pdf [04.05.2016] ordonanţa guvernului nr. 20 din 26 august 2014 pentru modificarea ordonanţei de urgenţă a guvernului nr. 57/2007 privind regimul ariilor naturale protejate, conservarea habitatelor naturale, a florei şi faunei sălbatice, 2014, http://legislatie.just.ro/public/detaliidocument/160931 [04.05.2016] oug nr. 57/20.06.2007 privind regimul ariilor naturale protejate, conservarea habitatelor naturale, a florei și faunei sălbatice, 2007, https://aliantasportnatura.wordpress.com/legeaariilor-protejate/ [05.05.2016] săndulache a., sficlea v., 1966, cartografie-topografie, editura didactică şi pedagogică, bucharest. stanciu e., florescu f., 2009, ariile protejate din românia noţiuni introductive, „green steps” press, braşov, http://natura2000.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ pu b l i c a t i o n . a r i i _ . pro t e j a t e. r o m a n i a . 2 0 0 9 . r o _ . p d f [05.05.2016] valeria a., 2005, cartografie în turism, editura centrului de învaţământ la distanţă credis, university of bucharest, bucharest. wendt j.a., 2011, zarys geografii turystycznej, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk. wendt j.a., 2013, skarby kartografii, arkady, warszawa. 1. introduction many scientists and politicians paid attention to the sphere of education today. only countries which have a highly and corresponding to modern requirements of the education system, can to become one of developed nations of the modern world. almost all countries show strong economic growth, a priority is the development of education. in order to correctly perceive, analyze and evaluate information, a person must have sufficient intelligence and the necessary range of knowledge. the basis for this laid exactly at the level of secondary education, which makes increasingly high demands on the higher educational establishments. research organizational and economic mechanism in the common secondary education takes on special actuality today, when the discussion about reform (or modernization) in education system is not finished. it’s carried among executives (not just the education system) and in academic circles. however, many liberal reformers proposals require careful critical analysis. 2. paper main body the main differences affecting such areas as reforming the economic mechanism of secondary journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 56–59 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.007.6206 state mechanisms of ensuring qualitative modernization of secondary education nadiya karpeko educational, scientific and production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: nadezhda_v@list.ru citation karpenko  n., 2017, state mechanisms of ensuring qualitative modernization of secondary education, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 56–59. abstract the article analyzes theoretical position of one of the problems of educational reform that allowed identify the ways to improve the branch system of economic relations in education and to define concrete steps on implementation assigned in connection with this task. reforming education in ukraine is part of the renewal of education systems associated with the recognition of the importance of knowledge as an engine of social welfare and progress. it is therefore particularly urgent study of all components of the system of secondary education: planning, assessment, prediction at both national and regional levels. key words economic mechanism, state regulation, reforming of education in ukraine. state mechanisms of ensuring qualitative modernization of secondary education 57 education as a change in the status of educational institutions, the transition to the required funding and competitive procedure for placing the state order for specialists training. after acceptance into 1991 of the law of ukraine „on education” (current version – of february 19, 2016) (закон україни…, 2016) was an important milestone in the development of new sectoral economic mechanism. the law removed many inconsistencies in the model of the economic system that offered previously, elaborated and brought it closer to the existing realities of a number of key points, gave legal force to new economic solution. however, experience shows that it is fixed economic model to date has largely obsolete. today it’s clear, that it is not an adequate system of modern economic relations in the area, and by that deforms it (садковой, 2013). building concept of the new system of economic relations in education today involves several fundamental decisions and far from trivial issues. the first step is to determine which balance the interests of participants of the educational process will show this system. it is known, for example, industrial model, which operated under the planned economy distribution primarily takes into account the interests of the management structures of higher levels of vertical. in this case obviously it was assumed that top managerial authority not only understand, but also better than other express interest all participants in the educational process. as a result, educational institutions essentially boiled down to the application level to the management system and completely lost their economic rights (смолин, 2002). improving economic system of education, in our view, must use strategy of gradual modernization modern model of distribution of financial resources in the area and consistently grow there elements that provide educational services free choice of its customers. now the movement in this direction in the first place can be achieved by expanding the volume of paid educational services and is in ever-increasing extent be marked in the allocation of financial resources in the industry. in the same direction can be conducted and experimental work on local (with some areas) the introduction of special credit certificates (vouchers) to pay for major (performed as part of the mandatory program) educational services provided by institutions of general education (синицина, 2004). as a whole, the proposed evolutionary path of development and distribution relationships in education is still the most appropriate because in the end the difficult socio-economic situation is not advisable to radically change the existing order of things and introduce innovations that are not tested during serious experimental work. anyway, in the short term seems best to build a new system of economic relations in education using the principle of individual expression of interest, mainly due to the so-called social order formed by the state, by the scheme: personal through the public, not vice versa (байкова, 2007). modernizing the state economic mechanism in education must play better in the updated model of the specific educational institutions such as nonprofit organizations which profit is not the purpose of their operation. unlike business corporations (enterprises, cooperatives etc.), educational institutions for their economic activity is not the main. it’s just providing a process, so it should be considered (мухін, 2008). as a result of economic activity, for example, impossible to judge effectiveness of the educational institutions, including and economic efficiency. in education do not work and it is effective in other areas of economic mechanisms stimulating the growth of quality of manufactured products or services. thus, under the effective influence of several objective reasons, educational institutions cannot significantly expand the volume of produced services, and this can interrupt natural for most sectors of the economy chain, improving product quality – increased demand for it the increase in output growth – revenue producer. it means, we must find other incentives and other mechanisms improve the quality of manufactured products – education services. the study of the question shows that these mechanisms are in administrative regulation of the industry and within these reasons, in principle, inappropriate to model economic relations in education based on the canons adopted in a commercial environment (смолин, 2002). moreover, in the world is considered normal when the current regulations, in a sense, hinder educational institutions interested in maximizing profits. and it is experienced by many established that in the pursuit of profit, these institutions will inevitably have to sacrifice quality services produced by them, and it certainly is contrary to their functional purpose (головко et al., 2009). improving sectoral pattern of economic relations, it is necessary, as we have noted, consider that education is very different from other sectors of the economy manifest themselves market mechanisms of self-regulation system. not all of them are „triggered” in this very specific area. for example, education in this area is very 58 nadiya karpeko limited optimization capabilities of competition in the education market. and if in the field of vocational education and preschool education they can still give positive results, in general education are essentially powerless (чикало, 2003). it is obvious that in the countryside, competition between educational institutions virtually absent. consumers are enjoying the services of those agencies that are directly in its settlements or at most a short distance from it. in such a situation, even if a number of wealthy parents of children using the material possibilities of the latter, and attend better, from their perspective, a school in another village or in the nearest town, the general economic condition of local schools is noticeably not affect. budget allocations it receives almost the same volumes and reducing funding certainly not go beyond the significant annual fluctuations (шукевич, 2015). at the same time, such a mass character „migration” cannot receive, because firstly, not all consumers of educational services so desire, and secondly, not all willing enough this means. another situation, but the same results, in the modern city. here, especially in large cities, students and their parents really great selection of secondary schools. however, in practice it is much narrower „production” capabilities of institutions that really work well and whose services are in demand. limited resources, primarily personnel, potential does not allow them to accept all interested and does not allow to expand the volume of its activities. as a result, much of consumers of educational services have to get them to „ordinary” secondary schools and this provides them calm existence (чижевський, 2005). we know that competition in the market of goods and services allows to optimize territorial distribution of production. its beneficial effect affects the development of all sectors of the economy and general education is only in this sense absolute exception. here no competition producers or any other innovative market mechanisms do not have a direct effect on the placement of network of secondary schools (шульгіна, яковлев, 2004). thus, the study of the specific sector shows that market mechanisms in education system of self-regulation often do not work and so they should be duplicated mechanisms of administrative regulation. for example, competition between educational institutions does not create incentives to improve the quality of work, does not provide optimization of industry structure, not reduces the cost of education. all this shows that we should not invent new here, but questionable relative of economic necessity and effectiveness, building aimed at „inclusion” exactly economic mechanisms of the system (огаренко, 2005). if necessary a differentiated approach to the remuneration of teachers and financial ensuring the institutions have different quality parameters activities carried out by them, is enough to determine the category in the first case workers, and in the second case, institutions, based on these identified differences in their work. moreover, determine these differences and identify criteria for assessing the quality of teaching, or more – educational activities should science. economists remain here only justify differences in payments and provision. but these issues are not the subject of this study (бесчастний, 2009). forming a new branch model of economic relations in education, need to know that educational institutions are not organizations that are financed just because they operate. unlike management structures, educational institutions produce, albeit very specific, but nevertheless a quite definite marketable product – educational services. therefore wrongly speak about financing of activity of these establishments because the customer pays not it, but obtained his services. this raises a whole complex of questions related to the organization pay for educational services that are performed under the state order (калініна et al., 2002). the fact that the segmentation of the educational market, where prices of the individual sectors are installed under a the influence of various factors, and usually at a very unequal level differentiation activities of educational institutions to „favorable” and „unfavorable” (садковой, 2013). and since, for objective reasons, most low-paid types of work are those that are performed within the state order, that is the main educational activities of public institutions, eventually, through their efforts and redistribution of teaching staff in favor of a commercial plan additional paid educational services. 3. conclusions formation of a new economic model in education is a very complex and dynamic conditions of a fundamental restructuring of the entire system of economic relations in the country. naturally, the specificity of this historical period has a high level of entropy in socio-economic development of society, and lays on it a special mark. in particular, it’s relative high degree of openness created by the system to account for new phenomena in the economy and the social sphere, its inherent ability to transform in an environment that changes the content model state mechanisms of ensuring qualitative modernization of secondary education 59 and transition elements, designed for use in extraordinary circumstances of economic crisis. with the stable economic development in education should be excluded following types of institutions to attract extra-budgetary funds as providing brokerage services to commercial organizations. it should greatly limit and lease of housings of educational institutions. it is well known that, as a rule, it is not caused by an excess in schools, orphanages, kindergartens and sports education institutions teaching space, and an acute shortage of these facilities for educational work. references байкова о.м., 2007, концептуальные основы государственной политики в области образования и экономические границы его коммерциализации, экономика образования, 1, 98–110. бесчастний в.м., 2009, розвиток інформаційного суспільства як позитивний чинник впливу на якість управління вітчизняною освітою, державне управління: удосконалення та розвиток, 3, http://www.dy.nayka.com. ua/?op=1&z=34 [10.09.2016] головко б.а. et al., 2004, реформування вищої освіти у процесі демократизації українського суспільства, національний університетт ім. т. шевченка, впц “київський університет”, київ. закон україни «про освіту» № 1060-xii, 23.05.1991, редакція станом  на  19.02.2016, верховна рада урср, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1060-12 [14.09.2016] калініна л.м. et al., 2002, теоретико-прикладні аспекти управління закладами освіти, інститут педагогіки академії педагогічних наук україни, асоціація керівників школи україни, актуальна освіта, київ. мухін м.і., 2008, шляхи підвищення якості управління інноваційною діяльністю в освітній установі, педагогічна академія післядипломної освіти, київ. огаренко в.м., 2005, методика застосування системи підтримки прийняття рішень по управлінню структурою пропозиції освітніх послуг, [in:] актуальні проблеми державного управління. випуск 2, видавництво харрі наду “магістр”, харків, 111–119. садковой в.п., 2013, основні економічні механізми державного регулювання входження в європейський простір сучасної вищої освіти україни, державне будівництво, 1, http://www.kbuapa.kharkov.ua/e-book/ db/2013-1/doc/2/10.pdf. [10.09.2016] синицина н., 2004, досягнення якісно нового рівня підготовки фахівців з державного управління засобами стандартизації галузевої вищої освіти, управління сучасгим містом, 3(7), 274–279. смолин о.н., 2002, про регулювання економічних механізмів у сфері утворення, економіка освіти, 2, 17-20. чижевський б., 2005, освітня політика в україні : пріоритети, завдання, принципи та шляхи їх упровадження, освіта україни, 64, 6. чикало в.г., 2003, аналітична діяльність суб’єкта управління навчальним процесом управління освітою в регіоні: пошуки оптимальних шляхів, [in:] mатеріали науково-пракичної конференції, сумський державний педагогічний університет імені  а.с. макаренка, суми, 75–78. шукевич б, 2015. шляхи поповнення терміносистеми з дистанційного навчання, [in:] українська термінологія і сучасність: збірник наукових праць. випуск vі, кнеу, київ, 437–440. шульгіна в.д., яковлев о.в., 2004, розвиток національної освіти в україні в умовах відкритого інформаційного простору, [in:] професіоналізм педагога: матеріали всеукаїнської науково-практичної конференції, присвяченої 60-річчю кримського деравного гуманітарного університетуту. випуск 1, рвв кдгі, ялта, 78–82. journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(4), 52–64 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.4.06 champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects waldemar moska (1), owidiusz moska (2) (1) department of physical culture, gdansk university of physical education and sport, górskiego 1, 80–336 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-7177-8376 e-mail: waldemarmoska@wp.pl (corresponding author) (2) department of physical culture, gdansk university of physical education and sport, górskiego 1, 80–336 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-3446-5191 e-mail: owi-84@wp.pl citation moska w., moska o., 2022, champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(4), 52-64. abstract in the 17th century, the champa kingdom, which had operated for more than 1,000 years in what is now central and southern vietnam, ceased to exist. the hindu influence of the cham state remained visible in the brick tower-temples that still exist, as well as in sculptures some of which are in vietnamese museums. the first research into the cham culture and history was carried out by french colonisers in the early 20th century, followed by polish archaeologists and the vietnamese government, among others. the study of the legacy left by the cham poses significant difficulties, due to years of warfare, environmental influences, the passage of time and theft. however, the homogeneous culture and architectural structural integrity enable conducting a research analysis of the legacy left behind. the heterogeneous level of tourist development of the different tower groups poses a challenge to create a high standard of tourist attractiveness. the high quality of tourism provision characteristic of my son and po nagar, setting an example to be followed throughout the southeast asian region, stands out against the low level of tourism development at other cham temples. key words champa kingdom, cham towers, vietnam, tourism, tourist attractions, tourist development. received: 09 august 2022 accepted: 20 november 2022 published: 30 december 2022 1. introduction notwithstanding the problems caused by the covid-19 pandemic, tourism in vietnam is experiencing a period of rapid development, becoming a leading part of the economy (moska, 2021). one of the elements of state and social activity is to take care of the development of tourism infrastructure and the display and restoration of artefacts. in this regard, the towers-temples that are the remains of the defunct kingdom of champa, whose origins date back to the 2nd century, can be identified as a global tourist attraction. the basis for the clarification of the origins of the cham state comes from chinese and vietnamese texts; cham manuscripts, held, among others, in the paris inventory of the archives of the asiatic society; stone inscriptions (phan, 2015); oral accounts; and artefacts retrieved from the cham towers. chinese chronicles indicate that the cham were already inhabiting the area south of hue in the 2nd century. on the other hand, we learn from stone inscriptions that the kingdom of champa was established in the 7th century. the aim of the study is an analytical presentation of the existing towers of the champa kingdom as a potential factor of vietnam’s tourist attractiveness. 2. history and geographical conditions a state with changing names (huan wang, champapura, chiem thanh), consisting of several principalities (panduranga – now phan rang; indrapura – dong duong; amaravati – quang nam; vijaya – binh dinh; kauthara – now nha trang), playing an important role in the south china sea basin for about a thousand years, has ceased to exist. complicated, unstable international politics resulted in permanent changes to the territory of the champa kingdom, even though the cham led the entire region in pottery production and rice cultivation, as well as maritime trade. the 14th-century legendary proposal by jay simhavarman iii, king of cham, to hand over part of his territory in exchange for the hand of princess dai viet huyen tran resulted in the region between hue and tourane (da nang) becoming vietnamese territory. subsequent wars led to the loss of parts of the champa kingdom, primarily to dai viet, and the hindu religion of champa was transformed into islam and animism with indian elements. in 1697, the champa kingdom became part of vietnam, and the cham king received the annual nomination of the vietnamese nguyen family and paid tribute to it until 1832 (hubert, 2015). eventually, the cham became a vietnamese ethnic minority of one hundred and sixty thousand (nakamura, 2008). the matrilineal and matrilocal system (wielka encyklopedia, 2005; konarska, 2016)1, as well as the cultivation of akhar thrah, as tab. 1. location of existing cham structures. no name of groups or individual towers location 1. my son duy phu, duy xuyen, quang nam 2. my khanh phu dien, phu vang, thua thien-hue (northern part) 3. po tam/po dam phong phu, tuy phong, binh thuan 4. phu hai phu hai, phan thiet, binh thuan 5. hoa lai tan hai, ninh hai, ninh thuan 6. dong duong binh dinh, thang binh, quang nam 7. khuong my tam xuan, nui thanh, quang nam 8. ha trung gio an, gio linh, quang tri 9. po nagar nha trang xom bong, nha trang, khanh hoa 10. binh lam phuoc hoa, tuy phuoc, binh dinh 11. banh it phuoc hiep, tuy phuoc, binh dinh 12. chien dan tam an, tam ky, quang nam 13. nhan tuy hoa, phu yen 14. lieu coc huong xuan, huong tra, thua thien-hue 15. linh thai vinh hien, phu loc, thua thien-hue 16. bang an dien an, dien ban, quang nam 17. duong long binh hoa, tay son, binh dinh 18. hung thanh dong da, qui nhon, binh dinh 19. after klong garai luu vinh, phang rang-thap cham, ninh thuan 20. thoc loc/phu loc binh nghi, tay son, binh dinh 21. thu thien binh nghi, tay son, binh dinh 22. canh tien nhon hau, an nhon, binh dinh 23. yang prong ea roc, ea sup, dac lac 24. after rome huu duc, ninh phuoc, ninh thuan source: phuong, 2009. 1 the matrilineal system, due to the rule of descent in force, is unilinear, limiting the range of relatives to those related to each other through female agency; the matrilocal system is when a man resides in his wife’s house after marriage. champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects 53 a script derived from sanskrit, is part of the cham’s concern for their own culture. architectural considerations aside, cham’s search for cultural identity is also determined by its close links with china, its transposition of buddhist art, its hindu cultural borrowings, its many hitherto undiscovered temples, and the fact that cham artefacts have been repeatedly exhibited in various museums around the world, most notably in vietnam, the usa and france (binh, 2018; vietnamese archaeological treasures…, 2018; ramabadran, 2019; momoki, 1996). the temple complex, which had a unified structure, was entered through a gate tower. the altar (calan) in the form of a linga standing on a yoni together with the place of sacrifice was the centre of the temples of the kingdom. it was surrounded by small towers and outbuildings, an auxiliary building (mandapa) stood next to it, stone stelae with inscriptions stood in front of the entrance and the whole was surrounded by a low wall. the temples, built mainly of brick and sandstone, were furnished with sculptures and statues made after the construction had been completed. a detailed analysis of the structures discovered so far has revealed 24 tower groups, consisting of 1 to 68 temples, bringing the total to an impressive 115 standing buildings remaining in vietnam from the champa kingdom. tab. 1. includes the groups of inventoried cham buildings. the currently remaining structures (the earliest dating from the late sixth and early seventh centuries) were built of brick, as wooden shrines could not stand the test of time. french archaeologist and architect h. parmentier, the first known researcher of cham temples, who published two works on architecture and archaeological research in 1909 and 1918, believed that for various reasons the study of the artefacts of the kingdom of champa was highly hampered. tab. 2. contains the strengths and weaknesses of the historical, geographical and architectural conditions of the buildings left behind by the kingdom of champa, representing hindrances as well as opportunities when undertaking research activity. some of cham’s brick temples have survived, but many have been destroyed during warfare, due to adverse weather conditions, theft and the passage of time. the first attempts to reconstruct and restore the towers of the kingdom of champa were made as early as the beginning of the 20th century and, with varying success, this process is still being carried out today. tab. 3. presents the most important undertakings aimed at maintaining the temple heritage of the now defunct kingdom. tab. 2. strengths and weaknesses of the cham towers study. no weaknesses of cham architecture research conditionality 1. long period of civilisation more than 1,000 years of state functioning (an older civilisation than khmer from the 9th to the 15th centuries) 2. extensive research area the champa kingdom operated in an area from hoanh son to phan thiet, over a meridional length of about 1,000 km 3. significant distances between groups of towers the champa state was a federation of small states. individual sanctuaries were separated from each other to minimise losses from hostile expansion 4. difficult terrain rapidly growing vegetation 5. non-military purpose of towers the structure, intended only for religious purposes, was significantly vulnerable to damage due to its lack of defensive capabilities 6. complex soft raw material in the form of bricks the brick used by cham is a less durable raw material than stone 7. bonding material of the bricks lack of archival records of brick bonding hinders proper reconstruction of towers 8. method of measurement at the beginning of the 20th century, a measured method of counting bricks was used, due to the difficulty of accessing crumbling towers 9. robbed property the area of the former kingdom of champa remained without state control for many years 54 waldemar moska, owidiusz moska tab. 3. major reconstructions and restoration of cham towers in vietnam. no group of reconstructed towers institutional care period of activity 1. po nagar nha trang a group of french archaeologists in hue 1902; 1907; 1931–1933 2. cham towers ecole francaise d`extreme orient, hanoi since 1930 3. bang an tower a group of french archaeologists in hue 1933–1940 4. my son group a group of french archaeologists in hue 1937–1942 5. my son government of vietnam since 1978 6. cham towers in central vietnam centre for the restoration of cultural property of the ministry of culture and information of poland, under the direction of kazimierz kwiatkowski 1980 7. my son government of vietnam 1981–1990 8. chien dan, po klong garai, hung thanh, duong long government of vietnam 1980–1990 9. hoa lai towers government of vietnam 1998–2001 source: phuong, 2009. champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects 55 tab. 2. strengths and weaknesses of the cham towers study (continuation). no strengths of cham architecture research conditionality 1. uniform formula for tower construction the sacred purpose of the cham towers allows comparative studies to be used. 2. pyramid design the positioning of the towers on the hills, with an eastern orientation, facilitates their identification and the search for yet undiscovered objects/ the pyramidal shape of the towers reinforced their strength 3. square base with a hollowed-out calan, prayer halls devoid of decoration. use of false doors the location of the false doors in the structure of the towers, the square base and the hollowed out calan made it easier to identify the cultural affiliation of the objects. 4. principle of copying the second level of the temple in relation to its ground floor the structural uniformity of the first two levels of the towers facilitates their reconstruction 5. numbered floors of towers the numbering of floors allowed for more effective restoration of damaged buildings 6. fitting of churches with vestibules, linked by a common structure to the towers this design may have been a factor in the longevity of the temples 7. brick fired at low temperatures as the basic building block of temples weak material in the form of bricks fired at low temperatures has proven to be resistant to environmental influences and warfare 8. stone as a material for the construction of: lintels, doorframes and steps the introduction of stone in the construction of cham temples has made the towers more resistant to damage 9. decorative, animal, figurative sculptures, special ornaments, pilasters, entrepilasts made after construction, ornaments made on temple bases the manner in which the ornaments were placed after construction was completed probably promoted their effective survival and enabled their later identification source: parmentier, 1909. 3. technical conditions for the construction of towers despite the many problems associated with wars, climatic influences and looting activities, the cham towers have even managed to survive for more than a thousand years, and their design and construction technology still arouse wonder today. various theories have arisen as to how the towers were, or are, built as sanctuaries. the process of inquiring into knowledge in this regard will be an ongoing one, as the towers that were built in the central and southern parts of vietnam differ in terms of period of construction, size, style, environment, maintenance in the original condition and care of the monument. the process of finding out about the construction technique of cham towers is of considerable importance when it comes to the conservation of these monuments and their restoration in such a way that the reconstructed temple does not differ from the original. one experiment attempted to create a vision of making bricks and tying them together in the construction of cham temples (tìm hiểu kỹ…, 2009). in hoi an, the author built a tower 0.6 m high with a base of 0.3 m, using sandblasted, soaked, rubbed bricks. he carved on the already finished model of the tower and then fired the whole thing after a few days. once completed, the experiment proved to be a complete success, as it resulted in a structure with adequate durability and aesthetics. the result of that study is a series of conclusions that can be used primarily for the reconstruction of temples that no longer exist, because, according to the author: · towers–temples were built from unfired carpentry bricks, using a small amount of sand and clay; · bricks were dipped in water and rubbed against each other, liberating the mortar; · the wet bricks were then pressed together; · the carving process was carried out on a still unfired whole; · the constructed piece of masonry was re-baked; · the finished tower structure was filled with sand from the inside and backfilled from the outside, creating a pyramid that prevented collapse during the subsequent firing of the tower and the intensive carving process; · the process of final burning of the tower, which did not yet have a roof, started from the top and then the sand was successively removed from the centre in order to effectively burn the lower levels down to the very bottom; · the sand on the outside of the tower served primarily to keep the whole thing stable and was also a helpful substrate for the finishing and artistic work done on its outer walls. although on a micro scale the concept author’s assumptions proved to be accurate, he stipulates that this is only a hypothesis which may be useful in the conservation and restoration of temples left over from the kingdom of champa. it is highly likely that the cham used different techniques and technologies for firing bricks as civilisation developed, which is reflected in the styles of their architecture (tìm hiểu kỹ…, 2009). because of the restoration attempts that have been made, in many cases partly changing the original image of the individual towers, a group of italian archaeologist-experts decided to publish restoration recommendations close to what cham did during the construction of the temples. according to them: · the firing temperature of the bricks must not exceed 850 degrees c; · lime and traditional bricks should be rejected as distorting and likely to cause dampness; · a mixture of natural resin (currently used for sealing boats), clay and brick meal should be used as a binder; · conservation work must focus first and foremost on maintaining the churches that still exist, and leave the reconstruction of damaged buildings for the next period (tran, 2011). recognising that in the cham culture only the gods were entitled to permanent masonry buildings, this study presents the temples and the remains of the temples which are part of the artefacts found as the element of cham activity that has not stood the test of time. these are also artistic creations, primarily in the form of pottery, jewellery and sculpture, which are preserved both on the buildings of the temples that are still standing and have been discovered as a result of archaeological work and have found their way into museums around the world. caring for cham’s heritage, as a responsibility of vietnam, should be seen as an activity that influences the development of the tourism industry. the unique architecture, artefacts, and secrets left behind by the defunct kingdom of champa are all factors of tourist attractiveness, enhanced by reconstruction backed by scientific research. 4. existing cham towers in vietnam cham temple complexes have been located throughout present-day vietnam in several distinct clusters, some of which have unfortunately only become the subject of archaeological research. 56 waldemar moska, owidiusz moska the first of the tower complexes, very well preserved and properly developed, is the large po nagar temple complex (fig. 1.) in the coastal town of nha trang, which was built between the 7th and 12th centuries, on the site of an earlier wooden temple. however, a place of worship existed there much earlier, as early as the 2nd century. currently, there are four tower-temples preserved in very good condition, along with an area armed with various sculptures, such as a dancing shiva, musicians and a nandi bull, among others. po nagar owes its very good condition to the early renovations initiated by henri parmentier between 1902 and 1907, followed by jean-yves claeys’s consolidation of the entire complex between 1931 and 1933. although efforts were made to restore the towers to their original state, as was the case between 1931 and 1942, the clumsy use of cement, masonry techniques and the firing of bricks at high temperatures in the later period affected the deformation of some of the structures. a small museum operates on the po nagar site. some of the artefacts found along with a stone stele with inscriptions of the champa kingdom from the 10th century are housed at the national history museum in hanoi. due to the evasive damage of war and calamities, the po nagar temple is rated as the best-preserved example of cham architecture in vietnam. it is also the venue for cham folk dance demonstrations and the organisation of the po nagar festival from 21–23 march according to the lunar calendar (katsimpalis, 2009; khám phá báu…, 2020; po nagar towers…, 2020). the group of temples located around da nang city includes the dong duong area, tra kieu, the lone octagonal tower bang an, chien dan and khuong my. most of the dong duong structures, built at the end of the ninth century and considered the largest religious architectural complex in southeast asia, probably collapsed in 1820. the doors and other furnishings disappeared from the surviving tower, and only the remains of the floors and columns remain (phuong, 2006). louis finot and henri parmentier made the first discoveries at the beginning of the 20th century, which today are still considered ground-breaking. a 114-centimetre bronze statue, a stone sculpture of shiva, a dong duong relic and many other valuable artefacts found at the dong duong site are part of the displays at the cham sculpture museum in da nang, the national history museum in hanoi and the ho chi minh city history museum and are also on display in the champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects 57 fig. 1. po nagar nha trang shrine. source: author’s own collection. world’s leading museums (doang, 2015; dung, 2014; huong, 2011; khám phá báu…, 2020). at the site of the tra kieu (simhapura) citadel dating to the 2nd or 4th century, the former capital of the kingdom of champa, only fragments of the ramparts 2–3 m high remain. valuable artefacts such as, among others, a 10th-century stone sculpture of the nine navagarh gods, gold jewellery, structural elements of towers, parts of altars, stone lingi, various stone carvings, fragments of statues as well as pottery dating to the 9th to 11th century discovered by j.-y. claeys between 1927 and 1928 and artefacts from the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries excavated during archaeological work in the late 20th and early 21st centuries by english, japanese and vietnamese researchers are held by museums in da nang, hanoi, ho chi minh city, hue, binh dinh and hoi an. the sa huynh and champa culture museum, located in tra kieu, has around 200 original artefacts in its collection, in addition to many replicas: ceramics, stone altars, jewellery, tomb jars, documents and photographs (doang, 2019; đỗ, 2017; hoang, 2017; museum…, 2009; sa huynh…, 2009; truong, 2020). a national historic site of vietnamese architecture, the stripped-down bang an’s two towers, which were built between 875 and 977, are shaped like a vertical linga with a calan on an octagonal plan. the inner furnishings of the towers include a small stone linga, and on the outside are two stone statues of gajasimha, probably from the 11th century, and a stone stele with a partially illegible inscription dedicated to shiva, probably from the 10th century. according to one of the legends proclaimed on the basis of an epitaph found at the tower, the temple in honour of shiva was built at the turn of the 4th and 5th centuries by king cham bhadravarman ii (bang an tower…, 2020; hoa…, 2021a, 2021b; kumar, 2016; tháp bằng an…, 2020 2022; tháp bằng an, dien…, 2022). tourist facilities at the site are reduced to a stone-lined road and two information boards. the three parallel towers of chien dan, probably built in the late 10th and early 11th century, on a square base, consist of a gate tower (gopura), a front building (mandapa) and a south tower. located about 50 km from da nang, the structures have no furnishings, as subsequent archaeological work (1901–2002) excavated all artefacts. some of the valuable excavated artefacts, in the form of statues of gaasimha, warriors, dancers, musicians, a goddess with six arms holding weapons and various forms of hindu gods were placed in, among others: the binh dinh provincial museum in qui nhon, the chien dan gallery, the quang nam museum and the ho chi minh city historical museum. the walls of the towers are still decorated with floral appliqués, ribbons and pilasters. there are also masks of the kala monster, two busts, a stone tympanum including a seated deity holding a lotus flower, stone friezes of monsters, dancers, animals, plants and other designs, among others. in addition to the towers, there is a small museum in a fenced area displaying stone sculptures (chien dan cham…, 2022; chien dan towers…, 2022; kumar, 2016; tran, 1998). the vietnamese national monument, a group of three brick khuong my towers with sandstone domes built in the late ninth and early tenth centuries, consisting of three-storey square structures, is set in a north-south line, with an eastern orientation, near tam ky town (the quang nam province). the decorative motifs of deeply carved branches and flowers, probably originated from khmer art. notable among other wall ornaments are figures of garuda, a naga snake, horsemen, a monkey and an elephant, as well as embossing in the form of a lotus flower. all towers are fitted with false doors and carved stone bases. the towers are devoid of furnishings as valuable artefacts discovered during archaeological investigations between 1901 and 2007 were placed in museums, most notably the ho chi minh city historical museum and the da nang museum of sculptural art. these include sculptures of krishna, four-armed vishnu, demon king ravana, chariots with a coachman, dvarapala, a turtle, a lotus flower and several hundred other sculptures, bas-reliefs, statues and wall decorations. according to one legend, khuong my is also the burial place of king chiem thanh’s wife (độc đáo tháp…, 2018; khuong my tower…, 2008; kumar, 2016; levin, 2008; nhóm tháp khương…, n.d.; thanh; tháp khương mỹ, 2010). another large cluster of cham temples, with twin towers, the vijaya citadel (cha ban ruins) with the canh tien tower, the banh it tower and the thi nai citadel and the nhan tower located in the binh dinh province, near quy nhon. the two varying heights of the twin towers with khmer architectural influences, located on a flat site with a southern orientation in the city’s quy nhon park, were built between the 11th and 13th centuries. the structures have distinctive carvings of people, animals and mythical figures. the passage of time, environmental influences, theft and inept restoration have contributed to the destruction of one of the three original towers, significant degradation of the other two structures and severe distortion of the interiors from their original state. listed among the country’s most important monuments, with status as a vietnam national monument, national heritage site and national 58 waldemar moska, owidiusz moska monument, the twin towers have undergone several renovations, upgrades and have been the subject of archaeological surveys. a bonsai garden has been installed at the site. the binh dinh museum displays the best-preserved elements of the towers, friezes and doorframe (cham temples…, 2020; cham towers…, 2020; quy nhon…, 2020; riblet, 1997; tháp doi…, n.d.). the vijaya (cha ban) citadel, probably built in the 14th century, one of champa’s last citadels, ceased to be the capital of the kingdom as a result of significant damage shortly after its establishment. it is estimated that the area protected by the cha ban citadel had as much as about 50 km in circumference. as one of the elements of champa’s power, it was a military unit, with dimensions of 1.4x1.1 km at its core. added to this were ramparts of varying lengths from 1.6 to 2.2 km, of specific construction, consisting of blocks of sedimentary rock and ceramic elements. the cha ban citadel is the only champa citadel in vietnam in which a tower-temple (canh tien) has survived. vietnamese archaeologists exploring the ancient well and other sites within the citadel have uncovered several thousand different 4th century cham artefacts (ceramics, porcelain, everyday objects), on display at the binh dinh museum, among others (ancient structures…, 2015; archaeological champa…, 2014; truong et al., 2017). the cham monument to architecture and art, a four-storey, 20-metre-high canh tien tower in good condition, dates back to the late 12th and early 13th centuries. located about 30km from quy nhon town, the structure was built on a 10x10m square plan in the centre of the now defunct vijaya citadel. equipped with three false doors and wall pillars, the tower was decorated mainly in the roof area. characteristic elements are the phoenix tail and makara ornaments at the corners and the stone reliefs of shiva and the dancers. two two-metrehigh khmer stone elephants and stone dvarapals are located in close proximity to the structure. the shabby renovated complex is fenced off and the inner paths are paved with flagstones (basic information…, 2020; canh tien…, 2019, n.d.; cham temples…, n.d.; hệ thống tháp…, nd.; nguyen, 2019a; truong et al., 2017). part of vietnam’s national heritage, the four banh it towers, remaining from a larger temple complex that looks like a pyramid from afar, were built in the late 11th and early 12th centuries in an eastern, north-south orientation. the restored complex, located at the top of a hill near the town of binh dinh, has undergone renovations mainly involving the main tower, the roof tower and the gate tower. the different shapes of the individual towers, their varying heights, architectural dissimilarity and location on a hill, create a unique landscape. some of the temples’ furnishings are on display at the cham museum of sculptural art, while others have been stolen or taken abroad. it is likely that one of banh it’s major works, a statue of shiva, was moved by the french to the trocadero museum between 1884 and 1886. a replica of the statue was placed in the main tower. the well-kept complex was equipped with a car park and stairs. in 2022, it was decided to undertake a comprehensive, careful restoration of all banh it buildings, using only handmade work (banh it towers…, n.d.; banh it tower…, n.d.; banh it towers (built c. 11th century)…, n.d.; basic information…, 2020; binh dinh…, 2022; cham temples…, n.d.; cham towers…, n.d.; irving, 2000; kumar, 2016). lying in the sea, with a history of more than 1,000 years, the thi nai citadel established as a military and trading port can only be seen at low tide. discovered in 1987, the citadel was destroyed in the 15th century as a result of the expansion of king le thanh tong’s army. the method of construction of the citadel has not yet been investigated, but it is believed that the cham people used a mortar that was unique for the time, enabling the creation of smooth surfaces (đầm thị nại…, 2017; những di tích…, 2013; thành thị nại…, 2011). a national art monument and special national monument of vietnam, the 11th-century nhan tower was built on top of nhan hill. the four-storey, 23.5 m square structure with a base area of 121 m square and an eastern orientation has been renovated several times. the temple grounds include a carved stone, a stone lotus flower and a stone stele with an inscription in honour of shiva and other gods. characteristic elements of the building rebuilt from destruction include pyramidal turrets and a linga on the roof, as well as damaged false doors. on the fifteenth day of the first month according to the lunar calendar, it hosts a poetry night, cultural performances every saturday from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., and a poetry festival on the first full moon, in celebration of tet (le, 2019b; nhan tower…, 2007, 2012, n.d.; thang, 2017; tran, 2020). a completely separate group is the my son shrine (located in the province of quang nam, a few dozen kilometres from da nang), which originally comprised around 80 towers dating from the 7th to the 13th century, although their construction began as early as in the 4th century. the locations, surrounded by mountains, were planned so that the temple complex would also have a defensive function. the temples, shaped like towers, equipped with stone pillars and decorated with sandstone reliefs, were built using low-fired brick. champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects 59 my son was partially restored to its original state after the first reconstruction between 1937 and 1942, and extensive restoration work was carried out. unesco’s patronage, the work of vietnamese, polish and italian experts in the post-1978 period, and the support of the world heritage fund, led to the clean-up of the site, the excavation of many elements of the towers, photogrammetric surveys and the reconstruction of some structures. the uniqueness of the heritage complex, the unesco world heritage status, contacts with laos, thailand, myanmar and cambodia, an increasing number of tourists visiting my son, not only from abroad, is causing a growing awareness of the social obligation to combine leisure tourism with visits to historical sites. situated in the woods, the complex is well organised, the directions of the tour clearly marked out and the individual sites connected by picturesque brick paths. there are information boards about the artefacts, as well as directions to the site. along with the ticket, tourists receive a mini map and are taken around in electric cars. the stay at the site is enhanced by daily dance shows and cham music concerts. a new product of my son is the artistic performances organised from 24 march 2022: the legendary night of my son. in front of the temple complex there is a museum facility (sparkling…, 2022; son sanctuary…, 1999, 2006; my son, vietnam…, n.d.; pham, 2014; tran, 2011). located on ong xiem hill, phu lac (binh thuan province), the group of six low po dam towers dating from the late eighth and early ninth centuries are shrines in honour of king po dam (po kathit, la tra duyen) built in a southern orientation. holding the status of a national architectural monument, it is a heterogeneous group of shrines in age, with the three northern towers built in the hoa lai style dating from the late eighth and early ninth centuries and the three southern towers from the 14th century. it is likely that the first structures of this complex were hypaethral temples, i.e. without a roof. although legend indicates that the temples were dedicated to 15th-century kings, experts indicate that the buildings were built seven hundred years earlier (dang, 2017; 2021b; khám phá báu…, 2020; parul, 2016; tháp po dam…, 2014, n.d.). a linga – yoni altar has been preserved in the complex equipped with a modest information board. also found were stone tablets and elements of columns, a late 12th century stone statue of shiva as decoration from the temple’s main entrance, and a mid-13th century stone sculpture of a lion, all of which are on display at the national history museum in hanoi. in april, according to the cham calendar, the dragon robes of king po dam are honoured by sacrificing them (dang, 2017; 2021b; khám phá báu…, 2020; parul, 2016; tháp po dam…, 2014, n.d.). other important cham sites associated with the presence of temples include: phu hai, hoa lai, po klong garai, po rome (chapman, 2018). the three towers of phu hai (po sah inu) were built in honour of shiva and princess po sah inu on ba nai (ong hoang) hill. the eighthto ninth-century structures, which have vietnamese national heritage status and face east, stand 7 km from phan thiet within the binh thuan province. the structures, 5 to 16 metres high, are among the oldest surviving cham temple complexes in vietnam. despite damage caused by the passage of time and inappropriate restorations, the pyramidal towers with a square base and steeply pitched roofs have preserved many structural elements and ornaments, such as light recesses, gun ports, carved lintels, cylindrical exterior columns, false doors, pilasters and carved appliqués, among others. the only piece of equipment in the temples is the linga – yoni altar with a partially replaced pedestal. the complex is completed by the ruins of the fourth tower, discovered between 1992 and 1995. on july 1, according to the cham calendar, cham festivals such as kate, rija nu`ga, poh mbang yang, the ginger cake baking festival, weaving and pottery festival are held within the fenced premises (parmentier, 1909; parul, 2016; po sah inu…, n.d.; tháp po sah…, n.d.; yen, 2021). the two hoa lai temple towers bearing the designation of national historic landmark and special national monument, facing east, are located in the tam thap, ninh thuan province. part of an ensemble dating from the eighth to ninth centuries was probably the third tower, of which only the base remains. the unfinished complex still contains brickwork and remains of the walls. the 8.4x8.4-m and 9.2x9.2-m towers, built on a square plan, consist of many ornate architectural elements, such as columns, a system of false doors and doorframes, decorative belts, a figure of an armed god, a garuda figure, a tiger rider, sculptures of flowers, leaves and vines. legend tells of the cooperation of the cham and cambodian kings in the creation of hoa lai. archaeological work after 1986, led to the discovery of, among others, a stone linga and yoni and more than 400 other artefacts, placed in the ninh thuan museum. meanwhile, a stone stele, listed as a national treasure of vietnam, was unearthed in 2006. despite many restorations, mistakes were not prevented by partially deforming the temples between 1998 and 2001. the site was fenced and equipped with a gate (cham folk…, 2009; chiêm 60 waldemar moska, owidiusz moska ngưỡng vẻ…, 2020; dang, 2020; đoài, n.d.; fangi et al., 2013; excavation at hoa…, 2008; hoa lai…, 2020; le, 2019b). the po klong garai tower complex, which has the status of vietnamese national monument, vietnamese national heritage and special national monument, was built by king jay simhavarman iii, in the late 13th and early 14th centuries in panduranga, the former principality of the kingdom of champa, on the rocky trau hill. the most beautiful cham temples located in do vinh ward, ninh thuan province were built in honour of shiva and king po klong garai, who built the nha trinh dam and the cham canal. the three 9–14 m high brick towers (cong – gateway, lua – fire and main) remaining from the larger temple complex, which are in very good condition thanks to the polish specialists who restored po klong garai between 1980 and 1990, were executed in a careful architectural style. built on a rectangular plan, the temples are decorated with saddle roofs, shrines on the domes, a linga and a sculpture of a dancing shiva. internal decorations include a sculpture of king po klong garai, many simple appliques, carved faces, makar and lotus leaves. in january, april, july and september according to the cham calendar, po klong garai is the venue for many festivals, artistic performances, pottery demonstrations, weaving, art and folk games, including the prayer for rain, kaolin festival, and kate festival, among others. in front of the entrance to the complex is the cham cultural exhibition centre, documenting daily cham life, as well as a photo gallery, souvenir sales and a wooden cart with buffaloes pulling it (dang, 2017; troung, n.d.; duc, 2019; le, 2019a; le., 2019b; nguyễn…, 2019; po klong garai…, 2020; tran, 2011; temple cham…, 2020; tháp chàm…, 2020; truong, 2022). the four-storey, eight-metre-high, east-oriented po rome tower, in honour of king po rome (1627– 1651) from the 16th–17th centuries, stands on a high hill, in hau sanh village (the ninh thuan province). the last cham brick building to have the status of a national monument of architecture and art, made on an 8x8 m square plan, is equipped with three false doors and a dome with a stone linga on top. the temple was decorated with brick carvings in the form of: shiva, human effigies, nadin cow, fire, lotus. it houses a statue and the tomb of king po rome and a statue of queen po bia sancan. surrounding the enclosed tower, accessed by a stone staircase, is a statue of queen sucih and two tombstones. restorations and archaeological work have led to the discovery of human remains, carved stone stelae, fragments of carvings and structural elements, and a set of 17th-century reliefs. on the po rome site, the kate festival takes place from 1 to 3 july, according to the cham calendar (le, 2020; kate festival…, n.d.; po rome…, n.d., 2012; tháp pô rômê…, 2019). archaeological sites are a separate category which, due to the scale of devastation, cannot be attributed to towers or citadels, although they are also mentioned in the literature in the context of heavily devastated temples, if only because of ongoing research work. they are particularly in close proximity to towers or citadels or in places where, for example, some artefacts were accidentally encountered during other work. among the many sites, archaeological work is carried out mainly in: linh thai, lieu coc, dong duong, lan my duc, quang binh, ha trung, thach anh, bich la, da nang – phong le, huong que, xuan duong, tam ky, chanh lo, quang ngai, kon tum, mam, quy nhon, binh dinh, rome and, in particular, my son. in vietnam, cham artefacts are collected in more than a dozen museums, of which only the cham sculptural art museum in da nang is dedicated to the sculpture of the champa kingdom. apart from it, the most important sites collecting cham artefacts, mainly sculpture, building elements and ceramics, include the sa huynh and champa culture museum in da nang, the cham museum in bac binh, the cham cultural house in binh son, the cham cultural research centre in ninh thuan, the history museum in ho chi minh city, the museum of culture and art in ho chi minh city, the my son museum pavilions, the vietnam national history museum in hanoi, the sa huynh cultural museum in hoi an, the royal museum in hue, the gia lai provincial museum, the binh dinh museum, the nguyen thi dao exhibition house, the hoi an museum of history and culture, the ho an thuan collection. in addition, some researchers suggest that “hundreds of ruined sites may lie along rivers leading to the central plateau, eastern cambodia and laos” (ramabadran, 2019). 5. summary currently, vietnam is pursuing an organised conservation policy, also treating artefacts that have arisen as a result of the expansion of cultures from other parts of the world and the region as national heritage. stopping the ruination of monuments is closely linked to economic development, in which tourism plays a leading role. the difficulties presented in the study regarding research activities, information on archaeological research and problems of a geographical and historical nature, champa kingdom towers as a tourist attraction in vietnam. historical, geographical and architectural aspects 61 references ancient structures of champa found in binh dinh, 2015, vietnam national museum of history, hanoi. archaeological champa relics to be excavated, 2014, vietnam national museum of history, hanoi. bang an tower, quang nam province, vietnam, 2020, asian historical architecture, https://www.orientalarchitecture. 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errors caused by forced totalitarian-administrative pressure on the scientific field, levelling of political party bias, raising the issue of struggle of ukrainians for the status of political nation to a high level, and so on. considerable attention in this respect has been paid in recent years, especially to regional political history, regarded as one of the constituent elements of political regional studies. the purpose of the article is a retrospective analysis of the political development of the westernmost region of modern ukraine – zakarpattia (transcarpathia). taking into account the complex political processes that have influenced its development and the life of the local population during the last 100 years, the author tried to emphasize the key historical facts that form the regional mentality and a kind of political passport of zakarpattia. political history of zakarpattia in the 20th century is peculiar and, to some extent, symbolic of ukrainians of this region. this consists in that the journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(3), 1–13 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.3.01 socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe marian tokar institute of political regionalism, uzhhorod national university, narodna 3, 88000 uzhhorod, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0001-8426-4481 e-mail: carpatia.doslid@gmail.com citation tokar m., 2022, socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(3), 1–13. abstract zakarpattia is perhaps the only region of contemporary ukraine which during the twentieth century has experienced complex political processes of regionalization and adaptation to different states and their political systems. a characteristic feature of the changes in the region was a frequent transition of political conditions from authoritarian to democratic styles of state governing of the title nations which had implanted in zakarpattia their political rules trying to change the political culture and political consciousness of local elites and citizens. key words socio-political development, ukrainian region, political regime, state policy, civil society, political and non-governmental organizations. received: 24 june 2022 accepted: 11 august 2022 published: 28 september 2022 2 marian tokar effective political development of the region, when local inhabitants directly began to participate in this process started almost at the beginning of the 20th century. logical understanding must be found in the possibilities and prospects of zakarpattia ukrainians’ influence on the course of political events and decisions about important political objectives to their own opinion and their own strength. until the 20th century, zakarpattia had a complicated political history, which was marked by the complete disenfranchisement of the local autochthonous population before the nations ruling here (narisi istorìï..., 1993). in turn, this greatly aggravated the discussion about the origin and affiliation of the local population to different nations and peoples (magocsi, 2015). therefore, throughout the entire history of zakarpattia, the fate of the region was meticulously treated by researchers from different countries (botlik, 2005; fredinec, vehers (eds.), 2010; kruglašov, tokar (eds.), 2014; puškaš a., 2006; schmidt, 1939; švorc, 2003). at the time of the collapse of the austro-hungarian monarchy, hope appeared and favorable preconditions were formed to develop social and political life on their own. and after the end of world war ii such hopes received opportunities for realization. since the beginning of the 20th century, we can safely talk about the evolution of the political institutions of transcarpathia, as well as the formation of new political realities. the most peculiar in this respect were complex transformational changes which affected the political systems, whereas during the last century the region had experienced a series of political cataclysms. they just were the driving force of the diverse elements of state-formation, formation and decline of the political systems, functioning of the various political regimes and their institutional manifestations, etc. thus, it was at the beginning of the 20th century that the real and effective development of the political history of zakarpattia began, when attempts to politicize the regional society intensified. during this period, the region experienced a number of political changes which emerged in the process of diverse elements of state-formation, formation and decay of political systems, etc. in the 20th century, zakarpattia had different official names of its own geographical territory, to some extent reflecting the specificity of the political development of the region: ruska kraina, podkarpatska rus, karpatska ukraine, pidkarpatska territory, zakarpatska ukraine, zakarpatska oblast. different was also territorial filling of the region, and therefore researchers conventionally used a generalized name to identify the region – “historic zakarpattia”. to our mind, the fundamental principle of understanding the specificity of the socio-political evolution of zakarpattia society is the fact that only during the twentieth century it was part of at least eight inherently different state and half-state formations (austro-hungarian monarchy, the hungarian republic, the czechoslovak republic, karpatska ukraine, hungary, zakarpatska ukraine, ukrainian ssr/ussr, ukraine). to some extent, this reflects the specificity of the political development of the region, indicating its membership or becoming part of some state formation and, consequently, requiring adaptation of the political institutions of the region to the requirements of that or another political system which increasingly absorbed rather poorly developed and relatively stable political subsystems. based on the latter, we should understand the influence of transformational processes on party and electoral systems. so far, as mentioned above, state formations had political systems that differed from one another and within which there were different political regimes and, consequently, different methods of formation of the state and local organs of authority. the historical peculiarity of the region which influenced various political changes during the last century should also be noted. therefore, it should precede a specific analysis of individual components that make it possible to describe objectively the complex picture of social and political development of zakarpattia as a political region. the symbolism of the political history of zakarpattia in the twentieth century in this case is also in sharp evolution, starting with the lack of political traditions, political culture and political leadership, completing the modern institutions of political life. thus, the political portrait of zakarpattia should be viewed in chronological order and in the gradual implementation of the evolution of political institutions and relations of the region with the center (kruglašov, tokar (eds.), 2014). 2. attempts of politicization of zakarpattia ukrainians at the beginning of the 20th century the first important period in the political history of zakarpattia in the twentieth century is based on the political-legal and state-representative basis. its analysis should begin with a review of the political situation in the region at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries before the collapse of the austrohungarian empire, the end of world war i, the problems of finding the state and national identity. this socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe 3 period was also typical of the national and cultural awakening of ukrainians of zakarpattia. 2.1. felvideyk / prycarpattya (upper hungary) being a part of dualist austro-hungarian monarchy (1867–1918), the region had a conventional name pidkarpattia (by its geographic location from the center). in the official chronicle, the region was often called felvideyk (upper hungary). the social and political situation of the population of zakarpattia at that time was quite difficult because the general social changes hardly touched the province, but in 1900, the territory of four zakarpattia comitats was about 18,000 square kilometers with the population of 848,160 citizens. because of the political and legal powerlessness and social inequality, the inhabitants of the province were unable to effectively fight for their political rights. the political system was characterized by the restriction of voting rights (high property and educational qualification), freedom of publishing, freedom of assemblies and so on. in addition, the electoral processes were held under strict political terror (harassment, arrests). another problem was the policy of the hungarian political parties regarding zakarpattia. the participation of transcarpathians in nationwide political protests and strikes was limited (narisi ìstorìï …, 1995). the similar state of things was affected by poor structuring of the regional society and the lack of political and legal traditions of governance. the most obvious political problem was the lack of the political elite. its leadership functions were assumed by the national cultural intelligentsia (activity of enlighteners) who performed an important role in the process of the political socialization of citizens. the public addresses by workers of large enterprises led by the newly formed social democratic organizations – the first political centers in the region – were more or less organized. the increase in social and political movement in zakarpattia took place in 1905–1907. with the new force, struggle for the introduction of general suffrage began. in spite of that, the increasing activity of workers of large enterprises, together with the newly formed social-democratic organizations (the first political centers in the region) organized political speeches, lack of political rights of the local population, socioeconomic backwardness of the region, policy of hungarization (magyarization) and denationalization, actually influenced the political feebleness of regional political institutions within a strong state system. in consequence, institutional manifestations of the political system of dualistic monarchy of austria-hungary were extremely weak because centralized power by all means tried to control all political and economic key factors of social progress. all of the above mentioned also relates to the party system of austria-hungary, whose manifestations in zakarpattia in the early twentieth century were barely noticeable. the policies of pro-government and opposition parties concerning zakarpattia were the same, and therefore hungarian political parties were unpopular in the region. if we classify the political system within which zakarpattia functioned in the early twentieth century, taking into account the formational approach of the typology of societies, it was a bourgeois political system of the western model. its political regime was characterized by authoritarian methods of governance. 2.2. ruska kraina only at the end of world war ii, due to the enthusiasm of the national liberation movement, did the strengthening of the struggle against the war also begin to change the political situation in the region. there was the first gradual increase in national consciousness of ukrainians which promoted finding ways of national-state determination. therefore, attempts were made by the hungarian government of m. karoi to keep zakarpattia as part of hungary (law of ruska kraina) (narisi ìstorìï …, 1995). law of ruska kraina anticipated the formation of four comitats (ung, uhocha, bereg, maramorosh) of an autonomous region within hungary. the document also provided the right to self-determination in internal political affairs, and more specifically – the administrative self-governance, justice, education, religion, language. the ruska national assembly was declared to be the legislative body of the autonomous region. in contrast to general state duties of the region, the document related to external political (foreign) and economic relations, military, financial, transport and social issues and more. the political power of the region was represented by the governor (regent). however, his power was not absolute, whereas inspection and control of his actions was accomplished by the minister of affairs of ruska kraina, who was subordinated to the hungarian state assembly (parliament) (puškaš, 2006). however, the post-war transformation of the political system occurred in the conditions of dominance of reintegration processes. the main regional peculiarities of the transformation of political systems in zakarpattia in the first half of the twentieth century were characterized by several factors. firstly, there was social dissociation which was based on national and religious differentiation of population. the second factor was political and civil uncertainty. at that time when all slavic nationalities had clearly determined their course to independence of the 4 marian tokar nation, ukrainian rusyns in zakarpattia hesitated, and that was the great advantage for other peoples (fredinec, vehers (eds.), 2010). a significant negativity in this process was imposed by the absence of a strong political elite, among which liberal attitudes prevailed, in particular in relation to hungarians. another factor was the economic and entrepreneurial weakness of the zakarpattia region, which was traditionally considered agricultural. therefore, the attempts to keep the historical zakarpattia within the weak conditions of the hungarian political system at that time looked pathetic. alternatively, the given situation influenced numerous attempts to establish one’s own locally-autonomous political regimes with specific management models. 2.3. the hutsul republic another attempt to stabilize the political situation, but rather to determine the orientation of the national government was the existence of the hutsul republic in the north-east of zakarpattia (1918– 1919). the existence of the hutsul republic ceased after the occupation of romanian troops, which had received the consent of the european countries to start to put things in order in adjacent territories. it was a semi-political formation that had emerged spontaneously. at that time when the hungarian authority was losing control over the situation, detachments of people’s self-defense, disarmed gendarmerie in a peaceful uprising, transferred power in the hands of local residents. on november 8, 1918, at the general assembly in yasinia, they adopted a unanimous decision about the union with ukraine (vegeš (ed.), 2002). the leadership of the 20,000 population and legislative functions was entrusted with a peculiar parliament – the newly formed ukrainian national council, which consisted of 42 members. moreover, the authority was also clearly divided into branches of power. executive power belonged to commissions (sections) whose leaders had to report to the main board (holovna uprava). thus, the administrative, domestic, commercial, school, forestry, trade, food, diplomatic, military and other sections were formed. these elements of state formation were complemented by armed forces (police and border guards). it should be noted that at the first meeting of the ukrainian people’s council deputies took an appeal to the government of the west ukrainian people’s republic on the desire to be reunited with it. on january 8, 1919, as a result of an armed uprising against hungary, ukrainian people’s council in yasinia officially declared the separate and independent hutsul republic (vegeš (ed.), 2002). the prime minister, the military commandant and the chairman of the council – all these functions were actually performed by the president of the hutsul republic with extraordinary power. although this semi-state formation was not recognized by the international community, its internal political life was unfolded by the classic state-forming scenario. if we talk about the realities and prospects of independent existence of such a state, then on the basis of contemporary policy of neighbor states and big countries which had won in the world war i, the duration of its existence also looked ghostly. also the decision of the general public congress influenced the increase in politicization of zakarpattia ukrainians. the khust forum (january, 21, 1919) and its decision once again confirmed the orientation of local residents for reunification with ukraine. the hutsul republic (1918–1919) and the activity of its leaders were reinforcing the idea of conciliarism of ukraine (vegeš, tokar, 2018). and only complex foreign circumstances prevented the unification processes of the ukrainian nation, which eventually made zakarpattia ukrainians start the movement for inclusion of the region in the framework of a newly formed state – the czechoslovak republic. 2.4. ruska kraina (under soviet rule in hungary) in 1919, another attempt was made for the formation of a new political regime on the territory of zakarpattia. it was associated with the establishment of soviet power in hungary. due to the crisis of m. кaroi’s government, the socialists came to power, who on march 21, 1919, proclaimed hungary as a soviet republic. owing to the merger of socialists with communists, the united socialist party of hungary and one-party government were created, which carried out peaceful socialist revolution in hungary. this was a surprise for all subjects of contemporary political processes. in the following three days, the soviet power spread on the territory of zakarpattia. the soviet power forced the territorial allegiance and named the region – ruska kraina (narisi ìstorìï…, 1995). the priority task of the new power was to change the political system of the state. it greatly considered the of social-political and social-economic content of state livelihoods. among the major plans for the realizing of tasks, the revolutionary government council of hungary marked the nationalization of banks, the submission of financial, economic and industrial institutions, the creation of the red army and other military units (puškaš, 2006). the soviet power did not have time to implement the vast majority of these bold plans. its policy both in hungary and in zakarpattia was characterized by duplication socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe 5 of internal political development of soviet power in contemporary russia and ukraine. the process of the formation of soviet organs of power acknowledged the importance of the role of councils, their executive committees, directories with involving broader circles of population. it is confirmed by the results of elections, according to which we can speak about the heterogeneous social membership of councils (narisi ìstorìï…, 1995). if the formation of the people’s councils had a positive response among the local population, other forms of government became unpopular. administrative innovations had negative consequences, because power was increasingly gaining dictatorial traits. the most vicious in the contemporary situation was the way of duplicating of the soviet bolshevik policy with its main negative manifestations (e.g. repressions against opposition and dissidents). furthermore, the internal political situation deepened the problem of the adaptation of a new political system, which did not contribute to the implementation of new forms of functioning institutions of a weak political regime. those institutional manifestations which the representatives of the soviet power tried to initiate in zakarpattia for the lack of time could not find the adequate support from the citizens. but the implementation of fundamental changes in social-political and economic directions was failed by the soviet power, owing to external political rejection of a “soviet island” in central-eastern europe. the soviet power lasted 133 days in hungary and only 40 days in zakarpattia. it is impossible to speak about the formation of a new political system and also about its stabilization and adaptation of local people to the new requirements of state livelihoods. those institutional manifestations which the representatives of the soviet power tried to initiate in zakarpattia, for the lack of time, could not find appropriate support from citizens. furthermore, politicians failed to realize a considerable range of social and political changes. it was not just the temporal reasons, but also complex internal and external political reasons. therefore, as the previous attempts that we have examined above, the latter also failed (narisi ìstorìï …, 1995). the reasons are also common in the mentioned cases. the external political situation did not contribute to the implementation of new forms of the functioning of institutions of weak political regimes. directly or indirectly, we consider that in the contemporary conditions, key factors could only predominate the external nature. 3. checking by democracy and authoritarianism (1919–1944) 3.1. podkarpatska rus (1919–1938) the next stage of national belonging of the region is the formation of the czechoslovak republic, which called on the inhabitants of zakarpattia to be actively involved in political life and to become a real political entity of the postwar world order. in particular, the fact that political history of 1920–1930 was based on the foundations of a democratic society was new to the population. and the establishment of a multi-party system gave a push to a comprehensive development of political thought, ideological struggle and political culture in general. indeed, dramatic changes took place when, owing to the voluntary decision of the local political elite, elite immigrant groups and the support of the european countries who were winners of the first world war and also of the usa, zakarpattia lands were included to the newly formed slavic state – the czechoslovak republic (boldižar, mocnì, 2002). during 1919–1939 the region, under the name podkarpatska rus ruthenia, was able to fulfill itself in a democratic political system. it carried out a gradual evolution of a new state structure in zakarpattia and its integration into the political system in czechoslovakia. in practice, establishing a new political elite began, whose representatives considered it a priority to defend acting autonomy. the czechoslovak political system had all the characteristics of a democratic society, primarily expressed in the effectiveness of pluralism, the implementation of legislative framework, the practice of political equality. according to the general statute of organization and administration of podkarpatska rus adopted by the czechoslovak authority, the directory was formed as an advisory body in the autonomous affairs. the administrator together with the military commander concentrated the executive branch of power in their hands. during 1919–1920, the czechoslovak government reorganized the administrative-territorial structure in podkarpatska rus. however, the relationships between local and central authorities were almost constantly in conflict, as broad authority and autonomous power expected in the general statute were not implemented. in all administrative bodies, there was the dominance of czech officials because the government believed that local residents were not ready to perform administrative functions professionally in the local authorities (švorc, 2003). in september 1919, political and school departments (referats) and also the health care department were formed in the region. subsequently, there were 6 marian tokar the legal department, police department, department of public works, department of post-offices and telegraphs, economic and financial departments, department of social care (narisi ìstorìï…, 1995). thus intense political integration of zakarpattia into the political and state system of the czechoslovak republic began. with the adoption of the constitution, the czechoslovak power was to make some concessions in determining the status of podkarpatska rus, as the continuation of the conflict between central and local authorities did not promote the stability of the political situation in the state. according to the changes to the general statute, adopted on april 26, 1920, the civilian administrator was denied the right to exercise the local executive branch of power. instead, the post of the governor of podkarpatska rus was introduced, whose competence included the exercise of executive power in matters within the jurisdiction of autonomy (puškaš, 2006). the constitution of the czechoslovak republic gave fairly extensive rights to the future soim of pidkarpatska rus (regional parliament). in accordance with the norms of the constitution, the soim could adopt laws that dealt with the issues of language, religion, education and also the functioning of local administration. in addition, the soim was granted the right to make special laws relating to pidkarpatska rus which were in force on this territory, in the case of granting it such right by the czechoslovak parliament and if the adopted laws did not conflict with the existing legislation of the czechoslovak republic. the constitution defined the governor of podkarpatska rus as the highest representative of the autonomy, appointed by the president of czechoslovakia. it was also noted that the governor was responsible not only to the soim of podkarpatska rus, but also to the czechoslovak authority. the representation of podkarpatska rus in the legislative organ of state was to be determined by the legislation of czechoslovakia about elections. the subjects of the election process were political parties which appeared after 1919 (tokar, 2006). after the legal registration of zakarpattia lands being part of a new state, the dynamics of democratization of the socio-political life in the region was appreciable. the gradual evolution of the new state structure was carried out in zakarpattia along with its integration into the political system of czechoslovakia. in practice, establishing of a new political elite began (g. zhatkovych, a. beskyd, a. voloshyn et al.). its representatives raised a priority question about giving the region effective autonomy. the czechoslovak political system had all the characteristic features of a democratic society, primarily expressed in the effectiveness of pluralism, the implementation of legislative framework, the practice of political equality. podkarpatska rus, as part of czechoslovakia, was in the epicenter of political changes due to the transformation of the political system in participation of the state formation and so on. the process of involving citizens in the development of the state passed through a prism of representative democracy whose intermediaries were political parties. the multiparty system that had both positive and negative characteristics contributed to faster involvement of public masses into the state policy. during the 1920–1930s, the manifestation of political pluralism took effect of direct participation in the political evolution of the state by its citizens. the newly formed czechoslovak republic, which immediately began large-scale development of democratic principles, among which there was the establishment of a multiparty system, gave opportunity to implement freely their political ideas of different orientations into life. some political parties undertook the main burden concerning the implementation of reunification processes. the accumulation of the priority issue among local residents, i.e. bringing the objective communion of ukrainians on both sides of the carpathians to the awareness of population, was an important factor in their activity. we can consider ukrainian politicians and party leaders of the interwar period, the best representatives of ukrainian political nation of zakarpattia, as the forerunners of reunification of those political processes that had happened in the second half of the 1940s. however, the achievements of many ukrainian political parties and their representatives in this way actually were privatized by one communist political organization that, objectively speaking, did not pretend to have a leader role of general ukrainian reunification and did not bear the idea of unity of a nation in its modern sense. just at this time political parties led the struggle for policy of the ukrainian nation in zakarpattia and the idea of reunification of ukrainian lands on both sides of the carpathians. however, it was not a new idea in the interwar period. therefore, at the end of world war i, the idea of forming a unified national state in ethnographic boundaries was really considered. however, external political factors prevented this. they included a so-called pro-ukrainian political trend in contemporary podkarpatska rus. among them, there were the rus grain-growing (zemledilska) party (1920–1924), the christian people’s party (1924–1938) (both had the status of autonomous political organizations) and affiliated organizations of national parties – zakarpattia regional committee of the communist party of czechoslovakia socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe 7 (regional committee of cpcz) (1921–1938) and the social democratic party of pidkarpatska rus (1920– 1938) (tokar, 2006). in the programs of the named political parties, open requests for connection of zakarpattia to ukraine did not sound as the ultimate goal, but radicalization in the political sense gradually evolved. by the mid-1930s, another two pro-ukrainian parties appeared on the political scene – the ukrainian peasant party and the ukrainian fraction of agrarian party. the leaders of the ukrainian peasant party saw its main task in the formation of a unifying core of all ukrainian public and political forces on the basis of the party: “therefore, all ukrainians, under blue and yellow flag, under which we stood in 1918! we must fight for the idea of autonomous ukrainian pidkarpattia!” (doboš, 1995). it is interesting that both left and right political parties, in spite of the ideological difference, wanted to unite zakarpattia ukrainians with ukrainian people on the other side of the carpathians. the only difference consisted in that some (regional committee of cpcz) saw this union being part of the soviet ukraine, and others (the christian people’s party, the ukrainian peasant party, the social democratic party, the ukrainian agrarians) – saw it in a non-communist united ukrainian state. ukrainian leaders played a progressive role in the party representative body – the first rus (ukrainian) central people’s council. their cultural and national support was fellowship “prosvita”, which in 1937 united all progressive national forces, regardless of their party affiliation. however, despite the successes of democracy in the region and the activity of political and non-governmental organizations in social life, linguistic and national contradictions remained unresolved (botlik, 2005; magocsi, 2015). it should be noted that the transformation of the political system, and especially its stabilization and gradual adaptation of zakarpattia regional political institutions of the czechoslovak political system was a significant step forward in comparison with previous attempts of a similar nature. the progress was obvious in all social and political spheres for local citizens even in spite of the incompleteness of the process. 3.2. carpathian ukraine (1938–1939) features of the national state formation of carpathian ukraine at the end of 1930s forced focusing on a political and legal basis. this stage was the top state forming competitions of ukrainians in zakarpattia, who in full force declared themselves as a political nation. the prague government during the interwar period constantly delayed the implementation of its promises of the autonomy of the region, arguing that ukrainians were not yet ready for independent life. however, the political maturity of local inhabitants had not raised doubts of conscious representatives of regional politics yet. 1938 was a year of dramatic political changes in the historic zakarpattia. the party development of 1920–1930, during which two party blocks crystallized, which were following ukrainophilic and russophilic orientations, was also on the doorstep of transformation. at that time, national councils had the greatest influence on political life, in particular persha ruska (ukrainian) the central people’s council and the people’s ruska central council (russophile), whose actions were coordinated by representatives of the regional political elite. due to the compromise on october 11, 1938, the first autonomous government of podkarpatska rus was formed, headed by a. brodiy – the leader of russophile policy orientation in the region. but the autonomous government lasted a very short period and managed to hold only three ministerial sittings (15, 18, 22–23 october 1938), during which the main governing bodies, a number of important economic and business issues, problems of border demarcation with slovakia, creating a center of social security, internal political situation in podkarpatska rus and so on were viewed and approved. soon, it became known that adam brody had been working for a long time to hungary under the nickname “bertalon”. he was accused of state treason and arrested (vegeš, 2004). the situation in political life changed especially dramatically with the arrival of the second autonomous government headed by the leader of proukrainian orientation a. voloshyn (october 1938). after the prohibition of activity of all political organizations, persha ruska (ukrainian) the central people’s council, which had to stabilize the socio-political situation, monopolized political life of the region. simultaneously, the organizational work to create a new (ruling paradigm) ukrainian national party began; its apparatus was formed by the ruling elite of the region. established in january 1939, the party ukrainian national organization (obiednannia) (uno) acted as a single electoral subject. these facts point to the one-party system, and there was no alternative to elections to soim (regional parliament), which indicated the authoritarian character of the political system. although the authority justified it by the need to stop a political chaos, its actions violated the already acquired in previous years democratic victories. we assume that authoritarianism was temporary because the convocation of soim and the importance of its decisions, in particular the proclamation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/paul_r._magocsi 8 marian tokar of the independence of the carpathian ukraine on 15 march, 1939, the election of the president and ministers, the approval of the state symbols, pointed to the political and legal framework of a democratic state status of carpathian ukraine. however, unfavorable conditions for the deployment of state life and also the beginning of the hungarian occupation negated attempts of political construction. the government was working in extreme conditions. the political crisis in the region was deepened by the contradictions between czech officials and the local population, as well as by numerous conflicts in the ukrainian sphere (camp). in 1938–1939, representatives of two generations faced each other: young radical nationalists, who demanded the government to act decisively and older moderate politicians, who tried to keep the autonomous status of the region through some maneuverings. after the decisions of the first vienna arbitrage, the autonomous government of carpathian ukraine moved to khust. the political regime of carpathian ukraine started on the basis on a one-party system represented by uno. its policy symbolized the authoritarian type of government. the formation of a single pro-state party uno and the presence of its members in the government determined the state position of the government that was based on authoritarianism and nationalism, despite the proclaimed democratic content of documents. party leaders chose a radical way owing to internal and external crisis circumstances and thus tried to stop the political chaos in the region. so, this way was chosen as acceptable in the contemporary conditions and had to solve two major problems. firstly, all national ukrainian political and cultural forces should gather and unite to stand out as a single front in favor of their conquests. secondly, a possibility to organize a strong opposition should be given that would bring to naught all attempts of ukrainian association to form prerequisites for building a full autonomy of carpathian ukraine. in november 1938, the organization of people’s defense of the carpathian sich (opdcs) was formed, although the first sich troops in the early 1930s started to be formed by dmitry klympush from yasinia. on november 9, 1938, in khust the constituent assembly of the carpathian sich took place. dmytro klympush was elected the commander of the carpathian sich (vegeš, 2004). on november 22, 1938, the czechoslovak parliament changed the constitution, adding resolutions of the federal system. at the same time, a separate constitutional charter of podkarpatska rus was adopted, according to which the region was considered as a federal part of the renewed czechoslovak republic (so-called “second” republic). thanks to the adoption of this law, the legal status of podkarpatska rus / carpathian ukraine went far beyond the autonomy defined in the saint-germain contract and the czechoslovak constitution of 1920. in accordance with these decisions, forming their own regional government and convening soim (parliament) was foreseen. in january 1939, the prague authority proposed a new government of the carpathian ukraine (the third autonomous government), under the leadership of avgustyn voloshyn. on february 12, 1939, the elections to soim of the carpathian ukraine were called. 92.4 per cent of voters voted for the party list of uno (tokar, 2006). it gave the right to the government of carpathian ukraine to summon soim – the first parliament in the history of the region. on march 14, 1939, the prime minister a. voloshyn declared independence and sovereignty of carpathian ukraine and appointed the convocation of soim on march 15, 1939, which had to adopt this decision. in general, six sittings of soim were held which adopted decisions that had a great historical importance for the establishment of the young carpatho-ukrainian state. the sitting of soim officially proclaimed the independence of carpathian ukraine – a republic headed by the president. 22 members of the parliament adopted the constitutional law. part 1: §1. carpathian ukraine is an independent state. §2. the name of the state is: carpathian ukraine. §3. carpathian ukraine is a republic with a president elected by soim of carpathian ukraine headed. §4. the official language of carpathian-ukraine is ukrainian. §5. the color of the national flag of carpathian ukraine is blue and yellow, whereby the blue color is the upper stripe and yellow is the lower stripe §6. the state emblem of carpathian ukraine is the previous regional emblem: a bear in the left red semicircle, and the trident of st. volodymyr the great with a cross on the middle dent. §7. the state anthem of carpathian ukraine is: “ukraine’s glory has not perished...”. §8. this law is binding immediately upon its adoption (vegeš, 2004, р. 286). afterwards, the soim of carpathian ukraine elected a. voloshyn the president of carpathian ukraine, who after taking the oath, appointed a new (the fourth autonomous) government headed by julian revaj. the decision of soim changed yet again the state-legal status of carpathian ukraine. since then, although somewhat symbolic, carpathian ukraine ceased to be part of federal czechoslovakia and became an independent state. proclamation of full independence of carpathian ukraine was an socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe 9 important state-political act, but it did not receive enough international recognition, because there was not time for it. it was the highest manifestation of the will of the population, in accordance with the right to self-determination, which belongs to the ukrainian nation so as it belongs to dominant state-forming peoples (schmidt a., 1939). we must understand that at that time, there was a general crisis of political systems in the conditions of exacerbation of international relations. carpathian ukraine passed a short way from the regional political autonomy to the state independence with transitive authoritarianism. 3.3. pidkarpatska territory (1939–1944) the period of hungarian occupation is also peculiar in the political history of zakarpattia. its characteristics indicate a sharp turning point of a newly formed system of democratic relations in society and the revenge of the hungarian political regime, re-establishment of old hungarian orders from the beginning of the 20th century (fredinec, vehers (eds.), 2010). during march–july 1939, a military-administrative dictatorship of the hungarian occupation authority was established in the region. also the official name of the region was changed – pidkarpatska territory. the regime was characterized by repressions and purges, firing of a large number of professionals and civil servants; it indicated a nontolerant personnel policy of the new power. as before the world war i, magyarization (hungarization) of all social spheres increased. the political system experienced significant changes several times. in the summer of 1939, hungary replaced the dictatorship by civil power. the laws concerning zakarpattia ratified by the hungarian parliament introduced a new political management institute – the regency commissariat of the pidkarpatska territory. in addition, the hungarian party system carried back orders of the “austro-hungarian” period, and the promised autonomous parties in zakarpattia could be forgotten. to replenish the regional deputy corpus in the hungarian parliament, the “the best” and “faithful” representatives of the local elite were co-opted, and to speak about the system of pluralistic choice at that time was impossible. 4. the loss of regional characteristics in the process sovietization of zakarpattia (1944– 1991) 4.1. zakarpats’ka (transcarpathian) ukraine (1944–1946) after the liquidation of hungarian occupation regime in the autumn 1944, the establishment of people’s power began in zakarpattia with the soviets and their political force structures. the movement for reunification with soviet ukraine was activated. this period obtained the political and legal status of a semi-state (transitive) body and the name – zakarpats’ka ukraine (1944–1946). during this period, branches of people’s committees were formed as bodies of local government. however, their formation was only partially from the national initiative. the main role was performed by the representatives of military headquarters of the red army, which were appointed by the leadership of localities. at the same time, on pots were local civil servants. therefore, at this stage, there was somewhat paradoxical situation of dual power. however, in course of time, the communists and soviet workers forced out of administrative positions old civil servants and monopolized power in their hands. the control of soviet force structures over political organs of the zakarpats’ka ukraine was exercised everywhere. the new power made it clear that a return to the «czech pluralism» with extensive multi-party system would not occur. instead, it started to form a oneparty system with monopolizing role in society. the communist party of zakarpats’ka ukraine (cpzu), which operated in zakarpattia from 19 october 1944 to 15 december 1945, was the successor of the transcarpathian regional committee of the communist party of czechoslovakia (operating in 1921–1938). at the organizational conference in mukachevo it was decided to unite all centers in a single communist organization (makara, 1995). the party’s main task was the reunification of zakarpats’ka ukraine with soviet ukraine, and therefore it obligated its members to lead the movement of national masses for the unity of the ukrainian people and soon to solve the socio-economic and national-cultural problem through the prism of sovietization of the region. in practice, this meant the establishment of various committees which dealt in the confiscation of private land and creation of collective farms on its basis, the elimination of educational and scout centers and the creation of of communist youth organizations. in general, the priority task of members of the communist party of zakarpats’ka ukraine (cpzu) was total bolshevization of society with the help of force structures. 10 marian tokar moreover, intensified purge of the newly accepted communists was carried out taking into consideration the peculiarities of «recent tenure as a part of foreign state». the activity of the communist party of zakarpats’ka ukraine (cpzu) had a deeply revolutionary character; it idealized merits of the red army and communists in liberation of the region. in its work, the communist party of zakarpats’ka ukraine (cpzu) based on the formation of a mass trade union, youth arts and cultural and sports organizations. on the initiative of the cpzu during 1944–1945 mass assemblies, meetings, conferences, congresses of workers, peasants, teachers, cultural workers and others were carried out. much work was done during the preparation and sessions of the first congress of people’s committees, which adopted a manifest on the reunification of zakarpats’ka ukraine with soviet ukraine on november 26, 1944. the broad strata of local population took part in these events that would contribute to the enthusiasm of the level of political culture in the conditions of adaptation to the new political system. as a result of implementation of its main task and the unpredictability of outlined further program principles, the existence of the communist party of zakarpats’ka ukraine (cpzu) as a separate party structural and organizational unit became impractical. on december 15, 1945, the central committee of the all-russian communist party of bolsheviks decided to consider possible adoption of the cpzu to the all-russian communist party of bolsheviks and automatic transfer of its members to the all-russian communist party of bolsheviks. however, this decision caused another wave of party-political purge of the staff (only 38 percent of the cpzu became members of the all-russian communist party of bolsheviks). instead of the central committee of the cpzu was appointed regional (oblast) committee of the communist party of bolsheviks of ukraine, and on january 5, 1946, its new membership was approved (makara, 1995). the first congress of people’s committees, except the manifest on reunification of zakarpats’ka ukraine with soviet ukraine, chose the highest organ of state power – the people’s council of zakarpats’ka ukraine (pczu) with 17 members. i. turianytsia was elected as the head of the council. also the staff of executive and administrative body – the government of zakarpats’ka ukraine was approved. according to the decree the people’s council of zakarpats’ka ukraine (january 9, 1945), all absolute power belonged to the people in the region and was exercised through freely chosen representative bodies, that is, local people’s committees and people’s council – in the center. whereas the people’s council of zakarpats’ka ukraine was the single highest executive and legislative organ of power in the region, its activity could be described as full consistency of the legislative and executive powers. elected members of the people’s council of zakarpats’ka ukraine ,except legislative activities, implemented adopted laws by the council and the dominated principle was «democratic centralism». but gradually the duplication of the fundamental principles of the soviet power became more tangible in the context of the soviet union, and attempts to resist this were immediately eliminated. 4.2. zakarpats’ka oblast in soviet ukraine (1946–1991) at the beginning of 1946, a transitional status of zakarpats’ka ukraine was changed by the legal adoption of its territory as part of the ukrainian soviet socialist republic ssr and the formation of the zakarpats’ka oblast with the center in town uzhhorod. legally, the status of the region was solved on june 29, 1945. since that time, there was fully legitimate infusion of social and political institutions into the national soviet political system, and aspects of the politicization of transcarpathian ukrainians lost its regional peculiarities in comparison with other regions of ukraine. it was the third and the last period of sovietization of the region in the twentieth century. this process was completely implemented by a primordial idea of unity of the ukrainian people. however, it should be noted that ideas of reunification of the ukrainian lands on both sides of the carpathians were not new. at the end of world war i, the idea of formation of a single national state in the ethnographic framework (though in a non-soviet variant) was really considered. however, the foreign policy factors created some obstacles. in the interwar period, separate political parties that were in zakarpattia took on the main burden of the implementation of reunification processes. among them was a communist political organization. political parties of zakarpattia could, and it would be rightful, be considered the forerunners of those reunification processes that had occurred in the second half of 1940s. however, the achievements of many ukrainian political forces and their representatives were actually privatized by a single communist political organization which, objectively speaking, did not claim to be the leader of national reunification in its modern sense (tokar (ed.), 2016). in one way or another, at the stage of sovietization, communists remained the core of the political system; their party entirely controlled social and political processes. the party practically monopolized all the levers of regional livelihoods. the main socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe 11 objective of that time was the strengthening and activation of the soviet organs of power, the establishment of soviet order, the maintenance of social justice, etc. ideological work, especially among people who distrusted communists, was also strengthened; the campaign of forming soviet and party senior staff using visitors started. dismissal of qualified local workers from offices gained a widespread character. consequently, we can say that the staff policy of the soviet power was directed to the approval of the new political system and its adaptation to the corresponding institutions as soon as possible. for this, the substitution of the status of transitional semistate was made, but properly autonomous formation to the equivalent administrative-territorial unit – oblast (region) as a part of the ukrainian soviet social republic (ussr). as a result, along with the political aspects, economic aspects (normalization of five-year plans, collectivization), cultural and national aspects (breaking with the notion of “carpathian ukrainians” and extension of the meaning of the notion «ukrainians»), social activities (introduction of the soviet passport regime with compulsory registration) were realized. but there were other disadvantages, which in the first years of the soviet power negatively influenced its image. it was extreme militarization of the region due to supersaturation of servicemen, strict borderline regime, anti-religious policy (liquidation of the greek-catholic church), the introduction of administrative-command system, the management of all social spheres. during the sovietization process of 1950–1980, the actual duplication of the main elements of the political system of soviet ukraine / the soviet union occurred. general trends dominated over regional peculiarities of this process and, as is pointed out, the sovietization of zakarpattia was carried out in a “from the top”, rapid, emergency mode. party centers with the full support and control of military units and security organs played a leading role in this process. therefore, this period is dynamic in terms of social development of the region, and controversial, due to the exaggerated role of “the popular initiative” in this process (tokar (ed.), 2016). the electoral process in zakarpattia during the soviet period underwent a complex evolution, but the electorate – good practice of political training. during this time there was everything: from a strict selection of deputies (cooptation) to alternative and transparency of subjects of the election process. in the postwar years, the conditions for the deployment of civil and political activity of the working people were created, providing their widespread participation in the social and political life. however, during stalinism there were gross human rights violations. first of all, that was showed by the conditions of the election campaigns which had nothing in common with the previous pre-soviet traditions of pluralism and democracy. therefore, the process of adaptation to the soviet political system in zakarpattia took place in rather difficult circumstances of post-war reconstruction. if economic successes had an objectively positive character, the political control of livelihoods of local residents left a negative trace on the sovietization of zakarpattia as a special political region. 5. the post-soviet period (since 1991) – the zakarpats’ka oblast in independent ukraine the development of political life in the period of formation of ukraine’s independence and its further livelihoods serves today as a new guideline of evolution for zakarpattia as a political region. the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s was a landmark in determining ukrainians as a political nation. the wave of liberalization of social and political relations as well as democratic transformations of public life led to the transformation of national consciousness, the search for truth, freedom, human values, preservation of historical monuments, and the renaissance of cultural heritage. under the conditions of a single-party system, citizens with common interests grouped by forming unofficial public organizations, associations and unions. as on other ukrainian lands, in the zakarpats’ka oblast the process of activation of public associations, centers of political parties, representatives of the regional elite had an accumulating role in making important social changes. the historical significance and the role of informal public organizations can hardly be overestimated. they actually created a mass social base and a broad framework for the rise of a powerful national-democratic movement with a vivid variety of its manifestations. also cultural and educational orientation did not take the last place. for the time of contemporary national, cultural and political awakening on the ukrainian lands 1990–2021, dramatic social and political changes occurred that led to the return of original national sources of the carpathian region and gave a possibility to touch memorable pages of the past. the ukrainian society of the contemporary state experienced the period of formation and adaptation of many public institutions to the political system. choosing the democratic way of development in all spheres of social life and taking a pattern of the western european variant of democracy, ukrainians 12 marian tokar tried to adjust to the realities and prospects of the development of a modern democratic society. only under these conditions, can the liberalization of relations and social and political activity of transcarpathians be expected in the context of forming the principles of civil society. in everyday vocabulary, the zakarpats’ka oblast is called by the regional name zakarpattia (transcarpathia). it is a geographical and historical territory whose geopolitical position is unique because of its location on the crossroads of economic, trade, national and cultural routes in the center of europe. the region is located in the far west of ukraine. in the northeast, east and south-east zakarpattia borders on lvivska and ivano-frankivska oblasts, and in the northwest, west and south boundaries of the oblast are the state borders of ukraine with a total length of 467.3 km, which includes poland – 33.4 km, slovakia – 98.5 km, hungary – 130.0 km and romania – 205.4 km. hence, in the zakarpats’ka oblast there are 19 border crossing points with neighboring states. the area of zakarpattia with the center in uzhhorod is 12.8 thousand km², or 2.1% of ukraine’s territory and is one of the smallest among the oblasts of the western region, occupying 11.6% of its territory. the number of de facto population in the oblast on january 1, 2010 was numbered 1244.8 thousand people, 2.7% of the population of ukraine. according to the population size, the oblast took 17th place among other regions, and according to the average population density (97.6 persons per km) – 8th place. 62.8% of the population live in rural areas. the geographical location of the region also determines the presence of a sufficiently large number of national minorities among its population. in the zakarpats’ka oblast live citizens from about a hundred nationalities and ethnic groups, including 80.5% – ukrainians, 12.1% – hungarian, 2.6% – romanians, 2.5% – russians (tokar (ed.), 2016). the multinational composition of the population of the region has led to its multi-religious character. numerous religious organizations of different religious confessions and faiths are registered in the region. ethno-confessional organizations are the most typical of the jewish population, germans, slovaks, romanians, and hungarians. for them, according to their own historical, ethno-cultural and canonical and ritual traditions, normal conditions and opportunities were created to satisfy their religious needs. on the basis of this survey, it should be noted that during the last preconditions for the formation of a new type of thinking of local population and special features of its regional political awareness and political culture were formed century in the zakarpats’ka oblast. transcarpathians regularly participated in state-forming and other political processes, specifically influencing their dynamics owing to peculiar regional and national traditions, historical, cultural, mental characteristics, the typical content of struggle and defending social and political values. 6. conclusions the motivation to write this material is an argument for historical and political traditions of small regions that under any geopolitical circumstances focus attention of the state power on the effectiveness of single-minded policy of “center” to “region”. mistakes and negative effects between two subjects lead to the development of appropriate national regional policy that will promote the population’s participation in political life. especially important is the study of the specificity of regions with common characteristics. it gives opportunity to identify traditional trends of political culture, political behavior of the population in the regions and their influence on power to adopt important social and political decisions. the detailed overview of the past and circumstances of the modern development spur on the formation of the political portrait (passport) of the zakarpattia region – the most western region of modern ukraine, which is filled with courses of regional political processes, polyethnicity and multireligion, geographic specificity of the territory and its border status, the number of population, sociocultural aspects of the formation of electoral behavior and complex and dynamic political history. the social and political life of the region initiated the creation of new administrative and territorial systems depending on the circumstances and requirements of the time and also led to bearing up the principles of authoritative relations of the «center» according to historical traditions. the 20th century gave opportunities to many modern ukrainian regions to realize several different variants of political relations in the context of functioning of various political regimes. but this opportunity was given as a result of global and specifically european transformational processes, somewhere extremely tragic. the 20th century brought a number of fundamental changes in political history that made society flexibly respond to them, adapt or not to accept the content of institutional manifestations in each particular case. the complexity of the transformation of political systems (or particular political regimes) in the geographical boundaries of the zakarpattia region consisted in the fact that this area was at the turn of several socio-political passport of zakarpattia (ukraine): a brief history of the region’s survival in central europe 13 state formations, in clash of political and international interests in central europe, the strategic axis “east – west”. a historic insight witnesses complicated sociopolitical relations of local inhabitants with the political elite of different levels. however, it primarily concerned the period when the citizens of these areas were forcibly removed from the adoption of socially important political decisions, and thus themselves could not influence the course of current events. that also reflected on the effectiveness of political development of the land. therefore, only since the early twentieth century, when local inhabitants began to directly participate in this process, have transformations of political relations affected conditions of the historical and geographical, mental and ideological, political and legal character. so, zakarpattia, small in area, during the 20th century had different official names of the geographical area, reflecting the specificity of development of the political system of the state to which the region belonged. these transient changes demanded adaptation of political institutions of the territory to the requirements of this or other political system, which every time absorbed rather poorly developed and ad hoc stable/unstable regional political subsystems. basing on the last, we must understand the influence of transformation processes on the party and electoral systems. as state formations to which zakarpattia belonged at various times had different political systems within which various political regimes functioned, respectively, there were different methods of formation of the state and local power, just as the character of citizens’ participation in social processes. consequently, in the context of analysis of the current processes of social and political transformations of the ukrainian society, consideration of territorial peculiarities of electoral space and electoral behavior in the development of regional policy of the ukrainian state and the consolidation of the ukrainian nation is a priority. indeed, these electoral moods of a territorial society are a sensitive indicator of political mutual understanding between the “center” and the “region”. references boldižar m., mocnì p., 2002, deržavno-pravovij status zakarpattâ (pìdkarpacts’koï rusì) v skladì čehoslovaččini (eng. state-legal status of transcarpathia (subcarpathian rus) as part of czechoslovakia), užnu. užgorod. botlik j., 2005, czechoslovakia’s ethnic policy in subcarpathia (podkarpatskaja rus or ruthenia), 1919–1938/39, hamilton, http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/botlik/botlik.pdf (accessed 20 may 2022). fedinec c., vegeš m. (eds.), 2010, kárpátalja 1919–2009: történelem, politika, kultúra (eng. transcarpathia 1919–2009: history, politics, culture), argumentum, mta etnikainemzeti kisebbségkutató intézete, budapest. doboš ì., 1995, ìstorìâ ukraïns’koï žurnalìstiki zakarpattâ 20 – 30-h rokìv xx st. (eng. the history of ukrainian journalism in transcarpathia in the 20s and 30s of the 20th century), naddniprians’ka mis’ka drukarnia, ivano-frankìvs’k. kruglašov a., tokar m. (eds.), 2014, elektoral’nì procesi ukraïni v regìonal’nomu vimìrì: bukovina ì zakarpattâ: monografìâ (eng. electoral processes of ukraine in the regional dimension: bukovina and zakarpattia: monograph), lìra, užgorod. magocsi p.r., 2015, with their backs to the mountains: a history of carpathian rus’ and carpatho-rusyns, central european university press, budapest – new york. makara m., 1995, zakarpats’ka ukraïna: šlâh do vozz`êdiannâ, dosvid rozvìtku (žovten’ 1944 – sìčen’ 1946 rr. (eng. zakarpats’ka ukraine: the path to reunification, experience of development (october 1944 – january 1946). uždu, užgorod. narisi istorìï zakarpattâ. t. i. (z najdavnìših časìv do 1918 roku) (eng. essays on the history of transcarpathia (from ancient times to 1918)), 1993, vidavnictvo “zakarpattâ”, užgorod. narisi ìstorìï zakarpattâ. t. ii. (1918–1945), 1995, (eng. essays on the history of transcarpathia (1918–1945)), vidavnictvo “zakarpattâ”, užgorod. puškaš a., 2006, civilizaciâ ili varvastvo: zakarpat’e 1918– 1945 (eng. civilization or barbarism: transcarpathia 1918–1945). isdatel’stvo “evropa”, moskva. schmidt a., 1939, ukraine: land der zukunft (eng. ukraine: land of the future), r. hobbing, berlin. švorc p., 2003, krajinská hranica. medzi slovenskom a podkarpatskou rusou v medzivojnovom obdobi (1919–1939) (eng. country border. between slovakia and subcarpathian rus’ in the interwar period (1919–1939)), universum, prešov. tokar m. (ed.), 2016, zakarpattâ v nezaležnìj ukraïnì (1991– 2016): do 25-rìččâ progološennâ nezaležnostì ukraïni (eng. zakarpattia in independent ukraine (1991–2016): to the 25th anniversary of ukraine’s independence), adps «karpatìâ» – polìgrafcentr «lìra», užgorod. tokar m., 2006, polìtičnì partìï zakarpattâ v umovah bagatopartìinostì (1919–1939): monografìâ (eng. political parties of zakarpattia in conditions of multipartyism (1919– 1939): monograph), pp basarab m.m. “nash ridnyj kraj”, užgorod. vegeš m. (ed.), 2002, voni boronili karpats’ku ukraїnu: narisi ìstorìї nacìonal’no-vizvil’noï borot’bi zakarpat’skih ukraïncìv (eng. they defended carpathian ukraine: essays on the history of the national liberation struggle of transcarpathian ukrainians), karpati, užgorod. vegeš m., 2004, karpatc’ka ukraїna. dokumnenti ì fakti: monografìâ (eng. carpathian ukraine. documents and facts: monograph), karpati, užgorod. vegeš m., tokar m., 2018, podih svobodi zolotoї guculìï (eng. golden hutsulia’s breath of freedom), [in:] s. kločurak (ed.), gucul’s’ka respublìka (1918–1919) (eng. hutsul republic (1918–1919), karpati, užgorod, 5–27. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/paul_r._magocsi https://books.google.com/books?id=nzj2daaaqbaj https://books.google.com/books?id=nzj2daaaqbaj 1. introduction two of the six original demands of russia put forward at the “negotiations” with ukraine which have been held since february 28, 2022, contrary to all the canons of diplomacy, during continuous hostilities and barbaric bombings and rocket attacks on ukrainian cities, related to humanitarian issues. this is the journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(s1), 23–33 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.s1.04 historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism oleksandr lytvynenko center of social research, national institute for strategic studies, pyrohova 7a, 01054 kyiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-0544-8977 e-mail: boshigt@ukr.net citation lytvynenko o., 2022, historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(s1), 23–33. abstract a number of modern russian political discourse provisions which consist of tendentious interpretations of russian and ukrainian history and which result in frank and systematic manipulation of historical memory have been analyzed. their goals are to justify russia’s aggressive policy towards ukraine to prove and legalize the right to decide the fate of the ukrainian people and to determine the vectors of the ukrainian foreign policy. at the same time, they are aimed at discrediting the ukrainian government and delegitimizing ukrainian statehood as well as ultimately distorting and leveling ukrainian national identity. the outdated concept of ancient rus as the cradle of “three brotherly peoples”, i.e. russians, ukrainians and belarusians, or its more archaic version about the existence of a single russian nation, whose branches are actually russians, ukrainians and belarusians, is used. a component of this concept is the idea of russia being the direct and sole legal heir of ancient rus, whose historical mission was and remains the gathering of ancient russian lands, which include the lands of ukraine and belarus. accordingly, the separate existence of the ukrainian people, and hence their right to state independence, is either denied altogether or conditionally recognized, if they maintain inseparable ties with russia and renounce the western vector of foreign policy. modern ukraine is considered by the russian authorities and the political establishment as “anti-russia”, which has no right to exist. attempts to apply the tools of the historical politics of the russian federation. in particular, it concerns historical education and memorial practices in the donetsk and luhansk regions of the donbas, where the territory temporarily is not controlled by ukraine. these territories are also considered a model for similar measures used on temporarily occupied territories during the 2022 war. key words historical memory, historical politics, identity, manipulation. received: 14 april 2022 accepted: 01 august 2022 published: 25 november 2022 mailto:boshigt@ukr.net 24 oleksandr lytvynenko granting of the status of the second state language to the russian language and the cancellation of laws that allegedly limit its use, as well as the so-called “denazification”, in particular, the cancellation of the current laws on “heroization of nazis and neo-nazis”. the second of these requirements directly concerns the issue of historical memory or historical politics. it is known what an important role the latter plays in the general aggressive policy of the kremlin. there is also a special interest in the history of v. putin, who finds in it ideological justifications for strengthening his own authoritarian regime, which is increasingly taking on the features of totalitarianism, alienation from western civilization with its democratic and liberal values, and the realization of imperial expansionist ambitions. until 2022, the historical policy of the russian government was an important element of the socalled “hybrid war” of russia against ukraine. five components can be distinguished in it. 1. attempts to prove through historical excursions the ethnic, cultural and religious kinship/identity of the ukrainian, russian and belarusian peoples, hence the artificiality and unsustainability of the ukrainian people as a separate ethno-national entity. 2. discrediting any aspirations of ukrainians for national self-determination (in socio-political, cultural, religious spheres) and gaining state independence. 3. discrediting the national liberation struggles of the 20th century, especially the period of the 1930s–40s, as allegedly inspired and supported by the nazis, hostile to the interests of the ukrainian people themselves. 4. discrediting modern ukrainian statehood as having no historical basis for its existence and being an artificial formation and glorifying people who in russia are considered to be collaborators of hitler’s germany, hence inheritors of their ideology and political traditions. 5. the glorification of russian statehood in all its historical manifestations as the personification of all political, moral and religious virtues, the legal heir not only of the ussr and the russian empire, but also of the old russian statehood of the 9th– 13th centuries. an alternative to ukrainianism was the idea of a “russian world” and its church equivalent – the idea of a triune “holy russia”. in connection with the latter, it can be mentioned that the head of the russian orthodox church, patriarch kirill, in his sermon on march 9, 2022, called russia’s war against ukraine a “conflict” between two parts of one people, divided by external hostile forces. therefore, the study of the historical policy of russia is necessary for an adequate understanding of both the internal transformations taking place in this state, as well as its progress on the path of “restoration” of the former imperial greatness in the confrontation not only with ukraine, but also with the entire western civilization, which in the eyes of the russian elites is the personification of world evil. the purpose of the study is to analyze the historical policy of russia in recent years in the part that concerns the falsifications of the history of ukraine and serves as a justification for russian aggression against our state. 2. data and methods the main research method is a critical analysis of open sources, primarily historical “excursions” of the president of the russian federation, v. putin, and reports on the activities in the field of historical policy of the russian government on the international arena and its proteges in the occupied areas of the donetsk and luhansk regions. it should be taken into account that measures in the field of historical policy in the so-called donetsk people’s republic (dnr) and the luhansk people’s republic (lnr), primarily in the field of historical education and memorial practices, can serve as a model for conducting similar measures in the territories occupied by the russian army in february–march 2022 during the war against ukraine. 3. results and discussion the ideological tools set in russia’s war against ukraine include systematic attempts to impose on both the ukrainian and its own people that version of the historical past that maximally justifies the current policy of the russian government, proves its legitimacy and traditionality, and at the same time discredits the policy of the ukrainian government aimed at protecting its country, consolidating the ukrainian political nation, distancing from aggressive imperial russia and integrating into the european and euro-atlantic communities. in addition to these so-called tactical goals, there are also attempts to pursue the goal of strategic meaning: the deformation of the ukrainian national identity, whose aspect is a certain image of the past, proving its fictitiousness or lack of independence in relation to the russian identity. achieving this goal should make obvious the dubiousness of the historical foundations of ukrainian statehood. the representatives of historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism 25 the russian establishment publicly declare partial or total illegitimacy of the ukrainian government and even its non-compliance with the interests of the ukrainian people, whose natural aspiration should be, in their opinion, inseparable unity with the russian people. it must be recognized that such a policy of the russian government, aimed at undermining and, ultimately, at the liquidation of the state sovereignty of ukraine, is guided not only by modern interests, but really has its roots in the ancient tradition of russia’s attitude towards other east slavic peoples, namely ukrainians and belarusians. their territory was considered the legitimate heritage of the russian rulers, and they themselves were artificially separated parts of the single russian people or possibly separate peoples, but genetically, historically and culturally related to russians. their joining russia was described in russian historiography as “unity”. when it comes to other countries, it was about voluntary joining (in particular, in terms of georgia, part of the lands of kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan), liberation (armenia, bessarabia), conquest for geopolitical and security reasons (in particular, the azerbaijani khanates of the caucasus, the territory of the baltic states, finland, khanates of kokand and khanates of khiva, emirate of bukhara). accordingly, the attitude to the prospects of independence of these lands and countries in russia was different. in 1990, when democratic sentiments in the ussr reached their historical maximum, one of the than opinion leaders of the russian intelligentsia o. solzhenitsyn (1990) expressed his attitude in his essay “how should we organize russia?” as follows: it is necessary to urgently, loudly and clearly announce: the three baltic republics, three transcaucasian republics, four central asian republics, and moldova... will definitely and irreversibly be separated. (solzhenitsyn, 1990) however, the independence of kazakhstan was allowed with certain caveats: only its southern part, where kazakhs made up the majority of the population, should be independent. as for ukraine and belarus, their separation seemed a catastrophe to o. solzhenitsyn, and his “word to ukrainians and belarusians” (part of the mentioned essay) is nothing more than a persuasion not to “rip themselves off ”, a recognition of all the injustices and crimes of the tsarist and soviet governments in relation to “fraternal nations” and an assurance that nothing like this will happen in the future. nonetheless, almost all of the speech is addressed to ukrainians, and only in the penultimate paragraph it is stated that “everything that has been said fully applies to belarus, except that they did not incite reckless separatism there”. perhaps it was the absence of “separatism” in belarus that allowed the great russian writer to solve the “belarusian question” in one sentence. the uttermost solution that he could offer ukrainians and belarusians is voluntary and equal membership in the “russian union”: with the exception of these twelve [countries], there will only be what can be called rus, as it was called from ancient times (the word “rus” meant little russians, great russians and belarusians for centuries), or – russia (a name used since the 18th century) or... now: the russian union. (solzhenitsyn, 1990) although o. solzhenitsyn criticized the imperial principle of “unity” and admitted that “we do not have the strength for the outskirts, we do not have the strength for the empire”, he fully adhered to this principle, when it came to ukraine and belarus. therefore, he thought quite traditionally for russian intellectual-statesman and similarly traditionally appealed in his “words to ukrainians and belarusians” to the common historical past, “when the same princes ruled us”, i.e. to ancient rus and “precious kyiv, from where christianity dawned on us” (solzhenitsyn, 1990). the fundamental conviction of the russian establishment regarding the artificiality and ephemerality of ukrainian independence took on new, more aggressive forms, when already independent ukraine expressed a clear intention not just to be “non -russia”, but to become independent of the russian influence, develop relations with the west, acquire membership in the eu and nato. thus, at the bucharest nato summit on april 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 2008, russian president v. putin expressed the opinion that “ukraine is not even a state” and most of its territory was “gifted” to it by russia (putìn – bušu..., 2020). v. putin voiced this opinion repeatedly on various occasions, in particular, during the so-called “big press conferences”, at which the president of the russian federation demonstrated “free” communication with mass media. the confidence of the russian authorities and a significant part of the political community in their right to decide the fate of other east slavic peoples is based on the idea of the historical rights of russia to the lands of ukraine and belarus, as part of ancient rus. this idea arose at the beginning of the 15th century and was based on the beliefs that the moscow grand princes, later the tsars, were direct heirs of the “ancient rus statehood”, since they, like the princes of kyivan rus, belonged to the ruryk dynasty. the rights to the ancient russian heritage of the romanov family were justified by the continuity of the russian state and monarchical tradition, in the light 26 oleksandr lytvynenko of which the change of the ruling dynasty was not of fundamental importance. in europe already in the 19th century similar “dynastic” justifications of ownership rights, which in the 18th century served as justification for the wars for the “spanish” (1701–1714) and “austrian” (1740–1748) successions, the annexation of silesia by prussia (1741), etc., were considered a dangerous anachronism. in russia, they influenced “real politics” and public consciousness until the very fall of the russian empire. in modern russia, the “dynastic” argument has repeatedly been “modernized” in order to confirm its continuity in relation to ancient rus, hence the decree of the president of the russian federation from march 3rd, 2011, “on the celebration of the 1150th anniversary of the birth of russian statehood” (ukaz…, 2011). this celebration was supposed to remind the general public in russia that the year 862 should be considered the beginning of russian statehood, when the varangian ruler ruryk, according to the annals, was invited by some slavic and finno-ugric tribes to “rule and own” them and became the first ruler of rus. in 2015, the creation of a range of multimedia historical parks “russia – my history” began. an exhibition on “the rurykovichs” topic was presented, chronologically covering the period from 862 to 1598. currently, such parks operate in 23 cities of russia. on august 25th, 2021, v. putin instructed the russian government to include them in the national project “obrazovanie”. in 2016, a grandiose monument to prince volodymyr the great of kyiv was unveiled in moscow, which was supposed to actualize in the public consciousness of russians both the state-dynastic and religious factors of the unity of the east slavic peoples. references to these factors were also used by v. putin as justification for russia’s right to crimea. on november 5th, 2014, at a meeting with young scientists and history teachers, he stated: crimea also has some sacred significance for russians. after all, it was in the crimea, in chersonese, that prince volodymyr was baptized, and then he baptized rus... the original baptismal roots of russia are there... in fact, the russian people have been fighting for many centuries to firmly claim their historical spiritual roots. (vstreča…, 2014) at the same time, the reinterpretation of the history of ukraine in a neo-imperial key continued. without it, the development of the “russian world” would lose its “cornerstone”. the latest and most vivid example of politically motivated interpretations of ukrainian history was v. putin’s article “on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians”, published on july 12th, 2021, on the official website of the president of russia both in russian and ukrainian (stat’â..., 2021). in it, the president of the russian federation gave a detailed justification for his earlier statement that “russians and ukrainians are one people”. the “historical” justification given in the article for the linguistic, religious, cultural, political, and generally national unity of the ukrainian and russian peoples does not go beyond the russian historical narrative of the 19th century, analyzed and criticized by m. hrushevsky in the article “the usual scheme of “russian” history and business of the rational structure of the history of the eastern slavs” (1904) (grushevskij, 2014, pp. 203–208). in a slightly modified form, this narrative also dominated soviet historiography, which merely replaced the concept of a triune russian nation with the concept of three “brotherly nations”. its use nowadays can be considered an anachronism. however, despite this, it is indoctrinated into the public consciousness of russians. russian scientists, not to mention politicians, support the idea as well. v. putin interprets the joining of ukrainian and belarusian lands into the grand duchy of moscow and the russian empire as “reunification”: moscow became the center of reunification, which continued the tradition of “ancient rus statehood”. the muscovite princes... threw off the foreign yoke and began to collect historical russian lands, while in the grand duchy of lithuania, and later in the commonwealth of nations, according to v. putin, this tradition has ceased. however, in earlier times even russian historians voiced other views on the very possibility of moscow’s continuation of ancient rus statehood tradition. thus, s. dumin believed that “in the social system and judicial affairs of the west russian lands, traces of the old rus tradition were often more clearly and vividly revealed than in volodymyr (later muscovite) rus’”. (mironenko, 1991, p. 121) in his opinion, the experience of the grand duchy of lithuania and rus shows that it was possible to create not only the asian despotism of ivan the terrible in the eastern slavic lands, but also for the democratic institutions of a multifunctional state to function quite effectively. (mironenko, 1991, p. 123) at the same time, he notes that “moscow princes, especially since the time of ivan iii, are actively destroying the structures of local governments that were formed earlier..., liquidating (as was the case in novgorod and pskov) city freedoms”, that is, destroying the social and political traditions of ancient rus (mironenko, 1991, p. 122). the fact that the elements of the political system of kyivan rus in southwestern rus were preserved, in historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism 27 comparison with northeastern rus, was also pointed out by g. vernadsky (2004). he noted in north-eastern rus “a sharp contrast between the preand postmongol periods in the field of social relations” and noted that “the very foundations of moscow society were not the same as in the kyiv period” (vernadskij, 2004, p. 344). likewise, l. gumilev noted in his book “from rus to russia” that “moscow did not continue the traditions of kyiv, as novgorod did. on the contrary, it destroyed the traditions of centuries of freedom..., replacing them with other norms of behavior, largely borrowed from the mongols” (gumilev, 2008, p. 377). it can be added that these traditions were destroyed by moscow and in novgorod itself after its conquest in 1478. it is worth dwelling on v. putin’s thesis that already in ancient rus there was a linguistic, economic, political and religious unity of its population, which, thus, had all the signs of a formed ethnic community. in russian historiography, the latter received the name of the “ancient rus people”, from which ukrainians, russians and belarusians supposedly trace their origins. however, scientists have proven that in the times of ancient rus there was not and could not be a single “ancient rus” language, if book old slavonic or church slavonic is not meant. according to м. brajčevs’kij, the common literary language for all of rus can testify to this (linguistic) unity just as little as the commonality of, let’s say, the latin language for all western slavs. the old bulgarian language is foreign to rus. a living, vernacular language of the 9th–13th centuries, we don’t know. (brajčevs’kij, 2000, p. 360) we can only speak of a certain set of tribal dialects, from which the ukrainian, belarusian and russian languages developed. o. shakhmatov and b. rybakov believed in the preservation of the dialectal and, to some extent, tribal division in kyivan rus until its fall. b. rybakov thought that its feudal fragmentation also took place according to the old “tribal” scheme, and the newly established separate principalities even geographically coincided with the territories of the chronicled kryvychi, slovenes, polochans, severians, etc.: “kyiv rus was divided into a dozen and a half independent principalities, more or less similar to one and a half dozens of ancient tribal alliances” (rybakov, 1964, pp. 148–149). in the same way, under the conditions of natural economy domination, it is hardly possible to talk about the economic unity of a huge territory, much larger than that occupied by any of the european countries at that time. as for religion, orthodoxy in the pre-mongol period mainly covered the ruling elite and cities with its influence, that is, it was not yet widespread and could not serve as a unifying factor. according to м. hrushevsky, precisely during the times of the decline of the ancient ukrainian state and the transitional lithuanian-polish times, 14th–16th centuries, the spread of the christian rite and worship among the masses, the clergy and its influences should be mainly considered. (gruševs’kij, 1994, p. 6) as for the political unity, as mentioned above, the policy of the individual princes led to the final destruction of even the relative unity of the country that existed in the period from yaroslav the wise to volodymyr monomakh. therefore, there is no reason to speak of the population of ancient rus as one people. it consisted of various ethnic groups of slavic, finno-hungarian, turkic and baltic origin, on the basis of which the modern ukrainian, belarusian and russian peoples were later formed. theoretically, a single “rus” people could be formed if the centripetal tendencies overcame the centrifugal ones on the territory of rus, and a single more or less centralized state emerged, as in the countries of western europe, but history developed otherwise. therefore, the “historical unity of russians and ukrainians” (as well as belarusians), as v. putin understands it, is nothing more than an antiscientific and politically dangerous fiction. in general, the idea of the historical and genetic unity of the three east slavic peoples – ukrainians, belarusians and russians – is only a variety of old political and ethnological concepts with the prefix “pan-” as in pan-slavism, pan-turkism, pangermanism, etc. the facts of the ethnic closeness of the respective peoples served as justification for the political, economic and cultural integration needs under the auspices and in the interests of the hegemon states – russia, turkey and germany, accordingly. when it comes to russia, this need has always been expressed in the most dramatic forms: “will slavic streams merge into the russian sea? will it run out? that is the question” (a. pushkin “slanderers of russia”), and doubts in here were equal to treason. thus, all those who defended ukraine’s independence from russia, starting with hetmans i. vyhovsky, p. doroshenko and i. mazepa, and ending with the modern political and military leaders of our country, were considered traitors. the danger of such an ideology, as well as the ideology of the “russian peace” related to it, lies not only in its aggressiveness, but also in its archaism; it is problematic at the beginning of the 21th century to find common ground with people who interpret reality in the categories of the 19th century. 28 oleksandr lytvynenko in addition to outdated historical concepts, v. putin’s article contains frank distortions of historical facts. thus, he writes that during the protracted war of the russian state with the polish-lithuanian commonwealth, some of the hetmans, the heirs of b. khmelnytsky, sometimes “moved away” from moscow, and sometimes sought support from sweden, poland, and turkey. but for the people, the war had, in fact, a liberating character. it ended with the truce of andrusovo in 1667. the “eternal peace” of 1686 distinguished the final results. however, the article does not even hint at what motivated the ukrainian hetmans to such an unstable and, at first glance, chaotic foreign policy. also, nothing is said about the consequences of the aforementioned “protracted war” for ukrainian people. n. kovenko (2005, p. 397) described these consequences succinctly but comprehensively: “this is how the ruin ended. not because the brothers were horrified, looking back at the rivers of spilled blood, but because there was no one to kill one another”. one can learn about the course and consequences of this war for belarusians from gennady saganovich’s monograph “the unknown war: 1654–1667” (saganovìč, 1995). likewise, the statement that “during the northern war with sweden, the inhabitants of little russia did not have a choice whom to join” cannot withstand criticism either. mazepa’s mutiny was supported by only a small part of the cossacks. in fact, this “mutiny” was supported by all troops of zaporozhian cossacks, led by the basket chief kost hordienko (for which sich paid with a terrible massacre by russian troops), as well as a significant part, if not the majority, of the general and regimental officers, who joined i. mazepa, and charles xii was prevented by the occupation of hetmanship by russian troops. we can also mention the barbaric destruction of the population of the hetman’s capital baturin by o. menshikov, as well as the torture and execution of the “mazepyntsis” in lebedyn, which do not fit into the picture of the general support of the population of ukraine for peter i during the northern war. the thesis about the brilliant prospects that the russian empire created for representatives of the cossack elders, who “reached the heights of their political, diplomatic, and military careers in rus”, looks clearly tendentious, reflecting only one side of historical reality, while “graduates of the kyiv-mohyla academy played a leading role in church life”. the mentioned representatives, and not always the senior officers (e.g. brothers razumovsky, o. bezborodko, v. kochubey, i. paskevich, etc.) reached “career heights”, renouncing their identity and turning into russian nobles and dignitaries, loyal subjects of the empire. the same applies to the role of the ukrainian clergy in the theological and liturgical development, spiritual and economic enrichment of the russian orthodox church. the statement that the works of ukrainian classics are the “common literary and cultural heritage” of ukrainians and russians, as some of them were written in russian, is also tendentious. the national affiliation of a literary work is determined not so much by its language as by its content and the identity of the author; otherwise, the works of w. b. yeats and d. joyce could be unconditionally included in the thesaurus of english literature, and the early poems of o. pushkin, yu. lermontov and “letters” by p. chaadaev to be considered works of french literature. v. putin explains the emergence of ukrainianism by the fact that “at the same time, among the polish elite and some part of the little russian intelligentsia, ideas about a ukrainian nation separate from the russian one arose and strengthened” (stat’â..., 2021). in this way, the old, but still popular in certain russian circles, opinion about the ukrainian people prevails as a consequence of the “polish”, later “austro-hungarian’’ or “german” intrigues, in the implementation of which the ukrainian intelligentsia always played a subordinate and, ultimately, treacherous role. v. putin in his article (stat’â…, 2021) could not keep silent about such facts of discrimination of the ukrainian language and culture as the valuev circular of 1863 and the ems decree of 1876 (miller, 2013, pp. 277–281). however, he interprets the content of these documents only as restrictions on the “publication and importation of religious and socio-political literature in the ukrainian language from abroad” and justifies these restrictions by the “historical context”, namely “the desire of the leaders of the polish national movement to use the ‘ukrainian question’ in their interests”. however, despite this, in the russian empire, according to v. putin, “there was an active process of development of little russian cultural identity within the borders of the great russian nation, which combined great russians, little russians and belarusians” (stat’â…, 2021). in fact, the valuev circular and the ems decree played a fatal role in the formation of ukrainian identity. in the first one, the ban on publishing and importing from abroad extended not only to religious and socio-political literature, but also to educational literature and that which was intended “for the initial reading of the people”, i.e., was supposed to develop literacy and form the foundations of its worldview. the ems decree, which was issued more than ten years after the last polish uprising, i.e., had nothing to do with the mentioned “historical context”, prohibited primary education in the ukrainian language historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism 29 and also demanded that the “libraries of all lower and secondary schools in the little russian provinces” be cleared of ukrainian books. political supervision was established over the education system on the territory of ukraine, which was supposed to prevent the penetration of ukrainophile tendencies. it was supposed to create “a named list of teachers with a mark on the trustworthiness of each of them in relation to ukrainophile tendencies” and the transfer of “untrustworthy and doubtful” “to great russian provinces, replacing them with natives of the latter” (miller, 2013, pp. 279–281). at the same time, the printing of any original works and translations in the ukrainian language was prohibited, with the exception of historical monuments and works of belles-lettres (but with mandatory observance of russian orthography). however, in the absence of ukrainian education, these works could not be intended for a mass readership. therefore, on the eve of the revolution, which opened opportunities for raising the question of the state independence of ukraine, the idea of this independence was understood only in very limited circles of mostly humanitarian intelligentsia. therefore, despite “the efforts of the creative intelligentsia to establish a special national self-awareness in ukrainian society, their successes were not comprehensive” (toločko, 2020, p. 125), because they could not reach the majority of the population of ukraine, deprived of education and literature in their own language. and the ukrainian society itself, as a mass phenomenon, practically did not exist at that time, because it could not have arisen in the circumstances that were created by the mentioned documents. that is why, the ukrainian people turned out to be unprepared for the challenges that the era of revolutions, the collapse of empires and the creation of new national states put before them. as s. yekelchyk points out, the scheme of the famous czech historian m. groh can be applied to the history of the ukrainian national movement, according to which such movements go through three phases: academic – a period of ethnographic, historical and philological research, cultural – a period of national agitation, when wider strata of patriots, grouped around printed organs, cultural and educational societies, national schools, begin to spread national consciousness among the masses, political  – the period when mass national movements arise, political parties and the masses mobilize for the struggle for national independence (êkel’čik, 2010). the second phase is characterized as follows: the period when the vernacular colloquial language becomes the language of books and teaching in schools of all levels, the time of the founding of scientific societies, the opening of departments in universities, the development of the press, the publication of special (scientific) literature in the vernacular. (êkel’čik., 2010, p. 122) in ukraine, this sequence was significantly deformed: the second phase of the development of the national movement actually coincides in time with the third one, and many of its inherent elements arose only after the third phase ended with the collapse of the national liberation struggle and functioned in a limited and distorted form. these are also remote consequences of the valuev circular and the ems decree. using the example of the ukrainian people’s republic of 1917–1920, v. putin tries to demonstrate the “impermanence” and artificiality of “quasi-state formations that arose on the territory of the former russian empire during the civil war and turmoil” (stat’â…, 2021). however, the baltic states and finland were able to defend their independence during the civil war, and in the interwar period, they demonstrated the ability both to build the state and to develop economically. the main threat to the independent existence of these and other states that arose on the ruins of the empire, including ukraine, was not internal instability, but the aggressive policy of the soviet government, which in 1920–1921 annexed independent azerbaijan, armenia, and georgia, and in 1940, through tough military and political pressure, it achieved the accession of lithuania, latvia and estonia. v. putin’s article “on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians” traditionally mentions “collaborationists, natives of oun-upa”1, that “served” the nazis, who “needed not ukraine, but living space and slaves for the aryan masters” (stat’â…, 2021). the understanding of oun-upa collaborationism is a typical anti-ukrainian russian propaganda. at the same time, deliberately distorted ideas about the ukrainian national liberation movement of the 1920s and 1940s are projected onto the modern ukrainian political reality, in which, according to russian propagandists, the leading positions are occupied by the “nazis”, under whose influence the military and political leadership of ukraine is. since 2014, russian mass media have been actively spreading theses about the “nazification” of ukraine, also doing it abroad. the purpose of these insinuations was to create a repulsive image of our state, which allegedly professes the most odious ideology of the 20th century and is guided by it in its policy. at the same time, the obvious fact was deliberately ignored that the glorification of individual 1 oun – the organization of ukrainian nationalists; upa – the ukrainian insurgent army. 30 oleksandr lytvynenko figures of the oun-upa did not and does not foresee in any way the introduction of the ideas of integral nationalism (by the way, fundamentally different from german national socialism) into the political practice of the ukrainian state, just as the glorification of bohdan khmelnytsky or ivan mazepa does not envisage building a cossack state in ukraine headed by a hetman. similar examples can be found in any democratic european and not only european country, whose heroes and outstanding figures lived in different historical eras, professed different ideologies and were far from democratic values in the vast majority. nevertheless, they are mentioned in history textbooks and their monuments are preserved as part of the national cultural heritage. the ideas that drove them can remain elements of the national worldview, as a complex multi-level system, but do not become the basis for concepts and programs that guide modern politicians and statesmen. for a long time in russia, the cult of the “great victory” in this war and the idea of russia as the main creator of this victory were planted in russia with such actions as “the immortal regiment” and “georgievska ribbon”, numerous films about the “great patriotic war”, and other means of mass propaganda. at the same time, the image of ukraine as an aggressive, hostile to russia, “nazi” state was being formed. consequently, to a large extent, the vast majority of russians are now convinced that the russian army in ukraine is fighting nazism for the future of their homeland, continuing the traditions of their victorious ancestors. this belief is practically unaffected by the gradual realization that the absolute majority of ukrainian citizens support the ukrainian government and the armed forces in the fight against the russian invaders, and the most odious military practices of the german nazis are demonstrated by the russian army itself. this situation demonstrates the falsity of the notions that the war in ukraine is putin’s business, not the russian people’s, unfortunately quite widespread in some european countries. at the same time, it suggests that in order to ensure peace in europe and the world, it is the russian people who must go through a process similar to “denazification”. v. putin declares that “modern ukraine is entirely and completely the brainchild of the soviet era” and it “was largely created at the expense of historical russia” (stat’â..., 2021). however, the same can be attributed to the modern russian federation, which was created largely at the expense of other republics of the ussr, including ukraine, and their natural and human resources. v. putin’s attitude towards the collapse of the soviet union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” is well known. at the same time, he considers it unfair that the former soviet republics, in particular ukraine, “appropriated” territories that did not belong to them at the time of joining the ussr. but such logic calls into question the right of russia itself to the kaliningrad region, south sakhalin, the kuril islands, the northwestern districts of leningrad and the pecheneg district of the murmansk region, which in 1922, when the soviet union was created, belonged to germany, japan, and finland, respectively. ultimately, the “historical” part of v. putin’s article can be reduced to two theses: 1) the ukrainian people as an independent ethnonational unit does not exist. it is, like russians and belarusians, a constituent part of the russian people. the very idea of its national independence has a schismatic nature; it arose in the environment of external forces hostile to russia and can only be evaluated negatively. 2) ukrainian statehood is artificial and only conditionally legitimate. its existence can be justified only by close relations with russia and subordination of its domestic and foreign policy to russian interests. the following text contains assessments of the situation in ukraine since the beginning of 2014. it can also be summarized in several provisions: 1) since 2014, ukraine has been under direct foreign rule, whose goal is to turn it into “anti-russia”, something russia will never come to terms with. the ukrainian government is completely subordinated to external influences hostile to russia. its internal allies are “radicals and neo-nazis”. 2) millions of ukrainians rejected the ukraine project as “anti-russian”. the separatist uprising in donbas, like the “voluntary” incorporation of crimea into russia, was nothing more than an act of self-defense by the local population. millions of pro-russian residents of other regions of ukraine are subject to repression and are deprived of the opportunity to express their opinion. 3) russia will not allow its “historic territories” and “people close to it” who live on them to be used against it. the border of these territories is not delineated, but, taking into account the above, it can be assumed that we are talking about almost the entire territory of ukraine. 4) true sovereignty of ukraine is possible only in partnership with russia, subjecting its policy to its interests. it is easy to notice that the given theses logically follow from the previous “historical excursion”. on the other hand, this excursion itself is determined by the ideological dominants of modern russian historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism 31 political thinking. taken together, these theses can be considered as the doctrinal basis of russia’s policy towards ukraine. in general, they testify to the fact that further military actions against ukraine, annexation of its territories and even full unification with russia were always considered by the russian leadership as legitimate goals and methods. an important weapon from the arsenal of historical politics in russia’s hybrid war against ukraine of 2014–2022 was historical education implemented in puppet quasi-state entities in donbas, as it has the greatest impact on the formation of the identity of the young generation, and lays the foundations for a valuable attitude to the past and the present. examples of what is taught to pupils in history lessons in the non-controlled territories of donbas can be found in the textbooks of the “local historiography” course, which is taught in the so-called schools. dnr from the fifth to the eleventh grade within the educational field “social studies”. yes, in the textbook for 5th grade, “local historiography. introduction to the history of the donetsk region”, one can find the following passages: war has come to the land of donbas again. no less cruel than in 1941. again, warplanes bombed the native city. but now it was not the german fascists. it is the ukrainian government that started a war against its own people. (...). the shells and mines of the ukrainian punitive forces kill civilians of donbas every day, destroy houses and schools, and burn crops in the fields. the tragedy of donbas united all those who considered themselves true patriots of the russian peace. (istoričeskoe…, 2016, p. 210). as examples of “true patriots” on the same page, there are photos of the terrorist group leaders givi and motorola. in this way, hatred of ukraine, respect for terrorists, as well as a sense of gratitude to russia is cultivated in even younger teenagers, since “the russian federation provides the republic with invaluable assistance in the form of finances, construction materials, fuel, equipment, food, medicines, textbooks...” (istoričeskoe…, 2016, p. 210). in the textbook for 11th grade, “local historiography. pages of the history of donbass: recent and modern history (from 1939 to the present day)”, theses similar to the above are given in more detail: mass protests against the illegitimate nationalist government, which came to power as a result of the “euromaidan” coup d’état in kyiv, quickly turned into a broad national liberation movement demanding a return to russian cultural and historical roots, reunification with russia, (...) the people of donbas, despite the paralysis of the central authorities... betrayal by the regional “political elites, (...) could realize their historical choice. (...) the republic survived and became stronger in the brutal struggle against the external armed aggression of the kyiv regime (…). dnr built full-fledged state institutions, gained economic independence. humanitarian aid and comprehensive support provided by the russian federation became decisive in the formation of the republics of donbas, in their subsequent struggle for independence. (istoričeskoe…, 2019, p. 64). similar “educational manuals” are also published in luhansk, for example, “history of the luhansk people’s republic from the earliest times (!) to the present day and luhansk people’s republic: the history of the formation of statehood” (v “lnr” vypustii..., 2020). their content and assessments of the events of 2014 and subsequent years do not differ from those contained in the above-mentioned donetsk textbooks. russians continue the policy of planting their version of history in the occupied territories with the simultaneous eradication of all manifestations of ukrainian historical discourse even during the war with ukraine, which began on february 24th, 2022. thus, according to the mass media, the libraries of the temporarily occupied territories of luhansk, donetsk, chernihiv and sumy regions have begun to confiscate ukrainian historical and literary literature that does not coincide with kremlin propaganda. this is done by units of the russian military police. in particular, books covering the history of ukrainian liberation struggles, the orange revolution, the revolution of dignity, ato/oos2 are being removed, as well as school history books. in addition, according to the same reports, the occupiers compiled lists of persons whose memory should be erased from the public consciousness of ukrainians. these are, in particular, ivan mazepa, simon petliura, stepan bandera, roman shukhevich, vyacheslav chornovil (karlovs’kij, 2022). thus, under the guise of “denazification”, russians imitate the anti-cultural practices of the most odious totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, which are nazi germany and stalin’s ussr. over the past seven years, the non-controlled territory of donbas has formed its own “politics of memory”, materialized in memorial objects and related commemorative practices. since december 2014, more than a hundred such objects (memorial plaques, memorial signs, monuments and memorial complexes) have appeared in uncontrolled areas of donetsk and luhansk regions (komar, 2021). the most famous are the “alley of angels” in donetsk, opened in may 2015, and the “they defended the motherland” monument, opened in luhansk in 2016. one can also mention the monuments “to the innocent victims of the undeclared war” (horlivka), 2 ato – anti-terrorist operation; oos – joint force operation. 32 oleksandr lytvynenko “to the brothers and sisters who gave their lives for the liberation of debaltseve from the ukrainian punishers” (debaltseve), “to the miner heroes who gave their lives for freedom and independence of the luhansk people’s republic” (anthracite city), “to the dead citizens of the dnr” (donetsk city), “sorrow and sadness” (horlivka city), “to the militiamen who died near ilovaisk” (mnogopillya city), “to the dead to the countrymen” (artemivsk), “in memory of the fallen militiamen and fighters of the lnr people’s militia” (krasnodon) and others. in some cases, such objects were built next to the monuments to those who died during the second world war, which emphasized the continuity of the historical memory of the people of donbas, as well as the historical heritage in the matter of the “fight against fascism”, as interpreted in the “hybrid war” in the russian and separatist propaganda discourse (for example, on the mentioned monument “they defended the motherland” there is an inscription “eternal memory and glory to those who stood up for the defense of the motherland, shielding the luhansk region from fascist nationalism”. in this way, a kind of “martyrology” of the uncontrolled territories of donbas was formed, in the objects of which, due to their anonymity, every involved local resident can put his/her content. these educational and memorial events are extremely dangerous from the point of view of the future reintegration of the temporarily occupied by russians ukrainian territories of donbas back to ukraine. the memorial objects created there in recent years have a clear anti-ukrainian content and must be liquidated after the return of these territories. however, it will be problematic to do so. the liquidation of memorial objects, as the experience of decommunization shows, is relatively painless when they have already lost their relevance for the population, such as, for example, numerous monuments to lenin and other communist figures. the mentioned memorial facilities in donbas, already today representing a rather extensive network, are in the vast majority not personified (that is, dedicated to certain categories of persons – miners, children, residents of the respective settlements, “militias”, etc.) and symbolize the memory of the dead, and therefore will remain relevant for the local population for a long time. at the same time, in a few years, a generation of residents of these territories will enter adulthood, for whom their unrecognized “republics” will be the only state-political reality, and whose memory, and therefore the worldview in general, will be largely shaped by anti-ukrainian history textbooks, based on which children are being taught, and the antiukrainian discourse broadcast by local and russian mass media. their integration into ukrainian society will be a serious challenge for ukraine, so it is necessary to analyze all possible options and consequences for national security. 4. conclusion attempts by the russian authorities and the political establishment to weaken or even eliminate the ukrainian identity, including through the manipulation of historical memory, testify to the weakness and insufficiency of the russian identity itself, which needs foreign territories together with their population, foreign history and culture for its confirmation. this situation is typical of nations making the transition from empires, where they occupied a dominant position, to their own nation-states. this transit is never painless; it can last for decades and be interrupted by sharp reactions to the lowering of the status and deterioration of the situation of the mentioned nations due to post-imperial transformations, that is, attempts to revive the empire in one form or another. we are currently observing one of these reactions in russia. no matter how controversial it sounds, ukraine in its historical national formation really was and remains “anti-russia”, not in the sense that it was built on the russian model, but with the opposite sign, on the denial of russian spiritual and cultural values, on nurturing negative attitude towards russians, etc., and because that by the very fact of its existence it denied and denies, firstly, the possibility of the existence of russia as an empire, of which all east slavic lands should be an integral part, and secondly, the idea of a great russian nation, whose offshoots were, and some still are, “great russians”, “little russians” and “belarusians”. in other words, the ukrainian project has always been and de facto remains a negation of the great russian project, both in the state and national sense, since both projects need the same territory, population, and historical heritage for their implementation. the fundamental difference is that the implementation of the ukrainian project did not and does not endanger the existence of the russian nation as such, while the implementation of the project of a great russia would mean the end of the existence of the ukrainian nation in a political and cultural sense. as long as the “great russian” project remains relevant to the russian authorities and to a certain part of russian society, ukraine will necessarily remain “anti-russia” and will cease to be so when russia overcomes the post-imperial transition and becomes open to equal partnership relations with neighboring countries. historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of russian neo-imperialism 33 references âkovenko n., 2005, naris ìstorìï seredn’ovìčnoï ì rann’omodernoï ukraïni (eng. essay on the history of medieval and early modern ukraine), kritika, kyiv. brajčevs’kij m.û., 2000, vibranì tvori: ìstoriko-arheologìčnì studìï, publìcistika (eng. selected works: historian-archaeological studies of the publicist), vd «km academia», kyiv. êkel’čik s., 2010, ukraïnofìli: svìt ukraïns’kih patrìotìv drugoï polovini хіх st. 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s molodymi učënymi i prepodavatelâmi istorii. v muzee sovremennoj istorii rossii sostoâlas’ vstreča vladimira putina s molodymi učënymi i prepodavatelâmi istorii (eng. meeting with young scientists and teachers of history. vladimir putin met with young scientists and history teachers at the museum of modern history of russia), 2014, prezident rosìï: ofìc. sajt. 2014, 5 november. http:// kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46951 (accessed 29 march 2022). https://rg.ru/gazeta/rg/2011/03/05.html https://rg.ru/documents/2011/03/05/1150-site-dok.html https://rg.ru/documents/2011/03/05/1150-site-dok.html journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(2), 36–50 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.05 stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union senada nezirović (1), ana živko (2), belma durmišević (3), amna hodžić (4) (1) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina, e-mail: nezirovicsenadapmf@gmail.com (2) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina, e-mail: zivanna18@gmail.com (corresponding author) (3) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina, e-mail: belma_durmisevic10@hotmail.com (4) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina, e-mail: amna_travnik@hotmail.com citation nezirović s., živko a., durmišević b., hodžić a., 2022, stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(2), 36–50. abstract the european union (eu) represents a certain partnership and alliance between states and countries. it is not governed as the united states of america, nor intergoverned as the united nations. member states of the eu are sovereign countries united to become privileged and globally successful. every enlargement of the union is significant, but the fifth enlargement has been recognised, so far, as the most significant, showing the unification of eastern and western europe. however, the most significant enlargement is yet to come with the western balkan countries becoming member states of the eu (serbia, bosnia and herzegovina, montenegro, albania, kosovo and north macedonia), considering the political and economic situation of the region. the european commission has proposed the stabilization and association process (sap) for south east europe, as the most significant frame for the eu to ensure relations with the western balkan countries and to direct its overall enlargement policy to this part of europe. associations of the western balkans are usually negative, referring to weak economic development, wars and political instability, which have led to the pre-accession strategy for the eu membership known as the stabilisation and association agreement (saa). the aim of this paper is to present the progress of the western balkan countries towards the eu membership, their current state, and the problems they face on that path and to explain the sap and the saa. key words european union, western balkan, stabilisation and association agreement, candidate country, potential candidate. received: 21 may 2021 accepted: 13 february 2022 published: 19 august 2022 mailto:nezirovicsenadapmf@gmail.com mailto:zivanna18@gmail.com mailto:belma_durmisevic10@hotmail.com mailto:amna_travnik@hotmail.com stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union 37 1. introduction the western balkans are part of europe comprising bosnia and herzegovina (hereinafter: bih), serbia, montenegro, kosovo, albania and north macedonia (fig. 1). on 26 may 1999, the european commission proposed initiation of the stabilisation and association process (hereinafter: sap) for the western balkans. regional approach mechanisms have not initiated some relevant changes and modifications in the western balkan countries. the same goal was set by the union as part of the sap. it was a modification of the last regional approach, which appeared to be insufficiently flexible and dynamic to articulate the eu policy efficiently and to ensure long-term relations with the countries of the region. the new policy in the form of the sap has offered a higher degree of the relation institutionalisation between the eu and potential new member states, and a few financial support instruments. the new approach has offered the opportunity for development of existing economic and trade relations with the union, and within the region over new assistance instruments for democracy, civil society development, institution building and reinforcing collaboration in different areas, such as justice and internal affairs, regional dialogue development and further closing the stabilisation and association agreement (bazina crnokić, 2018, pp. 81–82). the sap has three aims: stabilisation of the countries and encouraging their transitions into market economy, regional collaboration promotion, and preparing the country for the eu membership. close collaboration and cooperation between the region countries is highly encouraged, particularly through closing agreements on free trade and intensive collaboration on the stabilisation and association agreement issues (hereinafter: saa), pointing out common interest issues. the sap is a progressive partnership through which the eu offers each country mixed trade concessions, economic and finance aids and contractual relationships (proces stabilizacije i pridruživanja, no data). the saa represents the third generation of the european agreements within the sap. the agreement is concluded for an indefinite period, and the main goal is economic and political contribution to the eu member states. 2. stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union all accession agreements signed by the eu with the third-party countries generally aim to gradually develop the free trade zone, to improve economic relations, to develop political dialogues between the eu and signatory countries, as well as to initiate the gradual approximation of the laws and regulations of the member states and signatory countries. considering that the economic power of the eu is always dominant in relation to the one of a signatory country, this approach of gradually involving in the eu economic flows and trends, i.e. current liberalisation of the eu export with the phase of the eu import liberalisation, is beneficial for the economy of a certain country, enabling it to adjust to the new economic flows and trends in phases. beside pointing out aims characteristic of all the accession agreements, the saa has another political dimension, i.e. stabilisation of the western balkan region fig. 1. prospective european union members in the western balkans. source: european commission, 2017. 38 senada nezirović, ana živko, belma durmišević, amna hodžić as a post-conflict area and strengthening regional collaboration and cooperation. the greatest benefit of signing the agreement is that signatory countries get the status known as “the eu associated states”. primarily, the agreement aims to associate the state formally to the eu over the certain interim (transitional) period (6 to 10 years). political advantage can be noticed as strong political relations between the signatory countries and the eu, due to bigger obligations they both have, and including political dialogue and regional collaboration. the sap stimulates economic development and collaboration. besides, approximation to the eu quality standards improves the product competition, increasing and adopting higher standards, and consumer protection leads to an improvement in consumer security. investments are another benefit that countries gain signing the agreement. during legitimate employment of the western balkan residents in certain member states, their spouses and children, legally staying on their territory, have access to the labour market of the country where the worker has been granted residence. signing the agreement enables access to the ipa funds and the eu funds. signing the agreement is expected to bring the progress in different areas, such as democracy, human rights, freedom of the media, higher education, or transportation infrastructure (budimir, međak, 2017). some european thinkers predicted in 2010 that croatia, serbia, bih, montenegro and albania would join the eu between 2011 and 2020. others believed that non-member states would join the eu by 2030. former german foreign minister joschka fischer has diagnosed a deep european disease: “franco-german engine … appears blocked, at least for the moment”. national positions across the eu are “simply too different”. fischer predicted that the membership of the balkan countries in the eu before 2030 should be excluded. the eu has a powerful tool at its disposal for transforming societies, but it will not be able to use it due to disagreements. joschka fischer was right. the enlargement of the balkans was in crisis even before eu leaders failed to agree on opening accession negotiations for north macedonia and albania in october 2019. unless there is a serious change of pace, none of the western balkan countries will be a member state of the eu until 2030 (esi, 2020). the integration process of the western balkan countries in early 2020 was marked by the european commission’s enhancing the accession process – a credible eu perspective for the western balkans. a new methodology of grouping the existing negotiating chapters into a smaller number of clusters has been introduced. relevant chapters for the social dimension, chapter 19 – social policy and employment, and chapter 26 – education and culture, have been part of cluster 3 – competitiveness and inclusive growth, while chapter 28 – consumer and health protection has found its place in cluster 2 – internal market (vučković, 2020). 2.1. montenegro since declaring independence in 2006, montenegro has made progress towards eu integration. montenegro signed the saa with the eu in 2007, which entered into force in 2010 (european court of auditors, 2016). it applied for membership on 15 december 2008 in paris after a year of successful saa implementation. it has achieved the status of a candidate country on 17 december 2010, after the complex process of negotiations with the european commission (đurović, 2017). the council adopted a negotiation framework in june 2012, and accession negotiations began. in the same year, the first negotiating chapter was opened (european court of auditors, 2016). negotiations with montenegro started with the so-called new approach of the eu, i.e. binding to chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security), as the initial and final points. thus, the progress with these chapters has become crucial for the overall dynamics and the quality of montenegrin negotiations with the eu (vučković et al., 2020). 2.2. serbia when milošević lost power in 2000, serbia’s alienation from the west eased. however, relations between serbia and the eu have sometimes been strained (crs, 2021). the zagreb summit, held in november 2000, marked the beginning of the relation normalization between the federal republic of yugoslavia (fry) and the eu. it was pointed out that the progress of each country on the road to the eu will exclusively depend on individual progress in meeting the copenhagen criteria and implementing the saa, with a special focus on regional cooperation. the decision was made to create a joint consultative working group of the federal republic of yugoslavia  – the eu, which opened the perspective of concluding the saa with the eu. in 2005, the european commission decided that the country was ready to start negotiations on concluding the saa. due to the lack of an agreement between serbia and montenegro, there was serious stagnation in relations between the eu and the state of serbia and montenegro, which led to the new approach of double or parallel track presented by the european commission in 2004. that approach enabled serbia and montenegro, as one entity, to conclude a single saa, which should contain separate annexes for stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union 39 each member state of serbia and montenegro union, following protocols, joint and unilateral declarations. the opening ceremony of the negotiations was held on 10 october 2005, and the first official round of negotiations on 7 november in the same year. although it was expected that the saa could be signed in the second half of 2006, it did not happen due to “incomplete cooperation” with the international criminal tribunal in the hague. shortly afterward, montenegro declared independence. serbia inherited the right to international legal personality and became the successor to the state union of serbia and montenegro. henceforth, on the proposal of the european commission, the council of the eu, on 24 july 2006, accepted the amended mandate of negotiations for the saa conclusion with serbia. following its progress of cooperation with the international criminal tribunal in the hague, negotiations resumed in june 2007. the last round of negotiations was held on 10 september 2007. the agreement was initialled on 2 november 2007, and signed on 29 april 2008, in luxembourg (budimir, međak, 2017). in march 2012, the country was granted the eu candidate status. the saa entered into force in 2013 (crs, 2021). 2.3. north macedonia north macedonia (then the former yugoslav republic of macedonia) embarked on its journey to the eu and nato in the mid-1990s. it became the first post-yugoslav republic to sign an action plan for membership with the alliance (1999) and the saa with the eu (2001) (bechev, marusic, 2020). it was a regional leader for the eu membership at the beginning of 2000, partly because it avoided violence that largely devastated other parts of the former yugoslavia during the 1990s (crs, 2021). in april 2000, the first round of saa negotiations began. the negotiations were completed in a short period (april to november 2000) through three rounds of major negotiations and five expert-level meetings. the saa was initialled at the zagreb summit and signed in luxembourg in 2001. in march 2004, the country applied for membership; in april of the same year, the saa officially entered into force, and in september, the government of the republic of macedonia adopted the national strategy for the european integrations. after the adoption of the strategy, the european commission submitted a questionnaire to the government of north macedonia. after the government submitted answers to the questionnaire, the presidency of the european council granted north macedonia the status of a candidate state for the eu membership. in december 2005, it received the status of a candidate state (chronology – timeline of the relationships with the eu, no data). 2.4. albania although albania’s diplomatic relationships with the eu were established in 1991, it was the thessaloniki summit in june 2003 that officially reaffirmed the eu perspective for all the sap countries (beshku, mullisi, 2018). in june 2001, the european commission adopted the report feasibility study for albania. the saa negotiations between albania and the eu lasted three times longer than negotiations between the eu and croatia and north macedonia, due to the slow reform process in albania, especially fighting corruption and organised crime. albania needed three years of negotiations before the saa was agreed upon in february 2006, in tirana, and on 16 june 2006 in luxembourg at the general and foreign affairs council, the saa and temporary agreement on trade and commercial cooperation were signed (nexhipi, nexhipi, 2019). in 2009, albania submitted its official application for membership. in its opinion on albania’s request, the commission assessed that before the formal opening of accession negotiations, albania had to meet the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria. in october 2012, the commission recommended that albania be granted the status of a candidate state for the eu, under the condition of implementing the key measures in the areas of judicial and public administration reform, and parliamentary rules of procedures revision. it received the candidate status in 2014 (albania – european neighbourhood policy and enlargement negotiations, no data). 2.5. bosnia and herzegovina after the dayton peace agreement in 1995, bosnia and herzegovina entered the socio-historical process of peace building. peace building takes place through the activities of democratic forces in bosnia and herzegovina and the institutions of the international community and the european union, all under the dayton peace agreement’s authority. in the historical context of peace building in bosnia and herzegovina during the post-war and post-dayton period, the integration of bosnia and herzegovina into the european union is a strategic and historical project in the first decades of the 21st century. with the signing of the stabilisation and association agreement between bosnia and herzegovina and the european commission, the process of bosnia and herzegovina’s integration into the european union started in 2008 as a contractual relationship (pejanović, 2021, p. 70). in march 2000, bih received the roadmap with 18 key conditions that needed to be met to develop the feasibility study necessary for the beginning of 40 senada nezirović, ana živko, belma durmišević, amna hodžić the saa in december 2002. in 2005, the european commission proclaimed that all the roadmap conditions were met. the commission recommended the opening of saa negotiations after bih met 16 conditions. formal negotiations started on 25 november 2005, and the saa was finally signed on 16 june 2008 in luxembourg (turčilo, 2013). the application for the eu membership was submitted by bih on 15 february 2016. following this application, the council of the eu invited the european commission to prepare a questionnaire, which was submitted to bih in december 2016. the questionnaire consisted of 3,897 questions covering all eu policies. it took the state 14 months to answer the initial 3,242 questions and 8 months to reply to 655 questions. despite establishing a coordination mechanism for eu-related questions, the authorities could not agree to provide answers to 22 questions: one on the political criteria, four on the regional policy, and 17 on the education policy (european commission, 2019). bih submitted answers on 28 february 2018. 1083 civil servants, organised in 35 working groups for the european integrations were involved in preparation of the answers. in addition, 15 members of the commission for the european integrations and 20 members of the collegium for the european integrations were involved in the work (bih and the eu – accession process, no data). the process of answering the questionnaire, besides the institutions of government, involved civil society organizations and citizens, aiming to raise public awareness of the significance of the european integration. after receiving answers, the commission sent additional questions, and answers to them were provided on 4 march 2019. the european commission adopted the opinion (avis) on the application of bih for membership on 29 may 2019. for the commission to recommend the opening of negotiations, certain priorities need to be met (table 1). 2.6. kosovo (. . .), its shortcomings notwithstanding, the eu has been an integral part of the state building process in kosovo. it has provided support and expertise for the development and restoration of kosovo institutions as an exporter of norms and democratization, and has played a more involved role on the ground since 2008, with the establishment of the eu rule of law mission in kosovo. in addition, the eu remains the largest single donor offering assistance to kosovo and is at the forefront of rebuilding efforts. since 1999, kosovo has received more than eur 2.3 billion in eu funding (sonnbäck, zogjani, 2021, p. 7). the republic of kosovo is a potential candidate state for the eu accession, which unilaterally declared independence on 17 february 2008. until march 2020, kosovo gained recognition from 115 countries, whereas 15 of them withdrew their recognition. kosovo has received recognition from 97 out of 193 un members, 22 out of 27 eu members, 26 out of 30 nato members and 34 out of 57 organisation of islamic cooperation member states (world population review, no data). according to other sources, israel recognised kosovo as an independent state on 1 february 2021, as the 117th country (grzegorczyk, 2021). five eu member states do not recognise kosovo as an independent state (cyprus, greece, romania, slovakia and spain), as well as serbia. kosovo is the only state that is excluded from the visa liberalisation regime. for approximation of the policy to the eu standards, the union organised the monitoring and supervision stabilisation and association mechanism for kosovo in november 2002. the process of signing the agreement started when the eu general affairs council approved the proposal of the commission for opening negotiations on 12 december 2012. the negotiations were open on 28 october 2013. after the opening, with chapters 4, 5 and 6 as focal points, the second round of negotiations was held on 27 november 2013, focusing on closing the aforementioned chapters, whereas new chapters 1, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10 for negotiating were open. the third and fourth rounds were held in december 2013 and february 2014, while the fifth round (24th march 2014) was focusing on the last chapter 2, on political dialogue. the final meeting of the main negotiators was held on 2 may 2014 in pristina, when the saa was adopted, being initialled in july 2014. kosovo and the eu signed the saa on 27 october 2015 in strasbourg (stabilization and association process, no data), and the enforcement began on 1 april 2016. the eu operates a rule of law mission in kosovo (the european union rule of law mission in kosovo, or eulex), its largest such a civilian mission (crs, 2021). 3. results and discussion montenegro and serbia are closest to the formal accession process. in 2018, the european commission stated that the two countries could potentially be ready for membership by 2025, warning that this perspective is “extremely ambitious”. at this moment, the two countries are not expected to join in the near future. observers expressed concern for democracy and the rule of law in both countries (crs, 2021). montenegro has adopted a revised methodology for enlargement and broadly continued to implement the sap. to date, all 33 screened negotiating chapters have been opened, of which three have stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union 41 tab. 1. key priorities democracy / functionality 1. ensure that elections are conducted in line with european standards by implementing osce/odihr and relevant venice commission recommendations, ensuring transparency of political party financing, and holding municipal elections in mostar. 2. ensure a track record in the functioning at all levels of the coordination mechanism on eu matters including by developing and adopting a national programme for the adoption of the eu acquis 3. ensure the proper functioning of the stabilisation and association parliamentary committee. 4. fundamentally improve the institutional framework, including at the constitutional level: a) ensure legal certainty on the distribution of competences across levels of government; b) introduce a substitution clause to allow the state upon accession to temporarily exercise competences of other levels of government to prevent and remedy breaches of the eu law; c) guarantee the independence of the judiciary, including its self-governance institution (hjpc); d) reform the constitutional court, including addressing the issue of international judges, and ensure enforcement of its decisions; e) guarantee legal certainty, including by establishing a judicial body entrusted with ensuring the consistent interpretation of the law throughout bosnia and herzegovina; f ) ensure equality and non-discrimination of citizens, notably by addressing the sejdić-finci ecthr case law; g) ensure that all administrative bodies entrusted with implementing the acquis are based only upon professionalism and eliminate veto rights in their decision-making, in compliance with the acquis 5. take concrete steps to promote an environment conducive to reconciliation in order to overcome the legacies of the war. rule of law 6. improve the functioning of the judiciary by adopting new legislation on the high judicial and prosecutorial council and of the courts of bosnia and herzegovina in line with european standards. 7. strengthen the prevention and fight against corruption and organised crime, including money laundering and terrorism, notably by: a) adopting and implementing legislation on conflict of interest and whistle-blowers’ protection; b) ensuring the effective functioning and coordination of anti-corruption bodies; c) aligning the legislation and strengthening capacities on public procurement; d) ensuring effective cooperation among law enforcement bodies and with prosecutors’ offices; e) demonstrating progress towards establishing a track record of proactive investigations, confirmed indictments, prosecutions and final convictions against organised crime and corruption, including at high-level; f ) de-politicising and restructuring public enterprises and ensuring transparency of privatisation processes. 8. ensuring effective coordination, at all levels, of border management and migration management capacity, as well as ensuring the functioning of the asylum system. fundamental rights 9. strengthen the protection of the rights of all citizens, notably by ensuring the implementation of the legislation on non-discrimination and on gender equality 10. ensure the right to life and prohibition of torture, notably by (a) abolishing the reference to death penalty in the constitution of the republika srpska entity and (b) designating a national preventive mechanism against torture and ill-treatment. 11. ensure an enabling environment for civil society, notably by upholding european standards on freedom of association and freedom of assembly. 12. guarantee freedom of expression and of the media and the protection of journalists, notably by (a) ensuring the appropriate judicial follow-up to cases of threats and violence against journalists and media workers, and (b) ensuring the financial sustainability of the public broadcasting system. 13. improve the protection and inclusion of vulnerable groups, in particular persons with disabilities, children, lgbti persons, members of the roma community, detainees, migrants and asylum seekers, as well as displaced persons and refugees in line with the objective of closure of annex vii of the dayton peace agreement. public administration reform 14. complete essential steps in public administration reform towards improving the overall functioning of the public administration by ensuring a professional and depoliticised civil service and a coordinated countrywide approach to policy making source: european commission, 2019. 42 senada nezirović, ana živko, belma durmišević, amna hodžić been provisionally closed (european commission, 2021a): 25 – science and research, 26 – education and culture, and 30 – external relations (đurović, 2017). montenegro opened the last chapter 8 – competition policy on 30 june 2020, which includes the protection of competition and state aid control policy (crna gora otvorila posljednje poglavlje pregovora s eu, 2020). montenegro has been assessed with 3.03, which means that the average assessment of progress this year is the lowest in the last six years (fig. 2). preparedness assessment, or normative compliance with the eu standards, is the best so far with 3 nov. in 30, out of 33 chapters, only “limited progress” has been identified, but no regression in any area has been identified this year either, although the functioning of the judiciary has been assessed lower than last year. freedom of expression has been assessed higher than before (izvještaj evropske komisije: još jedna godina tapkanja u mjestu, 2021). montenegro should endeavour to find a broad interparty and societal consensus on the eu reform agenda. concerning the political criteria, the reporting period was marked by tensions and mistrust between political actors. the deep polarization between the new ruling majority and the opposition persisted throughout 2020 and intensified in the post-election period. heated relations and mistrust fed frequent escalations and further exacerbated political divisions, including within the ruling majority. friction between the executive and legislative branches has slowed down reform work. corruption remains prevalent and it is a matter of serious concern. montenegro still needs to address some systemic deficiencies in its criminal justice system, including the way organized crime cases are handled in the courts, and more efforts are required to limit the effects of disinformation and online harassment and hate speech (european commission, 2021a). the general overview of preparedness for the eu membership according to the cluster initiative looks as follows: • cluster 1: montenegro is moderately prepared for all five chapters within this cluster (23, 24, 5, 18, and 32), as well as within economic criteria and reform of public administration. • cluster 2: montenegro is moderately prepared for six chapters (1, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 28), while a certain level of preparation has been achieved within chapter 2. montenegro has achieved a good level of preparation for two chapters (6 and 7). • cluster 3: montenegro has achieved moderate preparation for four chapters (10, 16, 17, and 29), a certain level of preparation for one chapter (19), and a good level of preparation for two chapters (25 and 26). moderate preparation towards a good level of preparation has been achieved in chapter 20. • cluster 4: a certain level of preparation has been achieved in chapter 27, whereas moderate preparation has been achieved for two chapters (14, and 21). a good level of preparation has been achieved for chapter 15. • cluster 5: a certain level of preparation has been achieved for two chapters (13, and 33) while moderate preparation has been achieved for three chapters (11, 12, and 22). • cluster 6: for both chapters (30 and 31), a good level of preparation has been achieved (ključni nalazi – godišnji izvještaj evropske komisije za crnu goru, 2021). montenegrin citizens continue to support the country’s eu membership in large numbers, as many as 76.6%, which is one of the highest support rates for the eu in the region (izvještaj ep-a: crna gora napreduje prema eu, 2021). montenegro has been the most successful so far on its road towards the eu. furthermore, this country has become a member of nato. however, montenegro has recently been shaken by the political crisis, and it has been facing serious problems of bad governance, corruption spread broadly and deeply in the system institutions and judiciary which is under inappropriate political influence. p. popović and n. todorović (2021) consider that the current crisis in the western balkans has not happened by chance in montenegro. the tacit approval of the west has enabled tensions to arise. the reasons for the western indifference are the historically conditioned perception of how montenegro naturally belongs to the serbian interest group and the fact that, in the construction of the post-yugoslav order, the west did not envisage or plan an independent country. the corruption and longevity of the đukanović regime, in the eyes of brussels, france and especially germany were sufficient proof for montenegro to be declared as angelically incompatible with the eu standards and values. a certain role in shaping this opinion was played by the russian and serbian media, which coined the phrase of the “last european dictator”. such a title was later awarded to đukanović by the occrp as a politician who contributed the most to crime and corruption in 2015. montenegro has become a weak link and relatively easy prey to vučić’s great power ambitions. after parliamentary elections held in august 2020, a part of the new parliamentary majority systemically conducts of “cultural war” of montenegrin nation, history and language denial. the eu greeted election results, albeit there is clear evidence that serbia has interfered with the elections. the enthronement stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union 43 of the metropolitan of montenegro and littoral of serbian orthodox church in cetinje in september was also a source of tensions. serbia has opened 18 chapters out of 35, including all chapters in cluster 1 on the fundamentals. two chapters have been provisionally closed (european commission, 2021b). after reaching the first agreement on principles, which regulates the normalization of the relationships between belgrade and pristina, and its implementation plan agreed on in 2013, serbia has found itself in the accession (negotiation) process. negotiations were opened in january 2014, but the frigid attitude of some eu members that chapters 23, 24 and 35 must be opened first, and only then other chapters, has led to stagnation. this attitude was not in line with the negotiating framework for negotiations with serbia. only at the second inter-government conference, held on 14 december 2015, two chapters were opened as follows: 32 – financial control and 35 – other issues (budimir, međak, 2017). serbia has opened the following chapters so far: 4 – free movement of capital (9 dec. 2019), 5 – public procurement (13  dec. 2016.), 6  –  company law (11 dec. 2017), 7  –  intellectual property law (20 june 2017), 9 – financial services (27 june 2019), 13 – fisheries (25 june 2018), 17 – economic and monetary policy (10 dec. 2018), 18 – statistics (10 dec. 2018), 20 – enterprise and industrial policy (27 feb. 2017), 23 – judiciary and fundamental rights (18 july 2016), 24 – justice, freedom and security (18 july 2016), 25 – science and research (13 dec. 2016) – provisionally closed, 26  –  education and culture (27 feb. 2017) – provisionally closed, 29 – customs union (20 june 2017), 30 – external relations (11 dec. 2017), 32 – financial control (14 dec. 2015), 33 – financial and budgetary provisions (25 june 2018), 35 – other issues (14 dec. 2015) (serbia and eu – history, no data). serbia has accepted the new methodology, meaning that it has practically opened the first cluster in the accession negotiations. it is a cluster of fundamental values, which includes chapters on the rule of law, economic criteria, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, public procurement, statistics and financial control (tuhina, 2021). the 2020 white paper states that serbia has achieved very good results in addressing long-term systematic weaknesses (macroeconomic stability, stable inflation, increasing employment levels). yet covid-19 forced some of the progress to take a few steps back. it was accentuated that the reform process must continue. more needs to be invested in the fight against corruption, in greater transparency, in an independent and efficient judicial system, and in the enforcement of contracts. increased transparency in the field of state aid policy is urgently needed, including public procurement and bilateral international agreements. the role of public consultations in the law-making process is crucial. the remaining weaknesses need to be addressed within fiscal management, public administration as well as the role of the state in the economy. further improvements in the field of digitalization are also needed. (fic, 2020). due to its low level of democracy and lack of reforms, serbia ended 2020 without an opened chapter in negotiations with the eu. serbia received an average mark of 2.8 in 2021, which has been the lowest average mark for serbia since 2015. in the previous year it was 3.02, in 2019 it was 2.95 and in 2018 it was the closest to the current average of 2.82 (fig. 2) (ewb, 2021). the annual report on the progress of the western balkan countries in negotiations with the eu in 2021 states that serbia has not made progress in judicial reform, and the media situation, and that the political situation in the country is characterised by a lack of sustainable opposition in parliament, which is not convenient for political pluralism. the incendiary language continued to be used during parliamentary debates against political opponents and representatives of other institutions expressing different political views. limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption and organised crime, in terms of freedom of expression and public administration reform (european commission, 2021b). although the assessment on the progress of serbia has been mostly positive, there has not been official support for opening a new cluster. at the meeting of the eu foreign ministers, it was assessed that there is progress but that the authorities still have work to do. in october, the commission suggested opening cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) and cluster 4 (green agenda and sustainable connectivity), but that process is still ongoing and is currently being addressed by the council working group (radišić, 2021). the biggest stumbling block on serbia’s path to the eu is the non-recognition of kosovo. tensions between serbia and kosovo have recently increased. for the president of serbia, aleksandar vučić, there is no doubt that the biggest problem is the european integration of kosovo, and not the rule of law, while for the european commissioner for enlargement, johannes hahn, the solution of the kosovo issue is not the only precondition. hahn has explained that the president of the european commission clearly pointed out on several occasions that no new member of the eu can join it unless it resolves open bilateral issues, which means essentially solving the kosovo 44 senada nezirović, ana živko, belma durmišević, amna hodžić issue (jelesijević, 2019). furthermore, foreign policy, such as friendly relationships between serbia and russia, is also a big obstacle. a great number of actions done by serbia was contrary to the eu views and would still depend on the pace of the rule of law reforms and the normalization of relationships between serbia and kosovo. albania and north macedonia have not started accession negotiations yet. on several occasions during 2018 and 2019, member states of the eu did not approve the beginning of accession negotiations despite the european commission’s support. by adopting a revised enlargement methodology, the eu member states approved the opening of negotiations with albania (providing that the country meets several conditions) and north macedonia (no preconditions) (crs, 2021). north macedonia received a relatively positive assessment of the situation in key fields. it continues to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, including activation of existing control and balance systems and providing information on key political and legislative issues. the country has shown commitment to achieving results in key areas of fundamentals. opposition parties remained actively involved in parliament and on some occasions supported key eu-related laws, but parliamentary work was hampered by political polarization, exacerbated by covid-19. the need for strengthening parliament’s role as a forum for constructive political action dialogue stands out, especially on the eu reform agenda. north macedonia is moderately prepared to reform its public administration. some progress has been made in implementing the judicial reform strategy and in the fight against corruption and organised crime. some progress has been made at the operational level, but more needs to be done to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement in the fight against certain forms of crime, such as money laundering and financial crime. the general context is auspicious to media freedom, allowing critical media coverage, although there have been increased tensions during the covid-19 crisis. in the field of regional cooperation, north macedonia maintained good relationships with other enlargement countries and continued to engage in regional initiatives. north macedonia has achieved some progress and it is at a good level of preparation for developing a functioning market economy (european commission, 2021c). accession negotiations for north macedonia could not be opened for many years primarily due to a dispute with greece over the use of the name macedonia to recognise the bulgarian roots of macedonian language and history. for some time, the possibility of asking skopje not to label the language in that country as macedonian but as a bulgarian dialect was also mentioned (riegert, 2020). other eu members, primarily france, present obstacles to membership. president e. macron, in an interview for the economist, said that he opposed the enlargement of the union according to the current rules, i.e. he called for reforms related to the membership procedures. he also points out that enlargement is not essential within the eu and that there 3.12 3.09 3.18 3.03 2.82 2.95 3.02 2.80 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 2018 2019 2020 2021 montenegro serbia fig. 2. average marks for montenegro and serbia (2018–2021). source: izvještaj evropske komisije: još jedna godina tapkanja u mjestu, 2021. stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union 45 are already some disagreements among members and fears that these problems will be deepened by the accession of the western balkan countries (emmanuel macron in his own words, 2019). according to the current situation when north macedonia is making a lot of effort, it seems that the country itself is not the problem, but the eu, which directly reflects on the progress of north macedonia, and all other countries within the western balkans towards the eu integrations. according to the latest western balkans public opinion poll conducted by the regional cooperation council, 87% of albania’s population considers the eu membership as positive. in late 2020, the european commission asserted that albania had made “decisive progress” and was close to meeting these conditions; however, eu member states did not approve a negotiating framework for albania, partially out of doubts about albania’s progress (crs, 2021). albania has continued to show commitment to the eu-oriented reforms despite the challenges posed by the covid-19 pandemic. regarding political criteria, general elections were held on 25 april 2021. the osce/odihr final assessment found that elections were generally well organised, but concerns related to the misuse of public resources or official functions, allegations of vote-buying, and the leaking of sensitive personal data covering political preferences of citizens, remained. it is emphasised that the improvement of political dialogue between parliamentary majority and opposition is inevitable. albania has received a positive assessment of the implementation of comprehensive justice reform, primarily resulting in the appointment of three new judges to the constitutional court. the temporary re-evaluation of all judges and prosecutors has advanced, which is a condition for the first igc. albania has also made some progress in strengthening the fight against corruption. tangible results have also been identified in the fight against organised crime, including enhanced cooperation with the eu members states and europol. limited progress has been made on the implementation of the roadmap on an enabling environment for civil society. albania complies with international human rights instruments, and it has ratified most international conventions related to the protection of fundamental rights. lack of progress has been identified in freedom of expression. the need to improve coordination within the administration is also emphasised especially regarding the eu integration (european commission, 2021d). the netherlands, france and denmark have prevented the start of accession negotiations with albania and north macedonia. french president, emmanuel macron, has blocked the start of negotiations demanding that the pre-accession process must be reformed and tightened before new enlargement rounds. he believes that negotiations should be conducted together for both albania and north macedonia. due to that, the administration disagreed with the eu members where on the one hand the members believe that albania and north macedonia should start negotiations together, and on the other hand certain members disagree and think that these countries should be separated. at the end of 2020, new delays in the eu enlargement process emerged – namely, bulgaria and the netherlands “were blocking” the start of accession negotiations. the hague demands that albania ensures the functioning of its constitutional court and implements the media law before the start of the negotiation process. italy insists that talks must begin with both countries. if france, the netherlands and italy reach a common solution, which will assemble other eu members, a final opening of negotiations for the two countries can be expected (esi, 2020). even in 2021, bih and kosovo still remained without the status of candidate countries for eu membership. bih was rated the worst, which means that it had very small or no progress in meeting its 14 key priorities. at the end of april 2021, the house of representatives of the parliamentary assembly of bih adopted a conclusion on forming an interdepartmental working group for preparing proposals for amendments to electoral legislation of bih. in mostar, local elections were held on 20 december 2020 (sverige, transparency international bosnia and herzegovina, 2021). due to political polarization and disruptions caused by the pandemic, legislative and executive branches have had poor results. the state still has the constitution, which conflicts with the european convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms. there is no progress in fighting against corruption and organised crime, in the election process reform, in freedom of speech, in the judiciary and in foreign relations. evidently, there is a lack of active involvement of the parliamentary assembly in the adoption of reform acts and laws. there has been a setback in the area of public procurement. within the economic criterion, the authorities of the republic of srpska entity provide unnecessary resistance to the improvement of the economic system and the fragmented bosnian market. a special part of the report is dedicated to migration (european commission, 2021e). the migrant crisis showed many weaknesses in the state functioning, which have always existed, but in that period, they surfaced. weak institutions and insufficient accommodation capacities came to the fore 46 senada nezirović, ana živko, belma durmišević, amna hodžić (nezirović et al, 2021). the failure of the authorities to establish a sustainable system for migrations and asylum led to a humanitarian crisis in december 2020. although some reforms have been made, bih still has a lot of work to do. the biggest obstacle is the ethnic divisions that permeate almost every society segment in bih. nationalist rhetoric is getting sharper every day. besides, the state is shaken by various scandals, prices are getting higher, wages are staying the same, strikes are being organised more frequently, and queues in front of foreign embassies are longer and longer. although the end of 2021 was set as the deadline for the election act amendments, nothing has changed (fig. 3). the federal government of bih has failed to be formed since the elections in 2018 and the institutions have been blocked. besides, the representatives of the republic of srpska have started blocking the institutions of bih as an answer to the hr valentin inzko’s decision on enacting the law on amendment to the criminal code of bih, which implies that genocide denial will be treated as a felony with imprisonment. at their session in banja luka, it has been decided that they will no longer participate in the activities and decision-making process within the institutions of bih, adding that it does not mean that anyone withdraws from the presidency, the council of ministers, or parliamentary assembly of bih (maglajlija, 2021). according to the statistics agency of bih, the average salary in september 2021 was 1.006 km (about €514), which represents an increase of 165 km (about €84) for ten years’ period. this is far from the real situation. citizens humorously make comments on how they eat cabbage, politicians eat meat, and statistics show that on average we all eat sarma (a dish made of cabbage and meat). the researches have shown that citizens can live on their wages for only half a month. the union consumer basket in october 2021, calculated by the confederation of independent trade unions of bih, was 2.101,71 km (€1.073) (sindikalna potrošačka korpa u oktobru koštala 2.101,71 km, 2021). aside from nationalism and ethnic divisions, corruption is deeply rooted in society. following the corruption perception index measured by transparency international for 2020, bih ranks 111th out of 180 countries in the world. along with north macedonia, it is the worst-ranked country in the western balkans (transparency international, 2021). all this led to the biggest problem of today in bih – demographic depopulation. bih is the first country in europe in terms of population emigration – from 2013 to 2019, 530,000 people left bih (boračić-mršo, 2019). bih ranks third in the world in terms of emigration and “brain drain“, according to the infographics data published by the economist (e. sk., 2020). the problem of political dialogue led kosovo to enter negotiations significantly later. after the fig. 3. arrival of the eu delegation for election act amendments. source: memčić, 2021. stabilisation and association agreement between the western balkan countries and the european union 47 issue of independence was partially resolved, the eu accession process for kosovo has been accelerated. the eu leads a special dialogue with pristina. the status of kosovo remains highly questionable, primarily as russia and china oppose its independence, and being serbia’s allies, their veto right can prevent kosovo from joining the un. serbia’s accession to the eu before kosovo could be a big problem, as serbia henceforth could veto kosovo’s membership. the future integration of kosovo and serbia remains closely related to the eu-backed dialogue, which should result in a legally binding comprehensive agreement on the normalization of relations. early parliamentary elections in kosovo, in february 2021, resulted in forming the new government supported by the clear parliamentary majority. the commission maintains its 2018 assessment that kosovo has met all the criteria for visa liberalization regime, but this proposal is still pending in the council and should be considered as a matter of urgency (2021 enlargement package: european commission assesses and sets out reform priorities for the western balkans and turkey, 2021). the latest report highlights the political instability due to which executive activities were limited. the situation in the north of kosovo was assessed as “challenging”, especially as regards corruption, organised crime, and freedom of expression. kosovo maintained generally good relationships with albania, montenegro and north macedonia. formal relationships with bosnia and herzegovina remained unchanged. overall administration of justice remains slow in pace, inefficient and subject to unjustified political influence. corruption is widely spread and it remains a matter of serious concern. limited progress has been achieved with the fight against organised crime. public defamation campaigns, threats, and physical assault on journalists remain a matter of concern. the lack of progress is identified within the public procurement reform (the european commission, 2021f ). tensions existing in kosovo over the years have been recorded over the last year as well. one of those situations happened in september when serbian people in the north of kosovo were blocking traffic for two weeks on two border crossings. the blocking started after kosovo authorities had decided to issue temporary license plates on the borders for vehicles coming from serbia and after special police unit, rosu had arrived at border crossings (maglajlija, 2021). 4. conclusion the western balkans continues to be a challenge for the european union. joining the eu by the western balkan countries will probably be the biggest enlargement due to political and economic situation of the region, being always characterised as a problematic area with a complex situation. even nowadays, this area is mainly associated with wars, political and economic instability, corruption, underdeveloped democracy. the agreement itself, signed by the countries and ratified by all eu member states, was a big step forward considering that this agreement grants the signatory states the status of potential candidates for the eu membership. predictions that the countries of the western balkan will have joined the eu by 2025 are too optimistic and unrealistic. furthermore, the pandemic brought additional complications and aggravated the existing situation. serbia and montenegro have achieved major progress in the process of integrations, having already started the accession negotiations, which implies that they will be the next members. although, montenegro has positioned itself as a leader among the western balkan countries in the european integrations processes, existing internal political tensions will certainly hamper its progress. as mentioned above, the major stumbling block for serbia is their relationship with kosovo. recognising kosovo as an independent state restrains serbia in the process of integration, as the union is lobbying and advocating for the independence of kosovo. serbia continues to interfere with the internal affairs of the neighbouring countries, which primarily refers to bosnia and herzegovina and montenegro. in addition, the hypocrisy comes forward, because serbia aspires to the eu membership, and therewith it considers russia and china the biggest friends. the eu member states cannot agree on whether the accession negotiations for north macedonia and albania should be opened concurrently or separately; therefore, the two countries are still waiting for the negotiations to begin. the worst positioned countries are bosnia and herzegovina and kosovo, not having been un members yet. for bosnia and herzegovina, the eu and nato integrations are the key to preserving the existing peace. inflammatory ethnic rhetoric is getting more intense day by day. the negotiations on the election act amendments continue in 2022, without any progress. the end of state institutions blockade is not in sight; hence, it increasingly resembles anarchy with disrespecting its own country. the authors consider that becoming an eu member state requires extensive work to do for the western balkan countries, notwithstanding that even the eu itself has not been clear about its goals yet. although the countries work hard to meet the eu conditions, apparently, the eu has been indecisive if further enlargement is welcomed, considering the 48 senada nezirović, ana živko, belma durmišević, amna hodžić big disagreements within the union 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1. introduction an important feature of modern organization of hotel industry is its extremely high fragmentation. the industry is noted for developed diversified structure of hotel types as to specialization, categories, forms of the consolidated business. the global hotel industry fragmentation, its development in ukraine reflects the nature of the business, namely, orientation to the complex structure of demand and high adaptive competitiveness of the business in the market. the phenomenon of the hotel forms organization is the most topical and insufficiently studied in the modern theory and practice of the hotel industry. the primary active form of organization of the hotel business in the past 40 years has been the establishment of hotel chains as a peculiar symbol of global changes in the market of hotel facilities competition. the interest shown in specific hotel chains and the strategy of their development is due to several reasons. first, this form of organization is extremely rapidly developing, the share of investment capital turnover is constantly increasing, especially in economically developed countries. the activity of the hotel industry is a kind of indicator of population welfare and the state of economy. second, journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 72–76 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.031.5818 modern strategies of highly competitive organization of hotel chains ihor pandyak tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: pandyakig@ukr.net citation pandyak i., 2016, modern strategies of highly competitive organization of hotel chains, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 72–76. abstract analyzed were the ways of interpreting key terms of the hotel industry, it was found that the degree of their definition accuracy is connected with the level of development of the industry. the main assets and their role were identified in the formation of competitive advantages of hotel enterprises. the human potential of the hotel business is the main source of competitive advantage and generation of economic rent.the peculiarities of competition within hotel chains in the target market were investigated. it was shown that network organization of hotel business plays a decisive role in the creation, development and control of competencies. identified and analyzed were the main types and organizational structure of the hotel chains. key words hotel chain, hotel services, brand, international hotel operators. modern strategies of highly competitive organization of hotel chains 73 the formation and development of hotel chains, especially international, reflects the globalization of the economy, industrial infrastructure, the entry of multinational companies into regional markets and, at the same time, the expansion of market share of the business. third, the chainwide form of organization of hotel business is characterized by the highest potential of competition of generated intangible assets in its structure – intellectual potential. for theoretical interpretation of the economicinstitutional phenomenon such as the hotel chain, you first need to identify the definition of the term “hotel” at the level of resource provision and identify the key intangible assets for the development of sustainable competitive advantages and formation of highly consolidated forms of hotel business. 2. evolution and definition of the concept of “hotel”, the features of the organization of hotel companies the key term of the hotel industry “hotel” is differently interpreted in the literary sources. at the legal and regulatory level, it is an enterprise of any form of incorporation and form of ownership, consisting of six rooms and providing hotel services for temporary accommodation with mandatory other kinds of hotel service” (закон україни “про туризм”, 1995), “a house with furnished rooms for short stay of guests” (браймер, 1995, p.  18), “this is a building (complex of buildings) with a complex 24-hour technological process in which clients are guaranteed the provision of rooms (hotel beds), as well as additional services aimed at comfortable, convenient and safe consumption of the hotel product” (кабушкин, бондаренко, 2003, p. 48), “the company that provides outside people a range of services, the primary ones among which (complexing) are equally accommodation services and meals” (кабушкин, бондаренко, 2003, p. 26). the comparative analysis of the definition of “hotel” in ukrainian and post-soviet sources finds its constricted nature, attention is primarily being focused on commercial and legal functions and in a dominant sense, the technologically functional purpose of the enterprises is emphasized. the bias of such approaches is maintained and transmitted spontaneously, despite the change in the economic system and the almost complete change of ownership from the state to individual private forms of entrepreneurship. the multiplicative nature of market forms of organization of the hotel industry has been actively manifested in the last 10–15 years in ukraine, in particular in the consolidated forms – hotel chains, and reflects the fact of creating sustainable competitive advantages in the hotel business. in addition to the understudied practical aspects of the organization of the hotel business forms, there is a need to adjust conceptual frameworks, in particular the concepts of “hotel”, “hotel chain” and other derivative terms. in the countries with developed conceptual basis for the development of the hotel industry (primarily the usa and europe), the conceptual framework includes more adequately substantiated content of the key concepts. (mehmetoglu, altinay, 2006). in particular, the italian scholar g. rispoli defines the term of “hotel” as “the place (building) which ensures the production, supply and provision of accommodation services and support services to individuals who normally live outside the place of this residence” (rispoli, 1996, p.  121). “hotel enterprise” is defined by the author as an organization that focuses on making a profit and which manages one or more business units (commercial hotels). in modern theories of the organization of hotel enterprises, focused on the study of factors and mechanisms of formation of competitive advantages, dominates the resource concept (foss (ed.), 1997). according to this concept, the high fragmentation of hotel enterprises is the consequence of their adaptability to the environment, primarily determined by human resource, organizational skills of managers of the company. human potential is the main factor, it is a source of competitive advantages of the hotel and income generation. professional management develops the strategy of the enterprise development, it explains at the operational level the causal relationships in the business process, creates a performance culture, introduces technological or managerial know-how, thus forming appropriate characteristics to the individual hotel, group of enterprises, business philosophy. for extremely dynamic sphere of activity, which is the hotel industry, it is important to develop mechanisms to protect the strategies embodied in the management innovations from probable copying by competitors. the development of any type of enterprise is characterized by a combination of seven key assets: human, material, financial, technological, geographic location, organization, image. each of the assets is important at a specific functional stage; however, the human, organizational and image assets play the key role in the creation of competitive advantages these types of assets, due to their intangible nature, are difficult to identify and 74 ihor pandyak measure by quantitative and qualitative indicators (chen, dimou, 2005, p. 1732). the assessment of the use of organizational resources (selected development strategy, corporate culture, personnel management, quality control,etc.) is identified in the functional activities of the hotel as well as in the combination of each pre-specified function (rispoli, 1996). according to the logic above, we can summarize: the potentialities of hotels involve an effective diversification, particularly in general management, operations management, marketing, distribution, financial management, but first and foremost, they are determined by human and organizational assets of the enterprise; • in marketing research, a company’s image is of particular importance; • material and human assets of the hotel form the basis for high quality of operating activities; • hotel location greatly affects the hotel profits and distribution of potential services. each hotel enterprise generates its appropriate combination of assets that are necessary for meaningful competition. in one company, a competitive advantage can be formed on the basis of one asset, in others – on the complex combination of several assets. organizational capabilities play a key role in the formation of effective relationships between resources and their combination in the accommodation facilities.in contemporary strategic management theory, it is the organizational capabilities that are defined as an intangible asset, which is the most difficult to borrow and imitate and is therefore the most reliable source of sustainable competitive advantage (wiertz et al., 2004). the hotel industry is formed from a relatively large enterprises which are characterized by the complex activity that is generated from the production, supply and provision of accommodation services and other additional related services. the efficiency of competitive solutions in the hotel industry depends significantly on the chosen model of the asset management, the temptation of quick and substantial economic effect should be balanced by the required quality and uniqueness of the provided services. hotel chains formed of enterprises located in different countries are united by common brand. today, this form of organization of hotel business has become mainstream throughout the world. most international hotel chains are global companies that attract the investors’capital in different countries, international transactions creating the main source of their profits.the priority strategy of many international hotel chains is global expansion, the maximum coverage of the strategically important regions. however, the hotel chain is a dynamic brand which, within a certain region, absorbs and reflects in its activities the elements of local culture, local economic characteristics, maximally adapted to the regional characteristics of the market business development (lovelock, yip, 1996, p. 66). 3. organization and types of structure of international hotel chains the hotel network is unification of hotel companies and related forms of organization of economic activity in other sectors of the economy into a long-term, mutually beneficial system with characteristics of strategic management distinct from other similar networking enterprises with the aim of gaining maximum economic benefits. in hotel chains, mutually beneficial joint actions are clearly shown and are reflected in marketing, common system of information interaction reflected in a single reservation system, as well as the globally distributed network brand, which ultimately leads to strengthening the competitive position of the hotel chain and each enterprise in particular. the unification of hotels into a hotel chain provides, first of all, for the transfer of organizational competences to one another, which is eventually accompanied by creation of key factors of the hotel chain competitiveness and formation of rent (чернышев, 2000; филипповский, шмарова, 2003; чудновский, жукова, 2006). a distinguishing feature of the hotel chain forms of the organization of hotel business is activity in the high-class segment: 4-5 star hotels, and the need for each enterprise to comply with high standards of service quality. the advantage of the hotel chain organization of business is the ability to create, develop and control required competencies among the members. experts of the hotel business market, regarding the criteria for the organizational structure of hotel chains, differentiate two main types. the first type is a functional technical network, it forms the internal level, the basis of management. at this level occur processes of information exchange, interaction between hotels of the same brand. the second type is the external network, the level which includes all the partners of the chain. this level also includes partners of other brands within the association of hotel chain brands. in particular, the internal functional network of the hotel chain radisson sas is formed from the hotels under the radisson sas brand, while the network of external interaction consists of the modern strategies of highly competitive organization of hotel chains 75 rezidor sas partners. the rezidor sas hotel chain, in turn, is part of the network merging sas airlines “which is a parent” hotel chain of portfolio-managed hotel brands park inn, radisson sas, country inn and other brands, each represented by its own concepts of development, the categorization system, the target client groups. in the structure of the hotel chain stands out the core, the central enterprise with the function of organization of the entire network, which deals with developing the total marketing concept, establishing mechanisms of dissemination of the brand culture, support of the hotel chain brand and proposal standards (fuchs et al., 2000). the structure of the central core of the hotel chain often includes the company-developer with which the central hotel office interacts on issues of strategic development. the company-developer performs the functions of finding new markets, expansion of hotel chains, the search and purchase of real estate according to specific criteria, deals with reconstruction, construction of new hotels for the hotel chain, etc.; thus, the partnership with the company-developer is effected within the spectrum of issues in the property sector (смирнова, 2005; галасюк, 2012). another important aspect in the organization of activities of the hotel central office is provision of automated information exchange within the hotels of the chain in the matters of operational management. the information exchange system is provided by using the product of advanced information technologies in the hotel business, it exercises control over the reception and accommodation of guests in hotels, coordinates and optimizes the work of all personnel, provides automated managerial and financial exchange, ensures centralized network planning and easy access to all major global distribution systems. an important element in the organization of the chain brand central hotel office is development of strategic competitive advantages of the hotel chain: components of external and internal marketing, material (tangible) and intangible components of services. the success of the organizational competence of the hotel chain is only provided by rational combination of each of these components (fuchs et al., 2000). some hotel chains are formed with dual central office. in such hotel chains, the highest level of management is formed with participation of the entire hotel association the structure of which incorporates the given hotel chain. the hotel association is based on the well-known brand which is a guarantee of high quality services of the hotel chains that are included in this hotel association. hotel associations develop standards and bring together the individual hotel chains and independent hotels, ensuring a high organizational competence. the second level of the central office is the hotel corporation itself which provides coordination of hotels in a certain region of the world. building hotel chains in dual-level associations is a modern tool to gain competitive advantage. each association is built according to appropriate concepts and unites in its structure only hotels with the appropriate brand and concept. individual hotel chains in the structure of the association unites enterprises in different countries and with different organizational forms: whether it is management contract, franchising, total ownership of the central hotel office of a hotel in the hotel chain, etc. the choice of organizational form is determined by economic effect and depends on location, category, hotel capacity (bedspace). in addition to hotel premises, the structure of the hotel chain may include providers of integrated logistics services, consulting companies, financial intermediaries, providers of related services, companies to support electronic reservation systems, etc. taking into account the high quality and significant volume of services in hotel chains, the structure of suppliers can be particularly extensive. the interaction of the individual hotel and supplier in the hotel chain can be regarded as a kind of source of managerial competence which takes into account the local level of organization, the value of which strengthens the overall brand. 4. conclusions thus, the monopolization of the market of hotel services by hotel chains in the regions with welldeveloped hotel business in the second half of the twentieth century and different organizational manifestations in their build demonstrates competitive advantages of the consolidated forms of the hotel business organization. the hotels within a hotel chain can make more efficient use of the environmental opportunities and internal resources of hotel chains in shaping managerial competences that are important in creating a high quality hotel product. references: foss n.j. (ed.), 1997, resources, firms and strategies, oxford university press, oxford. 76 ihor pandyak fuchs p.h.,. mifflin k.e, miller d., whitney j.o., 2000, strategic integration: competing in the age of capabilities, california management review, 42(3), 118–147. lovelock c.h., yip g.s., 1996, developing global strategies for service businesses, california management review, 38(2), 64–86. rispoli m., 1996, competitive analysis and competencebased strategies in the hotel industry, [in:] r. sanchez, a.  heene, h. thomas (eds.), dynamics of competence based competition, elsevier, oxford, 119–137. браймер р.а. 1995, основы управления в индустрии гостеприимства, аспект пресс, mocква. кабушкин н.и., бондаренко г.а., 2003, менеджмент гостиниц и ресторанов: учебник для студ. спец. „экономика и управление социально-культурной сферой” вузов, ооо „новое знание”, минск. про туризм, 1995, закон україни від 15 верес. 1995 р. no №325/95-вр., http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/324/95-%d0%b2%d1%80 [09.09.2016]. chen j.j., dimou i., 2005, expansion strategy of international hotel firms, journal of business research, 58(12), 1730– 1740. lashley c., 2000, in search of hospitality: towards a theoretical framework, hospitality management, 19, 3–15. martorell cunill 0., 2006, the growth strategies of hotel chains: best business practices by leading companies, the haworth hospitality press, new york. mehmetoglu m., altinay l., 2006, examination of grounded theory analysis with an application to hospitality research, international journal of hospitality management, 25(l), 12–33. rezidor sas hospitality философия успеха, 2006, гостиничный и ресторанный бизнес, 1, 8–12. wiertz c., ruyter k., keen c., streukens s., 2004, cooperating for service excellence in multichannel systems. am empirical assessment, journal of business research, 57, 424–436. волков а., 2000 , forte hotel group: лучшая гостиничная цепь европы, пять звезд, 5, 13–15. галасюк к.а., 2012, готельні ланцюги в сучасній індустрії гостинності, науковий існик онеу, 21(137), 127–135, http://tourlib.net/statti_ukr/galasjuk17.htm [29.08.2016] смирнова м., 2005, формирование гостиничной сети: концепция, методы, практика, гостиничное дело, ноябрь, 25–30. трофимова и., 2006, мировой рейтинг гостиничных цепей, отель, 2(78), 28–34. филипповский е.е., шмарова л.в., 2003, экономика и организация гостиничного хозяйства, финансы и  статистика, mocква. чернышев, а.в., 2000, гостиничная индустрия: проблемы теории и практики технологии управления, ооо «агентство рекламы «товарищ», mocква. чудновский а.д., жукова м.а., 2006, информационные технологии управления в туризме: учебное пособие, кнорус, mocква. the term “pomerania” functioning in poland is commonly identified with the part of the southern baltic coast which is located within the present state borders of poland. the contemporary latitudinal range of pomerania does not reflect the actual spatial relations (social, economic, cultural ones) that have influenced its present day from the eastern and, even more so, the western side. this also applies to contemporary processes taking place not only within the region, but also at its interface with adjacent areas whose representatives show very different behaviors towards pomerania (from identification with the region to a clear reluctance), which translates into a number of clearly spatially differentiated positive and/or negative phenomena in the border zone. even greater doubts are raised by the meridian range of pomerania, because while the northern border of the region is delineated by the baltic coastline, the southern border is often very discretionary. most often, it is assumed that the southern border of pomerania is delineated by the administrative border of the seaside provinces, mainly the pomeranian and west pomeranian voivodeships. on the one hand, this facilitates a number of synthetic analyses often dependent on statistical reporting; on the other hand, it raises doubts, because many phenomena and processes escape relatively rigid administrative divisions. regardless of the above deliberations, the key is to answer the question whether the boundary understood as, quoting j. bański (2010, p. 492), “a line or zone that separates fragments of space in a specific time period” is a stimulant or a destimulant to the development of the region. another question arises from the above-mentioned definition. since a border separates certain fragments of space, there is a spatial, social and economic neighborhood that may be of significant importance for the development of the region. in this context, it would be interesting to consider not only the endogenous potential of neighbors of pomeranian, but also the lack of a direct neighbor of the pomeranian region from the north. a separate problem of pomerania is journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(1), 1–5 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.1.01 determinants of the development of pomerania related to maritime economy and tourism: introduction paweł czapliński (1), iwona jażewicz (2) (1) institute of spatial management and socio-economic geography, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 18, 70-383 szczecin, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5093-941x e-mail: pawel.czaplinski@usz.edu.pl (2) institute of social and economic geography and tourism, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76–200 słupsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-5698-442x e-mail: iwona.jazewicz@apsl.edu.pl citation czapliński p., jażewicz i., 2021, determinants of the development of pomerania related to maritime economy and tourism: introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(1), 1–5. received: 09 march 2021 accepted: 11 march 2021 published: 31 march 2021 2 paweł czapliński, iwona jażewicz its homogeneity. both the distant past of the region, the post-war period, and the present day provide extensive evidence of a significant diversification of the determinants of development of individual parts of the region. their outcome is the contemporary spatial image of pomerania, determined by the progressive polarization of development within the polarization-diffusion model, including the rapid development of the tri-city metropolis and the szczecin agglomeration with the progressive drainage of the development potential of their peripheral areas. perhaps the socio-cultural or even ethnic incoherence of the inhabitants of the region lies at the root cause of this fact. this is reflected in the significant diversification of the regional identity which not only does not favor internal integration, but even leads to unnecessary divisions into us and them, sometimes even on a local scale. in addition, one should consider infrastructural incoherence as significant, especially in terms of transport which still causes significant restrictions in intra-regional mobility not only between the largest cities in the region (gdańsk – szczecin), but also between smaller centers, and this does not favor convergence processes both on the economic and the social plane. in the light of the above, it can be concluded that while pomerania is often perceived stereotypically as one spatial entity, in fact it is a cluster of many sub-regions mainly linked by geographical location, because the human factor has become mixed up in this region, often reduced, and eventually replaced. it should be emphasized that in the past pomerania was ruled by local rulers who pursued their particular interests, but for most of its period it was ruled by the rulers of germany or poland, and temporarily even of sweden and the state of the teutonic order (inachin, 2008; labuda, 1992 labuda (ed.), 1972a, 1972b, 1976, 1984, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2003; salmonowicz (ed.), 2000, 2002). the effects of this historical changeability are visible in almost every element of the cultural landscape of pomerania, which in itself seems interesting. the special issue presented to the readers of the journal of geography, politics and society is devoted to the polish part of pomerania. therefore, it follows the long tradition of scientific studies containing the characteristics of social and demographic processes (kołodziejski, podolski, 1977; rydz, 1994; sobczak, 1980; stanny (ed.), 2011; szmielińska-pietraszek, szymańska (eds.), 2012) and economic and planning ones (kołodziejski, 1982; laskowski, 1969, matczak et al. (eds.), 2004; parteka, szydarowski (eds.), 2003; czapliński, 2016) in this area. it is impossible to describe all social and economic aspects related to the development of pomerania in a single issue of the journal. the aforementioned complexity, multithreading, and heterogeneity of the occurring processes and phenomena make it necessary to select issues, sometimes limiting them to specific places (case studies), often with reference to the ceteris paribus clause. this is why the presented volume focuses on two determinants favoring the development of the region’s economy from the geographical viewpoint. the first one is maritime economy and the second one is tourism. it does not mean that there are no other determinants influencing the development of the region or having the resources, potential and capital of the place. it seems, however, that both maritime economy and tourism remain the base and, in some cases, the limit of the development capabilities of pomerania. the first three articles are devoted to maritime economy whose traditions date back to the second polish republic. after poland regained independence in 1918, access to the sea was limited, and at the same time the economic challenges faced by the young state, for which the sea was then the actual window to the world, were great (orłowicz, 1928). after world war ii, as a result of new geopolitical conditions, the previous priorities were reoriented. on the one hand, it was associated with poland’s gaining wide access to the sea, and on the other, more importantly, with the introduction of centrally controlled economy (łodykowski, 1965). in the period of 1945–1989, poland significantly developed maritime economy initially having very scarce resources. the shipbuilding industry, the fish processing industry, maritime education, but, above all, the quantitative, qualitative and spatial development of ports can be considered as particularly important elements. another change was initiated at the end of 1989 with regaining sovereignty by poland and with the transformation of the economic system. in consequence, it was possible to integrate poland socially and economically with the structures of the european union. nowadays, it is also worth emphasizing the impact of globalization processes on maritime economy, whose further development will be based on the processes of networking of the production and services, their servicization, automation and robotization. the development of advanced technologies in the field of flexible management of production systems and the ongoing search for new (cheap, independent) energy sources will also be important. piotr binek is the author of the first article on the risk of social conflicts related to the development of offshore wind farms in the polish part of the baltic sea. the author raises an important problem of a smooth transition from electricity production based on fossil fuels to one which is based on determinants of the development of pomerania related to maritime economy and tourism: introduction 3 renewable sources. in the polish literature on the subject, it is the first such a broad and in-depth analytical study of this important issue and, at the same time, a challenge for the (future) polish power industry. the next two articles concern polish large ports. we distinguish 4 large ports of fundamental importance for the polish economy (gdańsk, gdynia, szczecin, and świnoujście) and the remaining ones (luks, 2011). as demonstrated by maciej tarkowski, sławomir goliszek and tadeusz bocheński, transshipments in large ports are growing rapidly, which is a result not only of infrastructural development, but mainly of enhanced hinterland connectivity. unfortunately, unlike large ports, other polish ports are experiencing a regression that requires immediate action. it also gives rise to a discussion on the role of small ports in the structure of transport and handling in a strategic perspective (michalski, 2020; szymańska, michalski, 2018). the next article by sandra żukowska is a microscale analysis. it concerns the transformation of a part of the gdynia port – the dalmor quay. this interesting case study shows a chance to return to shaping the waterfront of gdynia, which is an attempt to return to the basic development assumptions of the city from the interwar period. it is important for the city to rationally shape the downtown space, where the boundary between urban and port areas becomes blurred with time, thus creating a coherent whole. the next two articles in the issue are devoted to tourism in the pomeranian voivodeship. the area in question is characterized by high tourist attractiveness resulting from both its natural (kistowski et al., 2006; rozenkranz, 1974) and anthropogenic (wanagos (ed.), 2004; wierzchołowska, błyskosz (eds.), 2007) values. the first article by tomasz wiskulski is devoted to gdańsk as a tourist destination. due to its numerous tourist facilities and the coastal location itself (visit gdansk, n.d.), gdańsk is a city which attracts many tourists and visitors. it is also a wellestablished tourist brand (kuczamer-kłopotowska, łuczak, 2009). the article analyzes the results of a survey regarding the perception of gdańsk as a tourist destination. especially valuable is the presentation of the relationship between satisfaction with the visit and the decision to recommend the destination to others, and de facto presentation of all elements of the destination brand (cognitive, emotional, and behavioral elements) and their mutual relations, ultimately reduced to a specific behavior towards the perceived tourist destination. the second article by anna wiśniewska is devoted to agritourism. a comprehensive description of the tangible aspect of the attractiveness of a pomeranian village was presented in an extensive monograph entitled bogactwo kulturowe i przyrodnicze wsi pomorskiej [eng. cultural and natural wealth of the pomeranian village] (bogactwo..., 2007). however, one should not forget about the intangible attractiveness of the pomeranian village, which is largely related to kashubians (borzyszkowski et al., 1999; mordawski, 2005, 2008) and kociewiaks (golicki, 1986; powierski, 1992) living in the central part of the voivodeship. the article analyzes the educational offer of the pomeranian voivodeship agritourism farms which are associated in the national network of educational farms. it should be considered important that the educational offer of farms gives variety to and extends the farmer’s economic activity. it also gives satisfaction from working with children and teachers and creatively develops farming families as well as provides them with additional income. we hope that the special issue devoted to selected aspects of maritime economy and tourism in pomerania will contribute to a better understanding of such complex issues in such a complex region, and that the presented research results will become an inspiration to continue one’s own research paths. we realize that many topics have not been mentioned in this issue, and the presented ones require further consideration. our goal, however, was not to present a full picture of the socio-economic reality of pomerania, but only of those elements that are of interest to researchers of the region, and at the same time seem interesting in terms of cognition, methodology and application. paweł czapliński, iwona jażewicz references bański j., 2010, granica w badaniach geograficznych – definicja i próby klasyfikacji (eng. border in geographical research studies – definition and an attempts at its classification), przegląd geograficzny, 82(4), 489–508. bogactwo kulturowe i przyrodnicze wsi pomorskiej (eng. cultural and natural wealth of the pomeranian village), 2007, pomorski ośrodek doradztwa rolniczego, gdańsk. borzyszkowski j., mordawski j., treder j., 1999, historia, geografia, język i piśmiennictwo kaszubów (eng. history, geography, language and writing of kashubians), wydawnictwo m. rożak, gdańsk. czapliński p., 2016, problemy rozwoju morskiej energetyki wiatrowej na południowym bałtyku (eng. problems of development of offshore wind power in the southern baltic), prace komisji geografii przemysłu polskiego towarzystwa geograficznego, 30(3), 173–184. https://doi. org/10.24917/20801653.303.13 fic m. 2020, ziemie zachodnie i północne w polsce ludowej (eng. western and northern territories in people’s po4 paweł czapliński, iwona jażewicz land), [in:] m. fic (ed.), powrót do macierzy? ziemie zachodnie i północne w polsce ludowej (eng. back to the motherland? western and northern territories in people’s poland), wydawnictwo uniwersytetu śląskiego, katowice, 11–28. golicki j., 1986, kociewie. nazwa, granice, dialekt, grupy etnonimiczne (eng. kociewie. name, boundaries, dialect, ethnonymous groups), kociewski magazyn regionalny, 1, 3–8. hejger m., 2008, przekształcenia narodowościowe na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych polski w latach 1945–1989 (eng.  ethnic transformations on western and northern polish lands between 1945 and 1959), wydawnictwo naukowe akademii pomorskiej w słupsku, słupsk. inachin k.t., 2008, die geschichte pommerns (eng. history of pomerania), hinstorff verlag, rostock. kacprzak p., 2010, polityka władz polskich wobec ludności niemieckiej w okresie funkcjonowania ministerstwa ziem odzyskanych (eng. the policy of the polish authorities towards the german population during the functioning of the ministry of the recovered territories), czasopismo prawno-historyczne, 62(2), 215–235. kistowski m., lipińska b., korwel-lejkowska b., 2006, walory, zagrożenia i propozycje ochrony zasobów krajobrazowych województwa pomorskiego (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem trójmiejskiego obszaru metropolitarnego) (eng. the values, threats and proposals for the protection of landscape resources of the pomeranian voivodeship (with particular emphasis on the tricity metropolitan area)), [in:] j. czochański, m. kistowski (eds.), studia przyrodniczo-krajobrazowe województwa pomorskiego (eng. nature and landscape studies on the pomeranian voivodeship), urząd marszałkowski województwa pomorskiego, gdańsk, 137–277. kołodziejski j. 1982, planowanie regionów nadmorskich (eng. planning of coastal regions), [in:] a. kukliński, e.z.  zdrojewski (eds.), gospodarka przestrzenna, morska i regionalna (eng. spatial, maritime and regional economy), państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe, warszawa-poznań, 127–141. kołodziejski j., podolski k., 1977, społeczne aspekty rozwoju makroregionu północnego polski (eng. social aspects of the development of the northern macroregion of poland), komitet badań i prognoz „polska 2000” przy prezydium pan, gdańskie towarzystwo naukowe, gdańsk. kuczamer-kłopotowska s., łuczak m., 2009, kreowanie wizerunku obszaru turystycznego na przykładzie gdańska (eng. creating the image of city brand on the example of gdańsk), prace naukowe uniwersytetu ekonomicznego we wrocławiu, 50, 287–293. labuda g. 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(eds.), 2012, przemiany demograficzne pomorza na przełomie wieków ujęcie społeczne, ekonomiczne, przestrzenne (eng. demographic changes in pomerania at the turn of the century – a social, economic and spatial approach), rządowa rada ludnościowa, słupsk-warszawa szymańska w., michalski t., 2018, przekształcenia funkcji polskich małych portów morskich (eng. changes of the functions of small polish sea ports), prace komisji geografii komunikacji ptg, 21(3), 70–77. doi: 10.4467/2543859xpk g.18.015.10140 visit gdansk, https://visitgdansk.com/en/ (accessed 08 april 2021). wanagos m. (ed.), 2004, program rozwoju produktów turystycznych województwa pomorskiego (eng. the development program of tourism products in the pomeranian voivodeship), urząd marszałkowski województwa pomorskiego, gdańsk. wierzchołowska r., błyskosz t. (eds.), 2007, program opieki nad zabytkami województwa pomorskiego na lata 2007–2010 (eng. program of the protection of monuments of the pomeranian voivodeship for the years 2007–2010), urząd marszałkowski województwa pomorskiego, gdańsk. 1. introduction after the end of world war ii, george orwell published a famous bestseller-dystopian 1984 (orwell, 1949) where he far-sightedly described a future authoritarian society with total power propaganda and totalitarian control of the state over each action and even thought of an average citizen. in 2009, the british newspaper “the times” called the novel of 1984 “the most important book published within the last 60 years” (sutherland, marsh, 2009), because george orwell ingeniously anticipated the consequences of totalitarisation of the state life built on the principles of “war is peace”, “freedom is slavery”, “ignorance is power”. such phrases from the book as “big brother is watching you”, “the ministry of peace concerns itself with war, the ministry of truth with lies, the ministry of love with torture and the ministry of plenty with starvation” have become globally famous and widely cited (orwell, 1949). although, formally the events in the book were supposed to occur in great britain, the majority of readers guessed easily that the described state was the soviet union, and even the images of the dystopian key characters (the leader is big brother and state enemy no.1 – emmanuel goldstein) were easily read as stalin and trotskyi. however, now it becomes more obvious that the current russian federation continues living following the postulates and principles of orwell’s oceania. it is the russians who call themselves “big brother” with regard to ukrainians, forgetting that the moscow tsars did not found kyiv, but a grandson of the kyiv prince built moscow in the northern outskirt of the mighty kyiv state! in absolute compliance with orwell’s “freedom is death”, putin declared “liberation of the russianspeaking ukrainians” and “denazification”; however, he does not wage war in western ukraine (where there are particular nationalistic sentiments) but in the eastern part where he kills peaceful russianspeaking ukrainians who he was going to “liberate”. the russian propagandistic machine re-writes and falsifies history in total compliance with the canons of orwell’s ministry of truth, replicating for the journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(s1), 1–5 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.s1.01 mental and historical rationale for principal differences between the ukrainian and russian nations – introduction оleksandr rаdchenko department of public administration, national aviation university, lubomyr husar 1, 03058 kyiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002–0437–6131 institute of socio-economic geography and spatial management, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland e-mail: olekandr.radchenko@ug.edu.pl citation radchenko o., 2022, mental and historical rationale for principal differences between the ukrainian and russian nations – introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(s1), 1–5. received: 02 august 2022 accepted: 14 september 2022 published: 25 november 2022 mailto:radchenko@o2.pl 2 оleksandr rаdchenko whole world deceitful narratives like “ukrainians and russians are one nation”. that is why this special issue of journal of geography, politics and society is devoted to an attempt to unmask russian propagandistic myths, revealing to the european reader the truth about profound and principal differences in values-and-mental worldviews of the russian and ukrainian nations, their historical lifestyle, understanding the environment, forms of organization of a social and political life, etc. 2. results in the context of the purpose set in the special issue, halyna kuts, a professor from kharkiv, stresses that the basic parameters for the ukrainian political identity were individualism, intolerance of the authoritarian trend, love of freedom, etc. instead, in the mentality of muscovites, servility has always been considered as a virtue, and the deceit and ability “to lie beautifully” as a sign of cleverness. inna semenets-orlova from kyiv reveals the differences between the russian and ukrainian national mythology as fundamental nature of people’s subconscious. the professor stresses that the postulate of short connection between the state and the nation is intrinsic to the russian mythology. it contradicts the system of complicated representative and lawful mechanisms where one “nation” is possible only on condition of the availability of a state structure which gives it an identity mandate for a right to be called “nation”, and the power justifies its legitimacy, referring to a symbolic representativeness on behalf of the whole “nation”. by contrast, in ukraine, like in other western democracies, the principles of democracy and freedom are enweaved into the heroic myth. olexandr lytvynenko, the main consultant of the national institute for strategic studies of ukraine, discloses the propagandistic provisions of the modern russian political discourse, the matter of which lies in tendentious interpretations of the russian history and the history of ukraine, and which turn into open and systemic manipulations with historical memory to justify the aggressive politics of russia with regard to ukraine, proving its legal right to determine the destiny of the ukrainian nation and to establish the vectors of foreign politics of the ukrainian state. andrii kuzyshyn and inna poplavska from ternopil characterize the peculiarities of the political identity of ukraine’s population through the prism of electoral preferences and state that polarization of ukraine by a regional principle is artificial, a consequence of the russia-provoked idea of recovering the former imperial lifestyle of the ussr, and is based on dependent political forces engaged in the election process to neutralize the principles of the political identity of the ukrainian state. professor ihor todorov from uzhhorod justifies historical-and-psychological roots of the ukrainian reasonableness in decision making, tolerance in interpersonal and international relations, husbandry with certain cost-effectiveness, individual form of goal-setting and personal responsibility for the consequences of the implementation of objectives, which is a pre-requisite of the appearance of a person able to consciously build the civic society. at the same time, authoritarianism, paternalism and immanent permanent hesitation, splitting and non-admission of either eastern or western standards and values are intrinsic to russians. the scientist specifies that, in fact, the russian federation rejects the right of ukraine for existence as an independent state and pursues its final aim – the complete destruction of ukraine as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality. 3. discussion in our opinion, the mental and historical rationale for ukrainians’ and russians’ worldview difference go back to ancient times of the beginning of the slavic word-building when the first words meant not only and not so much a thing or a phenomenon itself, described by this word, but its essence. moreover, fundamental postulates of the value-and-mental worldview of the russian and ukrainian nations (the same as in the majority of other nations in the world) are described in the most concise form of folk wisdom – fairy-tales, songs, semantics of words formation, etc., because as l. czìnpìn’ specifies: as the essence of the people’s folklore, the folk tales are one of the oldest literary genres brightly reflecting characteristics and mentality of one nation’s culture. in each country the folk tales obtain their peculiarities as if they get dressed in the national costume which relates to national everyday realia. moreover, it is easier for us to watch and research the culture and mentality of this nation through the study of fairy tales. (czìnpìn’, 2019, р.135). since the beginning of the human civilization, the most important value priority for all the nations has been people and the family; as a rule, when transferring to the state-organizational life, relations in the family were always interpolated to the relations in the state. in the depths of history, the king or another sovereign were perceived by citizens as a “father” mental and historical rationale for principal differences between the ukrainian and russian nations – introduction 3 of the nation, a wise or a strong ruler, a protector and a caregiver. however, with the development of guilds and social strata in europe, a widened circle of representatives of political, economic or religious establishment, the king started to be perceived as “the first among equal”, and then the state stopped being the ownership of the sovereign. the widening of democracy led to fixation in the european mentality of understanding the state not as a caregiver but as a service provider. thus, europeans began to connect the responsibility for their future mostly with themselves, with own actions and deeds, which fixed positive individualism in the mentality. with this regard, the russians and ukrainians have “got stuck” so far at the mental perception of power as a “father taking care of his children, and the state as the family where everybody is cared for and the conditions for implementation of creative potential are made” due to long-term traditional lifestyle and other historic consequences” (semčuk, 2019, p. 242). indeed, how the monitoring data of the institute of sociology nas of ukraine 1992-2016 certify, the value-based mentality of ukraine’s citizens is characterized with dominating traditional vital values, related to family, children and welfare (ukraïns’kie…, 2016). however, it is where the first principal line of value discrepancy related to the peculiarities of traditions in family lifestyle and education of descendants lied. until the 20th century, the russians lived in big families where the father was the head, and he often used quite totalitarian methods like compulsion and physical punishment not only to children but also to his wife (that is where a famous russian people’s saying comes from: “beating a wife is a sign of love”). thus, the russians want to see this archetypical “father-tyrant” accustomed to them: tsar, general secretary of the party or current president. that is why, the majority of the russians are unconscious apologists of traditionally conservative, rigidly centralized power of one-man charismatic type. thus, the main hero of the russian fairy tales is ivan the fool, lazybones and an idler, a person with absolute absence of personal responsibility, to whom the fabulous presents are given “from above”, from “the destiny”; the hero of the russian fairy tale does not have to stretch himself – desired rewards will come to him themselves, like the bins from the well went after yemelia “as if by magic” (russian: “po shchuchiemu veleniu” – literally: “by the pike’s command”) (po ŝuč’emu…, 2020), i.e. from a powerful sacred force. this fabulous sacral nature of supreme forces gradually transformed into mental sacralisation by the russians of the state and state rulers, “by the command” of whom the people receive their benefits. the ukrainian men were not so tightly connected with the place of long-term living and with their families. they often had to go on military campaigns and be at wars, “be a cossack”, “go to crimea for salt” or to be far away earning money in conditions of military campaign brotherhood, equality and wide selfgovernment and self-determination. that is why, in mentality of the ukrainian men love of freedom and an inclination to maximum decentralization of the power, even anarchism was fixed (vsevolod volineikhenbaum, petro arshynov-marin, aron baronkantorovych), and its outstanding practitioners, for example, “batko makhno” (father makhno), came from ukraine or operated in its territory). o. hordiichuk, in his work entitled “ethnogenesis and the main features of the ukrainian mentality: social-andphilosophical context”, specifies: an anarchic dominant of the ukrainian mentality is an individual point, which shows itself ambiguously: 1) as one of important values of the ukrainians because exactly these “uncontrollability”, immediacy, spontaneity and disobedience to oppressors trigger confrontations and revolutions aiming at free existence and approval of the state political course between the representatives of the power and the ukrainian nation; 2) as one of the major vices of the ukrainian character combined with the inability to take independent political decisions, which is exposed in non-ability to long-term volition and mental efforts, consolidation of required forces to reach a common purpose; it appears to be especially harmful and tragic for the whole nation in the form of short-sightedness, unreadiness of their political elite to substantial strategic planning with further goal-oriented implementation of the planned objectives. the demonstrative examples are b. khmelnytskyi and cossacks’ highest ranks, leaders of the central council of ukraine, v. yushchenko and his team, etc. (gordìjčuk, 2021, pp. 57–58). consequently, the men-heroes of the ukrainian fairy tales are not stupid but, on the contrary, crafty fellows. moreover, they got accustomed to work and obtain rewards for themselves and their families from the childhood. this is what our fairy tales of kotyhoroshko or ivasyk-telesyk are about  – a little boy who went fishing to the river and fed his old grandmother and grandfather, and when the witch caught him by deceit, he befooled the witch’s daughter, escaped and making efforts, reached his home (ìvansik -telesik..., 2022). one more principal difference between the two nations comes from the same traditional lifestyle of family being and is seen in social importance and significance of the woman. this importance was reflected at a semantically-semiotic level of the word 4 оleksandr rаdchenko defining a man and a woman who come into marital relations. russians call them “husband” – “supruh” and “wife” – “supruha”. the old slavic word “supruh” originated from the word of “zapriahaty” (english: “horse a carriage”) and thus, at the mental level, the breadwinner of the family was denoted – a horse, the main draft animal of the russian village. the horse was collared (in russian: “khomut”) and pulled a cart. the head of the family began to be called the same in the folklore allegorism – a man who got collared himself to pull a cart of life and be the main breadwinner of the family. this is a root for an interesting saying about a woman who forced or forced by deceit a man to marry her without his wish – “zakhomutala khloptsia” (english: “collared a guy”). later, the old slavic “supruh” was substituted by the word of “muzh” (english: “husband”), and this new word only increased the role and significance of the man because “muzh” means “powerful”, “understanding” (šanskij, 2000); moreover, it also means a state rank – “statesman” (russian: “gosudarstvennyi muzh”) – “man” (russian: “muzhchina”). at the same time, the word “supruha” (english: “wife”) in old slavic meant a mare walking near the draft horse – i.e. it was tied to the draft, to the main draft horse and thus, played a secondary, subordinate role. the more current synonym of “supruha” is “zhona”, which in old slavic meant a “woman” – an impersonal woman, a person of a female sex (šanskij, 2000), who does not have individuality and who can be beaten like a draft mare (one more moral excuse of the saying “beating your wife is a sign of love”). hence, the russians who come into marital relationships are divided into a powerful individual – “husband” and impersonal, subordinate and secondary “wife” at the level of self-designation. in the ukrainian historical tradition, the situation is completely different: the ukrainian family was developing during several previous centuries in the conditions of long-term absence of a significant part of fathers-men when the main burden of children’s education and housekeeping was put on a woman-wife. that is why, the ukrainians who come into marital relationships are called “cholovik” (english: “a husband”) and “druzhyna” (english: “a wife”). in these words-names, the impersonality of the former catches an eye at once, because “cholovik” is simultaneously a married man and a person of the male sex (hrinchenko, 1909, p. 469). at the same time, the word of “druzhyna” (english: “wife”) does not have only one meaning in ukrainian. this is not only a woman who married a man. these are also regular troops of kyivan princes in the beginning of the first millennium; this is a machine or princely power of those times! this is simultaneously free comradeship, a team, voluntary union established with a particular purpose (velikij tlumačnij…, 2022). it is obvious here that already not a man (like russians) but a woman – “druzhyna” is a source of force and the main subject of the family with an impersonal man! that is why, a man will not hit a ukrainian woman, it is she who can strike with a fire iron, a frying pan or a rolling pin. a ukrainian husband is a bit of afraid his wife. what can one say about an ordinary man! a devil, as a representative of the power of evil, the personification of the evil of the male sex – is also afraid of a ukrainian woman! at least, this is what ukrainian fairy tales say (baba ì čort, 2015), and i have not seen similar fairy tales where the personification of the absolute evil is afraid of an ordinary woman in the folklore of european nations and especially the russian one. 4. conclusion deep historic roots of principal mental, psychological, social and spiritual differences can be found between the ukrainian and russian nations. first of all, a historically determined dramatic difference was found in understanding, perception and conventional social roles of archetypes of a woman and a man in the people’s folklore of ukrainians and russians as a basis of nations’ value-based worldview and a derivative social-and-emotional idea of the state and the foundations of state management. the love of freedom of the ukrainian nation that verges upon anarchism and celebrates personal freedom, recalcitrance and a possibility to choose one’s life oneself stands against inclination of paternalistic russians to the authoritarian power with a sacral ruler of the state. this is what scares the russian political elite as an example of awakening of the russian people from despotism and justifies the sacredly important to the russian power ideas of subjugation of the ukrainians as the main pre-requisite of restoration and saving the imperial type of the russian state, which was the real reason for unleashing a long-lasting bloody war of muscovites against ukraine in 2014–2022. references baba ì čort (eng. grandma and the devil), 2015, derevo kazok, https://derevo-kazok.org/baba-i-chort-ukrayinskanarodna-kazka.html (accessed 17 july 2022). czìnpìn’ l., 2019, izučenie narodnyh skazkov kak effektivnyj put’ issledovaniâ mental’nosti (eng. the study of folk tales mental and historical rationale for principal differences between the ukrainian and russian nations – introduction 5 as an effective way to study mentality), naukovì pracì nacìonal’noï bìblìoteki ukraïni ìmenì v. ì. vernads’kogo, 54, 133–139. gordìjčuk o., 2021, etnoġenez ta osnovnì riski ukraïns’koï mental’nostì: socìal’no-fìlosofs’kij kontekst (eng. ethnogenesis and main features of the ukrainian mentality: socio-philosophical context), vìstnik žitomirs’kogo deržavnogo unìversitetu ìmenì ìvana franka. fìlosofs’kì nauki, 2, 52–62. grìčenko b., 1909, tlumačnij slovnik ukraïns’koï movi (eng. explanatory dictionary of the ukrainian language), 1909, https://slovnik-grinchenka.com (accessed 18 july 2022). ìvansik-telesik. ukraïns’kì narodnì kazki (eng. ivasyk-telesyk. ukrainian folk tales), 2022, derevo kazok, https://derevokazok.org/ivasik-telesik.html (accessed 18 july 2022) orwell g., 1949, nineteen eighty-four: a novel, harcourt, brace and company, new york. po ŝuč’emu veleniû: russkaâ skazka (eng. at the behest of a pike: a russian fairy tale), 2020, derevo kazok, https:// ru.derevo-kazok.org/folklor-tales/po-shhuchemu-vele nyu-russkaya-skazka.html (accessed 17 july 2022). šanskij n.m., 2000, ètimologičesij slovar’ russkogo âzyka (eng. etymological dictionary of the russian language), drofa, moskva. semčuk h., 2019, problema ukraïns’koï mental’nostì v kontekstì formuvannâ nacìonal’noï svìdomostì (eng. the problem of ukrainian mentality in the context of the formation of national consciousness), vìstnik l’vìvs’kogo ynìversitetu. serìâ fìlosofs’ko-polìtologìčnì studìï, 22, 239–243. sutherland j., marsh s., 2009, the best 60 books of the past 60 years, the times, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ the-best-60-books-of-the-past-60-years-gvrvzvw2fvj (accessed 17 july 2022). ukraïns’kie suspìl’stvo: monìtoring socìalnyh zmìn 1(15)/2016 (eng. ukrainian society: monitoring of social changes 1(15)/2016), 2016, ìnstitut socìologìï nan ukraïni, kiïv. velikij tlumačnij slovnik sučasnoï movi (eng. a large explanatory dictionary of the modern language), 2022, https:// slovnyk.me/search?term=дружина (accessed 17 july 2022). 1. introduction nowadays technical assistance programs occupy a significant position in the process of social and economic transformation of many countries. foreign aid affects integration processes in the global economy, ensures national households’ sustainable development as well as implementation of projects that governments are not able to finance themselves. the largest donors to ukraine have been and remain the united states and the european union. other donors include canada, germany, the netherlands, sweden, switzerland, japan, denmark, and the united nations organisations, the world bank, the ebrd and the oecd. fairly limited number of ukrainian scientists explores technical assistance given to ukraine by donor countries, as well as the problems and mechanisms for implementing and evaluating the effectiveness of current projects. it should be pointed out that there are rather fewer studies analyzing technical assistance effectiveness in terms of meeting or failing to meet objectives within a foreign aid project implemented in ukraine. most research works are devoted to other issues, e.g. legislative environment and political consequences of donor country impact in the country. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 70–76 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.009.6208 the methodological principles of evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid projects in ukraine polina yurijivna kulish law and european integration department, kharkiv regional institute of public administration of the national academy of public administration under the office of the president of ukraine, moskovsky prospect 75, 61001, kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: polina.kulish@gmail.com citation kulish p.yu., 2017, the methodological principles of evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid projects in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 70–76. abstract the article examines the major issues of methodology that evaluates the effectiveness of technical assistance project implementation in ukraine. it analyzes the organizational and legal assessment of the impact of international technical assistance upon regional development in the present context. the article puts forward some steps to define key performance indicators, principal evaluation and monitoring methods for implementing ita projects. it is reasonable to create a unified national system for monitoring and auditing the effectiveness of projects being implemented at the expense of funds under the ukrainian legislation. key words international technical assistance, method, methodology, evaluation, performance evaluation, monitoring. the methodological principles of evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid projects in ukraine 71 in recent years, the term ‘effectiveness’ has increasingly arisen in discourses on aid. this responds to different tendencies: debates on how to combine the aid accountability and effectiveness principles of the paris declaration on aid effectiveness. from one hand, rosemary mcgee treats transparency as a means to achieving greater ‘aid effectiveness’, by permitting the tracking and achievement of paris declaration commitments (mcgee, 2013). from other perspective, the oecd has admitted that, “there is little data based analysis of the overall effectiveness of technical assistance as an aid instrument, whether in terms of cost/benefit, impact on growth, fiscal impact or other financial measures.” (development…, 2005, p.119) the institute of foreign aid is relatively a new phenomenon in the public administration of ukraine. thus, the research of this realm has revealed being insufficient. such scientists as a. bazyliuk, m. vasilyeva, o. palyuh, k. ploskyj (базилюк, 2010; палюх, 2012; васильєва, 2010; плоский, 2013) study various aspects of the subject. an important contribution to the development of the theory of technical assistance from european community member states was made by m. koryukalov, n. hnydyuk, i. kravchuk (корюкалов, 2012; гнидюк, 2011; кравчук, 2015). analysis of some ukrainian scientists’ (плоский, 2013; кравчук, 2015) works suggests that both theoretical and methodological principles of attracting and use of technical assistance, particularly in terms of project effectiveness, should be studied in detail. it also should be noted, that most literature has tended to focus on viewing technical assistance as an instrument of donor policy or fundrising strategies of recipient country, rather than focusing on the issue of how to find a ballance between international and national markets of expertise services, and improving effectiveness and accountability of domestic procurement procedures. for purpose of research technical assistance was defined according to the oecd. it has three main elements (williams et al., 2003, p.2): • study assistance through scholarships and traineeships, including training of developing country nationals in donor countries; • personnel, including long term and short term experts (both expatriate and national); • research into the problems of developing countries, including diseases. the article is aimed at methodology of evaluating the effectiveness of the international technical assistance provided to ukraine as well as mechanisms for improving assessment and monitoring of foreign aid projects. this article focuses primarily on ukraine bilateral assistance, not on the work of multilateral aid entities, such as the un or world bank, to which the ukraine contributes. the absence of accurate data on multilateral aid means that its hard to analyse ‘real aid’ for multilateral donors (share of administration costs in multilateral technical assistance). also we should stated on that effectiveness – the extent to which initiatives are effective in achieving stated goals. results are compared to the initial program goals and expectations to determine whether the project or contract has been performed successfully (performance monitoring), and if the resulting data are analyzed in an effort to explain how and why a program meets or fails to meet strategic objectives, this is called performance evaluation (white, 2011, p.3). it needs to be distinguished from impact – the degree to which the initiative attains its further-reaching or ‘second-order’ goals. 2. research discussions at present, ukraine actively participates in ita, mostly, as the recipient. foreign aid projects represent one of the important components of integration strategy to join the european community, support economic development, and stimulate internal and external interests of the state in the economy and national security spheres. within the years of cooperation with international organizations, ukraine has received more than 9 billion us dollars of foreign aid. major donors of ukraine are usaid and the european union. also there are top 10 organizations that should be mentioned. they are un agencies in ukraine, the us state department, the german government, the osce, sida, the ebrd, the world bank, the eu instrument – the european neighbourhood instrument (eni), which has replaced the european neighbourhood and partnership instrument (enpi) from 2014. according to the website of the ministry of economic development and trade of ukraine as of 1st april 2016 were registered 289 projects with total contract value of over 3.3 billion us dollars. technical assistance areas include: nuclear safety improvements, protection of the state and citizens; shelter object transformation into ecologically safe system and environment protection; improvement of regulatory policy, investment climate, development of entrepreneurship and competition in the domestic market; financial market and banking sector; agricultural sector; healthcare and social welfare; education, science, culture and tourism; civil society, rule of law, fight against corruption. 72 polina yurijivna kulish according to the resolution of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine (15.02.2002, #153) “on establishing the unified system of the use and monitoring of international technical assistance” (про створення…, 2002), and the order of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine (11.09.2013, #697-р) «on approval of the strategy for attracting, use, and monitoring of international technical assistance and cooperation with international financial organizations in 2013– 2016» (про схвалення…, 2013), it is stated that international technical assistance is aimed at helping acquire knowledge and skills in relevant areas, usually in economics and management. it (foreign aid) might be represented in the form of any property required for projects (programs) imported or acquired in ukraine; works or services; intellectual property rights; financial resources (grants) in national or foreign currency; other resources under the ukrainian legislation, including scholarships (про створення…, 2002). it should be noted that the ukrainian scientists studied the role of international assistance (базилюк, 2010; палюх, 2012; васильєва, 2010; плоский, 2013). in their works foreign aid in ukraine has been considered as inefficient, due to the deficiencies of the regulatory framework and public management systems, as well as insufficient coordination of foreign aid projects. in 2007 the country joined the paris declaration on aid effectiveness that sets out the principles and measures for planning, monitoring, and assessment of ita effect, with appropriate mechanisms at the national level (паризька декларація…, 2007). moreover, within the framework of the european integration policy the requirements and changes occurred while signing additional initiatives on foreign aid during such high-level events as accra agenda for action (2008), busan partnership for effective development cooperation (2011), mexico high-level meeting communiqué (2014) should be taken into account as well. however, a clearly defined mechanism for evaluating and monitoring implementation of ita projects in ukraine does not exist. it should be stated that ita projects do not differ from the usual concept of a project in management. robert archibald, one of the acknowledged classics of project management defines a project as a “set of efforts undertaken to obtain specific unique results within the time limit and approved budget allocated to pay for resources used or consumed in the course of a project” (арчибальд, 2010, p.57). effectiveness can be defined not only as the ratio of the results and costs but also as the degree of results compliance with stakeholders’ expectations. appropriate expectations depend not only on the cost of resources, time, capital, but no less, on results of functioning of similar objects under conditions that are compared. one of the key factors of increasing the effectiveness of ita project implementation in ukraine is to create a complex system of monitoring and foreign aid projects assessment. on the one hand, improvements to the assessment, require increased transparency of donor organizations, including the provision of relevant information, on the other hand, it needs building government institutions capacity to conduct appropriate monitoring and evaluation. after all, according to researchers in the public sector, the assessment of public policy and programs is fragmented and chaotic. there is a lack of both culture and demand assessment, as well as qualified specialists, methods and reliable data (васильєва, 2010; плоский, 2013). the resolution of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine (про створення…, 2002) contains a general list of indicators in accordance with those ones it is proposed to carry out ongoing and/or final monitoring: information about the terms of seminars, number of participants, theme, equipment, transferred (developed) technology, work advisers’ services, developed documents, publications, as well as on education, training specialists, provided grants, scholarships, total amount of money spent on the technical assistance during the term of a project (program), problem areas. however, methods for measuring the impact of ita projects, for comparing planned performance criteria with achieved ones, are not specified. yet, the choice of evaluation methodology considerably influences the objectivity of the evaluation of project effectiveness. the big drawback of ita projects might be their inconsistency within even one donor. thus, these projects have neither unified performance indicators, nor overall assessment which would put together all the ita projects (programs) within their complex analysis. given all the above mentioned, there is no point in doing a comparative analysis of the impact of ita projects implementation. it is known that the wider range of project participants, the more difficult coordination of the interests of each of them as well as control of compliance with contract commitments. this question requires the use of special methods of project management such as network planning, project financing methods. a rational step to improve the assessment of ita projects implementation would be the development of key performance indicators. this can be divided into several phases (арчибальд, 2010): the methodological principles of evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid projects in ukraine 73 1. objectives, principles, and scope of key performance indicators. it is reasonable to analyze the current situation of projects and to identify improvements in project management. 2. business processes in project management. 3. development, coordination, approval of key performance indicators. it is important to develop and ensure the procedures for planning, monitoring and control projects effectiveness. 4. key performance indicators for project managers. the practical implementation of such systems in national and foreign companies has revealed a significant degree of rejecting the system at different stages of its development and operation, which is connected with individual and group resistance of employees. ignoring the need to adapt the system leads to serious consequences, such as reducing the motivation, failure of projects, loss of key employees. the suggested sequence of steps will promote the formation and development of indicators to assess the effectiveness of ita projects implementation. understanding the need for analysis and evaluation of government programs in different countries led to the emergence of different methods and approaches. the comparative analysis of approaches to the assessment of programs shows the following foreign and national methods of evaluating the effectiveness of programs (see weimer, vining, 2005; dunn, 2009). cost-benefit analysis method. effectively, this approach is used in areas where it is difficult to only assess all of the effects throughout financial instruments: infrastructure, transport, environment, education, health, and culture. this method allows from different sides to assess the impact of a program on the level of social welfare during any period of time. the method is easy to use and understand, but at the same time, it has highly subjective calculations of costs and benefits, the high cost of gathering information. cost-effectiveness analysis method. this method is not designed for assessment of projects with multiple objectives. it is better used to evaluate projects in areas where one can monetize achieved benefits: health, education and other social sectors. the method covers performance, as well as productivity and profitability assessment. cost-profit analysis method. this approach compares costs, estimated in monetary terms and benefits for the population, resulting in the implementation of budgetary expenditure, measured in terms of profits. the method differs in the subjective assessment of programs profit in relevant units and in a complexity of processing the received material. it is used to assess an activity leading to a range of results or to the results that may be different not only in quantity but also in quality, for example, health programs. rating scale method is based on part instrument (program assessment rating tool), developed in 2001 by the u.s. office of management and budget. according to this method, the assessment of budgetary programs is based on a number of issues which form a coherent scheme to evaluate the effectiveness of programs in a broad sense. the advantage of this model is that it allows you to assess performance based on a careful study of the most important aspects including the process from preparation stages of program documents to control procedures, outcomes of the assessment of implemented programs. it has some inaccuracy that occurs during the evaluation of programs on several criteria. in the international practice, the evaluation of economic effectiveness programs is carried out with the use of three main methods: cost – benefit, cost – profit, cost – effectiveness. these methods can determine the level of rationality resources spent to achieve the planned goals, the level of program (project) implementation. another central issue, which was raised by international community, is that technical assistance has been used as an instrument of donor policy that is sometimes disconnected from recipient country demand (williams et al., 2003). that’s why we need take into account donors’ effectiveness. one of the initiative which measures donors’ performance on 31 indicators of aid quality to which donors have made commitments was announced by center for global development in 2010 (birdsall, kharas, 2014). the indicators are grouped into four dimensions associated with effective aid: maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing the burden on partner countries, and transparency and learning. the 2014 edition finds that donors are overall becoming more transparent and better at fostering partner country institutions but that there has been little progress at maximizing efficiency or reducing the burden on partner countries. trying to find a balance between effectiveness and accountability sometimes donors are not so flexible in supporting domestic initiatives. good example of improving reforming ukrainian procurement system, which try to be changed during last two years due to triangular co-operation and not to advises from eu to harmonised public procurement rules with eu law at initial stage of reform. but as the rest of developing countries ukraine is failed to build long term capacity concerning given the high cost of technical advisers, especially expatriate 74 polina yurijivna kulish experts (twinning and other eu funded projects). some technical advisers, while working in the government, remain formally accountable to donors, as with the eu funded advisers being contracted at the twinning projects. the analysis of national approaches to assessment of programs and projects effectiveness showed the absence of the methodological basis for assessing different kinds of ita programs and projects in ukraine from domestic and international perspectives. another dimension that help to find answer on how improving aid effectiveness is analysis of triangular co-operation. since 2009, the oecd has been promoting dialogue and encouraging greater triangular co-operation. this work has helped to clarify what triangular co-operation is, how it is implemented and how it can be effective in promoting development (fordelone, 2009). there nevertheless remains an important knowledge gap on effectiveness of triangular co-operation. currently, actors involved, developing countries and researchers are not able to find complete, comparable and up-to-date information on where triangular co-operation is taking place, who is involved, in what type of activities and in which sectors (development..., 2016). donors continue to play a key role in the identification of needs, project design, terms of reference design, reporting and monitoring and evaluation. for example, according to the eni regulation, eu support shall be incentive-based and differentiated in form and amounts and external action partners, including civil society organizations, national and local authorities, are involved in preparing, implementing and monitoring eu support through consultation and timely access to relevant information allowing them to play a meaningful role in that process (regulation (eu) no 232/2014…, 2014, art. 4). consultation mean that eu is not obliged to take into account all proposals from external players. in preamble p.13 we have a norm which partly conflict with incentive-based approach. support should be coherent with the objectives and principles of the union’s external policies and, in particular, its development policy and the common foreign and security policy. coherence with the external dimensions of the union’s internal policies and instruments should also be ensured (regulation (eu) no 232/2014…, 2014). also eni regulation stipulates that the support and the amounts given to partner countries will be based on their progress achieve (commission decisions) and thus can be reconsidered. 3. conclusions in the present context, the external evaluation of the effectiveness is considered as part and parcel of project life cycle and often is required by donors at the stage of project development. however, this is not only an instrument of control or some formal requirement. analysis of project effectiveness provides managers with the opportunity to correct the deficiencies, and most importantly, to determine the prospects for further development. during last decade many donors try to change methodological approach in aid effectiveness progress-monitoring. using performance evaluation and financial audits, which play an important part in project management, are tend to be dismissed by impact evaluations, which look not at the output of an activity, but rather at its impact on a development objective. those changes is better answer on questions about foreign aid effectiveness. today, ukraine has taken progressive steps in national system formation for monitoring projects supported by international donors. the resolution of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine (27.01.2016, #70) approved the procedure for preparation, implementation, monitoring and completion of projects of economic and social development in ukraine, supported by international financial institutions (про порядок…, 2016). this document regulates the cooperation among all of the parties while implementing the system (support of reforms in ukraine with financing the state budget) and investment projects, still does not define approaches and methods of monitoring indicators, but the list of documents required for signing an agreement with international financial institutions on cooperation, auditing, financial reporting etc. in addition, the projects, being carried out in ukraine, are aimed at improving the regulatory framework that governs monitoring and evaluation of technical assistance. one of the biggest donors is the european union and the us, which policy is directed at reducing the gap in development between different regions and countries. but this two donors use different approach for evaluating the effectiveness of own aid programs. the key spheres of improvements of ita project management are the following ones: concepts and strategies for main areas of use, ita monitoring and programming; improvement of control system of the government ita programs; creating a commission on monitoring of international technical assistance; setting clear deadlines for technical projects and monitoring of contract commitments; sustainable the methodological principles of evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid projects in ukraine 75 criteria of project effectiveness; registration of completed projects and money spent; public discussion of projects, problems of implementation and ways out. monitoring projects provides donors, partners, governments and other stakeholders with access to detailed information on project progress and results. unfortunately, the mechanisms of control and coordination of ita are formed only partially and subject to be reviewed in the context of problems such as fraud, imperfection of the monitoring systems, inadequate legislative framework, and other. taking into account the abovementioned, it should be emphasized the need to build a unified national system for monitoring and auditing the effectiveness of programs and projects implemented with the help of funds under the legislation of ukraine. it goes about the cooperation with international donor organizations, state regional development fund, business entities, ngos and all stakeholders thereof. references birdsall n., kharas h., 2014, the quality of official development assistance (quoda), center for global development and brookings institution, washington, http://www. cgdev.org/publication/quality-official-developmentassistance-quoda-third-edition [20.11.2016] development co-operation report 2005, 2006, oecd publishing, paris, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/ development-co-operation-report-2005_dcr-2005-en [23.11.2016] development co-operation report 2016: the sustainable development goals as business opportunities, 2016, oecd publishing, paris, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ development/development-co-operation-report-2016_ dcr-2016-en [20.11.2016]. dunn w.n., 2009, public policy analysis: an introduction, longman, new york. fordelone t.y., 2009, triangular co-operation and aid effectiveness, working paper, oecd development cooperation directorate, www.oecd.org/dac/46387212.pdf [20.11.2016]. mcgee r., 2013, aid transparency and accountability: ‘build it and they’ll come’? development policy review, 31, 107– 124. regulation (eu) no 232/2014 of the european parliament and of the council of 11 march 2014 establishing a european neighbourhood instrument, 2014, official journal of the european union, i.77/29. weimer d.; vining a., 2005, policy analysis: concepts and practice. upper saddle river, pearson prentice hall, new york. white h., 2011, an introduction to the use of randomized control trials to evaluate development interventions, working paper  9, international initiative for impact evaluation, new delhi, http://www.3ieimpact.org/media/ filer/2012/05/07/working_paper_9.pdf [23.11.2016] williams g., jones  s., imber  v., cox  a., 2003, a vision for the future of technical assistance in the international development system – final report, oxford policy management, http://www.opml.co.uk/sites/default/files/ acf54001_0.pdf [23.11.2016] арчибальд р., 2010, управление высокотехнологичными программами и проектами, компания айти, дмк пресс, москва. базилюк а.в., 2010, економічні наслідки міжнародної технічної допомоги в організації агробізнесу україни, актуальні проблеми економіки, 9(111), 24–34. васильєва м.о., 2010, нова парадигма ефективності зарубіжної допомоги розвитку, актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин, 93(1), 103–107. гнидюк н.а., 2011, механізм координації політики європейської інтеграції в україні, abstract of thesis for obtaining the scientific degree of candidate of public administartion on specialty 25.00.0, національна академія державного управління при президентові україни, одеський регіональний інститут державного управління, одеса. корюкалов м.в., 2012, політика європейського союзу із надання зовнішньої допомоги для розвитку, abstract of thesis for obtaining the scientific degree of candidate of political sciences on specialty 23.00.04, київський національний університет імені тараса шевченка, київ. кравчук і.в., 2015, теоретико-методологічні засади оцінювання державної політики в україні, abstract of thesis for obtaining the scientific degree of candidate of public administartion on specialty 25.00.02, національна академія державного управління при президентові україни, київ. палюх о.о., 2012, реформування системи використання міжнародної технічної допомоги в україні, abstract of thesis for obtaining the scientific degree of candidate of economic sciences on specialty 08.00.03, міністерство економічного розвитку і торгівлі, науково-дослідний економічний інститут, київ. паризька декларація щодо підвищення ефективності зовнішньої допомоги, 2007, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/998_271 [19.04.2007] плоский к.в., 2013, актуальні завдання розвитку державного управління щодо залучення міжнародної технічної допомоги в україні, [in:] зб. тез хііі міжнар. наук. конгресу, харків, 21–22 берез. 2013 р. – х., вид-во харрі наду «магістр», харків, 322–324. про порядок підготовки, реалізації, проведення моніторингу та завершення реалізації проектів економічного і соціального розвитку україни, що підтримуються міжнародними фінансовими організаціями : постанова кабінету міністрів україни, 2016 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/70-2016-%d0%bf/page [27.01.2016] про створення єдиної системи залучення, використання та моніторингу міжнародної технічної допомоги: постанова кабінету міністрів україни, 2002, http:// 76 polina yurijivna kulish zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/153-2002-%d0%bf [19.08.2015] про схвалення стратегії залучення, використання та моніторингу міжнародної технічної допомоги і співробітництва з міжнародними фінансовими організаціями на 2013-2016 роки: розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни, 2013, http://zakon5.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/697-2013-%d1%80 [11.09.2013] 1. introduction education is a strategic resource for socio-economic and social and cultural development, improve the welfare of people, ensuring the interests of the nation, growth of prestige and international competitiveness of the state. the process of european rapprochement of ukraine takes place in several areas, the main of them is education. the formation and further development and improvement of the public administration of higher education in ukraine is also directed to the new searches of the development and implementation of an effective system of public administration that can provide the educational branch by the best operating conditions, to provide a comprehensive mechanism of its regulation at the national, regional and local levels, at the universities and scientific institutions. with the unification and improvement of the strategy of further development of the system of public administration of education, the considering of the historical experience of the public administration of education is very important, because the journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 19–23 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.003.6202 mechanisms of public administration in the field of professional training of civil protection staff svetlana mykolaivna dombrovska (1), volodymyr petrovich sadkovyi (2) (1) educational-scientific-production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: dombrovska_s@mail.ru (2) educational-scientific-production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: dergupr@nuczu.edu.ua citation dombrovska s.m., sadkovyi v.p., 2017, mechanisms of public administration in the field of professional training of civil protection staff, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 19–23. abstract it was found that in ukraine and abroad the measures that motivated to induce the state to widening the possibilities of citizens to study independent of age are realized, including the recognition of previous education. it was determined that the structure of educational area of ukraine and the field of civil protection in its ideology and goals are agreed with the education structures of the most developed countries in the world. thus for the support of the qualitative level of higher education is one of the main tasks necessary for the ukrainian social field. the quality of higher education is regulated by relevant standards and the process of unified education area in europe must be included during design of them. key words mechanisms of public administration in ukraine, professional training of staff, civil protection. 20 svetlana mykolaivna dombrovska, volodymyr petrovich sadkovyi transfer of the international models of the professional education management cannot give the positive results if the principles of national experience, and its tendencies and patterns are not taken into account (ребкало, 2007). 2. paper main body in the era of globalization the most influential factors of social dynamics become information, science and education. the person who has mastered the basics of science, knows the newest methods of perception and transmission of information, educated and practically prepared in the first place in the professional, linguistic and ideological context will be competitive in the future. that is why the global transformation processes are unfolding in the education system, science and information technology. partially they are implemented in ukraine. however, despite some progress, the situation in this field of ukraine is difficult. development, a comprehensive discussion and adoption of the national doctrine of education development of ukraine in the xxi century – is the first step on the way of bringing our education system into line with the requirements of globalization. the second step would be the phased implementation of the doctrine, the third is the recognition of the european and world community of national education as a self-sufficient and competitive. by the decree of the president of ukraine dated 25.06.2013 № 344/2013 “the national strategy of education development in ukraine for the period until 2021” (указ…, 2013), which is based on the analysis of the modern state of development of education defined the purpose, strategic directions and main objectives which should be aimed to implement the state policy in the sphere of education is approved (сбруєва, 2013). first of all the new national strategy of our country caused by the need of fundamental changes, aimed at the improving the quality and international competitiveness of the education branch in the new economic and socio-cultural conditions, accelerating of european integration into the new educational area. it outlines the main ways of implementing ideas, concepts and views for further development of the education defined in the national doctrine of development of the education field. for the purpose of the rapid process of reforming the higher education system and the qualitative realization of the strategy of sustainable development “ukraine – 2020” (указ…, 2013) the very important special-purpose programs of the state level for the higher education development are approved. according the strategy 25 indicators have to be achieved and two of them are concerned system of secondary education: 75 per cent of secondary schools allumni should use at least two foreign languages, confirmed by international certificates; ukraine will participate in the international pisa study and will enter the top 50 states – participants of the study (указ…, 2013, p. 5). recent years have caused a number of measures for the implementation of main ideas and regulations of the national doctrine of higher education during reforming of the educational branch, improving its quality, availability and competitiveness. modernization of the content and improvement of the organization of all branches of high professional education, creation of the new educational textbooks are given the development of the national education system in modern conditions, which takes into account all changes in the area of social life, historical requiments of the xxi century, that require the critical thinking of obtained and concentrating of efforts and resources on solving of the most pressing problems that impede further development and do not give an opportunity to provide the quality education to the modern historical period. also a practice of shadow reporting should be taken into consideration. this report evaluates the progress in implementing the key reforms in higher education of ukraine, which were determined by the new version of the law “on higher education” (закон…, 2014). the report covers the topics of the development of a new quality assurance system in higher education, enhancement of the universities’ academic and financial autonomy, ensurance of transparent university entrance criteria and procedures, integration of ukraine’s higher education system with the european higher education area (реформа…, 2016). among these problems, the most pressing are: • the insufficient compliance of educational services to the demands of society, the needs of the individual, the requests of the labour market; • the limited access to quality education for the various categories of population (children who live in the rural areas, children with the exceptional learning needs, the gifted students, migrants’ children); • the absence of the integrated system of education, physical training, moral and spiritual development and socialization of children and youth; • the lowering of the public morality, spirituality and behavior culture of some students; • the insufficient focus of the structure and content of vocational, high and postgraduate education mechanisms of public administration in the field of professional training of civil protection staff 21 to the needs of the labour market and modern economic requirements; • the unimproved of the effective system of the high educational institutions graduates’ employment and their professional support; • the insufficient development of the childcare institutions system; • the unimproved of the system of national monitoring and evaluation of the quality of education; • slow implementation of the humanization, environment and informatization of the education system, introduction in the educational process of innovative information and communication technologies; • the insufficient level of the social normative protection of the members of the educational process, the absence of the integrated system of the socio-economic encouragements for the pedagogical and scientific-pedagogical staff, the low wages of such employers; • the low level of the financial-economic, materialtechnical, educational-methodical and information support of the educational institutions, the weak motivation of society and business to the invest of education; • the availability in the system of facts of inefficient using of the financial and material resources creation, inappropriate use of the educational establishments facilities; • the absence of the system of motivation and stimulation of innovative activities in the education system, the leveling of risks in the mentioned activities; • the insufficient development of public self-government of educational establisments, the unimproved of the mechanisms of attraction to the management of education and its renewal of civil society institutions and the community. the difficult period of reforms, the process of systemic socio-economic instability, and environmental issues are caused risks that complicate the process of realization of the goals and tasks of the national strategy. among them there are: • the economic instability, limited volume resources to ensure systematic realization of all tasks and activities defined by the national strategy; • the discrimination of society by the families’ financial condition; • the negative influence of the difficult demographic situation; • the untaking of the new reforms by the part of society; • the unavailability of the part of education employers to the innovative activities; • the insufficient preparing of the education authorities to the new complex tasks, to the ensuring of the coordination activities of all services and institutions. the priority education development can have the permanent nonterminating nature, to respond to the major processes occurring in ukraine and the world community. the formation of further high-quality level of education should be aimed at ensuring of the economic stability in the country and the solution of social problems of the ukrainian society, further personal training and development. the quality education should be required condition for the constant democratic development of society. that is why these changes relate to the creation of the new educational standards, updating and revision of the educational programs, the contents of educational didactic materials, textbooks, forms and methods of training. the purposeful getting of knowledge, skills and abilities by youth, their transformation into competences assists to thepersonal cultural development, the technology development, the ability to respond quickly to the requirements of the time. today european countries began the grand discussion how to provide the necessary skills and knowledge to ensure the harmonious interaction with the technological society which is developing rapidly to a person. that is why it is important to understand the concept of competence in the society, that is based on knowledge. the main tasks of the comprehensive reform of the higher education in our state is the transformation of quantitative indicators of the educational services into the qualitative ones. this constantly evolving process can be based on such principles (головко, 2009): 1. it is the national idea of high education, the content of which is preserved and increase of the national educational traditions. higher education is intended to educate the citizen of the state of ukraine, harmoniously developed person, for which the need for the basic knowledge and to raise the educational and professional level is associated with the strengthening of the state. 2. the development of higher education must obey the laws of the market economy, that is the law of labor division, the law of the shift of labour and the law of competition, as the economic field is extremely important in forming of the logic of social development. at the same time, it should be considered the important factors – social, political, specifics of the spiritual life, social consciousness, culture, and moral values. 22 svetlana mykolaivna dombrovska, volodymyr petrovich sadkovyi the main part of the problems which has accumulated in the system of high education, associated with the imbalance of the complex of the mentioned factors of social change. 3. the development of higher education should be considered in the context of trends in the world educational systems, including european. especially, to allow the legislative and regulatory framework of higher education of ukraine to the world requirements, respectively to structure the higher education system and its components, to organize the list of specialties, to review the content of high education, to provide communication of the educational process and access to the international information systems. the high school is necessary to focus not only on the specialty market, but to fill the education content by the modern materials, to introduce the modern teaching technologies with a high level of communication of the educational process, to go to creative, business relationships with the specialist customers. in ukraine these trends and features of development are complicated by the fact that occured on the background of processes of the deep transformation of both the socio-political structure and socio-economic structure, but also the psychology of the public, the system of life values and objectives, the moral and ethical paradigms (свістович, 2007). in ukraine the education is acknowledged as one of the human values, its most fundamental component. the trend of modern policy and strategy of the state is aimed at further development of the national education system, its adaptation to the conditions of the socially oriented economy, transformation and integration into european and world community. today the community has begun to recognize the fundamentally new role of education in the modern information world, so it has become one of the most important factors of politics (ситник, 2003). unfortunetly specialized higher education institutions, associated with ministry of home affair, ministry of defence and other line agencies responsible for security issues in ukraine, haven’t a policy and associated procedures for the assurance of the quality and standards of their programmes and awards. they have some culture which recognises the importance of quality, but any strategy for the continuous enhancement of quality wasn’t developed and implemented according to standards and guidelines for quality asssurance in the european higher education area (standards…, 2015, p. 16; association…, annex xlii). 3. conclusions of the research therefore, today in ukraine the program of learning is carrying through out a person’s life. the countries that including in the bologna process, indicate the important contribution of higher education in the implementation of constant learning into reality. they take measures to guide the national policy of their countries to this goal and to encourage the high educational establishments to increase opportunities to learn independently of age, including the recognition of the previous education. they point that such actions should be an integral part of the activities of high education. the structure of the educational area of ukraine for their ideology and objectives is coordinated with the structures of education in the most developed countries of the world (сиченко, 2010). recently, in ukraine it has done a lot to expand access to higher education by increasing acceptance, early career guidance, ensuring greater objectivity of entrance examinations. the main hope for the improvement of the situation with the objective of the accession process in ukraine was performed by independent (external) testing. the increasing of objectivity worthy of the knowledge estimation of graduates passes through the external testing, and consists in the using of rating system. the ensuring of the quality of higher education is one of the main tasks, inseparable from the ukrainian social area. the quality of higher education is significantly governed by the standards of high education. in the development of these standards takes into account the processes of creation of the unified educational area in europe. taking the purpose of the independent assurance of the qualitative indices of educational activity, the legislation of ukraine provides transparent and clear mechanism of its regulation, the main components of which are the institutions of licensing, certification and accreditation. under the terms of accreditation the diploma of the state sample is issued. the assessment is carried out by the expert commission on the final learning results, the competencies of graduates, the requirements for which are stipulated in the relevant normative documents and standards of higher education. the government constantly monitors the quality of education and training using the quality indicators of higher education that has acquired the person as a result of the implementation by the higher educational establisment of vocational training programmes according to the criteria achievement of the higher education goals. mechanisms of public administration in the field of professional training of civil protection staff 23 also higher education institutions should develop their own internal quality assurance processes, and if those processes properly assure quality and standards, then external quality assurance state agencies might be less important than otherwise. references association agreement between the european union and its member states, of the one part, and ukraine, of the other part, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri =uriserv:oj.l_.2014.161.01.0003.01.eng [25.10.2016] standards and guidelines for quality asssurance in the european higher education area (esg), 2015, brussels, http://www. enqa.eu/index.php/home/esg/ [30.10.2016] головко б.а., 2009, реформування вищої освіти у процесі демократизації українського суспільства, видавництво “київ. ун-т“, київ. закон україни «про вищу освіту» від 01.07.2014 р. № 1556vii., 2014, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1556-18 [30.10.2016] ребкало в., 2007, ціннісні виміри державно-управлінської діяльності в україні, вісник наду, 4, 151–163. реформа вищої освіти україни: реалізація профільного закону в 2014–2016 рр., 2016, http:// parlament.org.ua/ wp-content/uploads/2016/12/he-shadow-report-final. pdf [24.10.2016] сбруєва а., 2013, інтернаціоналізація вищої освіти: пріорітети комплексної стратегії європейського союзу, вища освіта україни, 3, 89–95. свістович о.м., 2007, особливості діяльності рятівних служб україни, видавництво “прогрес“, харків. ситник г.п., 2003, state administration in the field of national security of ukraine, thesis of doctor of sciences in state administration: 25.00.01, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, кyiv. сиченко в.в., 2010, механізми регулювання системи освіти: сучасний стан та перспективи розвитку, юговосток, донецьк. указ президента україни «про національну стратегію розвитку освіти в україні на період до 2021 року» від 25 червня 2013 року № 344/2013, 2013, http://zakon5.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/344/2013 [24.10.2016] указ президента україни «про стратегію сталого розвитку „україна – 2020” від 12 січня 2015 року № 5/2015, 2015, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/5/2015 [25.10.2016] 1. introduction green (ecological) parties emerged began to appear on the european political scene in the late 1970s and 1980s. their formation coincided and was a consequence of significant changes in social values of the inhabitants of highly developed countries, the progressing ecological threats, and the disappointment of the young generation with the consensual politics of the two dominant political doctrines in western europe – social democracy and christian democrats. the characteristic features of the emerging green parties were the reluctance to mainstream parliamentary politics, which – according to activists – was unable to work out effective solutions to the ecological problems facing mankind at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. initially, their demands concerned only environmental issues. then greens formulated the other elements of the political agenda: attitude to economic policy, a vision of the political system, a vision of social justice, methods of solving social conflicts, the desired model of foreign policy (carter, 2007; castells, 2010; gahrton, 2015; grant, tilley, 2018). in western europe, the german green party (die grünen), established in 1980, has a special tradition, position in the political system, and relevance. its first election successes in the 1980s, followed by participation in governments at the regional and central level (coalition with the spd in 1998–2005), showed the growing importance of post-material values among western european societies including journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(2), 45–51 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.2.06 german green party: the evolution of political agenda emil kwidziński institute of political sciences, university of gdansk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-4663-3973 e-mail: emil.kwidzinski@phdstud.ug.edu.pl citation kwidziński e., 2020, german green party: the evolution of political agenda, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(2), 45–51. abstract the purpose of the article is to present the evolution of the political agenda of the german green party (die grünen) between 1980 (establishment of the party, its first program manifesto – das bundesprogramm) and 2017 (recent german federal elections program – zukunft wird aus mut gemacht. bundestagswahlprogramm). the research was conducted on the basis of the literature and the comparison of the two mentioned program manifestos. the hypothesis of the work is that the successes of the greens in west germany mainly result from the ideological, program, and strategic reorientation of the party that took place at the turn of 1980s and 1990s. key words german green party, die grünen, the greens, germany, bundestag elections. received: 30 may 2020 accepted: 17 august 2020 published: 20 november 2020 46 emil kwidziński concern for the environment which is increasingly devastated by industrial and technological development (kaelberer, 1998; tranter, western, 2009). the purpose of the article is to present the evolution of the political agenda of the german green party (die grünen) between 1980 (establishment of the party, first program manifesto – das bundesprogramm) and 2017 (recent german federal elections program – zukunft wird aus mut gemacht. bundestagswahlprogramm). the research was conducted on the basis of the literature and the comparison of the two mentioned program manifestos. 2. results and discussion the german green party (die grünen) was founded in 1980 in the process of institutionalizing many grassroots ecological movements. wacław miziniak mentions seven stages in the process of forming the german greens – from the birth of the first west german environmental organizations to the final elaboration of the political program (miziniak, 1990). the first stage (1950–1971) consisted of the activities of spontaneously created ecological organizations and initiatives expressing the need for an active role of society and the state in protecting the increasingly degraded natural environment. apart from ecological demands, there were often pacifist (opposition to the war in vietnam, disagreement with the presence of american troops in germany), anti-nuclear (opposition to the construction of nuclear power plants), anti-capitalist (opposition to the market economy, which in the opinion of activists was responsible for the exploitation of nature) and counterculture (pansexual slogans, undermining the applicable moral norms). a significant part of the activity of environmental activists was broader and enormously influencing non-parliamentary politics of the new left. this movement postulated a radical transformation of society and the state, inspired by the works of neo-marxist philosophers of the frankfurt school, primarily herbert marcuse and max horkheimer (heywood, 2017). the remaining six stages of the german greens formation process included: numerous formation of local ecological initiatives focusing on specific issues, such as preventing the storage of radioactive waste (1971–1977); establishment of the first west german environmental party – grüne liste umweltschutz (1977); formation national ecological federations and the first attempts to develop a joint program (1977–1979); establishment of the first federal environmental organization (1979); the constitution of the green party and its first participation in the elections to the bundestag (1980); expansion of the structures of the green party, development of the program and first successes in the elections to the bundestag and the european parliament (1981–1984) (miziniak, 1990). the greens were portraying themselves as an “anti-party” criticizing the west german establishment (michalak, 2011), a party rejecting the division into right and left, aspiring to overcome barren – in their opinion – disputes over secondary issues for the country’s future. they opposed the traditional politics based solely on the activity of the parties which claimed a monopoly in shaping the social reality. they were created for the advocates of change, not only in the anthropocentric way of thinking about the surrounding nature but also in the understanding of democracy and the relationship between citizens and power (the postulate of participatory grassroots democracy and democratization of larger areas of the social life than before) (jarausch, milder, 2015). from the very beginning of functioning of the german green party, there was no agreement among its activists as to the desired shape of the two areas of the party’s operation. one was the ideological orientation; the other one regarded the preferred forms of political activity and attitudes towards participation in parliamentary politics. the first problem concerned the spirit in which the party’s program should be built – “deep” or “shallow” ecology (barry, 1994). the second one was associated with controversy regarding the degree of integration and cooperation with other parties, well-established on the west german political scene – primarily the centerleft spd, with which there was the best chance of working out common program points and a possible coalition in the federal states or at the central level (barry, 1994; doherty, 1992). the two areas of dispute – theory and practice – were closely related. in this way, a visible problem emerged from the very beginning – the demands of some activists, related to “deep” ecology, seeking a radical reconstruction of the relationship between man (state, economy) and nature – condemned to failure the possibility of implementing at least some moderate postulates of “green politics”. the two mentioned problems – a different attitude to the “shallow” and “deep” ecology and the mainstream party – led to a significant division among the german greens. it was reflected in the formation of two factions – realists and fundamentalists (fundnis). this division was a natural consequence of the first significant election successes of the greens, primarily in the 1983 elections to the bundestag, as a result of which the party introduced 28 deputies to the bundestag (miziniak, german green party: the evolution of political agenda 47 1990). it should be noted that the essence of the division into realistic and fundamentalist trends did not apply only to the german greens but to all major ecological parties in western europe (doherty, 1992; kwidziński, 2015). realists proposed a strategy of “small steps”, which was to come down to the implementation of the main program postulates through cooperation with other parties in the parliament. they were opposed to radical program points, such as the total negation of the free market economy or the ecocentric vision of politics. they were also open to possible coalition talks and compromises, which, according to them, did not have to mean giving up the principled postulates included in the program documents. realists were convinced that only cooperation could lead to an increase in the significance and relevance of the party on the west german political scene, and, consequently, to the prospect of effective implementation of ecological postulates. the realists faced a serious problem in the first years of the greens’ activity. on the one hand, they had to be credible for this part of the party’s activists emphasizing uncompromising anti-establishment slogans and far-reaching postulates of social change. on the other hand, they had to take into account that the chances of implementing at least some postulates increase in the circumstances of political cooperation with the political mainstream. the most important politicians from the realist faction were joschka fischer and otto schily (miziniak, 1990). fundamentalists positioned themselves in opposition to realists. their basic feature was their program-uncompromising attitude, an aversion to any modification of the postulates, which in their case related to elements of “deep” ecology, ruled out the possibility of any coalition talks. the main representatives of the fundamentalists were jutta ditfurth, milan horacek, rudolf bahro, and most of all petra kelly, who became known not only as a charismatic politician but also a political writer and theorist (miziniak, 1990). in her works, she combined ecological, feminist, socialist, and pacifist elements, largely contributing to the enrichment of the theory of ecologism (richter, 2015). during the four decades of the greens’ functioning on the german political scene, their program has significantly evolved and changed under the influence of internal factors (dynamics of the german political system, relations of factions within the party itself ) and external factors (international politics, geopolitical situation). the first program created in 1980 was a compromise worked out by sometimes significantly different circles, from ecological socialists (ökosozialisten) and activists sympathizing with ultra-left organizations, to moderate activists, for whom the priority was not a radical reconstruction of society, but only liberal politics in line with the spirit of “sustainable development” of the state and economy (ökolibertaren). the clearest, however, was the division into realists and fundamentalists, two factions with strong personalities and charismatic leaders – j. fischer and p. kelly (jarausch, milder, 2015). the disputes, not only on the agenda but also more broadly – ideological ones – led to the fact that the first program manifesto of the german greens, created under the influence of both realists and fundamentalists, was inconsistent and had the character of general priorities. among them, however, there were “four pillars of green politics”, defining the greens in the initial phase of their activity, being the common denominator of the greens’ political agenda, and intended to determine the meaning and direction of their activities. these pillars were as follows: “ecological wisdom”, grassroots democracy, social justice, and nonviolence (pacifism) (carter, 2017). in the 1980 program, the greens emphasized their opposition to nuclear energy – they called for the immediate suspension of work on nuclear energy and the dismantling of existing reactors. moreover, they proposed the transformation of the economy into one with a “dynamic circular”, they pointed to the need to build an “ecological quality economy”, in which profits should be limited by the well-being of all living creatures. they opted for the production of durable and repairable consumer goods, instead of disposable products, wider use of recycling in the economy, abandoning technologies that permanently disturb the ecological balance. in the context of ecology, they devoted a lot of attention to changing urban trends into “greener” and more friendly to residents solutions (including promoting low-rise buildings, expanding green zones and quiet zones in cities, extending bicycle paths, abandoning the construction of expressways in recreational regions, replace road transport with the railway to reduce exhaust emissions) (das bundesprogramm, 1980). in the area of social, economic, and internal policy, the greens advocated reducing working hours to 35 hours a week while maintaining the current income, equal earnings of men and women in the same workplace, supporting the economic independence of women, and guaranteeing an 18-month childcare leave, supporting single parents with their offspring (das bundesprogramm, 1980). in the initial phase of their activity, the greens were the most radical in the field of defense and foreign policy – their demands were associated with 48 emil kwidziński pacifism and anti-militarism. the party called for the dissolution of the bundeswehr, the withdrawal of american troops from germany and western europe, germany’s exit from nato, and the creation of a nuclear-free zone throughout europe. however, the greens did not seek to change the geopolitical status quo in europe, accepting the existence of two german states. all these radical postulates, inconsistent with the geopolitical situation, were to be implemented under the new “ecological foreign policy” based on pacifism (das bundesprogramm, 1980). the political agenda of the greens resulting from their first program in 1980 was built under the influence of both fundamentalists and realists. the slogan “unity in diversity” promoted by party leaders was to express the conviction that the differentiation of views within the organization serves its development in the spirit of pluralism and democratization, and in itself can be a model to be followed by mainstream parties. however, the future showed otherwise. ultimately, “unity” took precedence over “diversity” – already in 1985–1988, fundamentalists largely lost their importance after joschka fischer joined the government of the hessian landtag with spd politicians, and j. dritfurth left the board (doherty, 1992). three main factors contributed to the weakening of the fundamentalist faction at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s: the first major electoral successes of the greens in the federal states and the necessity to undertake coalition talks; changes in the attitude of the party’s electorate to more liberal views; and fusion of die grünen and east german bündnis 90 oriented towards the politics of pragmatism (doherty, 1992). the real increase in the importance of the greens, but also the unequivocal end of the influence of the fundamentalist faction, came in 1998–2005 when the greens co-ruled germany for the first time at the federal level. the “red-green” coalition of the spd with the greens led by chancellor gerhard schröder has shown that environmental groups can actively shape the state’s policy and demonstrate coalition capacity if they give up some of their radical agenda points. the greatest challenge to the credibility of the greens was international and defense policy, an area in which at the beginning of its activity this grouping was characterized by extreme – for the then conditions – views consistent with the doctrine of “ecological foreign policy”. significantly, the then leader of the party, j. fischer (and at the first leader of the realist faction), received, in addition to the position of vice-chancellor, the portfolio of the minister of foreign affairs. moreover, the “red-green” government made some decisions, mainly in the field of international policy, which completely contradicted the original pacifist program of the greens (decisions on military interventions in the balkans and the middle east, close military cooperation within nato). this was the cause of serious ferment among party members. as a result of the government coalition of the greens with the spd, there has been a significant reorientation, not only of the program but also of the ideological position (blühdorn, 2009; miszczak, 2012). to illustrate the far-reaching ideological evolution and a significant departure from the elements of “deep” ecology, it is worth discussing briefly the program manifesto formulated by the german greens before the elections to the bundestag in 2017. this program consisted of ten priority areas devoted to climate protection, electromobility, sustainable agriculture, european integration, family issues and intergenerational solidarity, social security, refugees, equating the rights of women, men, and sexual minorities, personal and civic freedoms, and migrants (zukunft wird...., 2017). ecological postulates in the current political agenda of the german greens focus on counteracting the “climate catastrophe”, as some contemporary environmental activists call the man-made violent warming of the climate. the 2017 program included postulates related to this area the energy transformation, such as building an economy based solely on renewable energy sources by 2050 at the latest (and in the power industry by 2030), shutting down the twenty most polluting german coal mines by 2020 and introducing zero-emission transport by 2030. all this is to make the energy and economy more “green”, ecological, and environmentally friendly (zukunft wird...., 2017). the agenda of the greens invariably gives a lot of attention to the protection of animals. this was also reflected in the 2017 program, which stipulated that by 2030 a special system of certification of animal products should be introduced to protect animal welfare. also, the greens’ postulates in this regard include a complete ban on the industrial breeding of animals in large farms (zukunft wird...., 2017). in the area of social policy, the greens propose a model of a welfare state that actively interferes with economic processes, helps all excluded groups, people belonging to minorities (ethnic, racial, sexual), and creates a policy of supporting families with children. the main postulates in this regard included: earmarking 12 billion euro for pro-family policy, supporting women’s economic independence, more support for single parents, higher investments in the education system, reform of the pension system towards more solidarity, and equal opportunities and german green party: the evolution of political agenda 49 wages of women and men in the workplace (zukunft wird...., 2017). in the 2017 program, the greens take a broad stance on an issue that has aroused great controversy and has been discussed in recent years in western europe – immigrants and refugees. regarding these two groups, the greens propose building the foundations for an “immigrant society” (einwanderungsgesellschaft). according to the greens, the german government should provide immigrants with a possibility of free existence, provide conditions for social integration, liberalize the law on refugees and immigrants, introduce the “right of soil” (commonly referred to as birthright citizenship) (zukunft wird...., 2017). in this respect, the greens are not only tolerant of the existence of a multicultural society, but also in the vanguard of political groups whose agenda includes supporting immigrants and equating their rights with german citizens. apart from ethnic minorities, another minority group that the greens pay attention to is homosexual (non-heteronormative) people. the protection of their rights has been one of the primary demands of the greens from the very beginning of their existence on the political scene. the efforts of the greens to legalize same-sex marriage and the possibility of adoption of children by homosexual couples remain unchanged (zukunft wird...., 2017). in the area of security and defense policy, the greens are traditionally close to anti-militarist positions, but to a much lesser degree than in the 1980 manifesto. the party calls for a significant reduction in spending on the military and defense policy, opposes excessive surveillance of citizens by the services (instead calls for targeted monitoring of threats), and opts for tighter regulations on the possession and use of firearms (zukunft wird...., 2017). in the context of european affairs and foreign policy, the greens argued for the democratization of the institutional system of the european union and for increasing the competences of parliaments in creating the eu policy. they expressed their dislike of the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) between the eu and canada, which – according to the greens – lowers the standards of products, especially food products (previously, for the same reasons, the greens expressed their opposition to a similar agreement between the eu and the united states – transatlantic trade and investment partnership, ttip). the greens emphasized the need to counteract tax dumping in the eu. they also advocated a ban on the export of weapons to countries engulfed in armed conflicts and the abolition of agricultural subsidies for european farmers that they considered unfair to protect the competitiveness of agriculture from africa and low-developed countries (zukunft wird...., 2017). along with the evolution of the program, the electorate of the german greens also evolved. undoubtedly, it should be recognized that there is some feedback between a given political party and its electorate. on the one hand, it consists of the fact that citizens choose parties that reflects their views and aspirations (the function of representing political parties). on the other hand, the views of voters are to some extent shaped and modified by politicians themselves in the process of socialization of the electorate and communication with citizens. this is shown by the example of the german greens – as a result of changes in world views in their base electorate, there have also been changes in the political program and strategy of the party to more centrist positions (carter, 2007). 3. conclusions following the political activity of the german greens from their inception to the present day, as well as analyzing their two distant program documents from 1980 and 2017, it should be stated that this grouping has evolved in terms of both ideology and program, as well as the practiced political strategy. initially, the greens were close to political fundamentalism. this is evidenced by their ideological roots (radical and counter-cultural movement of the new left), program elements (significant influence of ecocentrism on program postulates, contesting the free market economy, aversion to representative forms of democracy, design of a new international policy in line with the “ecological foreign policy” and rejecting the classic realpolitik) or creating an anti-establishment “anti-party” reluctant to enter into closer relations with germany’s political mainstream. it should be noted, however, that since the very beginning of the activity of the german green party, moderate factions (realists, eco-liberals) have existed, which have ultimately dominated the party’s functioning in terms of the program and political strategy. the best example was the “red-green” government and the leading position of j. fischer in it. so the greens finally succumbed to what krzysztof zuba (2015, p. 26) calls “the mainstreamization of radical movements”, i.e. integration with mainstream politics. on the other hand, due to several decades of the greens’ activity in germany, the german party system has been “greened”. the two groups with the greatest political relevance – cdu / csu and spd – have opened up to environmental issues to 50 emil kwidziński mobilize a part of the electorate for which ecological demands are an important motivation for political elections, and to facilitate possible coalition talks with the increasingly relevant green party. this process can be observed in all political systems of western europe, as well as in the european union, where the environmental policy adopts more and more ambitious plans. an example is the european green deal proposed by the european commission in 2019, which provides, among others, introducing the “circular economy” – an original element of the german greens program (communication from…, 2019). so the potential of “political blackmail” of european green parties, combined with changes in social values (towards those of a post-material nature) and growing environmental problems, lead to the introduction of elements of “green politics” into the political mainstream. today, issues directly related to the narrowly understood ecology occupy a smaller part of the political agenda of the german greens, but they belong to the priority areas which define this grouping as compared to other german parties. the greens’ agenda is part of the broader “social ecology”, invariably containing the postulates of grassroots democratization of many areas of the social life, social justice, emphasizing the freedom of the individual, civil liberties and the right to self-realization, equality of minority groups, opposition to the neoliberal vision of the free market and pacifism. despite the traditional contestation by politicians of the green party against the division into right and left, the listed components of the political agenda of bündnis 90/die grünen make it clear that the party is placed on the left side of the political scene. the greens’ agenda includes both “deep” and “shallow” ecology elements, but the “deep” ones are much less emphasized since the fundamentalist faction has less influence on the party’s functioning. summing up, the most important areas of political transformation that the green party has undergone throughout the four decades of its functioning are the departure from fundamentalism in favor of pragmatism, an ideological transformation towards a political center, the associated increase in coalition capabilities and an increase in political relevance, and 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sociology, 60(1), 145–167. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.01222.x zuba k., 2015, pomiędzy pragmatyzmem a radykalizmem. ideologia w dobie postideologii (eng. between pragmatism and radicalism. ideology in the era of post-ideology), [in:] m. marczewska-rytko, w. ziętara (eds.), ideologie, german green party: the evolution of political agenda 51 doktryny, ruchy społeczne i polityczne. wybrane problemy (eng. ideologies, doctrines, social and political movements. selected problems), wydawnictwo umcs, lublin. zukunft wird aus mut gemacht. bundestagswahlprogramm 2017, 2017, bündnis 90/die grünen, berlin. 1. introduction throughout the 20th century, the population of russia was growing steadily, until 1992. with the collapse of the soviet union, the number of inhabitants began to decline steadily, mainly due to migration, as well as due to natural population loss. every year the demographic situation in the russian federation became more alarming. the population of the country gradually decreased, thus having a negative impact on socio-economic processes and threatening the territorial integrity of the country (kazalieva et al., 2018). in 2010, as a result of the government’s implementation of a new demographic policy, for the first time since the 1990s, a positive increase in the country’s population was recorded, which occurred only due to a positive migration balance. in 2013 for the first time after a 20-year break, natural population growth was registered in russia. journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(4), 23–32 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.04 population of the north caucasus at the present stage: indicators of regional differentiation vera v. minenkova (1), anna v. kazalieva (2) (1) institute of geography, geology, tourism and service, kuban state university, stavropolskaya 149, 350040 krasnodar, russia, orcid 0000-0003-4184-2522 e-mail: minenkova@inbox.ru (corresponding author) (2) institute of geography, geology, tourism and service, kuban state university, stavropolskaya 149, 350040 krasnodar, russia. e-mail: kazalieva.an@yandex.ru citation minenkova v.v., kazalieva a.v., 2020, population of the north caucasus in the present stage: indicators of regional differentiation, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(4), 23–32. abstract based on the collected statistical material, the analysis of population changes in the north caucasus regions since the last allrussian population census until 2018 was conducted. the article considers the main factors of the current population reproduction, and trends in the dynamics of the population in the north caucasus were set. based on the obtained data, the subjects of the north caucasus are divided into two categories. the first are russian-speaking regions where the absolute population growth is observed due to a positive migration balance that covers the natural decline of the population. the other category includes mainly national republics with a high natural growth that covers a significant migration outflow of the population. despite the favorable demographic situation in the region under study, there is a trend towards the end of the demographic boom that is typical of the entire north caucasus region. in general, there is a stabilization of the birth rate and natural growth, and a decrease in the intensity of migration movements. key words population reproduction, migration, north caucasus. received: 14 august 2020 accepted: 12 november 2020 published: 31 december 2020 24 vera v. minenkova, anna v. kazalieva the north caucasus is one of the few regions of the russian federation where, despite the all-russian trend, the population has continued to grow, both throughout the crisis period and at the present time. this article examines the dynamics and factors of population change in the north caucasus. the subjects located on the territory of the north caucasus as a geographical object are analyzed. for this reason, data for the rostov region are not included in this study. the article is based on the application of statistical and comparative geographical methods. statistical information obtained from the official data of the federal state statistics service of the russian federation is used. 2. results and discussion according to official data for 2020, the population of the north caucasus was 16,070 thousand people, or 11% of the total population of the russian federation. the population has increased by 1 million since 2010, which indicates a positive dynamics of population reproduction. table 1 reflects the absolute population size by year of both the north caucasus as a whole and each region separately. krasnodar region holds the leading position in terms of absolute population among the regional subjects and has had a stable population growth of 8.6% over the past 10 years. the largest population growth is observed in the republic of ingushetia (23%), the chechen republic (16.5%), the republic of dagestan (6.9%), and the republic of adygea (5.3%). kabardino-balkaria and the stavropol region complete the list with a slight increase in population – 1% and 0.6%, respectively. the republics of north ossetia-alania and karachay-cherkessia are subjects with negative population dynamics for the period under review. compared to 2010, by the beginning of 2020, the population of these regions has decreased by 2.2% and 2.6%, respectively (kazalieva, minenkova, 2019). thus, the most intensive population growth occurs in the chechen republic and ingushetia, followed by the krasnodar region and the republic of dagestan. the chechen republic (14.9 people per 1000 population) is the leader in natural population growth in the north caucasus (fig.1), followed by the republics of ingushetia (13 people per 1000 population) and dagestan (10 people per 1000 population). growth in the chechen republic and the republic of ingushetia peaked in 2010–2011. this situation is explained by the fairly stable national traditions of these republics. in contrast to other regions of the country, there is the least number of divorces and traditionally a large number of children in families. among other things, these three republics have the lowest mortality rates and the highest number of centenarians. the decrease in natural growth in tab. 1. dynamics of the population of russia and the north caucasus regions from 2010 to 2020 (thousand people; data for january 1 of each year) ye ar ru ss ia n f ed er at io n n o rt h c au ca su s k ra sn o d ar re g io n st ra vr o p o l r eg io n r ep u b lic o f a d yg ea r ep u b lic o f d ag es ta n r ep u b lic o f i n g u sh et ia k ab ar d in o -b al ka r r ep u b lic k ar ac h ay -c h er ke ss r ep u b lic r ep u b lic o f n o rt h o ss et ia -a la n ia r ep u b lic o f c h ec h n ya 2010 143263.0 15095.3 5226.6 2786.3 439.8 2910.2 412.5 859.9 477.9 713.0 1269.0 2011 142865.0 15109.2 5230.0 2786.0 440.0 2914.2 415.0 860.0 477.0 712.0 1275.0 2012 143056.0 15219.0 5283.4 2787.0 443.0 2930.4 430.0 859.0 475.0 709.0 1302.0 2013 143347.0 15316.2 5330.2 2791.0 445.0 2946.0 442.0 859.0 472.0 706.0 1325.0 2014 143667.0 15440.3 5404.3 2794.0 446.0 2963.9 453.0 859.0 470.0 704.0 1346.0 2015 146267.0 15561.7 5453.3 2799.0 449.0 2990.4 464.0 861.0 469.0 706.0 1370.0 2016 146545.0 15683.5 5513.8 2802.0 451.0 3015.7 473.0 862.0 468.0 704.0 1394.0 2017 146804.0 15800.9 5570.9 2804.0 454.0 3042.0 481.0 865.0 466.0 703.0 1415.0 2018 146880.0 15880.0 5603.4 2801.0 454.0 3064.0 488.0 865.0 466.0 702.0 1437.0 2019 146781.0 15970.0 5648.2 2795.2 455.0 3086.1 497.4 866.2 465.6 699.3 1457.0 2020 146749.0 16070.0 5675.5 2803.6 463.1 3110.9 507.1 868.4 465.5 697.0 1478.7 source: regiony…, čislennost’… population of the north caucasus in the present stage: indicators of regional differentiation 25 recent years is explained by the fact that, for example, in the chechen republic there is a steady trend towards a decrease in the birth rate. according to the state statistics committee, 28.1 thousand people were born in chechnya in 2019, while in 2016 – 30 thousand, and in 2010 – 37.8 thousand people. as a result, in 2018, the birth rate in chechnya decreased to 20.2%, and in 2019 – already 19.2%. nevertheless, the birth rate in the republic is significantly higher than the national average (dinaev, 2016). the birth rate is quite high in the republic of ingushetia – 15.9%, followed by dagestan with an indicator of 14.7% and north ossetia – 12.3%. the lowest rates were recorded in the krasnodar and stavropol regions – 10.8% and 10.0%, respectively. the lowest birth rate was recorded in the republic of adygea – 9.3%, which is lower than the national average. mortality rates are steadily decreasing in all regions of the north caucasus (minenkova, kazalieva, 2020). the lowest mortality rate in russia in 2019 was observed in ingushetia – 2.9% (in 2010 – 3.6%), followed by the chechen republic – 4.3% (in 2010 – 5.3%), dagestan – 4.7% (in 2010 – 6.2%), kabardinobalkaria – 8.2% (in 2010 – 9%), karachay-cherkessia – 9% (in 2010 – 11.5%), north ossetia – 10.3% (in 2010. – 11.1%), stavropol region – 11.3% (in 2010 – 12.2%). the highest mortality rates are in the krasnodar region and the republic of adygea – 12.4%. at the same time, the decrease in the death rate does not compensate for the decrease in the birth rate; the rate of natural population growth decreases (fig. 1). the natural population growth rate is also positive in the following republics: kabardino-balkaria (3.3 people per 1000 population), north ossetia-alania (2 people per 1000 population) and karachaycherkessia (2 people per 1000 population). the situation with natural growth is less favorable in the republic of adygea and the krasnodar region (the annual population loss in both subjects is on average 0.5 people per 1000 population). in the period from 2013 to 2016, the krasnodar region recorded a positive increase (0.3–0.6 people). in 2019, a natural population decline was recorded in the krasnodar region -1.6 people per 1000 population, in adygea – -3.1 people per 1000 population. in the stavropol region from 2012 to 2017, there was a positive natural growth. in 2019 the population decline is recorded at the level of 1.3 people per 1000 population. from the presented graph (fig. 1), it follows that in recent years there has been a gradual decline in the birth rate and natural growth (gimbatov, 2013). the demographic boom that has been characteristic of the entire north caucasus region for many years is -1 .7 0 .0 0 .2 0 .0 -1 .6 -2 .21 .1 -0 .6 -0 .5 -0 .8 -2 .3 -3 .1 -1 .3 0 .0 0 .6 0 .5 -0 .9 -1 .6 1 2 .3 1 3 .4 1 3 .5 1 2 .2 1 0 .8 1 0 .0 1 7 .8 1 8 .9 1 7 .2 1 3 .8 1 2 .9 1 3 .0 5 .0 7 .0 3 .9 5 .6 4 .4 3 .3 3 .3 3 .8 3 .9 2 .5 1 .8 2 .0 3 .7 4 .4 4 .7 3 .8 2 .8 2 .0 2 0 .5 1 9 .2 1 6 .6 1 6 .2 1 4 .9 -0 .6 0 .5 1 .3 1 .3 -0 .4 -1 .3 2 3 .3 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2019 russian federation republic of adygea krasnodar region republic of dagestan republic of ingushetia kabardino-balkar republic karachay-cherkess republic republic of north ossetia-alania chechnya republic stavropol region fig. 1. dynamics of changes in natural population growth rates in the north caucasus regions from 2010 to 2018 (per 1 thousand population) source: estestvennyj… 26 vera v. minenkova, anna v. kazalieva gradually coming to an end (dovletmurzaeva et al., 2016). for simple replacement of generations, the total birth rate must be at least 2.14 people. according to this indicator, simple replacement of generations occurs only in the chechen republic (for 2019, this coefficient was 2.6). indicators of other subjects lag far behind (table 2). analyzing this indicator as a whole for the entire study period from 2010 to 2019, the dynamics in a number of subjects is disappointing. thus, despite the fact that the chechen republic currently occupies a leading position in terms of the total birth rate, this indicator has decreased by 25% compared to 2010. the same dynamics is typical of the republic of ingushetia, where the birth rate has significantly decreased compared to 2010 – by 39%. in the republic of dagestan at the beginning and end of the studied period, the indicators did not change much, but the peak of the indicator was in 2014 with 2.08 births. in the republic of adygea, the indicator also continues to decline. to date, the lowest total birth rate in the north caucasus is observed in adygea (1.38%). the table shows that the total birth rate, according to data for 2019, is quite high only in the chechen republic – there are 2.58 children per woman, which provides a natural increase in the population of this republic. in all other regions, this indicator is extremely low and cannot provide natural growth. it should be noted that until 2016, the birth rate had a constant increase in all regions of the north caucasus. since 2017, almost everywhere the total birth rate has shown a downward trend (sigareva, 2019). this situation may indicate an impending wave of a demographic crisis associated with the economic crisis in the country. the level of reproduction among representatives of the caucasian peoples is much higher than that of the russians. this is due to the deep roots of the traditional culture of the caucasian peoples, who have preserved to this day such values as family and children. the ongoing changes in the socio-economic and political spheres of the country have little impact on the traditional culture of the peoples of the north caucasus. marriage, divorce, and birth rates are closely related. today, these processes are characterized by negative dynamics in our country. the demographic policy pursued in russia does not have a positive effect. in general, there is a trend towards later marriage. the average age of women who married in 2018 was in the range of 18–24 years. at the same time, the peoples of the north caucasus traditionally have the highest proportion of married women under the age of 18 in the region. according to official data, there were a record number of marriages in 2010. the maximum number of marriages in which the bride’s age was under 18 was registered in the chechen republic in 2010 (5.8%), followed by the republic of kabardino-balkaria with a share of 4.1%. by 2015, the percentage of women who married before the age of 18 had fallen to 0.5% in the chechen republic and 2.4% in kabardino-balkaria. the huge difference in the proportion of men and women getting married under the age of 25 is especially noticeable. this indicates that women marry at younger ages much more often than men do. this difference is most clearly visible in the republic of dagestan – for 181 women married in 2018 under the age of 18, there is only 1 man. in other regions, the difference is not so obvious, mainly due to the low number of women who marry before the age of 18. there is a small number of women who are officially married under the age of 18 in the chechen republic and ingushetia. for example, in the chechen republic, only 5 women and 1 man under the age of 18 were registered for 5,101 registered marriages. the situation is similar in the republic of ingushetia. according to the statistics below, in these republics, tab. 2. indicators of the total birth rate in the subjects the north caucasus 2010–2019 subject 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 republic of adygea 1.70 1.66 1.71 1.68 1.73 1.72 1.68 1.52 1.47 1.38 krasnodar region 1.57 1.58 1.70 1.72 1.81 1.84 1.83 1.72 1.67 1.62 republic of dagestan 1.92 1.98 2.03 2.02 2.08 2.02 1.98 1.91 1.86 1.80 republic of ingushetia 2.99 2.94 2.27 2.23 2.28 1.97 1.75 1.77 1.79 1.83 kabardino-balkar republic 1.66 1.70 1.83 1.80 1.83 1.75 1.72 1.61 1.61 1.51 karachay-cherkess republic 1.51 1.54 1.63 1.67 1.65 1.54 1.52 1.43 1.43 1.48 republic of north ossetia-alania 1.84 1.86 1.96 1.98 2.01 1.93 1.89 1.75 1.83 1.75 chechnya republic 3.45 3.36 3.08 2.92 2.91 2.80 2.62 2.73 2.60 2.58 stavropol region 1.44 1.43 1.52 1.55 1.62 1.64 1.68 1.54 1.51 1.42 source: own work based on: summarnyj… population of the north caucasus in the present stage: indicators of regional differentiation 27 official marriage is often replaced by religious rites. as a result, according to official statistics, there is not a significant number of women who have married before the age of 18. the same thing happens in the 18–24 age group. most women choose to marry at these ages, while more men marry between the ages of 25 and 34. a surge in the number of marriages entered into occurred in 2010 in almost all regions, but in the following years there has been a steady decline in the number of marriages registered annually. in 2018, the lowest number of marriages in the last 30 years was recorded. the number of marriages among young people under the age of 18 and women between the ages of 18 and 24 has fallen especially sharply. in the age groups from 25 to 34 and over 35, the negative trend is not so noticeable. the main reason is the gradual increase in the age of marriage and the increase in the number of people who are students and postpone marriage until graduation. the probability of remarriage also ensures that the marriage rate is maintained at older ages. in general, following the whole of russia, the north caucasus is gradually transitioning to the so-called european type of marriage, which is characterized by an older age of entering into marriage. according to official data, the main number of marriages is in the age group from 18 to 24 years in most regions of the north caucasus. the exception is the republic of north ossetia-alania and the krasnodar region, where since 2015 the largest number of marriages is performed annually at the age of 25 to 34 years. since 2017, the same situation has been developing in the republic of karachay-cherkessia. in the stavropol region and the republic of adygea, there is also a gradual increase in the age of marriage. the most obvious indicator that characterizes the state of the population in marriage is the socalled marriage rate (table 3). the highest marriage rate is in the krasnodar region; the lowest one is in the republic of ingushetia. in comparison with 2010, in 2018, the marriage rate significantly decreased in all regions of the north caucasus, especially in dagestan, ingushetia and chechnya. it should be noted that in 2018, the tab. 3. general marriage and divorce rates in the subjects of the north caucasus (2010–2018), ‰ subject 2010 2018 marriages divorces marriages divorces republic of adygea 7.9 3.9 4.5 3.6 krasnodar region 8.6 4.5 6.9 3.8 republic of dagestan 8.1 1.5 4.8 1.4 republic of ingushetia 0.8 0.9 3.8 0.8 kabardino-balkar republic 8.2 2.7 4.5 2.4 karachay-cherkess republic 7.5 3.1 4.6 3.2 republic of north ossetia-alania 7.1 2.6 4.7 2.5 republic of chechnya 10.3 1.0 4.7 0.5 stavropol region 7.5 4.4 5.0 3.5 source: own work based on: čislo brakov... & čislo razvodov... . tab. 4. number of births out of wedlock in the subjects of the north caucasus (2010, 2015, 2018) subject 2010 2015 2018 total % total % total % republic of adygea 1146 20.1 1018 18.1 790 17.5 krasnodar region 14114 22.2 13993 18.9 11639 18.0 republic of dagestan 9287 17.8 10680 19.5 10046 20.9 republic of ingushetia 1711 15.3 1284 14.8 1038 12.0 kabardino-balkar republic 1501 11.9 1358 10.8 1105 10.2 karachay-cherkess republic 1102 18.0 976 16.9 804 16.1 republic of north ossetia-alania 2887 28.0 2317 22.6 2245 24.5 republic of chechnya 1925 5.1 5957 18.7 12520 41.8 stavropol region 8057 24.4 7909 21.7 6698 21.8 source: demograficheskij... 28 vera v. minenkova, anna v. kazalieva marriage and divorce rates were the lowest in the last 20 years. the spread of unregistered marriages also plays a negative role in the dynamics of marriage, which can be indirectly evidenced by the presence of illegitimate births. from the data shown in table 4, it follows that in russia as a whole and in the north caucasus in particular, there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of births outside of marriage between 2010 and 2018. so, if at the turn of the century in the country almost a third of all births were outside of registered marriage, today the share of such births has fallen to 21.2%, i.e. every fifth child. this situation is observed in all regions of the north caucasus, including russian-speaking regions, which indicates a positive trend. of particular note is the republic of kabardino-balkaria. in 2018, it recorded the lowest number of children born out of wedlock in the country. however, in 2018 in the chechen republic, slightly less than half of births occurred outside of marriage. at the same time, the number of such births in rural areas is significantly higher than in cities. this high number of children born to informally registered parents can be explained by the fact that in this republic religious rites replace the official registration of marriages. the divorce rate has a special influence on the process of population reproduction and the formation of the marriage and family structure of society (table 3). as can be seen from table 3, the subjects of the north caucasus are divided into two types: some are characterized by an increase in the absolute number of divorces, while others are characterized by a decrease. the first group includes dagestan, ingushetia, north ossetia-alania, karachay-cherkessia. the second group includes kabardino-balkaria, chechnya, adygea, krasnodar and stavropol regions. according to the data shown in table 3, the highest divorce rate is observed in the krasnodar region, followed by the republic of adygea and stavropol region. the minimum percentage of divorces is in the chechen republic and ingushetia, where the lowest marriage rate was recorded in 2018. in comparison with 2010, the number of divorces in 2018 in all regions of the north caucasus slightly decreased. indicators of natural population growth have negative dynamics, from which it can be concluded that population growth should be sought in increasing life expectancy and migration. to analyze the dynamics of changes in life expectancy in the subjects of the north caucasus, refer to table 5. the table shows the average life expectancy of both sexes. for clarity, the data are for the beginning and end of the period under review – 2010 and 2018. data presented in table 5 show that life expectancy increased markedly between 2010 and 2018. although overall life expectancy in the north caucasus is significantly higher than the national average, there are significant regional differences (from 73.56 in adygea to 82.4 in ingushetia). at the same time, from 2010 to 2018, there was a noticeable increase in this indicator (3.0-7.7 years, depending on the region) (kazalieva, 2019). the difference between the life expectancy of men and women continues to decrease: in adygea from 11.4 years in 2010 to 9.1 years in 2018, in the krasnodar region from 10.7 to 9, in dagestan from 7.7 to 5.6, in ingushetia from 7.1 to 6.2, in kabardinobalkaria from 9.7 to 8.3, karachay–cherkessia from 10.0 to 8.9, in north ossetia from 11.3 to 10.2, the chechen republic from 6.4 to 4.7, and the stavropol region from 10.7 to 9.2 years, respectively. the presented data show that an increase in life expectancy in many regions leads to a slight increase in the population, in particular, in the krasnodar and stavropol regions. migration is of great importance in the formation of the territorial organization of the population. migration is the main reason for the overall population tab. 5. dynamics of changes in life expectancy in the subjects of the north caucasus in 2010 and 2018 subject 2010 2018 +/republic of adygea 70.0 73.6 +3.6 krasnodar region 71.0 74.3 +3.3 republic of dagestan 73.9 78.7 +4.8 republic of ingushetia 74.7 82.4 +7.7 kabardino-balkar republic 72.1 76.3 +4.2 karachay-cherkess republic 72.4 76.1 +3.7 republic of north ossetia-alania 72.7 75.7 +3.0 republic of chechnya 71.6 75.4 +3.8 stavropol region 71.0 74.2 +3.2 source: ožidaemaâ… population of the north caucasus in the present stage: indicators of regional differentiation 29 growth in many regions of the north caucasus, especially in the plains. let us consider the migration growth rates in the north caucasus regions in the period from 2010 to 2018 (fig. 2). according to fig. 2, the largest migration growth is observed in the krasnodar region (on average 88 people per 10 thousand population), the republic of adygea (on average 52 people per 10 thousand population) and ingushetia (on average 63 people per 10 thousand population). in the krasnodar region, the peak of migration growth occurred in 2013. the following years showed a slight decrease in the migration rate, but the migration growth remains quite high in comparison with other areas of the region. in the period from 2010 to 2014, the stavropol region had a low positive migration balance; since 2015 there has been a gradually increasing negative migration growth of the population. karachaycherkessia, kabardino-balkaria, dagestan, and north ossetia-alania consistently have high rates of migration outflow (abdulmanapov, 2016). in the subjects of the north caucasus with a young age structure of the population – the republics of chechnya and dagestan – the population is growing due to a high birth rate, low mortality rate and high life expectancy, which covers the negative balance of migration. it can be seen from fig. 2 that the north caucasus demonstrates high indicators of migration dynamics. since most of the subjects of the north caucasus are agricultural, the crisis in the agro-industrial complex of the country hit them the most strongly. this led to a general decline in the level of income and the quality of life of the population, which is especially pronounced in the national republics of the region (minenkova et al., 2016). it encourages the excess part of the working-age population, especially young people, to look for a place to apply their forces outside their republics. for example, the main migration flows of north ossetia-alania are directed to the rostov region, krasnodar and stavropol regions, as well as the central federal district. there are less significant migration links with other regions. from the republic of dagestan, the main flow of population is also directed to the krasnodar and stavropol regions, the central and ural federal districts. it is obvious that the main part of migration flows occurs within the north caucasus economic region. a significant number of migrants from the national republics settle in the more attractive socio-economic krasnodar and stavropol regions. it should be noted that a significant increase in the population in recent years, for example, in the krasnodar region is not associated with a high natural growth. the growth of the population of this region is directly related to high migration inflows, both from the northern regions of the russian federation and from nearby subjects of the north -160 -120 -80 -40 0 40 80 120 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 republic of adygea krasnodar region republic of dagestan republic of ingushetia kabardino-balkar republic karachay-cherkess republic republic of north ossetia-alania republic of chechnya stavropol region fig. 2. chart of changes in the migration growth of the population in the subjects of the north caucasus for the period from 2010 to 2018 (per 10 thousand population) source: koefficent… 30 vera v. minenkova, anna v. kazalieva caucasus, since the excess of the young workingage population, as noted above, is concentrated in the republics of the north caucasus. the analysis of the age structure of migrants allows us to conclude that more than half of those who arrived in the krasnodar region are people of working age (from 15 to 40 years). based on these data, we can conclude that through an increase in the share of the working-age population, for example, in the krasnodar region, the average age of the population decreases, due to which the mortality rates in the subject fall. the north caucasus continues to be the least urbanized territory of the russian federation (zhornickaya, 2016). on average, the share of the urban population remains at 52% (fig. 3). in dagestan, adygea, karachay-cherkessia and chechnya, most of the population lives in rural areas. in all other regions of the north caucasus, the level of urbanization is lower than the national average (anohin et al., 2014). the most urbanized region is the republic of north ossetia-alania with an indicator of 64%. a characteristic feature of the north caucasus region is the growth of the urban population with an even greater increase in the rural population, which leads to a reduction in the share of the urban population (tavasiev, okazova, 2014). uneven growth rates of urban and rural populations predetermined the formation of different types of dynamics (table 6). in the territory of five regions, including «rural» dagestan and ingushetia, the share of the urban population is steadily increasing. within ingushetia, the level of urbanization exceeded the 50 percent mark in 2018, while in 2017 the share of the urban population was 41.8%. the share of the urban population of dagestan is increasing at a slow pace and has not reached the 50 percent level yet. in four republics, there is an increase in the rural population. the share of the rural population is increasing most rapidly in adygea. over 9 years, the share of the urban population here has decreased by 3.9%. differences in the growth rates of urban and rural populations affect changes in their location. the difference in reproduction processes, which are most clearly manifested as a result of increasing differentiation between natural growth levels, as well as intensive migration processes is an important factor affecting population redistribution. 3. conclusion in general, the demographic situation in the north caucasus has positive dynamics – the birth rate is growing, the death rate is decreasing, and the average life expectancy is increasing. however, it should be borne in mind that population reproduction is 52 64 59 56 55 52 47 45 43 37 48 36 41 44 45 48 53 55 57 63 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 n o rt h c a u c a s u s r e p u b li c o f n o rt h o s s e ti a a la n ia s ta v ro p o l r e g io n r e p u b li c o f in g u s h e ti a k ra s n o d a r re g io n k a b a rd in o b a lk a r r e p u b li c r e p u b li c o f a d y g e a r e p u b li c o f d a g e s ta n k a ra c h a y c h e rk e s s r e p u b li c c h e c h n y a r e p u b li c rural urban fig. 3. the ratio of urban and rural population in the subjects of the north caucasus (in %, as of 01.01.2019) source: čislennost’… population of the north caucasus in the present stage: indicators of regional differentiation 31 mainly due to an increase in life expectancy and migration. the total fertility rate is too low to ensure simple reproduction, and the forecasts do not foresee its growth. despite the general decline in population growth rates, growth will continue in the coming years, but there is an urgent need for a competent socio-demographic policy, and the need to reduce migration outflow, especially from national republics. to do this, it is necessary to create new jobs, develop social, transport and recreational infrastructure. on the other hand, the state should create conditions for the successful integration of migrants in regions of the country with negative natural population growth, and develop mechanisms for managing the settlement of migrants on the territory of the russian federation. the current socio-economic situation in the north caucasus and in russia as a whole requires a change in attitude to the state’s migration policy. a competent migration policy should be one of the government’s priorities. references abdulmanapov p.g., 2016, sovremennaâ demografičeskaâ situaciâ v severo-kavkazskom federal’nom okruge (eng. current demographic situation in the north caucasus federal district), [in:] aktual’nye problemy social’notrudovyh otnošenij: materialy vi vserossijskoj naučnopraktičeskoj konferencii s meždunarodnym učastiem, posvâŝennoj 85-letiû obrazovaniâ dagestanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (eng. actual problems of social and labor relations. materials of the vi all-russian scientific and practical conference with international participation dedicated to the 85th anniversary of dagestan state university), approbation, makhachkala, 39–41. anohin a.a., zhitin d.v., krasnov a.i., lachininskij s.s., 2014, sovremennye tendencii dinamiki čislennosti naseleniâ gorodov rossii (eng. current trends in population dynamics in russian cities), vestnik sankt-peterburgskogo universiteta. seriâ 7. geologiâ. geografiâ, 4, 167–179. čislennost’ nоstoânnogo naseleniâ na 1 ânvapâ (eng. permanent population as of january 1), emiss gosudarstviennaâ statistika, 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2016), psihologia, sociologia i pedagogika, 8(59), 54–56. dovletmurzaeva м.а, nazirov d.т., mehtiev sh.r., 2016, tendenciâ demografičeskoy situacii v čečenskoy respublike (eng. trend of the demographic situation in the chechen republic), european research, 12(23), 50–51. estestvennyj prirost v pasčete na 1000 naseleniâ (eng. natural growth per 1000 population), emiss gosudarstviennaâ statistika, https://showdata.gks.ru/report/297732 (accessed 27 june 2020). tab. 6. grouping of north caucasus regions by types of population dynamics and structure in 2010 and 2019 percentage of urban population, % 2010 2019 subjects with the growth of the urban population krasnodar region 52.8 55.2 republic of dagestan 44.8 45.3 republic of ingushetia 42.7 55.5 republic of north ossetia-alania 63.7 64.3 stavropol region 57.0 58.6 subjects with a growing rural population republic of adygea 51.0 47.1 kabardino-balkar republic 54.7 52.1 karachay-cherkess republic 43.7 42.8 republic of chechnya 36.8 36.7 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(eng. theoretical and applied problems of geographical science: demographic, social, legal, economic and environmental aspects. materials of the international scientific and practical conference), vgpu, voronezh, 615–620. kazalieva a.v., minenkova v.v., 2019, naselenie severnogo kavkaza na sovremennom ètape: dinamika i faktory regional’noj differenciacii (eng. population of the north caucasus at the present stage: dynamics and factors of regional differentiation), [in:] ustojčivoe razvitie gornyh territorij kavkaza. kollektivnaâmonografiâ, tom ii (eng. sustainable development of the mountain territories of the north caucasus. collective monograph), skgmi, vladikavkaz, 520–526. kazalieva a.v., minenkova v.v., mamonova a.v., 2018, retrospektivniy analiz dinamiki izmeneniâčislennosti naselenâ severnogo kavkaza (eng. retrospective analysis of population dynamics in the north caucasus), izvestâ dagestanskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogičeskogo univesiteta. estestvennye i tochnye nauki, 12(2), 89–94. koefficient migracionnogo prirosta na 10 000 čelovek naseleniâ (eng. migration growth rate per 10,000 population), emiss gosudarstviennaâ statistika, https://showdata.gks. ru/report/279008 (accessed 27 june 2020). minenkova v.v., kazalieva a.v., 2020, osnovnye tendencii smertnosti naseleniâ severnogo kavkaza v postsovetskij period (eng. main trends in mortality in the north caucasus in the post-soviet period), učenye zapiski krymskogo federal’nogo universiteta imeni v.i. vernadskogo. geografiâ. geologiâ, 6(1), 43–55. minenkova v.v., kuziakina m.v., mamonova а.v., 2016, demografičeskaâ situaciâ na kavkaze (eng. demographic situation in the caucasus), [in:] geoinformacionnoe kartografirovanie v regionah rossii: materiali vii vserossiiskoy naučno-practičeskoy konferencii (eng. gis mapping in the regions of russia: materials of the vii all-russian scientific and practical conference), scientific book, voronezh, 68–72. ožidaemaâ prodolžitel’nost’ žizni pri roždenii (eng. life expectancy at birth), emiss gosudarstviennaâ statistika, https:// www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31293 (accessed 27 june 2020). regiony rossii. social’no-ekonomičeskie pokazateli. (eng. regions of russia. socio-economic indicators), 2019, rosstat, moskva, 43–46. sigareva e.p., 2019, novoe v semejnyh otnošeniâh: vzglâd molodeži severnogo kavkaza (eng. new in family relations: the view of the youth of the north caucasus), [in:] demografičeskij imigracionnyj portret kavkaza (eng. demographic and migration portrait of the caucasus), ekoninform, moscow, 46–57. summarnyj koèfficient roždaemosti (eng. total fertility rate), emiss gosudarstviennaâ statistika, https://www.fedstat. ru/indicator/31517 (accessed 27 june 2020). tavasiev v.h., okazova z.p., 2014, dinamika čislennosti gorodskogo i sel’skogo naseleniâ severnogo kavkaza (eng. dynamics of the urban and rural population of the north caucasus), sovremennye problemy nauki i obrazovaniâ, 6, 1596. zhornickaya o.b., 2016, urbanizaciâ kak faktor uspešnogo ekonomičeskogo razvitiâ gorodov kavkaza (eng. urbanization as a factor of successful economic development of cities in the caucasus), [in:] razvitie territorial’nyh social’noekonomičeskih sistem: voprosy teorii i praktiki: sbornik naučnyh statej xiv meždunarodnoj naučno-praktičeskoj konferencii molodyh učonyh (eng. development of territorial socio-economic systems: questions of theory and practice: collection of scientific articles of the xiv international scientific and practical conference of young scientists), institute of economics of the ural branch of the russian academy of sciences, yekaterinburg, 295–297. 1. introduction cognitive nature tourism in ukraine has a long tradition of development. today, ecotourism, active forms of tourism, ethnographic trips and trips to historical and cultural destinations are mostly developed. the most popular offers come from national parks and other natural areas with preserved natural, historical and cultural environments. among the regions with active forms of tourism, the carpathian mountain region and the crimea with a well-developed network of hiking and biking trails should be noted. rafting on the black cheremosh, prut, southern bug, dniester, desna, sluch, teteriv and other rivers is quite popular as well as trips to caves (in podillia, the carpathians and the crimea), which are often combined with visits to other natural attractions. travel agencies, specialized clubs, national parks and nature reserves, which cooperate to promote their offers on domestic and international tourist market, organize informative trips. journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 27–33 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.024.5811 ecotourism and geotourism in ukraine marta malska (1), yurii zinko (2), nataliia antoniuk (3) (1) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: malskym@ukr.net (2) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: zinkoyuriy@gmail.com (corresponding author) (3) department of geography and international tourism, ivan franko national university of lviv, sichovih strilciv 19, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: nantonyk@yahoo.com citation malska m., zinko y., antoniuk n., 2016, ecotourism and geotourism in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 27–33. abstract cognitive nature tourism in ukraine has a long tradition of development. today, ecotourism, active forms of tourism, ethnographic trips and trips to historical and cultural destinations are mostly developed. the most popular offers come from national parks and other natural areas with preserved natural, historical and cultural environments. among the regions with active forms of tourism, the carpathian mountain region and the crimea with a well-developed network of hiking and biking trails should be noted. rafting on the black cheremosh, prut, southern bug, dniester, desna, sluch, teteriv and other rivers is quite popular as well as trips to caves (in podillia, the carpathians and the crimea), which are often combined with visits to other natural attractions. travel agencies, specialized clubs, national parks and nature reserves, which cooperate to promote their offers on domestic and international tourist market, organize informative trips. key words cognitive nature tourism ecotourism, geotourism, national parks, geoparks, ukraine. 28 marta malska, yurii zinko, nataliia antoniuk cognitive tourism is perhaps the oldest on the territory of ukraine. at first, it developed as regional study trips in order to get to know natural and historical-cultural peculiarities of the native land, as well as health and recreational trips for the purpose of health improvement and keeping fit. the stages of development of various forms of cognitive (including ecological) tourism in ukraine examined in their works in detail o.  liubitseva (любіцева, сташук, 2002), m. malska (зінько, мальська, 2001; мальська et al., 2004) v. kyfiak (кифяк, 2003), v.  fedorchenko (федорченко, дьорова, 2002); l. ustymenko (устименко, афанасьєв, 2005), p.  masliak (масляк, 2008) and many others. now the travel industry of ukraine is not in its best condition – domestic and foreign tourist flows decrease annually in all regions of the country. hence, the issues of revaluation of touristic capabilities and resources, analysis of travel offers and creation of new strategies for promoting travel products are relevant. the aim of the presented study is to review the current state of development of the most popular types of cognitive tourism in ukraine. to carry out the study we have analyzed the scientific and popular scientific publications, travel offers of companies regarding cognitive nature tourism and own studies of the development of cognitive nature tourism within preparation of the projects on organization of national parks and nature reserves territories in western ukraine, projects on tourism development in some regions of ukraine. 2. research results cognitive nature tourism in ukraine is represented with various forms and types of travel activities. the most studied forms (categories) of cognitive tourism is ecotourism in protected areas, geotourism and cognitive types of active tourism (fig. 1). a net of 48 national parks of ukraine with a total area of more than 10,000 km² (1.8% of its territory) located in 14 out of 24 administrative regions serves the interests of ecotourism, weekendand sport tourism and recreation under natural conditions. they include reserves themselves surrounded by old agricultural zones, which nowadays serve the purposes of organized recreation. one of the most popular forms of cognitive nature tourism is ecotourism in national parks and other protected areas. a peculiar feature of national parks in ukraine is related to insufficient area of conservation territories and a large area of man-made landscapes, which are often the target of recreational use. legal framework has been established for the development of tourism in national parks, and the plans of parks protection envisage allocation of special territories for recreation and various forms of tourism. however, the current practice of touristic use of the ukrainian national parks shows that their potential is still insufficiently used for domestic and international tourism, the range of offers remains limited and forms of balanced tourism are poorly introduced. there is a difference in recreational reclamation of parks. some of them (carpathian, shatskyi, holy mountains) strongly experienced recreational pressure on the environment for the time of use, while most of the newly created are not ready yet to receive visitors. therefore, there is a need to develop ways of promotion and regulation of tourist movement, improvement of touristic infrastructure, optimal territorial management and approaching the parks to the requirements for sustainable tourism development in these areas. in travel terms, the national parks, including the developed touristic centers, are characterized by the diversity of types of recreation and tourism. the essential role here belongs to health-improving and leisure recreation at the premises of numerous sanatoriums and recreation camps (carpathian, shatskyi, hutsulshchyna, skolivski beskids, pryazovskyi, charming harbor). however, sufficiently developed here are the qualified tourism (carpathian, vyzhnytskyi, cheremoskyi, buzkyi gard, velykyi luh, nyzniodnistrovskyi, dzhaharlytskyi,etc.), culturological (podilski tovtry, carpathian, hutsulshchyna, khotyn, holy mountains, mezynskyi, dermanskoostrozkyi), and ecoeducational (all national parks). touristic infrastructure in the majority of national parks is well-developed and there are two forms of tourist services: directly by special park structures and by parties of recreation and travel activities. parks administration keeps records of visitors, who pass through the checkpoints and collect entrance fees to the park in the form of ticket sale. the number of visitors, who visit and receive health and recreational services on the territory of national parks from other parties, exceeds in several times the accounted one by the parks administration. western ukrainian national parks can be divided into two types based on the figures of infrastructure development degree and intensity of touristic movement – intensive and extensive touristic reclamation. each recreational type of national parks requires the development of specific strategies for sustainable tourism development with specification of actions plans for each of the parks. due to the existence of two types of national parks, there is a need to develop two different technologies of introduction of components of sustainable tourism. ecotourism and geotourism in ukraine 29 we should stipulate the following measures in the model of sustainable touristic development of the parks of the first type (with expressive recreational and travel function): implementation of conservation efforts and increasing the comfort level of recreational and sanitary institutions; modernization of places of public recreation and touristic infrastructure, dispersion of tourist flows and minimizing pressure on natural and aquatic systems; wider implementation of ecological forms of tourism (cognitive) and agrotourism; development in cooperation with the local authorities of action plans to introduce the components of sustainable development: by improving the appearance of localities, providing access to main attractions, support of traditional crafts, as well as ensuring development of food and lodging facilities. for parks of the second type with extensive development of tourism, there a possibility to adapt to models of sustainable development used in the national parks of european countries. these models should be directed on the one hand – at the increase of the flow of tourists to these parks, and on the other – at the development of infrastructure for environmentally oriented forms of tourism. among the priority measures we should ensure the creation of visit centers and ecoeducational centers, the development and arrangement of routes, preparation and provision of trails for qualified tourism, creation of thematic and ecoeducational paths, preparation of travel products focused on exploration of local natural and cultural values, and development of a food and lodging network in the protected zone of the park. national parks of ukraine:1 – synevyr, 2 – uzhanskyi, 3 – zacharovanyi krai, 4 – skolivski beskids, 5 – yavorivskyi, 6 – pivnichne podillia, 7 – carpathian, 8 – hutsulshchyna, 9 – verkhovynskyi, 10 – halytskyi, 11 – vyznytskyi, 12 – cheremoskyi, 13 – khotynskyi, 14 – dniester’s canyon, 15 – podilski tovtry, 16 – kremenetski mountains, 17 – verkhnie pobuzhzhia, 18 – dermansko-ostrozkyi, 19 – shatskyi, 20 – prypiat-stokhid, 21 – zalissia, 22 – ichnianskyi, 23 – mezynskyi, 24 – holosiivskyi, 25 – bilozerskyi, 26 – nyzhniosul’skyi, 27 – pyriatynskyi, 28 – hetmanskyi, 29 – desniansko-starohutskyi 30 – homilshanski forests, 31 – dvorichanskyi, 32 – slobozhanskyi, 33 – holy mountains, 34 – velykyiluh, 35 – pryazovskyi, 36 – biloberezhzhia sviatoslava, 37 – buzkyi gard, 38 – azovo-syvashskyi, 39 – dzhaharlyckyi, 40 – nyzniodnistrovskyi, 41 – tuzlovski estuaries, 42 – charming harbor. forms of tourism: tc – trekking & climbing; h – hiking; ct – cycle touring; с – canoeing trips; r – rafting trips; s – sailing trips; hr – horse riding trips; st – ski-touring; d – diving; bt – birding trips & birdwatching; at – animal trips; bw– botany & wildflower tours; g – geotourism. fig. 1. geography of different forms of cognitive nature tourism in ukraine source: own research. 30 marta malska, yurii zinko, nataliia antoniuk there are prerequisites in the national parks of western ukraine for the development of a wide range of forms of ecotourism (зінько, гетьман, 2002; szczecinski et al., 2004). the basic form of ecotourism should be cognitive nature one, which should be based on a strong network of didactic and themed trails. carpathian mountain parks have the best opportunities for the development of hiking, rock climbing, caving tourism. water touring has a chance for further development in shatskyi, vyzhnytskyi, carpathian parks and nnp „podilski tovtry”. the projects of development of popular cycle touring and horse riding trips are being developed in some parks. ethnographic tourism can eventually become a landmark of the national parks „hutsulshchyna” and „skolivski beskids”. introduction of regional tourism management and marketing is appropriate for effective development of ecotourism in recreational areas of natural reserve fund, which is impossible without participation of local people, their knowledge of history, culture and natural identity of the land. the largest national park has been founded in the carpathians to improve touristic infrastructure and to regulate tourist flows in the mountainous ecosystems, which are sensitive to anthropogenic influence. due to old agricultural cultivation of territories in ukraine, wildlife preserves are the most popular type of protected territories. they differ from reserves by a more compact area and protect local ecosystems and habitats of the endangered species of a biota. a net of such objects has 2632 preserves with a total area of more than 1 mln. hа, that comprises 37% from a total area of protected territories of ukraine. a majority of them are open for organized daily tours (hetman, zinko, 2002) (tab.  1). nature sights of ukraine, which consist of 3025 objects, are still more local. the rest of the nature protected territories (23.5%) include regional landscape parks (44), tab. 1. rating of 20 national parks most popular among tourists name square [hа] characteristic features prevailing forms of tourism carpathian 50303 mountains, resorts, ethnographic village winter and summer active recreation, ethnic tourism hutsulshchyna 32271 mountains, resorts, hutsuls village ethnic tourism, winter and summer active recreation skolivski beskids 35684 mountains, winter resorts, boiko village winter and summer active recreation, ethnic tourism synevyr 40400 mountains & lake winter and summer active recreation vyzhnytskyi 7928 mountains, hutsul ethnographic village ethnic tourism, summer winter and active recreation shatskyi 32515 lakes, forests summer water recreation, nature and rural tourism holosiivskyi 4525 forests sub-urban recreation yavorivskyi 7079 hills, rocks, forests, countryside summer water and active recreation, ethnic tourism holy tops 40609 hills, rocks, floodplain forests pilgrimage tourism, summer active recreation podilski tovtry 261316 hills, rocks, forests, river valleys and canyons, karst caves, countryside summer active recreation, nature and rural tourism, visiting caves, castle and architectural tourism pryazovskyi 78127 sand-stone rocks, steppe nature and archaeological tourism, seaside recreation dzharylhatskyi 10000 sea island, steppe summer seaside recreation azov-syvaskyi 52154 seaside wetlands, nesting birds nature tourism, summer water recreation homilshanski forests 14315 river valleys, forests nature tourism, winter and summer active recreation uzhanskyi 39159 mountains winter and summer active recreation, ethnic tourism halytskyi 14685 forests, river valleys nature tourism kremenetski hills 6951 hills, rocks, forests, castles, church nature tourism, castle and church tourism hetmanskyi 23360 floodplain forests, palace, countryside nature, historical and rural tourism prypiat-stokhid 39315 floodplains and floodplain forests, moorland nature tourism desnianskostarohutskyi 16215 floodplains and floodplain forests, moorland nature tourism source: hetman, zinko, 2002. ecotourism and geotourism in ukraine 31 protected tracts (774), botanical gardens (22), zoos (13), parks-sights of landscape architecture (538) and dendrologic parks (39). tourism in ukraine has traditionally flourished in national parks. the high quality of natural conditions in these areas is reflected in the intensive recreational utilization. as much as 9% of the capacity in collective accommodation facilities is located in large-size protected areas. from the point of view of realized attractiveness, the scale is dominated by mountain areas. this is mainly due to the relief that is suitable for tourism development and winter recreation: the most popular in the country zones of winter and summer tourism are located in recreational areas of the carpathian, vyzhnytskyi, skolivski beskids, synevyr, hutsulshchyna and other national parks. every year each of these carpathian parks accepts from 30  to 90 thousand tourists from all regions of ukraine and from abroad. national parks of the plain part of ukraine attract, with small exceptions, a much smaller number of tourists. as a rule, they satisfy the recreational needs of local population, mostly of the residents of large neighboring cities and urbanized districts with a complicated ecological situation. it should be noted, however, that touristic attractiveness is not determined by only one factor or uniqueness of a natural feature; rather, it is a complex of components including the shape of a landscape and nature of settlements. the existence of international biosphere reserves „eastern carpathians” and „roztochia” contributes to the development of various forms of nature cognitive tourism (зінько, мальська, 2001). projects on popularization of nature cognitive tourism and creation of respective infrastructure for servicing of tourist flows are realized on their territories by joint efforts of international organizations, environmental institutions, local governments and communities. 3. geotourism geotourism is a relatively young kind of tourism in ukraine. although pedestrian, water, bicycle and car trips to picturesque and unique geological objects and places have been popular for a long time in all regions of the country, it is only now that informational and educational aspects of such trips have started to attract attention. the carpathians, the crimean peninsula and podillia upland are the most popular geotouristic regions of ukraine. the objects most visited by tourists are concentrated there. it is possible to outline the most popular geotouristic objects and routes in the ukrainian carpathians. there are several tourist paths in their highest part – the chornohora: “2000  m mountains of the carpathians”, “mountainous lakes – brebeneskul, nesamovyte, and maricheika”, and a number of mountain routes in the carpathian biosphere reserve and national park “carpathian”. the region of the volcanic carpathians (zakarpattia region) is interesting and not difficult for visitors. geotouristic objects include there the domes of extinct volcanoes and other traces of volcanic activity: mountains antalovetska poliana and palanok, and the enchanted valley rock complex (fir-tree stone). skole and upper dniester beskids are rich in geological heritage. the most popular and visited geotouristic objects there are the dovbush rocks (a rock complex near the village of bubnyshche made of yamna sandstones up to 80  m of height, 200  m of width and up to 1 km of length) and urych rocks (erosion relics of massive yamna paleocene sandstones up to 50 m of height) with valuable geological, geomorphological, historical and cultural heritage. the crimea peninsula can be called an alfresco geological museum. the southern part of the peninsula is occupied by the crimean mountains, which stretch along the black sea coast for 180 km from the southeast to northeast with the width of 60 km. there are more than 1000 sinks, 135 caves, mines and pits on the chatyr-dag massive. the majority of them are inaccessible for regular visitors, and only two caves – marble on the chatyr-dag and kyzyl-koba (red) on dolgorukivska yaila are visited by tourists. the ghost valley on the south-eastern slope of demerdzhi mountain – a complex of chimera rocks (more than 100) formed as a result of the weathering of upper jurassic conglomerates (weathering niches, cornices, subsided and bastion forms) are among the most popular geotouristic objects of the crimean peninsula. the kara-dag natural reserve, mountains-laccolites ayu-dag and kastel, the great canyon of the crimea and the valley of the bodrak river often become the objects of geotouristic tours. on the kerch peninsula, to the north of the village of bondarenkove, there is the well-known bulganatske field of mud volcanoes. the podillia upland is popular due to its variety of well-studied objects of geoheritage, which are concentrated on relatively small territories and are accessible for tourists. the most popular are the podillia tovtry, a canyon of the smotrych river, gigantic karst labyrinths in gypsum and the canyon of the dniester river. tovtry is an arch-like ridge, 50-60 m of height, the relics of coast reefs, formed by parallel coastlines of old miocene seas. the karst gypsum caves of the podillia dniester area are popular among tourists. there are more than 100 caves 32 marta malska, yurii zinko, nataliia antoniuk there, and the majority of them are protected: the optymistychna cave (214 km, the longest gypsum cave in the world), ozerna (116 km), kryshtaleva (22.6 km), verteba (8 km), mlynky (36 km), atlantis (1.8 km), yuvileyna (1.7 km), dzhurynska (1.2 km) have been announced to be of national geological value. in the canyon-like valleys of the dniester and its left tributaries of the strypa, dzhuryn, seret and zbruch, a strong complex of sedimentary sequences is being exposed off the youngest ones – anthropogenic, and the oldest ones – silurian sediments of the palaeozoic era. in the lower part of the dniester canyon, silurian and devon sediments are exposed, and above them – cretaceous and neogenic sediments. the silurian and devon sediments in trubchyn, zalishchyky, ivan-zolotyi, ustechko and vistra deserve special attention. they have a great scientific value, and some of them are of global significance. the canyon of the smotrych river (80 ha) and outcrops of wend and silurian in the neighborhood of the city of kamianets-podilskyi (khmelytskyi region) are the other popular geotouristic places. on the dnieper upland, the kaniv hills, butskyi and tiasmynskyi canyons in cherkasy region seem to be promising geotouristic objects. the kaniv hills (the most known of them are chernecha, kniazha – 221.2 m, maryany hills – 224.4 m) were formed in the district of “kaniv dislocations”, known for the dislocation of the sediments of its sedimentary cover, which are folded and form scaly and sleeve structures. the places of the oldest rock outcrops – sediments of the ukrainian crystalline shield – will be interesting for geotourists. such a phenomenon can be observed in the valleys of the rivers sluch, southern bug and in the exposed parts of open pits. the southern bug river is the only in ukraine where rapids have been preserved in their natural form that add a mountainous character to the river. the southern bug cuts the crystalline rocks of the ukrainian crystalline shield, which outcrop here to the surface. overall, the territory of ukraine is extremely promising for the development of geotourism. nowadays, the interest in geotouristic attractions is growing due to the improvement of information supply and the development of touristic infrastructure. the geological service of ukraine, scientific institutions specializing in earth sciences, ukrainian branch of progeo, administrations of nature-protected territories with rich geoheritage, as well as some tour operators actively popularize geotouristic trips and objects. in general, geotourism in ukraine is in infancy: the appropriate infrastructure is insufficient, some interesting objects are located in inaccessible places, and there is a lack of informational and educational materials, as well as experts in geotourism. now specialists develop the mechanisms of management of promising geotouristic objects and of establishing new for ukraine forms of geoheritage protection and use – geoparks. in the west of ukraine, two geoparks can be opened in the mountainous part of the ukrainian carpathians – “rocky beskids” and “volcanic carpathians”, one geopark in the precarpathians – “the galician dniester region”, and three geoparks in western podillia – “fossil barrier reef ”, “podillia gypsum karst” and “the dniester canyon” (шевчук, 2012). cognitive forms of active tourism in ukraine have very wide geography. a network of hiking, water, bicycle and car travel routes, which are divided by subjects, covers all regions of ukraine. the feature of these routes is that most of them, including natural attractions, unite many of the valuable historical and cultural (archeological, historical, ethnographic and other) attractions. natural routes cover all the most significant natural areas of ukraine – tourist trails and ecoeducational paths in the national natural and regional landscape parks, to some of the greatest natural landmarks – „caves of podillia”, „caves of crimea”, „by carpathian mountain trails”, „crimean mountains”, „south coast of crimea”, to the rocks and rock-and-cave complexes, waterfalls, mountain and lowland lakes, etc. carpathians and crimea are the main areas of hiking trips. this variety of natural obstacles makes it possible for tourists to master almost all arsenal of hiking techniques, trail orienteering, productively carry out training activities. the period of hiking trips in these areas is also extensive – from early spring to late autumn, and under favorable weather conditions – in winter. the most interesting routes in the carpathians pass through the ranges of chornohora, gorgan and svydovets. the oldest tourist route „by carpathian trails” runs from zakarpattia through torunskyi pass, vyshkivskyi gorgan, the entire southern border of dolynskyi district, and from yaiko-ilemskyi gorgan turns to osmoloda in rozhniativ district (lyubitsewa et al., 2012). rafting on the rivers of black cheremosh, prut, southern bug, dniester, desna, sluch, teterivetc. is popular in the warm season. stationary tent rafting camps operate in the carpathians (black cheremosh) and myhiia (southern bug). organizers of water tourism offer long-lasting rafts and rafts of the weekend, exercise instructions and groups accompanying, and provide all necessary equipment. most often, the ukrainians organize trips with cognitive purpose on their own. however, there are a number of specialized travel companies and organizations, public associations (clubs) that provide services on organization of the various forms of ecotourism and geotourism in ukraine 33 cognitive nature tourism – hiking, mountain, bicycle, water, speleological, horse riding, etc. the leading travel companies in this area have recently united into the ukrainian adventure and ecological tourism association (українська асоціація…, 2014) to promote their products in the domestic and international travel markets. it is worth pointing out that the tourism infrastructure for different forms of cognitive nature tourism in ukraine is underdeveloped and in some cases obsolete. in the attraction natural touristic regions it is most developed in resort areas and near major touristic centers, or in economic zones of protected areas. even more popular becomes the use for placing the base of rural tourism and agrotourism (agrohouses, farms). the largest network of such institutions is developed in the carpathian region (zakarpattia, ivano-frankivsk, lviv and chernivtsi regions). the basic set of services in the carpathian agrohouses includes accommodation, homemade food, water treatments, equipment hire, sightseeing tours. 4. conclusions among the forms of cognitive nature tourism in ukraine the most developed became eco-tourism, active types of tourism (hiking, water, cycling, climbing, spelunking, etc.), ethnographic trips by the territories with preserved natural and historical-cultural environment. the most popular are ecological travel offers of the national parks and other protected areas, and the densest network of hiking and cycling tourist routes is laid in the carpathian region and the mountainous part of crimea. often the nature cognitive trips are combined with historical and cultural elements that only enhances cognitive effect. the issue of improving the touristic infrastructure remains relevant, including development of the network of tourist paths, trails and routes in different regions of ukraine (including cross-border ones), creation of new compact accommodations and food establishments along the tourist routes and near attraction natural sites, improving the existing and creation of new products of cognitive nature and promotion of such trips among domestic and foreign tourists, development of scientific-popular information materials to raise awareness of a wide range of people with natural attractions all over ukraine. current research may become the basis for further scientific and methodological and practical developments in the field of development of nature cognitive tourism in ukraine. references hetman w., zinko j., 2002, turystyka w parkach narodowych ukrainy, [in:] j. partyka (ed.), użytkowanie turystyczne parków narodowych, drukarnia kolejowa w krakowie, ojców, 455–468. lyubitsewa o., kiptenko v., malska m., rutynsliy m., zan’ko y., zinko y., 2012, geography of tourism of ukraine, [in:] j.  wyrzykowski, k.  widawski (eds.), geography of tourism of central and eastern europe countries, institute of geography and regional development univerity of wrocław, wrocław, 445–489. szczecinski r., jagusiewicz a., kowesznikow w., lozynskij r., malska m., zinko j., 2004, potencjał turystyczny ukrainy zachodniej, instytut turystyki, warszawa. зінько ю., гетьман в., 2002, розвиток туризму в національних парках українських карпатах, [in:] гори і люди. т. 1., кбз, рахів, 353–363. зінько ю.в., мальська м.п., 2001, розвиток екотуризму на транскордонній височині розточчя, [in:] розточанський збір 2000. т. 2., меркатор, львів, 32–35. кифяк в.ф., 2003, організація туристичної діяльності в україні, книги-ххі, чернівці. любіцева о., сташук к., 2002, розвиток екологічного туризму в україні, економічна та соціальна географія, 53, 189–196. мальська м.п., худо в.в., цибух в.і., 2004, основи туристичного бізнесу, центр навчальної літератури, київ. масляк п.о., 2008, рекреаційна географія, знання, київ. українська асоціація активного та екологічного туризму, 2014, http://uaeta.org/ua/participant/list [20.01.2014] устименко л.м., афанасьєв і.ю., 2005, історія розвитку туризму, альтерпрес, київ. федорченко в.к., дьорова т.а., 2002, історія туризму в україні, вища школа, київ. шевчук о., 2012, потенційні геотуристичні об’єкти і регіони україни, [in:] географія і туризм: національний та міжнародний досвід: матеріали vi міжнародної наукової конференції, видавничий центр лну ім. івана франка, львів, 407–419. 1. introduction – systemic transformation, european integration and port competitiveness according to eurostat data (gross weight of seaborne goods…, 2018), transhipment in polish ports grew by 37.3% from 2006 to 2016. it was the second-highest growth among the coastal states of the european economic area. a decade earlier, t. palmowski (1997) indicated a weakening competitive position of polish ports when describing their operation and functioning conditions in the first years after the journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(1), 16–26 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.1.03 hinterland connectivity as a driver of the development of competitiveness of polish ports in the post-eu accession period maciej tarkowski (1), sławomir goliszek (2), tadeusz bocheński (3) (1) division of regional development, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-9424-940x e-mail: maciej.tarkowski@ug.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) department of spatial organization, stanisław leszczycki institute of geography and spatial organization polish academy of sciences, twarda 51/55, 00–818 warszawa, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-0908-1487 e-mail: sgoliszek@twarda.pan.pl (3) department of economic policy and socio-economic geography, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 64, 71–101 szczecin, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-6172-7914 e-mail: tadeusz.bochenski@usz.edu.pl citation tarkowski m., goliszek s., bocheński t., 2021, hinterland connectivity as a driver of the development of competitiveness of polish ports in the post-eu accession period, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(1), 16–26. abstract academic research has indicated that port competitiveness is multidimensional. although a wide range of drivers of port competitiveness has already been determined, particular ports seem to use different sets of them at different development stages. this paper argues that significant growth in transhipment in polish ports results from infrastructural development and mainly from enhanced hinterland connectivity. before poland had joined the eu, the hinterland connectivity was so underdeveloped that it was more convenient for many companies to use services of the german north sea ports. however, with eu funds, road investments, travel times between the ports and hinterland have shortened by at least one-quarter. moreover, the development of railway lines as well as the increase in the number of intermodal container terminals in the hinterland have also improved accessibility to the ports. rail transport is especially significant for maintaining the competitiveness of ports at times of cutting-edge industry change, increasing the role of economies of scale in shipping. key words port competitiveness, drivers of competitiveness, hinterland connectivity, road transport, rail transport, poland. received: 17 january 2020 accepted: 08 march 2021 published: 31 march 2021 hinterland connectivity as a driver of the development of competitiveness of polish ports in the post-eu accession period 17 systemic transformation (after 1989). the decrease in transhipment was mainly due to the peripheral geographic location, structural changes in the hinterland economy and underdeveloped hinterland connectivity. on the one hand, it was an effect of infrastructural underinvestment; on the other, it resulted from mistakes made when privatising and deregulating the transport system (taylor, ciechański, 2017). all the circumstances mentioned above made hamburg the most critical seaport for polish international trade for almost two decades. still, in 2017 hamburg served more than 204 thousand teu to/ from poland. however, it was 7% less than in 2016 (top 10…, 2019). thus, hinterland connectivity was a weak point of polish seaports. nonetheless, large infrastructural projects implemented after poland had become the eu member state have significantly enhanced it. therefore, this paper’s main objective is to reconstruct changes in the hinterland connectivity with special attention paid to road and rail modes of transport to assess the role of hinterland connectivity in shaping the competitiveness of polish seaports. the paper refers to the concept of competitiveness. scientists, economists and politicians widely use this approach. the term competitiveness itself derives from works by classical economists. the numerous later interpretations significantly vary, resulting in analytical difficulties (pilinkienė et al., 2017). for the purpose of this article, the definition by m.e. porter (1990) was adopted, saying that competitiveness is a skill or talent resulting from acquired knowledge, able to generate and sustain superior performance as well as face competitive dynamics. this concept is used for multiscale analyses: international, national, regional, or local (business ecosystems or clusters) ones. as pointed in the literature (de langen, 2006; hollen et al., 2015; lugt et al., 2015, 2017; notteboom, winkelmans, 2002; parola et al., 2017), seaports can be perceived as business ecosystems and, as such, they can be analysed with the use of the concept of competitiveness (brandenburger, nalebuff, 1997). their competitive position on the global transhipment market depends on the ability of the whole port community to perfect their resources, competencies and skills to cooperate between the port authority and other entities operating in the ports and their hinterland. in this case, competitiveness has an inter-port dimension and applies to ports located within the same port region and the ones located in different regions (song et al., 2016). port competitiveness can be perceived and analysed as revealed (direct) and potential (indirect) competitiveness. generally, the first category addresses the transhipment volume (kim, 2015), the second the set of drivers affecting port performance. thus, their revealed competitiveness has significantly increased in the case of polish ports, as confirmed by the high transhipment dynamics (37.3%) between 2006 and 2016. the research problem addresses the role one particular driver plays in shaping transhipment volumes. in the broad sense, the revealed port competitiveness depends on the total cost of transport chains, and a particular port is its one link (song et al., 2016). thus, broadly speaking, the port competitiveness drivers may be categorised as follows: port location, endogenous factor, and maritime and hinterland connectivity. when analysing port competitiveness in the context of the total cost of transport chains, the traditional approach to shaping competitiveness– by port abilities and port-foreland-hinterland linkages – seems to lose its significance. at the same time, port authorities have less control over some competitiveness drivers (meersman et al., 2016). j.m. moya and m.f. valero (2017) pay particular attention to seeking a real decision-maker in the choice of a container port. they state that there are two groups of decisive factors – factors under control (fc) of pas and factors beyond control (fbc) of pas. the fc include port performance (efficiency and effectiveness), connectivity, and port charges, while the fbc group includes transport cost, inland and maritime distance to/from the port and geographical location of the port. the authors emphasise the significance of the door-to-port/port-to-door relation as a factor in improving port competitiveness. they also point out that the absolute competitive advantage in this scope depends on port authorities, terminal operators and people managing transport systems in the hinterland. the analysis covers the period starting after poland’s accession to the european union, from 2004 to 2016. in this period, some crucial organisational changes were implemented in polish ports. as already mentioned, the period of systemic transformation – symbolically narrowed to the years of 1989–2004 – was a period of stagnation for polish ports. during that period, some essential structural changes were implemented, including those in ownership. local authorities became co-owners of the ports, yet most were privatised, primarily the specialised port terminals. one of the achievements of this period was strengthening the market position of some ports. investing mainly in the superstructure, the terminal operators contributed to enhancing the port efficiency and port quality. however, all those changes were not accompanied by proper infrastructural development of the ports and hinterland, which could improve the hinterland 18 maciej tarkowski, sławomir goliszek, tadeusz bocheński connectivity and attract new investors to construct new terminals and establish new connections – thus improving the maritime connectivity. such changes took place after 2004 and were possible thanks to the eu structural funds, especially under two particular financial perspectives: 2004–2006 and 2007– 2013 (with budgetary execution by 2015). moreover, poland’s accession to the european union confirmed its economic and political stability. this coincided with the economic recovery; thus, the hinterland of polish ports was able to produce more significant cargo flows, which then started to be transported by sea. although the changes implemented before 2004 were crucial for the later success, they were not sufficient. the ones which took place after 2004 have opened the door for absolute competitiveness, and therefore they will be analysed in this paper mainly in the context of the development of hinterland connectivity. 2. methods and data the empirical part covered the analysis of changes in the hinterland connectivity in road accessibility to ports and rail terminals located in the hinterland. here, the gis methods were implemented, especially the network analysis. a road model was created based on the main roads network selected using openstreetmap for poland (cich et al., 2016; stępniak et al., 2017). speeds for the road model used for cross-sectional time analyses (1995–2015) were derived from poland’s national traffic model created by the institute of geography and spatial organization pas. data on infrastructural investments made from 2004 through 2013 were derived from the ministry of development (komornicki et al., 2013, 2018). the primary method used when determining the shortest possible way to the seaports in the isochrone method (an isochrone is a line connecting an area with the exact arrival time) (ratajski, 1989). another method used is the signature method, using lines depicting road investments in the selected periods (fig. 1). both the investments and isochrones were divided into particular periods during which some events affecting the road system development process took place. the two decades of the research period were also divided into two: the one before the accession and the one after it. for the investments, two periods were created: 2004–2006 (the first programme period) and 2007–2013, including the investment finished in 2015 (the second programme period). the seaport time accessibility was analysed in four periods: 1995, 2004, 2006 and 2015 (fig. 2). 3. improving hinterland connectivity of the leading polish ports the hinterland of polish ports mainly covers the area of poland. however, the ports’ impact range extends also to the czech republic, slovakia, a west part of ukraine and a part of belarus. despite numerous fig. 1. network corridors running through poland (baltic–adriatic) source: own elaboration. hinterland connectivity as a driver of the development of competitiveness of polish ports in the post-eu accession period 19 social and economic problems, the systemic transformation was generally a period of economic growth. from 1989 to 2012, polish gdp doubled (fixed prices). simultaneously, the sold production of industry tripled; export and import values increased eightfold and tenfold, respectively (polska 1989–2014, 2014). undoubtedly, the development of the infraand superstructure enhancing nautical accessibility, port efficiency, and port quality was necessary to strengthen the polish ports’ competitive position, yet it was not enough to attract the growing volume of goods. the fbc of pa’s actions were of crucial meaning – especially development and modernisation of the transport infrastructure, both road and rail, on the hinterland, resulting in a significant enhancement in port transport accessibility. this accessibility allowed attracting cargo flows from both the hinterland and foreland. 3.1. road accessibility the eu structural funds, especially the financial framework 2007–2013, allowed and still allow co-financing infrastructural projects which have changed the polish road system (komornicki et al., 2013). in the context of port accessibility, the most crucial investment was to develop and modernise roads being part of the core and comprehensive ten-t (trans-european transport networks) (fig. 1). in poland, the main lorry transport routes run along the main transport corridors being part of the core and comprehensive ten-t (trans-european transport networks). the core ten-t corridors have been established to implement large infrastructural projects of the highest european added value more effectively (komornicki et al., 2013; weenen et al., 2016). in the context of hinterland connectivity, the core corridors are the most important ones. there are two of them running through poland. the first one goes latitudinally and connects the north sea and the baltic sea. it can be considered a transport alternative for the polish ports, especially for short sea shipping. the second corridor connects the adriatic sea and the baltic sea. this corridor is used to transport goods from the polish ports inland and abroad (fig. 1). both alternatives run through port cities. nowadays, the route called via carpathia is becoming more and more critical. it connects the port in thessaloniki with areas located on the baltic sea’s eastern shore and the ports in gdańsk and gdynia (rosik et al., 2018). the described road network has been intensively developed and modernised since 2004 (fig.  1). it has resulted in visible improvement in the port road accessibility (fig. 2) (rosik et al., 2014). a reduction in long-distance travel times can measure this enhancement scale – between the ports and border crossing points in gorzyczki (the czech republic) and zwardoń (slovakia). during the two decades (1995–2015) the travel times were reduced by 23– 34%, depending on the relation (tab. 1). although there had been some road infrastructure investments before 2004, their visible growth was recorded during the first eu programming period 2004–2006 (komornicki et al., 2013; rosik et al., 2017). however, they were primarily focused on the latitudinal road sections, and their modernisation has only decreased the competitive position of the polish ports as it has improved conditions for lorry fig. 2. transport investments 1995–2015 (left) and changing the accessibility time (right) 1995–2015 source: own elaboration. 20 maciej tarkowski, sławomir goliszek, tadeusz bocheński transport. during the last analysed programming period of 2007–2013 (some of the investments were finished in 2015), the most significant number of roads were modernised or constructed in poland (fig. 2) (komornicki et al., 2013; stepniak, rosik, 2013). some of the road sections being part of the core ten-t were constructed or modernised with private investors’ financial participation or large consortia that manage them and charge fees later on (komornicki et al., 2013; rosik, stępniak, 2015; rosik et al., 2015). during the analysed period, a long section of express road s3 was constructed. this road is vital for the operation of the ports in świnoujście and szczecin. as for the ports in gdańsk and gdynia, the whole section of a1 from grudziądz to piotrków was constructed at that time, excluding the section connecting stryków and piotrków, which was finished in 2016 (rosik et al., 2015, 2017). the constructed sections of express road s7 were also essential for the ports located in tricity. during eight years, more than a thousand kilometres of roads: highways, express roads, national roads and others (provincial, county, local) as well as several dozen road junctions and other road facilities were constructed (rosik, stępniak, 2015). the most crucial road infrastructure projects, mainly the bypasses, have significantly increased safety on polish roads, and they have lowered the congestion and channelled the traffic (komornicki et al., 2013; rosik et al., 2015). all those projects have improved time accessibility and internal consistency (komornicki et al., 2013; stępniak, rosik, 2016). they have also improved port accessibility by significantly reducing travel times – mainly from central and western poland (fig. 2). 3.2. rail accessibility two international rail lines, located in ten-t corridor vi (baltic – adriatic), have basic meaning for rail services of polish ports’ (transeuropejska..., n.d.). line ce65 leads to gdańsk and gdynia and line ce59 runs to szczecin and świnoujście. some national rail lines are also of significant importance for port services. they are: gdynia – bydgoszcz (an alternative route for ce65 line), inowrocław – poznań and kołobrzeg – poznań (fig. 3). modernisation and reconstruction of rail infrastructure in poland started at the end of the 1990s using the eu funds. the first projects, co-financed under the phare and ispa pre-accession funds, concerned line e20 (east–west). during the 2004–2006 financing perspective, mainly preparatory projects were implemented. the 2007–2013 financing perspective brought intensification of the construction works to develop the whole rail network in the country. those projects were funded under the eu programmes, the national fund, the public budget, and the national railway infrastructure operator. at the very beginning, the projects aimed at the development of passenger transport. modernisation of the latitudinal rail routes, especially lines ce65 and ce59 (palmowski, 1997), and adjustment of railways technical parameters to the international standards were the most critical actions for the development of the polish ports. an increase in the maximum axle load to 221kn and modernisation of the traffic control system were the most significant enhancements for cargo traffic as they allowed to introduction of heavier trains into traffic and increased the railway lines capacity. modernisation of line 226 and construction of a new bridge on the martwa wisła river was a critical tab. 1. changes in travel times between the polish ports (gdańsk, gdynia, szczecin, świnoujście) and border crossings with the czech republic (gorzyczki) and slovakia (zwardoń) in the years 1995–2015 connection\time [min] 1995 2004 2007 2015 reduction in time [min] reduction in time [%] świnoujście–gorzyczki 505 480 462 389 116.2 23.0 świnoujście–zwardoń 597 557 522 450 146.8 24.6 szczecin–gorzyczki 459 433 415 339 119.4 26.0 szczecin–zwardoń 550 510 475 400 150.0 27.3 gdańsk–gorzyczki 532 522 507 353 178.4 33.5 gdańsk–zwardoń 544 542 528 391 153.0 28.1 gdynia–gorzyczki 545 535 513 362 183.5 33.7 gdynia–zwardoń 557 555 534 399 158.0 28.4 source: own elaboration based on: komornicki et al., 2013, 2018; rosik et al., 2014; rosik, stępniak, 2015; stępniak, rosik, 2018; rokicki, stępniak, 2018. hinterland connectivity as a driver of the development of competitiveness of polish ports in the post-eu accession period 21 infrastructure project for the port in gdansk. the construction works started in 2014 and finished in 2016 (tab. 2). this line serves the eastern part of the port, including the external port and dct terminal, the baltic leading container hub. in 2010, the rail network had more than a 55% share in servicing the szczecin-świnoujście port team and more than a 20% share in servicing the ports in gdynia and gdańsk (pluciński, 2013). such a percentage is a result of the shipment volume and structure. bulk goods, like coal and, more often, containers, were delivered by trains. at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the role of rail transport was not that significant. however, in the second decade of the 21st century, this tendency reversed in gdynia and gdańsk. it was a result of growing transhipment and an effect of intermodality development and an increase in the number of containers delivered by rail (bocheński, palmowski, 2015). in 2015, the rail network had more than a 28% share in servicing the port in gdańsk (dolecki, 2016). in 2012, the share exceeded 35% for the dct terminal and 40% for the bct terminal in gdynia. as for szczecin and świnoujście, the role of rail transport has remained relatively negligible (bocheński, palmowski, 2015). the network of regular container train connections between the sea and land terminals is fundamental for rail services provided to the ports. those regular connections are especially significant for the dct terminal in gdańsk and two other terminals in gdynia. when analysing the regular connections, a significant disparity between gdańsk–gdynia and szczecin–świnoujście was observed. there were, on average, 3–4 container trains a day running south from tricity and only one train in 3–4 days from szczecin. it is worth mentioning that regularity and frequency are the two most important advantages of intermodal transport. as for delivery speed, fig. 3. railways and trading sea ports in poland source: own elaboration based on: transeuropejska..., n.d.; bocheński, palmowski, 2015. 22 maciej tarkowski, sławomir goliszek, tadeusz bocheński container trains do not compete since all container trains in poland run at 29 km/h. it means that it takes 17–20 hours for a container train to cover the distance between tricity (located in the north) and significant economic centres located in the south. reaching destinations located in central poland takes 11–12 hours (poliński, 2015). the development of intermodal rail transport in poland results in the construction of new container terminals. before the systemic transformation (1989), only four container terminals were constructed. at the beginning of the 1990s, there were only a few terminals in operation in poland. the process of terminal infrastructure development intensified after poland had become a member state of the eu. in 2017 there were almost 40 terminals in operation (tab. 3, fig. 4). some new sites have been built in recent years, and the existing ones have been modernised and developed, while others were closed. modernisation of the road network facilitating distribution of goods in the rail container terminals’ hinterland was a factor fostering the development of intermodal connections between the ports and the hinterland. implementing projects aimed at constructing new roads and modernising the existing ones has significantly increased transport accessibility of the ports (fig. 5) and strengthened their competitive position on the freight market. 4. discussion and conclusions the 37% increase in shipment in polish ports recorded between 2006 and 2016 was the secondhighest one among the european economic area’s seaports. this article is perceived as a manifestation tab. 2. rail infrastructure projects of particular significance for the polish seaports operation were implemented in 1995–2015 line number section source of founding type of works completion period e65 gdynia – warszawa iep* modernisation 2009 – 2015 ce65 tczew – bydgoszcz gb revitalisation 2010 – 2015 ce65 nowawieświelka – trzciniec rf partial modernisation 2009 ce65 inowrocław – bydgoszcz gb, rf revitalisation 2012 – 2015 ce65 inowroclaw – chorzow batory gb, rf revitalisation 2012 – 2015 ce59 świnoujście – szczecin gb partial modernisation 2010 – 2013 ce59 szczecin – dolna odra gb, rf modernisation 2010 ce65 pruszcz gdański – gdańsk port północny iep modernisation 2014 – 2016 iep – infrastructure and environment programme, rop – regional operational programme, gb – government budget, rf – railway fund, * – the investment was co-founded under several different projects. source: own elaboration based on information by mapa inwestycji…, 2019. tab. 3. the number of publicly accessible container terminals in poland in the selected years specification years 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 n u m b er o f te rm in al s total 4 9 12 21 30 38 38 sea 1 2 3 5 5 6 6 land total 3 7 9 16 25 32 32 with broad-gauge railway 1 2 2 4 6 7 8 d en si ty o f te rm in al s per 1,000 km of railway lines 0.17 0.40 0.56 1.06 1.49 1.98 1.98 on an area of 10,000 square kilometres 0.13 0.29 0.38 0.67 0.96 1.22 1.22 source: own elaboration based on: bocheński, 2016; number and characteristics…, 2017; transport. wyniki działalności 1995– 2015, 1995–2015. hinterland connectivity as a driver of the development of competitiveness of polish ports in the post-eu accession period 23 of the revealed (direct) competitiveness (kim, 2015). this growth affected a set of different factors, and research results on competitiveness drivers (parola et al., 2017) revealed. in this context, two groups of drivers have been developed the most: port infra and superstructure and hinterland connectivity. this article focuses on the second one as, thanks to the eu funds, most of the pre-accession hinterland connectivity development barriers have been removed (palmowski, 1997). moreover, the enhancement of hinterland connectivity was a key development driver for the polish ports. it has made it possible to redirect some goods that used to be delivered from the polish hinterland to german ports of the north sea. the scale of road infrastructural investments, focused mainly on the development of express roads and highways, has reduced travel times from the south of poland to the ports located in the north by 23–34%. in the case of rail development projects, the enhancement resulted from the rail infrastructural projects and expansion of the network of intermodal containers terminals in whole poland. while in 1995 there were only 9 of them, in 2015 their number reached 38, which has significantly enhanced accessibility to intermodal transport services. most of them have regular connections to the leading polish ports in their offer. referring to the classification dividing the competitiveness drivers into controlled and uncontrolled by the port authorities (moya, valero, 2017), it may be stated that the enhancement of hinterland connectivity in poland is in the second group although fig. 4. development of container terminals in poland until 2017 source: own elaboration based on: bocheński, 2016; number and characteristics…, 2017. 24 maciej tarkowski, sławomir goliszek, tadeusz bocheński the representatives of maritime affairs were lobbing for it. however, enhancement of the nautical accessibility and development of the supraand infrastructure was under the port authorities’ influence and the port community. nevertheless, all the decisions were made with a high degree of certainty that the hinterland connectivity would be enhanced, and that the bottlenecks in servicing land-sea logistic chains would be removed. all the transformations of the competitiveness drivers may be analysed in the context of five cutting-edge maritime logistics industry changes influencing port competitiveness (parola et al., 2017): economies of scale in shipping, port governance changes, coopetition among ports in proximity, inter-firm networks, as well as green and sustainability challenges. the first trend seems to be the most visible in the context of hinterland connectivity. most of the critical transformations, such as improvement in nautical accessibility, development and modernisation of port infraand superstructure, and significant enhancement in the hinterland connectivity, were aimed at creating proper conditions for servicing larger vessels – mainly mega container ships. the success of the dct terminal in gdansk and its role in the development of the whole port, and its capabilities of servicing large transhipment volumes have indicated how critical it is to meet the challenges set out by economies of scale in shipping. the analyses of changes in the hinterland connectivity focused on the spatial structure of freight systems and on one of the accessibility measures – time accessibility. changes in cost accessibility were not subject of the analyses due to lack of data, being a commercial secret. however, such analyses should be conducted as they shed light on other important port competitiveness drivers, such as port costs and port efficiency. to sum up, by analogy to the research on competition between ports in hongkong and shenzen (tian et al. 2015), it can stated that such dynamic development of the polish ports recorded in the analysed period was possible thanks to exploiting simple reserves, mainly in the scope of port infra and superstructure as well as hinterland connectivity. simultaneously, the nearest competing ports – german ports of the north sea – focused on more sophisticated business drivers: port service quality and port site. although costly, they used the primary reserves to increase transhipment in a relatively simple way. however, it seems to be impossible to achieve such success again. in the future, the polish ports’ operation, already having high hinterland connectivity and operational efficiency, will depend on the already-mentioned more sophisticated business drivers. acknowledgements s. goliszek gratefully acknowledges the support of the polish national science centre allocated to the project “monitoring changes of traffic-generating potentials and determinants of the distribution of freight traffic on the network of polish roads in the fig. 5. changes in time accessibility to the container 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https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.02 socio-economic aspects of potential migrants of the mountainous region of adjaria merab putkaradze (1), george abuselidze (2) (1) department of geography, batumi shota rustaveli state university, ninoshvili 35, batumi & 6010, georgia e-mail: merab.putkaradze@bsu.edu.ge (corresponding author) (2) department of finance, banking and insurance, batumi shota rustaveli state university, ninoshvili 35, batumi & 6010, georgia e-mail: george.abuselidze@bsu.edu.ge citation putkaradze m., abuselidze g., 2022, socio-economic aspects of potential migrants of the mountainous region of adjaria, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(2), 8–15. abstract maintenance of the optimum quantity of population in mountainous regions of the world and management of migration processes are among urgent matters. the problem is so difficult that it requires a complex study and foresees regional originalities. therefore, the main objective of the research is to study the aims and factors involving potential migrants in possible migration processes, based on the example of georgia, in particular on the example of the mountainous region of adjaria. the research was mainly based on sociological questioning and an in-depth interview method, by which a comparison of surveys conducted in the soviet period and in independent georgia as well as a comparison of quantitative and qualitative properties of migration processes were performed. as a result of the research, it was concluded that main reasons causing potential migration processes in the modern period are not social, but economic and ecological factors. besides, in different social groups, geographical originalities of trends of expected migration processes were found. therefore, events managing the expected migration processes are set, which would bear huge importance for working out the country’s migration policy and efficiently fulfilling municipal programs. key words demographics, population, migration, economy, adjaria, georgia. received: 26 march 2022 accepted: 24 june 2022 published: 19 august 2022 1. introduction the collapse of the system of socialist states resulted in a whole series of systemic transformation processes (haček, 2021; norkus, 2012; rose, 2009). it was no different in georgia (stefes, paturyan, 2021; jawad, 2005). among other, these processes caused changes in the demographics of these societies. in terms of natural movement, these changes are generally in line with the second demographic transition (sdt) (sobotka, 2008; wilson 2013), including both changes in fertility (e.g. čipin et al., 2020; šprocha, bačík, 2021) and mortality (e.g. billingsley, 2011; brainerd, 2021). the situation is slightly different in the case of migrations, which are only partially compliant with the sdt, as a very large percentage socio-economic aspects of potential migrants of the mountainous region of adjaria 9 of post-communist countries, especially the poorer ones, have a negative net migration (e.g. matviyishyn, 2021; vakhitova, fihel, 2020). major changes also take place as regards internal migrations in post-communist countries. in the socialist period, new industrial plants were often set up in backward rural areas (hudec, urbančíková, 2008). foreign direct investment (fdi) appeared in these countries after opening the markets of the former socialist bloc. contrary to investments from the previous period, these are not localized in order to level disparities between regions. locations are chosen by companies in order to maximize profits. therefore, they are located in regions attractive to investors: with good transport accessibility, large human resources, etc. (kakaš, gruber, 2016). it is no different in georgia. this factor may worsen the economic situation of the population in peripheral regions, including mountain regions, and result in increased emigration (karachurina, mkrtchyan, 2019; popijaková et al., 2018; rosič et al., 2018). the study of originalities of the development of social-economic and migration processes in mountain regions of georgia (kohler et al., 2017; putkaradze, putkaradze, 2019) and the world (bachmann et al., 2019; coleman, 2008; gleeson et al., 2015; gurung et al., 2012; messerli, 2012; zhelezov, 2011) has shown that the main reasons for migration include the difference between social-economic levels and changes in ecological conditions, although quantitative and qualitative properties bear the regional nature (abuselidze, 2019; benz, 2016; nicilovic, 2011; gretter et al., 2017; löffler et al., 2016; mladenov, 2011). therefore, finding out the development tendencies of expected migration processes in a particular region will have a big importance for perfecting a sustainable demographic and socialeconomic development of mountain regions. changes in the field of the world business structure and the accelerated development of urbanization processes had an essential impact on the population’s migration processes. the mentioned regularity has involved almost all country, especially the mountainous regions, where the population intensively moves from mountains to plains, thus creating one of the urgent issues for mankind – to maintain an optimum amount of population in mountain regions. a similar problem is especially urgent in mountainous regions of georgia, where the demographic situation constitutes a significant social and economic challenge. the main goal of this research is to study (based on the example of the adjarian region) the quantitative and qualitative properties of the development of migration processes based on sociological interviews held during two different periods. the second goal is to find out the prognosis of expected migration processes by analyzing factors causing a possible involvement of potential migrants in the migration process. in order to achieve these objectives, solutions to the following tasks are needed: • comparing results of sociological interviews held in 1990 and 2019 and determining the reasons for potential migration processes during the two different systemic periods; • breaking down the causes of potential migrants’ involvement in migration processes and determining the originalities of social and economic factors of migration processes; • analyzing the potential migrants’ views in the modern period and regulating the migration processes accordingly; fig. 1. keda, shuakhevi and khulo municipalities in the context of the administrative division of georgia. source: own study. 10 merab putkaradze, george abuselidze • finding out the social and economic mechanism to manage expected migration processes and setting ways to optimize the population’s areal (territorial) movement. the study object is the mountainous region of the autonomous republic of adjaria (keda, shuakhevi and khulo municipalities) (fig. 1), which are known as those with the highest population reproduction rate among the mountainous regions of georgia and play an essential part in the country’s demographic development. therefore, the study conducted based on the example of a particular region would have the enlightening and applicable meaning as well. 2. data and methods factors causing migration have such a complicated nature that a study of their quantitative and qualitative properties needs a complex approach. the main basis of this study was ethnographic research and a sociological interview, by means of which in-depth interviews and data modelling were conducted in a formal and informal environment (anderson, 2003; hammersley, atkinson, 2019; lu, nepal, 2009; berg, lune, 2012). based on the applied method, reasons and factors causing migration during the two different periods were found along with quantitative indicators of potential migrants. by means of extrapolation (ribakovsky, 1978; bakhmutova, 1982), the development of indicators of the intensity of migration processes in the past period was analyzed. by application of the gravitation method (oninenko, popovkin, 1973; zaionchkovskaya, 1988), the impact of migrants’ attraction to a region in an expected migration processes was assessed. by applying historical, comparative, statistical and spatial-temporal analysis methods, the quantitative and qualitative properties of the possible development of the expected migration processes were established. the statistical data used in the article were collected based on the desk research method. the basic data taken for analysis come from national statistics office of georgia. besides, the results of interviews with regional public school teachers and students were used. 3. results and discussion during of recent century, the basic trend of migration processes in georgia has been from the mountains to plains and from villages to cities, which has led to a negative impact on the demographic development of mountainous regions of georgia, but this process has had an economic importance during the scheduled thrift conditions of the soviet period. an analysis of originalities of the demographic development of the mountain regions during the soviet period has shown that migration processes have mainly been caused by socio-economic factors ( jaoshvili, 1996; meladze, 2007; tsuladze et al., 2008). yet in independent georgia, this factor was accompanied by political processes and a worsened ecological condition. therefore, the scales and trends of migration processes throughout these two different periods substantially differ. z. zainchikovskai (1988) consider that forecasting of migration processes should rely not only on orientation of economic regularities, but on orientation of personal values as well. coming out of this, in order to reach the study goal, we have considered to compare and analyze materials from sociological interviews with the population conducted in two different epochs – in 1990 tab. 1. results of a sociological interview regarding the population of mountainous adjaria in 1990 and 2019. № factors causing the migration amount of prioritized factors named according the range in the first, the second and the third places 1990 year 2019 year i ii iii i ii iii 1 lack of land 227 125 90 126 162 188 2 profitability 202 384 245 141 116 91 3 change in the labor structure 58 56 59 48 42 38 4 creation of workplaces 16 17 33 263 230 196 5 improvement in cultural and living conditions 211 149 152 36 28 31 6 increase in prices of agricultural production 95 133 159 93 102 108 7 improvement in transportation conditions 47 63 128 52 48 44 8 supply of the internet – – – 51 58 76 9 ecological condition – – – 89 108 132 total 856 856 856 904 904 904 source: the table has been developed based on the materials of a field study conducted in 1990 and 2019. socio-economic aspects of potential migrants of the mountainous region of adjaria 11 (putkaradze, 1991) and in 2019 and – to draw proper conclusions (see table 1). the presented data (table 1) clearly shows that, according to sociological interviews held in 1990, potential migrants had the following prioritized reasons for migration (among the seven factors throughout the related range): the first place – profitability, in particular – low salaries (26.5% of interviewees), the second place – improvement in cultural and living conditions (24.6% of interviewees) and the third place – the lack of land (23.6% of interviewees). 74.7% of the interviewees in that period considered that the named factors needed improvement. for that period, the increase in workplaces was insignificant among the factors causing potential migration, as it was named in the first places only by 1.8% of the respondents. the mentioned factor actually did not influence the migration processes, as the population was practically employed. the sociological interview held in 2019 significantly differs from the one held in the previous period. in particular, 26.6% of the respondents chose the increase in the workplaces in the first place among nine factors causing migration; 15.6% of the respondents indicated low financial income in the second place, and the lack of land stands in the third place being chosen by 13.9% of the respondents. this indicates that potential migrants prioritize issues of an economic nature. besides, worsened ecological condition has no less meaning, as 9.8% of the respondents put this problem in the first place. from analysis of the interviews with the population, it is obvious that potential migrants from the soviet period prioritized social problems, whilst this factor in the modern period was indicated in the first place only by 4.0% of the respondents. the worsened ecological condition in the region has no less impact on migration processes of the population of mountainous adjaria. the intensity of ecomigrants was especially outlined by the end of previous century. in particular, in 1989–1991, 19,138 persons from mountainous adjaria (i.e. 22.5% of the total population) settled in different regions of georgia (putkaradze, putkaradze 2019). recent years have obviously outlined the decreasing tendencies in the number of eco-migrants, due to environmental monitoring and implementing activities related to environmental protection – the occurrence of elemental processes was limited to its minimum. nevertheless, according to the results of population’s sociological interview held in 2019, the influence of the mentioned factor on migration processes is still high (9.5% of the interviewees put it in the first place). thus, it resembles the situation from other regions of the former ussr, where economic emigration prevails, but unfavorable changes in the natural environment may be the actual cause of migration, yet difficult to ascertain on a macro scale (cf. štefančík, seresová 2021). quite interesting facts were outlined as a result of the sociological interview held in 2019. together with an increased distance from batumi (the region’s largest population center) and attitude, the influence of economic factors on migration processes are gradually increasing. for example, part of the population of the keda municipality (nearest to batumi and known for comparatively good environmental conditions) is employed in batumi. on the other hand, the named municipality produces ecologically pure and quite expensive vegetables. accordingly, a comparatively high level of employment and expensive prices of agricultural production do not constitute the main reason for migration. the influence of economic factors on migration processes are obviously outlined on the example of the khulo municipality, which is further from batumi (80–90 km away) and is located 900–1600 meters above the sea level. furthermore, income is low in the khulo municipality, and it is accompanied with a lack of land and a high level of unemployment. high quantitative indicators of potential migrants’ involvement in migration processes are also confirmed by the fact that 626 respondents out of 904 (69.2%) were going to move from their permanent residential place, and 278 of them (30.8%) intended to stay at their place in 2019. as an answer to the question where they were going to settle in, the vast majority (92.3%) answered that on the sea coast of adjaria, with 79.6% of them intending to settle in batumi. 7.3% of the respondents planned to settle in tbilisi, and the rest of them (0.4%) in other regions of our country. this specific high share of potential migrants desiring to settle in adjaria is caused by their will to live in their home region. on the other hand, some residents of batumi and adjacent areas benefit with their grandfathers’ lands situated at the areas of their origin. in order to give a complex nature to research, opinions of students of batumi state university whose permanent residence place is in the studied territory (the most active contingent of potential migrants) on migration was studied. in particular, only 18.0% out of 128 respondents intend to return to mountainous adjaria after graduation (see table 1). the mentioned circumstance indicates the high involvement of the most mobile social group in migration processes that should, by all means, be foreseen to ensure social balance and develop sustainable demographic processes in the regional population. the results of an interview with regional public 12 merab putkaradze, george abuselidze school teachers drastically differ. for instance, only 8 (or 10.8%) out of 74 teachers intend to change their place of permanent residence (see table 1). this results from the fact that this contingent of population is employed and, according to the law on mountainous regions, their salary rates are 35% higher comparing to an average teacher salary in georgia. according to quantitative and qualitative properties acquired in the study, it is possible to discuss expected opportunities of potential migrants’ involvement in migration processes, but in order to determine complex cause-and-effect correlations, it is necessary to determine the development tendencies of the expected processes by a migration forecasting approach. for this purpose, it is acceptable to apply the extrapolation method of forecasting (ribakovski 1982 and bachmutova 1978) by means of which the intensity of the development originalities of migration processes held in the previous period will be analyzed (see table 2). according the presented data (see table 2), negative migration balance of the studied region in 1990–2000 was 28,501 persons, in 2001–2011 – 11,035 persons and in 2012–2019 – 1,057 persons. it is obvious that during the recent 30 years, the intensity of migration per each 1,000 person has noticeably decreased from 383 persons (1990–2000) to 19 persons (2012–2019). therefore, we can suppose that the involvement of potential migrants in migration processes will be continue with less intensity comparing to previous periods. it is known that the level of attractiveness to potential migrants affects the migration intensity. for this purpose, the gravitational method was applied while evaluating the migration (oninento et al. 1973 and zaionchkovskaya 1988). owing to it, it was possible to find out how much impact a particular territory has on attracting migrants. according to sociological interviews, the main attraction region for potential migrants is the sea coast of adjaria (92.3% of migrants), especially the city of batumi (79.6%). however, it should be noted that less employment opportunities, high accommodation prices in batumi, and lack of available land in village settlements actually forecast that the population of this region lagging behind economically would be able to make their desires come true. thus, the direction of the studied migrations confirms the results of other studies from post-communist countries (bulatović and rajović 2018 and kakaš 2017) that internal migrants mainly go to the largest city in the region. due to the complexity of the studied matter, it is necessary to compare the quantitative and qualitative properties of migration processes taking place in mountain regions of georgia. as a result of the research conducted by the present authors (putkaradze, putkaradze, 2019; putkaradze, abuselidze, 2019), it was found out that in 1990–2016 the population of mountain regions of georgia decreased by 237,939 persons (i.e. by 46.5%). the negative migration balance was observed in all mountain regions. but intensity indicators have noticeably decreased in recent years. hence, the mentioned tendencies are also outlined in mountainous adjaria, which is restricted due to economic factors of migrants’ settlement in areas of attraction. the precision of the mentioned topic also requires analyzing demographic processes of mountain regions of the world and neighboring countries of the caucasus. since the 1950s, in the population of mountain regions of eastern europe decreasing tendencies of migration processes have been observed (löffler et al., 2016; mladenov, 2016; nicilovic, 2016; gretter, 2017). in neighboring countries of the caucasus, in particular, the demographic development of armenia almost coincides with originalities of migration processes of mountain regions of georgia (yeganyan, 2010). the population of mountain region of azerbaijan is characterized with much less intensity of a decrease in numbers (avdeev, 2015), although the mountain region of the caucasus on the russian federation’s side is known for far better tab. 2. intensity of migration processes of the population of mountainous adjaria in 1990 and 2019. years population quantity (persons) absolute value of natural increase (persons) population quantity at the end of the given period together with natural increase (persons) negative migration balance migration intensity per 1,000 persons 1990 84700 8101 92801 28501 383 2000 64300 2001 63300 4435 67735 11035 184 2011 56700 2012 56200 2357 58857 1057 19 2019 57800 source: the table has been developed based on the national statistics office of georgia. socio-economic aspects of potential migrants of the mountainous region of adjaria 13 demographic properties, which is related to local ethnic people’s traditions and religious factors (zagirova, 2016). 4. conclusions the analysis of demographic processes of mountain regions of the world and georgia clearly shows that tendencies in population decrease are observed everywhere because of migration processes. therefore, migration processes in mountainous adjaria will continue, but with the methodological approach to forecasting the migration processes, its intensity will presumably be lower comparing to the previous period. the study makes it clear that reasons causing the potential migration of the population of mountainous adjaria during of the two different periods significantly changed in line with socio-economic and ecological factors. besides, decreasing tendencies are observed as regards the indicators of potential migrants’ involvement in migration processes, which is caused by restricted economic possibilities of migrants’ settlement in attractive regions (migration intensity coefficient per 1,000 population in 1990– 2000 was 383 and in 2012–2019 – 19). according to the results of a sociological interview, the majority of potential migrants intend to settle on the coast of adjaria, but a lack of the land in the region and high prices in city settlements prevent them from realizing their desires. therefore, in the nearest future, decreased migration flows are expected in mountainous adjaria. by foreseeing the factors of possible involvement of potential migrants from mountainous adjaria in migration processes, it has been determined that their quantitative indicators will develop with decreasing tendencies. in order to regulate the existed issue, it is necessary to start effective municipal programs, thus limiting the migration flows to their minimum, and state projects should be deployed 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(1988). problemy prognozirovaniia migratsii naseleniia. metodologiia demograficheskogo prognoza (eng. problems of forecasting the population migration. methodology of demographic prognosis), nauka, moskva. zhelezov g., 2010, models and strategies for sustainable management of mountain territories in central and southeastern europe, [in:] g. zhelezov (ed). sustainable development in mountain regions, springer, dordrecht, 273–279. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-0131-1_22 1. introduction the lineage of contemporary geographical interrogation of sovereignty can be traced back to two interrelated events: 1) the collapse of the cold war order, and 2) the inability of prevailing international relations theory to explain those epochal changes. as agnew (1994) argues in a seminal article igniting critical geographic inquiry into state sovereignty, mainstream international relations theory was unable to anticipate or satisfactorily explicate the political-territorial transformations put in motion in 1989 because it set, and fell prey to, a “territorial trap” – a dominant understanding of the state system as an assemblage of mutually exclusive political entities delimited by sharply defined borders. taking this constellation of discrete territorial states as a given, prominent ir scholars, according to agnew, simply plotted out their patterns of commerce, peace, and war in terms that invoked balances of power or strategic hegemony, bilateral trade agreements and diplomatic relations; suband supra-state phenomena were assumed irrelevant. agnew identifies the sine qua non of this essentially territorial vision: the total sovereignty of the state over its territorial space in a world fragmented into territorial states gives the state its most powerful justification. without journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(2), 10–15 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.2.02 beyond the territorial trap? the geographic examination of sovereignty matthew derrick department of geography, environment, and spatial analysis, humboldt state university, harpst 1, arcata, 95521, california, usa, orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0506-1043 e-mail: mad632@humboldt.edu citation derrick m., 2020, beyond the territorial trap? the geographic examination of sovereignty, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(2), 10–15. abstract sovereignty is now a key concept in geographic scholarship. however, sustained geographic investigation of sovereignty commenced only in the 1990s, after the collapse of the cold war order. early, important contributions to the interrogation of sovereignty were historical, providing rigor in understanding the dialectical relationship between space and politics in the development of the state system. by the close of the twentieth century, however, historical complementarity in important geographic tracts on sovereignty, conditioned by new geopolitics of post-communism, gave way to diverging prognostications among academic geographers on the contemporary and future nature and salience of state sovereignty. key words sovereignty, geographic thought, nation-state system, territory. received: 23 june 2020 accepted: 14 october 2020 published: 20 november 2020 beyond the territorial trap? the geographic examination of sovereignty 11 this a state would be just another organization (1994, p. 60, emphasis added). thus, as the berlin wall fell, as the soviet union dissolved, as czechoslovakia commenced divorce proceedings, as yugoslavia conflagrated – as the “territorial trap” was exposed – so too was the concept of sovereignty was called on the carpet. yet, beyond offering the “powerful justification” designation, agnew neglects to define sovereignty. he might have offered a definition similar to that presented by knight: sovereignty, or the unqualified competence that states prima facia [sic] possess, implies competency to control the territory and its contents and also relationships with other states through the totality of powers that states, under international law, have and may use (1994, p. 75). such a definition would have pointed out the two commonly recognized aspects of sovereignty, internal authority and external independence (see e.g. krasner, 2001; james, 1984), while acknowledging its legal basis without uncritically affirming its ontological status (prima facie). agnew instead juxtaposes the sovereignty of territorial states with the “defence of human, cultural, or ecological security” (1994, p. 60), implying the former is necessarily maintained at the expense of the latter. this appears to be the type of zero-sum thinking he assails in ir debates focused on either/or scenarios of the “persistence or obsolescence of the territorial state” (agnew, 1994, p. 54). but even here the indictment against international relations might be overstated. as philpott discusses, leading cold war-era ir theorists did in fact exaggerate the utility of sovereignty while maintaining an exclusive focus on the territorial state: but by the 1970s and ‘80s some scholars had come to believe that states were losing control over the flow of money, goods, people, corporations, and information across their borders, and they started speaking of sovereignty in crisis (2001, p. 297). in spite of these apparent contradictions, agnew above all should be lauded for his clarion call for geographical investigation into the significance and meaning of sovereignty and the territorial state in different historical-political circumstances. the remainder of this article, following on agnew’s invocation, is comprised of a historically driven investigation of how academic geographers have interrogated the political norms of state sovereignty, illustrating how the historical concept in no way has remained static. rather, as key works of scholarship by geographers have illustrated, what in this article is termed as the locus of legitimation of state sovereignty as a political-legal concept has shifted dialectically since the mid-seventeenth century vis-à-vis shifts in the evolution international state system as it arose in the wake of the westphalian treaties. in particular, the locus of legitimation of sovereignty shifted alongside changing relationships between territory and peoplehood. key geographic inquiries into the historically changing nature of sovereignty that took place in the 1990s were largely complementary in their enrichment of our understanding of the towering concept, especially the inherent spatiality of its political-legal core. however, with the advent of the new century, their understandings and arguments of the more contemporary and future natures of sovereignty assumed sharply differing trajectories, conditioned by diverging interpretations of in-the-moment dramas of post-communist political-territorial upheaval. 2. data and methods this examination of the geographic interrogation of sovereignty employs a critical historical reading of important contributions to the development of scholarly inquiry and understanding of the key concept, one that remains a lynchpin in the international state system. critical textual analysis of tracts produced by noteworthy geographers beginning in the 1990s illustrates sovereignty’s changing ideological locus of legitimacy as the political-legal concept developed alongside the international state system. the critical historical methodological approach is utilized not only to point out how leading political geographers reconstructed what has become an accepted narration of post-westphalian sovereignty through the cold war, but also is utilized to help explain sharp disciplinary divergences in understanding and argumentation of the nature of sovereignty in the twenty-first century. 3. results and discussion taylor (1994; 1995) and murphy (1996) most immediately took up agnew’s challenge, historicizing the nation-state as a political-territorial ideal. in the process of showing the constructed nature of the sovereignty, they not only unraveled some shibboleths of orthodox international relations theory,1 but also 1 the work of these two has influenced subsequent ir analysis of sovereignty, informing, for example, krasner’s evolution from hardened realism (see e.g. krasner, 1992) to a constructivist position (see e.g. krasner, 1999; 2001). 12 matthew derrick helped to mold what is now academic geographers’ predominant understanding of the development of international system. a skeleton of that story follows. medieval europe, where sovereignty was concentrated in the throne of the holy roman emperor, was characterized by “complex and overlapping” territorial arrangements (murphy, 1996, p. 84), which gave rise to power struggles, competing sovereignty claims, and conflict that crescendoed in the thirty years’ war. hostilities were halted in 1648 with the peace of westphalia, which formalized the principle of cuius regio, eius religio. this noninterference principle devolved sovereignty’s locus of legitimation to the heads of competing states, i.e. sovereign kings, often seen as divine-right rulers. thus emerged from with the out of westphalia what taylor calls “interstateness” (1995, p. 3). following the enlightenment, with its focus on reason and the individual and questioning of royal divinity, the french revolution and its concomitant romantic nationalism represented a paradigm shift, what taylor (1995, p. 5) calls a change from “interstateness” to “internationality.” with this shift, sovereignty’s locus of legitimation transferred from heads of state to “the people,” i.e. national groups. from that point, “it became important to see political territories as reflections of nations” (murphy, 1996, p. 97). while the centralized, proto-absolutist states of west europe molded state-nations, germany and italy separately underwent a period of unification nationalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. romantic nationalism found its ultimate expression in world war i, which laid to rest the moribund empires of east europe and fed an ideology that combined claims to national self-determination and statehood: “…territory was equated with power and nations were seen as discrete social units whose members had the right to control their own affairs” (murphy, 1996, p. 88). sovereignty found its ultimate locus of legitimation: the discrete nation-state. though incongruity between national and political borders contributed to the outbreak of world war ii, status quo sovereignty was restored and protected until the fall of the berlin wall. though taylor and murphy contribute complementary geo-historical contextualizations of the international state system, and both acknowledge the growing challenges it faces at both supraand sub-state scales, they reach differing conclusions on the future of sovereignty. taylor claims that the principle is “sure to be abolished in any viable sustainable world. the competition engendered by states in their territories is ultimately a route to doomsday” (1995, p. 14). specifically, he identifies ecological destruction, itself the consequence of economic competition among states, as inevitably compelling humanity toward a post-sovereign world (taylor, 1994, p. 161). the kyoto protocol still years away, taylor cannot envision an international order in which territorial states cooperate out of enlightened self-interest to counteract environmental annihilation, among other problems. at the core of taylor’s assertion is a rigid either/or conceptualization of sovereignty: he assumes that states, as “growth machines,” inevitably will invoke the noninterference principle, as long as it is extant, for limitless economic expansion. murphy, though anticipating “significant change” in the international system, forecasts a basic continuity of the westphalian ideal: “if the history of stateterritorial ideas and practices tells us anything, it is that changes in arrangements and understandings occur, but that no one era represents a radical break with the preceding era” (murphy, 1996, p. 109).2 this calculus is grounded in a more nuanced understanding of sovereignty. recognizing that the meaning of the principle has been in flux since its formalization in the mid-seventeenth century, murphy distinguishes between de jure and de facto sovereignty. indeed, it is clear that practically no state, even the most powerful, can perfectly fulfill the ideal of internal supremacy and external independence. rather than taking a manichean view of sovereignty, as murphy implies, it would be more productive to look at the concept foremost as a question of degree. to paraphrase orwell, all recognized states are (de jure) sovereign, but some are more (de facto) sovereign than others. to be a legitimate actor in the state system, an entity must pass over an ambiguous threshold of external and internal sovereignty. this strategic ambiguity is a necessary feature that allows the world system to respond to changing circumstances, including the ecological destruction feared by taylor. these divergent conclusions might well represent separate lessons drawn from the 1991 war against iraq. the operation certainly produced conflicting evidence about the place of sovereignty in the post-cold war era.3 one the one hand, as murphy 2 a counter thesis, one positing radical change, is presented at about the same time by luke, who envisions a chaotic system in which “new subnational and supranational anarchies now permit agents of contragovernmentality, or un-stated sovran [sic] potentates, to contest the rules of in-stated sovereign powers” (1996, p. 491). luke’s position, unlike in his previous work (see footnote below), is supra-logical. his stated intent, in the spirit of foucault, is to dismantle inadequate “linguistic frames” in order to pave the way for insights into new political-territorial conditions (luke, 1996, p. 506). 3 the significance of this conflict was discussed early by luke (1991), who argues that iraq’s invasion of kuwait illustrates beyond the territorial trap? the geographic examination of sovereignty 13 indicates, the liberation of kuwait by a multistate, united nations-sanctioned coalition can be viewed as systematic dedication to sovereignty as a principle governing international relations. on the other hand, as taylor suggests, the united states-led war can be read as an expression of american hegemony at the service of economic elites keen on maintaining flows of global capital. these two divergent positions inform subsequent geographical interrogation of sovereignty. by the late 1990s, a “soft” post-sovereignty consensus followed murphy’s lead in trying to develop an enhanced notion of sovereignty. for example, austin and kumar attempt to reconcile traditional sovereignty, defined as “monopoly over legitimate violence” (1998, p. 50), with power, defined as “control over outcomes” (1998, p. 56). though the two historically have been conflated and located in the nation-state, increasingly mobile, large corporations assume more power as they transgress the authority of ostensibly sovereign states. to bridge the twain, the authors redefine sovereignty: the degree to which a state, other institution, or organization can coerce or otherwise intentionally (and significantly) influence the behavior of other participants in the world political system and have such behavior recognized and accepted by a significant number of participants in that world political system (austin, kumar, 1998, p. 58). though claiming to retain the state as a primary unit of analysis, austin and kumar, with this definition, place corporations and non-governmental organizations (ngos) on an equal footing with the nationstate as sovereignty’s locus of legitimation. moreover, this definition erases the distinction between power and sovereignty, conflating the two but dislocating them from the state’s exclusive possession. in effect, this definition un-states sovereignty, reducing it to mere power.4 the upshot of this formulation is that it approaches justification of sorts, not simple explanation, of economic and other forces that breach lingering notions of absolute internal and external sovereignty. the declining importance of the territorial state, as the kuwaiti government was able to use financial networks to transfer its bank reserves to other nodes in the capitalist network, thereby evading capture by saddam hussein. both agnew (1994) and murphy (1996) address this piece in developing their arguments. 4 other geographers by the late 1990s had tried to dislodge sovereignty from the state. see, for instance, sucharov (1998) for an attempt to delineate between state sovereignty and pan-national sovereignty. in the wake of “humanitarian” interventions in serbia and iraq, “soft” post-sovereignty has given way to a current “harder” position. an important article by agnew (2005) is emblematic. he contends that de jure sovereignty is a ghost, as attested to by guantánamo bay and other american military operations acting “worldwide with scarcely a nod to local claims of territorial sovereignty” (agnew, 2005, p. 438; see also reid-henry, 2007).5 in lieu of the legal/reality distinction, agnew proposes the concept of effective sovereignty, which he argues is not necessarily territorial. he develops a typology of four current sovereignty regimes, discussing currency policy as illustration (2005, pp. 445–456): 1. a classic sovereignty regime combines consolidated territoriality and strong central state authority. china, controlling its currency rates within its borders, embodies this regime. 2. an integrative sovereignty regime combines consolidated territoriality with weaker central state control. the european union (eu), consolidating currency control internally, exemplifies this regime. 3. a globalist sovereignty regime combines open territoriality with strong central state control. the us, whose dollars undersign a bulk of the international financial network, embodies this regime. 4. an imperialist regime combines open territoriality and weaker central state authority. south america, where national currencies have been replaced by us dollars, typifies this regime. though national currency certainly is an attribute of sovereignty, it also is a mechanism of power. indeed, in his analysis, agnew too appears to conflate sovereignty with power and/or control. his goal very well might be to expose sovereignty as an insidious fiction, a blanket for power, as he suggests in an expanded book-length examination of the topic (agnew, 2009). if so, he deserves praise for uncovering power mechanics. but his analysis, like that of the “soft” camp, makes a mistake in measuring sovereignty only in terms of compliance or noncompliance. neglected is the normative function the concept of sovereignty plays in framing everyday politics that in turn shape our territorial imaginings and practices. 5 additional forces, including the denationalization of currencies, environmental externalities, and terrorist networks further reveal the fictive nature of territorial sovereignty, according to agnew (2005; 2009). 14 matthew derrick 4. conclusions rather than being dismissed as an ontologically chaotic concept, as geographers have already urged us to do with “culture” (see, e.g., mitchell, 1995) and “economy” (see, e.g., castree, 2004), de jure sovereignty should be retained if only for its power as an idea, an idea empowered by its grounding in questions of legal constitutional authority over territory (philpott, 2001; lake, 2016). the continuing power of this idea is recognized for several interrelated reasons. first, the territorial nation-state retains its importance in shaping identity (storey, 2017). notions of post-sovereign cosmopolitanism (see e.g. held, 2004; 2013), attainable only by a small global elite, remain alien to the mass of humanity. second, as agnew rightly recognizes, historically there has been a very positive correlation between the development of democracy and the nation-state. naïve at best is the notion that a post-sovereign international system would be any more just than the current order (agnew 2005; 2009). third, shifting norms associated with sovereignty will condition how state actors attempt to justify their claims in territorial conflicts, as seen in disputes over crimea (charron, 2016), kashmir (osuri, 2017), nagorno-karabakh (borgen, 2007; blakkisrud, kolstø, 2012), and multiple other examples in eurasia (kofanov et al., 2018) and beyond (caspersen, 2013). fourth, weaker countries, recognizing that sovereignty’s banishment likely would benefit the more powerful states, often see sovereignty as a “resource to be cultivated and exploited” (peterson, 1998, p. 179). fifth, as the integrationist eu becomes more state-like, the negotiation of sovereignty between brussels and the member nations will ensure greater responsiveness and representation (moisio, 2006; paasi, 2016). and, sixth, sub-state indigenous groups will continue to post sovereignty claims (ranco, suagee, 2007; diver, 2018). negotiating these claims could lead to new forms of multilayered governance more accommodating of regional cultural difference. references agnew j., 1994, the territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory, review of international political economy, 1(1), 53–80. doi: 10.1080/09692299408434268 agnew j., 2005, sovereignty regimes: territoriality and state authority in contemporary world politics, annals of the association of american geographers, 95(2), 437–461. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8306.2005.00468.x agnew j., 2009, globalization and sovereignty, rowman & littlefield, new york. austin c., kumar m., 1998, sovereignty in the global economy: an evolving geopolitical concept, geography research forum, 18(1), 49–64. blakkisrud h., kolstø p., 2012, dynamics of de facto statehood: the south caucasian de facto states between secession and sovereignty, southeast european and black sea studies, 12(2), 281–298. borgen c.j., 2007, imagining sovereignty, managing secession: the legal geography of eurasia’s frozen conflicts, oregon review of international law, 9(1), 477–535. caspersen n., 2013, unrecognized states: the struggle for sovereignty in the modern international system, john wiley & sons, new york. castree n., 2004, economy and culture are dead! long live economy and culture!, progress in human geography, 28(2), 204–226. charron a., 2016, whose is crimea? contested sovereignty and regional identity, region, 5(2), 225–256. diver s., 2018, native water protection flows through self‐determination: understanding tribal water quality standards and “treatment as a state”, journal of contemporary water research and education, 163(1), 6–30. doi: 10.1111/j.1936704x.2018.03267.x. held d., 2004, global covenant, polity press, cambridge. held d., 2013, global covenant: the social democratic alternative to the washington consensus, john wiley & sons, new york. james a., 1984, sovereignty: ground rule or gibberish?, review of international studies, 10(1), 1–18. knight, d., 1994, people together, yet apart: rethinking territory, sovereignty, and identities, [in:] g. demko, w. wood (eds.), reordering the world: geopolitical perspectives on the twenty-first century, westview press, boulder, 71–86. kofanov d., shirikov a., herrera y.m., 2018, sovereignty and regionalism in eurasia, [in:] a. paasi, j. harrison, m. jones (eds.), handbook on the geographies of regions and territories, edward elgar publishing, cheltenham, 395–406. krasner s. 1992, realism, imperialism, and democracy: a response to gilbert, political theory, 20(1), 38–52. doi: 10.1177/0090591792020001003 krasner, s., 1999, organized hypocrisy, princeton university press, princeton. krasner, s., 2001, rethinking the sovereign state model, review of international studies, 27(5), 17–42. doi: 10.1017/ s0260210501008014 lake d.a., 2016, the statebuilder’s dilemma: on the limits of foreign intervention, cornell university press, ithaca. luke t., 1991, the discipline of security studies and the codes of containment: learning from kuwait, alternatives, 16(3), 315–344. doi: 10.1177/030437549101600302 luke t., 1996, governmentality and contragovernmentality: rethinking sovereignty and territoriality after the cold war, political geography, 15(6–7), 491–507. doi: 10.1016/0962-6298(96)00028-5 mitchell d., 1995, there’s no such thing as culture: towards a reconceptualization of the idea of culture in geography, transactions of the institute of british geographers, 20(1), 102–116. beyond the territorial trap? the geographic examination of sovereignty 15 moisio s., 2006, competing geographies of sovereignty, regionality and globalisation: the politics of eu resistance in finland 1991–1994, geopolitics, 11(3), 439–464. doi: 10.1080/14650040600767891 murphy a., 1996, the sovereign state system as a political-territorial ideal: historical and contemporary considerations, [in:] t. biersteker, c. weber (eds.), state sovereignty as social construct, cambridge university press, cambridge, 80–120. osuri g., 2017, imperialism, colonialism and sovereignty in the (post) colony: india and kashmir, third world quarterly, 38(11), 2428–2443. paasi a., 2016, dancing on the graves: independence, hot/banal nationalism and the mobilization of memory, political geography, 54, 21–31. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.07.005 petersen g., 1998, strategic location and sovereignty: modern micronesia in the historical context of american expansionism, space and polity, 2(2), 179–205. doi: 10.1080/13562579808721779 philpott d., 2001, usurping the sovereignty of sovereignty?, world politics, 53(2), 297–324. jstor.org/stable/25054148 ranco d., suagee d., 2007, tribal sovereignty and the problem of difference in environmental regulation: observations on “measured separatism” in indian country, antipode, 39(4), 691–707. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00547.x. reid-henry s., 2007, exceptional sovereignty? guantánamo bay and the re-colonial present, antipode, 39(4), 627–648. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00544.x storey d., 2017, states, territory and sovereignty, geography, 102(3), 116–121. doi: 10.1080/00167487.2017.12094021. sucharov m., 1998, regional identity and the sovereignty principle: explaining israeli-palestinian peacemaking, geopolitics, 3(1), 177–196. doi: 10.1080/14650049808407613 taylor p., 1994, the state as container: territoriality in the modern world-system, progress in human geography, 18(2), 151–162. doi: 10.1177/030913259401800202 taylor p., 1995, beyond containers: internationality, interstateness, interterritoriality, progress in human geography, 19(1), 1–15. doi: 10.1177/030913259501900101 1. introduction the establishment and consolidation of the communist ideology in european countries was usually associated with the geopolitical expansion of the ussr (1922–1991). despite numerous supporters of the communist model, military and police coercion was the main lever of its spread. overall, there were two major waves of communization (sovietization) in europe. the first one covered the area that came under the rule of communist moscow as a consequence of the civil war (the early 1920s), while the second one affected the states and territories occupied by the ussr during world war ii (1945). the deep socio-economic and later political crisis in the ussr led to the marginalization of the communist ideology, which did not enjoy public support without the use of military and police force. with the collapse of the ussr (1990–1991), all post-communist countries of central europe, and partly also eastern europe, implemented a strategy of democratization, abandoning totalitarian practices and displacing pro-communist elites from various spheres of social and political life (see: âz’kovij (ed.), 2007; łukowski, wojtaszczyk (eds.), 1996). journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(4), 8–16 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.02 decommunization of urban toponymy in ukraine: causes and consequences aleksander kuczabski (1), alina boychuk (2) (1) department of regional development, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-1271-0782 e-mail: aleksander.kuczabski@ug.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) european business association western ukrainian office, kulparkivska 200a, 79071 lviv, ukraine. e-mail: alinalv19@gmail.com citation kuczabski a., boychuk a., 2020, decommunization of urban toponymy in ukraine: causes and consequences, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(4), 8–16. abstract the decommunization in ukraine took place differently than in other post-communist countries. for many years after the collapse of the ussr, ukrainian society tolerated the post-communist remnants. the conflict with russia has fundamentally changed the narrative in relation to historical memory. through the active toponymic policy of the central government in 2014–2016, it was possible to get rid of almost all communist symbols and names in public space. nevertheless, a retreat in the matter of commemoration cannot be ruled out, as left-wing, and sometimes even pro-communist, views remain popular among a large part of the ukrainian society. key words decommunization, urban toponymy, historical memory, toponymic politics, ukraine. received: 27 april 2020 accepted: 11 october 2020 published: 31 december 2020 decommunization of urban toponymy in ukraine: causes and consequences 9 the post-communist transformation in the postsoviet space proceeded in different ways: some countries quickly and irreversibly switched to democratic principles (the czech republic, estonia, etc.); others, while maintaining the general democratic vector of development, experienced many relapses of recommunization (bulgaria, moldova), and still others clearly returned to totalitarian practices (russia, belarus) (see: milczarek, nowak (eds.), 2003; orlova, 2010). ukraine, unlike other countries in the region, has shown a much longer and more dramatic transition from totalitarianism to democracy. moreover, this process was not linear and was characterized by frequent changes of the transition phases (avioutskii, 2006; kuczabski, michalski, 2014). this article presents the process of decommunization based on the example of ukraine. the specific subject of interest is the last wave of decommunization of the urban toponymy, which occurred in 2014–2019. the basic concepts and terms characterizing toponymic policy are reviewed, and the essence and causes of decommunization, especially its “last” wave, are analyzed. moreover, the current legal mechanisms for implementing the remembrance policy in the urban landscape are shown. 2. basic features of the toponymic decommunization policy toponymic policy reflects social demands and expectations regarding the shaping of symbolic space, including names of geographical sites (toponyms). the key players in the process of filling the geographical space semantically are, on the one hand, political forces as the creator of toponymic information, and on the other hand – the population as its recipient. political forces willingly use geographical space to promote their own ideological markers. in turn, the society may accept or ignore these markers, trying to create its own, alternative toponymic dimension. as a result, in order to implement an effective toponymic policy, it is insufficient to have legal or police mechanisms to create toponymic nomenclature; it is necessary to recognize and feel the public demand for it. public expectations of a toponymic policy of remembrance are based on the collective historical memory of a state, region, ethnic group, etc. on the other hand, historical memory “constitutes the basis of identity, gives national communities a sense of cultural exclusivity and a shared historical fate” (gurik, 2016, p. 26). in this context, toponymic politics can be passive – reflecting the existing traditional images of collective historical memory, or active – removing unwanted symbols from the public space, promoting or imposing new ideological content. according to m. dymnicka and j. szczepański (2016), the policy of remembrance covers all conscious and unconscious, intentional and contingent actions, and is part of various identity projects, which, apart from the properties characteristic of the city, also include the residents’ attachment to the way they live in it, local customs or cultural landscape. historical memory is not unique, unambiguous and immutable. v. ciba (2017, p. 164), describing the national culture of commemoration, speaks of “generational communication codes for describing the past”. in general, historical memory can be more or less stable (ingrained in the mind), structured (depending on the social group), variable (susceptible to influence), and so on. geographical name changes, including changes to street and square names, are related to political and organizational changes in the state. the city space is an exemplary arena for reproduction, affirmation or creation of historical memory. in a country, each city is characterized by both common general features of reflecting historical memory and a specific local context or color. according to s. vоdotik and l. savеnоk (2017), cities have their own culture of memory. the most common, effective and efficient measure of the remembrance policy is giving various geographical sites the names of iconic figures (patrons) or events and places important from the point of view of political necessity. street names not only help one to find one’s bearing and identify places, but they also preserve in the minds of residents certain events, people or phenomena they commemorate. therefore, they are of great importance for every authority, because they refer to a specific symbolism hidden behind given persons or events. in addition to their purely practical function, the names also contain a deeper message; they are the carrier of specific historical, cultural and social content, as well as the image of a given time (kędziora, 2012; wagińska-marzec, 2017). the practice of using commemorative names dates back to the second half of the 19th century, so it is a relatively young tradition (kita, nartonowicz-kot, 2012). such names may be imposed by the authorities or are the result of the demands of society to manifest its attitude to the present as well as to the past. due to the turbulent history of the nation, street names are often changed many times in different historical periods, and the most common reason for these changes is political and ideological considerations (wagińska-marzec, 2017). street naming becomes a certain mirror reflecting the face of a given historical period in a given 10 aleksander kuczabski, alina boychuk country. as a result, the more frequently the names of streets are changed in it, the more turbulent its history is (jankowska, 2013). renaming streets during the political breakthrough expresses the competition for the way of classifying reality, evaluating history and creating the state’s identity (hałas, 2004). changing street names is a process that affects ordinary people extremely strongly; it is an integral part of their daily lives, so it raises considerable interest of the general public and is present in public discussion. they are also often controversial. renaming streets is usually a political act in which the authority of the state and its monopoly on the interpretation of history are manifested. in the process of assigning specific political meanings to the streets, the predominant, though not exclusive, group are names that refer to specific figures or collective heroes, such as armed or political groups (różycki, 2018, 2019). street names can become entangled in the politics of defining what is historically important or worthy of public memory. they are also part of a larger struggle for social and political identity, and are used both to oppose the hegemonic order and to recreate it (alderman, 2002). street names are changed in this context to promote in the public awareness specific events, characters and organizations that appear in the street names, but also to erase from the public awareness other events, characters and organizations that are removed from street names (see: rose-redwood, 2008; różycki, 2019). if the past is the main source of historical memory, its drama determines the essence and structure of historical memory. as m. gurik (2016, p. 26) notes, “the problem of preserving and recreating historical memory is particularly acute in post-totalitarian societies that experienced collective historical trauma in a state of colonial dependence.” for the countries of eastern europe, the problem of historical memory is still closely related to the period of the communist model of commemorating (sovietizing) public space. the imposition of communist ideological symbols by artificially shaping a new historical memory was a common feature of communism in various national communities. the difference between countries, regions and cities was the duration and the scale of sovietization, the brutality of its planting, and the local specificity of the commemorative semantic area. identification primarily with communist russia (the kremlin) is an important feature of sovietization in european countries (with the small exception of albania and yugoslavia). in fact, the spread of communist commemorative markers served to underline moscow’s geopolitical dominance. that is why communization is often equated with external enslavement. the toponymic policy of the last three decades in the vast majority of central and eastern european countries can be described as being part of decommunization. communist ideology, which for a long time dominated the sphere of geopolitical influence of the ussr, left behind a whole layer of symbolism, which at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s lost its relevance to the new socio-political context, including toponymy. the system of activities aimed at liberating oneself from the influences and consequences of the communist ideology in all spheres of life is referred to as decommunization (drоgušеvs’ka, 2017; kiridon, 2017). decommunization has various dimensions: from existential (abandoning the communist worldview), economic (returning to a market economy with private ownership), political (introducing political competition through democratic mechanisms) to formal (cleansing the information field from obsolete commemorative markers that may be associated with the communist past). as m. czepczyński (2008) notes, the reconstruction of the civic significance of urban space is among the most important tasks facing post-socialist societies. at the legislative level, the decommunization process covers the following areas: vetting of former functionaries of the communist regime, condemnation of the communist regime and its criminal practices, honoring the heroes who fought against the communist regime and restoring the rights of its victims, making available archival documents of communist secret services (râbеnkо, kоgut, 2017). matching formal decommunization to the actual social expectations requires consistency and synchronicity. introducing formal decommunization by force can provoke denial and even resistance and conflicts. in the context of formal decommunization, a. gricak (2016) noted that “it creates the illusion that history can be overcome by interpreting historical memory, but that history is interpreted not through memory but through political reforms.” 3. the essence of decommunization and the causes of its new wave in ukraine toponymic decommunization is a reaction to changes that took place in the ideological landscape of the geographical space of many european countries during the period of domination and cultivation of the communist worldview there. in order to understand the essence of decommunization, it is necessary to analyze how sovietization took place, how deep it was and how it influenced the shaping of actual historical memory. decommunization of urban toponymy in ukraine: causes and consequences 11 the main common features of toponymic sovietization were its enormous scale, brutality of introduction, and temporal instability. the scale manifested itself in the communist authorities’ efforts to change completely the informational content of geographical space. as part of sovietization, firstly the toponyms related to ideologically hostile worldview systems were replaced: the world of religion, other (and therefore hostile) forms of power and government (from the russian tsar to bourgeois democracy), national patriotic worldview (as opposed to the concept of internationalism), and so on. ideologically neutral names that did not fit the ideologized communist way of life were also under constant threat. as noted by ì. starеn’kij and â. zajšlûk (2017, p. 113), using the example of sovietization in kamieniec podolski, the bolshevik government “tried to erase from historical memory everything that could resemble the previous days, incl. by brutally interfering with the city’s toponymy, imposing names related to revolutionary events”. in total, about 200 new names were created in kamieniec podolski during the soviet period (42.5% of all toponyms), which were very rarely associated with the history of ukraine and its heroes (starеn’kij, zajšlûk, 2017, p. 114). sovietization was implemented through a strictly hierarchical set of names, titles, and symbols that were usually reproduced mindlessly, spontaneously and almost without taking into account local specificities. the hierarchical feature of the communist pantheon was emphasized by l. males (2016, p. 66), noting in the urban toponymy the names of revolutionaries of the “first, then second and subsequent order”. depending on the area, the general pantheon of communist figures and events was sometimes supplemented with local names. it should also be noted that the toponymic pantheon significantly evolved during the domination of the communist ideology. the reformatting consisted in the successive replacement of certain persons and events with others or changing their place in the overall hierarchy. nevertheless, the figure of lenin was invariably the central figure of the communist pantheon of the ussr and the satellite states since 1924. his importance in the shaping and content of geographical space is special and unique. as aptly noted by k. kоbčеnkо (2016, p. 67), the monuments of lenin are “markers in the mental mapping of ukrainians, specific ‘milestones’ that marked the symbolic boundaries of (post)soviet space”. constant changes in the communist pantheon had a significant impact on the nature of the toponymic politics of the time: often the existing communist toponyms were replaced with new ones, creating chaos and distrust as to the stability of geographical names. hence, the first examples of decommunization can be found directly in the communist period and were associated with the shedding of successive communist leaders: trotsky, stalin, molotov, khrushchev and hundreds of other smaller figures discredited during the internal political struggle. however, the removal of some persons from the information space was accompanied by the emergence of others with the same ideological profile. since in the european geopolitical direction russia was the source of the spread of the communist ideology, sovietization was simultaneously perceived as a strictly russian product in all the conquered countries. thus, the entire layer of communist ideology, reflected in the toponymy, was characterized by a clearly defined russian color. m. râbčuk (2016) points out that in ukraine communism was in fact a cover for russian imperial hegemony. in ukraine, in this context, the situation was additionally complicated by the fact that sovietization there “overlapped with the strong results of the previous 250-year russification” (kiridon, 2017, p. 157). in general, the communist era in the context of ukraine is often perceived as a continuation of the cultivation of the russian imperialist ideology, which was essentially anti-ukrainian (râbčuk, 2016; kоbčеnkо, 2016). the first wave of real decommunization took place in the last years of the ussr. this meant a change in the ideological orientation of the population, and it was manifested in acts of mass, deliberate rejection of the devalued ideology. according to t. hìtrоv (2015), the shaping and segmentation of the “decommunization” discourse is related to the information activities of ukrainian social movements and organizations, in particular the people’s movement of ukraine, the commemorative society, the ukrainian helsinki union and others. according to v. ciba (2017, p. 153), the first stage of the “deconstruction of the soviet historical heritage” dates back to the period of perestroika, when the local governments of donetsk and lugansk initiated the renaming of zhdanov to mariupol, and voroshilovgrad to luhansk, respectively in 1989 and 1990. similar trends occurred in urban toponymy, but they were usually uncommon and selective. the first renaming of streets and squares in ukrainian cities concerned their central, historical, and representative parts (see: malеs, 2016; starеn’kij, zajšlûk, 2017). they were mainly related the returning to the old (historical) names. immediately after the fall of communism, there were clear regional differences and disproportions in the processes of decommunization in ukraine. while 12 aleksander kuczabski, alina boychuk the local authorities of galicia and partially of volhynia were willing to support the initiatives of rightwing parties and social organizations in the face of changes in the historical and cultural landscape, outside these regions, de-sovietization was slow and without enthusiasm from the public. almost the entire 1990s were characterized by a powerful electoral triumph of left-wing forces, as well as president leonid kuchma’s intention to pursue a policy of careful political maneuvering (ciba, 2017). in the first period, just after the fall of communism, street names were de-communized in ukraine according to the wishes or at least with the consent of the inhabitants. thus, if the name of the street was not changed immediately, then there was no chance for such a change later. on the one hand, the inhabitants got used to the existing old name even more; on the other hand, although the name could be associated with the communist period, it did not necessarily reflect its criminal nature, especially that all the controversial names were already changed in the first phase of decommunization. additionally, it should be noted that renaming streets and squares is usually quite costly and burdensome. these costs are borne not only by local governments, but also directly by the inhabitants who have to exchange documents, information boards or advertising banners. in such a situation, the troublesome economic crisis of the 1990s and the lack of adequate resources at the disposal of local governments discouraged them from taking initiatives related to the deliberate and large-scale changes of the old communist names. in ukraine, leonid kravchuk (1992), leonid kuchma (2001) and viktor yushchenko (2007) attempted to revive the waning decommunization at the presidential level. however, such initiatives were usually not based on any effective legal mechanisms (râbčuk, 2016). during yushchenko’s presidency, another attempt at decommunization was associated with the policy of bringing attention to the holodomor tragedy, which was explained as a consequence of the deliberate policy of the communist authorities at the time. for this purpose, it was particularly important to pass the law of ukraine “on the holodomor of 1932–1933 in ukraine” in 2006, which provided a legal basis for the demolition of monuments to the bolsheviks considered to be the perpetrators of the famine in ukraine (see: ciba, 2017). the revolution of dignity and the russian aggression against ukraine in 2013–2014 became a powerful catalyst for the last wave of decommunization. among others, the reason lied in the similarities that were easy to find between the partially forgotten totalitarian communist past of ukraine and the russian propaganda of that time. according to v. ciba (2017, p. 152), “an important aspect of the policy of ‘decommunization’ was to be ... quickly dissociating oneself from the practices of commemoration common with russia”. russian aggression revived the aspects of ukrainian collective memory related to the ideas of national solidarity, sacrifice, patriotism and armed resistance to the aggressor (râbčuk, 2016). in addition, new challenges and events in ukraine have created a need to perpetuate and commemorate “the memory of the dead, heroes, new symbols and social phenomena (volunteering, volunteer battalions)” (malеs, 2016, p. 63). significant accumulation of the former communist content in ukrainian public space began to be perceived as an obstacle to european integration and mobilization against russian aggression. a. kiridon (2017) pointed out that sovietism did not leave independent ukraine, but it actively exists among ukrainians and remains deeply rooted in social consciousness. cleansing ukraine of the symbols of communism began spontaneously, enthusiastically and massively. v. ciba (2017) claims that the demolition of lenin’s statue in kiev on 8 december, 2013, during the euromaidan, by representatives of the all-ukrainian union “svoboda”, was the driving force of the present “decommunization”, the fourth stage of de-sovietization. later, the process became massive, because in 2014 alone, more than 500 monuments to lenin were dismantled in various cities of ukraine (pìd čas “lеnìnоpadu” ..., 2014). 4. the current legal regulation and practice of decommunizing urban toponymy in ukraine spontaneous decommunization gained legal framework in ukraine only on 9 april, 2015, when the law “on condemnation of communist and national socialist (nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols” (zakоn ukraїni ..., 2015) was passed. this act gave decommunization the status of a state policy and regulated the forced change of names referring to the post-communist legacy. this concerned geographical names, toponymic sites (streets, avenues, squares, etc.), legal entities, press titles, names of trademarks and services. the necessity to liquidate monuments, statues, commemorative plaques and other memorabilia of a communist character was also taken into account. the government’s intentions to finally get rid of the traces of the communist past were based on severe sanctions for non-compliance or breaking the law in this regard. according to a. kozyrska (2016), the decommunization of urban toponymy in ukraine: causes and consequences 13 new politics of memory had to favor the overcoming of the soviet legacy in mentality, historical myths and stereotypes that inhibited the consolidation of ukrainian society. the law gave local governments up to six months to rename all localities and toponymic sites that contained symbols of the communist totalitarian regime. these were city districts, squares, boulevards, streets, avenues, driveways, passages, alleys, malls, embankments, bridges, and so on. it was assumed that if the local government’s legislative body failed to make a decision to change the appropriate name within the prescribed period, the task related to the change would be taken over by the competent head of the municipality or the mayor, who in turn had a three-month deadline for it. if decommunization was not completed in that case, the law transferred this responsibility to the heads of regional state administrations, giving them another three months to do so. moreover, the act required local authorities to follow the recommendations of the ukrainian institute of national memory with regard to the interpretation of the relevant names. the “last” wave of decommunization in ukraine was not received by society in an unambiguously positive way (see: filon, borsuk, 2018; mälksoo, 2018). the flaw of implementing decommunization was the imposition on local governments of a government model of historical memory, an uncompromising change of names and shifting the relevant expenses to local budgets, enterprises and citizens. the policy of decommunization often resulted in more or less active resistance from its opponents. however, it should be noted that this resistance did not take an organized form and was generally within the law (though at times it went beyond ethics and respect for opponents). even in a rather brutal and dynamic form, decommunization did not cause any mass opposition in ukraine (kozyrska, 2016). most often, decommunization was opposed through the courts. the most prominent act in ukraine in this respect was the submission of an appeal on 30 may 2017 to the constitutional court by 46 ukrainian mps of the act “on condemnation of communist and national socialist (nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols” on the compliance with the constitution (konstitucìjne podannâ). nevertheless, on 16 july 2019, the constitutional court confirmed the constitutionality of this act. the issue of individual renaming was also a subject of court proceedings. among others, the resolution of the zinkiv district court in the poltava region of 27 april 27 2017 dismissed the claims for invalidation of the name change of a street in the village of opishnia in the poltava region, and the district administrative court in odessa on 9  november 2017 rejected a lawsuit in on the change of street names and toponymy objects in the odessa oblast (dеkоmunìzacìâ..., 2016; zvìt gоlоvi..., 2017). the babushkin district court in dnipropetrovsk (now dnipro) is also known to have heard a lawsuit to cancel the mayor’s order to rename the stalingrad heroes street (dеkоmunìzacìâ ..., 2016). a common form of silent protest against the central government’s imposition of total and mindless decommunization was some local governments’ attempts to keep the old name by giving it a different interpretation. the trick was that in fact the new name was the same as the previous one, although formally it referred to a completely different person or event than before. the implementation of decommunization in ukraine has shown that the authorities and regional political elites are able to instrumentalize and manipulate the provisions on decommunization (kutsenko 2020). in the event that decommunization changes became inevitable, attempts were made to maintain political neutrality when choosing new names by local governments. “implementing the renaming policy, local authorities in the south east gave preference to kievan rus and cossack legacy because such names are equally well acceptable by all strata of ukrainians, regardless of ideology and electoral preferences, and no one will protest” (gnatiuk, 2018, p. 10). one of the key issues in assessing the “last” wave of decommunization of urban toponymy in ukraine is to estimate its scale. according to the data of the ukrainian institute of national memory, since 2015 the name change in ukraine has affected an average of 3% to 5% of streets in cities, and in the east of the country – around 10% (as in kharkiv) (v’âtrоvič (eds.), 2015). the numbers significantly varied in different cities. for example, out of 680 streets in sloviansk, almost 130 (19%) were changed, and in vinnitsa, out of 840 street names approx. 140 (16%) had to be renamed; in kharkiv, out of 2,700 streets, about 285 names (10%) had to be changed (v’âtrоvič, 2015). according to the list of the institute of national memory, renaming 110 urbanonyms was necessary in kiev (males, 2016). in the years 2014–2015, a total of 195 urban changes were made in kiev. nevertheless, of these changes, only 39 were implemented under the decommunization act. at the same time, public discussions were held on 126 new name proposals, as a result of which 4 newly proposed names were rejected, and other names for these sites were proposed (males, 2016). in the following year, 2016, in 14 aleksander kuczabski, alina boychuk kiev, as part of the decommunization, 148 names of the city toponymy were changed (dеkоmunìzacìâ ..., 2016). by december 2016, as part of decommunization, 1,320 monuments to lenin and 1,069 monuments to other soviet leaders were dismantled; 32 towns and 955 villages were renamed (u v’âtrоviča..., 2016). 51,493 toponymic sites were renamed, the most in the kharkiv (4,116), poltava (3,815) and cherkasy (3,646) oblasts, the least in lviv (9), ivano-frankivsk (76) and ternopil (98) (dеkоmunìzacìâ ..., 2016). in mariupol, the boulevard with the original name ilyicha was renamed twice. for the first time, on 28 january 2016, the name was changed to boyka boulevard, a local politician and entrepreneur known for his pro-communist worldview, and already on 3 march to nikopolski. it is obvious that even after such a massive change of names as in ukraine, this process is far from completely getting rid of remnants of post-communist nomenclature. for example, according to ì. starеn’kij and â. zajšlûk (2017), in kamieniec podolski, apart from the already renamed streets and alleys, another 38 urbanonyms are being decommunized. in other cities, the situation is similar, because usually only the most obvious names have been decommunized. for example, out of 74 city toponymy sites of komsomolsk (now horishni plavni), only 5 were renamed by the city council in 2015 as part of decommunization (list vikоnavčоgо..., 2016). the positive result of decommunization was that the new street names became much less repetitive and more connected to the history of ukraine. l.  males (2016) also notes that during the decommunization period the number of names associated with non-ukrainian areas sharply fell, especially of those related to the geography or heroism of russia. the new post-communist toponyms were given mainly local names, and where possible, historical names were restored. 5. conclusions despite the long period that has passed since the loss of the dominant position of the communist ideology, the post-communist remnants in ukraine were very numerous and important until 2014. already a few years after the collapse of the ussr, decommunization of the naming of geographical sites in ukraine slowly faded out, and then completely stopped. it was only the events of the revolution of dignity and russia’s armed aggression against ukraine, including the annexation of crimea, that forced the ukrainian authorities to return to the subject of decommunization. in this situation, an attempt was made to cleanse the symbolic space of old communist names in one go and within a very short time. in general, the policy of decommunization in ukraine had much in common with the post-communist countries of central europe, including poland. nevertheless, there are significant differences. firstly, the vast majority of renaming in ukraine was conducted as part of the last wave, and not just after the fall of communism, as was the case in other post-communist countries. secondly, decommunization in ukraine was also a way of de-russifying the symbolic space. thirdly, pro-communist and leftwing political groups were surprised by the uncompromising policy of decommunization on the part of the central government and were unable to put up any noticeable resistance to the name changes. the intensification of the toponymic policy of the central government led to growing contradictions and a certain loss of balance in relations with the authorities of some local governments. some of these local governments have tried unsuccessfully to boycott, avoid or implement decommunization only formally and without enthusiasm. on the other hand, in ukraine, the vast majority of geographical names that could be associated with the communist past have been removed. it should be noted that after the active phase of 2014–2016, the process of decommunization of toponymy in ukraine has already moved to the passive phase. however, there is no doubt that the problem itself has not been completely resolved. it may return to the agenda at any time as a tool of political struggle. it is still uncertain whether political changes associated with the right-wing forces losing power would not lead to another shift in the politics of remembrance, and some old communist names would not be restored. references alderman d.h., 2002, street names as memorial arenas: the reputational politics of commemorating martin luther king in a georgia county, historical geography, 30, 99– 120. avioutskii v., 2006, les révolutions de 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(eds.), 2015, dеkоmunìzacìâ: ŝо ì čоmu pеrеjmеnоvuvati j dеmоntuvati (eng. decommunization: what and why to rename and dismantle), ukraїns’kij ìnstitut nacìоnal’nої pam’âtì, kiїv. vоdоtika s., savеnоk l., 2017, mìs’kij prоstìr, dеkоmunìzacìâ ì prоblеmi ìstоričnої pam’âtì (eng. urban space, decommunization and problems of historical memory), mìstо: ìstоrìâ, kul’tura, suspìl’stvо, 2, 119–133. doi: 10.15407/ mics2017.02.119. wagińska–marzec, m., 2017, wokół zmian nazewnictwa ulic na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych po 1945 r. (eng. around the changes in street names in the western and northern territories after 1945), rocznik ziem zachodnich, 1, 385–420. doi: 10.26774/rzz.178 zakоn ukraїni «prо zasudžеnnâ kоmunìstičnоgо ta nacìоnalsоcìalìstičnоgо (nacists’kоgо) tоtalìtarnоgо rеžimìv ta zabоrоnu prоpagandi їhn’ої simvоlìki» (eng. law of ukraine „on condemnation of communist and national socialist (nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols”), 2015, vìdоmоstì vеrhоvnої radi ukraїni, 26, 1390. zvìt gоlоvi ukraїns’kоgо ìnstitutu nacìоnal’nої pam’âtì za 2017 rìk (eng. report of the chairman of the ukrainian institute of national memory for 2017), 2017, ukraїns’kij ìnstitut nacìоnal’nої pam’âtì, kiїv, http://www.memory.gov.ua/ sites/default/files/zvit_golovi_ukrayinskogo_institutu_nacionalnoyi_pamyati_2017.pdf (accessed 31 march 2020). journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 5–6 introduction cezary mądry institute of socio-economic geography and spatial management, adam mickiewicz university, bogumiła krygowskiego 10, 61–680 poznań, poland, e-mail: cezary@amu.edu.pl citation mądry c., 2016, introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 5–6. research on borders in geography, political science, sociology and related sciences are very well developed; however, the changing functions of borders and their perceptions engender a need to continue observation and reflection. particularly intense border changes have been occurringsince the fall of the iron curtain in central and eastern europe. the situation in these countries was and still remains varied. after the shock of transformation,the countries of central europe quickly chose a direction of integration with euro-atlantic structures and nato. countries arising on the rubble of the ussr were in a more difficult situation. before they became involved in integration processes, they hadto undergo a period of building their own statehood and seek domestic and international recognition (c. mądry and v. sochircaelaborate on this problem in their article). a lack of or insufficient social and economic reforms hindered or prevented these processes. the more so the effort and the achieved effect in the socalled baltic states (lithuania, latvia, estonia) should be appreciated. the present issue of the journal of geography, politics and society is dedicated to issues related to borders, crossingthem, building cross-border, or in a wider sense, international relationships (in different scales) and the problems that the development of such cooperation faces. the issuestarts with w. szymańska’sarticle, which examines the changing functions of political borders in central and eastern europe. the author indicates the gradation of the permeability of borders from an almost full one as part of the schengen area and between belarus and russia, through a partial one (within the eu but outside the schengen area) to the heavily guarded and restrictive ones, e.g. between ukraine and its rebellious or annexed territories. the issue of barriers (bottlenecks) to cooperation is also discussed by e. vodichev, i.  glazyrina, and b.  krasnoyarova. based on the example of the timber industry, they discuss cross-border cooperation in the east of russia. the authors point to the fiat in decision-making on cooperation and other issues that prevent the emergence and functioning of cross-border regions, especially on the border with china. they also recommend benefitting from international experience and the institutional strengthening of cross-border cooperation. the necessity of cooperation in the field of management and environmental protection, especially in the near-arctic territories, characterised by a slow recovery process, is postulated by g.  khartinova, t.  alieva and l.  ivanova. functioning already 22 years project barents euro-arctic region (bear), which includes synchronisation of actions at the administrative, scientific, ngo and residents’level, is 6 cezary mądry the exemplification of a successful formof not only cooperation but also integration activities described by them. however,the authorspoint out a dependenceof the smooth functioning of the program on political decisions, including various sanctions. the diversity of approaches to cross-border cooperation within one country is presentedby j. smutekand p. łonyszyn in their paper. the authors also point to the political conditions of integration and disintegration processes by illustrating them with two mesoregions: western and eastern poland. cooperation on the western border of poland goes in the direction of integration of cross-border areas, although the authors call for greater involvement of the scientific community. on the eastern border of poland collaboration encounters barriers of the political (belonging to different political organizations),the infrastructural (particularly deficiencies in the transport network) and the institutional nature. still another type of cross-border relations is described in the paper by j.  bruneckienė, i.  zykienė and v.  stankevičius. based on the example of two towns on both sides of the lithuanian-polish border (alytus and ełk), they analyse their investment attractiveness from the point of view of businessmen and youth. the authors list the factors that enhance this assessment in both groups as well as those that constitute a barrier. they note that for the former of the studiedgroups, in addition to the infrastructuralissues, the business environment, etc., personal contacts are also important. for the latter of the studied groups not so much the quality of life is important as, above all, educational and then work and careeropportunities. the authors point out that educational and economic factors is essential to stop the adverse trends of migration from these areas. the next two articles are devoted to economic issues of international cooperation. c.  mądry and v.  sochirca focus on trade and investment links in moldova. they show the importance of natural and historical factors as determinants of the commodity structure in foreign trade. shaped already in the tsarist, and especially in the soviet times, the country’s economy is characterised mainly by exportingfarm produce and low-tech commodities. the changes that occur in the structure of commodity of exports indicate a certain role of foreign capital in its diversity; however, the gap separating moldova from other european countries is still very wide. the authors also show the sensitivity of moldova’seconomy to external political factors, especially to links with the russian and ukrainian markets. the importance of russia for investment processes in the baltic states (lithuania, latvia and estonia) is also discussed by a. pestich. in the article, trade links are only a backdrop for a discussion on russian investment in these countries. russia is not the biggest investor in those countries, and the structure of investment variesin particular countries.however, as the author concludes, in recent years, targeting russian investment at energy, finances and distribution has been increasing. the particular role is assigned to the development of control of gazprom over gas distribution networks in these countries. authors of articles in this issue come from ten different scientific centres in the four countries. the issues presented in particular papers, however, go beyond borders of those countries. the editor would like to thank the authors for their articles, and reviewers for their work, and at the same time he hopes that the presented topics will arouse readers’ interest. cezary mądry the project was financed from the funds of the national center for science allocated on the basis of decision number dec-2011/01/b/hs4/03234 1. introduction under the current conditions that have emerged in the global economy, a stable development of the ukrainian economy is impossible without active participation not only in european integration, but also in asia-pacific and transregional integration processes. accordingly, there is a high need to develop alternative and complementary strategies of ukraine’s cooperation with all major centers of world economic relations. in 2013 ukraine and china declared a strategic partnership between the countries, signing the treaty on friendship and cooperation and the joint declaration on the further deepening of strategic partnership relations. in reality, this level of relationship is not used at its highest efficiency. in 2014 china was very cautious about the political events in ukraine taking a wait-and-see position, since journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(2), 9–19 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.2.02 determinants and effects of chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine lilia ukraynets (1), nataliya horin (2) (1) department of international economic relations, ivan franko national university of lviv, universytetska 1, 79000 lviv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-3436-5556 e-mail: liliya.ukrayinets@lnu.edu.ua (2) department of international economic relations, ivan franko national university of lviv, universytetska 1, 79000 lviv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-0036-6120 e-mail: nataliya.horin@lnu.edu.ua (corresponding author) citation ukraynets l., horin n., 2021, determinants and effects of chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(2), 9–19. abstract the article analyzes chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine at the present stage. china is as an important partner for ukraine, not only in the field of foreign trade and investment but also for the implementation of the strategic vector of ukraine’s economic development and its integration into the modern world economy. the empirical study shows that chinese investors receive additional incentives to invest in ukraine if there is a prior positive investment experience, increasing market potential and openness, and economic freedom. as ukraine is generally perceived as a path to european markets, the signing of the association agreement with the eu is a positive factor. however, chinese investors’ readiness to support corruption schemes in the ukrainian economy arouses concern. therefore, in order to enhance and improve the structure of investment flows from china, it is necessary to take a number of measures to overcome corruption. key words china, foreign trade, foreign economic relations, foreign direct investment, ukraine. received: 17 february 2021 accepted: 05 may 2021 published: 30 june 2021 10 lilia ukraynets, nataliya horin revolutionary events would never cause unequivocal approval in china. it is very significant that the first meeting of the two leaders, petro poroshenko and xi jinping, took place only in april 2016 during the washington summit on nuclear security. but even such cautious political contacts somewhat improved the overall situation, which immediately affected the dynamics of foreign economic relations. although chinese companies are very cautious about investing in the ukrainian economy, they have been more actively involved in infrastructure projects. there is a relatively good political base for the deployment of trade and economic cooperation between china and ukraine. there is no history of tensions and geopolitical conflicts between the two countries. yet, the ukrainian crisis resulted in a situation where a large number of programs and projects within the „silk road” economic belt were postponed for indefinite periods. foreign direct investments from china to ukraine have a particular pattern and are carried out in a specific institutional and economic environment. the problem of the factors influencing the investor’s choice of foreign direct investment (fdi) destination is widely covered in the scientific papers. research shows that differences in firm performance along with differences in the characteristics of destination countries play an important role in explaining the choice of multinational enterprises (mnes) location (e.g. yeaple, 2009). despite the lack of formal theoretical research in this area, researchers agree that direct investment from some developing countries has different characteristics compared to investment from developed countries. empirical studies of fdi from developing countries generally use an eclectic approach and combine several incentives for investment, which may or may not differ from those of companies in developed countries. h.w.-c. yeung (1994) summarizes long-term theoretical and empirical research on fdi from developing countries and highlights the notable difference of these investments – they are significantly influenced by the government. the above author (yeung, 1994) argues that researchers from developed countries, when studying fdi from developing countries, tend to neglect the specific cultural, social and institutional conditions in donor countries, and therefore the results of such studies contain blunders. thus, yeung (1994) offers his interdisciplinary approach to such research, based on disciplines such as international business, international economic relations and political science. buckley et al. (2007) continue to study mnes from developing countries, deriving specific fdi motives and empirically analyzing aggregate fdi data from china. motives for foreign investment are related to the peculiarities of the domestic capital market and the institutional environment. according to buckley et al., the imperfect capital market of most developing countries can provide firms with a particular ownership advantage, such as below-market interest rates or flexible fiscal policies. the basis for flexible fiscal policy or government support provided to china’s mnes is political risk in the host country. this study emphasizes the importance of the company’s political connections for foreign investment decisions, as well as the need to take this important factor into account when applying generally accepted fdi theories to study mnes from developing countries. a recent study by l. yuan & n. pangarkar (2010) is particularly important for our analysis, as it focuses on decisions about the location of china’s mnes. a number of ukrainian researchers emphasize that ukraine’s and china’s foreign trade relations have strong prospects for growth and structural improvement (i.e. gal’perìna, šapoval, 2003; makogin, 2011). foreign economic relations in the context of strategic development of cooperation between ukraine and china are considered in the works of û. kurnišova (2010) and o.m. matusova & o.v. gončarov (2011). some aspects of economic cooperation including foreign trade and investment are highlighted in the research by v.v. velyčko (1999), v. golod (2014), i.s. pogorêlova (2010). the current state and prospects of the development of trade in services with china were considered by m.p. visoc’ka (2013) and v.e. êrmačenko (2015). however, the current state of bilateral cooperation between ukraine and china, the problems of further transformation of foreign economic relations and its impact on the country’s economic development are not sufficiently highlighted. the purpose of this research is to study the features and long-term effects of direct investment from china on the development of ukraine’s economy. our task was to identify the main determinants that affect ukrainian-chinese investment relations and to find ways of optimization of ukrainian-chinese foreign economic relations. 2. current trends of chinese foreign economic strategy summarizing existing research on china’s foreign economic relations, as well as analyzing recent changes in the country’s economic development and politics, we can highlight the following trends in china’s strategy, which are also relevant to ukraine: determinants and effects of chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine 11 1. china’s leading direction in expanding its economic influence on the world economy is foreign direct investment. china prefers to invest in countries with a larger market size and good growth potential, with relatively cheap local currency and better economic conditions. according to the resource search strategy, the availability of mineral resources in the country positively influences the chinese fdi. china’s important goal of fdi is to control the supply of raw materials through the purchase of foreign companies or direct contracts and government concessions for the development of natural resources by chinese enterprises. reliable access to raw materials and energy sources determines the interest of china in cooperation with developing countries, with significant resource potential. sometimes china does not want to begin the development of deposits immediately but reserves them for the future (danilčenko et al., 2008). the main limiting factor for investments in developing countries may be the growth of political risk, although the level of corruption is not a significant obstacle to the development of investment cooperation with china. although the chinese economy is gradually transforming, the role of the government remains very high. the scope of the fdi is no exception. empirical results confirm that the company’s political affiliation, along with its productivity, is an important factor influencing the decision on the implementation of fdi by firms in china (ukrainets, 2016). 2. dependence on the import of raw materials and strong motivation to invest in the countries with supply of natural resources also affects the formation of china’s foreign economic strategy. ensuring the sustainable supply of raw materials, especially energy, is an urgent issue, as china is one of the world’s largest energy consumers. such a supply, apart from investment and concessionary development, can be provided through practice of long-term purchases of large volumes of raw materials (danilčenko et al., 2008). 3. the third important way of china’s economic expansion into developing countries and transition economies is long-term government economic aid programs. by providing this assistance, china has moved from the political or ideological criteria that were decisive in the 1970s and the 1990s to the criteria of economic feasibility. through its aid programs, china not only gets access to resources and transforms recipient countries into its reliable sales markets, but also enhances its reputation and image as a global player (jun, 2014). 4. china’s strategy for the formation of its foreigneconomic relations system is primarily based on bilateral contacts with the government of the partner countries. bilateral contacts are the main instruments of china’s economic expansion; namely, credit lines, important infrastructure projects, humanitarian aid programs work the most effectively. in addition, at the expense of bilateral contacts, china is trying to synthesize a public and private initiative. due to intense diplomatic contacts and the involvement of firms with government support, chambers of commerce and industry and forums are founded in countries that are interesting for china from the strategic point of view (petinenko, 2012). 5. lately the motives for the economic expansion of china and its fdi, in particular, have ceased to be limited to seeking access to resources. as the chinese economy grows, the expansion into the markets of countries with lower prices than those in china, in particular, with a lower cost of production and with cheaper labor force, becomes increasingly important. at the same time, the fdi in such countries is not always accompanied by the transfer of production technology, the spread of know-how or the creation of jobs for the local population. as the experience of many african countries shows, china’s economic expansion is accompanied by the relocation of chinese workers to recipient countries. the local population is hired only for the lowest-skilled and dangerous work, which, at the same time, is paid at the lowest rates (dejč, 2017). 6. even taking into account the strong liberalization of the chinese economy and foreign economic relations, the accession to the world trade organization (wto) and the formation of partially marketbased economic mechanisms, the actions of chinese mnes are under the powerful influence of the government. the strategy of chinese economic expansion involves the formation of “national champions” – powerful multinational companies that operate in sectors identified as priorities by the government. accordingly, current large-scale international expansion is not entirely due to the activities of individual chinese companies, but as part of the country’s public sector (danilčenko et al., 2008). therefore, cooperation with chinese investors and trading partners primarily depends on the decision of the chinese government, which defines the priority directions for the promotion of chinese business abroad. 7. the threat to the environment in countries where there is a significant economic expansion of china is a huge concern. if in the chinese domestic market there is a tough competitive struggle for profit, can it be expected that chinese enterprises abroad will behave in a different way? therefore, the chinese expansion can be devastating to the 12 lilia ukraynets, nataliya horin environment of developing countries and countries with economies in transition. 8. to strengthen economic expansion china, its diaspora abroad is actively engaged. the system of foreign companies founded by chinese migrants who have close ties with the mainland of the people’s republic of china through a complex system of family and clan relations was called “bamboo net” or “china commonwealth” (cheung, gomez, 2012). at the same time, family and friendly ties play a greater role in managing this informal association than formalized relations. elements of the “bamboo net” can occur in any country in the world where there is an influential chinese diaspora (ren, na, 2014). in addition, chinese migrant entrepreneurs serve as sources of capital inflows, information on markets and business opportunities, especially for developing countries. direct investments of private entrepreneurs from china, often combined with migration flows, are becoming more and more significant even for developed countries. at the same time, most chinese migrant entrepreneurs operate in areas of low value added and target low-cost markets, which results in perceiving them as a “dumping” kind. this, coupled with the constant growth of chinese communities, has become a major concern for european recipient countries (e.g. hungary, italy, spain). as ukraine with the growth of integration processes can repeat the path of the countries of central and eastern europe, the issue of inflow of chinese migrants will become relevant in the near future (ukrainets, 2014a, 2014b). 3. chinese foreign direct investment in ukraine the inflow of foreign direct investment is an important indicator of the attractiveness of the national economy and of ensuring its competitiveness in world markets. as of december 31, 2018, the economy of ukraine attracted $32.3 billion of fdi (state statistics service of ukraine, 2019) although, according to the calculations of the ukrainian ministry of economy, the total investment need for structural adjustment of the economy ranges from $140 to 200 billion (kiričenko, harčenko, 2010). the number of countries that invested in the economy of ukraine at the beginning of 2019 amounted to 125. the largest volumes of direct investment came from 10 countries: cyprus, germany, the netherlands, the russian federation, austria, the united kingdom, france, the usa, the british virgin islands, and sweden, which together own more than 81% of the total direct investment in ukrainian economy. the number of enterprises involved in foreign investments is almost 19,000 as of january 1, 2019. unfortunately, china is not among the countries listed as those which form the basis of investments in the ukrainian economy, although the country is considered to be the largest creditor of the world. over last 30 years, despite the positive dynamics of investments from china, their volume remains at a rather low level, indicating that chinese companies are not aware of the potential investment proposals of the ukrainian business community. at the beginning of 2019, chinese investments in the ukrainian economy amounted to $17.9 million, which is 0.05% of the total volume of attracted investments. given china’s potential, such numbers are not comforting. at the moment, the priority areas for chinese outward fdi is the extraction of natural resources, since china’s own raw material base is gradually being exhausted, as well as the financial sector considered by the chinese business community as an opportunity for quick earnings and a separate brand (miheev (ed.), 2005). the chinese capital in ukraine is directed to agriculture and wholesale trade (see table 1). as figure 1 shows, agriculture accounted for the largest share of investments – 39.6%. in the second place is the manufacturing, which accounts for 19.4% of all investments from china, i.e. $3.53 tab. 1. direct foreign investment from china into the economy of ukraine by types of economic activity (in million usd) areas of engagement 01/01/2018 01/01/2019 total 16.6 18.2 agriculture, hunting, forestry 6.57 7.36 manufacturing industry 3.22 3.53 trade; repair of cars, household goods and personal items 1.86 2.03 transport and communications 1.82 2.00 real estate operations, leasing, engineering and business services 1.56 1.64 others 1.53 1.64 source: state statistics service of ukraine, 2019. determinants and effects of chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine 13 million. of this, $1.9 million (56.5%) goes to the processing industry, while $702 thousand (1.99%) – to the mining industry. 4. determinants of chinese fdi in ukraine the following section will try to explain how different factors can influence the investment decisions of chinese enterprises in relation to ukraine. variables that will reflect the relevant factors will be related to macroeconomic indicators, indicators of political stability and a number of dummies. the model for analysis of investment flows from china to ukraine is as follows: fdit=α+β1fdit–1+β2mst+β3ilt+β4tot+β5ctt+β6hct+β7it +β8crptt+β9eft+β10eut+β11ert+β12recessiont fdit – is the investment flows from china to ukraine in time t. this is our dependent variable. data were obtained from the state statistics service of ukraine (state, 2019) and the ministry of commerce of people’s republic of china (ministry, 2019) for 2002–2017. independent variables in the model are as follows: fdit–1 – lagged investment flows from china to ukraine. a number of studies (i.e. quazi, view, 2007) prove that the previous fdi implementation in the country directly influences further inflow of investments. mst – size of the ukrainian market in year t, calculated as gdp at purchasing power parity. in recent years, china has been proven to pay more attention to access to markets. therefore, the bigger the market is, the more attractive it looks to chinese investors. data were obtained from the statistical base of the international monetary fund (imf) (international, 2019) and the state statistics service of ukraine (state, 2019). ilt – the income level in ukraine for year t. to measure this indicator, we use gdp per capita. the level of income is not only related to effective demand, but it also correlates with labor productivity, and research suggests that for chinese investors in recent years it is also an important factor. data were obtained from the statistical base of the imf (international, 2019) and the state statistics service of ukraine (state, 2019). tot – the country’s trade openness in year t. this variable is obtained as the import quota. before ukraine’s accession to the wto, there were more obstacles to the flow of imports, which could have been the reason for chinese enterprises to invest in ukraine instead of exporting their products there. these data were calculated based on the world bank statistics (world, 2019). ctt – the level of corporate tax in ukraine in year t. the level of tax burden can be a significant factor for the company when it decides to invest in the country. relevant data was obtained from the world bank databases (world, 2019). hct – the variable of human capital in year t. studies show that chinese enterprises value low-cost, but well-educated labor force. as a result of migration processes, this indicator in ukraine has deteriorated for the most part; it can be a significant determinant of chinese investments. as a measure for human capital, we used r&d expenditures as a percentage of gdp; another indicator that is often used in such research, namely the literacy rate of the population, is not indicative of ukraine. relevant data was obtained from the world bank databases (world, 2019). it – is an indicator of infrastructure quality in year t. infrastructure itself is a major factor in making other 9.79% real estate operations, leasing, engineering and business services 9.01% transport and communisations 11.00% trade; repair of cars, household goods and personal items 11.20% manufacturing industry 19.40% agriculture, hunting, forestry 39.60% fig. 1. chinese fdi into the ukrainian economy by types of economic activity as of 01.01.2019 source: state statistics service of ukraine, 2019. 14 lilia ukraynets, nataliya horin foreign investment decisions, but for china, with its specialization in major infrastructure projects, it can be one of the key determinants. we have received the relevant indicator from the world bank statistics (world, 2019). crptt – the index of corruption in the country for year t. as shown by the example of african countries (ukrainets, 2013), corruption has a great impact on chinese investors, compared with investors from developed countries. the high level of corruption is less frustrating for chinese firms, as it provides some protection against competition from developed countries that are not accustomed to acting in such an environment. the data is obtained from transparency international (transparency, 2019). eft – the variable reflecting the level of economic freedom for period t. this index is determined by heritage institute for policy studies (heritage, 2019) and includes many other indicators. this is a good measure of the business environment in the country, which can also affect investment from china. eut – a dummy reflecting the signing of an agreement on a free trade area with the eu. the free trade area provides for the free access of a number of goods produced in ukraine to european markets that are in the interests of china. this variable has equaled 1 since 2014, when the provisional application of the association agreement between ukraine and the eu began to be implemented. ert – a variable reflecting fluctuations in the exchange rate of the hryvnia against the dollar per year t (national, 2019). recessiont – a dummy variable that reflects two major recessions, in 2008–2010 due to the global crisis and in 2014–2016 due to the annexation of the crimea and the military operation in the east of the country. before moving directly to the model analysis, it is important to investigate the data for the presence of statistical problems. the biggest problem that may arise in studies of this type is the multicollinearity error, which results in distortion of the results. table 2 shows the correlation matrix of our variables. the existence of an error of multicollinearity occurs when there is a correlation greater than 0.9. it is evident from table 2 that this situation arises in one case: when there is a strong correlation between the level of corruption and gdp per capita. this is an interesting finding that in ukraine gdp per capita can be used as an indicator of corruption. other high (but not critical) levels of correlation are observed between variables infrastructure and gdp per capita, corruption level and r&d expenditure, corruption level and infrastructure indicator, dummy of the association agreement between ukraine and the eu and indicator of economic freedom. in these cases, however, the results should be interpreted with caution. we analyzed time series models using the least squares method – the most commonly used method for such models. table 3 shows the results of model tab. 2. matrix of the correlation of variables of the econometric model of determining the factors influencing fdi from china to ukraine variable a b c d e f g h i j k l m fdi flows a 1.0 lagged fdi flows b 0.6 1.0 gdp c -0.3 -0.5 1.0 gdp per capita d -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 1.0 foreign trade openness e 0.5 0.7 -0.6 -0.3 1.0 corporate tax rate f -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.0 r&d to gdp g -0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.4 0.0 1.0 infrastructure h -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 -0.1 0.3 0.8 1.0 corruption i -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.9 -0.1 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 economic freedom j 0.1 0.3 -0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.0 association agreement with the eu k 0.1 0.3 -0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 exchange rate l -0.4 -0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.0 recession m -0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.1 1.0 source: own elaboration. determinants and effects of chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine 15 calculation. in the first column, the calculations are based on the basic equation (1), taking into account all independent variables. as can be seen from table 3, the investment experience (fdi indicator), market potential (gdp), and income level (gdp per capita) are statistically significant at 10%. positive and significant impact of these indicators was predicted by the hypothesis of the study. the absence of obstacles in ukraine’s foreign trade is very significant and positive. the more open the foreign trade policy was pursued by the country, the more investments came from china. this means that in the case of ukraine china’s motive is not penetration into the domestic “fenced” market of the country, but the use of ukraine as a platform for access to other, larger and more affluent markets of neighboring countries. the growth of corporate taxes has negatively influenced investments from china, which also corresponds to the hypothesis identified at the beginning of the study. as can be seen from the example of the baltic countries, low taxes contribute to an improvement in the investment climate and the attraction of foreign investment. this result would probably be even more statistically significant if, instead of the corporate tax indicator, we used an effective tax rate (de mooij, ederveen, 2006), but our capabilities were limited by the lack of necessary statistical data. high corruption, as in the case of african countries (ukrainets, 2013), can be a stimulus to increase investment from china. not least is this due to china’s desire to reduce its production processes and to avoid harsh environmental and labor protection requirements, which forces the chinese firms to pay attention to countries with high levels of corruption, including ukraine. in addition, operating in a corrupt environment, the chinese firms avoid direct competitive collision with western companies that choose to escape such markets. of course, this factor cannot be considered favorable from the point of view of the strategic prospects for the development of the national economy: the chinese investments attracted by high levels of corruption cannot be an engine of economic revival and are aimed mainly at the pumping of resources. dummies – the recession and the association agreement – also showed some significance for the inflow of foreign investment from china with a sign that coincides with the hypothesis. in the next column of table 3, an analysis of the corrected equation (1) was performed: the exchange rate indicator and dummies were left out. the major difference compared to the basic equation is that the indicators of economic freedom (with a negative sign) and infrastructure (with a positive one) were statistically significant at the level of 5%. consequently, from our research it can be concluded that chinese investors receive additional incentives to invest if there is prior positive investment experience, increasing the market potential and openness, and economic freedom. as ukraine is generally perceived as a path to european markets, the signing of the association agreement with the eu is a positive factor as well. however, the readiness of tab. 3. results of model analysis for identification of factors influencing fdi from china to ukraine variables basic equation corrected equation lagged flows of fdi 0.101 * 0.341 *** gdp 0.019 * 0.008 ** gdp per capita 0.003 * -0.001 foreign trade openness 0.154 *** 0.177 *** corporate tax rate -0.015 * -0.010 *** r&d to gdp 0.007 0.002 infrastructure 0.025 0.020 ** corruption -0.011 ** 0.012 economic freedom -0.019 -0.033 ** association agreement with the eu 0.032 *   exchange rate -0.014   recession -0.017 *   constant 0.142 ** 0.077 ** adjusted r2 0.577 0.767 average square error 0.020 0.032 note: significance at level *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. source: own elaboration. 16 lilia ukraynets, nataliya horin investors from china to support corruption schemes in the ukrainian economy arouses concern. therefore, in order to improve the structure of investment flows from china to ukraine, it is necessary to take a number of measures to overcome corruption. 5. priorities for attracting fdi from china in order to ensure a stable ukrainian-chinese cooperation, it is necessary to determine the priorities of the investment processes for the highest level of their efficiency: • involving not only private but also public resources in the investment process; • expanding opportunities for chinese investors to participate in privatization programs; • providing infrastructural security in ukrainian regions by developing financial and credit institutions, stock, currency and commodity exchanges, an adequate level of legal, consulting, audit and insurance companies, including international ones; • increasing investments in the ukrainian manufacturing industries through the mechanism of guarantees and preferences for business at the state and local levels, as well as the signing of the investment memorandum between the government investment agencies of both countries. the transport and port infrastructure, the energy sector, and the development of natural resources, aviation and machine-building industries are the most promising for chinese investments. in addition, effective measures to attract chinese businessmen to the ukrainian market are seen in the so-called fiscal instruments of government support of a foreign investor: • infrastructure subsidies that create the necessary infrastructure for the efficient activity of the investor; • provision of targeted grants (in the case of opening a new representative office of a chinese firm in the ukrainian market, it is expedient to compensate for some administrative procedures); • preferential investor lending and sale of real estate at low prices; • reduction of corporate income tax (reduction of tax rates, tax holidays, etc.); • reduction of barriers for cross-border operations (application of lower rates of social deductions for foreigners), etc. we consider it expedient to apply the experience of china in attracting foreign capital and to create legal and regulatory mechanisms for the effective functioning of foreign investors. for example, in china there is the so-called “tax holiday” for a certain period; enterprises operating in the market for over 10 years are completely exempt from tax for two years, and in the next 3 years pay half of the taxes (miheev (ed.), 2005). also, they are given a number of benefits among which the most important is considered to be an opportunity to sell their products on the chinese market. in ukraine there are completely opposite conditions – the country itself pays for using its market. but on the other hand, general indicators of doing business in mainland china and ukraine are quite close. in ukraine, the tax regime is not very favorable for doing business, and ukraine takes only the 70th place in the world in protecting a foreign investor (table 4). that speaks for the imperfection of the government regulation system of the investment process, the slowdown of reforms, the economic difficulties and social tension. tab. 4. assessment of business conditions in ukraine and china criterion (2017) rating of ukraine (overall rating – 80) rating of china (overall rating – 78) starting a business 20 127 obtaining licenses 140 177 registration of property 63 42 getting a loan 20 62 investor protection 70 123 payment of taxes 84 131 trade outside the country 115 96 contracts execution 81 5 closing business 150 53 source: doing business, 2017. determinants and effects of chinese foreign direct investment in the economy of ukraine 17 6. ways of optimization of ukrainian-chinese foreign economic relations at the current stage, ukraine is primarily interested in financial injections into the economy “undermined” with crisis and military actions, while china, in turn, is looking for new markets and political influence in europe. a new course has been proclaimed in the relations between the two countries which should first of all be based on security guarantees and the development of trade and economic cooperation. among the priorities of the chinese vector of integration for the foreign policy of ukraine, we should mention the following: • china’s significant role among the world’s major players; • complementarity of the structure of the economic systems of the two countries; • possibility of china’s influence on major events internationally and regionally; • increased demand for raw materials, driven by the rapid economic growth of the china. the primary focus is on the shaping of the ukrainian stand on the formation of the ukraine-china fta and the bilateral visa free regime. a fundamental answer to these issues will open a way for new initiatives in bilateral relations. in 2017 ukraine has simplified the visa policy for chinese citizens (now the visa can be obtained upon arrival), which is important for stimulating bilateral communication and cooperation, and in the future, further liberalization of the visa regime is possible. currently, holders of diplomatic and official passports can enter ukraine without visas, and holders of ordinary passports still need to be issued visas. the ukrainian side may consider establishing a visa-free regime with certain time limits to increase stimulation of communication and cooperation at the level of government structures and enterprises. as far as tourism cooperation is concerned, ukraine needs to intensify the popularization of ukrainian tourism, disseminate information about ukrainian nature, history, culture, national features, etc., to expand the areas of tourism cooperation, to produce unique, rich cultural and national features of tourist products. in november 2018, china held an international exhibition on the import of china international import expo 2018 for the first time. ukraine can seize this opportunity and demonstrate its own competitive products to chinese consumers. in addition, at the level of the top management of ukraine, it is appropriate to pay more attention to the joint ukrainian-chinese projects which are at the implementation stage. projects in the field of military-technical cooperation and space should be taken under patronage at the presidential level, and projects in the field of infrastructure and agroindustrial complex – at the level of the cabinet of ministers. as for the “16+1” format, ukraine needs to initiate consultations on participation in this format at least at the level of observers and to hold appropriate consultations with belarus on the experience of acquiring such status. china had no reservations about the eu-ukraine association agreement, and it has repeatedly declared its perception of ukraine as an “important country in europe” and stressed the importance of ukraine joining the new silk road. in addition, the level of development of the cee countries is much closer to the ukrainian economy than that of old europe. also, there should be consultations on the potential role and place of ukraine within the framework of the european strategy for euro-asian connectivity. according to chinese experts, the “16+1” format is the most promising for the project to create the economic zone of the new silk road and to carry out major infrastructure projects in europe. china proposed to european partners moving on to a more concrete cooperation and creating a special platform for this purpose (gončaruk, 2018). it is suggested that agreements at the local level be concluded and cooperation at the level of medium and small businesses be expanded. coordination issues will focus on trade and investment. however, the strengthening of mutual understanding remains the most important goal. because of this, special attention will be paid to the fact that the “16+1” format did not conflict with china’s relations with the eu in general and with the leading countries of europe, in particular. beijing emphasizes that cooperation in the “16+1” format complements and strengthens the strategic partnership between china and the eu, enshrined in the china-eu 2020 action plan. 9. conclusions thus, the ukrainian-chinese relations have great prospects of cooperation in various spheres of activity, abetted by the absence of contradictions in relations and the complementarity of the structure of economy. the empirical study shows that chinese investors receive additional incentives to invest if there is prior positive investment experience, potential market increases and openness and economic freedom. as ukraine is generally perceived as a path to european markets, the signing of the association agreement with the eu is a positive factor. however, the readiness of investors from china to support corruption 18 lilia ukraynets, nataliya horin schemes in the ukrainian economy arouses concern. therefore, in order to improve the structure of investment flows from china to ukraine, it is necessary to take a number of measures to overcome corruption. however, the expansion of china’s production capacity requires the ukrainian government to take decisive action regarding the marketing promotion of domestic goods to the chinese market and cooperation in the field of intellectual property rights protection. among other problematic issues there are: language and cultural barriers, market fluctuations in the chinese market, the presence of intermediaries in trade, the imperfection of the regulatory framework, the low level of mutual visits, etc. favorable factors include advantageous geographical location of ukraine, lack of political differences in relations, common 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the structure of u.s. multinational activity, journal of international economics, 78(2), 206–215. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.03.002 yeung h.w.-c., 1994, third world multinationals revisited: a research critique and future agenda, third world quarterly, 15(2), 297–317. yuan l., pangarkar n., 2010, inertia versus mimicry in location choices by chinese multinationals, international marketing review, 27(3), 295–315. doi: 10.1108/02651331011048005 1. introduction when defining agritourism, it should be noted that this is a form of rest taking place in rural areas of agricultural character, with accommodation and recreational facilities related to a working farm and its natural, production and service surroundings (barbieri, mshenga, 2008; drzewiecki, 1995; majewski, 2000; marks et al., 2006; mcgehee et al., 2007; mcgehee, 2007; wall, 2000; wiatrak, 1996). it is based on the attractiveness of the natural environment and the landscape. it also builds and protects the natural, agricultural and cultural heritage of rural areas (allen et al., 1991; burr, 2011; molenda, 2012; połucha et al., 2003). in the light of the eu strategy for multifunctional rural development, it brings significant economic and social effects, including educational ones (sikora, 2016). agritourism activity carried out on farms has a wide educational impact as it satisfies diverse journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(1), 44–55 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.1.06 educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms anna wiśniewska institute of social and economic geography and tourism, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76–200 słupsk, poland, orcid 0000-0001-5925-330x e-mail: anna.wisniewska@apsl.edu.pl citation wiśniewska a., 2021, educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(1), 44–55. abstract the aim of the study is to analyse the educational offer of pomeranian voivodeship agritourism farms which joined the national network of educational farms. the analysis covers the years 2011–2020. the survey involved 25 licensed entities (100%). their wide offers include educational programmes aiming to teach about farmer’s life and work, the process of food production and acquisition, and the cultural heritage of the polish rural areas and to promote the right attitudes towards nature and landscape protection. educational activities are usually organised in the form of one-day group and workshop activities addressed to school children and adolescents. thanks to that, the school education process is more varied and enriched with school curricula directed at hands-on activities, workshops in different school subjects, alternative venues of education and knowledge about rural culture. farmers usually play the role of guides or sometimes they hire teachers to do the job. more and more often, people with disabilities and students of third age universities use their services. the farms’ offers are very flexible and their scope and prices are adjusted to the demands, age and number of participants. the educational programmes differ depending on the season of the year. key words pomerania, education, educational farm, agritourism. received: 01 february 2020 accepted: 05 march 2021 published: 31 march 2021 educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms 45 cognitive needs of tourists, especially children and adolescents. education is accomplished through action, gaining experience, being, working and experiencing emotions in a group, playing, learning and discovering as well as developing senses and expressive skills (canavari et al., 2011; chojnacka-ożga et al., 2007). due to its coastal location and unique natural environment, the voivodeship of pomerania has perfect conditions for the development of agritourism. therefore, this region is in the poland’s forefront in terms of agritourism development (wiśniewska, 2017). despite strong competition on the market, pomeranian farmers have noticed opportunities for development of their farms through educational activities. some of them, i.e. 25 entities, joined the national network of educational farms operating since 2011. farms classified as “educational farms” are obliged to complete at least two educational programmes in the scope of plant and animal production, processing of agricultural produce, environmental and consumer education, tangible cultural heritage of rural areas, traditional jobs, handicraft and folk art. the owners of the farms are also obliged to have farm animals or agricultural crops (mitura, buczek-kowalik, 2016). moreover, the farm buildings must comply with the technical requirements for educational farms and follow the safety regulations for visitors. educational facilities include all farm buildings such as stables, barns, cowsheds, granaries, garages, shades, warehouses, dairy rooms, home bakeries, apiaries and even backyards. membership in the national network of educational farms is voluntary and free. nowadays, one of the conditions for effective education is learning through individual participation, personal discoveries and self-evaluation for own achievements. activating methods of teaching are usually promoted as they develop the natural love for learning every human being is born with. this modern approach to education makes farms attractive venues to conduct classes and activities integrating theory with practice. a direct contact with rich rural-natural and cultural-social environment of a farm enhances holistic development. free country space, the presence of animals, numerous smells and sounds provide multiple cognitive and emotional stimuli which make learning more successful in consistence with the rule that learning is more effective when it is fun (kline, 1988). this modern approach to education offered on farms is extremely important as they shape environmental awareness, show life in accordance with the laws of nature and the consequences of overexploitation of natural resources. activities provided by farms should contribute to the dissemination and increase in knowledge about nature and shape the tourists’ sensitivity (kurczewski, 2007). educational farm-based programmes are organised in many european countries. the most advanced networks are established in france, switzerland, austria and germany (kmita-dziasek, 2010). 2. research methods the aim of the research is to analyse the educational offer of pomeranian agritourism farms associated in the national network of educational farms (pl.: ogólnopolska sieć zagród edukacyjnych). the study includes conclusions drawn from quantitative and qualitative analyses of educational programmes provided by the entities. the research involved 100% of the entities from the pomeranian voivodeship – a group of 25 agritourism farms associated in the national network of educational farms in 2020 (fig. 1). the research was conducted through survey questionnaires concerning each farm in pomerania, which are available on the website of the national network of educational farms https://www.zagroda-edukacyjna.pl/. the first part of the questionnaire included contact details, the second part included the characteristics of the facility, whereas the third part included questions concerning its educational offer. respondents could choose more than one answer to each question. the information was supplemented with direct interviews carried out (on the phone) with the owners of the farms from 13 to 16 december 2020. in order to define the scope of activity of each farm, the educational offers provided on the home pages of these entities were thoroughly analysed (address data were downloaded from the official website of the organization). since 2019, parallel field research was also conducted, and 10 licensed farms belonging to the network were visited, 2 of which are situated in wejherowo county, 7 in kartuzy county and 1 in lębork county. while realising the assumed goals, other research methods were also used, i.e. analyses of the subject literature, statistical data as well as photographic and cartographic documentation. 3. research results the national network of educational farms comprises 290 entities that provide educational activities based on their own agricultural potential usually combining agricultural production and rendering tourist and educational services (kmita-dziasek, bogusz, 2017). 46 anna wiśniewska the pomeranian voivodeship takes the third place as far as the number of entities associated in the national network of educational farms is concerned, and there are 25 educational farms there (8.6% of all). half of the farms are found in kashubia, and most of these farms are found in kartuzy and wejherowo counties (fig. 2). farms from the area of kociewie and żuławy are also joining the network. a majority of the agritourism farms are up to 10 ha and educational services constitute an extension of their tourist offer and a way to prolong the tourist season (72%). pomeranian farms joined the network by submitting an application and a letter of recommendation from an agricultural centre. all the associated farms were given a promotion of offers in the national online system, the right to identify the facility by the logo of the educational farms as well as mentorship and training. according to the farm owners, barbara ditrich1 plays a very important role as their mentor and regional coordinator. the research shows that pomeranian farms receive organised groups most frequently, especially 1 chief specialist in the pomeranian agricultural consulting centre in gdańsk. pre-school and school groups. their offers are also designed for families with children, adults and increasingly more often for senior citizens. nearly 70% of the farms under research have developed educational programmes for special groups, mostly for people with disabilities. a slight but steadily increasing group of adults interested in rural education includes employees and members of institutions and organizations supporting the development of rural areas, i.e., the agricultural consulting centre (odr), the agency for restructuring and modernisation of agriculture (arimr), agritourism associations and care farms. this group also includes charges of social welfare centres, aging and disability associations and foundations. students of universities of the third age (from tricity and słupsk) make another significant group of users of the educational service. figure 3 presents the respondents’ answers to the question about their educational offer targets. visitors can see the farms, explore their basic functions and participate in the activities provided by the farmers. the offers are varied and designed for different recipients. visitors can stay on a farm for a few hours, a day and even a few nights. the offers mostly include one-day stays (no accommodation). fig. 1. educational farms in pomeranian voivodeship in 2020 source: own study based on the address data of educational farms available on the home pages of ogólnopolska sieć zagród edukacyjnych. educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms 47 nearly 44% of the farms also provide overnight stays for a few days. catering is available in 76% of the farms. only two farms offer ticketed tours (fig. 4). interestingly, most farms negotiate the fares with each group individually. in most pomeranian farms, educational activities are mostly conducted by the farmers and other members of their families. some of the farmers hire teachers (40%), usually folk artists, beekeepers and local organisers of cultural activities, while 36% allowed teachers-group mentors to run the activities (fig. 5). pomeranian farms, like all farms in the country (sikorska-wolak, zawadka, 2016), provide their own educational programmes depending on the profile of their agricultural activity, the nearest surrounding 38 31 25 23 23 21 20 19 17 14 13 12 11 9 7 7 0 l o w e r s il e si a n l e ss e r p o la n d p o m e ra n ia n m a so v ia n s il e si a n w a rm ia n -m a su ri a n g re a te r p o la n d h o ly c ro ss s u b c a rp a th ia n l u b li n p o d la sk ie o p o le k u y a v ia n -p o m e ra n ia n l u b u sz ł ó d ź w e st p o m e ra n ia n 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 68% 72% 80% 80% 92% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 special groups (people with disabilities ) school age adolescents (secondary school) pre-school age children adults school age children (elementary school) fig. 2. the number of educational farms in individual voivodeships in poland in 2020 source: own study based on the number of applications of educational farms available on the home pages of ogólnopolska sieć zagród edukacyjnych. fig. 3. recipients of the educational offer source: own study based on surveys. 48 anna wiśniewska 8% 44% 68% 76% 92% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ticketed tours several-day overnight stay self-catering accommodation and board one day programme (no accommodation) 36% 40% 48% 96% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 teacher-group mentor teacher hired by the farmer other people farmer fig. 4. scope of the offer source: own study based on surveys. fig. 5. people conducting activities source: own study based on surveys. tab. 1. educational programmes provided by pomeranian educational farms educational farm/location educational programme provided by the farm agritourism farm “lipy”, stara kiszewa 1. educational activities in a forest maze, including bread baking. 2. art workshop. agritourism farm “agrohanka, kniewo 1. vegetables and their use. 2. selected crop plants and traditional pastries. 3. traditional farm animals. educational farm “u garncarza”, polnica 1. the world of horses. 2. pottery workshop. 3. clay modelling workshop 4.  agricultural equipment and tools, household devices – in the past and today. agritourism farm “u rychterów, kiełpino 1. milk lesson. 2. corn lesson. 3. painting traditional kashubian embroidery patterns on glass. agritourism farm “wichrowe wzgórze”, chmielno 1. corn lesson. 2. hay ornaments. 3. painting traditional kashubian embroidery patterns on glass. 4. the kashubian region lesson. “a different world – a country of nature and adventure”, krastudy 1. educational visit to the country. 2. village toys – workshop on making hay toys and straw mats. 3. village olympics 4. come, paint my world – manual activities workshop. 5. country game hare and hounds – hit !!! “dolina jadwigi”, gowidlino 1. at the farmer’s. educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms 49 agritourism farm “u chłopa”, chmielno 1. get off lightly. 2. janko the musician. 3. from grain to bread. 4. painting on glass. 5. baking cakes. 6. leave the computers – come and learn about kashubia. agritourism farm “pod lipą”, sierakowice 1. a visit to the country. 2. adventure with kashubian nature. 3. all about kashubia 4. learning traditional craft. “jałowcowa dolina”, sylczno 1. a day at the farmer’s. 2. encounters with kashubian history and nature. 3. kashubian cultural heritage. “kaszëbskô zagroda”, pierszczewo 1. from grain to bread. “lavender farm”, przywidz 1. ecology on the farm. 2. lavender tales. 3. culinary workshop with lavender – what is it about? 4. lavender oils workshop. 5. soap workshop. 6. lavender manufacture of women’s happiness. 7. santa claus family workshop. “wiejska zagroda”, osice 1. why do we raise animals and plants? 2. delicious treasures of nature. 3. żuławy – various viewpoints. “stadnina koni maciukiewicz”, nowęcino 1. breeding and use of horses. agritourism farm “maciejówka”, opalenie 1. learn about the world of horses. 2. country life behind the scenes. apiary “u strusi”, jantar 1. the role of bees in nature. 2. bee products. 3. the ostrich’s life. “magic farm”, czarnylas 1. pumpkin festival. 2. the world of wool from bella the sheep. 3. kociewie rituals. 4. mad rabbit. 5. naughty goat. 6. roosters and hens. 7. looking for treasure in the forest. stock and agritourism farm “alpaki na kaszubach”, nowa huta 1. using exotic and farm animals in agritourism. 2. dry felting of wool. 3. arts and folklore. 4. the quaint world of the sanctuary. “mały holender”, żelichowo 1. cheese making – the żuławy style. 2. wild kitchen – identifying, collecting and preparing wild plants. 3. the secrets of good pastries. 4. the secrets of the arcade house. 5. painting żuławy chests. 6. lesson in the mill. 7. reading żuławy cemetery symbols. 8. photography panel. 9. making soap. 10. basic course of anti-flood protection. art and relaxation farm, wilcze błota 1. crop and wild plants. 2. herbs in nature. 3. herbs in art. 4. herbs in art and nature. 5. following the kashubian tradition. 6. midsummer night in kashubia. 7. plaiting utility items. agritourism farm “turze”, turze 1. raising and using horses. 2. collecting various plants, and animal habitat in the forest. 3. local history. 4. dairy cattle breeding and milk acquisition. 5. visitig the farm. wiatrak paltrak “u młynarza”, mokry dwór 1. old ways of cereal production. 2. growing vegetables. 3. milling – a forgotten craft. the miller’s job. 4. żuławy gdańskie. “gowińska zagroda”, gowino 1. the secrets of our forest. 2. sheep. 3. learning about polish corn. 4. kashubian folk art. 5. goats in the past and today. “sołtysówka zagroda”, łapalice 1. from grain to bread. baking rolls. 2. learning about farm animals. 3. cultural heritage of the kashubian region. 4. discovering the secrets of enchanting kashubia. 5. painting on the tree. 6. the potato day – seasonal. museum farm “izba”, bychowo 1. rolls and buns 2. crumpets and fritters. 3. kashubia painted on glass. 4. kashubian cushions. 5. painting with meadow and field. 6. soap fantasies. source: own study based on the home pages of ogólnopolska sieć zagród edukacyjnych. 50 anna wiśniewska of the farm and first and foremost the owner’s passions and interests. table 1 presents detailed offers of educational farms. pomeranian farms usually provide educational activities connected with plant production (92%) and learning about the rural tangible and intangible cultural heritage (80%). nearly half of the farms provide programmes connected with agricultural produce processing, environmental and consumer education (fig. 6). activities cover a wide range of topics (fig. 7). although outdoor recreational activities are the most commonly provided by the farms, the basic educational activity of agritourism farms is connected with showing life in the countryside and getting to know the farmer’s work. the possibility of observing production processes and field works was declared by 90% of surveyed farms – 68% of them provide specific educational programmes. the initiatives showing life in the village are activities called “a farmer’s day” – the secrets 48% 48% 76% 80% 92% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 agricultural produce processing environmental and consumer awareness livestock production cultural heritage plant production 28% 32% 36% 36% 36% 44% 60% 60% 68% 72% 72% 80% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 food processing disappearing professions ecology sports activities customs and rituals home cooking regional education arts and handicraft agriculture and farm work traditional food nature recreational activities fig. 6. scope of educational programmes source: own study based on surveys. fig. 7. topics of provided educational activities source: own study based on surveys. educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms 51 of everyday farm activities, farmer’s life, countryside is fun or country life behind the scenes. education in the scope of plant production is provided by 92% of the farms. programmes showing that process include: corn lesson, why do we grow corn, from grain to bread, vegetables and their use, lavender tales, crop and wild plants and herbs in nature. during the demonstration called from grain to bread provided by the farm “kaszëbskô zagrodo”2, the visitors (mostly children) can see a multimedia presentation on the stages of corn growth and then visit the farm in order to try and identify the types of corn grown there. they also take part in baking homemade bread and making souvenirs using the technique of salt dough modelling. on lavender farm, visitors can listen to lavender tales, participate in lavender culinary workshop – “what is it all about” or lavender oils workshop. zoological education plays an important role in agritourism. visitors learn about animals’ customs and behaviours through observation and participation in 1–2 hour activities such as: horse breeding and use, the world of horses, the world of bunnies, mad bunny, the role of bees in nature, naughty goat, roosters and hens, use of exotic animals (alpacas and llamas) and farm animals in agritourism. the offer of zaczarowany folwark (magic farm) is also worth knowing as it has provided educational workshops called “our animals” for years. the activities aim at raising respect for animals and broadening the knowledge about their lives. apart from activities on the farm, representatives of the farms visit preschools and schools with their animals. activities conducted in educational institutions usually last about 45 minutes. stock and agritourism farm “alpaki na kaszubach” provide alpaca therapy for preschool and school age children including children with disabilities (autism, cerebral palsy, etc.). farms “maciejówka” and “maciukiewicz stadnina koni” provide hippotherapy. similarly, the owners of farm “turze” run activities designed for children, adolescents, adults and the disabled concerning horse and jersey dairy cows breeding. this farm annually hosts the foundation for multi-profile improvement od nowa which provides “original play” – horse play workshops for teachers, therapists and educators. the farm “pasieka u strusi” provides apitherapy. contact with animals is a great tourist attraction as well as a form of education. it shows tourists how much work needs to be done to eventually obtain various food products of animal origin (marks et al., 2007). education in the scope of food production is provided by 76% of the farms. examples of 2 a kashubian name which means a kashubian farm. educational activities presenting the process of food acquisition and production in the surveyed farms include: milk lesson, dairy cattle breeding and obtaining milk, talks on why we produce, the world of hens, the life of the ostrich, the world of wool and sheep and bee products. “pasieka u strusi” provides interesting educational activities in these areas, and visitors have an opportunity to watch one working bee family placed in a glass hive (no risk of being stung). also, there is a “hotel” built for wild bees, where solitary bees, e.g., mason bees, can be seen especially in spring. another area of education aims to familiarise tourists with the cultural heritage of pomeranian rural areas. culture means all the creations of human activity, tangible and intangible, values and methods of conduct, recognised, objectified and adopted in given communities, transferred to other communities and next generations (szczepański, 1970). agritourism is a medium of knowledge for tourists, and a method of saving cultural heritage from oblivion for villages and agritourism farms (firlik, 2007). it creates the possibility of comparing the proper culture in the place of residence of tourists with rural culture. on the one hand, it shows the diversity of these cultures, and on the other hand, it teaches tolerance and creates the basis for dialogue between them (sikorska-wolak, 2007). the results of field observations allow stating that there has been a return to old rituals, customs and preservation of traditions in the rural areas of the voivodeship of pomerania. folklore activities of folk bands, regional cuisine and folk handicraft are promoted as well. on the farms, visitors get familiar with both tangible and intangible cultural heritage. 36% of the surveyed entities provide educational activities showing local customs and rituals. 60% of the educational farms provide folk arts and handicraft workshops which are very popular with visitors. the kashubian and kociewie customs and traditions are the most vital on the farms. since may 2005, the kashubian language has been the second official language in 10 communes of the pomeranian voivodeship along with dialects: kociewie, krajna, tuchola and new mixed dialects (ustawa z dnia..., 2005). on the surveyed farms, kashubian people cultivate such customs of their ancestors as “dyngus kłującym jałowcem” (wet monday with prickly juniper), “sobótki” (kupala night), seven-colour embroidery. some of the hosts and household members are able to communicate in the kashubian language which is still used today. the farm “u rychertów” provides educational programme involving learning the kashubian alphabet for instance. on numerous farms of the bytowski and kashubian lake districts, many kashubian traditions are 52 anna wiśniewska cultivated including embroidery, pottery and ceramics (with specific colours and floral motifs). the hosts also emphasise the participation of their family members in a number of folklore groups and folk bands whose activity is frequently included in the offer. tourists on agritourism farms can get acquainted with kashubian music during so-called ethnic food festivals. kashubian culture is presented during educational activities on the farms and they include: kashubian cultural heritage, following kashubian tradition, kashubian region lessons, leave computers – come and learn about kashubia, all about kashubia, painting kashubian embroidery patterns on glass, adventure with kashubian nature, learning traditional crafts, encounters with kashubian history and nature, kupala night in kashubia, kociewie art and folk rituals. the kashubian and borowiacki traditions are cultivated on the farms of the tuchola forest region due to the large ethnic diversity of this region. the hosts renovated and maintained the specific architecture including: wooden cottages, farms with a well in the middle, rail fences and fences made with interlacing poles, outbuildings and granaries. folk traditions are also reflected in music, ceramics and sculpture. on the other hand, visitors can learn about the culture of żuławy wiślane area participating in activities called żuławy from different points of view, reading the symbols in żuławy cemeteries, painting żuławy chests or making żuławy cheese. 60% of the farms under study provide regional education. all aspects of culinary culture deserve particular attention when it comes to the rural tourism market including traditional raw materials and food products, eating habits, types of food, methods of preparing food, and the process of consumption itself. visible interest in the culinary heritage of rural areas is an opportunity for the development of local entrepreneurship and the preservation of folk culture related directly or indirectly to food (dorocki, struś, 2015; orłowski, woźniczko, 2015). culinary education is also conducted on pomeranian agritourism farms. the agritourism providers offer various educational activities that are aimed at tourists of all age groups, and their main goal is to acquire or develop practical skills related to learning about regional cuisine. in addition to offering their own culinary products, it is possible to participate in their preparation and production together with the hostess. tourists have an opportunity (within the specifics of the offered culinary products) to participate in the entire production cycle from the stage of harvesting agricultural products to the final product on the plate. the hosts serving regional cuisine encourage guests to learn about the local culinary traditions. nationwide research conducted by m. marks et al., (2007) and d. orłowski (2008) shows that tourists appreciate educational values that are associated with participation in kitchen work, learning how to prepare regional dishes and drinks, and acquiring skills related to traditional food processing. the pomeranian voivodeship is similar in this respect. a wide range of educational culinary activities provided by pomeranian farms includes such initiatives as: • traditional bread baking; • baking cakes and cookies – for holidays or rituals; • making and moulding butter; • manufacture of pressed cottage cheese; • meat preservation – smoking; • meat processing – production of sausages, brawn, black sausage, jellies, cold meats; • smoking and processing of freshwater and marine fish; • fruit and vegetable processing, i.e. pickling cabbage, pickling cucumbers, drying fruit, making juices, preserves, marmalades, jams and powidła3; • drying herbs and mushrooms; • traditional picking and spinning of honey in an apiary located in a fruit orchard or garden; • preparing non-alcoholic beverages from forest and garden fruits – beetroot or bread sourdough, birch, maple, mint or elderberry; • preparing alcoholic beverages – fruit and herbal tinctures; • preparing regional dishes. educational culinary activities mostly involve baking bread, cookies and crumpets, making cheese, butter and cream, pressing fruit juices, identifying and drying herbs. the farm pasieka “u strusi” provides activities teaching how to prepare honey with propolis, bee pollen and a warming honey with cinnamon. the farm “stadnina koni maciukiewicz” runs a seasonal restaurant “pod gołębnikiem” where they serve local dishes belonging to the european network of regional culinary heritage. some of the farms provide regional dishes made with the use of traditional equipment, e.g., coal stoves, kneading-troughs, bowls, pokers, wooden shovels, butter dishes, barrels, moulds, cheese presses, slicers and stoneware pots. the greatest attraction in “kaszëbskô zagroda” is a large wood-fired bread oven where they bake bread according to an old recipe. the farmers cultivate this tradition and they have submitted an application to place their “bread from pirsno” in the list of traditional products. 12% of the farms under study have bread ovens. in nearly 30% of the farms, socalled culinary feasts are offered – tasting of regional dishes and traditional food products prepared 3 it is a specific type of jam made from plums. educational offer of pomeranian agritourist farms associated in the national network of educational farms 53 according to recipes handed down in the family for generations. kashubian feasts (with singing, dancing, roasting a boar, a piglet or a ram) prevail in the offers of the farms under study. a very important educational aspect of agritourism farms is the ability to shape appropriate attitudes towards nature and landscape protection. it is particularly important as tourism today tends to be environmentally friendly and promote environmental trends (al-sayed, al-langawi, 2003). educational farms are designed to raise environmental awareness, show life in compliance with the laws of nature and prevent the effects of over-exploitation of natural resources. educational activities provided by the farms should contribute to the dissemination and deepening of knowledge about nature as well as shape the tourist’s sensitivity (kurczewski, 2007). the offers of 72% of the surveyed farms include nature workshops, while 36% of them include ecology workshops addressed to children and young people staying on the farms within the so-called green school project. during the classes, participants follow didactic paths on the farm or in the vicinity (with stations in the garden, in the field, in the meadow, in the forest). they also take care of the farm animals or work in the garden (gardening with environmentally-friendly methods). the offers of farms located near national parks (słowiński national park and the tuchola forest national park) emphasise the possibility of using the resources of these places. at the same time, the environmental education centres located in the parks or along designated didactic paths are pointed out as perfect places to visit by tourists staying in the countryside. “alpacas in kashubia” farm (“alpaki na kaszubach”) provides activities aiming to teach children about flora and fauna in the nearby nature sanctuaries: lubygość lake and żurawie błota. “maciejówka” farm provides a carriage ride to the chamber of environmental education at the forester’s lodge in opalenie (equipped with a number of interesting and modern didactic aids), and a visit to the apiculture education centre called “miodowe rajskie pólka” where visitors can learn about the life of bees and the healing properties of honey. the agritourism farm “lipy” prepared a special educational offer in the forest maze with paths and information boards. agritourism farms “pod lipą” and “jałowcowa dolina” provide an adventure with kashubian nature. lavender farm provides activities called ecology on the farm which show ecological cultivation of several species of lavender in one of the biggest lavender fields in poland. on the other hand, art and relaxation farm organises herbal classes. there are educational paths along a meadow of herbs and flowers with descriptions of each plant. educational sports and recreation programmes provided by most of the farms are designed mostly for children and adolescents. they are always personalised depending on the participants’ age and fitness. the offers include horse riding, carriage driving, forests rallies and team games. the research shows that the offers of pomeranian educational farms are usually created and modified according to the demands and interests of service users. also, the prices are negotiable depending on the group size and the scope of the offer. such a flexible approach of the farmers shows in varied offers depending on the season, the life cycle of the farm and the weather. 4. summary the research proves that a majority of small but vigorously operating agritourism farms (up to 10 ha) are interested in the development of educational activities, and membership in the network of educational farms enables them to enter a new market, lengthen the tourist season and extend their offers. pomeranian farms have extensive educational facilities including stables, cowsheds, granaries, garages, shades, cheese dairies, home bakeries, apiaries and craft workshops. most of the farms conduct educational activities in their gardens, orchards, vegetable gardens and herbaria. in the majority of the entities, educational activities are conducted in home gardens, orchards, vegetable gardens or herbaria. the farms offer personalised educational programmes depending on the farm’s profile and the farmer’s passions. over 50% of the entities have adjusted their farms and provide activities for special groups, mostly groups of people with disabilities. although organised groups of children and adolescents constitute the majority of the service users, more and more often adults use the services, as they perceive them as a good source of knowledge, entertainment and relaxation. more than 50% of the entities have personalised their offers and provide activities for special groups – mostly groups of disabled people. pomeranian educational farms offer a wide variety of educational activities. most farms provide several educational programmes organised in the form of shows, demonstrations, contests, workshops and outdoor activities. the main aim of such initiatives is to activate the visitors. educational programmes connected with plant and livestock production prevail in the offers. visitors learn about country life, acquire knowledge about agricultural production 54 anna wiśniewska and food processing. numerous activities present rich tangible and intangible culture of pomeranian rural areas. the kashubian and kociewie traditional customs and patterns are the most outstanding on the farms under study. handicraft and folk products offered by the farms are generating more and more interest. tourists can learn to make cut-outs and to paint, sing and dance as well as to try embroidery, weaving, pottery, wickerwork, jewellery production and sculpture. educational offers of the farms also include activities of folk groups and folk artists. several farms provide regional culinary education which is very popular with visitors. another popular part of the offers are kashubian culinary festivals combined with local folklore. environmental educational programmes are the domain of farms located in the vicinity of protected areas. the main recipients of nature and environmental workshops are children and adolescents arriving within the “green schools” project. apart from standard offer, pomeranian farms provide innovative educational programmes of apitherapy, alpacotherapy and hippotherapy. generally, it can be stated that all educational activities carried out on the agritourism farms under study contribute to the dissemination and broadening of knowledge about the farmer’s life and the natural and cultural environment of the pomeranian rural areas. they shape the sensitivity of tourists and lead to raising environmental awareness. both schools and the agricultural sector benefit from education conducted on the farms. education becomes more varied, and the education process becomes richer due to hands-on educational programmes, workshops covering different subjects, alternative venues of education and learning about rural culture. on the other hand, it is also important for the agricultural sector to meet their potential customers and raise their awareness of the needs of rural economy. it also constitutes a variety and expansion of the 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agritourism on the development of rural areas), zagadnienia ekonomiki rolnictwa, 1/1996, 34–46. wiśniewska a., 2017, praca i dochody w pomorskich gospodarstwach agroturystycznych w latach 1999–2010 (eng. work and income in pomeranian agritourism farms in the years 1999–2010), wydawnictwo akademii pomorskiej w słupsku, słupsk. 1. introduction today, the party is no longer a political current with an effective impact on the iranian political scene, but an almost closed sect, similar to a group with few loyal members and followers who have limited to no special participation or appearance in political events and activities common with other parties. some believe that the party loyalists are mostly the conservative, old “tudehists”, who cling to the party’s past history and nostalgia. under all circumstances, for anyone interested in the political history of iran, it’s impossible to get insight on the subject without knowing about the tudeh party of iran. in order to understand the history of the leftist current in iran, it is necessary to study the party’s establishment to get a quick insight into the party’s actions and its fate after the iranian 1979 revolution. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 39–48 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.005.6204 the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran and the soviet union on the contemporary political developments in iran shokrollah kamari majin institute of international relations, faculty of journalism and political science, university of warsaw, żurawia 4, 00-503 warsaw, poland, e-mail: hagmatanah@hotmail.com citation majin s.k., 2017, the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran and the soviet union on the contemporary political developments in iran, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 39–48. abstract throughout the political history of iran, after the world war ii, the tudeh party has played a significant role as the mother of many other political parties in the last 75 years. this party has especially been the primary base for almost all parties with socialist and leftist tendencies. without a doubt, the party’s establishment was inspired by the 1917 october revolution in russia and under a major influence of the russian communist party. the aim of this paper is to show some of the consequences of such relationship between two actors within the international relations. although it is more than two and half decades after the collapse of the soviet union, the consequences of its influence are still felt in the iranian political space. in this paper, it is unavoidable to highlight this influence in order to open different angles of the discussion. furthermore, the paper aims to show a political reliance on a foreign power can easily come in conflict with the responsibilities of a popular movement within the national framework. it can be harmful, and it is something that can be avoided. key words tudeh party, iran, the soviet union, dependency relationship, the cold war. 40 shokrollah kamari majin the most obvious character of the tudeh party in the eyes of the iranian people is its reliance on the then soviet state, which according to many iranians has been the party’s major cause of its decline. however, a return of the tudeh party of iran to the leftist movement can be enriching and reinforcing to the entire movement. a review of the tudeh party’s history, an analysis of the party’s attitudes and actions in the course of its history and a critique of its purpose in contributing to transformation of the country could pave the way for this return. this paper attempts to conduct such a review, analysis and criticism. there are already many studies on the contemporary iranian political history, in which researchers, historians, and analysts have emphasized the tudeh party’s dependence on the then soviet state. some have mentioned the good times of the party (mottahede, 1985), while some have spoken of how it was in the days of its decline and at the time of the widespread arrests of its members and supporters (momen, 1985). mottahedeh underlines the shining times of the party in the mid-1940s when the tudeh party was the party of intellectuals so that only a few intellectuals dared to stand up against the party (mottahede, 1985). momen refers to the raid of the tudeh party by the islamic republic of iran in 1983 and repression of the party to the point of its near collapse (momen, 1985). this paper focuses on the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran and the soviet union during years of the cold war on the contemporary political developments in iran. in those years the tudeh party was the most rooted leftist political party, so that it represented a solid left wing in iran during the years. it started a close cooperation with the soviet union from the years of the party’s establishment. this cooperation lasted until the collapse of the su. the central questions in this paper are: first, why did the tudeh party that was a strong, extensive and popular political party among different groups of people, especially intellectuals, and youth ultimately decline? regarding this question, this paper focuses on the impacts of the tudeh party’s full reliance-relationship on both the party’s fate, and the ideas the party claims to fight for. secondly, what was role of the party’s ideology in the decline of the party? in this regard the focus is on the tudeh political party’s failure to meet the demands of its people due to its unwillingness to adopt a harmonious cooperation with other political groups within the framework of a national struggle. the reason can be identified as an ideological misunderstanding. thirdly, what was the role of the soviet communist party and its government in the process of weakening of the tudeh party? in this relation, focus is on the extent of the harmful consequences on the “younger brother” caused by the “big brother’s” actions serving own interests. fourth, what impact did the political life of the party and its weakening essentially have on the struggle process of the left movement? there will be talk about the party’s apparently undesirable role in weakening the socialist ideas among people, and especially in the spread of despair among young people. generally, many studies have been done on the issue of the relationship between the soviet union and its satellite parties around the world, and the su’s role on the international political scene during the cold war era. d. sylvan and s. majeski (2009) have emphasized the westerners’ concerns about soviet movements in the middle east, as well as the role of the cia in the coup against mossadegh government. within a similar context to which sylvan and majeski have worked, s. kinzer (2003) has conducted studies. he has tried to draw the westerners’ role in iran in the 1950s and their confrontation with the tudeh party in order to prevent soviet influence in iran. kinzer reveals cooperation between the americans and the british in iran to undermine the soviet position and offer financial support to the opponents of the tudeh party. he doesn’t see the role of the tudeh party on the iranian political scene in a positive light at all. kinzer points to the use of the soviet state as a tool by the party. e. abrahamian (1982) refers to the positions and actions of the tudeh party around the oil nationalization movement in the 1950s, coupled with the hard line policies of the soviet union on the tudeh party as the cause of separations and fallout among the party’s members. during his research work, e. abrahamian follows the history of the party and shows how the tudeh party falls from a pinnacle of glory to a humiliation. he also gives indications of influence of the soviets in iran. m. behrooz (2004) explains the role of the tudeh party as guarantor of the interests of the soviet union in iran. f. azimi (2004) has worked on this matter. c. chaqueri (1999), an iranian historian, sees the events and processes from another angle. he believes that the tudeh party was never an independent political current, but that it was basically created by the russians in order to preserve their interests in iran. the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran… 41 my main thesis in this paper is that a political party that could have a positive and constructive role in the field of socialist ideas and realization of them in the iranian society actually acted in the opposite direction. the argument that this paper has focused on is that the tudeh party relied on a foreign source outside the framework of the national movement. the worse was that the external source used the party in the direction of own purposes, regardless of the consequences of the socialist movement in iran in general and in particular for the tudeh party. 2. soviet deviations and errors the way they treated their own satellite parties generally and the tudeh party of iran, in particular, could be considered as a fault from the soviet part. the soviet approach in dealing with tudeh and other satellite parties could be either due to a normal policy lapse or a result of deeper rooted problems. looking at the “soviet mistake” more closely, we realize that the soviets had from the first years of taking power, laid numerous fault blocks on top of each other. among these blocks was the dominant foreign policy approach of the soviet union. the nature of this foreign policy was derived from both the early deviation and mechanisms, on which the western world foreign policies were based. this was the nature of the realist’s definition of international relations. in the west, two major theories of realism and liberalism gradually defined the behavior of states towards each other by their own perspectives and approaches. a socialist system, however, as it claimed to be a popular and democratic system that had emerged from the revolution of the working people, could be in possession of a correct external approach derived from its legitimate internal approach. but, according to many socialists who were critical of the soviet political system, this system had gone towards a totalitarian system rather than a system based on the awareness of, and participation of various sectors of society. the soviet system tried to change economic relations, but the people’s conscious participation in political processes was not prioritized. michael albert is a libertarian socialist, who in “what is to be undone” says that lenin from the very outset was opposed to the participation of the people in political affairs (albert, 1974). he notes, including the repression of ukraine in the early years of establishing the soviet socialist system. the early years after the october revolution the soviets even unilaterally canceled several colonial contracts between the soviet union and iran, and they refunded the part of iran’s assets to the iranian government, on the ground that those were iranian people’s assets. however, their role in iran in later years was more akin to a competition with other foreign troops, mostly with british to expand their influence field. their aim was rather to get more political and economic privileges than to offer support to the popular uprisings in the direction of a socialist transformation. the practices of these two foreign forces, both soviets and british, in many cases have been similar with the only difference being that their ideologies and their political identity characteristics have had two different appearances. one of them goes advance under the banner of capitalism, while the other in the name of marxism. it looks like as time went by from the october revolution, the soviet leaders started to gradually disregard people’s conscious participation in the managing of the soviet society. instead, they gravitated towards forming a strong government comprised of a stable and wide bureaucratic system. that negatively affected the global socialist movement whose core vision was to create states where authoritarianism would never thrive-the ideological framework of “libertarian socialism”. basically, the internal power relations including the power struggles in a country have impacts on the country’s foreign policy, and its orientation and role in its international relations. some believe that after the period of stalin the situation had gone beyond talking about a diversion. 3. the negative behaviors of the tudeh party in the midst of major political events in iran in the late 1940s, the truman administration was concerned about soviet movements in the middle east (sylvan, majeski, 2009, p. 50). therefore, cia by acting as the source of funding of the coup against mossadegh in 1953 played an important role. this was because of the cia’s analysis on the basis that, the mossadeq government was unable to resist against the communists (sylvan, majeski, 2009, p. 46). cia had such concerns about the activities of the tudeh party of iran and continued monitoring the party’s activities not only just after the 1953 coup against mossadegh but also for many years after the coup through cooperation with the shah’s regimen the field of information relevant to the tudeh party (sylvan, majeski, 2009, p. 85). 42 shokrollah kamari majin stephen kinzer in “the entire shah’s men” writes that the dulles brothers (john foster dulles and allen dulles-the two brothers who led american foreign policy at the time) believed that the main risk to relations with iran was the country’s fall into the embrace of the communism (kinzer, 2003, p. 4). the western politicians were well aware of the impending consequences of having a communist iran, and having learned from history, they could not risk having another korea-styled regime in iran. the solution lied in overthrowing mossadegh (kinzer, 2003, p. 10). the tudeh party had sketched such an image of itself – as a political party under soviet influence – that agents of the western governments, before the coup against the mossadeq government, published rumors, propagandas and even declarations on behalf of the tudeh party. their goal was to show that the party was threatening and thus exploit the religious flaws ultimately harming the image and influence of the party (kinzer, 2003, p. 13). one of the conscious or unconscious roles of tudeh party in the early 1950s was establishment of futile tensions, fueling the mood of unrest and finally creation of unnecessary power maneuver between itself and the mossadegh government. this resulted to more spirited efforts by the british and americans to contain the prospects of communism’s success in iran culminating in the overthrow of mossadeqh in 1953 (kinzer, 2003, p. 89). one of the reasons for opposition and unkindness of the tudeh party towards mossadeq was that the soviet union’s positions under stalin towards the international politics were based on the notion that the entire world was divided into two camps of imperialism and socialism, and therefore a middle position between these two camps – where mossadegh could be placed – was less imaginable (abrahamian, 1982, p. 322). in fact, the tudeh party by getting inspiration and influence from extremist politics, which at that time were dominant in the ussr, tried to undermine mossadegh’s image, something that was later criticized by some party leaders. even iraj eskandari who was one of the top leaders of the tudeh party, years later, in his memoirs wrote that he and his colleagues were of the belief that the communists should not support a national movement, something he considered as a mistake (abrahamian, 1982, p. 323). the tudeh party’s errors at the time of mossadegh was that it exploited the bad conditions and the economic chaos and people’s living difficulties caused by economic pressures from the western governments, attempted to organize labor protests and provoke various sectors of society, perhaps with the aim of forcing a desperate mossadegh to approach the soviets. ultimately, none of these measures were in favor of the soviets, but it was the british and the americans who were victorious in this field. during the years leading up to the fall of the mossadeq government all these chaos-mongering were excuses in the hands of the imperial court and its supporters as well as the mossadegh’s right-wing enemies and opponents. maneuvers of the tudeh party in the midst of the nationalization of the oil industry movement were used as tools in the hands of western powers in the direction of their efforts to show the communist threat. it led to that the western agents justifying their actions in iran against mossadegh and finally completing the project of the overthrowing the mossadegh government. as a result, the tudeh party’s behavior led to harmful consequences for the democratization movement in iran. perhaps it can be seen in two highlighted times: 1. at the time of 1953 the tudeh party by weakening prime mossadegh helped to provide possibilities for his government’s overthrow and led the country into a prolonged period of political repression. 2. by the continuation of past policies based on dependence on the soviet union, the tudeh party was subjected to a heavy loss (in 1983–1984 at the time of the islamic republic), while it caused a major blow against the democratization process and the left movement in iran. in many places of the book, “the entire shah’s men” written by kinzer, one encounters claims from the us and english diplomats, that argued that iran was in danger of communism. they argued that mohammad mossadegh was not the person, who could resist the communists. s. kinzer (2003, p. 162–163) refers to an item of cooperation between the americans and the british, with coordinating responsibility on american norman darbyshire and british donald wilbur with a budget of 150,000 dollars to finance activities and efforts to tarnish the reputation of mossadegh, causing fear and panic about his policies, and discrediting him among the people. propaganda efforts against mossadeq were mainly focused on two axes, one, his tendency towards communism and the other, his enmity towards islam. these two axes naturally acted together, in a complementary way, and in the same direction. in this way, the tudeh party’s verbal attacks on religious forces, was complementary to the americanbritish agenda. the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran… 43 s. kinzer (2003, p. 179) writes that, in the midst of those events and in the coup day (on 19 august 1953) the tudeh party was the only force that could come to the aid of the mossadeq government, but the party did not show any reaction. here s. kinzer is looking for the cause – or the answer to the question of why the tudeh party did not do anything. he immediately states that the tudeh party like many communist parties around the world was under the leadership and influence of the soviet union, and accordingly, in critical cases, this party could not act without receiving instructions by the soviets. s. kinzer (2003, p. 179) writes that the party did not receive any command or instruction in the coup day. he mentions that there were researchers who tried to find any answers for the question through access to sources and documents in moscow, but they were denied access to such documents. another mistake of the tudeh party at the time of mossadegh was that the party made itself too visible for its ability. on numerous occasions and in critical situations, it came out in the open exposing itself to infiltration by the western security agents in iran, and giving them an opportunity to paint the party in bad light through coordinated vilification propaganda machinery by exaggerating the role of the party in breeding chaos. these exaggerations led to the notion that the threat of communism in iran was eminent and disastrous. after the coup against mossadegh, the cia agents acknowledged that the tudeh party was not as powerful as claimed (kinzer, 2003, p. 2006). kinzer mentions several possibilities under which, the coup would not have happened. of these probabilities, kinzer mentions the possibility of entering into action by communists of the coherent tudeh party in support of mossadegh (kinzer, 2003, p. 2006). the tudeh party continued its mistakes after the 1979 revolution, this time in another form. the tudeh party after the revolution defended the new rulers based on, in its own view, a realistic analysis of the political and social situation in iran and finally on the basis of this conclusion that the islamic republic had a broad base of people and was in the antiimperialist line. however, the party’s affiliation ties to the soviet union were still intact. this affiliation by the tudeh party, despite its positions in line with the policies of the islamic republic could not let it survive the onslaught of the islamic republic. this party affiliation had a high price for both the party itself and for the whole of the left movement. another mistake of the tudeh party that again resulted from a reliance on the soviet union was that the party from the start of the iranian revolution in 1979 was in favor of the shiite theocracy, and supported the seizure of power by the shiite clergymen. the main and obvious reason was that the “revolution” now had broken the influence of westerners, especially americans, which at least so far could be considered as a great victory for the soviet union the neighbor of iran. in those circumstances, as long as a government though reactionary, religious and equally oppressive against the civil liberties of its people cut the interest of americans, it was in itself a victory for the soviets. the tudeh party thought that by supporting this islamic government the party could encourage it to lean more towards the soviet union. this party did not insist on the rights and freedoms of citizens of its country, but based on its analysis of being anti-imperialist of the new government, it went so far as calling the supreme leader “imam khomeini”, something that unexpected from a marxist-leninist party. the tudeh party of iran in the first years after the 1979-revolution, with an opportunistic conformist approach, perhaps in its own belief, intended to ride on a populist wave, which was unexpected of a so-called vanguard old political party. this party that was expected to be concerned of restricted revolution-embodied freedoms, be guard of these freedoms, be among one of the defenders of freedom for all political forces, and protest the prohibition of these freedoms, unbelievably in situations played an opposite role, often with this argument that the islamic government was in the anti-imperialist line. one of the arguments of the tudeh party in its discussions with other political forces, which was based on the theory of “non-capitalist way of development”, was that unstable, shaky and untrustworthy governments should be helped to get close to the east camp rather than falling into the lap of western countries. the high point of failure of the tudeh party was the arresting of the party’s leaders in two stages, in 1983 and 1984. there haven’t yet been serious investigations at a level that can show the consequences and results of such an onslaught and defeat, which the tudeh party has been subjected to. at the time of the terrible blow to the life of the tudeh party by the khomeini regime in 1982 almost all the party’s skeletons and strength were together captured in the hands of the regime. many of the party leaders were tortured, executed, forced to make televised confessions and to write against their 44 shokrollah kamari majin earlier beliefs, died within the period of their detention, sentenced to lengthy prison terms, dishonored and disgraced. in the meantime, a few people managed to escape before they were arrested. one of the party’s stable members – the famous poet siavosh kasraie – who had escaped from the clutches of the regime, in a conversation with another poet, houshang ebtehaj – who is still alive, said that they (the russians) betrayed them all. the tudeh party after the revolution had potential that could be used in a better way than it was done, but this never became a reality. the tudeh party was, of course, not a political force with official power in the islamic republic structure, but: 1. the party was present in many organizations and institutions across the country. 2. the party had traditionally a part of the upper echelons of the military with itself. 3. after all other political forces were exterminated the tudeh party had the opportunity to get into the political scene better than ever. the party could gather the other failed political forces around it and find more power. 4. through more power in the future, the party would adopt a more independent stance towards the government’s positions, gradually be transformed into a serious opposition, gain more bargaining power, and speak more clearly and explicitly about socialist ideals, programs and policies in line with popular demands. 4. the coordinated role of the ussr and the tudeh party in the cases of azerbaijan, kurdistan and the north oil the tudeh party in the early years of its activity gradually gained a broad popular base among people in many cities. the party quickly found a broad base among different groups of people in the 1940s, especially the late 40s and early 50s. in the first day of may 1946, the tudeh party gathered around 80,000 people in the oil-backed city of abadan to take part in protests on labor day (abrahamian, 1982, p. 302–303). this kind of the party’s power-showing stunts was a source of concern to the western politicians. however, this support and popularity did not last beyond a few years. one of the most obvious reasons of the party’s short-lived glory is the undisputed dependence on the soviet union. this dependence was something, which westerners-especially the british vehemently strived to prove in order to apply it as an effective weapon against the party. the great britain’s high commission in tehranespecially in this case, worked with the aim of undermining the party (abrahamian, 1982, p. 304). there happened two important events that had a tremendous impact on the judgment of the iranian public opinion towards the tudeh party. one was the presentation of demands for the oil concession in northern iran from the soviet union, and the other was the russian’s direct involvement in the incidents related to parts of the iranian territories, i.e. azerbaijan and kurdistan (abrahamian, 1982, p. 345). based on an agreement between the governments of the allied forces, the foreign troops in iran had to leave the iranian soil within six months after the end of the world war ii. however in 1946; stalin refused to abide by the agreement, and instead strengthened the soviet military forces on iranian territory (kinzer, 2003, p. 65–66). the tudeh party, in collaboration with this soviet union, defended the autonomous government of azerbaijan, something that in the eyes of the iranian people was not a social justice movement. after a period of chaos, foreign occupation, famine and so on, all areas of iran needed social change, and perhaps the formation of popular movements was inevitable with the azerbaijan being a favorable environment for establishing such a movement. despite all this, one cannot close the eyes at the question of what role the soviets played in this case, and the question of, to what extent the azerbaijan movement had an influence on the people, and to what extent it was a solely military occupation and foreign interference in iran’s affairs. e. abrahamian (1982, p. 198) refers to a case of soviets’ influence in parliamentary elections xiv (this assembly lasted from november 1943 to february 1944) in northern iran, where the soviets were in power. they went as far as forcing the governor of azerbaijan to resign as a reaction to the election results on which they were dissatisfied. their interference with the electoral process led to disqualification and removal of their candidates from the ballot papers as a protest by the supreme electoral council. a more serious question was about the direction of the people of azerbaijan-whether to pursue a better life through an uprising or follow the succession option and form their independent country. many iran regions were annexed to russia in a similar fashion during the qajar dynasty. the role and intentions of the tudeh party remained unclear ahmed qavam; the iranian prime minister went to moscow and persuaded the leaders of moscow to withdraw their troops from iran. his action put the party to task about its objectives; whether to act as an agent the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran… 45 of soviet policy in iran, or to safeguard the interests of the azerbaijan people. this was the tipping point of the party’s outlook by the people. the failure of the azerbaijan movement was also a hard kick to the body of the tudeh party of iran, because after this defeat the right-wing forces launched a large campaign against the party and claimed it as a political party with received orders from outside the country’s borders. here the issue of being cosmopolitan for a socialist man in line with her / his commitment and responsibility towards humanity beyond specified geographical boundaries can be raised. however, this question will also be raised; that if the soviets also had an (assumed) intention like the tudeh party’s intention, why did they reach an agreement with the iranian government and retreat instead of resistance until achieving victory? one interesting thing that is mentioned in the book “iran between two revolutions” written by abrahamian is that the azerbaijani association was founded in 1941 by the qajar nobility and created a cooperation front with the soviets, while the patriots were united with great britain. the azerbaijan association began to work with this condition from the qajar nobility’s side that the soviets should not speak of a social revolution in iran. abrahamian writes that farmanfarma the leader of the forum that had very few members won an election in a soviet-occupied zone, an area in which his family had owned many villages. e. abrahamian mentions that the other landowner members of this forum and states all wanted ahmad qavam, who was known to be an ally with the soviets, to assume power. qavam is someone, who abrahamian considers as an ambitious and shrewd politician (abrahamian, 1982, p. 180–181). even mohammad reza shah in a meeting with a british minister mentions qavam as a dangerous man waiting for implementation of his ambitious plans by help from the soviets (abrahamian, 1982, p. 181). an interesting point was the question of how it was that the soviets, who were supposedly supporters of socialist revolutions in the entire world, saw no different between uniting with a group of landowner aristocrats in iran and a few years later participating in founding of the democratic party of azerbaijan, which mainly contained revolutionaries. now the question is whether it was only a firm foothold in iran at any cost, and an alliance with any party was important for the soviets. if so, what difference can be seen between for example the british expansionist policies and the russians? if they both had the same intention, so what guarantee would there be that the russians did not form their plan solely on the basis of their expansionist goals, but not on a support agenda to progressive groups in iran in the direction of positive social change? establishment of the democratic party of iranian azerbaijan took place through an in advance coordination between the soviet union and the tudeh party. abrahamian writes that, when the pishahvari along with several of his companions announced the founding of the party in tabriz, the tudeh party’s branch in azerbaijan accompanied it. on the other hand, the soviets warned the iranian government about sending military forces to the area (abrahamian, 1982, p. 217). the then great britain consul in tabriz writes in his reports that “…it seems that the soviets are exploiting a genuine revolutionary movement” (abrahamian, 1982, p. 218). many believe that the defeat of the azerbaijan movement was due to a soviet compromise with the iranian government. the prime minister of iran qavam went to moscow and asked stalin to withdraw soviet troops from iran and give the opportunity to the iranian military to enter in azerbaijan in a peaceful and non-violent manner and with regard to the stipulated rules in the constitution. in return, iran would withdraw its complaint to the united nations, which was presented by former prime minister, and it was also agreed that qavam should present the proposal for the northern oil concession to the russians in the next parliament (abrahamian, 1982, p. 228). one of the events that after more than 70 years have remained in the historical memory of the iranian people is the case of the north oil concession to the soviet union. in 1944, when the british had influence in the southern iran, and there was talk that the “saed” government had plans to deliver the southern oil concession to english and american companies, rumors also spread about the possibility of giving the northern oil concession over to the americans, but the soviets demanded the northern oil concession. in that situation, it was expected of a government like the soviet union to have a stance against the presence of military forces and western colonial companies in the south. but it was in the wake of a balance of power in iran and therefore claimed the north oil concession in return of the south oil concession to the british and americans. it was a further blow to the soviet union’s credibility in the eyes of the iranian people. it had an effect in the face of public opinion, which considered the soviet union as a people’s freedom fighter through a socialist alliance of all socialist governments, forces, and parties. it also hurt 46 shokrollah kamari majin the image of the tudeh party for aligning with such a government. it remained forever as a document and a pretext for both anti-socialist forces and the socialists who were critics of the practices of the soviet state and the tudeh party and thus their cooperation. the tudeh party’s support of the soviet demands showed out prominently in their characteristic attack on the person of the prime minister “saed” after he suggested that it was best to suspend every concession giving until the end of the foreign occupation of the country. the tudeh party called him a british puppet and organized a few thousand people to protest against him. the tudeh party in protest against the rejection of the iranian government to give the northern oil concessions to the soviets organized massive demonstrations in various cities in iran in october 1944. according to the american embassy in tehran, part of the protests happened in front of parliament where about 35,000 people participated (abrahamian, 1982, p. 299). 5. ideology and its cosmopolitan being one of the reasons for the failed policies of the tudeh party was this political party’s ideological nature. basically, an ideology cannot promote a society in a way in which society’s wishes and demands are realized. as long as its ideology works, a political identity in the service of a political power is alive and perhaps able to play a role in governance. however, from the time when the political power is removed, the ideology is unusable. it can be used only to learn from previous human experiences in the way of getting more knowledge for better management and better behavior and more correct policies. if the goal, however, is to reach the political power from a new political group or to return to the power from a previous ruler, it would be wiser, more original and more sustainable to look at the society’s economic, social, cultural and political relations rather than to revive an old ideology. egalitarianism is an ideal but not an ideology. social justice has always been one of the noble and ancient ideals of humanity. stalinism and the “actually existing socialism” of the then soviet union are theories that shaped the body of the ideologies that no longer have any use, both on the basis of the above reasoning, and because of ideological failure in practice. however, socialism’s ideas and ideals are not something that dies or become obsolete. the tudeh party paid a high price for the marxist stereotype theories and being indifferent to the considerations and realities of the national struggle. it was one of the most dramatic and fundamental errors of the tudeh party, which after a short period from the beginning of its establishment began and continued to gradually grow into a skewed towering mansion. the party with its sporadic extreme slogans and imitation of the non-iranian communist experiences made a part of the population frightened (abrahamian, 1982, p. 309). the ideological basis of the tudeh party was a combination of a commitment to cooperate with the international proletariat and participate in a campaign in which the capitalist system throughout the world was on the one side and the socialism on the other. up until this point it can be said that participation in such a campaign for a socialist party was entirely legitimate and justified, but here after there would be a problem. it was the fact that the positions and determinations of orders and prohibitions related to this campaign often depended on definitions and attitudes made by soviets and certainly not on the basis of national interests of iranians. if in some situations there was a conflict between these interests and the national interests of iran, it was quite obvious on whose side the tudeh party would be. under these circumstances, the influence of the “older brother” can be so overshadowed, so that the relationship between the two the one who helps and the other who is being helped – can be changed from an ideological relation to an employer-employee-like relation. thus, the authenticity of the meaning and aim of the “little brother” party will be so doubtful. the mistake of the tudeh party is that it has abandoned the socialism and that it is still living with nostalgia of past ideologies and the “actually existing socialism” in the soviet era. the perception or allegation of the leaders of the tudeh party was that the socialism did not recognize nationality, but that a socialist man has passed patriotism and has achieved a cosmopolitan insight. it would be wiser that the party separated the blind nationalism that can be tinged with racism and chauvinism, from real analysis based on existing realities of the iranian society. it can be damaging to a political party with a socialist ideological foundation to separate itself from the body of its own national movement. while that political party goes ahead with socialist ideals, aims and theories, it is forced to move within the framework of the national movement to which it belongs. the effect of the dependency relationship between the tudeh party of iran… 47 this is in fact tantamount to the political analysis and thus the positions of the political party exists on the basis of a consideration of the existing nature, circumstances, mechanisms, necessities and opportunities in the economic, social and cultural relations of the society, where the party live. one can compare any political force with a fish that lives in the water. the water is the national movement. if a political party decides to act outside of the real world of the national features and frameworks, it cannot continue to exist. what took the tudeh party along this road? perhaps the party considered the national tendency as a conflicting road to the socialism. however, concepts such as racism and nationalism can be laid in one category, while nationalist movements belong to another category. it cannot be said that man must necessarily be either nationalist or cosmopolitan. a man may be neither of these two identifications. even if a person chooses any of the two cases it may not necessarily let the person live without responsibility for a struggle within the framework of the national movement. it is true that the socialist thinking does not recognize black and white, but that it looks at people from a standpoint higher than nationality and ethnicity. the socialist ideas can lead us to cosmopolitanism, and so far it can be said that it’s a not a bad thing. but that mistake, which the tudeh party of iran had committed, was that the party ignored the iranian national existence and requirements, so that the party leaders’ cosmopolitan vision put this party in the service of national interest of another country, consciously or unconsciously. this self to be in the service of national interest of a particular country was contrary to the cosmopolitan principle or “value”. m. behrooz (2004) explicitly writes that what the party in taking its positions in the period of the oil nationalization movement led by mossadegh took into account, were the interests of the soviet union. one of the mistakes of the tudeh party, which can be analyzed in the context of dependence, was that the party without regard to the national requirements did not want the lifting of foreign influence in iran, but its aim was rather replacing the western influence with the soviet influence (azimi, 2004). the tudeh party made this mistake both under the oil nationalization movement led by mossadegh and in the years after the 1979 revolution. azimi believes that many of the party leaders used the machiavellian ways to achieve their goals, and that in this way they repeatedly justified the means (azimi, 2004). the tudeh party is among the political parties with this perception that the loss of or abandonment on a part of the natural freedoms of the citizens is inevitable, in order to achieve social justice. it is one of the crooked fundaments of these parties, which is rooted in a tradition of the “actually existing socialism”. this tradition clearly shows itself in the behavior of the tudeh party in the first years after the revolution in 1979. 6. the consequences for the party itself people like cosroe chaqueri, the iranian historian, believe that from the beginning of the establishment of the tudeh party, the soviets were the hidden hands behind it, and it can even be said that it was created with the soviet order and the authority of the party’s early leaders. the soviet union aimed to secure its interests in iran (chaqueri, 1999). in connection with this “dependence”, it can be pointed to the soviet union’s decision in 1956 when it decided to transfer the public organizations of tudeh party from moscow to east germany because it wanted to improve its relationship with the royal government of iran. this decision was actually a kind of decision for the tudeh party out of the will and authority of the party. the party had to move its workplace and offices and so on to another country, which could affect the functionality of the party, but it was obviously not important to the russians. the most important thing for them was that the decisions should be in accordance with their own national interest. one of the consequences of the tudeh party dependency to the soviet union was that this party shortly after its establishment began with the process of the loss of its leaders, influential forces and followers. they were unhappy about the party dependency to the soviet union. each of these separations was a detrimental effect on the tudeh party. abrahamian points to a number of groups split from the tudeh party and the party’s isolation of prominent characters (abrahamian, 1982, p. 188). one of the most important members of the party by the name khalil maleki in the late 1940s was broke from the party and formed a new party called “toilers” without dependence to the ussr. in one of his articles, the “toilers” he explains that, despite accusations from the tudeh party, he still considers himself a marxist but expresses dissatisfaction with the party affiliation of the soviet union (abrahamian, 1982, p. 48 shokrollah kamari majin 257). he accused the tudeh party of following moscow with closed eyes (abrahamian, 1982, p. 277). another error of the tudeh party was giving propaganda opportunities to the enemies of socialism, which was effectively used to discredit socialism in general and the party specifically. enemies and the opposition of the party, in fact, were anti-socialist groups and individuals who were happy to see the party’s dependency increase and called the party the fifth column of the enemy. this process contributed to the decline of the party and the effect on the public opinion. splits were often caused by this reason. among them was a split that occurred in 1965, when two of the party leaders came out of the party and formed a new political organization called “toufan” that means “hurricane”. they had many criticisms over the foreign policy of the soviet union and the party’s blind obedience to the soviets (abrahamian, 1982, p. 453–454). the most defectors believed that the soviet union had gone the wrong way, and thus the “small brothers” parties like the tudeh party followed the same wrong path as the soviet union did. the tudeh party during the years between 1956 and 1964 – the years, the party established its organization in eastern europe and especially in east berlin – showed its dependence on the soviet union more open. the party also defended arms sales from the soviet union to the regime of mohammad reza shah (abrahamian, 1982, p. 455–456). 7. conclusion in view of the discussed issues, the following can be concluded as the cause of the tudeh party: 1. after peaking and political success of the tudeh party immediately after its creation in 1941, it gradually entered the era of one after another failure, political despairs, passivity of a part of the active and motivated forces, and finally an era of the splits caused by the policy of reliance on the soviet union. 2. the case of the north oil rating, the demand of the concession by the soviet union, and the tudeh party’s support of this demand. 3. the tudeh party’s incorrect assessment, and the consequence of this error, secret agreements between the soviets and the iranian government, and finally a dagger in the back of azerbaijan democratic party, the republic of kurdistan and the tudeh party. 4. the negative or passive role of the party in the oil nationalization movement led by mossadegh, and finally the 1953 coup against mossadegh government. 5. the years of normalization of the relations between the soviet union and the regime of mohammad reza shah and finally the tudeh party’s silent and passive role in the political developments in iran in these years. 6. the tudeh party’s misjudgment on khomeini being an “anti-imperialist”, and thus supporting him. 7. the lack of a proper assessment from both the soviet union and the party of the likelihood of attack on the party and an almost collapse of the party. 8. the party’s inability to have harmony with other opposition groups to adopt a strategy and broad cooperation in order to fight for democracy in iran. references abrahamian e., 1982, iran between two revolutions, princeton university press, princeton new jersey. albert m., 1974, what is to be undone? a modern revolutionary discussion of classical left ideologies, porter sargent publisher, boston. azimi f., 2004, unseating mosaddeq: the configuration and role of domestic forces, [in:] m.j. gasiorowski, m. byrne (eds.), mohammad mosaddeq and the 1953 cou in iran, syracuse university press, syracuse, 27–101. behrooz m., 2004, the 1953 coup in iran and the legacy of the tudeh, [in:] m.j. gasiorowski, m. byrne (eds.), mohammad mosaddeq and the 1953 cou in iran, syracuse university press, syracuse, 102–125. chaqueri c., 1999, did the soviets play a role in founding the tudeh party in iran? cahiers du monde russe, 40/3, 497–528. kinzer s., 2003, all the shah’s men: an american coup and the roots of middle east terror, john wiley & sons, inc., hoboken, new jersey. momen m., 1985, an introduction to shi’i islam, yale university press, new haven, london mottahede r., 1985, the mantle of the prophet: religion and politics in iran, one world, oxford. sylvan d., majeski s., 2009, us foreign policy in perspective: clients, enemies and empire, routledge, milton park, abingdon. 1. introduction the study of preeminent practices in highly developed countries has shown that the introduction of democratic governance norms (as a replacement of a hierarchical model) provides higher standards of social development, improves welfare of the population, and declares the human being as the highest value in the entire system of socio-economic relations. democratization processes of governance involve the engagement of the general public in collective decision-making for the benefit of the local community. democratization of governance increases the efficiency of communities and ensures their ability to independently address issues of local importance. this approach is the basis for creating journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(2), 27–35 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.04 democratization of governance as the basis of local economic development in ukraine оlga krajnik department of regional and local development, institute for public administration, lviv polytechnic national university, sukhomlynskoho 16, 79491 lvivbriukhovychi, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0001-6295-3999 e-mail: okraynyk@gmail.com citation krajnik o., 2022, democratization of governance as the basis of local economic development in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(2), 27–35. abstract the article considers the role of democratic standards of governance, which imply the involvement of wide layers of the population in making administrative decisions to ensure regional and local development. the real transition to the implementation of democratization of power relations in ukraine began with the decentralization reform. the main function of local governments amid decentralization processes is to improve the territorial socio-economic condition, which is the expanded economic recovery of the territory, using the real benefits of democratization and decentralized governance. this article analyzes the stages of decentralization and illustrates the main legislative and regulatory guarantees of this process. the determination of financial resources available to local governments plays a special role in the economic development of territorial communities. the article also scrutinizes changes in local budget revenues of ukraine over the past six years. the formation of the participatory budget as a component of government democratization as well as the development of public confidence in government is typified. in conclusion, the importance of continuing the decentralization reform and maintaining the society’s progress towards democratization is determined. key words democratization of governance, local economic development, decentralization, municipal budgets, participatory budgeting, local communities, ukraine. received: 28 march 2022 accepted: 02 june 2022 published: 19 august 2022 mailto:okraynyk@gmail.com 28 оlga krajnik conditions to ensure their socio-economic development, determining the priorities of local economic development and having an impact on these processes of local governments. the decentralization reform has become the basis for introducing democratic standards in the relationship between the state and local governments. in this context, the main function of local governments is to improve the socio-economic condition of the territory and to secure real interaction with the public in order to expand the reproduction of the territory’s economy. utilizing the real benefits of democratization and decentralized governance will ensure that the potential for economic development is exploited both locally and in the country as a whole. theoretical and applied principles of democratization of local economic development governance are covered in many legislative and regulatory acts and in a number of foreign and ukrainian economists’ works. in particular, the universal declaration of human rights (universal ..., 1948) defines the right of every citizen to participate in public affairs as well as in the governance of own country directly or through freely elected representatives. s.  huntington (naumkìna, 2004) substantiated the interdependence between democracy and economic development. according to him, democratization is facilitated by certain economic and cultural conditions, including a relatively high level of economic development and the superiority of western cultural values. the constitution of ukraine (konstitucìâ ..., 1996) defines the basic implementation principles of direct democracy rules, and encyclopedia britannica (kauffman, 2010) characterizes the democratization processes and defines their role in the country’s economic development. the european charter of local self-government (êvropejs’ka ..., 2015) declares the normative consolidation of the citizens’ right to participate in the public affairs governance, which can be directly and effectively implemented at the local level. ì.m. bezena (2019) states that the democratization and decentralization of public power in ukraine have begun. the mission of the individual in the outlined processes is changing, and new requirements to qualitative indicators of its activity are being defined. experts from the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd, 2019) call decentralization a “quiet” revolution that affects all areas of life, from the environment and governance quality to economic growth and to improving the well-being of citizens. ì.l. rajnìn (2016) notes the role of local authorities in being responsible for the following factors: local and regional economy development, ensuring population employment, and modernization of the state in order to allow citizens to participate in governance. finally, b. pytlik (2017) notes the special role of democratization of governance through the participatory budgeting formation. meanwhile, b. pytlik also states that these processes may have some shortcomings. the establishment of democratic principles in reforming public administration requires broad participation of all social strata and strengthening institutions of civil society. in general, the effectiveness of any management process is determined by the extent to which it meets the interests of society as well as the needs of both the community and each of its members. in this case, the main governance requirements are not only the high professional level of its execution but also compliance with democratic standards. democratization of governance is a complex socio-economic process that offers a transition from a deeply hierarchical centralized model of governance to decentralization, providing ample opportunities to influence broad sections of society to make governance decisions. as international experience shows, democratization of governance provides higher standards of social development, increasing the levels of success indicators in accordance with predetermined goals. based on the involvement of a wide range of performers, the method of collective decision-making is used so that all of the participants would influence the final result of the process equally. the key basis of this approach is the use of organization principles of modern society, which are based on the involvement of man in state-building, ensuring compliance with the norms of democratic society. the universal declaration of human rights, adopted by the un general assembly on december 10, 1948, defines the right of every citizen to participate in public affairs. it states that everyone has the right to participate in governing his or her country directly or through freely chosen representatives. the will of the people must constitute the basis for government authority. this will must be manifested in periodic and genuine elections, which must be held according to the general and equal election law by secret ballot or through other equivalent forms that ensure freedom of vote (universal ..., 1948). the basic principles of implementing forms of direct democracy are enshrined in the constitution of ukraine (konstitucìâ ..., 1996), where the status of a territorial community is recognized as the bearer of the right to local government, which establishes forms of direct democracy and their influence on public administration. existing foreign experience (oecd, 2019) demonstrates that direct democracy, which involves the direct participation of citizens in public administration democratization of governance as the basis of local economic development in ukraine 29 in the most effective way, can be implemented at the local level. in ukraine (kujbìda, 2009), the intensification of this process was ensured by decentralization of governance, a reform of the local government and territorial government organization which aims to improve the standard and quality of life of local communities. in this regard, several ukrainian scholars note that “at the current stage of democratic development and decentralization, it is possible to outline priorities of the state regional policy, which are to improve the quality of human life; spiritual and mental, as well as the socio-political, socioeconomic consolidation of regions. this can be the basis for achieving the integrity and homogeneity of the humanitarian, information and economic space, increasing the competitiveness of regions” (kujbìda, 2009). an american scientist s. huntington focused on and substantiated the interdependence between democracy and economic development of countries. thus, analyzing the “third wave” of democratization, huntington’s claims about the “retreat of democracy” are primarily based on the economic foundation of this political phenomenon. in his view, democratization is facilitated under certain economic and cultural conditions, in particular a relatively high level of economic development and the predominance of western cultural values (naumkìna, 2004). describing the democratization processes, the british encyclopedia defines the role of this process in the economic development of the country, noting: economic development: the correlation between democracy and economic development is one of the strongest such associations established in political science. however, there is much debate about the nature of the relationship as well as the causal mechanisms behind it. early modernization theorists noted that the most successful and enduring democracies at the time were also the richest, whereas most poor countries had difficulty developing democracy. many interpreted this correlation as evidence that economic development, usually measured as per capita gross domestic product (gdp), lays the foundation for democratic transitions. some even saw democratization as the final stage of the modernization process. the basic argument is that economic development produces an educated and entrepreneurial middle class with an interest in demanding greater influence over governance issues and the capacity to do so. eventually, even the most repressive governments must bow to this pressure (kauffman, 2010). among the principles of the european charter of local self-government are those that declare the normative enshrinement of citizens’ right to participate in the governance of public affairs, which is one of the common democratic principles of all council of europe states. the charter stipulates that this right can be exercised directly and effectively at the local level (êvropejs’ka ..., 2015). 2. data and methods legislative and regulatory support of the decentralization process is analyzed based on data from the decentralization website, data from the ministry of community and territorial development (ministerstvo rozvytku…, 2022) of ukraine and the verkhovna rada of ukraine (verkhovna…, 2022). the analysis of local budget revenues, their structure and dynamics from 2016 to 2021, was conducted according to the ministry of finance of ukraine data (ministerstvo finansiv…, 2022) analyzing the revenues of local budgets, the reports on general local budgets funds were used without taking into account intergovernmental transfers. as overall statistics on public budgets in ukraine are not available, data from the lviv city council (l’vivs’ka mis’ka…, 2022) were used to analyze the participation budget and the number of public projects. in addition, commonly used scientific methods were applied in the analysis: system analysis for generalization and systematization of literature sources and problem state study (kustovs’ka, 2005) economic statistical method for analysis of local budgets as the main funding source for the development of territorial communities, their structure and dynamics, analysis of statistical data and reflection of research results (lapishko, 1995), content analysis to characterize legislative and regulatory support of decentralization (kostenko, ivanov, 2003). the abstract-logical method was used to form proposals for the continuation of the implementation of democratic standards in local government, generalize the material theoretically, and to formulate conclusions (lapishko, 1995). 3. results and discussion some forms of citizen participation are described by laws, in particular, the law of ukraine “on bodies of self-organization of the population” (zakon ..., 2001). the constitutional right of citizens to appeal is enshrined in the law of ukraine “on citizens’ appeals” (nakaz ..., 2002). these laws outline the forms of citizens’ appeals and how they are carried out, outline the requirements for them, as well as the procedures for responding to appeals of public authorities and local governments. real processes of democratization of power relations began in ukraine after launching https://www.britannica.com/topic/economic-development https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-science https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-science https://www.britannica.com/topic/gross-domestic-product 30 оlga krajnik decentralization and changing approaches to the center-region relations. in this regard, ì.м. bezena (2019) states that the democratization and decentralization of public power in ukraine has begun, and there have been achieved some results. the mission of an individual in the outlined processes is changing, and new requirements to activity quality are being defined. an official endowed with public authority must meet the competencies of a modern governor, which are distinguished by democratic principles of activity. he or she must be action-oriented in the legal field of authority and see ways to implement them to regulate the community life. a study by experts from the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd) states that: decentralization, sometimes called the “silent” revolution, is one of the most important reforms of the last 50 years. it is implemented to varying degrees in most countries and has profound consequences due to its complex and systemic nature. the process of decentralization affects all spheres of society, from the environment and the quality of governance to economic growth and, more broadly, to improving the well-being of citizens (oecd, 2019). decentralization of management involves the provision of quality services to territorial communities. one of the most important tasks in this context is to be able to form effective local governments – to elect the head of the community and local advice as well as to effectively influence them, making difficult decisions and feel responsible for the results of joint work. in this context, ì.l. rajnìn (2016, p. 32) notes: when the state has shifted away from productive and social functions, new tasks are assigned to local authorities. the challenges of the time require local authorities to take responsibility for the following factors: the development of local and regional economies; ensuring employment; modernizing the state in order to allow citizens to participate in governance; securing the inclusion of socially excluded groups (social work); developing the settlements to meet the needs of citizens; promoting cultural, scientific and technological progress and regional integration. that is, the main function of local governments is to improve the socio-economic condition of the territory, expand the reproduction of the economy of the territory and use the real benefits of democratization and decentralized governance. in the context of continuing decentralization processes, it is important to highlight the task of state, regional, and local authorities, which is the implementation of regional and local economic development policy. two stages of decentralization were implemented in ukraine during the period starting from 2014 and up to 2021 (the first one: 2014–2019; the second one: 2020–2021). legislative support for the change of the government system and its territorial basis was launched in 2014 after the adoption of laws and regulations by the government of ukraine, which ensured the formation of united territorial communities and the transfer of governance functions to the local levels. the number of united tab. 1. the main legislative and regulatory acts that ensured the process of power decentralization in ukraine. year of creation number of united territorial communities legislative support of decentralization reform 2014 – the concept of reforming local government and territorial legislature organization and approval of the action plan for the implementation of the concept. law of ukraine “on cooperation of territorial communities” 2015 159 laws of ukraine “on voluntary association of territorial communities”, “on principles of state regional policy”, “on local elections” methods of forming capable territorial communities 2016 366 establishment of the united territorial communities association 2017 699 law of ukraine “on amendments to certain legislative acts of ukraine (regarding voluntary accession of territorial communities)”. 2018 876 approval of the composition of the central election commission (cec) and holding the first elections to 125 utcs (united territorial communities) 2019 1029 adoption of the perspective plan for the territorial communities’ formation. draft law of ukraine “on amendments to the constitution of ukraine (regarding the territorial organization of power)” (not adopted) 2020 1469 completion of the amalgamation of territorial communities. regulations on the administrative centers definition and territorial communities approval in each region in accordance with the law of ukraine “on amendments to certain laws of ukraine on the definition of territories and administrative centers of territorial communities” resolution № 3650 “on the formation and liquidation of districts”. source: own study based on decentralìzacìâ daê možlivostì. democratization of governance as the basis of local economic development in ukraine 31 territorial communities and changes in the legislative support for their creation and operation are shown in table 1. in 2022, there is a plan to amend the constitution and adopt a number of other legislative acts on decentralization which are necessary for further promotion of the reform and its completion. of particular importance in this context is the need to determine the composition and volume of financial resources, their relationship with the economic development of administrative-territorial formation and opportunities to analyze the availability of financial resources, sources of their production and investment projects of individual communities. in general, a significant amount of research is conducted in world practice on the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economic development of a territory, emphasizing the real interdependence of these components (martínez-vázquez, mcnab, 2003). in this context, the following opinion of ì. z. storonâns’ka & a.o.  pelehatij (2014, p. 107) can be quoted: adequate financial support is required for the effective implementation of the functions assigned to it by the territorial community and the achievement of strategic priorities, current functioning and development goals. in this case, the territorial community should be both a carrier of the socio-economic development of territories and the driving force for achieving the strategic goals of territorial formation. table 2 shows the dynamics of changes in local budget revenues from 2016 to 2021. from an analysis of table 2, a decrease in the number of transfers in 2020 can be seen. that was due to a decrease in total budget revenues. the reason for this is the global pandemic of sars covid-2019. the growing share of local budget revenues in the consolidated budget of ukraine should also be noted. according to table 3, from 2016 to 2021, it increased 1.3 times from 19 to 24 percent. the data in table 3 also show that local budget revenues are growing from year to year. their share in the consolidated budget of ukraine is also growing. this state of affairs in the conditions of democratization of governance contributed to a possibility to form a participation budget as a component of the local budgets of ukraine. an important task today is the application of foreign experience to an effective and democratic model of governance at the local level, the involvement of broad sections of citizens in public affairs, which in some way is established through the formation of the public budget. public participation in local government is an important component of local government success. the involvement of citizens in making governance decisions related to the development of an area and control over the implementation of norms and rules is evidence of the democratization of governance at the local level. democratization of participation ensures the citizens’ trust in the government, which can give a powerful impetus to solve local problems and improve the quality of life in a particular village, town or city. such opportunities for citizen participation in the territorial community governance are provided by the participation budget. the use of the participation budget began in 1989 in the municipality of porto alegre, the capital of the southernmost state of brazil, where more than a million people live and which is considered rich according to brazilian standards. in 1988, as a result of the victory of the workers’ party, whose campaign was based on democratic participation and the “spending priorities inversion”, there was a change in the cost of public resources and the use of a joint budgeting approach. this approach has been used as a means of helping the poor, and neighborhoods have received higher levels of government spending (wampler, 2000). the formation of the participation budget involves the interaction of local councils and their executive bodies with the public. the desired results are obtained through allocation of local budget costs for the implementation of projects proposed by local community residents. the selection of project proposals is carried out through open public voting, which ensures the openness and transparency tab. 2. dynamics of local budget revenues for 2016–2021. metrics 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 (january) general fund income (excluding transfers) uah billion 146.6 191.9 233.9 275.0 290.0 351.9 27.1 transfers uah billion 196.0 272.9 285.5 245.4 161.0 203.2 11.8 total revenues uah billion 342.6 464.8 519.4 520.4 451.0 555.1 38.9 share of local budget revenues in the consolidated budget of ukraine,% 19 19 22 22 24 24 – source: compiled by the author according to the ministry of finance of ukraine (dovìdka ..., 2022). 32 оlga krajnik of local government structures. at the same time, the effectiveness of this process depends on both parties: on the civil society activity and its desire to participate in local government processes, as well as on the ability of local governments to manage the participation process. however, the participation budget use will only be effective if both government officials and residents decide upon its formation and distribution. it is crucial to allow residents to express their attitudes in the form of approval or criticism by discussing the public budget or participating in general consultations. in addition, the influence of such factors as the size of local budgets, the share allocated to the implementation of participatory projects, and regulatory support for the selection and implementation process of local projects is obvious. advantages of engaging public in governance decisions by forming a participation budget include: • involving a large number of residents with different education and different practical knowledge in decision-making for the benefit of the community; • generating more project implementation ideas; • choosing democratically participation projects; • increasing public confidence in local governments. as the participation budget is formed independently by each territorial unit, there is no summary data concerning the whole country. that is why the participation budget formation process of lviv is offered as an example. formation of the participation budget in lviv has been arranged since 2016, and the local government has been one of the first to initiate such a process. encouraging residents to take part in the formulation of project applications, local authorities on the public project website explained the importance of this process and the ability to track the fate of their project online directly on the website. in addition, characterizing the essence of the process, it is noted that the participation budget is a democratic process that allows each resident to participate in the distribution of local budget funds through the creation of projects to improve the city and vote for them. anyone living in the city can submit a project to improve life in the city, take part in a competition, win a vote and observe how their project is implemented using the budget costs (bûdžet učastì, no data). the main stages of project implementation are the submission of projects, where everyone can leave a project application in an electronic form or at the support centers of the participation budget. then the authorized persons among the executive bodies of the local council consider the projects. in case of incorrect filling out of the application, the authors may obtain permission to change it. the next step is to vote online or at the budget support centers. at this time, the authors are trying to obtain the maximum number of votes. after the winners are chosen, the local council begins to implement the ideas. the dynamics of submitted and implemented projects for 2016–2021 in lviv is demonstrated in table 3 below. as can be seen from table 3, the total cost of the winning projects is increasing every year, while the total number of submitted projects remains approximately the same. the number of registered project authors also slightly varies. the significant activity of women project authors, which is dominant in most cases, should be noted. the ratio of winning projects to the total number of projects ranges from 12.9% in 2017 to 39.7% in 2021, similarly changing the ratio of tab. 3. dynamics of the number of submitted and implemented projects for 2016–2021 in lviv. year projects submitted total cost of projects, [uah million] authors of registered projects number of projects–winners total cost of projects–winners [uah million] total women men 2016 259 145.4 214 101 (47%) 113 (53%) 67 17.5 2017 294 235.0 269 154 (57%) 113 (43%) 38 25.7 2018 159 141.6 142 91 (64%) 49 (36%) 54 38.2 2019 219 213.4 200 109 (55%) 88 (45%) 55 46.8 2020 240 235.4 212 106 (50%) 103 (50%) 80 59.5 2021 254 259.3 228 135 (59%) 92 (41%) 101 77.8 source: compiled by the author of bûdžet učastì (2022). democratization of governance as the basis of local economic development in ukraine 33 the cost of winning projects to submitted projects. after analyzing the ratio of the participation budget to the general fund of the local budget of the city, it can be stated that it is not constant and changes from year to year (see table 4) (ìnformacìâ...,2016–2021). the amount of financial resources allocated to the participation budget from the local budget depends on many factors, in particular: the general state of budget funding, the number of other projects implemented in the city, the activity of residents regarding the projects submission, etc. noting the benefits of participation for each resident, it can be stated that participation in community projects is: • a chance to influence the place where you live; • not the deputies, but you decide what exactly the allocated funds are used for; • voting is transparent and you can influence this process by promoting your project; • you know exactly how to apply and when its fate will be clear (no need to beat the thresholds of government agencies); • next year you will see how your idea comes to life; • exactly what you have planned will be realized within the limits of previously known amounts of costs (ìnformacìâ..., 2016–2021). monitoring of decision-making process at all stages is of particular importance in the formation of participation budget and its actual implementation decision-making process. the public monitoring group, which includes both local citizens and local experts, analyzes the procedure and records all problems and violations that have occurred. poland’s experience shows that participatory budgeting is the best way for local authorities and the public to interact. in particular, boguslaw pytlik notes the main role of this approach in making residents responsible for their environment. starting from 2013, the participation budget in poland ceased to be an isolated phenomenon, becoming increasingly popular over time. it is important that in the implementation of this task there are enough difficulties and unsolved problems. in this regard, b. pytlik (2017, p. 121) notes that: thoughtless, i.e. not taking into account local conditions, introduction of participatory budget models; the informative nature of the so-called public consultations, and thus the low level of attendance at meetings; residents lacking full knowledge of local problems; conflicts of interest between residents and local authorities, which prefer to perceive the former only and at most in the role of advisers; lack of discussion on investment priorities and a long-term development plan; not fully thought out and often partly random distribution of financial resources or the lack of an educational aspect in the process of communication between the authorities and residents – these are some of the most fundamental examples of negligence which are instrumental in determining that the participatory budget in poland has no right to bring maximum benefits. monitoring the process in terms of ensuring its effectiveness, forming a list of changes suggestions is the task of monitoring groups. involving the public plays an important role in transforming urban spaces, expanding public influence on public coverage of future local projects, and ensuring competition for ideas in this area. in addition, an important form of citizen participation is both social and ecological activity in the field of ecology and environmental protection. such activities can be manifested in improving the work of local schools, organization of recreation areas, sports and cultural events, building green zones, etc. nongovernmental organizations and organized civil society groups make a significant contribution to the development of democratic governance principles and respect for human rights. as the european experience shows, the use of such mechanisms allows taking into account the views and interests of local communities in the policy-making process and ensures the democratic process in governance. 4. conclusion the decentralization reform has a decisive impact on the country’s democratic transformation. tab. 4. the ratio of submitted and implemented projects for 2016–2021 in the city of lviv. year share of projects–winners in the total number of projects, % ratio of winning projects to the submitted projects, % share of participation budgets in the general fund local budget,% 2016 25.9 12.0 4.3 2017 12.9 10.9 5.1 2018 33.9 26.9 2.5 2019 25.1 21.9 3.4 2020 33.3 25.2 3.4 2021 39.7 30.0 2.7 source: calculated by the author of ìnformacìâ... (2016–2021). 34 оlga krajnik decentralization of power contributes to the consolidation of society and ensures the formation of a viable local government responsible for the development of territorial communities, improving the entire system of government. the decentralization reform, which is the basis of state policy for regional and local economic development, is the most effective reform since the declaration of independence. it provided institutional transformations that became the basis for improving the standard and quality of life of the population and continuing reforms in the country’s economy. the provision of financial resources is important for the implementation of the functions of local authorities in the implementation of the policy of economic development of administrative-territorial formation. local budgets are the main source of revenue for the territory’s development. it should be noted that, except for the pandemic period, the size of local budgets has been growing steadily. since 2016, part of the general fund of local budgets has been directed to the participation budget, which is a sign of the introduction of democratization of governance at the local level. russia’s open military attack on ukraine, launched on february 24, 2022 and supported by belarus, turned all economic processes into a state of martial law. according to experts, even with the rapid end of the war, the negative economic consequences will be felt for a long time. however, a special task in this context is to preserve the democratic direction of the country’s development and to continue and deepen the reforms that have begun. references bezena ì.m, 2019, demokratizacìâ publìčnogo upravlìnnâ ta ìnformacìjno-medìjnij rozvitok kompetentnostej jogo posadovcìv (eng. democratization of public administration and info-media development of its officials’ competences), deržava ta regìoni. serìâ: deržavne upravlìnnâ, 3(67), 27–32. doi: 10.32840/1813-3401-2019-3-5 bûdžet učastì (eng. participation budget), mìsto l’vìv, https:// lviv.pb.org.ua/about (accessed 20 march 2022). decentralìzacìâ daê možlivostì (eng. decentralization provides opportunities), https://decentralization.gov.ua/ (accessed 20 march 2022). dovìdka ŝogo stanu vikonannâ mìscevih bûdžetìv (eng. information on the state of local budgets execution), 2022, mìnìsterstvo fìnansìv ukraїni, https://mof.gov.ua/uk/ vykonannia-dokhodiv-mistsevykh-biudzhetiv (accessed 20 march 2022). êvropejs’ka hartìâ mìscevogo samovrâduvannâ (eng. european charter of local self-government), 2015, ofìcìjnij vìstnik ukraїni vìd 03.04.2015 № 24, https://zakon.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/994_036#text (accessed 20 march 2022). ìnformacìâ pro stan mìscevogo bûdžetu upravlìnnâ fìnansìv l’vìvs’koї mìs’koї radi 2016–2021 r. 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democratization of governance as the basis of local economic development in ukraine 35 oecd, 2019, making decentralisation work: a handbook for policy-makers, oecd publishing, paris, https://doi. org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en (accessed 21 january 2022). pytlik b., 2017, budżet partycypacyjny w polsce (eng. participatory budget in poland. evolution and dilemma), studia z polityki publicznej, 1(13)/2017, 103–122. rajnìn ì.l., 2016, o organìzacìjna struktura sistemi upravlìnnâ rozvitkom regìonu (eng. organizational structure of the regional development management system), êvropejs’ki perspektivi, 2/2016, 29–36. storonâns’ka ì.z., pelehatij a.o., 2014, naprâmki modernìzacìї fìnansovogo zabezpečennâ rozvitku sìl’s’kih teritorìal’nih gromad u kontekstì zavdan’ admìnìstrativno-teritorìal’noї reformi (eng. ways of modernization of financial support for territorial communities’ development through tasks of administrative-territorial reform), fìnansi ukraїni, 10/2014, 97–108. universal declaration of human rights, 1948, united nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declarationof-human-rights (accessed 20 march 2022). verkhovna rada ukrayiny (eng. the verkhovna rada of ukraine), https://www.rada.gov.ua/ (accessed 20 march 2022). wampler b., 2000, a guide to participatory budgeting, https:// www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/ag u i d e t o pa r t i c i p a t o r y b u d g e t i n g. p d f ( a c c e s s e d 20 march 2022). zakon ukraїni «pro organi samoorganìzacìї naselennâ» (eng. law of ukraine “on population self-organization bodies”), 2001, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/262514#text (accessed 20 march 2022). 1. introduction the right of citizens to take part in the conduct of public affairs is one of the elementary political rights enshrined directly in the constitution of the slovak republic (hereinafter referred to as the “constitution”). this right is declared by article 30 paragraph 1 of the constitution: “citizens shall have the right to participate in the administration of public affairs directly or through freely elected representatives,” and specified by the decision of the constitutional court of the slovak republic: “in case of citizens’ fundamental right to participate directly in the administration of public affairs under article 30 paragraph 1 of the constitution, this is one of the fundamental political rights of citizens in a democratic society, while the administration of public affairs shall mean the participation of citizens in the political life of the state, the administration of the state and public affairs in municipalities” (ii. ús 9/2000). in the context of the execution of the administration of public affairs in the territory of self-governing units such as municipalities and higher territorial units, this right is specified by article 67 paragraph 1: “municipality inhabitants’ assemblies shall realize a territorial selfadministration by local referendum, by referendum journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 59–63 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.020.5807 the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in the context of territorial self-administration jana neuschl faculty of law, comenius univesity in bratislava, šafárikovo nám. 6, p. o. box 313, 810 00 bratislava 1, slovakia, e-mail: neuschl.janka@gmail.com citation neuschl j., 2016, the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in the context of territorial self-administration, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 59-63. abstract the paper deals with the constitutional right of the residents of municipalities and territorial units, which entitles them to take part in the conduct of public affairs within the slovak republic. the citizens can directly or indirectly participate in sustainable development and good governance due to legal arrangements, in particular, such as the local referendum, the municipality inhabitant’s assemblies, the right to petition, the right to file motions, suggestions and complaints with the municipality bodies, and etc. it focuses on the rights of the residents to comment and to be hear within the activities and actions of the municipal authorities, but not only within the administrative procedures, but also within the decisions making processes, which have the impact on the performance of their other rights. key words constitutionality, right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to governance, the self-governing region, municipal authorities and territorial unit bodies, local referendum. 60 jana neuschl on the territory of the higher territorial unit, by municipality authorities or by higher territorial unit authorities.” the overall and more specific regulation of the right of the administration of public affairs in the context of self-governing units is contained in act no. 369/1990 coll. on municipalities, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the “act”) and act no. 302/2001 coll. on the self-government of higher territorial units (hereinafter referred to as the “act on self-governing regions”). 2. execution of self-administration – direct and indirect participation of entities of the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs first of all, it is necessary to make it clear, to whom the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in the local and regional authorities of the slovak republic belongs. in accordance with article 1 paragraph 1, the municipality getting together persons having permanent residence in its territory and thus the person having permanent residence in the territory of the municipality is a municipality resident (article 3 paragraph 1). “a self-governing region is an independent territorial, self-governing and administrative unit of the slovak republic,” and “the resident of the self-governing region is a person who has permanent residence in the municipality in its territory”1. the right to participate in the administration of public affairs in the municipality or the higher territorial unit is therefore not bound to the slovak nationality, but to permanent residence, and the right to administer public affairs rests with the municipality residents who may also be citizens of other countries. in case of application of the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, special entities within self-administration are actively legitimized that are the persons who “have their real estate located in the territory of the municipality, pay local taxes or local charges, have temporary residence registered in the municipality or enjoy the right of permanent residence in the higher territorial unit or have honorary citizenship in the municipality”2, or persons who work, carry on business or pursue other activities in the territory of the municipality, stay often in the territory of the municipality, or come from the municipality and the like. these may also be legal persons 1 act no. 302/2001 coll. on the self-government of higher territorial units (hereinafter referred to as the “act on selfgoverning regions”). 2 act no. 302/2001 coll. on the self-government of higher territorial units. carrying on business or pursuing other activities in the territory of the municipality. the act on municipalities does not define these persons explicitly, but implicitly their right to participate in the administration of public affairs arises to them from the universal nature of fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution. however, these persons do not have the right to vote or to be elected to self-administration bodies of municipalities and to self-administration bodies of higher territorial units and do not also have the right to vote in a local referendum, and therefore, their rights consist in the mere possibility of active participation in the form of participation in municipality inhabitants’ assemblies and meetings of the municipal council, or they may file motions, complaints, comments with self-administration bodies and thus exercise, for example, their constitutional right to petition. in terms of article 4 paragraph 2 of the act, the self-administration of municipalities shall be executed by inhabitants in the form of direct or indirect democracy. the indirect form of exercising the right of citizens to take part in the conduct public affairs is the exercise of the active and passive rights to elect and to be elected members of the bodies of a municipality, which are the municipal council and mayor. the active and passive voting rights are regulated by the so-called “election code” (act no. 180/2014 coll. on conditions of exercise of voting rights and on amendments and supplements to certain acts) – the active voting right have the inhabitants of the municipality – slovak citizens having permanent residence in the municipality who have reached 18 years of age no later than on the election day. the right to be elected as the member of the municipal council is limited only by age, namely 18 years of age. it is contrary, for example, to the age limit for the candidate for a member of the national council of the slovak republic – only the slovak citizens who have reached 21 years of age may be elected thereto. in fact, in the case of the election to municipal or self-governing region councils, there is no difference between the active and passive voting rights. however, the age limit applies to mayors or self-governing region chairmen. a mayor may be elected only a resident of the municipality who has reached 25 years of age no later than on the election day and met other specific requirements laid down by special law. analogous provisions governing the exercise of the active and passive voting rights also apply to the elections to the bodies of self-governing regions, which are the council and self-governing region chairman. the application of direct forms of democracy and thus the direct participation of citizens in the the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in the context of territorial self-administration 61 self-administration of municipalities can be realized in the form of a local referendum, the municipality inhabitant’s assemblies or through universal constitutional rights such as the right to petition, the right to file motions, suggestions and complaints with the municipality bodies, the right to information, and the like. all universal constitutional rights directly result from the right of citizens to participate in the administration of public affairs, which is, in accordance with article 27 paragraph 1 of the constitution, declared as follows: “the right to petition shall be guaranteed. everyone shall have the right to address state bodies and local self-administration bodies in matters of public interest or of other common interest with petitions, proposals, and complaints either individually or in association with others.” the right to petition is also regulated by act no. 85/1990 coll. on the right to petition, as amended, which indicates that the right to address the municipal bodies with petitions, proposals and complaints in the context of the respective contribution is not only the right of inhabitants of the municipality, but of all natural or legal persons, irrespective of their permanent residence. in our opinion, the respective act only minimally regulates the right to petition in the execution of self-administration and contains only basic principles for handling submitted petitions. for example, article 5c of the above act states: “if the subject of the petition is the activity of the local self-administration bodies, their members or the statutory body of the organization founded by the local self-administration body, the petition shall be handled by the relevant local self-administration body.” in terms of article 9 of act on the right to petition, the right to petition in the execution of selfadministration shall not be subject to administrative proceedings: “the general regulation on administrative procedure shall not apply to the handling of petitions under this act,” but act no. 9/2010 coll. on complaints, as amended, shall apply thereto, in which it is declared that “... the public authority shall regulate the handling of complaints by its internal regulations”. we can infer from the context of the respective provision that the internal regulations of the municipalities or higher territorial units should then have the character of binding internal regulations governing clearly the rules for the handling of petitions or complaints and comments filed by the residents of the municipality or the higher territorial unit, and they should be published on the official boards and websites of the municipality so that the participation of citizens through the respective institute is as effective as possible. a referendum is another important element of direct democracy in municipalities and higher territorial units. a local referendum is regulated in the act on municipalities, from which it follows that in terms of the act the municipal councils are obliged to declare the local referendum in case of “the legal merger of municipalities, the division or cancellation of municipalities, as well as the change in the name of the municipality, removal of a  mayor from office, the petition of at least 30% of eligible voters, the change in labelling of the municipality or as provided by special law.” the local referendum may obligatorily be declared if important issues regarding the life in the municipality and its potential further development are to be discussed. in terms of article 11a of the act on municipalities, the announcement, dealing with and checking of particular documents for the application of the referendum in practice shall be the responsibility of the municipal council. under the act on municipalities, details regarding the organization of local referendums shall be “stipulated by the municipality upon a generally binding regulation”. successful adoption of the results of the referendum shall be subject to the presence of at least half of the eligible voters of the municipality, and the decision which is the content of the referendum must be taken by at least an absolute majority of valid votes. the local referendum carried out in the territory of self-governing regions is governed by article 15 of the act on self-governing regions, which defines the requirements of the announcement and the conduct as well as validity of the referendum, which, in terms of grammar, can be described as almost identical compared to the requirements of validity of a local referendum in a municipality. as regards the municipality inhabitants’ assembly, which is further tool of direct democracy, and therefore further tool of the participation of citizens in the administration of public affairs, article 11b of the act on municipalities states: “to discuss the municipality affairs, the municipal council may convene an assembly of inhabitants of the municipality or part thereof, and its further regulation shall be left to the discretion of the municipality.” despite the fact that the constitution or the act on municipalities do not regulate the binding force of the institute of direct democracy in details, the municipality, through its council, may stipulate the requirements of the organization, conduct, control and binding force of the decisions and measures taken in the public municipality inhabitants’ assemblies by internal binding regulations or general binding regulations so that the adopted conclusions of such municipality inhabitants’ assemblies have definite legal effects and are legally binding on the municipal bodies without doubt on their legal nature and binding or nonbinding force. 62 jana neuschl in accordance with article 3 paragraph 2 subparagraph c) of the act, the residents of the municipality have the right to participate in meetings of the municipal council. in view of publicity of the municipal council meetings, which is declared in article 12 paragraph 9, any other persons shall be entitled to take part in such meetings, but the right to comment on the discussed items on the agenda or present views on certain items on the agenda does not directly result for them from the act, and therefore, it is not legally claimable. “in this case, there is an asymmetry in the act, namely in the wording of article 12 paragraph 10 of the act, between the status of residents of the municipality who may or may not be heard and the status of members of the national council of the slovak republic, members of the european parliament, representatives of the government or any other public authority who must be allowed to speak at their request” (dostál et al., 2013). in terms of article 12 paragraph 12 of the act, the details of the meetings of the municipal council may be directly regulated by the rules of procedure of the municipal council. within the purview of the act, the municipal council may establish initiative, executive and supervisory bodies and committees as its permanent or temporary advisory, initiative and supervisory bodies. members of the municipal council may only be elected members of the municipal council, but members of the committees may also be other persons, even those who are not, for example, permanent municipality residents. “membership in the committees of the municipal council is thus another possible form of public participation in the activities of municipalities. alike the opportunity to speak in the meetings of the municipal council, the membership in the committees is not claimable and it depends only on the decision of the municipal council whether the persons who are not members of the municipal council are elected members of the committees or the committees consist only of the members of the municipal council” (dostál et al., 2013). as regards the activities of the municipal council or the committees, the act does not state and stipulate the requirements of publicity of their meetings, thus suggesting that this issue falls within the competence of the municipal council, which should regulate the publicity or non-publicity of the meetings of its advisory bodies by the rules of procedure and it should also regulate the opportunity to speak for other persons who are not members of these advisory bodies. in our understanding, an important component to increase the direct participation of citizens in the administration of public affairs is the so-called raising of the awareness of citizens about the activities of bodies of self-administration at all levels through necessary informedness implemented by means of disclosure of different kinds of information about activities and intended activities of the municipal council, its bodies, committees, about their agenda and materials to be decided, and about the decisions and activities of the mayor and the administrative staff of the respective municipal bodies. in our opinion, only transparent self-administration is the right way to increase real participation of citizens in the administration of public affairs. 3. conclusion as seen above, legislation in the field of regulation of participation of citizens in the administration of public affairs is left to the arbitrariness of individual bodies of self-administration, particularly of the members of municipal and self-governing region councils, which in our opinion should be changed and in many cases there should be statutory regulations of individual institutes of direct democracy so as not declared at the level of theory but used in practice. the citizens, especially residents of municipalities and territorial units should play the greater role within local government. the legislators, in particular, regional presidents, parliamentarians, mayors and county councillors, such as authorised representatives of the democracy, should take more account of the wider impact of its policy decisions to life of citizens and should allow for timely action to prevent the decrease in the efficiency of participatory democracy in their territories, because such democracy and civil dialogue are not empty slogan, but, rather essential principles on which the success of the modern, democratic, civic society and therefore of its future depends. references dostál o. sloboda d., kuhn i., 2013, právo na dobrú samosprávu. štúdia. bratislava, http://samosprava.institute.sk/ uplatnovanie-prava-na-dobru-spravu-veci-verejnych-v-samosprave-2013.vjzhgiu2r6k [15.09.2015] ako má samospráva zverejňovať informácie, http://samosprava.institute.sk/ako-ma-samosprava-zverejnovat-informacie-o-svojej-cinnosti-na-webstranke-a-uradnej-tabuli [22.09.2015] ministry of interior of the slovak republic, http://www.minv.sk/ [22.09.2015] nález ústavného súdu slovenskej republiky, sp. zn. ii. ús 9/2000, z 27. apríla. 2000. zákon č. 302/2001 z. z. o samospráve vyšších územných celkov v znení neskorších predpisov. the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in the context of territorial self-administration 63 zákon č. 369/1990 zb. o obecnom zriadení v znení neskorších predpisov. zákon č. 85/1990 zb. o  petičnom práve v  znení neskorších predpisov. zákon č.9/2010 z.z. o  sťažnostiach v  znení neskorších predpisov. journal of geography, politics and society 2023, 13(1), 30–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2023.1.04 geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity vadym vasiutynskyi institute of social and political psychology, national academy of educational sciences of ukraine, andriivska 15, 04070 kyiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-9808-4550 e-mail: vadymvas55@gmail.com citation vasiutynskyi v. 2023, geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity, journal of geography, politics and society, 13(1), 30–41. abstract the purpose of the research is to establish correspondence between the geographical and mental boundaries of the ukrainian ethno-political identity. a theoretical and comparative analysis and generalization of historical, geographical, political and sociological theses and data have been applied. the research determines the external boundaries (between ukraine and the surrounding countries) and internal ones (between the regions of ukraine). it demonstrates the exceptional importance of the ukrainian identity opposition to the russian mental influences. ukraine is divided into three main regions. central ukraine is a mental basis for the ukrainian identity and political nation. western ukraine is notable for the highest level of national consciousness and ukrainian patriotism. south-eastern ukraine is characterized by stronger competition of the ukrainian and russian values, but simultaneously by dominating ukrainian identity. key words mental boundaries, ukrainian identity, ethnic identity, political identity, ethno-political identity, regional identity. received: 5 october 2022 accepted: 30 january 2023 published: 31 march 2023 1. introduction when a conversation drifts to the ukrainian identity, a question about its ethnic and political sense arises first. in the most general way, ethnic identity is understood as a commitment to a given cultural background (maehler, 2022) or to a home or host society (epstein, heizler (cohen), 2015), as a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with descent (chandra, 2006). v. gamsakhurdia (2017) describes ethnic identity as ethnic belonging that endures transformations through time and changing environments. ethnic identity and associated discourses influence people’s behavior, lifestyle, and values. belief in a long common history consolidates and legitimates ethnic bonding. if the ethnic identity is based on a commitment, its formation and availability must be subject to positive circumstances of life and communication. l. kuang & s. nishikawa (2021) emphasized the important role of positive ethnic socialization messages in adolescents’ ethnic identity and selfesteem. in the longitudinal research by c. houkamau et al. (2021), in-group warmth and ethnic identity centrality predicted increases in three wellbeing measures for new zealand māori: life satisfaction, self-esteem, and personal wellbeing. geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity 31 however, real relations appear to be more complicated. b. woo et al. (2019) proved that high racial/ethnic identity can act as an exacerbator for some ethnic groups and in certain social conditions; instead, moderate identity may be a protective resource to buffer any negative mental health consequences of discrimination for others. in many societies, the ethnic identity is united or competes with the religious one. for example, the research by ma. e.j. macapagal et al. (2018) states that “the muslims in the southern region of the philippines identified themselves more strongly with their religious identity over their ethno-political affiliations.” the opposite example is of two autonomies in georgia – abkhazia and adzharia. the indigenous population of the first one is different from georgians both ethnically and religiously (abkhazians are muslims); the adzhars are ethnic georgians professing islam. during the ussr breakup, anti-georgian protests were inspired in both republics. in abkhazia, they “succeeded,” but in adzharia they failed because the local population did not support them. the ethnic factor appeared to be stronger than the religious one. the political identity has a shorter tradition of learning than the ethnic one, but its designed nature is more obvious and better proved. b. gentry (2018) offers to consider the concept of a political identity as an inner narrative of one’s political self. identity is the story that we tell ourselves and others about who we are, who we were, and who we foresee ourselves to be in political life. in western, first of all, american tradition, a political identity is often associated with party’s preferences. americans’ political identity (either democrat or republican) exerted a strong influence on self-reports of emotional distress, threat perception, discomfort with exposure, support for restrictions, and perception of under/overreaction by individuals and institutions. the dominance of political identity has important implications for crisis management and reflects the influence of normative value differences between the parties, partisan messaging on the pandemic, and polarization in american politics (collins et al., 2021). in the service field, conservatives (vs. liberals) are more satisfied with the products and services they consume. this happens because they are more likely to believe in free will and, therefore, to trust their own decisions (fernandes et al., 2022). ethno-political identity is the combination of ethnic and political sides of identity. first of all, it is important in those societies where the ethnic problems become especially acute and a subject of political fight, like in belgium (cartrite, 2002), pakistan (khan, byrne, 2018) or bosnia and herzegovina (kočan, zupančič, 2022). even sport in many countries, especially in those which have recently become independent, has proved to be a highly politicized realm of national expression in which narratives of nation, identity, and culture are intensely articulated (brentin, 2014). the issue of ethno-political identity of the ukrainians is often developed in a discussion about ethnic or political ukrainian nation. the adepts of two extreme positions oppose. the first declare that ukraine is a country of ethnic ukrainians and the rest must either become ukrainized or leave. the others insist that ukraine is a multinational country where no ethnos must dominate. according to the census survey in 2001, ukrainians amounted to 77.8% of the population, russians – 17.3%, and representatives of other nationalities – 4.9%. thus, one can say only about biethnicity rather than about polyethnicity of ukraine. the russian military aggression led to the situation when the majority of those who considered themselves ethnic russians, especially among the youth, call themselves ukrainians now. under the data of general national surveys of sociological group “rating”, after the occupation of crimea and a part of donbas in 2014, the amount of the respondents who identified themselves as russians decreased reaching 11%, and the amount of ukrainians grew up to 87–88%. now (april 2022), 92% of the respondents identify themselves as ukrainians, 5% – as russians, 3% – as other ethnoses (the tenth national survey…, 2022). the russian language spread significantly among the ethnic ukrainians impedes the perception of ukraine as a monoethnic territory: in 2001, 14.8% specified russian as their mother tongue. v. kulyk (2013) emphasizes the importance of the ukrainian language as a crucial component of ukrainian identity. given the lack of independent statehood, ukrainian identity was primarily ethno-cultural rather than civic. however, the contradictory policies of the soviet regime produced a largescale discrepancy between the language use and ethno-cultural identity. moreover, independence boosted ukrainian civic identity and stimulated reconsideration of its relationship with the ethnocultural identity of the titular group. the perception of oneself as ukrainian is gradually shifting from ethno-cultural to civic, particularly among the young generations. linguistic differences significantly specify the regional variants of the ukrainian identities. regional identity in ukraine is determined by a unique combination of the historical heritage of the region, features of the ethno-confessional composition of 32 vadym vasiutynskyi its population, socio-economic status, and specifics of lifestyle, traditions and culture. the politicization of regional differences in modern ukraine has led to an increase in the regionalization of electoral political sympathies, the aggravation of social differences around geopolitical and ethno-cultural values (balabanov et al., 2019). available contradictions could have become a strong factor of social conflicts. however, three decades of independent ukrainian statehood existence showed that inside the ukrainian nation (provided lack of external negative influences), there are powerful preventive mechanisms in force that kept the national organism from interethnic and interregional outbreaks. a. polese (2018) performed an interesting analysis of non-conflict uniting of general national and regional interests. he looked at the way identities are constructed, and renegotiated, at the everyday level, by ordinary people, by illustrating the competition between the russian and ukrainian languages in odessa, a ukrainian city on the black sea, to look at the synergy generated by the competition between local and national narratives. the elites, the state, and its institutions “imagine” the nation in a more civic or ethnic manner, construct a national narrative intended to fit, and be applied in, all possible cases and geographical areas of the country. however, this narrative may sometimes contrast with some realities, situations, geographical areas, where it may be in conflict with the way locals perceive, and live, their own identity. if the state proposes a policy, without forcing or controlling to what extent citizens comply, and citizens create the impression to comply with the official discourse, without necessarily adopting it always and everywhere, then everyone seems satisfied. this combination of elastic rules and limited control allows local leaders and actors to feel relatively free and make it easier to accept a ukrainian identity based on relatively flexible boundaries and markers. thus, it is obvious that an optimum solution of the issue regarding ethnic or political nature of the ukrainian nation is somewhere in the middle between these two options. summing up, it can be said that the ukrainian ethno-political identity is the feeling of a deep individual and collective commitment to ukraine as a territory and surrounding, to all ukrainian – the language, culture, history, values, social surrounding, which initially had ethnic sense, and in historic and modern conditions it has been transformed in aspiration of political self-determination of ukrainians as a nation. 2. methods the theoretical and comparative analysis and generalization of historical, geographical, political and sociological statements and data representing space-and-time and sense parameters of the ukrainian identity were used as the main method. for that purpose, secondary data analysis was used (clarke, cosette, 2000; johnston, 2014). we have avoided a detailed description of the geographical parameters themselves, because there is a lot of information of this kind in the media landscape. the geographical borders are the basis for the analysis, but are not its subject. 3. results and discussion determination of geographical and mental parameters of the ukrainian identity is based on division with regard to the external and internal borders. the external borders are between the ukrainians and neighboring ethnoses/nations; the internal ones represent regional divisions of ukraine. 3.1. the external ukrainian–russian boundaries dissociation with the most significant mental importance for ukrainians’ identity occurred between them and the russians. the most grounded problem relates to the claim concerning the succession from ancient rus. the interpretation born in the russian ideological environment lies in the idea that ancient rus became a “cradle” for statehood of three “fraternal” peoples – russian, ukrainian and belarusian. an idea that rus itself is a prototype of current ukraine opposes to this understanding. the historic ancestor of belarus was lithuania of that time (not contemporary!) – a slavic country, which was rus’ by origin and language, and comprised an integrated ethnic body with rus. there was no russia in the current meaning. a part of its present north-western lands belonged to rus, but the majority of the territory was inhabited with ugro-finnic tribes, and then it was colonized by turkic and mongol ones. original muskovy was not rus. it was called muscovian rus later to connect its successor to the throne of the tsardom of muscovy with ancient rus and justify the renaming as russia (an ancient greek variant of the name of rus) committed by peter i in 1721. conversion of the tsardom of muscovy to christianity encouraged the spreading of the church slavonic language that geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity 33 formed the basis for general russian koine from which the russian language originated. renaming muscovy as russia is a pre-current basis of the russian claims to believe itself to be russia. a special role is played here by not distinguishing the terms rus’ and russian, contrary to the neighboring languages – ukrainian, belorussian and polish: rus’ – from rus, russian – from russia. however, in the russian language “the russian language” and other identical notions are united in one – all of them are “russian”. this non-distinguishing placed into the russians’ consciousness the belief that all rus’ is russian and then, the ukrainians and belarusians are not individual peoples but a part of general russian ethnos. when, due to many historic events, the bigger part of the ukrainian ethnic lands appeared to be in the russian empire, the ukrainians started to be called “little russians,” and muscovites became “great russians.” this terminology had to emphasize the leading role of the latter ones and dependent condition of the others. first, the word little russia meant the ethnic center of rus, and since the 14th century, it was applied to the ukrainian lands as such. however, in the russian discourse, this word derived a derogatory and diminutive tone to determine an inferior part of “great” russia. as a part of the russian empire, ukrainians inhabited lands southand eastward from their initial ethnic territory. the russian state encouraged this relocation in all possible ways, using the ukrainians as an instrument for colonization of huge eurasian territories. while inhabiting these territories, the ukrainians lost their ukrainian identity within two or three generations. they mostly turned into russians and partially formed a new mixed identity, like it happened to zaporizhzhia cossacks-ukrainians who became the russian cossackdom with a specific, not absolutely russian but already not ukrainian identity. instead, in their main ethnic territory, the majority of ukrainians saved their identity – first rus’ (rusyn), then little russian and cossacks, and, at last, ukrainian. the center where the ukrainian identity as such arose was middle dnieper ukraine on the left and right banks of the dnieper near kyiv, where it gradually spread to the majority of the territories inhabited by the ukrainians in the west, south and east. the issue concerning the south-eastern territories of current ukraine deserves special attention, as it is more problematic from the point of view of their population’s ukrainian identity in comparison with central and western regions. these lands were colonized when they were part of the russian empire, but mostly by ukrainians. russia won them in the fight against the crimean khanate and the osman empire, after that it “allowed” ukrainians to inhabit these territories. such historic circumstances are essential because the russians are searching grounds there for claims to southeastern parts of ukraine (jointly with the ukrainian population), calling them new russia “presented” to the ukrainians. the ukrainians claimed their rights to political independence from russia after the bolshevik takeover during the fights for national liberation in 1917–1922, having declared the ukrainian people’s republic and the west ukrainian people’s republic, and having united them in one state. however, for different reasons, ukrainians were not able to keep their independence and ultimately, the bigger part of ukraine appeared under the control of russian bolsheviks. on the initiative of the soviet leader, lenin, a nationalterritorial demarcation was implemented, according to which dozens of russia’s nationalities received formal properties of national statehood. several larger peoples, including ukrainians, received their statehood as union republics, formally founding the soviet union. in this way, the bolshevik authorities to some extent met national aspirations of different ethnoses, including ukrainians. eastern lands of the ukrainian ethnic territory appeared in the body of the russian federation – the biggest and the main soviet republic. the soviet regime encouraged denationalization of ukraine in different ways. during so-called collectivization (collective farms foundation), wealthy farmers were sent to siberia. ukrainians villages that died out during the holodomor were peopled with the those born and raised in russia. nationally conscious intellectuals were killed during repressions, while those who agreed to accept the communist system were kept alive. graduating specialists were sent to work to russia and other republics where they did not have any chances to preserve their ukrainian identity; moreover, instead, russian workers were sent back to ukraine. such russification gave its results. each consecutive ukrainian generation became more and more russian speaking and closer in their identity to the russians. the russian language became a sign of loyalty to the communist regime and belonging to higher strata of the social system. by contrast, principal ukrainian speaking was considered as a sign of anti-soviet beliefs, which directly endangered its speakers. lingual russification caused a change in the identity from ukrainian for russian-soviet or 34 vadym vasiutynskyi its subordinate variant – ukrainian-russian-soviet. the ukrainian identity was better preserved in western regions, which were joined during and as a result of world war ii, and in the central ukrainian province where the population spoke mostly pidgin (the ukrainian-russian mixture) and did not have notable ambitions. the towns became russian speaking faster and faster. there was more of everything russian – first of all, the language, as well as identity – in southern and eastern regions, especially in big and medium towns. one can speak about two main categories of the russian language, culture and identity bearers in ukraine. the first ones are the migrants from russia for whom a great russian imperial identity is a complex of ethnic superiority, and claims to exceptionalism were a natural component of selfconsciousness and the worldview. the other category comprises russified ukrainians who themselves or whose ancestors started to speak russian instead of ukrainian and placed many efforts to stop being ukrainians and to become proper russians. the most typical situation of this change is a move from a ukrainian speaking village to a russian speaking town with an aspiration to join “cultural” town life and get rid of the ukrainian identity. the meeting of these two identities traumatized in different ways confirmed the russian discourse of ukraine as a smaller, younger, and inferior part of russia. two groups can be distinguished among those who were trying to save the ukrainian identity. the first one (“little russians”) – ukrainian speaking people oriented on the ukrainian culture in its folklore-ethnic variant, but subordinate to the russian-soviet discourse. these were ukrainian speaking intellectuals who survived in the conditions of the russian repressions and searched for a compromise between russification and at least symbolic preservation of the ukrainian sense of cultural and social life. on one hand, these people – teachers, writers, actors, etc. – played an important role in the relative saving of the ukrainian language, culture and identity1. on the other hand, the soviet regime actively used them for propaganda of socalled “proletarian internationalism” showing a seeming explosion of the ukrainian national culture in the conditions of total russifying pressure. the second group is more determinant ukrainian patriots who were consequently called nationalists, with only negative, antihuman meaning attributed to this term. these people lived all over the territory of ukraine; however, their original weight was higher in western regions, gradually decreasing eastwards. after all, the main line of mental division between ukrainians and russians lied along the state border of ukraine and russia. ukrainians in ukraine and ukrainians in russia have different, often principally different identity. it was demonstrated especially brightly during the period of ukraine’s independence and too brightly – under the influence of the russian military aggression. “ukrainian” ukrainians more and more expressively renew and coddle the ukrainian identity in themselves2. “russian” ukrainians under the influence of the russian public thought and official propaganda face even more significant alienation from ukrainianness, experiencing a whole range of negative feelings concerning ukraine. demarcation between the ukrainians and belarusians was much less dramatic – perhaps, because they rarely had to solve the issue of borders at the level of the independent political subjects. if the ethnic border itself between these two peoples was quite clear, the line of interstate divisions was not principal for ukrainians and belarusians, because they did not make them. in ancient rus, ukrainians and belarusians belonged to one rus ethnic area. in the kingdom of poland and the grand duchy of lithuania, they were the issues of regional rather than interstate divisions. then, the borders were marked by the russian empire and the soviet union. thus, the border between ukraine and belarus appeared to be quite constant and did not cause problems. however, approximately one million ethnic ukrainians of the brest lands – south western part of belarus, despite their distinctive ukrainian language, received a new belarusian identity. similarly, several tens of thousand ethnic belarusians living in the north of ukraine turned into ukrainians having saved belarusian speaking in everyday communication. this fact does not have a significant representation in mass consciousness of either ukrainians or belarusians and affects feelings of an insignificant part of hyperpatriotic persons in both countries. 3.2. internal division of ukraine being influenced by the russian factor the russian factor appeared to be determining not only on the external borders of the ukrainian identity spread, but also in internal ukrainian differentiation. no other influences – polish, romanian, jewish, 1 they are the teachers whom the author thanks for comprehension of his ukrainian identity in those dangerous times. 2 their smaller part due to political polarization of the society moved to the pro-russian figures. geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity 35 turkish, american, etc. – even jointly reached such power as the russian ones had before and have now. according to decades’ long (since 1994) psychosemantic monitoring of the mass political consciousness held by the institute of social and political psychology, naes of ukraine, the russian factor belongs to three most powerful ones that determine the sense, condition and tendencies of development of the ukrainians’ political consciousness (two more – perception of reforms and attitude to authorities). in individual periods (especially at the beginning of the 2000s and before parliamentary and presidential elections), it becomes leading by the power of influence (vasiutynskyi (ed.), 1997, pp. 42–67). within ukraine, the russian factor specified its division into “two ukraines” – central-western and south-eastern. this division found its expression the most clearly during the “orange revolution” in 2004. later, pro-ukrainian statements were significantly spread in south-eastern regions where they strengthened the ukrainian identity. historic and political events specified the mental division of south-eastern ukraine into several significantly different regions. crimea clearly stands out – this is a peninsula in the black sea (fig. 1) inhabited by crimean tatars (one of turkic peoples) since the earliest times, and sporadically in different historic periods by ukrainians, and intensively in the russian and soviet times by russians. 0 100 km p o l a n d b e l a r u s m o l d o v a r u s s i a oblast (province) city with special status autonomus republicvolyn lviv zakarpattia ivano frankivsk ternopil rivne khmelnytskyi vinnytsia zhytomyr kyiv cherkasy chernihiv sumy poltava kirovohrad mykolaiv odesa kherson dnipropetrovsk kharkiv zaporizhzhia donetsk luhansk crimea sevastopol kyiv crimea donbassouth-eastern ukraine western volyn eastern galicia bukovyna zakarpattia left-bank ukraine right-bank ukraine r o m a n i a chernivtsi southern bessarabia fig. 1. modern administrative regions of ukraine mentioned in the paper source: own study. in the interwar period, the peninsula had a status of autonomy as part of the russian federation. in 1944, crimean tatars were deported to central asian republics. inhabitants from the central regions of russia were relocated to substitute them, which led to a quantitative dominance of ethnic russians (58.5% according to the census of 2001 (about number…, 2001). as the economic development of crimea slowed down, in 1954 central moscow authorities transferred it to ukraine. after this, populating crimea by the ukrainians increased (in 2001 they amounted to 24.4% of the population), but at the same time ukrainians in formally ukrainian crimea underwent accelerated russification, and in their identity they tended towards the russians. during 36 vadym vasiutynskyi the years of independence, ukraine-wide tendencies of ukrainian revival also took place in crimea, but they were less intense. when the soviet union broke up, crimean tatars received an opportunity to return to crimea (according to the census of 2001, there were 12.1% of them there (about number…, 2001). it is important to specify that during the annexation of crimea by russia in 2014, crimean tatars appeared to be much more pro-ukrainian than ethnic ukrainians. in the east of ukraine, donbas stands out. the name is an abbreviation of donets coalfield (donetsk and luhansk oblasts (fig. 1)). long ago, it was poorly populated wild fields (a steppe frontier region), partially inhabited by ukrainians, and partially by nomads. later, in the periods of industrialization, it was inhabited by people born and raised in different parts of russia and the whole soviet union, having formed a multinational environment denationalized to great extent. however, a ukrainian ethnic element prevailed there, with the dominant russian language. if russian-speaking natives out of ukraine and their descendants ensured prevailing russian identity in crimea, in donbas this role was mostly performed by russified ukrainians. a smaller part of them kept their ukrainian identity, a part changed for russian, but the biggest part of the population there formed a diverse local identity with ukrainian, russian, soviet and regional elements. opposition to the general ukrainian identity became – not categorically, but notably – an important peculiarity of their statements and aspirations. at the same time, they did not incline so much towards russia as they tried to spread their values to whole ukraine3. the locals of crimea and donbas were the ones who perceived the events of maidan in 2004 the most critically. a part of them were scared and encouraged to protest. simultaneously, pro-ukrainian strata performed respective political promotions. that allegedly gave “grounds” to speak about a civil war in ukraine. however, it is obvious that without forceful intervention of russia “both ukraines” would agree with each other, like before. the difference between big industrial cities – oblast centers and other agglomerations where ukrainian ethnic population prevails but the language is russian, and ukraine-speaking province is distinctive for steppe ukraine and the black sea region (dnipropetrovska, kharkivka, khersonska, mykolaivska, odeska and zaporizka oblasts). our own research of the russian-speaking population of the south-eastern regions of ukraine even in 2009 showed a notably prevailing ukrainian identity in it. only 17.9% out of 1,292 people questioned identified themselves as ethnic russians. instead self-identification as citizens of ukraine (36.8%) or russian-speaking residents of ukraine (34.1%) prevailed. if at the level of socio-political self-identification they targeted at saving the connection with the russian state, language, culture, at the socio-perceptive level their preferences moved towards the acceptance of the ukrainian surrounding. “russian” was “theirs” in a more symbolic sense whilst “ukrainian” – in a more pragmatic one (vasiutynskyi, 2012a, pp. 45–47). in the same research, we determined 5 principal statements of the russian-speaking residents of ukraine concerning their integration into the contemporary ukrainian society: active integration (used by 6.5% respondents), passive integration (23.2%), sub-integration – at the level of a region (50.3%), passive counter-integration (12.4%), active counter-integration (7.6%) (vasiutynskyi, 2012b, pp. 170–174). passive integration and sub-integration as the statements that are the most widespread among the russian-speaking citizens showed the major senses of their ethno-political orientations at that time: to live in ukraine, in the ukrainian environment, to be ukrainian citizens and bearers of the ukrainian identity but to keep their lingual-cultural specifics and possibly, respective socio-psychological privileges. the latter ones include belonging to urban and “great” russian culture, higher selfestimation and self-confidence, better opportunities and more modern areas of personal development. simultaneously, the majority of the russianspeaking residents of ukraine do not want to become part of russia. as the events in 2014 and even more in 2022 showed, ukrainian patriotism of the russianspeaking population and the fact that only a small part of it welcomed the russian occupation were a great surprise for the russian authorities and society. instead, the prevailing majority treated the russian intervention negatively, and there are a lot of russian native speakers among those who are fighting against the russians. the regional division of central-western ukraine is more diverse. the difference between central and western regions is the most significant there. within the borders of central ukraine a division was formed into left bank ukraine (chernihivska, poltavska and sumska oblasts) and right bank ukraine (cherkaska, khmelnytska, kirovohradska, 3 a popular slogan of the president yanukovyh’s time, who was born and raised in donbas – everything will be donbas! kyivska, vinnytska and zhytomyrska oblasts) (fig. 1) along the dnieper. these two parts became the center of the ukrainian statehood formation and were usually together part of one state (ancient rus, the grand duchy of lithuania, the kingdom of poland, the polish-lithuanian commonwealth, the russian empire, the soviet union). only a little longer than one hundred years ago, in the 17th–18th century, were they divided between poland and russia along the dnieper. it is hard to say if they were exactly the years that caused certain differences in identity (rather mentality) of the ukrainians on the both banks of the dnieper. our psycho-semantic research recorded three mental peculiarities of the left bank territory residents in comparison with the right bank residents: higher sympathy with the soviet social economy, in particular, with collective farms (possibly, due to the lower land capacity, which specified fewer possibilities to have individual economy), a relatively lower level of the ukrainian patriotism (which is strange because the spreading of the ukrainian language here was much more significant years ago than on the right bank territory, where beside russian there was much polish and yiddish)4, notable magic-mystic thinking in explanation of life and political phenomena (and consequently, irrationalism in electing authorities). western ukraine is the territory, which was out of the soviet area and belonged to three different countries. it is the most divided into regions. the identity of its population became a result of long influences both from russia and from neighboring ethnoses and states. 3.3. the ukrainian identity formed in mutual interaction with western neighbors poles are the most influential western neighbors. for centuries, polish political and mental influences ensured expansion of western customs and values into ukraine, mostly performing the function of opposition to russifying tendencies, especially among the ukrainian nobility and cultural elites. polish influences had the most effect in the current territories of western ukraine (except transcarpathia (fig. 1)), right bank ukraine, northern left bank ukraine. however, in the south-eastern parts, they also took place and are seen now – mostly as spreading catholicism. at a certain time, poles intensively propagated catholicism in orthodox ukrainian lands. catholicism from poles was spread exclusively in polish, which significantly decreased its efficiency. the compromise reached in 1596 as the foundation of greek-catholic church using the ukrainian language had a better effect. it operates under the eastern (i.e. orthodox) procedure but is subordinate to vatican. poles as a state nation put many efforts to polonize ukrainians, the ukrainian nobility, first of all, and achieved certain success in this regard. in different regions of ukraine, poles amounted to a significant share of the population, but during the soviet and post-soviet time their number significantly decreased. sometimes, discussions arise who ukrainian poles are by origin. they are obviously both ethnic poles who arrived at different times from polish ethnic territories (there are more of them in the west), and ethic ukrainians whose ancestors converted to catholicism and, consequently, spoke in the polish language. nowadays, ukrainian catholics are using the ukrainian language in church more and more: first, it was on the vatican’s initiative, and now the believers themselves, especially the young generation, take ukrainian speaking for granted and as more corresponding to their ukrainian identity. polish influences were the strongest in eastern halychyna (ivano-frankivska, lvivska and ternopilska oblasts (fig. 1)) with the center in lviv, where as part of the austro-hungarian empire, ukrainians and poles competed almost as equals. halychyna was the center of the ukrainian national movement both in austria-hungary and in the interwar period in poland. poles had a qualitative advantage: they had more power, in the city culture of that time, there was more polish content. ukrainians had a quantitative advantage: according to the census of the population in 1900 in austria and hungary (chornyi, 2001, pp. 40–41) and in 1931 in poland (chornyi, 2001, pp. 64–69), the ratio of ukrainians was higher than the ratio of poles in all the districts of eastern halychyna except lviv (and two more districts under the polish census). nowadays, halychyna inhabitants are noted for the highest level of patriotism, religious commitment (among them greek catholic believers prevail), and adherence to traditional values in ukraine. the big north-western ukrainian area of volyn in 1920 was divided approximately in halves between soviet russia and poland. during two decades, once integral and homogeneous territory was divided into two mentally different parts. eastern volyn experienced all disasters of sub-soviet ukraine – starvation, repressions, etc. western volyn (now they are volynska and rivnenska oblasts (fig. 1)) as geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity 37 4 probably, the reason for this was actually a lack of language and mental competition. 38 vadym vasiutynskyi part of poland gained a relative civil and national freedom from centuries of restrictions in russia. repressions by the polish state also took place, but they were much softer than in the soviet union. this combination of certain national freedom (particularly being influenced by more conscious halychyna) and polish repressions fostered essential anti-polish attitudes in these territories as a reply. the infamous “volynian massacre” in 1943, when ukrainians and poles mutually and violently murdered each other in the conditions of german occupation, became their terrible result. currently, for the ukrainian society, it is hard to admit that ukrainians were instigators of that massacre and that their actions led to a bigger number of victims. ukrainians are trying not to remember this hard page in history: not to know what was going on, devaluate the importance of those events, place responsibility on poles, and the german or soviet regimes. the border between poland and soviet ukraine established in 1945 brought longstanding ukrainian-polish disputes concerning ethnopolitical belonging of eastern halychyna and western volyn to a close. the bigger part of these lands became ukrainian; however, a narrow strap of ethnic ukrainian territories was passed to poland. then, poland and the soviet union exchanged the population when the majority of ethnic poles left ukraine for poland, and part of ethnic ukrainians – left poland for ukraine. slovaks and partially czechs are other slavic ethnoses neighboring ukrainians. their influences were the most notable in transcarpathia, especially within the interwar period, when this territory was included into then-existing czechoslovakia. before that, both ukrainians ad slovaks were under hungarian and austrian influences. currently, slovaks and slovakia little influence the ukrainians of transcarpathia. even if their mental influence takes place, it is rather as part of the european union, attracting ukrainians with an opportunity to go to earn or to live in more comfortable conditions. instead, there is a problem of ukrainians in the priashiv region who reside in the north-east of slovakia. their majority, for different reasons, do not consider themselves ukrainians but an individual ethnos – rusyns. there is a rusyn movement in transcarpathia, too. the main reason for political rusynness is relatively late “return” to the main group of ukrainians. hungarian colonization during the 11th–16th centuries and then the long stay under austro-hungary pulled transcarpathian rusyns from other rus’ and then ukrainian lands for a long time. that is why, the process of comprehending themselves as ukrainians was much slower than in neighboring halychyna and bukovyna. joining transcarpathia to soviet ukraine in 1945 ultimately solved the issue of the ukrainian nature of local slavic-and-rus’ population. the hungarian influences were especially strong in transcarpathia, where they had dominated for centuries. however, long hungarization had a relatively weak effect and led to hungarization of a small part of transcarpathian ukrainians only – mostly those who lived in enclaves among the hungarian population. the ideas of rusynness were significantly weaker in bukovyna (fig. 1) where ukrainians lived near romanians in austria-hungary, and then in romania. in 1940, soviet troops occupied bukovyna and divided it between soviet ukraine (northern bukovyna where ukrainian population prevailed, now this is chernivetska oblast) and romania (southern bukovyna where there were more romanians). the issue of rusynness/ukrainianness has remained problematic for ukrainians of neighboring countries – poland, slovakia, serbia, romania. when in ukraine mental outbreaks arise, like the events in 1991 (declaration of independence), 2004 (orange revolution), 2013–2014 (revolution of dignity), 2022 (a new stage of the russia military aggression), in rusyn circles adherence to own ukrainianness arises. when the national enthusiasm of the majority of ukrainians becomes weaker, the centrifugal tendencies strengthen among rusyns, too. the territory of common dwelling of ukrainians and moldovans is much bigger than with romanians. moldovans have the same origin and language as romanians, but due to long historic processes they segregated into an individual ethno-political community. the russian-soviet influences have mostly led to that. moldovans were imposed with the “moldavian” language – romanian, in fact, but with cyrillic (russian) characters. inhabiting jointly big territories of the ukrainianmoldavian borderland, ukrainians and moldovans hardly had inter-ethnic conflicts or disputes. their being in the environment of the russian-soviet discourse eliminated a need and a possibility to express mutual complaints. certain contradictions strengthened after 1991; they mainly concern ethno-political and lingualcultural rights of ukrainians in moldova and the moldovans in ukraine. in the most general way, one can say that the ukrainians in moldova do not have a high level of the ukrainian self-consciousness and mainly identify themselves with the russian minority. in particular, this is seen in preferring russian-language schools for their children rather than ukrainian-language ones. the ukrainian identity as such has been strengthened over the last years. a great tangle of ukrainian-moldovan concerns arose around transdniestria – a moldavian autonomy, established years ago in ethnically ukrainian lands and then transferred to the moldavian soviet republic. in 1991, transdniestria announced the exit from moldova but it remains unrecognized by the world community. the population of this region includes three ethnic groups –moldovans, ukrainians and russians. by their ethno-political views, ukrainians of transdniestria tend mostly towards russia; they are less ukraineor moldova-oriented. their identity is influenced by transdniestria as a quasi-state formation, whose citizens they are or have to be, moldova, which considers transdniestria as its integral part, russia, which is the main source of the whipping up tensions around “the transdniestrian problem”, romania, which actively pulls moldova into romanian political and mental environment, at last, ukraine, which is the most passive in this case and responds weakly to the interests of the ukrainian population in this territory. the south odesa region is the most diverse region of ukraine: moldovans5, russians6, bulgarians7, turksgagauzs8, romani, albanians reside along with ukrainians, and before serbians, poles, germans, jews lived there. this territory of former bessarabia (fig. 1) was included into ukraine in 1940. like in other polyethnic regions, russification of the soviet period happened here faster than in monoethnic communities. in independent ukraine, the region’s residents are becoming reoriented towards the ukrainian political identity – slowly, inertly, but without obvious resistance and conflicts. 3.4. internal ukrainian extraregional divisions for centuries the jewish issue for the ukrainian identity was specifically topical. first, because in the ukrainian territories the jews were second-third ethnic group by the population number, i.e. there were a lot of them and their needs and solutions had weight. second, like in many other countries, jews took an individual place in the society: as essentially different and that is why unclear, as wealthy and that is why the ones who excited envy, as clever and dexterous and that is why more successful than “ours.” all these components in the attitude were the basis for antisemitism – popular one, and therefore political. the content of fiction and publicist literature in the 19th-20th centuries shows that antisemitism was an essential component of the ukrainian patriotism and came into the ukrainian identity through it. the ukrainian social and nationalliberating movement often turned anti-semitic and sometimes led to bloody jew bashings. the ukrainians are ascribed with the glory of bitter anti-semites, although ukrainian antisemitism was hardly much stronger than in neighboring poland or russia. in any case, during the years of independence in ukraine there was no officially proclaimed antisemitism, or powerful anti-semitic movements that would receive support from a significant part of society. anti-semitic slogans, even if they are heard, go from the far periphery of the ukrainian social life. election of an ethnic jew as the president of ukraine in 2019 became a convincing proof of mental freedom from antisemitic sentiments of the majority of ukrainians. the ratio between the people of urban and rural origin and the way of life is an important vector in determining the ukrainian identity. the problematic nature of this vector is hard to understand for an average european for whom the difference between life in a city and in a small village is the matter of a free personal choice. in ukraine this difference was objectively big and subjectively significant not long ago. life conditions, assessment of their social condition and self-estimation of residents of towns and villagers were mostly in favor of the former. the villagers were much more restricted in their rights and opportunities – from the times of former serfdom to soviet collective farm slavery. suffice it to say that villagers started to receive passports and that is why became able to change their place of residence without permit from authorities only in 1976. the village did not have many advantages the urban life had – sewerage, central heating, asphalt roads, transport communications, shops full of goods (according to the soviet standards), satisfactory medical service, etc. this difference as an established norm came into ukraine from russia where it is stronger9. geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity 39 5 among them there are those who call themselves romanians. 6 incl. lypovany – old believers, who escaped there pursuing in russia in the 17th-18th centuries. 7 a part of them resides in the south of zaporizka oblast. 8 the majority of them appeared in the body of moldova where they founded pro-russian gagauz autonomy. 9 for example, in austria-hungary it was much slighter, which is still notable in former austria-controlled regions. in ukraine the relationship between the urban and rural residents was complicated by the problem of identity. in towns and cities, especially in big industrial centers, the russian language was and is dominant, instead ukrainian prevails in villages. that partially became a reason for views of the ukrainian nation as “farmers,” incapable of independent existence. these views were accepted, to a great extent, by ukrainians themselves and have become part of their identity as a complex of ethno-cultural and political inferiority and perception of their nonstatehood as a natural condition. nowadays, ukrainians, first of all, youth, are overcoming the stupid paradigm of the russian speaking town/city and ukrainian-speaking village quite confidently. this change is one of the trends in positive development of the ukrainian identity. the opponents of the independent existence of ukraine and ukrainians who do not want and cannot lose such an essential argument for their self-esteem through humiliation of ukrainianness in others and in themselves let this illusion go harder. 4. summary generalization of the geographical and mental correlations provides grounds to speak about a complicated structure of territorial spread of the ukrainian identity. first of all, one should speak about its external boundaries. if more or less clear and long-standing identity is taken into account, these boundaries mostly coincide with the state border of ukraine. if it concerns the identity that is more blurred, mixed, and adapted to non-ukrainian conditions, it does not have clear geographical borders and accompanies migration of ukrainians to different countries. in some countries (russia, belarus and other postsoviet countries), ukrainians experience an intensive russification and soon lose their ukrainian identity. in others, mostly westwards of ukraine, they adjust to local conditions of life and keep partially the ukrainian identity in the ukrainian ethnic enclaves or gradually lose it during next generations. inside ukraine, the main boundary divides so called “two ukraines”: central-western (more ukrainian) and south-eastern (ukrainian-russian). this boundary approximately coincides with administrative borders of the relevant oblasts. the russian military aggression largely decreased the available differences, increasing dramatically the ukrainian nature of the south-eastern regions. if one speaks about “three ukraines”, one individually detaches western ukraine – the most ukrainian-speaking and nationally conscious. within its boundaries, there is a division into eastern halychyna, western volyn, northern bukovyna and transcarpathia, which are different with regard to their historic experience of belonging to the ukrainian nation and state and mutual interaction with neighboring countries. central ukraine is the most homogeneous and is a mental basis of the ukrainian ethnic and political nation. within the 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(ed.), 1997, psihologìâ masovoї polìtičnoї svìdomostì ta povedìnki (eng. psychology of mass political consciousness and behaviour), dok-k, kyiv. vasiutynskyi v.o., 2012a, socìal’na ìdentičnìst, predstavnikìv prosìjsko-movnoï spìl’nosti (eng. social identity of representatives of the russian-speaking community), [in:] v.o. vasiutynskyi (ed.), rosìjs’komovna spìl’nota v ukraїnì: socìal’no-psihologìčnyj analìz (eng. russian-speaking community in ukraine: social and psychological analysis), imeks-ltd, kirovograd, 170–178. https://ispp.org.ua/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/monvasut-2012.pdf (accessed 10 august 2022). vasiutynskyi v.o., 2012b, pozicìï predstavnikìv rosìjs’komovnoï spìlnoti ŝodo ukraïnìzacìï (eng. the position of representatives of the russian-speaking community about ukrainization), [in:] v.o. vasiutynskyi (ed.), rosìjs’komovna spìl’nota v ukraїnì: socìal’no-psihologìčnyj analìz (eng. russian-speaking community in ukraine: social and psychological analysis), imeks-ltd, kirovograd, 45–54. https://ispp.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ monvasut-2012.pdf (accessed 10 august 2022). woo b., fan w., tran th.v., takeuchi d.t., 2019, the role of racial/ethnic identity in the association between racial discrimination and psychiatric disorders: a buffer or exacerbator? ssm – population health, 7, 100378. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2019.100378 geographical and mental boundaries of ukrainian identity 41 1. tropology of the heroic myth the heroic-and-centric vision of the world (to form the world of meaning in politics) is quite persistent in those post-soviet republics that preserved an authoritarian or half-authoritarian political regime. thus, the problem concerning the representation of political power is solved through heroic symbolic representation. heroic-and-centric meaning of the political reality constitution is fixed with special “visible” placement of image of the “ruler” with regard to other symbolic elements of political communication. today, the myths have transformed into an important element in designing political leaders’ images (bradford, 2021). the figurative language of the heroic myth serves as a symbolic form of political reality comprehension (bellquist, 1987), i.e. a semiotic model of political communication. the heroic figurative language of political communication designs journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(s1), 16–22 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.s1.03 the impact of myth consciousness on the formation of the national political and cultural space: “ukraine is not russia” inna semenets-orlova educational and scientific institute of management, economics and business, interregional academy of personnel management, frometivska 2, 03039 kyiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0001-9227-7426 e-mail: innaorlova@ukr.net citation semenets-orlova i., 2022, the impact of myth consciousness on the formation of the national political and cultural space: “ukraine is not russia”, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(s1), 16–22. abstract the articles researches the concept of political culture as a system of inherited political notions expressed in symbolic forms and generalizes the differences between the political culture of ukrainians and russians. it stresses that the cultural identity of ukraine is established on one of its basic tendencies – penchant for archaization of all symbolic forms; it researches the place of the heroic political myth in this process; it analyzes sacral projections of the political in the myth through which the subject-and-object order of the ukrainian politics world is explained. thus, the pattern of the heroic monomyth (a structured ontological range of symbols) serves as a program of political reality (as a structured order of political objects). the symbols of the heroic monomyth have sacral significance because they present an idea of political order, stability, forecastability of politics (the latter is lacking in the crisis context of development) when there is unwillingness of a part of citizens to bear responsibility for prospects of future development of events in the country in the conditions of long-term uncertainty. the article researches peculiarities of the how the structure-image of the hero builds the constitution of political reality in ukraine and russia. key words heroic myth, political consciousness, archetype, political culture, political myth, ukraine, russia. received: 07 may 2022 accepted: 21 september 2022 published: 25 november 2022 mailto:innaorlova@ukr.net the impact of myth consciousness on the formation of the national political and cultural space: “ukraine is not russia” 17 a sacral political reality by modelling awareness of it construed as important factors-constructs, a relevant to the ukrainian political culture “mythotext” being read by the collective individual. political power in authoritarian states is perceived as legitimate only in the symbolic context of the worldview, when the events of the present and the past are symbolically connected with a manipulative purpose. provided the use of the heroic political myth, political leadership is carried out through manipulation with symbols. an idea that the only factor that can save the european culture from perishing is active mythmaking and the recognition of the advantages the myth has in comparison with morality, science and intellect has prevailed in a scientific tradition for a long time (kostiukevych et al., 2020). researcher g.m. nikson (2010) stresses that the formal structure of a human language is always a key to understanding the unique nature of human consciousness. in the researcher’s opinion, at a certain time, the society experiences an existential crisis i.e. awareness of own mortality. that can be transmitted only owing to a wider area of symbolic awareness (nixon, 2015). thus, our symbolically activated (culturally constructed) self-awareness – the fortress of cultural identity that provides possibilities of cognition but also creates particular frameworks to the processes of realization – is a human quality. in general, the heroic symbolic representation of political power is a model of one-way political communication. the symbolic authoritarian word of a hero-ruler can either be accepted completely or denied completely. it has merged with authority – political power. the heroic myth is a postmodern political strategy in the context of an actualized problem of virtual political reality construction in the information society (ŝerbinina, 1998). 2. the unitary state positive myth of russia a good definition of a heroic political myth can be as follows: this is a phenomenal reality and a closed world of meaning as a construct of constructs. the main metaphors of this myth are “canonic”: for those who use them, they embody the world and set a priory to the components of its description. certainly, virtual mythoreality is not notable for durability of a special totalitarian heroic political myth, but it is included into the structure of a political being as a legitimizer of phenomena of senses when other legitimations of power are ineffective. to estimate russia’s experience on operating the unitary state positive myth and to see the threats resulting from this experience for ukraine, an attempt will be made to analyze individual problematic aspects of the russian myths. for the russian social consciousness, a mediated figure of the russian “soldier” representing the russian state, will, power and honor is a particular form of the union between the authority and the population. in the russian mythology, a short connection between the state and the people is postulated: without the system of complicated representative and legal mechanisms typical of western democracies; therefore, the united “people” can only be possible on condition of availability of the state structure providing them an identity mandate for a right to be called “a people”, and the power grounds its legitimacy referring to symbolic representativeness on behalf of the whole “people”. analyzing the current propagandistic policy of russia, n. ŝerbinina (1998) emphasizes that designing virtual politics as a world of artificial and imaginary propagandistic images was typical as early as the modernist society of russia. certainly, the world of propaganda became extremely formalistic, readymade, conventional. that was, as they would say today, a virtual world of official myths, rituals, solidarity, organized collective hatred, fight and expulsion of demons. m. mcluhan admits this typical of russia practice of designing iconic propagandistic images technologically successful and relevant to further information phantom explosion: for the russians to be aggressively efficient in the current world of information it is enough to adapt their traditions of the eastern icon and image building to new electronic means of communication. the russians did not show any creativity or work of imagination in their propaganda. they simply did what their religious and cultural traditions had taught them, particularly – built images (mcluhan, 2003, p. 43). certainly, in this context the main image was a figure of a political hero. the political propaganda in russia, in our opinion, cannot do without a heroic political myth, which plays a prominent technological and content role in it. this proved that the technology of power legitimation should be considered as an efficient method of manipulating through modelling the world image. the influence of the political power is carried out as open direct “engineering” propaganda, totalitarian by its matter. an obvious constructivist potential of propaganda is also used in the post-modern communication context. for example, e. aronson & a.r. pratkanis (2003) believe that the information age characterized by dominance of different images still remains an age of “propaganda”. moreover, 18 inna semenets-orlova the main designers of the world image are political leaders and means of mass communication that discursively form a political reality. the phenomenon of propaganda also characterizes a postindustrial society, and the interpretation of propagandistic influence cannot be reduced to politics of lie, which is attributed to totalitarian regimes only. despite the fact that people have created the virtual worlds since long ago, it is accepted to think that it is postmodernity that is distinguished by virtual information technologies and virtualized mass media. that means that the way of transmission or reception of information becomes virtual, and phantom hyperreality is encoded and modelled using the means of mass communication. according to j.  baudrillard (2007), postmodern one-way communication is not, in fact, an “exchange” since it simulates “a response” and imposes the models of significance. j. baudrillard thinks that the symbolic way of communication is intrinsic to the phenomenon of mass: “mass is those who are comprehended with the play of symbols and enslaved with stereotypes, they are the ones who will perceive whatever as long as it is a spectacle” (baudrillard, 2007, p. 192). according to j. baudrillard (2007), the area of the political is subordinate to the increasing symbolism; this is the area of simulation where the people appeared to be audience. in the field of post-modern political spectacle, a symbol has a special magic meaning: it unconsciously states a sacral political reality. thus, the “virtual reality” will mean hereinafter an artificially created world of simulacra that find virtual existence and that adds a special ontological status to this reality. in other words, we believe that political being does not only include an objective reality but also a virtual reality where the political component of the space dissolves. with this regard, one can agree with one of the main theses of postmodern philosophy – the loss of authenticity of the political, caused, in our opinion, by artificial design of reality. as a result, specific hyperreality is constituted where the symbols themselves create their own existence. in this self-absorbed virtual reality, the signs-simulacra having their own phenomenal being are the examples and review their own world. virtualization of political reality is some kind a virtual analogue of political interactions, for example, relationship between the power and the people or a leader and his/her followers. moreover, the roles of a political leader and a citizen are simulated. hence, the objective reality is substituted, and simulacra (political images) enter the relations with each other. a symbolic exchange in the current virtualized political space is based on a symbolic reference and encoding of social and political integrity. thus, a person deals with a figurative expression of the world. the mass media, especially television, build the virtual reality through “telepresence”, increasing the “optical density of its copies” of information. this is where the danger for practices of modern democracy lies, because democracy, as a behavior reflex in the virtual world, does not require public discussion when imposed thoughts win the pre-election campaign and the “demonstration” of a party program gives space to “predictability” of the political behavior model offered to the voters. hence, a political leader does not review a social (normative) group but serves as a symbolic isolated model of lifestyle which is to be chosen by an individual from the stars’ “menu” designed by the mass media. 3. the elements of ukrainians’ political consciousness mythologization the problem of heroization or demonization of concrete people becomes actual, first of all, because the creation of heroes/enemies (political, in particular) is one of the main mythmaking assignments now. the images of the enemy and the hero, going through archetypical peculiarities of national consciousness, universal binary oppositions of the good and the evil obtain specific coloration. for ukraine, this coloration resulted in a fight of the truth and the falsehood. the myth about the hero (archetype of ukrainian kotyhoroshko) remains important in election campaigns. the image of the hero is built on understanding basic people’s problems. the hero has to beat the enemy fast, cardinally change the situation, quickly solve all the problems. that is why, the image of the hero is “eternal” in a society’s consciousness. as j. blondel (1992) stated, regardless of the fact if our vision of the “golden age” of leaders-heroes was right or wrong, for the contemporaries it is hard to overcome a feeling that they are being managed by people who do not meet the requirements of the “real” leadership. therefore, along with some general disappointment with the state elite’s activity, ideal images of the power and leaders that are passed down through generations remain almost unchanged. that specifies the fact that the images of real and ideal politicians significantly contradict each other more and more often. however, nowadays, the archetype of the hero can be taken as a particular collective positive image of a messiah, a rescuer, a creator or a reformer. for increased and stable efficiency of the artificial myth, the archetype actualization requires for the candidate to have such the impact of myth consciousness on the formation of the national political and cultural space: “ukraine is not russia” 19 personal features which would allow identifying him/her with a certain archetype. l. kočubej & k. merkotan (2004) assure that in 99 cases out of 100, the leader’s life journey and positive features formed will be transmitted at the current state through the archetype of the hero. the parliamentary election of 1998 in ukraine was the first during which an indirect negative advertisement started to be used – through presenting negative information, i.e. very favorable from the point of view of political psychology. according to û. šajgorods’kij (2009), the voters themselves can “add” the required volume of the negative data from their own experience, which sensibly enforces the influence of this advertising. the specifics of the presidential campaign in 1999 is a clear-cut artificial exaggeration of the confrontation between the communist myth (p. symonenko) and a democratic myth, a strong voice of the “russian theme” along with the veiled european one. a myth about the man of the people, the politician of the people was a novation among the mythologemes of the presidential campaign in 2004 in ukraine. a politician’s identification with a grass-root voter occurred. for example, a mythoimage of v. yanukovych was based on the archetype of a “mythologized criminal” with an accent on a complicated life route of the politician “of the commons”. parliamentary election campaigns in 2006 and 2007, as well as the presidential one in 2010 were built on the myths about the hero and europe. taking into account that the ukrainians have always belonged to the central-eastern wing of the european civilization, the european way is not a choice of politicians. the ukrainians have always been and remain europeans. however, with the use of myths, the european future dreamt about as “golden century” for ukraine slowed down from time to time, taking into account the tendencies in the situation of personal intentions among oligarchic elites that held state power at a specific stage. in о. kolinič’s opinion (2012), while designing the politicians’ images, myth-producers have to appeal to the collective subconsciousness, universal archaic ideas to activate the mythological thinking of people. k.g. jung (2004) distinguished such main archetypes: the archetype of a mother, a divine child, the self, a spirit, animus (anima), a mask (person), a shadow. the archetype of the self (archetype of a hero), according to к.g. jung, is implemented in the political culture in the image of a hero, knight, winner. in о. kolinič’s opinion (2012), the archetype of the hero could clearly be traced in the image of v. yushchenko during the events of the orange revolution. v. yushchenko’s image as a messiah (according to the self-archetype) appeared not to have worked due to the non-compliance of the mythologized imagebuilding features and his natural weak character. an apt example of especially negative use of political symbols was an election myth of the opposition bloc party: “kyiv does not hear industrial regions”. this is a disconnective myth to the confrontational content of which the citizens react alarmingly. this myth can leave traumatic effects in the citizens’ consciousness. the main problem of the pre-election programs of the parties was the weak constructive rational component – the content of the programs appeared to be unspecific, and the solution of the issue concerning long-term development of ukraine was not offered. in ukraine, a tendency to archaization of myths is notable. the model of a strong modern state is quite viable and can be easily opposed to the models of “hetman” (who was embodied by v. yushchenko in 2004 and by p. poroshenko in 2014) and the “mother” (in 2010 – yu. tymoshenko) that bring after themselves the arrival of the messiah. although their model is closer to the ukrainian traditions, it is not less dangerous, taking into account that ukraine is an area of confrontation between russia and the west. that is why, the ukrainian society needs univocal consistent idea-backbone of the resilient modern state. a political myth of a “strong state” is in the memory of generations of the post-totalitarian society, which in terms of the mythologized social consciousness tends to perceive all the economic problems as the consequences of democracy. residual evidence of the “soviet thinking” in the mentality of the society under transformation (the majority of theoreticians agree that the residual phenomena of the soviet consciousness were cancelled in the ukrainian society after the protest events in 2013–2014). the results of early parliamentary elections in 2014 proved that, when representatives of the communist ideology did not pass to the parliament for the first time. in 2014, the president of ukraine p. poroshenko offered to become united around the strategic vision of the national idea through the slogans of sustainable development strategy 2020 – dignity, freedom, the future. two needs correspond to this strategic vision of the president of ukraine, which, in our opinion, have to be taken into account by the subjects of mythmaking: 1. uniting the political elite carrying out strategic reforms. 2. uniting the elite and the nation in the fight against the aggressor. 20 inna semenets-orlova the discussion within the framework of these coordinates is important to specify the vectors the process of determining the unitary state positive myth will be running. the ukrainian society requires a clear understanding of its position in the military conflict in the east of ukraine. that can be successfully incorporated into the unitary state myth. at the time of quick changes, the social request is formed significantly faster than the ability of political forces to meet it. that is why, the unitary state myth would perform a stabilizing role in similar situations, preventing crisis phenomena. 4. resistance to a ruining effect of myths at the end of 2013, ukraine made a civilization choice – high citizen activism, the uniting of the ukrainian political nation which puts the statehood and success of a national project before all else, resulted in a wider and more modern understanding by the ukrainian society of the national identity (not only through embroidery, language or other ethnic elements). in our opinion, one of the priorities in the state politics must be the designing of a system for complex resistance to the ruining myths and the active formation of state-building political myths aimed at consolidation of the nation around democratic values, rights and freedoms of the person. analyzing the nature of historical myths, it can be stated that these structures lead both to improvement and deterioration of the human life. negative myths justifying racism, xenophobia, religious and other types of intolerance are well known. however, there have been myths used for lofty aims – to widen the freedom, equality, national liberation, statebuilding based on democratic principles, etc. in ukraine, it can be stated that the keystone of the culture of memory is the absent boundary between scientific (research) and scientific-popular history, although myth-makers intensively use history for national mythology. nationologists stress that the nation is an everlasting and the most valuable parameter; therefore, the rightness of history must be determined by the rate of devotion to this absolute value. the myth about the split of the nation is an element of the crisis mythology in ukraine. in 2004, after a conflict of personalities (v. yushchenko and v. yanukovych) transformed into a conflict of identities (the western pro-european region against the eastern pro-russian one), it was given a timeless form due to the convenience of civilization rhetoric. the myth about a split of the ukrainian nation was created by moscow political strategists after the presidential election in ukraine in 2004 (ševčenko, 2006) and successfully implemented into the social (everyday and even theoretical) consciousness. in a technological way, in the conditions of absent counterstand and countermyths from the ukrainian society and inability of the ukrainian mythmaking subjects to decode negative symbols, stereotypical structures about the split of ukraine obtained a character of norm and began to be perceived as obvious. political and public leaders began using “split” mythologeme in public discussions easily, not understanding the negative results it can cause. for example, are the differences between bavaria and saxonia (which are quite significant) or a fact of differences between germany and its former people’s democratic republic, in our opinion, a real basis for a german public official to start speaking about the “split of the german nation”? certainly, not. however, as it appeared to be, not for ukraine which borders with a half-authoritarian state which, moreover, wants to position itself as a strong “stem” country of an individual civilization space. another artificial myth analyzed by о. ševčenko (2006) within the framework of the crisis mythology in ukraine is also exported from russia (and, by the way, is very wide-spread in russia) – about the crisis of management. within the framework of such myth perception, the main ideologist of “united russia” v. surkov specified that the ukrainians are not a “statebuilding nation”, do not have “skills of state existence”, they demonstrate principal inability to build a state and autonomous geopolitical choice that foredooms them for a status of eternal province. in fact, some features of the political process in ukraine – indecisiveness, manipulativeness of power elites, their complete dependence on the elites nonvoted for by the citizens (i.e. oligarchic groups) favors “exporters of myths from russia to ukraine” in presentation of new arguments promoting the myth of management crisis in ukraine. for some time, the myth about the management crisis (more mythologized than real) continued psychological pumping of apathy and negativism in society’s consciousness due to another spreading of the propagandistic formula of “national rescue”, although, sometimes in fact, the nation must be rescued, first of all, from the makers and distributors of this myth. one more component of the crisis mythology is a myth about inevitable disintegration of ukraine, used not only by russian politicians. for example, o. ševčenko (2006) provides a statement of a slovak journalist s. khelemendyk about “civilization incompatibility” of numerous “ukraines” (which include the impact of myth consciousness on the formation of the national political and cultural space: “ukraine is not russia” 21 kyiv, pro-russian north-east, crimea, agrarian areas of central and southern ukraine, halychyna and former austria-hungary). this situation bears a forecast about “yugoslavia’s scenario”, probable separation of a part of ukraine, which о. ševčenko (2006), rendering s. khelemendyk’s words, calls “russian” (crimea, south-east). perhaps, they are biased materials of the journalist, but another fact troubles – the distribution of this analytics out of the commonwealth of independent states. the most dangerous is a situation of a largescale manipulation by the “crisis mythology” which leads to perceiving by the society’s consciousness of a myth about ukraine’s disintegration as fatal inevitability. this is an ideal hidden rationale for political strategies popularizing a “crisis” image of the state. positive myth-making allows reaching relevant balance in the society for some time. the myth makes penetration of both rational and irrational politics possible; it penetrates into constitutions and laws in active and passive forms. patriotic protests in ukraine refed themselves with memorial markers of identity and retrospective understanding of the national in 2013–2014. the following ones worked well: • cossack myth (cossack sotnias (“hundreds”); • honoring the heroes of the past; • ruining monuments to v. lenin; • cultivation of the ukrainian language, songs, embroidered shirts, other cultural product. according to o. mykhailova, this certifies that the national is tightly connected with memorial markers (malahov, 1999). the protests in ukraine started from the events of euromaidan, i.e. borrowed identity markers appeared to be not less important than memorial – the protesters considered themselves natural europeans. it was a demonstration of tolerance in the respected meaning and perception of “other”. the other part of ukraine’s people did not borrow the european but russian identification markers – paternalism and hostility concerning other identities (thugs for hire, so-called “titushky”). in general, a successful end of the protests was determined in many aspects by the fact whether the leaders were able to specify new markers (koval et al., 2021) that depicted a new identity of the ukrainian society. to identify the nature of the current myth in transitional societies, one can use the concepts of “threshold”, “society’s structure” and “ideal community” offered by the rituals researchers. according to b. gal’ (2008), the society includes two inseparable models of human relationship: • social structure as a structured system of political-and-legal and economic statuses of people; • ideal communion as a non-structured and relatively non-differentiated community of individuals, arising where there is a lack of social structure. 5. conclusions the society cannot develop in a balanced way without consideration of national indicators. in post-soviet states, the opposition between the ideal communion and a social structure is permanent. it is important how much the groups in these societies aspiring for a status of nation-building ones were integrated into the existing state. the existence of russia’s aggressive information propagandistic policy against ukraine and relevant dangers resulting from it are put into the basis of heroic mythology of russia. in the russian mythology, they postulate a short connection between the state and the people, which denies the system of complicated representative and legal mechanisms. that is why, in russia one “people” is only possible if the state structure giving them an identity’s mandate for a right to be called “people” is available, and the power justifies its legitimacy referring to symbolic representativeness on behalf of the whole “people”. political and social discourse of ukraine and almost all post-soviet area is the imposition of individual symbols from the previous epochs taken out from political “naphthalene” onto the common soviet symbolic basis: for russia these symbols are dynasty’s, for ukraine – cossacks’. by contrast, in ukraine, like in other western democracies, the principles of democracy are interwoven into the heroic myth. however, the state structure components are not an immanent component of heroic mythology. heroic-and-sacral symbolism in the consciousness of the ukrainian society can become actualized in a plural way: with embodiment in an individual person (president in the image of the “father of nation”), group (young ambitious politicians in the image of cossack’s otamans), community (army, volunteers as forces of the good that beats the absolute evil) or ideas (eurointegration, victory in the conflict with russia, which will lead to “the golden age”). the ukrainians have always been and remain europeans. however, due to myths, dreamed european future for ukraine in the image of the “golden age” sometimes slows down, taking into account the tendency in the situation of personal intentions of particular circles of the elite. the positions of the myth about the hero remain dominant in ukrainians’ political consciousness but not so strong as in other 22 inna semenets-orlova countries of the post-soviet space, for example, in russia. topical dangers for national security which started with the annexation of crimea by russia require counterstand beyond the borders of humanitarian aspects. the aggressive information policy hostile to the ukrainian interests certifies not only about the lack of tolerance, culture of political dialogue among particular layers of the russian political elite but is a demonstration of infringement upon the national narratives of ukrainians, leads to a permanent increase in mutual non-understanding. in the conditions of the transformation stage in the development, the process of permanent updating of standard-and-symbolic components of 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establishments arise. first it was on the trade routes and routes of pilgrims in the middle east where appeared caravanserais, in the medieval europe they were first inns and hospices. the word “hospice” came into the english language from old french “hospice”, where it formed from the latin words “hospes” and “hospitium” meaning “hospitality”. this term was used since the 6th century to denote the places where pilgrims could rest. the first hospices were usually situated along the roads on the main routes of the christian pilgrims. these were, in some sense, the houses where the tired, exhausted or ill travelers were taken care of. however hospices also were helpful to the local population. the word came from the english language into other european languages in the 19th century (мальська et al., 2011). the standards of services in such establishments show that they were largely different from our today’s image of the comfortable places to sleep and rest, which are the present hotels. often the guests had to bring with them their own beds and cutlery (as did the wealthy burgers in the 17th century in europe), and they had to watch out so that the goats journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(4), 77–83 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.032.5819 the development of lviv hotel business in the interwar period (1919–1939) taras zavadovsky, dmytro kadnichansky (1) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: taras_zavadovski@ukr.net (2) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: dimakad@ukr.net (corresponding author) citation zavadovsky t., kadnichansky d., 2016, the development of lviv hotel business in the interwar period (1919-1939), journal of geography, politics and society, 6(4), 77–83. abstract the current paper researches and analyses the start and development of the hotel business in lviv of the interwar period. the main focus is set on the division of accommodation establishments into categories, their structure and location. much attention is also paid to the description of hotels and their pricing policy depending on their status and venue. numerous tables help to structure the statistical data, especially their client capacity, number of rooms, location etc. key words hotel, lviv, interwar period, tourism, guidebooks to lviv, categorization. 78 taras zavadovsky, dmytro kadnichansky did not eat their pillows at night, as the rooms were shared with all the household. the way from the first documented by historians accommodation establishments to the modern hotels lasted for four thousand years. nevertheless, despite the living conditions and the price for the night, all the hospitality establishments were ruled by one principle “hospes hospiti sacer” (the guest is sacred for the host) as the ancient romans used to say. when it comes to the hotel business it is not possible not to mention hospitality. hospitality is the feature that unites all the owners of hotels, it is the “genius loci” – the spirit of the place, which should be present in every hotel without exceptions. the main reasons for the development of the hotel business in the ancient times are defined as follows: • trade exchange; • travelling connected with the visiting of places of religious value; • expansion of diplomatic relations between the countries; • travelling to other places (мальська 2009). 2. analysis in ukraine the hotel business started developing extensively only in the second half of the 19th century and it was mainly connected with kyiv and other large cities. the opening in 1889 of the regular railway connection caused the growth of number of travelers coming to kyiv and triggered the building of hotels. before that in the city stood out the “green hotel” built in 1803–1805, which belonged to kyiv-pechersk lavra and was the most famous during the 50s of the 19th century (ганич, 2013). in the late 19th-early 20th centuries in the eastern galicia, which was the part of austro-hungary, the hospitality sphere was characterized by high rates of development. almost every town had its own small hotels, restaurants, cafes. generally in galicia (both eastern and western) in 1902 there were 935 hotels with the average employment rate of three persons per hotel. the hotels employing more than 20 people constituted only 0.5% of the total hospitality establishments. most hotels were characterized by the low level of comfort – simple interior, absence of water supply and sanitation system. here stayed mostly people with low income, commercial agents. in contrast with that there were large and a few small hotels with rich interior décor, luxury furniture, well-trained staff, utilities. they corresponded to the style of fashionable european hotels of that time. the large expensive hotels provided the services of restaurants, cafes, baths and shower, so predominantly rich clients stayed there. lviv stood out in the eastern galicia according to the number of hotels, including the luxury ones. in the early 20th century the city had almost 48 hotels. for comparison: warsaw had 32 hotels and krakow only 18. the most famous hotels of lviv were “george”, established in 1796 and called “de la rus”. later it was renamed after one of its founders george hoffman. the hotel had 93 rooms: 32 suites with baths, central heating, hot and cold water supply, telephone connection. the price depended on the equipment of the room and was from 6 (single room) to 24 (double room with a bath) zlotys. the hotel included a luxury restaurant, café, an orchestra performed every evening in the marble hall (мальська, пандяк, 2009). in the western galicia (included into poland, czechoslovakia and romania) hotels were in private ownership, which helped its better financial supply and service organization. an important feature of hotel business was quite a large network of small establishments, aimed at servicing various categories of population. after the end of world war i and the fall of austrohungarian empire the territory of galician kingdom and volodymyria again after some short armed riots came under the power of the polish republic. correspondingly, all the state and administrative institutions started working differently. with time changes came in financial and economic sector. instead of guldens and krones the currency used was polish mark till 1924 and later – zloty. but from the prices given below we may see that for a long time the austro-hungarian currency had still been used. the postwar tourist guidebook “przewodnik po galicyi” of 1919 (orłowicz, 1919) characterizes the hotels of galicia as more expensive but less comfortable, than the accommodation establishments of the western europe (4–14 krones). for the people, who needed somewhere to stay for longer periods of time there were accommodations in guest houses, existing in lviv, krakow, zakopane and yaremche. the prices were 5–10 krones for a day of stay. in the smaller towns there were second class hotels, inside which it was quite dirty, very often the travelers stayed at a tavern or a village house. at that time there was plenty of restaurants in all large cities, spa resorts and hub railway stations. in smaller towns, even in poviat centers, as a rule there were no restaurants, and there was only an opportunity to have a breakfast. warm meals needed to be the development of lviv hotel business in the interwar period (1919–1939) 79 ordered in hospitality establishments several hours in advance. there were also towns with no hotels or restaurants at all. if you went into the countryside or to the mountains, you had to bring your own dinner with you. in small towns all trade was controlled by the jews, so on saturday all shops were closed, there was no possibility to buy anything and the towns looked as if they died out. the cafes in large cities were mostly in vienna style. there were often held concerts of ballroom or military music. the role of cafes was often taken by confectioneries, predominantly visited by ladies (tab. 1.). when it comes to lviv, in 1919 its tourist infrastructure included hotels, guest houses, restaurants, breakfast rooms, milk shops, cafes, confectioneries, wine houses etc. tab. 1. categorization of hotels in lviv in 1919 name price first-class hotels (with restaurants) “george” up from 4 krones “europejski” up from 2,40 krones. “francuski” up from 3 krones. “imperial” 3–11 krones cheap hotels “austrya” up from 2 krones “victoria” up from 2 krones “city” up from 2 krones “metropol” up from 2 krones “grand hotel” up from 2 krones “narodna hostynnycia” up from 2 krones “sans-souci” up from 2 krones “warszawski” up from 2 krones “pod trzema murzynami” up from 2 krones “krakowski” up from 2 krones source: orłowicz, 1919. interesting is the recommendation of “przewodnik po galicyi” guidebook, where it is noted that it is better to avoid dirty and neglected jewish hotels in zhovkva suburbs and on horodotska street (orłowicz, 1919). the guest houses (daily price 6–10 krones) where mostly for those, who were staying for longer periods: • dom kobiet (house for women); • guest house “anuta”; • guest house “goplana”; • guest house “grottger”; • guest house “litwinka”; • guest house “mignon”; • guest house “warszawianka”. later the accommodation establishments started to be characterized according to a new classification. thus as it is said in “przewodnik po lwowie” guidebook of 1925 (orłowicz, 1925), this period was determined by a large number of the third-class hotels. the prices varied from 1 to 3 zlotys per day for one person. at the time of “eastern trade” there is an increase in private dwellings. the situation was a bit different in guest houses, there was a variable tariff – the pay included a room with full accommodation – 5 zlotys per day (orłowicz, 1925). the “polski przemysł i handel” book of 1930 gives the description and characteristics of separate hotels, which were considered the best and the most popular among the visitors of lviv. among them are such hotels: “krakowski”, “george”, “new-york” and “bristol”. “krakowski” hotel location: bernardynska square, 3. administrator: p. orzehowski. director: s. lackowski, k. christman. it was a first-class hotel owned by “państwowy zakład pensyjny”. the hotel included 98 stylishly furnished suites with bathrooms. there were rooms for business meetings, a library, a banquet hall and a modern restaurant with exquisite polish and french cuisine. correspondence was carried out in polish, german, french and english. “george” hotel location: mariatska square. administrator: s. borowski. the hotel is situated in the city center and was one of the most luxury in terms of comfort, it had central heating, telephone connection in every room as well as hot and cold water. there were 32 suites with individual bathrooms and an elevator. there was the service of personal belongings storage. the hotel had its own restaurant, which was famous even abroad for its special cuisine. the hall paved with marble hosted concerts every evening. there were separate rooms for business meetings (similar to the modern conference-halls). correspondence was held in polish, german, french, english and russian. “bristol” and “new-york” hotels the hotels were situated not far from each other on legioniv street. the owner was z. zehnegut. both hotels were established in 1894 in the central part of the city. at that time they were 1st category hotels. they were using innovational technologies – telephone connection in the rooms and individual bathrooms. the location of the hotels made them the venue of the international fairs. the hotels provided tab. 2. information and statistics about the hospitality establishments of lviv in 1930–1931 name of hotel, guest house, resort address h – h o te l g – g u es th o u se r – re so rt owner to ta l n u m b er o f r o o m s to ta l c ap ac it y price of room pr ic e o f a ro o m w it h b at h price of guest house o p en s s ea so n a ll ye ar y availability 1 b ed 2 b ed s pr ic e d u ri n g s ea so n pr ic e n o t d u ri n g t h e se as o n ce n tr al h ea ti n g b at h el ec tr ic al li g h t ra d io te le p h o n e h o t an d c o ld w at er in t h e ro o m s g ar ag e astoria kazymyrivska, 15 h dr. mayer i ska 42 51 5–8 8–11 y • • • • bristol legioniv, 21 h zehngut zyg. 47 62 8–9 11–13 y • • • city–depend syxtynska, 4 h fabian henryk 20 27 6–8 9–12 y • • elite legioniv, 27 h reich i perlmutter 19 28 6–7 8–10 y • • europejski mariatska square, 4 h uwiera antoni 65 88 6–10 9–14 y • • • georgé mariatska square, 1 h borowski stan. 90 122 8–13 19–21 20 y • • • • • imperial the 3rd of may, 3 h ganz filip 54 75 7–13 15–18 y • • • krakowski bernardynska square h 100 124 6–14 19–25 22 y • • • • • metropol pilsudskoho h melle natan 30 45 5–6 9 y • • monopol legioniv, 25 h horowitz br. 14 22 5–7 6–8 y • • narodna hostynnycia kostiushka, 1 h tow. spoldzieleze 43 55 6–9 10–13 y • • • new-york legioniv, 45 h zehngut zyg. 43 56 7–9 11–13 y • • • polonja batoria, 34 g sokolowska m. 10 15 12–15 y • • • • salus r spka z ogr. odp. 20 20 20–40 y • • • • • sanat. czerw. krzyża lychakivska, 107 r p. czerw. krzyż 39 39 15–40 y • • • • • • saski batoria, 20 h münzer ozjasz 19 25 5*50–6 9 y • • savoy sobeskoho, 7 h przeporski ant. 30 45 4–7 7–9 y • • warszawski bernardynska square h moskowicz fr. 49 65 8–11 15–28 22 y • • • • • vita lystopada, 22 r schramm i dr. schwarc 30 40 16–35 y • • • • • • • zacisze zyblikevycha, 52 g chorośnicka m. 12 16 11–14 y • • • source: skorowidz hotelowy…, 1930–1931. the development of lviv hotel business in the interwar period (1919–1939) 81 unobtrusive and diligent service, which contributed to the positive reputation and to meeting all the needs of the clients. another advantage was closeness to the tram network, which connected the hotels with the main railway station, and almost with any other part of the city. according to the reviews the first-class cuisine was also worth praise. correspondence was carried out in polish, german and french (polski przemysł i handel, 1930). another publication of that time “skorowidz hotelowy rzeczpospolitej polskiej 1930–1931” gives quite detailed information about the hospitality establishments in many cities of that state. among other data are given the type of the establishment, the price of stay and additional services, there are also included the number of rooms and capacity, which adds to the informativeness (skorowidz hotelowy, 1930–1931) (tab. 2.). taking into consideration the information load of the given above table, we can build several diagrams by the main indicators (fig. 1., fig. 2., fig. 3.). fig. 1. total numbers of rooms in 1930 source: skorowidz hotelowy…, 1930–1931. fig. 2. total amounts of beds in 1930 source: skorowidz hotelowy…, 1930–1931. 82 taras zavadovsky, dmytro kadnichansky in 1936 the categorization of accommodation establishments changed. so the categories were (ilustrowany przewodnik…, 1934) (tab. 3.). tab. 3. categorization of hotels in lviv in 1936 luxury hotels second-class hotels george amerykanski krakowski angielski warsazawski continental category “a” hotels grunberg bristol metropole europejski podolski grand polonja imperial reunion narodna hostynnycia rojal new-york saski category “b” hotels pod trzema murzynami astoria wenecki belweder zipper elite sanssousi source: ilustrowany przewodnik…, 1934. the category of second-class hotels was at that time the most numerous one and constituted 60% of all the accommodation establishments. the least popular were the guest houses – there were 8% of them (lwów z lotu ptaka…, 1938) (fig. 4). another guidebook “lwów z lotu ptaka informator-przewodnik związku popierania turystyki m. lwowa” gives such information (tab. 4.). apart from these hotels there were also a lot of smaller ones, which are not mentioned in the guidebook. this guidebook to hotels mentions an economic innovation. a tax of 20% was imposed on hotels. guest houses: • “kasztelanka” – the 3rd of may street, 12 • “zacisze” – zublikevycha street, 52 short-term suites (pl. kwatery dla wycieczek): • “szkolne schronisko” – virmenska street, 4 • “dom emigracyjny” – vyshnevetskykh street, 4 • “bursa grunwaldzka” – sobinskoho street, 15 • “ii-gi dom techników” – abramovychiv street, 5 • “dom akademicki” – lozynskoho street,6 • “dom studentek” – torosevycha street, 36 • “klasztoe ss. sakramentek” – sakramentok street, 11 • “dom z. z. k.” – kotrynskoho street, 56. another guidebook to lviv “ilustrowany informator miasta lwowa: ze spisem miejscowości województwa lwowskiego” (1939), gives a slightly different information about accommodation establishments. in the guidebook these establishments are also divided into four categories, but according to different criteria: first-class luxury, first-class, second-class and guest houses. it should be noted that all first-class luxury and first-class hotels were situated in the city-center. second-class hotels and guest houses were located a bit further from the downtown. this guidebook mentions an important convenience – the availability in each hotel or guest house of own telephone number, which at that time increased the hotel service. thus to the first-class luxury hotels belonged only four hotels: “bristol”, “george”, “europejski” and “warszawski”, of which “warszawski” belonged to second class as early as 1894, while “bristol” was not mentioned at all, “george” and “europejski” confirmed their luxury category. to the first-class belonged also four hotels: “grand”, “imperial”, “narodna hostynnycia” and “new-york”. in this category situation was a bit different, “grand” and “imperial” stayed in their category, while the rest two had not been mentioned in the previous edition (lwów z lotu ptaka…, 1938). in the end of the second period in 1939 largely increased the number of second-class hotels in lviv, there were fifteen of them. among them only “angielski” stayed in its category, respectively hotels “wiktoria” and “metropole” lowered their rating, all the rest twelve hotels: “astoria”, “city–depend”, “continental”, “edison”, “palas”, “patria”, “podolski”, “reunion”, “saski”, “savoy”, “splendid”, “wenecki” were mentioned in this publication for the first time. there fig. 3. percet correlation of establishments of placing is on 1925 source: skorowidz hotelowy…, 1930–1931. the development of lviv hotel business in the interwar period (1919–1939) 83 historical conditions and events on the quantitative and qualitative indexes of the hotel infrastructure of the city. references ilustrowany informator miasta lwowa: ze spisem miejscowości województwa lwowskiego, 1939, wyd. zdzisław jaśkiewicz, juliusz brunelik, lwów. ilustrowany przewodnik po lwowie : z wykazem ulic i planem orjentacyjnym miasta, 1936, „sztuka” lwów . lwów z lotu ptaka informator-przewodnik związku popierania turystyki m. lwowa, 1938, drukarnia polska, lwów. orłowicz m., 1919, przewodnik po galicyi, skład główny „książnica polska”, lwów. orłowicz m., 1925, przewodnik po lwowie, atlas, lwów. polski przemysł i handel, 1930, izba przemysłowo-handlowa, warszawa. skorowidz hotelowy rzeczpospolitej polskiej 1930–1931, 1930– 1931, nakł. towarzystwa wydawniczego „polski znicz”, kraków. ганич н.м., 2013, історико-географічні особливості становлення та розвитку готельної сфери львова, вісник львівського університету. серія географічна, 42, 53–63. любіцева о.о., бабарицька в.к., 1995, туристична сфера, готельне господарство та форми їх організації у світі, кдтеу, київ. мальська м.п., пандяк і.г., 2009, готельний бізнес: теорія та практика, центр учбової літератури, київ. мальська м.п., пандяк і.г., занько ю.с., 2011, організація готельного обслуговування, знання, київ. were only two typical guest houses in 1939: “kasztelanka” and “zacisze” (ilustrowany informator miasta lwowa…, 1939). 3. conclusions thus we may state, that very popular in lviv at the beginning of the 20th century were guest houses – furnished apartment-like rooms of western european type, which were used for long-term stay of the guests. already in 1910, in lviv provided services 4 guest house. guest houses were smaller than hotels, and were aimed at the family-style recreation, they had a separate room for relaxing, and the dining room and living room were shared. the guest houses in the early 20th century set the perspective of establishing in the eastern galicia of hotel-apartments. for example, in 1913 there were 11 guest houses in lviv. however with the fall of austro-hungarian empire and inclusion of galicia into the polish republic the guest houses lost their popularity. their number in the range of 1931–1939 years there were only two units. and with the advent of the soviet power they disappear absolutely as a separate category of hospitality establishments. the analysis of the development of accommodation establishments development in lviv in various time periods enables us to evaluate the influence of fig. 4. percet correlation of establishments of placing is on 1925 source: lwów z lotu ptaka…, 1938. tab. 4. price list of hotels in lviv in 1938 name location note george mariinska square, 1 single room from 6 to 9 zlotys, double room from 13 to 16 zlotys krakowski bernardyniv square, 8 single room from 5 to 8 zlotys, double room from 8.80 to 14 zlotys europejski mariinska square, 4 single room from 6,50 to 9 zlotys, double room from 11 to 14 zlotys warszawski bernardyniv square, 5 single room from 4 to 6,50 zlotys, double room from 7 to 10 zlotys bristol legioniv street, 2 single room from 5 to 7.50 zlotys, double room from 8.50 to 10 zlotys new-york legioniv street, 45 single room from 3.75 to 5 zlotys, double room from 6.50 to 7.50 zlotys source: from lwów z lotu ptaka…, 1938. 1. introduction there is no doubt that the role of the human factor is of fundamental significance in all manifestations of socio-economic life. this applies both to the production of goods and services and to their consumption. thus, the changes in the population, but also in its structures (especially age), have a significant impact on various manifestations of socio-economic life. this is reflected in numerous publications showing this impact, among others, on: • social situation (balicki, 2010; mastalerz-kodzis, pośpiech, 2016); • social policy (kuropka, pisz, 2012; gołata, kuropka, 2015, hrynkiewicz et al., 2018); • pension system (zieliński, 2012;; bednarczyk, 2015, nietupska, 2015, maziarz, 2018); • labor market (sneddon little, triest, 2002; klimczuk-kochańska, 2010; malik et al., 2012; journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(3), 38–50 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.3.04 the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship franciszek kłosowski institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, faculty of natural sciences, university of silesia in katowice, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-2806-0403 e-mail: franciszek.klosowski@us.edu.pl citation kłosowski f., 2022, the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(3), 38–50. abstract the aim of this article is to show the impact of demographic changes on the situation in the services of the silesian voivodeship and its selected cities. the analysis covers the period of 1999–2019. the method of comparative analysis was applied in the study. the presented material does not allow defining the nature of this impact unambiguously. the dominant trend in the population decline in the voivodship and in most of its cities does not automatically result in a decline in the level of the development of services. we also observe stabilization or even its increase. this also applies to those services that are addressed to people of pre-working age, i.e. the group with the largest regression in the population. however, the dynamic growth in the number of seniors results in a significant increase in the number of institutions and social programs addressed to them. yet, there is no doubt that services addressed to the elderly do not fully meet the needs of this group of residents today, and taking into account demographic forecasts, they must show high dynamics of development in the forthcoming years. key words demography, services, demography and services, silesian voivodeship. received: 16 july 2022 accepted: 12 september 2022 published: 28 september 2022 mailto:franciszek.klosowski@us.edu.pl the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship 39 jóźwiak, 2013; kiełkowska (ed.), 2013; pleśniak, 2014; bednarczyk, 2015; skibiński, 2016; drela, 2017); • consumption (bylok, 2013); • economic development (miles, 1999; azomahou, mishra, 2008; bloom et al. 2003, bloom et al., 2010; choudhry, elhorst, 2010; banister et al., 2010, janicka et al., 2015; cruz, ahmed, 2018), • socio-economic situation (european..., 2006; frąckiewicz (ed.), 2007; gubernat, 2009; chesnais, 2009; dragan, 2011; cloves, choroś-mrozowska, 2012; hafiz et al. 2017). there are few previous publications that would address the problem of the impact of demographic changes on such an important sector of the economy as services. the most frequently discussed issues were the impact of demographic changes on selected areas of services such as: education (grob, volter, 2007; vincent-lancrin, 2008; mincarini, vignoli, 2008; rangel de meireles guimarães, 2013), gastronomy (kwiatkowska, 2010), transport (beim, radzimski, 2009), health care (veser, 2015; mielczarek et al., 2018), or social services (hryniewicz, 2000). attempts to show this impact on the majority or all of the services were rarer (huigan et al. 1986, murdock et al., 2015). in order to fill this gap at least partially, the author of this study will try to define this impact on services based on the example of the silesian voivodeship. the choice of this sector of the economy as the research subject results from the fact that it is the largest economic sector in europe and in poland, gathering both the largest number of employees and generating the largest part of the gdp. despite rapid changes in the forms of providing services (development of e-services), the human-tohuman form of contact is still of fundamental importance in services, supplemented with other features of providing most services, i.e., among others, a direct contact between the service provider and the recipient (local nature), inability to store the effects of most services, or high sensitivity to changes in service needs. in addition, the nature of the services determines the universality of the use of this sector. services are addressed both to the whole society and to its selected groups (e.g. education). admittedly, among all services, only a small group are those of a compulsory nature (such as compulsory education for children and youth), but a much broader scope involves those from the obligatory-subjective group whose use, although selected by an individual, but due to their fundamental importance for human functioning, is de facto indispensable for normal life (e.g. health care, trade, financial services). nowadays, without trade (e.g. in food products), it is difficult to imagine the possibility of satisfying such basic needs as food, which are necessary for human survival. the temporal scope of the study covers the years 1999–2019, i.e. the period of operation of the silesian voivodeship, although due to the availability of statistical materials and their comparability, these periods may slightly differ for particular service departments. in spatial terms, the analysis will be conducted on the example of the silesian voivodeship, i.e. a region in which the scale of demographic changes is among the largest in poland. it will cover both the entire voivodeship and its selected cities, i.e. those where the highest population changes (both increases and decreases) were noted. 2. data and methods in the analysis of the impact of demographic changes on services, a comparative method was applied in which the scale of changes in the demographic potential of the voivodship and selected cities was compared with changes in services. in the demographic analysis, the main focus was on changes in the number of the population, including in terms of their age, because the number of inhabitants (consumers), through their demand, is one of the most important factors affecting services. due to the large scope of services and the lack of comprehensive and comparable statistical data for the entire period, the analysis mainly focused on selected areas of services in which changes in the number of service facilities were mainly included. the study primarily used the statistics poland data provided by the local data bank. the first part characterizes measures which in the most general way show the development of all services (the number of employees in services and of entities of the national economy operating in services) and which are also addressed to the entire society (e.g. health clinics, libraries, cinemas). on the other hand, the second part focuses on those services that are addressed to the age groups of the population in which the greatest changes took place after 1999 (people of pre-working age and post-working age). 3. results 3.1. demographic changes in the silesian voivodeship since the establishment of the silesian voivodeship, i.e. since 1999, a constant decrease in the population has been observed (fig. 1), although this process began earlier, i.e. at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s (runge, 2010; sitek et al. 2013). in 1999–2019, 40 franciszek kłosowski the population of the voivodship decreased from 4,776.9 thousand to 4,517.6 thousand persons, i.e. by 259.3 thousand (this represents 5.4% of the state from 1999). obviously, these are official data from statistics poland and they do not take into account population losses resulting from foreign migrations which over the years often change from initially being temporary in nature to definitive migrations. in this analysis, data relating to changes in the total population are too general; therefore, in order to better understand the problem, it is necessary 4 350 4 400 4 450 4 500 4 550 4 600 4 650 4 700 4 750 4 800 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 3 500 1999 2019 1999 2019 1999 2019 pre-working age working age post-working age fig. 1. changes in the population of the silesian voivodeship in 1999–2019 (in thousands). source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. fig. 2. the population of the silesian voivodeship in pre-working, working and post-working age in 1999 and 2019 (in thousands). source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship 41 to present more detailed data, i.e. by age groups of economic activity and 5-year age groups. in the case of age groups of economic activity, the population is broken down into 3 groups: preworking age (in this analysis 0–17 years old), working age (18–64 years old for men and 18–59 years old for women) and post-working age (60 years old and over for women and 65 years old and over for men). when analyzing figure 2, it can be seen that the changes in these groups are much larger than in the case of the total population. the fall in the number of working-age population amounted to 10%, (thus, it was almost twice higher than in the case of the total population), while in the group of pre-working age population it was already 31% (thus, it was 6 times higher than in the dynamics of changes for the total population of the voivodship). however, taking into account both the dynamics and changes in the absolute population, the greatest changes occurred in the group of post-working age population, although the trend was different here, since an increase in this group of residents was observed. between 1999 and 2019, its number increased by as many as 391,000 people, i.e. by 59% of the state from 1999. in most 5-year age groups, there was a reduction in the population number (fig. 3), the largest in three groups of young people, i.e. 15–19-year-olds by 213,000 people, 20–24-year-olds by 161,000 people and 10–14-year-olds years by 137,000. on the other hand, an increase in the population number was recorded mainly in the oldest years, starting with the 55–59-year-olds, reaching the maximum value for the group over 70-year-olds, which increased by 228,000 people (68.2%). in the workingage group, a slight increase took place in 2 groups of 30–34-year-olds and 35–39-year-olds, but it only amounted to 28,000 and 29,000 people, respectively. simultaneously, one should be aware that, according to forecasts, the group of people of the retirement age will continue to grow dynamically in the coming years, which is related to entering the retirement age by persons born during the baby boom of the 1950s. 3.2. demographic changes in selected cities all these data refer to the demographic image of the entire voivodship, while changes relating to individual municipalities are much more diverse. considering the fact that the services are located mainly in cities (especially the poviat ones), these will be the main focus of attention. out of 67 cities in the silesian voivodeship, only in 11 of them there was an increase in the population number. usually, these were increments of a few percent; it exceeded 10% only in three cases, namely in wilamowice (11% increase), orzesze (14%) and imielin (20%). in the other cities, population declines were recorded. in the case of 15 cities, they exceeded 10% of the population, amounting to over 15% in 3 cities, i.e. in toszek (16.5%), bytom (16.4%) and sosnowiec (15.2%). interestingly, this group mainly comprised large cities (except toszek) including the capital of the province – katowice (tab. 1). –250 –200 –150 –100 –50 0 50 100 150 200 250 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–70 ≥70 fig. 3. changes in the population of the silesian voivodeship by age groups in 1999-2019 (in thousands). source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. 42 franciszek kłosowski table 1 clearly shows that in cities with a higher population growth, there is a small decrease in the population in the pre-working age group (usually a few percent), an average increase in the number of working-age population (from a several to slightly over 20%) and a large increase in the post-working age population (from 28 to 55%). in the group of cities with the largest population decrease, there is a very large decline in the number of people of preworking age (at the level of 30–40%), a significant decrease in the population of working age (approx. 20%) and a large increase in the post-working age population (usually, approx. 50%, with a maximum value of 68%). 3.3. changes in services in the analyzed period, both the total number of employees in the silesian voivodeship and the number of employees in services increased, but the dynamics of growth of employees in services was higher than in the case of the entire economy (tab. 2). thus, the share of services in the structure of employees increased from 49.3% in 1999 to 58.8% in 2018. this is an effect of the continuation of structural changes in the silesian economy, which at the turn of the 20th and 21st century was one of the most industrialized in poland. in 1999, 710,000 people, or 45.6% of those working in the economy, were associated with industry. the above-mentioned process of structural changes meant that the share of industry, although still significant, dropped to 37.9%. table 2 shows that changes in the number of inhabitants have had a different impact on the total number of employees and the number of those working in services. in most cases, regardless of the nature of demographic changes (population increases or decreases), there was an increase in the total number of employees and the number of those working in services. a different trend was observed in only 3 cities (bytom, zabrze, wilamowice). yet, while in bytom and zabrze there was a decrease in the total number of employees, the decrease in the number of people working in services affected wilamowice and bytom. interestingly, despite the population increase and the total number of people working in the economy, in wilamowice, there was a decrease in the number of people working in services. on the other hand, the case of bytom is a consequence of the general (not only economic) decline of the city (sobala-gwosdz (ed.) 2010; krzysztofik et al., 2011, 2012), accompanied by one of the highest unemployment rates in the voivodship (in 2019, the unemployment rate was 8.3%, while the average for the voivodship amounted to 3.6%). in the research period, despite the decrease in the population, the total number of regon business entities increased from 371,200 to 481,800, and the number of regon business entities operating in services from 283,500 to 370,000. thus, the dynamics of changes in both groups slightly differed in favor of service providers (129.8 and 130.5, respectively). the situation was very similar in the case of the surveyed cities, as also here increases were observed; however, their dynamics varied (tab. 3). in the examined cities with a population increase, the dynamics of regon entities operating in services exceeded 150, while in cities with a decrease in the population, this dynamics was lower (with the exception of toszek). for example, in sosnowiec it only slightly exceeded 100. tab. 1. cities with the largest demographic changes in the silesian voivodeship in 1999–2019 (1999=100). cities total demographic change changes in age groups pre-working age working age post-working age population growth imielin 120.7 98.8 122.5 148.2 orzesze 114.3 89.5 115.5 155.6 wilamowice 111.2 92.8 114.0 128.7 population loss toszek 83.5 58.7 80.9 144.7 bytom 83.6 59.2 78.3 148.2 sosnowiec 84.9 62.0 74.1 168.0 gliwice 86.5 65.2 78.8 155.6 częstochowa 86.8 62.6 79.5 147.6 zabrze 86.9 57.6 83.3 159.1 katowice 87.9 62.9 80.8 151.4 source: own calculations based on local data bank statistics poland. the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship 43 to illustrate the situation in other service areas, several available service examples were selected (tab. 4). as can be seen, in other services addressed to the general public, usually, the number of health clinics and cinemas increased during the studied period, while the number of hospital beds and libraries decreased. 3.4. services addressed to selected age groups given the fact that, irrespective of the direction of population changes, this usually results in an increase in the level and availability of services. thus, a question arises: what is it like with selected types of service activities. analyzing demographic changes, further attention will mainly be focused on services dedicated to specific age groups, namely a group of children and youth and a group of seniors. tab. 2. changes in the number of people working in services in selected cities of the silesian voivodeship in 2000–2018. specification total number of employees working in services dynamics of changes in 2000–2018 2000 2004 2018 2000 2004 2018 total number of employees 2000=100 total number of employees 2004=100 working in services 2000=100 working in services 2004=100 silesian voivodeship 1750800 1491800 1870000 877151 856293 1100000 106.8 125.4 125.4 128.5 imielin – 631 1281 – 295 592 – 203.0 – 207.7 orzesze – 2013 3047 – 1225 1515 – 151.4 – 123.7 wilamowice – 478 818 – 442 386 – 171.1 – 87.3 toszek – 837 1099 – 718 862 – 131.3 – 120.0 bytom 44938 33642 28365 23907 22243 21016 63.1 84.3 87.9 94.5 sosnowiec 50908 46731 51378 28712 28451 36351 100.9 109.9 126.6 127.8 gliwice 63629 59569 81049 36714 34619 46713 127.4 136.0 127.2 134.9 częstochowa 74018 71428 77225 42264 40016 46444 104.3 108.1 109.9 116.0 zabrze 40705 38576 37819 22632 23937 25466 92.9 98.0 112.5 106.4 katowice 158496 144150 168639 101912 101487 134248 106.4 117 131.7 132.3 explanation: „–” no data source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. tab. 3. changes in the number of regon business entities in selected cities of the silesian voivodeship in 2000–2019. specification number of entities of the national economy number of entities of the national economy in services dynamics of changes 1999 2019 1999 2019 total number of business entities 1999=100 number of business entities in services 1999=100 silesia 371 234 481 757 283 546 370 002 129.8 130.5 imielin 604 960 419 698 158.9 166.6 orzesze 1 308 1 946 961 1448 148.8 150.7 wilamowice 240 336 159 240 140.0 150.9 toszek 217 340 166 266 156.7 160.2 bytom 13 152 16 500 10 599 13 386 125.5 123.3 sosnowiec 21 635 21 916 17 615 17 779 101.3 100.9 gliwice 18 047 24 243 14 431 19 896 134.3 137.9 częstochowa 26 057 26 626 18 944 20 575 102.2 108.6 zabrze 11 588 16 966 9 628 13 988 146.4 145.3 katowice 38 690 48 460 31 957 40 880 125.3 127.9 source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. 44 franciszek kłosowski 3.4.1. services addressed to children and adolescents as regards this group, the services are primarily educational ones. their role is especially important because, due to legal regulations, there is an obligation to learn at an educational establishment until turning 18 years of age. thus, every child must (with a few exceptions) attend school. so what has changed in the education system in the past two decades due to the decrease in the number of children and adolescents? it should be noted that due to the reforms of the education system in 1999 and 2016, the types of schools changed in the studied period (lowersecondary and profiled upper-secondary schools were first introduced and then abolished), and years of learning in particular types (including primary schools and secondary comprehensive schools) also changed. therefore, for the sake of comparability of data (full functioning of a given type of school), the periods of comparison for different types of school may slightly vary. as already signaled earlier, the number of children and adolescents decreased. this is also visible in the decrease in the number of pupils at most types of schools. in the case of the entire silesian voivodeship, this is visible in the case of primary schools (a decrease in pupils by 25.9%), in lowersecondary schools (by 42.2%) and basic vocational schools (by 22.2%). on the other hand, the number of pupils increased in the case of comprehensive secondary schools (an increase by 62.9%) and technical secondary schools (by 17.7%). this is a result of actions taken by regional authorities as well as of social expectations, signals coming from the labor market and the educational crisis in basic vocational schools (then referred to as the “hatchery of the unemployed”) that contributed to changes in the model of education (szczepański et al. (ed.), 1999; kłosowski, 2010). as a result, the number of pupils undertaking secondary education increased at the expense of vocational schools. the situation was similar in the studied cities (tab. 5). interestingly, large drops in the number of pupils did not always affect adequate reductions in the number of institutions. this is understandable in the case of small towns where there are single establishments (wilamowice, toszek, imielin), because it is difficult to liquidate the only such facility in the city, but interestingly, in many large cities there was stabilization or even a growth of their numbers. in the case of primary schools, such a situation occurred in częstochowa, katowice and zabrze, while in the case of lower secondary schools in bytom, gliwice, zabrze, sosnowiec, katowice and częstochowa. częstochowa is particularly noteworthy here is, as it recorded the highest increases in the number of facilities among the studied cities. in the case of secondary schools, there was a significant increase in the number of comprehensive secondary school students and technical secondary school (tab. 6). two cities were characterized by a different trend, namely katowice and zabrze, where the number of such schools decreased (by 20.6% and 3.8%, respectively). tab. 4. dynamics of changes in selected service areas in cities of the silesian voivodeship in 1999–2019. specification dynamics of changes (1999=100) total health clinics total hospital beds libraries and their branches cinemas silesian voivodeship 314.6 90.4 88.8 79.7 imielin 400.0 – – – orzesze 175.0 – – – wilamowice 500.0 – – – toszek 200.0 – – – bytom 184.6 70.4 64.7 100.0 sosnowiec 281.8 77.9 90.9 200.0 gliwice 227.8 108.2 72.0 66.7 częstochowa 151.4 91.3 92.0 133.3 zabrze 297.2 79.3 95.7 150.0 katowice 355.7 101.8 97.4 160.0 explanation: “– “ the phenomenon does not occur source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship 45 in the smallest surveyed cities (imielin, orzesze, wilamowice, toszek), there were no upper secondary education institutions. the situation was slightly different in the case of upper secondary education. decreases in the number of students in basic vocational schools were accompanied by a general decrease in the number of institutions, while in technical secondary schools, the increase in the number of students was accompanied by stabilization (bytom), growth (gliwice, częstochowa), as well as a decrease in the number of institutions (sosnowiec). a similar situation was observed in the case of comprehensive secondary schools, where stabilization (gliwice, częstochowa) or a decrease (the remaining studied cities) in the number of institutions was observed. a more detailed analysis indicates that local government and school authorities responded to the change in the number of students mainly by creating new or closing down classes in the existing institutions. the increase in the number of students was usually associated with an increase in the number of classes (comprehensive secondary schools, technical secondary school), and the decrease in the number of students was accompanied by a reduction in the number of classes (primary schools, lower secondary schools, basic vocational schools). orzesze and wilamowice, where the decrease in the number of students was accompanied by an increase in the number of classes, are exceptions from this rule in the case of primary schools. the situation in the case of preschool education is specific. as results from fig. 3, also in this age group there was a decrease in the number of children (although not as significant as in the case of other age groups). simultaneously, the number of kindergartens significantly increased (in the silesian voivodeship by 15%) just as the number of children attending kindergartens (an increase by 37.5%). in some cities, this growth was much higher. in toszek, the tab. 5. dynamics of changes in primary and lower secondary schools in the silesian voivodeship. specification the dynamics of changes in primary schools in 1999–2018 (1999=100) dynamics of changes in lower secondary schools in 2002–2016 (2002=100) establishments branches pupils establishments branches pupils silesian voivodeship 92.2 91.6 74.1 110.0 67.3 57.8 imielin 100.0 123.3 111.1 100.0 85.7 87.9 orzesze 110.0 116.5 93.9 100.0 77.8 58.9 wilamowice 100.0 121.4 89.6 100.0 60.0 42.1 toszek 100.0 86.2 62.6 100.0 70.6 51.3 bytom 82.9 79.4 62.6 105.0 64.7 51.3 sosnowiec 86.3 82.3 69.3 110.0 63.5 53.7 gliwice 90.9 88.7 71.6 108.3 64.8 55.7 częstochowa 113.1 93.1 70.5 122.9 70.0 57.0 zabrze 106.3 87.2 65.9 97.1 57.0 56.3 katowice 106.5 87.9 68.1 119.0 73.1 48.9 source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. tab. 6. the dynamics of changes in upper secondary education. specification comprehensive secondary schools 2002–2018 (2002=100) technical secondary schools 2004–2018 (2004=100) basic vocational schools 2004–2016 (2004=100) establishments branches pupils establishments branches pupils establishments branches pupils silesian voivodeship 90.8 196.7 169.3 102.9 140.0 117.7 89.7 82.8 67.8 bytom 88.9 241.7 196.1 100.0 154.8 110.0 83.3 85.7 75.1 sosnowiec 92.9 158.0 140.4 90.0 117.2 115.9 66.7 96.4 75.5 gliwice 100.0 202.1 183.7 180.0 290.5 232.8 62.5 85.7 38.8 częstochowa 100.0 191.7 167.6 127.3 159.5 127.2 81.8 87.7 69.5 zabrze 91.7 229.4 186.0 100.0 109.1 96.2 66.7 79.5 58.9 katowice 87.0 219.8 140.4 94.7 122.6 79.4 71.4 76.2 51.8 source: own study based on local data bank statistics poland. 46 franciszek kłosowski number of kindergartens increased by 200%, and of children attending them by 65%, while wilamowice this was 100% and 195%, respectively. in all other analyzed cities, both of these parameters went up, with the exception of 2 cities (imielin and bytom), where the number of institutions decreased, but it was still accompanied by an increase in the number of children attending pre-school education (by 180% and 16%, respectively). this is a consequence of the adopted social policy aimed at fully involving children aged 3–6 years in pre-school education. therefore, while still at the beginning of the 21st century 483 children per 1000 children aged 3–6 years attended kindergarten in the silesian voivodeship, in 2018 this number almost doubled (890 children per 1000). therefore, a drop in the number of the youngest children de facto facilitated implementation of these guidelines without new investment activities. while in the case of educational institutions, the decrease in the number of children and young people was not always accompanied by a decrease in the number of institutions, in the case of health care institutions addressed to children and young people, this was generally the case. this is more evident in the case of hospital pediatric wards, which in 2000 had 1,469 beds, while in 2016 their number decreased to 849 (i.e. by 42.2%). however, it is also a mark of the general trend in hospital treatment, in which the aim is to shorten the patient’s stay in the hospital; hence, since there is a faster rotation of patients, some of the hospital beds prove to be unnecessary. 3.4.2. services addressed to seniors the radical increase in the number of seniors translates into the development of specialized facilities aimed at the elderly. these are primarily medical services – especially geriatric ones, various types of care and treatment facilities and retirement homes. in the case of geriatrics, which treats diseases of the old age, the number of geriatric wards and beds in them significantly grew. in 2000, there were 157 beds in the voivodeship, while in 2018 their number rose to 368 in 15 hospital geriatric wards, which gives 0.8 beds per 10,000 population (one of the best results in the country). however, it should be noted that not all, even large, cities have such wards. among the surveyed cities, there are none such wards in bytom, gliwice and zabrze. in addition, there are 16 geriatric clinics mainly located in the largest cities of the region, i.e. in katowice, sosnowiec and częstochowa. thus, despite favorable trends, the availability of this type of services for residents, even in large cities, is not the best. the number of nursing and care facilities, care and treatment facilities, hospices and palliative medicine wards is growing dynamically. in 2000, there were 10 such wards in silesia, while in 2018 their number increased to 86. simultaneously, these wards raised the number of beds 16-fold from 309 (in 2000) to 5,062 (in 2018). undoubtedly, this increase does not yet meet all the demands of the region (one still needs to wait for admission to these facilities), but it has significantly mitigated them. there is no doubt that the number of retirement homes increased the most dynamically. social changes taking place in silesian families, the departure from multigenerational families, and at the same time the progressive ageing of the population raise the demand for retirement homes. therefore, it is no wonder that their number is growing rapidly. they are present in virtually all cities, and a large number of them are also located in the countryside. simultaneously, in addition to public institutions, the number of private institutions is growing as well. there are several such facilities in large cities. most of them are in katowice (7 establishments), zabrze and częstochowa (6 each), bytom and sosnowiec (4 each) and gliwice (3). in addition to the development of the infrastructure aimed at seniors, the scope of programs and activities of a social nature has radically increased as well. today, a senior is not only a person caring for grandchildren and practically staying mainly in their own apartment, but more and more often it is a person actively participating in various manifestations of social life. among others, it is so thanks to new initiatives with a constantly expanding scope that are addressed to this group. this applies both to initiatives that have been present for a long time but are becoming more popular (e.g. universities of the third age), as well as emerging new ones. this is also the case of initiatives at the national level (government initiatives regarding the activity of older people such as “senior plus”, “program for the social activation of older people – asos”) and at the regional one (“silesian senior’s card”, “silesia for the senior”, “charter of life”) or local ones. almost all municipalities (96%) provided social services addressed to the elderly, including programs activating this group of people (regional..., 2019). institutionally, educational, health and cultural establishments are at the forefront. these include, above all, various types of courses and workshops, including foreign language courses, computer courses, healthy eating, dance classes, etc. universities of the third age (utw), which started operating in the region in 1982 (university of the third age of the university of silesia), have a long the impact of demographic processes on changes in services. an example of the silesian voivodeship 47 tradition. until 1999 only the university of the third age in częstochowa operated here. proper development took place in the 21st century, when the number of these facilities grew in katowice (up to 2) and częstochowa (up to 3), and new ones were established in bytom, gliwice, sosnowiec and zabrze. 4. discussion it seems that the simple consequence of a decrease in the population of the silesian voivodeship, and hence the consumers of services, should be a decrease in the level of development of this sector of the economy. the material presented in the article indicates that the situation is much more complex. it is true that this is indeed the case for certain types of services, but there are also different situations, i.e. a stabilization or even an increase in the level of development of services. so what could be the reasons for this? this seems to be largely due to the ever-increasing demand for services in the region. on the one hand, the silesian voivodeship is still undergoing significant structural changes in the economy. the role of industry is decreasing for the benefit of services, hence the increase both in the number of service employees and in the number of business entities registered in the regon system. in comparison to the leading voivodships of poland, this sector still shows some underdevelopment in the silesian voivodship (kłosowski, 2021). it is enough to mention that the silesian voivodeship with 234 service employees per 1000 inhabitants is ranked only 6th in the country, while in the leading mazovian voivodeship these are 347 persons, in the lower silesian voivodeship – 250, and in the lesser poland voivodeship and the greater poland voivodeship – 248 each. it is also lower than the national average (239). thus, there is still a great potential for development in the silesian voivodeship. on the other hand, the decline in the number of inhabitants is overcompensated by the increasing economic level and standard of living of the inhabitants, which generates an increased demand for services, including new ones. it is enough to mention that during the research period the average monthly gross salary increased by approx. 150%, which is well above the level of inflation for this period. as regards individual cities, attention should also be paid to the different socio-economic policies of individual local governments, which differently respond to the occurring changes, which, however, is strongly related to their financial capabilities. the attitude of local communities is also important. the process of closing down some institutions (including schools) usually meets with harsh protests of residents, hence the municipalities, which are the administrator of a large part of services, try (if their financial situation allows it) to limit unpopular decisions on liquidation of institutions. thus, despite the decrease in the population, there is no “automatic” closing down of facilities. however, relatively large population declines (at the level of several percent) and a difficult socio-economic situation may contribute to a decline in services, especially in some groups. the best example is bytom, which after 1989 is experiencing a very difficult period (sobalagwosdz (ed.), 2010; krzysztofik et al., 2011, 2012). as a consequence, this city showed a regression of services in relation to 1999 in most of the measures adopted for this analysis. to a lesser extent, this also applies to sosnowiec. on the other hand, we have the example of toszek with a similar decline in the population, where related trends did not take place. this is because here we can observe the stabilization of the level of certain services, or even their slight increase. however, it should be noted that toszek is a small city (3,500 inhabitants); therefore, in many cases, there are single operating service facilities, and their liquidation would completely deprive the city of this type of services. hence, as a rule, authorities do not make such drastic decisions and take alternative measures aimed at, for example, reducing their running costs. as a rule, cities with an increase in the population were also characterized by an increase in the level of services, although in some areas we also have a stabilization of their level. however, these are primarily small cities with basic services. however, the situation is very interesting in the case of services addressed to the age groups of the population in which the greatest changes occurred. thus, despite large decreases in the number of children and adolescents, not only decreases in the number of institutions (e.g. basic vocational schools), but also their increases were recorded. częstochowa is a good example, where the number of primary school pupils decreased by 29.5%, while the number of primary schools increased by 13%; similarly, in the case of lower secondary schools, the decrease in the number of pupils by 43% was accompanied by a 22.9% increase in the number of institutions. undoubtedly, these actions resulted in a substantial improvement in the conditions of education. by contrast, a significant increase in the number of pupils in comprehensive secondary schools caused a certain decrease in the number of institutions or, at most, their stabilization. however, in this case, it can be seen that the situation in comprehensive secondary schools (and technical secondary 48 franciszek kłosowski schools) was regulated not by creating new facilities, but by adding the number of classes within the existing schools. the increase in the number of seniors has influenced the dynamic development of facilities and infrastructure addressed to this group, which is constantly being enriched. as regards these services, one can observe an increasing activity of private entities. simultaneously, one can observe a significant expansion of the service offer addressed to the elderly through implementation of various social programs of a local nature (they occur in virtually all cities). 5. conclusion the aim of this article was to show the impact of demographic changes on the situation in services of the silesian voivodeship and its selected cities. the presented material does not allow defining the nature of this impact unambiguously. the decrease in the population in the voivodship and in most of its cities does not cause an automatic reduction in the level of development of services. although, of course, such cases do occur. in many cases, we observe stabilization or even an increase in the level of services. this also applies to their types which are addressed to people of pre-working age, i.e. the group with the largest regression. on the other hand, the dynamic increase in the number of seniors results in a 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http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0102-30982013000200011 https://rops-katowice.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019.04.12_informacja-o-wynikach-bada%c5%84-wsg-za-2019.pdf https://rops-katowice.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019.04.12_informacja-o-wynikach-bada%c5%84-wsg-za-2019.pdf https://rops-katowice.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019.04.12_informacja-o-wynikach-bada%c5%84-wsg-za-2019.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10389-015-0675-6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10389-015-0675-6 1. introduction the current armed conflict between russia and ukraine has been going on for the ninth year, which exceeds the average duration of modern wars. the historical extent of the russian-ukrainian war can be explained by the fact that it is an inter-civilizational clash. according to s.p. huntington’s observations (1996), in particular wars on the verge of a civilization split last on average longer than “normal” wars within individual civilizations. the russian invasion of ukraine and the hybrid aggression of the russian federation against the countries of the west have already radically affected international security and international relations. the author assumes that the current war has deep foundations due to significant differences between ukraine and russia. these dissimilarities include a complex of mental, historical and geopolitical components. the relevance of the study results from the later wave of russian expansion in the world. journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(s1), 44–51 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.s1.06 mental, historical and geopolitical background of differences between ukraine and russia ihor todorov department of history and international relations, uzhhorod national university, narodna 3, 83000 uzhhorod, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0003-0986-9485 e-mail: ihor.todorov@gmail.com citation todorov i, 2022, mental, historical and geopolitical background of differences between ukraine and russia, journal of geo­ graphy, politics and society, 12(s1), 44–51. abstract the article highlights certain prerequisites of mental, historical and geopolitical differences between ukraine and russia. peculiarities of the ukrainian mentality in comparison with the russian mentality were studied. the historical origins of ukraine’s belonging to european civilization were outlined. deep contradictions in the geopolitical orientations of russia and ukraine were identified. the current armed conflict has been going on for the ninth year, which exceeds the average duration of modern wars. the historical extent of the russian-ukrainian war is caused by an inter-civilizational clash. the russian invasion of ukraine and the hybrid aggression of the russian federation against the countries of the west have already radically affected international security and international relations. the author assumes that the modern war has deep foundations due to significant differences between ukraine and russia. these differences include a complex of mental historical and geopolitical components. key words russian aggression, nato, eu, geopolitics, inter-civilizational clash, international security. received: 02 june 2022 accepted: 23 august 2022 published: 25 november 2022 mailto:okraynyk@gmail.com mental, historical and geopolitical background of differences between ukraine and russia 45 separate aspects of this matter are the subjects of scientists’ research interest. in particular, the following scientists have touched upon the topic: p.  gay-nizhnik (2017), v.p. horbulin (2017), т. kuzio (2017), e. mahda (2017), h.m. perepelytsya, (2015), i.p. rushchenko (2015), k. smagliy (2018), v. tkachenko (2016), о.v. zadorozhniy (2015) and others. however, further aggressive actions of the russian federation and attempts to strengthen russian influence on western countries require further analysis. 2. data and methods the purpose of this article lies in highlighting certain prerequisites of mental, historical and geopolitical differences between ukraine and russia. the realization of the defined goal took place by solving the following tasks: showing the roots of the ukrainian mentality in comparison with the russian one, outlining the historical origins of ukraine’s belonging to european and euro-atlantic civilization, determining profound differences in the geopolitical orientations between russia and ukraine and the role of the west in realizing this. the objective of the survey and its tasks determined the methodological choices. the gnoseological basis of the study consisted of general scientific and special scientific methods. the research is based on the principles of objectivity, complexity, and historicism. the following are among the used specialhistorical methods: systemic approach to history, comparative historical method, chronological analysis of the problem range, source study. the research contributed to the purposeful study and objective highlighting of mental, historical and geopolitical differences between ukraine and russia. 3. results and discussion the european vocation adsorbs ukraine’s self-awareness in the modern european context, combining it with a practical instruction, namely organizing the process of gaining membership in european and euro-atlantic structures. the historical and psychological roots of ukrainian prudence in decision-making, tolerance of interpersonal and inter-ethnic relations, approach to economy with a certain frugality and enthusiasm have their origins in the peculiarities of ukrainian people’s lifestyle. accordingly, this influenced the formation of, in many respects, similar national character mental features of the absolute majority of ukrainians. the ukrainian people are characterized by an individual form of goal-setting and personal responsibility for the consequences of their achievements. this results in the emergence of such an individual who would be capable of consciously creating a civil society. according to academician о. kyrychuk: the state emerges where there is a highly developed expression of will, where there is a corresponding dynamic that associates equal-side or “divergent” competitions of strong individuals, as it is in europe, or where a passive and indifferent general public does not know how to resist the will of a despot, obeying him, as we see in russia. we [ukrainians], belonging to europe, have moved too far from it to develop the willpower necessary to build our own state, but we have not come close enough to asia to surrender ourselves to our own despot (kyrychuk, 1994, p. 14). the main principle of ukrainian life is “to each their own”. it aptly reflects an ancient desire to be an owner, a master or a landlord. parenthetically, it is worth emphasizing one characteristic feature: the ukrainian mentality formation does not depend on the purity of ethnic origin. on ukrainian soil, the ukrainian element always wins, prompting the national definition of a person as a representative of the ukrainian nation. located at the very center of europe, with a favorable geographical location and rich natural resources, ukraine is a kind of buffer between aggressive russia and the western world. it was forced to constantly show dichroism in its political activity under the influence of determinants that did not always purely reflect ukrainian national interests. v. lypyns’kyy once said: the main difference between ukraine and moscow is not language, tribe, or faith (…) but a different political system created over the ages, a different (…) way of organizing the ruling class, a different relationship between upper and lower classes, state and citizens (lypyns’kyy, 1926, р. 43). authoritarianism is also a significant destructive component of the russian mentality. russia is immanent in its eternal indecisiveness, bifurcation, and non-acceptance of either western or eastern standards and values. marquis de kyustyn rightly remarked back in 1839: moscow nature is a savage nature, indifferent to the sanctity of the given word, to any true feeling, to the sense of justice. everything in it is a triumphant lie, deceit and deception, the lack of any moral sense, the absence of the concept of right and duty (de kyustyn, 2008). ukraine is a central european country. for example, poles, czechs, and hungarians have a desire for hetmanship no less developed than ukrainians. 46 ihor todorov indeed, they tried with all their might to escape from the warsaw pact, where the so-called “elder brother” was in charge, gaining independence at the first opportunity. but the same poles, slovaks, czechs, bulgarians, romanians, hungarians gladly joined another association – nato, built on other principles. that is, the matter is not the hypertrophied desire to become hetman, but the natural appeal to the principles of unification (kravchuk, 1998). modern ukraine is formally a young subject of political and economic relations in the geostrategic space of europe and the world, but it has deep roots of european and euro-atlantic vocation. a cursory look at the map of prehistoric europe proves that for thousands of years, since the late paleolithic and neolithic periods, the roughly modern ukrainianrussian border has been the boundary between different civilizational types of human existence. that is to say, a specific mental, ethnic, cultural and geopolitical type of society has been formed in the geospace of the northern black sea region since the ancient times. all later local proto-state polyethnic formations, such as cimmerian, scythian, sarmatian, proto-slavic (1st millennium bc – 1st millennium ad), arose based on the same civilizational geopolitics. the formation of kyivan rus was the cornerstone of that complex process. conventionally, this protoukrainian civilization (from the 3rd millennium bc to the 10th century) can be called “pontic” one. it has always been racially and culturally connected with the balkans and asia minor (bahan, 2002). since ancient times, modern ukrainian lands have been an integral part of european civilization. at the end of the 6th century bc, the scythians managed to stop the expansion of the persian leader darius i. the “father of history”, herodotus managed the first detailed description of the national territory in the 5th century bc. ancient polises in the south of modern ukraine lands were influencing the modernization of the northern black sea region. it was scythian bread that ensured the flourishing of classical hellenic civilization. people from scythia were responsible for public order protection in athens during the rise of the democratic system of government. the second roman pope st. clement was exiled to chersonesos and founded the first monastery in inkerman. the pontic kings defended the eastern borders of the roman state, and the sarmatian legion protected the interests of rome in distant britain. that is, it is safe to say that ukrainian lands have been within the boundaries of the ancient paradigm since ancient times. at all stages of human civilizational development, economic factors have played a significant role in the relations between countries and peoples; formed a living fabric of interstate relations, filling them with real content; created opportunities for a wide mutual exchange of material and spiritual cultural assets. an unbiased analysis of the last millennium events proves that ukrainian presence in europe was a completely natural and organic phenomenon (todorov, 2006). the dominant role in this case belonged to the economic aspect. it should be noted that, due to its geopolitical position, ukraine has experienced the cross influences of the asian nomadic, eastern-byzantine and western european worlds, adapting to them in different ways. and yet the decisive vector of the country’s socio-cultural and political orientation was western european civilization. at one time, the classics of ukrainian state-building noted that the ukrainian people are a people of western culture – one of the richest when it comes to eastern, oriental influences, but still of western culture and spirit (onofriychuk, 2016). this conclusion was based on a study of ukrainian history in its organic and diverse connections with the western world precisely as an important component of the pan-european historical process. the comparative characteristics of the socio-economic and political structures created by the ukrainian people at all stages of historical development show that ukraine mainly followed a path similar to the one of central and western european countries. this is indicated by the similarity between kyivan rus internal socio-economic systems and the european countries as well as by the extensive trade relations between them all. after the collapse of kyivan rus, numerous contacts with the countries of central and western europe were maintained by the principalities of galicia-volhynia, which united a significant part of kyivan rus lands during a period lasting from the mid-13th century and till the mid14th century, existing as a united state at one time. the kyiv principality, which included a certain part of ukrainian lands, under the auspices of the house of gediminids during the second half of the 14th and almost till the end of the 15th centuries also fits into the western european political and economic context. during this period, large-scale trade processes, which were conducted in traditional ways, developed on ukrainian lands. first of all, such trading centers as kyiv, lviv, kamianets, lutsk should be noted. from kyiv, the way to bavaria, the rhineland, england, france, and spain passed overland through volodymyr, krakow, and prague. through pripiat, bug and neman (also known as nemunas or nioman) lay the way to the baltic sea and saxony. the activities of genoa, florence, venice merchant families’ numerous representatives and many trade and banking enterprises were concentrated in lviv. cossacks wrote a vivid page in ukraine’s alignment with mental, historical and geopolitical background of differences between ukraine and russia 47 european values. moreover, it should be added that the south of ukraine, in particular the crimea, was an interesting territory for medieval italian trading republics, especially genoa. in the end, regardless of the government form, social order or historical stage, ukraine has firmly established its image of the european granary. at the same time, it would be wrong to narrow ukraine’s cooperation with europe to one, albeit important, economic direction. geopolitics is the main factor that establishes the identity of the central-eastern european countries and ukraine. despite all the differences, they have one thing in common, i.e. being objects that depended on and were invaded in numerous senses by germany and russia (in the past, also sweden and turkey). each of these states sought to subjugate central europe, seeing it as their vital interest. in the west and south of europe, germany had trouble accommodating its surplus population, because in the past these areas were more developed and more densely populated. a suitable place could be the slavic east – weak and sparsely populated. in turn, russia’s advance on the west and southwest of europe was connected both with the realization of an ideological goal (“moscow is the third rome”) and with the opportunity to raise its level of civilization (by means of annexing those territories that were part of western civilization) and to play the role of the european policy formation and regulation factor (shchepans’kyy, 2004). ukraine was the first on russia’s western path. to a large extent, this determined the situation with foreign policy certainty in the first years of independence. at the same time, the so-called multivector nature, to a certain degree, was connected with internal aspects. the problem of the ukrainian government was not the dismemberment of foreign policy between the east and the west, because it was supposed to be active and different in the western and eastern directions. since ukraine has declared independence, the double-sided approach to internal politics was a problem to solve. this duality encouraged a constant split. in the east of ukraine it indulged in russification, while it played the role of ukrainianizer in the west. in the east, it protected the monuments of lenin, while it blessed the monuments of bandera in the west (pavlychko, 2002). worse still, instead of caring about the consolidation and unity of the ukrainian nation, there had been examples of open hostility between easter and western parts of ukraine, which were provoked by representatives of the authorities, who relied on moscow political technologists. but it was the implementation of the european and euro-atlantic vocation that gave ukraine the only chance to preserve its own identity. common democratic values have been challenged by the modern geopolitical situation. this has forced ukraine and the entire western civilization to adequately respond to russia’s aggressive policy. democratic values are the result of humanity’s long journey to self-respect. their institutional consolidation at the beginning of the modern era became the basis for comprehensive achievements of human civilization during more than the last two hundred years. in march 2014, the russian federation violated all the basic principles of international law. in particular, the principle of sovereign equality of states, nonuse of force and threat of force, inviolability of state borders, territorial integrity (inviolability) of states, peaceful settlement of international disputes, noninterference in internal affairs, human rights respect, performance of the undertaken obligations, etc. most of these principles are recorded in numerous international legal acts: the un charter (statut..., 2005), the declaration on the principles of international law of 1970 (deklaratsiya…), the helsinki final act (zaklyuchnyy..., 1975) and others, in which the russian federation was and formally remains a participant as the legal successor of the ussr. russian aggression was the first attempt to change european borders by force since the end of the second world war. the countries of the european union, the united states, japan, canada, australia and others have begun to introduce sanctions against violators of international law. however, powerful propaganda activities of the russian federation took place with little to no penalty in western countries. the mechanisms of propaganda dissemination were different: actual pro-russian misinformation, distortion of the war in donbas facts, creation of pro-russian organizations and relevant websites that cover the news from the preferable perspective. its main messages: creating a hostile image of the us and spreading disinformation about the “nazi” government in kyiv and the supposedly large number of neo-nazi organizations in ukraine. all the states of the european union and the alliance turned out to be extremely vulnerable to the propaganda and disinformation spread by russia and only in recent years they have been trying to activate and coordinate efforts to oppose them. moscow uses various channels and means, including cyberattacks and the spread of fake news. most often and obviously, three main narratives were advanced: nothing has changed for the better in ukraine since the “color revolution” (revolution of dignity) supported by the west, the ukrainian authorities provoke and support right-wing radical sentiments in society, the ukrainian authorities are not interested in peace. the opinion was actively imposed that ukraine was to blame for the war in 48 ihor todorov donbas and that kyiv did not have the political will to establish peace. pro-russian and anti-ukrainian ultra-left supporters, nationalist and eurosceptic (isolationist) parties and groups made demands for russia support. however, despite the importance of all the political and propaganda efforts, the economic factor played a key role in russia’s destruction of stable democratic values. many countries suffered losses in exports due to sanctions imposed on russia. moscow tried (quite successfully!) to strengthen its own position, undermining the attractiveness of liberal traditions and democratic institutions. everything that deepened the existing differences within the eu and nato gives russians an advantage. after the victories of 1990–2000, the european liberal forces felt some loosening. a wave of populism arose, which began to effectively parasitize democratic values. and this happened with the support and even initiation of russia. in addition, representatives of the establishment clearly demonstrated the key role of russia in the destruction of stable democratic values (when “price tags win over values”). some representatives of business circles, interested in restoring normal trade and economic relations with russia, demanded the attenuation of sanctions or even their cancellation. so, in the current geopolitical situation, the basic values of the free world come into conflict with purely mercantile interests. the escalation of russian aggression in february 2022 has changed the situation. ukrainian society does not want peace at any price and is not going to sacrifice its sovereignty and freedom. ukrainians have always fought for freedom and dignity, and this is the main difference between ukraine and russia. we [ukrainians] have different political cultures. therefore, there is a constant confrontation between the discourse of freedom and such of deprivation of liberty, which is a valuable confrontation between two systems, two different lifestyles and different frameworks that cause a sharp conflict. ukrainian society has finally realized that russia is not a neighbor generating problems with whom it is possible to come to an agreement by “just ceasing fire”, but an “existential enemy” whose goal is the absolute destruction of the ukrainian state. the main goal of russia in the modern confrontation is to force western democracies to make significant concessions. one of the ways to force the west to undertake such steps is to create a kind of instability zone on the borders of western countries and cause uncertainty within western countries through political (including radical) or financial russia-oriented groups or those having financial interest in such an orientation. the main goal of the west in this confrontation is to preserve a unified policy that will allow proceeding maintenance of balanced and mutually beneficial political and economic relations between the western countries in the face of russia’s efforts to create centers of instability in individual countries of the west and interstate relations between countries. one of the decisive factors for such a unified policy to function is the timely recognition by particular countries and international organizations of the threat posed by russia’s policy. as part of the definition and recognition of this threat, economic sanctions have been imposed on russia. in addition, some western countries recognize russia as a threat to their national security. back in 1997, the russian political scientist o. dugin (1997) indicated in his manual that the existence of ukraine within the borders recognized by international law is tantamount to inflicting a “terrible blow” on russia’s geopolitical security, tantamount to “invasion of its territory”. and furthermore: “the ukrainian question is the main and most serious problem that moscow faces”. russia’s military aggression seemed a complete surprise to many in the world, as well as its destruction of the fundamental principles of international public law. however, the revanchism of post-soviet russia began immediately after the collapse of the ussr. it manifested itself in attempts to transform the cis into a new allied state, prevent the expansion of nato, and play its own role in the conflict in the balkans. however, certainly, with v. putin’s accession to power, russian expansionism acquired new dimensions. putin’s speech at the munich security conference in 2007 had programmatic significance. the bucharest nato summit (2008) actually gave russia carte blanche in the post-soviet space, although even before it the west was completely indifferent towards russian support for the self-proclaimed transnistrian moldavian republic, abkhazia, south ossetia, nagorno-karabakh... blatant russian federation’s aggression in georgia in august 2008 also remained unpunished. at the center of the mentioned confrontation happened to be ukraine, which, due to historical and socio-economic circumstances, tends more to acquire the european model of civilization. the attack on ukraine is only one part of the russian leadership’s aggressive policy, which seeks to take revenge for the defeat in the “cold war” and restore the empire in the post-soviet space. the reluctance of the russian federation to be guided by generally accepted civilized rules and norms of modern world state behavior indicates its intentions to return to such a model of the world order. such an order mental, historical and geopolitical background of differences between ukraine and russia 49 legitimates the right of force, the right of a powerful state to interfere in the internal affairs of a weaker state, blackmailing and threatening used instead of economic incentives. russia with its nuclear potential and energy capabilities has turned into a significant threat to the democratic values of the modern world. the international mechanisms created to maintain peace and stability in the world turned out to be unprepared for such a development. however, the aggressor must be stopped. ukraine is not the ultimate goal for v. putin and the russians, although it is existentially important. for russia, the subjugation of ukraine is not the final goal in itself, but a step towards restructuring the world order according to its own interests, a necessary prerequisite for a further attack on europe, an example to intimidate the disobedient. kyiv is fighting first and foremost for its future, but after winning this campaign and having ukraine’s resources at its disposal, the russian federation will become much more selfconfident and aggressive. everyone will actually see a different russia. the west will have to stop it not on the siverskyi donets, but on the vistula and the elbe. russian aggression is absolutely natural. the russian federation never actually recognized the independence of ukraine. the only question that remained was to influence it again through control over puppet power, or threatening with weapons. preparations for the implementation of such a plan began with the beginning of v. putin’s presidency. it actively began with involvement in the single economic space treaty. a territorial conflict around the island of tuzla began immediately after signing the treaty, with real interference in internal affairs during the orange revolution and the information war after its victory. the strengthening of anti-ukrainian propaganda and the formation of an agent network in ukraine intensified with the coming to power of v. yanukovych. state authorities have become a tool for dismantling national independence. first of all, these are the ministry of defense, the ministry of internal affairs, the security service of ukraine, the ministry of education and science, the prosecutor’s office, etc. the activities of the power structures were under the control of russian special services, and the ukrainian economy was under the influence of the russian state capital. challenges to democratic values in the context of the russian federation’s invasion of ukraine include international legal, economic, political and informational aspects. russia considers ukraine, like the west, as its existential enemy. russia not only does not share, but aggressively denies such values as: human rights, liberalism, democracy, individual freedom, freedom of conscience, property rights and freedom of entrepreneurship, people’s right to self-determination, peaceful coexistence and respect for the sovereignty of countries, ideological pluralism. using controversies, russian theoreticians try to formulate their own values in such a way that they would deny western ones. the russian federation does not accept ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state and pursues its [russian] ultimate goal – the complete destruction of ukraine as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality. without russian intervention, there would be no lnr/dnr (also known as lpr/dpr). the so-called “people’s governor”, p. gubarev frankly admitted that, in general, there was no serious movement in ukraine against european integration, and the people of donbas would have silently agreed if yanukovych signed the association agreement with the eu (rushchenko, 2020). so, the nature of the current war is the assertion that ukraine and russia belong to different civilizations. this opinion is held by many experts. minister of foreign affairs of ukraine (2007–2009), v. ohryzko (2018) noted: “russia and moscovia were different and antagonistic from the very beginning: russia was civilizationally and mentally an integral part of europe, moscovia – asia”. according to the russian researcher a. pyontkovskyy (2020), “the war imposed by the kremlin on ukraine is neither a territorial dispute over crimea or donetsk, nor an ethnic conflict. this is a decisive ideological clash between the heirs of kyivan rus and the heirs of the golden horde, in which the horde ... is doomed”. ukraine and russia belong to two different civilizations. the war that russia has been waging against ukraine for several centuries has an inter-civilizational character and its newest phase fell in the second and third decades of the 21st century. it is not the result of a random coincidence of circumstances or the ill will of only one insane political criminal, because it logically continues the expansion of russia to the west due to certain internal civilizational properties. in order to win this war of civilizations, it is necessary to recognize its inter-civilizational character, to change the paradigm of national security. it is also important to plan the future in accordance with the context of the frontier of the western world and the protection of common values at the crossroads of civilizations. the mass consciousness must get rid of the inherently fake slogan of russian propaganda about “fraternal nations” or “one united people”. victory over russian aggression, particularly hybrid aggression, is possible only through the consolidation of the west (and ukraine as its integral part). our country [ukraine] is certainly grateful to europe and the usa, the entire democratic world for their 50 ihor todorov help, but ukraine can really protect itself only on its own. the situation in public consciousness proves that there is no alternative in the formation of a new ukrainian identity (both at the state and individual levels) solely because of russophobia. further progress in the creation of ukrainian national identity is possible on the path of building ukraine as a modern country. contrary to the fundamental theses of globalization about the weakening of state sovereignty, the issue of sovereignty is crucial for ukraine. in the west, there is a fairly large part of people who naively continued to believe that russia could be reformed in a democratic way. this was a key mistake: the history of the last 30 years, using the examples of ukraine, georgia, and moldova, proved that this is an absolute absurdity. it is worth posing a question not only about the coexistence of ukraine and russia, but also about the coexistence of the whole world and russia. from a civilized point of view, such coexistence should be peaceful. if, of course, a wave of inadequacy does not come to the moscow leadership once again, and they do not press the appropriate buttons. ukraine came to the forefront of the struggle against russian imperialism in its purest form, but it is also a struggle of worlds, different ideologies and worldviews. postmodern european consciousness assumes the elimination of conflict and excludes a black-andwhite approach. “military field trials” and torture (on the russian side) are not enough proof for many. europeans are looking for villains on both sides of the conflict. the western view of events in ukraine is distorted by the constant search for “balance”. some europeans knew very well that russia was an aggressor, but the usage of such terms was banned from public diplomacy discourse, which is based on the search for “peace”. these postmodern european reflections brought even more damage when they were combined with the so-called german military guilt, which is focused on redemption exclusively when it comes to russia. germany has a special term – rußlandverstehe, which is “understanding of russia”, although in reality it is not an understanding, but only a constant refrain that it is necessary to listen to russia and its concerns, interests and legitimate concerns, to appease it. one of the most dangerous phenomena is anti-americanism. especially in france, germany and great britain, where criticism of american methods and motives has deep cultural roots. it is assumed that the events in kyiv or tbilisi were somehow always organized in washington (vilson, 2015). putin’s decision to start military expansion was not accidental, a kind of impulse to external irritation. everything points to the opposite thing: the invasion was preceded by a long preparatory stage. starting from february 24, 2022, the discussions about “fraternal nations”, especially about “one united nation”, ceased for good. today, the difference is obvious to everyone in ukraine and is becoming obvious to the rest of the world. the absolute majority of ukrainian citizens (91%) in april 2022 did not support the thesis that “russians and ukrainians are one nation.” in august 2021, there were 59% of them. apparently, the number of respondents who selfidentify as citizens of ukraine – from 75 to 98%, and as “europeans” – from 27 to 57% has significantly increased (samoidentyfikatsiya..., 2022). 4. conclusion today, ukrainian society, political and state governing institutions are undergoing a difficult phase of their development. for the first time after the declaration of independence, the issues of preserving national-state sovereignty and restoring the integrity of ukraine were so acutely put on the agenda. moreover, threats and challenges arising in this context are not only products of external origin. unfortunately, russian aggression to a certain extent became possible precisely because of internal factors that motivated external interference in the internal affairs of our country. among these is the lack of ukrainian national identity formation. war is the most serious test for any nation, and it proved that ukrainians are actually ready to meet each other despite their differences. so, there are significant mental, historical and geopolitical differences between ukraine and russia, between ukrainians and russians. the essence of these disagreements lies in ukraine’s belonging to the european and euro-atlantic civilization. references bahan o., 2002, zakony yevraziys’koyi polityky (zaperechuy­ uchy r.dzh. toynbi) (eng. bagan o. laws of eurasian politics (denying r.j.toynbee), 2002, informacjìjnij centr ”majdan monìtoring”, https://maidan.org. ua/?s=%d0%91%d0%b0%d0%b3%d0%b0 (accessed 12 april 2005). deklaratsiya pro pryntsypy mizhnarodnoho prava 1970 roku (eng. declaration on the principles of international law of 1970), http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_05 (accessed 10 september 2010). dugin a., 1997, osnovy heopolytyky. heopolytycheskoe budu­ shchee rossyy (eng. fundamentals of geopolitics. 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kyiv. zaklyuchnyy akt narady z bezpeky ta spivrobitnytstva v yevropi (hel’syns’kyy zaklyuchnyy akt) (eng. final act of the conference on security and co-operation in europe (helsinki final act), 1975, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/994_055#text v 10 (accessed 7 march 2011). https://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/proshchanie-slavjanki--2463445.html https://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/proshchanie-slavjanki--2463445.html https://nasze-slowo.pl/chi-aktualniy-mihaylo-grushevskiy-s/ https://nasze-slowo.pl/chi-aktualniy-mihaylo-grushevskiy-s/ http://obozrevatel.com/blogs/17405-gibridnaya-kapitulyatsiya.htm http://obozrevatel.com/blogs/17405-gibridnaya-kapitulyatsiya.htm https://zn.ua/ukr/ukraine/ukrajintsi-ta-rosijani-ne-odin-narod-tak-vvazhajut-ponad-90-hromadjan-ukrajini.html https://zn.ua/ukr/ukraine/ukrajintsi-ta-rosijani-ne-odin-narod-tak-vvazhajut-ponad-90-hromadjan-ukrajini.html https://zn.ua/ukr/ukraine/ukrajintsi-ta-rosijani-ne-odin-narod-tak-vvazhajut-ponad-90-hromadjan-ukrajini.html https://maidan.org.ua/?s=%d0%a9%d0%b5%d0%bf%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%81%d1%8c%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%b9+%d0%25 https://maidan.org.ua/?s=%d0%a9%d0%b5%d0%bf%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%81%d1%8c%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%b9+%d0%25 https://maidan.org.ua/?s=%d0%a9%d0%b5%d0%bf%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%81%d1%8c%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%b9+%d0%25 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010#text https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010#text http://krytyka.com/ua/articles/sim-smertnykh-hrikhiv-abo-sim-prychyn-chomu-evropa-nepravylno-rozumiie-rosiysko-ukrayinsku http://krytyka.com/ua/articles/sim-smertnykh-hrikhiv-abo-sim-prychyn-chomu-evropa-nepravylno-rozumiie-rosiysko-ukrayinsku http://krytyka.com/ua/articles/sim-smertnykh-hrikhiv-abo-sim-prychyn-chomu-evropa-nepravylno-rozumiie-rosiysko-ukrayinsku 1. introduction ukraine gradually moves to development firstly as an independent, sovereign, strong, respected by the world community state and as a competitive, prosperous, self-sufficient member of the european community; and secondly as democratic with formed civil society, social and legal state, country of health and welfare. complicated social transformations associated with preservation of the integrity and sovereignty of ukraine, burdened by a number of today’s geopolitical antagonism, internal and external challenges, such as opposition to separatism with the formation of the national unity resulting in “anti-terrorist operation” (hereinafter – ato). the transformation processes in ukraine related to long, lasting and sporadic, multifaceted political and economic transformation of systems providing the country functioning and livelihoods of people today still relate to the need of drastic changes in organization, management, financing etc. it significantly negatively impacts, primarily the social sector, causing increased social differentiation of population and decline in quality of life, reduction in social protection and confidence in the future of the journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 18–24 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.016.5803 social protection of ato participants and members of their families in modern conditions of development risks of ukraine olena korolchuk the national academy of public administration under to the office of president of ukraine, ezhena pottier 20, 03-057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: terrasanitas@gmail.com citation korolchuk o., 2016, social protection of ato participants and members of their families in modern conditions of development risks of ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 18–24. abstract in this article we analyze the unfavorable demographic, social, economic situation, which has been forming for 20 years in ukraine and now is burdened with military actions. that’s provoking increasing a number of people, who having received disabilities and, as a result, need versatile rehabilitation. the state takes care of its defenders and their families. defined at this article risks, unfortunately, impede rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration of those who participated anti-terrorist operation and members and their families. key words public health, socio-economic situation in ukraine, anti-terrorist operation, the participants of the anti-terrorist operation, social protection. social protection of ato participants and members of their families in modern conditions of development risks of ukraine 19 citizens, physically and mentally complicating their livelihoods. thus, the priority tasks are building and improvement of medical and social support towards the establishment of such a system that would meet modern world standards and ensure promising future to the population of ukraine. thousands of ukrainian mobilized soldiers and volunteers protecting the territorial integrity and independence of the homeland, during the last year had to practice military skills, look into the eyes of war due to ato in the east. nowadays reality stipulated by increasing role and value of management factors, the need for new forms, methods and techniques of organization and management lead to formation of new scientific modern mechanisms of state control for regulation of social relations in this sphere: including ato procedure, regulation of ato participants status, creation of perfect and efficient system directed to preventive medical and welfare improvement of health of the ato participants and members and their families. the absence of multifaceted, complex, interdisciplinary, scientific and analytical researches on the medical and social security of ato participants and members of their families with option of effective ways, methods and procedure for solving certain scientific and practical problems that would show the feasibility and ways of implementing qualitative changes in public administration led to the topicality of this article. at the meeting of who regional office for europe in 2009 “health in times of global economic crisis: implications for the who european region” (1–2.04, oslo, norway) it was highlighted that the current global crisis is a serious global threat to health systems, social security and public health in general, because in continues at the background of global environmental and energy issues and profound demographic changes that in modern ukraine are complicated with hostilities of ato. it is universally recognized that the socio-economic situation in a country determines the state of public health. thus, lower incomes during the crisis lead to a feeling of uncertainty in the future, which inevitably causes negative changes in health status and increasing needs of the population in medical and social protection while the state is unable to satisfy it fully. on the other hand, it is common that deterioration of public health is a prerequisite for deeper irreversible effects of socio-economic and spiritual development of the ukrainian nation, the real threat to ukraine’s national interests. unhealthy nation cannot at full strength resist negative external and internal (social, economic, socio-political, environmental) factors to solve complex problems in order to overcome the crisis. therefore, it is necessary to identify, evaluate existing and potential risks and ways to minimize or eliminate their negative impact. implementing anticrisis measures, to adopt effective appropriate decisions to complete the transformation processes and future development. 2. problems and risks of health care and social spheres for the last 15 years, unfortunately, in ukraine the demographic situation, accumulating influence of a wide range of factors (transient and long term, related to the specific socio-historical development caused by modern social changes) is characterized by a decrease in the total population, reduction in life expectancy for both men and women; decrease in birth rate, increase of death rate, lack of natural growth; aging of population with increased “load” for working persons, deformation of gender and age structure by predominant death rate of men; increase sanitary-epidemiological problems at risk of outbreaks and dissemination of infectious diseases, worsening the situation of tuberculosis and hiv; significant deterioration in the health of the nation with increased premature mortality and so on (tab.  1.) (лібанова, курило, 2012; рингач, 2014). the problems and risks of health care also include reducing the availability, quality and effectiveness of tab. 1. demographic indicators in ukraine for the last 5 years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 total population [millions of persons] 45,778.5 45,633.6 45,533.0 45,426.2 42,928.9 rate of natural increase, population decline [thousands of persons] -200.5 -162.0 -142.4 -158.7 -144.2 number of births [thousands of persons] 497.7 502.6 520.7 503.7 465.9 number of deaths [thousands of persons] 698.2 664.6 663.1 662.4 632.7 migration increase, population decline [‰] 16.1 17.1 61.8 31.9 22.5 source: data of the official website of the state statistics service of ukraine (дані офіційного сайту державної служби статистики україни). 20 olena korolchuk medical care (prevention, treatment, supervision) at all levels and medications support, medicines, which come amid a surge of quantity, change of need for medical and social care and growth in the number of contingent in need for state care; difficulty of healthy lifestyle. decreasing the number and reducing health state of ukrainians, migration outflow of young, active and rich segments of the population automatically lead to deterioration of the country’s labor potential competitiveness. among worsening economic risks in ukraine are chronic budget deficit, devaluation of the hryvnia, reduce of real value of the allocated funds, respectively, the country’s inability to ensure implementation of the adopted social programs and activities during growth and modernization of social needs, corruption; loss of income by the most people etc. the economic risks were enlarged by necessity of warfare in eastern ukraine, going beyond the destroyed region, formed a chain of economic losses of the country: numerous enterprises, commodity markets and jobs which, in turn, increase unemployment, decrease budget revenues and social insurance funds, thus the capacity of the state to provide social programs and activities of medical and social sphere. repeated increase in funding the military sphere and restore of destroyed infrastructure also turn into increase of budget expenditures. risks and effects of social issues are related to the loss of housing, livelihood due to large-scale displacement of people from temporarily occupied (so called „gray zone”) and located close to the boundary territories, which remain industrial desert and reduce the chances of reintegration of the local population. fall in living standards combined with fear for life (own, children`s, relatives`) increase migration, particularly people are fleeing with intention to change the country forever – this is the risk-effect that will influence the development prospects of the country for many years massive exodus of active employable people produces direct loss of labor and reproductive, intellectual potential – ukrainians will work in other countries, spend their money, and have children there. the spread of unemployment, growth of traditional risk groups and the emergence of new risk groups – victims of social conflicts and refugees – provoke increasing of social tension in ukrainian society, large scale of social exclusion, marginalization and polarization of the population. the issue of increasing the number of children who receive no education requires special attention – it is a potential threat for rising crime. in ukraine there is a high degree of deterioration in the quality and accessibility of different population groups to social activities (including education and health care), social and economic inequality, including gender and territorial. socio-legal problems, which ukrainians frequently face, are related to the protection of social and economic rights, including receiving the state financial assistance, because today ukraine is a country of privileges, subsidies and grants: from social protection for poor families, pensions, aid to unemployment subsidies for utilities; child benefits (childbirth assistance, child care, single mothers) to the important issues related to the participation of the citizens in ato (guarantees during mobilization, the status of combat veteran, compensation in case of injury or death, treatment of wounded, prosthetics). also matters about housing of families of the soldiers who died in ato are important for the ato participants and their families. the most important thing today in different regions of ukraine is the problem of social protection of migrants (status of migrant, restore of lost documents, registration, targeted assistance for employable and disabled family members, dismissal and employment). as of february 1, 2016, according to the data of social protection structural units there were registered almost 1,705,000 persons or 1,346,276 families from donbass and the crimea. also, social risk-effects include uncontrollable territories of ukraine, full of weapons complicated criminal situation, increasing manifestations of separatism, banditry and threats of terrorist acts that inevitably spread to remote territory from warfare areas. sharp political confrontation, bloodshed increase aggression in society; set up illegitimate methods for disputes and conflicts resolution; lead to usage of force and weapons. there appears a need for fast and simple solutions – the threat of criminalization and dehumanization of society in general, when emotions, accusations and revenge come to the fore; intolerance, values split, atomization of society are catalyzed. events in the east, ato caused except economic and social very important psychological impact on ukrainian society – the war has generated a number of challenges and threats to socio-psychological nature. prolonged existence of the population in state of acute and chronic stress is provoked and/or enhanced by common socio-economic problems of life in ukraine and ato. this will have social social protection of ato participants and members of their families in modern conditions of development risks of ukraine 21 risks-effects – increase in number of patients with mental disorders (post-traumatic syndrome, psychosomatic disorders) and behavior (socially dangerous and suicidal). it has been dozens of suicides of ato participants returning home, including healthcare workers. according to the ministry of defense 171 ukrainian soldiers committed a suicide in 2014, but it is believed that the real number is much higher. alcoholism and drug addiction are major problems today among ukrainian demobilized soldiers. continuous military operations and constant increase in a number of their participants (currently there are more than 124,000 soldiers, who has combat veteran status) create implications, risks-effects of post-war syndrome, resocialization of demobilized soldiers and their families. socio-psychological risks-effects are complicated with inadequate personnel support from state managers to sociologists, physicians, psychologists. however, there have been positive changes of socio-psychological situation in ukraine, manifested in the acceleration of integration of ukrainian political nation, society has united for the idea of building an independent sovereign state; enhanced social connections social capital is gradually increasing, particularly through the establishment of a new system of contacts between total strangers. the awareness and the desire to avoid public danger led to the formation of active mass volunteer movement – a bright manifestation of strengthening civil society, growth of its social role and new alternative informational system, formation and use of which involves ukrainians, especially young and middle aged – as a sign of democracy. 3. some aspects of the social protection for ato participants today ukraine has a system of social protection at three levels: national (presidential administration of ukraine, the cabinet of ministers of ukraine, verkhovna rada (supreme council) of ukraine, ministries and departments, courts), regional (regional administrations, regional councils, departmental territorial bodies), local (district administrations, district councils, departmental territorial authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations). the bodies and institutions that provide social protection for ato participants coordinated by the ministry of social policy, are: • state services of ukraine for war veterans and members of the antiterrorist operation, services on labour, employment and pension fund of ukraine; • territorial social security agencies (total of 696 – structural subdivisions: 25 regional departments, one city department in kyiv, 670 district offices); • the network of social services for families, children and youth (total of 692 centers, 25 regional, 464 district and 138 local, 31 district-city, 34 village); • services for children (total of 695 services, 24 regional, 464 district and 143 local, 60 district in towns, 3 city); • centers of vocational rehabilitation for disabled (total of 10 centers, with the ability to provide rehabilitation services to about 1.6 thousand people with disabilities); • specialized resort facilities (total of 4 sanatoriums: “peremoga” (kyiv), “batkivshchyna” (truskavets), “slava” (myrgorod), “salut” (odessa)); • children’s center state enterprise “moloda hvardiya”; • fund of social protection for disabled; • state experimental prosthetic and orthopedic enterprises (12 state enterprises and 70 private); • ukrainian scientific-research institute of prosthetics and rehabilitation. as indicated above, more than 124 000 of ukrainian citizens – ato participants have received combat veteran status, so state social protection system now conducts 6 programs for social protection of ato participants and members of their families: with regard to obtaining combat veteran status. at first the interdepartmental commission on granting combat veteran status was established. today, combat veteran status is given under simplified procedure by departmental committees dealing with these issues. with regard to resort treatment. 3,700 tickets for ato participants were purchased; more than 200 people were made healthier under this program in summer. with regard to housing of ato participants. close fruitful cooperation of social security bodies and local authorities is being conducted. more than 10 million uah were transferred for housing of 25 ato participants; another 10 million uah are planned for purchase of housing for 19 ato participants. 64 million uah were allocated from budget for housing to those who lost functionality of the lower extremities during ato. with regard to prosthesis. 120 ato victims got prostheses, four injured soldiers received biological and myoelectric prostheses abroad (cost from 30 to 45 thousand euros). each ato participant who needs high-tech prosthetics, not available in ukraine, by the decision of departmental commission can count on aid (over 2 million uah). people who need 22 olena korolchuk prosthetics or provision of technical means of rehabilitation are monitored. currently, nine soldiers prepare for prosthesis under this program. it is important that professionals work abroad to open in ukraine service center for imported prostheses. with regard to psychological assistance. psychological support is provided to ato participants by experts of both small and large medical institutions (there are 20 hospitals, 29 hospital departments in total, more than 6.5 thousand beds) and private entities. 50 million uah were allocated for the program of psychological rehabilitation of ato participants from the state budget. as of august 1, 2015 psychological support and rehabilitation were provided to about 20 thousand families of ato participants. with regard to social and professional adaptation of ato participants. the state provides 27 million uah for social security program. retrain and second specialty groups are being formed with the help of ngos and volunteers. it will help ato participants to adapt to new conditions. of course, all the problems of people who until recently were carrying out military service in eastern ukraine these six programs cannot solve. there is a lot of questions, a lot of conflicts, sometimes they require innovative solutions. for this purpose new modern mechanisms of public influence are in process. this issue is under ongoing debate among experts, managers and scientists. personnel is taught, qualification of specialists such as management specialists, social and medical workers military psychologists is increased. social protection for ato participants and members of their families is carried out by state employment service. pursuant to presidential decree no 150/2015 of 18.03.2015 “on additional measures for social protection of anti-terrorist operation participants” [про додаткові заходи щодо соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції], order of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine of 31.03.2015 no 359-p “on approval of action plan for medical, psychological, vocational rehabilitation and social adaptation of anti-terrorist operation participants” [про затвердження плану заходів щодо медичної, психологічної, професійної реабілітації та соціальної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції] and order of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine of 13.01.2016 no 10-p “on approval of interagency action plan for adaptation to civilian life of anti-terrorist operation participants” [про затвердження плану міжвідомчих заходів з адаптації до мирного життя учасників антитерористичної операції] in order to promote employment and social integration of anti-terrorist operation participants, state employment service fig. 1. the number of people receiving assistance from state employment among ato participants in different regions of ukraine as 31.12.2015 source: data of the official website of the ministry of social policy of ukraine (дані офіційного сайту міністерства соціальної політики україни) social protection of ato participants and members of their families in modern conditions of development risks of ukraine 23 ensures full range of social services, including employment, vocational guidance and training, etc. since 2015, 21,100 unemployed among ato participants took advantage of state employment service, more than 700 of them have disabilities. 20 200 persons received unemployment benefits. 4 000 persons, including 78 people from among the disabled got work. the age structure of the unemployed among the soldiers who took part in ato is as follows: every tenth person is 15–24 years old, over 19% are from 25 to 29, one in five is 30–34, 38% are persons of 35–44, 12% are persons of over 45, including 1% of over 55. division of unemployed by education among the soldiers who took part in ato is as follows: people with vocational education represent almost 50%; people with higher education – 27%, primary and secondary education – 26% (http://www. dcz.gov.ua/statdatacatalog/document?id=393494). in 2015, half of the unemployed soldiers among ato participants were employed at positions of legislators, senior civil servants and managers, each one of six at worker position, 7.4% at elementary occupations and 6.6% at positions in trade and services. 1,500 ato participants started their own business at the expense of one-time payment of unemployment benefit since 2015 (офіційний сайт міністерства соціальної політики україни). since early 2015, more than 2  200 ato demobilized participants were trained at the advice of state employment service. thus, at the end of 2015, 14 700 persons had unemployed status (decrease of 6,400 people – 30% for a year); unemployed among ato participants, of which 14,000 received unemployment benefit (30% less than at the beginning of the year). in january-february 2016, 16,500 unemployed ato participants took advantage of state employment service. 15,900 people received unemployment benefit. 1 000 persons got a job, including 968 persons, who were employed at the advice of state employment service. 325 of them received one-time payment of unemployment benefit for organization of own business. 870 unemployed among ato participants underwent vocational training. 359 such persons were involved in public and other temporary works (кондратенко, 2015). figure 1 shows the number of people receiving assistance from state employment service, among ato participants as of 31.12.2015 in different regions of ukraine. 4. summary ukraine faced with resolving the issues of further development with the formation of national unity, preserving the integrity and sovereignty, which is burdened with a number of today’s geopolitical antagonism, external and internal risks, including opposition to separatism and conduction of ato. negative demographic dynamic described herein above, burdened by deterioration of health, economic and social welfare as a result of long-term sporadic maintenance, chaotic changing vectors of implementation and incompleteness of reform processes in country`s functioning. unfavorable demographic, social, economic situation, which has been forming for 20 years is burdened with military actions in the area of ato, provoking increasing a number of people, who need versatile rehabilitation, having received disabilities, especially considering the fact that 70% of them are people of working age. an important fact is increasing a number of family members of ato participants, those who doomed to limited opportunities for quality development over the next decades. solving the issue of adequate medical and social security for ato participants and members of their families is an important duty of the state. in 2016 systems of medical, social and psychological care for this category of people are being developed and started to work efficiently in ukraine. but only a few areas of theory and practice are developed today, rehabilitation activities and institutions are being elaborated, but a proper level has not yet been reached which is determined firstly by lack of experience, and secondly by lack of relevant capabilities. thus, the state takes care of its defenders and their families, but there is still a need for optimal variant of complex multi-stage rehabilitation and competent scientific approach to the governance of medical and socio-psychological support of ato participants and members of their families. despite general awareness of the importance of integrated rehabilitation, recovery and return to normal life of soldiers; support to their families, there are still no clearly defined common methodological approaches to medical, vocational and social rehabilitation, no complete national system for comprehensive medical and social rehabilitation for this group of people. therefore, further researches and development are very important for the theory and practice of public administration in particular and development in general. solution to these complex risk issues described herein is an important task of government and nowadays, in our opinion, lie in securement of adequate living conditions and productive life of society as a whole and each individual in particular. 24 olena korolchuk references health in times of global economic crisis: implications for the who european region. overview of the situation in the who european region: reference and analytical document, 2009, who regional office for europe, copenhagen. кондратенко o.o., 2015, загальні засади нормативно-правового забезпечення державного управління у сфері соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції та членів їх сімей, вісник наду при президентові україни, 4, 113–120: http://visnyk.academy.gov. ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2015_4_17_ukr.pdf [12.02.2016] лібанова  е., курило  i., 2012, демографічний прогноз: що очікувати українцям до 2050 року? урядовий кур’єр, 18, 2–3. офіційний сайт державної служби статистики україни: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ [15.12.2015] офіційний сайт міністерства соціальної політики україни: http://www.mlsp.gov.ua/ [15.12.2015] про додаткові заходи щодо соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції, 2015, указ президента україни від 18 берез. 2015 р. no 150/2015.: http:// zakon4.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/150/2015 [17.02.2016] про додаткові заходи щодо соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції, 2015, указ президента україни від 18 берез. 2015 р. no 150/2015.: http:// zakon4.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/150/2015 [17.02.2016] про затвердження плану заходів щодо медичної, психологічної, професійної реабілітації та соціальної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції, 2015, розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 31 берез. 2015 р. no 359-р.: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/359-2015-%d1%80 [17.02.2016] про затвердження плану міжвідомчих заходів з адаптації до мирного життя учасників антитерористичної операції, 2016, розпорядження кму від 13 січня 2016 р. no 10-р.: http:// http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/10-2016-р [17.02.2016] рингач  н.о., 2014, ризики для громадського здоров’я та системи охорони здоров’я в україні, спричинені соціально-економічною і політичною кризою, науково-інформаційний вісник академії національної безпеки, 3/4, 64–76: http://nbuv.gov.ua/ujrn/nivanb_2014_3-4_9 [17.02.2016] щодо надання послуг державної служби зайнятості безробітним з числа військовослужбовців, які брали участь в ато, 2016: http://www.dcz.gov.ua/statdatacatalog/ document?id=393494 [17.02.2016] 1. introduction currently, most researchers support the approach that human capital is the basis of economic development. the characterization of modeling the relationship between demographic factors and economic development has been challenged and debated since the time of t.r. malthus (1798). it has portrayed the influential dimension of the demographic factor on the economic growth by defining the malthusian stagnation mechanism. nevertheless, this has changed in recent year due to the changeable idiosyncratic of demographic factors, the economic situation, or even the changeable modern concepts. based on this way of analyzing, a number of research streams have been constructed as a summarized framework for the related theories which includes: • the traditional “malthusian regime” that focused on the stagnation from the relationship between the controlling process of demographic transition (population growth) and the food issue; journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(2), 26–34 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.2.04 the influence of demographic factors on the economic development of the azerbaijan: the interconnection problem saleh nagiyev department of azerbaijan geography and the methodology of teaching geography, baku state university, academician zahid khalilov 23, az 1148 baku, azerbaijan, orcid: 0000-0002-5610-5851 e-mail: naqiyevsaleh@mail.ru citation nagiyev s., 2020, the influence of demographic factors on the economic development of the azerbaijan: the interconnection problem, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(2), 26–34. abstract demographic factors have sometimes occupied center-stage in the discussion of the sources of economic growth. in the 18th century, thomas malthus made the pessimistic forecast that gdp growth per capita would fall due to a continued rapid increase in world population. there is a straightforward accounting relationship when identifying the sources of economic growth: growth rate of gdp = growth rate of population + growth rate of gdp per capita, where gdp per capita is simply gdp divided by population. this article examines the interconnection between economic development and the demographic policy of azerbaijan. the article analyzes various approaches of the impact of demographic factors on the economic development of a country. the following demographic factors have been identified and described as significant fo r the economic development: fertility dynamics, mortality dynamics, population size and gender and age structure. key words demographic policy, economic development, demographic situation, demographic processes, fertility, mortality, azerbaijan. received: 11 may 2020 accepted: 29 july 2020 published: 20 november 2020 the influence of demographic factors on the economic development of the azerbaijan: the interconnection problem 27 • the “post-malthusian” state which implied a slight impact of greater population on growth; • the “modern approach” postulates the steady growth mechanism with a group of factors that impact growth. demographic factors have sometimes occupied center-stage in the discussion of the sources of economic growth. in the 18th century, thomas malthus made the pessimistic forecast that gdp growth per capita would fall due to a continued rapid increase in world population. there is a straightforward accounting relationship when identifying the sources of economic growth: growth rate of gdp = growth rate of population + growth rate of gdp per capita, where gdp per capita is simply gdp divided by population. the cobb-douglas relationship provides another way of looking at the same idea: change in economic output is related to the change in capital stock, change in labor stock, and change in the state of technology (van de kaa, 2003). human development is conditioned by the sustainable socio-economic development of the country. the concept of human development, developed by un experts and introduced in 1990, emphasizes the main and only goal of sustainable development – the well-being of the population. at the same time, ensuring the welfare of the population on the path of socio-economic development is considered a key goal for any state. thus, human development and socio-economic development are interrelated and interdependent. the degree has been discussed for years by social scientists and economists. as a result of discussions and debates on this issue, three views have been formulated: 1. population growth limits socio-economic development. 2. population growth promotes socio-economic development. 3. there is no correlation between population growth and socio-economic development. proponents of each point of view present a number of arguments in favor of their point of view. despite the different approaches, the majority of theorists and practitioners discuss the relationship between economic growth and demographic development. the economic needs and behavior of the population differ at different stages of life, and changes in the age and sex structure of the population can have a significant impact on the overall economic activity of the country. it is known that children and young people require investment in health and education, provide production and savings for the middle-aged population, and the older generation needs medical care and social security, especially pensions (ravenstein, 1889; ryder, 1965). due to the needs of this contingent of the population, low growth rates of economic development will be observed in that period. if the share of the older generation in the country is high, the age structure will have the same retarding effect on the country’s economic development. the working age population below and above represents a nonproductive class and requires a large amount of resources to maintain, which slows down the pace of economic development. in turn, the share of the population of working age is high. a “demographic dividend” is created in countries by effectively using the existing labor potential. the process of “demographic transition” in economically developed countries mostly finished. this process is characterized by high birth and low mortality rates. in the early stages of the demographic transition, the population in the 0–14 age group decreases during the decline in birth rates. during this period, the labor force (age group 15–64) is growing at a higher rate than the protected population groups (age groups 0–14 and 65+) over a period of time, and the demographic burden is declining, which provides resources for investment in economic development and social security. the income of the population is growing faster. the effect of the said dividend may cover a period of more than fifty years. it is known that low birth rates lead to a slowdown in the growth rate of the labor force. a decrease in mortality and an increase in life expectancy lead to an increase in the number of older generations and their share (aging of the population). given the changes in the age structure, the growth rate of per capita income in the country is declining, and the dividends previously received are beginning to have the opposite significance (ravenstein, 1876). on the other hand, there are conditions for the country to receive a second demographic dividend. one of the main tasks for the able-bodied population in the upper age groups is to meet their needs after retirement. thus, this contingent, which does not have full confidence that it will be provided by the family or the state as it approaches retirement age, has a strong incentive to accumulate financial assets. thus, the first dividend brings temporary benefits to the country, while the second dividend ensures sustainable development by converting these benefits into larger assets. it should be noted that the results could be expected primarily as a result of consistent socio-economic policy in the country. the duration of the demographic dividend is not a complete guarantee, but only an opportunity to improve 28 saleh nagiyev the living standards of the population. the amount of dividends for each age of the population depends on the volume of production and consumption in the group. the level of labor productivity of young people and older age groups has a serious impact, among other factors. the productivity of young people primarily depends on policy measures that provide opportunities for young parents to work, as well as decisions made in the field of education and the effectiveness of the practice in the field of youth employment in the country. at the same time, the number of children born in young families and the time interval between children have a certain effect on the parents’ productivity. at the same time, the level of health of the population, disability policy, tax incentives and restrictions, in particular the structure of pensions may change the level of labor productivity in the older age groups. the realization of the second dividend mainly depends on how the society supports the elderly citizens. in many countries, senior citizens are supported by their families and the state, but they also depend on the funds they have accumulated over the years. these funds include pension, personal cash reserves and housing. as the population ages, the burden of support for families and the state increases relative to gdp. this is a serious concern in many countries. if the policy encourages employees to create savings for the post-retirement period, the second dividend could significantly increase the amount of capital relative to gdp for the vast majority of middle-aged workers (mason, 2007). ensuring the sustainability of the country’s socioeconomic development in modern times requires the solution of the problems arising from the aging of the population. with the increase in the number of the elderly, the increase in social transfers allocated by the state reduces the total state assets and leads to a decrease in the second demographic dividend. at the same time, if workers are supported to save money and create a pension fund, the aging of the population will affect every employee. this can lead to an increase in the amount of capital calculated and per capita income. thus, the creation of reliable financial systems will stimulate the population to create their own financial future and realize the potential of economic growth (van de kaa, 2003). 2. data and methods to carry out the research, scientific studies in the field of demographic development were used for analysis (afandiyev, nagiyev, 2012; əfəndiyev, nağıyev, 2012). data in this area are the main source of statistical data published by azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi (the state statistics committee of azerbaijan) and foreign literature (o’nelli et al., 2001). data on the impact of demographic factors on economic development were collected, and reports were prepared. these reports have been widely used. the analysis in the article is carried out with the help of statistics, historical-geographical study of areas, mathematical analysis, and methods of comparative analysis. 3. research according to this approach, demographic changes lead to institutional, political and technical changes. demographic growth can contribute to economic development, despite the subjective factors of a political and natural situation. thus, in consistence with modern views, demographic processes are a determining factor in economic development. it should be noted that both the dynamics of fertility, mortality and population size and changes in the age and gender structure of the population are the basic demographic factors for the development of the economy. one of the main trends of the social-economic policy realized in the republic of azerbaijan during last years is the development of labor market and advantageous use of labor force. due to reforms implemented in the country caused by changing of the fundamental quality in the country economy, dynamic economic development were provided. relevant measures were taken towards the regional economic development, increasing social welfare and standard of living of the population in the regions and economy of the country especially carrying out of development of non-oil sector. to providing employment for the population, new jobs, enterprises, infrastructural objects, etc. are created. in 2018, the number of economically active population increased by 753.0 thousand persons accounting for 5133.1 thousand persons compared to 2005, of which 4879.3 thousand persons are engaged in various fields of economic activity and 253.8 thousand persons are unemployed. the implementation of reforms in economy, especially privatization of enterprises and organizations in the state property were the reasons for significant changes in the distribution of employment in state and non-state sectors. therefore, if in 2005 the share of persons employed in the state sector made 30.3% of the total number of persons engaged the influence of demographic factors on the economic development of the azerbaijan: the interconnection problem 29 in economy, then in 2018 this indicator decreased to 23.7%, and the number of persons employed in the non-state sector increased 1.3 times during this period (afandiyev, nagiyev, 2012; azərbaycan...). in 2018, 2487.5 thousand persons or 51.0% of the total number of employed population in economy were engaged in production fields (agriculture and fishing, industry, construction), and number of persons employed in the field of services was 2391.8 thousand persons, which made 49.0% of the employed population. 1551.7 thousand persons or 31.8% of the total number of employed population in economy in 2018 was the share of employees workers. the majority of employees were aggregated in large and medium enterprises. the number of persons who received the official unemployment status in the country made 20.1 thousand at the beginning of january 2019. during last years, the share of woman among unemployed persons decreased making up 37.2% in 2018, as compared to 51.6% in 2005 (nagiyev, 2008; azərbaycan...). during 2005–2018 average monthly nominal wages and salaries of employees increased 4  times making 544.6 manat. one of the primary factors in economic development is gender data on labor. according to the obtained information, almost 50% of economically active population are men, and approximately half of the economically active population are women. although among employed and unemployed people male employees are in the dominant position, with respect to the official unemployment status, the number of women is higher than of men (table 1). the age structure of the population determines an economically important indicator, namely the demographic load coefficient, which determines the structure of workers and dependants in the population of a country or region. the demographic load is usually allocated per 1000 population in the working age. at the same time, the load from children age to old age differs. the sum of loads of children and the elderly forms the overall demographic load. it should be noted that this indicator is essentially conditional because it does not take into account certain categories of the working population. the change in the age structure of the population of azerbaijan has a significant impact on the ratio of different age groups, which leads to significant economic consequences. for example, an increase in average life expectancy negatively affects the ability of women to continue the race and give birth to children, so this defines the increase in the proportion of dependants in the total number of working-age people. a decrease in the family size can also lead to an increase in the employment rate of women, which contributes to a decrease in the birth rate and, as a consequence, an increase in the demographic load (avdeev, 2015). in the early 1990s, azerbaijan had the opportunity to obtain the so-called „demographic dividend”, and total demographic load factor began to decline. however, this occurred mainly due to a decrease in a load of children. but, in general, azerbaijan was under conditions of an insignificantly increasing tab. 1. employment and unemployment rate according to genders in azerbaijan (thousand persons) 2005 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 economically active population1) 4380.1 4587.4 4840.7 4915.3 5012.7 5073.8 5133.1 women 2111.3 2257.7 2365.0 2404.5 2439.5 2464.8 2495.7 men 2268.8 2329.7 2475.7 2510.8 2573.2 2609.0 2637.4 employed persons 4062.3 4329.1 4602.9 4671.6 4759.9 4822.1 4879.3 women 1957.6 2101.7 2226.8 2263.4 2294.2 2319.3 2349.9 men 2104.7 2227.4 2376.1 2408.2 2465.7 2502.8 2529.4 unemployed persons2) 317.8 258.3 237.8 243.7 252.8 251.7 253.8 women 153.7 156.0 138.2 141.1 145.3 145.5 145.8 men 164.1 102.3 99.6 102.6 107.5 106.2 108.0 persons who received the official unemployment status 56.3 39.0 28.7 28.9 33.0 38.5 20.1 women 29.1 17.0 11.3 11.2 12.6 14.0 7.5 men 27.2 22.0 17.4 17.7 20.4 24.5 12.6 1) calculated taking into account total unemployed during 2005-2018 based on i̇nternational labor organization’s methodology. 2) based on i̇nternational labor organization’s methodology (including unemployed persons receiving official status). source: azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi. 30 saleh nagiyev load until 2015. in the future, a steady growth of this indicator is expected. according to the data of the demographic forecast until 2030, presented by the state statistics of azerbaijan, the coefficient of the demographic load will increase with all variants of the forecast (nağıyev, 2007; azərbaycan...). it is necessary to pay attention to an extremely important fact: the load will increase the faster, the more favorable the demographic indicators will be, i.e. the more children will be born, the lower the mortality will be. as long as the labor market is able to “absorb” the labor force, labor productivity will increase, which creates dividends of economic growth that contribute to the growth of savings and investments. in particular, those families that have a low number of kids have the opportunity to allocate a large number of funds for health and education of children, which contributes to the growth of human capital and increases labor productivity (table 2). tab. 2. demographic load factor (disable-bodied per 1000 able-bodied persons) year low forecast mean forecast high forecast 2016 745 760 775 2018 767 782 797 2020 788 803 818 2022 808 823 838 2024 827 842 857 2026 845 860 875 2028 862 877 892 2030 878 893 908 source: azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi. different variants of demographic growth and trends of demographic changes are the most important factors in the development of the economy of a country. in those phases where the number of the youngest and oldest population groups is maximum, economic growth slows down. the implementation of dividends occurs in the middle phase of the demographic transition. reducing the number of children and the level of fertility increases the coefficient of the demographic load. however, the effect of demographic dividends by the economy and society is experienced automatically. stimulating the flexibility of the labor market, investments and savings, as well as the payment of education and medical benefits is a major factor of high productivity. in line with this, the change in the structure of the sex-age pyramid that is determined by the decrease in mortality and fertility rates is represented as a factor contributing to economic growth. in line with this, the change in the structure of the sex-age pyramid that is determined by a decrease in mortality and fertility rates is represented as a factor contributing to economic growth. poverty reduction is promoted not only by economic development but also by reduced fertility, which leads to a redistribution of consumption in favor of the poor and makes it possible to increase the incomes of the poor through the women involved in the economy. currently, higher and secondary vocational education has acquired mass character, especially among women, who occupy a significant segment of the market of azerbaijan. the age and gender composition of the population and its components determine the process of production, distribution and consumption of economic goods produced by society. in order to establish the relationship between the level of economic development of azerbaijan and demographic trends, let us analyze the statistical data containing the number of the employed and economically active population (table 2). despite the significant improvement in the position of women in the labor market, there is a persistent gap between men and women. the demographic policy of azerbaijan is aimed at increasing the birth rate and life expectancy, as well as at reducing mortality rates, strengthening and improving the health of the population, and creating a favorable demographic situation through migration. the specificity of the demographic situation in azerbaijan is that the pace of development of the demographic and economic subsystems is contradictory, which has a significant impact on the formation of the labor market. so, to carry out economic research, age-productivity profiles is important area. given that older individuals are less productive, an ageing workforce can reduce economic growth and decrease fiscal sustainability. if senior workers’ wages exceed their productivity levels, older workers represent losses for the companies. further, successful attempts to increase the retirement age may demand the removal of seniority-based wage systems (skirbekk, 2004). population projections differ widely in their geographic coverage, time horizon, types of output, and use. spatial dimensions can range from local areas to the entire world. local-area projections tend to use shorter time horizons, typically less than 10 years, whereas national and global projections can extend decades into the future, and in some cases more than a century. these long-term projections typically produce a more limited number of output variables, primarily population broken down by age and sex. in contrast, projections for smaller regions often include other characteristics as well, which might include educational and labor force composition, the influence of demographic factors on the economic development of the azerbaijan: the interconnection problem 31 urban residence, or the household type. the diversity of types of projections is driven by the diversity of users’ needs. commercial organizations often use projections for marketing research and generally want a single most likely forecast. they typically want population classified by socioeconomic categories such as income and consumption habits (in addition to age and sex) and by the place of residence. government planners may be concerned with population aging and its potential social and economic impact. they may, therefore, desire longer-term projections, and want to know more about the health status and living arrangements of the elderly. the policy community, including advocacy groups, often would like alternatives to a single most likely scenario, including projections that reflect the influence of the policy. for example, those concerned with the environmental impacts of population growth may be interested in the potential for reductions in such growth through population-related policies. in addition, they may want to know what the potential effect of environmental feedbacks on growth might be, a topic recently highlighted as underdeveloped by the national research council. global change researchers often use projections as exogenous inputs to studies on topics such as energy consumption, food supply, and global warming. these studies usually require projections with long time horizons (a century or more) and a range of scenarios rather than a single most likely projection. we focus here on a relatively small subset of projections: longterm, global population projections that is, sets of projections that may be made at the national or regional level but that cover the entire world. the time horizon of these projections typically ranges from 50 to 150 years. demographers often feel uncomfortable making projections farther than a few decades into the future; uncertainty grows with the time horizon, and increases substantially beyond 30–40 years, when most of the population will be made up of people not yet born. nonetheless, long-term global projections are increasingly in demand by global change researchers and educators. only a few institutions produce such projections, but research and practice has been evolving rapidly (o’nelli et al., 2001). projected demographic changes can have serious socioeconomic consequences associated with changes in the age and gender structure and population size in all categories. let us consider them. firstly, there will be a shift in the structure of demand due to a change in the age structure of the population. this will manifest itself not only in the area of demand for labor market goods and services but also for government services. in particular, with an increase in the population of the pre-retirement and retirement ages, the demand for social and health services will increase. along with this, an increase in the birth rate will lead to an increase in the number of students in secondary schools, which will lead to an increase in the demand for public services. secondly, there will be a decline in the assumption of labor due to the ageing of the population. thus, a change in population with constant indicators of labor activity will lead to a reduction in the number of economic populations, which in turn will lead to a slowdown in the growth of gdp per capita. accordingly, the aging population will slow down the growth of the standard of living of the tab. 3. dynamics of the number of employed and economically active population po p u la ti o n th e n u m b er o f t h e ec o n o m ica lly a ct iv e p o p u la ti o n o f th e r ep u b lic o f a ze rb ai ja n an a ve ra g e o f t h o u sa n d s o f p eo p le a y ea r th e n u m b er o f e m p lo ye d in th e r ep u b lic o f a ze rb ai ja n an a ve ra g e o f t h o u sa n d s o f p eo p le a y ea r m en , a n a ve ra g e p er y ea r, th o u sa n d s o f p eo p le w o m en , a n a ve ra g e p er y ea r, th o u sa n d s o f p eo p le th e si ze o f a ze rb ai ja n’ s n o m in al g d p as b ill io n u s d o lla rs 2005 4380.1 4062.3 2104.7 1957.6 13238.7 2010 4587.4 4329.1 2227.4 2101.7 52909.3 2013 4757.8 4521.2 2337.5 2183.7 65951.6 2014 4840.7 4602.9 2376.1 2226.8 69683.9 2015 4915.3 4671.6 2408.2 2263.4 74164.4 2016 5012.7 4759.9 2465.7 2294.2 75234.7 2017 5073.8 4822.1 2502.8 2319.3 52996.8 source: azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi. 32 saleh nagiyev population and the economic growth of the country as a whole (table 3). according to the forecasts, the demographic situation in azerbaijan will develop and will lead to an increase in the number of able-bodied people and, as a result, increase in the rates of economic growth and development. thirdly, the volume and structure of savings of the population will change. therefore, the periods of accumulation and use of savings, in particular, an increase in the proportion of the population in the younger age groups will increase the burden on the economically active population, and the increase in the number of infants in the older age groups increases the burden on the state budget due to the increased need for budget transfers. as a result, the structure of demand for financial resources and their value, as well as market interest rates, are changing. fourthly, with a change in the demographic structure of the population, the change will occur in the direction of financial flows and obligations between generations. in particular, the solution of budgetary problems, due to demographic trends contributes to the growth of public debt. on the other hand, the imbalance of intergenerational relations is associated with a change in the ratio of the number of workers and individuals receiving pension benefits under the conditions of the existing pension system, which raises the question of increasing the retirement age. furthermore, we would like to dwell on some of the challenges of demographic development that azerbaijan is facing. demographic problems are not new in azerbaijan. these problems matured long ago, in the early 1990s. just then, during the transition period, the birth rate plummeted. people at that time were willing to conceive children. it was necessary to adapt to the new socio-economic conditions. in this regard, the effort of the state and society to increase the birth rate is of paramount importance. in azerbaijan, the decline in the total fertility rate at the beginning of the 2000s to the level of 1.8 (from 2.8 in 1990 and 2.9 in 1991) was replaced by its increase and subsequent stabilization at 2.3. however, in recent years, the value of this indicator has decreased (2011 – 2.4; 2012 – 2.3; 2013–2014  – 2.2; 2015–2018 – 2.1) (afandiyev, nagiyev, 2012; azərbaycan...). this decrease is probably due to the overestimation of the total fertility rate due to the timing shifts that occurred in previous years. this applies mainly to first births. if in 2005 the total birth rate for first births was 1.221, in 2010 it was – 1.172, then in 2018, it dropped to 0.963. for second births, the total fertility rate in 2018 (0.760) almost did not change compared to 2010, and even increased somewhat in the third, fourth, fifth and subsequent (respectively, from 0.271 to 0.326, from 0.047 to 0.059, from 0.012 to 0.016). timing shifts in first births are evidenced by a decrease in the average age of the mother at birth of the first child from 24.4 years in 2009–2010 to 23.0 years in 2018. the average number of children born in real generations of women obtained according to the census of the population of 2009 and calculated at the end of the reproductive age, based on the hypothesis of the immutability of age-specific birth rates in 2018, is approximately 2.0 in all five-year age groups of women from 15 to 35 years (at the time of 2009 census) and approximately 2.10–2.15 for 35–39-year-old women (table 4) (azərbaycan...). if there are no significant timing shifts in the period up to 2030, except for the possible continuation of the “timing failure” on first births (the total coefficient equal to 0.961 in 2018 is probably somewhat overestimated compared to the proportion of having at least one child in real generations) and the associated small decrease in the total fertility rate for the second births, which are now almost impossible to foresee, the value of the total fertility rate is likely to be close to 2.0 (azərbaycan...). according to the high variant of the forecast, we can assume tab. 4. forecast dynamics of the age structure of the population of azerbaijan for the period until 2030 (%) 0–19 20–64 65+ 20181) 2020 2025 2030 20181) 2020 2025 2030 20181) 2020 2025 2030 likely 29.7 29.2 28.8 27.7 64.2 63.8 61.5 59.7 64.2 7.0 9.6 12.7 low 29.7 29.2 28.8 27.3 64.2 63.8 61.7 60.3 64.2 6.9 9.5 12.4 high 29.7 29.5 29.7 29.1 64.2 63.5 60.7 58.2 64.2 7.0 9.7 12.7 1) the beginning of 2018 source: azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi. the influence of demographic factors on the economic development of the azerbaijan: the interconnection problem 33 a slight increase in the value of the total fertility rate, to about 2.3. according to the low variant of the forecast, we can assume a decrease in the value of the total fertility rate, but apparently not below the level of 1.8 (the minimum for the period from 1990 to 2018). there is no reason to suggest a more significant decrease in the value of this indicator, since there was no steady (not related to timing shifts) reduction, neither in a total fertility rate nor in the number of children born in real generations (conditionally calculated until the end of reproductive age) (table 4). fertility should be considered not only as a replenishment of the population but also as the reproduction of the family and the social values of society. of course, the population can be reproduced through an increase in migration flows. however, it must be borne in mind that their increase may adversely affect the receiving side in the form of a change in the age and sex structure, the ethnic composition of the population, changes in sociocultural values, the emergence of conflicts, an increase in crime, etc. in the direction of increasing the birth rate, the state has already taken some measures, but we cannot stop there. these measures are only the beginning and require continuation and deployment. it is necessary to continue supporting young families with children and to develop and implement measures to increase fertility. a state program is needed that would be part of the demographic policy of the state, forming and supporting family values and containing measures to increase the prestige of families with two or more children. now it is very important that in society, and especially among the younger generation, such values as a legal marriage, a full family, and many children are strengthened. the program of forming family values should include television, radio, music channels, and other means of propaganda (table 5). table 5. forecast of total fertility rate in azerbaijan forecast option 20181) 2020 2025 2030 low 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 likely 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 high 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 1) factual data source: azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi. the well-being of the demographic development of azerbaijan can be called a decrease in the death rate of the population. the peak of the death rate of the population was observed in 1994 – 7.3 person per thousand people. aggressive military campaigns that entail the death of civilians and a high level of casualties among the military during bloody battles are factors that caused the peak of mortality, and it is important to note that a high mortality rate is observed among the male population. of course, mortality is a natural process. however, if the death rate is less than the birth rate, then this leads to a further increase in the population. consequently, in order to increase the number of population it is necessary, on the one hand, to take measures to increase the birth rate, and on the other hand, to reduce mortality. what measures can the state take to reduce mortality? we see at least three areas of government activity. first, improving the quality of life and fighting poverty. secondly, it is the improvement of the quality of medical care and the introduction of preventive measures aimed at maintaining health and reducing possible health losses. thirdly, measures aimed at promoting a healthy lifestyle and reducing the level of alcohol abuse and drug addiction (nagiyev, 2007). 4. conclusion to summarize, it should be noted that in order to change the dynamics and direction of the demographic processes in azerbaijan, it is necessary to ensure an increase in the birth rate and a decrease in the death rate of the population. the existing measures aimed at ensuring the demographic policy are to create a stable economic environment for families. therefore, it is advisable to develop a series of measures to support and develop the demographic policy, which should involve solving housing problems, improving social policies, raising the level of medical and social services, ensuring a decent standard of living, and improving the nation. the solution of the demographic problem in azerbaijan is one of the priorities, since the demographic process may entail a serious impact on the rates of economic growth, social, cultural, technological development and a decrease instability of the economy of the republic of azerbaijan as a whole. references afandiyev v.a., nagiyev s.k., 2012, economic and geographical development problems of baku agglomeration, analele asociației profesionale a geografilor din românia, 3, 59–64. avdeev a., 2015, population situation analysis: beyond the demographic transition in azerbaijan, unfpa/undp, baku. azərbaycan dövlət statistika kometəsi (eng. azerbaijan state statistical committe), n.d., https://www.stat.gov.az/ source/labour/ (accessed 19 june 2020). 34 saleh nagiyev əfəndiyev v.ə., nağıyev s.q., 2012, bakı metropoliten ərazisinin inkişafına demoqrafik proseslərin təsir (eng. influence of demographic processes on the development of the baku metropolitan area), bdu-nun xəbərləri, 3. mason a., 2007, demographic dividends: the past, the present, and the future, [in:] a. mason, m. yamaguchi (eds.), population change, labor markets and sustainable growth: towards a new economic paradigm, elsevier press, amsterdam – london – new york, 75–98. nagiyev s.g., 2007, the demographic situation in azerbaijan, [in:] rgs, the russian geographical society “izvestia”, st. petersburg, 71–77. nagiyev s.g., 2008, demographic potential of azerbaijan and the city of baku, ekonomichna ta sotsialna geografiya, 58, 344–349. nağıyev s.q., 2007, böyük bakının demoqrafik proseslərin düzənlənməsi (eng. regulation of the demographic processes of the greater baku), [in:] akad. h. əliyevin 100 illiyinə həsr olunmuş beynəlxaq konfrans (eng. international scientific conference dedicated to the 100th summer of acad. g. aliyev), bsu, baku, 108–110. o’nelli b.c., balk d., brickman m., ezra m., 2001, guide to global population projections, demographic research, 4, 203–288. doi: 10.4054/demres.2001.4.8 ravenstein e., 1876, the birthplaces of the people and the laws of migration, the geographical magazine, 3, 173– 177, 201–206, 229–233. ravenstein e., 1889, the laws of migration: second paper, journal of the royal statistical society, 52, 241–305. ryder b.n., 1965, the cohort as a concept in the study of social change, american sociological review, 30(6), 843–861. skirbekk v., 2004, age and individual productivity: a literature survey, vienna yearbook of population research, 2, 133–154. doi: 10.1553/populationyearbook2004s133 van de kaa d.j., 2003, second demographic transition, [in:] p. demeny, g. mcnicoll (eds.), encyclopedia of population macmillan reference usa. vol. 2, thomson-gale, new york, 872–875. journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(4), 12–22 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.4.02 rural tourism and agritourism in poland – development processes and evolution of terminology jolanta wojciechowska the institute of urban geography, tourism and geoinformation, the faculty of geographical sciences, university of łódź, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-0386-0749 e-mail: jolanta.wojciechowska@geo.uni.lodz.pl citation wojciechowska j., 2022, rural tourism and agritourism in poland – development processes and evolution of terminology, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(4), 12–22. abstract the paper describes the evolution of rural tourism and agritourism in poland and presents the terms which define tourism in rural areas. first, the terms used over three historical periods in poland are discussed: interwar, socialist and post-socialist. in this part, the long tradition of recreation in the polish countryside and how it developed differently from west european countries is presented. following that, the concept of polish agritourism exogeneity is explained, seen in the way it was introduced and popularised at the time of political and economic transformations. in contrast to the evolutionary process of agritourism development in west european countries, the revolutionary origins of agritourism in poland were the foundation of a hierarchy of terms defining tourism as connected with the countryside and farming. key words tourism, rural tourism, agritourism, terminology, poland. received: 20 september 2022 accepted: 21 november 2022 published: 30 december 2022 1. introduction agritourism in poland has been developing for over 30 years. it arose after the collapse of communism (after 1989), in a period of political and economic change, and its origins are associated with the chamber of agriculture and tourism in suwałki (north-east poland), a foundation which launched nationwide agritourism seminars – still an important place for an exchange of views between tourism academics and practitioners. the first inventory carried out in 1996 revealed 2,489 agritourism farms and 21,522 bed places (raport..., 1997). since that time, an upward trend has been observed. in 2007, there were 8,800 agritourism farms with over 87,000 bed places, then a decline followed in 2009 – 5,500 farms with 57,100 bed places. in 2010, however, the statistics poland registered 7,000 agritourism farms with 82,700 bed places, while in 2013 there were 7,800 farms with 82,900 bed places (http://msport. gov.pl/statystyka-turystyka). this scale of magnitude persists despite the coronavirus pandemic (2019– 2021). in general, agritourism constitutes 0.3% of all farms in poland (wojciechowska, 2018). agritourism, in the period of 30 years of its existence constitutes 3–4% of the total number of tourist beds. that makes agritourism a niche market in poland with a demand still growing. however, rural tourism and agritourism in poland – development processes and evolution of terminology 13 large fluctuations can be observed at the supply level – some facilities disappear while others appear. agritourism contributes to many positive changes – especially visible in the settlements, as well as in the mentality of a local community. the aim of the paper is to describe the evolution of tourism in rural areas and present major changes, as well as differences, in the approach to the idea and development of rural tourism in poland. the complicated history of poland1 had an influence on different approaches to the definitions of terms defining tourism forms in rural areas, and it is suggested that the development of rural tourism had taken an alternative course, compared to other european countries. the paper presents the evolution of the polish terminology connected with tourism in the countryside in certain periods of time, i.e. in the interwar, socialist and post-socialist periods. moreover, the purpose is to explain the concept of agritourism exogeneity in poland and to define its attributes and position in the system of terms. the methodology of the discussion presented here is based on the first of studies in the polish literature on the subject, with reference to the european literature. 2. insights into the countryside tourism transformation in poland as a tourist phenomenon and a term in poland, like in many other countries in europe, tourism in rural areas has a long tradition (e.g. dziegieć, 1995; kulczycki, 1977; lane, 1994, 2009; nilsson, 2002; oppermann, 1996; schöppner, 1988; sharpley, roberts, 2004; sharpley, sharpley, 1997). in poland, generally, the development of tourism in rural areas went through the same processes as in west european countries before world war i, but those changes occurred a few years or several decades later, mainly due to the partition of the country among three occupants and the lack of statehood2. the development of the polish territory, torn into three parts, varied economically and socially. in addition, the parts were located peripherally in relation to the original polish land. both those facts had an influence on the development of rural tourism. many development processes in tourism followed the european trends of that time, but others could not even start. one of the processes which did occur was the 19thcentury fashion among intellectuals and financial elite to rest in palaces and manor houses built in rural areas, often surrounded with romantic gardens. following the urbanization processes, the number of city dwellers going on recreational and health trips to the countryside started to grow as well. it was for them that accommodation started to be provided, and soon summer settlement complexes started to be designed. moreover, rural regions were gradually becoming tourist penetration areas for large numbers of youth and involved citizens working in sports and tourism associations, which were most often founded by elite members in order to strengthen national awareness (kulczycki, 1977). an example of the other group of processes comes from the field of broadly understood tourism policy, referring to the formation of organizational structures of tourism. in the second half of the 19th and in the early 20th century, in many european countries, self-governing and national organizational tourism structures started to be formed from the bottom up. due to the political situation (the occupants’ policy), the polish society disregarded and did not propagate the economic role of tourism. neither did it care to introduce polish elements into the administrative structure of that time. it could only be done when poland regained independence, i.e. after 1918. it must be stressed that the beginnings were difficult because the young polish state had to deal with many important problems, such as reconstruction of the country after it had been destroyed in world war i, mental, linguistic and cultural reintegration of the society, industrial and agricultural development, etc. nevertheless, the process of forming the organizational structures of tourism in the country finally started in 1919 (establishing the tourism office at the ministry of public works), and followed a different course than in west european countries. it was not a spontaneous and bottom-up process, but rather a top-down one, based on external ideas and models, as well as the experience of other european countries. the ideas of building tourism industry and its organizational formation were implemented top-down, i.e. directly by the government or state administration. the ideas were not only imposed, but often unfamiliar ideologically, external. it can be assumed then that initially tourism development and its organizational formation in the young polish state was a revolutionary process for the society (wojciechowska, 2009). 1 especially events such as: the partitions of the country among occupants (1772, 1793, 1795), inclusion into the socialist block (1944–1989) and the change of the political-economic system after 1989. 2 for 123 years – since 1795 (the last partition of the country) to 1918 (the date of regained independence of the country). 14 jolanta wojciechowska the development of tourism in rural areas in the interwar period was also vital to state authorities, which resulted in the development of the summer holiday tourism concept, according to which countryside inhabitants were being prepared to receive tourists, provide them with accommodation and food, as well as encouraged to build houses to let. the bodies responsible for carrying out such field operations (especially in the mountain regions) were territorial economic self-governments and state administration institutions (łazarek, 1972). as a result of this activity, summer holiday tourism was steadily growing, summer resorts being typically situated around large cities and in the tourist zones some distance away, i.e. in the mountains and at the seaside. however, a systemic development of this form of tourism was not achieved. research into summer holiday tourism included collecting statistical data. specialist terminology included the term “summer holiday tourism” (leszczycki, 1938), related to “summer holidaymakers” – the participants of this movement. the change of the state’s political system to socialism after world war ii, which was followed with a complete transformation of economic and social relations, resulted in a different approach to tourism. it was treated as a social, non-productive area, subsidised by the state. thus, it became a significant tool, playing a very important role in shaping the attitudes of the citizens of a socialist country. the task of enabling all citizens to participate in tourism and recreation was carried out by state companies (owning their own holiday resorts), schools (organising summer camps for children and youth, hiking trips, etc.) or social organizations (youth, school, student, etc). the prewar tradition of receiving summer holidaymakers was part of private business activity – contradicting the ruling ideology. in the first years of the socialist period, the number of trips to the countryside was limited, and the recreational function at some destinations even disappeared. this phenomenon was observed mainly in the suburban zones of large cities, where pre-war summer holiday areas were inhabited permanently by migrant population. in the 1950s, the idea of summer resorts in rural areas was reactivated, but it was controlled by the state, which actually hampered their development and contributed to the creation of the illegal “rented accommodation black market” (especially in the 1980s). it mainly offered night stay to tourists. tourism in the rural areas of socialist poland developed first of all at the holiday centres belonging to state enterprises and on private recreational plots of land belonging to the city inhabitants (second homes). an explosion of this form of recreation in rural areas in poland came about in the 1970s and caused spatial, physiognomic and functional changes in many villages, which became a study object. different authors discussed tourism in the countryside and, in particular, recreational settlement (e.g. dziegieć, liszewski, 1984; matczak, 1985; wojciechowska, 2017). the terms used in literature at that time pointed to the place where the phenomenon occurred, e.g. “tourism in the countryside” or “tourism in rural areas”. that resulted from intensive changes in rural areas, taking place at that time under the influence of the increasingly expansive tourism. tourism in the rural areas of west european countries was developing differently. french researchers emphasise that this development was connected first of all with the socio-economic changes taking place mainly in the late 1950s and 1960s (barbier, 1991; coulet, 1991). the progressing mechanization and modernization of agriculture decreased employment in this economic sector and caused an outflow of country inhabitants to cities. those phenomena inspired a search for ideas, first how to stop unfavourable changes in the countryside (occurring since the 1970s) (barbier, 1991; durbiano, 1991). the initial approach involved solving the current problems of countryside inhabitants and providing them with ideas how to gain alternative income from tourism. that approach led to (e.g. in france) buying out land to build second homes and taking over the incomes from tourism by external entrepreneurs. only later (since the 1980s) was the focus shifted to the future of the countryside inhabitants, and tourism development started to be planned, with the local community being involved (coulet, 1991; richez, richez-battesti, 1991). rural tourism developed in west european countries mainly as a result of the activity undertaken by the governments of individual countries, and next within the framework of the programs of the european economic community, later the european union, and other international organizations, such as oecd. this also applies to france, where in the 1950s the government launched the “gites ruraux” project, in which farmers were offered wide-ranging help of advisors, e.g. as regarded adapting buildings so that they could serve tourists (fleischer, pizam, 1997). other countries whose governments supported entrepreneurship in tourism in rural areas include germany, austria and great britain. these countries became leaders in the development of rural tourism in europe. rural tourism, and especially agritourism3, became a highly organised activity run by active 3 the definitions of these types of tourism are discussed in sections no. 3 and 4. and energetic associations. we may quote the example of the french federation “gites de france” – the oldest one in europe, founded in 1955, or the german association “urlaub auf dem bauernhof ” (founded in 1973). these organizations established a specific character of their activity, particularly visible in giving the priority to cooperation at the national level. in the case of the french federation, the priority concerns the relevant ministry, while in the case of the associations in germany or austria – agricultural organizations, e.g. the farmers’ association or agricultural chambers. generally, it can be said that west european countries developed three types of policy as regards rural tourism. the first type concerns tourism based on market principles, the second type – tourism based on the involvement of authorities, and the third one is a mixed model. in most countries, we find the mixed model, where the private sector shows initiative as regards the development of the tourist product, and the state supervises this development and shapes individual elements of the base and infrastructure (davies, gilbert, 1992). after 1989, poland entered the next phase of economic and social changes. adopting the rules of market economy led to some changes in the ownership system, management and development plans of many recreation-related facilities. at the same time, new opportunities appeared to use foreign aid funds (e.g. phare) to stimulate rural areas through tourism in different ways. the style of recreation changed among tourists looking for the possibility to practice more individualised, active and cognitive recreation. as a result of opening the polish society to the west, numerous associations, community unions and foundations interested in tourism development were established. there appeared brochures, information booklets, catalogues, as well as guidebooks for the organisers of tourism in rural areas. at the time of the system transformation in poland, we could observe negative social phenomena, such as economic crisis, marginalization of agriculture as the basis of keeping up the family, or pauperization of society. following the example of west european countries, relevant polish ministries (of agriculture and of tourism) started to see agritourism as a possibility to relieve the deepening crisis of the agricultural sector and to offer an idea for an alternative source of income to farmers and cheap recreation to tourists. agritourism in poland – both as a term and as a tourism phenomenon – appeared at the time of the system transformation. in the early publications, both popular and scientific, the authors used the form of the word which was directly taken from german, austrian and swiss materials (agroturyzm). the polish version of the term (agroturystyka) was introduced later. in the light of the presented history of recreation in the polish countryside, it is possible to notice a clear evolution of the polish terminology. the concept of this evolution at three historical periods (interwar, socialist and post-socialist) is presented in fig. 1. it is based on the diversity of terms used to refer to the predominant types of tourism at individual periods and the symbolism of changes, observable in their semantic ranges. the model points to the multitude and diversity of terms; the closer to contemporary times it gets, the larger the number of terms is. in polish scientific literature, we can see the apparent changeability of their use, i.e. in some periods some terms dominated and in other periods they lost validity or completely disappeared. an example of such a term is “summer holiday tourism”, used in the interwar period, which during the socialist era gave way to terms “tourism in rural areas” and “tourism in the countryside”. after 1990, another term – “rural tourism” was introduced and terms derived from other languages started to be adapted, such as “agritourism” or “agri-ecotourism”. this evolution of terms expressing the continuously changing supply and demand of tourism in rural areas can refer to symbols, such as person, location and function (fig. 1). the symbols fig. 1. model of the evolution of the polish terminology regarding tourism closely connected with the countryside. source: modified from wojciechowska (2018). intervar period socialist period post-socialist period summer holiday tourism tourism in rural areas person (participant) lokation (village, rural area) function (specialization) rural tourism time types of tourism symbolism of change agritourism agri-ecotourism rural tourism and agritourism in poland – development processes and evolution of terminology 15 show that initially polish authors used terms which were semantically related to tourism participants (summer holiday tourism – the interwar period), next – to the place of recreation (village, rural area, tourism in rural areas – socialist period), and currently – to the function and specialization of the location (agritourism, agri-ecotourism). concluding the discussion about the tradition of recreation and the evolution of terminology in the polish literature on the subject, we should stress that in west european countries the development of the tourism forms mentioned above was endogenous and evolutionary. in poland, on the other hand, the process (which commenced much later) was stopped by the outbreak of the world war ii, and, as a result of the political history of the country, it was redirected. after 50 years, however, the development in postsocialist poland and in west european countries was confronted. intuitionally, but also pragmatically, differences between various forms of tourism in rural areas in west european countries became obvious, and there were attempts to adapt some of them in poland. the accepted foreign terms for these forms of tourism, which appeared in the 1990s, accentuate their specialist range and functions performed in rural areas. 3. the exogeneity of agritourism in poland and the evolution of the semantic range of the terms defining tourism in rural areas in polish literature on the subject, many definitions of the terms “agritourism” and “rural tourism” can be found. in this chapter, definitions of these terms are presented as a compilation, which has been formulated by combining attributive expressions most frequently mentioned in the definitions found in polish literature. agritourism is a form of rural tourism which is a particular tourist undertaking at a functioning farm, organised by a farmer’s family on the basis of the resources of their own farm and the tourist assets of the vicinity, as well as in cooperation with the local community, for the benefit of tourists looking for peace and quiet, interested in the life and customs of the country. rural tourism comprises forms of tourism practiced in the countryside, related to farming, forestry, horticulture or fishery, and based on natural or cultural attractions, as well as the inhabitants’ everyday life. these forms of tourism are organised by entities which are not necessarily socially or economically connected with these areas. agritourism was introduced into the polish countryside in 1991 by state institutions, mainly farming consultancy centres, which started to cooperate with similar bodies abroad. thanks to this cooperation, they first educated their own personnel, and next encouraged country inhabitants to take action and undergo training. the campaign popularising agritourism was supported by commune (gmina) councils. all the institutions mentioned above promoted agritourism through actual activity (e.g. running courses for farmers), organizationally (e.g. providing counselling services) and legislatively (sanctioning farmers’ exemption from income tax when letting up to five rooms to tourists). it can be concluded then that agritourism in poland was created institutionally and, at the same time, it became a part of the long tradition of recreation in the countryside (wojciechowska, 2009). however, the name of this form of recreation, as well as the way of generating tourism, based on the experience of west european countries were new. it made agritourism a novel phenomenon, both for the countryside and city inhabitants. in poland, it developed “from scratch”, mostly as regards the professional skills and tourism social experiences of the rural inhabitants of that time. first of all, they had to understand that the innovation of agritourism involved a farmer’s family’s readiness to welcome tourists at their home and offer them an attractive stay based on the advantages of farming, countryside attractions, as well as the local community’ system of values. moreover, they had to realise that this form of tourism follows the rules of market economy (not the socialist economy any more), i.e. develops in competitive conditions, both in the close and further environment. they had to learn how to organise tourism business in their homes and then make money from it and cooperate with others so that it could prosper (wojciechowska, 2014). as it has been said earlier, the term agroturystyka (agritourism) in poland was adapted from foreign terminology. initially, it was not well received by practitioners. they preferred to use polish names defining recreation in rural areas. they often used old terms, even from the interwar period, to refer to the tourist traffic created in a new way. perhaps it was a way of getting used to something which was new and strange to them, coming from outside. until the mid-1990s, the use of terminology and the understanding of it were treated quite freely, both by practitioners and academics. in the early 1990s, the definitions of terms “agritourism” and “rural tourism” appearing in polish publications were mostly direct translations from west european literature. the next polish definitions, based on the first two, formulated by both practitioners and 16 jolanta wojciechowska academics, served the purpose of popularising the new phenomena among rural community. they were an attempt to explain what tourist services in the countryside are and what effect they might bring. in the second half of the 1990s, the authors of the definitions started to distinguish between the terms “agritourism” (agroturystyka) and “rural tourism” (turystyka wiejska). all the definitions of both analysed terms appearing in polish literature can be divided into two groups. the first one includes short, even laconic definitions, and the other one – broad and descriptive ones. descriptive definitions present the details of accommodation, types of recreational activities, countryside attractions and other resources. the definition content depends on the author’s field of knowledge or even their practical experience. one can easily notice which aspects – economic, social, natural, agricultural or legal – the author focuses on. many definitions of “agritourism” and “rural tourism” tended to be formulated by practitioners, e.g. employees of farming consultancy centres, higher level administration workers or local authority activists. the basic formula of polish definitions, typical of both analysed terms, usually focuses on one aspect at a time, i.e. presents either the supply (i.e. tourism organisers) or the demand side (tourists). they are rarely considered together. it is worth mentioning that with time some expressions included in the definitions of “agritourism” underwent modifications, i.e. they were either abandoned or replaced. for instance, in the first half of the 1990s, it was stressed that agritourism was “an additional source of income for the farmer and his family”, while towards the end of that decade and currently, we speak of a “tourist undertaking” or “tourist business”. other changes in the content of the definitions can be seen in the spatial context. initially, the location of agritourism mentioned in the definitions was the village and rural areas, and now it is a working farm. the changes largely correspond to the issues discussed in european literature. for example, n.c. mcgehee (2007), p.ä. nilsson (2002) or s. phillip et al. (2010) highlight the role of farms in agritourism, while l. roberts & d. hall (2001) or j. saarinen (2007) – the commercial character of rural tourism. the above analysis entitles us to present the evolution of terms defining countrysideand agriculture-related tourism used in polish literature after 1990 (fig. 2). the main criterion which systematises the terms is the range of the changeable definition content. in the early 1990s, the terms “agritourism” and “rural tourism” used in polish literature were identified with each other and used interchangeably (a=rt). only in the mid-1990s was the semantic range of “agritourism” and “rural tourism” clearly separated (aєrt). moreover, another term started to be used more and more often, i.e. “tourism in rural areas” (turystyka na terenach wiejskich), which was then used interchangeably with the term “rural tourism” (rt=tira). definitions of the polish term ”turystyka na terenach wiejskich” (tourism in rural areas) appeared only after 2000, when the semantic range of this term started to be distinguished. it can be stated then that in polish literature, the semantic range of the three analysed terms crystallised in an evolutionary way, their hierarchical semantics being established at the same time. the term of the narrowest semantic range is “agroturystyka” (agritourism), which is contained in the term “turystyka wiejska” (rural tourism), while the term of the widest range is “turystyka na terenach wiejskich” (tourism in rural areas). fig. 2. evolution of terms defining tourism which is most closely connected with the countryside and agriculture used in polish literature after 1990. source: wojciechowska (2009). rural tourism and agritourism in poland – development processes and evolution of terminology 17 the systematics of the terms presented above can be referred to other similar forms of tourism. such terms, commonly used in literature, are “ecotourism” and “alternative tourism”. fig. 2 shows that the range of these terms only partly overlaps with those discussed earlier, because not every tourist staying in a village or at a farm is a form of alternative tourism or ecotourism. the part shared by “ecotourism” and “agritourism” is referred to as “agri-ecotourism” by some authors. to sum up, the names, as well as the content and range of the definitions of the new forms of tourism presented in polish literature raised some doubts. the exogeneity of agritourism was seen in the way it was introduced and popularised. countryside inhabitants perceived it as something alien, external and imposed on them. those reservations and extensive discussions resulted in an evolutionarily hierarchised system of terms defining tourism in rural areas. the process of defining has not ended yet as efforts are still being made to formulate the best definition, acknowledging the existing names at the same time. 4. the attributes of terms and the diversification of their systematics rural tourism and agritourism have been discussed by many authors, such as e.t. davies & d.c. gilbert (1992), l.a. dernoi (1991), b. lane (1994, 2009), m. oppermann (1996), s. phillip et al. (2010), j. saarinen (2007), j. saarinen, l. monkgogi (2014), r. sharpley, j. sharpley (1997), or r. sharpley, l. roberts (2004). some of them have been analysing the reasons why formulating precise definitions of the terms discussed above is so difficult. the author who looked particularly closely into these reasons was lane. when in 1991 he was asked by the oecd to formulate a definition of rural tourism, lane stated that it was not a simple task for many reasons. one of them was the necessity to define the quantitative features of rural tourism in the context of rural area criteria, bearing in mind that the latter is understood differently in individual european countries (lane, 2009). in the light of polish literature, the fundamental attribute of the term “agritourism” (agroturystyka) is the working farm, where tourists are offered accommodation and other services connected with the functioning of this farm and the whole village. therefore, agriculture and rurality (in this order) constitute the essence of this form of tourism (wojciechowska, 2009). as regards the demand, this attribute can be seen in the fact that tourists stay on a working farm and, as a result, they have the possibility to directly observe the everyday life of the host family, as well as to participate in this life. moreover, they can appreciate direct contact with the rural community. as regards the supply, the attribute is visible in the activities of the owners of agritourist farms, who decide to share their living, working, learning and resting space with tourists, and in this way disclose the details of their own family, professional and social life to strangers. understood in this way, the agritourism attribute is a novelty. it also shows the differences between the summer holiday lodgings from before world war ii and the socialist period. these differences (from the supply perspective) are presented in table 1. as regards the traditional summer holiday lodgings (from before world war ii), tourists usually used their own equipment, bought their own food, organised their stay themselves and maintained a rather loose relationship with the hosts. in contrast, in agritourism, the farming family is ready to receive tourists and offer them an attractive stay program. nowadays, summer holiday lodgings are also functioning in poland, but they are understood more as recreation at country residences or second houses, rented from their owners. modern summer holiday lodgings are then an element of rural tourism, and not agritourism. tab. 1. differences between agritourism and summer holiday lodgings in the countryside in pre-war, socialist and contemporary poland. tourism features from the demand perspective traditional summer holiday lodgings before world war ii summer holiday lodgings during the socialist period agritourism (after 1991) private everyday use equipment (bed linen, kitchen pots and other utensils) yes no no own board yes mostly yes on request own programme of stay yes yes on request contacts with the hosts scarce scarce continuous source: wojciechowska (2009). 18 jolanta wojciechowska the differences between traditional summer holiday lodgings and agritourism are also noticeable in their missions. a mission is understood as the real function performed in the social environment to satisfy human needs. missions can be divided into spontaneous ones, i.e. initiated directly by the persons involved, and controlled ones, i.e. conducted officially. a spontaneous mission of summer lodgings could be a city inhabitant’s care for their own health. in the case of agritourism, it is a search for changes on the professional plane, the effect of which is the chance to learn new skills and gain new knowledge by the organisers of this form of tourism. the controlled missions of pre-war summer holiday lodgings entailed stimulating the local community (village and town people), which was passive, uneducated and lacked the tradition of local self-government. agritourism, on the other hand, shows the alternative of the changing role of the farmer’s profession, as well as the possibility to create a tourist recreation style by offering tourists a well-thought-out agritourist product. it has been stressed by polish authors that the attributes of the term “rural tourism” (turystyka wiejska) are the rurality of space, both functional and landscape-related, as well as agriculture (e.g. majewski, lane, 2001; wojciechowska, 2009). this form of tourism is based on attractions integrally connected with living in the country, its physiognomy, cultural resources, events which are important for the local community, as well as on the agricultural environment (animals, farming products, nature). it occurs in various functional types of villages and hamlets, e.g. farming, forest, horticultural or fishing ones, which cultivate recreational traditions. there are opinions in poland (mainly voiced by practitioners) that the range of this term should concern the space of small towns, especially those inhabited by 2000–5000 people, most of which retain rural character. in many west european countries, this aspect is not taken under consideration, which has been stated in the oecd report (tourism policy…,1994) or in the report by k. orzechowska (2019). the most important attribute of the term “tourism in rural area” (turystyka na terenach wiejskich) adopted in polish literature is the administrative rurality of space (wojciechowska, 2009), which means that this form of tourism occurs in areas which are administratively rural4, but they do not always comply with this “rurality” as regards the settlement system, landscape or even functions. the example could be villages and areas strongly developed touristically, rural holiday resorts, large complexes of recreational summer plots of land, specialised tourism and recreation centres within natural space (more rarely farming space), as well as national parks and other areas under strict environmental protection. tourism takes place in strongly colonised rural areas, developed for tourism purposes, where rurality and agriculture are only administrative notions. the distinctive features (attributes) of polish terms are presented in a graphic form in fig. 3. the concept of the attributes and systematics of terms defining tourism in rural areas in poland is worth referring to examples presented in european literature. the diversified understanding of terms in west european countries has been pointed out by many authors. for instance, m. jansen-verbeke (1990) argued that in the 1980s, in the eu states, the understanding of the terms rural tourism, agritourism fig. 3. distinctive attributes of the terms used in polish literature. source: wojciechowska (2009). agritourism working farmstead (croft, farm, agritourist village) agriculture and rurality administrative rurality rurality and agriculture rural tourism villages, hamlets, small towns, (guesthouses, recreation centres, summer resorts) tourism in rural areas villages and areas highly developed touristically and natural areas, (country resorts, summer plots of land complexes, specialist centres, landscape parks, national parks) 4 it has been established for poland that, administratively, rural areas are all those which are situated outside the city borders. rural tourism and agritourism in poland – development processes and evolution of terminology 19 and farm tourism depended on the national context and the farming and tourist tradition of a given country. these states have not agreed on common definitions until today. literature and international conferences devoted to these issues are a forum for discussion regarding their legal, economic, cultural, ecological, marketing and other aspects, delimiting the semantic range of terms and leaving a wide margin for interpreting and defining them in individual countries. the multilingual terms analysed in this article refer to the same object, but the understanding of their range varies, depending on the country, the geographical region of europe or another part of the world. this makes it possible to identify two models of terminological systematics: one based on the west-european literature (mainly in english), the second one based on the polish literature (fig. 4). corresponds more to the english term farm tourism. on the other hand, the range of the term “turystyka wiejska” corresponds to two terms used in the west european literature at the same time, i.e. rural tourism and agritourism. next, the term “turystyka na terenach wiejskich” seems to be the creation of polish researchers, opting for a semantic range wider than rural tourism, because it refers both to areas intensively developed touristically (resorts, specialist recreation centres, complexes of second houses) and to areas where people let nature take its course (e.g. marshes, lakes, national parks). the concept of the polish term “agroturyzm” can be seen as another achievement of polish researchers. it is understood as a superior term in relation to “agroturystyka” and “turystyka wiejska”. agroturyzm is a theoretical overall concept of all the issues concerning tourism related to the countryside and agriculture in the temporal and spatial aspect (wojciechowska, 2018). the presented models may be subject to change. this statement is based on the diverse experiences of the countries of the compared language groups with regard to the development of tourism in rural areas. however, the polish model is still valid. 5. conclusions tourism in rural areas is undergoing constant changes, as a result of which its new and old forms may co-exist. their components are changeable in time, thus contributing either to the decline of a given form of tourism, or its revival, or they inspire the creation of brand-new ones. this explains the multitude and variety of terms used in european countries, whose scope is also changeable in time. poland is a case in point here, as the evolution of terminology concerning tourism in rural areas started only in the 20th century. however, the crystallization of a hierarchical systematics of terms closely connected with the countryside has been observed only since the second half of the 1990s. its main components are “agroturystyka”/”agritourism” (of the narrowest semantic range), “turystyka wiejska”/“rural tourism” and “turystyka na terenach wiejskich”/“tourism in rural areas”. “agroturystyka” is a new term in polish literature, while the other two have been used before, but since the 1990s, they have gained new meaning. another new term is “agroturyzm” as the whole of theoretical issues regarding agritourism and rural areas. an important problem is that polish terminology was developed at the time of the political and economic transformations after 1989, as well as when debates on rural tourism were held in the world literature. that gave a revolutionary beginning to rural tourism agritourism farm tourism english terminology polish terminology system agrotourism fig. 4. the relation between polish and english terms defining tourism in rural areas. source: developed and modified from wojciechowska (2009). both models show a hierarchical system of the range of terms. the hierarchy of terms in english literature was pointed out by m. jansen-verbeke (1990), who wrote that rural tourism is a term of the widest semantic range and signifies all tourism in the countryside, while agritourism is merely its component, as it concerns agriculture-related tourism. the term of the narrowest semantic range, which is a component of the two terms mentioned above, is farm tourism, signifying tourist stays at farms. in further analysis, we may notice differences between this model and the polish language model. the differences are noticeable in nomenclature and partly in the semantic range of the definitions of the terms. it is particularly visible in the case of: agritourism and “agroturystyka”, where the range of the polish term 20 jolanta wojciechowska agritourism in poland, in contrast to the endogenous and evolutionary process in west european countries. in poland, agritourism turned out to be a new form of tourism, both for its participants and organisers, introduced via institutions, based on the experience of other countries. the term which defines it has been accepted by practitioners and academics alike and became a part of a crystallised and evolutionarily hierarchical system of terms referring to tourism in rural areas. among the countries of the former western block, poland was one of the first to adopt the idea of agritourism and automatically became the leader for others. looking globally, we can state that a significant feature of the idea of agritourism and rural tourism development is the institutional impulse. in west european countries, it was given by governments, self-governing bodies and international organizations (e.g. oecd, ue), which took patronage over the further development of agritourism (e.g. phare, leader i, leader ii). in this way, agritourism and rural tourism became tools of the rural areas development policy, which is imposed in the hope of its bottom-up evolution. wherever agritourism becomes a part of continuous tourism development, we can say that it spontaneously becomes an internal, bottom-up element. in other cases, it can be treated as an external tool for a long time. in poland, a challenge for the further development of agritourism and rural tourism is the pursuit of a new identity, based on endogenous factors, where entrepreneurship and business are given priority. references barbier b., 1991, turystyka na obszarach wiejskich we francji (eng. tourism in rural areas in france), acta universitatis lodziensis. folia geographica, 14, 21–33. coulet l., 1991, turystyka wiejska turystyką swobodną (eng. rural tourism as free tourism), acta universitatis lodziensis. folia geographica, 14, 47–53. davies e.t., gilbert d.c., 1992, 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turismo y patrimonio cultural, 12(3), 565–579. doi: 10.25145/j.pasos.2014.12.042 wojciechowska j., 2017, a model of agritourism offer polarisation in metropolitan surroundings – the łódź metropolis: a case study, [in:] m.j. sznajder (ed.), metropolitan commuter belt tourism, routlege, london – new york, 255–266. wojciechowska j., 2018, agroturystyka. signum turystyki i obszarów wiejskich (eng. agritourism. signum of tourism and rural areas), polskie wydawnictwo ekonomiczne, warszawa. 22 jolanta wojciechowska 1. introduction one of the urgent problems of clustering the economy is the study of the methodology of cluster formation. in the course of the development of the economic science, many theories were distinguished, which were based on certain processes of formation and development of branches of the national economy. in conditions of external instability, as the world economic crises have shown us, no enterprise is immune from bankruptcy. the crisis of recent years (2008–2009) clearly showed the strengthening of the process of interdependence of business structures, even not so much within the state as within the global economic system. to improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the national economy, it is necessary to strengthen the processes of self-organization of enterprises, including the formation of an effective cluster model. the competitiveness of the national economy is one of the key factors of its socio-economic development. the world economic forum (wef) has published the next global competitiveness index (gci 2019) ranking of 141 countries. the first places were distributed as follows: 1st place – singapore (gci84.8); 2nd place – usa (gci-83.7); 3rd place – hong kong (gci-83.1), 4th place – netherlands (gci-82.4), 5th place – switzerland (gci-82.3). the overall global competitiveness index of 2019 for the countries of the former ussr was as follows: journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(2), 44–49 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.2.05 analysis of the key elements of the mechanism of formation of the system of intra-cluster interaction anastasiia vasylchenko marketing and international management department, polessky state university, kulikova 27, 225716 pinsk, belarus, orcid: 0000-0001-8969-6611 e-mail: vasilchenko.2012@inbox.ru citation vasylchenko a., 2021, analysis of the key elements of the mechanism of formation of the system of intra-cluster interaction, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(2), 44–49. abstract the article considers the key elements that influence the mechanism of formation of the system of intra-cluster interaction. the article analyzes the competitiveness of the national economy as one of the system-forming factors, the mechanisms of self-organization of cluster formations, the properties of integration and cooperation of the participants of cluster formations, and it analyzes the structure of cluster system connections and develops the principles of state policy to promote the development of cluster formations. key words clusters, system-forming links, structural components of system-forming links of clusters, principles of state regulation. received: 15 april 2021 accepted: 05 june 2021 published: 30 june 2021 analysis of the key elements of the mechanism of formation of the system of intra-cluster interaction 45 estonia – 70.9 (31st place); lithuania – 68.4 (39th place); latvia – 41st place (67.0); russian federation – 66.7 (43rd place); kazakhstan – 62.9 (55th place); azerbaijan – 62.7 (58th place); armenia – 61.3 (69th place); georgia – 60.6 (74th place); ukraine – 57.0 (85th place); moldova – 56.7 (86th place) (the global competitiveness report, 2019). the republic of belarus is not represented in this rating; however, according to the estimates of 110 indicators proposed in the ac “strategy”, it could take the 82nd place. the relatively low indicators of the post-soviet countries are associated with the inability to build a competitive national economy. t. hagerstrand in his work “spatial diffusion asa process of innovation implementation” said that the translational capacity of a region depends on the investment climate and the development of the market environment. this study is a logical extension of francois perroux’s theory of the poles of growth, as it is dedicated to determining the factors that affect the speed at which “motor” industries will pull the rest of the economy (mâmlin, 2013). p. krugman created the model of “industrial center agricultural periphery” and came to the conclusion that industrial enterprises are concentrated near markets; in turn, the markets are located where the industrial enterprises. p. krugman (1999) is the founder of the method of economic analysis of the spatial organization of the economy based on models of imperfect competition. m.e. porter is considered the founder of the cluster theory. in his work, competition [1998], he defined a cluster, “a geographically concentrated group of interconnected enterprises, companies specializing in the supply of a certain type of product, service organizations, companies operating in related industries, and related institutions (for example, universities, standard-setting agencies and trade associations) in specific industries, competing, but also cooperating with each other” (porter, 2005). m. enright introduced the concept of “regional cluster” and emphasized the main feature of clusters – their geographical concentration, writing that the competitive advantages of countries are formed at the regional level, not at the national level. having identified the prerequisites for the formation of the cluster: the peculiarities of the economic development of the region, the common culture, education, peculiarities of doing business and organizing production, he defined it as: an industrial cluster in which the member firms of the cluster are located in geographical proximity to each other (dyrdonova, 2015). m. enright mathematically proved the positive impact of the geographical concentration of production on the economy of the region. the concept of a cluster, instead of its contribution to studies on competitiveness, met with profound critique. there are two essential aspects of this critique. first, r. martin and p. sunley (2003) underlined the deficits in the profundity of the concept that caused concerns related to the definition, theorization and empirics. second, according to the french school of proximity achievements, a. nowakowska (2011) argued that geographic proximity is not the only kind of proximity that fosters cooperation between economic entities. for example, institutional or cultural proximity can replace geographic proximity to some extent. moreover, the primary question – geographic proximity – is also debatable. as g. micek (2017) proved, the perception of distance differs among economic branches. after analyzing the theoretical component of the study, some hypotheses were developed to test: h1: there are several mechanisms of cluster formation – self-organized and formed under the influence of the state; h2: the ability of a cluster to self-organize regulates its ability to develop in the future; h3: the structure of intra-system connections of the cluster determines its impact on the efficiency of the cluster formation. the research presented in this article is based on the theoretical methods of scientific research (blaug, 1992; bochenski, 2012; hunter, 1998): • the method of induction, which allows considering and analyzing the system-forming properties of clusters to analyze the process of cluster formation; • the axiomatic method whose purpose is to test hypotheses of the mechanisms of cluster formation and the influence of intra-system connections on the efficiency of cluster functioning; • methods of analysis and synthesis in order to generalize the study results. 2. results and discussion from the point of view of the regional economy in the context of a systematic approach, a cluster is a collection of enterprises of various sectors of the national economy. they are connected in a single structure and function to achieve common goals, achieve competitive advantages and develop their own potential. integration and cooperation of cluster members is a system-forming property. however, the degree of interactivity is determined by the presence and parameters of system-forming factors that stimulate the cluster actors to develop and implement 46 anastasiia vasylchenko innovations. this is individual in each cluster, but there are general trends. when assessing the degree of the integrative property, several opposite approaches are used: the principle of “systematization”, which is an approach based on reducing the degree of independence of the cluster actors to find effective system solutions for managing the cluster initiative and obtaining effective synergy. the other one is the principle of “factorization”, whose essence is to ensure a high degree of independence of the cluster actors because in non-standard situations, certain solutions are required based on the independence and individuality of the resources of the cluster actors, but taking into account the functioning of the system. both approaches have certain disadvantages: an increase in factorization leads to a decrease in the potential of the cluster actors; an increase in systematization leads to the concentration of enterprises in the cluster and an increase in competition through innovation. however, in addition to the system-forming factors, it is necessary to assess the cluster’s ability to self-organize and self-develop. rapidly changing environmental conditions dictate new conditions for the functioning of the system, so its ability to adapt is an important property. the adaptation mechanism is formed by various elements of self-organization, including differentiation (a desire of the system to diversify the structure and functions of the elements in order to resolve emerging contradictions and the possibility of adapting the elements to the changing environmental conditions) and flexibility (an ability of the system to change depending on the situation for decision-making). the ability of the cluster to self-organize dynamically implies the ability to develop. however, the changing factors of competitive advantages imply the intra-system mechanism of functioning of the cluster. all this happens in the conditions of development of the market environment and under the influence of the environment of direct and indirect influence. this contributes to the formation of intra-system shifts and a flexible mechanism for the functioning of the cluster in the context of the development of the system. it entails a change, an increase in the structural and functional diversity of the system, reflecting the changing external conditions for the existence of elements. among the promising areas of increasing the diversity of cluster elements, we can highlight the involvement of insurance, financial companies, public organizations and other structures that, in addition to the main ones, will be involved in the tourism cluster, forming a new system of interrelations of structural elements and their cross-functional interaction within the cluster and, as a result, strengthening the synergistic effect in terms of increasing the diversity of activities and the formation of new structural and functional capabilities. consideration of these processes in dynamics will allow us to trace the process of self-organization and self-development of the cluster structure, and additionally, to identify the key features of the system in development and its “weak points”. the active phase of self-development continues until the system reaches a state of stability, i.e. the formation of relatively stable organizational and financial ties within the cluster and in the context of the interaction of its actors with key external stakeholders that ensure effective functioning within the cluster. another key feature of the cluster’s self-development is the system’s communication capability. as mentioned earlier, for effective functioning, the enterprises that are part of the cluster must interact with the elements of the external environment, which is represented by different organizations that are on a different hierarchy of power relative to the subjects of the cluster. this can be horizontal interaction formed as a result of contact with enterprises located at the same level (other industry clusters) or at different levels (public authorities, etc.). it can also be information or financial interaction with elements of subsystems (marketing agencies, enterprises that are not part of the cluster, etc.). effective interaction within the framework of communication forms a related property of hierarchy, which is manifested in the fact that the pattern of integrity is manifested at each level of the hierarchy. consequently, new properties arise at each level, which can be derived as the sum of the properties of the elements. like any socio-economic system, a cluster functions continuously, which means that as long as it functions, it exists. this is because all processes within the cluster are closely interrelated, since the appearance of a synergistic effect is impossible without the interconnected and purposeful work of the cluster entities. if we analyze the system properties of industry clusters, it is necessary to identify a number of general patterns. w.r. ashby (1956) highlighted the law of necessary diversity, which in cluster formations is manifested in an ability to self-development. this law reads as follows: in order to create a system that will be able to cope with a solution to a problem that has a large variety of solutions, a large variety of options and functional elements must be created within the system, in relation to the problem. this system must have them or be able to create them in a short time. the cluster-forming system is influenced by factors of the external and internal environment. analysis of the key elements of the mechanism of formation of the system of intra-cluster interaction 47 external factors affect the goal setting, the level of profitability in certain sectors of the economy, key factors of competitiveness, integration trends of enterprises, etc. according to the procedure for building a “goals tree”, they have a certain hierarchy, which is based on the principle of decomposition, which means that the achievement of the main goal is possible with the effective implementation of sub-goals in the hierarchy. the quantitative and qualitative indicators of the final goal depend on the resulting indicators at each of the levels. this property reflects the cluster structure and characterizes its intra-system connections. the overall structure of the cluster’s system relationships can be shown in figure 1. in the strategic economic policy of the state, in order to ensure the growth of regional competitiveness, solve the problems of unemployment, and increase the efficiency of a number of enterprises, it is necessary to stimulate the participants of cluster formations. this approach to the development of the regional economy is more and more common. however, the efficiency of cluster policies is debatable (brodzicki, kuczewska (eds.), 2012). in order to broaden the experience, the state policy should be based on a number of principles, including: 1. the principle of state regulation, which consists in developing a number of programs of state support for the development of cluster initiatives, creating the necessary and” comfortable” conditions for business to enter the cluster, ensuring the mechanism for the functioning of publicprivate partnerships, planning and monitoring its regulatory side, developing long-term strategies for the development of regional economies in the structure of the state, providing tax benefits to participants of cluster associations and projects implemented within the framework of public-private partnerships. 2. the principle of balance, which provides for the compliance of the developed strategies for the development of the regional economy with the interests and specifics of local cluster formations. 3. the principle of partnership, which provides for the cooperation of cluster structures with authorities of different levels, coordination and cooperation for the effective implementation of projects and implementation of interaction in various forms. 4. the principle of complementarity, which means that state support for the development of cluster formations should be provided not only from the state, but also from local budgets. continuity of flow processes (financial, material, information) integrativity of elementssystem integrity regional cluster self-organization and selfdevelopment synergistic effect of the cluster actors’ activities the presence of a synergistic effect in the case of effective joint activities of the cluster actors hierarchical development mechanism systemforming factors mechanism of adaptation to rapidly changing conditions system integrity at the level of vertical connections planning the development process organizational and financial stability ashby’s law of necessary diversity, cognitive flexibility of cluster structures communication skills the process of material and information exchange with the external environment fig. 1. structure of cluster system links source: own study. 48 anastasiia vasylchenko in order to analyze the development of the regional economy of the republic of belarus, we present the following data. the assessment of the degree of development of regions and countries is carried out using a number of universal integral indicators, one of which is the human development index developed by the undp. according to this index, in 2020 belarus occupied the 50th position out of 189 countries and was included in the group of countries with a very high level of human development according to the un classification. according to the indicators of countries ‚ achievement of the sustainable development goals, the republic was in the 23rd place (77.4 points out of 100), which is higher than the average score for the region of eastern europe and central asia. in the overall national welfare rating for 2019, belarus was ranked 73rd (out of 167 countries). the country also ranks high in terms of education (32nd place) and living conditions (45th place) (socio-economic status…, 2020). these results were achieved as a result of the implementation of forecast and program documents at the state and regional levels (ukaz..., 2016, 2019; postanovlenie..., 2019) and others, including presidential decrees, resolutions of the council of ministers concerning the socio-economic development of the regions of the republic of belarus, the national strategy for sustainable development (until 2030), the state program for the development of tourism “belarus hospitable” (2016–2020), state programs approved by industry, programs for socio-economic development developed at the level of regions, districts and cities of regional subordination and minsk. they reflect the main complex directions of the development of the regions of the republic, as well as the key directions of the development of the regions within individual sectors of the economy. they form the target indicators of their development and reflect the methods of evaluating the effectiveness of activities and the complexity of results. one of the features of the mechanism for stimulating the formation and functioning of innovation clusters is the expansion of the use of the potential of free economic zones (fez), which are located in each region and are part of the territory of the economic complex of the region. the main purpose of the functioning of the fez is to stimulate the free movement of resources and the optimal use of economic factors in the interests of a particular region. the use of a special fez regime for business entities that are part of an innovation and industrial cluster forms a mechanism for the effective functioning of the cluster and obtaining a relatively quick effect by attracting external and internal investments to the region. the analysis of the economic activity of the fez residents showed that today they do not fully use their potential, but in the future, they could become points of growth for the development of certain regions of belarus. the world experience of using the potential of fezs (the usa, japan and china) allows solving the problems of innovative development of regions and creating cluster formations that would ensure the effective development of regions. belarusian fezs have all the prerequisites for the formation and effective functioning of innovation clusters: tax incentives, the creation of an effective infrastructure, the creation of infrastructure, incubators for small and medium-sized businesses, etc. to create favorable conditions for the functioning of the fez, it is necessary to modernize the existing economic relations and create effective management structures in relation to the conditions of belarus, based on the experience of economically developed countries. another way is to transform cluster policy into regional smart specialization strategies. the eu has chosen this path in the period of 2014–2020 financial perspective. the initial research suggests positive outcomes of these strategies (wojnicka-sycz, sycz, 2018). 3. conclusions according to the formed system of intra-cluster relations (figure 1), the process of cluster formation can be carried out both with the help of the state and spontaneously, i.e. based on the prevailing favorable conditions. it is proved that the cluster’s ability to self-organize forms the mechanism of its functioning and development in the future. the study determines the structure of intra-system connections and its influence on the efficiency of the cluster functioning, which proves that the optimization of the cluster structure has a directly proportional relationship with the increase in the efficiency of its functioning. however, in the context of regional development, a balanced strategic component of the analysis of national economy sectors is also needed, taking into account the regional concentration of enterprises and their specialization, as well as the cluster-formation ability, the processes of self-organization of clusters, indicators of their development, cooperation and coordination of the levels of intersectoral relations and opportunities for stimulating enterprises participating in cluster formations. regions have different territorial and sectoral structures, different degrees of formed relations between enterprises, their integration and cooperation. in addition, the market environment forms and supports the development analysis of 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god» (eng. the decree of the president of the republic of belarus of 31 october 2019 no. 401 “on the parameters of the forecast of socio-economic development of the republic of belarus for 2020”), 2019, prezident respubliki belarus’, http://president.gov. by/uploads/documents/2019/401uk.pdf (accessed 04 april 2021). wojnicka-sycz e., sycz p., 2018, smart specializations as innovative ecosystems. 5th international multidisciplinary scientific conference on social sciences and arts, sgem 2018, [in:] 5th international multidisciplinary scientific conference on social sciences and arts sgem 2018, sgem scientific elibrary, book number 5.2., 479–486. doi: 10.5593/ sgemsocial2018/5.2/s20.060 journal of geography, politics and society 2023, 13(1), 11–21 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2023.1.02 the multiculturalism of a traditional economic region – the example of the katowice conurbation (poland) jerzy runge (1), anna runge (2) (1) institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, university of silesia in katowice, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 00000003-2766-4926 e-mail: jerzy.runge@us.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, university of silesia in katowice, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 00000003-1271-5559 e-mail: anna.runge@us.edu.pl citation runge j., runge a., 2023, the multiculturalism of a traditional economic region – the example of the katowice conurbation (poland), journal of geography, politics and society, 13(1), 11–21. abstract the katowice conurbation took shape from the end of the 18th century in the borderlands of two states, poland and germany. in this sense, it was an area on both their peripheries. permanent and dynamic interactions between different national-ethnic groups resulted in cultural intermingling. from the middle of the twentieth century, this complex settlement system was already at the centre of socio-economic development on a supra-regional scale. as a result of multidirectional migration, influenced by intensive industrialisation, social relations evolved between the migrants and the local (indigenous) population, as well as between the migrants themselves. the aim of this paper is to analyse the early multicultural nature of selected cities in the katowice conurbation against a methodological and terminological background and to indicate the extent to which this feature might be an asset in presentday socio-economic transformations in this area. the temporal and spatial overlapping of various origins of socio-cultural links and relations leads the authors to formulate the concepts of cultural genotype and primary and secondary cultural genotype, and to exemplify the formation of cultural genotypes in the katowice conurbation. key words multiculturalism, cultural genotype, katowice conurbation. received: 11 december 2022 accepted: 02 march 2023 published: 31 march 2023 1. introduction mass transcontinental emigration, the formation of nation states from the second half of the 19th century onwards, changes in the course of national borders after the first and second world wars, or the processes of economic transformation and social modernisation and, finally, globalisation – these all changed the face of socio-cultural differentiation. this concerned different size categories as well as the functional-spatial characteristics of individual towns and complex settlement systems. today, in the space of cities and urban complexes, it is often difficult to identify the previous cultural pluralism of local or regional communities (glazer, 1998; knight, 1982; newman, 2006; paasi, 2003). geopolitical realities have changed, the urban fabric underwent numerous transformations during and after the wars, while in many cases new residents have arrived in place of previous residents, often unaware of the 12 jerzy runge, anna runge socio-cultural complexity of the place have arrived in (otto, 2015). the complexity of socio-cultural transformations is particularly evident in historical and geographical borderlands, especially those where political and administrative changes have overlapped, corresponding to dynamic urbanisation transformations. at the same time, former national and ethnic regionalisms and nationalisms are being revived in many such areas (horowitz, 2000; kamusella, 2002). thus, we find attempts to conceptualise national and ethnic issues considered in the global sense (kłoskowska, 1966; esman, 2008), including theoretical comparisons with the possibilities of multicultural education (grant, lei (eds.), 2001). at the regional level, research interest encompasses central and eastern europe and its historical national-ethnic and denominational diversity (evans, need, 2002; keating, 1998; paasi, 2003). an interesting attempt to identify the role of transport in the spread of cultural diversity was presented by t. klinger and m. lanzendorf (2015), taking into account different modes of transport. as t.g. jordan and l. rowntree (1979) emphasise, the issue of ethnic diversity is an important component of cultural geography. among the important factors – from both a historical and contemporary point of view – is the issue of cultural differentiation in upper silesia, which was a borderland between prussia/ germany, russia and austria between 1795 and 1918. attempts have already been made to show the socio-sedentary complexity of this area (krzysztofik, 2014; runge, runge, 2020; runge, 2020; śliz, szczepański, 2015), the resurgence of regionalism (kamusella, 2002), or to identify the process by which upper silesians «find their place» in north rhine-westphalia (germany) – (otto 2015). the aim of this study is to outline the multicultural nature of selected cities in the katowice conurbation in the past against a methodological and terminological background and to indicate the extent to which this feature may be an asset in the contemporary socio-economic transformations of this area. multiculturalism is treated here in terms of religious and linguistic diversity. 2. multiculturalism and related issues the economic development recorded in the postwar years required adequate labour resources. therefore, the newly created silesian-dąbrowa voivodeship experienced an influx of people. this multidirectional migration – the outflow of the german population on the one hand, and the influx of migrants from the voivodeship’s rural areas and from outside the voivodeship on the other – shaped social relations between the migrants and the local (autochthonous) population, as well as between the migrants themselves. these relations were generally shaped in places of work and places of residence, which is a manifestation of multiculturalism. as a. śliz and m.s. szczepański (2011, p. 9 et seq.) note, multiculturalism is not a simple reflection of the proximity of social groups characterised by nationalethnic differences, places of origin, as well as developed relations between them. according to the authors, an important element of multiculturalism is also that cultures interact with each other in different ways. a. śliz and m.s. szczepański state that multiculturalism is a set of principles and processes for the implementation of social coexistence under conditions of [...] ethnic and social pluralism [...] and processes aimed at optimising social relations by equalizing rights and opportunities for participation, which allows for the levelling of tensions and conflicts (śliz, szczepański. 2011, p. 10). terms related in meaning to multiculturalism are interculturalism and transculturalism. while the former emphasises the identification of permanent and dynamic interactions between different nationalethnic groups, with the latter we are dealing with the enduring effect of the interpenetration of cultures as an intermediate type combining the characteristics of individual cultures. the interpenetration of cultures at different levels of social life is not new; it intensifies with economic transformation, social modernisation or globalisation. differentiating between multiculturalism, interculturalism or transculturalism does not exhaust the possibilities of distinguishing types of phenomena, depending on the criteria adopted. if the contact between two cultures is called duoculturalism, then having many cultures adjacent to each other would entail multiculturalism. changes over time make multiculturalism with a long duration (historical) possible, and this is exemplified by switzerland. consequently, a distinction should be made between mediumand short-term multiculturalism. generally, the former has an industrial basis. the abolition of serfdom facilitated massive, multidirectional migration processes towards dynamically developing cities in early capitalism, at the same time leading to a situation where national and ethnic groups of different origins would meet in the urban space. with the passage of time, these groups became more or less integrated, forming today’s relatively homogeneous urban communities. one manifestation of these the multiculturalism of a traditional economic region – the example of the katowice conurbation (poland) 13 integration processes is transculturalism, for example, in the form of mixed marriages. shortterm multiculturalism is also possible, and generally results from military conflicts or natural disasters. after such threats have passed, not all migrants return to the places they were forced to leave. another possible distinction can be made between indigenous multiculturalism and multiculturalism imposed by various causes (political, economic, social, etc.). such displacement, often of large social groups, nations and ethnic groups, has occurred many times in different regions of the world during the course of history. with regard to the spatial dimension of multiculturalism, one can identify state, regional or local forms of multiculturalism. in the first case, the state has various national-ethnic groups on its territory, in the second case, these groups reside only in a certain part of the national territory, while in the third case, they are found fragmentarily and locally in a small number of localities (towns or rural municipalities). the presence of national-ethnic groups in space can be either continuous or territorially discontinuous. immigrant individuals or families may reside in close proximity to each other, in the immediate vicinity (the same house, the same street, neighbourhood), or they may live some distance from their fellow citizens, ‘blending in’ with the local population. the last distinction cited here (though not the last possible one) is between exogenous and endogenous multiculturalism. the former indicates that the scale of multiculturalism in a country, region or local space is so great that it is difficult to identify the native representatives of the community in that territory. in the second case, representatives of other nations or ethnic groups are clearly in the minority within a given area. as signalled earlier, an important element of multiculturalism is the formation of a structure of social relations between representatives of different national or ethnic cultures. these relations have both a spatial and a structural dimension. the appearance of representatives of a given culture signifies a specific location in space and, at the same time, the fact of adopting a specific position (role) in the demographic and social structure of the inhabitants (age, gender, education, socioprofessional activity). thus, the spatial dimension of multiculturalism is connected with the place of residence, while the structural dimension is related to the place of work, study and the fulfilment of other social needs (knight, 1982). these places determine how direct and indirect social relations are formed. direct relations are oriented towards neighbours living next door and also towards work colleagues. in many cases, these are fellow residents, people representing the same cultural group, which generally results in the existence of territorial socio-cultural enclaves of different sizes (house, street, neighbourhood) – (jordan, rowntree, 1979). indirect relations are formed to a greater extent in places of work, studies, the occasional fulfilment of social needs (e.g. management of the workplace, administration of the university, management of units and departments in municipal administration). the formation of relations between representatives of national-ethnic groups is dynamic: it can stem from the varying degree of the influx/outflow of migrants over time, the changing directions of such migrations, and the degree of incumbency, as well as intra-territorial (country, region. local space) migration. while long-duration multiculturalism is generally highly stable, multiculturalism’s medium and short-duration forms are subject to political, economic, or social change due to economic cycles, social modernisation, or geopolitical decisions. other types of multiculturalism may overlap with long-duration multiculturalism. the silesianlesser poland (małopolska) borderlands are a case in point. the multiculturalism in this area, which had existed since the early middle ages, was first layered with medium-duration multiculturalism (a consequence of industrialisation at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries), and in the 20th century with the multiculturalism of a short duration (in the aftermath of world war i and world war ii). since the 10th century, the polish lands had also been home to a jewish community. the multiculturalism of the silesian-lesser poland borderlands meant that poles, jews, germans, russians, czechs or moravians coexisted here (1931 census). in the 10th century, jews appeared in the polish lands, but they were merchants traversing the trade routes, who stayed in the main trade settlements of the time, that is, krakow and przemysl. the first permanent settlements with a jewish population appeared later in the first half of the 11th century, in the suburb of wawel, in what was then cracow. larger groups of jews are found only at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries in silesian cities. they appeared after the expulsion of the jewish population from prague (kowalski, 2016, szuchta, 2015). the degree of cultural awareness and identity is subject to change. in the literature, the fact of migration from the countryside to urban areas has been equated with a shift from peasant culture to urban culture. in many cases, the adjacency of other cultures leads from indifference, through curiosity, to the adoption of certain behaviour patterns and customs of another culture, sometimes resulting in transcultural relationships (e.g. marriage). 14 jerzy runge, anna runge 3. cultural genotype and related concepts – a methodological proposal when talking about culture as a set of tangible and intangible values developed by a specific social group at a given stage of civilisational change, one should recognise the complex and multifaceted nature of this research issue, which is analysed by ethnologists, anthropologists, sociologists, cultural scientists and cultural geographers. when talking about cultural areas/regions, we ordinarily identify them in terms of the national-ethnic or religious context. these are the origins of studies of the indigenous peoples of north and south america, africa or australia, for example. in poland, this may apply to the inhabitants of podhale, the tatra mountains, the beskid żywiecki mountain range or upper silesia. however, the context of ethical norms, rituals, beliefs, material products, etc. obscures the fact that the cultural dimension of the local/regional community overlaps with everyday existence, and vice versa. culture is to a large extent what we want to use in order to distinguish ourselves from others (rituals), what we want to leave to future generations (material culture), or how we want to organise the group of which we are a member (norms of social life, law). the everyday functioning of an individual and of a social group in a given area denotes the ability to organise a kind of added value around oneself, which serves as a ‘superstructure’ for the biological rhythm of everyday life. in human history, we can note a process of superimposing various types of cultural values on this everyday life, from primitive humans, who documented this everyday life with drawings of hunting on cave walls, through the everyday life of ancient temples and pharaohs’ tombs with representations of battles fought on the desert sands, right through the greek amphorae with paintings of athletes, and then the works of dutch painters illustrating the everyday life of the inhabitants of amsterdam to the photographers and film-makers of the 20th century, documenting the everyday life of various societies around the world, etc. the dominance of the everyday ended with the decline of feudalism. relatively permanent local communities began to experience a transition towards the disintegration of previous human connections and relationships in favour of rural depopulation and displacement in favour of rapidly growing industrial cities. the hitherto daily, highly homogenous rhythm of rural, local social structures was replaced to varying degrees in different areas by new dynamic connections and relationships. the local communities of pyskowice, toszek, będzin, bieruń or mikołów, which had been growing since the middle ages, were progressively connected by closer or more distant neighbours – immigrant communities who came to work in the then new economic activities (mining, metallurgy), bringing with them their own cultural patterns. the consequence was a temporal and spatial overlapping of different origins of socio-cultural links and relations. at this point, it is necessary to introduce three concepts: the cultural genotype, and primary and secondary cultural genotype. the term cultural genotype refers to the earliest historically permanently settled social group in a given area, characterised by a particular material and immaterial culture, engaged in a specific type of spatial management, and, at the same time, maintaining links with the environment. two basic cultural genotypes are possible – primary and secondary. the primary genotype is a derivative of long-term, permanent settlement in a given area, while the secondary genotype emerges over a relatively short period of time as a derivative of dynamic change. the primary genotype could be further defined as autochthonous and the secondary genotype as allochthonous. in the former case, the genotype of a culture is characterised by a clear integrity, systemicity, a certain type of activity, primordiality or complexity. in the latter case, however, we are dealing with a blurring of these properties, to a greater or lesser extent. thus, the integrity of the primary genotype should be considered in terms of the degree to which the local community is closed (to what extent and under what conditions outsiders are accepted), while systemicity entails the predominance of in-group bonds and relations compared to out-group bonds and relations. in the case of the type of activity, we indicate certain proportions of tangible and intangible cultural products; primordiality means that the social group initiated the process of transformation of the area; and complexity is identified in terms of the multifaceted structural as well as the vectorial characteristics of the social group in question. this is the original proposal of the authors concept. in the case of a locality representing an allochthonous (secondary) cultural genotype, the properties listed above do not occur or are blurred (fuzzy). 4. the formation of cultural genotypes in the katowice conurbation the dynamic development of settlements resulting from the capitalist industrialisation of the core of the katowice conurbation meant that the differences between primary and secondary cultural genotypes began to diminish, especially where a second genotype appeared right next to the first. in some of the conurbation’s cities, this situation had a particular dimension. for example, in the middle ages and the following centuries there were more than 50 villages in the area of what is now zabrze, villages with different functional and spatial structures and, at the same time, different cultural genotypes. only the emergence of heavy industry led to an increase in population, along with an increase in the homogeneity of the spatialfunctional structure. however, this does not mean a unification of the city’s socio-cultural space: quite the contrary was the case. even today, zones of discontinuity reflecting the former boundaries between once independent localities are still visible. on the scale of the entire settlement system, processes of territorial integration and disintegration have both been recorded (krzysztofik, 2014), leading to cultural differences being erases or strengthened. in the form of what might be termed ‘guiding fossils’, local/local communities characterised by a primary cultural genotype and dating back to the preindustrial period have been preserved until today, integrated into the surrounding secondary cultural genotypes. research in this area carried out in the 1990s by sociologists confirmed the inertia of sociocultural transformations in the workers’ hamlets and settlements established in various parts of the katowice conurbation (e.g. the nikiszowiec and giszowiec settlements in katowice). this ‘cultural mosaicism’ not only has a historical dimension but also a contemporary and prospective one, most often being a consequence of migration waves associated with large, supra-regional economic investments, both within the katowice conurbation and in other parts of the province. jastrzębie zdrój, dąbrowa górnicza or tychy are characteristic cases of secondary cultural genotype in the postwar years. here, the autochthonous local cultural genotype was superimposed on a significant scale by a dominant allochthonous cultural type. the migratory influx, both from different localities in this province and from other regions of the country, resulted in the superimposition of different cultural patterns in workplaceand cooperative housing estates. paradoxically, the effect of migrants flowing in from different localities of the closer and further surroundings of the secondary genotype locality does not equate to a process by which socio-cultural links and relations are intensified. the weakening of neighbourhood relations and the anonymity of neighbouring households are more significant in the case of large-scale housing. a factor frequently complementing this is the indifference, sometimes resentment, of the permanent residents of the villages in which these hamlets / settlements were located. researchers’ attention has been drawn far more often to the urban features of the new settlements than to the formation of their internal socio-cultural structure. it suffices to review the state of the literature on the socio-cultural issues of dąbrowa górnicza, jastrzębie zdrój and tychy. in view of the scale of supra-regional economic investments in these localities, the formation of allochthonous cultural patterns has been examined to an extremely modest degree. this mostly concerns the localities of the dynamically developing core of the katowice or rybnik conurbation. in fact, the most spectacular case of dąbrowa górnicza is still to be subject to a synthetic analysis of the formation of a secondary (allochthonous) cultural genotype, initiated first by the establishment of the bankowa steelworks in the 19th century, and a century later by the katowice steelworks. the authors of existing publications focus more on the issues of local identity, economic changes, or cross-border relations across the przemsza and brynica rivers with neighbouring silesia (śliz, szczepański, 2011, 2015). taking into account the number of towns and cities that make up the present-day silesian voivodeship, the changing administrative divisions, and the numerous intra-regional adjustments to the boundaries of towns and rural communes, the creation of multiculturalism in this area and its neighbouring areas should be considered at various territorial levels, from the local to the regional level. the local level of multiculturalism manifests itself where a specific national/ethnic or religious group occupies a certain part of the city, for example, a street, city block or neighbourhood. in every city, a hierarchy of neighbourhoods/functional areas can be identified, in which the characteristics of the socio-cultural groups resident there can be placed on an ordinal scale according to the structure of this population. one element of this structure is the presence of specific socio-cultural groups that enhance or downgrade the attractiveness of an area. for example, in the case of katowice, one such depreciating area is the district of załęże, directly to the west of the central district; in the case of chorzów it is the district of chorzów ii, where the kościuszko steelworks was located, the fundamental employment base in this city until it was liquidated; in the case of sosnowiec, it is the district of konstantynów, in the case of świętochłowice, the district of lipiny, etc. in contrast, socio-culturally enhancing are those fragments of the city in which representatives of the creative class are located, the multiculturalism of a traditional economic region – the example of the katowice conurbation (poland) 15 most often situated within individual developer housing, in revitalised residential spaces and in other attractive locations. the socio-cultural dimension of the distinctiveness of this group is signified by their multifaceted activity on a city/regional and, in many cases, supra-regional scale. belonging to the creative class also means being able to make different kinds of decisions that affect the functional and spatial structure of the region, as well as the demographic and social processes and structures recorded here. the location in the local space is occasionally accompanied by multifaceted links and relations with the surroundings. the local level of socio-cultural differentiation constitutes a unification of national-ethnic and religious differentiation on the one hand and local multiculturalism in historical-structural terms on the other. at the local level (on the basis of census statistics), we can identify structural changes in socio-cultural differentiation. at the same time, we are able to compare these changes in different time periods in individual localities. these can be interpreted in terms of strengthening or weakening socio-cultural differences. at the regional level, first of all, it is important to identify the external causes of the ongoing changes in the socio-cultural space. these may stem from national social policy priorities, from economic projects that have been initiated and affect the regional labour market, including the extent and volume of population movements leading to changes in the socio-cultural space. moving from the local to the regional scale, we are confronted with successive levels of generalisation in the picture of the differentiation of socio-cultural space. 5. the statistical dimension of multiculturalism multiculturalism treated in terms of national-ethnic and religious diversity has a numerical dimension in the official statistics. here, censuses are the primary source of information on the number and territorial presence of representatives of specific nationalities, ethnic groups or religions on the territory of the country as a whole and in individual administrative units. as the authors prove in the 3rd volume of the history of silesia, published in 1976 under the editorship of s. michalkiewicz ((ed.), 1976), it is particularly difficult to identify the territorial range of polishness in nationality statistics from the silesian area since the intensification of the industrialisation process (1850–1890). on the one hand, it was as early as the middle ages that czech influences began to be felt, then later austrian, from the middle of the 18th century prussian and, from 1871, german. as a result of the collapse of the polish state at the end of the 18th century, the subsequent three partitions, or the establishment in 1790-1805 of what was termed ‘new silesia’ east of the border line of the przemsza and brynica rivers separating the historical regions of silesia from western lesser poland, this rapidly developing region was described by three different sets of national statistics – prussiangerman, austrian and russian. this makes direct comparisons of local statistics difficult. in practice, the declaration of using the polish language at home was a legitimate identification criterion for polish in silesian conditions. the national-ethnic and confessional diversity was shaped by and overlaid (especially from the second half of the 19th century onwards) with external migratory movements (migration inflows and outflows) on the one hand, and by migrations from the countryside to the cities, on the other hand. while in the years 1850–1858 the opole governmental district (regierungsbezirk), covering the area of upper silesia, recorded a migration increase of 11,700, in the following years there was already an outflow (1859–1867) of 9,000 people, 1868–1880, a decreases of 69,500 people, and from 1881–1890 a decrease of 80,900 people. as t. ładogórski (1976, p. 41) notes, these were emigrants heading for saxony, and also for america. the author estimated the first group at 80–90,000 people, and the second at around 120,000. among those heading over the ocean were upper silesian peasants from the vicinity of strzelce opolskie and toszek, settling in 1854–1855 in texas, where the polish language has been preserved to this day. according to the author’s estimates, in 1890 there were approximately 600,000 people born in upper silesia outside the silesian voivodeship, i.e. 14% of the local population. at the same time, 188,000 people were born outside upper silesia in the same year. the largest number of immigrants at that time came from greater poland (wielkopolska) (49,200 people), austria and russia (40,700 people), berlin and brandenburg (33,800 people), and 25,900 people from saxony. however, this direction of migration was insufficient to counterbalance the general outflow from upper silesia, referred to in the literature as the ostflucht (ładogórski, 1976, p. 43). migrations towards the rhineland and westphalia and beyond the borders of europe intensified at the turn of the 20th century. migration from the countryside to the cities was also an important part of population movements. 16 jerzy runge, anna runge this was motivated by the desire to break out of rural poverty, which was facilitated by the abolition of serfdom in prussia at the beginning of the 19th century. in particular, the rapidly developing hamlets and factory settlements were for many immigrants from the countryside a manifestation of sociocultural urbanisation, the acquisition of a sense of urbanity, the creation of highly homogeneous population centres, functioning in many cases far from inner city spaces. it is estimated that between 1/2 and 3/4 of urban residents were immigrants from rural areas. for example, according to an 1890 statistic, 63.0 per cent of bytom’s population was born outside the city, in the królewska huta district of chorzów 52.0 per cent, and in racibórz 64.0 per cent (ładogórski, 1976, p. 44). according to estimates made by t. ładogórski (1976, p. 52), in 1840 the proportion of the polish population in districts with a predominance of this nationality reached 90.1%, whereas by 1890 it had decreased to 82.2%. among the towns in the katowice conurbation, the relatively weakest share of the polish population in 1890 was in bytom (55.0%), while katowice had a polish population of 79.0%, tarnowskie góry 85.0% and zabrze 82.0%. in 1890 second place in terms of nationality structure was occupied by germans, ranging from 44.9% in bytom to 20.9% in katowice. the jewish community in predominantly polish boroughs did not exceed 6.0% at that time (5.9% in bytom). as indicated earlier, the changing geopolitical location of the katowice conurbation meant that the processes and socio-economic structures were recorded in population censuses at different times in the prussian/german, russian or austrian parts of the region. therefore, only partial comparability of the data is possible. moreover, due to limited space, this publication focuses only on the denominational structure and mother tongue as identifiers of multiculturalism. a publication by a. krzyżanowski and k. kumaniecki (1915) entitled statystyka polski (statistics of poland) and the materials from the 1931 census were used. owing to poland’s absence from the political map of europe, the authors used data for 1910 from the statistical offices of germany, russia and austria, compiling the data regionally, including data for the cities and districts of upper silesia. we find data on the denominational structure for six cities in the katowice conurbation area (table 1). the multiculturalism of a traditional economic region – the example of the katowice conurbation (poland) 17 tab.1. denominational structure in selected cities in the silesian voivodeship in 1910. city religious denomination roman-catholic protestant jewish other bytom 85.38 10.71 3.81 0.10 gliwice 81.55 15.53 2.68 0.24 katowice 71.88 20.83 6.89 0.40 królewska huta 86.93 11.80 1.24 0.03 tarnowskie góry 94.54 4.71 0.75 0.00 zabrze 94.98 4.25 0.75 0.02 source: own analysis based on: krzyżanowski, kumaniecki, 1915 (tab. 42 districts in upper silesia (rejencya opolska). area. 1910 population of towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants, p. 70). in six cities in the western and central part of the katowice conurbation, the roman catholic denomination was predominant, with over 80%, and in zabrze and tarnowskie góry even reaching a level of over 90% (94.98% and 94.54%, respectively). however, the proportions of protestant and jewish denominations varied. relative to the other centres, gliwice had the highest percentage of protestants and zabrze the lowest. among the adherents of judaism, the highest percentage of this community was in katowice, bytom, followed by gliwice. they were least represented in tarnowskie góry. comparing these figures with other localities in upper silesia, it was apparent that the jewish community was concentrated in the larger industrial cities, and was significantly smaller in the other localities, including rural areas. as the territory of the polish state, resurgent after 123 years of partitions, was still being formed after the end of the first world war, the 1921 census did not include upper silesia and vilnius. it was not until the 1931 census that population tables by religious denomination and mother tongue were included. in fact, the data in the tables refer to the administrative division as of 01.08.1934. it should be remembered that the present-day katowice conurbation found itself in two countries after world war i – the western part lay in the territory of germany, while the central and eastern parts were part of the polish state. after the creation of the silesian voivodeship in 1922, in practice, the territory of the dąbrowa basin (zagłębie dąbrowskie – the eastern part of the katowice conurbation) became part of kielce voivodeship. this fact is taken into account in tables 2 and 3, which present the denominational structure and mother tongue in the nine cities, respectively. in the denominational structure (table 2), the previously high dominance of the roman catholic denomination was confirmed. it was only in sosnowiec that the percentage of this denomination was below 80% (79.5%). the jewish denomination came second (będzin, czeladź, dąbrowa górnicza and sosnowiec). a particularly high proportion of the jewish denomination was recorded in będzin; in fact, będzin was commonly called a ‘jewish town’. in chorzów, katowice, mysłowice and tarnowskie góry, on the other hand, protestants were the second most numerous religious denomination. comparing the data from 1910 with the 1931 census, one can discern a decrease in the share of adherents of judaism in katowice, chorzów and tarnowskie góry, which could perhaps be explained by the first world war and emigration from overseas. 18 jerzy runge, anna runge tab.2. denominational structure in selected cities in the silesian voivodeship in 1931. city religious denomination total romancatholic and armeniancatholic greekcatholic orthodox protestant jewish other and unspecified będzin 100.0 54.18 0.04 0.10 0.12 45.43 0.13 chorzów 100.0 92.19 0.04 0.05 4.78 2.76 0.18 czeladź 100.0 94.38 0.04 0.13 0.19 5.13 0.13 dąbrowa górnicza 100.0 85.27 0.02 0.30 0.27 13.94 0.20 katowice 100.0 89.81 0.14 0.11 5.09 4.53 0.32 mysłowice 100.0 94.50 0.09 0.13 3.10 2.04 0.14 siemianowice śl. 100.0 94.83 0.03 0.01 4.35 0.64 0.14 sosnowiec 100.0 79.48 0.09 0.44 0.72 19.09 0.18 tarnowskie góry 100.0 95.44 0.07 0.09 2.74 1.62 0.04 source: authors’ own analysis based on: narodowy..., 1931 (tab. 11. population by sex and religion. silesian voivodeship p. 24–25; kielce voivodship p. 32 and 34). in terms of linguistic structure, the dominance of polish as the mother tongue among the inhabitants of the cities was evident (table 3). in relative terms, the smallest margin of polish predominance was recorded in będzin (55.4%), which was due to the high proportion of będzin’s jewish community using yiddish (40.0%). in neighbouring sosnowiec, the proportions were 81.9% to 17.3%. while yiddish was prominent in the cities of the dąbrowa basin (the eastern part of the katowice conurbation), german was the second most widely spoken language in silesia’s cities (chorzów, mysłowice, siemianowice śląskie, tarnowskie góry). thus, in spite of the dismantling of the state border between germany and russia after the first world war, the socio-cultural boundary (religion, mother tongue) along the przemsza and brynica rivers, which formed the state border from 1795 to 1914, remained in place between the wars. 6. discussion the katowice conurbation was formed from the end of the 18th century on the border of two states, poland and germany. in this sense, it was an area on their peripheries. since the mid-20th century, however, this complex settlement system has been a centre of socio-economic development on a supra-regional scale. while centres are the focus of socio-economic life, determining not only the transformation of their own territory but also that of other areas, the periphery is an area of socio-economic and cultural influence. peripherality is associated with the fluidity of borders, the difficulty of creating a unified political centre, or socio-cultural, religious and confessional homogeneity (skrok, 2008, pp. 9–12). yet this dualism of territories is by no means obvious. analysing the history of the great powers that created political, economic or cultural centres of civilisation, one can see both the processes of transition from the position of the periphery towards the centre and the loss of significance of the previous rank. the cycle of transformation did not have to end there, as in many cases development impulses became apparent after a certain time. one need only trace the historical process of the movement of the centre of europe’s socio-economic and cultural development after the great geographical discoveries began (genoa, lisbon, madrid, amsterdam, london) – (braudel, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). for example, in central europe, states emerged successively over time: great moravia, bohemia, the habsburg empire, austriahungary, modern austria, all punctuated by periods of relative peace. the polish lands also experienced periods of political, economic and socio-cultural prosperity, as well as the collapse of the state, the partitions, and then, after world war one, its reinstatement 123 years after its independence was lost. similar variability of transformations, as well as the variability of processes and structures within the area are characteristic of many other peripheries initiating their transformations in the first or second kondratieff cycle (kondratiew, 1925). as m. barwiński notes (2016, pp. 148–150), interest in multiculturalism is not only of historical dimension; quite the contrary is the case. the recorded processes of globalisation, social modernisation, multidirectional migration, or urbanisation and suburbanisation cause an intensification of contacts between individuals, social groups presenting different types of norms, behaviours, and cultural customs. poland’s accession to the eu has opened up the possibility of both short-term trips to western european countries and permanent moves, with direct contact with the national culture there, on the one hand, and contact with non-european immigrants arriving from various parts of the world on the other hand (especially former colonies). this dual cultural contact, often manifesting itself between districts/ areas inhabited by different national-ethnic or worker groups, required certain pro-social attitudes, both on the local labor market and in the places of residence. one might even venture the hypothesis that historical multiculturalism between the 1st and 2nd cycles of kondratieff ’s theory (1925) was subject to a process of erasure in europe with the rise in military conflicts from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century. the creation of nation-states and the first and second world wars significantly reduced or, in many cases, eliminated the previous national-ethnic and denominational differentiation. at the same time, with the decline of colonialism, economic migration by the inhabitants of former colonies to europe’s colonial states began in the aftermath of world war ii, resulting in the formation of multicultural cities and regions. the accumulation of socio-political and economic problems and armed conflicts all contributes to an increase in refugees/ migration to economically developed countries. according to r. kaczmarek, borderlands are culturally attractive, economically dynamic, and creative in the creation of new the multiculturalism of a traditional economic region – the example of the katowice conurbation (poland) 19 tab.3. linguistic structure of selected cities in the silesian voivodeship in 1931. city linguistic structure total polish russian czech german jewish hebrew other będzin 100.0 55.40 0.02 0.01 0.07 40.03 4.34 0.13 chorzów 100.0 87.03 0.01 0.02 11.70 0.95 0.18 0.12 czeladź 100.0 95.28 0.05 0.01 0.03 4.30 0.04 0.30 dąbrowa górnicza 100.0 86.05 0.10 0.01 0.04 12.90 0.37 0.53 katowice 100.0 84.91 0.04 0.04 13.44 1.10 0.15 0.32 mysłowice 100.0 89.76 0.04 0.01 9.37 0.61 0.06 0.16 siemianowice śl. 100.0 92.44 0.00 0.03 7.36 0.12 0.02 0.02 sosnowiec 100.0 81.87 0.17 0.01 0.15 16.81 0.81 0.19 tarnowskie góry 100.0 83.22 0.03 0.01 16.35 0.29 0.01 0.09 source: authors’ own analysis based on: the narodowy..., 1931 (tab. 12. population by sex and native language. silesian voivodeship p. 26–27; kielce voivodeship p. 35 and 37). tomek komentarz w tekście linguistic structure patterns of behaviour and political visions thanks to the diversity of people living there and the transfer of ideas [...] today, borderland regions, with the richness of the traditions of their inhabitants, need not be a problem. without losing their social dynamism, they are among the best economically and culturally developing in the whole of europe, as long as they do not allow themselves to be pushed into sterile disputes that have been taken over in a raw state from the last century, disputes about whether they should be integrated (read: unified) as quickly as possible into a homogenous nation state... (kaczmarek, 2010, p. 67). according to h. rusek (2000, pp. 146–47), when talking about borderlands, we usually mean cultural borderlands. yet there are many dimensions to this concept – from spatial to non-spatial (psychological), from economic to socio-cultural, from regional to national, or from inter-group to inter-cultural, etc. h. rusek (2000, p. 147) emphasises that «the multicultural space of the borderlands [...] imposes on its inhabitants the necessity to develop and adopt complex attitudes towards it, which often differ in relation to particular spheres of life...». according to rusek, borderland multiculturalism occurs in two different senses: • firstly, it is an analytical category enabling description of the multiplicity of cultures in the area being studied; • and secondly, it is an ideology of multiculturalism, leading to the observance of norms of customs, legal systems, etc. that create a policy towards minorities, allowing differences to be respected and accepted in the name of democracy and tolerance. while the central territory is characterised by a higher level of homogeneity of socio-economic and cultural processes and structures, the periphery is generally not as homogeneous. such areas may be subject to significant territorial variations in the formation of political-administrative, socioeconomic and cultural processes and structures. thus, we are dealing with the multidimensional external variability of borderlands, as well as with their internal variability. the former is the result of the clash of interactions and relations between the central territories, while the latter stems from the intra-border differentiation of the constituent local and sub-regional spaces. within borderlands, changes are generally a consequence of military conflicts (shifts of political borders, mass migration movements), the introduction of new administrative divisions, as well as the correction of existing ones, and contemporary socio-economic policies that initiate, for example, large economic investments, thus significantly changing the functional and spatial structure of the area. irrespective of the central or peripheral source of the initiation of economic and social change, the intangible components of the cultural heritage of border regions are the historical legacy of earlier stages of transformation, alongside material cultural dimension. 7. conclusion local communities formed up until the rise of industrialisation were relatively homogeneous and had a small proportion of immigrants, mainly as a result of the segmentation of local labour markets (merchants, craftsmen, liberal professions). these communities attracted to the area of today’s katowice conurbation those who were interested in the possibilities of trade on an important european route from western europe to the east from the middle ages onwards. this promoted the relatively even development of numerous towns and cities in the upper silesia area. however, it was not until coal mining and metallurgy emerged that the processes of change were diversified beyond this west-east axis. the influx of migrants to the mines and smelters led to multifaceted socio-cultural stratification in terms of area of origin (locals, immigrants), income (factory owners, landowners, managers, engineers, foremen, workers), religious denomination (catholics, evangelicals, orthodox, jews), place in the social hierarchy (aristocracy, clergy of various denominations, bourgeoisie, workers, peasants), nature of family ties, or by the degree of local/regional awareness and identity. the immigrants’ language became a component of the local inhabitants’ gradually forming dialect. over the years, the silesian dialect has meant a dual closingoff in relation to others on the one hand, in terms of territory, and in terms of language on the other. this closing has been accompanied over the years by the proximity of the historical, geographical and sociocultural borders on the przemsza and brynica rivers. 20 jerzy runge, anna runge references barwiński m., 2016, wielokulturowość we współczesnych polskich badaniach geograficznych i edukacji geograficznej – zarys problematyki, (eng. multiculturalism in contemporary geographical studies and geographical education in poland – an outline of the subject), przegląd geograficzny, 88(2), 137–157. doi: 10.7163/przg.2016.2.1 braudel f., 1992a, kultura materialna, gospodarka i kapitalizm xv–xviii wiek, t. i: struktury codzienności (eng. civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, vol. i: the structure of everyday), piw, warszawa. epochs), [in:] s. michalkiewicz (ed.), historia śląska, tom. iii: 1850–1890 (eng. history of silesia, vol. iii: 1850–1890), wydawnictwo ossolineum, wrocław, 21–61. michalkiewicz s. 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wydawnictwo gebethner i spółka, kraków. ładogórski t., 1976, ludność śląska na przełomie dwóch epok (eng. the population of silesia at the turn of two journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(4), 33–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.4.04 changes in the ways of using plots in allotment gardens in poland. a case of selected gardens in the łódź voivodship roman szkup departament of urban geography, tourism and geoinformation, university of łódź, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-1605-5335 e-mail: roman.szkup@geo.uni.lodz.pl citation szkup r., 2022, changes in the ways of using plots in allotment gardens in poland. a case of selected gardens in the łódź voivodship, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(4), 33–41. abstract the the article attempts to check whether there is spatial regularity in the relationship between the model of agricultural and productive use of allotment gardens and the leisure and recreational model. the article also presents socio-demographic features of users nowadays defining the use of plots in gardens. the objectives were achieved by means of a direct inventory and a questionnaire survey conducted among users of five gardens: one located in łódź and four located in the western part of the suburban zone of łódź. as a result of the analysis, it was found that the farther from the center of łódź, the less dominant the leisure and recreational model was. in addition, it was found that the users’ professional activity and age are the sociodemographic features which today determine the way of using plots in gardens. key words allotment gardens (ag), allotment gardening, use of allotment gardens, landscaping of allotment gardens. received: 11 july 2022 accepted: 28 october 2022 published: 30 december 2022 1. introduction the idea of allotment gardens comes from the circle of social activists from the end of the 19th century (acton, 2010). although the first gardens in poland began to be created at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, their development on a wider scale took place only after the second world war (pawlikowskapiechotka, 2010). allotment gardens perform many functions, having economic, social, cultural, educational, health and environmental benefits (among others, drescher et al., 2006; nettle, 2010; perez-vazquez et al., 2005). the relationship between an allotment plot and health is becoming an important and increasingly frequently discussed problem. among others, two functions of gardens are emphasized. the first one is of an economic and social nature. the role of allotment gardens as a place of social activation conducive to the activity of economically inactive people and as a place of recreation and active leisure is emphasized (duś, 2014; mokrasgrabowska, 2020; szkup, pytel, 2016). for the poorer and economically inactive people (including pensioners), activities carried out on plots in family allotment gardens1 are the only form of 1 rodzinny ogród działkowy (family allotment garden) in polish is commonly referred to with an acronym rod. in this article the term allotment garden means a family allotment garden. 34 roman szkup active recreation (matczak, szkup, 2010; szkup, 2013; szkup, pytel, 2015). in the past, gardens performed a clearly economic function by supplying agricultural produce to the population from the poorest social strata (moran, 1990; poniży et al., 2021; riley, 1979). over time, the agricultural and productive function of gardens has become much smaller than before. changes in everyday life caused by the development of civilization (including the deluge of cheap food in hypermarkets) and political transformations in poland, contributed to the intensification of the process of gradual change in the use of allotment gardens from agricultural and productive use to recreational use. conducting research in 2008– 2011 on a representative sample of 10 łódź family allotment gardens, r. szkup (2013) stated that at that time only one third of the plots (36.7%) were used exclusively for agricultural and productive purposes. this is related to the health aspect of the functioning of allotment gardens, including their positive impact on their users’ health (armstrong, 2000; bell, et al., 2020; turner et al., 2011; twiss et al., 2003; van den berg et al., 2010). however, it should be borne in mind that the covid-19 pandemic has changed not only the mental state of the population, but also many of their behaviors (grabowski et al., 2021; heitzman, 2020; lorettu, 2021; sozański et al., 2021), including spatial ones (stępień et al., 2021). the models of the use of allotment gardens is no different (schoen et al., 2021; szkup, 2020). therefore, it can be assumed that nowadays the recreational and sports model of the use of allotment gardens will become dominant. the article attempts to verify whether the form of using plots in family allotment gardens in the era of the covid-19 pandemic demonstrates spatial regularity. the hypothesis was formulated that the farther from the center a given allotment garden is located, the more important the model of agricultural and productive development of the plot is, and the smaller the recreational and sports model. in addition, the article aims to indicate the scale of such changes and to present the socio-demographic characteristics of users who nowadays decide to use plots in allotment gardens. figure 1 shows the location of allotment garden in the context of the division into poviats2. as can be seen, the zacisze allotment garden is located on the outskirts, but still within the administrative boundaries of łódź (approx. 9 km in a straight line from the center of łódź). near the border of łódź, but already in the pabianice poviat, there are two allotment gardens: pod borem and kalina (approx. 10 and 13 km). much farther away are the żeromski allotment gardens (approx. 25 km) and wolinka (approx. 39 km). 2. materials and methods the research in all five gardens was carried out during the covid-19 pandemic, at the turn of august and september in 2020 and in 2021. the main materials were obtained using the survey method (questionnaire interview). direct inventory of plots in the examined gardens was also conducted. 2 a powiat (poviat) is the second-level unit of local government and administration in poland, equivalent to a county, district or prefecture in other countries (lau-1). 0 5 10 km zacisze kalina pod borem im. żeromskiego wolinka łódź zgierski poddębicki zduńskowolski łaski pabianicki łódzki wschodni piotrkowski fig. 1. location of the examined allotment gardens in the context of the division into poviats source: own elaboration. changes in the ways of using plots in allotment gardens in poland. a case of selected gardens in the łódź voivodship 35 due to the fact that there is no database of legal and actual users of allotment gardens in poland (moskalonek et al., 2020), the questionnaire survey was not representative. despite the lack of representativeness, a significant number of questionnaire interviews were conducted – 386 (tab. 1), i.e. interviews were conducted with nearly half of all users of the surveyed gardens. in addition, more than 90% of all plots in the gardens were inventoried. since the questionnaire interview was conducted in direct contact with the respondents, despite maintaining social distance, some users refused to participate in the study (in all gardens there were about 10% of such cases – more in 2020 than in 2021). it should also be noted that despite repeated visits to the gardens, about 1/4 of the plots were not used during the research (there were no users on these plots). the zacisze family allotment garden is located at 17a kasprowicza street in nowosolna, which currently is part of the łódź-widzew district. the garden is located in the immediate vicinity of a forest and areas used for agriculture. the zacisze allotment garden neighbors on several other gardens – the polanka allotment garden, the tulipan allotment garden, the jaśmin allotment garden and the relaks allotment garden. the garden was created in 1980 and originally had 125 plots. due to the location of the garden in the vicinity of a now defunct rubbish dump, at the end of the 1990s, a protection zone was designated for sanitary reasons and thus some of the plots in the garden were liquidated. currently, the zacisze allotment garden is a small garden in terms of the number of plots, with 76 plots. although the total area of the garden is 8.44 ha, the area of plots in the garden is only 3.2 ha. the garden is used in 100% by the inhabitants of łódź. the kalina family allotment garden is located in the city of konstantynów łódzki. it consists of two parts. the first (larger) one is mainly accessible from lutomierska street, the other one – from krzywa street. the initiative to create a garden arose in 1983, and the construction of the garden took 2 years. the kalina allotment garden neighbors on two other gardens –the malwa allotment garden and the zgoda allotment garden, with which it once shared a connection to the water supply. currently, the kalina allotment garden comprises 169 plots. 127 plots are located in the southern part, while in the northern, smaller part – 42 plots. the total area of the garden is 8.22 ha. in the vast majority the garden is used by the inhabitants of łódź. the pod borem family allotment garden is located in the city of konstantynów łódzki on józefów street. in the immediate vicinity of the garden there are detached houses. the river ner flows 750 m away. the pod borem allotment garden was established in 1980 as the implementation of the application of the nszz «solidarność» trade union submitted to the management of then functioning «konstilana» wool factory. the «konstilana» factory acquired an area intended for the garden. at that time, 155 plots with a total area of 8.64 ha were allotted. in 2006, the adjacent pod górką allotment garden was incorporated into the garden. currently, the pod borem allotment garden consists of 179 plots. the total area of the garden is 12.20 ha. the garden is mostly used by the inhabitants of łódź and konstantynów łódzki. the żeromski family allotment garden is located in łask, in the kolumna district in miła and przedwiośnie streets. the garden complex is bordered only by clusters of detached houses, and there is a large forest complex and łask-kolumna railway station nearby. the garden was founded in 1962 on the initiative of local residents who wanted to create a garden to grow their own vegetables and fruits. the garden area was originally a wet wasteland that was drained and reclaimed. over time, a pond was dug in the garden. currently, the żeromski allotment garden has 135 plots with the total area of the garden being 5.77 ha. the garden is mostly used by the inhabitants of łódź. the wolinka family allotment garden is located in the town of zduńska wola on lipowa street. in the vicinity of the wolinka allotment garden there are detached houses, a city beltway, a combined heat and power plant and a large housing estate. a few hundred meters away there are large industrial plants – wola and zwoltex. the planning for the establishment of the wolinka allotment garden began in 1967, and the garden itself was open to use in 1970. the wolinka allotment garden was established on the wave of mass creation of allotment gardens in socialist poland on the initiative of the central authorities, and with the intention to be used by the working class. trade unions from the wola plant largely contributed to the creation of the wolinka allotment garden – it was mainly the employees of this factory who were the first users of plots. currently, the wolinka allotment garden has 237 plots, and the total area of the garden amounts to 7.42 ha. the garden is used in over 90% by the inhabitants of zduńska wola. among the 386 surveyed plot users, there were no people living permanently or having a residence abroad. over 84% of users were people living in łódź. among the respondents, there was a slight predominance of women (51.0%) over men (49.0%). 36 roman szkup table 1. percentage structure of the surveyed users of the examined allotment gardens. total wolinka żeromski kalina pod borem zacisze total number of plots 796 237 135 179 169 76 number of surveyed users 386 63 54 100 100 69 percentage of plots surveyed 48.5 26.6 40.0 55.9 59.2 90.8 sex: male [%] 49.0 58.7 57.4 38.0 52.0 44.9 female [%] 51.0 41.3 42.6 62.0 48.0 55.1 age: median age of the respondents [years] 54.4 58.2 62.8 53.5 50.7 51.4 under 40 years old [%] 17.4 12.7 0.0 18.0 26.0 30.4 40-49 years old [%] 17.4 17.5 7.4 25.0 21.0 16.0 50-59 years old [%] 21.2 23.8 22.2 20.0 21.0 18.8 60–69 years old [%] 25.4 20.6 53.7 15.0 19.0 18.8 70–79 years old [%] 16.2 15.9 16.7 22.0 12.0 14.5 80 years old and over [%] 2.4 9.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 occupational status: unemployed [%] 2.8 7.9 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.9 employed [%] 53.3 42.9 29.6 61.0 71.0 62.3 retired and pensioners [%] 43.9 49.2 70.4 36.0 29.0 34.8 place of residence: łódź [%] 84.2 0.0 83.3 81.0 51.0 100.0 other cities of the łódź agglomeration [%] 15.8 100.0 16.7 19.0 49.0 0.0 source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. which in the case of the łódź voivodeship is not surprising – the research conducted by the present author in łódź allotment gardens in 2008–2014 also shows that the sex structure of users of łódź allotment gardens is very similar to the sex structure of the inhabitants of łódź, where there is a small surplus of women over men (szkup, 2013; szkup, pytel, 2015). a slight majority of women may also testify to the greater activity of women during the covid-19 pandemic. on the other hand, the surplus of men was clearly visible among garden users aged 50–79. the allotment garden users’ age is related to their professional activity (szkup, 2013); the dominant groups in the study were professionally active and relatively young users (median age: 54.4 years), who constituted 56.7%, people with vocational education (32.2%), those with a large family (59.1%) and those who defined their financial situation as average (76.4%). the analysis used classification and regression trees (cart) (see: klusowski, 2020; steinberg, 2009). 3. results and discussion the role played in human life by family allotment gardens is reflected, among others, in the way of the development and use of the plot itself. the very physiognomy of the plot can tell a lot about its owner. a well-maintained plot, with maximally used and developed space, proves a very strong, emotional relationship between the owner and the used piece of land. anyone who has had the opportunity to visit an allotment garden can notice that nowadays two types of plots dominate: a typically agricultural and productive plots dominated by fruit and vegetable plantings (sometimes small greenhouses) and plots with well-maintained lawns, with grassy mini football and volleyball fields, which only serve relaxation and sports recreation (mokras-grabowska, 2020; szkup, 2013). while studying the łódź family allotment gardens, r. szkup (2013) distinguished two basic models of plot development: 1. the model of agricultural and productive development of the plot – it concerned plots dominated by the area related to cultivation of land (a garden and vegetable area and an orchard area). in addition to buildings and communication space, there may be residual amounts of wooded areas and poorly invested sports and recreational areas. 2. the model of recreational and sports development of the plot – it concerned plots in which poorly invested sports and recreational space dominates (sports fields, playgrounds for children and grass areas), intended for leisure and recreational sports (volleyball, football, badminton, etc.). in this model, the area related to the cultivation of soil usually does not exceed 15%, and there is often a few percent of a wooded area. in extreme cases, the aforementioned model included plots with a high degree of investment in the form of professionally built swimming pools or recreational ponds. the research conducted in 2008–2011 by r. szkup (2013) showed that in the space of łódź family allotment gardens, the areas associated with quasiagricultural land use definitely predominated, and in eight out of ten gardens, the areas associated with agricultural and productive use of the plot exceeded 45%. the inventory of the plot area carried out in five gardens of the łódź voivodeship shows that currently as many as four out of five gardens are dominated by poorly invested leisure areas (mainly well-maintained lawns and fields for sports games), which account for over 60% of the area in these gardens (fig. 2). only in the wolinka allotment garden in zduńska wola, do agricultural and productive areas slightly dominate, accounting for just over 46%. agricultural and productive areas (fruit, vegetable and orchard farming) statistically constitute just over 1/4 of the plot area in gardens. the zacisze allotment garden in łódź stands out in this respect, in which the agricultural and productive area constitutes only 14.1%. the presented data prove that in the studied gardens, agricultural and production plots are displaced by plots used for leisure and recreational purposes. by comparing the obtained results with the distance of these gardens from the center of łódź, one can see that with the increase in this distance – the importance of recreational and sports function decreases (tab. 2). only in the case of the żeromski garden, there is a slight disturbance of this regularity (fig. 2). table 3 presents the structure of land use in the five studied gardens depending on the sociodemographic characteristics of their users. the cart method showed that the degree of professional activity, age and place of residence of users have the greatest impact on the use of plots. fig. 2. structure of plot area use in the examined gardens. source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% zacisze pod borem kalina im. żeromskiego wolinka total recreational area (lawns, play areas) agricultural and productive (vegetable and fruit) communication (sidewalks, driveways) wooded (trees, conifers and ornamental shrubs other (e.g. ponds, rock gardens, outbuildings) changes in the ways of using plots in allotment gardens in poland. a case of selected gardens in the łódź voivodship 37 table 2. structure of the use of plots used exclusively for recreational and agricultural purposes. alotment garden distance from the center of łódź [km] plots used exclusively for recreational purposes [%] parcels used exclusively for agriculturalproductive purposes [%] zacisze (łódź) 9 61.2 12.3 pod borem (konstantynów łódzki) 10 59.8 20.1 kalina (konstantynów łódzki) 13 55.2 24.1 żeromski (łask-kolumna) 25 57.1 32.7 wolinka (zduńska wola) 39 39.8 41.5 total 56.7 23.5 source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. table 3. structure of plot area use depending on socio-demographic characteristics of users. lot size: recreational area (lawns, playgrounds) [%] agriculturalproductive (vegetable and fruit farming) [%] communication (sidewalks, driveways) [%] wooded (trees, conifers and ornamental shrubs) [%] other (e.g. ponds, rock gardens, outbuildings) [%] male 58.2 29.6 7.2 3.1 1.9 female 63.2 26.3 6.3 2.9 1.3 under 40 years old 63.4 21.5 8.0 4.3 2.8 40-49 years old 62.0 22.1 8.7 4.0 3.2 50-59 years old 62.6 27.5 6.8 1.8 1.3 60–69 years old 58.2 31.5 5.7 3.7 0.9 70–79 years old 56.2 35.6 4.4 3.4 0.4 80 years old and over 42.1 50.8 4.0 3.1 0.0 higher education 62.0 23.6 8.7 3.9 1.8 secondary education 65.3 26.4 5.0 1.8 1.5 vocational education 55.8 33.8 6.3 2.6 1,5 primary education 59.5 25.2 8.3 5.4 1.6 retired and pensioners 58.7 32.1 5.4 3.2 0.6 employed 61.9 25.3 7.7 2.7 2.4 unemployed 73.1 16.8 5.1 5.0 0.0 unmarried person 69.4 19.5 6.6 4.0 0.5 unmarried person with a child 51.3 43.7 5.0 0.0 0.0 married person with no children 63.1 22.1 8.8 3.5 2.5 married person with children 57.9 32.1 5.9 2.6 1.5 financial situation better than average 56.9 31.7 7.2 3.2 1.0 average financial situation 62.1 27.0 6.5 2.9 1.5 financial situation worse than average 54.4 29.1 8.9 3.2 4.4 łódź 62.1 25.6 7.2 3,5 1.6 other cities of the łódź agglomeration 58.4 31.9 5.9 2,2 1.6 source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 38 roman szkup despite the fact that in the studied gardens, leisure area definitely displaces agricultural-productive area, the latter is most intensively cultivated by retired persons and pensioners (32.1%). leisure and recreational areas are developed and used more often by unemployed (73.1%) and working persons (61.9%). the use of plots in the examined gardens is significantly influenced by the users’ age. the conducted research shows that the development of plots in a manner enabling the cultivation of land is the domain of mainly older people (over sixty years of age). elderly persons very often come from rural areas – they emigrated to the city in times of industrial prosperity. however, they retained the habits of their youth, including their love for cultivation. on the opposite pole there are young people who treat a plot in an allotment garden mainly as a place of recreation unrelated to farming. the conducted research clearly shows that with the age of the plot user, the share of agricultural and productive area increases, and the share of leisure and recreational area decreases. the collected material also indicates that agricultural-productive areas are less frequently developed and used by inhabitants of łódź (25.6%) than by inhabitants of cities of the łódź agglomeration (31.9%). the manner of development and use of plots in the analyzed gardens is much less differentiated by such socio-demographic features as their users’ age, education, family situation or financial status (tab. 2). the seasonality and frequency of stay on the used plot also testify to the ways of using the gardens. «the more often and the longer a person stays in the garden, the greater the role it plays in his life» (szkup, 2013, p. 178). the holiday period was the time of the most intensive use of the examined allotment gardens; intensive use began at the end of april and ended in midseptember (fig. 3). in the peak months – in july and august ––users stayed on their plots on average for about 18 days a month (in june – 17 days). the most intensively used gardens in the studied period were the żeromski allotment garden in łask-kolumn and the wolinka allotment garden in fig. 3. seasonality of use of the surveyed gardens (number of days per month). source: own study, based on field research in allotment gardens. 0 5 10 15 20 25 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii zacisze pod borem kalina im. żeromskiego wolinka total zduńska wola. the garden with the smallest period of use was the zacisze allotment garden in łódź – in this garden the use was maintained at a maximum of 12–13 days in the summer months. this may be explained by the peripheral location of the garden in relation to the large housing estates in łódź and the fact that the garden is located near a defunct and reclaimed landfill site, which may result in its less intensive use. 4. conclusions the analysis of the collected research material indicates that during the covid-19 pandemic the model of recreational and recreational use of plots dominated in the łódź agglomeration. it can be clearly seen that the further away from the center of łódź, the more the importance of this model decreases in favor of the agricultural and productive changes in the ways of using plots in allotment gardens in poland. a case of selected gardens in the łódź voivodship 39 use model. however, due to the impact of factors of a local nature, this is not unambiguously clear. the described diversity can be related to the regularity of a greater importance of the leisure and recreational model in large cities and their immediate vicinity. this regularity is even more pronounced during the pandemic. the users’ working status, age and place of residence have the greatest impact on the use of plots. acknowledgement students of the university of łódź collecting materials for their own bachelor thesis – magdalena rosiak (wolinka allotment garden), aleksandra marczyk (żeromski allotment garden), karolina łukomiak (kalina allotment garden), paulina łykowska (pod borem allotment garden) and martyna serzycka (zacisze allotment garden) references acton l., 2010, allotment gardens: a reflection of history, heritage, community and self, www.pia-journal.co.uk (accessed 11 november 2012). armstrong d., 2000, a survey of community gardens in upstate new york: implications for health promotion and community development, health and place, 6(4), 319– 327. doi: 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szkup r., 2013, użytkowanie rodzinnych ogrodów działkowych (allotment garden) przez społeczność wielkomiejską. przykład łodzi (eng. use of allotment gardens by a metropolitan community. the example of łódź), wydawnictwo uniwersytetu łódzkiego, łódź. szkup r., 2020, allotment gardens (ag) in the days of the covid-19 pandemic. the case of “żeromskiego” ag in łask-kolumna and “wolinka” ag in zduńska wola (poland), journal of geography, politics and society, 10(4), 49–57. doi: 10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.06 szkup r., pytel s., 2015, rodzinny ogród działkowy (allotment garden) jako miejsce wypoczynku i aktywności seniorów (eng. allotment garden as a place for seniors relaxation and activity), [in:] s. sitek (ed.), stare i nowe problemy badawcze w geografii społeczno-ekonomicznej. zeszyt 6, (eng. “old and new” research problems in social and economic geography. vol. 6), polskie towarzystwo geograficzne oddział katowicki, sosnowiec, 103–113. szkup r., pytel s., 2016, rodzinne ogrody działkowe (allotment garden) w przestrzeni dużego miasta. przykład łodzi (eng. allotment gardens in the big city. case study of łódź), prace komisjii krajobrazu kulturowego, 32, 109– 124. turner b., henryks j., pearson d., 2011, community gardens: sustainability, health and inclusion in the city, local environment, international journal of justice and sustainability, 16(6), 489–492. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2011.595901 twiss j., dickinson j., duma s., kleinman t., paulsen h., rilveria l., 2003, community gardens: lessons learned from california healthy cities and communities, american journal of public health, 93(9), 1435–1438. doi: 10.2105/ ajph.93.9.1435 van den berg a., van winsum-westra m., de vries s., van dillen s., 2010, allotment gardening and health: a comparative survey among allotment gardeners and their neighbors without an allotment, environmental health, 9, 74. doi: 10.1186/1476-069x-9-74 changes in the ways of using plots in allotment gardens in poland. a case of selected gardens in the łódź voivodship 41 countries of central and eastern europe, like other countries of the continent, faced the challenges related to the covid-19 pandemic, including a rise in social and health inequalities (king, loblova, 2021; moiseenko et al., 2022), an increasing pressure on health systems (lupu, tiganasu, 2022; vaitkevičiūtė, 2021; webb et al., 2021) and a negative impact on mental health (bojanowska et al., 2021; grabowski et al., 2021; reile et al., 2021). similarly, the pandemic influenced drug demand, drug supply and drugrelated response in europe and around the globe. for example, there were a number of challenges for drug services to maintain the same level of service during the lockdown and provide treatment for new clients. as a consequence of the pandemic, drug services were forced to transform their operating procedures. this special issue of the journal aims to provide an insight into the impact of the pandemic on drug use, the related harms, services and the drug market in selected countries of central and eastern europe. it is a result of horizontal cooperation of reitox national focal points (nfp) of the emcdda (european drug monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction), which are the national drug observatories. the analysis presented in the special issue is based on the information available at the national level but also on joint work conducted in 2020 and 2021 by the emcdda, which was investigating the impact of the pandemic in europe via rapid assessment studies in close cooperation with the nfps (see article 1). in addition, there has already been a platform for exchanging information between poland and the baltic countries organised in the form of annual reitox baltic academies, devoted to various issues important for central and eastern europe in the area of drugs and drug addiction. the results of this cooperation were presented at several scientific conferences1. the special issue is the first step in a number 1 lxaddictions19: the future of addictions — new frontiers for policy, practice and science, 23–25 november 2019, sicad, emcdda, addiction journal, ssa, isaje; the 30th conference of the european society for social drug research journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(1), 1–3 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.1.01 what we know and what we do not know about the impact of covid-19 on the drug situation and response in central-eastern european countries? – introduction artur malczewski research, monitoring and international cooperation department, national center for prevention of addiction, dereniowa 52/54, 02–776 warsaw, poland e-mail: artur.malczewski@kcpu.gov.pl citation malczewski a., 2022, what we know and what we do not know about the impact of covid-19 on the drug situation and response in central-eastern european countries? – introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 1–3. received: 07 april 2022 accepted: 21 april 2022 published: 27 may 2022 mailto:artur.malczewski@kcpu.gov.pl 2 artur malczewski of initiatives planned by the group on the analysis of the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on the prevalence of drug use and related problems and its implications for the future. for example, the next annual reitox baltic academy meeting will take place later this year in gdańsk. the objective of the meeting will be to update and complete the information presented in the special issue and start a discussion on the challenges and opportunities that the pandemic brought to the drugs field and the work of the nfps in the shortand long-term future. the covid-19 pandemic has not yet ended, while the countries of the region have been affected by another crisis related to russia’s aggression against ukraine and a massive influx of ukrainians to the bordering countries. the meeting will address the impact of the recent migration cries regarding drug use and available response, and future steps and strategies to build the national and eu preparedness. in total, six articles were prepared by experts from estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland, ukraine and the emcdda for this special issue. the journal opens with an article by emcdda staff covering the situation across europe. the country-specific analyses are presented in the following articles. they show the situation primarily with regard to the prevalence of drug use and the problems associated with it. in the case of latvia (zīle-veisberga, 2020) and estonia, the studies largely present the impact of the pandemic on the drug market. as the available data show, the drug markets were not affected by the covid-19 pandemic the way other areas of social and economic functioning were. local problems related to the availability of drugs on the illicit markets were noted, but generally, the supply did not fall. available data suggest that drug use patterns have not changed, but of course, there are some exceptions. lithuanian students who used psychoactive substances irregularly were more likely to reduce the use of these substances or abstain during quarantine. however, those who used these substances regularly quite probably increased their use during the quarantine. according to one of polish papers, the new psychoactive substances (nps) use decreased during the covid-19 pandemic (garus-pakowska et al., 2022). data from the general sanitary inspectorate also indicated a drop in the number of non-fatal nps overdoses (główny…, 2022). however, when trying to assess the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on the drug situation and (essd), 26–28 september 2019, essd and university of latvia, 2019 issdp conference, 22–25 may 2019, international society for the study of drug policy (issdp) and paris school of economics. the related problems, it is difficult to determine to what extent covid-19 had an impact on the change of the situation and to what extent certain trends, such as the mentioned decreasing number of poisonings due to nps in poland or deaths due to drugs in estonia (stable situation) (national institute..., 2022), would continue anyway. undoubtedly, as a result of the covid-19 pandemic, the role of the internet as an effective channel for distributing drugs increased. this again indicates that while modern technology might prove useful in solving problems of the contemporary world, it might also turn against us. among new challenges for the countries of central and eastern europe is the war in ukraine (masters, 2022) and the support to be provided to millions of displaced ukrainians (panayotatos, 2022). a psychoactive substance helpline and psychological support for people from ukraine have been launched in poland. there are also plans to launch activities aimed at, on the one hand, examining the needs of children and adolescents from ukraine and, on the other, planning prevention programs addressed to them. in march, the first women from ukraine who came to poland as a result of russia’s aggression against ukraine were admitted to several substitution treatment programs in poland. similar experience is shared by the countries of the region covered in this special issue. therefore, international collaboration is needed to analyse the situation, learn from the experience of different countries and draw conclusions on the possible direction in which our aid and support activities in the field of addiction should go. finally, i would like to thank the staff of the emcdda, reitox focal points and the experts cooperating with them for preparing the papers for this issue. artur malczewski references bojanowska a., kaczmarek ł.d., koscielniak m., urbańska b., 2021, changes in values and well-being amidst the covid-19 pandemic in poland, plos one, 16(9), e0255491. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0255491 garus-pakowska a., kolmaga a., gaszyńska e., ulrichs m., 2022, the scale of intoxications with new psychoactive substances over the period 2014–2020 — characteristics of the trends and impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on the example of łódź province, poland. international journal of environmental research and public health, 19, 4427. doi: 10.3390/ijerph19084427 główny inspektor sanitarny, 2022, raport głównego inspektora sanitarnego w sprawie środków zastępczych dotyczący https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255491 what we know and what we do not know about the impact of covid-19 on the drug situation… 3 zatruć środkiem zastępczym lub nową substancją psychoaktywną w polsce 2021 (eng. report of the chief sanitary inspector on substitute substances concerning poisoning with a substitute or a new psychoactive substance in poland 2021), warszawa. grabowski j., stępień j., waszak p., michalski t., meloni r., grabkowska m., macul a., rojek j., lorettu l., sagan i., bidzan l., 2021, social isolation during covid-19 pandemic. perceived stress and containment measures compliance among polish and italian residents, frontiers in psychology, 12, 673514. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.673514 king e., loblova o., 2021, covid-19 in central and eastern europe, european journal of public health, 31(supplement 3), ckab164.679, doi: 10.1093/eurpub/ckab164.679 lupu d., tiganasu r., 2022, covid-19 and the efficiency of health systems in europe, health economic review, 12, 14. doi: 10.1186/s13561-022-00358-y masters j., 2022, ukraine: conflict at the crossroads of europe and russia, council on foreign relations, new york – washington, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraineconflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia (accessed 16 april 2022). moiseenko i., shakhovska n., dronyuk i., datsko o., 2022, social and economics aspects of the pandemic influence in ukraine, procedia computer science, 198, 670–675. doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2021.12.304. national institute for health development, 2022, narkootikumide üledoosist tingitud surmade ennetamise programm eestis (eng. prevention programme for drug related overdose deaths in estonia), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. panayotatos d., atanda i., schwartz e., 2022, crisis in ukraine: humanitarian and human rights imperatives, refugees international, washington, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/3/21/crisis-in-ukraine -humanitarian-and-human-rights-imperatives (accessed 23 march 2022). reile r., kullamaa l., hallik r., innos k., kukk m., laidra k., nurk e., tamson m., vorobjov s., 2021, perceived stress during the first wave of covid-19 outbreak: results from nationwide cross-sectional study in estonia, frontiers in public health, 9, 564706. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.564706 vaitkevičiūtė j., 2021, the health crisis in 2020 – an example from lithuania, journal of health inequalities, 7(2), 107. doi: 10.5114/jhi.2021.112841 webb e., winkelmann j., scarpetti g., behmane d., habicht t., kahur k., kasekamp k., köhler k., miščikienė l., misins j., reinap m., slapšinskaitė-dackevičienė a., võrk a., karanikolos m., 2021, lessons learned from the baltic countries’ response to the first wave of covid-19, health policy, s0168-8510(21)00293-1. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.12.003 zīle-veisberga a., 2020, drug use patterns and the illegal drugs market in latvia in relation to covid-19 pandemic: results of the european web survey on drugs covid-19, presentation: essd 2020 online conference, 24–25 september 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckab164.679 a yugoslavian leader once said: “i rule a country with two alphabets, three languages, four religions and five nationalities that live in six republics, are surrounded by seven neighbours and must live in harmony with eight minorities” (lopatka, 2018). this short sentence explicitly shows how complicated the internal situation in yugoslavia was. the example of yugoslavia clearly shows how difficult it is to even out the level of income between particular regions (countries). these countries have been in different cultural and civilizational areas for many centuries. after the second world war, when communists had taken power, a system of financial transfers was introduced with the main objective to even out the standard of living and development in individual republics. all the republics had to contribute a part of the generated income to a specially allocated fund which then was supposed to be transferred to the poorest parts of the country, whether in the form of grants or loans on preferential terms. despite these transfers, after the dissolution of yugoslavia, it became apparent that the disparities in the development of particular countries have survived. in the 1960s and the 1970s yugoslavia implemented the most liberal policy among the socialist states (furubotn, pejovich, 1973; rusinov, 1967). its openness to western countries led to the inflow of foreign investment; the yugoslavian passport allowed citizens to travel around the world, and millions of tourists from capitalist countries left money in yugoslavia. before the dissolution, yugoslavia had been famous for its enchanting plitvice lakes, the belgrade kalemegdan, the sarajevo old town and stunning dubrovnik. however, for a growing group of tourists it was not these sites that were the main destination of tourist trips. the media image of the balkans, which consisted of beautiful elements of nature and the richness of its cultures, was complemented by an image of the devastating and tragic civil war. the first signs of a registered tourist movement in the area of the former yugoslavia should be recorded at the end of 1992, when an italian tourist agent, massimo beyerle, organized special expeditions journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(3), 1–3 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.3.01 changes in tourism in countries of the former yugoslavia after gaining independence – introduction tomasz wiskulski department of tourism and recreation management, faculty of tourism and recreation, gdansk university of physical education and sport, górskiego 1, 80–336 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-7802-721x e-mail: tomasz.wiskulski@awf.gda.pl citation wiskulski t., 2019, changes in tourism in countries of the former yugoslavia after gaining independence – introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(3), 1–3. received: 29 august 2019 accepted: 29 august 2019 published: 30 september 2019 2 tomasz wiskulski to various conflict-torn corners of the world (lisle, 2007). customers who used his services spent two weeks on bosnian or croatian fronts. during that time they were equipped with bulletproof vests and helmets, and their health was supervised by doctors. participation in this form of tourism cost its participants 25,000 dollars. for many tourists, a trip to bosnia and herzegovina is complemented by a stroll along the sarajevo sniper alley, and sometimes it is the highlight of the trip; some tourists choose srebrenica or mine fields, still quite abundant in the country, as their destination. the war tours in sarajevo were organised already a few months after the dayton agreements had been signed. the first tour guide licenced after the war in sarajevo offered tourists a few hours’ tour of sarajevo’s cemeteries, the devastated olympic complex and walking through the tunnel used by fugitives to escape from the besieged city. all of this had the english name “mission impossible tour” (volcic et al., 2013), which makes it easy to define the target group of the prepared offer. the situation in the market of tourist services began to improve after the end of military actions aimed at the independence of individual republics. the countries of the former yugoslavia again became attractive to the mass tourist. slovenia, which was the first to gain independence, has undergone a huge cycle of changes in the market of tourism services. we can find out from an article by d. cigale on changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia that, in many regions, tourism has become a very important, if not the most important, factor shaping the gdp and stimulating the volume of unemployment. the author also draws attention to many factors influencing the development of tourism in slovenia. among them, he includes the country’s accessibility, the change in economic conditions, the existence of many diversified natural values, the policy of sustainable development pursued by the authorities and factors related to the prevailing trends. the article also highlights a change in the structure of the tourists’ origin, in particular an increase in the number of tourists from non-european countries. croatia was the next country that gained its independence. in his article, t. wiskulski described changes in the number of tourists and the use of accommodation in croatia throughout the period of 21 years. the paper presents results of an analysis of the tourism density index, schneider’s rate, the tourist accommodation density index, baretjedefert’s index, the average length of stay, the accommodation development index and the charvát index. the conducted analysis allowed the author to identify tourist regions and their change in 1997 and 2017. the author points out that, on the one hand, there was clarification of tourist regions based on similar geographic conditions. on the other hand, there were even greater disparities in playing the tourist function by the various counties. attention has also been drawn to the lack of a common policy on creating the tourism potential, which begins to have consequences in terms of imbalance in the level of tourism capacity and tourism absorbency. the third country that gained independence from yugoslavia was macedonia. as the first country, it managed to gain the independence in a completely peaceful way. however, an etymological problem emerged, as greece considered itself to be the only heir to the traditions of ancient macedonia. the conflict was resolved in 1995 when the country changed its name to fyrom (danforth, 2010). this name, however, did not cease to diminish the greek claims, which was expressed in the fact that greece blocked macedonia’s accession to nato and its integration with the european union. it was not until february 2019 that the country changed its name to the republic of north macedonia, which met the expectations of both the macedonian and greek citizens (asani, 2018; hagemann, 2019). in his article, d. iliev described the evolution and changes in macedonian tourism during the post-socialist period of 1991–2018. in his paper, he used the talc model to help explain complex processes of development and changes in tourism over the analysed years. he distinguished and described in detail four stages of tourism development in the territory of macedonia while describing the variability of the tourist movement, the number of bed nights and the gastronomic facilities. the study used secondary statistical materials. the country which won its independence in a very bloody way was bosnia and herzegovina. during fighting, the country’s capital, sarajevo, was besieged by troops of the serbian republic and yugoslavia for 3.5 years, resulting in 23% of the buildings being seriously damaged and 64% partially destroyed (final report of..., 1994). a. pobric, s. sljivo and n. mulaosmanovic presented in their article the valorisation of the tourist centre of sarajevo in the cultural and historical context. they used the hilary du cros method in their assessment. the authors also presented changes in the volume of the tourist movement and accommodation in canton sarajevo in the years 2008–2018. disproportions in the distribution of the tourist movement and the number of bed nights in particular municipalities in canton sarajevo were also analysed. the authors then changes in tourism in countries of the former yugoslavia after gaining independence – introduction 3 assessed the bascarsija district using the presented research method. montenegro is the country that was the last to gain independence from yugoslavia (actually the state union of serbia and montenegro). this was the last peaceful separation of the new country from serbia, which took place gradually until 3 june 2006, when as a result of the referendum of 25 may, the creation of an independent state was proclaimed (friss, 2007). since 4 february 2003, a new constitutional act has been in force, which has guaranteed, among others, independent economic policy, parliaments and the currency – the euro. in their article on changes in the market of tourist services between 2007 and 2017 in montenegro, w. szymańska and a. wiśniewska focused on the analysis of changes in the volume of the tourist movement and the accommodation base. the regional analysis was conducted with a breakdown into the coastal and the mountain areas, podgorica, other tourist areas and other places. due to the nature of the descriptive values, the authors focused on a thorough analysis of the three largest groups of areas. the editor of the volume would like to thank all the authors who contributed to this issue of the journal, working in various scientific centres in the countries of the former yugoslavia and in poland. special thanks are also due to the reviewers of the volume, without whom this issue could not be published. simultaneously, i do hope that the articles presented in the journal will contribute to further cooperation between authors of particular texts. tomasz wiskulski references asani d., 2018, the dynamics of the name issue of the republic of macedonia, european journal of social sciences, 1(1), 87–90. doi: 10.26417/ejss.v1i1.p87-90 danforth l. m., 2010, ancient macedonia, alexander the great and the star or sun of vergina: national symbols and the conflict between greece and the republic of macedonia, [in:] j. roisman, i. worthington (eds.), a companion to ancient macedonia, wiley-blackwell, west sussex, 572–598. final report of the united nations commission of experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780, annex vi, part i, study of the battle and siege of sarajevo, 1994, united nations security council. friis k., 2007, the referendum in montenegro: the eu’s ‘postmodern diplomacy’, europe and foreign affairs review, 12, 67–88. furubotn e. g., pejovich s., 1973, property rights, economic decentralization, and the evolution of the yugoslav firm, the journal of law and economics, 16(2), 275–302. doi: 10.1086/466767 hagemann ch., 2019, goodbye fyrom, welcome north macedonia, südosteuropa mitteilungen, 1, 6–19. lisle d., 2007, defending voyeurism: dark tourism and the problem of global security, [in:] p.m. burns, m. novelli (eds.), tourism and politics, global frameworks and local realities, elsevier, oxford, 333–345. lopatka r., 2018, auf dem weg in die eu? der westbalkan vor großen herausforderungen (eng. on the way to the eu? the western balkans face major challenges), aies, vienna. rusinow d., 1967, understanding the yugoslav reforms, the world today, 23(2), 71–79. volcic z., erjavec k., peak m., 2013, branding post-war sarajevo, journalism studies, 15(6), 726–742. doi: 10.1080/1461670x.2013.837255 1. introduction although the eu is one of the richest parts of the world, it suffers from significant inter-regional and inter-state differences in the level of prosperity. the wealthiest member state, luxembourg, is seven times richer than romania and bulgaria, which are the poorest members of eu-28 countries. economic, social and territorial cohesion, or also known as cohesion and regional policy focuses on reducing economic and social disparities between eu regions, aiming to contribute to building the eu internal market. the basic unit for the discussion is “the region” and its problems. region, unlike the state, shows the natural result of differences between regions. it has such cross-border as national content, and for crossborder is considered the region whose specificity goes beyond national borders and applies either to large groups of people with common ethnic features or geographically defined area or zone made up of the economic, military or other criteria. regional disparities within the eu cause a number of factors such as the long-term disadvantages caused by geographical distance or sparsely populated; recent social and economic changes; enduring legacy of the former centrally planned economies, or a combination of these and other factors. the result of this unfavourable condition is often manifested by social deprivation, poor quality of schools, journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 39–49 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.018.5805 ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions radoslava brhlíková (1), mária kočnerová (2), anna kúbeková (3) (1) faculty of arts, constantine the philosopher university in nitra, slančíkovej 1, 94901 nitra , slovakia, e-mail: rbrhlikova@ukf.sk (2) faculty of arts, constantine the philosopher university in nitra, slančíkovej 1, 94901 nitra , slovakia, e-mail: mkocnerova@ukf.sk (corresponding autor) (3) private business college, štúrova 22, 94901 nitra, slovakia, e-mail: akubekova@gmail.com citation brhlíková r., kočnerová m.,kúbeková a., 2016, ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 39–49. abstract the article defines and characterizes the challenges and changes in regional policy after ten years of membership of slovak republic in the european union. it analyses and compares the aims, measures and benefits of eu regional policy towards given regions trnava and nitra. the article compares the approaches of trnava and nitra regions towards eu structural funds and how they used this opportunity for their development. key words regional policy, trnava, nitra, structural funds. 40 radoslava brhlíková, mária kočnerová, anna kúbeková higher unemployment and inadequate infrastructure. the main goal of regional policy then is the full potential use of individual regions; improving competitiveness and employment through investment at regional level in areas with high growth potential and added value for the eu as a whole and as quickly closing the gap with the eu average in countries that joined the eu since 2004. and such a country is slovakia. although existing differences in economic and social development of individual regions arose there in the past they intensified after the changes in key economic sectors. these regional disparities need to be addressed and therefore this area falls within the priorities of the regional policy of the government. regional development is carried out through the regional operational programmes (rop), which are linked to eu structural funds and designed to increase the availability and quality of civic infrastructure and facilities in the regions of the eu convergence objective, where encompasses all regions of slovakia except bratislava. eligible applicants the grant under the rop are local governments, regions, founders of pre-school, primary and secondary schools, social service facilities etc. for the purpose of studying the issue in presented study the authors will focus mainly on the development of regional policy after slovakia’s accession to the eu, i.e. the programming period 2004–2006 and 2007–2013. the aim of this paper is to compare and find out what goals and tools are selected and used in nitra and trnava regions, as their purpose and effective use. in examining the issue, we used a method of analysis and comparison. furthermore, we used the method of induction, by which we examined various facts that led to the general conclusion. within the comparative method, we encountered several problems in terms of methodological approach because the regions selected for study purposes are not working with the same methodological approach evaluating their activities. this led to difficulties in identifying indicators suitable for use in comparative methods. at the same time many relevant sources at european level ranks nitra and trnava regions into a single unit and refers to them as the region of western slovakia (sk02) with a very similar development and it is therefore difficult at this stage to do a comparative study. for our analyse, presented in this study, we were using the method of evaluating the statistical data, which are drawn mainly from the statistical office of the slovak republic and official documents in both regions. we also analysed the material provided by the examined self-governing regions such as annual reports, analyses and possible future cooperation, and the national development plan (národný rozvojový plan, 2003). 2. eu regional policy eu regional policy is aimed at promoting rural regions and regions suffering from the loss of heavy industry. it developed into one of the most important policies to ensure the eu’s competitiveness in the global economy. it reflects the principle of solidarity within the eu where the richer countries contribute to the development of poorer countries and regions. it aims to support regions that do not reach 75% of the average level of eu gdp per capita, regions with social problems and damaged environment. its financial instruments and initiatives there are basically from the beginning of integration. in 1958 creation of the european social fund, followed by the european agricultural guarantee and guarantee fund and in 1975 was founded the european regional development fund (erdf). cohesion policy was created in the 70s of the 20th century, following the accession countries with less developed economies and strong regional disparities as the united kingdom, denmark and ireland to the former european communities (ec). legal bases for an integrated regional policy brought the single european act in 1986. economic and social cohesion has become one of the objectives of the ec and as its basic principles were introduced: the principle of concentration, programming, partnership (complementarity) and additionality. an important impulse for its development was the entry of greece, spain and portugal to the european community and approved the plan for the creation of the single market. the maastricht treaty introduced new instruments – the cohesion fund, the institutions – committee of the regions and principles – subsidiarity. subsequently, the budget for regional policy funds increased to a third of the eu budget. since 2000, cohesion policy influences the lisbon strategy and the planned enlargement of the eu in 2004. eastern enlargement to 10 new member states of the eu population has increased by a fifth, but the gdp by only 5 percent. the average gdp of the new member states did not reach half the eu average and that all are entitled to apply for support from the structural funds and the cohesion fund (brhlíková, 2013). in the financial perspective for years 2007–2013 was allocated to cohesion policy 35.7% of the eu budget, which ranked it in the first place followed by promotion of agriculture. three objectives were set: convergence – promotes growth and job creation in countries and regions with the lowest levels ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions 41 of development. it concerns the nuts 2 regions with a gdp per capita of less than 75% of the eu average. to this end it was allocated 81.5% of total funding and is financed by the esf, erdf and the cohesion fund. regional competitiveness and employment – to help the richer countries cope with economic and social changes and globalization and the transition to a knowledge-based society. this objective falls under the european employment strategy, which supports the creation of more and better jobs by adapting the workforce and investing in human resources. to this end it has been allocated 16% of all funds and is financed by the erdf and esf. european territorial cooperation – continues the initiative interreg and promotes cross-border cooperation at local and regional projects, transnational cooperation to support integrated territorial development and interregional cooperation, and exchange of experience. it concerns the nuts level 3 regions along the internal land borders and certain external borders, the nuts level 3 regions along maritime borders with a maximum mutual distance of 150 km. erdf funding is divided according to targets for cross-border and international cooperation. a thematic channel of funds is directed to transport, human resources, sustainable development, research and development, innovation and information society (brhlíková, 2013). 3. regional policy in slovakia differences in economic and social development of individual regions in slovakia originated naturally already in the past, but intensified as a result of changes in key economic sectors, particularly in the second half of the 90s of the 20th century. in the years 1999–2001 the various program documents as the integrated plan of regional and social development, the national plan of regional development; regional and sectoral operational programs were prepared and approved. they formed the framework for the disbursement of pre-accession funds phare, ispa and sapard. in connection with eu accession and subsequent slovakia´s participation on regional policy it was necessary to develop a new set of programming documents, which are covered by the national development plan (ndp). this has become a basic program document for implementation of structural and regional policy in 2004–2006. its key objectives are to increase competitiveness of underdeveloped regions and their performance while respecting the sustainability, reduce disparities in the level of gdp per capita compared to the eu average and functionality of regional policy in symbiosis with the economic priorities of slovakia. based on ndp slovakia could then draw aid from the structural funds and the cohesion fund and initiatives interreg and equal. in this regard based on the government resolution no. 157/2002 the modified classification of territorial statistical units was introduced as suggested by the eu’s statistical office eurostat and the statistical office. the identification of the regions is based on the common system of classification of the regions – nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (nomenclature des statistiques uniteés territoriales, abbreviated nuts). the purpose of dividing slovak republic to nuts is to ensure regional statistics are comparable on the same basis as in the european union and the regions with different levels are included to the various structural policy objectives of the european union. when defining nuts it is based on the complementarity it refers higher units are formed by a number of whole lower units. it also takes into account the size of units in relation to the practice in force in the european union. current arrangements in slovak republic under this categorization are actually a return to the initial territorial systematization of slovakia (see tab. 1). the starting position of slovak regions had substantive and systemic differences from the original eu countries. the material differences include low competitiveness of individual regions, unfavorable branch structure, and lack of innovative capacity of tab. 1. valid territorial systematisation in slovakia unit number territorial unit nuts i 1 slovakia nuts ii 4 bratislava region, western slovakia, central slovakia, eastern slovakia nuts iii 8 regions nuts iv 79 districts nuts v 2883 municipalities source: národný rozvojový plán, 2003, p. 14. 42 radoslava brhlíková, mária kočnerová, anna kúbeková regions, monostructural economic base, and differentiated quality of human potential, low traffic access regions as a result of insufficient infrastructure facilities. the systemic differences may include lack of value criteria when designing development programs for individual regions, comprehensiveness and irrationality in the use of intra resource development, slow formation of institutions managing settlement and regional level (národný rozvojový plán, 2003). till 31.12.2004, in framework of the structural funds were submitted in slovakia 4,978 applications for the nfc in total project value of 102.98 billion slovak crowns. on the number of projects submitted, the proportion of the nitra region was 17%, of prešov region 16% of the trnava region of 12%, of žilina region 13%, banská bystrica region 15% of the košice region 14% of trenčín 10% bratislava region 3% (výročná správa o implementácii rámca podpory spoločenstva 2004–2006, p. 55). in terms of distribution of volumes of completed projects in the shortened programming period 2004–2006, i.e. after slovakia joins the eu, the share of banská bystrica sgr 20% htu žilina 11%, 16% vúc nitra, prešov sgr 12.5%, higher territorial units košice 12% , 14% htu trnava, trenčín htu 12%, and the districts of bratislava 2.5%. nitra region submitted a total of 931 applications, while trnava region only 644 applications (výročná správa o implementácii rámca podpory spoločenstva 2004–2006, p. 58). the current regional disparities are reflected particularly in the share of individual regions in the gdp, the extent of unemployment, the extent of foreign capital, the level of income in living standards, the dynamics of development of small and medium enterprises. the cause of these phenomena can be also different geographical, historical and socio-economic conditions. the regions in slovakia can be divided into three basic categories based on performance. the developed regions with diversified and relatively wide range of different types of industry and services with relatively high production of gdp per capita and relatively low unemployment are regional centers as bratislava, košice, prešov, banská bystrica, žilina, trenčín, nitra, trnava. these are located on the main highways of slovakia and attract a sufficient number of qualified workforce. the second category consists of regions with a relatively stable economy, located along the border with the czech republic and in the traditional regions považie and liptov. these regions are characterized by industrial tradition and relatively sufficient amount of own funds. diversification of the economies of these regions is sufficient and creates suitable conditions for future development. the third category consists of regions affected by structural problems mainly due to the decline of a particular type of industry (armaments, glass), which is related to high unemployment, particularly long-term, which is also a major problem in the fight against unemployment in slovakia. this group includes also those areas of eastern slovakia and south of slovakia, which are located outside regional centers and therefore are long term lagging in development (národný rozvojový plán, 2003). especially the last mentioned are priority areas in terms of regional development for eu structural funds. it can be concluded that the existing regional disparities in slovakia have a character of social inequalities that are influenced by a complex of potential (in particular human resources), infrastructure, lifestyle and positional tendencies. differentiation is reflected in the social and demographic structure, the rate of unemployment, in terms of social dynamics and migration of the population. it turns out that the differences in living conditions, advantages and disadvantages of local or regional situations are a strong incentive of individual behavior. in the direction from bratislava, which has a dominant position, further east there is a rising unemployment, more difficult conditions of regional economic development, worsening employment opportunities, and the jobs offer reduction and opportunities to obtain employment. problem regions are considerably heterogeneous internally especially in the quality of its human resources, since in such a situation are areas with both progressive and regressive age structure of the population. unemployment in these areas is well above the national average. investment flows are very low and the average monthly wage is about 20% lower than the national average. the problems persist in the infrastructure and connection of certain areas to the communication (especially transport) infrastructures. basically, it can be concluded that the fundamental socio-spatial problems of slovak regions are: • existing strong polarization between the capital bratislava and other regions in a series of key indicators for the standard of living and quality of life (e.g. gdp / capita, average wage, unemployment and others.); • existing significant differences between districts within some regions in the gdp per capita and income per capita; in regions affected by the necessary extensive industrial restructuring (especially in special and extractive industries), but also in areas with greater focus on agriculture is high and still rising unemployment, failing to sufficiently quickly and efficiently implement the necessary structural changes; ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions 43 • deepening diversity of rural areas which have a comparative disadvantage to the cities, local authorities in rural areas have unfavorable conditions for business, and there is an aging rural population; • lagging economic level of border districts situated mainly on the southeastern and northeastern borders of the slovak republic; • persistent lack of connection of these areas (and other areas) of slovakia on the trans-european communication networks and capital, which significantly contributes to the lack of interest of investors, especially foreign, in these territories; • the differences between the quality of human potential in bratislava and other regional cities but also between groups of urban settlements, as well as between the city and village; • different levels of the regional distribution of r&d, technological development, regional differences also in socio-demographic characteristics of human resources as well as the qualification level of the workforce (národný rozvojový plán, 2003). a special category are marginal regions, especially the regions of eastern and southern part of slovakia. these regions are characterized by low economic performance, low standard of living, and a minimum share of investment (especially foreign), growth of long-term unemployed and socially dependent, low level of industrial development, services and modern infrastructure. an accompanying feature of these regions is also low level of education and a high proportion of at-risk groups (e.g. roma). slovakia tried to deal with the solution to these issues in the programming period 2007–2013. the regional policy of slovakia was implemented in this period by the regional operational programme (rop)1, which aimed to increase the availability and quality of civic infrastructure and facilities in the regions. although the operational programme was not directly aimed for supporting the business community it had to contribute to the stimulation of internal regional resources for the development of downstream business activities (smes) and increase the attractiveness for foreign investment, coinciding with the national reform programme in the area of business environment. rop was approved by european commission on september 24, 2007. by slovak government resolution no. 832/2006 the managing authority of rop in slovakia became the ministry of construction and regional development of slovak republic and its powers were passed to the ministry of agriculture and rural development 1 see: http://www.ropka.sk/operacny-program/ of slovak republic in 2010, except the coordination of the use of funds from the european union. the total eu financial contribution to the regional operational program amounted to 1 445 000 000 eur (regionálny operačný program, 2008). self-governing regions should carry out tasks in relation to the following measures rop: • support and development of tourism infrastructure. • regeneration of settlements. • regional roads ensuring transport serviceability of the regions 2. 4. nitra and trnava region and eu structural policy nitra and trnava regions are neighboring areas. nitra region as far as its area of 6  343.8 km2 occupies 13% of the territory of the slovak republic. trnava region with the area of 4  147 km2 ranks the penultimate place in the framework of slovak regions (occupies 8.5% of whole territory). both regions are located in the southwestern part of slovakia, but unless trnava region forms a common border with the czech republic, hungary and austria, as nitra region borders only with hungary, the trnava region favors in terms of cross-border cooperation. from a geographic point of view, both regions have similar, since these are mostly flat and lowland character of the landscape punctuated by hills. in both regions there are quality agricultural land and about the same climatic conditions. both, therefore, in this context rank among the most productive agricultural centers of slovak republic. both regions are rich in water resources occurrence – belong to the danube basin, as well as natural resources3 and mineral resources but trnava region compared to the nitra region is richer in the occurrence of mineral resources 4. 2 within the slovak regions adherent to the objective 1 has banská bystrica region the largest concern of road network (highways, roads i. – iii. class and local communications) and the lowest one has trnava region. on the other side, trnava region has the largest concern on length of highways and košice region the lowest one. see: ministry of transport, post and telecommunication of slovak republic. 3 we can name thermal spa in podhájska, patince, komárno, poľný kesov and štúrovo – author´s note. 4 mineral resources of trnava region are represented by oil and gas in the north and by calcite, dolomite and gravel sand reserves in other parts of region. mountain chain of little carpathians is rich on beech and oak wood. in nitra region there are reserves of gravel sand, wall stone and brick raw material – author´s note. 44 radoslava brhlíková, mária kočnerová, anna kúbeková there are 22 national nature reservations, 70 nature reservations, 45 natural monuments and 87 protected areas and one national natural monument. both regions are rich in cultural and historical monuments, urban conservation, and folk architecture reservation. the city of nitra in slovakia is the town with the oldest written record from year 826. both regions thus have something to offer in the development of regional tourism services (nitriansky kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013; trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). in the demographic comparison the nitra region with its 689,564 inhabitants as of 31.12.2011 ranks the fourth place among the regions in the slovak republic, with a share of 12.8% of the nationwide total. from the total population 51.5% are women. with a population density of 111.1 inhabitants per km2 is the fifth most populated province in the country. nitra region has 354 municipalities, of which 15 have city status. 317,435 inhabitants lives in the cities, what is 46% of the total population. trnava region has 555,509 inhabitants as of 31.12.2011 it is the smallest from all regions and its representation in the total population of slovakia is 10.3%. the region is comprised of 251 municipalities, with a concentration of 6 villages in 100 km2. a significant concentration of population is in 16 municipalities with city status. 47.7% of the population is concentrated in the cities. population density 134 inhabitants per km2, ranks the region to the second place compared to others regions. both regions are affected by changes in demographic trends. in nitra region the tendency of slowing down the reproduction of the population and decreasing natural population growth is more significant, in 2011, the natural population growth was – 907 (nitriansky kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013; trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). comparing the economic performance of both regions, regional gross domestic product (at current prices) in 2009 (see table 2), is in the nitra region 7,009 million. eur share on sr by 11.1%. regional gross value added at current prices in 2009 reached 6,371 million. euros with a share of 11.1% of the total for the slovakia. trnava region is one of the most productive agricultural regions (followed by nitra region). based on the development of economic indicators in table. 2, we can conclude that the evolution of the gdp per capita in slovakia is significantly regionally differentiated. in the last decade the regional disparities have deepen. in year 2010 the highest creation of gdp per capita was in the bratislava region, which reached 241% national average. except this region only trnava region was above the average with (112%). in trnava the economic situation especially in recent years greatly improved thanks to an increase in industrial production and gross production due to growth in production and supply of electricity, water and gas as well as the significant increase in prices of these commodities (trnavský kraj – charakteristika regionu, 2013). both regions are the most important producers of crops such as wheat, barley, grain maize, edible peas, sugar beet, rape seed, sunflower seed for seed, oil bearing plants, grain legumes and grapes5. following the primary agricultural production the production of foods (milk and dairy products, meat and meat products, sugar, confectionery and sparkling wines) is developed. plant production is complemented by livestock production, with a significant share livestock, poultry and pigs (nitriansky kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013; trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). types of industries in both regions is varied, but unevenly distributed territorially. other core 5 gross agricultural production of nitra region presents 30.2% of slovak production – author´s note. tab. 2. regional gross domestic product per capita in eur region/year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 bratislava 15 446.6 16 977.9 18 957.7 22 270.3 23 784.0 26 918.5 28 541.6 28 442.7 29 241.2 trnava 6 844.1 7 874.2 8 852.0 9 895.6 12 427.0 13 675.3 14 196.7 12 928.1 13 633.7 trenčín 6 254.9 6 946.3 7 770.6 8 081.4 9 536.8 10 502.7 11 220.5 10 265.0 10 744.5 nitra 5 786.7 6 546.5 7 416.3 8 125.9 8 755.7 9 509.0 10 495.2 9 928.3 10 077.6 b. bystrica 5 912.0 6 484.3 6 909.9 6 565.4 7 536.9 8 450.2 9 329.9 8 425.3 8 973.6 žilina 5 591.9 6 037.7 6 792.8 7 536.8 8 270.2 9 553.2 10 790.2 10 037.7 10 746.4 prešov 4 237.2 4 577.8 5 021.7 5 384.6 5 583.0 6 259.0 7 268.0 6 654.0 6 860.7 košice 6 175.5 6 706.4 7 392.4 7 720.7 8 599.0 9 361.6 10 194.2 9 021.8 9 580.6 slovakia 6 843.1 7 549.6 8 390.6 9 154.3 10 202.6 11 386.8 12 381.4 11 609.1 12 130.7 source: regionálny hrubý domáci produkt na obyvateľa v sk, štatistický úrad slovenskej republiky. ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions 45 industries in the nitra region include electrical machinery, food processing, chemical and rubber industries. the district sala there are important chemical plant duslo.a.s., which processes natural gas and produces nitrogen fertilizers and rubber chemicals. a significant proportion of the trnava region is a manufacturer of computer, electronic and optical products and motor vehicles. the most important industrial undertaking active in the automotive industry in the trnava region is psa peugeot citroen (hospodársky vývoj v regiónoch sr (analytická časť), 2013). among the major sectors are also fabricated metal products production of machinery and equipment, production of chemicals and chemical products, production of basic metals, production of basic pharmaceutical products. the region has created a dense network of equipment wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, which undertook to 31.12.2011 27.8% of the total number of enterprises aimed at generating profit and 20.4% of the number of entrepreneurs in the region (trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). in addition, legal entities aimed at generating profit undertook business in professional, scientific and technical activities, in manufacturing and in construction and natural persons in construction and manufacturing. according to the program of cross-border cooperation between slovak republic and czech republic trnava region is one of the largest industrial agglomerations, contributing to higher employment and economic growth in the region. this fact is apparent, inter alia, from the favorable geographical location of the border region near the capital, good infrastructure and the possibility of getting funds from a number of cross-border cooperation programs. especially the last two mentioned factors – infrastructure development and cross-border cooperation and the associated tourism – are according to authors of the article supported by finance from eu funds for regional development and thus also contributed to the growth of the region. nitra is behind trnava region in industry because in its territory, except duslo šala there are no large industrial companies and the region has always had a rather agricultural character. region drew eu funds especially in the development of road infrastructure and education, but failed to capitalize these investments in terms of generating direct investments and building industries and new jobs. the truth remains that most roads in the nitra region are not connected to the main transport roads, which primarily affects the southern part of the region. given the nitra region higher unemployment and lower economic growth compared to the trnava region and the population, real wages are lower. nevertheless, both regions, drawing on their position near bratislava and thanks to the spending of eu funds for infrastructure development are compared with the other regions of slovakia to those more developed (nitriansky kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013; trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). in terms of spending of eu funds according to the following studies of conservative institute m.r. štefánika shown in figure 1 shows that the trnava region has been more successful in spending of eu funds in comparison with fig. 1. redistributing eu funds in slovakia to 31.5.2009 source: čerpanie štrukturálnych fondov, kohézneho fondu a európskeho fondu pre rybné hospodárstvo k 31.12.2013. 46 radoslava brhlíková, mária kočnerová, anna kúbeková nitra region, which was reflected in the growth of all economic and social indicators (čerpanie štrukturálnych fondov, kohézneho fondu a európskeho fondu pre rybné hospodárstvo k  31.12.2013). on the other hand, the authors of the study indicate that the spending of eu funds don´t contribute to balancing the regions, which is their main goal, and the largest recipients of investment in the slovak republic remain at low levels of development. the authors of this article agree with those postulates, but stresses the fact that the condition is mainly caused by the inefficiency of using investments from eu funds. directly responsible for this are the recipients in the mentioned regions. the authors are inclined to the opinion that the effective use of eu funds in the trnava region is an example of successful regional development support. with respect to regional, respectively eu structural policies, both regions are eligible for objective 1 – convergence, which focuses on job creation at nuts 2 level; as well as under the objective 3 – european territorial cooperation, which aims to promote crossborder cooperation at local and regional projects on the nuts 3, where both regions can act independently. both regions as well as have the possibility to co-finance projects from the cohesion fund in areas such as environmental protection and development of infrastructure, especially the road network. when comparing the transport infrastructure, we can conclude that both regions are well connected by roads, so important for both national and international transport. the territory of nitra region crosses international main-line railways. in the town of komárno is located an important river port on the danube river, which is connected to european river highway rhine – main – danube. the territory of the nitra region is crossed by important pipes. the most important gas transit and interstate pipelines are the družba and adria. also in the trnava region road, rail and water transport is well developed. but its extra advantage is that that it is passed with important road routes from bratislava through trnava to žilina and from hodonín through trnava to nitra. the rail transport is strongly represented in this region, since its passed by routes bratislava – žilina and electrified single track line trnava – galanta and trnava – kuty, which extends south railway line towards the czech republic. importance is the track bratislava – galanta – štúrovo. construction of gabčíkovo significantly improved navigation conditions on the slovak section of the danube (hospodársky vývoj v regiónoch sr (analytická časť), 2013). both regions are comparable to the analysis of data drawn from the statistical office of the slovak republic and in education, as in the whole territory of both regions is well established dense network of preschool and school facilities. in almost every major village is situated primary school providing compulsory education. in both regional capitals occupied by two universities – in nitra is the slovak university of agriculture and constantine the philosopher university. in the town of komarno seats selye university. in trnava it is the trnava university and the university of sss. cyril and methodius. trnava guests also one faculty of slovak technical university– faculty of material sciences. in addition, in the trnava region, there are two private universities the university in sládkovičovo and the central european university in skalica (nitriansky kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013; trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). in the area of culture both regional capitals nitra and trnava have a long tradition. nitra is deemed one of the most important centers of slavic education, culture and the christian life. the development of culture are going back to the early settlement of the ancient slavs and continued in the first state formation pribina principality of nitra and great moravia during the middle ages until modern times. the region has seven theaters, two galleries including branches and 307 public libraries, including branches. attention deserves andrej bagar theatre in nitra, nitra museum and nitra gallery. in recent years, in addition to traditional agricultural exhibition agrokomplex, also fairs and exhibitions such as automobile, furniture and living, international engineering fair, lignumexpo and others are organized in nitra. theater tradition in the trnava region represents trnava theatre. a significant role is the film art that promotes extensive network of permanent and natural cinemas. historical and cultural monuments are exhibited in galleries and museums, most exhibits presents western slovakia museum in trnava. educational activities provide cultural and educational institutions, leisure art ensemble and facilities on a special interest-educational activities (nitriansky kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013; trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013). it follows that both regions have comparable resources and opportunities for regional development and the alleged facts constitute a great potential to develop tourism travel, which would ultimately lead to development in all areas of the regions. however, given the uneven distribution of the two regions, nitra greater is faced with structural problems. if, in the trnava region was achieved in september 2014 unemployment rate of 8.32%, in the nitra region was up 11.30%. trnava region has the second lowest unemployment rate (9.81%) ranked after the bratislava region (6.22%), as fig. 2 shows. ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions 47 thanks to the spending of eu funds, both regions improve innovation, which is confirmed by the regional innovation scoreboard from 2014 (hollanders, es-sadki, 2014), which both regions classified as a moderately developed regions. during the reporting period from the slovak republic into the eu progressed from underdeveloped regions in 2006 to slightly develop in 2008 a position have still maintained the economic growth to 2.5% in this area. from the slovak republic only bratislava region shows full progress in the use of european support for innovation and thus ranked as the most advanced regions of the eu. it is not possible to compare the level of the monitored region since most evaluation reports of the european commission classifies trnava and nitra, as mentioned above, in the category of western slovakia (sk02) and predicts a similar development on its entire territory. the data can be misleading especially in terms of assessing the nitra region, because in this category it is a part of the trenčín and žilina region that are assessed as most industrialized areas of the slovak republic according to the ministry of agriculture and regional development. the graph shows that the area of regional development is in second place in the spending of eu funds behind the health sector in the slovak republic in the overall disbursement rate of 70%. of the total commitment of 2007–2013 in all 14 operational programs slovakia exhausted the resources till 31.08.2013 at 44.63%. the level of spending over 50% of total commitments reached in 2007-2013 operational programme health (80.88%), regional operational programme (65.86%), op employment and social inclusion (56.80%), operational programme sr-cr 2007–2013 (56,22%) and the operational programme fisheries (50.63%). in terms of spending of eu funds slovak republic lags globally, therefore the committee on regional development of the european parliament adopted in december 2013 amendment no. 1297/2013 which enables us together with romania, the possibility for using the funds for a longer period (výbor europarlamentu schválil slovensku dlhšie čerpanie eurofondov, 2013). nitra regional government (nsk) has registered 71 projects within the rop, of which 23 were approved, representing a non-repayable grant totaling 26,442,401, 75 euros. the other two projects were prepared by the op information society, the project „digitalization services nitra regional government” and the project “the most important archeological and historical monuments in museum collections of nitra regional government”. within the op environment regional government implemented a project to improve air quality in the nitra region on which 10 cleaning mechanisms for regional communications were bought. other completed projects were funded from other sources of eu and norwegian financial mechanism. in 2008, the ministry of construction and regional development has authorized nitra regional government to implement three measures fig. 2. the registered unemployment rate in slovakia to 30.6.2013. source: nezamestnanosť, 2013. 48 radoslava brhlíková, mária kočnerová, anna kúbeková of the regional operational programme to support the infrastructure of tourism, regeneration of settlements and regional roads. to carry out these tasks, regional government created the intermediate body under the managing authority for the regional operational programme (ib / ma for rop), which contracted and managed proper implementation of 129 approved projects of applicants from nitra. until the june 30, 2013 107 projects were completed. the total value of approved eligible expenditure is 98 689 703.37 euros (nitriansky samosprávny kraj v 3. volebnom období 2009–2013, 2014). in the years 2010–2013 nsk spent on maintenance and repair of roads ii. and iii. class 37 878 thousand euros from current funds and 13 876 thousand euros in capital expenditure, of which there were 9 899 thousand euros from the regional operational programme. overall, the total reconstructed or repaired roads in length of 129 km and 1 146.6 m² of bridges, of which from the rop nearly 88 km of roads. in 2011, nsk has been settled – together with the town stará tura, as the best among all governments in the transparency and quality of obligatory disclosure agreements (nitriansky samosprávny kraj v 3. volebnom období 2009–2013, 2014). trnava regional government has no comparative report on implementation of regional programs with a summary of projects and finances amounts. the situation is comparable to the rest of slovak regions, there the implementation of eu funds forms 80% of public investments to all areas. 5. conclusion an analysis of the documents shows that the effective use of structural funds, which is a prerequisite for the development of regions is needed in the first place consistently and correctly define the most fundamental problems of the regions. on base of this analysis is then necessary to prepare a national development plan, which report shall contain the specific problems of each region. the problem is that the success of the application of regional policy in a very significant extent depends on political decision-making, which manifests itself mainly in non-approval of individual projects, which are some applicants repeat successful, others not. why do you think? thus, a major problem is corruption. another problem is the overall set of funding, when you some regions, authorities, municipalities and other eligible applicants cannot afford to co-finance the project as envisaged principle of additionality – i.e. by taking part in the financing of 50% and 25% and 15%. the problem is also administrative complexity of a project. often projects are scrapped because of banal misspellings. for these reasons slovakia represents one of the eu countries with the lowest eu funds withdrawal (85,3%, by the eu-28 average of 88,3%), as fig. 3 shows to us. according to presented study we have to conclude the trnava region has been more successful in spending of eu funds in comparison with nitra region, which was reflected in the growth of all fig. 3. total percentage of available funds paid out by the commission 2007–2013 source: cohesion policy data, 2016. ten years of eu membership – benefits for slovak regions 49 economic and social indicators. to better position and condition of trnava region contributes also fact, that trnava can withdrawal more cross-border projects and is closer to the capital city of bratislava and the most developed core of slovakia. on the other hand, the authors of the study indicate that the spending of eu funds don´t contribute to balancing the regions, which is their main goal, and the largest recipients of investment in the slovak republic remain at low levels of development. the authors of this article agree with those postulates, but stresses the fact that the condition is mainly caused by the inefficiency of using investments from eu funds. directly responsible for this are the recipients in the mentioned regions. the authors are inclined to the opinion that the effective use of eu funds in the trnava region is an example of successful regional development support. references brhlíková r., 2013, politiky európskej únie po lisabone, ukf, nitra. cohesion policy data, 2016, european commission, http:// ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/ [06.04.2016] čerpanie štrukturálnych fondov, kohézneho fondu a európskeho fondu pre rybné hospodárstvo k  31.12.2013, ministerstvo financii sr, http://www.monitoringfondov.eu/ upload/cerpanie/mfsr/fondy_eu%2831122013%29.pdf [05.11.2014] hollanders h., es-sadki n., 2014, regional innovation scoreboard 2014, maastricht university, merit, european commission, 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produkt na obyvateľa v sk, štatistický úrad slovenskej republiky, http://archiv.statistics.sk/html/ showdoc.dodocid=2276.html, [21.01.2013] regionálny operačný program, 2008, ministry of construction and regional development of slovak republic, http:// www.ropka.sk/operacny-program/ [12.03.2013] trnavský kraj – charakteristika regiónu, 2013, štatistický úrad slovenskej republiky, http://slovak.statistics.sk/ wps/por tal/ex t/themes/regional/trnavsk y%20k raj/ about/!ut/p/b1/jzbbdoiweevpjb1assuyyig1riecyjcgjtekgi6mxtulqeurs5vkvt-tjwyqkemba3tolu2pb47p3 f i b j c k n b o co g ua a q f l g e r l l k c d s b 6 au i r y yw k a tyqfjeiydzjcqjd_fpgyaka_stkxl1nhdv4qupgm-av-xb gx _0 5m u 22 c26 7z ggh 0ya z gr hpp oyb d de kg wta7nobuda3eokui8c t4sxfrqckehod-bjgk2crcar shdmfxggrn7o9ondlwd-1atvepad2muew/dl4/d5/ l2dbisevz0fbis9nqseh/ [15.08.2014] výbor europarlamentu schválil slovensku dlhšie čerpanie eurofondov, 2013, sme z dňa 24.9.2013, http://ekonomika. sme.sk/c/6946683/vybor-europarlamentu-schvalil-slovensku-dlhsie-cerpanie-eurofondov.html [07.11.2014] výročná správa o implementácii rámca podpory spoločenstva 2004–2006, ministerstvo výstavby a regionálneho rozvoja sr, riadiaci orgán pre rámec podpory spoločenstva, https://www.google.sk/search?q=v%c3%bdro%c4%8dn%c3%a1+spr%c3%a1va+o+implement%c3%a1cii + r % c 3 % a 1 m c a + p o d p o r y + s p o l o % c 4 % 8 d e n stva+2004%e2%80%932006&oq=v%c3%bdro%c4%8dn % c 3 % a 1 + s p r % c 3 % a 1 v a + o + i m p l e m e n t % c 3 % a1 c i i + r % c 3 % a 1 m c a + p o d p o r y + s p o l o % c 4 % 8 d e n stva+2004%e2%80%932006&gs_l=serp.12...2710.2710.0 .3837.1.1.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0....0...1c.2.64.serp..1.0.0.0xmfftdcjoq [21.01.2013] 1. introduction in 2019, the united nations (un) declared that the world was to end the warmest decade (2010– 2019) ever recorded. the un stressed that the levels of carbon dioxide (co2) and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere had increased to new records. on september 25–27, 2015, a un summit, including 193 member states, adopted transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development (united nations, 2015). the agenda came into effect in 2016, contextualized by the paris climate agreement (cop21), the addis ababa action agenda and the sendai framework for disaster risk reduction (karlsson & silander, 2020). the 2030 agenda included 17 sustainable development goals (united nations, 2015). goal 13 focuses on climate action and its impact on humanity. it stresses how an increasing global temperature erupts in wildfires, hurricanes, droughts, rising sea levels and floods affecting countries all over the world and foremost developing societies. it also acknowledges how climate change may promote conflict. “already, we are seeing how climate change can exacerbate storms and disasters, and threats such as food and water scarcity, which can lead to conflict.” (un goal 13, 2015, p. 1). this article discusses climate change addressed in goal 13 in relation to goal 16 in the un agenda on just, journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(2), 34–43 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.2.04 the un agenda 2030 and the climate-security nexus in africa daniel silander department of political science, linnaeus university, se-35105 vaxjo, sweden e-mail: daniel.silander@lnu.se citation silander d., 2021, the un agenda 2030 and the climate-security nexus in africa, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(2), 34–43. abstract there is a growing bulk of studies on global climate changes and conflicts. it has been argued that climate change may be a triggering factor to conflicts and wars, especially in societies with poor governance. this study explores the climate-security nexus in africa. it is argued that the global climate change provides profound state and human security challenges to african governments and people. scarcity of vital resources in food, water, sanitation and health has challenged political and economic structures, infrastructure and integration. this has also been due to poorly governed states with authoritarianism, corruption, ethnic divisions and fragile, dysfunctional institutions. the war in darfur is a tragic, but illustrative example of the climate change-security nexus of our time. key words climate change, security, poor governance, africa. received: 08 march 2021 accepted: 01 may 2021 published: 30 june 2021 the un agenda 2030 and the climate-security nexus in africa 35 peaceful and inclusive societies by highlighting the urgent climate-security nexus in africa. africa is the lowest carbon emitter in the world (the world bank, 2016), but the continent is extremely vulnerable to climate changes. although less than 3 percent of the global emissions of greenhouse gases come from africa (hope, 2010), many african states are among the top 10 states most affected by climate change. climate change has an extremely negative impact on states and societies, including socioeconomic despair in societies with political instability and poor governance. therefore, climate change may cause severe stress on african societies that have limited capacities to protect state and human security (mohamoud et al., 2014; hausler, mccorquodale, 2011). climate change challenges the african continent in many ways: with a rise of temperature, escalation of droughts, storms, rising sea levels and floods, with climate hot spots, and foremost the desertification of the sahara and sahel regions, but also with the rapid and massive melting of snow on mt. kenya and mt. kilimanjaro. such changes are causing social tensions over natural resources in many african societies, such as kenya, the northern parts of nigeria, sudan, etc. also, for decades, political tension, conflicts and wars have had serious consequences for african security, both state and human. a growing bulk of studies has indicated different explanations for wartorn african states in colonial legacies, limited economic development, fragile political institutions, corruption, ethnic tension and poverty. in addition, a growing number of scholarly studies have also pointed out global climate change as a driving engine or triggering factor for conflicts. global climate change may be seen as one factor adding stress to societies and state governments already in political crisis (scheffran et al. (eds.), 2012; scheffran, battaglini, 2011). this study explores the climate-security nexus in the most challenged african states and sets out links between climate change, insecurity and fragile and weakened states in sub-saharan africa. it is argued how climate change and political fragility is a dangerous combination for state and human security, which is highlighted by a case-study analysis on the developments in darfur. 2. global climate change in africa there is a growing bulk of scholarly studies on climate change using environmental, economic, social, and political perspectives (canter (ed.), 2016; birnbacher, thorseth (eds.), 2015). in politics, there seem to exist a growing consensus among most state leaders and international and non-governmental organizations pointing out how climate change embeds aggravating conditions for life and safety around the world. at the same time, there has been disagreement, foremost between the developed and less developed states, on how to approach climate change regarding mitigation and adjusting to climate change consequences (hickmann, 2016; urry, 2015). different geographical regions around the world face different levels of vulnerability due to climate change. in addition, state governments have different levels of capacities to mitigate such challenges. africa is a large continent with states that pursue different levels of capacities to approach climate change (roessler, 2016; busby et al., 2014). overall, however, africa is under severe climate change challenges; this is due to high exposure to climate change and low level of capacities to mitigate climate challenges. although many african societies have seen substantial development over recent decades, some african states are facing socioeconomic and political challenges. the limited political capacities include continual lack of democracy and good governance, rule of law, counter-corruption measures, democratic legacy and ethnic and political unity (see freedom house, 2020). the limited economic capacities refer to a recent stalemate of economic growth and an increasing population throughout the continent (rodrik, 2016; the world bank, 2016). this has led to a greater need for resources, such as food, water, energy and infrastructure as well as policies on poverty reduction, education and healthcare. the importance of promoting development and politically initiated policies to favor prosperity and wealth in african societies have led to further pressure on the environment. developing african states are increasing energy consumption, including fossil fuels, to favor the economies, which have resulted in negative consequences on the climate. however, a political halt to decrease carbon emissions could result in limited economic development, social tension, poverty, and eventually growing political instability. the alternative way, to promote a transformation from fossil resources to low-carbon energy sources, would come with immediate transitional costs for most african economies (silander, 2020). despite the fact that many african states have acknowledged global climate change and politically declared the importance of new policies on mitigation and adaption in order to protect and promote state and human security, the overall reactions to climate change have been late and rather unstructured. most political activities on climate change 36 daniel silander have been institutionalized within the group of 77 and china (g77/china), the alliance of small island states (aosis), the organization of petroleum exporting countries (opec) and the least developed countries (ldc-group) (roger, belliethathan, 2016; opec, 2016; ldc, 2013). the first step for african political collaboration on climate change happened in 1991 at the first regional african ministerial preparatory conference of the united nations conference on environment and development (unced) in egypt. the political talks ended up in a coherent african stand on development and environmental concerns. preparatory negotiations for the earth summit in 1992 were another strategic step on the climate challenge. these talks concerned unifying african interests and speaking with one voice on environmental issues. the third step was the eighth african union (au) summit meeting in 2007, where it was decided that the au would become a strategic political platform for approaching climate change challenges. in addition, the establishment of the african group of negotiators (agn) in the early 1990s also institutionalized the idea of “one continent, one voice”. the agn identified that a common proactive political stand and presence at negotiations with one african voice was crucial in order to become influential on the international scene. however, despite such acknowledgement, a common african stand on addressing climate change has continued to be challenged by traditional political notions of state sovereignty and national economic and political self-interests (silander, 2018, pp. 88–89; see also chin-yee, 2016; cap, 2015). african societies are challenged by climate change in many different ways. first, climate change has led to food and water scarcity. volatile weather conditions, mainly major changes in rainfall and temperature, have resulted in pressure on the productive landscape in african societies (hope (ed.), 2017; wheeler, von braum, 2013). the majority of african people make their living through agriculture and fisheries. agriculture and fisheries comprise about 40 percent of all exports and over 30 percent of the gdp in sub-saharan africa (hope, 2010), but are very vulnerable to climate change. food shortages and scarcity of fresh water are major concerns for security for the people in many african societies (nagothu (ed.), 2015). scarcity of water includes both the lack of drinking water and water for hygiene and sanitation, and about 33% of the african population faces water-stress (reig et al., 2013). scarcity of water also leads to desertification and land degradation resulting in challenges to the production of food leaving african societies with food shortages. many african states, such as cameroon, chad, ethiopia, nigeria, sudan, south africa, and zimbabwe, have occasionally faced food shortages due to reduced production of cereal and crops (hope, 2010). in addition, scientific studies have predicted an increase in the average temperature in africa by 2050 of about 1.5–3°c, leading to a decrease in annual rainfall and further stress on food production (ipcc, 2007). both malawi and uganda, among other african states, have faced less rain over time, jeopardizing farmers’ capacities to survive leading to further malnutrition, poverty, and diseases (magrath, 2010). the scarcity of food is further alarming with the overall trend in africa of increasing populations. for example, burkina-faso and ghana have seen growing populations, while being heavily dependent on agriculture. studies set out how the african continent’s population of 1.1 billion in 2013 will increase to about 2.4 billion in 2050 (population reference bureau, 2013; mohamoud et al., 2014). population growth demands greater need to cultivate arable land, but estimations from the 1950s and forward show how about 65% of the agricultural land in africa has faced soil degradation. in addition, about two-thirds of africa is arid or desert and about 35–40% of african land will soon become useless for cultivation due to climate change (mohamoud et al., 2014; un convention to combat desertification, 2017). second, climate change has also resulted in forced migration and displaced people. one major explanation to migration and displaced people is desertification and deforestation (manou et al. (eds.), 2017). the scarcity of farmland has forced farmers to migrate often resulting in socioeconomic despair among this group of citizens, competition and tension among farmers for farmland, but also political instability caused by increased populations in cities and tension between urban and rural areas (mohamoud et al., 2014; mcadam, 2012). the fast trend of african urbanization has led to urban poverty as a new and increasing problem in states such as gambia, kenya, madagascar, malawi, mozambique, sierra leone, and zambia with the poverty rate at over 50 percent (hope, 2010). often migrating farmers also have too limited educational background leaving them without chances of finding jobs in companies and factories, resulting in a livelihood in poverty and slums outside city centers. forced migration has also been a result of rising sea levels in many coastal areas in africa forcing people into inland areas and creating social tension. migration into inland areas creates competition for food, water and farmland, but may also result in tension, conflict and violence when such migration crosses borders and contributes to preexisting tensions based on ethnic and political divisions. the un agenda 2030 and the climate-security nexus in africa 37 cross-border migration has led to political tension and inter-state conflicts in for example chad-sudan, uganda-sudan, democratic republic of congo-central african republic, rwanda-burundi and rwanda-democratic republic of congo leaving fragile states further weakened (messer, 2010; mazo, 2009a, 2009b). 3. climate change in dysfunctional african states there is growing scholarly interest in the climatesecurity nexus (bretthauer, 2016; hentz (ed.), 2014). the scholarly debate on climate change and security began in early 2000. the ipcc report in 2007 declared serious human security concerns with climate change. the un security council (unsc) also stated the climate-security nexus and the secretarygeneral ban ki-moon argued how climate change could be a serious risk comparable to war (scheffran, battaglini, 2011). over the last decade, there has been a growing bulk of academic work on the potential climate-security nexus. research has shown how climate change may be a triggering factor for violence and conflicts. the dominating scholarly perspective on climate change and security seems to be that although there is no empirical evidence demonstrating a causal relationship, climate change may be a triggering factor for conflict and violence and especially so in states in political and socioeconomic instability. in such states, climate change may become a serious burden for societies already under stress and without greater capacity to act. this is what the un general assembly has conceptualized as “risk-multiplier” (salehyan, 2008; un general assembly, 2009) or as stated by the un development programme. “weak responses further reinforce climate vulnerability, and if governments or institutions cannot meet the needs of communities as climate impacts occur, this may exacerbate grievances, undermine government legitimacy, and aggravate intercommunal tensions between affected groups, particularly over access to natural capital. hence an indirect impact of climate change is an increased risk of tensions and insecurity, particularly in areas where there are already concerns about government and institutional capacity or a perceived lack of institutional legitimacy” (undp, 2020, p. 3). since many african states’ economies are dependent on agriculture and about 95% of africa’s farming is rain-fed, climate change may be an important driver toward conflict. while some groups of people may feel deprived of resources, other groups may be in control of key resources creating societal tension. social tension and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have occurred in many african states, but especially so in southern ethiopia, in northern nigeria, in chad and mali as well as in southern sudan. in these areas, climate change has led to scarcity of resources and has, in the long run, provided social tension and political instability. it must, however, be stated that global climate change does not always result in conflicts and wars, but could be a possible driver of violence and conflict due to the negative impact climate change has on the living conditions for people (bretthauer, 2016; hentz (ed.), 2014). a dominant perspective in academic studies on global climate change and security has stated a nexus between the two, but studies have also, surprisingly, stated that competition over scarcity of resources may favor cooperation to promote common security (bretthauer, 2016). state institutions, seeking technological innovations and financial instruments, have launched such cooperation and social policies to adapt to climate change impact, but also through bottom-up initiatives taken by local authorities or civil society organizations seeking common solutions to common challenges. more recently, there has been an interest in exploring the role of political institutions to handle global climate change and conflicts (bulkeley, newell, 2015; azim, 2013). poor governance has been associated with a scarcity of resources and measures to be used to mitigate climate change. the many studies on weakened and failing states have shed light on states with poor governance and limited state capacities to promote societal functions vital to wealth, health, and development (scheffran, battaglini, 2011). while scholars have argued that climate change is a root cause of violent conflicts, most scholars would rather stress that climate change could be a driving engine depending on the functionality of the state. as a consequence, climate change and poor governance may both be important explanatory factors to violent conflicts and the combination of the two is often seen in african states. as argued, “conflict and state failure make adaption to and mitigation of climate change more difficult, as state institutions become less able to implement adaption measures…” (mazo, 2009c, p. 104). many african states are politically fragile with limited resources to mitigate climate change (harbeson, rothchild, 2016). this has resulted in added pressure on african societies as political institutions have had limited capacities to protect citizens from human insecurity. while scholars on climate change have stressed the importance of good governance in africa to mitigate climate change consequences on state and human security, scholars on security 38 daniel silander studies have identified a high number of weak, fragile african states deeply vulnerable to climate change (harbeson, rothchild, 2016; the world bank, 2007; rotberg (ed.), 2003). based on the fragile state index (the fund for peace, 2020), consisting of annual measurements on the level of weakness among 178 states in the world, the african continent includes weakened and failed states. the fragile state index assesses the vulnerability of states to collapse based on 12 conflict risk indicators within the areas of cohesion, economic, political and social. the indicators used are cohesion indicators: 1. security apparatus (sa); 2. factionalized elites (fe); 3. group grievance (gg); economic indicators: 1. economic decline (ec); 2. uneven economic development (ud); 3. human flight and brain drain (hf); political indicators: 1. state legitimacy (sl); 2. public services (ps); 3. human rights and rule of law (hr) and social indicators: 1. demographic pressures (dp); 2. refugees and internally displaced people (rd); 3. external intervention (ex). based on the wide range of indicators on vulnerability, the fragile state index sets out numerous african states at the top of the risk analysis. among the most vulnerable and fragile states in the world, we may find somalia, south sudan, congo democratic republic, central african republic, chad, sudan, zimbabwe, burundi, cameroon and nigeria (the fund for peace, 2020). in addition, using the freedom house index, measuring the range of political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world, it is shown how the on-going global decline in democratic governance and respect of human rights embeds sub-saharan africa that is overall backsliding. in 2020, the freedom house index showed how 22 african states saw declining scores. although many african states also saw progress in rights and liberties, 15 states, sub-saharan africa had seven states among twelve that saw the most serious setbacks in freedom scores (temin, 2020). the most obvious cases of setbacks in 2020 on the african continent was benin, guinea, nigeria, senegal, tanzania, zimbabwe and uganda (freedom house, 2020). corruption, lack of transparency, concentration of power, limited freedom of expression and association, deficient civil society and military influence are some of the major challenges in many african states. this has left many african societies and populations with very weak political institutions and poor relations between those who govern and those who are governed (freedom house, 2020; the fund for peace, 2016). 4. darfur, climate change and state and human insecurity the combination of malfunctioning governance and climate change challenges is a contemporary and tab. 1. top-ranked fragile states in 2020 country rank cohesion (max 30) economic (max 30) political (mx 30) social (max 30) total (120) sa fe gg ec ud hf sl ps hr dp rd ex yemen 1st 112.4 9.7 10.0 9.7 9.4 7.8 7.0 9.9 9.5 10.0 9.8 9.7 10.0 somalia 2nd 110.9 9.8 10.0 8.6 9.1 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.0 10.0 9.1 9.0 south sudan 3rd 110.8 9.4 9.7 9.1 9.5 9.2 6.8 9.9 9.5 9.0 9.5 9.7 9.5 syria 4th 110.7 9.9 9.9 10.0 8.7 7.2 8.4 10.0 9.1 10.0 7.6 10.0 10.0 congo democratic republic 5th 109.4 8.5 9.8 9.7 8.0 8.6 6.9 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.4 central african republic 6th 107.5 8.3 9.7 8.0 8.4 9.9 6.8 8.9 10.0 9.2 8.8 10.0 9.5 chad 7th 106.4 9.2 9.5 8.3 8.5 8.9 8.4 9.3 9.4 8.5 9.6 9.2 7.7 sudan 8th 104.8 8.4 9.4 9.4 8.1 8.0 8.0 9.3 8.3 8.9 9.1 9.3 8.6 afghanistan 9th 102.9 9.9 8.9 7.5 8.3 7.7 7.5 9.0 9.5 7.6 9.0 9.3 8.6 zimbabwe 10th 99.2 8.5 10.0 6.4 8.6 7.6 7.0 9.1 8.7 8.3 9.3 8.5 7.2 burundi 11th 97.9 8.2 9.3 8.6 6.8 7.7 7.6 8.9 8.3 7.8 8.8 8.6 7.3 cameroon 11th 97.9 8.3 7.9 7.6 8.5 7.3 5.9 9.1 7.9 9.1 9.2 8.5 8.5 haiti 13th 97.7 6.9 9.6 5.6 8.5 9.1 8.1 9.1 9.3 6.9 8.2 7.1 9.3 nigeria 14th 97.3 8.7 9.9 9.1 7.9 7.8 6.6 8.1 8.9 8.4 9.3 6.9 5.7 source: the fund for peace, 2020. the un agenda 2030 and the climate-security nexus in africa 39 highly dangerous reality in many african societies. the un has addressed the climate change-security nexus pointing out how climate change may become a serious security challenge in fragile states. “climate change worsens existing social, economic and environmental risks that can fuel unrest and potentially result in conflict. security concerns aggravated by climate change include impacts on food and water supply, increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, climaterelated disasters, migration and displacement. crisis-affected countries are more susceptible to being overwhelmed by the security risks posed by climate change. stabilization efforts often do not consider the impacts of climate change. at the same time, state fragility hinders climate change adaptation efforts, particularly among the most vulnerable communities” (unep, p. 1). sub-saharan africa and especially the sahel region has the dangerous combination of fragile states and high vulnerability to climate change (mazo, 2010). sudan is one of the most fragile states in the world. based on the above-mentioned fragile state index, sudan is assessed as number 8 in the world and south-sudan as number 3. in addition, since its independence in 1955, sudan has systematically faced minor and major conflicts and been ruled by an economically, politically and militarily dominated small elite. although in 2019 sudan saw how the 30year dictatorship of omar al-bashir and the national congress party (ncp) ended after popular unrest and call for political change, the freedom house index sets out sudan and south-sudan as not free and with very limited rights and liberties for the people. the transitional government is to be replaced through elections in 2022, but serious challenges remains to be handled to see a transition to democracy (freedom house, 2020). geographically, sudan constitutes one of the largest african states. darfur is a region within western sudan, consisting of about 6 million people. in february 2003, a brutal civil war started in darfur. it began when para-military groups, in the sudan liberation movement (slm) and the justice and equality movement (jem), based on non-arab muslim fur, zaghawa and masalit ethnic groups, criticized the government of conducting political and economic repression of non-arabs in darfur. in a short period, both para-military groups and government forces engaged in violence, and government forces initiated a systematic ethnic cleansing of non-arabs in the region, ending up in several hundreds of thousands of civilians killed, including casualties in combat and by war-related starvation and diseases. the escalation of warfare in darfur resulted in forced migration of over 2 million people both within and across sudanese borders. the aggressiveness from the government forces with support by militias, foremost against three ethnic tribes, led to a massive humanitarian catastrophe by many defined as genocide (mazo, 2010; ki-moon, 2007). the escalation of violence and cruelty received international attention. in late 2003, the sudanese government and rebel forces signed a peace agreement after international pressure and diplomatic mediated talks with representatives from norway, italy, the uk and the us. however, the peace agreement was soon undermined, foremost by international interferences and interests over existing oil resources in darfur. in a short period, the peace agreement turned into further violence between rebel forces from the western darfur and government forces. in mid-2004, the unsc supported the african union (au) in its efforts to monitor the new ceasefire and to protect civilians from further harm. as a result, in 2006, a new peace agreement was signed based on new unsc resolutions now monitoring the peace accord in addition to allowing peacekeeping forces and using the international criminal court (icc) to prosecute war crimes. the peace agreement was the result of many diplomatic talks in nigeria, but as previously, the new agreement was soon challenged when only one rebel group was interested to sign the agreement. the remaining rebel groups questioned the agreement that they saw missed assuring progress for darfur regarding compensation for victims, protection of displaced people and political representation. while the sudanese government was willing to sign the agreement, many rebel groups and international observers questioned the government’s interest to implement the peace agreements (dagne, 2010; mohamed, 2009). in a few years of civil war, the situation in darfur turned even worse with armed conflicts between the central government and rebel forces, between different opposition factions and between the government and arab groups dissatisfied with the central authority’s inability to protect their safety. in late 2008, president omar hassan al-bashir initiated peace talks, but was challenged by rebel factions that accused him of using systematic violence against civilians. in 2010, the sudan government signed numerous peace agreements with different opposition forces, but without creating any signs of de-escalation of violence or increased stability. in 2011, the doha document for peace in darfur was decided on by the government and the umbrella organization, the liberation and justice movement (ljm), but as in previous years, many rebel forces continued to refuse to participate and sign any 40 daniel silander treaty. instead, in early 2011, south sudan voted in a referendum for its independence from sudan leading to a new sovereign state in the republic of south sudan. however, in 2013–2015, another civil war began resulting in about 2.2 million displaced people jeopardizing both the state and region to such an extent that sudan and south-sudan were under threat of collapse (bbc, 2018). while the conflict faded from the international and media spotlight, the civil war continued with growing number of displaced, injured and killed people. the state and human security situation deteriorated with millions displaced, hundreds of thousands living as refugees and millions in need of food and other vital aid. in addition, the discovery of gold in darfur resulted in further violence and displacement with an escalating conflict. today, in 2021, darfur continues to be challenged by insecurity and violence although there are un/au (unamid) peacekeeping forces in the region. there are minor signs of improvements in the recent arrest of the former dictator in omar albashir and the sudanese militia leader ali kushayb and his extradition to the icc in the city of hague in the netherlands. bashir is also wanted by the icc accused of conducting war crimes and atrocities in darfur (beaumont, 2019, 2020). many scholarly studies have explored the root causes to the many problems in darfur (akasha, 2014). in 2007, the un secretary, general ban kimoon declared the civil war in the darfur region of sudan to be the first climate change conflict in the world. he pointed out climate change as an important explanatory factor. on june 16th, 2007, kimoon stated: “amid the diverse social and political causes, the darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change” (ki-moon, 2007, p. 1). since the civil war began, darfur and sudan have become an illustrative case on the climate change-security nexus. although climate change should not be seen as the only factor or perhaps even not one of the most important ones to the conflict, climate change did provide for growing state and human insecurity in scarcity of water and food triggering for tension and conflict. the united nations environment programme (unep) has stated how decreasing rainfalls for decades resulted in sincere desertification and an expanded sahara, leading to growing tensions between farmers and herders in sudan (unep, 2007). the drier weather put severe stress on settled farmers in the region and led to increased social tension between local farmers and migrating arab nomadic herders over farmland and water (ki-moon, 2007). as in many african regions, darfur’s economy is based on agriculture with crop farming as the dominant activity. due to long-term droughts, farming has become very problematic, with scarcity of food and water as well as competition over fertile land and land ownership. with climate change continuing, many local farmers changed their activities from harvesting crops to raising animals, creating a situation of social tension over access to grazing land between pastoralists and farmers. one of the important causes of the darfur war could be argued to be declining rainfall in southern sudan leading to escalation of tension and at the end violence among societal groups. overall, studies have identified how summer rains, particularly in western and southern sudan, have declined by about 10–20% since the mid-1970s challenging sudan’s food production at the same time as a rapidly population growth has been identified. in 2010, about 8 million people faced food insecurity in northern and southern sudan and with declining levels of rainfall, the number of people challenged by food insecurity will dramatically increase as the crop production, foremost in the south-eastern areas of sudan, will decrease. south darfur has seen the largest decline of rainfall; estimations of about 20% lower throughout the 20th century at the same time as the air temperature has increased by more than 1°c throughout central and southern areas of sudan and towards darfur. focusing on the darfur region and southern sudan, “since 1980, decreasing rainfall has been accompanied by rapid increases in air temperature on the order of more than 1°c. this warming, which is two and a half times greater than global warming, is reducing evapotranspiration and making normal years effectively drier, especially in the extended darfur and southern sudan regions” (usgs, 2011, 4). another important factor in the armed conflicts, besides climate change, was poor governance of the sudanese authorities in khartoum, for supporting arab networks in darfur by arming paramilitary groups (baltrop, 2010). based on an arab-dominated government since the late 1980s, non-arab citizens and farmers felt increasingly socioeconomically and politically marginalized from societal support and resources. the government policies were perceived as strongly supporting arabs and separating non-arabs from arabs and other non-arab tribes. therefore, in the early 2000s, the fur and zaghawa tribes armed themselves and formed the jem and the sla, leading to the ensuing civil war in darfur. poor governance contributed to years of conflicts and war, both between arabs and non-arab tribes in darfur as well as between former government-supported paramilitary groups and the government. poor governance in sudan also resulted in ongoing competition over resources such as farmland and water, but also over the un agenda 2030 and the climate-security nexus in africa 41 oil reserves where international interests have been involved, all together destabilizing sudan and darfur to become further weakened. to sum up, there have been many identified explanatory factors to the darfur conflict; poor governance, militarization, ethnic tension and climate change are some of the most important ones. it is important to acknowledge how climate change has been a threat multiplier in darfur as an exacerbating factor that adds stress on an already weakened society due to political, economic, and social factors. as argued, “the current darfur conflict is a product of an explosive combination of environmental, political, and economic factors. it is well known that environmental degradation and competition over shrinking resources have played, and continue to play, a critical role in communal conflicts in the sahelian countries, such as mali, niger, and chad. in this regard, darfur is no exception” (sikainga, 2009, p. 1). 5. conclusion the growing bulk of studies on global climate change and conflicts has provided mixed results on explanatory factors to violence in african societies. while some scholars have stressed that climate change has been the most important explanatory factor for war, other scholars have rather argued that political and economic challenges are primary reasons for political instability and conflicts. an intermediate perspective has set out how both climate change and poor governance are drivers of conflicts. this study has explored how global climate change provides serious state and human security challenges to african governments and people. climate change has resulted in scarcity of vital resources in food, water, sanitation, and health and come to undermine political and economic structures, infrastructure and integration. scarcity of food and water has also forced people to migrate resulting in further marginalization and without essential resources to survive. in addition, climate change challenges have been met with very limited mitigation efforts in most african societies. poorly governed states with major challenges in authoritarianism, corruption, ethnic divisions and fragile, dysfunctional institutions has left state institutions without capacity to find counter-measures to climate change consequences. undemocratic and dysfunctional governments are a major challenge for africa to provide for state and human security. africa is the most vulnerable geographical area in the world due to climate change consequences and with a combination of limited state capacities to address the effects. the civil war in darfur, sudan has been a long-term humanitarian catastrophe and an illustrative example of the climate change-security nexus of our time. references akasha m.o., 2014, darfur – a tragedy of climate change, anchor academic publishing, hamburg. azim z., 2013, post-kyoto climate governance: confronting the politics of scale ideology and knowledge, routledge, new york-london. barltrop r., 2010, darfur and the international community: the challenges of conflict resolution in sudan, i.b. tauris, london-new york. bbc, 2018, south sudan country profile, bbc news, 6 august 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082 (accessed 04 march 2017). beaumont p., 2019, ex-sudan leader omar al-bashir sentenced to two years for corruption, the guardian, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/14/sudanesecourt-sentences-omar-al-bashir-to-2-years-in-prison (accessed 10 february, 2020). beaumont p., 2020, notorious sudanese militia chief in darfur conflict arrested in car, the guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/09/notorious-sudanesemilitia-chief-in-darfur-conflict-arrested-in-car (accessed 06 april 2019). birnbacher d. thorseth m. 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why the social sciences matter, palgrave macmillan, london, 45–59. usgs, 2011, a climate trend analysis of sudan, famine early warning systems network. u.s. department of the interior / u.s. geological survey. fact sheet 2011–3072 june 2011. wheeler t., von braum j., 2013, climate change impacts on global food security, science, 341(6145), 508–513. doi: 10.1126/science.1239402 1. introduction1 one of the most important consequences of collapse of the soviet union is substantial changes in the configuration of the external borders of russia. many territories on the east previously considered as inner ones became new border regions. these 1 the study was supported by the ras partnership integration project no 23. included such regions as the altai krai, novosibirsk, omsk, tumen oblasts, and others. having received a new status they obtained alternative possibilities to construct their development strategies, however combined with challenges and problem issues. these regions supplemented traditional border regions of russia behind the urals located along the chinese and mongolian borders. at the same time, these acquired qualities of the new and traditional journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 13–20 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.009.5454 transboundary cooperation on the east of russia: regional development and institutional bottlenecks1 evgeny vodichev (1) (2) (3), irina glazyrina (4) (5), bella krasnoyarova (6) (7) (1) institute of petroleum geology and geophysics, russian academy of sciences, siberian branch, koptuga 3, 630090, novosibirsk, russia, e-mail: vodicheveg@ipgg.sbras.ru (corresponding author) (2) department of international relations and regional studies, novosibirsk state technical university, geodezicheskaia 10, 630073, novosibirsk, russia, (3) faculty of history, tomsk state national research university, lenina 34/3, 634050, tomsk, russia, (4) institute of nature resources, ecology and cryology, russian academy of sciences, siberian branch, nedorezova 16a, 672914, chita, russia, e-mail: iglazyrina@bk.ru (5) energy department, transbaikal state university, alekzavodskaya 30, 672914, chita, russia, (6) institute of water and environmental problems, russian academy of sciences, siberian branch, molodyozhnaya 1, 656038, barnaul, russia, e-mail: bella@iwep.ru (7) faculty of geography, altai state university, lenina 61, 656049, barnaul, russia. citation vodichev e., glazyrina i., krasnoyarova b., 2016, transboundary cooperation on the east of russia: regional development and institutional bottlenecks, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 13–20. abstract the aim of this article is to characterise new and traditional borders of the russian east from the perspective of transboundary cooperation. weak institutes by which regional economy in the border regional is trapped are characterised in the paper. case study of the timber industry is used as an illustration. ecosystem approach is presented as an instrument to balance environmental risks. methodologically the paper is based on the theory of border, paul krugman’s theory of spatial economic development and the world bank classification scheme of development, and ecosystem approach as a component of environmental economy. key words asian russia, transboundary territories, regional economy, institutes, ecosystem services. 14 evgeny vodichev, irina glazyrina, bella krasnoyarova border territories as stimuli for their development strategies as well as risks remain underestimated both at federal and regional levels. 2. functionalities of borders, transboundary territories and transboundary regions: connotation dilemmas formation of new borders in the asian part of russia is just one of changes caused by collapse of the ussr as an integrated state. the processes of transition connected with new role of a border, namely the relationship between such functions of a state border as remaining barriers and/ or becoming contact zones is at least not less important. these transformations embraced both types of russian borders on the east – new borders and the old ones – and impacted relations of russia with all its eastern neighbours such as kazakhstan, mongolia and china. just a quarter of century ago the borders and border territories of russia on the east of the country were exclusively considered in the context of military, strategic and national security interests. nowadays in addition to that they received a function of a communication spaced which is to be pragmatically conceptualized in order to stimulate regional development and cooperation between the neighbouring countries. in fact, none of economic experts is now disputing this theory. meanwhile, in many respects international cooperation on the border territories is still developing spontaneously and even chaotically, and proper balance of the state, regional and local interests is not duly considered and maintained. it can be explained, inter alia, by lack of the system vision of potential advantages, which can be achieved on the basis of the pragmatic consideration of these regions as transboundary territories. the explanation is rooted, at least partially, in the fact that the essence of transboundary territories as both natural and social phenomena is still not well conceptualized in russia. meanwhile, the factor of transboundary nature of geographic and socio-economic systems, which is determined by the integrity of their natural structures and/or unity of their socio-economic and cultural imperatives is getting new and important dimension in the current epoch of globalization. this factor can substantially impact the existence and future development of such specific spaces which are divided by the state borders. on the one hand, the transboundary character of the natural objects (and territories as a whole) can be interpreted as a background for the development of mechanisms of international and interregional cooperation. on the other hand, it gives birth to new issues and problems, anthropogenic on their nature. this statement makes us briefly refer to a theory of a border. according to a classical approach, specifics of border regions are generally determined by the functional dualism of a border, which combines barrier and contact functions. “structural dynamics, growth or collapses of economic spaces depends upon the balance of factors of barriers and contact of the formal borders” (вардомский et. al., 1989). the classification scheme of border regions includes aloof border regions (interactions across the border are missing); coexisting border regions (territories with some economic and cultural interactions); interdependent border regions (territories, which implement broad interactions in the economic, social and cultural spheres); and integrated border regions (a high degree of integration; free transfer of people, goods, services, finances and ideas is provided) (давидов, чекалина, 2008). however, different understanding of such methodologically important terms as border territories, transboundary territories, transboundary regions, etc. is circulating in the expert community. the problem of border territories is seen as even more complicated due to the lack of agreements on their geographical scales and limits. the category of a boundary space introduced into the geographical discourse became a compromise, while remaining a palliative. from the standpoint of geography, it is characterised by three dimensions such as an extent, width and intensity of the boundary processes. at the same time, the issue of proper criteria for qualifying these parameters is hardly solved at the moment (ганзей, 2004). evident conflict between political, administrative, economic and geographical approaches to dividing these spaces into districts is also to be taken into consideration as the methodological issue. not going into details of these discussions since we have already got a possibility to present our argumentation in other publications, we would like to point out that the system of criteria for identifying transboundary regions should include a number of parameters. they are to characterize not just integrity of these territories as geographical objects but also specify the integrity or complementarity of their economic profiles, closeness of their historical development and cultural archetypes. regions located in a proximity to the state border naturally are the backbone and key structural elements of transboundary regions. there is a term of “an international transboundary territory” introduced into scientific discourse that is seen as operational. according to this assumption, transboundary cooperation on the east of russia: regional development and institutional bottlenecks 15 an international transboundary territory is “a territory. which combines interacting border territories of one or several neighbouring countries and possesses a combination of natural resources and types of economic activities based on the integrated geosystem or two or more geosystems of the regional level which interact in the area of the state border” (бакланов, ганзей, 2004). the background for appropriateness of such categorising is a combination of natural and anthropogenic factors, which in their integrity allow interpreting border territories as internally indivisible transboundary regions, and considering them as holistic geosystems, ecosystems and/or territorial complexes. according to some experts, they have a number of interconnected layers, namely physical and geographical, economic, cultural and historical, functional and political ones (бакланов, шинковский (eds.), 2010). if sufficient level of cooperation and integration is developed and maintained on an international transboundary territory, it formulates a solid basis for becoming a true transboundary region. in our opinion, transboundary regions should only be treated as interacting or cooperating border territories. we believe that this is the factor of interaction as well as the level of mutual integration across the border, which is to be seen as the key parameter for identification of a territory as transboundary region. thus, transboundary regions are always a result of some political design. the major precondition for qualifying transboundary regions is a joint participation of different kinds of actors across the state border in setting up objectives and selecting means and instruments for development of the adjacent territories. in a practical sense, it makes an analysis of the existing practices and modelling of the optimal institutes of transboundary cooperation the key issue of both research and management practices of cross-border cooperation. transboundary cooperation is typically determined as a combination of bilateral and/or multilateral links between administrations and authorities, economic entities, public organisations and population of border regions of the two or several countries (давидов, чекалина, 2008). in the theory, integrating efforts of the state institutes and the institutes of the civil society transboundary cooperation is an important factor of regional development harmonizing the processes of globalisation and regionalization. in practice contrary to the eu countries, which for a long time have been successfully relying on the european framework convention on trans-frontier cooperation (european…, 1980), russia has just started to conceptualize new opportunities of transboundary cooperation, and setting up acceptable and effective institutional platform for collaborating with its neighbours is now under formation with many obstacles on this way. 3. transboundary institutes and regional development policy: a bit of methodology as applied to russian realities this is for sure, that interaction of transboundary regions is supposed to be based on the developed system of transboundary institutes. no doubts that effectiveness of border contact zones is determined by the cooperation institutes, which include international agreements, chamber of commerce and trade representatives, bilateral and multilateral commissions, associations, consultancies, etc. facilitating international economic and human contacts (вардомский, 2006). international and specifically, european experience is rich of positive practices of this sort, including euroregions (see: vodichev, 2014). we believe that institutionalisation of crossborder links, ties, contacts and communication is the most important indicator of a true transboundary region. after classical approach of thorstein veblen, the institutional framework is understood as forms of organisation and means of development of transboundary interactions. it incorporates a combination of laws, rules, codes of behaviour, types of socio-economic relations and links (веблен, 1984). in other words, these are ways of public life in connection with the material surrounding of the existing society. in this sense, institutes can be divided into formal, including instruments, means, regulating methods in some specific spheres of life, such as laws, rules and regulations, etc., and informal ones, which are also influencing and structuring actions undertaken by formal institutes. respectively, the process of institutionalisation can be interpreted as a creation of mechanisms, systems and methods, which provides for regulating certain spheres of life. this process should always be considered historically and retrospectively since it passes specific phases in course of its development. thus, in a wider sense a category “transboundary institute” accepted either officially or publically can be applied to any kind of relations across the state borders. from the formal point of view, a transboundary institute is an instrument of transboundary interactions agreed with the international laws. in this sense transboundary region should be considered in integrity of their political, legislative and regulative, economic, social, cultural and infrastructural institutional dimensions (бакланов, шинковский 16 evgeny vodichev, irina glazyrina, bella krasnoyarova (eds.), 2010). we share the opinion that so far institutes in russia are rather barriers than stimuli for the regional development, and the russian economics as a whole is “institutionally trapped” (see: водичев et al., 2012). although these are formal institutes, primarily the system of legislation and the administrative system of institutions represented by the existing governing bodies, which are mostly in the focus of attention of the analysts, informal institutes should not be neglected since they deeply influence the formal ones. there is a huge bibliography already produced illustrating the decisive role of social institutions for the “resource curse” in russia, mostly addressing oil and gas issues. this thesis can be illustrated with numerous examples from recent economic performance on the east of russia and we will refer to this issue in the subsequent part of this paper using the case study of a timber industry. in the context of the institutional analysis, the paul krugman’s theory of spatial economic development is seen as specifically important. as it is well known, the theory is based on the analysis of interaction of different factors: specifically the factors of the first (an amount of natural deposits and their geographical location) and the second (institutions) nature (krugman, 1991). in a simplified way when applied to transboundary territories of the east of russia, factors of the first nature such as huge mineral basis and deposits and suitable geographical location for their excavation and transportation can be seen as their comparative advantages. meanwhile, these advantages remain blocked because of the existing institutional system. moreover, in some cases this is merging of business structures and the public administration that makes formal institutes operate in a negative sense. for further analysis, we will use the world bank classification scheme as a valuable methodological instrument. it is based at outlining three dimensions of regional development, which are characterised by the factors of the market accessibility, such as a density, a distance and disunity. in the framework of such an approach, equalisation of territories against basic indicators of living standards and the quality of life, or their economic pulling up to the levels of the leading regions is considered as the essence of regional integration processes. such aspects and trends as agglomeration, migration, regional specialisation and trade are interpreted as the key drivers of changes in the regions, both positive and negative. the authors of this concept have elaborated socalled “empirical rule of economic integration” based on proper selection of instruments, which governments and authorities should have at their disposal and may use in a view of the three mentioned above dimensions of regional development. firstly, the rule incorporates formation of institutes, which are “territorially neutral”. these are laws and regulations connected with the land use, labour force, international trade, as well as such institutes which are dealing with education, health, water supply, sewerage systems, etc. which are to be funded from the state budgets. secondly, these are such measures, which may connect and integrate territories. these are predominantly infrastructural instruments such as construction of roads, bridges, airports, communication systems, etc., which provide for the movement of people, goods and ideas and making this process easier and faster at all levels. and the last but not least, these are measures which stimulate development of specific territories, such as regional programmes focused on poverty prevention, tax privileges and other preferences for concrete territories. without making conclusions on sufficiency of these instruments when applied to transboundary territories on the east of russia it is worth to note that their appropriateness is well supported by a broad spectrum of other examples. it is pointed out by the world bank experts that final success in making regional policies is conditioned by utilisation of all three kinds of means of regional growth since each of these instruments is designed to solve specific tasks at the own level. our analysis indicates that most of the strategic development programmes for the eastern regions of russia contain predominantly the measures, which stimulate development of specific territories only, and thus belong to the third category of instruments of governing. meanwhile, there is a lack of attention given to the measures, which are to be neutral in a territorial respect. in the same time, such measures are necessary for russia in order to guarantee implementation of its legislation, specifically, environment protection laws, providing equal access to resources for creating favourable conditions for business to all business actors and not to specific companies which operate at some concrete territories, and protecting population and businesses from violence and other arbitrary actions. it should be pointed out that measures of the second group such as development of infrastructure are not always neutral to the regions. rather often they are aimed at providing some privileges or favourable business conditions to some concrete companies and/or consortia (e.g. the projects of the highway and gas pipeline “altai”, special tourist and recreational zones on the altai mountains and the lake baikal area, east siberian and far eastern (vsto) transboundary cooperation on the east of russia: regional development and institutional bottlenecks 17 gas pipeline, railway naryn – lugokan in zabaikalskiy krai, etc.). in other words, they are focused on providing support to certain industries. in addition to that, accepting significance of the named projects we would like to underline that they do not embrace the whole scope of the tasks connected with the infrastructural development in the eastern regions of russia. securing of acceptable living standards equal to the average ones in the country should be the major objective of the institutes regulating territorial development. it is specifically acute now for the eastern territories since existing disparity in living standards is leading to the increasing population outflow from the region. in this context, the effectiveness of such an institute as a private-public partnership, although admitting its importance and significance, should not be overestimated when setting up machinery for the solution of the key strategic tasks. at the moment there are some indications, that certain demands for improvement of the institutional infrastructure are demonstrated by some regional administrations, although they are still weak enough. they generally remain cautious. the matter is that improvement of institutions will certainly lead to decreasing of the administrative rent. it is a reason why this process is often connected with resistance to the institutional modernisation. this issue formulates an important aspect for further research, and a study of correlation between transboundary links and interactions and transboundary demand for natural resources should be an important component of such a research. it is well known that the resource orientation of economic development contributes to the decreasing rent in the resource sectors of the economy and lead to the increasing rent in the processing and innovative industries. this is why there is a risk that such advanced industries are extruded from the economics of transboundary territories, if the existing dynamics and deepening of the raw materials orientation in the border regions will not be overcome. we believe that it applies not only to the eastern transboundary territories of russia but to the western ones as well such as karelia at the russian-finnish border. 4. timber industry in eastern siberia: a case study of the transboundary cooperation and institutional bottlenecks in the theory, this is clear that transboundary location may entail some negative consequences for the economic performance if remains unregulated. on the opposite side if the situation is duly conceptualised it provides with much more possibilities for effective utilisation of the factor of border and transboundary location, when generating joint operational strategies allowing transformation of transboundary territories into real transboundary regions. one of the most indicative examples of how institutions create problems for regional economic development in transboundary regions on the east of russia is a development of timber industry in siberia and on the far east. now the biggest importer of the russian wood is china. timber complex of the east siberian and far eastern regions of russia is mostly oriented to exporting wood and timber to this country (антонова, юн, 2012; антонова, 2014). in the theory favourable geographical location and constantly growing demand for timber from the chinese industry should have stimulated development of modern production technologies in the regional timber complexes. however, in reality due to the impact of spatial and institutional factors these “theoretical advantages” are becoming barriers for technological modernization of this industry. for instance, in zabaikalskiy krai (one of the east siberian regions) three factors surprisingly play a negative role for the industrial development, although initially they might have been seen as positive ones. these are boundary location of the territory, huge deposits of the timber resources, and localization of several border check points within the limits of this particular krai including the biggest russian-chinese automobile and railway border transition point zabaikailsk – manzhouli. the boundary location of the region and low costs for transportation of timber which might have become the competitive advantages in practice became obstacles for creation of modern timber industry in russia. in 1990s – early 2000s export of raw wood was not connected with high commercial and investment risks, which were characteristic to most of the businesses in the processing industries in russia and provided for a quick return of the investments, and typically the choice was made in favour of exporting raw materials. thus, export of raw timber (wood round timber) and primarily processed timber remained more profitable business in comparison with deep-processed timber. the model of regional forest exploitation, which was formed on the east of russia, brought some positive results in a short run. however, it took the industry to the dead-end in a longer perspective. specifically, after economic crisis of 2008–2009 and changes in the customs policy only those regions managed to preserve their positions at the external markets, which expanded added-value production in the timber processing complex (колесникова, 2013). 18 evgeny vodichev, irina glazyrina, bella krasnoyarova meanwhile, the problem of low efficiency of the forest exploitation has become actual for regions with large processing industries and bigger export volumes. there was a government resolution issued on 23 december 2006 “on rates of export duties for goods exporting from the territory of the russian federation outside of the states members of the customs union” that was focused on decreasing of raw materials export from russia. it introduced substantial increase of the customs duties for raw wood. however, it did not radically solve the problem (колесникова, 2013). after accession of russia to the world trade organisation special quotas were introduced which determined low export duties for row wood of the coniferous breeds of trees (13% for firtrees and 15% for pine trees). as a result, the share of wood round timber in the timber export decreased and its place was substituted by pre-processed but not deep-processed timber (отмена…, 2013). zero level custom duties for timber led to the situation when chinese businesses delivered many primitive power-saw benches to the territories of russian eastern siberia and far east. they are being used for production of the pre-processed timber with minimal added value which is subsequently being exported from the country without paying any customs duties. it is possible to say that such customs policy served as “anti-stimuli” for modernization of this branch of industry in the regions, which possessed favourable geographical location for exporting of their products. this is actually an illustration of poor budgetary efficiency of timber processing in the regions exporting substantial quantities of timber to its eastern neighbour. so far, several large regions of the eastern siberia and far east exporting timber demonstrate negative economic performance and are subsidized from the federal budget. thus, the combination of the economic and institutional factors in the boundary territories on the east of russia and in the regions, which possess good infrastructural conditions for developing export to china does not stimulate development of deepprocessed production and consequently does not contribute to an increase of the budgetary efficiency of the forest exploitation. certainly, this is a characteristic point of not just forest exploitation alone. there are numerous trends of similar transboundary asymmetry in cooperation with china in many other branches of industry (бардаль, 2014; глазырина, 2012; кулешов et al., 2010; ломакина, 2014). 5. ecosystem services as an instrument of reasonable transboundary economic activities there is another negative impact of weak institutes in transboundary cooperation that deserves special attention – the issue of the environmental consequences of interaction of factors of the first and the second nature. environmental outcomes and nature protection issues are practically excluded from the agenda of current economic transboundary activities on the east of russia. there are a number of commissions of different kinds but their activity remains formal and unproductive. we assume that ecosystem approach can be taken as a conceptual basis and key instrument for analyzing and balancing them. respectively, some portion of theory should be addressed to make it clear. in general, ecosystem services are interpreted as universal benefits important for the humanity, which originate from functioning of ecosystems. the term was introduced by the founders of the environmental economics and is now widespread in the scientific literature (see: глазырина, михеев, 2014). after r.a.  perelet, ecosystem services can be divided into two categories such as ecosystem environmental “services”, which is a system of biospheres’ regulation of climate, water regime, ozone layer of the earth, etc., and “services” of nature connected with aesthetic, ethic moral, cultural, recreational, historical, etc. aspects (перелет, 2009). ecosystem services therefore can be interpreted as a product of the human capital, which should not be misidentified with natural resource potential (глазырина, 2001). ability of natural systems to perform environmental functions is not less important than provision of economic activity with natural resources. respectively, both issues – providing natural raw materials and performing environmental services – are executed as “streams” and thus they have a dynamic nature. in the meantime, there are arguments indicating meaningful discrepancy of ecosystem services from the stream of natural resources (farley, costanza, 2010), which are conceptually and methodologically important. (1) ecosystems are not quantitatively spent, but can qualitatively change in the process servicing; (2) contrary to the natural resources, it is impossible to create stocks of the ecosystem services. they can not be utilized sooner or later depending on our will and intentions; (3) ecosystem services are the streams of benefits generated by the specific configuration of natural assets and not just by their existence as such. the last point seems to be the most important in this argumentation. only healthy and complete transboundary cooperation on the east of russia: regional development and institutional bottlenecks 19 ecosystems are able to perform their environmental functions in a full scale and provide with ecosystem services. in this connection, the principle of responsibility for the integrity of ecosystems should belong to key ones in the nature protection activity (glazyrina, strizhova, 2000). structure and diversity of ecosystems should be treated as an important component of the capital of nature. specific actions aimed at supporting this integrity are needed, and the system of payments is to be introduced to serve this purpose. numerous data collected in the framework of our research of the transboundary territories in siberia and far east of russia indicate that there are serious risks of irreversible changes connected with drastic violation of the ecosystem integrity there due to unbalanced economic performance. possible solution is also rooted in the ecosystem approach. based on that, a number of procedures have been developed in the international practice in order to prevent these risks. in this sense the ecosystem approach is presented as a complex strategy of management of land, water and live resources in order to preserve them and guarantee their utilization on the fair basis (бобылёв , 2012). specifically, the eu water framework directive based on the ecosystem approach can be used as a good example. it became the key instrument of the european economic commission for elaborating recommendations on introduction of system of payments for ecosystem services in the conditions of complex management of water resources (плата за …, 2006). economic mechanisms of regulating of relationship of nature and society are not the only ones but they are very important instruments to preserve the integrity of ecosystems. the systems of payments for ecosystem services is utilised in the oesd countries, and some developing countries including china belong to this category. however, in russian practice of payments for utilization of resources still dominates a mono-resource approach. this outdated methodology is used, as a rule, when debating and signing agreements on transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries. our research of basic trends in the ecosystems transformations on the east of russia indicates necessity of rapid reconsideration of the existing agreements with china on the basis of ecosystem approach and setting up new institutional forms of their practical implementation including transboundary system of payments for ecosystem services. 6. summing up collapse of the ussr resulted in emergence of new state borders in siberia and changes in functionalities of the old one in far east. new transboundary territories appeared on the east of russia, and transboundary links and cooperation are now increasing while often remains spontaneous and not well agreed with regional development strategies. on this reason and due to ineffective regional development and transboundary cooperation institutes eastern border territories can not be considered so far as true transboundary regions. application of paul krugman’s theory of spatial economic development to the border regions of russian east indicates that in many cases factors of the second nature (institutes) work against factors of the fist nature initially seen as advantages, and regional economy is seen as “institutionally trapped”. results of the case study of timber industry in zabaikalskiy krai in the eastern siberia and ineffective cooperation with china in this field convincingly confirms this statement. the wealth of forests on the east of russia and proximity to the chinese border with its highly demanding economics requiring timber in the situation of weak institutes and mismanagement are not leading to modernisation of this industry and causing depletion of natural capital of the forests’ ecosystems. thorough analysis of formal and informal institutionalisation in the framework of the ongoing processes of socio-economic and socio-cultural interactions on the border territories at the interregional levels is seen now as specifically important since the process is contradictory and in many cases institutes play a very negative role de-stimulating innovations in some branches of the regional economy. we assume that institutional approach based on international practices should be a platform for planning and evaluating regional development instruments, such, for example, as siberia and far east development corporation. no doubts that improvement of institutes is to be a basic precondition for modernisation of national economy as a whole. it does not mean that it should go ahead of the economic and technological modernisation: the two processes may develop in parallel and in interaction. however, it is really important to understand whether the existing institutes are going on in a right way, and correctly assess all possible consequences (economic and non-economic) of their development both at federal and regional levels. sensitive environment in transboundary territories of siberia and far east of russia should not be sacrificed to economic performance due to ineffective institutes. ecosystem approach is seen as optimal concept to cope with 20 evgeny vodichev, irina glazyrina, bella krasnoyarova environmental risks for designing new institutes of regional and trans-regional development. references european 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142. колесникова а.в., 2013, анализ эффективности экспортно-тарифной политики в лесном секторе россии в  среднесрочном периоде, экономика природопользования,5, 106–118. кулешов в., атанов н., безруков л., коржубаев a., малов в., санеев б., сысоева н., 2010, о некоторых аспектах совершенствования российско-китайского межрегионального сотрудничества, проблемы дальнего востока, 6, 62–69. ломакина н.в., 2014, промышленное развитие дальнего востока россии и северо-востока китая: цели, результаты и возможности для сотрудничества, эко, 6, 25–39. отмена пошлин на пиломатериалы не принесла желаемых результатов, 2013, http://www.tks.ru/news/ nearby/2013/05/14/0002 [10.08.2016] перелет р.а., 2009, системное управление переходом к  устойчивому развитию, труды института системного анализа ран, 42, 87–103. плата за экосистемные услуги в условиях комплексного управления водными ресурсами, 2006, http://cawaterinfo.net/bk/water_law/pdf/unece_payment_ru.pdf [10.08.2016] 1. introduction the specific nature of the course of the political process in ukraine determines peculiar features of identification contradictions in the ukrainian nation. to a large extent, elections are the agents of influence on social and political life, formation of values and society development strategies. the diversity of factors influencing the establishment of the ukrainian nation – political, economic, and cultural ones – has become a subject to numerous worldview speculations from those political parties and fractions that aimed at intensifying conflict dynamics of discrepancies between different regional groups in the ukrainian society. they were quite often contrived, artificially formed structures aimed to “refeed” a thought concerning cloning or calquing an idea of borrowing such views from neighboring states, first of all, eastern and northern ones to ukraine. these are the reasons that encouraged preparation of this publication to emphasize a special role and journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(s1), 34–43 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.s1.05 peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences andrii kuzyshyn (1), inna poplavska (2) (1) department of geography ukraine and tourism, ternopil volodymyr hnatiuk national pedagogical university, kryvonosa 2, 46027 ternopil, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0003-3879-7337 e-mail: kuzyshyn_a@tnpu.edu.ua (corresponding author) (2) department of geography ukraine and tourism, ternopil volodymyr hnatiuk national pedagogical university, kryvonosa 2, 46027 ternopil, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-0881-475x e-mail: inna18@tnpu.edu.ua citation kuzyshyn a., poplavska i., 2022, peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(s1), 34–43. abstract key features of the ukrainian society as an individual political nation have been characterized. the research is based on the election process at the level of the election to the verkhovna rada. in the research, data from parliamentary election campaigns held in ukraine during the 21st century were used. key markers for estimation of the population’s identity, the problem of language priority, the problem of historic memory, the issue of ukraine’s unitary formation and its spatial and territorial integrity were determined. the arguments offered and the objective grounds of state integrity worded in the research prove separate, formed and integral nature of the ukrainian political nation. key words ukraine, political identity, electoral activity, election process, territorial identity, territorial integrity. received: 11 june 2022 accepted: 30 august 2022 published: 25 november 2022 mailto:kuzyshyhn_a@tnpu.edu.ua mailto:inna18@tnpu.edu.ua peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences 35 meaning of the voting process in the ukrainian national identification. to emphasize the identity of the ukrainian people and their pro-european positions, one should stress their sociopolitical cleavage, which is a customary phenomenon for european nations. the researchers underline that socioeconomic as well as so-called post-materialist cleavage lines are principal in the countries with a strong (political) national identity and a sustainable democratic management system. it is they that are the basis for support during the election process of the most influential parties and groups of interests competing for power and/or influence on it. instead, ethnocultural, valuecultural (contrary to value-ideological) and regional divisions, developing political meaning, play a significantly more important role in the developing countries, emerging democracies and newly formed states (kolodij, 2015). 2. data and methods social cleavage is one of the key points in the formation of political identity. it has a dominant influence on the formation of a party system in a society and citizens’ voting preferences. “social cleavage”, according to а. rёmmele (2004), is a long-standing structural conflict leading to the emergence of opposite positions which, in turn, can be (or not be) represented by political parties. a phenomenon of “cleavage”, which is also translated as a “split”, is described by m. lipset & s. rokkan (1967) in their joint work entitled “cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignment. party systems and voter alignments”. based on the research of european history from the modern times, m. lipset & s. rokkan (1967) showed how the relationship of status inequality between the center and periphery, especially in language and ethnic issues; between the church and the state, first of all, regarding the influence on education, upbringing and culture; between the village and the town, mostly due to the resource distribution and the problem of equivalent exchange; between the class of owners of manufacturing tools and the class of hired employees/workers arose as a result of cleavage. these cleavages transform differences under indicators specified into politically significant social discrepancies (lipset, rokkan, 1967). each of the cleavages corresponds to an ideological marker, which, in turn, is represented in the existence of particular political parties and electoral preferences, forming their different segments. new communities politically interested in advocacy of their own specific interests arise with a complication of new social structures and diversification of forms of spiritual and sociocultural representation. thus, new social and political cleavages and political groups based on them spring up. both old and new cleavage lines include three structural components sequentially: differentiation between social groups, propensity to conflict and a degree of comprehending the differences between them, organization and protection of group identities and purposes. moreover, objectification of cleavage by political parties is a condition for transformation of social contradictions into a conflict. political elites can conceal or, vice versa, actualize some social discrepancies regarding the advantage expected from this mobilization. this, in turn, is accompanied by an artificially generated wave of social discontent, refusal of dialogue, intolerance to opponents, search for enemies, etc. regardless of a large amount of new sociopolitical divisions existing in modern societies, in our research we shall analyze the ones specifying the peculiarities of political identification of ukrainian citizens’ voting preferences. therefore, we shall focus on generalization of divisions based on territorial, ethnolingual, cultural and religious differences. despite a very deep social stratification in ukraine (both in the regional and the individual dimension), a socioeconomic factor has not become the main criterion for political cleavage. due to peculiarities of social transformation, “sublimation” of the society’s strata and formation of discontent and ideological polarities related to it unfolded in the country; they were substituted with interregional differences which really were less deep but more actualized by the political environment that raised them to the level of main issues of internal political fight (ethnolingual factor and cultural values). this is where the role of russia, on the one hand, and of ukrainian oligarchs, on the other hand, were determinant. they appeared to be natural allies in their attempts to use available cleavages and divisions, bringing them to the stage of split, which neither ukrainian governmental institutes nor civil society could properly resist to (kolodij, 2015). after the systemic transformation out of communism started in 1991 followed by the first elections in ukraine, one could observe significant regional differences both in the elections and in voter turnout. nowadays, scientific literature on electoral geography distinguishes two main aspects of space-related differentiation of voters’ behavior. according to the first one, the main reason for electoral disproportion is historic and cultural circumstances while the 36 andrii kuzyshyn, inna poplavska other one focuses on social and economic indicators (zarycki, 1997). the first theory underlines the topicality of integration of ukraine’s territory into different state formations (control of these territories by the russian and the austrian-hungarian empires and later by the soviet union, and integration of individual territories of western ukraine, in particular, into poland, romania, czechoslovakia) had an impact on the worldview of the local population, which periodically tried to declare independence for individual regions of ukraine or its integral union within the borders of one state. that became a basis for the historical formation of political views. this pattern is often explained by long traditions of parliamentarism, which was typical of the society developed in the polish and austrian states, whilst eastern communities developing as part of the russian empire did not have relevant conditions for progress owing to an autocratic regime. here one can draw a certain parallel to the formation of voting preferences in different parts of poland (kowalski, 2004). life in this environment led to the formation of clear social standards and political views (krzemiński, 2009). the other concept does not admit the historical influence explaining voters’ behavior mostly by the use of modern social and economic situations. this approach is used, first of all, in the research by a. lasoń & a. torȯj (2019). a study by a. casaglia et al. (2020) analyzing the role of populism in the electoral process is interesting for studying the mentioned issue. they discuss the role of this phenomenon in the national identification process (based on an example of italy) and specify the spread of populism as a kind of response to outer threats which obligatorily form behavioral borders that may be real or conventional. a. kuczabski & t. michalski (2014) noticed the specifics of cleavage formation within the borders of the ukrainian space. they rightfully state that the process of democratic transformation in ukraine is not linear and specified by frequent changes of transformation stages, caused by the change of the political vector of the state itself, which was the mirroring of changes in governmental structures formed as a result of the latest electoral processes. the authors mention a negative role oligarchs played in the frequent change of political views in the state. they developed their research (in further scientific publications) with an idea that it is the unsystematic nature of the changes and implementation of reforms that became a reason for a failure in the transformation process in ukraine. the role of russia was significant as it used the existence of “homo sovieticus” and a significant russian-speaking minority in ukraine. this became an identity problem of the ukrainian citizens (ethnic diversity and, then again, “homo sovieticus”) as well as an obstacle for political elites, which during almost a century were not able to create a real civil society in ukraine (radchenko et al., 2014). researching the spatial and temporal measurements of the electoral process in ukraine, the problem of political identity of the population was covered in publications by o. vistak & m. myrosh (2017), b. buyak & a. kuzyshyn (2021) and a. kuzyshyn (2020). 3. results and discussion voting preferences have been formed, to a significant extent, by external influences and can play a role of social sentiments identifier. the parties participating in election popularize their beliefs and form electoral support using different technologies. during the national elections in ukraine, these technologies are traced quite clearly. that is why, it is important to estimate the manifestations of ukrainian society’s identification as a mature community through the analysis of voting preferences. that can be seen in a form of voting preference to particular political parties which, in turn, represent particular views and beliefs. a gradual deviation from an idea of contraposition in the ukrainian electorate’s views can serve as an example of national identity comprehension. in this way, the political community of ukrainian citizens received pre-set identities: western, eastern, crimeans, representatives of donbas, etc., with seemingly incompatible economic problems and deep historical and cultural contradictions between the east and west of the country. manipulation by the theme of unitary mechanism of the ukrainian state became an important element fixing oppositions in values in mass consciousness of ukrainian citizens and aggravated the contradictions between them. future parliamentary parties espousing this doctrine had a significant support from the electorate during the last two cadences. in 2014, “petro poroshenko bloc”, “people’s front”, political party of “samopomich” union, all-ukrainian union “fatherland” intensively propagated this idea. they received support in terms of regions and thus revealed the position of almost 79% voters. traditionally, several parties supporting this idea and forming a relevant electoral field participate in elections. since the beginning of the 2000s, this thesis has been used in their ideological views by the left-wing parties (natalia vitrenko’s bloc of “people’s opposition”, the farmers’ party of ukraine, elective peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences 37 bloc of political parties “to soyuz”, party of “russian bloc”, “opposition platform – to life”). it is rewarding that the support of such views decreases (fig. 1) with each election cadence. dating back in 2008, the then leader of “ukrainian choice” and until recently – a leader and deputy of the verkhovna rada of ukraine from the “opposition platform – to life”, v. medvedchuk (2012) declared: “federalization of our country is the only and single medicine against its split, a threat and a danger of which exist”. statements of this type fed up social and political antagonisms in the country provoking discussions concerning similarity/difference of the historical destiny of ukraine and ethnic russians who live in the territory of current ukraine; they fed up the conflicts of historic memory, formed negative stereotypes in the perception of bilingualism of ukrainians, their religious heterogeneity, etc. these identification contradictions, in turn, were used by political parties as instruments of political fight for enlargement of their own electoral circle and, as a result, access to economic resources both as a whole nation and its individual regions. electoral programs of ukraine’s political parties continue using the theme of polarization of ukraine in linguistic, religious, historic and political contexts. they stress a necessity of systemic reforms to decentralize the authorities and extend the rights of local authorities. for example, at snap elections to the verkhovna rada of ukraine, on october 26, 2014, the top 5 electoral front-runners in the multi-seat countrywide constituency, particularly: the “people’s front” political party, the party of “petro poroshenko bloc”, the political party of “samopomich union”, the political party of “opposition bloc”, oleh liashko’s radical party in their pre-election programs declared a necessity of power decentralization and extension of local authorities’ rights. such unification in positions of the representatives from different political forces certified, in particular, increasing populist tendencies in the ukrainian political class. in general, this position had a relevant correlation to the electoral initiatives of many european states – france, italy, hungary, where the populist ideas had a significant support and became mainstream (casaglia et al., 2020). thus, identification discrepancies between the local authoritative elites and communities were harmonized at the declarative level owing to an emphasis in the programs of the political parties on the uniqueness of each region in the country, their right to an extended use of their own administrative and financial resources (superechnosti…, 2015). let us emphasize that these approaches, intrinsic for the parties of different ideological courses, are also a good confirmation of political maturity and self-identification of the ukrainian electorate that has made a significant step forward during the last decades. in this case, we consider it appropriate to provide an example of this process formation based on the regions of the carpathian-and-podil territory of ukraine. if the ideas of national uniqueness have always had a positive response and habitual support from the electorate in this region, the idea of decentralization as an accompanying component of 31.5 40.1 29.3 25.3 31.0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 2006 2007 2012 2014 2019 fig. 1. support of political parties [%] of ukraine by the criterion of ukraine’s territory federalization (2006–2019). source: own work based on the open data of the central election commission of ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua), analysis of election programs of the parties and personal statements of the people’s deputies from relevant political forces. http://www.cvk.gov.ua 38 andrii kuzyshyn, inna poplavska the ideology of center-right parties has become an embodiment of a craving to comprehend the feeling of an “owner” and private property as a component of the territorial development. before the elections of 2014, the transcarpathian, chernivetska, khmelnitska and vinnytska regions had a relatively passive position concerning the center-right parties that expressed this idea; later, in 2014 and 2019, this was one of the key theses concerning an increase in support for such party ideologies. the diagram below illustrates the support of this idea at all-ukrainian level (fig. 2). based on the support of parties and blocs that propagate “blurring” of the ukrainian nation’s borders through establishment of local political regimes and intolerance to “others”, their recognition as “alien”, a threat of distributing the separatist moods was kept until 2014. the representatives of the local authoritative elites understood the slogans to local government reforms in their own way. regional leaders often chased their civil position and geopolitical orientations correspondingly to customer-patron communications established with the central authorities in kyiv or in the capital of the neighboring state – moscow under the title of democratic transformations. it is indicative that impediment to the destructive manipulations around the content of the ukrainian nation’s identification discrepancies was complicated by the fact that on the face of it a number of non-governmental and political parties and their activists’ work conformed with the ukrainian statutory regulations. however, in practice, the activities of these organizations implicitly undermined the foundations of the ukrainian statehood and were avowedly anti-ukrainian and antihuman. the support of the parties that held monolithic structure and self-identification of the ukrainian nation, usually socialist ones, actually stimulated the formation of a peculiar market of identities in ukraine which was used as a method of fostering interregional contradictions, undermining the foundations of social solidarity, denying the unity of the ukrainian society as a community of the ukrainian state, and cultivating antihuman methods of political struggle. the laws of the identities market were subject to utilitarian principles aimed at an increase in advantages and they became a subject to bargain, an instrument to receive political and economic preferences for local political leaders for whom the state policy of the national solidarity did not play a leading role, and democratic values of freedom and sanctity of human life were completely declarative (superechnosti…, 2015). since the elections to the verkhovna rada in 2014, we have had clear confirmations that the idea of incompatibility of regional identities, propagation of ideas of federalism and autonomization of the regions were, to a large extent, artificial constructs that confirmed their destructive nature and unpopularity in the ukrainian society. an attempt to introduce a strategy of “identities implanting” through them does not correlate in reality with the positions of 33.3 45.9 59.1 79.5 81.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2006 2007 2012 2014 2019 fig. 2. support of political parties [%] of ukraine by the criterion of power decentralization and extension of local au-thorities’ rights (2006–2019). source: own work based on the open data of the central election commission of ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua), analysis of election programs of the parties and personal statements of the people’s deputies from relevant political forces. peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences 39 the majority of the ukrainian citizens. in particular, that certifies more moderate voting preferences of the bigger part of the ukrainian citizens, a decrease in the efficiency of manipulative and populist technologies of opposing eastern and western parts of ukraine in a pre-election campaign and a shift of value-based reference points both in the worldview attitudes of the voters and in the program documents of the political parties. particularly, preelection programs of the political parties at the last parliamentary elections were built around the ideas of consolidation of the nation, for example: establishment of peace, defense of territorial integrity of ukraine, struggle against corruption, introduction of economic reforms, etc. (superechnosti…, 2015). one of the key problems mirrored in the programs of political parties of different ideological courses was language. unfortunately, until recently, it encouraged the escalation of identification discrepancies of the ukrainian nation. almost since the first election in independent ukraine, this problem has been disputed by representatives of individual political forces and non-governmental organizations as a factor forming two large historical and cultural areas of the ukrainian people – ukrainian-speaking and russian-speaking ones. language and cultural attitudes of the west and the east of the country formed a certain axis of the political discourse around which there have been intense discussions during the whole period of the latest independence of ukraine. the initial position of the pro-russian political forces and non-governmental organizations laid in provision that the russian language be given a status of the second official language, taking into account its so-called insufficient development in independent ukraine. the “party of regions”, characterized as ruling and dominating during 2010–2014, was an apologist of this theme. having its electorate under the slogan of democratic initiatives, this party was able to pass a draft law “on measures of the state language policy” stipulating a possibility of official bilingualism in the regions where the number of national minorities exceeded 10%. in february 2014, the law was cancelled. its theses were being imposed on the electorate by forming negative stereotypes among the residents of the east of ukraine concerning the situation of the russian language in ukraine; particularly, they always mentioned an idea about its permanent oppression and eternal unity of the ukrainian and russian language spaces. the division of the ukrainian citizens by the language principle was one of the most obvious mechanisms for structuring the electoral field of the country, a method of differentiating “us” and “them”, stressing an otherness of ukraine, the antipode nature of its regions and impossibility to find a “common language” within one state. in that way, a kind of “hate speech” was fired up in the political discourse; it provoked conflictogenity of identification diversity of the ukrainian nation. estimating a share of the voters supporting this idea, a continuous positive trend of decreasing its perception as a key one and relevant separation from russia owing to this powerful argument is observed. this is also another step of the ukrainian nation’s self-identification at the local and state levels. during the electoral cadences in the 21st century, at the nation-wide level, significant fluctuations concerning the society’s estimation of this issue were observed. there have been performed many sociological cuts and mass meetings, which grounded particular thoughts; there was a discussion in media. at the level of the programs of the political parties nominated for the title of “parliamentary” (participating in the election), there were also essential fluctuations. complexity of the language issue also lied in the fact that “a range of political parties that have a long and not very long history of activity in ukraine as well as other so-called “third” forces known for their prorussian vision of socioeconomic, geopolitical and humanitarian development of ukraine not only in their narratives but also in reality are russian-speaking. despite an obligation to keep the document flow in ukrainian, russian remains the language of social interaction and it is often a language of the documents in private companies. state and regional leaders maintain the policy of publishing russianspeaking issues, publishing their speeches in russian. flirting with voters, the ukrainian political class often uses a regional “language game”, which does not encourage national consolidation. the logical consequence of these manipulations was politization of a range of non-governmental pro-russian organizations’ activity operating under the claim of cultural and educational mission on protecting ethnic russians from language discrimination. each following electoral cadence confirms an idea that the manipulations around the language theme do not find response wanted by some pro-russian political and non-governmental organizations; the prevailing share of ukrainians stay on the position of supporting ukrainian as the only state language. a significant step forward regarding the identification of ukrainians at the current stage was the idea of decommunization of historic heritage and minimization of its maintenance in the form of space references, names and events. it elicited response, first of all, in the programs of right-wing and center-right-wing parties becoming more and more 40 andrii kuzyshyn, inna poplavska powerful in the ukrainian establishment. being influenced by exactly these political forces and their electorate, the ministry of justice of ukraine in july 2015 banned the left-wing parties: the communist party of ukraine, the communist party of ukraine (updated), the communist party of workers and farmers) to be subjects of election. in 2015, there was another attempt to legalize these political movements (foundation of the “left opposition” bloc). they were involved in the development of ideas of antinational identity. the first of them is an identity of a fascist, which, in steady stereotypes of the population, had to be fixed after the representatives of the european political forces, as well as an identity of an antifascist, which was for the ruling party. this was another camouflaged attempt to preserve the identity with the russian people; however, the quantity of the electorate that responded to it confirms its marginalization. based on an untrue identification of the fighters for independence of ukraine with “fascists” that has been intensively propagated in soviet historiography during decades, a persistent association of western ukraine representatives, who wanted independence, with fascists has become a foundation for a new ideological policy of the “party of regions”, as well as a stem of mass information campaign aimed at discrediting the pro-european course of ukrainians. in general, one can talk about the availability of two leading strategies of building (and, correspondingly, collision) political identities of the ukrainian citizens used in the activity both by non-governmental organizations and political parties – pro-ukrainian (with a stress on a necessity to rehabilitate national heroes, reveal authentic history of ukraine, free from ideological clichés and cliché of the soviet period), and imperial (with a dominating worldview attitudes of “conservation” of soviet artefacts and a conformist attitude in the perception of symbols and signs of the totalitarian past, and the persons embodying it) which avertedly co-exist in the public space. the quantity indicator of the political parties participating in the elections in ukraine requires a special attention. here two points of view dominate. the first one is based on the idea that society’s party structuring and quite frequent changes of electoral preferences are still being formed in ukraine (a bright example – support of a fledgling party structure of “servant of people” in 2019 – we have already conducted and published relevant studies (buyak, kuzyshyn, 2021; kuzyshyn, 2020). the other group of views is based on the idea that parties are instrumentalization in political struggle, i.e. transformation of the parties into so-called electoral machines. that is why, political parties in ukraine have now a narrow corridor of access to the leverage of influence on performance of policy in national and regional scales, since they are formed as an instrument to legalize the interests of a narrow circle of people, as a rule – representatives of financial and industrial groups and do not perform regular political activity. currently, the party system of ukraine is characterized by a clan nature, patronage of different oligarchs, who have a status of obvious or latent 31.5 40.1 29.3 25.3 31.0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 2006 2007 2012 2014 2019 fig. 3. support of political parties [%] of ukraine by the criteria of attitude to language policy (2006–2019). source: own work based on the open data of the central election commission of ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua), analysis of election programs of the parties and personal statements of the people’s deputies from relevant political forces. peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences 41 “sponsors” of a party or several parties. this paralyzes possibilities for democratic advance of the party system in the country and formation of an activist-type political culture among ukrainian citizens. according to the monitoring data of institute of sociology of national academy of sciences of ukraine, the prevailing majority of ukrainians (87.2%) are not members of any non-governmental, political organizations or movements (superechnosti …, 2015). that certifies an insufficient use by the citizens of their right for participation in non-governmental organizations and political parties even when, on its face, a quantitative parameter – a non-governmental sector in ukraine looks like a kind of a social phantom. against the background of these dominating areas, the political life is only a mediate link that comes into counterfactual contradiction with the work of the majority of non-governmental organizations and political parties that become actualized in the pre-election period and then come into a phase of “freezing” their activity undermining the resource of loyalty in the society to non-governmental organizations and political parties. the key challenge in the work of non-governmental organizations and political parties is that the citizens of ukraine do not identify themselves as a united consolidated community that operates the instruments of influence on and feedback with the representative institutions. in general, speculative-populist technologies based on radicalization of cultural and ethnic as well as foreign policy identification contradictions of the ukrainian nation that provoked polarization of the ukrainian society have taken on a new meaning at this stage of the development of the political system with maintenance of a general strategy on policy holding: in the public discourse of the country, nongovernmental organizations and political parties emphasize a necessity to save peace and consolidate the ukrainian nation. however, the methods of implementing these slogans into life remain nonarticulated and vague, which does not meet available social requests and expectations. moreover, a change of elites in the country is rather imitative, which can be generalized with the expression of “old faces of a new policy”. that increases the risks of degradation of the country’s political system and can also become a powerful catalyzer of new massive social protests. outlining the problem of national identity in the context of voting preferences will be incomplete without focusing attention on the issue of its sovereignty and territorial and political integrity. in general, it concerns all above-mentioned determinants of the national identity of ukrainians. to solve these issues, maximum attention to should be paid the sociocultural connection of the regions in the context of establishing the common ukrainian political identity, maintaining historical and mental barriers of interregional mutual perception, nonconsolidation of the population in the regions of the state with regard to the perspectives of cultural development of ukraine and its place in the current political world (dnistryans`ky`j, 2015). all election cadences in the 21st century were noted for imposing a narrative about the existence of cultural and civilization differences and event intercivilization standoff of different parts of ukraine from the point of view of voting preference, which was favorable for the russian propaganda and provoked by their political strategists. powerful convergence of geopolitical and information realia occurred in 2004 when electoral and political preferences of the population from western and central ukrainian regions significantly consolidated, shifting a conventional “border” of electoral discrepancies further eastand southwards of ukraine. the following crash of the political identification in the spatial dimension falls onto the 2014 election campaign when a question of the country’s consolidation around one development program but without differently vectored information and administrative pressure was due. that is why, it is worth agreeing with the statement by м. dnistryans`ky`j that under the results of all presidential campaigns, taking also into account parliamentary election, from the political and geographical point of view there are more grounds to speak about districts with quite persistent and notably expressed differences in electoral activity rather than two poles of electoral and political preferences. if to take lines of drops (quantity leaps) in differentiation of the voter turnover and votes for main candidates and political parties as a basis between such electoral districts, one can receive a model of territorial division, which, in general, corresponds to the model of macrodistricting in the territory of ukraine, distinguished on the grounds of historical and geographical and ethnographical principles (dnistryans`ky`j, 2015, р. 77). that is why the statement that both ethnic and national area and historic and geographical pre-requisites are the indicators determining the differentiation of mental and political environment of ukraine and secure basic foundations of state integrity, as at the core, around 95% of its territory is the area of settlement of the ukrainian state-constituting ethnic nation which has absolute majority in all other regions except the autonomous republic of crimea. also, it should be noted that, in fact, all regions have different experience of common residence as part of state formations at particular periods and were involved in the uniform ukrainian state-constituting 42 andri kuzyshyn, inna poplavska process of the 19th–20th centuries to different extent, i.e. the ideas of integrity and independence of ukraine were determining both for the core of the territory and for ukrainian lands when they were parts of poland, czechoslovakia, romania. this, in turn, is one more confirmation that in ukraine there are quite favorable prerequisites for consolidation of the country’s unity and identification of the nation as independent and formed. 4. conclusions identification of the ukrainian society as nationally formed through the prism of voting preferences has a range of aspects. owing to the electoral activity and pluralism concerning participation in elections one can specify the freedom of will as an instrument intrinsic to democratic societies. voting preferences of non-governmental organizations and political parties in the modern ukrainian society is specified by conflictogenity and contradictory worldview models of the country’s development. imposing and systemic reproduction a semiotic pair “us” – “them” in the rhetoric of individual political forces participating in the election in ukraine formed a persistent stereotype concerning the division of ukrainians by regional principles with incompatible values. at the same time, it was a politically strategic trick to minimize an idea of political identification of the ukrainian nation. this political strategy was and is an important resource of electorate mobilization and ensuring the controlled status of the wide strata of society with paternalistic attitudes. imposing the identities being positioned as polar, opposite, conflicting jointly with “pocket nature” of significant number of political parties and nongovernmental organizations, intensively undermine the trust of citizens to the institutions of democratic representativeness as they do not meet their authentic identification reference points. polarization of ukraine by a regional principle is artificial, it was provoked by russia’s idea regarding implementation of its imperial plans on re-establishment of the former ussr and relies on dependent political forces involved in election to level the principles of political identity of the ukrainian state. one of the ways in performance of this geopolitics became provoking regional counterstanding on the conditions of actualization of individual events in history, idealization of persons and events of the russian period, imposing neocolonial relations in the information and cultural area. a range of the most disputable themes among which there is an issue of country’s federalization, language policy, necessity to rehabilitate national history become important components in the ideologies of the political parties that represent the ideas of their electorate in the parliament of ukraine or during the election campaign. current sociological research shows that the abovementioned markers of identities only have a particular influence on ukrainian citizens, whose system of value-based preferences includes dominating economic interests related to the provision of an appropriate level and standards of life in the state and the priorities of general welfare. to some extent populist mechanisms of advancing the above standards through the election programs of the parties had consequences in the form of social apathy and disappointment, but did not form a successful ground for spreading the ideas of new “general russian identity”. on the contrary, each following election campaign in the 21st century reinforced the position of state policy of the national unity and support of foundations of ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent and democratic state. among basic principles provided in the election programs of political parties with the maximum support among the electorate, there is lustration, peace, control over power branches, protection of human rights and democratic freedoms. these priorities are basic for harmonization of identification contradictions of the ukrainian nation and formation of valuebased markers of the civil self-determination of the ukrainian society as a community of one state. reference to the progressive examples of the european values allows forming restoration of the community’s trust to institutionalized forms of collective life, which, in turn, must be a foundation for the formation of the civil society. non-governmental organizations and political parties as generators of leading directions and key theses of social dialogue at the national level are becoming, in this system of axes, key ones in searching the foundations of social solidarity, harmonization and humanization of identification contradictions of the ukrainian nation. despite the social and cultural differentiation in ukraine specified by objective historic and geographic as well as ethnogeographic prerequisites, the ukrainian ethnos is characterized by a detached political identity, complicated by regional and political relationships in the beginning of the 21st century and which can be reinforced with efficient domestic geopolitics and purposeful large-scale geopolitical resistance to russia. peculiarities of ukraine’s population’s political identity through the prism of results of electoral preferences 43 references buyak b., kuzyshyn a., 2021, change of the electoral sympathies of the voters in the western ukrainian region according to the parliamentary elections results in 2019, annales universitatis mariae curie-sklodowska, sectio b  – geographia, geologia, mineralogia et petrographia, 76, 145–162. doi: 10.17951/b.2021.76.0.145-162 casaglia a., coletti r., lizotte c., agnew j., mamadouh v., minca c., 2020, interventions on european nationalist populism and bordering in time of emergencies, political geography, 82, 102238. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102238 dnistryans`ky`j m.s., 2015, tery`torial`no-polity`chna nezrivnovazhenist` ukrayiny`: imanentna nemy`nuchist` chy` rukotvorny`j naslidok? (eng. language policy of ukraine in comparison to the european and the post-soviet experience?), visny`k l`vivs`kogo universy`tetu. seriya geografichna, 49, 68–86. kolodij a., 2015, mizhregional`ni podily` v ukrayini i deyaki pry`ncy`py` publichnogo vryaduvannya (eng. interregional divisions in ukraine and some principles of public governance), [in:] t.o. yaroshenko (ed.), buduyemo novu ukrayinu: zbirny`k konferenciyi (26-27 ly`stopada 2014  r., m. ky`yiv) (eng. we are bubbling up a new ukraine: conference materials (november 26–27, 2014, kyiv)), vy`davny`chy`j dim „ky`yevo-mogy`lyans`ka akademiya”, ky`yiv, 309–327. kowalski m., 2004, regionalne zróżnicowanie zachowań wyborczych polaków w latach 1989–2001 (eng. regional differentiation of poles’ voting behavior in 1989–2001), biuletyn kpzk pan, 211, 407–430. krzemiński p., 2009, zachowania wyborcze w wyborach parlamentarnych i prezydenckich w polsce w latach 2005– 2007 – wzory przestrzennych zróżnicowań (eng. electoral behavior in 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rozkolu (eng. medvedchuk: federalization of ukraine is the only medicine against division), 2012, lb.ua, https://lb.ua/ news/2012/07/16/161051_medvedchuk_federalizatsiya_ukraini_.html (accessed 07 april 2022). radchenko o., kuczabski a., michalski t., 2014, main factors affecting the social transformation process in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 4(1), 5–18. rёmmele a., 2004, struktura razmezhevany`ya y` party`jnыe sy`stemы v vostochnoj y` central`noj evrope (eng. the disengagement structure and party systems in eastern and central europe), poly`ty`cheskaya nauka, 4, 30–51. superechnosti identy`chnostej v ukrayini ta shlyaxy` yix regulyuvannya v kontekstax polity`ky` gromadyans`koyi konsolidaciyi ukrayins`koyi naciyi: anality`chna dopovid` (eng. super identity of identities in ukraine and the ways of their regulation in the context of the policy of the ukrainian nation’s consolidation), 2015, ipiend im. i.f. kurasa nan ukrayiny`, kyiv. the central election commission of ukraine, www.cvk.gov. ua/ (accessed 05 april 2022). vistak o., myrosh m., 2017, electoral activity of the population of western ukraine border territory, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 73–80. doi: 10.4467/24512249jg.17.017.6633 zarycki t., 1997, nowa przestrzeń społeczno-polityczna polski (eng. new social and political space in poland), europejski instytut rozwoju regionalnego i lokalnego uniwersytet warszawski, warszawa. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/b.2021.76.0.145-162 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102238 https://doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.10 https://doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.10 https://lb.ua/news/2012/07/16/161051_medvedchuk_federalizatsiya_ukraini_.html https://lb.ua/news/2012/07/16/161051_medvedchuk_federalizatsiya_ukraini_.html https://lb.ua/news/2012/07/16/161051_medvedchuk_federalizatsiya_ukraini_.html 1. introduction higher education is the most important key factor of the long-term influence on the development of economy of a country and regions, on the improvement of population’s living standards, belonging to the state in the modern society. thus, it may be indicated that higher education in certain regions and countries in general becomes one of the main core factors of the economic growth. scientific and methodological grounds for this research are the theory and practice works in the area of the state administration by such scientists as d.  dzvinchuk, g.  dmytrenko, v.  zhuravski, s.  nikolaenko, and others (дзвінчук, 2003; дмитренко, 1996; журавський, 2003; ніколаєнко, 2005). in the context of the range of problems of the state administration of higher education, interesting are the scientific and practical approaches journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 64–69 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.020.5807 the development of ukrainian education in the context of transformation of the state and regional administration alina leonidivna pomaza-ponomarenko (1), nadija mykolaivna karpeko (2) (1) scientific department of problems on state security of educational-scientific-production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: dergupr@nuczu.edu.ua (2) scientific department of problems on state security of educational-scientific-production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: a_pp_l@i.ua citation pomaza-ponomarenko a.l., karpenko n.m., 2016, the development of ukrainian education in the context of transformation of the state administration and ensuring of regional development, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 64–69. abstract the essence of the ukrainian regional system of higher education as an object of the state administration under the conditions of transformation is defined. the direction and concept of the state policy of education regionalization are determined. the fundamentals of this concept are as follows: the purpose of its development is the formation of the system of the state administration of higher education that will provide the mobilization of internal resources of the higher educational institutions and regions for the development of higher education and the optimization of distribution of nationwide resources directed at the educational area based on the principles of efficiency and justice. thus, it is important to solving of problem of financing of the branch of higher education. key words regional systems of ukraine, object of state management, academic mobility, the concept of public administration in ukraine, development trends. the development of ukrainian education in the context of transformation of the state and regional administration 65 proposed by o. zhabenko, v. oharenko, n. safonova, v. sychenko, and others (zhabenko, 2003; огаренко, 2005; сафонова, 2004; сиченко, 2010). despite the wide scope of scientific groundwork in the field of the state administration of higher education, there are many problems requiring further development. there is still no complex research of the reformation of legal and regulatory, organizational and functional components of the state administration of education in higher educational institutions of the і-іі accreditation levels in ukraine. this research should interpret theoretically the modern tendencies and the principles of proper governance, and take into account the development process of the state administration in the educational field. paper objective is to determine the essence and the development of regional systems of higher education as an object of the state administration under the present conditions. it is also necessary to demonstrate the direction and the concept of the state administration of higher education in regions under the present conditions providing persistence, stabilization and further stable development of higher educational institutions in accordance with the main policy of a modern state. 2. paper main body the role of education from the regional point of view is known. social sciences consider the educational institutions as the main channel of social circulation. the modern post-industrial societies are characterized with the intensive inter-branch and international flow of physical and human capital, the quick appearance of new branches, their rapid development and further reduction. the systematic structural reconstruction of the state administration leads to radical changes in the social environment. however, this question has not been studied comprehensively yet, requiring more attention. it is one of rather substantially studied and solved question in the foreign literature. as for the recently adopted official documents defining the prospects of the development of ukrainian education, they determine the range of problems concerning the improvement of the economy of education and the development of scientific problems, the most important of which include the issue of the improvement of the state administration of higher education, the development of the statistics of education, the increase of internal and external efficiency of education at the central, regional and institutional levels (ніколаєнко, 2005). special attention is paid to the question of the increase of competitiveness of ukrainian education, the stimulation of integration processes in it, the establishment of the new types of educational institutions, scientific schools and centres in regions, the regional forecasting of the needs of society in certain skills and knowledge types, and the satisfaction of social demand of the population for the higher continuous education. the urgency of the problem of development and implementation of the new mechanism of higher education financing increases, as well as the training and retraining of personnel for the system of higher education, and the development of the system of public organizations in education. during the cycle of labour activity, a person needs to change occupation, place of work and even place of residence several times. under these conditions, the labour force reproduction stipulates the increase of their professional mobility (указ президента україни…, 2002; сафонова, 2004). the professional mobility as a component of global tendencies makes the range of demands of academic mobility, which would become the most important qualitative characteristics of the modern educational systems. thus, the academic mobility originates from the time of establishment of the first european universities. at that time, students and teachers traditionally spent the majority of time travelling, changing one higher educational institution into another. the academic contacts depended on political and economic conditions, and the flow of students from the other countries depended on the level of activity of interstate relations (zhabenko, 2003). the modern academic mobility is connected with the individual movement of students and higher-education teaching personnel. it is based on the interacademic contacts based on the creation of the single system of education and the integration of educational institutions, the intensification of regional and national opportunities for the formation and the implementation of the policy in the area of education corresponding to the new conditions. the development of international trade, the intensification of division of labour and specialization turn the migration of labour force to the most important conditions and lead to the establishment of the international labour markets. for example, the integration of european countries leads to the creation of the single “european home” that transforms the educational system into a sort of a “single european university” (закон україни “про освіту”, 1991; огаренко, 2005). the state level of the administration of education provides for the maintenance of the single 66 alina leonidivna pomaza-ponomarenko, nadija mykolaivna karpeko educational space guaranteeing the high quality of education favouring the development of academic mobility. however, it is possible to determine the optimum scope and the sufficient diversity of educational services provided by local institutions of the system of higher education only at the regional level taking into account the state of economy, the structures of population employment in one or another region. the concept of the state administration of higher education in ukraine, under the conditions of decentralization and adoption of the european level, favours the increase of the quality of educational services provided by the regional systems to population, enterprises and establishments of these territories as the main institutions of society, the core factors of economic and social development of the state (дмитренко, 1996; сиченко, 2010). the fundamentals of this concept are as follows: the purpose of its development is the formation of the system of the state administration of higher education that will provide the mobilization of internal resources of the higher educational institutions and regions for the development of higher education and the optimization of distribution of nationwide resources directed at the educational area based on the principles of efficiency and justice. the result of implementation of this concept must be the solution of the following tasks (панов (ed.), 2006a, 2006b; дзвінчук, 2004): a) the creation of conditions for stabilization of functioning and further development of higher education in a region; b) the intensification of focus of the development of higher educational institutions on the additional internal sources of self-financing and the means of regions; c) the creation of conditions for the optimum distribution of higher education among the groups of population with different levels of income, educational tastes, academic abilities, among the different regions based on the principles of efficiency and justice; d) the increase of attractiveness of the programmes of academic and professional education for the residents of these regions based on the principle of the necessary diversity of specialities and specializations taking into account the specific nature of local labour markets and social demand of population; e) the development of legal, informational, statistical base in the system of higher education; f ) the formation of the effective system of higher education guaranteeing the maximum employment, the increase of incomes of population, and the cultural advance; g) the building of confidence in regional education, the provision of economic safety of regions and the equal accessibility for population to the qualitative higher education. the reformation of the state agencies of administration of higher education at the national and regional levels is directed at satisfaction of the interests of population, employers, and territories. this is the main purpose of the state at the moment. the scales, the sizes and the tasks of the modern higher education result in the establishment of institutions of such complexity and size that the exclusively centralized administration becomes impossible. thus, the necessity appears to delegate the part of powers from the central authorities to the regional ones, which is implemented in the policy of regionalization of higher education. this provides for the improvement of the centralized administration of higher educational institutions and the increase of the role of regional governments in higher school control. the questions of higher education must be governed by both state and regional levels of administration (дзвінчук, 2003). education plays the very important role in the creation of fundamental conditions for population prosperity that is proved by the world practice of social and economic researches. the significant influence is made by the system of higher education in the current period of joining the post-industrial society. this stipulates the exigency to search for the optimum ways of fastest renewal of the educational system at the regional level, to help it out of a crisis, to provide not only the survival, but also the expected development of the system in accordance with the global tendencies stipulated by the general processes of the society development (журавський, 2003). the process of regionalization of education includes the focus on the needs of an individual implemented in this area, the formation of single educational space of a region, and the consideration of specific regional peculiarities with the determination of areas and directions of activity of all the structural elements of the educational system. the issue of the reformation of the state administration of higher education in ukraine maintain insufficiently elaborated. it is connected with the difficulty of suggestion under the conditions of the political and economic instability of the long-term strategy of the state administration. however, in connection with the gradual intensification of the process of the country development, the organizational and legal registration of the administrative structures, and the the development of ukrainian education in the context of transformation of the state and regional administration 67 improvement of the content of powers of the bodies of the state executive authorities and the bodies of local self-government, the real conditions for the transition of the system of administration to the qualitatively new level begin to appear. it should be emphasized that during the next years, the role of the state in the administration of higher education in ukraine will be significantly higher than it is in the european countries. considering this, it should be the state represented by its authorities to understand the necessity to reform the state administration of higher education and to make it conform to the modern conditions. all the responsibility for the beginning and the course of the reform of the state administration of higher education in ukraine must be taken by the president and the government of ukraine, and the ministry of education and science of ukraine. if the executive authorities are not confident concerning the implementation of certain changes, then in order the models of the reformation of the state administration of higher education to work it is necessary to carry out an experiment to answer the majority, if not all the questions. we are convinced that the reformation of the state administration of higher education must be implemented by means of the performance of specific actions. thus, there is the need in the development, the approval and the implementation of the concept of the reformation of the state administration of higher education in ukraine. this makes it possible to accumulate the resources of all state authorities as much as possible, to ensure the consolidation of efforts, the coordination and the interaction during the determination of the effective ways of urgent problems solution. one of the main problems requiring the urgent solution is the problem of financing of the branch of higher education. in comparison with the european countries, ukraine is among the top ten countries with the highest level of the investment of the state funds into higher educational institutions. however, their “shortage” indicates the inefficiency of the existing model of the state financing of higher education. it is known that the european countries formed several models of higher education financing – financing according to expenditures, financing according to results, contractual financing of education, government order based on capitation, etc. it is important to ensure transparency of the procedure of higher school financing. interesting in this context is the model of higher school financing in france. it allows to step aside from the allocation of state funds to higher education based on quantitative indices, and to go over to the qualitative criteria of the development – the participation in scientific researches, the quality of education, the training of skilled personnel. the clear definition of the criteria of financing of the higher educational institutions shall favour their efficient operation and shall create the effective system of distribution of state funds among higher educational institutions regardless of the conjuncture, political factors. now, the state administration of higher education in ukraine is the difficult vertical hierarchic structure, the distinctive feature of which is a high level of administration centralization. however, the european experience shows that the central level of administration shall establish the regulatory framework, and the regional level of administration shall ensure its execution. together, they must create the conditions for the implementation of these standards. thus, considering the european experience, it is possible to carry out the optimization of the functional component of the authorities of the state administration of higher education in ukraine in the direction of the increase of the role of the community, and the introduction of the principle of publicity. the excessive centralization of the state administration is unjustified under the modern conditions, and does not allow the system of higher education to trigger the ways of self-organization and to find way out of crisis independently. that is why it is necessary to take certain measures concerning the delegation of power. the decentralization of the administration of higher education shall potentially provide the possibility to better determine the needs of the regional economy in specialists, to meet the needs of the population and to get the community involved. at the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the peculiarities of different regions when using financial resources and stimulating interaction at the regional and central levels in the field of administration of higher education. the ministry of education and science of ukraine must become the body of state supervision over higher education, which should determine the goal, the priorities, the directions and the main tasks of the state policy in the field of higher education. the reformation of the state administration of higher education must ensure the increase of the quality and the reduction of the terms for the achievement of results; the transparency, the openness, the reasonableness and the timeliness of the solutions of the bodies of state administration; the increase of the effectiveness of the interaction between all levels of authorities and ngos at the expense of the clear definition of measures, procedures and criteria for the achievement of results. 68 alina leonidivna pomaza-ponomarenko, nadija mykolaivna karpeko 3. conclusions of the research the success of the development of higher education mainly depends on the theoretical analysis and the transformational changes in the state administration, on the study of the historical experience of european countries, on the determination of general tendencies and peculiarities in this field. one of the peculiarities of the present higher education in ukraine is the state nature of origin and the centralized form of administration during the long period of time. this leaves its mark on the ways and the means of its further development, and, in particular, excludes the possibility of decrease of the degree of accessibility for population to the state building. the state represented by state and regional governments must be the initiator of the educational reforms. the new state policy in the area of higher education must be based on the traditions of ukrainian higher school and, at the same time, include the new elements of higher school improvement. the system of higher education consists of the higher educational institutions implementing the educational programmes, which are located on the territory of one or another region and mainly satisfy the needs of its population. the tasks of the governments (both state and regional) in the area of higher education must be in the optimum provision of the regions with the qualitative education in accordance with social standards. the regional government must support the competition among higher educational institutions by way of government procurement of the training of highly skilled specialists, the allocation of scientific grants, and the governmental scholarships. the state policy of higher education regionalization and the modern legislative base must be directed at the creation of conditions for stabilization, improvement and further development of the regional systems of higher education. at the national level and in regions, the governments together with the administrations of higher educational institutions must develop the concepts and the programmes of education development directed at the establishment of the new organizational forms in the system of regional higher education and the state mechanism of administration of higher educational institutions. references zhabenko o.v., 2003, peculiarities and tendencies of development of state administration of education in ukraine (1946–2001), thesis of candidate of sciences in state administration: 25.00.01, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, кyiv. дзвінчук д., 2003, державне управління освітою в україні: тенденції і законодавство, зат “нічлава”, київ. дмитренко г.а., 1996, стратегічний менеджмент. цільове управління освітою на основі кваліметричного підходу, ізмн, київ. журавський в.с., 2003, вища освіта як фактор державотворення і культури в україні, видавничий дім “ін юре”, київ. закон україни від 23 травня 1991 р. “про освіту”, 1991, відомості верховної ради україни, 1997 №34 ст. 451. ніколаєнко с.м., 2005, вища освіта – джерело соціальноекономічного і культурного розвитку суспільства, знання, київ. огаренко в.м., 2005, державне регулювання діяльності вищих навчальних закладів на ринку освітніх послуг, видво наду, київ. панов м.і. (ed.), 2006a, вища освіта. нормативно-правові акти про організацію освіти у вищих навчальних закладах ііі-іv рівнів акредитації, том 1, право, харків. панов м.і. (ed.), 2006b, вища освіта. нормативно-правові акти про організацію освіти у вищих навчальних закладах ііі-іv рівнів акредитації, том 2, право, харків. сафонова н.м., 2004, реалії та перспективи сучасної системи вищої освіти в україні, історія української науки на межі тисячоліть, 17, 195–205. сиченко в.в., 2010, механізми регулювання системи освіти: сучасний стан та перспективи розвитку, юговосток, донецьк. указ президента україни про національну доктрину розвитку освіти, 17 квітня 2002 р., http://zakon3.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/347/2002, [09.10.2016] 1. introduction assessing the government’s performance is an important social and political objective. the concept of “government” may be interpreted differently. in a broad sense, the government consists of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. in this regard, public administration would be a synonym for a government. the government is a tool to exercise social and economic policy. an objective assessment of the government’s performance ensures a proper level of accountability of government’s decisions, increases political competitiveness, and eliminates the strategies unwanted by the society, etc. according to h. izdebski and m. kulesza (2004), public administration performs its tasks on the following four levels: a traditional administrative level focused on maintaining order and implementing regulations (law enforcement level), public services management, ownership rights management (public property management), and the development management level. the government has its core functions in the protection of persons and property, establishing the rule of law, the sanctity of contract, and perhaps the creation of a limited set of public goods (chobanov, mladenova, 2009). therefore, ensuring conditions for economic growth may be considered by society journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(3), 30–40 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.3.03 economic efficiency of national governments: case study of poland and ukraine aleksander kuczabski department of regional development, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-1271-0782 e-mail: aleksander.kuczabski@ug.edu.pl citation kuczabski a., 2021, economic efficiency of national governments: case study of poland and ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(3), 30–40. abstract the article proposes a new unique approach to assessing the economic efficiency of national governments. the assessment is based on the indicator of gross free product per capita, which is a difference between gdp and government size per capita. this method was used to analyze the situation in two post-communist states – poland and ukraine. the author studied their economic development in 2009–2019, and the received data was used to draw conclusions about economic policies in the two countries in the period in question. a forecast has been made about the possible impact of the covid-19 pandemic on economic processes from the perspective of changes in the gross free product per capita. key words government, economic growth, government size, gross domestic product, gross free product per capita, poland, ukraine. received: 27 may 2021 accepted: 05 october 2021 published: 29 november 2021 economic efficiency of national governments: case study of poland and ukraine 31 as one of the important requirements for the government. in parallel, other requirements about security, stability, or social support are set. in reality, creating conditions for economic growth, or increasing well-being is crucial for ensuring all other functions of the government. economic growth provides resources for the proper execution of the government’s tasks. thus, in terms of social interest, the key criteria for assessing government’s activities include the creation and improvement of well-being through economic growth. this research focuses on the national government and its activities to improve people’s well-being through ensuring economic growth. it must be noted that the government aims to improve its citizens’ well-being in democratic countries only, where voters generally recognize and share the philosophy of economic growth. at the same time, the object of assessment may cover not only the long-term multi-faceted government’s activities but also its individual aspects. in this paper, we propose an approach to the assessment of the economic efficiency of national governments alone. 2. key approaches to assessing the government’s economic policy in simplistic terms, economic efficiency is about contrasting the outcomes of economic activity with the invested resources. the government’s economic efficiency may be assessed differently, depending on economic approaches and accepted indicators. researchers following the keynesian theory expect a proactive role of the government in the economic policy. for example, they claim that the government provides the public goods that the market is incapable of providing and removes distortions in the allocation of resources due to externalities (chobanov, mladenova, 2009). on the other hand, the state efficiency is ensured by the well-functioning system of government bodies, the ability to articulate and legally protect the public interest, and to implement successfully the state social and economic policy, ensuring not only the interests of the state or the ruling class, but also the entire population, certain social groups, and each individual (moiseev et al., 2017). the supporters of the austrian school of economics generally posit that economic efficiency will be higher due to the government’s limited interference into economic processes. the negative impact of the government on economic growth is manifested in the “disincentive effects of higher taxes and the crowding-out effect of public investment in relation to private investment, diminishing returns as governments undertake activities for which they are illsuited, and an interference with the wealth creation process, because governments are not as good as markets” (gwartney et al., 1998, p. v). they often say that that, similarly to the market, the state does not offer a perfect mechanism of assets allocation. the public choice theory has taken into consideration the political aspect of economic processes, in particular the problem of inefficient political processes, and developed the category of government failure (przesławska, 2006). according to j.w. dawson (2003), the level of economic freedom, especially the level of property rights, is an important cause for economic growth. therefore, the lower the government’s impact on the economy, the better for the economy. economic liberals generally support the private sectoral market economy and consider private property to be extremely important for the building of a prosperous society. furthermore, m.n. rothbard (1973) provides an interesting argument that the private sector could more effectively undertake all of the functions normally performed by the government. private owners have a higher incentive to grow the returns of their own companies intended to raise the efficiency and search for innovations rather than public owners (balcerowicz, 2018). thus, l. balcerowicz (2004) encourages restricting the necessary (or desired) scope of the government’s activities for the benefit of the private sector. in this regard, the high efficiency of the economy mostly depends on the share of private capital in the national economy. in other words, it may be assumed that the bigger the private capital in the national economy, the better the prospects for its growth, both short-term and long-term. in fact, neither approach denies the relevance of public impact on the economy. in particular, they imply such government’s functions as ensuring the rule of law, the efficiency of the judiciary, a low corruption level, well-organized public bureaucracy, or well-functioning property rights (see north, 1987; abdiweli, 2003; rodrik et al., 2004; afonso, jalles, 2016). besides, there is a consensus about the fact that with no government support economic growth cannot be possible. d. mitchell (2005) highlights that if there were no government, it would be very difficult to provide for enforcing contracts, protecting private property, and developing infrastructure. the key difference between the two approaches is the efficiency assessment of public and private sectors in the economy. whereas the latter claims that the efficiency of the private sector is a priori 32 aleksander kuczabski higher than that of the public sector, the former assumes that at least in some situations the public sector is capable of achieving higher efficiency. gross domestic product is a universal indicator used for assessing the status of the economy today. gross domestic product illustrates the final result of the activity of all entities of the national economy. gross domestic product is equal to the sum of gross value added of all ownership sectors or all domestic institutional sectors or to the sum of gross value added of all sections and divisions, increased by taxes on products less subsidies on products (statistical yearbook of the republic of poland, 2020). gross domestic product is the value of all new goods produced in the country in a specific period (typically a year). gdp is calculated in three ways: (1) as expenditures of economic subjects (households, entrepreneurs, government, and foreigners) on goods and services; (2) as production in all economic spheres; and (3) the overall income, i.e. the amount of earning and profits received by all subjects that add to a country’s gdp. gdp can be assessed based on current prices (nominal gdp) or based on market-adjusted prices in a given period (real gdp) (hall, taylor, 2002). gdp is also an element in a series of more integrated and specific economic indicators. gdp per capita or gdp in conversion per one citizen is a commonly used criterion for measuring well-being. it may be generally accepted that the government’s key economic task is to increase gdp. when we compare state economic policies in different countries, the assessment will reflect, in the simplest terms, the change in the government’s gdp share in global production. however, this simple approach cannot be considered fully adequate. a reason for it is a significant impact of other (non-economic) factors on economic growth. for example, the administrative factor implies that it is extremely difficult, and sometimes hardly possible, to define the timeline when the effects of the government’s economic policy will become tangible. in other words, the current economic growth may be based on economic decisions from distant past rather than on the outcomes of the current economic policy. another good example may be a security factor that can bring to naught even the most adequate economic solutions and efforts during military conflicts or internal political turbulence. in fact, additional factors and circumstances encourage researchers and experts to elaborate alternative integrated indicators for an objective assessment of government decisions in the economic area. assessment of economic efficiency of national governments may be performed with many indicators and indices that use the available statistical data and other sources, including the gdp. some of the most popular indicators that reflect the economic condition of countries and may be used in assessing the economic efficiency of national governments should include the following: index of economic freedom (index…). it is an indicator of the regulatory rigor and scope of coercion used by the government in the economic sphere in various countries. it is published by the wall street journal and the heritage foundation. global competitiveness index (world economic forum, 2020). it is published by the world economic forum. the wef groups the indicators into 12 categories (pillars of competitiveness), which are as follows: (1) institutions; (2) infrastructure; (3) macroeconomic environment; (4) health and primary education; (5) higher education and training; (6) goods market efficiency; (7) labor market efficiency; (8) financial market development; (9) technological readiness; (10) market size; (11) business sophistication; and (12) innovation. competitiveness index (the 2017 imd world competitiveness ranking, 2017). it is calculated by the international institute for management development and the world economic forum and organizers the indicators into four groups (“competitive factors”): (1) economic performance; (2) government efficiency; (3) business efficiency; and (4) infrastructure. satisfaction with life index, which is a macroeconomic indicator, which measures people’s satisfaction with their current lives (university of leicester…, 2006). human development index, which is a summary measure describing the degree of socio-economic development of individual countries (human development index). happy planet index. it is an economic measure which identifies the level of well-being in individual countries. in addition to popular indicators (gross domestic product and human development index), it also takes into account an environmental impact and sustainable development, as it is based on the assumption that the goal of economic activity is not so much to get rich as to ensure health and happiness (happy planet index). gini index, as an indicator of social inequality, expresses the uneven distribution of goods, especially income (gini index). economic efficiency of national governments: case study of poland and ukraine 33 3. methodology. cost of the state and economic efficiency thus, the road to the objective assessment of economic efficiency is to study the extent to which governments interfere with economic development. in other words, it is about government size. government size is defined as a share of the economy that is directly regulated by the government. in simple terms, it is presented as a share of the public budget in gross domestic product and is measured in monetary units, usually within a year’s term. economic growth leads to the expansion of government’s functions, and thus, to an increase in government spending. the problem is in the disproportion between the growth of the two indicators. in the extreme case, i.e. under statism, the state starts engulfing the economy. statism is associated with full or almost full state control and state interference in all or almost all areas of social, economic, and political life. it also means the restriction of broadly understood freedom (stępnicka, 2015). e.v. balackij (2013) claims that the building of the public sector of the economy is connected with difficult periods for the national economy, such as crises, wars, or post-war reconstruction while the growth of government spending is not limited only to those difficult periods. another reason for the development of statism is a desire for increased income of the state treasury connected with emergence of the so-called state monopolies (stępnicka, 2015). based on the available statistical data, a. wagner (1883) defined a law whereupon as the wealth of society increases, so does the relative size of government. it is explained by a need for more administrative and protective functions of the state, a need for increased provision of social and cultural goods and services, and an increased need for provision of proper administrative and bureaucratic controls to ensure the smooth operation of market forces (wahab, 2004). the government’s activities, even some of the most efficient ones, require engagement of the respective resources. two important reasons for a negative impact of excessive government spending on economic growth are the fact that the necessary taxes reduce the incentives to work, to invest and innovate, and the fact that the government crowds out more efficient private suppliers (heitger, 2001). in general, any taxes, under similar conditions, depress the growth opportunities at the cost of reducing investment resources (dubrovs’kij, čerkašin, 2018). a much worse situation takes place when the excess burden of taxation is found not only to exert a significant drag on economic growth (grossman, 1988) but also to facilitate the creation of a “grey zone” and the increase in tax fraud (schneider, enste, 2000). thus, growth of the government size has its reasonable limit, since growing above these functions, the government is likely to be detrimental to economic growth (mitchell, 2005; chobanov, mladenova, 2009). an oversized government sector may have negative spillover effects on the economy due to financing of government spending via increasing taxes, borrowing, and/or printing money (asimakopoulos, karavias, 2016). government spending undermines economic growth by displacing private-sector activity. whether financed by taxes or borrowing, government spending imposes heavy extraction and displacement costs on the productive sector (mitchell, 2005). furthermore, a larger public sector does not necessarily imply a better satisfaction of public requirements or a more efficient approach to providing the minimum required benefits of the welfare state (afonso, furceri, 2010). the state that aspires to efficiency should find the optimal level of the tax burden that will provide for the expected level of public services. for that purpose, the government shall address a crucial task: to accumulate funds to provide for the functioning of the government and its programs without a general decrease in economic activity and incentivizing private initiatives. comparative studies of the interdependence of public expenditure and economic growth have recently become popular (landau, 1983). the impact of the government size on economic growth has been the focal point of academic research for many years (i.e. barro, 1990; karras, 1997; gunalp, dincer, 2005). in many economic studies, the correlation of budget spending to the gdp indicates their inverse relation to the growth rate (woetzel et al., 2018). some researchers argue that reducing the government size will certainly incentivize economic growth (afonso, furceri, 2010; afonso, jalles, 2016; altunc, aydın, 2013; marlow, 1986; pevcin, 2004). for example, according to o.f. altunc and c.  aydın (2013), a 1% change in the ratio of public expenditure and national income results in a 0.74% improvement in the economic growth rate. on the other hand, a. afonso and j.t. jalles (2016) established that a 10% increase in government spending is associated with the 0.5–1.0% decrease in annual economic growth. however, other researchers question a direct linear relationship between these indicators. for example, l. balcerowicz (2004) argues that a low effective level of the tax burden is not necessarily closely 34 aleksander kuczabski related to fast economic growth. economic growth is influenced not so much by the effective taxation level as by the sum of actual payments, both in the form of taxes and bribes. the fact that a complex and non-linear relationship between government spending and growth exists has been first empirically verified in endogenous growth models (pevcin, 2004). when we take a more thorough approach to analyzing the government size, we can see that not only is the profitability of public investment different in countries with different levels of development, but that it also significantly differs between sectors of the same economy. the study by a. afonso and j.t. jalles (2016) claims that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy, whereas an additional incentive for growth could come from investment into key areas (such as education, science, and infrastructure). d. romero-avila & r. strauch (2008) say that government consumption and transfers have a significant negative effect, and government investments have a significant positive effect. some researchers are trying to define optimal government size that will be adequate for all economies, both rich and poor. they believe that the increase in government spending is beneficial up to a certain threshold, but beyond that level the impact on growth is negative. in terms of methodology, they rely on the study by r. armey (1995), r.j.  barro (1990), g.w. scully (1995) and r. rahn & h.  fox (1996), whereupon the “bars curve” was developed. the regularity confirms that there is a positive correlation between public expenditure and gdp up to a certain point, after which the correlation turns negative (altunc, aydın, 2013). some of the early fundamental research of the issue can be found in the analysis by e.a. peden (1991). the study of the impact of public expenditure on the productivity of the us economy over 1929–1986 proved that the maximum productivity growth correlated with the 17%–20% of the government share. in general, according to m. friedman (1997), the optimal level of public spending should be between 15% to 50%. other studies that covered the specific list of the same-type states produced more precise findings. in particular, with the methodology of the “bars curve”, they made several attempts to empirically establish optimal government size. building upon the barro model, g. karras (1997) developed an empirical methodology to examine the role of public expenditure in the process of economic growth. that study, focusing on the data from 20 european countries, estimated the optimal share of public spending to be 16% (+/– 3%). later, b. gunalp and o. dincer (2005) identified the optimal share of public spending for 20 transitional economies to be 17% (+/– 3%). following that, g.w. scully (2008) predicted that the share of the tax rate in the gdp that maximizes economic growth should be 19.3%. the study by d. chobanov and a. mladenova (2009) showed that if you need to maximize economic growth, the government size should not exceed the range from 20 to 30% of the gdp. s. asimakopoulos and y. karavias (2016) have empirically established that the optimal level of the tax rate that maximizes economic growth is 19.12% for developing countries and 17.96% for developed countries. therefore, the negative impact on economic development only comes from the situations when public spending exceeds the critical point. on the other hand, it has been challenging to practically implement the findings of theoretical research as the calculations usually have an insignificant influence on the government’s economic policy, in particular as regards the government size. in fact, over several decades, the developed countries have seen an increase of government size (afonso, furceri, 2010), which in most countries has been above optimal levels (chobanov, mladenova, 2009). the situation has been most critical in europe, since many european governments have extremely large welfare states (mitchell, 2005). a key shortcoming of the attempts to establish a universal optimal government size is connected with significant peculiarities of individual states. f.  forte and c. magazzino (2011) pose a historical question: should the fiscal adjustment be the same for all the states or should it depend on the weight of the public sector on gdp in each country? in our analysis of the weight of the state and of the attempts to establish the optimal level, we believe it reasonable to focus on another aspect of the issue. in terms of the market economy paradigm, a key performance indicator is the scope of the economy beyond public regulation. since the private sector (with few exceptions) offers the best opportunities for multiplying the material resources, and thus, for economic growth, the main parameters for quality and objective assessment of economic efficiency of national governments reflect the difference between gross domestic product and the public budget per capita. in other words, we suggest assessing the government’s economic efficiency by analyzing the gdp dynamics per capita excluding the weight of the government. we suggest this indicator shall be termed as gross free product per capita. gross free product per capita does not focus on government size per se but explores the scope of the most economically efficient private (non-state) economic efficiency of national governments: case study of poland and ukraine 35 capital in the national economy. it can help us explain why the highly developed economies with excessive government size have an advantage over the underdeveloped nations, with insignificant government weight in the economy. therefore, in this regard, the reduction of government size should not be a goal in itself. the main objective shall be to increase the private component in the national economy. in other words, the efficient government shall restrict the effect of the wagner law so that the state’s growth rate does not exceed the growth rate of the economy. this indicator is easy to calculate, as it is based on the generally available statistical data, which is its another advantage. at the same time, we shall highlight certain shortcomings related to the calculations and use of gross free product per capita indicator. firstly, the indicator does not account for the non-economic factors, such as political environment, conflicts, wars, or crises, which may require from the government a rapid increase of government size, even if it contradicts the original plans. secondly, although the indicator is easy to calculate, it fails to account for some economic processes that may be critical in identifying the actual impact of government size. these include the government’s policy on public debt, the scale of inflation, the redistribution of funds within the eu, and others. thirdly, additional factors of economic growth may influence the actions of the government that are not related to providing a sufficient share of private capital in the national economy. such soft factors include the government’s policy in entrepreneurship, in particular, creating and maintaining a fair legal system, eliminating bureaucratic obstacles, encouraging entrepreneurship, and investing in education. fourthly, there is still an open question about what should be the basis for economic efficiency assessment – a comparison with earlier periods or with economic policies of other countries. certain methodological restrictions come from the year-based calculations as governments usually replace each other with no connection to calendar years. 4. findings some studies in the usa propose assessing the government’s economic efficiency from the perspective of reducing government size (mitchell, 2005; de rugy, 2004). these studies compare the economic policies of the us governments from different periods. the comparisons of different countries give more interesting results as they allow for making conclusions not only from the chronological but also from the geographical perspective. contrasting the countries can help illustrate the influence of public policy on changes of economic weight for individual countries. it should also be taken into consideration that the use of cross-country analysis in assessing the optimal government share of gdp has also a deficiency because each country has individual characteristics (chobanov, mladenova, 2009). ukraine and poland offer good comparative study material in this context. these countries are comparable in the area, population size, and in 1990, they had a roughly similar level of economic development (see fig. 1). they shared the communist totalitarian past and a wish to reform the inefficient planned economy. whereas poland coped with the task relatively fast, ukraine failed to achieve the objective. overall, after the collapse of the communist system, the situation of ukraine turned out to be more challenging than that of its neighbors (kuczabski, michalski, 2014). after having become independent, the new ukrainian leadership focused on the building of national institutions and the establishment of national insignia, largely disregarding economic policy and economic reforms (åslund, 2019). using the indicator of gross free product per capita is also justified by the fact that both countries had to overcome the post-communist distortions and still need to increase the share of private capital in the economy. namely, they have not yet reached the efficiency peak under bars. according to statistical data from 2010–2019, the share of this indicator in poland was dropping consistently – from 20.4% to 18.1%, respectively. according to ê. šulga (2021), on the armey-rahn curve, ukraine is located far away on the right from the point of “optimal government size.” it implies that the insufficient capacity of the ukrainian state is not connected with its underfinancing and a decrease in the government spending within the gdp will entail economic growth. therefore, in any situation, the increase in gross free product per capita in the two countries will illustrate the government’s efficiency in economic policy. it is assumed that, on the one hand, the annual dynamics of gross free product per capita is a comparative benchmark for the analysis; on the other hand, the percentage of increase in gross free product per capita in both countries is a point of reference. the study covers the period from 2010 to 2019, i.e. the time of relative economic stability that lasted from the end of the 2008 global recession until the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. while in 1990 both countries had a comparable level of economic 36 aleksander kuczabski development, by 2010, the gap between them had become very significant. this situation posed more radical challenges before the ukrainian government in terms of economic reforms. however, generally, the decade between the crises presented a chance for the two countries to increase the competitiveness of their national economies and gave opportunities for bridging further the gap between them and the leading european economies. among the non-economic factors that affected the economic policies of the two countries, we highlight the russian military aggression against ukraine. its active phase took place in 2014–2015. both economies have been affected, but the ukrainian system faced a critical challenge, which had a significant impact on the indicators under analysis. furthermore, we mention the economic consequences of the ukrainian 2013 political crisis and the dramatic political change following the 2014 and the 2019 elections in ukraine and the 2015 elections in poland. huge inflation in ukraine has also complicated the assessment of economic policy efficiency. nominally, the statistics gathered in the national currency show a positive trend, but the real picture is more pessimistic. thus, the assessment was based on the world bank data presented in us dollars, rather than the official gdp statistics in the ukrainian currency. this approach helped avoid inflation-related distortions. in the period under analysis, poland had a rather stable government size, with a slow downward tendency. there was a short exceptional period, though, when the government size grew from 18.2% in 2014 to 19.4% in 2016. in our view, it gave an impetus for the dynamic growth of the polish economy throughout the entire period under research. thus, a consistent tendency has been maintained since the early 1990s (see fig. 2). the growth of gdp per capita, ppp (constant 2017 international $) in ten years reached as high as 38%: from 24,000 per capita in 2010 to 33,100 in 2019 (the world bank…). gross free product per capita has been growing with a better dynamic – 42.7% over 10 years (see fig. 3). in 2011 and 2018, the growth rate for gross free product per capita reached 6% a year. on the other hand, in ukraine, government size remained high, only dropping to 30.9% in 2011 and then peaking to 35.4% in 2017 (see fig. 2). ê.  šulga (2021) considers excessive public spending in ukraine to be a cause of slow economic growth. unlike the developed economies, where government size is also high, in ukraine, the efficiency of the public sector has been extremely low. therefore, a reduction of public spending in ukraine is by far the only means to improve the economic situation. ukraine has a problem with its social policy, as a significant reduction of the government size may be 0 5 000 10 000 15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000 35 000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 poland gdp per capita, ppp (constant 2017 international $) ukraine gdp per capita, ppp (constant 2017 international $) fig. 1. gdp per capita dynamics in poland and ukraine, constant 2017 international $ (1990–2019) source: own study based on the world bank open data. economic efficiency of national governments: case study of poland and ukraine 37 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 poland, government size ukraine, government size 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15 poland, gfp per capita, (increase / decrease compared to the previous year, %) right ukraine, gfp per capita, (increase / decrease compared to the previous year, %) right poland, gfp per capita, (constant 2017 international $, tys.) left ukraine, gfp per capita, (constant 2017 international $, tys.) left fig. 2. government size dynamics in poland and ukraine, % (2010–2019) source: own work based on the world bank open data, statistical yearbook of the republic of poland (2011-2020), statistical yearbook of ukraine (2011-2020). fig. 3. gross free product per capita dynamics in poland and ukraine, % (2010–2019) source: own work based on the world bank open data, statistical yearbook of the republic of poland (2011–2020), statistical yearbook of ukraine (2011–2020). 38 aleksander kuczabski politically unrealistic. according to v. dubrovs’kij and v. čerkašin (2018), about 22% of gdp constitutes the irreducible public expenditure, of which 10% of gdp is used to provide for retired citizens. over the decade under analysis, the ukrainian economy stagnated. it is proved by an insignificant growth of the gdp per capita, ppp (constant 2017 international $), from 11,800 per capita in 2010 to 12,800 in 2019, or by 8.8% over 10 years (the world bank…). changes in gross free product per capita demonstrate a similar tendency: from 7,800 in 2010 to 8,400 in 2019, or by 7.4% over 10 years (see fig. 3). in the decade under analysis, the best year for ukraine in economic terms was 2011 when the gdp per capita grew by 5.8%, and gross free product per capita increased by as much as 10.4%. similarly to other poor countries with weak public administration, ukraine has a rather high level of the shadow economy, which is estimated at 28% of the gdp (dubrovs’kij et al., 2017). in this regard, we can assume that the actual gross free product in ukraine is much higher than the official statistics show. however, it should also be kept in mind that the corruption burden virtually eliminates the taxexempt “preferences” of the shadow economy. in addition, it causes the transfer of profit abroad to low tax jurisdictions. in ukraine, the capital outflow to other countries is estimated to be uah 130-220 bln per year, which results in an underpayment of taxes to the budget from uah 23 to 40 bln (dubrovs’kij et al., 2017). 5. conclusions the economic efficiency of national governments depends on decisions in the economic area. a key task is to retain the size of the state that would be adequate to the level of its economic development. in post-communist states, economic growth is attributable to the overcoming of state monopoly and statism. therefore, economic development and its dynamics directly depend on the decrease in government size. our research proposes a unique and new approach to assessing the government’s economic efficiency based on the government size indicator. we argue that the government size is a consequence of the government’s policy and has a crucial impact on both economic growth or recession. we suggest assessing the government’s economic efficiency with the indicator of gross free product per capita, which is a difference between the gdp and the government size per capita. a comparison of the outcomes of economic policies of polish and ukrainian governments in 2009– 2019 has offered certain conclusions. firstly, the polish economy retained the positive dynamics that started in the early 1990s while the ukrainian economy was stagnating. secondly, a key success factor for the polish economy was the preservation of optimal government size, which allowed for a consistent increase in gross free product per capita, and thus for providing a good basis for economic growth. thirdly, in the case of ukraine, it turned impossible to achieve the optimal balance between government size and the private sector of the economy, which largely delayed economic growth and undermined the prospects for future solutions. fourthly, it may be assumed that the covid-19 pandemic will have a significant impact on economic processes and will cause a deep crisis. attempts to maintain the pre-pandemic government size with reduced economic activities will affect gross free product, and thus, will launch a long-term negative tendency. references abdiweli a.m., 2003, institutional differences as sources of growth differences, atlantic economic journal, 31(4), 348–362. doi: 10.1007/bf02298493 afonso a., furceri d., 2010, government size, composition, volatility and economic growth, european journal of political economy, 26(4), 517–532. doi: 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36, 2125–2135. doi: 10.1080/0003684042000306923 woetzel j., madgavkar a., seong j., manyika j., sneader k., gupta s., 2018, outperformers: high-growth emerging economies and the companies that propel them, https:// www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/innovation-andgrowth/outperformers-high-growth-emerging-economies-and-the-companies-that-propel-them (accessed 17 april 2021). world economic forum, 2020, the global competitiveness report 2020, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-globalcompetitiveness-report-2020 (accessed 17 april 2021). 1. introduction in europe, the covid-19 pandemic caused temporary shortages in supply drug chains due to restriction measures. in some cases, the process went higher with lower purity. the wholesale movement of drugs continued in the eu-member states due to commercial transportation in the region. organized crime tried to adapt to the situation. as a result, in some cases, violence increased in this environment, especially among mid-level suppliers and distributors. the role of darknet and internet markets increased. experts noted less home delivery, face-to-face contacts and cash transactions that may influence the behavioural patterns of users in the future (europol, emcdda, 2020). shortages of cannabis that resulted in inflated retail prices were observed in some eu states. due to shortages in heroin supply, the substance was substituted with synthetic opioids, nps, crack cocaine, amphetamine journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(1), 59–64 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.1.07 impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug markets, prevention and treatment in ukraine maria bevz research, monitoring and international cooperation department, national center for prevention of addiction, dereniowa 52/54, 02–776 warsaw, poland e-mail: maria.bevz@kcpu.gov.pl citation bevz m., 2022, impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug markets, prevention and treatment in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 59–64. abstract this paper aims to highlight some issues, challenges and trends caused by the covid-19 pandemic in the drug scene and the system of drug prevention in ukraine. this article is based on the official statistics, available qualitative and quantitative studies conducted by the institute for psychiatry, forensic psychiatric examination and drug monitoring of the ministry of health of ukraine (ukrainian national focal point), the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) and ukrainian researchers. of course, some studies are not representative of the general population; however, they give some information on the drug scene in ukraine during the pandemic. the data used in the article were collected mainly in 2019–2020. every actor on the drug scene had to adapt to the new reality caused by anti-pandemic measures. drug sellers proposed “stable work” during lockdown; drug dealers dropped ordered substances closer to the customer’s place. at the same time, ost facilities implemented home-treatment, and many private facilities appeared. ost patients misused methadone and sold it on the illicit market, while drug users started to find substitutes of their main drug and notably increased drug-related deaths. key words pandemic, drug prevention, restrictions, ukraine. received: 25 february 2022 accepted: 11 april 2022 published: 27 may 2022 mailto:artur.malczewski@kcpu.gov.pl 60 maria bevz or synthetic cathinones. cocaine maritime trafficking continued at the same level and sometimes even increased in comparison to 2019. however, due to travel restrictions, air trafficking dramatically decreased. synthetic drug production continued in the main european countries, like the netherlands and belgium. however, demand for those substances decreased due to the closure of the main distribution areas: discotheques, festivals and other entertainment venues (europol, emcdda, 2020). this paper is an attempt to analyse the impact of the pandemic on drug-related issues in ukraine. in ukraine, the first case of covid-19 was detected on the 3rd of march 2020. in march–april 2020, the state of emergency was declared. the boarder was closed for foreign citizens, transportation ceased, and mandatory facial masks were required. on the 11th may, the first lockdown release was introduced with opening of stores, parks, and recreational places. in may, the boarder was partially opened, public transportation was restored and small gatherings were allowed. lockdown release continued in june. intercity transportation, sport and educational facilities were opened, air transportation was allowed. in august 2020, so-called “adaptive lockdown” was introduced. anti-pandemic measures depended on the situation in the region. in november, some “weekend lockdown” was implemented. in august–december some restrictions were restored (e.g. limitation of recreational activities and public gatherings) (dumchev et al., 2021). the covid-19 pandemic also affected the drug market, drug use and treatment availability. the aim of this article is to analyse the impact of covid-19 pandemic on the drug-related issues in ukraine. this paper is based on the data and reports provided by the institute for psychiatry, forensic psychiatric examination and drug monitoring of the ministry of health of ukraine (ukrainian national focal point), the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) and other stakeholders involved in drug supply and demand in this country. the report on the drug and alcohol situation in ukraine will be the basic source of quantitative data. for the purposes of this article, the term “national drug report” will be used alternately. the most recent available data are form 2020 (institute..., 2021). in 2020, emcdda published a trendspotter briefing dedicated to the impact of covid-19 on drug-related issues in the european neighbourhood policy (enp) countries. the methodology was based on a search of peer-reviewed articles in international journals. two online surveys on drug-related health and security were conducted; the european web survey on drugs: covid-19 (ewsd-covid) was conducted in enp countries, and a virtually facilitated group of experts from enp countries was involved in the study (emcdda, 2020). a total of 111 respondents residing in the enp region completed the online ewsd-covid questionnaire (with around 30 questions) in one of the 21 languages, including russian and french, made available between 8 april and 25 may 2020. the authors of the briefing underline that web-surveys are not representative of the general population. however, they show us some highlights of drug users’ behaviour. respondents from ukraine accounted for 86% of the sample (emcdda, 2020). another study entitled “impact of the covid-19 epidemic on drug markets, substance use patterns, and delivery of harm reduction and treatment services in ukraine” used in this paper was conducted in kyiv by ukrainian researchers. in order, to evaluate and describe drug-related behaviour and service use, 51 adult people who used drugs (pwud) in the last 30 days were recruited and followed for six months. an online survey was conducted for data collection. interviews were also conducted with people who work in the sphere of treatment services to explore changes in the drug scene and service provision. this research is also not representative for the general population but it highlights some findings in the sphere of treatment (dumchev et al., 2021). this paper is an attempt to compare quantitative data in the years 2018–2020 and explain the differences. it will also try to highlight the response of the ukrainian drug treatment system to the pandemic. 2. data sources secondary data analysis was used to collect statistics on drug markets, prevention and treatment in ukraine (see: boslaugh, 2007; johnston, 2014). of the three data sources used in this procedure (heaton, 2008), only official databases from the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) and from ukrainian institutions (institute for psychiatry, forensic psychiatric examination and drug monitoring of the ministry of health of ukraine, ministry of internal affairs of ukraine, prosecutor general’s office of ukraine) were used. 3. drug markets the ukrainian drug market has some distinguishing features. illicit substances like methadone and amphetamine-type stimulants are distributed without meeting with a dealer in person. usually, a drug user contacts the dealer through a trusted phone number or encrypted messenger telegram, transfers money impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug markets, prevention and treatment in ukraine 61 for a dose, receives the information on the place where the drug is hidden (so-called “dead drops”) (dumchev et al., 2021). usually, a drug is hidden in a public place and the consumer receives the photo where to find it. the addresses of telegram-channels are written in the public space as graffiti, and police runs campaigns of removing them (ministry…, 2021). there are also virtual drug forums that work as a marketplace. people can also share their opinions on the substances and complain about sellers if needed. such marketplaces started to use pandemic as a promotion of stable work in the sphere of drug production and sales. according to journalist investigation, drug-related “professions” are not limited to “chemists” and dealers. there are also administrators, warehousemen, and packers. people involved in the drug trade or production have to pay deposit in order to avoid abuse (garasim, 2021). another distinguishing feature of the ukrainian market is the popularity of acetylated opium (“shyrka”) among people who inject drugs (pwid), made by dealers and users at home from locally grown poppy (emcdda, 2020). according to the emcdda publication, drug prices have increased during the pandemic in ukraine. a survey among national law enforcement experts shows that prices of cannabis (herbal and resin), heroin, amphetamines and nps have slightly increased. however, prices of cocaine and mdma have increased by more than 20%. the only data regarding changes of drug purity is available for cocaine showing its decrease (emcdda, 2020). the availability of mdma and cocaine has decreased; however, a slight increase in amphetamines and nps has been noticed (emcdda, 2020). emcdda together with europol monitored data on online drug distribution. data from ukraine indicated that the number of detected drug sales on darknet markets in the first few months of 2020 was substantially higher that the number of detected drug sales for the same period in 2019. however, almost half of ewsd-covid respondents from ukraine reported no change in the way in which they had obtained illicit substances, with only a small number indicating that they had purchased illicit drugs online and on the darknet more often than they had before the covid-19 pandemic (emcdda, 2020). emcdda reported a decrease in drug availability. this also affected the behaviour of drug users. the research showed that nearly a quarter of people who use drugs did not change their drug use habits, while three out of 10 indicated using fewer drugs and one in 10 reported stopping drug use following the emergence of the covid-19 pandemic (emcdda, 2020). the available data show that during the pandemic cannabis was used more frequently or in greater quantity. cannabis was also reported as a substance that was substituted by alcohol. mdma/ecstasy, which is considered a typical nightlife drug, was used less frequently (emcdda, 2020). data from experts and targeted studies indicate that some mdma users may have discontinued use, while others may have opted for alternatives, such as ketamine (emcdda, 2020). some users may have returned to the home-based production of stimulants, such as the production of a substance known locally as ‘vint’. however, the scale of this activity, as well as its potential to significantly affect local markets, remains unknown (emcdda, 2020). the research indicated misuse of opioid substitution treatment medicines (methadone) in ukraine prescribed by private practitioners (emcdda, 2020). according to the survey, the most cited explanation for reductions in drug use was fewer social opportunities, constraints on living arrangements and loss of income/less money to buy drugs. health concerns, financial uncertainty and reduced ability to buy and collect drugs have also been mentioned. on the other hand, one in five participants of the online survey reported increasing their drug use during the period under study, with reasons reported being boredom, anxiety, need to cope with covid-19 and stockpiled drugs. a small proportion of respondents were unable to assess a change in their illicit drug use pattern since the start of the covid-19 pandemic (emcdda, 2020). according to the research conducted in kyiv, prior to march 2020 the main source of illicit methadone were so-called “dead drops”. however, till the end of september people bought less from this source. the available data show that people started to buy the substance more frequently form dealers and intermediaries. in the case of illicit methadone, the importance of the internet has totally decreased. however, prior to march, some people used it as the main source. the most popular source of medical methadone was pharmacy, sometimes dealers and intermediaries. the role of the internet increased in august. however, it was not declared as the main source of this substance (dumchev et al., 2021). the authors of the research notice: importantly, the decreasing trend in the use of illicit methadone, and the compensatory increase in the use of medical methadone obtained by prescription did not reverse after the restrictions for public transportation, and other epidemic control measures were released. this suggests that this change in the drug scene became sustainable, at least during the study period, due to the convenience and other perceived advantages of the prescription source (dumchev et al., 2021). 62 maria bevz ukrainian research showed that some patients in the governmental opioid substitution treatment (ost) facilities were transferred to 10-day take-home doses. however, there were indicators that medical opioids were sold on the illicit market. moreover, pwud and service providers tried to adapt to the challenges of the pandemic. private physicians started to open new sites (at least 40 in kyiv), offering discounts for new customers. in this way, one person could be a client of several such treatment methadone sites, buying the substance cheaper and more than needed, and in fact, reselling it afterwards. dealers made “dead drops” closer to consumer’s place. with the renewal of public transportation, drug availability gradually returned to the pre-pandemic situation (dumchev et al., 2021). the official statistics show a rise in drug-related administrative offences in 2020 (compared to 2019) and a decline in criminal offences (table 1, table 2) (institute..., 2021). the following tables show the dynamics of registered and judicially charged cases of drug-related administrative and criminal offences. table 1. drug-related administrative offences in 2017– 2020 year number of registered cases number of judged cases 2017 7 879 6 775 2018 7 190 6 094 2019 6 377 5 408 2020 7 567 6 348 source: institute..., 2021; based on judicial statistics. table 2. number of registered drug-related criminal offences in 2016–2020* year for selling purposes (cases) for not selling purposes (cases) people charged (persons) 2016 2 293 17 398 10 357 2017 5 029 20 071 15 440 2018 5 453 18 022 13 160 2019 6 382 18 623 13 309 2020 8 392 15 735 13 249 * illegal production, manufacture, purchasing, storage, transportation, shipment of drugs, psychotropic substances or their analogues not for selling purposes and for selling purposes) source: institute..., 2021; based on prosecutor general’s office of ukraine. 2016, 2017, 2018 – data updates based on the information from all the law enforcement authorities. 4. trends the number of drug users who applied for a treatment during the covid-19 pandemic has not significantly changed. however, we can observe a significant decrease after 2014. it can be explained by the russian occupation of crimea, donetsk and luhansk regions and a lack of data availability on the occupied territories (institute..., 2021). the most prevalent group of substances is opioids (about 40,000 cases). cannabinoids is the second group (about 4,700 cases) (institute..., 2021). however, the available data show us a significant increase in patients who applied for treatment of cocaine addiction. in 2018, there were 40 patients, in 2019 – 346 and in 2020 – 274 cases. we can observe some increase among stimulant users after 2017 (1,184 in 2017, 1,557 in 2018, 1,457 in 2019 and 1,441 in 2020) (institute..., 2021). according to the ukrainian national drug report, in 2018, the data collection form and method changed, and ukraine started collecting data on infectious diseases of only people who inject drugs. comparing to 2019, in 2020 the number of hiv, hcv, hbv detections increased (institute..., 2021). the number of deaths related to drug use and poisoning has been increasing since 2017 (in 2017 – 251, 2020 – 589 cases). in 2020, 90% of deaths were among males. the most frequent deaths are among people at the age of 30–39. half of the deaths were caused by opioids (50.2%) (institute..., 2021). a similar situation was in 2018: 84% of male deaths (institute..., 2019). however, looking at the comparison between 2019 and 2020, drug related deaths increased almost in every age group (institute..., 2021). the ukrainian research “impact of the covid-19 epidemic on drug markets, substance use patterns, and delivery of harm reduction and treatment services in ukraine” showed that 55% of the participants, increasing to 76% in late july and to 80% by late september were employed and declared fullor part-time job as their main source of income (dumchev et al., 2021). prior to march 2020, over 71% of the pwud cohort used illicit methadone. this number decreased till the end of september 2020. however, the situation is totally opposite with medical methadone: the use in the same period significantly increased. people switched from illicit methadone to medical one. quantitative results of the cited research showed that the use of amphetamine fluctuated and mostly remained low at about 10%, then reduced to 4–7% in july–august and september. there was a noticeable decline in the use of cannabis (from 20% in april to 13% in september). antihistamines, mostly used as an adjuvant to injected impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug markets, prevention and treatment in ukraine 63 opioids, decreased from 20% in april to 13–15% in september. the use of heroin, homemade opioids and other drugs (mdma, lsd, others) was negligible. alcohol consumption increased in april to 46% compared to the pre-covid level (37%), but then steadily decreased to about 30% in the last rounds of the survey (dumchev et al., 2021). according to qualitative data, the subjective availability of drugs changed during the pandemic. at the beginning of covid-19, pwud noted harder access to their primary drug. however, the number of users who declared harder access was gradually decreasing and at the end of september it declined to 0% (dumchev et al., 2021). at the beginning of the lockdown, the prices slightly increased. however, in june they returned to the previous rates. some users claimed that sellers decreased the process or proposed some bonuses (dumchev et al., 2021). the available data suggest that the trend in overdose notably increased with the beginning of the pandemic. the main substances that caused overdose were mainly illicit and medical methadone, sometimes street buprenorphine, rarely amphetamine, alcohol, antihistamines (dumchev et al., 2021). these data prove misuse of substitution treatment substances during covid-19. 5. prevention and treatment the prevention system in ukraine covers certain social and age groups of the population. according to the ministry of education and science of ukraine, the prevention of use of psychoactive substances is integrated into secondary education and is a part of the school curriculum. the government standard is approved in ukraine; centres for social services for families, children and youth (under the ministry of social policy of ukraine) provide services for families who are in difficult life circumstances related to alcohol and narcotic drug or psychotropic substances use. the ministry of youth and sport of ukraine in partnership with non-governmental organisations organises national and regional events to popularise and promote healthy lifestyles. in 2018, the most frequent preventive measure were individual sessions (550,382 sessions – 95% of overall events). lectures were in the second place (17,208 events) (institute..., 2019). in 2020, according to the ministry of education and science of ukraine, the most popular preventive measure were trainings (288,224 events – 51.6%), in the second place there were individual interviews (115,702 – 20.7%), then educational hours (80,115 events – 14.3%) (institute..., 2021). a number of families in difficult life circumstances that were provided with support of social services has slightly decreased: 12,924 families in 2018, 9,600 – in 2020 (institute..., 2019, 2021). the governmental ost programs quickly adapted to the epidemic. before covid-19, about 50–60% of the ost patients received substitution therapy every day on-site. however, in march, 90% of the clients were transferred to take-home administration of methadone/buprenorphine for up to 10 days (dumchev et al., 2021). according to the qualitative interviews, governmental narcological clinics in kyiv stopped accepting new patients to treatment programmes. so, some people were unable to receive services, despite their motivation, and were placed on the waiting list. those patients who were suspected of methadone misuse at home were taken back to on-site treatment. overall, ost facilities returned to their normal work, providing standard services. moreover, free covid-tests were provided for people who wanted to start treatment (dumchev et al., 2021). 6. conclusions a case of ukraine is not very different from the eumember countries. anti-pandemic measures made every actor on the drug scene adapt to the new reality. limitations imposed in the transportation system caused shortages in supply chains. this caused a lack of availability of some drugs and, naturally, an increase in the prices. pwud started to find substitutes of their primary drug that caused risky behaviours, such as the use of acetylated opium (“shyrka”), misuse of the substances and overdose. darknet markets offered sales of their goods. the importance of internet decreased. a distinguishing feature of the ukrainian market is use of telegram messenger for contactless drug trade. such “marketplaces” started to use the pandemic as a promotion of a “stable job” during lockdown. pwud started to buy more frequently form dealers and intermediaries. sellers made so-called “dead-drops” more convenient for consumers and closer to their places. however, with the renewal of public transportation drug availability gradually returned to the pre-pandemic situation. there is also a notable change in the ukrainian prevention system. in 2020, trainings and individual interviews became a more popular preventive measure. however, the number of families in difficult life circumstances that were provided with support of social services slightly decreased. it may be explained with the lockdown. ost facilities changed their operating mode and did not accept 64 maria bevz new clients. home-treatment was introduced. the patients were provided with medical methadone for 10 days. private facilities appeared rapidly. however, some facts indicate methadone misuse. private physicians abused methadone prescriptions, and pwud could be the patients of several facilities, buying the substance several times and reselling it. nonetheless, patients who were suspected of such misuse were treated on-site in an ost facility. to summarise, at the very beginning of the pandemic, there were problems with access to substances and treatment. however, those challenges were gradually eliminated with the restriction measures. sellers treated lockdown as a chance to attract new workers and clients. physicians used pandemic as a chance to open a private facility, attract new patients and give them a chance to buy medical methadone. nowadays, the majority of those problems are not relevant as the restrictions are gradually being suspended. the system has adapted to the situation 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ministry of health of ukraine, 2021, report on drug and alcohol situation in ukraine for 2021 (based on data 2020), https://cmhmda.org.ua/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/national-drug-and-alcoholreport-20212020.pdf (accessed 07 april 2022). institute for psychiatry, forensic psychiatric examination and drug monitoring of the ministry of health of ukraine, 2019, report on the drug and alcohol situation in ukraine 2019 (based on data 2018), https://cmhmda. org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ukraine_countryreport_2019_emcdda.pdf (accessed 07 april 2022). johnston m.p., 2014, secondary data analysis: a method of which the time has come, qualitative and quantitative methods in libraries, 3, 619–626. ministry of internal affairs of ukraine, 2021, polìcejs’kì razom z aktivìstami po vsìj deržavì proveli akcìû z protidìï vuličnìj reklamì narkotikìv (eng. police together with activists across the country held a rally to counter street drug advertising), https://www.npu.gov.ua/news/narkozlochini/ 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https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/statistika 1. introduction the objective of the study is to analyse the function of borders in contemporary european post-communist countries, as direct and indirect barriers in traffic and cooperation between inhabiting them populations. the shaping of the current borders in the analysed area took place mainly in two periods. the first one occurred immediately after the end of world war ii, and its largest beneficiary turned out to be the (former) soviet union, when, among others, the finnish-soviet border was moved by handing over three so far finnish regions: karjala, petsamo, saala to the ussr; the borders of lithuania, latvia and estonia were taken down because of the incorporation of those states by the soviet union; a new border was established in east prussia (earlier: germany) due to splitting the land between the ussr and poland (wendt, 2004); the soviet-polish border was significantly moved due to taking over large areas of the former second polish republic by the ussr1; similarly, the czechoslovak-soviet border was moved due to the incorporation of subcarpathian ruthenia into the ussr, and the border with romania due to the incorporation of bessarabia and northern bukovina into the ussr. the second period in changes of the borders began after the fall of the system of socialist states as a result of the so-called “revolutions of 19892”. its characteristic feature is the emergence of 1 polish: kresy wschodnie, in english: eastern borderlands. 2 the period is sometimes called “the autumn of nations”. journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 7–12 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.008.5453 borders as barriers (based on the example of european post-communist countries) wioletta szymańska institute of geography and regional studies, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76-200 słupsk, poland, e-mail: szymanskaw@apsl.edu.pl citation szymańska w., 2016, borders as barriers (based on example of european post-communist countries), journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 7–12. abstract functions of political borders as a spatial barriers have been analysed in the paper. a direct and an indirect (through the border region) impact of the borders has been distinguished. it was found that intra-eu borders and one between belarus and russia play the least direct role as a spatial barrier. by contrast, the worst situation is on the borders of ukraine with transnistria, occupied crimea and the so-called donetsk people’s republic and the luhansk people’s republic. when it comes to the borderland areas, the worst situation is in the border regions of ukraine with russia. key words border, barrier, post-communist countries, central europe, eastern europe. 8 wioletta szymańska a number of new states as a result of the dissolution of the existing federal countries: czechoslovakia, yugoslavia and the ussr. currently, there is a new quality process which does not involve changes to the course of the borders as much as changes in their significance. this is a consequence of the former post-communist states joining the european union and the schengen area. during the period of communism, populations of those countries were subject to increased control, whose one element was great difficulties in crossing the state borders. the iron curtain, separating countries belonging to the warsaw pact from the remaining ones in europe is a symbol of this period. changes of a political (birch, 2003; michalski, 2010b; rose, 2009; szul, 2001; wendt, 2002, 2004; wendt, ilieş, 2001), social (illner, 1996; michalski, 2010a, 2015; radchenko et al., 2014; sztompka, 1996, 2004, 2008; wegner, 2000), economic (bąk, 2006; grykień, 2004; stryjakiewicz, 1999; vančura, 2006; wendt, ilieş, 2011), etc. character, which took place in these countries after 1989 also resulted in changing the role and the significance of borders. 2. direct and indirect functions of a border as a barrier state borders may directly and indirectly influence the displacement of populations and contacts between communities inhabiting both sides. a direct impact is that any political border serves as a spatial barrier (maik, parysek, 1978), namely it is an obstacle for links, traffic and interactions in the physical space (rykiel, 1991). j. łoboda (1983) understands the following as a barrier effect: • resistance, sometimes identified with psychological, economic, cultural, etc. barriers; • directional deviation resulting from the diversity of space, which means that the innovation stream in different directions takes place with different speed; • barriers, both natural (e.g., mountains, swamps, seas) and artificial (e.g. political, ethnic, linguistic). j. bański (2010) identified many possible criteria of the division of boundaries. this study is based on the classification proposed by a.  moraczewska3 (2008), based on the criterion of international relations. accordingly, three main functions of borders have been distinguished: 3 such a division partly refers to that proposed by r. domański (1970) into four main types of barriers. • disintegrative (its essence is to close the border to contacts); • fragmentative (characterised by varying degrees of openness, depending on the agent penetrating it); • integrative (characterised by a high degree of openness and the intensity of contacts). on the other hand, the indirect impact of borders on the displacement of the population takes place due to the specifics of the borderland areas. firstly, their development is clearly affected by the border through the functions it plays (cf. nowińska, 1997). secondly, due to their peripheral location, these regions are generally considered to be less developed, thereby requiring activation. according to s.  ciok (1994, 2010), a delay in the development of these areas may be due to two reasons: (1) for a long time this area has been poorly managed or not managed at all, or (2) a delay results from changes in the course of the borders4. 3. the situation in post-communist countries looking at the functioning of borders in the analysed region (cf. cichocki, 2004; dołzbłasz, raczyk 2015; ilieş et al., 2011b; komornicki, 2001, 2007, 2008; miszczuk, 2010; sadowski, 2004; wendt, 2004; więckowski, 2001) and referring to the division proposed by a.  moraczewska (2008), we can conclude that in the analysed area borders mainly play the second and the third function, less often the first one5 (fig. 1): 1. in every sense of the word, the integrative function in this area is played by borders between countries of the schengen area and partly the eu borders between croatia, romania and bulgaria6, 4 in the latter case, we deal with an area originally developed economically, and only designating a border in it entails adverse effects which often cause stagnation or even regression in regional development. 5 in the proposed division a fragment of the border between ukraine and russia (and more specifically, between the donetsk people’s republic and luhansk people’s republic and the russian federation) has been omitted due to the lack of reliable data that would allow including this fragment of the border in one of the three functions listed here (although based on fragmentary data one can venture a statement that this border plays a fragmentative function, but with significant elements of the disintegrative function). 6 partly, because these countries do not belong to the schengen area, hence intra-eu border controls are in force between them, although they are not as strict as, for example, on the external borders of the eu. borders as barriers (based on the example of european post-communist countries) 9 as well as the border between belarus and russia7. 2. the fragmentative function is played by most of the borders between the countries not belonging to the european union and by the external borders of the european union. 3. a border plays a disintegrative function relatively seldom. in the analysed area this is the front line between ukraine and the so-called luhansk people’s republic and the donetsk people’s republic, and partly the border between ukraine and 7 due to the fact that these countries make the union state of russia and belarus. transnistria and between ukraine and crimea occupied by russia8. referring to the classification of backwardness in the development of the borderland areas proposed by s.  ciok (1994, 2010), in the analysed area there are regions which for a long time both have been poorly managed or not managed at all, e.g. the borderland area between czechoslovakia and hungary and austria, and also with borderland areas whose backwardness results from changes in the course of the 8 due to a stable situation, the border between transnistria and moldova has been included among those playing a fragmentative role, which does not mean that a conflict can reignite there at any time, and thus this border will serve as a disintegrative barrier. fig. 1. general division of functions of borders in european post-communist countries, state at the beginning of 2016 source: own study, based on a. moraczewska (2008). 10 wioletta szymańska borders, as is for example the situation in the former east prussia after the end of world war ii (cf. wendt, 1999). after the negative impact of a border on the frontier region ceases, usually its development takes place. a model of such a development was presented by m.  miszczuk (2013). however, even if the border stops having damaging effects on the borderland region, making up for the delays requires time and financial outlays. still one can clearly see that making up for this backwardness is much more efficient on the internal borders of the european union than on its external borders or on borders between countries not belonging to the eu (cf. ilieş et al., 2009, 2011a; komornicki, miszczuk, 2010; vlad, ilieş, 2014; wendt, 2007; węcławowicz et al., 2006). if during the period of communism borders clearly divided populations inhabiting both its sides, today z. chojnicki’s (1998) observation that a border not only separates the two neighbouring areas but it also connects them is becoming increasingly more valid on most borders. a release of possibilities of their activities which happened after the fall of communism (cf. bafoil, 1999) is of major importance in playing not only a function of a barrier but also of a link between the communities living on both sides of a „permeable” border. its institutional dimension manifests itself the creation and functioning of euroregions. yet, it should not be forgotten that the fall of communism and the „opening” of borders also entails risks, such as: an increase in crime, emergence of sex tourism and smuggling on a previously unknown scale, a decrease in epidemiological safety (cf. dziecięca…, 2011; michalski, 1999, 2003, 2008; perkowska, 2010, 2013). looking at the current (the beginning of 2016) situation in european post-communist countries, it seems that the worst situation now is on most external borders of russia and the border areas of its neighbouring countries (cf. gogsadze, 2011; gurzu, 2015; saldžiūnas, 2016; горбулін et al. 2015) as well as in transnistria (całus et al., 2014; rodkiewicz (ed.), 2011). this is largely a derivative of the neo-imperialist policy pursued by that country. 4. summary the analysed group of countries is diverse in many ways, also in terms of the barrier effect on their borders. looking at the direct impact of a border as a barrier, the best situation occurs on intra-eu borders, although in this respect a little worse situation is on eu borders between bulgaria, croatia and romania because these countries do not belong to the schengen area. theoretically, the barrier function is not played by the border between belarus and russia either. on the opposite side, there are parts of the borders between ukraine and regions directly or indirectly linked with moscow, i.e. 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(eds.), 2001, chosen problems of political geography in central europe, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk. wendt j., ilieş a., (eds.), 2011, regional development studies in poland and romania, editura universităţii din oradea, oradea. wendt  j., 1999, political regionalization of east prussia, [in:] multicultural regions and cities, region and regionalizm, 4, 52–56. wendt  j., 2002, diffusion du processus democratique de l`union europeenne a europe centrale: comparison de la pologne et de la roumanie, mosella, xxvi(3–4), 53–58. wendt  j., 2004, przestrzenne zróżnicowanie i uwarunkowania przenikania systemu demokratycznego w polsce i w rumunii, carta blanca, warszawa. wendt  j., 2007, romanian euroregions in the process of european integration – case study of the serbian border, [in:] m.  koter, k.  heffner (eds.) regions in the process of european integration. dilemmas of regional policy in the european union, region and regionalism, 8(2), 14–26. więckowski m., 2001, granica polityczna jako bariera dla rozwoju i funkcjonowania transportu w karpatach zachodnich, prace komisji geografii komunikacji ptg, 7, 201–221. горбулін  в.п., власюк  о.с., кононенко  с.в., 2015, україна і росія: дев’ятий вал чи китайська стіна, національний інститут стратегічних досліджень, київ. 1. introduction alcohol and marijuana are the most commonly used psychoactive substances in europe (european…, 2019) and in poland (konsumpcja…, 2019). indicators of the volume of alcohol consumption at the national level show some changes as regards the popularity of its particular types and situations in which they are consumed. other important changes concern combined use of various substances, such as alcohol and marijuana. the results and observations presented in this article refer to the situation in gdańsk, a large urban centre in the north of poland, with a population of nearly half a million (468,158 as on 30 june 2019). the case in point is worth observing as the city is dynamically developing: gdańsk is characterised by growing indicators of perceived quality of life (załęcki, brosz, 2017) and a relatively high level of in-migration, stemming from prosperity in the labour market. addressing the issue in focus has been motivated by the fact that in the last four years the proportion of marijuana users in the adult population of gdańsk has almost doubled: from 7.1% in 2015 (abramowicz et al., 2018a) to 14.1% in 2019. this change begs questions about the population of users of journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(1), 9–14 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.1.02 a pattern of alcohol consumption among marijuana users in the adult population of the city of gdańsk maciej brosz institute of sociology, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-9621-5588 e-mail: maciej.brosz@ug.edu.pl citation brosz m., 2020, a pattern of alcohol consumption among marijuana users in the adult population of the city of gdańsk, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(1), 9–14. abstract alcohol and marijuana are the most commonly used psychoactive substances both in europe and poland. in the last four years the proportion of marijuana users in the adult population of gdańsk has almost doubled: from 7.1% in 2015 to 14.1% in 2019. the surveys concerning the consumption of alcohol conducted every four years since 2007 indicate a significant fact: the proportion of people who drink is decreasing. however, this does not mean that they drink less or less often. a question elaborated in this article is whether marijuana users consume more or less alcohol than non-users. this article is based on the data collected in a questionnaire survey on alcohol and other psychoactive substance use conducted in gdańsk in the autumn of 2019 on a representative sample of 1,004 adult residents of the city. key words alcohol, marijuana, pattern of consumption, gdańsk. received: 26 december 2019 accepted: 22 february 2020 published: 31 march 2020 10 maciej brosz the drug. such questions are also important in the context of downplaying the effects of marijuana use and treating it as a drug which is safe (popova et al., 2017, okaneku et al., 2015) and has less dangerous social effects than alcohol (rezkalla, kloner, 2014; simmons, carey, 2002). patterns of psychoactive substance use are changing. regular surveys concerning the consumption of alcohol conducted every four years since 2007 indicate a significant fact: the proportion of people who drink is decreasing. however, this does not mean that they drink less or less often. in an attempt to answer a general question whether marijuana users consume more or less alcohol than non-users, this article sets out to achieve the following objectives: (1) to identify a pattern of alcohol consumption among marijuana users in a large urban centre on the example of the adult population of gdańsk, taking into account a substantial increase in the user population in the last four years. in other words: what changes have occurred in the population of gdańsk in terms of the widespread use of marijuana and its frequency? (2) to compare the patterns of alcohol consumption among marijuana users and non-users; identified differences will serve as a point of departure for in-depth studies on combined use of the two substances; (3) to investigate the socio-demographic profile of marijuana users in a large urban centre: who are they? what are the social characteristics of this group of psychoactive substance users? has their population changed over the last four years? the collected data did not make it possible to identify and study those who engage in simultaneous alcohol and marijuana (sam) use, which brings much more significant negative effects than marijuana or alcohol use separately (lee et al., 2017). the survey conducted in gdańsk clearly indicates that alcohol consumption among marijuana users displays a pattern whereby they drink more often and more heavily than non-users. it can be assumed that this category includes sam users. 2. methodology this article is based on the data collected in a questionnaire survey on alcohol and other psychoactive substance use conducted in gdańsk in the autumn of 2019 on a representative sample of 1,004 adult residents of the city (n = 1004). it should be stressed that the selection of the sample was not guided by any factors related to the issue in focus of the study, i.e. the use of psychoactive substances (alcohol, marijuana, over-the-counter painkillers and so on). the representativeness of the sample was achieved by (1) reflecting the basic demographic characteristics of gdańsk population (sex, age) and their territorial distribution (city districts), (2) random selection of particular individuals for the study. first, households were selected using the random route method; next, a member of each household who answered the age and sex criteria was selected using simple random sampling. according to the adopted procedure, only one member of a household could be surveyed. considering the sensitive nature of the issues in focus, the respondents were given the questionnaires and completed them in their own time; they were collected at a later date. the questionnaire used in the study was highly standardised and included 46 questions in total: 30 closed questions, 1 open question, 6 scale questions, 9 demographics questions. issues concerning alcohol and marijuana use were addressed in 11 questions about: the fact of using a particular substance/ type of substance (beer, wine/sparkling wine, vodka/other spirits, marijuana) in the preceding 12 months (possible replies: yes/no); the frequency of its use (possible replies: 5 or more times a week, 3–4 times a week, once or twice a week, once a month, 6 or more times in the last 12 months, up to 5 times in the last 12 months); in the case of alcohol: the amount usually consumed on one occasion, measured in – beer: pints (kufel, about 0.5 litre), wine/ sparkling wine: 100 ml glasses, vodka/other spirits: 50 ml glasses. data processing and analysis involved data aggregation based on questions about the use of marijuana and particular types of alcohol, and testing the statistical significance of correlations between particular variables using chi-square test and logistic regression. for the purpose of analysis presented in this article, the applied data indexing procedures concerned not only the fact but also the frequency and volume of alcohol consumption. this made it possible to develop measures of drinking alcohol frequently and in large quantities. as applied here, consumption of a large amount of alcohol on one occasion means drinking at least three pints of beer or 100 ml glasses of wine or 50 ml glasses of highpercentage beverages, and high frequency – drinking at least once or twice a week. data processing and statistical analysis were performed using r (3.6.2) and rstudio (1.2.5033) software. a pattern of alcohol consumption among marijuana users in the adult population of the city of gdańsk 11 3. results 14.1% of the surveyed adult residents of gdańsk admitted using marijuana in the 12 months preceding the study. this result is almost twice as high as that recorded in 2015 – 7.1% (abramowicz et al., 2018b). compared to the study conducted in 2015, the frequency of marijuana use was also higher: the proportion of those who used it at least 5–6 times a week increased from 6.8% to 13.0%, and up to 4 times a week – from 5.1% to as much as 36.7%. the recorded proportion of those who drank alcohol was higher among marijuana users than nonusers – the former admitted drinking beer in the 12 months preceding the study more often than the latter: 83.1% vs 68.6% (χ2 = 12.726, df = 1, p = 0.001); the corresponding figures for wine were 66.9% and 55.0% (χ2 = 6.570, df = 1, p = 0.01), and for vodka/ other spirits – 73.2% and 50.0% (χ2 = 25.526, df = 1, p = 0.000) (see fig. 1). compared to non-users, then, the proportion recorded for users was significantly higher in the case of each type of alcohol. more indepth information was provided by measures taking into account the frequency of use of a given type of substance and, in the case of alcohol, the volume of consumption. considering the frequency of alcohol consumption, it is apparent that it was higher among marijuana users than other respondents. an index developed to measure it was based on the following replies to questions about the frequency of consumption of particular types of alcohol: “5 or more times a week”, “3–4 times a week”, “once or twice a week”. the proportion of frequent drinkers among non-users of marijuana was 28.4%, and among users – 49.4% (χ² = 23.711, df = 1, p <0.001). the analysis also included another parameter: the volume of alcohol consumption on one occasion. this makes it possible to answer the question whether marijuana users drank more or less than non-users. based on an indexed measure of the volume of consumption on one occasion (at least three pints of beer, 100 ml glasses of wine or 50 ml glasses of vodka/other spirits), it turns out that respondents who admitted using marijuana in the 12 months preceding the study drank more than those who did not use this drug. in the case of marijuana users, the proportion of replies indicating consumption of a large amount of alcohol on one occasion was much higher than among non-users: the respective figures were 50.0% and 18.4% (χ2 = 66.961, df = 1, p < 0.001) (see fig. 2). an index including both the frequency and the volume of alcohol consumption revealed statistically significant correlation between marijuana use and drinking beer or vodka; no such correlation was recorded in the case of wine. respondents who were marijuana users were high-frequency consumers of large quantities of beer more often than nonusers: the respective figures were 21.1% and 5.8% 73.2 66.9 83.1 50.0 55.0 68.6 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 beer wine vodka/other spirits marijuana users marijuana non-users fig. 1. consumption of alcohol (beer, wine, vodka) among marijuana users and non-users (%) source: the author’s own study. 12 maciej brosz (χ2 =  36.990, df = 1, p < 0.001). the pattern was the same in the case of vodka/other spirits: 7.0% and 2.6% (χ2 = 6.577, df = 1, p < 0.01) (see fig. 3). what was the profile of marijuana users? most of them were male (18.7%) rather than female (10.2%) (χ2 = 13.984, df = 1, p < 0.01), belonged to the youngest age group of the respondents: 18–29 years old (37.3%) (χ2 = 92.942, df = 4, p < 0.01), and were in education (36.4%) (χ2 = 28.846, df = 3, p < 0.01); they were mostly unmarried (30.8%) (χ2  = 52.209, df = 3, p < 0.01), non-believers and non-practitioners (34.5%) (χ2 = 42.905, df = 4, p < 0.01). other variables 18.4 50.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 marijuana users marijuana non-users 5.8 21.1 2.6 7.0 0 5 10 15 20 25 marijuana users marijuana non-users beer vodka/other spirits fig. 2. consumption of a large amount of alcohol on one occasion among marijuana users and non-users (%) source: the author’s own study. fig. 3. high-frequency consumption of alcohol (beer, vodka/other spirits) in large quantities among marijuana users and non-users (%) source: the author’s own study. a pattern of alcohol consumption among marijuana users in the adult population of the city of gdańsk 13 considered in the study – such as the level of education, income, the fact of having children and their number in the household, a sense of satisfaction with life – did not have a significant impact on replies to the question concerning the use of marijuana. 4. discussion the group of marijuana users among the adult population of gdańsk has doubled over the last four years. at the time when the study discussed here was conducted (autumn 2019), one in seven adult residents of the city could be considered a user of the substance. what also increased was the frequency of marijuana use: one in seven users used it almost every day. this observation cannot be left without a comment. it also begs the question concerning the consumption of alcohol among marijuana users. considering the demographics (presented above) such as age, work situation and marital status, it can be assumed that what plays the key role here is social factors related to group membership, to seeking support, and to prevailing patterns of reference. single young people who are in education search for their place, try to fulfil their aspirations and to achieve and maintain a certain social status. the observed increase in indicators reflecting the scale of marijuana use may be related to the media image of the drug – to how it is presented in films, music and the internet – which young people and young adults refer to when they develop their cognitive habits and their ideas. the issue of users’ awareness of negative effects of the drug is an interesting study question in its own right, particularly in the context of common-sense opinions echoed by the young generation, according to which marijuana is a safe alternative to alcohol and other drugs. this view tends to be supported by invoking the medicinal use of marijuana. in the case of the adult population of gdańsk, more marijuana users than non-users drink alcohol (all types); they also drink more often and more heavily. in the former category of respondents, the proportion of those who admitted drinking beer, wine or vodka/other sprits in the 12 months preceding the study was higher (the difference was well over ten percentage points). the results of the study clearly indicate that not only the fact of consumption as such but, most importantly, also its frequency and volume display a similar pattern. marijuana users drink far more often than non-users: the applied index of frequent consumption (at least once or twice a week) showed a difference of 21 percentage points between the two groups. they also drink more heavily – according to the applied index of high-volume consumption the difference is quite considerable: while every second marijuana user has at least three measures of a particular type of alcohol on one occasion, the corresponding proportion for non-users is less than one in five. an analysis considering both the frequency and the volume of alcohol consumption suggests that marijuana users drink beer or vodka more often and in larger amounts than other respondents; no such correlation was recorded in the case of wine. as it turns out, the pattern of alcohol consumption among marijuana users is that they drink more often and more heavily; marijuana use can be identified as a risk factor for increasing it. a comparison between survey results presented here and those recorded in 2015 (abramowicz et al., 2018b) indicates that the population of marijuana users has not significantly changed in terms of its demographic profile: it is still mainly composed of single young males in education who are non-believers and non-practitioners. however, it is important to note that one factor included in both surveys has undergone an interesting change. while in 2015 marijuana was more often used by respondents dissatisfied with their lives, in 2019 this factor did not have a significant impact on the distribution of replies – the drug was used not only by those who could be characterised as sensation seekers or people who want to raise their spirits (linden-carmichael et al., 2019; zuckerman, 2007). the fact that marijuana use is no longer correlated with the subjective sense of satisfaction with one’s life prompts a conclusion that the drug is becoming more popular. in other words, the use of marijuana is subject to peculiar democratisation. since the issue of reasons for this state of affairs is beyond the scope of this article, it will be addressed in another study. it is also worth noting other limitations of this discussion as well as plans for further research. presumably, activities increasing access to marijuana (e.g. medical use) on the one hand, and the absence of intensified information campaign on the negative effects of its use on the other, foster the perception of the drug as an “equivalent of alcohol”, particularly among users and potential users. however, this assumption has not been verified in this article. consultations with practitioners and specialists in addiction prevention and substance-related harm reduction conducted as part of this project made it possible to formulate the following study question: if the proportion of alcohol users is decreasing, does it mean that they use something else instead? (abramowicz et al., 2018a; abramowicz et al., 2018b). providing an answer to this question will increase our knowledge 14 maciej brosz about the nature of changes in patterns of psychoactive substance use. as mentioned in the introduction, the growing proportion of marijuana users on the one hand, and specific patterns of alcohol consumption in this population on the other, indicate the likelihood of emerging a group using both substances simultaneously. verifying this assumption requires analysing their practices in the context of sam use characteristics documented in the literature on the subject. as planned, this task will be part of further studies among adult residents of the city of gdańsk. references abramowicz m., brosz m., bykowska-godlewska b., michalski t., strzałkowska a., 2018a, narkotyki, alkohol i dopalacze. diagnoza problemu. studium socjologiczne na podstawie badań wśród mieszkańców gdańska (eng. drugs, alcohol and designer drugs: a diagnosis of the problem. a 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for marijuana use problems: the role of affect dysregulation, psychology of addictive behaviors, 16(1), 72–75. doi: 10.1037/0893-164x.16.1.72 załęcki j., brosz m., 2017, jakość życia w gdańsku i jej społecznoprzestrzenne uwarunkowania. studium socjologiczne (eng. the quality of life in the city of gdańsk and its sociospatial conditions: a sociological study), wydawnictwo zakładu realizacji badań społecznych q&q, kawle dolne. zuckerman m., 2007, sensation seeking and risky behavior, american psychological association, washington. 1. introduction in september 2015, a special united nations (un) summit, including 193 member states, adopted transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. the agenda included a political declaration and 17 sustainable development goals (sdg), embedding economic, social, cultural, political and environmental sustainability (un general assembly, 2015). since 2015, the un agenda 2030 has become the blueprint for europe’s ambition to become sustainable and the european union (eu) has committed itself to implementing all necessary reforms (european commission, 2016). in 2016, the eu commission launched the communication next steps for a sustainable european future – european action for sustainability (european commission, 2016) including changes and challenges ahead (european commission, 2016). the un sustainable development goal 16 addresses political sustainability; the sustainable development goal means promoting and protecting peace and inclusive societies based on strong institutions and the rule of law. the political declaration of the agenda highlights the importance of democratic governance. it declares how democratic norms and values are essential to promote and fulfil the remaining sustainable development goals. democracy is a fundamental goal and a means to sustainable development (un general assembly, 2015). in july 2019, the deputy secretary-general amina mohammed stressed the importance of expanding journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(4), 18–28 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.02 eu and agenda 2030 – peace, justice & strong institutions daniel silander department of political science, linnaeus university, se-35105 vaxjo, sweden e-mail: daniel.silander@lnu.se citation silander d., 2021, eu and agenda 2030 – peace, justice & strong institutions, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(4),  18–28. abstract in 2015, the united nations (un) decided on 17 sustainable development goals. goal 16 focused on peace, justice and strong institutions and on the importance of democracy for global sustainable development. this study explores the status of democracy in europe and highlights tendencies of authoritarianism in some post-communist states. this happens in a global context of resurgence of autocratization. although the european union (eu) continues to be a solid liberal democratic order, challenges in post-communist europe exist, especially in hungary as a new authoritarian state within the eu. key words un goal 16, democracy, european union, post-communism, hungary. received: 27 april 2021 accepted: 24 september 2021 published: 24 january 2022 eu and agenda 2030 – peace, justice & strong institutions 19 democratic governance around the world and how goal 16 had to be promoted in all un activities. she acknowledged that democracies may have different forms of governance, with different historical and cultural legacies, but how democracy, as free and fair elections, transparent institutions, fair and balanced rules for people/state relations and checks and balances are universal freedoms for everyone and everywhere (un secretary-general, 2019). this study explores the status of democracy in europe in the last two decades by using well-established democracy indexes, namely the freedom house index, the nations in transit index and the v-democracy index in addition to research on democratization and autocratization. the main question is: what is the status of democracy in europe in a context of the agenda 2030 and goal 16? it is stated that, although the eu is a global frontrunner on the agenda 2030 and goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, there are new alarming challenges in the european democratic landscape and especially so in some post-communist states such as hungary and poland. these challenges could become serious hindrances for the consolidation of democracy in individual states and the implementation of goal 16 in post-communist societies, but also undermine further eu integration based on a liberal democratic order. 2. the un agenda 2030 – peace, justice and strong institutions agenda 2030 was a result of a long political process of debates and negotiations, which started in june 2012 with the rio-20 conference on sustainable development, where participating states finally agreed to develop global sustainable development goals based on the previous millennium development goals and the 2005 world summit outcome. the agenda 2030 of 2015 included 17 goals (see table 1.). the agenda 2030 embedded a wide array of sustainable development goals. the un declared how billions of citizens around the world faced challenges to sustainable development goals. such challenges were poverty and unsafe drinking water, hunger and diseases, social, economic and gender inequalities, poor education, conflicts and human rights abuses. in addition, the un also acknowledged climate changes consequences with a severe impact on people and societies, such as natural tab. 1. summary of agenda 2030 goals content 1. ending poverty reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty 2. food security ending hunger and promoting sustainable agriculture 3. health & well-being health systems, health coverage and countermeasures against diseases 4. quality education inclusive and equitable education as well as life-long learning opportunities 5. gender equality girls’ and women’s empowerment, plus social and economic participation 6. clean water & sanitation sustainable management of water to provide safe water and sanitation 7. sustainable energy sustainable energy services, and sure access to affordable, reliable and modern energy 8. work and growth promoting decent work and full employment through inclusive and sustainable economic growth 9. industries and innovation sustainable industrialization and fostered innovation 10. reduced inequalities structural transformation to address income inequalities 11. sustainable community sustainable urbanization to enhance effective local development 12. responsible consumption and production responsible supply chains and business practices, as well as promotion of green economy 13. climate action combating climate change and its impacts 14. life below water conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas and marine resources 15. life on land protecting and promoting sustainable terrestrial ecosystems on land, and combating unsustainable management of forests, desertification and land degradation 16. peaceful societies & strong institutions promoting inclusive societies based on strong institutions and the rule of law 17. global partnerships & implementation strengthening and monitoring means of implementation of development goals based on global partnerships source: united nations, general assembly 2015. 20 daniel silander disasters, desertification, drought, land degradation, rising sea levels and ocean acidification. although progress has been made in many states and regions, the agenda called for the implementation of urgent global reforms (un general assembly, 2015). the agenda 2030 in goal 16 addresses the importance of peace, justice and strong institutions in providing for sustainable development. the un declares how the different goals in the agenda are dependent on peaceful, just and inclusive societies with effective public institutions. goal 16 is essential to obtain other goals; lack of justice and stable and accountable institutions is a major hindrance to socioeconomic development in quality education, healthcare, fair economic policies, social inclusion and environmental protection. as stated by the un, “institutions that do not function according to legitimate laws are prone to arbitrariness and abuse of power, and less capable of delivering public services to everyone” (un, 2019, pp. 1–2). the importance of goal 16 for sustainable development is highlighted in the political declaration of 2015. agenda 2030 is to “envisage a world of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality” (un general assembly, 2015, p. 3). such a world is “one in which democracy, good governance and the rule of law, as well as an enabling environment at the national and international levels, are essential for sustainable development” (un general assembly, 2015, p. 4). therefore, democracy is a fundamental aspect of agenda 2030 and the overall un charter (un charter, 1945). however, goal 16 is in great need of global promotion and protection. states and regions around the world are highly divided regarding the level of peace, justice and strong institutions, wherein some states and regions are free from serious challenges, while other states and regions are undermined by conflicts, dysfunctional institutions and democratic and human rights abuses. therefore, the un provides electoral assistance in about 60 countries every year in addition to partnerships with regional, international and governmental organizations (freedom house, 2019). such work focuses on promoting aspects of goal 16 in the rule of law and equal access to justice, effective, accountable and transparent institutions, responsive, inclusive and representative decision-making and public access to information (un goal 16, 2015). 3. europe – peaceful societies and strong institutions the eu charter of fundamental rights addresses the importance of dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity and citizen’s rights and justice within the eu. it sets out shared european norms and values and a platform for european integration and peace. it declares how the eu “is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity: it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law” (charter, 2000, preamble) as institutionalized in the european coal and steel treaty (1951) and the ecand eu treaties thereafter. these treaties acknowledge the founding ideas of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. as stated in the teu of 1992: “the union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states” (the maastricht treaty, 1992, article 6:1). the notion of the eu as a peace-prone region of democratically elected governments based on strong institutions and the rule of law have attracted great scholarly attention for decades. studies on european integration have explored how european states have domestically developed democratic institutions and on a european level shared institutions with other eu member-states. studies on international relations have analyzed how the eu memberstates have developed normative power based on shared democratic norms and values. in consistency with the democratic peace theory, scholars have acknowledged how the development of democratic institutions, norms and values, within european states, have consolidated a european democratic peace order among states and favored an eu normative power externally (manners, 2002; pace, 2007; russet, oneal, 2001; russett, 1993). the democratic norms and values have also guided european states on how to pursue politics regionally and internationally (pace, 2007) in the areas of trade, development of cooperation, common foreign policy and security and enlargement (see the maastricht treaty, 1992; the treaty of the european union, 2012). in the fall of 2012, the norwegian nobel committee announced the nobel peace prize to the eu. the committee stressed how european integration facilitated peace, stability, democracy and human rights for decades. “the norwegian nobel committee wishes to focus on what it sees as the eu’s most important result: the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights. the stabilizing part played by the eu has helped to transform most of europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace” (the nobel prize organization, 2012). in addition, the transformation and stabilization of a continent of peace has provided for eu external relations based on shared norms and values. perhaps the enlargement policy has been the eu’s eu and agenda 2030 – peace, justice & strong institutions 21 most efficient tool in external relations, offering eu membership based on absorption of european democratic norms and values domestically (commission of the european communities, 2001; bosse, 2009). another important part of eu external relations is the european neighborhood policy (enp), launched at the european council meeting in copenhagen of december, 2002 (council of the european union, 2003). the enp has embedded “a mutual commitment to common values” (commission of the european communities, 2004), such as democracy, rule of law and human rights, towards eu neighboring states. beyond the regional scope, the european instrument for democracy and human rights (eidhr) has promoted democratic institutions, justice and human rights and human rights defenders at risk as well as favored eu election observation missions and the nexus between democratic governance, peace and conflict management (european commission, international cooperation and development). the eu also constitutes the largest aid donor in the world. based upon eu treaties, the 2006 european consensus on development and the 2017 new european consensus on development, the eu declares how “progress in the protection of human rights, good governance and democratization is fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable development” (european parliament, council and commission, 2006, p. 13, council & representatives of member-states, 2017 pp. 5–7). finally, in june 28, 2016, the high representative launched the global strategy for the european union’s foreign and security policy, identifying objectives of eu foreign policy, including security, conflict prevention, democracy and sustainable development (mogherini, 2016). 4. status of democracy – contemporary european challenges it could be argued that goal 16, on peace, justice and strong institutions, is institutionalized in democratically elected european states, within the eu community of shared democratic norms and values as well as in many areas of eu external relations. in a global comparison, the european landscape is by far the most democratic one in the world. in the early 2000, however, scholars shed light on a democratic decline in the world. the retreat of democracy included the development of authoritarian activities within repressive states, but also increased activities internationally questioning established democratic institutions, norms and values (diamond, 2021; lührmann, lindberg, 2019). studies showed how authoritarian states continued to oppress rights and liberties at home, limiting freedoms in the political system and the civil society, but also how these authoritarian regimes pointed out democracy as a western phenomenon jeopardizing security, safety and progress (brady, 2016; nathan, 2016). authoritarian regimes challenged international treaties, norms and values that had founded the global and european order (merloe, 2016). studies focused on sharp power, including authoritarian regimes promoting cultural and education exchange, media enterprises and broadcasting, think-tanks and strategic investments plans in infrastructure and technology, to promote authoritarian norms and values within democracies. overall, authoritarian sharp power has embedded strategic actions to socialize others into specific narratives, suppress alternative narratives, monopolize ideas and exploit international institutions for the sake of national interests (walker, ludwig, 2017a, 2017b). in addition, a weakened democratic leadership has also challenged democracies. studies have shown how stable democracies have faced hindrances in socioeconomic crisis, migration, populism, xenophobia and political fragmentation (silander, 2020). some democracies have seen a growing number of dissatisfied democrats demanding improved democratic performances while other democracies have faced illiberal and antidemocratic movements and leaders. the many and complex challenges have existed on both sides of the atlantic leaving the world with a weaker democratic leadership (noury, roland, 2020). on the u.s. side, the presidency of donald trump has led the u.s. into a path of democratic decline (carothers, 2019). the government launched institutional pressure on electoral integrity and judicial independence, questioning the role of media and used harsh and hostile political rhetoric against opponents (ghitis, 2020). in addition, the u.s. foreign policies showed lack of coherence regarding democracy and human rights, at times speaking out against authoritarianism, but at other times excused political misbehavior by economic and security collaborates (carothers, 2017). on the european side of the atlantic, democratic challenges also existed in clash of interests between democracy, security and trade, but more obviously in elected leaders pursuing populist agendas, restricting rights and liberties in the name of national interests and allowing human rights abuses against minority groups and immigrants. some established european democratic leaders have seen an “ethical decay” (repucci, 2020) where mostly right-winged populist politicians have challenged rights and liberties (freedom house, 2020). in sum, “the unchecked 22 daniel silander brutality of autocratic regimes and the ethical decay of democratic powers are combining to make the world increasingly hostile to fresh demands for better governance” (repucci, 2020 p. 1 ). based on the methodology used in the freedom of the world, the natins in transit and v-democracy, the status of democracy in europe may be explored. freedom in the world is published annually on political rights and civil liberties, and the methodology is to large extent based on the universal declaration of human rights, adopted by the un general assembly in 1948. each country receives 0 to 4 points on 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators, where 0 represents the most limited degree of freedom and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. while the political rights questions are categorized into electoral process, political pluralism, participation and functioning of government, the civil liberties questions are categorized into freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights. the highest score for a country on political rights is 40 (a score of 4 for each 10  question) and for civil liberties 60 (a score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). these scores reflect a) political rights and b) civil liberties, where 1 represents the freest conditions and 7 the least free. there are three categories of countries’ freedom – an overall status of 1 = free, 2 = partly free, or 3 = not free (freedom house nations in transit, 2021). based on the freedom in the world index, europe stands strong as a community of shared democratic norms and values. over the last decades, the eu has widened and deepened based on the notion of a democracy–justice–security nexus as embedded in goal 16. table 2 below illustrates the scope of tab. 2. status of political rights and civil liberties among eu member states country 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 pr cl status pr cl status pr cl status pr cl status pr cl status austria 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free belgium 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free bulgaria 2 3 free 1 2 free 2 2 free 2 2 free 2 2 free croatia 2 3 free 2 2 free 1 2 free 1 2 free 1 2 free cyprus 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free czech republic 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free denmark 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free estonia 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free finland 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free france 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free germany 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 2 free greece 1 3 free 1 2 free 1 2 free 2 2 free 1 2 free hungary 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 2 2 free 3 3 partly free ireland 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free italy 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free latvia 1 1 free 1 2 free 2 1 free 2 2 free 1 2 free lithuania 1 2 free 2 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free luxembourg 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free malta 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 2 1 free netherland 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free poland 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 2 2 free portugal 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free romania 2 2 free 3 2 free 2 2 free 2 2 free 2 2 free slovakia 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 2 free slovenia 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free spain 1 2 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free sweden 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free 1 1 free source: based on freedom house, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020. eu and agenda 2030 – peace, justice & strong institutions 23 political rights and civil liberties within the eu member-states. at the beginning of the 21st century, all eu member-states were consolidated democracies with ensured wide range of rights and liberties for its citizens. the eu with member-states symbolized a pro-democratic community and a peace-prone community. freedom house’s assessment is very important to understand the eu member states’ stand on goal 16. goal 16 refers to the rule of law, accountable and transparent institutions, political pluralism and participation, freedoms of expression, beliefs, association and personal autonomy in protecting fundamental freedoms. the european scores on freedoms regarding rights and liberties shed light on a region of consolidated democratic states that to large extent embeds goal 16. however, when scrutinizing the last years of development, the european democratic landscape has worrying tendencies. there are signs of growing illiberal populism that has attacked the idea of liberal democracy (freedom house, 2020). some european states are challenged by a global trend of threats against independent institutions, civil society and media and where elected leaders and parties pursue policies to undermine checks and balances, concentrate power and limit basic rights and liberties. hungary is the most alarming case, as it dropped from free to partly free between 2000 and 2020. minor decline on democratic score is identified in latvia, malta and poland, although they still remain as free states. the nations in transit index explores 29 post-communist states in central europe and central asia focusing on the status of democracy by assessing each country on a scale of 1 to 7 in the following categories: national democratic governance, local democratic governance, electoral process, independent media, civil society, judicial framework and independence and corruption. each country receives a democracy score from 1–7 where 1 being the most democratic and 7 the least. the ambition is to explore institutions in place and the impact of such institutions on actions taken. the nations in transit then classifies countries into different types of regimes using consolidated democracies (cd, score 5.01–7.00), semi-consolidated democracies (scd, scores 4.01–5.00), transitional or hybrid regimes (thr, scores 3.01–4.00), semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (sca, scores 2.01–3.00) and consolidated authoritarian regimes (ca, scores 1.00–2.00) (freedom house – nations in transit, 2021). the nations in transit index identifies an overall antidemocratic tendency in central european states in patterns of misuse of state authority against judicial independence, civil society and the hollowing out of electoral frameworks and the role of the parliament. a number of political leaders have acted illiberal and antidemocratic by invoking restrictions of democratic rights and liberties in the name of safeguarding the nation. in 2020, the nations in transit stresses how the region of countries covered in the index have fewer democracies today than ever since the assessments began in 1995. the democratic decline is foremost visible in some eu memberstates in central europe (nations in transits, 2020). the nations in transit points out hungary, but also poland, as alarming examples of resurgence of authoritarianism. as illustrated in table 3, the index classifies hungary as a transitional/hybrid regime that no longer is democratic in nature. hungary has thereby descended by two regime categories becoming a transitional hybrid regime (nations in transits, 2020, pp. 1–2). in addition, poland has transformed from a consolidated democracy to a semiconsolidated democracy. the nations in transit also identifies issues over developments in bulgaria and slovakia, but not to such an extent that would result in a change of the regime type. 5. the resurgence of authoritarianism in postcommunist europe: the case of hungary hungary is today the worst eu case of authoritarian resurgence as illustrated by the freedom house index and the nations in transit index. the freedom house index illustrates how hungary has dropped from a free state to a partly free state, and the nations in transits index sets out a transformation of hungary from a consolidated democracy to a transitional/hybrid regime. the resurgence of authoritarianism in hungary is also supported by v-dem institute, which produces the largest dataset on democracy in the world, including 202 countries from 1978–2021. based on v-dem’s electoral and liberal democracy index, figure 1 illustrates a decline of democracy (interval from low to high, 0–1). the electoral democracy index measures the de facto existence of the share of population with suffrage, the degree to which government policies are vested in elected politicians, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association and the availability of alternative sources of information. on the other hand, based on the electoral democracy index, the liberal democracy index measures equality before the law and individual liberty, judicial constraints on the executive index and legislative constraints on the executive index (see v-dem institute, 2020, pp.  33–34). overall, v-dem stresses how “the global decline during the past 10 years is steep and 24 daniel silander tab. 3. nations in transit – post-communist eu-member states country year national democratic governance electoral process civil society independent media local democratic governance judicial framework & independence corruption democracy score regime bulgaria 2005 4.50 6.25 5.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.00 4.82 scd 2010 4.75 6.25 5.50 4.25 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.96 scd 2015 4.25 5.75 5.75 4.00 5.00 4.50 3.75 4.71 scd 2020 4.25 5.50 5.50 3.50 4.75 4.50 3.75 4.54 scd croatia 2005 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.25 4.25 3.50 3.25 4.25 scd 2010 4.50 4.75 5.25 4.00 4.25 3.75 3.50 4.29 scd 2015 4.50 4.75 5.25 4.00 4.25 3.50 4.00 4.32 scd 2020 4.25 5.00 5.25 3.75 4.25 3.50 3.75 4.25 scd czech republic 2005 5.50 6.00 6.50 6.00 6.00 5.50 4.50 5.71 cd 2010 5.25 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.25 6.00 4.75 5.79 cd 2015 5.25 6.75 6.25 5.25 6.25 6.25 4.50 5.79 cd 2020 5.00 6.75 6.00 5.00 6.25 6.00 4.50 5.64 cd estonia 2005 5.75 6.50 6.00 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 6.04 cd 2010 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 6.04 cd 2015 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 6.04 cd 2020 6.00 6.50 6.25 6.25 5.75 6.50 5.25 6.07 cd hungary 2005 6.00 6.75 6.75 5.50 5.75 6.25 5.25 6.04 cd 2010 5.50 6.25 6.25 5.25 5.50 6.00 4.50 5.61 cd 2015 4.25 5.25 5.50 4.25 5.00 5.25 4.25 4.82 scd 2020 3.25 4.25 4.50 3.25 4.75 4.75 3.00 3.96 thr latvia 2005 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 5.50 6.25 4.50 5.86 cd 2010 5.50 6.00 6.25 6.25 5.75 6.25 4.75 5.82 cd 2015 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.00 5.75 6.25 5.00 5.93 cd 2020 6.00 6.25 5.75 6.00 5.75 6.25 4.50 5.79 cd lithuania 2005 5.50 6.25 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.25 4.25 5.79 cd 2010 5.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 5.50 6.25 4.50 5.75 cd 2015 5.25 6.00 6.25 5.75 5.50 6.25 4.50 5.64 cd 2020 5.25 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 4.50 5.64 cd poland 2005 5.50 6.25 6.75 6.50 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 cd 2010 4.75 6.25 6.50 5.75 6.25 5.50 4.75 5.68 cd 2015 5.50 6.50 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 4.50 5.79 cd 2020 4.00 6.50 5.50 5.00 5.75 3.50 4.25 4.93 scd romania 2005 4.50 5.25 5.75 4.00 5.00 4.00 3.75 4.61 scd 2010 4.00 5.25 5.50 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.54 scd 2015 4.25 4.75 5.50 3.75 5.00 4.25 4.25 4.54 scd 2020 4.00 5.00 5.50 3.75 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.43 scd slovakia 2005 6.00 6.75 6.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 5.00 6.00 cd 2010 5.00 6.25 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.32 cd 2015 5.00 6.50 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.36 cd 2020 4.75 6.25 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.29 cd slovenia 2005 6.00 6.50 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.00 6.32 cd 2010 6.00 6.50 6.00 5.75 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.07 cd 2015 6.00 6.50 6.00 5.75 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.07 cd 2020 5.75 6.50 6.00 5.50 6.50 6.00 5.25 5.93 cd source: freedom house – nations in transit, 2021. eu and agenda 2030 – peace, justice & strong institutions 25 continues” and how “electoral autocracy remains the most common regime type.” (v-dem institute, 2021, p. 4). in particular, v-dem institute recognizes how “hungary is no longer a democracy leaving the eu with its first non-democratic member-state” (v-dem institute, 2020, p.  4). v-dem institute classifies hungary as an electoral authoritarian regime and the first authoritarian regime ever within the eu (v-dem institute, 2020, p.  9). in fact, hungary is first among the top-10 most regressing countries in the world transforming from a liberal democracy in 2009 to an electoral autocracy one decade later. the resurgence of authoritarianism in hungary is substantial over the last decade with systematic government attacks on the media, civil society and academic freedom, disrespect towards and harassment of political opponents, assaults on the judiciary, distribution of false political information to provide social polarization and undermine electoral frameworks and procedures (v-dem institute, 2021, pp. 9, 18–19). based on the three indexes, the rule of prime minister viktor orbán and the alliance of young democrats–hungarian civic union (fidesz) has resulted in limited independence of core institutions through constitutional and legal changes, policies challenging political opposition, journalists, universities and civil society organizations as well as reforms centralizing power and the electoral framework. in addition, the government has initiated populist and illiberal policies against migrants and asylum seekers, as its impasse with european institutions over its migrant policy leading the european commission to launch a legal investigation (freedom house, 2020). the hungarian development has led the european parliament to suspend fidesz, and the eu has triggered the use of article 7 against hungary due to the suspicion that hungary does not fully commit to article 2 of the eu’s fundamental norms and values. article 7(1) allows the eu to take action if there is suspicion that a member state does not adhere to the eu’s fundamental norms and values (requires absolute majority of four-fifths of the council), whereas article 7(2) includes possible sanctions on a member state (requires unanimity) (the treaty of the european union, 2007). hungary’s democratic decline also comes with other worrying signals in post-communist europe. figure 2. by v-dem. illustrates hungary’s autocratization in 2020, although bulgaria and poland may also become new challenges within the eu, as in 2020 they moved in a wrong direction compared to in 2000 (v-dem institute, 2021, pp. 19, 23; 2020, p. 22). 6. conclusion on september 14, 2016, in the context of the new un agenda 2030, jean-claude juncker, the former president of the european commission, delivered the state of the union towards a better europe – a europe that protects, empowers and defends. he described numerous challenges to europe and called upon all european actors to show leadership and strength; one of the challenges identified was the fight for human rights and fundamental values (juncker, 2016). goal 16 of the un agenda 2030 is institutionalized in most eu member-states. the consolidation of democratic institutions, norms and values has served individual states very well and left europe as a peaceprone region of like-minded states. today, the eu symbolizes not only a democratic peace project, but also a global force for rights and liberties. however, fig. 1. democratic decline in hungary source: v-dem institute index hungary, 2021. 26 daniel silander while the world faces resurgence of authoritarianism, europe also sees signs of populism and illiberal politics challenging the very founding democratic norms of the eu. this study has highlighted the return of authoritarianism in hungary, but with worrying tendencies in some other post-communist states as well. v-dem. raises alarms over a rapid democratic decline in poland symbolized foremost by media laws from 2015–2016 restricting freedom of expression, actions diminishing judicial independence and tightening government grip over democratic institutions. references bosse g., 2009, challenges for eu governance through neighbourhood policy and eastern partnership: the values/security nexus in eu–belarus relations, contemporary politics, 15(2), 215–227. doi: 10.1080/13569770902858152 brady a.m., 2016, china’s foreign propaganda 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democracy index, university of gothenburg, gothenburg, https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/countrygraph/ (accessed 22 september 2021). v-dem institute index europe. regional comparison europe 2000-2020 – liberal democracy index, university of gothenburg, gothenburg. https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/regional/ (accessed 22 september 2021). walker c., ludwig j., 2017a, the meaning of sharp power – how authoritarian states project influence, foreign affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power (accessed 05 march 2021). walker c., ludwig j., 2017b, from ‘soft power’ to ‘sharp power’ rising authoritarian influence in the democratic world, national endowment for democracy, https://www.ned.org/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/introduction-sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence.pdf (accessed 5  april 2021). 1. introduction on march 11, 2020, the world health organization declared covid-19 a global pandemic. following march 13, 2020, the estonian government declared a state of emergency which included social distancing and stay-at-home orders to slow down the viral spread of covid-19. no movement ban was imposed in estonia during the entire pandemic. estonia has approximately 8,600 people who inject drugs (pwid) (raag et al., 2019), up to 800 different drug treatment slots, and around 3,500 regular harm reduction clients (national institute for health development, 2022). based on the available studies and information, this paper gives an insight into the effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the illicit drug journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(1), 8–16 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.1.03 the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug demand and supply in estonia katri abel-ollo (1), margo kivila (2), aljona kurbatova (3), svetlana ovsjannikova (4) (1) national institute for health development, hiiu 42, 11619 tallinn, estonia e-mail: katri.abel-ollo@tai.ee (corresponding author) (2) police and border guard board, pärnu mnt 139, tallinn 15060, estonia e-mail: margo.kivila@politsei.ee (3) national institute for health development, hiiu 42, 11619 tallinn, estonia e-mail: aljona.kurbatova@tai.ee (4) national institute for health development, hiiu 42, 11619 tallinn, estonia e-mail: svetlana.ovsjannikova@tai.ee citation abel-ollo k., kivila m., kurbatova a., ovsjannikova s., 2022, the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug demand and supply in estonia, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 8–16. abstract the covid-19 pandemic has changed the world and imposed restrictions and rules that democratic countries could not have foreseen. the global health and social care system was put under enormous pressure, and preventing it from a total collapse became the primary objective. this paper looks at how the pandemic affected the illicit drug market, people who use drugs and services designed to support and help them. based on the available studies and administrative statistics from 2019 and 2020, illicit drug use and need for services remained the same despite the pandemic. services quickly adopted new operating rules and became available for the target group. there is ample evidence that in some cases illicit drug use (e.g. cannabis) even gained in popularity as a coping method for anxiety and stress. the drug supply fell only temporarily due to the covid-19, to which it quickly adapted through new it and crypto possibilities (dark web). key words covid-19, drug demand, drug supply, service availability, estonia. received: 26 march 2022 accepted: 02 may 2022 published: 27 may 2022 the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug demand and supply in estonia 9 demand and supply. as all harm reduction and treatment services had to quickly revise their operating procedures to rearrange service provision for their clients, this paper also looks at the availability and use of help and support services for people who use drugs (pwud). 2. data the data presented and analyzed in this paper come from different surveys and administrative statistics. all the research describing prevalence of drug use comes from the national institute for health development (nihd). the nihd is responsible for several general population studies describing illicit drug use (vorobjov et al., 2019; reile, veideman, 2021), surveys among vulnerable groups (salekešin et al., 2021) and alternative study methods like wastewater study, syringe residue study and web-based survey among pwud (abel-ollo et al., 2021a; abel-ollo et al., 2022; kütt, 2020). supply reduction statistics and intelligence information is presented in cooperation with police and border guard board and emcdda’s national focal point (nfp) situated in the nihd. the estonian nfp regularly collects and analyzes supply reduction data from police and border guard board and estonian forensic science institute. information and statistics on harm reduction and treatment service delivery is part of estonian nfp’s regular work, as all the services are coordinated by the nihd. 3. results 3.1. drug use in estonia before and during the covid-19 pandemic as of 2018, a quarter (25%) of 16–64-year-olds in estonia had used illicit drugs in their lifetime, with the last year prevalence of 7% and the last 30 days prevalence of 3%. cannabis was the most frequently used illicit drug (24%), followed by amphetamine (6%), ecstasy (5%), and cocaine (5%) (vorobjov et al., 2019). based on the estonian health behavior survey conducted in 2020, 13% of the population aged 16–64 had used drugs or psychotropic prescription pharmaceuticals without a doctor’s prescription during their lifetime, 7% of them in the last 12 months, and 6% in the last 30 days. drug use was more common among men than women (17% vs 11%) and significantly higher in younger age groups (fig. 1). the main drug used in the last 30 days was cannabis, followed by sedatives/hypnotics, ecstasy, amphetamines, and cocaine. although studies before the covid-19 and during the pandemic show different rates for lifetime illicit drug use, the rates for more recent drug use are comparable. based on the 12 months’ and 30 days’ 34.2 29.2 19.7 9.4 2.9 29.2 18.5 8.1 2.8 1.5 23.3 16.3 6.1 2.8 1.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 16–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 incl last 30 days incl last 12 months life time use fig. 1. use of narcotic drugs or misuse of psychotropic prescription pharmaceuticals in men by age group (%) 2020 source: estonian adult health behavior survey 2020 – reile, veideman, 2021. 10 katri abel-ollo, margo kivila, aljona kurbatova, svetlana ovsjannikova prevalence data from the 2018 and 2020 population studies, we can assume that illicit drug use has remained stable or even increased with time (last 30 days prevalence 3% vs 6%). to obtain a better insight into the impact of covid-19 on the drug situation, at the beginning of the pandemic (april–may 2020), estonia participated in the emcdda-led mini web survey. the main objective of the survey was to assess possible changes in the drug market, illicit drug use, and availability of support services in times of local and global restrictions due to covid-19. according to the results, 84% of the respondents (n=1146) had used at least one substance in the past 30 days. most of the respondents used cannabis (92% had used cannabis in the past 12 months, 76% in the past 30 days). almost 30% of the respondents had not made any changes to their use of illicit drugs during the lockdown. 21% of the respondents reported they used illicit drugs less and 17% had not used any illicit drugs during the covid-19 restrictions. 24% of the respondents began using drugs more frequently, and 8% found it difficult to tell whether their drug use pattern had changed. those who reduced the use of illicit drugs justified it with fewer opportunities to use drugs (34%) and limited opportunities to buy drugs (27%), also due to their financial situation. people had more free time during the lockdown, but there were also fewer options to spend time outside home and limited social support to cope with the difficult times. drug use mostly increased because of boredom (77%) and anxiety (44%) (kütt, 2020). based on the results of the 2019 and 2020 (15−21.09.2020) tallinn wastewater survey, it can be stated that despite the restrictions and a decrease in tourism, drug use had not significantly decreased compared to 2019, but rather increased in the case of some substances. the most common substances in tallinn wastewater were cannabis, amphetamine, and cocaine, followed by methamphetamine and mdma (fig. 2). the situation had not changed significantly compared to 2019. comparing the 2019 and 2020 results of the tallinn survey, the amount of methamphetamine in wastewater dramatically increased, which indicates an increase in the availability of this substance on the drug market. for both study years, differences in use between days of the week were most seen for mdma and cocaine. these two substances were mostly used at weekends, and it can be assumed that they were also used for recreational purposes at gatherings/parties during the fall of 2020. although there were no large public events and parties, there is reason to believe that both online and in-person private parties and 304.8 83.7 63.2 294.0 7 053.7 368.0 251.0 111.0 288.0 8 331.0 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000 7 000 8 000 9 000 amphetamine metamphetamine mdma cocaine cannabis (thc) 2020 2019 fig. 2. the average amount of used substance in tallinn wastewater per 1000 inhabitants per day by days, mg, 2019, 2020. source: wastewater study for drugs and their metabolic products in tallinn and pärnu: abel-ollo, riikoja, barndõk, kurbatova, 2021a. the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug demand and supply in estonia 11 gatherings took place more than usual. cannabis use, which has somewhat increased since 2019, may indicate a method of coping with stress in uncertain and anxious times during the covid-19 pandemic (hollo et al., 2020; abel-ollo et al., 2021a). 3.2. service provision findings suggest there was a decline in the availability of european drug services during the first two months of the pandemic in both providing treatment and harm reduction interventions (emcdda, 2020). estonia reacted quickly to the situation; within the first weeks of the pandemic, a new operational framework for drug treatment and harm reduction services was created. there were no service closures during the pandemic. only residential treatment was closed to new patients for a few weeks. although new patients were not admitted as a precaution to protect the patients already in treatment, patients on the waiting list were supported by counselors via mobile and online channels. later, a covid unit was organized where covid-19 was also treated as part of the residential drug treatment. a set of rules and recommendations was developed by the national institute for health development for drug services with the focus on implementing new hygiene and social distancing measures. needle and syringe exchange programs and opioid substitution treatment were always available with the recommendation to provide clients with drug use paraphernalia and take-home methadone for longer period than usually. most of the clients were happy to be quarantined and to be able to visit a substitution treatment site once a week instead of daily visits (eurasian harm reduction association, 2020). also the police were informed that higher doses of methadone were made available for the substitution treatment clients during the covid-19 restrictions period. take-home naloxone provision and individual counselling continued via mobile harm reduction services, outreach work, and treatment centers. clients of drug services were contacted via mobile or online platforms to mitigate the difficulties in providing face-to-face care. mobile harm reduction and outreach services helped to compensate for the lack of contact although there was feedback from some service providers that clients missed the face-to-face interaction and everyday routine to visit the services. as estonia did not have a personal drug treatment register in 2019 (the new personal register became operational in february 2020), it is difficult to provide accurate data on how covid-19 affected the drug treatment demand. based on the information from drug treatment centers, the demand for drug treatment had not significantly increased. at the beginning of the pandemic, there were some signs that the demand for opioid substitution treatment had increased, but as the drug market quickly stabilized, demand for treatment remained unchanged. also, the mini web survey confirmed that neither the intention to seek professional support nor the use of remote professional support had increased during the first months of the pandemic. however, the respondents whose intentions to seek professional support had increased used online or remote professional support services (kütt, 2020). the main challenges in the first months of the pandemic were staff shortages due to a sickness and quarantine of the staff as well as helping more vulnerable and marginalized clients to access essential hygiene-related services. also, challenges linked to the use of remote technology (phone and video) and problems with enrolling new clients were observed. harm reduction and drug treatment services were supplied with the personal protective equipment (masks, gloves, etc.) for the staff. the personal protective equipment was purchased centrally by the government. in 2019 and 2020, harm reduction services saw stable numbers of regular clients (around 3,500). approximately 1.5 million syringes were distributed to pwid via the harm reduction services in 2020. in 2020, the support services and drug use paraphernalia were used to a lesser extent compared to 2019, which was caused by movement restrictions and a fear of personal contact due to the covid-19 pandemic (table 1). also based on the results of the mini web survey, harm reduction services (drop-in centers and outreach services) and pharmacies remained popular places among pwid to obtain syringes. access to clean drug use paraphernalia remained the same for most of the pwid in this study as it had been before the covid-19 pandemic (kütt, 2020). apart from maintaining the existing harm reduction and treatment services, new services were developed during the covid-19 pandemic. a new substitution treatment and harm reduction center started operating. support services for problematic drug users and cooperation with pharmacies expanded. in may 2020, new mental health counselling service was opened for users and their loved ones, in both an in-person format and by using different communication channels (facebook, messenger, and phone). also, aftercare service provided psychological support to the users and their loved ones at the beginning of the pandemic. based on the hiv prevalence study among pwid (salekešin et al., 2021), more than half of the pwid (59%) considered covid-19 to be very dangerous or rather dangerous, and 9% to be not dangerous 12 katri abel-ollo, margo kivila, aljona kurbatova, svetlana ovsjannikova at all. based on research results, only few pwid had sars-cov-2 antibodies in spring 2020 (salekešin et al., 2021). starting from summer 2021, covid-19 vaccines were made widely available for pwud via mobile harm reduction services and drug treatment services. these vaccination opportunities were used by many pwud. 3.3. drug overdose deaths for over a decade up to 2017, estonia had the highest overdose mortality in europe. the use of illicitly manufactured fentanyl was a major contributor to estonia’s overdose death epidemic. since 2018 overdose deaths have been relatively low and remained stable (abel-ollo, 2022). in 2020, there were 31 cases of overdose deaths (110 cases in 2017). the reason for the decline is associated with the successful police work which led to the dismantling of many criminal networks related to the illicit fentanyl market in estonia, wider scale take-home naloxone distribution (fig. 3), and other harm reduction programs. as harm reduction services (including take-home naloxone provision) were constantly available, and a shortage of fentanyl on the estonian drug market continued, the covid-19 pandemic had not had a significant impact on drug overdose mortality. 3.4. people who inject drugs since 2005 estonia has regularly used cross-sectional respondent-driven sampling studies among pwid in three estonian cities (tallinn, narva and kohtlajärve). the studies have aimed to monitor the risky behavior of pwid and the prevalence of infectious diseases. the latest study before the covid-19 pandemic was conducted in narva in 2018 and during the pandemic in kohtla-järve in 2020. based on the studies, the average age of pwid and their injecting career had increased from year to year, being table 1. statistics on the use of harm reduction services, 2018–2020 2018 2019 2020 total number of service users (with a client code) 3,738 3,474 3,523 number of times the service is used annually 92,562 92,297 77,189 number of consultations with harm reduction workers 42,232 44,992 38,335 number of consultations with social workers 8,463 9,420 8,486 number of psychological consultations 1,669 5,587 2,410 health-related counselling 5,398 5,288 4,505 number of syringes 1,680,531 1,629,477 1,529,814 source: national institute for health development, 2021a. 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000 7 000 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 n a l o x o n e o v e r d o s e fig. 3. naloxone provision in relation to drug overdose deaths in estonia, 2014–2021. source: national institute for health development, 2022. the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug demand and supply in estonia 13 37 years and 18 years respectively in the 2020 kohtla-järve study. the risky behavior of pwid has improved over years. in 2020, only 0.9% of pwid shared syringes previously used by others (3% in narva in 2018), which also indicates the availability of sterile injecting paraphernalia. until 2017, the main injecting drug had been either fentanyl or amphetamine, depending on the region (salekešin, et al., 2019, 2021). in recent years, the availability of fentanyl has decreased, and amphetamine has been the main substance in both tallinn and the ida-viru county. as services for the pwid community were operational during the covid-19 pandemic, the main development in the target group was the general higher anxiety level in the community as well as possible changes on the drug market and the availability of the drug of choice. to get a better overview of injected drugs, a syringe residue study was conducted in narva and tallinn harm reduction centers in 2021 (abel-ollo et al., 2021b). in summary, the syringes in tallinn and narva predominantly contained amphetamine (60%), followed by α-pvp (17%), buprenorphine with naloxone (15%), and methamphetamine (14%) (fig. 4). buprenorphine and naloxone are known mostly as drugs used in the treatment of opioid dependence, and their injection indicates drug misuse. the study of syringe residues confirmed the low prevalence of fentanyl and its analogues in estonia in the spring of 2021. fentanyl was found twice in syringes in tallinn. isotonitazene, a synthetic opioid that is considered to be one of the so-called substitutes for missing fentanyl, was found in 9% of syringes. 3.5. drug supply and drug market there is an indication that two-thirds of the mini web survey respondents obtained or attempted to obtain illicit drugs during the covid-19 pandemic. the most widely obtained drug was cannabis (85% of the respondents obtained cannabis during the restrictions). over half of the respondents did not change the way in which they obtained illicit drugs. the patterns of using drugs, price, purity, and quantity received remained the same as before for most of the respondents (kütt, 2020). from the supply reduction side, the covid-19 pandemic brought some temporary changes to the drug supply field, but mostly it affected the lowerlevel sellers and individual smugglers. covid-19 did not hinder drug offenders with good international contacts and allowed criminals to increase the prices of substances by about 10%. covid-19 had a significant effect on ordering illicit substances via the darknet by regular parcel/post. among other reasons, the covid pandemic increased the use of darknet and cryptocurrency in the drug supply field. it is known that the use of it and modern technology field in organized crime has been a growing problem; the covid pandemic only gave an extra boost to it. cannabis, amphetamine, mdma, and cocaine continue to be the most prevalent drugs used and traded in estonia. cannabis seizures, price, and 60.0 17.3 14.6 14.1 9.7 9.2 5.4 2.7 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 amphetamine ?-pvp buprenorphine metamphetamine cocaine isotonitazene methadone mdma diazepam carfentanil fentanyl 6-mam, morphine, codeine ac syringe without substance fig. 4. proportions of substances found in syringes used in tallinn and narva (%), 2021 source: syringe residues analysis collected in harm reduction centers in tallinn and narva (abel-ollo et al., 2021b). 14 katri abel-ollo, margo kivila, aljona kurbatova, svetlana ovsjannikova purity have been stable for many years. based on studies, there is reason to believe that cannabis use increased during the pandemic as a method of coping with mental health pressure caused by covid-19 (kütt, 2020). synthetic cannabinoids have not been very prevalent on the estonian drug market. based on data from the estonian forensic science institute, in 2020, three types of synthetic cannabinoids (5c-apinaca, ab-fubinaca, jwh-210) were confiscated, with the biggest amount being ab-fubinaca  – 14.6  g. the decreasing trend of nps seizures has been explained by the generic group-based legislative change that took place in 2016. most synthetic cannabinoids fall under the already existing substance groups and are automatically controlled. cocaine, amphetamine/methamphetamine, and mdma seizures have increased over the past years. the hypothesis that the use of recreational drugs would decrease with covid-19 restrictions was not confirmed in estonia (kütt, 2020; abel-ollo et al., 2021a). in 2020, the record amount of cocaine was confiscated in estonia (table 2). with the decreased price and improved standard of living, cocaine had become more affordable to young people and had lost its “high class” image (table 3). according to the estonian forensic science institute, the purity of cocaine has increased steadily since 2015. in 2020, the most common purity of cocaine was 81% (0.6−86). also, the mdma tablet purity was on the rise. while in the years of 2016 and 2017 the most common purity of tablet mdma had increased from 36 mg to 93 mg, in 2020 the most common purity of mdma had increased to 137 mg (34−243). amphetamine purity has been relatively low over the years in estonia. although the purity has increased a little, the most common purity of 17% in 2020 was still low. the bigger amounts of amphetamine/methamphetamine seizures over the years have been related to large-scale seizures. estonian pwid use both methamphetamine and amphetamine, whereas sometimes the users are not able to tell the difference between methamphetamine and regular amphetamine. methamphetamine seizures increased many times in 2020 (table 2). increased concentration of methamphetamine was also found in 2020 wastewater analysis (abel-ollo et al., 2021a). according to the police, the increased availability of methamphetamine may also be related to orders placed on the darknet, which became more active during the pandemic. the darknet distinguishes between amphetamine and methamphetamine, and the subscriber is likely to receive the desired substance. fentanyl shortage continued in 2020. the trend started in 2017 and is not related to the covid-19 pandemic. fentanyl was available on a small scale only in the east-virumaa and harjumaa counties, other regions were not affected by fentanyl. the shortage caused an increase in the price of fentanyl (table 3). fentanyl is mostly smuggled from latvia. people who use fentanyl compensated for the shortage or low purity of the substance with the use of amphetamines, cathinones (α-pvp), and prescription drugs. α-pvp is mainly trafficked from the russian federation. lately, drones have been used to transport drugs across the border. in 2020, the α-pvp availability decreased due to the closure of the borders of the russian federation related to the covid-19 restrictions and closure of some smuggling networks by the estonian police. while in 2019 table 2. amounts and number of seizures of confiscated narcotic substances 2018–2020. substance 2018 2019 2020 number of seizures amount (kg) number of seizures amount (kg) number of seizures amount (kg) cannabis resin 48 110.3 46 2.22 39 1.56 herbal cannabis 707 72.1 807 97.3 727 60.2 cannabis plant 40 19.5 31 74.7 40 36.3 heroin 7 0.012 4 0.004 2 1.4 fentanyl 98 0.7 31 11.097 20 0.16 cocaine 164 3.6 149 17 139 413.4* amphetamine 346 17.3 310 111.2 352 133 methamphetamine 126 5.1 37 4.04 135 27.1 mdma 275 8.13 199 33.5 227 70.5 ghb/gbl 68 140.9 63 129.71 104 44.75 *411 kg is one-time big seizure source: estonian forensic science institute, 2021 (emcdda standard table 13: number and quantity of seizures of illicit drugs). the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug demand and supply in estonia 15 1.2  kg of α-pvp was seized, in 2020 the amount of α-pvp decreased to 685 g. as for opioids, isotonitazene appeared on the estonian drug market in 2019 to compensate for the shortage of other opioids. isotonitazene (street name iso) is a potent synthetic opioid that, similarly to fentanyl, can cause a high rate of overdose deaths if the use becomes locally more prevalent. there is reason to believe that the small amounts of isotonitazene confiscated over the past years are related to the fact that the substance has been controlled only since january 2020. before the substance was officially listed as controlled, it had been problematic to define a big amount of isotonitazene and classify a criminal offense. in 2019, 58.2  g of isotonitazene (iso) was confiscated; in 2020 the situation remained stable (53.8 g). both substances, iso and α-pvp, were related to overdose deaths in 2020. 3.6. drug-related crime in 2020, in a total of 3,701 drug-related misdemeanors (act on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and precursors thereof, §  15.1: unlawful handling of small quantities of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances) and criminal offenses (penal code §§ 183–190) were registered. compared to the years 2018 and 2019, the number decreased in 2020 (4,505 vs 3,998 vs 3,701). the records of drug-related crime are not sufficiently detailed to give an overview of the background, level, or scale of drug-related crime. arresting people who use drugs for using them has not been a priority for the law enforcement over the last five years, whereas the focus has been on linking the pwud with treatment and support services. in 2020, the level of seizures and the number of criminal investigations also decreased because police forces were heavily involved in enforcing restrictions related to the spread of covid-19. the performance of law enforcement staff was also affected by illness, self-isolation requirements, and work-from-home orders. 4. discussion the covid-19 pandemic has affected countries socially and economically all over the world. the pandemic has influenced all areas of life, either directly or indirectly. globally, the health system’s sustainability and the population’s physical and mental health were put under enormous pressure. as illicit drug use is controversial, and reasons and patterns of use greatly vary, it is difficult to describe the overall effect of covid-19 on illicit drug use. based on different surveys, we can conclude that some people used illicit drugs (mainly cannabis) during covid-19 more as a self-help method to reduce stress and anxiety. some people who use illicit drugs as part of their recreation and social life reduce the use, whereas others continued to use drugs in other settings (e.g. private parties instead of public nightlife). wastewater studies show that despite restrictions and lack of entertainment options, the use of recreational drugs like stimulants remained the same in 2020, with increased use at weekends. although there were no large gatherings and parties in the fall of 2020, it would be naïve to assume that young people did not explore the possibilities of organizing leisure time activities and private events. for the problematic drug users and dependent individuals, drug use was not a matter of choice, and they tried to cope with the changes in the organization of drug services and the drug market in general. due to social distancing and other restrictions that impacted the work of the health and social services, pwid quickly became more vulnerable than ever. estonia managed to keep all the treatment, harm reduction, and support services for pwud operational/ table 3. the street-level price of substances 2018–2020 (eur). substance (dose or gram) 2018 2019 2020 min max mode min max mode min max mode cannabis (resin) 10 20 – 10 15 10 12 15 15 cannabis (herbal) 15 20 – 15 24 20 15 25 20 fentanyl 15 25 – 20 25 20 20 30 25 amphetamine 15 20 – 15 25 20 20 25 20 cocaine – – 150 120 180 150 100 150 150 mdma (tablet) – – 15 8 15 10 7 15 10 ghb – – 5 – – 5 5 8 5 lsd – – – – – 5 – – 10 α-pvp – – – 20 25 – 20 25 – source: estonian police and border guard board, 2021 (emcdda standard table 16: price of illicit substances (in euros). 16 katri abel-ollo, margo kivila, aljona kurbatova, svetlana ovsjannikova available within the first weeks of the pandemic although because of fear of contracting covid-19 and social distancing rules, the use of services slightly decreased in 2020. estonian drug overdose mortality statistics, surveys among pwid, and data from services providers illustrate that vital services were available and used by the target group during the pandemic. the demand for drug treatment did not significantly increase in march 2020. the estonian drug market and availability of illicit drugs mostly depend on other countries and international drug trafficking. the first hope that the covid-19 travel restrictions and the closure of borders would decrease the availability of drugs was premature. after the first shock on the illicit drug market, the availability of drugs remained the same. drug supply had started to move onto the darknet and crypto world before; the covid-19 pandemic just gave an extra boost to that activity. temporarily, the lower-level sellers felt the effect of covid-19, but bigger international networks were not affected by restrictions and reacted by increasing prices of illicit drugs. to conclude, based on the emcdda mini web survey, most people did not change their pattern of drug use or channels of acquiring drug supplies. the long-known philosophy remained the same: where there is demand, there is supply. the demand for illicit drugs is driven by the habit or the long-developed need to use illicit drugs, which will not change even when unusual phenomena like a pandemic occur in the world. references abel-ollo k., 2022, what lessons from estonia’s experience could be applied in the us in response to the addiction and overdose crisis? addiction [in press]. abel-ollo k., riikoja a., barndõk t., kurbatova a., 2021a, tallinna ja pärnu reovee uuring uimastite jääkide suhtes 2020 (eng. wastewater study for drugs and their metabolic products in tallinn and pärnu 2020), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. abel-ollo k., riikoja a., barndõk t., kurbatova a., murd a., 2021b, tallinna ja narva linna kahjude vähendamise keskustes kogutavate süstalde uuring narkootikumide jääkide suhtes (eng. syringe residues analysis collected in harm reduction centers in tallinn and narva), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. emcdda, 2020, trendspotter briefing. impact of covid-19 on drug services and help seeking in europe, emcdda, lisbon. estonian forensic science institute, 2021, emcdda standard table 13: number and quantity of seizures of illicit drugs. estonian police and border guard board, 2021, emcdda standard table 16: price of illicit substances (euros). eurasian harm reduction association, 2020, harm reduction programmes during the covid-19 crisis in central and eastern europe and central asia, https://harmreductioneurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/regional-review_final_eng.pdf (accessed 03 may 2021). hollo v., riikoja a., barndõk t., abel-ollo k., kurbatova a., 2020, tallinna reovee uuring narkootiliste ja psühhotroopsete ainete jääkide suhtes (eng. wastewater study for drugs and their metabolic products in tallinn), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. kütt v., 2020, narkootikumide tarvitamine covid-19 eriolukorra ajal (eng. drug use during covid-19 restrictions), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. national institute for health development, 2021a, kahjude vähendamine (eng. harm reduction), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. national institute for health development, 2021b, narkomaania ravi ja rehabilitatsioon (eng. drug treatment and rehabilitation), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. national institute for health development, 2022. narkootikumide üledoosist tingitud surmade ennetamise programm eestis (eng. prevention program for drug related overdose deaths in estonia). tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. pe n a l c o d e . h t t p s : / / w w w. r i i g i t e a t a j a . e e / e n / e l i / e e / 522012015002/consolide/current raag m., vorobjov s., uusküla a., 2019, prevalence of injecting drug use in estonia 2010−2015: a capture-recapture study, harm reduction journal, 16, 19. doi: 10.1186/ s12954-019-0289-3. reile r., veideman t., 2021, eesti täiskasvanud rahvastiku tervisekäitumise uuring 2020 (eng. estonian adult health behavior survey 2020), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. salekešin m., vorobjov s., 2019, hiv levimuse ja riskikäitumise uuring narva narkootikume süstivate inimeste seas 2018 (eng. survey of risk behavior and hiv prevalence among pwid in narva 2018), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. salekešin m., vorobjov s., 2021, hivi levimuse ja riskikäitumise uuring narkootikume süstivate inimeste seas kohtla-järvel 2020 (eng. survey of risk behavior and hiv prevalence among pwid in kohtla-järvel 2020), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. vorobjov s., salekešin m., vals k., 2019, eesti täiskasvanud rahvastiku uimastite tarvitamise uuring (eng. estonian adult drug use survey 2019), tervise arengu instituut, tallinn. 1. introduction health resorts as places where specialist activities are conducted have been a subject of interest to researchers and practitioners analyzing various aspects of their functions (rydz (ed.), 2005; sikora, 2014, szromek (ed.), 2010, 2012; zajączkowski, cegliński, 2018). research around the world confirms the unique nature of these areas. authors discuss the healing properties of natural resources and their use (krisciūnas, 2005; malkhazova et al., 2022), the economic potential of spa services (halkiv, 2017), marketing and classification (benett et al., 2004), transformation and development (boekstein, 2014), or even the role of health resorts in the covid-19 journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(2), 51–72 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.06 socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland wioletta szymańska (1), anna wiśniewska (2) (1) institute of social and economic geography and tourism, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76–270 słupsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-8673-2074 e-mail: wioletta.szymanska@apsl.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of social and economic geography and tourism, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76–270 słupsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5925-330x e-mail: anna.wisniewska@apsl.edu.pl citation szymańska w., wiśniewska a., 2022, socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(2), 51–72. abstract the health resort communes have a significant impact on the functioning of the local government. on the one hand, they enhance the development of tourism, but on the other hand, they inhibit the development of other branches of economy. the aim of the study is to compare and point out the developmental trends in the coastal health resort communes, which may provide conclusions on how their health and spa functions affect their development. the subject of the research is the socioeconomic situation of six communes including four located on the coast in the west pomerania province and two located on the coast in the pomerania province. to evaluate the socio-economic situation, the synthetic indicator method was applied involving pointer variables available in polish public statistics. the measurements were taken in three categories: human and social capital, material capital as well as financial and economic capital. depending on the data availability, the time period of some indicators was adjusted to their occurrence. the main time period under research are the years 2000–2020. key words coastal communes, health resorts, socio-economic development, synthetic index, poland. received: 29 april 2022 accepted: 19 july 2022 published: 19 august 2022 mailto:wioletta.szymanska@apsl.edu.pl mailto:anna.wisniewska@apsl.edu.pl 52 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska epidemic crisis) (szromek, 2021). it seems especially important to determine the state and perspectives of health resorts operating in certain legal space and market economy (cieślak, 2014; dryglas, golba, 2017; globa, 2009; grzegorzewska-mischka, 2011; januszewska, 2015; lewandowska, 2007; madeyski, 1999; peter-bombik, 2012). therefore, determining the social and economic potential of health resorts constitutes the basis to develop a concept of development of such areas (baran-zgłobicka, 2015; górna, 2013; mirek, 2012; soliński, 2012). however, in a wider view, the impact of health resorts and tourism on the social and economic local development is reflected in the strategic documentation of local governments and constitutes a subject of scientific research both in poland and abroad (bański, więckowski, 2014; cristian-constantin et al., 2015; kasagranda, gurnák, 2017; kesar, rimac, 2011; kurek et al., 2020; nestorenko et al., 2017). the aim of the study is to compare and point out the developmental trends in the coastal health resort communes, which may provide conclusions on how their health and spa functions affect their development. the subject of the research is the socioeconomic situation of six communes including four located on the coast in the west pomerania province and two located on the coast in the pomerania province. from the legal point of view, a health resort is an area where health resort treatment is provided and which has been designated to take advantage of and protect the natural resources with healing properties (gaworecki, 2003). obtaining the status of a health resort is a condition necessary to be allowed to function as a statutory health resort (mika, ptaszycka-jackowska, 2007). the issue of health resorts, their functions and rendered services are specified by the following normative acts (królak, 2021): • the act of 28 july, 2005 on healing treatments and health resorts as well as health resort protection areas and communes (ustawa..., 2005). • the polish standard pn-2001/z-11000 health resorts. terminology, classification and general requirements (polska..., 2001). according to the regulations of the act of 28 july, 2005 (ustawa..., 2005), a statutory health resort is an area, which has been granted the status of the health resort in the manner specified in the act (ustawa..., 2005, art. 2, item 2). such a status may be granted to an area, provided it meets all the following requirements (ustawa..., 2005, art. 34, item 1): 1. it has natural healing resources of confirmed healing properties under the terms of the act; 2. it has climate with confirmed medicinal properties under the terms of the act; 3. it has health resort enterprises and spa treatment facilities prepared to implement curative services; 4. it fulfills the environment protection requirements specified in the regulations; 5. it has the technical infrastructure for water and sewage, energy, mass transport and waste management. the study refers to those communes which were granted the status of health resorts and are located on the baltic sea coast. according to the classification of statistics poland (gus, 2011), statutory coastal resorts are those located within 3 km from the sea shore. there are statutory health resorts in the pomerania province (2) and the west pomerania province (4). these are: sopot, ustka, dąbki, kołobrzeg, kamień pomorski and świnoujście (tab. 1, fig. 1). tab. 1. list of coastal health resort communes including the health resort area in poland in 2020. name of the health resort commune area of the health resort dąbki darłowo rural commune villages: dąbki, bobolin, bukowo morskie, porzecze, żukowo morskie – 6113.5 ha kamień pomorski kamień pomorski urban-rural commune villages: żółcino, precincts 1-7 in the area of kamień pomorski – 1994.53 ha kołobrzeg kołobrzeg urban commune town borders – 2567 ha sopot sopot town with county rights sopot town area 1723 ha świnoujście świnoujście town with county rights health resort area – 956.27 ha a part of uznam island ustka ustka urban commune the town and 5 villages of ustka commune: lędowo, wodnica, przewłoka, grabno-zimowiska, wytowno – 6899.34 ha source: own study based on health resort statutes. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 53 2. data and methods the analysis of the socio-economic situation of the coastal communes holding the status of health resorts in poland was made on the basis of the synthetic indicator developed with the data available in the public statistics of the statistics poland – local data bank (local..., 2022). the analysis of most of the indicators was carried out in the time period of 2000–2020. depending on the data availability, the time period of some indicators was adjusted to their occurrence (e.g. the european union funds for programs and projects per capita where data are available since 2010). also, certain inaccuracy of the polish statistics must be emphasized especially those concerning the population, which results from the fact that part of the foreign and internal migration had not been registered (michalski, 2014; sakson, 2002; śleszyński, 2005; wiśniewski et al., 2020). moreover, t. michalski and w. szymańska (2017) distinguished 5 groups of problems concerning the analysis of legacy statistical data, i.e. statistical data timing (delay or longer than one year period of collecting data), low specificity or high specificity of the process, problems with unequivocal definitions of indicators (fluctuations in the period of defining, classifying and interpreting the data), problems with delimitation of units (changes to the territorial divisions, different units collecting data for different institutions) and the human factor. despite all the difficulties, the analysis made on the basis of public data reflects the changes that have taken place over the years. thanks to the applied method, the differences in the sizes of health resorts measured by the number of their residents and their economic potential were basically eliminated by using relative measures. the measurements were taken in three categories: 1. human and social capital, which constitutes a crucial factor enhancing local development; 2. material capital, which describes the elements of infrastructure related to the living conditions and life quality of the inhabitants dependent on the economic situation; 3. financial and economic capital related to the financial and economic situation of the health resort communes and including indicators describing the level of changes in the development of tourism and health resort activity. 23 indicators were applied in total, 10 of which described the human and social capital, 4 indicators described the material capital and 9 indicators described the financial and economic capital (tab. 2). the synthetic indicator procedure applied in the study required standardization of diagnostic criteria due to the fact that the data in a multidimensional matrix were in various measurement units. therefore, the diagnostic criteria were transformed into such a form where the range of their variability had a fixed length of 1 with the method of unitarization according to the following formula (młodak, 2006): for stimulants ; for destimulants ; where: zij – standardized value of criterion xj, min xij – minimum value of criterion xj, max xij – maximum value of criterion xj. the value of the synthetic indicator is the arithmetic mean for such standardized criteria of each place. fig. 1. map of coastal health resort communes in poland in 2020. source: own study based on tab. 1. zij = xij – min xij max xij – min xij zij = max xij – xij max xij – min xij 54 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska 3. results and discussion 3.1. health resort traditions of coastal communes in poland coastal health resort communes in poland (excluding dąbki health resort) have a long history and tradition connected with the development of health resort treatment dating back to the beginning of the 19th century (20th c. pre-war ustka, 20th c. postwar sopot) (tab. 3) kołobrzeg, kamień pomorski and świnoujście were the first to be granted the status of statutory health resorts as early as in 1967 by order of the minister of health and social welfare of 25 july 1967 on the list of localities recognized as health resorts (zarządzenie..., 1967). the following places were granted the status of health resorts later: ustka in 1988, sopot in 1999 and dąbki in 2007. however, all of them had been receiving visitors arriving to relax at the sea and take advantage of the medicinal properties of the sea climate. not all the health resort communes have the same natural conditions to be used in health resort treatments. having natural resources and a climate with medicinal properties are necessary conditions (ustawa..., 2005, art. 34, item 1). however, in the past, creating health resort houses, therapeutic stays and brine baths establishments provided a basis for shaping and developing health resort treatment tab. 2. indicators characterizing the social and economic situation of the coastal health resort communes. the area the name of the indicator human and social capital demographic potential: • the dynamics of the population changes compared to the previous year (%); • population growth per 1000 inhabitants – average level; • migration balance per 1000 inhabitants – average level; • indicator of population aging – the number of inhabitants aged 65 and older per 100 inhabitants up to 14 years of age – the dynamics of changes in relations to the previous year (%). social potential: • educational level of council members – percentage of council members holding an academic degree; • share of social foundations, associations and organizations in the total number of national economic entities (%). labor market: • the number of employed people per 1000 inhabitants – average level; • registered unemployment rate – the number of unemployed people per 1000 working-age population – average level; • the number of economic entities per 1000 working-age population – average level; • natural persons conducting economic activity per 1000 inhabitants – average level. material capital social infrastructure: • number of apartments per 1000 inhabitants the dynamics of the changes compared to the previous year (%); • usable floor area per capita – average level. technical infrastructure • expenditure on municipal economy and environmental protection per capita – average level; • share of people using the sewage network (%) – average level. financial and economic capital public finances: • the commune income per capita – the dynamics of increase/decrease compared to the previous year (%); • share of the commune’s own income in the budget – average level; • share of the investment spending in total spending – average level; • the european union funds per capita to finance programs and projects – average level. tourism: • total tourist accommodation (as in vii) per 1000 inhabitants – average level; • expenditure per capita in department 630 – tourism– average level. health resorts: • accommodation (as in vii) in health and spa establishments per 1000 inhabitants – average level; • expenditure per capita in department 851 – health protection – average level; • share of newly registered entities in medical sector in the total number of economic entities – average level. source: own study. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 55 tab. 3. health resort traditions of coastal communes in poland. name of the health resort commune health resort traditions health resort status dąbki darłowo rural commune 1920s – holiday makers, sanatorium of the berlin health fund 2007 – health resort status kamień pomorski kamień pomorski urban-rural commune 1876 – discovery of brine and peat deposits 1882 – the first brine baths establishment “fenix” 1967 – health resort status kołobrzeg kołobrzeg urban commune 1803 – the first sea baths establishment 1830 – the first brine baths establishment 1882 – the beginning of peat treatments 1967 – health resort status sopot sopot town with county rights 1823 – the first baths establishment 1824 – the first spa house 1999 – health resort status świnoujście świnoujście town with county rights 1822 – setting up the association of building a sea baths establishment 1823 – the first season for health resort patients 1826 – the first therapeutic baths 1967 – health resort status ustka ustka urban commune 1832 – arrivals to relax at the sea 1911 – the first balneology establishment 1988 – health resort status source: own study based on gus (2011). tab. 4. natural medicinal resources and climate factors applied in health treatments in coastal health resorts in poland. name of the health resort commune natural medicinal resources; climate factors dąbki darłowo rural commune natural resources: peloids low-type peat deposits. climate factors: “harsh” marine climate rich in iodine and strong cooling stimuli attenuated by large forest areas. kamień pomorski kamień pomorski urban-rural commune natural resources: mineral waters — sodium chloride, iodine; peloids lowtype peat deposits. climate factors: marine climate, moderated and attenuated by dense forest areas. kołobrzeg kołobrzeg urban commune natural resources: mineral waters — sodium chloride, iodine, chalybeate; peloid low-type peat deposits. climate factors: marine climate strongly stimulating, clean non-allergenic air, sea aerosols rich in iodine, essential oils and bromine contents, favorable thermal and humidity conditions. sopot sopot town with county rights natural resources: — sodium chloride water (brine), iodine water. climate factors: marine climate rich in high iodine and essential oils content from coniferous forests. świnoujście świnoujście town with county rights natural resources: sodium chloride, iodine, chalybeate waters; peloid deposits. climate factors: marine climate gently stimulating, moderated by coniferous forest areas and parks. ustka ustka urban commune natural resources: sodium chloride (brine), iodine, chalybeate waters, hypothermal waters, peloids – low-type and transitional peat deposits. climate factors: marine climate rich in iodine, calcium salts, magnesium moderated by forest areas (pines). source: own study based on health resort statutes. 56 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska with the use of natural resources in those places (tab. 4). the coastal health resorts operate on the basis of peloids and brine water. only dąbki does not have any medicinal waters. in the case of coastal communes, it is particularly important to take advantage of the marine climate which is usually strongly stimulating, rich in iodine but often attenuated by forest areas (tab. 4). as far as health resort activity is concerned (in accordance with ustawa..., 2005, art.13 item 1), health resorts usually base their activities on 6–7 groups of diseases (tab. 5). kołobrzeg and świnoujście are the only health resorts that offer a wider range of services (11 groups of diseases). all the described health resort communes offer treatment for orthopedic and traumatic diseases, neurological system diseases (excluding dąbki health resort), rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diseases of the upper and lower respiratory tract (excluding sopot which only offers treatment for lower respiratory tract diseases). some health resorts specialize in treating other diseases for instance, dąbki, kołobrzeg, świnoujście and ustka health resorts specialize in endocrine diseases; kołobrzeg, sopot and świnoujście specialize in osteoporosis; kołobrzeg and świnoujście specialize in obesity and skin diseases; kołobrzeg also specializes in treating women’s diseases. apart from differences in terms of the area and profile, the communes under analysis are not homogeneous in terms of the population: sopot, kołobrzeg and świnoujście are medium-size towns, ustka and kamień pomorski are small towns, while dąbki is a place located in a rural commune (tab. 6). those facts make the social and economic tab. 5. health resort activity of coastal health resorts in poland in 2020. name of the health resort commune health resort activity dąbki darłowo rural commune orthopedic and traumatic diseases, rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diseases of the upper respiratory tract, diseases of the lower respiratory tract, endocrine diseases. kamień pomorski kamień pomorski urban-rural commune orthopedic and traumatic diseases, rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure (including rehabilitation), diseases of the lower respiratory tract, neurological system diseases and children’s diseases: cardiovascular diseases, diseases of the upper and lower respiratory tract. kołobrzeg kołobrzeg urban commune orthopedic and traumatic diseases, neurological system diseases, rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diseases of the upper respiratory tract, diseases of the lower respiratory tract, diabetes, obesity, endocrine diseases, osteoporosis, skin diseases. sopot sopot town with county rights orthopedic and traumatic diseases, neurological system diseases, rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diseases of the lower respiratory tract, osteoporosis. świnoujście świnoujście town with county rights orthopedic and traumatic diseases, neurological system diseases, rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diseases of the upper respiratory tract, diseases of the lower respiratory tract, obesity, endocrine diseases, osteoporosis, skin diseases, women’s diseases. ustka ustka urban commune orthopedic and traumatic diseases, neurological system diseases, rheumatic diseases, cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diseases of the lower respiratory tract, endocrine diseases. source: own study based on health resort statutes. tab. 6. population in coastal health resort communes in 2000 and 2020. health resort 2000 2020 ustka 16,419 15,199 sopot 42,348 35,286 kamień pomorski 14,485 14,217 kołobrzeg 45,107 46,198 dąbki (darłowo commune) 7,470 7,965 świnoujście 42,207 40,948 source: local data bank. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 57 development of each of the places have completely different backgrounds; therefore, they show elements of distinctiveness. 3.2. human capital in coastal health resort communes in poland the human capital was defined on the basis of the demographic and social potential of the communities under study. each of them constitutes a significant factor of developmental opportunities understood in social, economic and cultural categories. the demographic potential1 of the health resort communes under study undoubtedly shows stable population dynamics; however, it must be emphasized that there is a visible depopulation trend especially in the second sub-period i.e., the years 2010– 2020. in the first decade, sopot and świnoujście experienced a population decline. the situation significantly worsened in the majority of the coastal health resorts in the second decade under study, and apart from darłowo all the other resorts recorded a population decrease. the final balance for the years 2000–2020 shows a stagnating population situation of the coastal health resorts and depopulation as the predominant trend (tab. 7). the rate of population aging points to the aging of the population in all the resorts under study. the lowest average dynamics of that rate characterized sopot, which has the oldest age structure compared to the others. the lowest average dynamics of aging was also recorded in darłowo commune, which is the only one to represent rural areas. on average, the other health resort communes have shown an increase in the share of the oldest population 1 from 1999 to 2009, (according to the administrative division of 31 xii), the balance of population size and structure was calculated on the basis of results of the national census (nsp)-2002. since 2010, the basis for calculating the balance of the population size and structure have been the results of nsp-2011. as there is no balance of population registered for permanent residence any more, the methodology of calculating all demographic ratios has changed and individual demographic and migration facts were related to the population (formerly referred to as “current status resident”). the balance sheet data for permanent and actual population and the rates for 2010 based on the data of nsp 2002 have a historical value only. the balance sheet data of the population for 2010 was prepared according to the administrative division valid on 1 i 2011. however, due to the specificity of the local data bank, they were calculated according to the administrative division of the country valid on 1 i 2010 (excluding changes that do not affect the indicators and names of the administrative units of the country’s territorial division), which results in the difference between the data published in the gus studies. compared to children (aged 0–14) by about 6% annually in the last 20 years. a similar situation occurs with regard to the average natural birth rate. it is negative and shows a population decrease, which is the highest in sopot. the average birth rate is positive only in darłowo in the years under study. equally negative trends are visible in the average migration balance. over the years, the average rate was positive only in darłowo and świnoujście. however, ustka and sopot recorded the biggest population losses. in general, the indicator of demographic potential was the most favorable in darłowo commune, and it was the lowest in ustka and sopot (fig. 2). all the more favorable indicators under analysis exerted an influence on the favorable demographic potential compared to the other coastal health resort communes: relatively high population dynamics, low population aging dynamics, positive average birth rate and migration balance. quite the opposite situation occurred in sopot where the only favorable indicator was the population aging rate, however, it should not be overestimated due to exceptionally old age structure of the population of that town. social potential was related to the measurement of shaping social awareness and the general level of social development of the local communities which influence local development (tab. 8, fig. 3). in this respect, the variables point to a clear dominance of sopot as a town with a community that is well-shaped, aware and striving to achieve the specified objectives. both the share of people holding an academic degree and prepared to make decisions about the town and a larger share of non-profit organizations than in the other resorts point to an undoubtedly high level of social capital in this town. darłowo commune has the lowest average share of its council members holding an academic degree. however, it also reports a kind of resilience of local communities as it takes the second place in terms of ngo’s share in the total number of economic entities. in all the coastal health resort communes, the civic society awareness has been on the increase as the indicators are clearly more favorable in the years 2010–2020 than in the previous years. in this respect, ustka is an exception as there has been a decrease in the average share of people holding an academic degree among the town’s council members. another area defining the human and social capital is the labor market. it defines social engagement in the economic development and a conscious shaping of material capital through own entrepreneurship (tab. 9, fig. 4). 58 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska tab. 7. indicators characterizing the demographic potential in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. commune demographic potential 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average population dynamics (%) ustka 100.06 99.18 99.62 sopot 99.15 99.04 99.09 kamień pomorski 100.15 99.67 99.91 kołobrzeg 100.44 99.81 100.13 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 100.60 100.05 100.32 świnoujście 99.83 99.87 99.85 average dynamics of the population aging rate (%) ustka 105.23 107.23 106.23 sopot 103.63 102.17 102.90 kamień pomorski 105.04 106.30 105.67 kołobrzeg 105.93 105.53 105.73 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 101.74 105.48 103.61 świnoujście 106.32 104.93 105.63 average birth rate (‰) ustka 0.23 -3.59 -1.68 sopot -5.22 -5.81 -5.52 kamień pomorski 0.44 -3.29 -1.43 kołobrzeg 0.85 -2.17 -0.66 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 1.71 0.14 0.93 świnoujście -1.20 -3.77 -2.49 average migration balance (‰) ustka -3.25 -4.76 -4.00 sopot -4.72 -2.95 -3.84 kamień pomorski -1.32 -0.90 -1.11 kołobrzeg -2.19 0.29 -0.95 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 1.77 0.33 1.05 świnoujście -1.23 1.63 0.20 source: own study based on local data bank. tab. 8. indicators characterizing the social potential in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. commune social potential 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average level of town council members holding an academic degree (%) ustka 71.75 58.00 64.88 sopot 97.31 98.52 97.92 kamień pomorski 58.31 72.67 65.49 kołobrzeg 66.45 80.24 73.34 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 9.94 38.00 23.97 świnoujście 69.42 73.69 71.56 average share of ngo’s in the number of economic entities (%) ustka 1.73 2.52 2.17 sopot 3.03 4.00 3.57 kamień pomorski 1.53 2.61 2.13 kołobrzeg 1.24 2.36 1.86 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 2.84 3.88 3.42 świnoujście 1.21 1.78 1.53 source: own study based on local data bank. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 59 sopot deserves attention in this respect as it has a well-developed labor market, low average unemployment rate, the best developed sphere of economic activity and entrepreneurship on average. however, kołobrzeg showed the highest average number of natural persons running their own economic activity per 1000 inhabitants. the worst situation connected with the labor market is in darłowo commune where all the indicators compared with the other health resorts are the worst on average. in general, sopot, then kołobrzeg and świnoujście have the best labor market. unfortunately, apart from darłowo commune, also kamień pomorski and ustka have poor labor market where 46.3 43.3 42.8 41.6 32.2 100.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 sopot darłowo ustka kamień pomorski kołobrzeg świnoujście fig. 2. the synthetic indicator of the demographic potential in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. fig. 3. the synthetic indicator of the social potential in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. 60 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska the value of the partial synthetic indicators does not exceed 40%. in general, sopot has the biggest potential in terms of human and social capital (fig. 5). despite unfavorable demographic trends, it is a health resort with a very high social potential and developmental opportunities. kołobrzeg and świnoujście are also very well developing resorts. although this indicator in all the three towns was similar in the years 2000– 2010, sopot clearly gained an advantage over the others in the next decade. 3.3. material capital of the coastal health resort communes in poland material capital refers to the investment which enables satisfying social needs and influences the opportunities of economic development including economic activity and entrepreneurship. the study describes it on the basis of social and technical infrastructure. the social infrastructure was defined only on the basis of the housing market which seems convenient and willing to improve the housing conditions for living in a health resort with developmental potential (tab. 10, fig. 6). in this respect, kołobrzeg is an outstanding town. it has the highest dynamics of its housing resources (świnoujście is the next) which makes it a very friendly place to live despite giving way to sopot in terms of the comfort (i.e. average usable floor area of apartments per capita). both indicators point to the worst situation in kamień pomorski, where there has been a visible increase in the housing resources and the average tab. 9. indicators characterizing the labor market of the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 20002020. commune labor market 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average dynamics of employed people per 1000 inhabitants (%) ustka 99.00 99.15 99.08 sopot 102.29 101.60 101.94 kamień pomorski 100.21 99.43 99.82 kołobrzeg 99.98 99.73 99.86 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 101.24 100.22 100.73 świnoujście 97.65 100.92 99.28 average unemployment rate per 100 working-age population (%) ustka 9.38 5.31 7.12 sopot 3.64 2.69 3.12 kamień pomorski 14.71 9.48 11.80 kołobrzeg 8.02 4.03 5.80 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 16.47 9.66 12.69 świnoujście 8.12 3.79 5.71 average number of economic entities per 1000 inhabitants (‰) ustka 232.68 230.74 231.60 sopot 306.86 406.55 362.24 kamień pomorski 202.24 226.38 215.65 kołobrzeg 312.68 293.27 301.89 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 118.89 148.59 135.39 świnoujście 245.53 253.21 249.79 average number of natural persons running their own economic activity per 1000 population (‰) ustka 121.44 99.20 109.74 sopot 111.00 126.60 119.21 kamień pomorski 106.78 104.60 105.63 kołobrzeg 164.44 129.40 146.00 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 62.56 76.10 69.68 świnoujście 132.67 119.70 125.84 source: own study based on local data bank. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 61 usable floor area of apartments over the years. however, it is the slowest increase compared to the other health resorts. the potential resulting from the technical infrastructure was defined on the basis of average spending on the municipal economy and environmental protection per capita and the average level of the sewage network use. in all the communes, both indicators have been rising though the increase is not the same. while the average spending on the municipal economy and environmental protection per capita has increased 91.2 51.0 38.3 29.4 14.4 68.1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 sopot kołobrzeg świnoujście ustka kamień pomorski darłowo 66.8 59.0 52.9 47.8 40.7 34.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 sopot kołobrzeg darłowo świnoujście kamień pomorski ustka fig. 4. the synthetic indicator of the labor market potential of the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. fig. 5. the synthetic indicator of the human and social capital in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. 62 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska more than threefold in ustka, kołobrzeg and darłowo, more than twofold in świnoujście, twofold in sopot, it has only increased by 40% in kamień pomorski. nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the level of spending is significantly higher in sopot and darłowo commune than elsewhere (tab. 11). as far as the sewage network is concerned, it seems that sopot, ustka and kołobrzeg health resorts have nearly satisfied all the needs as almost all their residents use their technical infrastructure. darłowo and kamień pomorski have not reached a satisfying level due to the communes’ rural or urban-rural character. sopot has a good level of investment in its technical structure judging from the indicators under analysis (fig. 7). however, it is not good enough in darłowo and kamień pomorski although spending per capita on the municipal economy and environmental protection is more than average in darłowo. tab. 10. indicators characterizing the social infrastructure in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. commune social infrastructure 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average dynamics of housing resources per 1000 population (%) ustka 102.53 101.41 101.97 sopot 101.94 101.56 101.75 kamień pomorski 101.18 101.32 101.27 kołobrzeg 103.12 102.29 102.70 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 101.59 101.33 101.46 świnoujście 103.92 100.92 102.42 average usable floor area of apartments per capita (m2) ustka 24.55 28.96 26.76 sopot 27.48 32.81 30.14 kamień pomorski 22.16 26.63 24.39 kołobrzeg 26.17 33.38 29.78 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 25.57 30.66 28.12 świnoujście 24.01 33.41 28.71 source: own study based on local data bank. 77.6 66.6 45.0 39.0 0.0 96.8 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 kołobrzeg świnoujście sopot ustka darłowo kamień pomorski fig. 6. the synthetic indicator of the social infrastructure potential in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 63 finally, the material capital indicator is the highest in sopot, although it increased in kołobrzeg in the second decade (fig. 8). kamień pomorski has the lowest material capital indicator which results from the worst social and technical infrastructure compared to the other health resorts. 53.7 53.5 49.9 31.0 30.3 100.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 sopot świnoujście ustka kołobrzeg darłowo kamień pomorski fig. 7. the synthetic indicator of the technical infrastructure potential in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. tab. 11. indicators characterizing the technical infrastructure in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. commune technical infrastructure 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average spending per capita on municipal economy and environmental protection (pln) ustka 158.82 502.41 330.62 sopot 534.35 1048.73 791.54 kamień pomorski 238.93 330.22 284.57 kołobrzeg 142.79 433.36 288.07 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 275.13 923.29 599.21 świnoujście 199.81 514.16 356.99 the average share of the sewage network users (%) ustka 97.21 97.70 97.46 sopot 98.54 99.73 99.13 kamień pomorski 61.62 74.60 68.11 kołobrzeg 97.70 99.11 98.40 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 14.08 26.48 20.28 świnoujście 93.16 94.23 93.70 source: own study based on local data bank. 64 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska 3.4. financial and economic capital in the coastal health resort communes in poland the financial capital including the communes’ own income is a crucial element determining local development and the result of that development at the same time. similarly, investment spending and the value of the eu funds prove the activity of the communes’ authorities and their engagement in the local development (tab. 12, fig. 9). the income dynamics of the coastal health resort communes in poland declined in sopot, kamień pomorski and kołobrzeg. generally, the income itself increased; however, the average increase in the income slightly declined in the second decade. the average income increase remained at a similar lever in ustka and darłowo communes and significantly increased in świnoujście. sopot had the highest average share of its own income in the budget in the period under study. this indicator improved in sopot, darłowo and świnoujście in the years 2010–2020. yet, the average share of their own income in the budget decreased in ustka and kołobrzeg in the same period. in general, kamień pomorski had the lowest share of their own income in the budget in the period under study. as far as the investment spending is concerned, only świnoujście reported an increase in investment spending in the years 2010–2020 compared to the previous decade. all the other health resorts were characterized by stagnation (ustka, darłowo commune) or even decrease (sopot, kamień pomorski, kołobrzeg) in average investment spending. as far as the evaluation of the eu funds is concerned, the available data did not allow conducting an evaluation for the years 2000–2010. however, they remain a very crucial element of the commune’s budget and oftentimes condition the investment development which is not possible from the communes’ own financial resources. in general, as far as the public finances are concerned, i.e., income, investment spending, obtaining eu funds, all the communes under study are at a similar level. however, ustka excels in this respect as it obtained significant eu funds in the years 2012– 2015 thus securing many investment opportunities for itself (fig. 9). only kamień pomorski has the lowest financial capital and showed the lowest level of nearly all the indicators on average compared to the other health resorts. tourism is undoubtedly a very important area of the communes’ economy. when it is described as an average phenomenon calculated per capita, it points out to darłowo which has a clear tourism profile, and tourism economy has an important share in the labor market and affects the developmental trends of that commune. average spending on tourism was the highest in sopot and darłowo (tab. 13, fig. 10). 83.3 73.3 65.7 49.2 35.0 15.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 sopot kołobrzeg świnoujście ustka darłowo kamień pomorski fig. 8. the synthetic indicator of material capital in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 65 61.5 58.4 52.5 38.3 35.8 1.4 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ustka świnoujście sopot darłowo kołobrzeg kamień pomorski fig. 9. the synthetic indicator of public finances in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. tab. 12. indicators characterizing public finances in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000– 2020. commune public finances 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average income dynamics of the commune per capita (%) ustka 109.40 110.48 109.94 sopot 113.62 102.94 108.28 kamień pomorski 111.15 105.78 108.46 kołobrzeg 110.80 106.45 108.62 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 111.05 110.13 110.59 świnoujście 108.18 115.30 111.74 average share of the commune’s own income in the budget (%) ustka 62.89 60.94 61.92 sopot 69.44 72.47 70.95 kamień pomorski 53.65 53.09 53.37 kołobrzeg 68.41 61.62 65.02 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 55.51 62.01 58.76 świnoujście 53.91 59.91 56.91 average share of investment spending in total spending (%) ustka 19.52 19.42 19.47 sopot 28.81 22.23 25.52 kamień pomorski 14.80 12.44 13.62 kołobrzeg 22.97 17.20 20.09 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 20.30 20.23 20.26 świnoujście 18.55 27.13 22.84 average share of the eu funds per capita (pln) ustka x 121.62 121.62 sopot x 12.47 12.47 kamień pomorski x 0.35 0.35 kołobrzeg x 15.53 15.53 darłowo (dąbki health resort) x 0.25 0.25 świnoujście x 44.02 44.02 source: own study based on local data bank. 66 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska the social and economic development of health resort communes is mostly stimulated by their health and spa activity. however, having the status of a health resort has both advantages and disadvantages in terms of economic policy. health and spa activity was assessed on the basis of the average number of beds in health and spa enterprises, spending in the department 851, i.e., health protection and the level of registering new entities of the medical sector (tab. 14). the health and spa activity has improved in the communes under study in the last twenty years. excluding świnoujście, all the other communes reported an increase in the number of accommodation in health resort enterprises. apart from darłowo commune, average spending per capita in the area of health protection has increased. unfortunately, tab. 13. indicators characterizing tourist economy in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000– 2020. commune tourism 2000-2010 2010-2020 2000-2020 average number of beds (sleeping places) in tourism accommodation enterprises per 100 inhabitants ustka 337.15 316.32 326.74 sopot 88.21 130.51 109.36 kamień pomorski 32.29 46.67 39.48 kołobrzeg 234.00 337.85 285.92 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 527.59 625.13 576.36 świnoujście 203.19 252.54 470.32 average spending on tourism per capita (pln) ustka 43.98 38.07 40.04 sopot 357.38 142.88 214.38 kamień pomorski 23.14 139.20 100.52 kołobrzeg 54.47 103.87 87.40 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 45.27 241.20 175.89 świnoujście 49.03 69.70 62.81 source: own study based on local data bank. 89.0 56.5 46.7 36.5 26.8 17.3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 darłowo sopot świnoujście kołobrzeg ustka kamień pomorski fig. 10. the synthetic indicator of tourism economy in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 67 69.5 46.7 33.0 28.2 14.4 12.1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 kołobrzeg świnoujście sopot darłowo kamień pomorski ustka fig. 11. the synthetic indicator of the economy of health resorts in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. tab. 14. indicators characterizing health and spa economy in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. commune health resort 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 average number of beds (sleeping places) in health and spa enterprises per 1000 inhabitants ustka 16.09 38.78 27.43 sopot 9.36 17.33 13.34 kamień pomorski 0.00 36.43 18.22 kołobrzeg 128.90 129.05 128.97 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 74.02 90.75 82.38 świnoujście 32.21 24.10 28.15 average spending on health protection per capita (pln) ustka 28.72 46.09 40.30 sopot 53.84 119.03 97.30 kamień pomorski 23.27 31.08 28.48 kołobrzeg 32.66 57.01 48.89 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 135.54 65.05 88.55 świnoujście 254.42 275.44 268.43 average share of newly registered enterprises of the medical sector in the total number of economic entities (%) ustka 2.63 2.21 2.28 sopot 5.34 4.81 4.90 kamień pomorski 3.95 3.17 3.30 kołobrzeg 3.46 6.99 6.40 darłowo (dąbki health resort) 1.72 1.23 1.31 świnoujście 3.74 2.50 2.70 source: own study based on local data bank. 68 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska the number of newly set up enterprises in the medical sector has decreased in all the health resort communes apart from kołobrzeg. if a commune reached the saturation level in terms of the number of enterprises in the medical sector, the indicator should not be very relevant. in general, the health and spa activity is best developed in kołobrzeg, where both accommodation, new medical sector entities and even expenditure on health protection are at a high level on average (fig. 11). kołobrzeg excels among the other communes under study in this respect. it reached such a high level as early as in 2000–2010 and improved it significantly in the next decade. in general, the financial and economic indicator is similar in the health resorts under study. kamień pomorski is in a slightly worse situation. it must also be emphasized that sopot excelled in this respect in the first decade; however, the level of its capital has flattened since 2010 and is nearly the same as for dominating kołobrzeg (fig. 12). 3.5. changes in the social and economic development in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020 when comparing the general social and economic situation in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020, sopot takes the first place, while kołobrzeg takes the second place at the beginning of the period under study. in all the types of capital, both towns took the first and the second place, respectively (fig. 13). towards the end of the period under study, the role of kołobrzeg is increasing while sopot loses its strong position. the most favorable changes in terms of the financial and economic capital take place in kołobrzeg, which significantly exceeded sopot in the years 2010–2020. in addition, the role of that capital becomes more important in ustka, świnoujście and darłowo, which means that sopot lost significantly compared to the other communes. the changes to the social and economic development in the coastal health resort communes were the most favorable in kołobrzeg, where all types of capital increased (tab. 15). świnoujście reported a significant rise due to the improvements in the human capital as well as in the financial and economic capital. unfortunately, it is weakened by a decrease in the value of the material capital indicator. two health resorts reported a decrease in the value of the synthetic indicator. in sopot, it was due to a significant loss of importance of the financial and economic capital, while in kamień pomorski it was due to a significant decline in the human capital and in the financial and economic capital, which were the poorest compared to the other communes. all the changes that took place in the years 2000– 2010 and 2010–2020 clearly point to an increasing role of kołobrzeg and świnoujście and a decreasing role of sopot. 51.9 47.2 46.9 46.2 37.3 9.3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 świnoujście kołobrzeg sopot darłowo ustka kamień pomorski fig. 12. the synthetic indicator of the financial and economic capital in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2020. source: own study. socio-economic development of coastal health resort communes in poland 69 4. summary the development of the coastal health resort communes is not homogeneous. the best operating ones are the already developed settlements and villages and the bigger towns in terms of resident numbers, like sopot and kołobrzeg, which suggests that a diversification of economic functions (serving to strengthen the tourism functions) may be beneficial also for the development of the health resort function. despite significant human capital, small health resorts do not have as large economic potential as the bigger ones, which impacts their poorer economic condition and a slower growth rate. the greatest differences are visible in terms of the material capital, especially the residents’ quality of life and housing resources as well as investment in technical infrastructure. the development of health resorts is a chance for the residents to improve the quality of their lives, find employment and raise their qualifications. implementation of training and educational activities is an exceptionally important issue to facilitate the development of health resort functions and create atmosphere facilitating local entrepreneurship. such activities should be addressed to people already employed in the health resorts but also to their future employees. therefore, introducing new fields of study connected with tourism and hospitality at all levels of education may significantly contribute to creating job careers in health resorts. health resort tourism may play an important role by stimulating 69.6 57.4 44.9 41.5 41.9 26.9 64.3 63.8 54.1 44.7 40.2 23.9 65.7 59.8 55.1 44.7 40.2 21.7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 sopot kołobrzeg świnoujście darłowo ustka kamień pomorski 2000–2010 2010–2020 2000–2020 fig. 13. synthetic indicator of the social and economic development in the coastal health resort communes in poland in the years 2000–2010, 2010–2020 and 2000–2020. source: own study. tab. 15. the change to the value of the synthetic indicator of social and economic development in two sub-periods: 2000–2010 and 2010–2020 in the coastal health resorts. health resort human capital financial and economic capital material capital general synthetic indicator ustka –13.48 19.63 –1.47 1.56 sopot 11.98 –30.28 2.46 –5.28 kamień pomorski –7.01 -3.96 3.42 –2.52 kołobrzeg 2.51 2.28 16.94 7.24 darłowo –11.45 6.59 14.57 3.23 świnoujście 10.28 16.43 –6.24 6.82 source: own study. 70 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska social and economic development in marginalized areas which are characterized by social exclusion. however, it is necessary to find appropriate staff rendering services to tourists, especially health resort tourists (peripheral regions usually do not have such human resources). the experience of other areas of sanatoriums and health resorts confirms that 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j., 2012, klastry jako szansa rozwoju przedsiębiorstw i miejscowości uzdrowiskowych (eng. clusters as a chance for the development of enterprises and health resorts), ekonomiczne problemy usług, 98(2), 519–534. młodak a., 2006, analiza taksonomiczna w statystyce regionalnej (eng. taxonomic analysis in local statistics), difin, warszawa. nestorenko t., tokarenko o., nestorenko o., 2017, healthresort complex development as a part of preventive medicine in the context of providing well-being, wroclaw economic review, 23(4), 239–249. doi: 10.19195/20844093.23.4.19 peter-bombik k., 2012, środki unijne jako wsparcie innowacji w gminach uzdrowiskowych (eng. ue funds as an innovations’ support in the spa towns), współczesne zarządzanie/ contemporaty management quarterly, 2, 177–184. polska norma pn-2001/z-11000 uzdrowiska. terminologia, klasyfikacje i wymagania ogólne (eng. the polish standard pn-2001/z-11000 health resorts. terminology, classifications), 2001, rs szś, rada sektorowa sektora 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(ed.), 2005, kształtowanie się funkcji turystycznych w miejscowościach uzdrowiskowych (eng. development of tourist functions in health resorts), pomorska akademia pedagogiczna w słupsku, słupsk. sakson b., 2002, wpływ „niewidzialnych” migracji zagranicznych lat osiemdziesiątych na struktury demograficzne polski (eng. the influence of „invisible” foreign migrations of the 1980s on the demographic structures in poland), szkoła główna handlowa w warszawie, warszawa. sikora k., 2014, szczególny status gmin uzdrowiskowych w polsce (eng. special status of health resort municipalities in poland), studia iuridica lublinensia, 23, 108–124. soliński t., 2012, znaczenie klastrów w transferze innowacji i rozwoju turystyki (eng. the importance of clusters in the transfer of innovation and tourism development), [in:] j. krupa, t. soliński (eds.), ochrona środowiska w aspekcie zrównoważonego rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego pogórza dynowskiego (eng. environmental protection and sustainable socio-economic development of pogórze dynowskie), związek gmin turystycznych pogórza dynowskiego, dynów, 35–45. statut uzdrowiska dąbki. uchwała nr xii/143/2007 rady gminy darłowo z dnia 16.11. (eng. statute of dąbki health resort, resolution no. xii/143/2007 of the council of darłowo commune of 16.11.2007), 2007, rada gminy darłowo, darłowo. statut uzdrowiska kamień pomorski, uchwała nr iv/27/10 rady miejskiej w kamieniu pomorskim z dnia 28.12.2010 z późn. zm. (eng. statute kamień pomorski health resort, resolution no. iv/27/10 of the town council in kamień pomorski of 28.12.2010 as amended), 2010, rada miejska w kamieniu pomorskim, kamień pomorski. statut uzdrowiska kołobrzeg, uchwała nr xl/526/13 rady miasta kołobrzeg z dnia 26.11.2013 z poźn. zm. (eng. statute of kołobrzeg health resort, resolution no. xl/526/13 of the kołobrzeg town council of 26.11.2013 as amended), 2013, rada miasta kołobrzeg, kołobrzeg. statut uzdrowiska sopot, uchwała nr xxiii/383/2021 rady miasta sopotu z dnia 19.03.2021 (eng. statute of sopot health resort, resolution no. xxiii/383/2021 of sopot town council of 19.03.2021), 2021, rada miasta sopotu, sopot. statut uzdrowiska świnoujście, uchwała nr xxii/176/2019 rady miasta świnoujście z poźn. zm. (eng. statute of świnoujście health resort, resolution no. xxii/176/2019 of świnoujście town council as amended), 2019, rada miasta świnoujście, świnoujście. statut uzdrowiska ustka, uchwała nr xvi/151/2011 z dnia 29.12.2011 rady miasta ustka (eng. statute of ustka health resort, resolution no. xvi/151/2011 of 29.12.2011 ustka town council), 2011, rada miasta ustka, ustka. szromek a. (ed.), 2010, uzdrowiska i ich znaczenie w gospodarce turystycznej (eng. health resorts and their significance for the tourist economy), proksenia, kraków. szromek a. (ed.), 2012, uzdrowiska i ich funkcja turystycznolecznicza (eng. health resorts and their tourist function), proksenia, kraków. szromek a.r., 2021, the role of health resort enterprises in health prevention during the epidemic crisis caused by covid-19, journal of open innovation: technology, market, and complexity, 7(2), 133. doi: 10.3390/joitmc7020133 śleszyński p., 2005, perspektywy rozwoju rynku mieszkaniowego w polsce w świetle sytuacji demograficznej, ekonomicznej i stanu zaspokojenia potrzeb mieszkaniowych (eng. perspectives of the development of housing market in poland in the light of the demographic and economic situation and the state of the fulfillment of housing demand), studia regionalne i lokalne, 1(19), 45–65. ustawa z dnia 28 lipca 2005 r. o lecznictwie uzdrowiskowym, uzdrowiskach i obszarach ochrony uzdrowiskowej oraz o gminach uzdrowiskowych ((eng. the act of 28 july, 2005 on healing treatments, health resort, health resorts protection zones and communes), 2005, dz.u. 2005 nr 167 poz. 1399 z późn. zm. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83534-7_5 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83534-7_5 72 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska wiśniewski r., mazur m., śleszyński p., szejgiec-kolenda b., 2020, wpływ zmian demograficznych w polsce na rozwój lokalny (eng. impact of demographic changes in poland on local development), instytut geografii i przestrzennego zagospodarowania pan, warszawa. zajączkowski m., cegliński p., 2018, analysis of development potential of health resort enterprises on the example of przedsiębiorstwo uzdrowisko ciechocinek s.a. in aleksandrów county, journal of education, health and sport, 8(11), 699–710, doi: 105281/zenodo.2591815 zarządzenie ministra zdrowia i opieki społecznej z dnia 25 lipca 1967 r. w sprawie wykazu miejscowości uznanych za uzdrowiska (eng. order of the minister of health and social welfare of 25 july 1967 on the list of localities recognized as health resorts), 1967, m.p. 1967 nr 45 poz. 228). 1. introduction tourism is one of the fastest-growing sectors of economy in the world. it is a consequence of economic factors (i.e. increase in the income of the population, favourable market conditions, financial stability of areas of tourist reception), social factors (life expectancy, holidays, non-working days), political factors (economic policy, foreign policy, fiscal policy, social policy, international integration), technical factors (transport infrastructure, accommodation and gastronomy facilities) and ecological factors (čerović et al., 2016). all of the above mentioned factors influence the development of tourism. on the other hand, tourism influences the factors that facilitate its growth (tkalec, vizek, 2016). being one of the youngest countries in the world, montenegro is also the youngest country recognised by other countries after the breakup of yugoslavia. thanks to its peaceful separation from serbia based on a referendum held on 21 may 2006, the country was spared disruptive fighting. the peaceful separation of montenegro from yugoslavia resulted in the increase of the tourists numbers by 76% from 1.133 million in 2007 to 2 million in 2017. at the same time, the number of domestic tourists decreased by journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(3), 42–49 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.3.06 changes on the tourism services market in montenegro in 2007–2017 wioletta szymańska (1), anna wiśniewska (2) (1) institute of geography and regional studies, pomeranian university, partyzantów 27, 76–200 słupsk, poland, orcid 0000-0001-8673-2074 e-mail: wioletta.szymanska@apsl.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of geography and regional studies, pomeranian university, partyzantów 27, 76–200 słupsk, poland, orcid 0000-0001-5925-330x e-mail: anna.wisniewska@apsl.edu.pl citation szymańska w., wiśniewska a., 2019, changes on the tourism services market in montenegro in 2007–2017, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(3), 42–49. abstract the aim of the article is to discuss the changes on the tourism services market in montenegro. the article presents statistical data on tourist traffic and the use of accommodation facilities both nationally and regionally. it focuses on domestic and inbound tourism with special emphasis placed on the citizens of serbia, russia, bosnia and herzegovina. it is assumed that the seaside location is of utmost importance for montenegrin tourism as increased tourist traffic can be observed in the coastal zone. it is also stated that the biggest threat to the development of montenegrin tourism is not enough diversity in international tourist arrivals. key words accommodation, former yugoslavia, montenegro, tourism. received: 27 february 2019 accepted: 5 september 2019 published: 30 september 2019 changes on the tourism services market in montenegro in 2007–2017 43 over 26 thousand compared to the extreme years of the period under research, whereas the number of foreign tourists increased by 893 thousand. such growth of tourist traffic in montenegro should seem satisfactory. however, it should be noted that a majority of international arrivals come from three countries: serbia, russia and herzegovina (cimbaljević et al., 2019; violante, 2017). while analyzing the statistical data, lack of effective actions aiming to diversify the tourist traffic source markets can be noted. 2. research data and methods statistical data on tourist traffic and the use of accommodation facilities in montenegro for the period 2007–2017 were applied in the study. also, data on the number of arrivals and the number of overnight stays of the national groups participating in the tourism traffic in montenegro were used. the timeframes result from the applied research methodology. despite the fact that montenegro declared independence in june 2006 i.e., before the beginning of the tourist season, the published statistical data for 2006 include serbs as domestic tourists. therefore, the data for 2006 cannot be compared with statistical data for subsequent years. data for 2018 are not taken into consideration in this article as they were not available at the time. classic statistical measures used in the study include arithmetic mean and the population standard deviation. those measures allowed to estimate the coefficient of variation as the measure of dispersion. the power of dispersion was interpreted on the basis of the obtained results in the following way (wiskulski, 2019): • 0%–20% low variation; • 20%–40% moderate variation; • 40%–60% high variation; • 60% and more – very high variation. the statistical data were obtained from statistical yearbooks of montenegro (statistical…, 2009, 2013, 2018). while analyzing the situation on the montenegrin market of accommodation services and the fluctuations of the tourist traffic, the country was divided into zones based on the geographical conditions. the following zones were distinguished: the coastal zone including districts with direct access to the adriatic, the mountain zones, podgorica, other tourist areas and other places. the distinction of the first three zones seems significant as each of those types of zones has individual features differentiating it from the others. longer overnight stays and mostly stationary character is typical for the coastal tourism. tourism in the mountain area is mostly activity-based tourism involving change of accommodation – a phenomenon observed through an analysis of average length of stay. on the other hand, tourism in podgorica involves mostly sightseeing. moreover, due to the fact that it is a capital city, users of its accommodation facilities may not arrive there for tourist purposes but on business. research on tourist traffic in montenegro has been conducted for many years. geographic information system (gis) has been applied to carry out those analyses (cimbaljević et al., 2019; statuto, 2017). the research mostly concentrated on an evaluation of tourist attraction of the country (djurović, djurović, 2016; marti, puertas, 2017). also, sustainable development of tourism is a significant part of the research (smolović et al., 2018; vučetić, 2017). the authors draw attention to the excessive exploitation of the tourist areas in montenegro and point to the threats it entails (šilc et al., 2016). there were also surveys on the innovative and competitive character of montenegrin accommodation facilities (marušić et al., 2019; srdanović, dragoslav, 2015; vučetić, 2018). 3. variation in the tourist traffic volumes similarly to croatia, the biggest increase in the number of tourists occurred in the seaside destinations – nearly 706 thousand tourists, i.e. 69.8%. they constituted from 88.4% to 90.7% of the population over the period 2007-2017 (fig.1). podgorica was the second most popular seaside destination. tourists visiting the capital constituted 3.7% to 7.3%. equally important tourist destinations are mountain resorts which attracted 3% to 4.2% of tourists. podgorica was characterised by the highest variation coefficient for the number of tourists estimated at 40.93% which indicates a high variation in the number of tourists. on the other hand, the variation coefficient for the mountain resorts was estimated at 26.24% – this value means moderate variation in the number of tourists. the lowest value of the coefficient was estimated for the seaside area at 17.1%. due to the prevailing participation of tourists visiting seaside destinations, the variation coefficient calculated for the whole territory of montenegro was 18.09%, which is evidence of low variation in the number of tourists. tourists to montenegro made up 7.29 million overnight stays in 2007. the number was growing continuously to reach 11.95 million in 2017 which means a rise by 63.87%. a majority of overnight stays was made in the seaside destinations and accounted for 94.9% – 97.0% of the total number of overnight stays. similarly to the number of tourists, the second 44 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska most popular area for overnight stays was podgorica. from 1.1% to 2.2% of overnight stays were made in its area. the third area with the highest number of overnight stays were mountain resorts where 0.9% to 1.6% of overnight stays were made. the variation coefficient calculated for podgorica was the highest of the three designated areas and was 34.41%, thus it can be concluded that the variation in overnight stays in the period under research was moderate. on the other hand, the variation coefficient calculated for the number of overnight stays in mountain resorts was 23.29% which means this is an area of moderate variation of the analyzed feature. the lowest variation coefficient was estimated for the seaside destinations at 16.39% i.e., a little lower than for the entire area of montenegro (16.43%). the average number of overnight stays for tourists in the period under study was between 5.98– 6.56. values exceeding the national average were characteristic of only the seaside destinations where the average length of stay was between 6.61–7.05 nights. in podgorica, the average length of stay was between 1.79–2.21 nights while in the third most frequently visited area i.e., the mountain area, the average length of stay was 1.99–2.68 nights. such low results outside the coastal area are a logical consequence of the specific forms of tourism done there. in the case of podgorica, the stays are short which may result from the capital character of the area, so people classified as tourists may not necessarily possess tourist characteristics but they may visit it for business purposes. in the mountain areas, the stays may be short because of hiking which entails frequent changes of places of stay. however, it must be emphasized that moving around constantly leads to artificial overstating of the official numbers. only coastal tourism is stationary thus should not lead to falsifying data. 4. domestic tourism in 2007, tourists identifying themselves as montenegrins accounted for 13% of the total number of tourist traffic participants (149 thousand). in subsequent years, the participation of domestic tourists decreased systematically to 6.14% (123 thousand). similarly to the entire tourist population, seaside destinations were also the most popular with montenegrins. in 2007, they accounted for 73.4% of domestic tourists (fig. 2.). their participation fluctuated in subsequent years to fall as low as 55.1% in 2017. the second most popular tourist destination in montenegro are the mountains. tourists staying in this area in 2007 accounted for 11.9% of the total number of domestic tourists and their number decreased to 6.4% by 2014. then, it increased to 16.5% by 2017. the third most popular tourist destination was podgorica. in 2007, the participation of tourists visiting this place was 3.6% only to grow up to 11.8% in subsequent years. the highest value of the variation coefficient for podgorica was estimated at 38.07%. that 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 capital podgorica coastal resorts mountain resorts other tourist resorts other places fig. 1. the structure (in %) of the number of tourists in designated areas in montenegro. source: own study based on: statistical…, 2009, 2013, 2018. changes on the tourism services market in montenegro in 2007–2017 45 is evidence of moderate variation in the number of tourist traffic participants. however, the variation coefficient for the seaside destinations was estimated at 17.86% – low variation. however, the coefficient for mountain destinations was estimated at 14.71% which indicates low variation of the analyzed values. the coefficient for the entire montenegro’s territory was estimated at 9.18% which makes it an area of low variation in domestic tourists numbers. in 2007, montenegrins accounted for 11.66% (852 thousand) of overnight stays in the accommodation facilities of montenegro. these values remained at a similar level until 2014. despite an increase of the absolute value in the number of overnight stays since 2015, it decreased to 4.04% (483 thousand) in 2017. a majority of overnight stays was made in the seaside destinations. 698 thousand of overnight stays were made in 2007, which accounted for 82%. their percentage and absolute value increased by 2013 when it reached the level of 918 thousand of overnight stays (they accounted for 92% of all overnight stays made by montenegrins). over the years 2014-2017, the number of overnight stays decreased to 352 thousand in 2017, which made up 72.9% of all overnight stays. the second area in terms of the highest number of overnight stays are mountain destinations. 7.1% (60.7 thousand) of all overnight stays were made by montenegrins in this area in 2007. then, their participation fell to 2.6% in 20014. then, an increase up to 8.5% was observed in the years 2015–2017. in podgorica, overnight stays made by montenegrins accounted for 2.9% (24.8 thousand) in 2007. despite the small percentage, their absolute value was the highest until 2016 when it reached 3.7% (26.5 thousand). the highest value of the coefficient was calculated for podgorica at 27.5% thus indicating a moderate variation in the analyzed feature. on the other hand, the coefficient value estimated for mountain areas at 25.53% indicates moderate variation in the analyzed feature. the estimated value for seaside destinations was 22.09%, which indicates a moderate variation in the feature in the period under study. the average number of overnight stays in domestic tourism ranged from 3.93–5.95 in the years of 2007–2017. obviously, the highest values were estimated for the coastal areas at the level of 5.21–6.58. in the mountain region, the number of overnight stays in the years under study was 2.04–3.63 while in podgorica, the values ranged from 2.28 to 4.60. 5. inbound tourism since the declaration of independence, international tourists in montenegro constituted a majority. in 2007 they accounted for nearly 87% of tourists. their participation in the structure of the tourist traffic increased and was as high as 93.86% in 2017. the seaside destinations were most frequently chosen by international tourists and were visited by 92.6% (901 thousand) of all foreign tourists in 2007 (fig. 3). 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 capital podgorica coastal resorts mountain resorts other tourist resorts other places fig. 2. the structure (in %) of the number of tourists in designated areas in montenegro. source: own study based on: statistical…, 2009, 2013, 2018. 46 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska their numbers grew by 6.3% year-on-year in the period under analysis. podgorica was the second most popular destination and was visited by 40 thousand tourists in 2007 (4.1%). their numbers increased to nearly 132 thousand in 2017 (7%). the third most popular destinations were the mountain areas which were visited by 21 thousand of international tourists (2.2%) in 2007. the above mentioned destinations gained popularity during the entire period of montenegro’s independence. it also translated into the number of arrivals of over 64 thousand (3.4%) in 2017. the highest value of the variation coefficient was estimated for podgorica at 41.41% which indicates high variation in the tourist numbers. the second highest variation coefficient was estimated for the mountain areas at 36.07% and indicates moderate variation in the number of tourists visiting this area. the coastal areas showed the highest stability of international tourists number. the variation coefficient estimated for tourists in this area was 19.77%, thus, it can be concluded that this area is characterized by low variation in tourist numbers. the variation coefficient estimated for the entire montenegro at 20.98 indicates moderate variation in the number of international tourists. international tourists accounted for nearly 6.5 million overnight stays in 2007. their numbers grew nearly every year except 2009 (decrease by 270 thousand overnight stays) and was as high as 11.4 million overnight stays in 2017. most of the overnight stays, nearly 6.26 million in 2007, were made in the coastal areas. they constituted 97.2% of all overnight stays made by international tourists that year. their number reached 10.99 million in 2017. however, their participation in the whole structure of overnight stays fell to 87.8%. podgorica ranks as a very popular destination. international tourists made over 80 thousand overnight stays in 2007 which accounted for 1.2% of the total number. the subsequent years showed an increase in the number of overnight stays. over 228 thousand (2%) overnight stays were made in 2017. in 2007, over 45 thousand overnight stays were made in the mountain areas of montenegro which accounted for 0.7% of all overnight stays made in montenegro by international tourists. by 2017, the number increased to over 154 thousand and accounted for 3.4% of all overnight stays. the highest value of the variation coefficient was estimated for the mountain areas at 40.29%. it indicates high variation in the number of overnight stays. on the other hand, the value of the variation coefficient estimated for podgorica was 36.73% and indicates moderate variation. the lowest value of the variation coefficient was estimated for the coastal areas at 19%. it indicates low variation in the analyzed feature. the value of the coefficient for the entire montenegro was estimated at 19.29% and indicates low variation in the number of overnight stays nationwide. the average number of overnight stays made by international tourists ranged from 6.11 to 5.76. the longest stays prevailed in the coastal area where 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 capital podgorica coastal resorts mountain resorts other tourist resorts other places fig. 3. the structure (in %) of the number of tourists in designated areas in montenegro. source: own study based on: statistical…, 2009, 2013, 2018. changes on the tourism services market in montenegro in 2007–2017 47 the average length of stay in the area under analysis ranged from 6.67 to 7.17 per tourist. in each of the years under analysis, the average length of stay by international tourists was longer than the average stay by domestic tourist by 0.83 nights. the greatest difference took place in 2017 and was 1.46 night. in the mountain area, the average length of stay ranged from 1.89 to 2.40 nights. in the whole period under study, the average length of stay made by international tourists was shorter by 0.67 night than the average length of stay made by domestic tourists. only in 2017, international tourists spent there 0.36 night more on average than domestic tourists. in podgorica, the average length of stay ranged from 1.73 to 2.00. each year under study, the average length of stay by domestic tourists was longer than the length of stay by international tourists by 1.06 night. the greatest difference occurred in 2007 and was 2.61 nights. 6. the main national groups visiting montenegro 50% of inbound tourists to montenegro come from three countries: serbia, russia and bosnia and herzegovina. those tourists generate over 60% of accommodation demand (exception: 2010 when the citizens of the three countries fulfilled 58% of the accommodation services for foreigners) (fig. 4). despite a decrease in the participation of serbian tourists in the structure of international tourists, their numbers remained at a similar level. the variation coefficient for serbian tourists was estimated at 12.11% and indicates low variation in their numbers. citizens of the russian federation are the second most numerous group of tourists. their numbers rose by 242% in the period under analysis whereas their participation increased from 10% to 23.58% in 2014 and then fell to 18.67% in 2017. the variability coefficient estimated for the number of tourists was 36.67% and indicates moderate variation in the trait under study. the third most numerous group involved the citizens of bosnia and herzegovina. their numbers fell to 101 thousand in 2007 and to 91 thousand in 2013. the variation coefficient for this group of tourists was estimated at 28.81% and indicates moderate variation in their number. bosnia and herzegovina’s tourists made up10.3% in 2007. the number fell to 6.79% by 2014 only to rise up to 10.72% in 2016. it was 9.79% in 2017. at the beginning of the period under study, the citizens of serbia accounted for 41% of overnight stays made by foreigners (fig. 5). their participation decreased in subsequent years to 25.66% in 2017. at the same time, the number of overnight stays 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 serbia russia bosnia and herzegovina fig. 4. participation [in %] of the citizens of serbia, russia and bosnia and herzegovina in inbound tourism source: own study based on: statistical…, 2009, 2013, 2018. 48 wioletta szymańska, anna wiśniewska exceeded 2.6 million in 2007 and 2.9 million in 2017. the variation coefficient for the number of overnight stays made by serbs was estimated at 50.8% in the period of 2007-2017 and indicates high variation. the second group in terms of the highest number of overnight stays are the citizens of the russian federation. their numbers increased from 789 thousand in 2007 to 3.059 thousand in 2017. the variation coefficient estimated for the number of stays in this group reached 54.92% and indicates high variation in the phenomenon in question. at the same time, the group’s participation in the structure of overnight stays made by international tourists rose from 12.25% to 26.67%. the citizens of bosnia and herzegovina made up over 703 thousand overnight stays in 2007. their numbers fluctuated to reach 1.083 thousand in 2017. the variation coefficient was estimated at 52.5% which indicates high variation in the described values. at the same time, the group’s participation in the general structure of overnight stays remained at a similar level ranging from 7.46% to 11.62%. 7. conclusions the analysis of the tourist traffic in montenegro indicates that it is in the phase of growth. the number of tourists has been constantly on the increase since the country gained independence. peaceful separation of montenegro and serbia was significant for the tourism development as it spared the country war damage and its historical monuments have been preserved. tourism in podgorica has been developing most dynamically whereas the coastal areas are the most popular with both domestic and international tourists. montenegro was granted the longest part of the yugoslavian coast after croatia and has been taking the best advantage of it. however, montenegrins should bear it in mind that overexploitation of the given area may have adverse impact on further growth of tourism. it is important to remember that over 50% of tourism traffic is generated by only three markets. therefore, the main tasks of the administration responsible for sustainable development of tourism in montenegro should aim at diversifying the sources of tourist traffic. deterioration of the economic or political situation in any of the three countries would have an irreversible impact on tourism in montenegro as well as on the entire national economy. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 serbia russia bosnia and herzegovina fig. 5. participation (in %) of citizens of serbia, russia, bosnia and herzegovina in the use of accommodation facilities by inbound tourists. source: own study based on: statistical…, 2009, 2013, 2018. changes on the tourism services market in montenegro in 2007–2017 49 references čerović s., knežević m., pavlović d., 2016, the effects of tourism on the gdp of macedonia, montenegro and serbia in 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international journal of contemporary hospitality management, 30(2), 740–756. doi: 10.1108/ ijchm-08-2016-0434 wiskulski t., 2019, uwarunkowania ruchu turystycznego z polski do chorwacji (eng. conditions of polish tourism flow to croatia), wydawnictwo awfis, gdańsk. 1. introduction gender equality is closely linked to sustainable development and is a prerequisite for realization of all human rights. gender equality in political participation remains one of the essential components of gender equality. the active participation of women in politics at all levels of decision-making and integration of their experience into the political process contributes to equality, peace and sustainable development, which can be considered a support of democracy. achieving gender equality in the political sphere is one of the central issues of gender equality. the low involvement of women in political journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(4), 37–45 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.04 great expectations: gender and political representation in georgia eka darbaidze (1), tamila niparishvili (2) (1) institute of political sciences, ilia state university, chavchavadze n 32, tbilisi 0162, georgia, orcid: 0000-0002-6919-9420 e-mail: ekadarbaidze@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) institute of political sciences, ilia state university, chavchavadze n 32, tbilisi 0162, georgia, e-mail: info@iliauni.edu.ge citation darbaidze e., niparishvili t., 2021, great expectations: gender and political representation in georgia, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(4), 37–47. abstract gender equality is one of the main priorities of any democratic society. the developed world has long agreed that the participation of women in politics is a key condition for democratic development of the country. no country can ensure fair and equal-opportunity policy without the participation of women. it will take decades for women to naturally secure equal political participation. therefore, in order to speed progress and to address inequalities, in 2020, after much resistance and disagreements, the statutory gender quota was adopted by the georgian parliament. the purpose of this study is to examine the current situation regarding women’s participation in georgian political life, to identify factors that have led to the implementation of the statutory gender quota, to access the efficiency of the state policies to increase women’s representation in political institutions and also to assess how incentive mechanisms devised in previous years have increased women’s representation in georgian political life. the aim of the paper is to identify the main reasons that hinder women’s political involvement in georgia. in the long term, it is necessary to maintain and increase the current gender quota to ensure equal representation. key words women’s political participation in georgia, women’s participation in politics, women in georgian parliament, women mps, gender quota. received: 04 december 2021 accepted: 16 december 2021 published: 24 january 2022 38 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili life is equally characteristic of both experienced and new democracies. although women represent 53 per cent of the population in georgia (national statistics office of georgia, 2020), their low representation in decisionmaking remains a problem for  the country. in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the soviet union when georgia declared independence, the absence of women in georgian politics was not remarkable for a country in post-soviet transition. at the time, “women’s issues” were not high on the political agenda of the state, since the prime objective of the georgian government was to achieve national independence. over time, the issue of women’s empowerment and political representation gradually became a part of the political agenda. despite the implementation of various support measures at the state level, including the implementation of the mandatory gender quota, women today still have not attained a so-called “critical mass”, needed to affect the political agenda. the low representation of women is particularly evident in local government. consequently, identifying the root cause of the underrepresentation of women in politics is crucial for developing effective policies, aimed at eliminating gender inequality. we are interested in studying women’s political participation in georgia and seek to identify the effectiveness and efficiency of a new electoral system and a binding mechanism for increasing women’s representation – the so-called “gender quota” as a measure to increase women’s political representation. we also seek to analyse when and how the gender quota was adopted and whether this gives us reason for optimism about the increasing numbers of women actively involved in politics. one of the main objectives of our article is to identify the factors hindering the participation of women in politics and to devise effective political mechanisms to rectify gender disparities based on an understanding of the root causes of women’s underrepresentation in politics. the article is based on the qualitative content analysis method, which allowed us to examine and analyse both international and georgian legislation (including policy documents, such as the elections code of georgia, the political associations act, lists of political parties, electoral programmes, etc.), as well as studies conducted by international organizations in georgia. four semi-structured interviews with gender researchers were conducted during the study. the study’s theoretical framework is based on the drude dahlerup’s “critical mass” theory (dahlerup, 1988), according to which certain measures must be taken to provide effective participation of women and to mainstream women’s issues and views into the political arena. to promote women’s political participation in future, quantitative representation of women needed to reach a “critical mass”, is generally considered to be about 30 per cent. inequality between men and women in the public sector remains a major challenge not only in developing but in developed democracies as well. despite the fact that in transitional countries, including georgia, gender balance was declared a state policy priority, political parties sometimes contribute to gender stereotyping and to maintaining the status quo. although a gender quota system was introduced in many countries of the world, including georgia, women continue to be largely under-represented in decision-making positions as they have a long way to go to reach the critical mass in decision-making bodies. 2. arguments in favour of women’s participation in politics feminist researchers have studied the growing theories of political representation and believe that the issue of women’s representation has not been systematically discussed in the current literature on mainstream politics (carroll, 1984). therefore, they discovered some weaknesses and shortcomings in established concepts of political representation. today’s feminist researchers have provided a number of interesting arguments, supporting the necessity of involving more women in politics (ipu parline, 2021). the first and most important argument– is an argument of justice. if a system allows and encourages participatory democracy in the country, then naturally this system must represent the interests of the people and meet the population’s needs. this requires, first and foremost, the participation of women in decision-making. the symbolic representation is also an essential component of confidence building, necessary for successful relationships between the authorities and the citizens. the notion that greater participation of women in politics will change the political sphere is rather controversial. however, empirical studies show that in countries where the degree of women’s political involvement is significantly higher, there is a change in the policy style, a discourse which is related to the factor of high participation of women (durest-lahti, kelly, 1995). the more closely the government represents the whole society, the more stable public policy is. this means that it is important not only to great expectations: gender and political representation in georgia 39 integrate women into politics but to ensure their effective representation as well. anne phillips calls the argument for the need for women’s representation “transformative argument”, because she believes that increasing women’s representation changes and transforms politics (phillips, 1995). she claims that women politicians behave more democratically and pay more attention to political equality and justice than men, and they always know how government policies affect female citizens. this is also supported by the fact that mixed-gender government and parliament are able to address more problems, which, of course, are not exclusively women’s. certainly, women politicians do not only work on issues that are important to women, and male politicians do not always exclude these issues, but studies have shown that female non-feminists are more focused on developing policies that affect women than male non-feminists (carroll, 1984). of course, women’s political participation and their leadership role is not the only essential factor for peace and prosperity in general, but their participation, undoubtedly, is a critical factor. 3. historical overview of women’s political activity if we assess the status of women’s rights since the middle ages, we will see that georgia has been ahead of many european countries in this regard. shota rustaveli’s 12th-century poem ”the knight in the panther’s skin”, which is considered to be the apex of georgian literature, brought the idea of equality of women and men to the forefront (rustaveli, 1966). undoubtedly, it is worth mentioning that queen tamar, crowned in the 13th century, was the first reigning queen in europe. an important indicator of women’s legal status is that according to georgian historical and legal sources of the 17th century, the law granted women the right to divorce on the grounds of incompatibility of character, infidelity, male impotence, etc., while in some european countries divorce was prohibited (metreveli, 2003). nonetheless, women in georgia did not actively participate in public and political life. this was mostly the prerogative of women of the upper class, while ordinary women were traditionally relegated to the roles of housekeeping, raising children, etc. the participation of women in public life increased during the 19th century, when women started to engage in public debates on a variety of issues affecting them. the women’s movement which began in europe in the late 19th century resonated with women in georgia as well. feminist ideas of that period were mostly available to well-educated georgian women in western europe who have returned to their homeland and considered emancipation and empowerment of georgian women the main purpose of their struggle. since the beginning of the 20th century, women’s activity significantly increased. initially, the women’s movement focused on securing rights to education and property, but later it shifted the focus to securing political rights. in the first democratic republic of georgia (1918–1921), women had the right to vote in elections as well as to run for office. during the parliamentary elections in 1919, women actually used their right to vote and among the 130 elected members of the legislative assembly, five were women. although the number of elected women remained low, at that time such a situation was quite progressive (ipu parline, 2021). in 1921, soviet russia invaded georgia and annexed georgian territories through violence. after that, the issue of gender equality, called “the disease, imported from the west” by the soviet government, was completely taken off the political agenda (buckley, 1985). after the collapse of the soviet union in 1991 and the restoration of the state independence of the georgian republic, the issue of gender equality gradually became a part of political agenda. lika nadaraya, one of the leaders of the first generation of georgian feminists, considerers steps, taken in the post-soviet period to promote gender equality to be an “awaking of feminism”. “at that time the main task of recently created women’s movement was to overcome the denial of the existence of discrimination and to expose the unequal status of women in society” – said a first-generation georgian feminist (interview with lika nadaraia, july 20, 2020). in the early 1990s, the lack of women in georgian politics was a common occurrence, as the country was “just beginning to rise” and “nobody had time” for women’s issues. over time, despite a variety of supportive measures, until 2020 positive change was still not possible. during the 2012–2016 term of the georgian parliament, the number of seats held by women was 18 out of 150 (12%), while in the 2016–2020 parliament, the number of women holding seats rose to 24 (16%). today, after the introduction of a legal gender quota in 2020, 25 per cent of parliamentarians are women (darbaidze, 2018). the problem of women’s representation in the regions and self-governing units (for example, in urban councils) is particularly acute. today, according the world economic forum global gender gap index, georgia is placed 95 for women’s political participation of the 153 countries 40 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili surveyed (wef, 2020). although this figure is slightly higher than the average for eastern europe and central asia, it still lags far behind the world average (0.154). georgia has the lowest percentage of women in parliament among the countries of the south caucasus (georgia – 14.2%, armenia – 23.5%, azerbaijan – 17.4%) (ipu parline, 2021). 4. factors impeding women’s political participation 4.1. gender roles and stereotypes research on women’s participation in politics usually exposes longer-term and interrelated factors impeding women’s political participation. the electoral knowledge network divides the factors into four categories (electoral knowledge network, 2020). the first category focuses on obstacles which women are facing as candidates, members of political parties and activists. the second category includes obstacles faced by women as voters. the third category presents obstacles faced by women working in elected administration. the fourth category includes obstacles faced by women representing the civil society (for example, electoral observers, mediators, human rights and civil society activists). our study identified three major barriers that women face in terms of involvement in politics: structural, institutional and cultural obstacles (electoral knowledge network, 2020). structural barriers are usually described by the level of socio-economic development of the society itself and the share of women involved in professional life. it is a wellknown fact that there is a direct link between the social and economic status of women in the society and their participation in the political institutions and in the elected offices. women continue to have a disproportionate responsibility for unpaid work in the household that makes a concurrent political career practically impossible. this division of obstacles highlights major problems that we encounter over and over in more than one category. in georgia, these problems are the traditional gender roles, gender stereotypes, discriminatory treatment and norms, lack of political experience, lack of information and education, lesser access to financial resources, pressure on political parties and organization, unfavourable electoral system. it is important to identify and discuss obstacles to women’s participation in political life in georgia. global gender gaps in political participation rates in georgia can be explained by differing interests and a desire to participate in politics. a number of factors may be responsible for the low level of women’s political participation in georgia: women’s attitudes towards election campaigns and political environment, family traditions, the perception of gender roles in georgian society. according to a survey conducted by the united nations development program in georgia, the majority of women consider politics to be a “dirty” business (undp and unfpa georgia, 2020). women are also concerned that an electoral campaign will negatively affect their children and families. according to the traditional distribution of family duties, the heavy burden of family responsibilities mainly falls on women, and this prevents them from participating equally in political life. in georgia, women have a disproportionate responsibility for unpaid work in the household compared to men, while women working full time are doubly burdened by family duties and work responsibilities. according to one recent poll, conducted by the united nations population fund in georgia, 80% of the respondents consider such domestic activities as cleaning, cooking and laundry to be women’s responsibility (unfpa division..., 2020). 49% of the respondents said that caring for a child in the family is a woman’s responsibility, while 43% said that these activities should be distributed in the family between women and men. public expectations of political candidates are less compatible with their gender expectations. this is especially true for georgia, where traditional attitudes concerning the role of women significantly differ from public attitudes towards how leaders are supposed to behave. this attitude has changed overtime. according to a survey conducted in 2020 by the united nations development programme (undp and unfpa georgia, 2020), 60% of the respondents supported women’s participation in politics. this figure was 10% higher than the one recorded in 2013 (50%). the driver for change is a change of public attitudes towards the participation of women in politics, especially among georgian women. in 2020, 72% of women believed that the mainstreaming of women in politics would be beneficial to the country, compared with 56% in 2013 (undp and unfpa georgia, 2020). in the case of men, the percentage distribution of respondents remained largely unchanged (45% in 2020 and 43% in 2013). at the same time, 37% of female respondents and 62% of male respondents agreed with the statement that men make better political leaders than women, while in 2013 the figures were 56% and 69%, respectively. moreover, by 2020, 42% of women and 63% of men considered politics to be a man’s business. in 2013, such a view was shared by 56% of women and 77% of men. this change shows that over the past great expectations: gender and political representation in georgia 41 seven years the perceptions and attitudes of georgians towards the social integration of women has considerably improved. these data show that in georgia the problem of public attitude and public behaviour towards the idea of having female leaders is far more acute than in developed democracies. the studies show that a stereotypical view of women as weak and having difficulty in making decisions is deeply ingrained in the society. the focus group on women’s weaknesses mentioned women’s sensitivity and simplicity (undp, 2020). these qualities are related to humanity, warmth and nurturing; therefore, the participants considered these qualities to be positive characteristics of female nature as well as an integral part of it. however, in their opinion, such qualities are unfit for political space, as it is considered that politicians should be less emotional and more resistant. the contemporary georgian political culture is characterized by traditional attitudes towards women’s leadership capacity. these attitudes towards gender equality are crucial for analysing elected women officials. according to tradition, the role of a mother and a housekeeper remains a priority for women. patriarchal values maintain the genderbased segregation. women’s responsibilities as mothers and wives along with household and family care work make it difficult for them to participate in public life. apparently, overcoming these obstacles will lead to significant changes in regards to women’s participation in political life. 4.2. the impact of the electoral system on the political representation of women in elected bodies a change in the electoral system is an important incentive for the mainstreaming of women in politics (norris, 2000). traditionally, more women are elected by proportional representation rather than by majoritarian representation at both the national and local levels. the proportional representation system allows voters to vote for parties or, in some cases, for individual candidates. the seats are distributed in proportion to the votes. such a system encourages parties to improve their attractiveness by including women candidates in the lists. one of the main institutional obstacles to women’s participation in politics is the electoral system. experience shows that in electoral systems of proportional representation, i.e. when candidates are elected by party-list, women’s chances to enter parliament are far better than in majoritarian electoral systems (norris, 2000). this issue is very much bound up with anti-women attitudes in politics. in majoritarian electoral systems the party would nominate one candidate per district. in gender-segregated societies, to which georgia also belongs, as indicated by the unece survey 2013, voters will more likely choose male candidates. if parties lack the political will to involve women in politics, majoritarian electoral systems make it possible to manipulate them. there are some connections between the electoral system and women’s representation in elected bodies (norris, 2000). on average, women occupy 20% of all seats in elected bodies by proportional representation in comparison with 9% of seats by majoritarian representation. in georgia there is a clear systemic relationship between the current electoral system and women’s representation. it has been proven that in representative bodies larger numbers of women are elected by proportional representation than by majoritarian representation. in local governments the situation is worse (norris, 2000). the georgian local government elections held in 2017 confirmed that majoritarian elections had not contributed to increasing women’s participation, since the number of women elected by majoritarian representation (8%) was significantly lower than of those elected by proportional representation (19.59%). today, in 20 out of 60 municipalities in georgia, the number of women elected by majoritarian representation is equal to zero. however, the local elections also showed that it is a lack of women-candidates rather than a lack of electoral support that is the central issue. if parties nominate women candidates, voters support them. for example, a woman was elected a mayor in self-governing unit ninotsminda (georgian..., 2017). electoral reform in georgia and transition to a fully proportional electoral system from 2024 will be a positive way forward in increasing women’s political representation. however, one female candidate of the parliamentary political party “girchi – more freedom” has already set a precedent by resigning from parliament in favour of a male candidate. a few months ago, the fourth candidate on the list, salome mujiri, a woman mp, should resign from the parliamentary mandate. this indicates a lack of political will to eliminate gender disparities in georgian political parties. 5. the importance and necessity of a critical mass of women the introduction of gender quotas is a common and widespread practice aimed at helping women enter the political arena. the platform for action, adopted by the un world conference in 1995 in beijing, articulated the foundation of its legitimacy. the 42 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili beijing platform for action examined discriminatory attitudes and practices and unequal power relations between women and men within the family, which, in turn, results in a low level of representation of women at all levels of policymaking (united nations, 1995). whereas previously lack of resources and lack of women’s interest in a political career were at the centre of discourse, after the adoption of the beijing platform for action, emphasis has shifted to institutional and cultural problems leading to the exclusion of women from political space. women’s political participation involves attaining a “critical mass” of women in the highest legislative and executive bodies. the 1995 beijing declaration and platform for action along with the united nations committee on the elimination of discrimination against women considers presence of 30–35% of women in parliament to be a necessary condition, and the council of ministers of the council of europe recommends that women participate in political life and decision-making. it is noted that the representation of women in policy-making positions should not be less than 40% (directorate..., 2003). in addition, the emphasis has shifted from individual women to institutions, designed to identify and address any barriers that prevents women’s participation in political life. it should be noted that the objective to achieve “a large number of women in politics” changed to “gender parity” and “equal distribution of power at all levels of decision-making”. the beijing platform for action stresses the importance of establishing a critical mass (20–30%) of women in elected bodies, with the final objective to achieve full gender equality (celis et al., 2008). while the beijing platform for action does not contain controversial term “quota”, this document calls on governments to take effective steps to achieve specific goals, through affirmative action in electoral systems, if necessary, and by encouraging political parties to include women as much as men. while the platform’s recommendations are articulated with great caution, the beijing platform aims to achieve gender equality in political sphere and encourages governments to make institutional changes that will ensure equal political representation of women and men. gender quotas are a quick way to achieve quantitative gender equality in representative bodies. the experience of scandinavian countries is often cited as an argument by the supporters of gender quotas. it is worth noting, however, that the introduction of gender quotas in scandinavia was preceded by a policy for women’s empowerment and an introduction of voluntary quotas by political parties, which allowed women to make up 20–30 per cent of the representatives in the legislature even before the introduction of gender quotas. consequently, the experience of scandinavian countries is a step-by-step process rather than an example of fast achievement of equal representation (dahlerup, 1988). therefore, the scandinavian example is not of much relevance to assess the challenges which can be faced when introducing gender quotas in an expeditious manner. 6. mechanisms to increase women’s representation thanks to considerable efforts by various international and local non-governmental organizations, in 2011 an amendment was made to the law of georgia “on political unions of citizens”, according to which electoral stakeholders receive a supplement of 10 per cent, if in their party lists at least 20 per cent of candidates out of every 10 candidates are women (darbaidze, 2018). later, this section was amended to stipulate that while complying with this requirement, electoral stakeholders will receive 30% of supplementary payments. the act entered into force right after the proclamation of the final results of the local elections in 2014. nevertheless, this mechanism had not worked, and smaller parties which were not elected to parliament took advantage of the opportunity and received additional funding. seven electoral stakeholders, registered to participate in the parliamentary elections of 2016, claimed a 30 per cent gender disparity, whereas only 4 of them passed the electoral thresholds. the ruling political party “georgian dream” and the main opposition party “united national movement” failed to comply with the requirements of the amendment. this prompts the conclusion that this amendment did not work for georgian political parties, and therefore the necessity of introducing gender quotas remained at the forefront of the political agenda (election administration of georgia, 2016). the discussion on quotas in the parliament of georgia started in 2003 when only 67 deputies took part in the voting procedure and, as a consequence, the initiative failed. however, the importance of the problem is underscored by the fact that in 2015 two initiatives on gender quotas were introduced to the georgian parliament. nana keenishvili, member of the ruling party “georgian dream”, was one of the initiators of the draft, but her legislative initiative was immediately rejected by the public and, therefore, was not discussed at the parliamentary level. as for the second initiative, the sponsor of the bill was a local women’s non-governmental organization that had great expectations: gender and political representation in georgia 43 participated in the work group task force on women’s political participation. the above legislative initiative envisaged 50% quota in the proportional representation system, i.e. a maximum of 38 women out of total 150 mps in georgian parliament, which equalled to a total of 25% of the mps. unfortunately, this legislative initiative failed, but despite the negative attitude of members of the legislative body towards the gender quota, in september 2017, the task force elaborated the legislative proposal on women’s political participation, a coalition of local and international organizations that advocate for gender equality and women’s political participation submitted to the parliament with 37 000 signatures, envisaged the introduction of the so called “zipper” system, where male and female candidates would appeared alternately on party lists of candidates for the parliamentary and municipal elections (kanoni..., 1997). the bill provided some amendments to the electoral code of georgia and the political associations act. parties and voting blocs were required to draw up electoral lists in accordance with the principle of gender equality. if an elected member resigned from the post for any reason, a vacant seat would be filled by the next candidate of the same gender. unfortunately, this legislative initiative, submitted for the third time, failed in the georgian parliament. the 4th and 5th periodic reports of the recommendations of the committee on the elimination of discrimination against women prepared for georgia states that the state should adopt measures to achieve a substantive gender equality, including gender quotas. this obligation also stems from article 349 of the association agreement, to which georgia acceded in 2014 (committee..., 2014). it is doubtless that the incentive norm developed for the parties during the recent years in order to encourage them to increase women representation in their party lists in return for the financial bonus did not work in georgia and eventually, the georgian government, fulfilling their international commitments, was obliged to vote in favour of a bill on gender quota. in july 2020, according to a set of amendments to the elections code of georgia, georgian parliament adopted a mandatory gender quota, aimed at achieving a gradual increase in the number of women in parliament. this amendment required political entities to nominate at least one of four candidates to the central electoral commission at the 2028 parliamentary election. the said rule will apply to the parliamentary polls through october 2024 elections and following snap polls until october 2028 elections. starting from october 2028 polls until october 2032 elections, however, the party lists should include at least every third person of a different gender (election administration of georgia, 2020). the last parliamentary election in georgia was held on 31 october 2020, and a second round of voting took place on 21 november 2020. the introduction of the gender quota on candidate lists was one of the most important changes during the elections, requiring at least each fourth candidate on party lists to be a woman. this requirement did not apply to candidates in single-mandate majority electorates (30 majority seats out of 150). there were 44.3% (3,049) of women out of 6,882 candidates in the proportional party lists and only 21.75% (107 out of 492 candidates) of women among candidates elected by the majority vote (election administration of georgia, 2020). the total number of 30 women (20%) parliamentarians, while higher than in previous elections (16% without gender quota), still falls short of the mandated target of 25 per cent. it should be noted that 29 women parliamentarians were elected by the proportional representation and one – by the majoritarian representation. the election results show that in almost all leading parties the number of women in the party lists exactly complied with minimum gender quota. 44.3% of the candidates on the party lists were women, while women’s representation in the parliament was 24.2%. this testifies to the fact that women candidates are related to lower ranks on the parties’ lists (where chances of being elected into parliament are lower). this shows once again that men continue to dominate georgian politics. statistics on political representation of women show that georgia is at a disadvantage in comparison not only to developed countries but to other developing democracies as well. despite the introduction of gender quota, the level of women’s political representation in georgia is still lower than the world average. it should also be noted that the 25 per cent target for women on the party lists, which was reached as a result of the quota, still does not meet the standard established by the 1995 beijing platform for action (30%). although this time georgian parties were able to comply with gender quota, it is possible that this legal regulation will be called into question in future, because political parties (such as “girchi – more freedom”, “georgian labour party”, “european georgia” and “alliance of patriots of georgia”), represented currently in the georgian parliament, are strongly against the introduction of gender quotas. also of note is that the political party “girchi – more freedom” challenged the measure in georgia’s constitutional court, but the court rejected the claim (gadatskvetileba, 2020). on 11 august 44 eka darbaidze, tamila niparishvili 2021, the parliamentary party “european georgia” appealed the decision by georgia’s constitutional court and although the court affirmed the binding nature of gender quota, “european georgia” still considers gender quotas discriminatory and claims that it may place women in an unequal position in the upcoming election (evropuli..., 2021). georgian experts have acknowledged that the formation of political parties in georgia, their stage of development and inner-party policies are today one of the main obstacles to the participation of women in georgian political life. the coordinator of a gender equality network in georgia believes that “not one of, but the biggest obstacle is the political parties themselves” (interview with the coordinator of a gender equality network, august 10, 2020). she believes that today no political party in georgia has a proper political agenda and has not established its own ideology. an underdeveloped political party is the biggest problem for women’s political participation, as it is the party that is the most important mechanism that facilitates women’s involvement in politics. men are still dominant in the political arena; therefore, gender stereotypes in society, traditional gender roles, double burden of women along with male-dominated composition of the executive bodies are major obstacles to women’s political participation. 7. conclusion overcoming structural, institutional and cultural barriers to women’s participation in political life will bring about significant changes. as regards public policies and mechanisms for gender equality, these, while still important, are limited to certain measures and thus remain perfunctory and do not have such a practical impact as a coherent and long-term strategy could have. the introduction of a gender quota system in 2020 slightly increased the percentage of women in the parliament, but still this mechanism has not yet produced the desired results. members of a working group task force, who initiated the introduction of the gender quota, believe that without it women would not be able to enter the georgian parliament in such numbers. but in the long term, restrictive gender quota should be maintained and most importantly, increased to address the problem. furthermore, the authorities and other public and private bodies are encouraged to contribute to the participation of women in the labour market and to women’s economic empowerment, which, in turn, will help to overcome cultural stereotypes in the society. this study revealed a number of issues which need to be resolved to draw the right lessons. first of all, the importance of a critical mass of women in the legislative branch needs to be stressed. it became clearer that to reach a critical mass of women and to ensure the effective representation of women, it is necessary to significantly increase the number of women in electoral institutions to allow them to lobby for the interests of women and to resolve women’s issues. this problem can be solved, more or less, by applying a gender quota mechanism. developments have proved that both the ruling and the opposition party lack the political will to empower women and promote their voice in the government. this is confirmed by the fact that the georgian parliament rejected the gender quota initiative for the third time, despite the fact that ngos were able to gather sufficient number of signatures twice. in the end, the adoption of the gender quota was largely related to the obligations assumed by georgia under the association agreement with the european union and to pressure from international organizations. introduction of a gender quota in georgia and, in particular, its incremental nature is a positive development. the example of developed democracies, however, proves that the use of gender quotas in political parties is equally important for quotas legitimacy. political parties, therefore, should recognize the necessity of women’s participation in politics and establish their own voluntary quotas, benefit from the stimulating norms offered by the state, make inter-party politics and the process of developing the lists more transparent, open and democratic, adequately access the work of women members of political parties and contribute to the development of their professional skills. references barriers to women’s effective participation in the electoral process, electoral knowledge network, gender and elections, ace, https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ge/ge1/ge13 (accessed 11 march 2020). buckley m., 1985, soviet interpretations of the woman question, [in:] b. holland (ed.), soviet sisterhood, indiana university press, bloomington, 24–53. carroll s.j., 1984, woman candidates and support for feminist concerns: the closet feminist syndrome, the western political quarterly, 37(2), 307–323. celis k., childs s., kantola j., krook m.l., 2008, rethinking women’s substantive representation, 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united nations, 1995, beijing declaration and platform for action, beijing: un, https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/beijing_declaration_and_platform_for_action.pdf (accessed 25 february 2020). women and men in georgia 2020, 2021, geostat – national statistics office of georgia, tbilisi. https://www.geostat.ge/ en/single-news/2165/women-and-men-in-georgia-2020 (accessed 10 may 2021). women in national parliaments, 2021, inter-parliamentary union, https://www.ipu.org/women-in-politics-2021 (accessed 19 may 2021). 1. introduction the collapse of the system of socialist states and disintegration of some of them caused a number of transformation processes of a political, social, and economic nature in a large area of europe and asia (see bunce, 1999; norkus, 2012). one of these processes is the changes in the role and importance of cities called post-socialist cities (hirt et al., 2016; sailer-fliege, 1999). it can be concluded that, as a consequence of these processes, the traditional industrial centers have lost significance (haase et al., 2016; mykhnenko et al., 2010), while the country capitals and cities attractive for tourists and those being a multifunctional economic base gained in significance (marszałek, 2017; salukvadze, golubchikov, 2016; stetsiuk, michalski, 2012). it is no different in kazakhstan, where the old industrial centers, such as karaganda and shymket, have lost their meaning, and cities located in the western part of the country: aktau, atyrau and the discussed here aktobe (terterov) are benefiting from the changes. the aktobe region, as a large industrial region of kazakhstan, has acquired the status of a border area (it borders on the russian federation in the north). the economic development of the region is journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(4), 51–57 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.4.06 geographical aspects of development of regional center aktobe zharas berdenov (1), nargiz nurtazina (2) (1) department of physical and economic geography, l. n. gumilyov eurasian national university, kazhymukan 13, 010008 astana, kazakhstan, orcid: 00000002-2898-8212 e-mail: berdenov-z@mail.ru (corresponding author) (2) department of physical and economic geography, l. n. gumilyov eurasian national university, kazhymukan 13, 010008 astana, kazakhstan, e-mail: nargizisnotonfire@gmail.com citation berdenov z., nurtazina n., 2019, geographical aspects of development of regional center aktobe, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(4), 51–57. abstract this article considers the social and economic situation of the aktobe region as well as discusses the prospect of industrialization growth. the paper presents a swot-analysis that determines strengths and weaknesses of the development of the aktobe agglomeration. the results can be used by school teachers in teaching a special course in local history, in the activities of architecture department, in the akimat for planning the economic development of the city. in the course of the study, a differentiated assessment of social and economic factors of the aktobe city was provided. key words regional development, zoning, aktobe, kazakhstan. received: 03 january 2019 accepted: 08 october 2019 published: 31 december 2019 52 zharas berdenov, nargiz nurtazina predetermined by several factors, including the economic-geographical factor (baranskij, 1980). this research focuses on the influence of the geographical position on development of the production potential of the aktobe region. while preparing this article, general scientific methods were used, such as generalization, systematization, system analysis, synthesis, system-structural approach, as well as specific geographical methods. the paper describes the influence of geographical location on the economic development of the aktobe region at the present stage. we used a comparative geographical approach to reach it. e.n. percik (1991) classified major cities following the principle of regional structure. according to this classification, the historical core, central, external, suburban zones were allocated in aktobe city, the regional center of the aktobe region. we defined the position of aktobe in classifications and typologies by n.n. baransky’s method (baranskij, 1980; percik, 2009). 2. analysis the geographical position of the aktobe region is a favorable factor to its sustainable economic development. according to the methodology of the international swot analysis, we determined the strategic potential of aktobe. the aim of the project was to assess the role of geo-economic factors in the economic development of the aktobe region. to achieve the goal, we set the following tasks: to consider the theoretical aspects of a geographical location, in particular approaches to assessing the economic and geographical position; to show the influence of the economic and geographical position on the regional economy; to analyze the impact of geographical features of the area on industrial development and economic sustainability; to consider prospects for further development of the production potential of the aktobe region due to economic factors (manak, 1985). e.n. percik (1991) classified major cities following the principle of regional structure. based on this classification, the historical core, central zone, outer zone, suburban zones are allocated in aktobe city. the historical core of the city is a small territory, where special historical architectural buildings, administrative, cultural and business centers of the metropolitan area are located. the city consists of three main parts: the old one – on the slope of the ak-tyube hill with narrow straight streets, built-up residential houses and public buildings in the center (railway and autobus stations), the new one (the north-western part of the city) – green, well laid out with the same type of multi-apartment well-appointed buildings, and the northern part of the city – the industrial part (where large factories are concentrated: the aktyubinsk factory of chromium compounds, the aktyubinsk factory of ferroalloys, the aktyubinsk x-ray factory, the aktobe chemical alcohol factory, and other small fig. 1. aktobe zoning map source: own study. geographical aspects of development of regional center aktobe 53 production) with private buildings (fig. 1) in the sanitary protection zone (svod pamâtnikov…, 2010). consider the place of aktobe in classifications and typologies by n.n. baransky’s method (baranskij, 1980): 1. classification of the urban population in terms of size: small cities up to 20 thousand people, average from 20 to 100 thousand, large ones from 100 to 500 thousand, the largest ones inhabited by over 500 thousand people are metropolises. according to this classification, aktobe city belongs to large cities. the population of the city was 420,151 people (as of 01/01/2018). 2. typology of cities by their socio-economic position: aktobe is located in a large industrial region (mining of chromium, nickel, gas, oil, copper, vanadium, etc.). 3. classification and typology of cities according to their functions: aktobe city is a multifunctional city that performs administrative, political, cultural and economic functions. 4. typology of the city in the regional social division of labor: the following sectors have been identified in the sectors of urban economy: – developed electric power industry; – developed ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy; – oil industry; – mining industry; – metal production; – oil refining and chemical industry; – light and food industry. 5. typology of the city by development strategy: now aktobe city has become center of the agglomeration, a major industrial and socio-cultural leader in the republic. in 2015, aktobe was among the five huge centers of agglomerations. the aktobe agglomeration is developing in the industrial-innovative direction (poslanie prezidenta…, 2018). the pattern of development and growth of the territory: the territorial growth of aktobe and the rise in the population are interrelated with the growth of industry. every year, young people who come to get higher education remain in the city after graduation. the work on preserving the dynamics of economic growth and improving the citizens’ well-being will continue to develop in the light of the tasks set by president in message to the people of kazakhstan on january 10, 2018. the main efforts will be focused on the modernization and dynamism of economy, the production of competitive products, the identification of new points of economic growth, support for entrepreneurship, and the steady improvement in the quality and social standards of the local population. a diversified industrial complex has been established in aktobe city, focused on the use of natural resources and the development of basic industries. the industrial potential of the region is determined by large export-oriented industrial companies. the city has sufficient potential for the development of enterprises of machine-building and metal-working industries (social’noe razvitie…, 2017). specialization of city’s industry is formed on this basis. currently, aktobe is the center of industrial and cultural development. in perspective, aktobe, having this industrial and cultural potential, can become a leading center not only in kazakhstan, but also in central asia. 2.1. transport and communication potential aktobe is the largest transport hub of western kazakhstan with a transit specialization. the junction of europe and asia establish a favorable geopolitical location of the region. aktobe is one of the largest industrialized regions of the country. the uniqueness of the economic and geographical position of the region lies in the fact that the most important air routes, railways and highways connecting the states of central asia and europe pass through its territory (almaty «aruna», 2010). the aktobe region takes part in the implementation of an international investment mega project “western europe – western china”. the total length of the corridor is 8,445 km, including 2,787 km that cross the territory of kazakhstan. as known, 628 kilometers of this transport corridor are laid across the territory of the aktobe region. at present, 14 bridges have been built, and 46 culverts have been installed (prognoz…, 2019). using n.n. baransky’s approach (1980) we applied the method of ball estimation of roads passing through the city, namely: the road of international importance (estimated at 5 points) which is the transit corridor “western europe – western china”; roads of national importance (estimated at 2 points), for example, the samara-shymkent highway; local roads (3 points), namely: aktobe-astana, aktobe-almaty; permanent international bus stations (3 points), for example bus stations „sapar” and „express”; railway stations (4 points), airports (3 points). when all points are summed up, the transport hub is estimated at 20 points. in comparison, the uralsk hub that consist of a republican road passes through the city (2 points); local roads (2 point); bus stations of international importance (1 point); railway stations (3 points); airports (3 points); river ports (0 point) gained a total of 11 points. currently, within the framework of implementation of the program for the modernization and 54 zharas berdenov, nargiz nurtazina development of ground infrastructure facilities, airport of aktobe has been reconstructed and now has the first category according to the standards of the international civil aviation organization (icao). 2.2. industrial potential the basis of the industry of the aktobe region is the mining industry. its share is 77.9%, and its components include: mining of fuel and energy minerals (66.7%), mining, not including fuel and energy minerals (11.2%), mining of metal ores (9.8%), other branches of the mining industry (1.4%) (social’noe razvitie…, 2017). the basis of the manufacturing industry is made up of the following sub-sectors: the metallurgical industry and the production of finished metal products (with a share of 7.4% in the industry), the production of food products, including tobacco (4.2%), the chemical industry (1.8%), mechanical engineering (1.4%), manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products (1.2%), production of rubber and plastic products (1.2%), production of coke, petroleum products and nuclear materials (0.6%), pulp and paper industry and publishing case (0.3%), and other industries (0.1%) (prognoz…, 2019). the share of the manufacturing industry in the total industrial potential of the region is 17.5%. food industry includes: production of meat and meat products, milk, flour, vegetable oil, wine and vodka products. light industry is based on manufacturing garments, while the pharmaceutical industry releases a wide range of drugs (prognoz…, 2019). assessing the geography of the city’s industry is the definition of the raw material base of the fuel and energy complex, oil and gas pipelines. the aktobe region is a center of sustainable growth in the quality of life with a favorable business environment based on hydrocarbon and mineral raw materials, dynamic manufacturing industry with the development of priority sectors of the region (construction industry, chemical industry, engineering, and processing of agricultural products) and a developed transport and logistics center in west kazakhstan. a diversified industrial complex is located in aktobe city. aktobe is one of the main industrial centers of kazakhstan. beside traditional industrial enterprises and the extraction of hydrocarbon raw materials, large-scale industry is developed here, which makes aktobe one of the major industrial centers of the cis. the leading enterprises of the manufacturing industry that determine the level of development of production include: – in the metallurgical industry, during 2017 aktobe ferroalloy factory jsc “tnc kazchrome” increased the production of ferrochrome (377.5 thousand tons), which is more than 40% in the total volume of the manufacturing industry (prorgamma razvitiâ…, 2017); – in the chemical industry, “aktobe chromium compounds plant”, with a total design capacity of 103.27 thousand tons, is the only manufacturer of chromium compounds in kazakhstan (prognoz…, 2019); – 85.8 thousand tons of chromium salts were produced in 2017 (social’noe razvitie …, 2017). the range of products includes technical chromic anhydride, technical metallurgical chromium, technical sodium dichromate, chromium sulfate (basic), technical potassium dichromate, technical pigment chromium oxide based on chromite ores mined in the aktobe region (prognoz…, 2019). mechanical engineering, jsc “aktyubinsk oil equipment factory” manufactures oil field equipment, jsc “aktyubrentgen” produces medical equipment, jsc “civil aviation plant no. 406” provides aircraft equipment repair services, and jsc “aktyubinsk metal structures” manufactures finished metal products (prognoz…, 2019). light industry is mainly represented by small enterprises. at the same time, factories are equipped with outdated equipment, the workload of which is no more than 30–40%. there are plans to implement projects “production of primary processing of wool with the release of felt and insulation boards” with a capacity of 3,500 tons per year, and creating 130 new jobs for locals is planned (ak-runo llp) (prognoz…, 2019). in the production of other non-metallic mineral products, “aktobe non-metallic pipes factory” jsc manufactures pipe products; “stroydetal llp” produces concrete structures made of concrete, silicate and ceramic bricks, and cellular concrete blocks are produced by brick factories “silikat” llp -a, “basalt” llp, “ecoton-batys” llp, “sital-2” llp (prognoz…, 2019). since the beginning of 2018, there has been a positive trend in the regional economy. in januarynovember 2018, industrial production increased 2.2 times compared to the corresponding period of the previous year, of which in mining – by 34.7%, and in manufacturing – by 39.3% (prognoz…, 2019). the dynamics of foreign trade in the aktobe region indicates an increasing role of other countries in the region’s foreign trade, which is a positive fact from the point of view of geographic diversification of exports. the creation of the customs union and the formation of a single economic space of kazakhstan, russia and belarus in 2014 appear to be the qualitative changes arising from the taken geographical aspects of development of regional center aktobe 55 tab. 1. swot analysis of the strategic potential of the city, taking into account the realities of the external environment strengths weaknesses 1. favorable geographical location, the presence of an external border with the russian federation. growing energy shortages and high levels of network losses that limit industrial development. 2. significant transport, logistics and transit potential along the europe-asia route. sectorial imbalance: the share growth of the mining industry in production and investment, low diversification of small businesses. 3. the presence of oil and gas reserves and minerals, which creates the basis for the further development of the mining industry. high dependence of the commodity sector on conjuncture of world prices. 4. availability of sources of raw materials for the development of the chemical industry. presence of many current and historical sources of environmental pollution. 5. significant economic potential in the field of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy. significant potential for the development of mechanical engineering, production of metal products and building materials. narrow specialization of the region in the republican division of labor, raw material orientation and a lack of sufficient incentives to develop entrepreneurship in the manufacturing industry. 6. high demographic potential: a rather “young” population, the predominance of the population of childbearing age, an increase in natural growth. high degree of uneven infrastructure potential of small cities and villages. 7. availability of resources for modern vocational education: infrastructure, professional teaching staff. underdevelopment of the agro-industrial complex due to the low level of soil fertility, a lack of irrigation water in most areas, dependence of agricultural production on climatic conditions and remoteness of agricultural producers from sales markets. 8. sustainable health development potential: reducing the morbidity of tuberculosis and cancer. lack of affordable housing for citizens; poor quality of district roads. 9. a high proportion of budget spending on social security. education contributes to both human capital development and support for domestic demand. a low level of education of the population in rural areas; a low quality of social infrastructure and services in this area. 10. effective implementation of the state policy aimed at consolidation of city residents. geographically uneven distribution of income per capita. opportunities threats 11. the cluster model of economic development and the active role of small businesses in cluster structures will increase the vertical diversification of products in traditional export sectors. slowdown in the development of the regional economy due to the conservation of energy shortages. 12. state support under the program of forced industrialization will increase the share of the manufacturing industry and diversify the economy of the region. preserving the stagnation of the construction industry due to the instability of the financial and credit system 13. the intensification of the activities of the sec and the regional techno park will allow developing small and medium business of industrial and innovative orientation. persistence of disproportions in the system of vocational education with a negative impact on meeting the demand for labor resources. 14. co-operation of households and peasant (farmer) farms in order to jointly promote products, especially in remote areas with a lack of production capacity. reduction of competitive advantages while maintaining the current level of road and transport development. 15. construction of new energy generating facilities for local raw materials, reconstruction of electricity transmission networks and integration into the unified energy system of the republic of kazakhstan environmental degradation in case of low modernization of treatment facilities. source: own study. 56 zharas berdenov, nargiz nurtazina political decisions which will significantly advance the economy and living standards of citizens of these countries (poslanie glavy…, 2012). economic cooperation is the main advantage of the customs union for the aktyubinsk region, because the territorial production complexes that were created in the soviet period still retain their influence. and aktobe enterprises can rejoin this process to become part of technological chains and use an economic platform in the territory of the cu countries to be able to sell their products on the european market. also, russia and belarus, using the capabilities of the aktobe region, will be able to supply their products and organize their processing in the region in order to sell them in southeast and northeast asia. 3. results and discussions a comprehensive description of the socio-economic results of the city’s development is expressed in a swot analysis that determines the strengths and weaknesses, limitations and possibilities for its development (tab. 1). the favorable geo-economic position of the aktobe region at the junction of significant territorial zones of kazakhstan as a multi-transport hub on the central, southern and northern axes of growth creates opportunities for the growth of satellite cities and the formation of agglomeration and network settlement in the area of urban concentration. thus, aktobe city can be seen as a reference city, integrated into regional and world markets, through the priority development of promising industrial and innovative economic areas, generating the development of new clusters. the main branches of economic activity, including the development of the mining and metallurgical industry will be aimed at maximum processing of raw materials within the region, production of high value added products, ensuring the development of other industries, such as engineering, construction industry, etc. in 2018–2020, the region is planning to introduce more than 20 projects of the construction industry, such as a factory for the production of gas blocks (“kazkordrilling” llp), construction of a lime production plant in koktau (“igdanit” llp), a mining and processing plant for the enrichment of quartz sand (jsc „nc “sec “aktobe”), a factory for the production of rubber products for the system of fiberglass pipelines (“biepk” llp), etc. (prognoz…, 2019). 4. conclusion the aktobe region today stands out among all regions of kazakhstan as a major industrial center, with a developed diversified agriculture, fully providing the region with agricultural products. the new program of development of the agroindustrial complex until 2020 will be aimed at creating conditions for improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector (prognoz…, 2019; poslanie prezidenta…, 2018). to achieve this goal, work will be carried out in the following four areas: financial recovery, increasing the availability of goods, works and services for agricultural entities, and developing state systems to ensure and improve the efficiency of state regulation in agriculture. at the same time, a special approach will be made to such sub-sectors as cattle breeding and feed production. the study analyzes the social development of the city and the current economic situation. as a result, the priority role of socio-economic factors is determined in the regional development of the city. 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aktûbinskoj oblasti (eng. social development of aktobe region), 2017. departament statistiki aktûbinskoj oblasti, http://stat.gov.kz (accessed: 19 february 2019). social’no-ekonomičeskogoe razvitie aktûbinskoj oblasti za 2017 god (eng. socio-economic development of aktobe region in 2017), city portal, www.aktobe.kz (accessed: 19 february 2019). stetsiuk o., michalski t., 2012, lviv – ukraine, [in:] w. cudny, t. michalski, r. rouba (eds.), tourism and the transformation of large cities in the post-communist countries of central and eastern europe, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu łódzkiego, łodź, 115–128. svod pamâtnikov istorii i kul’tury respubliki kazahstan. aktûbinskaâ oblast’ (eng. the set of historical and cultural monuments of the republic of kazakhstan. aktobe region), 2010, aruna, almaty. 1. introduction until recently, the production, distribution and use of cannabis1 was criminalized and threatened with 1 throughout the whole study, the term ‘cannabis’ is used to describe all psychoactive products based on the cannabis plant, e.g., marijuana and hashish. imprisonment in almost all countries of the world. however, under growing pressure from their societies, many countries have commuted penalties for the possession and use of cannabis. some of the countries have even allowed for the commercial sale and consumption of cannabis under controlled conditions. for example, cannabis can be legally consumed for therapeutic, but also recreational journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(3), 1–13 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.3.01 tourism of polish cannabis consumers andrzej matczak (1), przemysław a. pawlicki (2) (1) institute of urban geography, tourism studies and geoinformation, faculty of geographical sciences, university of lodz, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-9509-5879 e-mail: andrzej.matczak@geo.uni.lodz.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of urban geography, tourism studies and geoinformation, faculty of geographical sciences, university of lodz, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland e-mail: przemyslaw.adam.pawlicki@gmail.com citation matczak a., pawlicki p.a., 2021, tourism of polish cannabis consumers, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(3), 1–13. abstract the aim of this study is to characterize the tourism activity of polish cannabis consumers in terms of (i) the level of their participation in tourism, (ii) parameters describing this participation, (iii) the effect of legal access to cannabis on choosing tourism destinations. the study is based on an anonymous online survey in which 886 voluntary respondents answered a series of questions about their tourist travels, their attitude to cannabis consumption, and their demographic, socio-economic and geographic metrics. results of the survey were analyzed using several statistical indicators of variability, structure, correlation, and structure similarity. for the respondents declaring cannabis consumption, the level of their participation in tourism is close to the national level. other parameters describing the domestic and foreign tourism of these respondents differ quite significantly from those reported for the general public of poland. this indicates that the possibility of cannabis consumption significantly affects the nature and directions of travels undertaken by tourists interested in cannabis. furthermore, there is a strong connection between the respondents’ personal preferences and the nature of their tourism, especially the destinations of their foreign trips. the conclusions from this study mostly apply to current and recent cannabis consumers because the vast majority of respondents (90%) rank among such kinds of cannabis users. key words tourism, cannabis, cannabis consumers, poland. received: 20 august 2021 accepted: 08 november 2021 published: 29 november 2021 2 andrzej matczak, przemysław a. pawlicki purposes in dutch ‘coffee shops’, in several states of the usa,2 canada and uruguay. the legal status of cannabis production, distribution and use varies from country to country, which results in an increasing number of travels oriented towards cannabis consumption. the growing cannabis tourism tends to make a multi-sided impact on society, economy, politics, etc. in many countries and their regions. from a geographical perspective, cannabis tourism and the associated cultural transformations have only recently become the focus of in-depth research (kang et al., 2016). it is evident today that a number of tourist travels are associated with an opportunity for cannabis consumption. such travels can be either domestic or outbound to a neighboring country (e.g., german tourists in the netherlands, polish tourists in the czech republic, us tourists in mexico) or to a more distant country (e.g., uk tourist in the spanish island of ibiza) (valdez, sifaneck, 1997; bellis et al., 2000; briggs, turner, 2012; emcdda, 2012; cherpitel et al., 2015). the trip duration ranges from a weekend break to backpacking trips lasting up to several months. in poland, a relatively large group of citizens admits to consuming cannabis.3 according to a report prepared by the public opinion research center foundation commissioned by the polish ministry of health (sierosławski et al., 2015), it can be estimated at around 1.5 million. many of the users make tourist trips. thus, the aim of the present study is to characterize the tourist activity of polish cannabis consumers, and its determinants. first, the level of their participation in tourism is estimated. next, this participation is quantified using several parameters (such as the trip date, the length of stay, traveling companions, etc.) finally, the effect of demographic, socio-economic and geographic features of voivodeships4 on the participation of polish cannabis consumers in tourism is explored. 2. literature review the phenomenon of drug consumption during tourist travels first attracted interest of researchers in the 2 despite the federal ban, several states (e.g., colorado in 2012) legalized cannabis consumption for recreational purposes. 3 the purchase of cannabis for medical purposes was legalized in 2017. the first deliveries to pharmacies were made in 2019. 4 voivodship is an administrative region of poland that corresponds to a province in many other countries. there are 16 voivodships in poland (fig. 1). 1970s. this phenomenon was initially ascribed to a specific type of tourists who were termed ‘drifters’ (cohen, 1973). such a viewpoint was supported by subsequent studies on the drifter subculture on the beaches of goa (india) and koh pha ngan (thailand) (westerhausen, 2002). drug tourism was defined as “the phenomenon by which persons become attracted to a particular location because of the accessibility of licit or illicit drugs and related services” (valdez, sifaneck, 1997, p. 880). this definition resulted from the study of drug tourism on the usa-mexico border. later, the important role of cross-border mobility in drug consumption among the mexican-american residents living on the usa-mexico border was suggested (cherpitel et al., 2015). drug tourism was also formulated as “the phenomenon by which the tourist experience involves all of the awareness, consumption, and usage of drugs that are considered to be illegal in either the visited destination or the tourist’s country of origin” (uriely, belhassen, 2005, p. 239). motivations for the drug tourism of american and european tourists in the amazonia region were thoroughly analyzed in a series of studies (derios, 1994; winkelman, 2005; tupper, 2008; holman, 2011; prayag et al., 2015; kavenská & simonová, 2015). one of the reasons for those travels was an opportunity to consume the ayahuasca brew, which is made of plants containing psychoactive substances. the ayahuasca brew was consumed by the tourists seeking profound experiences while they were participating in all-night religious ceremonies conducted by local shamans. in contrast to the ayahuasca tourists, some other types of drug tourists, exemplified by british tourists in ibiza (bellis et al., 2000; briggs, turner, 2012; van havere et al., 2011) and american students on their spring break (josiam et al., 1998), were mainly motivated by the need for entertainment and leisure. nevertheless, the trips of drug tourists to the netherlands were taken due to the liberalism of the dutch towards drugs, the commercial availability of high-quality and relatively cheap drugs in the netherlands, as well as access to local health care services in case of drug indisposition or drug addiction (van den brink, 1996; korf, 2002; monshouwer et al., 2011; emcdda, 2012). the aforementioned studies of drug tourism are limited to only several tourist destinations where (i) some drugs are legally and commercially available and (ii) some niche forms of tourism, such as backpacking, drifting, tramping, participation in music festivals, etc. are supported. the conclusions drawn from these studies apply, in principle, to specific groups of tourists. the research approach to drug tourism in these studies is mostly constructed around the concept of trips associated with addiction (the tourism of polish cannabis consumers 3 so-called deviant entertainment), which is due to the negative social connotations of drug use. thus, the phenomenon of drug tourism still seems to be rather far away from being fully characterized (hoffmann, 2014; pinheiro dias pereira, de paula, 2016; kang et al., 2016). in the field of drug tourism, cannabis attracts increasing attention due to its prevalence over other drugs consumed worldwide (unodc, 2019). the extant literature on cannabis tourism usually stresses its negative perception as a marginal subculture (uriely, belhassen, 2005). such a perception seems not to provide an unbiased and in-depth picture of this kind of drug tourism. a recent study indicated that, in the light of cannabis legalization in several states of the usa, cannabis use can be perceived as a recreational activity for modern western societies (kang et al., 2016). moreover, cannabis consumption is largely used as a pastime and to cope with the challenges and demands of living in modern western societies (liebregts et al., 2015; osborne, fogel, 2008). therefore, the unilateral view on cannabis consumption as a deviant tourist behavior cannot be held any longer. nowadays, people are beginning to accept cannabis as a tourist attraction that they can experience during their holidays. they do not construe cannabis as a marginalized tourist interest or a mere extension of their daily habit (kang et al., 2016). cannabis tourism is inevitably associated with the process of cultural changes in the modern world, especially in the west. this process affects people’s attitude towards cannabis. thus, the sociological aspect of cannabis is also present in the studies of cannabis tourism (belhassen et al., 2007; kang et al., 2016; keul, eisenhauer, 2019; wen et al., 2018). the legalization of recreational cannabis creates opportunities for the development of tourism and hospitality. a better understanding of this development requires in-depth studies on cannabis tourism, the supply and demand for it, its economic and social impact, the relation between cannabis tourists and the locals, and policies and regulations governing the cannabis tourism market. the last few years have indeed seen a number of studies in these fields. first, there were attempts to formulate the very definition of cannabis tourism (motyka, 2016; taylor, 2019). next, the motivations for this kind of tourism (osborne, fogel, 2008; wen et al., 2018) and the segmentation of cannabis tourists were identified and analyzed (wen et al., 2020). issues connected with governing the liberalization of cannabis for recreational purposes in colorado were specified in a series of studies (kang et al., 2016; kang, lee, 2018; keul, eisenhauer, 2019). the effect of cannabis tourism on the overall tourism income was estimated for the amsterdam metropolitan area5 and the us state of colorado (kang et al., 2016; van loon, rouwendal, 2017). the positive economic effect of cannabis tourism in colorado resulted in the growing support of the locals for this kind of tourism (kang, lee, 2018; kang, 2019). finally, such cannabis-related events as cannabis festivals and their attendees were characterized from a tourism perspective (skliamis, korf, 2019; kang et al., 2019). it was reported in previous studies that the category of drug tourists mostly includes people at the age between 15 and 34 who study and/or work (uriely, belhassen, 2005; grobe, lűer, 2011; emcdda, 2012; motyka, 2016; matczak, pawlicki, 2016). males are twice as likely as females to become drug tourists. in principle, drug tourists are usually welleducated and they can afford to travel. they are not addicted to drugs, but they have previous experiences with their consumption. they are usually well integrated into the society, fulfilling basic social roles and life tasks. for them, drug consumption during tourist trips is usually part of their tourist experience (grobe, lűer, 2011; motyka, 2016). it was also shown that the youth who visited clubs, music festivals and dance events were more experienced in drug use than other young people (measham et al., 2001; van havere et al., 2011). for example, ibiza, which is famous for its nightlife and electronic music events, is recognized as a place where drug use is accompanied by extensive clubbing and partying (van havere et al., 2011; briggs, turner, 2012). 3. data and methods data were obtained from an anonymous online survey conducted in march 2016. answers to 14 questions were collected for 886 respondents who declared cannabis consumption (aged 15–64) and lived in poland at that time. the respondents answered nine questions about their attitude to cannabis consumption and the characteristics of their tourist trips. there were also five questions to provide the demographic, socio-economic and geographic metrics of the respondents (gender, age, education, source of income, place of residence). there are two methodological issues associated with the survey. the first is the date of the survey. year 2016 was one of the last years of intense discussions in the mass media, developing social 5 the expenses of tourists visiting amsterdam mostly for cannabis consumption were higher than those of all other tourists. this suggests an unexpectedly large contribution of cannabis to the municipal economy. 4 andrzej matczak, przemysław a. pawlicki movements to legalize cannabis consumption, and the liberalization of cannabis use despite the stringent law on drugs in poland. therefore, there was much interest in the survey among cannabis users at that time. thus, the date of the survey could be regarded as an advantage. the second issue arises from the fact that the online survey form was spontaneously filled in by a large group of voluntary respondents who came across a hyperlink to the survey while browsing the internet (the hyperlinks were placed in social networks, websites and discussion groups). the subject of the survey was interesting to the respondents who were convinced that the survey concerned them directly, and it could have an influence on public opinion. because of the voluntary participation in the survey, its results should be treated with some caution. results of the survey are analyzed by means of such essential statistical indicators as the coefficient of variation (v), spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs) and the concordation coefficient (rk) (runge, 2006, p. 503). the v coefficient is expressed in percentage points using the following formula: x s v where s is the standard deviation and is the arithmetic mean. the value of v indicates that the variability of a parameter is small (v < 20%), average (20% < v < 40%), high (40% < v < 100%) or very high (v > 100%). the rs and rk coefficients are calculated according to the formulas: nn d r n i i s – –= � = 6 1 )1( 312 22 222 –× ×= � ( + 1) n j = 1 j k where di denotes the rank difference, n is the number of elements in a series, r is the sum of ranks, and m is the number of features. the statistical significance of rk is verified by the χ 2 test (χ2 = m(n – 1)rk). the rk coefficient is a normalized correlation measure (0 ≤ rk ≤ 1). the closer the rk coefficient is to unity, the more consistent ordering a series of features shows. the similarity of voivodeships with respect to the tourist motives and travel destinations of respondents is analyzed by means of the structural difference index (ws) (rogacki, 2009, p. 214): � where ai and bi denote the shares of voivodeships a and b, respectively, in a given group of motives and travel destinations. the values of ws fall in the range from 0 to 1, and the former signals an identical structure. the higher the ws value is, the greater the difference is between two voivodeships in their structure. the model of arithmetic means (msr) is also used to distinguish the main elements determining individual structural groups (runge, 2006, p. 232). � � � oj gj sr x x m where xgj stands for the arithmetic mean of the j-th feature in a group, xoj is the arithmetic mean of the j-th feature in the entire matrix, j = 1, ..., m. 4. results the demographic, socio-economic and geographic characteristics of respondents participating in the survey were presented in our previous paper (matczak, pawlicki, 2019). below, the main findings of that paper are summarized to provide the background to the present study. the vast majority of respondents belong to the y generation, aged 15–34 at the time of the survey. respondents born in the 1970s (the so-called x generation) constitute merely a share of 4.4%. within the y generation, the respondents at the age of 15–29 dominate, amounting to 88.5% of all respondents. the group of male respondents is much more numerous (72.6%) than that of women. the age structure of respondents shows some differences between both genders. the shares of younger age, 20–24 in particular, mainly contribute to the group of all female respondents. there is a significant decrease in the shares of older women. for the male respondents, the share of age under 25 is clearly smaller than the corresponding share of women. for this reason, the shares of older male respondents decrease much slowly. respondents are essentially characterized by a high level of education. the highest share is represented by those having secondary or higher education. for the male respondents, the share of secondary education is greater than that of higher education. in contrast, there are more female respondents having higher education than those with secondary education. due to their young age, many respondents may continue education and increase the level of their education in the near future. the young age of many respondents also indicates a significant level of family participation in their livelihood. nearly half of male respondents declare their own source of income, while only one third tourism of polish cannabis consumers 5 of women do so. over one third of all respondents admit that they depend exclusive on family for their livelihood. on the other hand, similar shares of male and female respondents declare a combination of family support and their own source of income. such respondents most often work and/or study. more than half of the respondents (62.7%) are classified as the current cannabis consumers, that is, they consumed cannabis during the 30 days preceding the survey (emcdda, 2008). 28.6% of respondents declare regular consumption (practically every day) and 34.1% claim frequent use. 27.2% of respondents are identified as recent cannabis consumers, that is, they used cannabis during the 12 months preceding the survey (emcdda, 2008). occasional experimenting with cannabis in a lifetime is indicated by 10.1% of respondents (the so-called ever users). one third of the ever users gave up cannabis consumption. the share of male respondents is triple as many as the share of female respondents. this applies to both current and recent cannabis consumers. by contrast, there are almost identical shares of male and female ever users. the respondents’ age is another factor differentiating the frequency of cannabis consumption. the share of current consumption decreases with the respondents’ age. a similar trend can be found for recent users. interestingly, the share of cannabis experimenters increases with their age. an increase in the level of education is associated with the diminishing share of current consumption and with the growing shares of recent use and experimentation. current users more often declare their own source of income than their partial or total dependence on family support. by contrast, recent consumers and experimenters often depend on family for their livelihood. in the survey there are respondents from each voivodeship of poland. on average, 53.1 respondents can be assigned to each voivodeship, with a standard deviation of 38.2 and a high value of the variation coefficient (71.9%). small numbers of respondents come from three less populated voivodeships (świętokrzyskie, opolskie, lubuskie). two thirds of respondents live in the voivodeships with over 0.5 million inhabitants and large cities (dolnośląskie, łódzkie, małopolskie, mazowieckie, wielkopolskie) or being highly urbanized (śląskie, pomorskie). large cities (warsaw, kraków, łódź, wrocław and poznań) are the place of residence for 36.5% of respondents. each of these cities has over 0.5 million inhabitants and well-developed services offering the best prospects for work and education, and they provide various kinds of entertainment, including nightlife and stimulants. very few respondents live in small towns or rural areas (3.3%). 4.1. participation in tourism the results of the survey show that the level of respondents’ participation in tourism is slightly higher than that of the polish society (56.4 vs. 54.0%) (gus, 2016). the former is clearly differentiated between the voivodeships of poland (v = 75.2%). the respondents living in the eastern voivodeships, which are less economically developed, declare a higher level of participation in tourism. it appears that the lower level of social acceptance of cannabis consumption in these regions results in the necessity for tourist travels to consume cannabis. foreign travels are more popular than domestic trips; the latter are taken by less than one third of the respondents. this is much different from the trips of the polish in general; ca. 80% of the polish spend holidays in poland (gus, 2016). one third of the respondents declaring domestic trips simultaneously participate in foreign travels. the average frequency of traveling is high (3.6 trips per respondent) and it varies among voivodeships (v = 76.7%). for the respondents residing in the southern and northern voivodeships, the frequency of their traveling is above the average. 4.2. characteristics of tourism table 1 presents the complete characteristics of respondents’ tourism. from this table it can be deduced that the respondents’ domestic trips are essentially short-term. for 56.2% of the respondents, their domestic trips take no longer than four days. foreign travels are longer and 60.4% of respondents spend at least five days on such travels. respondents most often travel with friends, especially when going abroad (61.2%). respondents on domestic trips are accompanied by family members (14.9%) or a partner (13.4%). the share of foreign travels with family is only of 4.4% and that with a partner amounts to 26.4%. 7.5% of the respondents participate in domestic and foreign group travels. 3% and 13.2% of the respondents travel on their own within the country and abroad, respectively. cars (55.4%) and railway (35.4%) are two most popular means of transport for domestic trips. respondents travel abroad by car (39.1%), plane (28.9%) or bus (25%). rail transport and unconventional forms of transport, such as hitchhiking or by bicycle, are marginal. respondents on their tourist trips stay at relatively cheap accommodation facilities. respondents on domestic trips use private accommodation (22.9%), tents and camping houses (31.5%), summer houses (29.9%) and hotels (15.7%). respondents on foreign trips mainly use hotels (38.5%) or other hotel 6 andrzej matczak, przemysław a. pawlicki tab. 1. the characteristics of tourist trips made by the survey respondents. for comparison, tourist trips made by the polish society in 2015 are also characterized. all values are expressed in percentage points except for the values of expenses in pln trip characteristics trips of respondents 1 trips of the polish 2 domestic foreign domestic foreign date of trip 1st quarter of year 3.0 13.1 20.4 18.0 2nd quarter of year 9.0 13.1 20.3 23.2 3rd quarter of year 71.6 53.1 40.1 38.3 4th quarter of year 16.4 20.7 19.0 20.5 length of stay 2–4 days 51.4 34.2 60.8 19.2 5 days and more 48.6 65.8 39.2 80.8 traveling companion friends 61.2 48.3 nd 3 nd family 14.9 4.4 nd nd partner 13.4 26.4 nd nd group 7.5 7.7 nd nd none 3.0 13.2 nd nd means of transport car 55.4 39.1 74.0* 32.6* coach/bus 9.2 25.0 14.5* 17.4* train 35.4 3.1 11.0* 0.7* plane 28.9 -* 48.3* other 3.9 0.5* 1.0* type of accommodation facility all hotel facilities 15.7 45.7 22.2 50.1 only hotels 5.7 38.5 private accommodation/guest room 22.9 7.2 9.2 7.7 hostel 6.5 2.4 1.8 campsite, camping site, bungalow 31.5 18.8 3.6 2.5 summer house, etc. 29.9 21.8 62.6 37.9 average expenses per person domestic short-term trip 388.8 264.0 domestic long-term trip 1017.0 823.0 foreign one-day trip 257.5 344.0 foreign short-term trip 897.9 1151.0 foreign long-term trip 3281.1 2347.0 destination in poland within the voivodeship of residence 36.4 nd neighboring voivodeships 30.0 nd more distant voivodeships 33.6 nd abroad czech republic 24.2 5.4 netherlands 46.5 1.6 other european countries 24.8 78.5 non-european countries 4.5 14.5 1 based on own survey data. 2 according to (gus, 2014; gus, 2016). 3 the abbreviation ‘nd’ stands for no data. * means of transport used in 2013 for domestic trips taking at least five days or foreign trips with at least one night’s accommodation. source: own survey data. tourism of polish cannabis consumers 7 facilities (13.7%), tents and camping houses (18.8%) and accommodation with family and friends (21.8%). respondents spend relatively little money on tourist travels. nearly half of the respondents spend up to €100 on domestic trips. the rest of the respondents spend more than €100 but less than €750. greater expenses are spent on foreign trips. almost 75% of respondents spend up to €750 on such trips. 4.3. cannabis consumption as a travel motive the respondents’ tourist trips are partially conditioned by the willingness to consume cannabis. nearly one third of respondents indicate that cannabis consumption is a primary motive for traveling. however, 55.1% of the respondents claim that cannabis consumption on a trip is an additional factor widening their tourism experience. cannabis consumption is a minor motive for traveling for 12.8% of the respondents. the importance of cannabis consumption as a motive for traveling varies among the voivodeships of poland. the ws index allows dividing the voivodeships into five structural groups according to the importance of cannabis consumption as a travel motive (groups i–v in table 2 and figure 1). the travel motives determining these groups are identified by means of the arithmetic means model. cannabis consumption is the primary travel motive for the respondents residing in the following voivodeships: podkarpackie, warmińsko-mazurskie and świętokrzyskie. respondents coming from the śląskie, opolskie and pomorskie voivodeships reveal two mutually exclusive motives; many respondents make trips mainly to consume cannabis and many others consider cannabis consumption as a minor motive for traveling. cannabis consumption is an additional motive (that is, equally important as other motives) for the respondents living in the lubelskie, lubuskie, podlaskie, and wielkopolskie voivodeships. the respondents of the kujawsko -pomorskie, zachodniopomorskie, dolnośląskie, łódzkie voivodeships indicate cannabis consumption as a minor motive for their domestic tourist trips. there is a strong similarity between the voivodeships of the respondents’ residence if the frequency of cannabis consumption is compared with the motives for traveling, especially for foreign trips. the voivodeships of the current cannabis users’ residence (that is, those consuming cannabis during the 30 days preceding the survey (emcdda, 2008)) closely correspond to the voivodeships in which cannabis is regarded as the additional (rs  =  0.96) or primary (rs = 0.94) motive for a tourist trip. similarly, the voivodeships of the residence of recent cannabis users (that is, those consuming cannabis during the 12  months preceding the survey (emcdda, 2008)) correlate with the voivodeships in which the respondents consider cannabis as the additional motive for a tourist trip (rs = 0.94). respondents experimenting with cannabis usually share the same voivodeships with the respondents declaring cannabis as the additional motive for a tourist trip (rs = 0.875). tab. 2. the structure of the importance of cannabis consumption as a travel motive. group voivodeships msr 1 i kujawsko-pomorskie, zachodniopomorskie, dolnośląskie, łódzkie 1.59 – minor 0.999 – additional 0.76 – primary ii podkarpackie, warmińsko-mazurskie, świętokrzyskie 1.69 – primary 0.72 – additional 0.54 – minor iii mazowieckie, małopolskie 1.16 – primary 1.019 – additional 0.516 – minor iv śląskie, opolskie, pomorskie 1.175 – primary 1.039 – minor 0.889 – additional v lubelskie, lubuskie, podlaskie, wielkopolskie 1.303 – additional 0.741 – primary 0.346 – minor 1 the scale of motive importance ranges from ‘primary’ to ‘additional’ and to ‘minor’. source: own survey data. 8 andrzej matczak, przemysław a. pawlicki 4.4. tourist destinations 4.4.1. domestic tourist trips results of the survey essentially show similar shares of respondents traveling within the voivodeship of residence, to the neighboring voivodeships and to more distant voivodeships. frequent short-term trips to destinations with good environmental conditions for recreation (lakes, beaches, etc.) and in the vicinity of the place of residence are favored. trips to more distant voivodeships are less frequent, but the stays take longer and then recreation is combined with sightseeing and various forms of entertainment. as shown in table 3, the respondents living in the lubuskie, zachodniopomorskie, podlaskie and kujawsko-pomorskie voivodeships mainly travel within the voivodeship of their residence (termed by ‘intra’ in table 3). respondents from the opolskie, podkarpackie and warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeships mostly travel to the neighboring voivodeships, while those from the łódzkie and dolnośląskie voivodeships mainly go on trips to more distant voivodeships. respondents from the remaining seven voivodeships (group ii in table 3) willingly travel both within the voivodeship of their residence and to more distant voivodeships. the voivodeships exhibiting high tourist attractiveness tend to hold their residents for recreation, with the exception of respondents living in the dolnośląskie voivodeship. on the other hand, i ii iii iv v fig 1. five groups of voivodeships distinguished using the ws index for the structure of the importance of cannabis consumption as a travel motive source: data taken from table 2. tourism of polish cannabis consumers 9 the respondents coming from highly urbanized voivodeships and inhibiting large cities, prefer traveling to neighboring and more distant voivodeships. the respondents who spend holidays in poland take cannabis from their place of residence and consume it on a trip, regarding it as a form of leisure activities and integration with friends. 4.4.2. foreign tourist trips the choice of individual foreign tourist destinations by the respondents is related to the possibility of cannabis consumption in the destinations. the netherlands is the most often visited country (46.5% of the respondents traveling abroad), and the czech republic is the second most popular destination (24.2%). other european destinations account for 24.8% of foreign tourist trips. these destinations include, among others, spain, germany and great britain (ca. 4% each). few trips are reported to noneuropean destinations (e.g., egypt, india, the usa, mexico, thailand, vietnam, uruguay). cannabis is easily accessible in these countries. the respondents living in individual voivodeships show quite different preferences for the destination of their foreign tourist trip. five structural groups (i–v in table 4) are distinguished by means of the ws index. within each group, the dominant tourist destinations are identified using the model of arithmetic means (msr in table 4). the respondents of nearly two thirds of voivodeships favor traveling to the netherlands. the czech republic is a popular destination for the respondents residing in the border voivodeships. only the respondents of the lubuskie and łódzkie voivodeships visit the czech republic more often than the netherlands. respondents living in the northern voivodeships of poland prefer other european destinations to the netherlands and the czech republic. the residents of only a few most urbanized voivodeships (łódzkie, małopolskie, mazowieckie, śląskie and wielkopolskie) declare trips outside europe. the main reason for visiting the aforementioned destinations is the possibility of legally purchasing cannabis (advertised as feeling the taste of freedom) and trying many varieties of cannabis on a tourist or business trip. amsterdam and prague are sometimes visited in transit, e.g., while traveling to the alps. 4.5. effect of regional differentiation of demographic, socio-economic and geographic parameters on tourist trips the effect of demographic, socio-economic and geographic parameters on tourist trips is estimated by comparing the spatial distribution of the voivodeship of respondents’ residence with such parameters as the distribution of city inhabitants aged 16–44, the number of inhabitants of large cities (population larger than 100,000), the level of education (only secondary and higher), and the size of the gross domestic product. the rs coefficient calculated for all tourist trips, domestic trips and foreign trips is in the ranges of 0.88–0.94, 0.73–0.93 and 0.82–0.91, respectively. the rk coefficient adopts high values: 0.95 for all tourist trips (χ2 = 85.29), 0.93 for domestic trips (χ2 = 83.79) and 0.94 for foreign trips (χ 2  =  84.15). all the three calculated χ2 values are greater than the expected value of χ2 = 24.996, and therefore, they suggest a significant interrelation (α  = 0.05 is taken for the χ2 test). the spatial distribution of the voivodeship of the respondents’ residence is tab. 3. the structure of domestic tourist destinations group voivodeships msr 1 i łódzkie, dolnośląskie 1.802 – distant 0.673 – neighboring 0.540 – intra ii mazowieckie, lubelskie, wielkopolskie, śląskie, małopolskie, świętokrzyskie, pomorskie 1.061 – intra 1.048 – distant 0.870 – neighboring iii lubuskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, podlaskie, zachodniopomorskie 2.534 – intra 0.210 – neighboring 0.000 – distant iv opolskie, podkarpackie, warmińsko-mazurskie 1.875 – neighboring 0.843 – intra 0.393 – distant 1 domestic tourist destinations are termed as ‘intra’, ‘neighboring’ and ‘distant’, depending on the distance between the voivodeship of domicile and the voivodeship of a tourist destination. ‘intra’ means tourist trips within the voivodeship of residence. source: own survey data. 10 andrzej matczak, przemysław a. pawlicki strongly conditioned by the spatial distribution of young, well-educated people living in large cities and in rich, well-developed regions. the effect of parameters varies among the destinations of foreign tourist trips. in the case of the netherlands, the rs coefficient falls in a range of 0.8–0.9 and the rk coefficient is of 0.929 (χ 2 = 83.61). a similar range of rs is obtained for the remaining destinations and the rk coefficient amounts to 0.945 (χ2 = 85.05). for tourist trips to the czech republic, the spatial distributions of parameters are characterized by a much lower degree of similarity. then, the rs coefficients are at an average level of 0.5–0.53 and rk = 0.823 (χ 2 = 74.07). this indicates that the demographic, socio-economic and geographic structure of respondents traveling to the czech republic is somewhat different from that of respondents visiting the netherlands. respondents residing in the voivodeships bordering the czech republic and declaring cannabis consumption on a tourist trip more often choose the czech republic to be the destination of their trip. the rs coefficient between the distances of the voivodeship of respondents’ residence from the border crossing in cieszyn adopts a negative value of -0.6. the place of the respondents’ residence poorly corresponds to the place of residence of the polish declaring drug consumption in general (czapiński, panek, 2015). the rs coefficient between the two spatial distributions is equal to 0.238, 0.178 and 0.397 for all tourist trips, domestic trips and foreign trips, respectively. this suggests that cannabis consumers and users of other drugs are different in their demographic, socio-economic and geographic nature. the respondents declaring cannabis consumption on a domestic tourist trip usually prefer the region in which they currently live. it seems that the distance to a vacation spot and the length of stay are the most important, hence the low value rs = 0.282 between the place of respondents’ residence and the tourist attractiveness of this place. on the other hand, relatively high rs values can be observed between the destination region and its tourist attractiveness (0.679) and the volume of tourist traffic (0.703). this indicates that the respondents take the tourist attractiveness of a destination into account while planning a tourist trip. 5. discussion and conclusions the present study proves that online surveys, despite their inherent limitations, are able to provide the demographic (gender, age), socio-economic (level of education, source of livelihood), geographic (place of residence) and cannabis consumption characteristics of respondents making tourist trips. tab. 4. the structure of foreign tourist destinations group voivodeships msr 1 i dolnośląskie, opolskie, podlaskie 1.892 – the czech republic 1.162 – the netherlands 0.168 – other european countries 0.000 – non-european countries ii łódzkie, lubuskie 1.959 – the czech republic 1.058 – non-european countries 0.728 – the netherlands 0.628 – other european countries iii lubelskie, małopolskie, śląskie 1.103 – the netherlands 1.000 – the czech republic 0.953 – non-european countries 0.842 – other european countries iv kujawsko-pomorskie, pomorskie, warmińsko-mazurskie, mazowieckie, świętokrzyskie 1.780 – other european countries 0.767 – the czech republic 0.727 – the netherlands 0.326 – non-european countries v wielkopolskie, podkarpackie, zachodniopomorskie 1.532 – the netherlands 1.000 – other european countries 0.077 – the czech republic 0.077 – non-european countries 1 foreign tourist destinations are termed according to the country of a tourist destination. source: own survey data. tourism of polish cannabis consumers 11 on the one hand, the analysis of motives for the respondents’ participation in tourism indicates that cannabis consumption is an additional tourist attraction for the majority of the respondents. on the other hand, one third of the respondents consider cannabis consumption as the primary motive for their tourist trips. this shows that, to a large extent, the respondents equate their travels with the consumption of cannabis, which is in line with results of other studies (motyka, 2016; emcdda, 2012; grobe, lűer, 2011). the respondents’ tourist activity and travel motives are conditioned by the fact that many respondents are current and recent cannabis consumers. the frequency of cannabis consumption declared by our respondents differs from the findings reported in the literature, according to which 16.3% of the polish aged 15–64 admit to using cannabis at least once in a lifetime, 4.6% in the last year and 2.1% in the last month (sierosławski et al., 2015, p. 219). the present survey shows significant shares of respondents consuming cannabis during the last month (62.7%) and year (27.2%) preceding the survey. it means that mostly current and recent cannabis consumers were interested in participating in the survey. thus, the results of the survey mainly concern such groups of cannabis users. the tourism activity of respondents declaring current and recent cannabis consumption has a different nature from the tourism activity of the polish society in general. while the level of participation in tourism does not differentiate our respondents from the polish society in general, other parameters characterizing their tourist activity show evident differences. for foreign tourist trips, the respondents prefer those countries where cannabis is easily accessible and its consumption is legal or at least tolerated. this shows a strong influence of the respondents’ personal preferences on the nature of their travels. the statistical analysis of the survey data (rs and rk) confirms the previous finding that cannabis tourists come from a group of young people with secondary and higher education, living in large cities and rich regions (motyka, 2016; emcdda, 2012; grobe, lűer, 2011). therefore, a cannabis tourist is a person with a low/medium level of addiction and simultaneously rich enough to afford a tourist trip. participation in cannabis tourism, previously treated as a deviant or marginal behavior, results from in-depth cultural changes in the modern world (wen et al., 2018; ying et al., 2019). western societies rapidly change and they start taking positive attitude towards wide cannabis consumption for relaxation (wen et al., 2018). this also applies to the polish society. the consent to cannabis consumption is largely conditioned by a regional cultural context. this is illustrated by the geographic differentiation of the socio-economic environment in which polish cannabis consumers undertaking tourist trips exist. the present study seems to be another proof that cannabis tourism becomes a field of growing interest among tourism researchers. the worldwide trend to legalize the production, distribution and consumption 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montanari (2), katerina skarupova (2), marica ferri (2), isabelle giraudon (2), jane mounteney (2), sandrine sleiman (2), katarzyna natoniewska (2), bruno guarita (2), liesbeth vandam (2), tim surmont (2), paul griffiths (2) (1) european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, praça europa 1, cais do sodré, 1249-289 lisbon, portugal e-mail: alessandro.pirona@emcdda.europa.eu (corresponding author) (2) european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, praça europa 1, cais do sodré, 1249-289 lisbon, portugal citation pirona a., matias j., montanari l., skarupova k., ferri m., giraudon i., mounteney j., sleiman s., natoniewska k., guarita b., vandam l., surmont t., griffiths p., 2022, impact of covid-19 on drug markets, use, harms and drug services in europe, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 4–7. abstract since early 2020, the covid-19 pandemic has had a dramatic impact on the way we live, with european countries having to introduce unprecedented measures to protect public health. as with all areas of life, drug consumption, related harms and drug markets have been impacted, as have the drug services established to respond to drug-related problems. since the start of the pandemic in march 2020, the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction instigated three rapid assessment studies to identify the initial impact and implications of covid-19 on drug markets, use, harms and drug services in the community and in prisons. findings from these studies revealed that the pandemic and associated health prevention measures implemented by the countries impacted drug markets and use differently depending on the different periods and events throughout the pandemic, but also according to particular drugs or user characteristics. most drug services remained operational throughout the pandemic in order to assure continuity of care. this was achieved by innovation and adaptation of their services, especially during the different lockdown periods. thus, the results from these rapid assessments provide a glimpse into new developments in the drugs field across european countries emerging both during and in response to the pandemic, and which could have important implications for the future. key words covid-19, drugs, drug markets, drug use, pandemic, drug-related harms, drug treatment, harm reduction, opioid agonist treatment. received: 01 april 2022 accepted: 27 april 2022 published: 27 may 2022 impact of covid-19 on drug markets, use, harms and drug services in europe 5 1. background on 11 march 2020, the world health organization declared covid-19 a pandemic. since then, the virus has claimed millions of lives and has transformed nearly every aspect of our individual and collective reality. as with all areas of life, drug consumption, related harms and drug markets have been impacted, as have the services established to respond to drugrelated problems. as we enter third year of the pandemic, a number of observations in these areas can be drawn from the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) studies that were carried since the start of the pandemic to assess the impact and implications of covid-19 on the drug situation in europe. during the first weeks of the pandemic in 2020, the emcdda instigated two rapid assessment studies, followed by a third rapid assessment in 2021 on the impact of covid-19 and related national prevention responses on drug markets, use, harms and drug services in europe (emcdda, 2020a, 2020b, 2021a). these rapid assessments, called emcdda trendspotter studies, triangulate data from key informants, national focal points, online surveys of people who drugs, city-based wastewater analysis, and emerging data from established and developmental indicators (such as drug checking, syringe residue analyses, hospital emergencies, etc). while the lack of comprehensive data during that period due to partial disruptions in data collection or monitoring activities means that all conclusions must be made with caution, the results of these studies still provide a preliminary insight on the impact of the pandemic on the drug situation in europe. for detailed information on the methods of the emcdda trendspotter studies, please see emcdda 2018 and 2021a. 2. findings one of the main findings from the emcdda studies is that the drug market has been remarkably resilient to disruption caused by the pandemic. drug traffickers adapted to travel restrictions and border closures. at wholesale level this was reflected in some changes in routes and methods, with more reliance on smuggling via intermodal containers and commercial supply chains and less reliance on the use of human couriers. thus, more cannabis and heroin smuggled by sea, to avoid land border closures, leading to large seizures in europe’s ports. some changes were observed in the departure locations of cocaine trafficked from latin america to europe. however, no decline in supply was evident, and multi-tonne seizures of cocaine were reported in european ports in 2020 and early 2021, including 16 tonnes in hamburg in germany and 7.2 tonnes in antwerp in belgium (emcdda, 2021b; emcdda and europol, 2020). reports indicated that cannabis cultivation and synthetic drug production within the european union continued at pre-pandemic levels during 2020. while street-based retail drug markets were disrupted during the initial lockdowns, and some localised shortages were experienced, drug sellers and buyers appeared to have adapted by increasing their use of encrypted messaging services, social media applications, online sources and mail and home delivery services. this raises the concern that a possible long-term impact of the pandemic will possibly be further digitally enabled drug markets. findings from the emcdda rapid assessments also suggests that any reductions in drug consumption seen during the initial lockdowns in the member states in the first half of 2020, rapidly disappeared as social distancing measures were eased. in general terms, there appears to have been less consumer interest in drugs usually associated with recreational events, such as mdma, and greater interest in drugs linked with home use. however, the easing of restrictions on movement and travel and a return of social gatherings from the summer 2020 onwards was associated with a rebound in the levels of use. available data from the analysis of wastewater samples in european cities indicate that levels of use of most drugs appeared generally lower during the initial lockdowns in 2020, but then appeared to bounce back once lockdown were lifted. a comparison with 2019 suggests similar overall consumption of most drugs and in several cities possibly even higher levels, based on this data source. exceptions here appear to be mdma and methamphetamine, two drugs for which the levels observed in 2020 appeared lower in most of the participating cities. less consumer interest in mdma during the pandemic is supported by user reports collected through the emcdda web survey on drugs, where a decline in use was noted, and some limited data on hospital emergencies, which showed a decline in mdmarelated admissions. this is against a background of high availability of this drug, as indicated by the continued detection of high-strength mdma tablets in most countries by european law enforcement and drug checking services. interestingly, dutch drug monitoring services reported the introduction of lower-strength tablets, apparently marketed as more suitable for home use. 6 alessandro pirona et al. emcdda web survey data from people who selfreport drug use also pointed to higher consumption of alcohol and greater experimentation with psychedelics, such as lsd and 2-cb (2,5-dimethoxy4-bromophenethylamine), and dissociative drugs such as ketamine. this may reflect a growth in demand for substances possibly perceived as more suitable for home consumption. the same web-survey also found that those using drugs occasionally prior to covid-19 may have reduced or even ceased their use during the pandemic, but more regular and frequent users may have increased their drug consumption. this could have important implications for prevention and treatment services if the changes observed are substantiated and persist into the future. furthermore, an increase in reports of cannabis adulterated with synthetic cannabinoids emerged in several european countries during 2020 and continued in 2021. it is not known what could be driving this development but it could possibly reflect both shortages of cannabis linked to the pandemic or, possibly, criminal groups exploiting the availability of low-thc cannabis products in some countries, which may be difficult to distinguish from cannabis sold on the drug market. any scenario where people unwittingly consume synthetic cannabinoids is worrying given the toxicity of some of these substances, as illustrated by an outbreak of over 20 deaths related to the synthetic cannabinoid 4f-mdmb-bica in 2020. among the possible worrying developments associated with the pandemic is the observation that some countries are seeing an increase in crack cocaine availability and use. also of concern were reports of increased availability of smaller doses or cheaper packages of heroin, crack and benzodiazepines targeting problem drug users with financial difficulties during the pandemic. drug problems are often found in marginalised groups such as the homeless, and those with drug problems may often rely on informal or parallel economies. it is likely these groups have been financially disadvantaged and reduced income by social distancing measures, travel restrictions and lockdown measures, and may be particularly vulnerable to any future economic difficulties resulting from the ongoing health crisis. growing concerns were also noted about the misuse of benzodiazepines, either diverted from therapeutic use or benzodiazepines not licenced for medical use in europe appearing on the illicit drug market. increased use of benzodiazepines was seen among high-risk drug users, prisoners and some groups of recreational drug users, potentially reflecting the high availability and low cost of these substances and pandemic-related mental health issues. a sample of european sentinel hospitals observed an increase in emergency presentations related to benzodiazepines in 2020 compared with 2019. findings from the initial emcdda rapid assessments carried out in march and april 2020 (emcdda, 2020a) suggested a decline in the availability of european drug services during the first two months of the pandemic, with an associated decline in both new treatment entrants and all other treatment entrants, while harm reduction services remained a key frontline actor during and after the first lockdowns. a greater use of telemedicine by drug professionals may have contributed to the reduction in reported treatment demand but also allowed services to continue to meet their clients’ needs during the pandemic. with nearly 700 000 people receiving opioid agonist treatment (oat) in europe annually, service providers and national authorities had to act rapidly and change the way that oat was provided, both to ensure access to medications for those already in treatment and to respond to new treatment demands. drug services across europe had resumed their operations by june 2020, with a return to face-toface consultations within most drug services by early 2021, although at reduced capacity due to covid-19 prevention measures. in general, european professionals reported that the covid-19 prevention measures pushed services to re-evaluate longestablished working procedures. in some cases, this resulted in increased efficiency and innovation in service provision. treatment services in prison settings also reported service disruptions due to social distancing and restrictions on external service providers. restrictions on access by external visitors and contractors to prisons also are also reported to have temporarily reduced the availability of drugs in some prisons. 3. conclusion in conclusion, findings from the emcdda rapid assessments point on the impact of the pandemic to a number of new developments and trends that warrant further research and close monitoring. in the future there will be a need to pay close attention to the psychological and socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic, as well as longer term changes in patterns of illicit drug use and risk behaviours among the wider population. furthermore, the shift to the greater use of online platforms both for drug supply at the retail level, but also for the clinical impact of covid-19 on drug markets, use, harms and drug services in europe 7 management of drug problems will undoubtedly persist beyond the pandemic. finally, these findings provide a valuable first glimpse into the new developments emerging from the pandemic, one which could have important implications for the future as we (hopefully) move into a post-covid-19 period. references emcdda, 2018, trendspotter manual: a handbook for the rapid assessment of emerging drugrelated trends, publications office of the european union, luxembourg. emcdda, 2020a, emcdda trendspotter briefing: impact of covid-19 on drug services and help-seeking in europe, emcdda, lisbon. emcdda, 2020b, emcdda trendspotter briefing: impact of covid-19 on patterns of drug use and drug-related harms in europe, emcdda, lisbon. emcdda and europol, 2020, eu drug markets: impact of covid-19, publications office of the european union, luxembourg. emcdda, 2021a, impact of covid-19 on drug markets, use, harms and drug services in the community and prisons: results from an emcdda trendspotter study, publications office of the european union, luxembourg. emcdda, 2021b, european drug report 2021: trends and developments, publications office of the european union, luxembourg. zeskanowane obrazy 1. introduction around 96 million adults in the european union are estimated to have used illicit drugs at least once in their lifetime. the global covid-19 pandemic has dramatically altered different aspects of modern life, including drug use, the drug market, and the ability of european countries to provide help and support to people with drug problems (emcdda, 2020a). as there are great differences across european countries in their drug policy, drug availability, demand and response services, and also in the management of the covid-19 pandemic, the aim of this study was to investigate how the covid-19 pandemic might journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(1), 28–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.1.05 covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania evelina pridotkienė (1), rūta gedminienė (2), rasa povilanskienė (3), brigita rašimaitė (4), viktorija stifanovičiūtė (5) (1) drug, tobacco and alcohol control department, reitox network national focal point, šv. stepono 27a, lt-01312 vilnius, lithuania e-mail: evelina.pridotkiene@ntakd.lt (corresponding author) (2) drug, tobacco and alcohol control department, reitox network national focal point, šv. stepono 27a, lt-01312 vilnius, lithuania e-mail: ruta.gedminiene@ntakd.lt (3) drug, tobacco and alcohol control department, reitox network national focal point, šv. stepono 27a, lt-01312 vilnius, lithuania e-mail: rasa.povilanskiene@ntakd.lt (4) drug, tobacco and alcohol control department, reitox network national focal point, šv. stepono 27a, lt-01312 vilnius, lithuania e-mail: brigita.rasimaite@ntakd.lt (5) drug, tobacco and alcohol control department, reitox network national focal point, šv. stepono 27a, lt-01312 vilnius, lithuania e-mail: viktorija.stifanoviciute@ntakd.lt citation pridotkienė e., gedminienė r., povilanskienė r., rašimaitė b., stifanovičiūtė v., 2022, covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 28–41. abstract the application of restrictive public health measures because of covid-19 has affected all areas of life, including drug use, drug market, and the response of law enforcement and health, education, and social care institutions to the drug phenomenon. in lithuania students who used psychoactive substances irregularly were more likely to reduce the use of these substances or abstained during quarantine. however, those who used these substances regularly increased the use during quarantine. the provision of harm reduction services was not interrupted, but the package of health services was reduced. there were disruptions in the number of clients entering treatment. participation in the early intervention programme in lithuania for young people who are experimenting with alcohol or drugs increased but did not reach the pre-pandemic level. the pandemic also affected workplace-based prevention. the drug market situation remained stable, although the number of the quantities seized indicated some annual variations, caused by changes in supply and demand during the covid-19 pandemic. key words covid-19 pandemic, psychoactive substance use, drug prevention, drug treatment, drug supply, lithuania. received: 08 april 2022 accepted: 07 may 2022 published: 27 may 2022 covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 29 have affected patterns of drug use, drug market, coverage, and implementation forms of prevention measures, treatment and harm reduction services in lithuania. in this article, we discuss a hypothesis that the covid-19 pandemic may have impacted different aspects of the drug phenomenon in lithuania: not only drug supply and demand, but also the response measures, and that these changes were greatest at the beginning of the pandemic, when covid-19 management restrictions were introduced and during lockdown periods or covid-19 waves. we have reviewed the results of surveys conducted by the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) and drug, tobacco and alcohol control department, as well as data collected from other institutions of the republic of lithuania and other national data sources. 2. prevalence of psychoactive substance use 2.1. the mini-european web survey on drugs – impact of covid-19 on patterns of drug use in lithuania in order to investigate and rapidly document the current impact of the covid-19 epidemic and national responses in the eu member states on changes in patterns of drug use, harms and service provision, the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) conducted a study using an adapted version of the trendspotter methodology across the eu member states, whose part is the survey on impact of covid-19 on patterns of drug use, harms and drug services in the european union. the mini european web survey on drugs: covid-19 is part of this snapshot and it was conducted across europe. the aim is to gather information about how patterns of drug use may have changed in europe due to covid-19 (emcdda, 2020b). the standardised online questionnaire european web survey on drugs: covid-19, as developed by the emcdda, was made available online in 21 languages between the 17th of april and the 3rd of june 2020. the study specifically targeted adults aged 18 years old or above with experience of illicit drug use over the past 12 months. in lithuania, the survey questionnaire was distributed through social networks and operated for 5 weeks. during this period, 568 respondents from lithuania participated in the survey. the mean age of the subjects was 24.7 years old, ranging from 18 to 46 years old. the majority of the survey participants were men (55.1%). it is observed that the consumption rates of some substances in lithuania were higher compared to the overall rate of all countries participating in the study. seven out of ten respondents had used cannabis in the previous year, almost half had used mdma, and one third had used cocaine, amphetamine or lsd. more than half of those surveyed reported having used cannabis in the past 30 days; one in six had used amphetamine, one in seven –mdma, one in eight – cocaine and lsd (fig. 1). meanwhile, the results of european countries show that more than half of the respondents (60%) had used cannabis in the previous 30 days, one in ten – ecstasy, cocaine, lsd and opioids; 5% had used amphetamine, 4% – heroin and synthetic cannabinoids. the study assessed various changes in the use of psychoactive substances during the covid-19 pandemic. one-fifth of the respondents reported using more drugs (22.4%) during covid-19, and one in six (17.8%) using less during that period. 15.5% of the respondents indicated that they used the same amount. meanwhile, the results of european countries show that almost half of the respondents did not use or used less drugs, 30% of respondents reported using more drugs and 23% – using less. the biggest changes were among cannabis users. the majority of the respondents who used cannabis started using more (16.2%) and in higher quantities (8.6%) during the covid-19 pandemic. 7.7% of the respondents started using more alcohol instead of cannabis, and 5.3% completely stopped using cannabis (fig. 2). assessing european participation in the study highlights that regular (weekly) cannabis users were twice as likely to report an increased frequency of use compared with non-regular users during the confinement period. the use of mdma was not significantly altered during covid-19. about a quarter of the respondents said there was no change; 8.5% of the respondents indicated that they had stopped using these substances, and 4.8% used less often. about 16.5% of the respondents reported that their cocaine use patterns did not change, 6% – stopped using it, and about 3% – used less. about 16% of the respondents reported no change in their amphetamine use habits; 5.1% started using more, and the same number stopped using amphetamine altogether. one-fifth of the subjects reported that their lsd use did not change during the covid-19 pandemic; 4.9% had stopped using the substance, and 2.3% started using more. the study also looked at the reasons for lower or higher drug use. the majority of the respondents, both in europe and in lithuania, reported using less drugs due to reduced access and availability. in lithuania, a smaller proportion of respondents reported 30 evelina pridotkienė, rūta gedminienė, rasa povilanskienė, brigita rašimaitė, viktorija stifanovičiūtė 3 .5 % 5 .3 % 8 .5 % 9 .0 % 3 2 .9 % 3 3 .1 % 4 6 .1 % 3 4 .7 % 7 5 .9 % 2 .6 % 4 .0 % 7 .7 % 6 .9 % 1 7 .5 % 1 4 .6 % 1 6 .7 % 1 9 .5 % 5 7 .8 % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 c a n n a b is e c s ta s y /m d m a l s d c o c a in e a m p h e ta m in e s s y n th e ti c c a n n a b in o id s o th e r o p io id s o th e r s y s n th e ti c s ti m u la n ts h e ro in last year prevalence last month prevalence fig. 1. last year and last month prevalence of drug use (%) in lithuania, 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2020b. fig. 2. change in cannabis use since the outbreak of covid-19 (%), 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2020b. 0.45% 1.1% 1.4% 1.6% 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% 2.3% 5.3% 7.7% 8.6% 10.0% 16.2% 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 no charge used psychoactive medicines instead used a new psychoactive substance instead used a different form of cannabis used in a different way used other illicit drugs instead used less quantity in a session started using since covid-19 restriction stopped using since covid-19 restriction used more alcohol instead used grater quantity in a session used less frequently use more frequently covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 31 using less drugs due to financial instability or a decrease in income. only about 3.9% of the respondents indicated that they were concerned about the drug use impact on their health (fig. 3). one in seven subjects reported using drugs during covid-19, mainly due to boredom, about 6.9% – because of pandemic concerns (fig. 4). a quarter of the respondents said they did not attempt to purchase illicit drugs during covid-19, with one in ten receiving illicit drugs from another dealer. 8% reported buying in larger quantities than usual. for one-third of the respondents, drug acquisition remained unchanged. 40% of the european respondents said that restrictive measures did not change their drug-buying habits, with 24% saying that they did not try to buy drugs, and 5% stopped buying illegal drugs (fig. 5). the study sample is predominantly characterised as young recreational drug users: young adults with a greater experience of drug use than reported by the general population. general population surveys can provide valuable information on drug use prevalence in europe, but insufficient sample sizes can prevent them from yielding robust information on patterns of use. this is where web-based surveys can help. they are a useful tool for collecting information on patterns of drug use from a larger sample of people who use illicit drugs and can complement and overcome some of their limitations of other data sources. while not being representative of the general population, carefully conducted web surveys may nevertheless provide valuable additional information about variations in use among different groups of people who use drugs. 2.2. changes in psychoactive substance use during the covid-19 pandemic among university and college students substance abuse is common among university/college students and can result in a range of academic, physical, mental, and social problems. lack of skills, necessary to cope with pressure and manage stress in their lives, which became particularly relevant during the pandemic, can lead to substance abuse. in autumn 2020, the drug, tobacco and alcohol control department conducted an online survey among university/college students to assess their substance use patterns, well-being, attitudes towards prevention measures and policy, and explore the relationship between psychological well-being and substance abuse. the sample size was 2,412 students, studying in lithuania’s higher education institutions (universities and colleges) (narkotikų…, 2020a). survey results showed that 37.2% of the students smoked or used other nicotine containing products daily (tobacco cigarettes – 15%, heated tobacco products – 15.9%, e-cigarettes with nicotine-containing liquid – 12%). 71.4% of the students consumed alcohol at least once in the last month, and 2.6% – daily. 11.8% of the students used drugs 16.0% 15.7% 9.2% 8.1% 6.0% 5.8% 3.9% 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 reduced ability to obtain drugs reduced ability of drugs to buy decreased income saving money due to financial instability reduced availability of going out fewer opportunities to use drugs anxiety about drug effects on health fig. 3. most frequent reasons for decreased drug use as a result of the covid-19 restrictions (%), 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2020b. 32 evelina pridotkienė, rūta gedminienė, rasa povilanskienė, brigita rašimaitė, viktorija stifanovičiūtė 0.9% 2.1%2.3% 6.9% 13.4% 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 boredom anxiety/to cope with covid-19 increased income because i stockpiled drugs increased availability of drugs fig. 4. most frequent reasons for increased drug use as a result of the covid-19 restrictions (%), 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2020b. fig. 5. methods of acquiring illicit drugs during covid-19 (%), 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2020b. covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 33 (cannabis, ecstasy, lsd etc.) at least once in the last month (2.2% – daily). survey results showed that students who used alcohol, nicotine or drugs irregularly were more likely to reduce the use of these substances or abstained during quarantine. however, those who use these substances regularly were more likely to increase their use (use more often or in larger amounts) during quarantine. among students who were drinking daily, 41.3% answered that during quarantine their alcohol consumption increased (they used more often or in larger amounts than before quarantine), 22.2% consumed alcohol less frequently or in smaller amounts, and 34.9% reported that there were no changes in their drinking habits (compared to the pre-quarantine period). 40.4% of daily users of drugs, new psychoactive substances or inhalants replied that during quarantine their drug use increased, and 19.2% answered that their drug use decreased. among daily smokers (or other nicotine-containing products users, vapers), 26.4% of them were smoking/consuming nicotine more often or in larger amounts during quarantine, and 23.5% consumed less nicotine than before quarantine. to reduce the stress of studying, to relax or fall asleep, as many as a third of the students used nicotine-containing products and alcohol in the last year, with a smaller proportion choosing prescription medications (13%) or drugs (8%). in order to improve study achievements, increase work productivity and performance, in the last year, almost half of the students consumed energy drinks and other caffeinated products. 23% of the students used nicotinecontaining products for this purpose, 11% – alcohol, 8% – prescription medications, and 4% – drugs. study results also showed that during quarantine the well-being of as many as 23% of the students worsened. more than a quarter of the respondents were not satisfied with their health. more than a third of them often felt anxiety and had difficulty concentrating. nearly a third of the respondents often had sleep problems or did not want to do anything. 28% of the students often felt depressed, and the same percentage had been thinking about suicide at some point in their lives. students who used psychoactive substances rated some of their health and well-being indicators significantly worse than non-users, especially those who used psychoactive substances to reduce the stress of studying, relax, or fall asleep. 3. the impact of covid-19 on harm reduction and substance use treatment in order to investigate the effects and implications of this pandemic for people who use drugs in europe, the emcdda instigated a mixed-method trendspotter study: impact of covid-19 on drug services and help-seeking in europe. results highlighted that covid-19 and national lockdowns have led to reduced availability and provision of treatment and harm-reduction services in most european countries. emerging evidence suggests that, like other healthcare providers, drug services are facing a range of challenges including: staffing shortages, access to personal protective equipment, and managing infected clients and staff vulnerability to infection (emcdda…, 2020b). lithuania also participated in this study, and the national results showed that provision of harm reduction services was not interrupted but the package of services was reduced: hiv testing was suspended. instead of hiv testing, hiv self-tests were shared in small numbers. in order to reduce the frequency of visits, more syringes were issued per time. at the beginning of quarantine, there was a lack of protection measures, but the municipality supplied them. according to harm reduction services providers, the frequency of consumption and the quantity of one dosage decreased among high risk drug users due to the fact that it has become much more difficult to earn or get money. prices and quantity did not change. the availability did not decrease but, because of less income, drugs became less available to high risk drug users (low threshold cabinets clients). a significant proportion of individuals mix alcohol, methadone, and carfentanil. the healthcare sector faced many challenges during the covid-19 pandemic. substance use treatment services were not an exception. the first lockdown in lithuania was declared on 16 march, 2020. since then some drug treatment services were entirely suspended (e.g. inpatient treatment for new clients was closed, outpatient consultations were replaced by telemedicine). phased resumption of healthcare services started on 18 may, 2020, the resumption of inpatient services with covid-19 pre-testing requirements was reached on 8 june, 2020. despite the partial resumption of healthcare provision, difficulties such as covid-19 outbreaks and the isolation of patients continued to be challenging. as there were no conditions in healthcare facilities to isolate patients who were infected with covid-19 or had been in close contact with covid-19, they were discharged for outpatient 34 evelina pridotkienė, rūta gedminienė, rasa povilanskienė, brigita rašimaitė, viktorija stifanovičiūtė treatment. complicated requirements for patients to access treatment, changes in types of interventions and disruptions in service activity and capacity during the pandemic may have severely affected the reported numbers of clients entering drug treatment. the national mental health centre’s data on monthly drug treatment demands showed a decrease in both new and overall clients entering treatment during the pandemic (fig. 6). a particularly sharp decline in the number of patients entering treatment occurred during the first lockdown, which in lithuania preceded the first wave of covid-19 as some treatment services were entirely suspended. in 2020, inpatient and outpatient treatment centres in lithuania provided treatment in total for 555 persons, which is about 31% lower in comparison with 2019. the sharp decline in clients entering treatment is especially evident among opioid users (fig. 7). the disruptions in the number of clients entering treatment strongly correlates with the lockdowns, mandatory testing and covid-19 waves, which not only impaired the treatment accessibility but data collection as well. other issues, such as the changes in clients’ behaviours which would be unrelated to covid-19 pandemic, are also possible but are less likely due to the lack of evidence. 4. prevention in the context of covid-19 4.1. school-based prevention, family-based prevention, and non-formal education for children and adolescents, the two prime sites for substance use prevention are school and family (emcdda, 2019). study of the psychotraumatology centre of vilnius university showed that the number of adolescents (aged 13–18) facing psychosocial difficulties increased from 13% in 2019 to 18% in 2020. in 2020, more than half of adolescents had difficulty communicating with peers, and 1 in 4 said they had problems in their family (psichotraumatologijos…, 2020). although the quarantine and closing of schools had a significant impact on the psychological and social well-being of schoolchildren, the educational community made every effort to continue their activities. based on the education management information system data, in 2020 schools continued to give priority to social emotional education programmes and, less frequently, to psychoactive substance use prevention programmes, but there were changes in the popularity of these programmes compared to 2019. the coverage of some programmes decreased (mostly in the number of schools implementing the programme) and increased in other cases (mostly in the number of schoolchildren who participated in the programme) despite the quarantine (table 1) (narkotikų…, 2021a). fig. 6. preliminary data on the number of all and new clients entering treatment between january, 2019 and august, 2021 in lithuania source: several sources were used to prepare this figure – valstybinis…, 2019; valstybinis…, 2020; valstybinis…, 2021. covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 35 engagement of children and planning their afterschool leisure time is an integral part of non-formal and prevention education. in 2020, 60.2% of schoolchildren participated in non-formal education programmes or attended activities in schools (62.6% in 2019). participation in non-formal educational activities was limited by distance learning introduced due to the covid-19 pandemic. seeking to adapt to the pandemic situation and restrictions, 62% of pre-quarantine activities were performed remotely. but the goal of the state education strategy for 2013–2022 that all schoolchildren would use the opportunities of non-formal education by 2020 was not achieved (švietimo…, 2021). according to data provided by the centre for health education and disease prevention, in 2020, fig. 7. preliminary data on all clients entering treatment by primary drug between january, 2019 and august, 2021 in lithuania. source: several sources were used to prepare this figure – valstybinis…, 2019; valstybinis…, 2020; valstybinis…, 2021. tab. 1. implementation and participation in the social emotional education programmes in 2019 and 2020 (number of schools and schoolchildren). title of the programme number of schools implementing the programme number of schoolchildren participating in the programme 2019 2020 2019 2020 lions quest ‚crossroads of teens’ 226 300 34 835 49 211 lions quest ‚keys to success’ 125 208 18 229 35 415 ‘second step’ 290 265 29 914 31 412 lions quest ‘time together’ 104 190 14 805 26 301 ‚my way’ 49 79 12 970 18 511 ‘apple friends’ 228 184 10 687 8 173 ‘zippy‘s friends’ 316 291 7 661 7 132 ‚unplugged’ 90 75 3 974 3 964 ‚snowball’ 40 33 2 296 2011 veik education programme 42 51 1 121 1 295 ‚mentor’ 7 4 75 63 source: narkotikų…, 2021a. 36 evelina pridotkienė, rūta gedminienė, rasa povilanskienė, brigita rašimaitė, viktorija stifanovičiūtė the number of school-age children and children at social risk who participated in health education and training on smoking, alcohol and drug use prevention topics, organised by public health care and personal health care institutions, was almost 3 times lower than in 2019 (fig. 8) (narkotikų …, 2021a). family is generally the context in which children learn their group’s norms, values, attitudes and behaviours (emcdda, 2019). the psychological wellbeing of children significantly depends on the wellbeing of parents and carers and the situation in the family, which could be unstable and vulnerable during the pandemic. unfortunately, in 2020, compared to 2019, the number of parents participating in all 4 parenting skills training programmes, recommended by the ministry of education, science and sports, significantly decreased (fig. 9) (narkotikų…, 2021a). based on data provided by the state child rights protection and adoption service under the ministry of social security and labour, complex services were provided to families in all municipalities in 2020, but fewer people received these services than in 2019. in 2020, 76% of cases when it was necessary to ensure a safe environment for the child (prior to the assessment of the child’s situation) were due to intoxication of the child’s representatives from alcohol or other psychoactive substances and inability to take proper care of their child. but there were some positive trends: the duration of mobile teams’ work with the family was extended to 30 days in 2020, the number of applications to form mobile teams increased by 49% in comparison to 2019, the average number of mobile team meetings with family more than doubled (narkotikų…, 2021a), the number of children’s day care centres providing day social care and education services and the number of children participating in children’s day care centre projects increased, also more ngo projects to develop independent and constructive families were selected for funding (lietuvos…, 2021). 4.2. early intervention measures for young people one of the effective support measures for young people aged 14–21 who are experimenting with or irregularly using alcohol and/or drugs implemented in lithuania is the early intervention programme (based on the international programme ‘fred goes net’). the aim of this programme is to motivate young people to stop using these substances before they become addicted. participation in this programme can be voluntary or compulsory (as a means of administrative impact or minimal childcare). since 2018, the programme has been implemented nationally in the form of live group sessions. such activities could not be implemented or were restricted during the covid-19 lockdowns. data, provided every year by the regional public health bureaus shows that in 2020 the availability of early intervention services decreased by 35% fig. 8. number of children who participated in health education and training on smoking, alcohol and drug use prevention topics, organised by public health care and personal health care institutions in 2019 and 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2021a. covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 37 compared to 2019. although, in 2021, the number of municipalities implementing the programme was lower than before the pandemic, there are positive trends compared to 2020 – 10 more municipalities implemented the programme than a year ago (in 2019 – 48 out of 60 municipalities, in 2020 – 31, in 2021 – 41) but still far from being implemented in all 60 municipalities. the number of young people who participated in the programme and successfully completed it also decreased in 2020 compared to 2019. in 2021 the numbers increased but did not reach the pre-pandemic level (fig. 10) (narkotikų…, 2022). 4.3. workplace-based prevention the covid-19 pandemic and quarantine created new challenges for governments, employers, employees and whole society. changes in work conditions and stress could create potential risks to employees’ safety and health, e.g., uncontrolled use of psychoactive substances, lack of communication, need for support, uncontrolled workplace safety. in february–april 2021, 551 workplace representatives were interviewed using an online survey by the drug, tobacco and alcohol control department in order to assess the need and availability of substance use prevention measures in the workplaces of lithuania, and the changes in activities caused by the pandemic. half of the respondents were employers themselves (narkotikų..., 2021b). survey results showed that 20.5% of workplaces no longer carried out substance use prevention measures they had taken before the quarantine or limited them. only 2% of workplaces implemented more measures, including new ones, and in 7% of workplaces the scale of prevention measures remained the same, but their nature and methods of implementation changed. during the quarantine, implementation of all assessed substance use prevention and control measures decreased in at least some of the workplaces (fig. 11). about a third of the workplaces that implemented measures such as improving employee mental health, education, counselling on psychoactive substance use problems, and assistance to employees with such problems stopped these activities during the quarantine. a quarter of workplaces that tested employees for alcohol use, and more than half of the workplaces that tested employees for drug use stopped testing during the quarantine. 5. drug supply in the context of covid-19 according to the lithuanian criminal police bureau, the drug market situation is regarded as stable in lithuania, although the number of the quantities seized indicates some annual variations, which could be affected by lockdowns because of covid-19 – increasing cocaine, amphetamine and 39 237 218 1 101 4 676 2 50 177 638 3 421 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 3 500 4 000 4 500 5 000 'gordon training international programme' 'stairs. it’s easier together' 'school for parents and teachers' 'step' other parenting skills training programme 2019 2020 fig. 9. number of parents participating in parental skills training programmes in 2019 and 2020. source: narkotikų…, 2021a. 38 evelina pridotkienė, rūta gedminienė, rasa povilanskienė, brigita rašimaitė, viktorija stifanovičiūtė 490 386 661 403 325 532 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 2019 2020 2021 participated in the programme successfully completed the programme 3% 12% 16% 17% 18% 20% 26% 30% 31% 5% 7% 4% 7% 10% 11% 11% 9% 14% 0 10 20 30 40 50 drug testing in the workplace surveying employees on substance use allowing employees with substance use disorders to get addiction treatment, keeping their job support, help for employees who have substance abuse problems assessment of employee psycho-emotional wellbeing counseling employees on the problems caused by substance use improving mental health of employees, increasing psycho-emotional competencies alcohol testing in the workplace providing information, education, trainings to employees on substance use prevention implement currently do not, but implemented until the lockdown fig. 10. number of the early intervention programme participants in 2019–2021. source: narkotikų…, 2022. fig. 11. implementation of different substance use prevention and control measures in the workplaces (2021, n=551 workplace representatives, %). source: narkotikų..., 2021b. covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 39 methamphetamine quantities seized and a significant decrease in mdma. in lithuania, as in previous years, new psychoactive substances market can be assessed as small. no significant changes were noticed during covid-19 period. in 2020, there was a sharp increase in the quantities of cocaine, amphetamine and methamphetamine seizures compared with previous years (fig. 12). since 2019, the new trend has been observed – the amount of amphetamine seized exceeded the amount of methamphetamine. the same trend continued in 2020. the decrease in mdma amounts seized are mostly affected by covid-19 due to restrictions for all entertainment places (night clubs, pubs, bars, etc.). moreover, in 2020 the amount of hashish withdrawn from illicit circulation in lithuania decreased sharply – from 1775 kg in 2019 to 3.8 kg in 2020, as well as amounts of cannabis (220 kg in 2019, 41 kg in 2020), presumably due to lockdowns because of covid-19. according to studies, changes in the cannabis market were observed due to shortages of cannabis in the wholesale market. this may have been triggered by the closure of borders for individuals who smuggled cannabis in private vehicles. during the quarantine period, the closure of recreational places may have led to a decline in drug use, which did not result in a shortage in the retail market (emcdda, 2020b). following new psychoactive substances (nps) trends, no significant changes were observed in previous years. since 2016 up to now, in the illicit drug market heroin has been replaced by carfentanil and mixtures with carfentanil, and still no signs of heroin coming back to the lithuanian market. despite the changes in amounts seized, average retail prices of almost all ‘traditional’ drugs remained stable. only the price of amphetamine has increased, while the price of mdma has decreased – as a result of reduced mdma demand because of covid-19. 6. conclusions in lithuania the health and social consequences of covid-19 are still in research, but during the pandemic period these trends were observed: • changes in psychoactive substance use prevention varied to different degrees depending on the setting and activity. school-based prevention programmes and after-school activities were most often continued and/or performed remotely. after a significant decrease in the availability of the early intervention programme in 2020, there were positive trends in 2021, but participation in this programme still did not reach the prepandemic level. also, in 1 out of 5 workplaces, less preventive action was taken than before the pandemic. • during the pandemic, parts of both prevention and monitoring activities moved online. web surveys are a useful tool for collecting information 112.4 23.6 6.5 90.8 4.4 36.9 50.0 283.0 17.4 43.4 16.1 13.8 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2018 2019 2020 amphetamine methamphetamine mdma cocaine fig. 12. quantities of seized cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine and mdma, 2018–2020 (kg). source: narkotikų…, 2021a. 40 evelina pridotkienė, rūta gedminienė, rasa povilanskienė, brigita rašimaitė, viktorija stifanovičiūtė on patterns of drug use from a larger sample of people who use illicit drugs and can complement and overcome some of their limitations of other data sources. while not being representative of the general population, carefully conducted web surveys may, nevertheless, provide valuable additional information about variations in use among different groups of people who use drugs. • it may be assumed that the period of the lockdown changed the habits of the drug users and this made an impact on the seizures of drugs: the amount of amphetamine seized exceeded the amount of methamphetamine, and the amount of mdma significantly decreased. • the disruptions in the number of clients entering treatment strongly correlates with the lockdowns, mandatory testing and covid-19 waves, which not only impaired the treatment accessibility but data collection as well. other issues, such as the changes in clients’ behaviour which would be unrelated to covid-19 pandemic, are also possible but are less likely due to the lack of evidence. • due to the covid-19 lockdown, treatment service provision had to be changed and adapted to the restrictions – limited availability to some treatment services. harm reduction services provision was not interrupted but the package of services was reduced. references emcdda, 2019, european prevention curriculum (eupc). a handbook for decision-makers, opinion-makers and policy-makers in science-based prevention of substance use, european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, publications office of the european union, luxembourg, https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/11733/20192546_tdma19001enn_pdf.pdf emcdda, 2020a, european drug report 2020: trends and developments, european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, publications office of the european union, luxembourg, https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/13236/tdat20001enn_web.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). emcdda, 2020b, impact of covid-19 on patterns of drug use and drug related harms in europe, european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, lisbon, https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/13130/emcdda-trendspotter-covid-19-wave-2_1. pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). lietuvos..., 2021, socialinės apsaugos ir darbo ministerijos 2020 metų veiklos ataskaita (eng. 2020 annual report of the ministry of social security and labour), lietuvos respublikos socialinės apsaugos ir darbo ministerija, vilnius, https://socmin.lrv.lt/uploads/socmin/documents/ files/atask aitos/sadm/sadm%202020%20metu%20 veiklos%20ataskaita%20-2021-03-18.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). narkotikų..., 2020a, aukštųjų mokyklų studentų psichoaktyviųjų medžiagų vartojimo paplitimas ir prevencija (eng. prevalence of psychoactive substance use and prevention among high school students), narkotikų tabako ir alkoholio kontrolės departamentas, vilnius, https://ntakd.lrv. lt/uploads/ntakd/documents/files/prevencija/studentai.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). narkotikų..., 2020b, psichoaktyviosios medžiagos: tendencijos ir pokyčiai 2020 (eng. psychoactive substances: trends and developments 2020), narkotikų tabako ir alkoholio kontrolės departamentas, vilnius, https://ntakd.lrv.lt/ uploads/ntakd/documents/files/46791%20ntakd%20 metinis%20pranesimas%20web.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). narkotikų..., 2021a, psichoaktyviosios medžiagos: tendencijos ir pokyčiai 2021 (eng. psychoactive substances: trends and developments 2021), narkotikų tabako ir alkoholio kontrolės departamentas, vilnius, https://ntakd.lrv.lt/ uploads/ntakd/documents/files/psichoaktyviosios_medziagos_tendencijos_ir_pokyciai_2021.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). narkotikų..., 2021b, psichoaktyviųjų medžiagų vartojimo prevencijos darbo vietose poreikis (eng. psychoactive substance use prevention needs assessment in workplaces), narkotikų tabako ir alkoholio kontrolės departamentas, vilnius, https://ntakd.lrv.lt/uploads/ntakd/documents/ files/prevencija/dv/ntakd_dv_2021_tyrimas.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). narkotikų..., 2022, ankstyvosios intervencijos programos įgyvendinimo 2021 m. ataskaita (eng. report on the early intervention programme implementation in 2021), narkotikų tabako ir alkoholio kontrolės departamentas, vilnius, https://ntakd.lrv.lt/uploads/ntakd/documents/ files/ankstyvosios%20intervencijos%20programos%20 2021%20m_%20%c4%afgyvendinimo%20ataskaita.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). psichotraumatologijos..., 2020, mokinių psichologinė savijauta covid-19 pandemijos metu (eng. research-based recommendations for schools and schoolchildren: psychological well-being of schoolchildren during the covid-19 pandemic), psichotraumatologijos institutas, vilniaus universitetas, vilnius, https://www.fsf.vu.lt/dokumentai/ ptc/rekomendacijos_mokykloms_ir_mokiniams.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). švietimo ..., 2021, švietimo, mokslo ir sporto ministerijos 2020 metų veiklos ataskaita (eng. 2020 annual report of the ministry of education, science and sports), švietimo, mokslo ir sporto ministerija, vilnius, https://smsm.lrv.lt/ uploads/smsm/documents/files/veikla/ministerijos%20 veiklos%20ataskaitos/%c5%a0vietimo%2c%20mokslo%20ir%20sporto%20ministerijos%202020%20m_%20 veiklos%20ataskaita.pdf (accessed on 12 april 2022). valstybinis…, 2019, assis 2019 m. mėnesinė ataskaita (eng. 2019 assis monthly report), valstybinis psichikos sveikatos centras, vilnius, https://vpsc.lrv.lt/uploads/vpsc/documents/files/info_asis_naudotojams/asis%202019%20 covid-19 and the drug situation in lithuania 41 m%c4%97nesin%c4%97.docx https://vpsc.lrv.lt/lt/infoasis-naudotojams (accessed on 13 april 2022). valstybinis…, 2020, assis 2020 m. mėnesinė ataskaita (eng. 2020 assis monthly report), valstybinis psichikos sveikatos centras, vilnius, https://vpsc.lrv.lt/uploads/vpsc/documents/files/info_asis_naudotojams/asis%202020%20 m%c4%97nesin%c4%97.docx (accessed on 13 april 2022). valstybinis…, 2021, assis 2021 m. mėnesinė ataskaita (eng. 2021 assis monthly report), valstybinis psichikos sveikatos centras, vilnius, https://vpsc.lrv.lt/uploads/vpsc/documents/files/info_asis_naudotojams/asis%202021%20 m%c4%97nesin%c4%97_nauja_2021_09_27.docx (accessed on 13 april 2022). 1. introduction european countries have long been known to differ significantly in marriage formation patterns. hajnal observed in the mid-20th c. that populations living east of the trieste-st. petersburg line got married at much younger ages than those occupying the areas west of it “for at least two centuries up to 1940” (hajnal, 1965, p. 101–103). even though the political partition of europe after world war ii contributed to the perpetuation of early marriage formation patterns in some of its eastern regions, this division is now of purely historical interest. today, there is a growing tendency among populations in the majority of european countries to replace “the nuclear families of (married) couples with children” with “cohabiting unions, ‘living apart together’ partnerships, same-sex partnerships, one-parent families, and single living” (sobotka, journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(3), 14–30 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.3.02 the typology of first marriage patterns in europe anna majdzińska department of demography, faculty of economics and sociology, university of lodz, rewolucji 1905 41, 90–214 łódź, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-1323-2786 e-mail: anna.majdzinska@uni.lodz.pl citation majdzińska a., 2022, the typology of first marriage patterns in europe, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(3), 14–30. abstract this paper aims to present an overview of the main demographic characteristics of europe’s inhabitants entering into first marriages in the 21st c. and the typology of male and female first marriage patterns in european countries in 2010 and 2018. additionally, a special index is constructed to compare them for nuptiality as an element of the second demographic transition (std) in 2018. also calculated are correlations between the types of first marriage patterns and selected demographic and economic indicators. in order to analyse european countries’ populations in terms of first marriages there were used such research methods as descriptive statistics, a cluster analysis, special std index, and correlation coefficients. the basis of the analysis is data sourced from the eurostat database.  it appeared that the analysis of the males’ and female’s age-specific first marriage rates in the 31 european countries in 2010 and 2018 produced 22 types of first marriage patterns (which can be grouped into seven main categories). in the majority of european countries, the mean age at first marriage was older in 2018 than in 2010. countries in central and eastern europe are very different from the rest of the continent regarding the types of first marriage patterns. in 2018, the youngest types occurred in post-communist countries (especially in belarus and macedonia) and the oldest ones in spain, ireland, denmark, italy, and sweden. older types of first marriage patterns are characteristic of countries that are stronger economically and/or where the second demographic transition takes place at a faster pace. key words first marriage rates, nuptiality, special std index, second demographic transition theory, european countries. received: 22 july 2022 accepted: 07 september 2022 published: 28 september 2022 the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 15 toulemon, 2008, p. 85–86; see also: ehmer, 2021; sobotka, berghammer, 2021). these changes bring total fertility rates in the countries far below the generation replacement level, with adverse consequences for demographic, social, and economic structures. the most worrying of them is population ageing processes directly related to low fertility rates, which in recent years have accelerated in many parts of europe (see, e.g. uhlenberg (ed.), 2009). this paper presents the types of male and female first marriage patterns1 for 31 european countries in 2010 and 2018. it also shows associations between particular types and selected demographic and economic indicators. using ward’s method, the countries are clustered into groups based on the similarity of marriage rates in 2018. marriage formation in 2018 is assessed with respect to the second demographic transition by means of a special sdtm index. the second and higher-order marriages and informal unions (such as cohabitation or living lat (living apart together) relationships2) have been omitted from the analysis. 2. the theoretical framework marriage formation patterns in europe have been changing for several decades now, with the pace and character of the process varying with demographic, social, cultural, and economic factors (kirk, 1996, p. 367; willekens, 2015, p. 17–19; kohler et al., 2002, p. 654–656; see also: nauck, 2021; neyer, 2021), such as the age and gender structure of populations, the strength of tradition and social norms, households’ wealth, and the availability of employment. the role of governments’ population and social policies is also substantial. the differences in marriage patterns that are still observed between cee (central and eastern european) countries and the rest of europe are largely due to the former having been practically cut off from the inflow of people, products, and ideas from the west by the former ussr for almost all five decades after wwii. 1 a marriage pattern as understood in this paper is an age group-specific distribution of marriage rates obtained by dividing the number of new marriages by the number of persons in that age group. the analysis is conducted separately for male and female marriage patterns. 2 a lat relationship is defined as an emotional and intimate relationship between two partners who live separately (see, i.e., lyssens-danneboom, mortelmans, 2015; upton-davis, 2012). in order to describe and explain changes in the family formation patterns, a number of theories have been created that consider the phenomenon from demographic, economic, sociological, and psychological perspectives. the most prominent among the demographic theories3 are the first demographic transition theory4 (which explains “progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern one in which both are low” (kirk, 1996, p. 361, see also: kirk, 1944; notestein, 1945; van de kaa, 1987)) and the second demographic transition theory, which relates to processes taking place in countries that have completed the first demographic transition. the second demographic transition theory was proposed in response to changes in marital and procreative behaviours, such as a “fall in proportions married, rise in age at first marriage, rise in cohabitation, rise in divorce, increasing mean age at first parenthood, rising extra-marital fertility, [and] parenthood within cohabitation” (lesthaeghe, 2010, p.  5; see also: sobotka, 2008b; van de kaa, 1997, 2002), reducing total fertility rates (tfr) below 2.1 children per woman (the generation replacement level). the changes, mainly driven by evolving worldviews and social factors such as “the rise of ‘higher order’ needs: individual autonomy, self-actualisation, expressive work and socialisation values, sexual revolution, efficient contraception, rising symmetry in gender roles, female economic autonomy, flexible life course organisation, [and] multiple lifestyles” (lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 5–6; see also: philipov, 2003; sobotka, 2008b), first emerged in western and northern europe in the 1960s and then gradually spread to other countries. they reached the former eastern-bloc countries in the 1990s, at the time of turbulent political and economic reforms following the collapse of the soviet empire (see, for instance, philipov, 2003, p. 27; philipov, kohler 2001, p. 38–39; van de kaa, 1997, p. 20). the progressing secularisation of societies, the diminishing role of tradition, global technological advancements, and the improving standard of living 3 the description of economic, psychological and sociological theories and concepts dealing with changes in family patterns can be found in becker (1960), becker, barro (1988), blake (1968), caldwell (1978, 1980, 1982), davis, (1945), easterlin (1978), freedman (1979), hoffman, hoffman (1973), hoffman et al. (1978), leibenstein (1957, 1975), willekens (2015). 4 the first demographic transition in europe “began with a gradual decline in death rates dating generally from the early 19th century, followed by fertility decline beginning around 1880 in most countries, though earlier in france” (van de kaa, 1987, p. 4). 16 anna majdzińska in economically prosperous countries also catalysed the evolution of family formation patterns. also of significance was the expansion of mass media and the internet, which paved the way for globalisation processes because “the transition processes depend on social interaction” enabled by “ideas, opinions, attitudes and information on health and family planning practices […] transmitted through communication channels” (willekens, 2015, p. 19). the demographic changes known as the second demographic transition are still going on in some regions of several countries in central and eastern europe. as regards developed countries that have completed the second demographic transition, a number of them, especially those in western europe, have entered the third demographic transition (coleman, 2006). these countries have high and positive net migration rates because they are attractive for migrants who usually have more children than the native populations. as a result, their total fertility rates increase, too, limiting the demographic ageing of their populations. the processes initiated by the combination of low native fertility rates and high immigration rates are demographically significant “because they are changing the composition of national populations and thereby the culture, physical appearance, social experiences, and self-perceived identity of the inhabitants of european nations” (coleman, 2006, p. 402; see also: lichter, qian, 2018, p. 169; lópezgonzález, gonzález-gonzález, 2018, p. 62). 3. data and methodology the male and female first marriage rates in 31 european countries in 2010 and 2018 analysed in this paper were sourced from the eurostat database. the types of first marriage patterns were created as follows: the populations of first-married males and females aged 15–49 years in each country were divided into seven five-year age groups that were ordered from the highest first marriage rate to the lowest. the eighth group considered in the analysis was males and females aged 50+. as a result, 22 types of first marriage patterns were obtained for 2010 and 2018 (see table 1). the first marriage rates in 2018 were compared within and between countries using cumulative first marriage rates (cfmr) and quotients calculated by dividing the female first marriage rate by the male first marriage rate in the same age group. the cmfrs were calculated as follows5. in the first step, five-year age groups in each european coun5 the construction of the cfmr was inspired by the aptry were arranged from the highest first marriage rate in 2018 to the lowest; in the second step, the first marriage rates of the first five age groups were added up (starting with the age group with the highest marriage rate), and the total was multiplied by 5 (thus, the first cfmr was the same as the first marriage rate in the age group with the highest first marriage frequency, and the last one represented the sum of first marriage rates for all five groups). using ward’s method (see ward, 1963; see also: eszergár-kiss, caesar, 2017) with the euclidean distance matrix, the selected countries were divided into groups (clusters) with similar age group-specific distributions of first (male and female) marriage rates. in order to assess the progression of the second demographic transition in the countries in terms of marriage formation, an sdtm index was calculated for each country. the index was constructed by modifying the sdt1 index proposed by sobotka (2008a) and replacing the original variables with the following ones6: x1 – total first marriage rate; x2 – mean age at first marriage (years)7; x3 – the proportion of live births outside marriage, and x4 – crude divorce rate (per 1,000 population). the construction of the sdtm index started with the selection of appropriate variables. four variables were considered. depending on whether their effect on the phenomenon under study was positive or negative, they were named stimulants or destimulants, respectively (see jóźwik, gawrońska, 2018, p. 151–152; trojanowska, nęcka, 2020, p. 6). three were found to be stimulants (x2, x3, x4), meaning that their higher values had to do with the more advanced second demographic transition in the country regarding marriage formation. as the fourth one, x1, proved to be a destimulant, it was converted into a stimulant using formula (1) (see trojanowska, nęcka, 2020, p. 6): x’ x (1) where x’ij and xij – the values of variable j (a stimulant or a destimulant) for country i. proach used to calculate total first marriage rates or total fertility rates (see thomas, 2018, p. 104). 6 t. sobotka (2008a) constructed the sdt1 index using a different approach to ranking countries and the following variables: mean mother’s age at first birth; the sum of age-specific fertility rates per 1000 women below the age of 20 years; the percentage of non-marital births; the total first marriage rate; mean age at first marriage; the total divorce rate. 7 variable x1 was calculated as an average of females’ and males’ total first marriage rates; variable x2 was calculated as an average of females’ and males’ mean age at first marriage. the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 17 all four variables were normalised between 0 and 1 with formula (2) (see kukuła, bogocz, 2014): (2) where xij – the value of variable j for country i; zij a normalised variable. the countries’ sdtm indexes were calculated as the means of the normalised variables (zij). the higher the value of the stdm index, the more advanced a country is in the second demographic transition considered in terms of marriage formation. lastly, pearson’s coefficients were calculated to see how the types of first marriage patterns in 2018 and the sdtm indexes correlated with the selected demographic and economic indicators. all data were obtained from the eurostat database, and statistical analysis was performed in ms excel 2016 and statistica 13. the tables, graphs, and choropleth maps illustrating the data and research results were prepared using quantum gis ver. 3.16 and geographical data from the eurostat8 website. 4. results the analysis revealed that the selected european countries differed in mean ages at first marriage, first marriage rates, and first marriages as a share of total marriages. in most countries, the mean age at first marriage was rising, likewise the rates of second or higher-order marriages, while first marriage rates were falling. the highest mean ages at first marriage in 2018 occurred in spain and sweden, and the lowest in belarus and north macedonia; romania and lithuania had the highest crude marriage rates and  total first marriage rates9, whereas luxembourg, italy, portugal, and spain had the lowest ones. changes in family formation patterns in these countries may have been caused by women having their first children at increasingly older ages (in 2018, the mean ages of women at the birth of their first child were the highest in italy, spain, luxembourg, greece, ireland, and switzerland, and the lowest in belarus, bulgaria, romania, north macedonia, and ukraine). 8 © eurogeographics for the administrative boundaries (eurostat). 9 the total first marriage rate is “computed by adding the first marriage rates by age in a given year, separately for men and women” (eurostat). it “represents the proportion of women or men who would eventually marry, if they were subject through their lifetime to the age–sex specific first marriage rates of a given period” (ní bhrolcháin, 2015, p. 118). it is interesting to note, however, that in the majority of european countries, most children in 2018 were still born to married parents (see tables a1 and a2 in the appendix). 4.1. types of first marriage patterns the analysis of age-group specific first marriage rates resulted in the creation of 22 types of first marriage patterns occurring in the selected countries in 2010 and 2018. the youngest type is type 1 (in both years, most marriages took place in the age group 20–24 years), and the oldest one is type 22 (the greatest number of marriages was for people aged 30–34 years). in 2018, only type 16 did not occur in any of the countries; in 2010, types 12, 15 and 22 were not observed. the most common types of first marriage rates in 2018 were types 20 and 14 (males) and types 5, 9, and 10 (females). from each type, the first three age groups were selected to form broad categories of the types of first marriage patterns (a–g; see table 1). in 2018, the types of male first marriage patterns that occurred in most countries belonged to category f (age groups 30–34, 25–29, and 35–39 years); regarding the types of female first marriage patterns, types included in category d (age groups 25–29, 30–34, and 20–24) were the most common. comparing the age-group sequences that make up the youngest and oldest types of first marriage patterns reveals interesting shifts in the positions of particular age groups. for instance, the age group 20–24 years, which is first in types 1–3, is only fifth and sixth, respectively, in types 19–20, and 21–22; the age group 15–19 years, third in type 1 and fourth in type 2, is the last in types 11, 14, 15, 18, and 20-22 (see table 1). table 2 shows the types of male and female first marriage patterns in the selected countries in 2010 and 2018. in almost all countries but norway, slovakia, and austria10, the types of first marriage patterns in 2018 are the same or higher than in 2010, which seems to indicate an increasing tendency to 10 austria had type 18 of female first marriage patterns in 2010 and type 10 in 2018 because of similar first marriage rates between the age groups 25-29 years and 30-34 years and between the age groups 20–24 and 35–39 years. as for norway, female and male types of first marriage rates were higher in 2010 than in 2018 due to the similarity of the female first marriage rates between the age groups 20-24 and 3034 years and the male first marriage rates between the age groups 25–29 and 30–34 in 2010 and 2018. in slovakia, comparable female first marriage rates between the age groups 20–24 and 25–29 years in 2018 caused that its type 4 of first marriage patterns in 2010 was replaced by type 4 (see tables 1 and 2). ij = ij ij – min( ) max( ) – min ( ) ij ij 18 anna majdzińska postpone marriages. in both years, the type of male first marriage pattern was higher than the type of female first marriage pattern in all countries, excluding austria, where the types of male and female first marriage patterns in 2010 were higher than in 2018. the youngest types of male and female first marriage patterns in 2018 occurred in belarus and north macedonia, and the oldest in spain (see table 2). in 2018, the outermost types of male first marriage patterns characterised belarus (3), ireland, italy, sweden (21), and spain (22); as regards the female first marriage patterns, the lowest and highest types occurred in belarus and north macedonia (1) and spain (20). figure 1 reveals considerable differences in the distribution of age group-specific first marriage rates in europe. in 2018, post-communist countries had relatively high male and female first marriage rates in the age groups 15–19, 20–24, and 25–29 years, whereas those in the groups aged 40+ were rather low. the group of countries with the lowest male and female first marriage rates in the first three age groups included spain, italy and luxembourg; sweden and denmark had the highest male and tab. 1. the age-group composition of the types of first marriage patterns and the number of european countries where particular types occurred in 2010* and 2018**. main category type age group ranked from the highest to the lowest first marriage frequency no. of countries with a given type in 2010 and 2018 2010 2018 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii males females males females 1 20–24 25–29 15–19 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ 0 3 0 2 2 20–24 25–29 30–34 15–19 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ 0 2 0 1 3 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 15–19 40–44 45–49 50+ 1 0 1 0 4 25–29 20–24 30–34 15–19 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ 0 6 0 1 5 25–29 20–24 30–34 35–39 15–19 40–44 45–49 50+ 1 3 0 6 6 25–29 20–24 30–34 35–39 40–44 15–19 45–49 50+ 2 1 1 1 7 25–29 20–24 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 15–19 50+ 1 0 0 1 8 25–29 30–34 20–24 35–39 15–19 40–44 45–49 50+ 0 3 1 0 9 25–29 30–34 20–24 35–39 40–44 15–19 45–49 50+ 3 5 0 5 10 25–29 30–34 20–24 35–39 40–44 45–49 15–19 50+ 4 4 3 6 11 25–29 30–34 20–24 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ 15–19 2 1 3 2 12 25–29 30–34 20–24 35–39 45–49 40–44 15–19 50+ 0 0 0 1 13 25–29 30–34 35–39 20–24 40–44 45–49 15–19 50+ 3 1 1 0 14 25–29 30–34 35–39 20–24 40–44 45–49 50+ 15–19 4 0 5 3 15 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 20–24 45–49 50+ 15–19 0 0 3 0 16 30–34 25–29 35–39 20–24 40–44 15–19 45–49 50+ 0 1 0 0 17 30–34 25–29 35–39 20–24 40–44 45–49 15–19 50+ 1 0 1 0 18 30–34 25–29 35–39 20–24 40–44 45–49 50+ 15–19 3 1 2 0 19 30–34 25–29 35–39 40–44 20–24 45–49 15–19 50+ 1 0 0 1 20 30–34 25–29 35–39 40–44 20–24 45–49 50+ 15–19 4 0 6 1 21 30–34 25–29 35–39 40–44 45–49 20–24 50+ 15–19 1 0 3 0 22 30–34 35–39 25–29 40–44 45–49 20–24 50+ 15–19 0 0 1 0 a 1 20–24 25–29 15–19 – – – – – 0 3 0 2 b 2–3 20–24 25–29 30–34 – – – – – 1 2 1 1 c 4–7 25–29 20–24 30–34 – – – – – 4 10 1 9 d 8–12 25–29 30–34 20–24 – – – – – 9 13 7 14 e 13–15 25–29 30–34 35–39 – – – – – 7 1 9 3 f 16–21 30–34 25–29 35–39 – – – – – 10 2 12 2 g 22 30–34 35–39 25–29 – – – – – 0 0 1 0 * belgium and montenegro – 2009 data; belarus – 2011 data ** austria, belgium, germany, france and luxembourg – 2017 data; ireland – 2016 data source: eurostat data; calculated by the author. the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 19 female first marriage rates in the age groups 40–44, 45-49, and 50+. the highest first marriage rates were found in post-communist countries (the leader was romania) and the lowest ones in luxembourg (see fig. 1). because the first three age groups in luxembourg have comparable first marriage rates, the curves representing the first male and female marriage run flat, and the differences between the cfmrs are small (see figure 1 and table a3 in appendix). the values of the cfmr and total first marriage rates were higher for females in the majority of the countries (see table a3 in appendix). a between country-comparison of cfmrs showed that the first two age groups in romania had the same cfmrs as those obtained for the first four age groups in belarus, montenegro, and latvia, and similar to those obtained for the first five age groups in serbia and croatia. in the next step, ward’s method was used to divide the countries into groups with similar age group-specific first marriage rates in 2018. thus, three clusters of groups for women and three for men were obtained11. the most similar male first 11 the analysis of the graphs of amalgamation schedules in statistica software indicated that this division of the countries in figure 3 was optimal. the linkage distance used in creating the clusters was 0.09. had a smaller distance been used, marriage rates proved to be serbia and croatia; latvia and montenegro; switzerland and germany; spain and italy; and slovenia, netherlands, france, and finland. in the case of female first marriage rates, they were serbia and montenegro; netherlands and france; denmark and germany; austria and switzerland; hungary and czechia (see fig. 2). let us note that the clusters of countries yielded by ward’s method and the earlier typology (table 2) are not equivalent because ward’s method disregarded age-group sequences used by the typology, and the latter omitted first marriage rates. even so, the clusters created by ward’s method include countries with the same or similar types of first marriage patterns (see fig. 2). 4.2. quotients of male and female first marriage rates the quotients of age group-specific male and female first marriage rates in each country in 2018 were calculated to facilitate the comparison of first male and female marriage rates (see table 3). in all but a few countries, the female first marriage rates in the age groups 15–19, 20–24, and 25–29 years were greater than the male rates; in other age groups, it was the a greater number of more homogenous clusters would have been produced. tab. 2. european countries and the types of male and female first marriage patterns, 2010* and 2018**. country females males country (cont.) females males 2010 2018 2010 2018 2010 2018 2010 2018 austria 18 10 18 20 lithuania 4 5 6 10 belarus 1 1 3 3 luxembourg 10 10 14 20 belgium 6 10 11 15 montenegro 2 5 11 14 bulgaria 4 4 9 10 netherlands 9 11 14 20 croatia 4 5 10 13 north macedonia 1 1 5 6 czechia 5 9 14 14 norway 10 7 20 14 denmark 11 14 20 20 poland 2 5 7 11 estonia 5 9 10 14 portugal 5 10 10 18 finland 9 12 13 14 romania 1 5 9 11 france 10 11 14 15 serbia 4 5 10 11 germany 9 10 18 20 slovakia 4 2 9 8 greece 8 9 17 20 slovenia 8 10 13 15 hungary 8 9 13 17 spain 10 20 20 22 ireland 16 19 19 21 sweden 13 14 21 21 italy 9 14 20 21 switzerland 9 9 18 18 latvia 4 6 6 10 * belgium and montenegro – 2009 data; belarus – 2011 data ** austria, belgium, germany, france and luxembourg – 2017 data; ireland – 2016 data source: eurostat data; calculated by the author. 20 anna majdzińska 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ north macedonia (1 – f) slovakia (2 – f) belarus (1 – f) belarus (3 – m) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ bulgaria (4 – f) latvia (6 – f) north macedonia (6 – m) norway (7 – f) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ slovakia (8) lithuania (10) latvia (10) romania (11) bulgaria (10) poland (11) serbia (11) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ czechia (9) hungary (9) greece (9) france (11) estonia (9) switzerland (9) netherlands (11) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ belgium (10) portugal (10) luxembourg (10) austria (10) germany (10) slovenia (10) finland (12) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ croatia (13) finland (14) estonia (14) montenegro (14) czechia (14) norway (14) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ denmark (14 – f) belgium (15 – m) sweden (14 – f) slovenia (15 – m) italy (14 – f) france (15 – m) a) categories a – b (types 1-3; males and females) b) category c (types 4, 6-7; males and females) c) category c (type 5; females) d) category d (types 8, 10 and 11; males) e) category d (types 9 and 11; females) f ) category d (types 10 and 12; females) g) category e (types 13 and 14; males) h) category e (types 14 and 15; males and females) the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 21 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ hungary (17) italy (21) switzerland (17) ireland (21) portugal (18) sweden (21) spain (22) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 15–19 20–24 24–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ ireland (19 – f) denmark (20 – m) louxembourg (10 – m) austria (20 – m)netherlands (20 – m) spain (20 – f) germany (20 – m) greece (20 – m) i) categories f – g (types 17, 18, 21 and 22; males) j) category f (types 19 and 20; males and females) fig. 1. the broad categories of age-specific male and female first marriage rates in the selected european countries, 2018*. ** austria, belgium, germany, france and luxembourg – 2017 data; ireland – 2016 data source: eurostat data; created by the author. 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 l in k a g e d is ta n c e b e la ru s n o rt h m a c e d o n ia s lo v a k ia r o m a n ia l it h u a n ia p o la n d s e rb ia m o n te n e g ro l a tv ia c ro a ti a b u lg a ri a ir e la n d g re e c e g e rm a n y d e n m a rk h u n g a ry c z e c h ia a u s tr ia s w it z e rl a n d f in la n d s lo v e n ia e s to n ia s w e d e n it a ly s p a in l u x e m b o u rg p o rt u g a l n e th e rl a n d s f ra n c e n o rw a y b e lg iu m 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 l in k a g e d is ta n c e b e la ru s n o rt h m a c e d o n ia s lo v a k ia r o m a n ia l it h u a n ia p o la n d s e rb ia m o n te n e g ro l a tv ia c ro a ti a b u lg a ri a ir e la n d g re e c e g e rm a n y d e n m a rk h u n g a ry c z e c h ia a u s tr ia s w it z e rl a n d f in la n d s lo v e n ia e s to n ia s w e d e n it a ly s p a in l u x e m b o u rg p o rt u g a l n e th e rl a n d s f ra n c e n o rw a y b e lg iu m females males fig. 2. combinations of countries generated by ward’s method according to age group-specific first marriage patterns, 2018*. * austria, belgium, germany, france and luxembourg – 2017 data – 2016 data. source: eurostat data; created by the author. 22 anna majdzińska other way round. the exceptions were belarus and north macedonia, which had higher male first marriage rates in the group 25–29 years, and spain, with the female rate in the group 30–34 years slightly exceeding the male rate. the largest dispersion of the quotients in 2018 characterised the age group 15–19 years12 (see table 3) – the lowest quotient was calculated for ireland (where the female first marriage rate was 53% 12 the dispersion of the quotients was assessed with a coefficient of variation vs calculated as a ratio between standard deviation and the arithmetic mean of quotients for a given age group across all countries. higher than the male rate, both being relatively low), and the highest for romania and montenegro (the female first marriage rates in the two countries were 14 and 9 times higher than the male rates). the quotients calculated for belgium, france, and italy were rather high, but both male and female first marriage rates were relatively low. in the majority of post-communist countries, and greece and ireland, the quotients obtained for age groups older than 30 years were below 1 and quite low (in all these countries, the male first marriage rates in the oldest age groups were much higher than the female rates). in portugal, france, spain, tab. 3. quotients of male and female first marriage rates by age group, 2018*. 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50+ austria 5.04 1.85 1.34 0.96 0.78 0.65 0.68 0.61 belarus 4.44 1.50 0.73 0.64 0.71 0.68 0.49 0.46 belgium 8.31 2.16 1.18 0.82 0.79 0.72 0.68 0.67 bulgaria 5.11 1.82 1.16 0.76 0.69 0.66 0.48 0.48 croatia 4.74 2.14 1.21 0.71 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.48 czechia 6.23 2.31 1.37 0.89 0.63 0.53 0.38 0.33 denmark 5.21 2.03 1.34 0.93 0.75 0.68 0.68 0.68 estonia 4.65 2.07 1.29 0.87 0.80 0.72 0.55 0.48 finland 2.72 1.81 1.30 0.91 0.75 0.71 0.84 0.52 france 7.00 2.00 1.15 0.86 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.69 germany 6.74 2.37 1.40 0.92 0.72 0.62 0.67 0.61 greece 4.35 2.97 1.68 0.92 0.60 0.46 0.39 0.37 hungary 3.64 2.10 1.42 0.86 0.64 0.57 0.57 0.42 ireland 1.53 1.70 1.50 0.93 0.68 0.59 0.52 0.43 italy 7.08 2.79 1.62 0.98 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.64 latvia 3.25 1.92 1.18 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.62 0.54 lithuania 5.06 2.21 1.13 0.69 0.66 0.54 0.54 0.45 luxembourg 2.66 1.89 1.38 0.97 0.74 0.75 0.62 0.73 montenegro 9.15 2.40 1.17 0.72 0.50 0.66 0.52 0.41 netherlands 5.57 2.12 1.25 0.87 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.60 north macedonia 5.50 1.68 0.87 0.59 0.67 0.79 0.63 0.59 norway 2.49 1.64 1.09 0.86 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.52 poland 6.70 2.21 1.04 0.67 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.48 portugal 2.60 1.83 1.25 0.87 0.74 0.69 0.76 0.76 romania 14.31 2.65 1.09 0.68 0.62 0.67 0.73 0.58 serbia 6.31 2.25 1.16 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.67 0.54 slovakia 2.22 1.84 1.03 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.48 slovenia 5.00 2.28 1.40 0.98 0.96 0.69 0.71 0.63 spain 5.36 2.29 1.62 1.04 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.67 sweden 5.85 2.04 1.31 0.97 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.67 switzerland 7.82 2.05 1.28 0.94 0.75 0.64 0.66 0.65 vs 0.46 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.20 * austria, belgium, germany, france and luxembourg –2017 data; ireland – 2016 data; vs – coefficient of variation. source: eurostat data; calculated by the author. the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 23 sweden, and denmark, the male first marriage rates were only slightly greater than the female rates. 4.3. the sdtm index the sdtm index was calculated to assess the progression of the second demographic transition in the selected countries in respect of marriage formation. that none of the countries has an index of 0 or 1 (see figure 3) means that in none of them, all four variables making up the index had the highest or lowest values. the lowest sdtm index was obtained for north macedonia (which had the lowest crude divorce rate, the proportion of live births outside marriage, and mean age at first marriage, but one of the highest total first marriage rates) and the highest for sweden (with the highest mean age at first marriage and one of the greatest proportions of live births outside marriage and crude divorce rates). the progression of the second demographic transition as indicated by the sdtm index was also fairly slow in croatia, romania, and serbia, while in france, luxembourg, and spain, it was relatively fast. 13 13 total first marriage rates, the proportion of live births outside marriage and mean age at first marriage are detailed in tables a1 and a2 in the appendix. crude divorce rates for belgium, germany, greece, and ireland were calculated using 2017 data and for france with 2016 data. data on montenegro were not available. 4.4. correlations between the types of first marriage patterns and selected demographic and economic indicators to assess the correlations between particular types of male and female first marriage patterns and selected demographic and economic indicators in 2018, pearson’s coefficients were calculated (see table 4). understandably, the correlations are strong and negative for the youngest groups and moderate and positive for the oldest groups, implying that the lower the type of first marriage patterns, the higher the first marriage rate in age groups up to 29 years, and the lower in the older groups. a similar regularity occurs in the case of age group-specific fertility rates (with the difference that the type of the first marriage pattern does not correlate with the total fertility rate). the correlations between the type of the first marriage pattern and the quotients of male and female first marriage rates in the age groups 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 45–49 years, and older than 50 years proved positive. the types of first marriage patterns weakly, negatively, and significantly correlated with the crude marriage rates but not with the crude divorce rates. positive and significant correlations were also obtained for the types of first marriage patterns and women’s mean age at childbirth (total and at first birth), the proportion of the population aged 85 years and over, the median age of the male population, the duration of working life, fig. 3. european countries arranged by sdtm index, 201812. source: eurostat data; created by the author. 24 anna majdzińska the gross domestic product, and the sdtm index. all results are acceptable. 5. discussion and conclusions ordering the male and female first marriage rates for each of the eight age groups in the 31 european countries in 2010 and 2018 from the highest to the lowest produced 22 types of first marriage patterns. the analysis of the first three age groups from each type allowed seven main categories of first marriage patterns to be created. in the majority of european countries, the mean age at first marriage was older in 2018 than in 2010. the predominant types of male first marriage patterns in 2018 were type 20 (with the highest first marriage rates in age groups 30–34 years, 25–29, and 35–39 years) and type 14 (age groups 25–29, 30–34, and 35–39, respectively). as for the types of female first marriage rates, type 5 (age groups 25–29, 20– 24, and 30–34 years) and types 9 and 10 (age groups 25–29, 30–34, 20–24) occurred in most countries. countries in central and eastern europe are very different from the rest of the continent regarding the types of first marriage patterns. in 2018, the youngest types occurred in post-communist countries (especially in belarus and macedonia) and the oldest ones in spain, ireland, denmark, italy, and sweden (both male and female), and in the netherlands, luxembourg, greece, portugal, switzerland, germany, and austria (male). these western european countries also had the highest mean age at first marriage and the highest mean age of first-time mothers. older types of first marriage patterns are characteristic of countries that are stronger economically and/or where the second demographic transition takes place at a faster pace. the group of countries where the second demographic transition is the least advanced according to marriage formation includes north macedonia, croatia, romania and serbia. the countries where it is the most advanced are sweden, france, luxembourg, and spain. the statistical analysis showed that in the age groups up to 30 years of age, the types of male and female first marriage patterns negatively and significantly correlated with first marriage rates, first fertility rates, and crude marriage rates. at the same time, they were positively and significantly associated with first marriage rates and first fertility rates in older age groups, the quotients of female and tab. 4. pearson’s correlation coefficients* between the types of male and first marriage patterns and selected demographic and economic indicators in 2018**. indicator type – females type – males indicator (cont.) type – females type – males indicator (cont.) type – females type – males ffmr (15–19) -0.75 -0.79 mfmr (50+) 0.46 0.45 fr (40–44) 0.83 0.75 ffmr (20–24) -0.86 -0.89 f/m (15–19) -0.14 -0.07 fr (45–49) 0.61 0.63 ffmr (25–29) -0.57 -0.50 f/m (20–24) 0.16 0.34 cmr -0.52 -0.57 ffmr (30–34) 0.49 0.55 f/m (25–29) 0.78 0.86 cdr 0.07 0.03 ffmr (35–39) 0.70 0.70 f/m (30–34) 0.86 0.88 mawc 0.80 0.85 ffmr (40–44) 0.65 0.61 f/m (35–39) 0.49 0.32 mawfc 0.77 0.89 ffmr (45–49) 0.52 0.44 f/m (40–44) 0.27 0.09 prop (0–14) 0.22 -0.01 ffmr (50+) 0.48 0.47 f/m (45–49) 0.41 0.31 prop (65+) 0.23 0.29 mfmr (15–19) -0.64 -0.70 f/m (50+) 0.37 0.39 prop (85+) 0.52 0.54 mfmr (20–24) -0.82 -0.90 tfr 0.09 -0.02 mam 0.29 0.45 mfmr (25–29) -0.77 -0.76 fr (15–19) -0.52 -0.53 maf -0.05 0.02 mfmr (30–34) 0.07 0.12 fr (20–24) -0.69 -0.82 dwl 0.37 0.38 mfmr (35–39) 0.52 0.61 fr (25–29) -0.39 -0.43 gdp 0.49 0.58 mfmr (40–44) 0.64 0.69 fr (30–34) 0.56 0.61 sdtm index 0.65 0.58 mfmr (45–49) 0.54 0.50 fr (35–39) 0.83 0.80 note: ffmr and mfmr – female and male first marriage rates by age group; f/m – quotient of female and male first marriage rates in an age group; tfr – total fertility rate; cmr – crude marriage rate (per 1,000 population); cdr – crude divorce rate (per 1,000 population); fr – fertility rate in an age group; mawc –mean age of women at childbirth; mawfc – mean age of women at first birth; prop – an age group’s share of the total population; mam – median age of the male population; maf – median age of the female population; dwl – duration of working life (males and females); gdp – gross domestic product, market prices (current prices, euro per capita). * values in red are statistically significant (p < 0.05). ** for austria, belgium, germany, france, and luxembourg, all indicators were calculated with 2017 data; for ireland with 2016 data; german cmr and french cdr were calculated using 2016 data. data on belarussian gdp and dwl were not available. source: eurostat data; calculated by the author in statistica 13 software. the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 25 male first marriage rates in age groups older than 25 years, the mean age of women at birth (total and at first childbirth), the sdtm index, the proportion of the population aged 85 years and over, the median age of the male population, the duration of working life, and the gross domestic product. family formation patterns change under the influence of many factors, such as the wealth of society, governments’ family policies, the history of a country, and long-established social norms. while post-communist countries are still characterised by younger types of first marriage patterns than other countries in europe, in these countries, too, employment uncertainties and educational aspirations of populations, etc., mean that marriages are entered into at ever later age. another notable factor in marriage formation in this part of europe is tradition, whose influence is especially prominent in belarus, ukraine, albania, north macedonia, and montenegro. in bulgaria and romania, the decisions to get married are in many 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4.9 4.5 5.3 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.63 40.1 41.3 28.2 29.5 belarus : 8.1 6.4 : 0.86 0.66 : 0.91 0.73 19.6 13.0 24.9 25.8 belgium 4.4 3.9 3.9 0.48 0.43 0.42 0.51 0.45 0.43 45.7 49.0 28.0 29.0 bulgaria 4.3 3.3 4.1 0.50 0.39 0.55 0.52 0.44 0.64 54.1 58.5 25.6 26.2 croatia 4.9 5.0 4.9 : 0.66 0.67 : 0.71 0.72 13.3 20.7 27.5 28.8 czechia 5.4 4.5 5.1 0.49 0.42 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.63 40.3 48.5 27.6 28.4 denmark 7.2 5.6 5.6 0.71 0.66 0.66 0.74 0.68 0.67 47.3 54.2 29.0 29.5 estonia 3.9 3.8 5.0 0.37 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.41 0.55 59.1 54.1 26.3 27.7 finland 5.1 5.6 4.3 0.60 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.70 0.50 41.1 44.6 28.3 29.2 france 5.0 3.9 3.5 0.59 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.46 55.0 60.4 28.1 28.7 germany 5.1 4.7 4.9 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.62 33.3 33.9 28.9 29.7 greece 4.5 5.1 4.4 0.51 0.59 0.62 0.54 0.66 0.68 7.3 11.1 29.1 30.4 hungary 4.7 3.6 5.2 0.48 0.36 0.60 0.49 0.39 0.66 40.8 43.9 27.7 28.2 iceland 6.3 4.9 : 0.71 0.53 : 0.72 0.54 : 64.3 70.5 26.9 28.3 ireland 5.0 4.5 4.3 : 0.52 0.58 : 0.51 0.56 33.8 37.9 29.2 30.5 italy 5.0 3.7 3.2 0.60 0.50 0.46 0.65 0.54 0.50 21.8 34.0 30.6 31.2 latvia 3.9 4.4 6.8 0.44 0.45 0.69 0.45 0.46 0.76 44.4 39.5 26.0 27.2 lithuania 4.8 6.0 7.0 0.55 0.71 0.80 0.56 0.72 0.86 25.7 26.4 26.4 27.8 luxembourg 4.9 3.5 3.1 0.50 0.35 0.31 0.55 0.39 0.34 34.0 39.5 29.5 30.9 montenegro : 5.9 5.3 : 0.82 0.71 : 0.83 0.78 15.7 : 26.3 : netherlands 5.5 4.5 3.7 0.55 0.52 0.44 0.60 0.53 0.44 44.3 51.9 29.2 30.0 north macedonia 7.0 6.9 6.5 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.88 12.2 12.1 26.0 26.9 norway 5.0 4.8 4.3 0.48 0.54 0.44 0.51 0.51 0.43 54.8 56.4 28.0 29.5 poland 5.5 6.0 5.1 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.66 20.6 26.4 26.5 27.4 portugal 6.2 3.8 3.4 0.70 0.43 0.44 0.71 0.44 0.45 41.3 55.9 28.1 29.8 romania 6.1 5.7 7.4 0.61 0.70 0.94 0.64 0.77 1.07 27.7 30.9 25.5 26.7 serbia 5.7 4.9 5.2 0.73 0.62 0.68 0.75 0.67 0.74 24.0 26.8 26.9 28.1 slovakia 4.8 4.7 5.7 0.51 0.49 0.68 0.52 0.53 0.77 33.0 40.0 27.0 27.1 slovenia 3.6 3.2 3.5 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.53 55.7 57.7 28.4 28.8 spain 5.4 3.6 3.5 0.60 0.37 0.43 0.63 0.41 0.46 35.5 47.3 29.8 31.0 sweden 4.5 5.3 5.0 0.51 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.66 0.55 54.2 54.5 28.9 29.3 switzerland 5.5 5.5 4.8 0.59 0.62 0.55 0.65 0.66 0.60 18.6 25.7 30.0 30.9 ukraine : 6.7 5.4 : 0.63 : : 0.68 : 21.9 20.5 24.4 25.4 note: “:” stands for ‘data not available’. * belgium, france and germany – 2000, 2010, and 2017 data. ** belarus – 2011 and 2018 data; belgium and france – 2000, 2010, and 2017 data; germany – 2000, 2009, and 2017 data; ireland – 2010 and 2016 data; latvia – 2002, 2010, and 2018 data; montenegro – 2009 and 2018 data. *** belgium – 2000, 2010, and 2016 data; cyprus – 2000, 2010, and 2017 data; montenegro – 2009 data. **** belarus – 2009 and 2018 data; denmark – 2012 and 2018 data; france – 2013 and 2018 data; italy – 2013 and 2018 data; montenegro – 2009 data. source: eurostat data; calculated by the author. the typology of first marriage patterns in europe 29 tab. a2. first marriages and mean ages at first marriage in selected european countries, 2000, 2010 and 2018.   first marriages (%)* mean age at first marriage (years)** males females males females 2000 2010 2018 2000 2010 2018 2000 2010 2018 2000 2010 2018 austria 76.2 74.6 77.6 77.0 76.4 78.7 30.0 32.5 34.2 27.4 29.9 31.5 belarus : 75.4 70.0 : 75.4 67.8 : 26.8 27.5 : 24.4 25.1 belgium 74.7 72.2 70.0 75.7 73.6 70.6 29.1 31.7 33.5 26.9 29.4 31.2 bulgaria 87.0 86.0 86.2 87.8 87.8 86.9 28.5 29.8 30.8 24.7 26.6 27.5 croatia 90.7 91.2 87.6 91.0 91.6 87.4 28.5 30.0 31.0 25.4 27.1 28.3 czechia 74.8 73.6 75.9 75.1 74.3 76.4 27.6 30.8 31.9 24.6 27.9 29.2 denmark 72.7 75.1 75.0 71.7 74.7 74.9 32.5 33.6 34.9 29.9 31.2 32.5 estonia : 73.2 70.3 : 74.5 69.7 28.1 30.5 32.8 25.2 28.0 29.9 finland 78.3 74.1 72.0 77.3 77.0 70.8 30.5 32.5 34.3 28.3 30.2 31.7 france 81.5 79.4 80.1 82.6 80.8 81.3 30.7 32.8 34.9 28.4 30.7 32.8 germany 74.2 73.9 76.3 73.0 74.3 76.6 30.5 32.5 34.0 27.7 29.8 31.2 greece 87.5 87.5 86.6 89.2 88.8 87.4 31.1 32.6 33.4 27.2 29.3 30.3 hungary 79.0 76.2 77.9 79.6 77.1 78.7 27.6 31.2 32.4 24.8 28.3 29.6 ireland : 91.9 89.7 : 93.7 91.5 : 33.1 33.8 : 31.3 31.9 italy 93.2 89.9 86.1 94.6 91.2 87.6 30.9 33.2 35.2 27.8 30.3 32.4 latvia 70.3 72.0 68.3 70.5 74.4 68.2 27.2 29.4 31.8 25.0 27.1 29.2 lithuania 78.4 78.6 76.1 79.7 80.0 75.3 26.1 28.7 30.7 23.8 26.5 28.2 luxembourg 75.9 73.9 74.9 76.7 78.5 78.8 30.3 32.8 34.0 27.4 30.2 31.6 montenegro : 93.5 92.4 : 95.6 93.9 : 31.3 31.9 : 26.7 28.3 netherlands 80.0 74.1 74.5 81.8 74.7 73.9 30.7 32.4 34.1 28.0 29.8 31.6 north macedonia 91.7 90.5 91.8 93.7 92.9 93.0 26.8 28.2 28.9 23.7 25.2 26.0 norway 80.3 77.6 73.6 80.3 69.7 68.6 30.9 33.7 33.1 28.4 30.8 30.5 poland 90.0 89.1 85.5 90.5 89.5 85.0 26.5 28.4 29.8 24.1 26.1 27.4 portugal 90.0 80.6 75.4 92.3 83.3 78.0 27.4 29.9 32.9 25.2 27.7 31.1 romania 85.0 86.3 85.7 85.8 86.7 84.3 27.3 29.0 31.8 23.7 25.6 28.4 serbia 86.3 87.6 85.3 87.6 88.8 86.0 28.8 30.5 31.4 25.3 27.2 28.4 slovakia 87.9 86.0 85.2 89.7 88.0 86.0 26.9 30.0 29.2 24.1 27.2 26.5 slovenia 90.2 88.8 88.1 90.2 89.8 88.7 29.9 31.7 33.7 27.0 29.0 31.2 spain 93.4 85.1 81.0 94.6 86.6 82.3 30.2 33.1 35.6 28.1 30.9 33.5 sweden 73.9 72.1 74.5 78.0 77.8 71.2 33.0 35.6 36.7 30.4 32.7 34.0 switzerland 76.6 76.7 79.5 79.3 79.4 82.2 30.8 32.2 32.9 28.2 29.8 30.5 ukraine : 75.8 72.2 : 76.6 70.5 : 27.1 : : 24.0 : note: “:” stands for data not available. * belarus – 2009 and 2018 data; belgium and france – 2000, 2010, and 2017 data; cyprus – 2000, 2009, and 2018 data; germany and ireland – 2000, 2010, and 2016 data; moldavia – 2010 and 2016 data. ** austria and germany – 2000, 2009, and 2017 data; belarus – 2011 and 2018 data; belgium, france, and luxembourg – 2000, 2010, and 2017 data; croatia – 2001, 2010, and 2018 data; ireland – 2010 and 2016 data; latvia – 2002, 2010, and 2018 data; montenegro – 2009 and 2018 data. source: eurostat data; calculated by the author. 30 anna majdzińska tab. a3. cfmr for first five age groups with the highest marriage frequencies in european countries, 2018*. specification women men 1 1 – 2 1 – 3 1 – 4 1 – 5 1 1 – 2 1 – 3 1 – 4 1 – 5 austria 0.19 0.34 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.16 0.30 0.41 0.47 0.52 belarus 0.38 0.55 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.25 0.49 0.58 0.62 0.64 belgium 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.13 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.38 bulgaria 0.21 0.39 0.49 0.56 0.61 0.18 0.32 0.42 0.48 0.52 croatia 0.31 0.48 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.25 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.64 czechia 0.27 0.43 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.20 0.37 0.46 0.51 0.54 denmark 0.23 0.42 0.51 0.58 0.61 0.20 0.38 0.49 0.55 0.58 estonia 0.18 0.30 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.14 0.28 0.36 0.42 0.46 finland 0.17 0.29 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.13 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.41 france 0.15 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.13 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.40 germany 0.22 0.39 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.18 0.34 0.44 0.49 0.53 greece 0.25 0.47 0.55 0.63 0.65 0.24 0.39 0.52 0.56 0.59 hungary 0.25 0.42 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.19 0.37 0.47 0.52 0.56 ireland 0.23 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.25 0.37 0.49 0.53 0.55 italy 0.16 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.16 0.26 0.35 0.39 0.41 latvia 0.28 0.47 0.61 0.68 0.71 0.24 0.42 0.52 0.61 0.65 lithuania 0.37 0.60 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.33 0.55 0.66 0.74 0.78 luxembourg 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.09 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.29 montenegro 0.29 0.50 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.25 0.44 0.53 0.62 0.66 netherlands 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.41 0.13 0.25 0.33 0.37 0.40 north macedonia 0.33 0.60 0.72 0.81 0.85 0.31 0.51 0.67 0.72 0.75 norway 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.35 0.39 poland 0.29 0.50 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.28 0.42 0.52 0.57 0.59 portugal 0.17 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.14 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.41 romania 0.38 0.69 0.87 0.93 0.99 0.35 0.61 0.73 0.83 0.88 serbia 0.28 0.48 0.62 0.67 0.70 0.24 0.44 0.53 0.61 0.64 slovakia 0.27 0.53 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.25 0.40 0.55 0.61 0.64 slovenia 0.19 0.31 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.13 0.26 0.34 0.38 0.41 spain 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.37 0.39 sweden 0.15 0.29 0.38 0.44 0.48 0.15 0.26 0.37 0.42 0.46 switzerland 0.20 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.18 0.33 0.43 0.47 0.51 * austria, belgium, germany, france, and luxembourg – 2017 data; ireland – 2016 data source: eurostat data; calculated by the author. 1. introduction a. williams and v. baláž (2001) in their book “tourism in transition: economic change in central europe: tourism, retailing and consumption” discuss focused on problems of several sectors of the economy, namely in tourism, retailing and consumption. although westerners’ attention was concentrated on the post-socialist transition from around 1990, a. gosar (2012) considers that very little interest was shown for unstable southeast europe, especially for the western balkans and former yugoslavia countries. countries of the former yugoslavia, since the second world war and up to the fall of the iron curtain in 1989, were part of communist rule and centrally planned (socialist) economies. in 1991/2, ethnic violence erupted in yugoslavia, as several republics declared independence (gosar, 2012, p. 374), among which was macedonia. thus, macedonia independently enters the global tourism market and had to struggle with the destination recognition at first. because of the general political and economic setting of yugoslavia, where ethnic disputes lasted through the last decade of the twentieth century, journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(3), 23–32 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.3.04 evolution and changes of tourism in macedonia in the post-socialist period (1991–2018) dejan iliev institute of geography, faculty of natural sciences and mathematics, ss. cyril and methodius university, arhimedova 3, 1000 skopje, north macedonia, e-mail: d.iliev@hotmail.com; diliev@pmf.ukim.mk citation iliev d., 2019, evolution and changes of tourism in macedonia in the post-socialist period (1991–2018), journal of geography, politics and society, 9(3), 23–32. abstract the study provides a historical and contextual analysis of the evolution of tourism in macedonia. the time scope is defined as the period between 1991 and in 2018. the study investigates the tourism development in macedonia in the post-socialist period of the country, using the butler (1980) tourist area life cycle (talc) model as an analytical tool. the model provides a framework to explain the complex processes of the development and changes in tourism in the country over the years. for this purpose, an analysis of secondary data sources is implemented to find the changes in the evolutionary stages of tourism development. the findings show that tourism in macedonia is in a stage of development, and that it has not yet reached the consolidation stage. lastly, the study offers a better understanding of how tourism in macedonia is changing in the complex post-socialist period. key words tourism development, evolution, talc model, post-socialist period, macedonia. received: 02 july 2019 accepted: 06 september 2019 published: 30 september 2019 24 dejan iliev and where the transition from communism to democracy has been slow, the 1990s were characterized by slow economic development, even downfall, in particular in the tourism sector (gosar, 2012). because a market economy was introduced in the tourism sector countries of the former yugoslavia have gone through a whirlwind of changes, as the result of the regional instability and the transition itself (gosar, 2012). tourism development in the post-socialist countries was associated with the desire to make up for the lost time and the fast growth of income from tourism industry (banaszkiewicz et al., 2016). within the socialist countries much of the domestic tourism was regularized as “social tourism”, assigned holidays that were not bought but were the privilege of one’s employment or party position (banaszkiewicz et al., 2016, p. 109). also, they noticed that the transitions from those systems and sub-systems have been almost total and transformational. r. butler (1980) suggests that without comprehensive planning strategies and suitable tourism policy, destinations are intended to face of eventual decline and possible collapse. this argument is especially characteristic to many post-socialist countries, particularly in macedonia, where the development of tourism after the independence of the country is characterized by decaying infrastructure, weak linkage with other economic sectors, inherent shortfalls in long-term strategic tourism planning, political and economic instability and so on. at independence, the macedonia government depended almost exclusively on a few sectors, namely, industry, agriculture and trade. in consequence, macedonia has increasingly turned to the development of tourism as a possible source of foreign exchange earnings, job creation and economic growth, as is the case with many post-socialist countries in southeast europe. therefore, macedonia has embraced tourism as a strategy for socio-economic development, as is the case with many post-socialist countries in southeast europe. governments in these countries often consider the development of tourism as a generator of economic growth, job creation and reliable source of foreign exchange receipts. the study analyses the developments and changes in the tourism sector in the period 1991– 2018. the study uses butler’s (1980) tourist area life cycle (talc) model as a conceptual framework of analysis of the complexity of tourism development at its different stages in macedonia. the identification of the new stages of tourism development in macedonia derives from specific characteristics of each stage, including volume of tourists and nights spent, changes in the socio-economic indicators of the tourism development, certain attention is paid to the government’s role in the tourism policy and planning strategy, and the importance of tourism in the national economy. the paper organised in five sections. the second section explores the concept and gives a brief overview of the literature on the talc model. the third section addresses the study’s methodology and data source. in the fourth section applies a talc model to macedonia. the fifth section summarises the study with certain discussions and conclusions. 2. conceptual framework and brief overview of talc model authors such as r. butler (1980), w. christaller (1964), c. stansfield (1978), proposed the idea of an orderly progression in the life cycle of tourist resources. the butler’s (1980) model of a cycle of evolution of a tourism area was used in studies (choy, 1992; din, 1992; getz, 1992; haywood, 1986, 1992; smith, 1992; williams, 1993). the butler lifecycle model explains the evolution of tourism into the stages of exploration, involvement, development, consolidation, and stagnation, followed alternatively by either decline or rejuvenation (fig. 1.). according to d. weaver (2006) that is an ideal model of evolution. but, someone authors such as e. aguiló et al. (2005), b. prideaux (2000), m. uysal et al. (2012) saw specific deviations and were critical of the lifecycle model for its simplicity, its lack of precision, and its limited application scale. on the other hand, despite the criticism, the life cycle model is a useful framework for various scientific analyses and tool for research in tourism development. that’s why а various researchers agree that the life cycle model has played a significant role in tourism planning and development (candela, figini, 2012; de camillis et al., 2010; hovinen, 2002). a general conclusion of the life cycle model that it is a useful conceptual tool. it’s simple design and welldescribed stages appeal to researchers from a variety of disciplines and it has been applied to a range of studies. with the application of this model in the study specific stages in the evolutionary sequence are described. 3. method and data source the research methodology is based on a descriptive approach attempting to describe the phenomena relevant to the topic examined. the quantitative method has been used to interpret the research evolution and changes of tourism in macedonia in the post-socialist period (1991–2018) 25 data, as well as methods of comparison, analysis and synthesis. a simple descriptive statistical method was used to process, analyse and present the data indicating changes in tourism in the post-socialist period of macedonia. the research is based on secondary statistical data available from the official websites of the state statistical office and the national bank of macedonia. the author has consulted research and other papers published in relevant scientific journals and proceedings, as well as other publications and national strategies, informal discussions and dialogue with stakeholders in the tourism industry and policy that helped the author in the preparation of the paper. total annual tourist arrivals and total annual tourist nights spent (most affordable and most comparable) constitute the main units of measure for presenting tourism development in the country. data set covers the period 1991–2018. some data series are of limited scope due to the availability of data and this imposed a certain limitation to the depth of this research. in terms of geographical scope, this paper focuses on the administrative territory of macedonia. 4. an application of butler’s (1980) tourist area life cycle model to macedonia 4.1. tourism development in the complex postsocialist period 1991–2001 (decline stage) the break-up of yugoslavia had a disastrous impact on macedonian tourism. in the early years of independence macedonia reconciliation itself and accommodated itself to the fact that international visitors have most often just crossed the territory of the state. in such conditions, the tourism development in macedonia was moving downwards, aided additionally by the poor and unstable economy of the country (iliev, kitevski, 2016). the tourist visitors in the period 1991–2001 have a trend of steadily declining. in 1992, one year after the independence of the country, macedonia tourism had reached, in term of nights spent in tourist amenities, just 53.8% of its peak year 1987. in 2001, the lowest tourist turnover was registered (333,308 tourist arrivals and 1,254,582 overnights stays of tourists) (tab. 1). compared to 1987 (the most successful year in the tourism development of macedonia), there is a decrease in the arrival of tourists by 3.5 times and a reduction in the number of nights spent by tourists by 3.2 times (iliev et al., 2014). the post1991 period is characterized as a very unstable period with stagnation and reduces foreign exchange earnings from tourism (iliev et al., 2014). the reduction in foreign exchange earnings is occurs mostly rejuvenation reduced growth stabilization stagnation decline consolidation immediate decline development involvement exploration critical range of elements of capacity fig. 1. tourism area life cycle (talc) model source: adapted according to butler (1980). 26 dejan iliev in 1997 when 15.16 million us $ was registered, in 1998 – 16.70 million us $ and in 2001 – 25.95 million us $ (iliev, 2010). the country has experienced persistent shortfalls in foreign exchange earnings, due to decreased of foreign tourist arrivals. the structure of foreign demand has changed since independence. macedonia tourism has geographically become dependent on short-distance regional visits of residents of serbia and montenegro, bulgaria, albania etc., while western markets have cautiously responded to the new tourist destination “macedonia”. a major role for the decline of tourism development in this period was the military conflicts in the countries of the former yugoslavia, the disordered political and security situation of the region, the blockade of the international community, the military conflict in macedonia in 2001, on the basis of that the country gained the image of an unsafe tourist destination for foreign tourists. in the catering trade in the period 1991–2001 some decline in the development was evident (tab.  2). the hotels and catering facilities that prior to 1991 were in public ownership entered the process of transformation and privatization, while parts of them were closed (iliev et al., 2014). dominant issues that the tourist enterprises were faced: the low capability of enterprises to adapt to the demands of domestic and international markets; lack of advisory business tourism infrastructure; unfavorable financial services for new and small businesses, i.e. interest rates were too high, the procedure for obtaining financial support was complex and expensive etc. (iliev, kitevski, 2016). the structure of the accommodation capacities is unsatisfactory from the aspect of the level of equipment, offer and the quality of the services. in the hotel sector, there are mostly lower categories of hotels and those with more bedded rooms. also, there were not any high-class hotels in the country (spatial plan…, 2004). in this period, macedonia had a lack of international hotel brands, thus reducing the ability of the country to attract foreign tourists (iliev et al., 2014). regarding the geographical distribution of accommodation capacities, 80.5% of the total capacities were located in the lake places, 6.3% in the capital skopje, 4.7% in the mountainous places, 2.7% in the spa places, and 5.9% in other places (spatial plan…, 2004). there was a lack of quality hotel accommodation outside skopje, ohrid, struga and mavrovo (main tourist destinations). there were examples of overestimated categorization of accommodation facilities that did not correspond to the real standards. one of the major problems was the “grey accommodation“. а large part of the facilities in private ownership did not register their tourists, and in that way avoided paying the tourist tax which was not in favour of the municipalities and the state (iliev et al., 2014). in the process of privatization of tourism companies and facilities there was a problem related to the dismissal of surplus employees and the increase in unemployment. the problems left a mark on the operation of tourism enterprises as low-quality services, delayed modernization, which further reduced the country’s competitiveness as a tourist destination (iliev, kitevski, 2016). in the period after 1991, there is declining employment in the catering establishments (tab. 2), which coincides with the number of the touristic arrivals and the realized foreign exchange earnings in the country. the problem with the operation of the so-called grey economy was tab. 1. number of tourists and number of nights spent (1991–2001) year number of tourists number of nights spent total domestic foreign total domestic foreign 1991 710,278 415,955 294,323 2,740,484 2,164,146 576,338 1995 503,837 356,830 147,077 1,804,310 1,528,561 275,749 2001 333,308 234,362 98,946 1,254,582 1,041,831 212,751 source: tourism…, 2013. tab. 2. general development overview of catering trade and services (1991–2001) year catering trade and services number of employeesnumber of catering business units beds in catering trade and services, private rooms and vacation facilities seats 1991 3,663 80,296 163,703 12,764 1995 2,543 78,913 133,431 9,946 2001 1,772 74,130 128,274 10,070 source: statistical…, 2013. evolution and changes of tourism in macedonia in the post-socialist period (1991–2018) 27 obvious. it was very difficult to record the total workforce in the tourism sector, due to a grey tourism economy in the country (e.g. unregistered accommodation facilities, unregistered touristic workers, seasonal unregistered persons etc.). finally, because of the political and economic circumstances in the region of the balkans and in the country itself, there was stagnation and a decline in the tourism turnover in macedonia. thus, instead of the rapid growth of the tourist economy, anticipated for the period 1985-2000, and the estimates for increasing the number of beds by five times and the number of nights spent by seven times, were not realized (spatial plan…, 2004). therefore, the period 1991–2001 is characterised as relatively bad period in the tourism development in macedonia, where the domestic tourism had the principal place. there are some major reasons for the bad results in tourism development, some of them are more important: the no competitiveness of macedonia on the international market; inadequate tourist offer and modest tourist propaganda and presentation on the international tourism market; long period of transformation of tourist enterprises and unfinished privatization; unstable economy and unfavourable political and security situation; and high unemployment rate. 4.2. new life cycle of tourism in macedonia one of the aims of the study was identifying the new tourism life cycle of macedonia. figure 2 offers a graphic presentation of data on the key variables (total tourist arrivals and total tourist nights spent), which are necessary for determining these goals. тhe period 2002–2018 contains only three stages: exploration, involvement and development (fig. 2). 4.2.1. exploration stage (2002-2004) this is a stage of political, security and economic stabilization of macedonia. the government of the republic of macedonia identified tourism, together with agriculture, as a priority sector for development. in 2003, the “global study on tourism in the republic of macedonia” was developed, but it was not implemented (national…, 2009). later, the ministry of environment and physical planning, according to the order of the government of the state, has prepared a spatial development strategy “spatial plan of the republic of macedonia” with a special sector study “tourism development and organization of tourist areas”. this sector study has offered long-term goals for the development and organization of the country’s tourism offer, which defines a total of 10 tourist regions, 54 tourist zones and 200 tourist sites. however, tourism in the first years after the war in the country did not achieve the desired level of development. after political stabilization in 2002 the tourist arrivals have jumped to 441,712, and in 2004 to 465,015. generally, during the exploration stage (2002–2004), tourism in macedonia was characterized by the unfavourable structure of accommodation capacities (in terms of basic and complimentary accommodation facilities); seasonal use of accommodation facilities; low-level of equipment, poor supply and quality of services (spatial plan…, 2004); fig. 2. life cycle of tourism in macedonia, 1991–2018 source: made by the author based on the data from the state statistical office. 28 dejan iliev a lack of marketing strategy and insufficient presentation of the country on the international tourism market; the absence of a specific tourism product offer; the growth rate of tourism had no significant impact on the country’s economy. 4.2.2. involvement stage (2005–2006) in december 2005, at the european union summit in brussels, macedonia received the status of a candidate country for membership in the european union. this eu decision positively influenced the country’s economic and tourism development. the development rate in 2005 was 8%. gdp per capita is 2,550 euro. inflation is low, slightly above 2%, while the national currency – denar is tied to the euro and is stable. unemployment is at an unacceptably high level of 36% (national…, 2009, p. 2). foreign exchange earnings from tourism have steadily increased, so in 2006 they exceeded 100 million euro (iliev et al., 2014). the number of foreign tourists has increased dramatically in the last few years after resolving some of the regional problems. thus, from 122,861 foreign tourist arrivals in 2002, that number increased to 202,357 in 2006. in the same period, domestic tourism decreased from 318,851 to 297,116 tourist arrivals (tourism…, 2011), thus the domestic market failed to follow the upward trend in the foreign market. in general, the awareness of the importance of tourism for the country has increased significantly among the authorities, people involved in the tourism sector and the local population. 4.2.3. development stage (2007–2018) regional political processes, general economic conditions and increased awareness of tourism influenced the trends of tourist arrivals and economic development of the country. the growth rates of the gross domestic product of 6.1% in 2007 and 5.0% in 2008, are the highest ever in the country’s development. in this period, the contribution of the tourism sector to the gross domestic product of the country is somewhere between 2.3% in 2007 and 2.7% in 2008 (national…, 2009). in 2009 followed a period of global economic crisis, so that the real gdp rate in the country declined to 0.9% (iliev et al., 2014). after the global economic crisis following a period of recovery of the national economy where the real growth rate of gdp ranges from 2.9% in 2010 and 2.8% in 2011. later, in macedonia, tourism contributes 5.2% to national gdp in 2014 (national…, 2016). the total amount of travel and tourism in gdp was 288 usd per capita (national…, 2016). in 2014 about 4.7% of the macedonian labour force was directly or indirectly employed by the tourism industry. since 2008/2009 (when there were 27,000 employees), the number of people employed in the tourism industry in macedonia has steadily grown, reaching 33,100 in 2014 (national…, 2016). during this period, a new development strategy for tourism for 2009–2013 was prepared. it aimed to provide the necessary confidence of the involved actors in tourism, foreign and domestic investors, as well as international donor agencies, to devote themselves to tourism in the republic of macedonia (national…, 2009). the strategy also aimed to enable the allocation of ipa funds in the field of tourism in the most efficient way. later, a new national tourism strategy was developed in 2016, for assessing the proposed actions of the previous strategy and proposing new development directions. the second national tourist strategy identifies regions and products not yet discovered. the development stage (2007–2018) was characterized by a continuous increase in the number and nights spent of tourists (fig. 2). so, macedonian tourism is in constant change. the registrations of foreign visitors in accommodation facilities in 2007 reached/ exceeded the 2000 level. this recent recovery has been sustained with a solid growth of 10.8% in 2008 despite the unfavourable international economic situation that begins to affect travel decisions (national…, 2009). after the downward trend in 2009 and 2010, the number of realized annual arrivals has been increasing in the next years until 2014 reaching around 735,650 arrivals. macedonian tourism recorded a record number in 2018 with 1,126,935 total tourists and 3,176,808 total nights spent (state statistical office – makstat database). the year 2018 reflected the highest number of foreign tourists and their overnight stays in macedonia’s history since independence, with 707,345 foreign tourists and 1,491,535 nights spent, which were 5.8 times higher than the number of foreign tourists and 5.4 times higher than foreign nights spent recorded in 2002. regarding the foreign market, the most important are turkish tourists with 166,620 nights spent (with a market share of 5.2% and an average stay of tourists 1.5 days), and dutch tourists with 136,663 nights spent (with a market share of 4.3% and average stay of tourists 4.9 days). then follow: polish, serbian, bulgarian, greek and german tourists (state statistical office – makstat database). by comparing arrivals from domestic tourists with foreign – the characteristic is an interesting pattern of development – while the number of registered arrivals from macedonians decreased by about 40,000 between 2008 and 2014 (negative annual rate of 2.0%), the number of foreign arrivals is increased by 170,000 (positive annual rate of 8.9%) (national…, 2016, p. 10). similar, the number of domestic evolution and changes of tourism in macedonia in the post-socialist period (1991–2018) 29 overnight stays decreased to approximately 400,000 in the period 2008–2014 (negative annual growth rate of 4.2%), on the other, an increase of approximately the same number of nights spent by foreign tourists was registered (positive growth rate from 7.8%) (national…, 2016). although the share of overnight stays of domestic tourists decreased, however, with an average stay of 4,02 days in 2018 they remain an important market (tab. 3). the accommodation particularly in the area of hotel accommodation, marks significant progress in the quality of services. the number of beds in hotels has increased from 10,364 in 2008 to 21,530 in 2018 (state statistical office – makstat database), with the highest increase in the 4-star hotel segment. as well, there is an increase in the number of beds in hotels with 5 and 3 stars, while the decrease in hotels with 1 and 2 stars is noticeable. the entrance of several well-known hotel brands like marriott and hilton provides confidence in the general quality of accommodation offered and attracting new investors in this sector. the largest numbers of beds are still in the category of “private accommodation facilities” with 26,780 in 2018 and share of around 35% of the total volume (state statistical office – makstat database). in 2018, most of the registered overnights (87%) are realized in the hotels and facilities for private accommodation. overnight stays of foreign tourists are mainly in hotels (91%), while the largest number of nights spent by domestic tourists is realized in private accommodation (57%). it is assumed that the number of nights spent in private accommodation facilities is considerably higher, but due to the grey economy, it is very difficult to determine the real situation. during the development stage, the government of macedonia played a major role in encouraging the development of tourism. one of the priorities was the modernization of the airport infrastructure in the country. in 2008, the macedonian government signed an agreement with the turkish company tav for concession at the airports in skopje and ohrid (national…, 2016). hungarian low-cost airline wizzair has included macedonian cities and resorts in their networks. these conditions significantly increased the number of passengers, and in 2018 a record number of 1.8 million passengers were registered at the skopje international airport and the ohrid st. paul the apostle airport. in addition, in 2007, the government established the agency for promotion and support of tourism (national…, 2016), whose goal is the international promotion of macedonia, subsidizing tour operators and encouraging the development of tourism in the country. despite the growth of tourism in macedonia, the travel and tourism competitiveness index, of macedonia in the world’s tourism market has not changed significantly (tab. 4). tab. 3. more important indicators in tourism development indicator/year 2012 2018 average number of overnights – total 3.24 2.82 average number of nights domestic tourists 4.29 4.02 average number of nights foreign tourists 2.31 2.11 participation of domestic tourists in the total number of tourist arrivals, in % 47.10 37.23 participation of foreign tourists in the total number of tourist arrivals, in % 52.90 62.77 participation of domestic tourists in the total number of overnight stays of tourists, in % 62.30 53.05 participation of foreign tourists in the total number of overnight stays of tourists, in % 37.70 46.95 participation of foreign tourists in hotels in the total number of tourist arrivals, in % 89.50 92.29 participation of foreign tourists (overnight stays) in hotels in the total number of nights spent by foreign tourists, in % 87.30 91.12 net rate of use of beds in hotels and similar capacities, in % n/a 26.40 source: state statistical office – makstat database. tab. 4. the competitiveness of macedonia in the world’s tourism market year 2007 2008 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 index value 3.81 3.68 3.81 3.96 3.98 3.50 3.49 position in europe 38 38 37 37 36 34 n/a position in the world 83/124 83/130 80/133 76/139 75/140 82/141 89/136 source: travel…, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017. 30 dejan iliev most of the countries in southeast europe are better ranked than macedonia, such as greece (24 rank), croatia (32 rank), slovenia (41 rank), bulgaria (45 rank), montenegro (72 rank) (travel…, 2017, p. 9). macedonia is better ranked only from serbia (95 rank), albania (98 rank), and bosnia and herzegovina (113 rank) (travel…, 2017, p. 9). the regional competition on the tourism market is very strong. therefore, macedonia should use the comparative advantages and offer a diversified, original and competitive tourism product which it will compete on the regional and international tourism market. generally, in the development stage a modern tourist infrastructure was being created, also emerged new travel agencies, accommodation facilities and information centres; tourism development plans and strategies were projected and care for the natural environment and cultural landscape were especially targeted. this stage also witnessed new tourism products, developing new and attractive promotional materials, marketing campaigns were aimed at changing the stereotypical image of the country, identifying priority markets, a new national tourism logo and slogan, regulating illegal accommodation, harmonizing criteria for categorization of accommodation with european standards, the entry of new high-quality international hotels, the provision of favourable conditions for low-budget carriers, and finally strengthening the awareness of the government and the private sector and the local residents for the role of tourism in the economy. 5. discussion and conclusion the study examines the evolution of tourism during the post-socialist period of macedonia through a systemic analysis that identifies key changes in tourism. the research revealed two distinctive periods in the development of tourism in the postsocialist period of macedonia: (1) period of decline in tourism development (1991–2001), and (2) new life cycle of tourism development with three stages: exploration (2002–2004), involvement (2005–2006), and development (2007–2018). by the late 1990s, macedonian’s tourism industry had entered the decline stage and the country was not ready to receive an increasing number of international tourists. however, the period after 2001 was a period of stabilization and growth of the national economy, larger economic activity and investment, growth of the gdp and its greater openness to world markets (iliev et al., 2014). the contribution of the service sector to gdp tended to increase. analysis in the study indicates a dynamic and ongoing increase in total tourist arrivals and nights spent, accommodation facilities, beds, employees etc. macedonia appears to be at the early development stage of the butler (1980) model. the entry of the turkish company tav, hungarian low-cost airline wizzair, hotel brands like marriott and hilton mark achievement of the development stage. however, it should be noted that the weaknesses of existing data available for the tourism sector impose certain obstacles on the analyses. the lack of data available for the tourism sector means a heavy limit for more serious analytical approach in the research of the real economic value of tourism in the economy of the country. because tourism in macedonia has shown an unlimited potential for growth, despite economic recessions, it appears that numbers of tourists will continue to increase. the sustainability of the growth of tourism in the development stage will depend on the quality and competitiveness of the tourism product, the marketing campaign, the level of cooperation of the stakeholders in the tourist industry, and the overcoming of potential threats that could push tourism into a possible decline. according to the kohl and partner (national…, 2016) major threats could be: political and economic instability, faster and more professional development of tourism in competing neighbouring countries, noncoordinated development, insufficient financial resources for development and marketing of tourism, non-effective use of financial resources, weak organizational structure within the public administration, low-budget carriers decide to reduce the number of flights, global crises (e.g. terrorism, refugees). in analysing and predicting the development of tourism in macedonia, attention should be paid to the unpredictable nature of the dominant sociopolitical and economic exogenous factors that influence the development of tourism. most often, these exogenous factors are beyond the control of the creators of tourism policy and tourism planners, and it is very difficult to forecast their future long-term tendencies and impacts on tourism development. as well, the aim of the study was to evaluate the applicability of the butler (1980) model to the postsocialist tourism development in macedonia. thus, the study has comment on the validity of butler’s (1980) model for application to macedonia, as well as its usefulness as a conceptual framework for the analysis of the evolution of tourism in the post-socialist period of the country. as supposed by butler (1980), the evolution of tourism in macedonia should progress gradually from the consolidation to stagnation stage before entering the decline stage. tourism in macedonia has not yet entered the consolidation stage. according to l. hwang (2017) when evolution and changes of tourism in macedonia in the post-socialist period (1991–2018) 31 a destination reaches the consolidation stage the limits of growth start to become obvious. although total numbers of tourist will still increase, however, the rate of the increase in numbers of tourist will decline (butler, 1980). in the consolidation stage, the total number of tourists may exceed the number of permanent residents (butler, 1980). l. hwang (2017, p. 4) says that “the destination may attempt to use marketing to offset the slowing growth by extending the tourism season beyond traditional dates and by focusing on specialized cohorts of tourists”. however, these efforts cannot contribute enough to achieve the growth from previous stages. butler’s model, despite its shortcomings (e.g. model is not helpful as a forecasting tool for future long-term tourism development in macedonia), however, based on the macedonia case study, it can be determined that the model is a helpful conceptual frame, and can be used in the systematic analysis and explanation of complex social and economic processes of tourism development. references aguiló e., alegre j., sard m., 2005, the persistence of the sun and sand tourism model, tourism management, 26(2), 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migrations have become the essential component and agent of intercultural and interpersonal relations in the world. they have impacted the political and socio-cultural state of world. migration processes have been a part of human socialization, which not only led to geographical changes, but also quite significantly shaped the development of human civilization (barbag, 1978). the extent of migration and their institutional forms were significantly dependent on the level of development of civilization, particularly on the state of technical progress. in fact, two of the fundamental determinants for migrations were the geographical, and economic conditions of the state. migrations at the begging of the 21st century have been characterized by a new quality. the political, economic and social factors have determined journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(4), 58–66 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.4.07 specific aspects of european and polish migrations at the begging of the 21st century jarosław och institute of political sciences, faculty of social sciences, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-0771-2732 e-mail: jaroslaw-och@wp.pl citation och j., 2019, specific aspects of european and polish migrations at the begging of the 21st century, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(4), 58–66. abstract the text focuses on the migration in the european union and in poland at the begging of the 21st century. it aims to prove that even if the reasons and consequences of migration are varied, they have significantly shaped the development of human civilization and have been a part of human socialization. furthermore, this text points out that the phenomena of globalization and democratization have affected the population movement and caused new patterns of contemporary migration. the european union is a great example of cooperation between different countries in order to realize the principle of free population movement, which was put to the test over past years. additionally, this article characterizes the polish migration, especially the inflow of immigrants to poland. poland has become an emigration and an attractive immigration country. this text revels also the consequences of migration in modern europe. key words migration in europe, european union, migration, polish migration, population movement. received: 31 may 2019 accepted: 17 december 2019 published: 31 december 2019 specific aspects of european and polish migrations at the begging of the 21st century 59 the new speciality in terms of destination, duration and motivations. the process of democratization and globalization has significantly impacted the contemporary migrations in europe. democratization means universalization of civil rights and freedoms, including the right to freely move and decide on the choice of residence. that primarily means the peaceful coexistence of countries and undertaking actions to empower citizens (dahl, 1995). the experiences from the 19th and 20th centuries irrefutably show that embedding state in the democratic regime positively influences the observance of civil rights, as well as facilitates the decision about migration (baszkiewicz, 1999; grabowska, szawiel, 2003). democratic world also ensures peace, that affects correct international relations and leads to agreements. these agreements often go far beyond the standard cooperations between countries (see more: nakonieczna, 2007). an example of this type of agreement is the european union, whose supporting pillar is the principle of democratic functioning of the member state. a characteristic feature of the eu internal cooperation is the principle of free population movement within the territory of the member states (stępniak (ed.), 2001). globalization is a political, social and economic phenomenon, which implies a new perception of the world. that means closer interrelationship among the countries, nations and different part of the world that has become a global village. as one of the mega trends of contemporary world, significantly influenced the migration by creating its new patterns. this process caused the intensification of migration movements and massive social activities that encourage to live in better, richer and fully selfdeveloped environment (bauman, 2002). moreover, it has integrated the world economy and social sphere. the changes within political, economic or social sphere at the begging of the 21st century have transformed the migration process. they significantly impacted the population movements on the european scale, including polish migrations. referring to the characteristics of migration streams in the european union, efforts are being made to systematize knowledge about polish migration movements. 2. contemporary migrations within the european union the phenomenon of migration has shaped the image of current european union. migration flows over past years within and outside of the eu have impacted the current population structure in the member states. the eu faces two types of migration: the intra-eu migration for the purpose of employment, of studying or for a family reasons and the migrations from outside the eu states. since 2015, the eu has faced the migration crisis and immigration flows from africa and ukraine which significantly put the migration policy into a test and even questioned the power of integration. the new arrivals could partly solve the labour market shortages, but do not reverse the ongoing process of aging population in members states, even though they have had a strong impact on the population structure. in 2000, one of the fundamental european values, which is the principle of free movement was included in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union adopted in nice, on december, 8 2000. in accordance with article 45 of the cfr every citizen has a right to freely move and reside within the territory of the member states (charter of…, 2000). one of the most important regulations concerning a freedom of movement for workers were included in primary community law, in article 39–42 of the treaty of european community (mitrus, 2003) and schengen agreement. firstly, according to the most important art. 39 of the treaty establishing the european community (treaty establishing…, 2002): 1. freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the community. 2. such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 3. it shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: a) to accept offers of employment actually made; b) to move freely within the territory of member states for this purpose; c) to stay in a member state for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that state laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; d) to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed in that state, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the commission. 4. the provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in the public service. the specific rules concerning the freedom of movement for workers were included in communities acts, which are a part of secondary law. the most 60 jarosław och important are regulations and directives. the first ones are uniform and entirely applied to all eu members, the second ones are firm to achieve a certain result, but leave members free to choose how to do so. there are few significant regulations and directives, which impact on a freedom of movement for workers: • the restrictions on freedom of movement and citizens residence in the members state, justified on public order and security or public health care; • the freedom of movement for workers in the eu; • the abolition of restrictions on the right of eu citizens and their families to move and reside freely within the eu; • the right of workers to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed in that state; • the appliance of social security system for employed persons, self-employed persons and their families members living in the community; • the recognition of the academic diplomas obtained after the professional education and at least three years formation; • the right of residence for employees and selfemployed persons who have ceased their occupational activity; • the posting of the workers as a part of providing services; • the safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the community. above these acts, there are also different directives which go beyond the issue of free movement, but are relevant to broadly understood this freedom: • the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the community for nationals of member states with regard to establishment and the provision of services; • the right of residence (right of residence in other member state, than home country for union citizens who can finance their residence); • the right of residence for students; • about exercising the right to vote in european parliament election • about exercising the right to vote and right to stand as a candidate in local elections for citizens of the union residing in a member state of which they are not nationals. all these regulations are intended to remove obstacles to the liberalization of free movement of persons within the eu. the european court of justice judgments took an extremely active part in this process. the issues of the free movement and residence for eu citizens are stated in the european constitution project. the article 45 reveals that every citizen of the union shall have the right to move and reside freely and article iii-18 every worker have a right to freely move in the european union. secondly, the adoption of schengen agreement was an essential factor, which conditioned the implementation of free movement of persons within the eu. since 2007, it strongly affected the polish migration policy. the content of this agreement contains: • the unitary system of crossing the external borders; • the harmonization of visa policy, common policy towards the foreigners from third countries; • the common criteria and mechanism concerning the asylum procedures, in particular which member state is responsible for examining an asylum application; • the police cooperation rules and measures; • the improvement of legal assistance on criminal and extradition matters; • the cooperation against illicit drugs; • the common regulations on the possession and trafficking weapons and ammunition; • the creation and functioning rules of schengen information system (jaworski (ed.), 2001). the freedom of movement for workers in the eu is one of the fundamental european freedoms. nevertheless, it might presents particular tensions between members states. the unrestricted intra-eu migration and equal access to national welfare states have been a challenge for certain ms and created an arguable debate about the reforming free movement. the uk mainly insisted on changing the mobility policies and recognizing the uk as a “special case” that was not achieved by british government. this contention was a major factor in the uk’s recent referendum vote to leave the eu (see more: ruhs, 2017). besides the disagreements on the political level, the vast majority eu workers benefited from the right to freely move and reside in the eu, especially after flexibilization of european labour market. there have been four main phases in the european migration, which are closely linked to history, economic development, demographic changes, the transformations of labour market and the processes of eu enlargement. the first phase lasted from 1945 to 1970, then the second phase mid-1970–mid1990 and the phase mid-1990–2008. the four phase started in 2008 and is ongoing. in raport published by european commission in 2018, this four phase is characterized by consolidation and stabilization of intra-eu migration and a high immigration of noneu citizens (european migrations…, 2018). specific aspects of european and polish migrations at the begging of the 21st century 61 the eu has adopted frameworks to manage legal migration flows for highly skilled workers, students, seasonal workers and family reunification. in order to attract talented workers even outside the eu, the blue card directive was adopted in 2009. there is also a set of rules for resettlement of refugees that was launched in july 2015 (how the eu…, 2019). the statistics concerning the migration outside the eu show that migrations to eu countries declined between 2007 to 2012. it reflected the domestic migration, which decreased at the same time (internatioanl…, 2011). starting in 2012, and particularly since 2015, both intra-eu and extra-eu migrations have rebounded, mainly as a result of resumed economic growth and boost of employment. according to european commission’s raport in 2015 total intra-eu migration was 1.4 million while total legal migration from non-eu countries was 2.4 million. romania and poland were the most important origin countries for intra-eu migration, whereas ukraine and syria have risen as main non-european origin countries (european migrations…, 2018). since 2015, migration debate was mainly dominated by flows of syrian and other refugees entering from turkey, greece and italy. in 2015, almost 1.3 million asylum seekers came to europe, with syrians and afghans nationality. in 2015 and 2016, an estimated total of 1.2 million people arrived in germany to ask for asylum (labour… 2017). since the 2016 these applications have decreased while the border controls have increased (european migrations…, 2018). as of december, 2019, 125.0 arrivals came to europe, including 101.7 by sea and 23.3 by land. one year earlier the number of arrivals was more than two times smaller comparing with the data from 2016. the number sharply decreased from 390.4 in 2016 when the migration flow was on the massive scale to 144.1 in 2018 (flow monitoring europe). this decreasing number was a result of adopted european migration policy and border control. at that time, migration scholars have done researches on significant, sometimes even negative immigration impact on the local and national culture. migration policy should include the effective tools, which will facilitate the integration and assimilation processes in the society. the flows of migration impacted the european population over past years. on january, 1 2018 the population of the eu-28 was estimated at 512.4 million. young people (0 to 14 years old) made up 15.6% of the eu-28’s population, while persons of working age (15 to 64 years old) accounted for 64.7% of the population. older persons (aged 65 or over) reached 19.7% (an increase of 2.6 percentage points compared with 10 years earlier) (migration and…, 2019). belgium, ireland, cyprus, luxembourg, malta, the netherlands, austria, romania, slovakia and the united kingdom were the only eu member states where non-nationals were mainly citizens of  another member state. in most ms, the majority of non-nationals were citizens of non-eu countries. luxembourg was a state with the highest share of  non-nationals, non-nationals accounted for 48% of its total population. in contrast, in poland and romania non-nationals represented less than 1% of the population. according to eurostat data, the half of immigrants were aged under 28 years. the median age of the total population of the eu-28 stood at 43.1 years, while it was 28.3 years for immigrants to eu-28 in 2017 (migration and…, 2019). the aging population in eu countries has become an alarming fact, which shape the future of the eu. the population aged 65 years and over is increasing in every eu member state, efta country and candidate country. eurostat published set of population projections covering the period from 2018 to 2100. the eu-28’s population will probably increase to a peak of 525.0 million around 2040 and thereafter gradually decline to 492.9 million by 2100. during the period from 2018 to 2100 the population of working age is expected to decline until 2100, while those aged 65 years and over are likely to increase to account for 31.3% of the eu-28’s population by 2100, compared with 19.8% in 2018 (population structure and aging, 2019). moreover, eurosat’s data inform that there will be 66.1 million of people aged 80 years and over by 2080 (people in the eu…, 2017). these numbers prove that the group of people of working age is shrinking while the relative number of those retired is expanding. it will lead to a transition towards a much older population and a deep change in social policy. this phenomenon of aging europe may be explained by the law fertility rate and advanced medicine and healthcare. the recent data published by eurostat in 2019 have shown that the european fertility rate in 2017 was 1.59 and the mean age of women at birth of first child was 29.1 years. france was the member state with the highest total fertility rate in the eu, the result was 1.90 births per woman (births and fertility…, 2019). in poland this trend is quite similar. in 2017 total fertility rate was amounted to 1.45 and aged of women with the first brith was 28 years (sytuacja…, 2018). as the result of consistently low birth rates and higher life expectancy, the shape of the eu-28’s population structure is transforming. the government of several member states being aware of situation, decided to promote the procreation attitudes by giving: tax breaks for parents, paid parental leave, free childcare, financial 62 jarosław och support. however, these initiatives have not brought the expected results. despite the immigration flow entering the labour market, the situation did not effectively solve the problem of aging population. the reasonable solution to change it, should be the implementation of programs to increase the birth rate, and to attract the immigrants at once (see more: rifkin, 2005). if this demographic reality of europe does not change, europe will be losing its civilizational vitality. it would cause not only population issues but also economic and financial problems, because less people will pay the taxes, from which the pensions are financed. new migration patterns, especially the waves of arrivals from non-eu countries have shaped the european civilization. the contemporary migration movements in europe revel that they are an important power, transforming cultural and social order within the eu. furthermore, they have influenced the social and migration policy managed by member state. since the eu includes 28 countries until brexit, there is a significant need of efficient solidarity to face the contemporary, european challenges, which should lead to human and civilizational development. 3. migration patterns in poland at the begging of 21 century the period at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries was the time of poland political changes and proces of democratization. after 1989, the remarkable period in polish history was the time of accession negotiations to european structures and attainment of full-fledged membership which was concluded in may, 1 2004. this historical moment opened the door to new dimension of polish migration and its new forms (wiśniewski, duszczyk, 2006). the opening of the eu’s labor market and fluid mobility within the eu caused an emigration renaissance to the eu countries. poland as the eu member state participates in policy making on migration and implements the eu directives to facilitate the integration. since 2004, the year of poland’s accession to the eu, poles have been eager to migrate within the union. polish citizens are the second nationality among the biggest groups of eu-citizens living in other ms in 2018 (migration and migrant population…, 2019). after the accession, the access to the labor market was open and very attractive for polish workers. the united kingdom, ireland and sweden gave straightaway this possibility for the eastern and central european new member states. the full labour rights immediately granted by the uk caused the high level of polish migration. the year of 2011 revealed around 2.1 million temporary migrants, of whom 611.0 were living in the uk, 466.5 of these had stayed in great britain for at least one year. overall, from may, 1 2004 to december, 31 2012, the number of polish migrants reached between 573.0 and 588.0 (okólski, salt, 2014). nevertheless, poland has become an emigration and immigration country. according to the recent international migration outlook 2019, emigration of poles to oecd countries decreased by 5.7% to 248.0. 60.3% of people migrated to germany, 10.1% to the united kingdom and 9.6% to the netherlands (international…, 2019). however, in 2014 the wave of immigration from ukraine began in poland. in 2017 poland became a leader in the inflow of foreign, seasonal, short-term workforces (international…, 2018). the office for foreigners has observed that the inflow of foreigners to poland considerably increased since 2014. few factors caused this immigrant flow to poland. the internal agents such as the liberalization of visa regime and the simplification of procedures for foreigners in polish law took an important role in attracting foreign citizens to poland. in 2015 there was a significant legal change in the employment of foreigners in poland. the system of work statement was applied, which allows to carry out a job by foreigner for up to six months within a 12-month period. in 2017 the new regulations concerning the visa-free regime for ukrainian citizens with biometric passports came to force. it entitles to tourist, family and business stay but does not allow to work. the temporary stay are strongly dominant, even 10 times more demanded than the applications for permanent stay. economic immigration to poland is particularly the most popular, around 73% in 2018 (raport na temat…, 2019). all this changes attracted foreigners, especially the ukrainians to come to poland. the external agents such as the annexation of crimea in march 2014 and the outbreak of the conflict in donbass in 2014 influenced the political, social and economic situation in ukraine. as the results, the sharp economic recession was triggered by these events, which was followed by the immigrant flow. the largest inflow of ukrainians regarding the number of employer’s declarations for short-term work and work permits was the highest between 2014 and 2016 (jaroszewicz, 2018). there was an evolution of first residence permits in the eu, where poland took a significant place. in 2018 above 3 million residence permits was issued to non-eu citizens. the number increased by 0.4% compared with 2017 and it continues the upward. among the reasons, the family reason was the most popular (28%). then, employment accounted for specific aspects of european and polish migrations at the begging of the 21st century 63 27%, education reasons for 20% and international protection for 24%. in the eu, the highest number of residence permits for ukrainians was issued in poland (635.0, or 20% of total permits issued in the eu), followed by germany 17%, united kingdom 14% and france 8%. in poland 37% of all permits was issued for employment (first residence permits…, 2019). the immigrants have an intention not only to stay but often also work in poland. in 2018 the ministry of family, labour and social policy has published the raport about of immigrant employment in poland. the number of work permit is significantly growing. this publication shows that in 2017 the number of issued work permit was 235,626, in 2018 it was 328,768. in current year 2019 the number for the first half a year accounted for 217,297, which is impressive comparing with the first half of 2018, when the number reached 147,981. it has been estimated that poland has become an interesting country not only for temporary stay, but also for daily work and life. the perfect example is the number of ukrainians. according to data from 2018 published by mrpips (polish ministry of ministry of family, labour and social policy) the amount of work permit for the eastern neighbor was 238,334 which was only 100.0 less than the total number. in the first half of 2019, they received 162,421 work permits, which was around the 3/4 of the annual number (zezwolenia na…, 2019). they are also the biggest around 30% group among unemployed. however, considering the duration of stay in the register of unemployed, foreigners were less often long-standing group than poles (informacja o zatrudnieniu…, 2018). among the immigrants from ukraine, the dominance of men as well as the young people is definitely visible (raport na temat…, 2019). it has to be admitted that the ukrainian workers has become a valuable employees on the european market. as the results, polish employers are facing a strong competitive pressure from germany, czech republic and hungary, where the labour market is more and more open and advantaged for them, especially in the term of better salaries. besides, the huge amount of ukrainian workers on the polish labour market, there is an inflow of workers from asia. according to the raport of ministry of ministry of family, labour and social policy, over 35 thousand of work permits were issued for asians. it is 42% more than the previous year. in the first six months of 2019, most of those permits were granted to over 6 thousand nepalese and over 4 thousand indians. there is an inflow of people from moldova and kazakhstan (zezwolenia na…, 2019). these numbers may suggest that polish employers would favorably turn towards the asian employees in future. the foreign workers are needed and this phenomenon of immigration flow will continue to keep the polish economy growing. poland has become an attractive country for immigrants, but there is also a significant change in the amount of polish emigrants, which characterizes the contemporary polish migration pattern. according to data published by statistic poland, 2018 was the first year since eight years, in which the number of polish immigrant declined in other countries, mainly in great britain and italy. the most significant changes have been noticed in this first country, where the number of polish emigrants for a temporary stay decreased of 98 thousand. it means that more people left this country than arrived. those who left great britain, decided to returned to poland or moved to the other country. the statistic has estimated that at the end of 2018 around 2.455 thousand permanent residents of poland temporary stayed abroad, which is 3% less than in 2017. around 2.031 thousand poles resided in the eu countries, mostly in germany, great britain, netherlands and ireland (informacja o rozmiarach…, 2019). two factors affected this decrease. firstly, a good situation of polish labour market, low unemployment and an increase standard of living attracted polish emigrants. secondly, the uncertain political situation of great britain related to brexit. poland, supporting by european commission, is developing a migration strategy for next years to face the issue of an aging population, a growing labour demand and emigration of young citizens. the main aim is to sustainable labour migration policy framework encouraging the return of polish emigrants, enhancing the bilateral cooperation and foster integration and assimilation of immigrants. in january and february 2018, the amendments to the act on employment promotion and labour market institutions and the act on foreigners took effect. the eu directives which facilitate the recruitment of foreign workers came into force. currently, all foreign residents are provided a comprehensive integration support, as well as free language and cultural adaptation courses. the provincial governors in cooperation with ngos, with co-funding from the eu asylum, migration and integration fund have been implemented the projects, facilitating the integration. from 2019, holders of a permit granting labour market access have a possibility to ask for housing allocations under the “flat for start” program (international…, 2019). additionally, poland has become very common destination for international student and their interest is growing. around 65.8 international student were enrolled in poland for academic year 2016/2017, 64 jarosław och an increase of 15% over the year. they represented about 5% of total university student population. the number of foreign student was increasing over the past years. internationalization of higher education in academic year 2010/2011 was 1.12, in 2016/2017 the number was four times higher and reached 4.88 (migration statistics…, 2018). over past few years, there is an increase in number of foreigners coming to poland, particularly for work. the polish labour market has become various and open to other nationalities. the law measures has been taken to facilitate work and daily life of immigrant in poland. however, polish market has to compete with other european country. one the one hand, it might pose an obstacles and hire the immigration flow to poland, but on the other hand it might lead to improvement of migration policy, included in labour and social policy. the number of 200 thousand working ukrainians has revealed that they are eager to work in poland. they can feel well integrated in polish society because of history, culture and language similarities. the polish government and society have to take the initiatives to assimilate the foreigners to keep this tendency of high immigration flow. apart from, the openness of polish policy towards immigrants, poland has to take actions in order to keep polish citizens in the country and attract the polish emigrant to return to their country of birth. 4. conclusions the analysis of contemporary migration movements in the eu at the begging of 21 century revels that they are an important power, transforming population structure, influencing economy, political and cultural order. there are different types of migration: the short time stay, shuttle stay, transit migration and war migration, each of them has an impact on the society. the eu faced few migration flows which allowed to study the shortand long-term consequences of open border regimes on population movement. one of the biggest internal migration pattern was the time after the eu enlargement. since 2015, the external migration flows have been a challenge for common european migration policy and in broad term for the idea of integration. migration from non-eu countries has also influenced the poland, its migration policy and has shaped the polish society. poland has been one of the main countries for intra-eu migration since the eastern enlargement. over past few years this ms has become an interesting destination for immigrants. poland has adjusted their migration policy to changing reality, and has faced the same dilemmas, as the rest of eu members. democratization and globalization phenomenon made the migrations easier and massive within the eu, however it also caused political and social issues. these two processes led to tied and effective cooperation of the eu member state in order to bring closer the citizens to each other. as the effect, new tendencies have been noticed in the european migration reality, which shaped the human development and european civilization, as well the european contradictions occurred. due to new migrations patterns, new multiethnic and multicultural communities have emerged in societies. in these new realities the axiological order has changed and its process of unification has proceeded. contemporary migrations have caused the positives and negatives aspects occurring in every country of european union. migration has brought positive element enriching the eu. the short time migrations have allowed the eu citizens to gain the financial sources, educational or life experience and come back to country of birth. the long time migrations led to move the eu workers to the country where he or she is needed in order to solve the labour market shortages. it also makes the wish of living abroad possible and easier. the eu migration policy aims also to the non-eu citizens, so that they could benefit from the european values too and impact the european civilization. the european migration policy based on immigrant openness leads to putting the european and human values into practice by: respecting international law related to human, reinforcing modern education, tolerance, coexistence of different cultures and subcultures, as well as cultural and civilization syncretism. at the same, the issue of freedom of immigrant has been reveled. there is a contradiction between declared freedom of immigration and its reality, which is restricted, internationally controlled and stimulated by state. the selective choose of immigrants by countries is strongly visible. the immigrants, who can bring visible profits to receiving country, are well accepted, in contrast to the immigrants, who cannot adapt themselves to modern values. this situation leads to stressful conflicts, tensions and europeans ethical dilemmas. the repeated references to the mythological reality about all migrants or only particular groups in a stereotypical way are present in european societies. this phenomenon could be positive, but also negative for immigrants. on the one hand, there is an understanding and support of state and european authorities, on the other hand, there is an increasing number of distrustful, racial and xenophobic attitudes in societies. as the results, the bipolarization of cultural and civilizational life is present specific aspects of european and polish migrations at the begging of the 21st century 65 in current societies. on the one side, there are decisive, courage, entrepreneurial and creative people, active individuals who profit from migration. on the other side, there are “excluded individuals” who cannot adapt to fast changing cultural reality, they feel alienated and struggle with finding a their place in new social sphere. by joining the union, member states have agreed to pursue a common enterprise, at the same they have also accepted considerable risks: they have opened up their markets and their societies on the migration flows. however, in political debates on free movement rights receiving countries tend to leave the social costs of free movement for sending countries aside (seuber, 2019). the analysis of the massive population movement show that immigrants can create the specific cultural dispersion in country of destination, in which they are not willing to assimilate. they would try to create a multidirectional loyalty, it means that the immigrants identify with both, the country of origins and emigration country. it would also mean the necessity to redefine the term “homeland”, which from a geographic meaning will change into an emotional connection. the national identification would be no more linked with specific territory, but turn into a state of migrant’s mind. the awareness of changes occurring in new migration patterns should be a subject of deep interest, in every countries, which received the immigrants, as it could lead to serious religious, national and ethic conflicts. it has already raised the question about european integration and strength during the migration crises. migration might strongly transforms the society structure and social mentality which lead to human development. it is an element interfering the intercultural 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(ed.), 2002, migracje. historia i kultura. migracje i społeczeństwo, t.7 (eng. migrations. history and culture. migrations and society, vol. 7), neriton, warszawa. zezwolenia na pracę cudzoziemców (eng. work permit for foreigners), 2019, ministerstwo rodziny, pracy i polityki socjalnej), https://psz.praca.gov.pl/web/urzad-pracy/-/8180075-zezwolenia-na-prace-cudzoziemcow (accessed 10 december 2019). 1. introduction since world war ii, civil wars have become the dominant mode of violence around the world, resulting in approximately 20 million deaths. civil wars are the most violent type of domestic conflict and have devastating economic, political, and social implications; therefore, factors that increase their possibility must be understood. yet, on a cross-national basis, the consensus remains minimal on the causes of civil wars (sambanis, 2003). although there are various trigger factors, a recent study suggests that greed, opportunity, and grievance are a common spark of civil war. s. murshed (2002) wrote that underdevelopment is the main cause of civil war. the author made a claim based on many civil wars in africa. however, there are examples of ireland, sri lanka, or colombia where civil war reflects the quality of institutions or the governance system adopted by the institution rather than under-development. providing the case study of the revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc), a. arjona (2016) made the argument that people fighting civil wars aim to establish a different institution in the territory where they journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(3), 59–70 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.3.06 the interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reform: a case study of nepalese maoist civil war saroj kumar aryal faculty of political science and international studies, university of warsaw, krakowskie przedmieście 26/28, 00-972, warsaw, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5094-3590 e-mail: sk.aryal@uw.edu.pl citation aryal s.k., 2021, the interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reform: a case study of nepalese maoist civil war, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(3), 59–70. abstract various factors trigger civil war, depending on the society and stages of political development. but analyzing it through the quality of an institution or some provisions of institutions may lead to a possible cause of a civil war. thus, the primary objective of this article is to investigate institutional quality and its role in triggering a civil war. this paper argues that there is interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war, and institutional reforms, which occurs as a series of events. although the article provides many examples, in the second section, the case study of nepalese decade-long civil war and post-civil war institutional reform has been presented to back the argument made in the paper. by discussing various dynamics of historical institutionalism, the paper mainly analyzes the primary and secondary sources. key words civil war, institutional reform, institutional design, institutionalism, nepalese civil war. received: 06 july 2021 accepted: 05 november 2021 published: 29 november 2021 60 aryal saroj kumar operate. thus, it is necessary to shift the focus a little on the quality of an institution rather than directly connecting it to underdevelopment, greed, and opportunity in general. reform of state institutions after an armed conflict is considered by a growing number of studies today to be of paramount importance for fostering sustainable peace and democracy (ansorg, kurtenbach, 2017; paris, sisk, 2009; wolff, 2011). if violence arises because identity groups revolt aggressively to counter their political or economic exclusion, changing state structures so that the post-conflict politics becomes more inclusive or democratic may have a pacifying effect. consequently, changes to facilitate nonviolent, institutional conflict management can include the redesign of state territorial structures (brancati, 2006), the reform of electoral or party processes (boogards, 2013; reilly, 2006), or the engineering of state security institutions (bryden, hänggi, 2004). all available literature related to post-civil war institutional reforms indicates that rebellions tend to focus on changing the electoral system, federalism, and security institution. however, the interest of a civil war may lie in changing the whole institutional system or a small portion of it. for example, the rebellion of the sri lankan civil war demanded an independent homeland within sri lanka for hindu tamil populations (mapping military organizations, 2018). they wanted to separate themselves from the centralized governance system so that they could establish a new tamil-hindu friendly state. but, in contrast, the civil war in nepal demanded the social and economic transformation of the entire nation (crisis group, 2005a). although it sounds vague, social and economic dynamics are the major pillar of the governance system. the maoist insurgency officially began on 13 february 1996 with an attack on a police post in rolpa, a district in western nepal, by members of the communist party of nepal (cpn)-maoist. the cpn-maoist had taken part in the first democratic elections in 1991, but by 1994 they had chosen to take a different path to their goal. having a basic understanding that the absolute monarchy of nepal has institutionally exploited the deprived, ethnically marginalized, and socially excluded group, the key goals were to create a republic of the people and to establish a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution (do, iyer, 2010). about 17,000 civilians were killed in battle. around 1,530 people went missing and more than 8,000 were injured or physically disabled (adhikari, 2019). despite the extreme economic and human loss, the pro-democracy movement initiated jointly by the seven party alliance (spa) and the communist party of nepal (maoist) saw a change in nepal’s political environment, putting an end to the decade-old maoist uprising as king gyanendra stepped down on 24 april 2006 (mohammad, 2008). the civil war drastically reformed the institutions of nepal from absolute monarchy to republic, from the hindu nation to a secular state, and from a centralized governance system to a provincial/federal system. similarly, the conflict succeeded in providing oppressed communities with broader political space to express their grievances, especially ‘dalits’ (the socalled untouchables), women, landless and ethnic and indigenous people (sunam, goutam 2013). the process was carried out through a series of negotiations and the first constituent assembly (ca) election. the election of the constituent assembly (ca) was an important part of the peace process aimed at turning the conflict into peace. nepal carried out two ca elections in a short period. on 10 april 2008, the first ca election took place, but the first ca failed to enact the constitution and was dissolved on 28 may 2012 (adhikari, 2017). it took nepal almost 8 years to promulgate the ‘constitution of nepal 2015’, but it secured all the institutional reform agendas set during the civil war by the rebellion force. in trying to categorize the literature that addresses causes and effects of a civil war, the information is scattered. some considered underdevelopment to be the major cause, and some considered greed and opportunity as the other cause. this paper analyzes the quality of the institution as the major factor that triggers a civil war and later reforms of institutions. firstly, this research will discuss the approaches to attempts to analyze institutional reforms; secondly, it will present institutional connection between the quality of the institution and a civil war; thirdly, it will present the case study of nepal’s civil war that explains the interconnection between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reforms. 2. theoretical and methodological approach 2.1. historical institutionalism (hi) instead of giving the theoretical framework, historical institutionalism simply provides an approach to studying politics and social changes. this approach differs from other social science approaches in its attention to historical orientation, empirical problems in the real world, and the organization’s structure, forms of actions, and performance. historical institutionalism draws attention to how dependent national designs form the desires of the domestic community and, therefore, how governments are accepted in foreign positions (fioretos, 2011). historical institutionalism is a subfield of american the interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reform… 61 and comparative politics where, alongside rational choice institutionalism, it attributes practical and theoretical debates and defines the form of processes that constitute international relations, including the legacy of key moments that define long-term power relations (fioretos, 2011). when p.a. hall and r.c.r. taylor (1996) conducted thought-provoking research on three new institutionalisms and provided an opportunity to re-evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the existing institutionalism, they emphasized the necessity of interaction between rational choice, sociology, and historical institutionalism. institutionalists have reached consensus in that they all see institutions as laws that structure behavior. their interpretation of the essence of subjects whose acts or behavior are structured is where they vary. the school of rational choice claims that human beings are rational individualists who, in the decisions they face, weigh the costs and benefits. institutionalists of rational choice think that institutions are relevant simply because they frame the strategic actions of the individual. they think people obey rules because they are strategic actors who want to optimize their individual or personal gain. furthermore, sociological institutionalists perceive human beings as inherently social beings. in this view, people are not as self-interested or as ‘rational’ as scholarship for rational choice would have it (march, olsen, 1989). time is the main component of hi, e. voeten (2019) and h. farrell and a.l. newman (2010) explain that hi emphasizes how organizations are influenced by timing, sequence, and path dependency, and how social, political, economic actions, and change are formed. our preferences are dictated by the rules produced by early agents, and history affects our preferences; according to ‘path dependence’ which is one of the pillars of hi, it is not preferable to modify institutional rules, structure, etc. nevertheless, occasionally, there are extraordinary moments when everyone is open to fundamental change. revolutions and critical crises, which are either potential or pose danger of changing the law, are the key determinants/factors in this sense called ‘critical junctures.’ in an institutional study, critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the systemic forces on political action are substantially relaxed for a short duration (giovanni, kelemen, 2007). likewise, hi also can do a micro-analysis of minor events that ultimately can cause a bigger event. additionally, in a historical and comparative context, the best way to clarify historical institutionalism (hi) is to situate this approach, demonstrating where the approach originated and how it varies from other social science approaches (steinmo, 2008). two major intellectual agendas have emerged within institutionalist scholarship in recent years. the first one is an effort to better understand the processes of institutional change; the second one is an attempt to understand the role of ideas in history and politics. in the context of our research, we will focus on the process and components of institutional change. 2.2. institutional change structures and rules that regulate relationships focus on structural improvement. according to c. hay (2002), because of multiple influences, the characteristics of change are dynamic, unpredictable, and invariable. by comparison, institutions are conceptualized as frameworks external to actors, according to v. schmidt and j. monnet (2008), constraining them through historical paths that form their behavior. these players, rather than agents, are formalized as corporate actors such as unions, bureaucracy, companies, politicians, and so on. m. coccia (2018) divided the institutional design approach into three-part. the first one is based on institutional design, and in this approach, structural reform is a process of centralized and collective choice in which the laws of a collective political body, such as the society or the state, are specifically defined, and individuals and organizations participate in collective action, confrontation, and bargaining. g.d. libecap (1989) also argues that institutional reform is a path-dependent process: institutions can be a result of current technology, but also previous institutions and technologies. the second one is the evolutionary theory of institutional change, and the main argument of this approach is that institutional change is an evolutionary process (kingstong, caballero, 2009). theories of evolutionary institutional change indicate that human behavior, such as learning, imitation, etc., is responsible for institutional change. the role of the selection process in deciding which laws arise and are adapted in socioeconomic environments is the difference between evolutionary theories and design-based theories. the third one is the theory of the equilibrium view of the institution, and this perspective tries to deal with structured and informal rules in a cohesive setting by moving the emphasis from behavioral rules to the behavior itself (greif, laitin, 2004; myerson, 2004). the institutional perspective considers the vital role of both formal and informal rules as instruments that enable players to cooperate on one of these many balances by enabling them to achieve a common set of beliefs about each other’s actions both on and off the path of play. 62 aryal saroj kumar 2.3. methodology the available literature on institutionalism supports the argument that a minor flaw in the institutional system can cause a disastrous civil war. within ‘new institutionalism’, historical institutionalism allows conducting an in-depth analysis of past events that can trigger a big event in the present or future. therefore, to understand the flaws in the nepal government institutions that caused the civil war, research has to use hi as the main theoretical approach. using the same theoretical ground, the next section presents a categorical analysis of the causes of civil wars. furthermore, nepal had a very unstable governance system in the past seven decades, so to understand the institutional change, the research has particularly used the ‘evolutionary theory of institutional change’. the qualitative case study is a research methodology that encourages investigation of a phenomenon using a variety of data sources within its context. this means that the problem is not explored through one lens, but rather through several lenses that make it possible to expose and appreciate various dimensions of the phenomenon. within the qualitative framework, this research aims to use the ‘case study’ as the main methodological approach. according to r.k. yin (2003), the design of a case study should be taken into account when: (a) the study aims to address the “how” and “why” questions; (b) the actions of those involved in the study cannot be manipulated; (c) contextual conditions are to be covered because they are considered important to the phenomenon under study; and (d) the boundaries between phenomena and meaning are not explicit. the research intends to establish the understanding of the quality of the institution that triggers the civil war, as the quality of an institution is ultimately responsible for unequal distribution of economy or the opportunities, institutional exploitation of minorities or the people from certain ethnic groups. the civil war that ends in a peaceful process targets to fix the loopholes in the institutions. thus, this research presents the events and timeline associated with the case study that fits the proposed argument. 3. what causes a civil war? a collection of necessary and adequate conditions which can be applied mechanically cannot be given by any abstract concept of civil war. the process of classifying the countries that have undergone civil wars is tough, even with a good abstract concept of civil war. the understanding that we have are completely based on the close reading of the historical narratives of countries experiencing large-scale conflict as all cases are distinct. in the concept of civil war, not all countries can share every aspect (gersovitz, kriger, 2013). likewise, while talking about the cause of a civil war, the answer rather comes back as skater information. many studies have been conducted on the subject of causes of civil wars. based on the causes of a civil war, their categorical study can be conducted. referring to the economic deprivation of the united nations millennium development goals: ‘poor and hungry societies are much more likely than high-income societies to fall into conflict over scarce vital resources, such as watering holes and arable land. poverty increases the risks of conflict through multiple paths’ (un mdgs, 2006). two key studies provide this argument with some empirical evidence. p. collier and a. hoeffler (2004) notice that revenue variables have a tremendous explanatory capacity, which may be responsible for certain complaints, but are perhaps more relevant to the feasibility of rebellion. it was also noticed by j. fearon and d.  laitin (2003) that lower income per capita raises the risk of a civil war. they argue that income per capita is a proxy for the total economic, administrative, police, and military capabilities of the state. similarly, scholars like g. ostby (2008), m. humphreys and j.m. weinstein (2008), z. taydas and d. peksen (2012) argued and presented poverty as the main factor of civil wars. considering which socio-economic indicators help avoid social conflict, taydas and peksen show that redistributive social policies can have a strong pacifying effect while also improving economic equality, particularly for public goods such as health and education. similarly, the paper by ostby shows that differences between identity groups are more likely to lead to conflict than individualized inequalities within the society. she offers a significant data-driven reaction to previous studies that have found no connection or inequality between conflict and ethnic/religious diversity. on the other hand, many studies have been made under the impression that a civil war starts as a result of ‘grievance’ and later transforms into ‘greed’ or vice versa. a well-written and seemingly convincing study on ‘greed and grievance’ has been developed by a. hoeffler and p. collier (2011), seen in several published texts, which unambiguously concludes that greed, not grievance, is the primary cause of conflict. seeing it from the theory of collective action, both authors have defined the cause of a civil war. the principle of collective action implies that participants should earn private incentives to solve the issue of free riding. thus, greed in the the interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reform… 63 organization of rebellion can be an important factor. since rebellion involves private benefits, even if it is focused on popular grievances, both factors should be considered by civil war theories. however, the author seems conflicted in terms of drawing a clear demarcation between the greed and grievance factor of the civil war. likewise, criticism of the work by p. collier and a. hoeffler (2002) was widespread. one such critique centered on the fact that the generalization of civil wars that they attempted in their work is difficult to enforce. civil wars are triggered by highly complex social processes, which are highly dependent on the historical and regional context. a different economic model of rebellion was developed by p. collier (2000), where rebels aim not to conquer the state, but rather to continually plunder natural resources. this is similar to h. grossman’s (1991) and j. hirshleifer’s (2001) models of “rebellion as crime”. however, collier points out that rebellion has different causes from other forms of crime, particularly because much stronger military organization is needed. meanwhile, d. keen (2012) disagreed with the argument made by collier. while economic agendas are a significant factor in shaping civil wars, there are many issues with prominent theories focusing on rebel ‘greed,’ especially those put forward by paul collier. among these are: the way proxies have been used for ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’, the lack of attention to the relations between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’, and the lack of attention to ‘greed’ among counter-insurgency related elements. nevertheless, all the above arguments have a commonality that is related to the quality of the institution. unequal economic distribution, a noninclusive societal system or institutional exploitation of a certain group or ethnicity mostly trigger a civil war and are directly connected to the quality of the institution. the quality of institutions is an important factor in long-term growth. the world bank report argues that to avoid recurrent cycles of abuse, structures for security, justice, and jobs should first be integrated. 4. civil war and institutional reform we have established the above understanding that institutional discrimination toward a specific ethnic group or a class of people is among the major causes of civil wars. if violence arises because identity groups revolt aggressively to counter their political or economic exclusion, changing the state structures so that those post-conflict politics becomes more inclusive or democratic can have a pacifying effect. reforms to encourage nonviolent, systemic conflict management may also entail redesigning the structures of the territorial state (brancati, 2006), an electoral or party structure reform (boogards, 2013; reilly, 2006) or the engineering of the state security agencies (bryden, hänggi, 2004). the existing literature divides the institutional reform into three sectors. firstly, the reform of the administrative division of the country. one of the major causes related to grievance amongst the rebels is that the centralized administration cannot reach the bottom, and ultimately it officially marginalizes a certain population. for example, the asian development bank started ‘the provincial performance improvement initiative (ppii) in 2005, considering the unequal distribution of governance in each corner of the country. the initiative aims to deliver effective health, education, infrastructure, and law & order services to the people (saldanha, 2008). following the marxist-leninist ideology, the revolutionary army force of colombia (farc) started the guerrilla war in 1964 against the government of colombia. the objective causes of the colombian civil war are poverty and exclusion, a lack of infrastructure, systemic instability of the secular state, a lack of industrialization, alienation of regions, and slow assimilation of modernity (lopez, 2016). thus, during the civil war, farc militia seized much agricultural land and established some basic administrative provision in those areas. when farc signed the historical peace deal in 2016, the agreement addressed the causes of the war that had started 50 years earlier. more specifically, in terms of decentralization of the administration, the peace agreement included ‘comprehensive rural development’. the detailed chapter on the rural reform of the peace agreements contains the economic inclusion of the poor rural communities of colombia by land titling, the land fund, and the extension of state services to the countryside. furthermore, it also draws attention to the role of the government in standardizing basic facilities such as water, electricity, health, and education in rural colombia (apont, 2019). furthermore, the civil war that has been going on in the philippines since 1969 with a demand for an autonomous muslim region in the southern philippines reached the final negotiation in 2014. a ‘comprehensive agreement (2014) on bongsamoro’ was signed between the philippine government and the moro national liberation front (mnlf) in malaysia that guarantees that the government would establish autonomous bangsamoro. power-sharing was at the heart of the redesign of autonomy. secondly, post-civil war reforms tend to modify the electoral or party system. historically, on a fragmented case-by-case basis, the electoral system 64 aryal saroj kumar design process has tended to occur, which led to the unavoidable and persistent reinvention of the wheel due to minimal comparative knowledge. according to a. reynolds, b. reilly and a. ellis (2008), while dividing the appropriateness of the electoral system, three variables become important: 1) awareness of the essence of social division (for instance, the nature of the identity of a group, 2) the nature of the political system (for instance, the strength or nature of the conflict, and the geographical distribution of conflict groups), and 3) the essence of the political system (i.e. the existence of the state, the system of parties, and the constitutional process as a whole); or the mechanism that led to the adoption of the electoral system (i.e., the system was inherited from a colonial power, designed knowingly, imposed externally, or arose through a process of evolution and unintended consequences). as all three represent the triggering factor to the civil war, they equally have the potential to resolve or reform the postwar institutions. in terms of electoral reforms, historical evidence presents systems transferred from singular to multiple sharing systems. in september 1980, five major leftist revolutionary organizations merged into the farabundo mart national liberation front in el salvador. the fmln launched a guerrilla army to oppose the government and the right-wing paramilitary forces. on 16 january 1992, the signing of the united nations-brokered peace agreements of chapultepec in mexico city ended 20 months of negotiations. as part of the settlement, the salvadoran government and the fmln agreed to set up a unappointed truth commission to investigate abuses committed during the war. still, it took more than 10 years for fmln to win the number of seats to govern. in 2009, the fmln won the presidential election (the center for justice-el salvador). thirdly, the reform after the civil war also concentrates on reforming the internal security sector. police forces may also be a cause of abuse, persecution, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ during wars and conflicts. they did not represent the monopoly of the state’s legitimate use of force: run against minorities by governments, against other ethnic groups and political rivals by secessionists, not being legitimate, not having a monopoly on the use of force, they were subordinate (bieber, 2010). as an example of one of the most politicized police forces in the country, the police in serbia were directly commanded by president slobodan milosevic until his fall in 2000 and acted as his preemptive guard against domestic opposition and played a key role in ethnic cleansing during the wars in croatia, bosnia, and kosovo (babovic, 2003). considering their central position during the reform of conflict security was understood to be a cornerstone of post-conflict reconstruction. former yugoslavia, northern ireland, and sudan are some of the examples where the security reform was the main agenda in post-civil war reform. 5. civil war and institutional changes in nepal in the name of a people’s war, nepal witnessed a decade-long maoist conflict that began in february 1996. more than 13,000 people were killed and 200,000 people displaced, with millions of dollars worth of property destroyed. the decade-long civil war of nepal perfectly fits the argument that has been made above. 5.1. causes of the civil war few major causes triggered the civil war in nepal, but all causes can be connected to the quality of the institution or the provision of the institution. taking into account the geographical landscape of nepal, the presence of governance was subjectified as to whether governance was available in urban areas or only to the elite group (higher cast) of rural areas. before the beginning of the armed struggle in nepal, the communist force had tried to take the democratic path by contesting the election. however, on 25 november 1991, the communist party of nepal (united centre) held its first congress and adopted the line of ‘protracted armed struggle on the path to a new democratic revolution’ (shrestha, adhikari, 2005; lawoti, pahari, 2010) and agreed that the party would remain an underground party. later, the communist party of nepal (united center) cpn(uc)/(united people’s front of nepal) upfn was split into two factions on 22 may 1994. the revolutionary group changed its name to the communist party of nepal (maoist), or cpn-m. the government powers, mainstream political parties, and the monarchy were identified as feudal forces by this group. this sums up that the ultimate struggle was against the institutional monarchy. nepal is viewed by maoists as a ‘semi-feudal and semi-colonial republic’ because almost 90% of the population are engaged in backward agriculture, and the country is confined by various unequal semi-colonial treaties with foreign powers, especially india (the worker, 1997). furthermore, they claim that along with ‘bureaucratic capitalists’ and a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’, the king and large landowners rule the country. according to the maoists, these last two classes are only in a privileged position because they act as imperialist agents. it is thus claimed, in other words, that the semi-feudal and semi-colonial systems of nepal are the product of an the interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reform… 65 alliance between feudalism and imperialism. over time, as ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ grew steadily within the wombs of feudalism,’ the ‘external form’ of the state has undergone many changes (gobyn, 2009). as marx’s four stages in the development of the society – feudalism, bourgeois hegemony, socialism, and communism – nepal’s maoists adapted mao’s idealism that believes it is possible to abolish three stages: feudalism, bourgeois hegemony, and socialism by initiating ‘new democratic revolution’. thus, the main intention of the civil war of nepal was to remove the monarchy and its institution that promotes feudalism and bourgeois hegemony. the maoist conflict in nepal started at a time when the economy was recovering with the successful implementation of economic reform initiatives. however, the growth was not a quality growth because it was not pro-poor. due to the lack of protection, freedom from desire, it could not be maintained for a longer time. this culminated in violent confrontation and lack of personal security, leading to resentment and pessimism. this indicated that economic growth was not going to count until it proportionally addressed the economic need of people living under the poverty line. v. koubi and t. böhmelt (2014) also argue that worsening inequality can heighten social tension and provoke violence. there was a substantial increase in poverty in nepal in the 20 years between 1976 and 1996: the proportion of the population living in poverty increased from 33% to 42%, mainly because of the impoverishment of the agricultural sector, particularly in mountain areas, where poverty increased from 44% to 62% (sakellaropoulos, 2011). the latter’s share of generated wealth grew from 23% to 52%, with the corresponding share falling to 11% for the poorest 40% and from 54% to 37% for the median 50%. the conclusion is that the substantial economic growth witnessed by nepal brought an immense redistribution of wealth to the capitalist class, while the middle classes and poorer layers saw a vertiginous widening of the divide separating them from the wealthiest layers (bajracharya, 2004). later, the economic deprivation stands out as one of the moving factors for people to join the war that gives maoist revolutionaries a strategic upper hand against the government. the shahs (1768–1846, 1960–1990) and ranas (1846–1950) dynasties that ruled nepal attempted to unify and maintain central control over the kingdom. his government institutionalized two divisive social structures when prithvi narayan shah invaded the kathmandu valley in 1768 and united the territory: the feudal bureaucracy and the hindu caste system (adhikari, 2013). a variety of administrative and economic schemes were also introduced by the dynasty, such as monetary exaction in the form of gifts, forced labor, free treasury allowances, and birta (rent-free land grants) to favored officials (joshi, rose, 1966). political influence, land and wealth were concentrated by this model in the hands of a few high castes who had close links to the royal family. much of the development activities were restricted geographically to the capital of kathmandu. in 1990, nepal promulgated the constitution which institutionalized discrimination by declaring nepal a hindu nation that favors hindus. and within hinduism, the lower castes are not permitted in the same manner as other castes to observe hindu practices, norms, and values (shrestha, 2002). additionally, not only did minority marginalization continue after the 1990 people’s movement, but it grew much stronger, as the statistics for the lok sewa (public service commission) indicate: while the bahun chhetri (upper caste) held 69% of its posts in 1985, the trend rose to 98% in 2001 (cailmail, 2008). utilizing the ethnic, religious, and institutional discrepancies, the cpn (maoist) inserted provisions in their political programs in favor of the latter to demonstrate their loyalty to minorities. three points were devoted to the ethnic question when they released their ‘40 points demand’ in february 1996. furthermore, the ‘unified revolutionary people’s council collective minimum strategy and party’s program of the party dedicated two of its 11 sections to indigenous nationalities and the cast. (based on a historic leaflet distributed throughout the country on february 13, 1996: cpn (m): ‘march along the path of people’s war to smash the reactionary state and establish a new democratic state!’ 5.2. the tactic of the civil war in the mid-western hill zone, the maoists began with a small base of soldiers, embracing a combination of communist and republican philosophies for their recruiting efforts and tactical decision-making. they successfully integrated mao’s guerrilla warfare tactics, learned lessons from other revolutions, and tailored a strategy to exploit local grievances for their benefit in rural areas of nepal. they echoed mao’s violence justification that it was appropriate to bring about a brief reign of terror in any rural region and that it is necessary to exceed the proper limit to correct a wrong, and the wrong cannot be corrected with the proper limit exceeded (mao zedong, 1927). pushpa kamal dahal ‘prachanda’, the supreme of the cpn-maoist, redefined the expression of mao by stating; ‘without waging violent battles, people have not made even the least of gains. 66 aryal saroj kumar today, under the current political structure, nepalese society has reached a point of crisis that there is no solution on the part of the people other than to smash it’. since the start of their armed campaign in 1996, the maoists have employed force for political ends. they have used torture, execution, and other forms of abuse, including fear and extortion. but they have also been more restrained than many militant groups: they have restricted civilian casualties and have resisted indiscriminate attacks in general. the maoists are a political group at heart. they have developed military capabilities, but political power is secondary to them (crisis group, 2005b). thousands of people were displaced from their homes for just over a year as police raided villages and detained, tortured, and killed hundreds of alleged maoists. the high-handedness of the authorities against the peasantry eventually only enabled the rebellion to spread (karki, seddon, 2003). eventually, two factors turn out to be the strategies that give maoists the upper hand in guerrilla warfare with the government. first, the geographical condition of nepal where the mountains and jungle make it easy to disappear and second, the nice use of the institutional discrimination against the government. 5.3. maoist ‘jana sarkar’ during the first five years of the insurgency, having made rapid military gains, the maoist rebels began to form their jana sarkars (the people’s governments) in areas under their control to fill the political void created by the withdrawal of the nepalese state troops from the indefensible hinterland. it is this political growth that, with its associated consents and refusals, brought local cultural worlds into direct and sustained ties with an alien ideological practice to create new forms of governance (shah, 2008). in general, there is mixed evidence on how nepalese maoists should be viewed. on the one hand, cpn-m has professed its absolute adherence to the philosophy of marxism-leninism-maoism. even in practice, cpn-m has implemented communism-related policies, such as people’s courts institutions, and the introduction of collective farms and communal living in ‘model villages’ of maoists in the far-western regions of nepal, such as the jajarkot district (lecomtetilouine, 2010). on the other hand, nepalese maoists have based their propaganda more on subsuming public grievances than on promoting ideological covenants and publicizing initiatives they plan to introduce in communist nepal (davis et al., 2012). cpnm attempted to create its maoist regime, parallel to the official state, as part of its overall strategy. secondly, the maoists targeted the central government leaders, such as the police force and officials of the government. once such staff left, in areas marked by the absence of the official state, the maoists formed their own ‘people’ governments. the maoist ‘people’ governments took over much of the local government’s roles, including administrative, economic, social, cultural, and educational matters (thapa, sijapati, 2007). similarly, cpn-maoist has divided nepal into 13 provinces based on the majority of ethnic representation of the region. during the civil war, cpn-maoist has tried to fill the gap that was in the institutional system of the royal nepal government, through their ‘jana sarkar’. when the peace deal was signed and a new constitution was promulgated, they made sure to include many provisions that had been adopted by jana sarkar. 5.4. peace deal and the institutional reform nepal’s government and the communist party of nepal-maoist (cpn-m) concluded a comprehensive peace agreement (cpa) on 21 november 2006. the agreement was heralded in nepal and around the world as a positive step forward for the nepalese peace process after more than a decade of violent conflict during which approximately 15,000 people were killed, more than 1,400 disappeared, and various other human rights abuses were committed (bhandari, 2015). in april 2006, maoists announced a unilateral truce against seven political parties (spa) in the parliament that opposed the direct rule of the king. this encouraged the non-violent opposition movement to join them. peace talks followed, and the government and maoists reached an agreement on the 25-point code of conduct on ceasefire on may 26, 2006. cpn-m resolved to renounce violence, to observe the rule of law, and to respect the principles of universal human rights and democratic norms and values. in addition, under the control of the united nations mission to nepal (unmin), they decided to place their armed fighters in 28 separate cantonments and store weapons in containers. unmin carried out the mission of weapons and army verification (nepal peace process, 2013). since the 12-point agreement between the cpn-maoist and 7 parties alliance, 25 various agreements were signed, and the peace process officially ended on 12 april 2013 when the ‘integration and rehabilitation process’ ended. however, nepal has not made meaningful progress in the issues of justice, facts, and reparation problems for victims of serious human rights violations and abuses that occurred during the civil war. but, on the other hand, drastic institutional reforms have been made since then. the first major step taken after king gyanendra reinstated the parliament was that until the arms management the interconnectedness between institutional quality, civil war and institutional reform… 67 program would have been completed, elections should be held, and the permanent constitution should be drawn up to replace the 1990 text, while the interim constitution that transferred all executive authority to the prime minister was to remain in force. secondly, maoists, who in 2009 changed their party name to the united communist party of nepal (maoist) or ucpn(m), won the most seats, and on may 28, 2008, when the new assembly voted to declare nepal a democratic republic, more than two centuries of royal rule came to an end. in july 2008, ram baran yadav became nepal’s first president. one month later, there was an election in the parliament for the prime minister. pushpa kamal dahal, the maoist leader, popularly known as prachanda, won by a wide margin and established a coalition government. although it has gone through several unstable governments and two ‘constitutional assembly election’, nepal finally managed to promulgate the ‘constitution of nepal 2015’ which secures all the major demands that the cpn-maoists had during the civil war. the following are the major institutional changes that happened in post-conflict nepal: remodeling of power: power has been consistently allocated in nepal by class, religion, ethnicity, and gender. the end of the war brought further change. new factors also gained access to the political parties’ post-conflict scenario. during the first phase, there were two distinct periods of power sharing: formal agreements during the 18 months between the peace agreement and the elections and a more informal collection of negotiated principles for the completion of unfinished post-election reforms. later, the federal constitution was promulgated in 2015, which envisaged new forms of competition, developed new public management approaches, and generated new codes for governing centrallocal relations (acharya, 2018). the constitution requires three levels of government to promote the transition of power to the local government system (lgs) and other state organizations: federal, provincial, and local, and to specify local governments as the unit closest to the grassroots. the institutional transformation of nepal from centrally-based governance to federal government assured smooth decentralization of power adoption of the top-tobottom approach. inclusion: although inclusion had emerged in nepal in the 1990s as a political issue, the terms of the 1990 constitution and the socio-political structure of the political system were not amenable to inclusive reforms. maoists were the first large group that raised the issue of inclusion. various janajati (minorities and institutionally excluded) groups were home to the maoist heartland in the mid-west and other mid-hill regions, in which the party exercised a high degree of influence during the conflict that ultimately became the backbone to drive guerrilla warfare in rural and semi-urban areas in nepal. during the civil war, the maoist provincial division was also based on ethnicity. thus, the government legally attempted to institutionalize federalism and to establish an inclusive constitution in nepal. firstly, based on population, wealth, competence, and identity, the state was restructured into seven provinces. furthermore, the 2015 constitution officially declared nepal a ‘secular’ nation from a ‘hindu’ nation. article 4 of the new constitution identifies the state of nepal as a secular state but defines it as meaning ‘religious and cultural freedom, along with protection of religion and customs practiced from ancient times’ (constitution of nepal, 2015). in addition to the two big changes mentioned above, there are other small but significant reforms, such as the establishment of the ‘human rights commission’, the integration of the ‘security forces’ and press freedom. there is still a big question about the sustainability of all the institutional changes that have been made through the peaceful process. for instance, the hindu nationalists demand revival of the hindu nation, where some are protesting the provincial government by stating that it only increased the administrative budget of the government of nepal. however, the nepal peace agreement is one of the ideal models that represent how civil war is the silver lining between the ‘quality of institution’ and the ‘institutional reform’. 6. conclusion unlike the above-presented arguments and evidence, various factors can lead a nation to a civil war. for example, the civil war of afghanistan was due to the ethnic inferiority faced by certain communities within the country. however, we can all agree that when the civil war starts, the cause always has something to do with the quality of provision that institution has. the presented case study is one of the ideal cases. but there are many other examples when the peace deal is signed under a very different scenario and where implementing reforms will take a longer time. for instance, the colombian peace deal has certainly led to drawing a plan to eradicate the gap between social security that the government provides in urban and rural areas, but it is going to take approximately over two decades to do so. likewise, there is an example of the civil war in sri lanka which 68 aryal saroj kumar ended in may 2009, but still the tamil population in the country is waiting for the constitution to be reformed and ultimately secure the right of minorities. additionally, there are some cases of civil wars in africa that started as ‘grievance’ and now transferred to ‘greed’. consequently, there is very little chance to achieve peace in these scenarios. however, there are also some simple cases, such as small riots and protests, which also have a capacity to pressure the government to reform an institution, but this happens in politically developed societies. thus, the argument made in this paper has a very ideal scenario in which an institution formally exploits a certain ethnic or geographical population under a very undemocratic regime that shows extreme reluctance to evolve. as a result, a certain group decides to choose a path of civil war and prepare, educate and capacitate a certain population for the upcoming institutional reform. finally, through many rounds of negotiation and assurance to reform the institutions/governance peace is achieved. references 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gieras, 2013) has given a new direc‑ tion to polish‑russian relations (taras, 2014). in the context of investigating the causes and circumstanc‑ es of the accident, reports of the interstate aviation committee (iac) and jerzy miller’s commission are also important. the symbolism of the katyn massacre together with the newer phenomenon of the mythologization of the smolensk catastrophe, as well as the heroiza‑ tion of the late president lech kaczyński, who died in it, is not without significance in the polish policy pursued by the pis [law and justice party] govern‑ ments in 2005–2007 and 2015–2020. d. drozdzewski (2012), j.a. drzewiecka & m. hasian (2018), r.  fred‑ heim (2014) and j. niżyńska (2010) wrote about the phenomenon of mythologization of the above events. the current shape of mutual relations was also influenced by various events in third countries, es‑ pecially conflicts in which poland and russia took opposing positions. examples include the orange revolution, extensively described by s. pifer (2007), the rose revolution, described by c.h. fairbanks (2004) and l.a. mitchell (2006), the war in south os‑ setia, discussed by r. allison (2008), o. antonenko (2008), s.e. cornell & s.f. starr (eds.) (2015) and s.n. macfarlane (2010), as well as the crisis in ukraine, to which l. cleary (2016), h. shelest (2015) and s.a. sotiriou (2016) devoted their works. not only events in eastern europe, but also in the west affected relations between warsaw and mos‑ cow. the poisoning of sergei skripal and his daugh‑ ter (gioe et al., 2019), which triggered decisive action against russia not only by poland (lekki, 2018), but by many countries of the world (wood, henke, 2018) was an important event. poland’s contemporary historical narrative (black‑ er, 2012) is substantially different from the analo‑ gous area of politics pursued by the russian govern‑ ment (zięba, 2011). one should also emphasize the impact on international relations of actions, such as waging a disinformation war between the kremlin and the west, as described by m. baumann (2010). due to the growing conflicts between eu coun‑ tries and russia, the latter is accused of attacking computer systems of western countries. these cy‑ ber‑attacks are associated with a change in russian geopolitical strategy after 2000 (thornton, miron, 2019). tab. 1. opposite processes in 2010–2015 resulting from the smolensk disaster positive process negative process participation of president medvedev in the funeral of the presidential couple in wawel accusing russia of causing the tu‑154 plane crash the presence of bronisław komorowski and wojciech jaruzelski at the moscow parade on victory day attempts to blame politicians of platforma obywatel‑ ska [civil platform party] with the responsibility for the victims of the disaster by the politicians of law and justice participation of polish soldiers in the moscow parade on victory day dissemination of negatively marked vocabulary in the polish narrative associated with the smolensk catas‑ trophe (calling it assassination, crime) source: the author’s own study based on: wiatr (2017). 44 daria janke 3. polish-russian relations after the smolensk disaster the process of reconciliation between poland and russia was suddenly held up by the smolensk disas‑ ter on 10 april 2010. it resulted in the emergence of a specific duality in polish‑russian relations (tab. 1). after 10 april 2010, polish‑russian relations were dominated by the subject of the smolensk disaster. attempts were made in the public space to mytholo‑ gise this event, which can be exemplified by organ‑ ising smolensk monthlies. attempts to accuse the russian side of an attack, rejecting the version of an accident, or emergence of many conspiracy theories related to the course of the disaster were also obsta‑ cles to improving mutual relations (gauszka, 2017). russia’s first reaction was to announce the day of national mourning (april 12). a few days later, an‑ drzej wajda’s film katyn aired on russian television, and president medvedev began to declassify the katyn archives and to submit them to the polish gov‑ ernment (dempsey, 2010). in december 2010, the russian president came to poland, where he signed agreements, among others, on youth exchange be‑ tween poland and russia, as well as on setting up of the centre for the polish‑russian dialogue and un‑ derstanding in russia and an analogous institution in poland. polish‑russian relations have gradually deterio‑ rated due to tensions resulting from the long‑lasting failure to determine the causes of the disaster, differ‑ ences in the assessment of responsibility of persons and parties involved in the organization and control of the flight, as well as misunderstandings and lack of communication and agreement regarding the conduct of investigations. the dispute between the countries was exacerbated by the issue of handing over the wreck to the polish side, as well as protect‑ ing it from weather conditions. the policy pursued by the president of the re‑ public of poland, lech kaczyński, was not continued after his death (among others, actions conducted jointly with lithuania, such as vetoing the pca (eu– russia partnership and cooperation agreement), op‑ position to the nord stream, support for activities in georgia and ukraine and for the belarusian issues). when the po‑psl coalition took over power in po‑ land, the polish international relations with its east‑ ern neighbours were reversed. warsaw distanced itself from ukraine, as evidenced, for example, by dissolving the polish‑ukrainian peace force battal‑ ion (polukrbat), and it also attempted to improve relations with minsk, with which the law and jus‑ tice government maintained rather cool relations. during its rule, the po‑psl coalition accepted all german‑french projects without opposition and showed misplaced confidence in russia. the change in the american approach to russia was an important factor in polish‑russian relations. the united states position in the world was clearly weakened after the wars in iraq and afghanistan, as well as after the financial crisis. the country under new leadership of president barack obama and sec‑ retary of state hillary clinton gave hope for closer cooperation between the united states and rus‑ sia. the american administration decided to con‑ duct a comprehensive review of the missile defence program, as a result of which the polish‑american agreement was not sent for ratification. therefore, this decision meant abandoning the idea of deploy‑ ing interceptor missiles in poland (polish‑american negotiations..., 2012). these expectations were confirmed by prime minister vladimir putin during the ceremony in katyn on april 7, 2010, when he charged the stalinist leadership of the soviet union with responsibility for the katyn massacre. the rus‑ sian prime minister also paid tribute to its victims, thus creating the premises for changes in polish‑ russian relations. in february 2011, the russian ambassador in warsaw announced declassification of katyn files and rehabilitation of victims of nkvd, while the state duma admitted that joseph stalin was respon‑ sible for the katyn massacre. poland and russia be‑ gan a constructive dialogue on this matter, which could suggest building of partner contacts and an improvement in mutual relations (rosyjski deput‑ owany: stosunki..., 2011). seven years after poland’s accession to the eu and the introduction of the visa requirement for rus‑ sian citizens (since 2003), the time came to conclude an agreement between both sides on border cross‑ ing facilitation. in december 2011, poland conclud‑ ed the local border traffic agreement (lbt) with rus‑ sia, which came into force in july 2012 (palmowski, 2013). the introduction of facilitations resulting from the operation of the agreement significantly im‑ proved the relations between the sides, not only po‑ litically, but first and foremost socially. visa waiver for residents of border areas facilitated and streamlined the crossing of the polish‑russian border, which re‑ sulted in increased receipts from tourism and trade, as well as boosted relations between residents of the area covered by the agreement (palmowski, 2013). in november 2014, there was a diplomatic scan‑ dal (rokossovskaâ, 2014). two men suspected of espionage for russia were detected by the military counterintelligence service (wydalenie rosyjskich dyplomatów?..., 2014). warsaw expelled russian dip‑ lomats who, according to the findings, steered the polish-russian relations after 10 april 2010 45 russian agents. moscow, guided by the principle of reciprocity, decided to expel polish diplomats from russia. the russian ministry of foreign affairs con‑ sidered the behaviour of the polish side as unjusti‑ fied and hostile. likewise, the russian press (e.g. rossijskaja gazieta) presented warsaw’s decisions in a negative light (rokossovskaâ, 2014; rosja wydala polskich..., 2014). the deterioration of polish‑russian relations in 2016 was affected by the polish government’s deci‑ sion to suspend the lbt. as the reasons for its de‑ cision, the polish side cited the organization of the nato summit and world youth day. importantly, since the suspension of the lbt, there have been no reports of willingness to restore the lbt by poland, and it should be emphasized that the solution im‑ posed by the polish government was supposed to be temporary (palmowski, 2018). in 2017, hacker attacks on polish computer sys‑ tems became so intensive and dangerous that the polish prime minister, beata szydło, decided to con‑ vene the government’s crisis management team in june. the russian government actually has the tools and capabilities to launch cyberattacks on such a large scale (lukito, 2019). no information was pro‑ vided to the public about the actual administrator of the abovementioned attacks; however, the event itself prompted the international community to discuss threats and search for the source of the at‑ tacks. due to the geopolitical situation (mainly in the context of the conflict in ukraine) and for the past problems with russia, a significant number of poles suspected that moscow was responsible for infect‑ ing computer systems (duszczyk, 2019). tensions between poland and russia escalated as regards the issue of world war ii and the roles played in it by individual countries. in connection with the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of world war ii, the russian side accused poland of talking during this event about victims of the “soviet plan”, “assault by the soviet union”, “soviet occupa‑ tion” (loginova, 2020). andrzej przyłębski, polish ambassador to germany, spoke in reply. inaccura‑ cies in the arguments from the statements of the russian minister of foreign affairs and the polish ambassador are presented in table 2. vladimir putin was not invited to the celebration of the liberation of auschwitz in 2020, which was an‑ other situation indicating a disagreement between both sides. the president’s absence generated buzz in russian media. the polish side was then accused of making changes in the history of world war ii, removing soviet monuments, as well as unjustly blaming russia for a number of offenses in the 20th c. (posol rf..., 2020). in the light of these events, relations between po‑ land and russia remained unsatisfactory. sergei an‑ dreyev, russia’s ambassador to poland, also recog‑ nized that the political situation in poland is closely related to the authorities’ attitude to the history of world war ii, and these are bad relations between warsaw and moscow that affect its meaning and interpretation (winogrodzki, 2020). poland’s coun‑ terposition was strengthened by prime minister ma‑ teusz morawiecki, who accused russia of conduct‑ ing an aggressive historical policy, which, among others, includes trying to reconstruct the stalinist version of history (nałęcz, 2020). in january 2020, vladimir putin made a short ad‑ dress to the federal assembly. in his speech, the rus‑ sian president mainly discussed the issue of improv‑ ing the social situation of russians and the planned amendments to the constitution (torop, 2020). ac‑ cording to the analysis of the address conducted tab. 2. main inaccuracies related to world war ii in the russian and polish narratives russia’s allegations poland’s position heroization of the nazis russia benefited the most from the outcome of the war making changes to history after 1945, moscow subjugated poland slandering of soviet soldiers the war broke out in 1939 and not in 1941 diminishing the role of the red army in the liberation of poland the end of world war ii was decided by the western allies and not by the soviet union lack of invitation for the russian delegation to polish celebration of the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of world war ii (september 1, 2019) the war was possible due to agreements between the soviet union and the nazis, i.e. the molotov‑ribben‑ trop pact no mention of several million soviet soldiers who suffered wounds or lost their lives in the defence of poland during world war ii the red army contributed to the escalation of the conflict in 1939 after it entered poland on september 17 source: the author’s own study based on: loginova (2020); romik (2020). 46 daria janke by the centre for eastern studies, marginalization of foreign policy can be treated as a desire to con‑ tinue the current one, while the announcement of a fight against falsification of history indicates an ex‑ tension of the aggressive propaganda and political campaign on contemporary history (menkiszak et al., 2020). 4. summary the notion of historical truth and accusations of historical hypocrisy are a recurring topic in the mu‑ tual dialogue. in the political rhetoric, mutual accu‑ sations of falsifying history have been present for several decades, and progressive disinformation, strengthening mutual resentment and negative stereotypes are its components. difficult access to historical documents, as well as undermining their authenticity, is also a frequent phenomenon. this is largely associated with choosing the events to which attention should be paid, and this selection depends on political decisions. “the commentary of the department of infor‑ mation and press at the ministry of foreign affairs of russia on the russian‑polish dialogue on the history of our relations” was certainly an important declara‑ tion characterising russia’s attitude towards poland in early 2020. this document concludes that poland is responsible for suspending the bilateral dialogue and for freezing many elements of cooperation, and all steps aimed at warming mutual relations should originate on its part (komentarz departamentu in‑ formacji..., 2020). in russia’s activities, distorting history also in‑ volves interfering in the historical memory of rep‑ resentatives of other, most often neighbouring countries. sergei lavrov’s statement during the 56th munich security conference in february 2020 ex‑ emplifies such an attempt. the russian minister of foreign affairs imputed that in the circumstances of this year’s 75th anniversary of the end of world war ii, there are attempts at a gross distortion of his‑ tory. the russian politician stressed that he primar‑ ily meant reducing the merits of the red army in ending the war, but also “equating nazi execution‑ ers with europe’s liberators” (wystąpienie ministra spraw..., 2020). polish‑russian relations in the 21st  c. have been dynamic; however, almost throughout the entire analysed period both countries have remained in opposition to each other. their relations have mainly deteriorated, and their interests have practically never gone hand in hand, except for a few exceptions (the initial period of the po‑psl coalition, the introduction of a local border traffic with the kaliningrad district, the initial period of the first term of vladimir putin’s presidency). the katyn massacre (as a symbol of martyrdom) and the smolensk disaster can be primarily defined as the bone of contention in mutual relations. the conflict regarding these matters, which has been growing for many years, has cast a shadow over mutual relations, and it can be safely forecast that if both countries do not reach a consensus and solu‑ tions satisfying both sides (it can be presumed from the hitherto attempts that there are none), the im‑ provement in mutual relations will be impossible. regarding the history of both countries, poland has been expecting russia to apologize for the stalinist crimes of the soviet union for years. howev‑ er, russia, which also suffered many wrongs during the stalinist regime, does not feel any responsibility and in its narrative always uses the argument that it does not understand why a victim would apologize to a victim. the history of world war ii, the respon‑ sibilities and roles played in this war by individual countries are also inconsistent in poland’s and rus‑ sia’s narratives. seeking a compromise and trying to reach an agreement, both countries decided to set up a polish‑russian group for difficult issues, whose activities in many respects has brought poland and russia closer in perceiving shared history and has contributed to improving mutual relations. the shaping of polish‑russian relations in the 21st c. can be related to many changes in the internal transformations of both countries. events in other countries in which the two states took different posi‑ tions also played a role in the shaping of their mu‑ tual relations. this contributed to further cooling or worsening of already bad polish‑russian relations. examples of these events include the orange revo‑ lution, the rose revolution, the georgian crisis, the crisis in ukraine, and the poisoning of sergei skripal and his daughter. vladimir putin’s address of january 2020 may constitute a basis for forecasting relations between poland and russia in the third decade of the 21st  c. it follows from the russian leader’s words that moscow will probably continue its current foreign and historical policies. references allison r., 2008, russia resurgent? moscow’s campaign to “co‑ erce georgia to peace”, international affairs, 84(6), 1145– 1171. doi: 10.1111/j.1468‑2346.2008.00762.x antonenko o., 2008, a war with no winners, survival, 50(5), 23–36. doi: 10.1080/00396330802456445 polish-russian relations after 10 april 2010 47 baumann m., 2020, “propaganda fights” and “disinforma‑ tion campaigns”: the discourse on information warfare in russia‑west relations, contemporary politics, 1–20. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2020.1728612 blacker u., 2012, the wood comes to dunsinane hill: representations of the katyn massacre in pol‑ ish literature, central europe, 10(2), 108–123. doi: 10.1179/1479096312z.0000000005 chucherko j., 2011, znaczenie dla stosunków polsko‑rosyjs‑ kich polsko‑rosyjskiej grupy ds. trudnych (eng. the significance of the polish‑russian group for difficult is‑ sues in the polish‑russian relations), krakowskie studia międzynarodowe, 3, 13–24. cleary l., 2016, half measures and incomplete reforms: the breeding ground for a hybrid civil society in ukraine, southeast european and black sea studies, 16(1), 7–23. doi: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1148410 cornell s.e., starr s.f. 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l e % 3 d 0 % 2 6 p _ p _ s t a t e % 3 d n o r m a l % 2 6 p _ p _ mode%3dview%26p_p_col_id%3dcolumn‑2%26p_p_ col_count%3d1 (accessed 15 february 2020). zięba r., 2011, współczesne stosunki polsko‑rosyjskie: uwarunkowania, problemy, implikacje (eng. contempo‑ rary polish‑russian relations: determinants, problems), przegląd politologiczny, 3, 35–61. 1. introduction in research of regional systems, it is extremely important to recognize demographic structures and processes. in the subjective concept of the region, z. chojnicki (1999) points to three simple components of the region, i.e. composition, environment and structure. this study will focus on discussing the composition of the region understood as a population in a demographic aspect and living in a specific territory. it should be noted that in a stable political and economic situation of regions demographic changes are usually subject to relatively high inertia. demographic phenomena and processes in regions affected by geopolitical factors are shaped slightly differently. a good example in europe was the journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(1), 23–32 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.1.04 demographic aspects of the development of the german state mecklenburg-vorpommern iwona jażewicz institute of social and economic geography and tourism, pomeranian university in słupsk, arciszewskiego 22, 76-200 slupsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-5698442x e-mail: iwona.jazewicz@apsl.edu.pl citation jażewicz i., 2020, demographic aspects the development of the german state mecklenburgvorpommern, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(1), 23–32. abstract this publication presents selected aspects of the demographic development of east germany based on the example of the state of mecklenburg-vorpommern, which after the reunification of germany in 1990 found itself in a new socio-economic situation. the main goal of the study was to recognize the mechanisms, regularities and directions of changes in the population, to identify the determinants and consequences of changes in terms of reproductive behaviors, and to identify new migratory behaviors of the society. the conducted research showed that the demographic situation of the borderland of state of mecklenburg-vorpommern radically changed after the reunification of germany. at that time, the processes described in the theory of the second demographic transition began. in particular, they concerned a slump in the number of births and a decrease in female fertility, while mortality remained at the same level. in addition, emigration to the neighboring old federal states of germany in search of better living and working conditions deepened the depopulation processes, led to deformation of demographic structures and, consequently, to the progressive process of demographic aging. some alleviation of the demographic situation occurred as a result of the inflow of asian and african immigrants of a relatively young age structure and high biological resilience. key words population, birth rate, migrations, real growth, mecklenburg-vorpommern received: 18 november 2019 accepted: 10 march 2020 published: 31 march 2020 24 iwona jażewicz geopolitical division of germany into the western part territorially belonging to the federal republic of germany and the eastern part belonging to the german democratic republic. the division of germany, which lasted for 45 years until 1990, resulted in a diversified demographic situation of both parts of the german state. when western germany, or more broadly western europe, was affected by the consequences of the second demographic transition triggered by the modernization of societies, in eastern germany and eastern europe they were restrained and deformed (okólski, 2010). it was not until the collapse of the system of communist states that the processes related to the theory of the second of demographic transition began to take place rapidly in them. this concerns changes in terms of marriage and parity (cf. basten et al., 2013; magdalenić, 2016; kurek, 2012; osiewalska, 2018), and to a lesser extent changes in mortality (michalski, 2012; šprocha et al., 2015) and migration (cf. van nimwegen, van der erf, 2010; s. akturk, 2016). in view of the outlined issues, the aim of this publication is to identify demographic processes in east germany based on the example of the state of mecklenburg-vorpommern after the integration of the german state in 1990. changes in population and in the distribution of the population were analyzed; the consequences of changes in demographic structures were also indicated, and an attempt was made to answer to the following research questions: did changes in reproductiveness occur? what does fertility look like? what are the correlations between the birth rate and the death rate? what is the role of migration in balancing reproduction of the population? 2. data and methods the research concerned the state of mecklenburgvorpommern in germany divided into 6 districts (ger. landkreis) and 2 independent urban districts (ger. kreisfreie stadt). the research methodology was secondary to the established research objectives and was modified by the availability of source materials. the basic source material was based on data from the statistisches amt mecklenburg-vorpommern (www.statistik-mv.de) [statistical office of mecklenburg-vorpommern] and the publications statistische jahrbücher [statistical yearbooks] and statistische berichte [statistical reports]. to show mecklenburg-vorpommern in comparison to the whole country, the satistisches bundesamt [federal statistical office] database (www.destatis.de) was used. the temporal scope of the study covered 1990–2018, i.e. the period of socio-economic changes in east germany. to prepare this study, research on theoretical and methodological issues concerning one of the most important problems in modern europe – demographic challenges – was used. an attempt was made to explain the diversity of population processes in relation to the theory of the second demographic transition using works of d.j. van de kaa (1987), r. lesthaeghe (2010, 2014), j. bogaarts and t. sobotka (2012) and j.r. goldstein et al. (2009). to resolve the main problem of this publication, studies on demographic problems in east germany were used (buchman, 2009; grundmann, 1998; jażewicz, 2008; jezierska-thöle, 2016; milewski, 2010; pastuszka, 2019) and works presenting the determinants and consequences of population changes in the studied area (ciok et al., 2008; grykień, 2004; jezierska-thöle, 2018; pastuszka, 2016). 3. dynamics of population changes and disparities in its distribution in 2018, 1.6 million people lived in mecklenburgvorpommern, which represented 1.9% of the total population of germany. the population development can be divided into two sub-periods. one covers the period of 1990–2013, when the population showed systematic downward trends, decreasing by almost 1/5. the second period occurred in 2014–2018, when the number of inhabitants began to increase due to foreign immigration. in terms of population, mecklenburg-vorpommern was 14th out of 16 german states. the land area is 23,293 km2, which places it 6th in terms of area in the country. the relatively large area with a low population places mecklenburg-vorpommern among states with the lowest population density of 69 persons / km2, with the average for germany equal to 232 persons / km² (fig. 1). however, considering the intra-regional population, where a district remains the basic unit of division, some intra-regional disparities emerge. among 8 districts, the most numerous groups were those with the regressive type of population changes (loss above 5%) (fig. 2). units located in the border zone with poland are the districts with the largest depopulation characteristics. it should be noted that the situation of border areas is always worse compared to areas further inland. this is due to their location outside the zone of influence of urban-industrial centers, and development impulses arrive with a long delay (ciok et al., 2008). additionally, in the past, these districts were demographic aspects of the development of the german state mecklenburg-vorpommern 25 connected with cooperative agriculture. 95.4% of arable land in mecklenburg-vorpommern remained under the control of the state sector. the unification of germany caused transformation of agriculture in the new federal states, as a result of which rural residents suffered high social costs, because approx. 88% of those employed in the agricultural sector lost their jobs (grykień, 2004). simultaneously, the loss of subsistence primarily by small towns with a single specialized industrial function contributed to the 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2018 2014 1 500 1 600 1 700 1 800 1 900 2 000 1 500 1 600 1 700 1 800 1 900 2 000 fig. 1. trajectory of the population development [in thousands] of the state of mecklenburg-vorpommern source: own study based on www.statistik-mv.de fig. 2. population dynamics of districts in the federal state of mecklenburg-vorpommern in 1990–2018 (1990=100%) source: own study based on www.statistik-mv.de 26 iwona jażewicz collapse of their economic base and, consequently, to the loss of jobs. as a result, the rural labor market collapsed and a surplus workforce was released. employees of state-owned production cooperatives were dismissed and, being accustomed to social assistance in the former gdr, they were unable to pull themselves together in the new situation based on the mechanisms of free competition of german economy (pastuszak, 2016). consequently, they became part of the resource of the unemployed. in the initial period of transformation, i.e. in 1994, the unemployment rate in mecklenburg-vorpommern amounted to 16.2% and reached its maximum in 2004 when it was equal to 20.4%. according to the research, there were large intraregional disparities as regards the unemployment rate. as expected, it was the highest in the new german federal states, with the highest value recorded in mecklenburg-vorpommern. the situation was slightly different in districts located in the impact zone of sub-regional centers, i.e. rostock or wismark, as well as the regional center – schwerin. while population in these cities was decreasing, and their apparent demographic shrinkage was observed, the observed increase in population in the suburban area suggests that the apparent depopulation is closely related to suburbanization because in the areas surrounding the city the population increased. the suburban zones of the cities of rostock, wismar and schwerin quickly lost their agricultural function and became urbanized. currently, they are characterized by the development of nonagricultural functions. however, considering the size of the population in the federal state of mecklenburg-vorpommern in 2018 in the city–village cross-section, 1.0 million people lived in cities, which constituted 62.5% of the total population. the urban settlement network consisted of 84 municipal units and was based on a subsystem of 75 small towns, 8 medium towns and one large city (rostock). the distribution of the population and the current settlement system of mecklenburg-vorpommern largely refers to the conditions of the natural environment. in fact, one can talk about two settlement zones, one related to the southern baltic zone, with good natural conditions taking into account the values of coastal landscapes, the hydrographic system and building conditions. it is worth noting here that the largest cities, rostock, wismar, greisfwald or stralsund, are located in this baltic part of mecklenburg-vorpommern. the second settlement zone covers the lake district, which in turn is characterized by young glacial landscapes. the varied configuration of the mecklenburg lakeland, a large number of lakes, as well as extensive forest complexes were not conducive to active socio-economic development, and the settlement network is based on the subsystem of small towns. 4. parity and mortality shaping the natural increase or loss of population is based on the relationships between the number of births and deaths (van de kaa, 1987). this set of two components allows determining the balance of natural movement in the region (lesthaeghe, 2010, 2014). in turn, the level of births is a resultant of the demographic structure of the population, and above all the number of women in procreative age and the procreative proclivity of society. mecklenburg-vorpommern belongs to regions with unfavorable parity trends. as early as in 1990, mecklenburg-vorpommern took the first place among the old and new german states in terms of the parity level, while in 2018 mecklenburgvorpommern occupied the fourteenth place along with thuringia. a comparison of the distribution of live births per 1000 population using “box-whiskers” clearly shows that it is more favorable for germany than for mecklenburg-vorpommern (fig. 3). research shows that during the period of wendeknick1 changes in the number of births are part of a complex cycle intertwined with the phases of growth and decline. in 1990–1994 the number of births dramatically decreased. that situation result from mass emigration after the unification of germany, of mainly young people, to the old federal states (grundmann, 1998). the next wave of an increase in births occurred in the mid-1990s and lasted until 2010. the maximum number of births in this period was recorded in 2010 and amounted to 13,300 births (8.1‰). the next fall in births took place in 2011–2013, and this trend would probably have been perpetuated, had it not been for the inflow of immigrant families since 2014, which caused another wave of increased births (milewski, 2010). in 2018, every fourth child in germany was foreignborn, which constituted 24.0%, and the fertility rate among foreigners was 2.122. in the group of foreigners, mothers from asia (26.1% of all foreign births), turkey (10.7%) and africa (10.6%) were the most numerous. in mecklenburg-vorpommern, in 2014– 2018, the number of children born to immigrant mothers increased from 373 births in 2014 to 1062 births in 2018, and their share increased respectively from 2.9% in 2014 to 8.1% in 2018. 1 wendeknick denotes political and economic changes in east germany after 1990 (jezierska-thöle, 2016). demographic aspects of the development of the german state mecklenburg-vorpommern 27 spatially, the birth rate refers to the centrifugal system associated with the proximity of the state border (fig. 4). the gradient of the mean level of births gradually increased with the distance from the border, and in the district of ludwigslust-parchim on the opposite western side, it had the highest values. the cyclical nature of fluctuations in the level of births depends on the number of women in the age of increased procreation (20–29 years old) and on their fertility. total female fertility in mecklenburgvorpommern, similarly to the number of births, was drastically falling after the reunification of germany (goldstein, kreyenfeld, 2011). it is enough to mention that in the years 1990–2005 the total fertility rate decreased by more than a half. a slowdown in the downward trend in total female fertility was observed after the accession of poland and other central and eastern european countries to the european union, the opening of the german labor market in 2011 and a high inflow of immigrants from asia and africa (fig. 5). as mentioned earlier, the ensuing situation is reflected in an increase in births by demographically more resilient and younger primiparous women, but also in an increase in the number of women in the reproductive age and their biological resilience in younger age brackets (goldstein et al., 2009). the process looks different if live births per 1000 women at age specified are analyzed with a use of the coefficient of variation (vx). variability of live births per 1000 women at age specified in 1990–2018 was quite diverse. the older the women’s age group, the higher the value of the coefficient of variation. thus, the strongest changes in 1990–2018 concerned the subpopulation of women aged 40–44 (vx – 56.3%) and 35–39 years old (vx – 49.3%); a relatively stable situation was in the age group 25–29 (vx – 14.7%). the total fertility rate, i.e. the sum of live births per 1000 women at age specified, is a synthetic measure of total female fertility. its value in mecklenburgvorpommern was similar to the trends of changes in the live births rate and the fertility rate. in fact, from the reunification of germany till the accession of the countries of central and eastern europe to the european union, this was a downward trend (from 1.61 in 1990 to 1.342 in 2004), while in 2005–2018 due to foreign immigration there was a marked a upward trend (up to 1.550 in 2018) (bogaarts, sobotka, 2012). deaths constitute the second component of the natural movement of population. in examining the diversity of the population living in mecklenburgvorpommern, the features that make up the mortality pattern were used. the absolute death rate in mecklenburg-vorpommern in past three decades fluctuated between 17,000 and 22,000 deaths per year, and the death rate ranged from 9.8‰ in fig. 3. the average value of natural increase components in 1990–2018 for mecklenburg-vorpommern and germany source: own study based on www.destatis.de 28 iwona jażewicz 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 year 1990 year 2018 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 1990 2005 2011 2018 live births per 1,000 women women's age fig. 4. live births per 1,000 population in the federal state of mecklenburg-vorpommern source: own study based on www.statistik-mv.de fig. 5. distribution of female fertility in mecklenburg-vorpommern source: own study based on www.statistik-mv.de demographic aspects of the development of the german state mecklenburg-vorpommern 29 1998–2001 to 13.6‰ in 2018. given the basic statistical characteristics of deaths in mecklenburg-vorpommern, they are more favorable for germany (fig. 3). both the interquartile range, the median value and the maximum value are more optimistic. assuming that the total death rate depends on the intensity of the phenomenon in individual age groups and on the age structure of the population, an analysis of changes in mortality in individual cohorts was made. as follows from research, partial death rates in most age groups significantly decreased. as a result, the increasing average life expectancy and a growth in the number of people in the oldest age groups have contributed to the deepening of aging processes in mecklenburg-vorpommern (kemper, kurek, 2006). this was confirmed by the calculated demographic aging indices (ida)for several critical moments important from the point of view of the population situation: • 1990–2000 the first decade of wendeknick in germany ida amounted to 20.3; • 2004–2018 accession of most central and eastern european countries to the european union, ida amounted to 4.1; • 2011–2018 opening of the german labor market and immigration from asia and africa, ida amounted to 1.5; • 1990–2018 after almost 30 years of wendeknick ida amounted to 23.1. basically, the conducted analyses confirmed the progressive process of demographic aging of population in 1990–2018; however, with opening of the german labor market and a strong immigration stream of population from asia and africa, there was temporary rejuvenation of the german society. an in-depth analysis of the number of births and deaths allowed assessing the size of natural increase in the population of mecklenburg-vorpommern (fig. 3). during the period under the study, a downward trend with progressive natural decrease was clearly visible. the spatial arrangement of the rate of natural increase, similarly to the rate of parity, can be compared to a centrifugal system with a barrier in the form of a border with poland. with increasing distance from the border towards the regional center, the balance of natural movement takes values that are more favorable. 5. migration movement migrations, next to natural increase, are a fundamental component of the population growth. they are also an important factor changing the number of inhabitants, its structure and the demographic potential of regions. in 1990–2018, the role of migration in the demographic development of the federal state of mecklenburg-vorpommern was particularly important (fig. 6). –60 000 –40 000 –20 000 0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000 140 000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 immigration emigration the net migration rate fig. 6. inflow, total migration outflow and net migration in mecklenburg-vorpommern in 1990–2018 [in persons] source: own study based on www.statistik-mv.de 30 iwona jażewicz in the structure of migration inflow, internal migrations dominated, on average constituting 63.4% of the total inflow. in the first two years after the reunification of germany, an average of 18,700 persons came from the federal states and from abroad every year, of whom 1/5 were foreigners. until the end of 2010, the inflow remained stable at around 30,000 persons per year, while 2014–2018 the average increased to 48,600 persons a year, of whom 1/2 of the inflow were foreigners. the national structure of foreigners in geographical terms is extremely interesting. in 2004, immigrants mainly from the european union (70.3% of the total) came to mecklenburgvorpommern. after the accession of new countries to the european union in 2004, germany became an important destination for poles, who were the most numerous group among foreigners (1/4 of all foreigners in 2004 and 1/3 in 2018). it should be emphasized here that this is largely a result of the border location of the land. earlier, often pre-accession contacts of poles, seasonal labor migrations to germany, and above all an attractive offer of flats to buy and a system of german social benefits encouraged poles to settle in germany permanently. a slightly different migration inflow occurred in 2013–2018, when an average of 17,500 people came to mecklenburg-vorpommern every year. the ensuing situation meant accepting a record number of immigrants and refugees from asian countries (syria, saudi arabia), 34,300 people in total in 2013– 2018 and 5,400 people from africa (egypt, ethiopia). people from the other 15 federal states of germany made up an additional stream of immigration inflow with an upward trend. as expected, more than half of it (52.7% of total inflow) came from neighboring old and new german federal states. these were the following states: schleswig-holstein (15.0% of total inflow), brandenburg (13.5%), lower saxony (12.2%) and berlin (12.0%). in turn, the migration outflow in the state of mecklenburg-vorpommern showed specific features (fig. 6). first, the outflow structure in the first three years after the collapse of the gdr was dominated by the outflow outside the borders of the state and the whole country. proportions for the share of internal migrations were at the level of 48.1%, with external ones being 51.8%. in just three years, 139,600 persons departed outside the state borders. political and economic changes, the so-called wendeknick, caused unprecedented migrations of people to the western federal states (grundmann, 1998). in 1991, the largest number of residents of mecklenburgvorpommern moved to the neighboring states but which before 1990 were separated by the state border between the gdr and west germany. old federal states which took in the largest number of emigrants were schleswig holstein (19.8% of the total outflow outside the state), lower saxony (18.07%) and north rhine-westphalia (11.4%). however, considering the intra-regional diversity of mecklenburg-vorpommern, the areas with the largest outflow outside the state borders were districts located in the border zone with poland. for example, there were 2,600 persons less in the former uecker-randow district, 2,800 persons in the ostvorpommern district, and 2,600 persons in nordvorpommern; the further from the border, the more decreasing the outflow stream. undoubtedly, from a demographic point of view, the age of people leaving mecklenburg-vorpommern remained a big threat. as results from the analysis, in consistence with the principle of migration selectivity, young people dominated in the structure of leaving persons (jażewicz, 2008). the subpopulation aged 18–30 constituted as many as 1/2 of emigrants and was dominated by women. imbalance in the population of men and women at the age of the highest reproductive activity will have a negative impact on the population size of the studied state and its reproduction in the future. in the following years 1993–2018, the population outflow levelled off at 102,300 a year, of which 62.3% was the average internal migration outflow, 31.1% outflow to other german federal states and 6.6% outflow abroad. as regards geographical flows between the federal states, they were consolidated, and they are still the highest to the old states (pastuszka, 2019). foreign emigration played a relatively smaller role in shaping the population than foreign immigration. in 1990–2018, a total of 172,000 persons moved abroad. this was dominated by moving to the european union countries, mainly to poland and romania. in the flow system between the districts of mecklenburg-vorpommern, border districts still have the highest migration outflow outside the land borders. when assessing the volume of net migration in mecklenburg-vorpommern during 1990–2012, there is a clear advantage of migration outflow over inflow (fig. 6). especially in the first years of wendeknick, there was a very high negative net migration, which took extreme values of 42,300 persons in 1990. in later years, net migration decreased, although it remained a component negatively affecting the population number. in 1995–1996, net migration was ephemerally positive; however, the years 2013–2018 had a significant impact on the demographic development of the state, when net migration was positive due to the inflow of immigrants from asia and africa. demographic aspects of the development of the german state mecklenburg-vorpommern 31 6. summary the conducted research clearly confirmed that the current demographic situation in the state of mecklenburg-vorpommern is a consequence of the so-called wendeknick. political and economic transformation after reunification of germany caused profound changes in the residents’ reproductive behavior and contributed to a change in their migration attitudes. in addition to the process of german reunification, the situation was largely affected by external factors, especially by processes of accession of central and eastern european countries to the european union in 2004, and later in 2011 by the opening of the german labor market. furthermore, the unusually high wave of immigration inflow from asia and africa in 2013–2018 influenced changes in the demographic situation of mecklenburg-vorpommern. research shows that the analyzed region is an area of a depopulation character, where 0.3 million inhabitants left over the past 28 years. on the one hand, it should be noted that it was mainly the natural decrease that contributed to the decline in population, which was caused both by demographic factors in the form of a decrease in fertility levels, but also by non-geographical factors of an economic character. despite the high public financial transfers to the new federal states of germany as part of the integration of both german states, the standard and quality of life differed from the old federal states, which remained a classic push factor to move outside the state. circular displacements related to work and the search for better living conditions meant that in the first years after the integration of germany about 46,000 residents a year left for the neighboring states formerly within the borders of west germany. increased migration drainage in connection with natural decrease resulted in general weakening of the demographic potential of mecklenburg-vorpommern. consequently, accompanying processes related to demographic aging of the population, impoverishment of the human capital, a problem with simple replacement of generations or deformation of the demographic structure of the population were revealed. the immigration inflow from eu countries and from outside the european continent has become a kind of relief of the unfavorable demographic situation in mecklenburg-vorpommern. women coming from abroad proved to be biologically resilient and highly fertile, especially at the age of increased parity (20–29 years old), which was also supported by their favorable age structure. it seems, however, that such a situation has an intermediate impact, because today there is a clearly weakening tendency of the immigration inflow. according to demographic forecasts prepared by the federal statistical office, the population number in mecklenburg-vorpommern will drop by 0.2 million by 2050 and will amount to 1.4 million. however, in the federal state itself, there is evident polarization in the distribution of human resources and in the processes of concentration and depopulation. location close to the polish-german border remains the causative factor. the distribution of population and demographic processes are centrifugally directed from border areas of a peripheral character towards the state capital – schwerin. the closer to the border, the weaker the demographic potential. partially depopulated western borderland has become settled by polish citizens who initially only commuted to work and eventually permanently settled down by buying at preferential 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international migration, journal of ethnic and migration studies, 36(9), 1359– 1379. doi: 10.1080/1369183x.2010.515132 1. introduction the labor market is a complex system of social relations in the area of buying and selling a special type of commodity, which is work. it is worth noting that the work not only has an economic and technical dimension, but also includes political, social, cultural issues at various spatial scales, e.g. local, regional, national, international (campling et al., 2016; markova et al., 2019). it seems that this type of relationship explains the current macroeconomic situation of ukraine, including a significant part of the problems of the ukrainian labor market, the main component of which, i.e. the workforce, has not only physical but also psycho-social features, which can play a significant role journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(4), 24–34 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.4.03 problems of the ukrainian labor market paweł czapliński (1), vasyl dzhaman (2) (1) department of economics, finance and management, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 18, 70-383 szczecin, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5093-941x e-mail: pawel.czaplinski@usz.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) department of geography, yuriy fedkovych chernivtsi national university, kotsyubynsky 2, chernivtsi 58012, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-9188-3325 e-mail: vasyl_dzhaman@ukr.net citation czapliński p., dzhaman v., 2019, problems of the ukrainian labor market, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(4), 24–34. abstract according to various sources, after 2014 there was a clear decline in gdp and the level of income in ukraine, which, taking into account the interdependence between economic growth and the condition of the labor market, translated into significant difficulties in the structure of resources and the activity of the local workforce. the source of these difficulties turned out to be not only the price factor, but also non-price factors such as poor protection of employee rights, lack of social protection and social security, as well as payment gridlocks on the employer-employee line. this forced many ukrainians to sometimes make dramatic decisions about economic emigration, mainly to european union countries, including poland. according to various estimates, there are currently 7 to 9 million ukrainian citizens working abroad who contribute to the development of the economies of other countries. meanwhile, the ukrainian labor market is in a very difficult situation. based on the analysis of official statistical data, an attempt was made to characterize the ukrainian labor market, its main determinants were outlined and ukrainians’ attitudes towards changes on the domestic labor market were determined. the research used critical literature analysis, statistical description methods, spatial analysis methods and case study method. based on the conducted analyzes, it was shown that in the years 2010–2017 the ukrainian labor market was struggling with a number of unfavorable phenomena, which was significantly aggravated by the political crisis at the turn of 2013 and 2014. key words labor market, ukraine, economic emigration. received: 01 october 2019 accepted: 12 november 2019 published: 31 december 2019 problems of the ukrainian labor market 25 especially in the volatile, unstable and unpredictable environment (hollinshead, 2019; moskalenko, zaporozhets, 2018; zappalà, massei, 2011). it is obvious that the key determinant of every market, including the labor market, will be the price factor related to the mechanism of buying and selling work as a specific form of commodity. the whole mechanism of market regulation through the law of demand and supply also seems to be obvious, which makes this specific type of market similar to other markets (cartelier, 2017). however, there are a number of conditions that make the labor market stand out. this applies to, among others labor prices, which, in relation to the human factor, cannot be subject to the usual, sometimes long-term, market game due to biological and social time constraints of employees whose age, needs and capabilities change over time. this seemingly obvious statement can be omitted if there is generational replacement and the sociooccupational structure is not significantly changing. however, it seems that the contemporary global economy, including the globalization processes under way, force transformation of national economies, including national labor markets relatively often, and sometimes also rapidly. in the case of ukraine, in principle, since it has gained independence, we have been facing significant delays in both diagnosis of the state, restructuring programs and implementations. this means that the development distance of ukraine to the economies of the european union is currently several dozen years (batchenko, dielini, 2011; fichter, 2005; fritz, 2005; sadova, 2010). it also results from inefficiency and many mistakes in management, including in strategic management of enterprises, assuming, for example, that the price of the labor force is constant, and therefore the waiting time for a more favorable demand-supply ratio may last for a long time. this erroneous assumption combined with the weakness of national regulations regarding the minimum wage, tariff rates, hours of work, social protection and many other conditions caused a number of dysfunctions of the ukrainian labor market, including the spread of the shadow economy, corruption and activities on the border of the law, and sometimes even beyond, for example in forest management and wood exports (czaplińska, kibych, 2019; oliskevych, 2015). one of the features characterising the modern labor market in ukraine is its segmentation, or rather polarization. it is divided into two main parts: working and non-working, which translates into specificity of economic and social behavior as well as the status, level and stability of income. this division is getting even deeper as result of economic transformation processes launched after 2014. in many areas of economic activity, restructuring processes take place, which results in employee dismissals. the scale of these reductions and the relatively short time to carry them out caused an increase in unemployment and impoverishment of some social groups. in connection with social and political dissatisfaction and the aforementioned legal and administrative weakness of the state, the shadow economy, consisting of informal workers, is developing. its functioning is dangerous not only for the employees themselves acting on their own and full risk, not only economically, but also for the state because of the lack of coordination and compliance with the development of the official economy. the activities undertaken in this way are usually accepted by local communities due to an economic factor that softens social, ethical and even legal assessments (markina et al., 2018). an increasingly popular alternative to the shadow economy is economic emigration, which is usually decided by the unemployed or those who often receive the minimum wage in installments. the most important motive here is the level of wages in the countries of arrival, but in some cases the workplace itself, which allows material security for oneself and one’s family. it is also worth noting other determinants of economic trips, i.e. anxiety about the future related to the socio-economic and political situation and high levels of inflation. at the same time, economic emigration is becoming the greatest threat to the ukrainian economy, especially in the conditions of a low increase in labor productivity. it puts pressure on the level of earnings and the level of social standards, on the profitability of enterprises, etc. its consequence is economic and social impoverishment of the state, including intellectual one, which can lead to intellectual collapse. emigration will also negatively impact long-term demographic change (oliskevych, tokarchuk, 2018; dluhopolskyi et al., 2019). the ukrainian authorities have started to notice the danger posed by mass economic emigration of citizens for the economic foundations of the country, but the scenarios for limiting emigration are rather pessimistic, despite a number of legislative initiatives and administrative decisions. these actions, however, seem to be overdue and therefore their effectiveness is low. perhaps this is due to the diagnostic delay, which is based on reliable and timely primary and secondary data. therefore, there is a need to permanently monitor the behavior of the labor market in a national (central) system as well as in the regional system, because regional labor markets in ukraine have their specificity. the primary goal 26 paweł czapliński, vasyl dzhaman of monitoring the labor market should be more efficient use of labor resources, creation of attractive employee potential and its commercialization. at the same time, monitoring could contribute to taking effective measures to prevent mass reduction of employment and economic migration. it seems that the existing institutions that are responsible for the labor market do not fulfill the tasks entrusted to them, and ad hoc diagnoses only provoke ad hoc actions of decision-makers, which can be interpreted as the inability to use human resources to develop and strengthen the position of the ukrainian state (lehmann et al., 2012; ryndzak, 2019). 2. the state of the ukrainian labor market in the years 2010-2017 (national perspective) the situation on the ukrainian labor market in 2010– 2017 is characterized by several negative phenomena. one of them is the decrease in the number of economically active population aged 15–70 from about 22.1 million to 17.9 million, i.e. by 19.0% (tab. 1). the dynamics of the economically active population in 2010–2011 remained at a relatively similar level, while from 2012 it adopted a downward trend meaning a slowdown in the development process that continued until the end of the period under review, i.e. until 2017 with a clear, sharp drop in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 and its inhibition in 2016–2017. considering the time analysis, the size of the share of the economically active population in the entire population aged 15–70 is similar, with the difference that after 2015 there was a clear increase in the share of this group in the entire population, which may be due to the social mobilization being a response to the complex and difficult internal and external situation of the country, which in consequence led to a rapid deterioration of the material and living conditions of a significant part of the population, but also to the increase in the number of registered unemployed after 2014, especially in the group dismissed at their own request. data on the decrease in the number of employed by basic sectors of the economy confirm the general downward trend in total employment with a clear breakthrough in 2013–2014, but at the same time indicate significant cross-sectoral differences (tab. 2). the agricultural sector proved to be the most stable, which confirms its strong position and significant share in the structure of exports and generating gdp. the service sector achieved a similar level of dynamics, which also seems to be predictable, as the service sector usually adopts new market conditions faster. on the other hand, industry and construction, as a result of insufficient capitalization and, as a consequence, low level of technological advancement and weak management practices inadequate to the challenges of the modern world, (lack of formalized internal procedures and manual personnel management, employing cheap labor instead of a smaller number of employees, but supported by modern technologies) lost its employees. the best of them gave up their jobs themselves creating at the same time employment gaps very difficult to fill due to low interest. new specialists did not replace the staff leaving to the private sector or retiring, as they often decided for career abroad. an important indicator that determines the status of the labor market and the effectiveness of its functioning from the point of view of the state is the unemployment rate, which in ukraine at the end of 2017 amounted to 9.5% and was the highest since 2010. in absolute numbers it reflected 1698 thous. tab. 1. population by economic activity (aged 15–70) in ukraine in the years 2010–2017 specification years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 economically active population [in thous.] 22051.6 22056.9 22011.5 21980.6 19920.9 18097.9 17955.1 17854.4 dynamics of working population 2010=100 100.0 100.0 98.8 99.7 90.3 82.1 81.4 81.0 economically active population in the entire population [in%] 63.7 64.3 64.6 65.0 62.4 60.1 62.2 62.0 employed persons in the economically active population [in%] 91.9 92.1 92.5 92.8 90.7 90.8 90.6 90.4 source: statističnij…, 2018. problems of the ukrainian labor market 27 citizens. the total number of unemployed in ukraine was subject to fluctuations during the period under review, which resultd from many social, economic and political circumstances (tab. 3). one of the most important factors determining the scale of unemployment and its shape was the ukrainian-russian crisis, which directly and indirectly affected the number of jobs in the areas, currently beyond the control of the ukrainian authorities. but the high number of unemployed has a much more fundamental foundation, which results, among others from a commercial policy that has been maintained for years and is mentally fixed. for several years, ukraine has been and is still an export-oriented country, with low qualifications of employees and a desire to have profitoriented enterprises. this means that the ukrainian state was not, and perhaps is still not interested in raising salary, because low salaries were seen as the main competitive advantage in the foreign markets. changing the current course in foreign trade has necessitated a number of changes in the sphere of management, technology, marketing and finance, but their success depends primarily on the employment of more qualified specialists who should be paid much more. however, many questions arise that have a direct impact on the labor market. the key is what happens with existing human resources. should the staff be freed and new people employed instead, or a deep reorganization based on a wide system of courses and trainings improving or changing the existing qualifications? secondly, there is the problem as to the level of remuneration, which, despite many central government decisions, still does not meet the expectations of employees. in addition, the remuneration system is not limited only to the financial dimension, but includes a number of additional benefits for both entrepreneurs and the state. in view of the above, it seems reasonable to ask whether there is a real chance to improve working conditions in ukraine. at the same time, the economic, social and also cultural aspects are important, because the desired evolution require deep mental changes, and these do not occur quickly. a frequently practiced solution in other countries, including poland, which seems to be important for the ukrainian labor market, is to stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit and develop the private sector through individual business activity. the first step in entrepreneurship would be to dismiss one’s previous job, often in the public sector (tab. 3). perhaps that is why this is one of the most important reasons for obtaining a registered unemployed status. unfortunately, as it results from many studies on the intentions and entrepreneurial attitudes of ukrainians, the freedom to decide is definitely not enough to start one’s own business. many respondents emphasize that, apart from the lack of sufficient financial resources, they do not have sufficient knowledge and skills, including soft competences (czapliński, kibych, 2017). therefore, facing the choice of running own business, raising qualifications and looking for a new job, or looking for new employment abroad, tab. 2. employed persons (aged 15–70) by economic sectors in ukraine in the years 2012–2017 [in thous.] specification years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 employed persons total 20266.0 20324.2 20354.3 20404.1 18073.3 16443.2 16276.9 16156.4 dynamics 2012=100 99.6 99.9 100.0 100.2 88.8 80.8 80.0 79.4 including: agriculture . . 3496.0 3577.5 3091.4 2870.6 2866.5 2860.7 dynamics 2012=100 . . 100.0 102.3 88.4 82.1 82.0 81.8 industry . . 3345.6 3274.8 2898.2 2573.9 2494.8 2440.6 dynamics 2012=100 . . 100.0 97.9 86.6 76.9 74.6 72.9 construction . . 884.9 888.8 746.4 642.1 644.5 644.3 dynamics 2012=100 . . 100.0 100.4 84.3 72.6 72.8 72.8 services . . 12627.8 12663.0 11337.3 10356.6 10271.1 10210.8 dynamics 2012=100 . . 100.0 100.3 89.8 82.0 81.3 80.9 source: statističnij…, 2018. 28 paweł czapliński, vasyl dzhaman where previous experience may or may not matter, they choose the latter. dismissal at one’s own request is not a final state, but a temporary one, which is supposed to secure and formalize professional status, while giving motivation to look for a job and credibility in the eyes of a future employer. as it results from the data presented in table 3, the situation of school graduates is significantly improving, as they seem to be better prepared and adapt faster to the changing conditions of the market game. their requirements are increasing, but the employee deficit in the market is also growing, hence many employers agree to the conditions, knowing that the ukrainian labor market, like most european markets, is changing into the „employee market”. the reverse situation occurs among seasonal workers usually associated with the agricultural sector. their periodic activity determines irregular incomes that do not meet basic social needs in difficult socio-economic conditions. hence the support in the form of benefits resulting from the status of the unemployed person. such a situation proves not only the low competences of this group, but also the lack of initiative or an idea for own business activity. results belonging to the group of „others” reasons for unemployment seem interesting, because a very large growing group (4.9% in 2017) mentioned family reasons there. their explanation seems ambiguous and complex, but may indicate a division of responsibilities between spouses, one of whom works, often abroad, and the other assumes the fullness of domestic duties by resigning from work. according to estimates, approximately 12% of ukrainian households operate in this way. in addition to the devagations on the reasons for remaining unemployed, it is also worth mentioning that the situation on the ukrainian labor market is affected by the deteriorating demographic situation, whose basic indicators in 2010–2017 such as the total population, age structure, birth rate, life expectancy ratio whether the level of emigration should be considered unfavorable (tab. 3). their deterioration was associated not only with the standard of living of average citizens, but also with the intentions, attitudes and activity of ukrainians in the socio-economic sphere, which is often overlooked reducing the cause-andeffect relationship to the economic dimension. the attitude of many observers towards ukrainian economic emigration looks similar. meanwhile, economic emigration should be treated as a natural process of market relations. a long-term process, very complex and not to be perceived only in terms of a threat. it is worth emphasizing that, after all, labor migrations make the labor market more flexible and allow better adjustment of the employment level to changing demand conditions. therefore, the occurring migration processes should be perceived as a challenge and opportunity, with migration being treated as the result of individual calculation of potential economic profits and costs of possible displacement. however, the non-monetary costs associated with the socio-cultural sphere of individuals and entire societies are also to be taken into account (tab. 4). in the light of the above, the annual increase in the number of border crossings by ukrainian citizens should not come as a surprise, nor should the number of permanent residence permits granted in the tab. 3. unemployed in ukraine (aged 15–70) against the total population in 2012–2017 year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 total number of unemployed [in thous.] 1657.2 1576.5 1847.6 1654.7 1678.2 1698.0 dynamics 2012=100 100.0 95.1 111.5 99.8 101.3 102.5 reasons for staying unemployed [in %] dismissal on one’s own request 33.7 34.0 31.8 28.9 33.0 34.5 economic reasons 23.4 21.2 22.3 27.8 22.4 23.2 no first job taken 17.0 17.3 16.7 16.4 15.6 12.2 seasonal work performed 9.1 8.6 9.3 9.9 9.7 10.1 others 16.8 18.9 19.9 17.0 19.3 20.0 total population of ukraine population [in mln] 45.4 45.2 42.8 42.6 42.4 42.2 dynamics 2012=100 100.0 99.6 94.3 93.8 93.4 93.0 source: statističnij…, 2018. problems of the ukrainian labor market 29 eu, which has been dynamically growing in the period under review, which increased by 160% in seven years. it is worth noting that the actual scale of labor migration from ukraine is not precisely known, and the available data and knowledge flowing from it fragmentary and stereotypical, which justifies the earlier postulate of the authors about reliable and permanent monitoring of the ukrainian labor market. it is difficult to prepare and carry out regulatory activities without knowing the state at the starting point. 3. the state of the ukrainian labor market in the years 2010-2017 (regional perspective) the functioning of the labor market in ukraine should also be considered in a regional perspective, which is enabled by a significant diversity of demographic and economic potential, socio-cultural differences and the current situation in the east of the country (niemets et al., 2018). average number of employed per 10,000 inhabitants in 2010 amounted to 4350.9 people, but regionally varied, reaching values from 3840.6 in ivanofrankivsk oblast to 4,956.4 in the city of kiev. it often resulted from the production potential accumulated there and its specificity. the socio-political and economic changes that took place over the years 2010– 2017 meant that the number of employed in the vast majority of regions fell, in the case of donetsk oblast and luhansk oblast this decline was radical in nature. the average for the other regions with a loss amounted to 5.7 percentage point. only in three districts an increase in the number of employed was recorded, i.e. ivano-frankivsk oblast, sumy oblast and kharkiv oblast, which may be due to internal labor migration from the east of the country. the indicated causes caused a significant spatial diversity of the number of employees. this is confirmed by the statistically calculated standard deviation(s), the value of which for the indicator used in 2010 was 155.2 and in 2017 already 426.6. the more regionally individualized situation concerns the number of unemployed per 10,000 residents in the group of 15–70 years. in this case, in 9 regions a decrease in the number of unemployed was noted, taking into account the aforementioned specificity of the measurement, while in the remaining 16 there was an increase in the number of unemployed. importantly, their differently measured standard deviation increased from 52.4 to 81.5 but it is definitely smaller than in the previous indicator, which may indicate a similar scale of the problem, although different scenarios for its solution. to regions with a drop in the number of unemployed, apart from donetsk oblast and luhansk oblast, where the recorded decline was due to a very difficult socio-political situation and should not be assessed in terms of economic success, include districts which, due to e.g. its border location chernivtsi oblast and lviv oblast, also possible sumy oblast or in the sphere of direct influence of the capital of the country kiev are theoretically more likely to alleviate the phenomenon of unemployment. this group also includes districts with significant economic potential, which is still one of the regional development locomotives, i.e. kharkiv oblast. districts with the highest unemployment rate per 10,000 residents are located in the southeast of ukraine creating a clear concentration. the only exception in this group is volyn oblast, which is located in western ukraine. the increase in unemployment in most ukrainian districts is a consequence of the country’s macroeconomic situation, but also results from quantitative and qualitative social resources whose internal drainage (domestic, to urban agglomeration) and external drainage (foreign, to other countries) tab. 4. border traffic from ukraine in 2010-2016 selected elements specification years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 estimated number of border crossings [in mln] 18 20 21.5 24 23 23.5 . number of ukrainian citizens with the right to reside in eu-28 [in thous.] 695775 749388 779953 843199 883918 1027113 1113659 dynamics 2010=100 100.0 107.7 112.1 121.2 127.0 147.6 160.1 number of ukrainian citizens with the right to reside in  eu-28 [in thous.] . . . 217571 372346 762700 1262845 source: registration…, nd; migration…, nd; migration in ukraine…, 2016. 30 paweł czapliński, vasyl dzhaman continues and becomes a serious threat to local and regional development. the main way by which the government tries to stop the outflow of employees is to raise the minimum wage. in the examined period, it was raised abruptly, but although in percentage terms it is a significant result, however its real effect is negligible. after taking into account the variable exchange rate of hryvnia (uah) to the us dollar (usd) in the period 2010–2017, it turned out that the increases made were apparent and the average salary increase was -2% (tab. 5). on a regional scale, the variation in the average nominal wage has decreased from usd 221,8 to usd 209,1 which may indicate the „employee labor market” regardless of the place of work. in addition, in only three districts: volyn oblast, zakarpattia oblast and zaporizhia oblast there is a real 3% salary increase. in the remaining seven, there is stagnation, and in the next 15 districts a real, we encounter several percent decrease in salaries. the exception is luhansk oblast, where the drop in salaries was over 20%. the conducted analysis proves that the announced increases do not bring the expected effect, and ukraine is still among the european leaders in the countries with the lowest earnings, and this is the main stimulus for economic emigration of ukrainians (tab. 6). the migratory pressure examined in 2017, although ubiquitous, is not as felt the same way in every district. districts in which migration moods (both those already realized and those declared in the near tab. 5. employed and unemployed (aged 15–70) and average wages in ukraine1 – regional approach oblasts of ukraine years 2010 2017 2010=100 2010 2017 2010=100 2010 2017 relative increment employed persons for 10 thous. residents unemployed for 10 thous. residents average nominal wage2 [in usd] cherkasy 4375.22 4247.92 97.1 483.30 485.10 100.4 229.7 226.4 0.99 chernihiv 4347.78 4177.13 96.1 508.04 524.47 103.2 214.1 211.2 0.99 chernivtsi 4231.11 4183.30 98.9 393.90 383.81 97.4 221.8 210.6 0.95 dnipropetrovsk 4610.84 4304.67 93.4 351.97 399.86 113.6 296.5 260.0 0.88 donetsk 4459.73 1748.14 39.2 411.19 298.30 72.5 319.0 290.9 0.91 ivano-frankivsk 3840.61 4058.09 105.7 344.01 376.77 109.5 241.2 227.6 0.94 kharkiv 4599.70 4614.32 100.3 355.33 298.44 84.0 257.8 233.9 0.91 kherson 4479.67 4223.57 94.3 422.49 525.32 124.3 216.9 218.9 1.01 khmelnytskyi 4360.38 4048.94 92.9 412.31 393.91 95.5 223.5 222.5 1.00 kiev 4407.42 4224.52 95.9 347.17 295.85 85.2 287.2 269.3 0.94 kirovohrad 4249.08 3940.39 92.7 416.83 550.07 132.0 227.2 217.0 0.96 luhansk 4413.99 1347.45 30.5 342.11 268.94 78.6 284.2 219.6 0.77 lviv 4308.16 4154.00 96.4 366.51 339.18 92.5 242.9 239.5 0.99 mykolaiv 4523.57 4290.63 94.9 416.37 493.29 118.5 265.6 251.4 0.95 odessa 4374.62 4140.03 94.6 284.80 323.95 113.7 256.1 245.1 0.96 poltava 4316.89 4066.97 94.2 463.29 553.82 119.5 263.1 245.4 0.93 rivne 4088.23 3965.03 97.0 527.51 517.81 98.2 245.3 225.3 0.92 sumy 4259.64 4399.22 103.3 507.39 438.64 86.5 233.5 222.8 0.95 ternopil 3968.92 3792.60 95.6 467.47 512.21 109.6 207.6 208.1 1.00 vinnytsia 4217.46 4067.12 96.4 467.12 485.47 103.9 223.0 229.3 1.03 volyn 4176.37 3524.46 84.4 390.09 501.71 128.6 211.8 219.1 1.03 zakarpattia 4266.95 3944.67 92.4 404.39 462.58 114.4 231.0 238.1 1.03 zaporizhia 4573.42 4176.60 91.3 370.55 500.24 135.0 273.7 257.1 0.94 zhytomyr 4366.42 4147.04 95.0 473.82 503.56 106.3 223.4 218.7 0.98 m. kiev 4956.43 4623.58 93.3 306.79 344.52 112.3 429.4 417.2 0.97 1 – due to the lack of data, crimea and sevastopol are not included in the list; 2 – at the average annual usd exchange rate. source: statističnij…, 2018. problems of the ukrainian labor market 31 future) are most popular are located in the western part of the country. next, although with a slight loss, are districts located in the central ukraine and finally with the eastern part of the country. the location rent is not always important, but a more significant stimulus towards migration in terms of attitudes, intentions and entrepreneurial activity of the local community, and perhaps also a cultural factor determining local identity and awareness. it is worth emphasizing, however, that slight differences in the results obtained do not allow for building far-reaching conclusions. to sum up, ukrainians still go abroad to work, because domestic business cannot raise the salary enough to make it attractive. it is also worth emphasizing the non-monetary factors of travel such as social conditions of stay and work, quality of the environment, willingness to change the environment or family pressure of people who left earlier. 4. specificity of the ukrainian labor market (current situation) from the beginning of 2019, the ukrainian labor market is experiencing a huge shortage of qualified employees who are being encouraged to take up work with raised wages. the market is lacking in particular accountants, doctors, teachers, lawyers, pharmacists, economists, as well as engineers from various professions. at the same time, approximately 75% of the unemployed ukrainians are people with higher education. therefore, the question arises about adjusting the educational offer at a higher level to the needs of national and regional labor markets. for example, the problem of the lack of business schools that would educate managerial staff is often signaled. those who offer such education are usually of poor level. business owners complain that there are no candidates for the management team for the positions of directors they could employ, even with tab. 6. the scale of economic emigration by regions of ukraine. as of december 2017 ranking oblasts of ukraine share of actual and declared emigrants in the entire population [in %] share in the total number of economic emigrants [in %] 1. ternopil 23 6 2. zakarpattia 21 7 3. rivne 18 8 4. khmelnytskyi 17 3 5. cherkasy 16 5 5. chernihiv 16 3 5. ivano-frankivsk 16 6 6. kiev 15 3 6. lviv 15 6 6. poltava 15 7 7. sumy 14 2 7. vinnytsia 14 5 8. kirovohrad 13 4 9. luhansk 12 2 10. zaporizhia 11 3 10. zhytomyr 11 5 11. kharkiv 10 5 11. dnipropetrovsk 10 2 11. volyn 10 1 12. m. kiev 9 3 12. kherson 9 4 13. odessa 8 1 14. donetsk 6 3 14. mykolaiv 6 3 15. chernivtsi 5 2 source: prajsnar, 2018. 32 paweł czapliński, vasyl dzhaman salaries of 2 thous. usd. everything indicates that this is a serious structural problem, which unfortunately requires time to be solved by the education sector service providers, who should adopt their activities to the changing economic reality in the mental, organizational and marketing dimension. a good example of a change for the better can be the fact that in 2019, 928 people received coupons for training and advanced education, but on a national scale this should be considered a far insufficient level (pervak, 2019; śmietana, 2019). there is also a shortage of qualified production workers in such professions as seamstress, locksmith, bricklayer, carpenter, etc. also employees in the service sector are sought after, especially salesmen, bodyguards, nurses, bakers, bartenders, hairdressers, social workers etc. the problem is not solved by relatively high salaries from 10 to even 20 thous. uah. candidates often do not even have basic knowledge in a given profession. job placement has developed due to difficulties in reaching employees and recruiting them on a massive scale. their main direction of activity is not seeking free resources, especially in peripheral areas or activities aimed at reorienting jobs that are so needed in places of structural unemployment, but relatively simpler and more cost-effective recruitment of economic migrants, sometimes in an unreliable manner. it would be much more appropriate to work with school and university graduates to prepare them theoretically and practically for entering the labor market, choosing a profession in line with predispositions, perhaps also gaining first professional experience through a system of apprenticeships and professional internships and making them aware of the necessity of education throughout their lives in order to increase own competitiveness on the labor market. promoting new forms of employment, such as a freelancer, or even new professions such as an eteacher, also requires more attention. of course, this requires adequate technical facilities and financial resources, but the question about the justification of such actions from the point of view of the development of the information society seems to be rhetorical (rinok pracì…, 2019). at the beginning of 2019, over 235 000 vacancies were reported. a lot of these concerned the industry, then trade, and finally the agricultural sector. the average salary also increased and reached the level of 6.1 thous. uah, but what is more important, is that in most of the proposed jobs it was higher. this mainly concerns the largest urban agglomerations of ukraine, and above all the kiev agglomeration. the number of registered unemployed amounted to over 365 thous. most of whom were women. according to official statistics, over 3 million ukrainian citizens were permanently resident abroad, but an average of 7 to 10 million may participate annually in the entire migration process. of course, this number is not constant, and its changes are mainly caused by seasonal factors (kulchytska, minich (eds.), 2019; šutka, 2019). finally, the impact of the political factor on the labor market should be emphasized. it should be remembered that in a situation of uncertainty, business weakens and goes into a state of anticipation, which must lead to a slowdown and sometimes suspension of operations. therefore, one should be very cautious about statements and decisions, because it may quickly turn out that they will have their market consequences, including changes in the labor market. this seemingly obvious is not always respected, which may indicate the weakness of political elites. 5. conclusion to sum up, the labor market is an extremely complex system, and thus requiring large and constant attention. it is the result of the macroeconomic situation of the country, the socio-cultural and demographic condition of the society, and political activities. due to its sensitivity (which is determined by the human factor) it is relatively easy to weaken it and upset the balance between the demand and supply of labor. the content presented in the article inclines to the conclusion that the ukrainian labor market is facing both quantitative and qualitative problems in both national and regional terms. on the one hand, there is a shortage of hands to work, and on the other, there is still a large percentage of people out of work. this clear dissonance is related to the mismatch of the structure of the unemployed to the structure of jobs. the adaptation of these two structures takes time and is in principle impossible to achieve in the short term. therefore, the level of remuneration was adopted as the main determining factor. the neglect at its level, however, is so large that despite the actions carried out this does not bring the expected result. in addition, the modern employees, especially those who have already experienced work abroad, do not reduce their requirements and expectations to the payroll factor regardless of origin, sex, age or place of residence (mccormick, sheppard, 1992). in the period 2010–2017, which in ukraine can be considered a politically turbulent, functioning of the labor market was determined by the continued economic transformation and transition to the rules of the market economy, which in the ukrainian version is still in a phase of transformation shock. the problems of the ukrainian labor market 33 shock that does not allow her to escape the lack of a clear, consistent social and economic vision of the country and the lack of proper power elites (at all levels) prepared in terms of content and mentality for change. hence, often visible ad hoc activities on the labor market, which is illustrated by unfavorable indicators illustrating its functioning in the form of the number of the unemployed, professionally active and employed. their changes were undoubtedly influenced by both political changes, especially the turn of 2013–2014, which is clearly indicated in the results presented, as well as the equally dangerous very bad demographic situation of the country. its effects are not very 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https://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/praca-i-kariera/artykuly/1429618,budowlanka-brak-pracownikowukraincy.html (accessed 30 september 2019). statističnij ŝorìčnik za 2017 rìk (eng. statistical yearbook of ukraine 2017), 2018, deržavna služba statistiki ukraïni, kiïv. šutka n., 2019, rinok pracì s’ogodnì ì do čogo tut vibori (eng. the labor market today and what is the election here), https:// zik.ua/news/2019/04/15/rynok_pratsi_sogodni_i_do_ chogo_tut_vybory_1552011 (accessed 30 september 2019). zappalà s., massei f., 2011, psycho-social factors and innovativeness in a sample of small enterprises, psicologia sociale, 6(1), 51–70. 1. introduction presenting the directions of changes in size and use of accommodation facilities in the tourist regions of croatia in 1997 and 2017 was the purpose of this paper. a significant impact on tourist traffic and on development of the tourist function has quality and spatial diversity of the accommodation facilities (pavia, floricic, 2017; rettinger, 2010; salo et al., 2014; scholz, 2016). the presentation of spatial and temporal variability in the size of indicators related to the tourist function has a crucial meaning in the assessment of tourist carrying capacity and tourist absorption (matos marquez, perez colmenares, 2019; wang et al., 2019). warfare led to a decrease in potential tourist interest in croatia as a tourist destination. however, the free market reforms, the reconstruction of the country and the increase in tourist potential had a positive impact on the restoration of trust among visitors. croatia joined the eu in july 1993. it directly influenced the tourist services market. there has been journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(3), 14–22 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.3.03 changes of tourism in croatia in the post-socialist period tomasz wiskulski department of tourism and recreation management, faculty of tourism and recreation, gdansk university of physical education and sport, górskiego 1, 80–336 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-7802-721x e-mail: tomasz.wiskulski@awf.gda.pl citation wiskulski t., 2019, changes of tourism in croatia in the post-socialist period, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(3), 14–22. abstract 21 years of transformation in the tourist function in the territory of croatia has been summarized in the article. this area has come a long way from the region that was an integral part of yugoslavia, through the area of warfare related to the civil war to one of the fastest growing tourist destinations in the world. the number of tourists has more than tripled, with an increase from 57% to 1830% in individual counties of croatia during the analyzed period. at the same time, there was a disproportionately low increase in capacity of accommodation base across the country at the level of 76%. this increase took values from 20% to 350% in extreme districts. key words croatia, perkal synthetic indicator, rectangular coordinate system, tourism. received: 05 june 2019 accepted: 30 july 2019 published: 30 september 2019 changes of tourism in croatia in the post-socialist period 15 a significant increase in the number of tourists, especially from eu countries, and the development of accommodation facilities. it is not without significance for the volume of tourist traffic was the visa requirement from april 1st, 2013 for citizens of countries such as russia, ukraine and turkey. however, these changes didn’t affect the average length of stay of tourists in croatia. 2. data and methods volume of tourist flows, accommodation base and its capacity at the level of county were used in the study (statistical ..., 1997, 2017). in addition, data of surface area and population of county were used (census ..., 2013). statistical data describing tourist traffic and elements of tourism development at the level of nuts 3 were used in paper. data for 1997 and 2017 were used. on the one hand by their availability (data from 2017) and on the other by changes in the administrative division of croatia (1997) was caused this selection. the change of the knin region from zadar-knin county to šibenik-knin county (narodne novine, 10/1997) was decisive for the temporal scope of the study. tourism density index (vojnovic, 2018), schneider’s rate (gogonea et al., 2017; hacia, 2014), tourist accommodation density index (markovic et al., 2017; simancas cruz, penarrubia zaragoza, 2019), baretjedefert’s index (podhorecka, dudek, 2019), average length of stay (duro, 2018), accommodation development index (wiweka, arcana, 2016) and charvát index (przybyla, kulczyk-dynowska, 2017; stefko et al., 2018) were used in this paper. presenting the structure of each of them is pointless because they are commonly used indicators in the description of tourist traffic and tourism development and their construction has been repeatedly described in the literature (wiskulski, 2019). to delimitate tourist regions on the territory of croatia a numerous statistical methods were used. use of them were considered complementary. the method of rectangular coordinate system is a method based on the variability of two features based on the one-class classification of continuous variables (runge, 2006). the intensity ranges of a given feature should be determined in the adopted situation. analyzed objects according to the measured feature, e.g. into two groups, are divided. objects with a feature intensity below the accepted threshold are included in the first of them. objects with a feature intensity above the accepted threshold are classified and we treat them as objects having established property are included in the second group. in the paper, in reference to the one-way classification, the values of the analyzed indicators were divided based on the customary (arbitrary) criteria. to verify the results of the data analysis obtained by using the method of rectangular coordinate system, six partial indicators were analyzed using perkal synthetic indicator. refer to the actual values of the features were the main assumption of this method. their quantities are given in various measuring units. standardize them before making any further calculations was necessary. 3. results and discussion tourism as a social and economic phenomenon is one of the factor determining implementation of tourism function in tourist region (markovic et al., 2017; muler gonzalez et al., 2018). it can testify to the tourist attractiveness of the region as a social element. according to the adopted definition, indicators describing tourism and tourism development are included in basic elements that make up the tourist function. indicators describing tourist traffic are: tourism density index and schneider’s rate. and group of indicators describing tourist development includes such indicators as: baretje-defert’s index and tourist accommodation density index. in order to demonstrate changes in the performance of tourist function on the territory of croatia, an analysis of changes in size of listed tourist indicators was carried out. data for 1997 and 2017 were included in the study. analyzing the indicators describing tourist traffic, the first was tourism density index calculated. it was calculated for the data for 1997 and it should be noted that only five of all counties match the assumed criteria of division. the highest value of the indicator was calculated for istria county where it was 625.87. the second highest value was achieved in the city of zagreb (in this region the criteria for schneider’s rate weren’t matched). in the case of schneider’s rate the assumed criteria were matched in seven counties. the highest value of the indicator was calculated for istria county where its value was 852.46. by using the rectangular coordinate system method taking into account tourism density index and schneider’s rate the counties were divided into four groups (fig. 1). the first of them included counties matching the criteria for schneider’s rate and not matching the criteria for tourism density index. these are such county as: lika-senj, zadar and šibenik-knin. the second group are counties in which the criteria for both indicators were matched: istria, primorje-gorski kotar, dubrovnik-neretva 16 tomasz wiskulski and split-dalmatia. another group created counties for which the criteria for tourism density index were matched but the criteria for schneider’s rate weren’t matched – city of zagreb. the last group consists of counties in which the criteria for both indicators weren’t matched. by analyzing the location of designated counties, it should be noted that they form two clusters in the north and in the south of the country. a buffer zone between the designated regions were formed by counties from the second group. data from 2017 was used in the next study (fig.  2). in the study conducted for tourism density index eight counties met the set criteria, while the maximum value was reached in the city of zagreb – 2005.34. in the case of schneider’s rate criteria are met in ten regions. the highest value of the indicator was calculated for istria county where it amounted to 1972.56. by using the rectangular coordinate system method taking into account tourism density index and schneider’s rate the counties were divided into four groups, one of them wasn’t assigned any county. the first of the groups which included counties with matching the criteria for schneider’s rate and those that didn’t match the criteria for tourism density index were two counties: karlovac and krapina-zagorje. the next group with counties that match the criteria for both indicators has eight counties. these are all coastal counties and city of zagreb. city of zagreb due to its different character (completely urbanized area with a high intensity of tourist assets on a relatively small area) in relation to other counties matches the criteria. the third group consists of all the counties that don’t match the criteria for the analyzed indicators. the indicators describing the level of tourist development were analyzed and the values of baretjedefert’s index were calculated for the data from 1997 (fig. 3). six countries were classified into the group of regions with a high level of tourism development. the maximum value of the indicator was calculated for istria county and amounted to 105.98. in the case of tourist accommodation density index the adopted criteria allowed to classify seven counties as areas with a high level of tourist development. the highest value of the indicator was calculated for istria county and amounted to 77.81. by using the rectangular coordinate system method taking into account baretje-defert’s index and tourist accommodation density index the counties were divided into four groups. the first of them included counties matching the criteria for tourist accommodation density index and not matching the criteria for baretje-defert’s index. this group includes two counties: split-dalmatia and the city of zagreb. the second group consists of five counties dubrovnik-neretva county istria county primorje-gorski kotar county split-dalmatia county 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 0 120 240 360 480 600 720 tourism density index s c h n e id e r' s r a te fig. 1. rectangular coordinate system method for tourist traffic indicators in croatia for 1997 source: own elaboration based on statistical yearbook of the republic of croatia, 1997; census of population, households and dwellings, 2003. changes of tourism in croatia in the post-socialist period 17 that match the criteria for both analyzed indicators. the next group creates counties in which a satisfactory level of baretje-defert’s index was achieved and the sufficiently high value of tourist accommodation density index wasn’t achieved. lika-senj county is included in this group. the fourth group is made up of counties for which the values of both indicators haven’t reached a satisfactory level. indicator values were calculated for data from 2017 (fig. 4.). in the case of baretje-defert’s index seven counties were classified as meeting the assumed criteria. the county with the highest value of the index was istrian county for which the value of the index was 144.21. in the case of tourist accommodation density index the values for seven counties allowed them to be classified as high tourist development. the region with the highest index value was the istrian county where its value was 106.76. by using the rectangular coordinate system method taking into account baretje-defert’s index and tourist accommodation density index the counties were divided into four groups. the first of them included counties matching the criteria for tourist accommodation density index and not matching the criteria for baretje-defert’s index. one of them was included in this group: the city of zagreb. the second group includes 6 counties that match the criteria for both analyzed indicators. the next group creates counties in which a satisfactory level of baretje-defert’s index was achieved and the sufficiently high value of tourist accommodation density index wasn’t achieved. lika-senj county is included to this group. the fourth group is made up of counties for which the values of both indicators haven’t reached a satisfactory level. to verify rectangular coordinate system, perkal synthetic indicator was analyzed for six component indicators. these are indicators such as: • average length of stay; • accommodation development index; • tourism density index; • tourist accommodation density; • baretje-defert’s index; • charvát index. the calculations are static in nature and relate to data for 1997 (table 1) and 2017 (table 2). due to the value of perkal synthetic indicator, counties were divided into groups. the arithmetic average () of differences in ordered values of perkal synthetic indicator for individual counties was used to determine the boundaries between classes. four groups of counties were determined using the adopted criteria for data from 1997: dubrovnik-neretva county istria county lika-senj county city of zagreb primorje-gorski kotar county split-dalmatia county šibenik-knin county zadar county 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 0 240 480 720 960 1200 1440 1680 1920 2160 fig. 2. rectangular coordinate system method for tourist traffic indicators in croatia for 2017 source: own elaboration based on statistical yearbook of the republic of croatia, 2017; census of population, households and dwellings, 2013. tab. 1. the value of perkal synthetic indicator calculated for 1997 country average length of stay (x1) accommodation development index (x2) tourism density index (x3) tourist accommo dation density (x4) baretje-defert's index (x5) charvát index (x6) standardized values σx’ij ws x’1 x’2 x’3 x’4 x’5 x’6 istria 6.99 8.04 625.87 77.81 105.98 5,961.35 1.71 -0.83 2.79 3.53 3.36 3.91 14.47 2.41 primorje-gorski kotar 5.71 9.61 399.88 41.60 48.86 2,680.18 1.01 -0.67 1.58 1.61 1.21 1.48 6.23 1.04 dubrovnik-neretva 5.86 5.67 157.87 27.86 40.47 1,343.59 1.10 -1.06 0.29 0.89 0.90 0.50 2.60 0.43 city of zagreb 1.71 30.15 600.30 19.91 1.64 84.49 -1.16 1.35 2.65 0.47 -0.56 -0.43 2.32 0.39 zadar 6.52 4.18 74.94 17.95 40.42 1,099.78 1.45 -1.21 -0.15 0.36 0.90 0.32 1.66 0.28 split-dalmatia 6.29 5.03 123.10 24.48 23.98 757.93 1.33 -1.13 0.10 0.71 0.28 0.06 1.35 0.23 šibenik-knin 6.51 3.77 51.88 13.77 36.46 893.31 1.45 -1.25 -0.28 0.14 0.75 0.16 0.97 0.16 lika-senj 4.25 4.88 21.08 4.32 43.05 893.61 0.22 -1.14 -0.44 -0.36 0.99 0.16 -0.56 -0.09 vukovar-srijem 5.87 18.92 4.99 0.26 0.32 35.08 1.10 0.24 -0.53 -0.57 -0.61 -0.47 -0.84 -0.14 krapina-zagorje 3.17 30.97 34.07 1.10 0.95 93.15 -0.36 1.43 -0.37 -0.53 -0.59 -0.43 -0.85 -0.14 osijek-baranja 2.81 34.61 12.59 0.36 0.46 44.40 -0.56 1.79 -0.49 -0.57 -0.61 -0.46 -0.90 -0.15 sisak-moslavina 3.56 30.72 3.90 0.13 0.31 33.43 -0.15 1.41 -0.53 -0.58 -0.61 -0.47 -0.94 -0.16 koprivnica-križevci 3.05 31.35 6.80 0.22 0.30 29.14 -0.43 1.47 -0.52 -0.58 -0.61 -0.48 -1.14 -0.19 varaždin 3.23 19.33 30.90 1.60 1.09 68.22 -0.33 0.28 -0.39 -0.50 -0.58 -0.45 -1.97 -0.33 međimurje 2.58 23.51 11.03 0.47 0.29 17.54 -0.68 0.70 -0.50 -0.56 -0.61 -0.48 -2.14 -0.36 zagreb county 3.15 17.54 6.08 0.35 0.34 18.91 -0.38 0.11 -0.52 -0.57 -0.61 -0.48 -2.45 -0.41 brod-posavina 1.57 19.78 5.28 0.27 0.31 9.52 -1.23 0.33 -0.53 -0.57 -0.61 -0.49 -3.11 -0.52 virovitica-podravina 2.62 11.45 1.78 0.16 0.34 10.09 -0.66 -0.49 -0.55 -0.58 -0.61 -0.49 -3.38 -0.56 požega-slavonia 1.79 14.66 1.79 0.12 0.26 6.80 -1.12 -0.18 -0.55 -0.58 -0.61 -0.49 -3.52 -0.59 bjelovar-bilogora 1.70 13.79 3.31 0.24 0.48 11.17 -1.16 -0.26 -0.54 -0.58 -0.60 -0.49 -3.63 -0.60 karlovac 1.72 7.32 4.76 0.65 1.66 20.89 -1.15 -0.90 -0.53 -0.55 -0.56 -0.48 -4.18 -0.70 arithmetic average (x) 3.84 16.44 103.91 11.12 16.57 672.03 sd 1.84 10.14 187.29 18.89 26.63 1,353.12 source: own elaboration based on statistical yearbook of the republic of croatia, 1997; census of population, households and dwellings, 2003. tab. 2. the value of perkal synthetic indicator calculated for 2017 county average length of stay (x1) accommodation development index (x2) tourism density index (x3) tourist accommodation density (x4) baretjedefert's index (x5) charvát index (x6) standardized values σx’ij ws x’1 x’2 x’3 x’4 x’5 x’6 istria 6.20 13.68 1,460.25 106.76 144.21 12,221.04 1.94 -0.94 2.06 3.11 2.63 3.16 11.95 1.99 dubrovnik-neretva 4.14 20.52 1,044.29 50.90 74.12 6,292.27 0.63 -0.54 1.29 1.13 1.01 1.30 4.83 0.81 primorje-gorski kotar 5.34 13.77 777,44 56.47 68.40 5,029.61 1.40 -0.93 0.79 1.33 0.88 0.91 4.38 0.73 city of zagreb 1.76 80.09 2,005.34 25.04 2.03 286.55 -0.88 2.96 3.07 0.22 -0.65 -0.57 4.15 0.69 zadar 5.91 9.72 427.31 43.98 94.40 5,422.10 1.76 -1.17 0.14 0.89 1.48 1.03 4.13 0.69 split-dalmatia 5.25 11.99 695.76 58.03 57.95 3,649.03 1.34 -1.04 0.64 1.39 0.64 0.48 3.45 0.57 šibenik-knin 5.91 9.49 308.98 32.54 88.90 4,987.69 1.76 -1.18 -0.08 0.49 1.35 0.90 3.23 0.54 lika-senj 3.60 16.65 137.60 8.26 86.83 5,197.68 0.28 -0.77 -0.39 -0.37 1.30 0.96 1.02 0.17 krapina-zagorje 2.32 52.03 115.77 2.22 2.06 248.53 -0.53 1.31 -0.44 -0.59 -0.65 -0.58 -1.47 -0.24 međimurje 2.39 45.73 96.48 2.11 1.35 147.75 -0.48 0.94 -0.47 -0.59 -0.67 -0.61 -1.88 -0.31 karlovac 1.70 40.18 91.85 2.29 6.43 438.56 -0.92 0.62 -0.48 -0.58 -0.55 -0.52 -2.44 -0.41 vukovar-srijem 1.56 47.51 36.24 0.76 1.04 77.13 -1.01 1.05 -0.58 -0.64 -0.67 -0.64 -2.50 -0.42 zagreb county 1.72 45.34 28.27 0.62 0.60 46.85 -0.91 0.92 -0.60 -0.64 -0.68 -0.65 -2.56 -0.43 bjelovar-bilogora 3.09 26.76 8.54 0.32 0.70 58.24 -0.04 -0.17 -0.63 -0.65 -0.68 -0.64 -2.82 -0.47 sisak-moslavina 2.46 32.11 8.20 0.26 0.66 52.27 -0.44 0.14 -0.63 -0.65 -0.68 -0.64 -2.91 -0.49 osijek-baranja 1.93 36.73 22.20 0.60 0.82 58.25 -0.78 0.41 -0.61 -0.64 -0.68 -0.64 -2.94 -0.49 varaždin 2.31 25.23 48.56 1.92 1.38 80.43 -0.53 -0.26 -0.56 -0.60 -0.66 -0.64 -3.25 -0.54 koprivnica-križevci 2.09 27.42 10.60 0.39 0.58 33.58 -0.67 -0.13 -0.63 -0.65 -0.68 -0.65 -3.42 -0.57 požega-slavonia 2.30 22.29 7.29 0.33 0.76 39.23 -0.54 -0.43 -0.64 -0.65 -0.68 -0.65 -3.59 -0.60 virovitica-podravina 2.36 20.12 7.01 0.35 0.83 39.43 -0.50 -0.56 -0.64 -0.65 -0.68 -0.65 -3.68 -0.61 brod-posavina 1.78 26.18 14.10 0.54 0.69 32.03 -0.87 -0.21 -0.62 -0.64 -0.68 -0.65 -3.68 -0.61 arithmetic average 3.15 29.69 350.10 18.79 30.23 2,116.11 sd 1.57 17.04 538.63 28.31 43.40 3,201.21 source: own elaboration based on statistical yearbook of the republic of croatia, 2017; census of population, households and dwellings, 2013. 20 tomasz wiskulski dubrovnik-neretva county istria county primorje-gorski kotar county šibenik-knin county zadar county 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 baretje-defert's index t o u ri s t a c c o m m o d a ti o n d e n s it y dubrovnik-neretva county istria county primorje-gorski kotar county split-dalmatia county šibenik-knin county zadar county 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 baretje-defert's index t o u ri s t a c c o m m o d a ti o n d e n s it y fig. 3. rectangular coordinate system method for tourist development indicators in croatia for 1997 source: own elaboration based on statistical yearbook of the republic of croatia, 1997; census of population, households and dwellings, 2003. fig. 4. rectangular coordinate system method for tourist development indicators in croatia for 2017 source: own elaboration based on statistical yearbook of the republic of croatia, 2017; census of population, households and dwellings, 2013. changes of tourism in croatia in the post-socialist period 21 • group i – county with the highest value of perkal synthetic indicator, istria county. it’s located in the northern part of croatia near the border with slovenia. it influenced high value of standardized values; • group ii – primorje-gorski kotar where the value of perkal synthetic indicator is ≥1; • group iii – contains 5 counties where the value of perkal synthetic indicator is ≥0. this group contains such counties as: dubrovnik-neretva, city of zagreb, zadar, split-dalmatia and šibenik-knin; • group iv – counties with a negative perkal synthetic indicator, i.e. lika-senj county and all inland counties excluding the capital of the country. three groups of counties were determined using the adopted criteria for data from 2017: • group i – county with the highest value of perkal synthetic indicator, istria county. it’s located in the northern part of croatia near the border with slovenia. it influenced the high value of standardized values; • group ii – contains 7 counties whose value of perkal synthetic indicator is ≥0. this group includes all other coastal counties and the capital of the country; • group iii – counties with a negative value of perkal synthetic indicator, icludes all inland counties excluding the capital of the country. 4. conclusions conducting the research procedure allowed to present basic changes in tourist flows and tourist development. the tourist function in croatia was changed during analyzed 21 years. it can be concluded that there was a reduction in the number of counties groups by analyzing the perkal synthetic indicator calculated for 1997 and 2017. on the other hand, there were even greater disparities in the tourist function between individual counties. what is important, in both cases it can be seen that in istria county the tourist function is performed at the highest level compared to other counties of croatia. in terms of tourism flows, coastal areas have been combined into one group. the entire coastal area of croatia can be classified as one tourist region. in addition, the capital of the country joined group of areas with increased use in terms of tourism. in zagreb the volume of tourist flow increased more than threefold, in a similar way as in the whole country. the smallest increase in the number of tourists occurred in koprivnica-križevci county where the number of tourists increased by 0.5 times. the highest percentage increase in the number of tourists occurred in the karlovac county where the number of tourists increased more than 19 times. such a big increase in the value of individual indicators has an impact on tourist carrying capacity and tourist absorption. the tourist season on the territory of croatia starts in mid-june and lasts until mid-september when it begins to fade towards the south. increased tourist traffic is also an increase in traffic on the roads which affects the formation of congestion. despite the network of highways running through tourist regions, access to tourist destinations was difficult. increased vehicle traffic combined with longtime travel from places generating traffic affect the safety of travelers and comfort of travel. croatia’s accession to the eu has reduced the waiting time at the border. this increased travel comfort. on the other hand this has led to an increase in the number of tourists so this problem remains relevant. performing the described study has its weaknesses. use of the presented indicators related to tourism may raise doubts as to the correctness of their use. this raises the question of sufficient way of describing the phenomenon of tourism. submission of data with 21 years of interval without an analysis of this period means that the study is incomplete and conclusions are limited. references census of population, households and dwellings. 2011 edition, 2013, croatian bureau of statistics, zagreb. duro j.a., 2018, seasonality of tourism: a new decomposition, tourism economics, 24(5), 615–621, doi: 10.1177/1354816618768319 gogonea r.m., baltalunga a.a., nedelcu a., dumitrescu d., 2017, tourism pressure at the regional level in the context of sustainable development in romania, sustainability, 9(5), 1–24, doi: 10.3390/su9050698 hacia e., 2014, the development of tourist space in polish port cities, [in:] s. ivan, r.g. thompson (eds.), procedia social and 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conditions of polish tourism flow to croatia), wydawnictwo awfis, gdańsk. wiweka k., arcana k.t.p., 2016, the impact of tourist accommodation development toward the socio-cultural aspects in the seminyak village, district of kuta, regency of badung, bali (in perspective of the local community), [in:] a. m. morrison, a. g. abdullah, s. leo (eds.), asia tourism forum 2016 – the 12th biennial conference of hospitality and tourism industry in asia (atf-16), series: advances in economics business and management research, 19, 216–225. 1. introduction according to scholars studying rural areas, their diversity and directions of changes on the one hand come from: (a) current historical conditions of development, (b) current agricultural policy, (c) adopted strategies for prospective transformations of rural areas, on the other hand – multi-dimensional environmental, social and economic conditions (e.g. bański, 2014; knapik, kowalska, 2014; runge, 2017). the last thirty years emphasized various problems in these areas, which require external financing and development of appropriate programmes. for this reason, the process of revitalization consisting of various remedial actions, taken in various aspects, is becoming crucial for rural space as the main goal of regional and local policies. revitalization of rural areas is composed of spatial, technical, social and economic changes. its goal is to “resurrect” those villages that suffered from stagnation, economic degradation or the loss of their functions due to political, social and economic changes. revitalization projects stimulate local communities to rebuild their social and economic potential. journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(2), 44–56 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.2.05 classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization ewa pałka-łebek (1), iwona kiniorska (2) (1) institute of geography, jan kochanowski university, świętokrzyska 15, 25–406 poland, orcid: 0000-0003-1733-9046 e-mail: ewa.palka@ujk.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of geography, jan kochanowski university, świętokrzyska 15, 25–406 poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5630-4554 e-mail: iwona.kiniorska@ujk.edu.pl citation pałka-łebek e., kiniorska i., 2019, classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(2), 44–56. abstract the article aims to show the classification of polish rural areas in the context of revitalization process. this work shows the research making in polish rural areas concerning this new, important process. taking experiences from development of rural regions in european union self-government created the programs called “revival of the country” and revitalization. these are the most important and the largest regional enterprises implemented by the rural society and also for rural society. it had favorable influence on the preservation and development of the rural identity and integrity at their full range. nowadays the revitalization process is very important factor of versatile rural economy development. key words rural areas, revitalization, problem areas, classification received: 20 february 2019 accepted: 31 may 2019 published: 30 june 2019 classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization 45 this paper aims at supplementing insufficient studies on revitalization in rural areas. the problem discussed in this study is identification of revitalization as a method for development of rural areas. revitalization is one of the biggest challenges for rural areas in poland. nowadays, it is undertaken by numerous gminas (lau-2) to eliminate obstacles preventing or slowing down their development. degraded area is such a hindering element. the process discussed in this paper, focused on solving different problems is one of the most important tasks financed with the eu funds for the period of 2014–2020. revitalization of rural areas meets the needs to respond to social, economic and spatial degradation and the resulting crisis phenomena. the subject of the study is revitalization of rural areas. the object of the study is the society (population) changing their space with this process. spatially, the subject of the study covers problem areas in rural areas. the main goal is to identify revitalization in rural areas with their various categories taken into account. the study classifies the studied areas due to the need for introduction of this process. based on the analysis of the literature and the authors’ own experience, the thesis has it that rural areas in poland are not homogenous due to different previously developed socioeconomic functions. therefore, their characteristic features include a variety of problems to solve, also with revitalization. the results may be practically used by local governments, ngos, rural leaders or entrepreneurs since they provide information on ongoing revitalization processes, which may facilitate planning of development of the areas in question. the main method of scientific research on revitalization in poland is the analysis of theoretical and cognitive content. in order to solve the problem of this study, the authors used mainly scientific literature, with reviews of polish and foreign publications. moreover, territorial classification of rural areas was also used. 2. revitalization of rural areas in scholarly studies the works addressing the issue of revitalization evolved over time. initially, they only documented and evaluated the effects of revitalization programmes in various regions. recently, papers with theses and research questions related to revitalization have appeared. moreover, practical revitalization also changed over time and referred to the evolution of its programmes, goals, activities and policies. as many authors prove and experience shows, each revitalization leads to spatial and functional changes of the revitalized area, which results in its socio-economic development, improvement of spatial order, aesthetics and functionality, as well as elimination of pathological phenomena (kaczmarek, 2015; parysek, 2006, 2015; lorens, 2007). contemporary polish scholarly studies emphasize strongly developed social element. this is crucial since it is the man who is in the centre of all initiated revitalization projects. when assessing the works on revitalization focused on rural areas from the polish literature, it should be emphasized that initially authors focused on general and cognitive issues, and later discussed results, consequences and problems of revitalization. in europe, the first scholarly discussions on revitalization of rural areas appeared with the first papers on village revival. first it appeared in germany in the early 1960s and in the netherlands (renewal…, 1966; röling, 1993). as a component of rural policy, revitalization in germany has the longest tradition among european countries. that is why german publications provide the most knowledge concerning revitalization of rural areas. following the literature, it was assumed that revitalization in this country is a comprehensive organizational and investment process, ultimately leading to a revival of degraded, neglected or dysfunctional areas (strijker, 1993). it refers mainly to reversing unfavourable processes that systematically lead to the fall and degradation of these areas. the first german scholar who showed the importance of revitalization and renewal of villages was g. henkel (1979). in his later studies (henkel, 1984, 2000), he emphasized the spatial aspect and proved that village centres as separate spaces (the so-called village cores) are public spaces where interpersonal interactions of residents are concentrated. in the literature, there were works regarding harmful results of actions following the modernization paradigm for rural areas (gulinck et al., 2001). this led to the transfer of patterns for urban development to rural areas (knievel, 1997). in 1990s in germany a new wave of studies on revitalization of rural areas appeared. the emergence and development of new non-agricultural functions was an important issue discussed in the studies (e.g. böcher, 2014). the sources of these changes were attributed with the urgent need to adjust the rural economy of that times to the applicable development requirements. after the german unification, while implementing revitalization projects there were efforts to introduce non-agricultural functions to villages. the emergence of new functions 46 ewa pałka-łebek, iwona kiniorska in rural areas shaped the economic dimension of their revitalization and led to their multifunctional development. the turn of the 20th and 21st century brought social focus in german studies. the role of social aspects of revitalization increased significantly, and they also focused on local society and its role in this process (e.g. marsden, 1999; crouch, 2006; halfacree, 2012). gradually, scholars emphasized its comprehensive character in the form of a specific activities programme, and they also began to appreciate the role of social participation and social capital (magel, 2000; white, 2011). therefore, revitalization began to be understood as a specific model of division of tasks between the state authority and society (damyanovic, reinwald, 2014). since the early 1990s, the development of rural areas, which is affected by local communities, has come into sharp focus in western europe and the united states of america (hamedinger, 2004). it was suggested that revitalization cannot focus only on economic effects, but it must also take into account community revival, which is the primary resource for rural areas (e.g. henderson et al., 2007; zagrofos, 2007). instead of currently widespread studies of changes in the spatial and functional structure of rural areas, the contemporary literature, mainly british and american, emphasises the importance of social studies on rural areas. moreover, it is worth mentioning that the revitalization model adopted in the west justifies subcontracting this process to specialized companies, which is typical to western europe, the us and canada (roberts, sykes, 2008; kort, klijn, 2011). in poland, such practices have not been adopted yet, and there are no entities offering such services. presently, revitalization has already been discussed as a problem of transformation and development of rural areas (woods, 2005). despite its mainly practical nature, it is the subject of numerous scholarly works. it was analysed mainly in european countries, but also in the united states, canada, japan, china, hong kong and australia. currently, in poland there are great expectations associated with the adaptation of patterns and experience from western european countries where the development of rural areas followed the paradigm of revitalization using revival programmes for villages. 3. genesis of revitalization processes of rural areas revitalization in rural areas was proposed as a modern concept of their development, related to degraded areas. it refers to areas where negative social, economic, ecological and spatial phenomena occur simultaneously. according to m.s. cato (2009), properly implemented revitalization has an integrated character and includes comprehensive processes carried out in partnerships, revival oriented, binding together both technical activities and projects boosting socio-economic recovery. presently, it is not possible to preserve all tangible and intangible resources of rural areas without revitalization. moreover, specific nature of developed public space strengthens the identity of residents, making the entire community stronger. in theoretical publications and statistical sources, there is no single, commonly used definition of revitalization. it refers to areas which were previously used and fulfilled specific functions; however, due to poor management they were neglected, lost their values, and presently constitute so-called problem areas. problem area, a part of geographical space, is characterised by negative social, economic and technical phenomena, that cause specific anomalies of development and abnormality of a particular area (zagożdżon, 1980). presently, the binding definition of revitalization in poland was stipulated in the act of the polish parliament on revitalization of october 9, 2015 (ustawa o rewitalizacji z 9 października 2015, 2015). it is described as “complex, coordinated, long-term process of spatial, social, economic and technical transformations carried out in a degraded area, initiated by a local government in order to bring it out of a crisis, mainly by providing it with new functional quality and creating conditions for its development, based on its characteristic endogenous conditions”. according to this approach, the implementation of revitalization programmes for rural areas aims at preventing further loss of socio-economic functions and creating opportunities for their sustainable development. numerous definitions of this process were developed for various strategic and operational documents. in poland, the term “revitalization” started to be commonly used in mid-1990s. however, even now this term seems to be overused or misused. another important issue is the fact that revitalization is a response to the crisis in problem rural areas, which occurs in many aspects of socio-economic life. it is also important to define transparent criteria for delimitation of degraded rural areas where classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization 47 revitalization takes place. it must include actions with many interrelated elements in problem areas. it should also recognise a variety of primary and specific goals of revitalization in rural areas (tab.1). the implementation of specific and primary goals of revitalization is a necessary condition for achieving the main goal, i.e. to introduce permanent quantitative changes in the area covered by the revitalization programme (i.e. improvement of living conditions of the local population). 4. the idea and criteria defining rural areas the transformation processes of rural areas in poland were introduced several years ago, but many problems have not been solved yet (kamińska, pałka, 2009). there are various negative phenomena in these areas. traditionally, rural areas were identified with agricultural activities. since the turn of the 21st century, the scope of studies devoted to rural areas has changed. it was focused on analysing relationship between agriculture and development of rural areas (zegar, 2012). in polish and european literature there are numerous publications on historical changeability of the role of agriculture and transformations in rural areas. in the current literature there is a clear devision between rural areas and villages (runge, 2017). while villages are settlement units, rural areas belong to a broader concept, covering both villages and their surroundings (stanny, 2014a). changing external conditions of rural areas often connect their definition to this external context and their relationship to neighbouring urban centres (runge, 2017). this is how rural areas are defined by m. stanny (2014a), who proves that it is the place of residence and management of people forming a local community, where, compared to cities: (a) both social and economic activity (agricultural in particular) is spatially dispersed; (b) less diversified social and economic structures result from their lower competitiveness; (c) the availability of goods and services, especially public ones, is lower. presently, the concept of “rural area” no longer means the whole vast territory, and is understood as a separate space distinguished due to its specific feature. villages are usually treated as specific settlement units, while rural areas include the territory of villages and their neighbouring areas. according to j. bański (2011), definitions of rural areas have undergone historical changes and they require some flexibility. typically, they are agricultural areas with an emphasis on human economic activity, characteristic of agricultural regions (kutkowska, 2011). with socio-economic transformations in rural areas in mind, their definition should take into account not only diversification of functional structure of the economy of rural areas, but also features of rural communities (rosner (ed.), 2007). these features are usually taken into consideration in definitions of rural areas developed by sociologists (e.g. kaleta, 1998). an important methodological elements of studies on rural areas is the possibility to conceptualise issues addressed with the use of a specific explanatory theory (mazurek, 2010). a review of contemporary literature on rural areas shows numerous references to the concept of multi-functionality as tab.1. primary and specific goals of revitalization in rural areas primary goals specific goals – selected examples economic – stimulation of economic development of rural areas with setting up and developing small, local companies and attracting external investors – decreasing unemployment rate – higher tax revenues of gminas social – better standards of living for citizens – neutralising social exclusion and negative social selection – improved demographic situation – high level of public safety – restoration of social ties environmental – limited interference in the natural environment – maintenance or improving of natural environmental conditions – larger green areas – reduced emissions of waste spatial – integration with previously isolated rural areas – maintenance or improving of spatial order – shaped landscape of rural areas – expansion of infrastructure source: elaboration based on pałka-łebek (2019). 48 ewa pałka-łebek, iwona kiniorska the way leading to sustainable development of rural areas (e.g. kostrowicki, 1976; kłodziński, 1996; korelewski, 1998; adamowicz, 2004; runge, 2017). however, it should be noted that this concept, developed in western european countries at the beginning of the 20th century, aroused interest in poland in the 1980s, and following the transformation of political and economic system it is enjoying its revival (runge, 2017). together with the concepts of order (social, economic and spatial), renovation of rural areas and small towns, development based on local initiatives and boosting development of local communities, it creates a set of so-called old concepts of development of rural areas (siemiński, 1996). 5. problems of rural areas problem areas are an integral part of geographical space. they are formed, in rural areas, with those parts of the country or region with high concentration of numerous negative phenomena that make the area handicapped and weaken their agricultural and non-agricultural functions. in many scholarly studies on problem areas in rural areas, terms are used interchangeably and they include the following examples: backward areas, retarded areas, peripheral areas, depressed areas, neglected areas, and declining areas. sometimes, they are used as synonyms for “problem areas”. this terminological freedom may cause serious confusions. in foreign literature, conceptual differences concerning the term “problem areas” and its derivatives (e.g. depressed areas, distressed areas, problem areas, etc.) are as wide as in polish studies. according to z. więckowicz (1989) the problem area is a part of geographical space characterized by specific anomalies of its development. the development of these areas is accompanied by certain anomalies with a negative impact on the entire area. this condition creates certain problems, which unfortunately cannot be solved with internal forces alone as they require external intervention. specializing in rural research, r. kulikowski (1992) divided problem areas into two separate groups. these are: • depressive areas, underdeveloped in comparison to surrounding areas, with similar environmental and non-environmental development conditions; • conflict areas, with concentration of numerous economic functions (e.g. agriculture, industry, transportation, etc.), where one function develops at the expense of others. many geographers and specialists in agricultural sciences have attempted to define an agricultural problem area. j. falkowski (1990) noted that it is characterized by low efficiency of its agriculture in relation to its natural, historical and economic conditions as well as investments in fixed and current assets of agriculture. j. bański (1999) closely focused on the territory of poland to verify previously identified problem areas in rural areas. the author also attempted to develop appropriate criteria and methods for identifying agricultural problem areas. based on his comprehensive review of the literature, he assumed that the problem area is a spatial unit characterized by some abnormality of one or many elements of this space. the problem area is characterized by concentration of negative phenomena that hinder its proper development (bański, 2000). a. rosner (2000) separated rural problem areas in poland. the author proved the thesis that funds from various sources aimed at stimulating socio-economic development and improving living conditions of the rural population, were transferred mainly to the most active gminas, where local governments were able to prepare realistic and well-founded applications. the analysis carried out by a. rosner (2000) showed that there are three dominant types of problem gminas in rural areas in poland. these are: 1. gminas with extremely unfavourable development conditions in many respects. 2. gminas with extremely unfavourable conditions determined by their demography and infrastructure. 3. gminas with extremely unfavourable conditions; however, they are mainly determined by their demography and the factor related to the state of natural environment. the author noted that problem rural areas should be privileged and receive the access to funds for equalisation of regional economic development earlier. comprehensive studies on agricultural problem areas in poland were also published by j. jadczyszyn and a. rosner (2013). the authors attempted to describe the socio-economic characteristics of areas with features preventing development of their agricultural function. analysis of the results showed that a large part of agricultural problem areas are composed of areas with socio-economic underdevelopment and poor dynamics of current changes. this applies primarily to lowland areas. on the other hand, in terms of agricultural function problem areas in mountain and foothill areas are characterized by relatively high dynamics and pace of socio-economic development. however, in these areas agricultural activity is limited or replaced by other functions, classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization 49 including tourist function. the results showed that polish gminas with no restrictions for the development of agriculture constitute 62.2% of all units, and problematic 37.8%. an attempt to identify peripheral rural areas in poland and to group them according to the similarity of their socio-economic characteristics was made by m. stanny (2014b). the author defined the level of socio-economic development using six different spheres, which were described with the chosen variables. these were the spheres of: demographic structure, social situation, labour market, de-agrarization, agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. such selection of indicators was made to reflect the most important problems of the regional structure of villages in poland. the distribution of synthetic measure obtained in polish rural space showed that rural areas in western poland are better developed than in eastern regions. the leading, territorially spacious region, highly developed is wielkopolska and the neighbouring regions: the central part of lubuskie voivodeship, northern part of dolnośląskie voivodeship and south-western part of kujawsko-pomorskie voivodeship. on the other hand, poorly developed gminas, classified as peripheral areas, prevail in eastern poland and they include the following voivodeships: podlaskie, lubelskie, świętokrzyskie, małopolskie, warmińsko-mazurskie and mazowieckie. they occupy compact spaces. however, in western poland units with low levels of development are located point-wise. based on the indicators of socio-economic development adopted by the author, using the taxonomic method, gminas were grouped into typologically homogeneous peripheral areas (fig. 1). this procedure produced three types of problem areas in poland: 1, 2, 3. the types identified by the author are diversified (heterogeneous) and internally consistent (homogeneous): • type 1 gminas (so-called “eastern type”) are concentrated in eastern poland (podlaskie voivodefig. 1. typology of peripheral rural areas in poland in 2009, non-hierarchical method source: m. stanny (2011), amended. 50 ewa pałka-łebek, iwona kiniorska ship, lubelskie voivodeships, subregional zones of mazowieckie, świętokrzyskie, and łódzkie voivodeships) and they cover almost half of all gminas classified as peripheral rural areas in poland. • type 2 gminas are located mainly in podkarpacie and in the region of the former central industrial district (pl. centralny okręg przemysłowy). they were called „southern type”. • type 3 peripheral gminas of so-called „northern type” were named as post-state-owned farms. the functional models of peripheral rural areas described by m. stanny (2014b) are a successful attempt to group them according to the similarity of socio-economic features. j. bański (2014) presented an overview of contemporary typologies of rural areas in poland. the concepts of typology of rural areas discussed by the author were based on two basic research approaches, i.e. location or structural. the classification procedure was applied by the author for rural areas. these areas were divided into smaller groups, which is justified in terms of financial perspective of 2014–2020, where the distribution of funds depends also on the type of rural area. functional classification of polish gminas was carried out by p. śleszyński and t. komornicki (2016). they made it for monitoring of spatial planning in gminas. for this purpose, they applied a deductiveinductive method, the so-called functional typology. as a result, 10 categories (types) of gminas were identified, which the authors presented cartographically. majority of polish gminas were classified as agricultural types (approx. 47%). over 10% of units showed extensive development. environmental protection functions play a major role in these gminas. among all other types, the most numerous is the group of gminas with other functions (e.g. tourist) (śleszyński, komornicki, 2016; fig. 2, p. 480). functional classification presented by the authors is a good reference point both for spatial monitoring and other applications related to the analysis of socio-economic processes. the proposed classification gave the opportunity to identify spatial regularities. the review of the distribution of problem areas developed for this study shows that due to the socio-economic structure there are strongly heterogeneous units in polish rural areas. therefore, their development problems differ. moreover, this development cannot follow a commonly adopted model, as this could lead to even greater diversification. generally, it is necessary to implement regional and local development policies, taking into account separate, original, local features and with greater involvement of local communities and authorities. following the review, the definition of problem areas was adjusted to the goal of the study. thus, problem areas in rural areas are composed of those regions (i.e. parts of rural space) with difficult problems of social, economic, technical, environmental or spatial nature. they are the cause of various development anomalies. problem areas understood this way create systems with pathological features, the development of which is accompanied by various irregularities that negatively affect the whole territory. elimination of these negative features is not possible only using internal forces, but it requires specific revitalization measures. 6. classification of rural areas in terms of their revitalization territorial classification is one of the key elements of socio-economic geography. as a result, its significance as an applied science increases. various approaches to classification and typology of rural areas may be found in the literature (both polish and foreign). a thorough review and assessment of the methodological background of contemporary typologies of rural areas in poland was made by j. bański (2014). the author wrote that the most important issue taken into account while choosing typology and classification methods is their goal. the attempt to classify rural areas in terms of their revitalization in this subsection follows the structural approach. it includes the most important features distinguishing the contemporary nature of rural areas in poland, their economic functions, as well as the need to solve various problems in risk areas. classification is connected with generalization and concise description. it is used to extract subgroups (subsets) in a specific group (set) of objects. it requires two main conditions, i.e. adequacy (i.e. the sum of subgroups (subsets) should equal the whole group (set)) and separability (i.e. subgroups (subsets) should not contain common elements) (nowak, 2004). thus, classification leads to the division of the whole group (set) of examined objects or units. j. parysek (1982) also distinguished typological classification. it is understood as the best accepted variant of classification in a given study. in this study, areas which require revitalization are understood as geographically separated territories with accumulated negative social, economic, spatial and natural phenomena, the solution of which requires special support. this fact seems to be justified since revitalization is a process aimed at boosting the development of problem areas. classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization 51 research procedure presented later on in the paper focused on the classification of rural areas in terms of the need for their revitalization may be treated, from a procedural point of view, as its specific type. the goal was to identify rural areas in poland with a diversified need for revitalization. three separate groups of rural areas were identified in terms of the need to undertake the above mentioned processes (tab. 2). these are: 1. regions which require the most urgent revitalization. 2. regions which require moderate revitalization. 3. remaining regions where revitalization complements other processes aimed at solving problems in degraded rural areas. the first group according to the need for revitalization is composed of: a. rural areas which require the most urgent revitalization. the first group of rural areas includes those areas where due to the accumulation of problems there is a need for the most urgent revitalization (the most degraded areas). it includes those rural areas with numerous development barriers, i.e. those with simultaneous accumulation of numerous negative tab. 2. classification of rural areas in poland according to the need for revitalization no. groups of rural areas distinguishing features of rural areas location 1. regions which require the most urgent revitalization. • regions where gminas with extremely unfavourable conditions determined by demographic and infrastructural factors (type 1 according to rosner) form compact spaces, • peripheral gminas (included in eastern and southern problem areas) forming coherent and continuous groups of units, • problem areas of national significance, • gminas not participating in development processes and areas located away from functional urban areas, • underdeveloped areas, • highly agricultural regions, with dominating agricultural functions or with tourist and recreational functions. • voivodeships: • warmińsko-mazurskie, • podlaskie, • lubelskie, • świętokrzyskie, • podkarpackie, • eastern part of mazowieckie (i.e. the following poviats: pułtusk, maków mazowiecki and ostrołęka), • eastern part of małopolskie (i.e. the following poviats: dąbrowa tarnowska, tarnów, brzesko, gorlice, nowy sącz). 2. regions which require moderate revitalization. • problem areas of inter-voivodeship significance, • underdeveloped areas, • peripheral gminas (included in southern and partly northern problem areas), • areas with high percentage of gminas with extremely unfavourable development conditions defined by factors of various nature, • regions with high percentage of gminas classified as lowland and mountain problem agricultural areas, • gminas not participating in development processes, • areas with dominating agricultural functions, with mixed functions and multifunctional transitional areas, • areas of degraded space for agricultural production conditioning development abnormalities. • central part of pomorze region (pomerania), • southern part of mazowieckie voivodship (i.e. the following poviats: lipsko, zwoleń, szydłowiec, radom, kozienice, przysucha), • rural areas in górny śląsk region (upper silesia), • southwestern part of małopolskie voivodeship (i.e. the following poviats: limanowa, nowy targ, zakopane and sucha beskidzka), • western part of dolnośląskie voivodeship, • southern part of lubuskie voivodeship, • south-eastern part of łódzkie voivodeship (i.e. the following poviats: opoczno, tomaszów mazowiecki, piotrków trybunalski and radomsko). 3. remaining regions where revitalization complements other processes aimed at solving problems in degraded rural areas. • areas where it is possible to identify degraded areas locally, • areas where it is advisable to solve existing problems, e.g. with revitalization. • other rural areas in poland, except for those included in the first and second groups. source: authors’ own elaborations. 52 ewa pałka-łebek, iwona kiniorska phenomena hindering proper development. their most distinctive features are the most unfavourable demographic and social processes in poland. there are abnormalities of elements of their space, and underdeveloped areas form compact spaces. in the eastern part of such a region, the percentage of gminas with extremely unfavourable conditions determined by demographic, social and infrastructural factors is very low. accumulated problems in areas which require the most urgent revitalization make them lagging behind other areas. these are spatial underdevelopments in terms of dynamics of changes taking place, with insignificant own development potential, which require special management and appropriate development policy. the characteristics of rural areas from the first group include also a very low level of economic, social and territorial cohesion. solving negative phenomena accumulated here requires intervention by local authorities and financing from external sources. rural areas in poland from the first group should be first to receive revitalization funds, and the implementation of projects aimed at this problem may bring numerous benefits. revitalization projects should contribute to reducing developmental backwardness (underdevelopment). they include: • regions where gminas with extremely unfavourable conditions determined by demographic and infrastructural factors (type 1 according to a. rosner, 2007) form compact spaces, • peripheral gminas (included in eastern and southern problem areas – m. stanny, 2014b) forming coherent and continuous groups of units, • problem areas of national significance (according to t. komornicki and p. śleszyński, 2009), • gminas not participating in development processes and areas located away from functional urban areas (bański, 2014), • underdeveloped areas, • highly agricultural regions, with dominating agricultural functions or with tourist and recreational functions (bański, 2016). these are the most visible and complicated agricultural problem areas in poland where pathological areas (i.e. those where their underdevelopment (backwardness) is so deep that farms deriving their income only from agriculture have no chances for development without external support) form compact spaces. they cover north-eastern, south-eastern and eastern parts of the carpathian region and northwestern functional region of polish rural areas. they include the following voivodeships: warmińskomazurskie, podlaskie, lubelskie, świętokrzyskie, podkarpackie and the eastern part of mazowieckie as well as the eastern part of małopolskie (tab. 2). the identified rural areas from the first group are extremely economically and socially incoherent. this is reflected in the lowest economic indices in poland and the european union. these areas require special development policies as they constitute the most significant problem areas in poland. it is necessary to introduce revitalization as soon as possible to neutralize negative problems in degraded rural areas. these regions should be the first to receive support and preferences in the form of funds for development and equalization of economic development. however, due to long-lasting underdevelopment solutions to various problems in these regions cannot be fully provided quickly. the first group of rural areas includes those areas where due to the accumulation of problems of various background there is a need for the most urgent revitalization (the most degraded areas). therefore, revitalization can contribute to reducing their underdevelopment (backwardness). the second group according to the need for revitalization is composed of: b. rural areas which require the most urgent revitalization. this group of rural areas includes those regions where due to existing problems of various nature there is a moderate need for revitalization. it is composed of areas with unfavourable development conditions, mainly in social and spatial terms. they include: • problem areas of inter-voivodeship significance (according to t. komornicki and p. śleszyński, 2009), • underdeveloped areas, • peripheral gminas (included in southern and partly northern problem areas according to m. stanny, 2014b), • areas with high percentage of gminas with extremely unfavourable development conditions defined by factors of various nature (a. rosner, 2007), • regions with high percentage of gminas classified as lowland and mountain problem agricultural areas (j. jadczyszyn, a. rosner, 2013), • gminas not participating in development processes (according to j. bański, 2014), • areas with dominating agricultural functions, with mixed functions and multifunctional transitional areas (after j. bański, 2016), • areas of degraded space for agricultural production conditioning development abnormalities. they include: the central part of pomorze region (pomerania), southern part of mazowieckie voivodeship, rural areas in górny śląsk (upper silesia), southwestern part of małopolskie voivodeship, western classification of rural areas in poland in the context of revitalization 53 part of dolnośląskie voivodeship, southern part of lubuskie voivodeship, south-eastern part of łódzkie voivodeship (tab. 2). they cover the central part of the north-western functional region of rural areas, central part of the central region, wyżyna śląska (silesian upland) region, western part of karpaty (carpathian) region and south-western part of sudety (sudeten) and wielkopolska and śląsk (greater poland and silesia) regions. the above-mentioned group of rural areas includes areas where it is advisable to initiate revitalization processes due to various problems existing there. this fact may contribute to their development progress. within the borders of rural areas, included in two groups of regions mentioned above, there are units classified by m. stanny (2012) as gminas with low and medium level of socio-economic development (see stanny, 2012; p. 111). the third group according to the need for revitalization is composed of: c. remaining regions where revitalization complements other processes aimed at solving problems in degraded rural areas. they are composed of remaining rural areas in poland, except for those included in the first and second groups. these include better developed areas. although they do not form problematic, pathological agricultural areas or areas with extremely unfavourable development conditions (determined by factors of various nature) on the national scale, but locally it is possible to identify degraded areas. therefore, in these areas it is advisable to solve existing problems, e.g. with revitalization. the classification of rural areas in terms of revitalization prepared for this study requires some generalization. this is mainly due to the fact that the classification procedure itself is a kind of generalization. the second reason is the lack of source statistical information in the resources of statistics poland regarding revitalization and problems in rural areas in particular gminas. the units developed for this study, due to diversified needs to initiate revitalization, differ between one another, i.e. they are heterogeneous, but internally consistent (homogeneous). areas classified to the first and second groups of rural areas in poland are particularly interesting. they are potential regions for implementing revitalization projects. they are introduced to areas of spatial and social degradation. in such areas revitalization should be introduced quickly in order to prevent degradation and negative changes from becoming irreversible. the results of theoretical considerations presented above show that in rural areas in poland there are regions with diversified needs for revitalization. of course, the boundaries between them are contractual, since it was assumed for greater simplicity that their problems are similar within entire administrative units. delimitation of regions in poland with different needs for revitalization was carried out in a purely theoretical way. it is clear that regardless of possibilities and benefits of revitalization, the final result – whether it will be introduced and what effects may be expected – depends on numerous different factors. each of the areas in the study with diversified needs for revitalization requires an individual approach, and the transformation processes occurring there must be considered in relation to local conditions. 7. summary and conclusions nowadays, rural areas face processes of social, cultural, spatial and functional degradation and they occur continuously with varying intensity. for this reason, revitalization consisting of various remedial actions plays a significant role in shaping the space of rural areas. its correct implementation is necessary for the proper development of these areas. poland’s accession to the eu structures, and thus the possibility of using eu funds for various revitalization projects, enabled gminas to develop local revitalization programmes, which were obligatory documents when applying for funding (subsidies). acquiring money from european funds currently provide a great opportunity for further socio-economic development at local level. however, it is important to remember that funds from the eu budget are not a ready solution guaranteeing stimulation of economic development in gminas. their unfavourable locations may as a result generate costs beyond financial capacity. however, the proper use of european funds, taking into account current needs and financial capacity of particular gminas as well as long-term development plans, may directly boost their sustainable socio-economic development. going beyond economic, sociological or spatial aspects of the interpretation of the concept of revitalization, it should be clearly underlined that it has an immensely broad meaning. it takes into account not only the structure of the economy, various social conditions, a specific way of developing rural space, relationship with geographical environment. revitalization is an individual and original category that plays a large role in the social, economic, political and cultural life of rural areas. associated 54 ewa pałka-łebek, iwona kiniorska phenomena, which occur in rural areas in poland, previously occurred in developed western countries. the complexity of revitalization manifests itself in its multidimensional (space, functions, society, economy, etc.) and multi-subject nature (local community, non-governmental organizations, local governments, entrepreneurs, investors). the study proved that the thesis that rural areas in poland are heterogeneous due to various previously developed socio-economic functions is true. therefore, their characteristic features include a variety of problems to solve, also with revitalization. without any doubts, a positive consequence of revitalization in rural areas is the fact that it provides opportunities for economic, social and general development for inhabitants of degraded areas. moreover, revitalization – by changing local conditions and improving the image of villages can promote individual development of their residents. therefore, problem areas may turn into development areas where various socio-economic problems will be solved. the actual benefits of revitalization processes, i.e. the activation and integration of residents, preventing social exclusion, complemented by the effects of infrastructural projects, are significantly higher than their costs, time spent and work. therefore, efforts to prepare suitable documents to initiate revitalization processes are reasonable and necessary. its approval will provide external funds that are so important for local communities. based on the what was discussed before, the following conclusions may be drawn: 1. revitalization of rural areas is not the goal itself, but it makes sense as it is integrated into all socio-economic projects and adjusted to key tasks. it provides peripheral areas with special opportunities for their development. 2. the examined process, due to the costs and duration of its effects, is currently the most effective development-oriented activity integrating various development goals in rural areas. 3. actions aimed at collecting funds for revitalization are particularly important at local level. therefore, local authorities must initiate and develop partnerships to gather funds for revitalization. 4. presently, revitalization plays an increasingly important role in shaping of rural space. it also affects the creation of social capital, which includes, among others, knowledge, 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well as scientific publications, as well as political groups and leaders, wrote and mentioned the agreement signed a hundred years ago, in may 1916, between the representative of the british empire, sir mark sykes, and the french representative, francois georges –picot concerning the future of the middle east1. all considered the “sykes – picot agreement” as the base for 1 see for example – the sykes – picot agreement at 100, youtube discussion of 2 hours, 26:24 minutes. also see – rethinking the map of the sykes – picot agreement legacy, bbc world youtube. the creation of the political map of the middle east divided for several independence states which exists today in that area. more new information to this ‘known’ agreement was supplied in a book called “a line in the sand” (baar, 2012) written by the journalist and political analyst, james barr, published in 2011 (american edition 2012). according to the overall public opinion, this agreement between the governments of britain and france created the existing political structures of the middle east – a structure that the muslim state (isis) tries to abolish. isis declared that the boundaries of the sykes – picot journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 50–58 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.019.5806 is the sykes – picot agreement of 1916 was the basis for the political division of the middle east? gideon biger department of geography and the human environment, tel-aviv university, p.o.b 39040, ramat aviv, tel aviv 69978, israel, e-mail: bigergideon@gmail.com citation biger g., 2016, is the sykes – picot agreement of 1916 was the basis for the political division of the middle east?, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 50–58. abstract in 1916, britain and france signed an agreement deals with the future division of the ottoman empire. this agreement, known as the sykes – picot agreement, after its two designers, the british sir mark sykes and the french françois george picot, is seen up today as the main act which created the modern middle east and responsible for some of its problems. the article present here point to another act, the decision of the newly established league of nation to create the mandate system and , following it, the san remo decision of april 1920 giving the mandates concerning the arab middle east to france and britain, as the main designer of the division of the middle east to its present form. key words first world war, ottoman empire, league of nations, britain, france, mandate system. is the sykes – picot agreement of 1916 was the basis for the political division of the middle east? 51 agreement are void and null2, tried to abolish the separate arab states units, and bring back the middle east to the situation in which there were no borders separating and disintegrate the arab world – the muslim middle east. james barr’s book reinforces this argument and tries to show that the “line drawn in the sand” drowned on the map attached to the agreement, put the middle east as a conflict area between france and britain struggled for control of the territory after the fall of the ottoman empire, hence the root of the ongoing conflicts in the middle east. moreover, from this stems the notion that middle eastern countries, with the possible exception of turkey and israel, are being artificial and unnatural, never been established according the frame of the “nation-state idea”. is that right? it seems that a historical research, which is based on original documents and previous studies, which try to examine what happened during the years 1914–1920, without preliminary views, present a slightly different picture. 2. background in the eve of world war i the ottoman empire controlled the entire area currently defined as the middle east (but not independent persia – now iran), with the exception of egypt, which was officially still under the sovereignty of the ottoman sultan but actually was, since 1882, control by the british empire. the accession of the ottoman empire in the great war (wwi) alongside with the central powers (germany, austria-hungary and bulgaria) against the allied (entente cordial) powers (britain, france, russia and serbia later joined by italy, greece, portugal, rumania and the usa), which took place mainly in europe but also in the middle east (and even in central africa) brought about discussions between these powers concerning the future of the middle east. an ottoman – germany victory would leave the situation as it is, under the authority of one empire – the ottoman, but a victory of the allied powers could bring into the creation of a new middle east. pre-war great britain held diplomatic outposts in the middle east, in egypt, cyprus and aden, and held a series of agreements with arab sheikhs along the persian gulf. france had religious, trade and political interests on the east coast of the mediterranean, particularly in syria, lebanon and palestine. thus france sought to achieve influence and control over the christian holy places in the ottoman empire 2 melisa ruthven, the map isis hates, the new york reviews of books, 25 june 2014. (especially in palestine – the terra sancta) and to secure control all over the area from the egyptian border – a line set in 1906 – as far north as aleppo in syria and the gulf of alexandretta (iskenderun, today in turkey) and in the area of mosul in northern mesopotamia (now iraq). in contrast, britain sought to strengthen its persian gulf positions and extend its control to the north of mesopotamia, where she hoped to find oil3. in western middle east britain look for palestine, due to activities which took place in the course of the war itself. attempts to attack the suez canal “the life line of the british empire”, by the ottoman army (with german encouragement and planning), although twice failed, made it clear to britain that the sinai desert is no longer a buffer in the age of modern war, aided by railroad and motor traffic by land and airplanes. crossing the desert barrier became more easily. it became clear to britain that a modern military force located in palestine is a constant threat to the suez canal, a waterway vital to the british empire. britain sought therefore to expand the actual power and control to all the territory between palestine and mesopotamia from egypt in the west, up to the ottoman – persia boundary, demarcated in 1914, in the east. britain wanted to get this area in order to ensure direct contact between the persian gulf and the mediterranean by continental railroad, roads and oil pipelines (frieschwasserraanan, 1955). tsarist russia had no territorial ambitions in palestine and focused its ambitions in other parts of the ottoman empire – the area of istanbul, the bosporus and dardanelles straits, and parts of eastern anatolia and armenia. the italians, who had occupied the territory of the ottoman empire in libya and some islands in the aegean sea, (the dodecanese islands) just before the war, asked for international approval of their control in these areas, as well as controlling some areas in central anatolia. russia and italy as well as britain, refused to accept that only one european power (france) and one christian faith (the catholic church) will rule the holy places in palestine. those conflicting ambitions of the allied countries, formed the basis for discussions on a possible partition of the ottoman empire, if the war will end in the collapse of it. thus, immediately upon the outbreak of war, after the ottoman empire joined the central power in 31 october 1914, france demanded for herself syria, including lebanon and palestine. russia, the closest ally of france, tended at the beginning to agree to this request but later russia withdrew its support for this demand because of the reluctance to see a catholic control 3 on the rival between britain and france in the middle east see y. nevakivi (1969) and e. monroe (1963). 52 gideon biger of the holy places in palestine, where the russian orthodox church had also interests and properties. in march 1915 the french government asked officially russia to accept french future control of syria and palestine at the end of the war, but the russians rejected the french demand for the control of the holy places in palestine, and to do so, russia enlisted the help of britain. the british government was not prepared to formally discuss the future of the ottoman empire before the latter defeated, but the british cabinet set up, in april 1915, a committee of experts headed by maurice de – bunsen, to discuss the british interests in the middle east4. france, which faced russian opposition and non cooperation from britain concerning its ambitious demands, withdrew from those demands and place a demand to control syria, lebanon and only part of palestine but suggested the internationalization of the holy cities of jerusalem and bethlehem. the russians claimed that the holy places in palestine also include nazareth, the galilee and the sea of galilee, and they were not willing to let the catholic church a control in these places. while france and russia discussed the future control over the holy places, britain found herself facing the ottoman – german threat on suez canal, and therefore demanded that all the territory of palestine, from haifa to aqaba, will become a neutral territory according to the suggestions of the de – bunsen committee, as well as allocated the alexandretta area to britain. thus britain and russia stood against the french claim to control palestine. 3. the sykes – picot (and two other partners) agreement these conflicting ambitions and the entry of additional plaintiffs for the territory of the ottoman empire –the zionist movement on the one hand and the arabs on the other – resulted in the opening of formal discussions between france and britain over the future of the middle east. these discussions began in october 1915. britain was represented by sir arthur nicholson, and later replaced by sir mark sykes. james barr describes in detail how well mark sykes enters the discussion and how he achieve a central place in it. barr also describes in detail the stands of the french discussant, francois georges-picot. after five months of discussion, an english–french agreement, known as the sykes – picot agreement, was signed by the british and the french .foreign secretaries in march 1916, dealing with the division of the 4 document „secret” a220 d.i.c. from 30 january 1915, file cab 1/27 in british archive p.r.o. ottoman empire after the war. in accordance with the terms of the agreement, which was later joined by russia and italy, france was due to have direct control over most of the eastern shore of the mediterranean sea, from rosh hanikra in the south to alexandretta golf in the north and the great syrian – african rift in the east. in addition, she was supposed to directly control cilicia, the south asian region of anatolia. the french control area was painted by blue color on the map that accompanied the original agreement. as concerning palestine france was supposed to have complete control of the area from rosh hanikra to the sea of galilee, including the upper galilee region, with the city of safed, hula lake and the northern part of the jordan river (fig. 1). in addition to this area france was due to help run an independent arab state, which was supposed to stretch from the great rift valley in the west and from the yarmouk river in the south, to the foothills of the zagros mountains in the east (the pre-war boundary between the ottoman and the persian empires) including mosul area in northern mesopotamia and to the taurus mountains in the north. this area, which included the golan heights, horan and the druze mountain, was due to become an independence arab state, in the france’s sphere of influence. this area was marked on the map (fig. 1) as zone a. britain, the other senior partner in this agreement, whose ambitions were mainly located in the eastern region of the persian gulf, was supposed to have full control over the southern and central valley of the tigris and euphrates rivers, from the city of baghdad south to the persian gulf coast and along this coast southward. britain was supposed also to control the haifa bay, the cities of haifa and acre and the area of the valley between them. this was due to britain’s desire for the construction of a deep water port in haifa that will be used in the future as the oil pipeline terminal and railroad connecting the rivers valley to the mediterranean sea. those two areas were painted with red color on the attached map (fig. 1). there was no territorial link between the two areas of british control, but between them another arab state was supposed to be established, which was due to stretch between the 1906 boundary line of egypt in the west to the persian gulf in the east. this area, which was due to be in british sphere of influence, was marked on the map (fig. 1) as zone b. russia and italy were jointed to the agreement. russia was due to control a large area in eastern anatolia, included armenia (yellow color on the map), while italy was to get the official control of the aegean sea islands occupied before the war, (rhodes and the dodecanese islands), as well as area in central is the sykes – picot agreement of 1916 was the basis for the political division of the middle east? 53 anatolia (green color on the map (fig. 1) as well having an area which due to be in the italian sphere of influence (marked c on the map (fig. 1)). the desire for controlling the holy places in the holy land, led to the creation of a neutral zone in palestine, which was supposed to be managed jointly by britain, france, russia, italy and a representative of the arab – moslem world. this area, known in the literature as the “international area” was painted by brown color on the map. this area was delimited around the holy cities of jerusalem, bethlehem and nazareth at the center, and all the area included in a line runs from rosh hanikra to the north west of sea of galilee, included capernaum) on the shore of the sea. from there the line run along the jordan river as far south as the dead sea, then westward toward the mediterranean sea, south of the city g (fig. 2). the very small scale of the map, 1:2,000,000 as the discussion was made regarding all areas of the middle east, not about palestine apart, later created some difficulties to the exact location of the line on map with larger scale (biger, 2003). 4. the meaning of the sykes – picot agreement the sykes – picot agreement as presented here was partly in contrast to the agreement achieved between britain with the arabs discussed early in 1915, promising the arab hashemite sharif hussein a total independence arab state in the whole arab middle east, but not the area west of the great cities of syria (aleppo, homes, hama and damascus). it is also stand in contrast to the 1917 balfour declaration in which britain promised to support the establishment of a jewish national home in palestine. anyhow, in a first sight, and as such it was first present to the world by the bolshevik authorities back in 1918, it appears that the sykes – picot agreement is an example of dividing the world by imperial powers irrespective of terrain or the will of local residents. such divisions have characterized the international politics during the nineteenth century and up to the war, and can therefore be seen herein as the culmination of the imperial process. however, this agreement can also identify new elements, and perhaps the beginnings of a new policy. the agreement initially recognized rights of the residents of the areas to be independent. the idea of establishing two independent arab states, albeit under the auspices of imperial powers but with the fig. 1. sykes – picot agreement map with french, britain, russia and italy control and sphere of influence areas source: the british archives p.r.o. 54 gideon biger definition of an independent state, was certainly an idea that never appeared before in any partition set by world powers. this idea was, perhaps without referring to its drafters and perhaps due to recognition of the emerging international system, a new ruling from which will continue to influence global policy, i.e. – the principle of self-determination, although still under the auspices of the superpowers, but in a new way. in the wards of the agreement: “1. that france and great britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent arab state or a confederation of arab states in the areas (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an arab chief. that in area (a) france, and in area (b) great britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. that in area (a) france, and in area (b) great britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the arab state or confederation of arab states”5. according to many scholars, among them also the author of “the line in the sand,” there is but a continuation of the policies of the past, but this view does not explain why certain parts of the division of the ottoman empire were to be british, french, russian and italian, while other parts were supposed to be arab independent states, although in european spheres of influence. more ever, this agreement also present for the first time the idea of joint international control over space containing holy sites of religious importance for the christianity and the islamic faiths. a similar idea was held on the eve of the war in the city of tangier in morocco, but there, political and economical reasons were behind it. thus the agreement proposed for the first time a joint international control for the regime which was due to govern palestine. from then on, this idea continued to be suggested, in one form or another, in subsequent programs of partition presented during the british mandate period in palestine, before the formal establishment of the state of israel. the idea which was rose in our days in order to create an “international space” in the “holy basin” of jerusalem is the direct result and continuation of an idea proposed by the sykes – picot agreement. 5. the demise of the agreement the agreement between britain and france which was signed due to the constraints of the war, did not fulfilled the requests of the signatories, and each side sought to attract the terms of the agreement to its benefit. the agreement was a confidential one, not being published publicly, and only the relevant governments know about it. however, tsarist russia, which was a one of the partner of the sykes – picot agreement, underwent a revolution when the communists took over the country in late 1917. the new regime revealed the agreement and released it publicly in order to show the evils of the imperialist powers. the soviet union announced its withdrawal from the agreement (fig. 3). this measure eliminated from the agreement. by this, the agreement lost its legal validity as one of its members abolished his participation in it. more ever, at the same time (late 1917 to september 1918), the egyptian expeditionary force – the military power of 5 sir edward gray, british foreign secretary to paul cambon, french foreign secretary, 16 may 1915, in british wwi document archive, official papers, sykes – picot agreement, 15&16 may, 1916. fig. 2. palestine according the sykes – picot agreement source: author own map. is the sykes – picot agreement of 1916 was the basis for the political division of the middle east? 55 the british empire led by general allenby in the west middle east, occupied palestine and syria. another british expeditionary force captured mesopotamia – the east rivers valley. thus, when the war was ended, in november 1918, britain ruled over all the areas designated for partition according to sykes – picot agreement of 1916, except north eastern anatolia which was intended for russia. shortly after the british military journey along the eastern coast of the mediterranean, in october 1918, general allenby organized the occupied area into three administrative subdivisions called “occupied enemy territory.”6 thus, “the southern occupied territory” included the districts of jerusalem, nablus and acre and was put under the command of a british general. “the northern occupied territory” (later called “western”), which included the districts of beirut, lebanon, latakia, antioch and alexandretta bay, was placed under the command of a french colonel. the third area – “the eastern occupied territory” included all the region east of the areas mentioned above, and was placed under the command of an arab officer, gen. ali reza al-riqabi. this act was based mainly on the division of the territory according the lines of the sykes-picot agreement, with one key difference. palestine, the area designed to be placed under international regime, was place under the command of a british officer. this was the first significant deviation from the agreement. not only had these acts changed the meaning of the agreement. even before, when united states joined the allied forces in 1917, its president, woodrow wilson, presented his 14 points determination of the us war’s goals. one of the points dealt with the idea of non – annexation of occupied areas after the war, another dealt with the independence of the arabs in the middle east (manuel, 1949). britain and france agreed to accept the american principles, and by this, they waived the sykes – picot agreement which allocated areas for british and french control in the middle east. the league of nations which was established in the 1919 paris peace conference, intended to deal with the future of the world after the war, tried to fulfill the idea of self – determination. thus new states were established in europe based on this principal (finland, estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland, czechoslovakia, yugoslavia) in the areas of the defeating empires. anyhow it also claimed that “with regard to those colonies and territories which as a result of the recent war ceased to stand under the sovereignty of states ruled them before, populated by people who are not yet able to stand by themselves under the 6 allenby to war office, telegram a.w. 1808, 23 october 1918, in file wo/101/71 in the british archives p.r.o. fig. 3. newspaper publication about secret treaty in manchester guardian, after soviet russia commissioner for foreign affairs, m. trostky. source: the manchester guardian, november 26, 1917, 5. 56 gideon biger difficult conditions of the modern world, we must act according to the principle that the welfare and development of the member nations concerned are a sacred trust of civilization”7. it was also stated that “custody of these people will be entrusted to advanced nations.” as for the middle east the league of nation declared that “certain committees, belonging to the turkish empire, reached the rank of development where we can recognize the existence of independent nations, provided they receive help and advice from a government mandate, until they can stand on their own”. according to those statements, advance countries, britain, france, south africa (for areas belong to the german empire in africa), australia, new zealand, japan (for areas belong to the german empire in the pacific ocean), got the mandate to administer those area, which were called “the mandate areas.” thus, the issues that were discussed during the peace conference were those dealing with which advance countries will get the mandate and for which areas of the previous ottoman empire it will be given. the league of nations stated that “the requests of these committees should be used as a main consideration in choosing a mandate.” britain and france, which stood behind the mandate idea, were the main candidates for the task to manage the new middle east as both were empires that had extensive experience in controlling and managing overseas regions, and they had clear interests in the middle east affairs. the league of nations recognized the right of the self determination of various groups settled in the middle east including the arabs, the christians maronites of lebanon,) the armenians and the kurds and added to them the jewish people because of their historical rights to the holy land, though actually they were not settled (but in minor number) in palestine at that time. the maronites and the jews gladly accepted the offer to manage them by the french (maronites) and the british (the jews) while the rest of the peoples of the region, and especially the arabs, have expressed their desire for the management of a modern superpower that hold no interests in the middle east, i.e. at that time, the united states (documents…, 1946). anyhow, the new regime in united states (president wilson ended his presidency in 1920) halt its actual activities in the middle east partly because its reluctance to be involved in that area and partly because of the isolationist policies it adopted, which even prevent her to join the newly established league of nations. thus, armenia and kurdistan, which were due to became mandate territories under the unite 7 article 22, league of nation declaration. all the other citation are from this declaration. states, lost that status (armenia got its independence only in 1989, after the abolition of the soviet union, kurdistan is still not an independent state). the league of nations, according to the interests of france and britain, decided, in april 1920, at a conference of san remo, after lengthy negotiations, that britain will receive a mandate to administer palestine and mesopotamia and france will get a mandate to the administration of syria and lebanon. this decision was the final act to abolish the original sykes – picot agreement, although, as will be present later, parts of its boundary’s lines have affected the new boundary lines which were created in the middle east. britain and france had to decide where the dividing line between the areas under their management will be delimited, which they did in the 1920’s, and each of them was sovereign to draw the internal boundaries of the areas under their management. france was to determine the line between christian lebanon and arab syria, which she did in 1920 as well as to negotiate the delimitation of the new boundary between syria and turkey. britain was supposed to place a line between palestine and mesopotamia (later iraq), as well as the future boundary between their controlled areas and saudi arabia. all of those lines, established in the 1920s, but not of palestine (now partly the state of israel), with minor changes, are the international boundaries of the middle east up to now. these boundaries are the boundaries isis wanted to abolish and not the sykes – picot lines. conclusion thus, the san remo resolution of 1920 and the later arrangements developed from it, not the sykespicot agreement of 1916, is the international act which gave britain and the france the power to act in the middle east, determine as they wish according to their ability, and thus created the territorial division and the border demarcation of the new map of the middle east. the new map used only some minor sections of the lines suggested by the sykespicot agreement. palestine, which became a british mandate territory, instead of an international area, adopted from the sykes – picot map only part of its eastern boundary, the line along the jordan river. the boundary between french lebanon and french syria with british palestine is differ from the agreement’s lines, transjordan was created entirely as a new area which did not appeared in the agreement, british iraq was extended far north of the sykes-picot line and included the mosul area. only the outgoing line from a point south of the druze mountain in syria to the town of deir a-zor on the is the sykes – picot agreement of 1916 was the basis for the political division of the middle east? 57 euphrates river remained unchanged from the map of the agreement. it therefore appears that the sykes – picot agreement did not “lived” too long, and “died” shortly after obtained and actually never came to realization (fig. 4). however, since the agreement became known to the world, and thus entered the history books, and partly because of extensive soviet propaganda as to the evil of the imperialist’s activities, which was adopted by all the post colonial countries and writers, especially those which deals with the breaking of the pseudo – arab unity, it remains etched in the memories of statesmen, political science students and politicians of all parties, as the agreement that shaped the territorial division of the middle east, without having any historical or geographical true base for this. references article 22, league of nation declaration. 28 june 1919. paris peace conference. barr j., 2012, a line in the sand: the anglo – french struggle for the middle east 1914–1948, w.w. norton and company, new york & london. biger g., 2003, the boundaries of modern palestine 1840–1947, routhledgecurzon, london & new york. document “secret” a220 d.i.c. from 30 january 1915, 2015, file cab 1/27 in british archive p.r.o. documents of the us state department, paris peace conference 191, 1946, vol. xiii, 780–781. frieschwasser-raanan h.r., 1955, the frontier of a nation, athlone press, london. manuel f.e., 1949, the realities of the america – palestine relations, public affairs press, washington dc. monroe e., 1963, britain’s moment in the middle east, 1914– 1956, chatto & windus, london. fig. 4. sykes picot map and the actual map of the middle east source: a line in the sand, james barr, 12. 58 gideon biger nevakivi y., 1969, britain, france and the arab middle east, 1914–1920, athlone press, london. russia and secret treaties, 1917, the manchester guardian, november 26, 1917, 5. ruthven m., 2014, the map isis hates, the new york reviews of books, 25 june 2014. 1. introduction the actuality of the study presented in this article is linked to the announcement of the european vector of ukraine’s development and the initiation of a series of reforms in public administration. “strategy for sustainable development «ukraine – 2020» announced in 2014 by petro poroshenko, the president of ukraine, as one among the most important goals defines the reform of management system, and the power decentralisation implementation. this determines new administration mechanisms in the healthcare sector at the local level. poland during its walk towards european union implemented a number of reforms in the healthcare sector. it seems to be feasible to learn them and apply in ukraine. the existing health care system in ukraine is characterised by outdated methods of delivering primary healthcare (phc) at the level of villages, and sometimes cities. this is explained by its artificial fragmentarity and atomism. as a result there is a substantial time delay in making diagnosіs and providing relevant medical treatment for patients. oftentimes people have to pay visits to six different doctors. this significantly increases the cost of medical assistance both for private households and local communities in general (попова, 2015). this way of proposing specialised medical services in phc facilities was implemented in ukraine in the middle of 20th century by building outpatient policlinics. in the total allocated budget of such an establishment traditionally about 41% are journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(1), 5–9 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.001.5250 fiscal consolidation for granting health services in a decentralized power in ukraine maryna bilynska (1), evgen kuliginskiy (2) (1) public health administration chair, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, ezhena pottier 20, 03057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: bilynska@ukr.net (corresponding autor) (2) public health administration chair, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, ezhena pottier 20, 03057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: kulginskiy@gmail.com citation bilynska m., kuliginskiy e., 2016, fiscal consolidation for granting health services in a decentralized power in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(1), 5–9. abstract the aim of the study is to find the optimal model of consolidating financial resources combined communities to ensure effective provision of health care in ukraine. the proposals on the formation of community expenditures for various kinds of medical care. investigated and analyzed the positive experience of poland reforming the health sector under decentralization of power that should be used in ukraine. key words decentralization of power, healthcare, ukraine. 6 maryna bilynska, evgen kuliginskiy non-formal payments of citizens. in the majority of such institutions the access of public to information on tariffs for medical services is not available. community-owned facilities are often used for rendering services on a private basis when payments out of patients’ pocket do not reach communal budgets (the so-called crawling privatisation) (ведернікова, 2014). it should be taken into consideration that today’s medical staff of specialized medical care oftentimes resist to any infrastructural changes in favour of preventive phc based on family medicine practice. current underdeveloped state of ukraine’s healthcare system is explained by low responsibility of citizens for their own health, by reduced requirements to quality standards and accessibility of medical assistance, family doctors often lack motivation to do timely preventive medical checks and provide effective treatment to patients. in fact a citizen noncontrollably “matures” to the state of being ill with sometimes neglected and deadly dangerous diseases requiring urgent specialized or highly qualified medical treatment. premature mortality rate is one of the highest in europe, first of all it concerns men in working age, and it is possible to prevent it by rendering medical assistance. accessibility of specialised healthcare to a patient bypassing a family doctor (urgent cases excluding) makes it financially dominant above preventive and phc. ukraine’s legislation demonstrates obvious preferences to specialised healthcare based on ‘customary law’ without taking into consideration ‘equitablе law’. in conditions of noticeable aging of population there is a modern form of providing physical and financial accessibility to quality phc in developed countries, in poland in particular, and this is a qualified family doctor. this practice enabled in these countries within a space of 30 years to reduce to some extent the premature mortality and disability of population thanks to timely diagnostics and quality treatment of patients by private family doctors first of all. 2. decentralisation processes and their effect on healthcare system today power decentralisation processes are underway in ukraine; they are mainly focused on strengthening of financial independence and accountability of local communes. we made an analysis and proposed a forecast on the number of village communes, we calculated their needs in pmc after the reform of local self-government has been implemented (table 1.). ukraine has got some success stories of healthcare system reformation, and it would be appropriate to use this experience. one of such examples is the city of komsomolsk in poltavska oblast which during 15 years has been a venue for phc model development. several pilot projects concerning the family medicine model have been implemented in this city. after adoption of several national laws and orders of the cabinet of ministers in 2015 a portion of taxes from businesses’ and individuals’ income tax will likely stay in the city budget of komsomolsk and it will make up 62.7% of total revenues. while tax on the individuals’ revenues will make up 29.6%, local taxes will make up 14% of the total budged revenues. state budget share in the city budget structure will make up 37.3% in a form of transferred subvention. at the same time in monthly deductions from salaries and corporate taxes the share of contributions aimed for healthcare system will not be specified. tab. 1. estimated number of village communes and their needs in pmc after self-governance reform in ukraine no. before reform after reform evolution of communes 1. 2015 – 11.5 thousand of city and village councils each village council accounts for 3 village-type settlements, 47 km² of territory; in ukraine 28% of villagers live 3 to 10 km distant from their village council. one village council accounts for 1.4 thousand permanent population; average population per village makes up 520 people. 2017 – 1.5 thousand communes; 9 thousand people in a commune; average number of settlements in a commune makes up 16; territory = 400 km²; max distance to administrative centre is 20 km; population of one village is 520 people. health care provision in villages 2. three paramedics at three feldsher-midwife stations, or a family doctor and a nurse rarely; car is rarely available. as per criteria of family doctors availability in rural areas (1.2 thousand) a commune with 9 thousand people needs 7-8 family doctors, 14–16 nurses and 7 nurse assistants. source: own studies based on: ведернікова, 2014. fiscal consolidation for granting health services in a decentralized power in ukraine 7 as the experience of poland showed to give real rights to local communities and rayons to form their own budgets the effective tools were implemented to ensure their filling up. so, a share from the national budget makes up 25% from individuals and 15% from businesses. 100% of proceeds from tax on land, real estate, death-duties and agricultural activities stay in local budgets (kutzin, 2001). the base of revenues of poviats and cities made equal to poviats consists of local contributions form sales, parking services and other paid services. a share of state budget in the total budget of local governance only makes up 0.4%. eu contributions make up 9%. the exceeding limit of budget income per capita is 15%. to level voivodeships’ capacities applied are subsidy and grant mechanisms, as well as money of environment protection fund, international investments bank, grants for education, credit lines, bonds are involved. during 17 year poland participated in the european programme of creating special economic zones. today they are 14 effective. before 2020 there is an existing limit on their space, it should not be more than 20 ha each. enterprises enjoy tax holidays on profit and real estate. сompensations for invested costs in the amount of 55% for small and 45% for medium businesses are stipulated. during 15 year period the amounts invested annually in economic zones made up more than 1 bn euro and 15 thousand jobs were created (lekhan et al., 2007). after joining the eu poland received in 2004– 2006 3 bln euro annually to solve the mentioned issues of which 30% were allocated to regions to spend at their own discretion. during the period of 2007–2013 years 37 bln euro was spent (about 9 bln annually). for the next 7 years 2014–2020 more 2 bln euro were envisaged. of this amount 25% are allocated to the regions. these actions provided that poland increased its gdp per capita by 19% (growth from 49% in 2004 to 68% in 2013). this enabled to create appropriate organisational and financial conditions for developing modern health care system. 1. system risks during reform implementation in poland should be listed as follows: 2. the government tried to load self-governance with “uncomfortable” powers or to snatch powers and money from local communes. so in this case it is necessary to have clear legal and administrative tools for powers realisation. this concerns the refusal of central government to amend laws in its favour. delegation of powers and budget formation to poviats and implementation of relationships: strong gmins and poviat, poviat and strong city, poviat and powiat’s territory. formation of poviat councils is feasible by delegating deputies of gmin councils. 3. new health care system – re-boot let’s consider a possible strategic action plan of ukrainian authorities and civil society to create a new health care system. the essence of administrative-territorial reform in ukraine should concern the formation of institutional mechanisms enabling effective functioning of social services especially at the level of village and city communes. therefore the first steps in creation of new health care system, which will be based on modern socially oriented mechanisms viable in the market environment must be the following: • to ensure adoption of new legislation facilitating demonopolisation, economy legalisation, respect to property rights in social infrastructure, especially healthcare and its functional and financial structuring according to types of medical services; • from political point of view – to facilitate creation of policy susceptible to health care system needs by newly elected local government bodies who should provide adequate conditions for priority funding of preventive and phc based on family medicine practice; • real separation of local budgets from the state budget, transfer rights to communes for real creation and filling of their budgets and their spending including for the health care sector; • transfer property rights for land, buildings, medical equipment to local communes, including the health care sector; • transparency of medical services purchasing schemes; • to ensure real independence of village councils chairmen; we propose to distinguish the following conditions of the development of new health care system in ukraine: 1. political will of the state leaders and local-level authorities in justification and modernisation of the country, region, rayon and local communes, their capacity to overcome the resistance to changes. 2. active involvement of experts community in developing strategies for changes implementation. 8 maryna bilynska, evgen kuliginskiy 3. support to citizens, first of all to young people below 35. 4. support to progressive medical community, first of all to young people with statesmanship vision. 5. professional independent media. 6. development of professional competencies in modern public management. from the point of view of ensuring citizens with health care the administrative-territorial and local governance reform should stipulate the creation of: at a commune level: • in villages – outpatient clinics of family medicine to render phc, urgent, palliative and hospice medical assistance. at the same time money transfers should be ensured for patients sent by phc facilities to institutions of specialized medical services. first of all it concerns children, disabled people, pregnant women and lonely people. • in cities – deployment of phc centres based on family medicine practice, growth of specialised medical assistance. in regions: • integration of institutions of specialised medical assistance based on the patients’ needs and budget capacities. in oblast centres: • financing patients’ needs from communes and rayons and other regions to provide highly qualified medical assistance. 4. summary based on the described above we can outline the following tasks in the area of creating and consolidating financial funds for rendering healthcare services in ukraine. village and city communes should be able to finance outpatient clinics of family medicine, urgent, palliative and hospice medical assistance or to delegate these functions to rayon level. within a commune the evaluation of inhabitants needs in consultative, diagnostic and other specialised assistance should be carried out (hospitals). in fact this is a justified financial resource at the rayon level. the control over these funds spending should be performed by deputies of village, town and city councils. based on poland’s experience deputies of local communes should be delegated to rayon councils to control the effective spending of monetary funds, first of all in health care sector. it means secondary level healthcare should be provided by rayon healthcare departments under the control of the rayon council deputy delegated by a commune. under these conditions the second level healthcare structure will clearly correspond to realistic healthcare needs of village, city, rayon communes with regard to their financial capacities. also a 3-fold increase in expenditures for preventive, phc, palliative and hospice, urgent and rehabilitation assistance should be stipulated. expenditures for secondary health care should be reduced respectively, first of all for outdated hospital infrastructure. this will enable to partially legalise communes’ resources intended for secondary health care funding. for communes of the cities it will be funds localisation for rendering all types of the abovementioned medical services when they will get respectively from 10% up to 35% of the total funding. in the cities it is feasible to form a general pool consisting of autonomous modules per each type of health care. in villages this approach will concern financing preventive, phc, urgent, palliative and hospice assistance at their own cost, or this function will be transferred to the rayon level. there is a controversial discussion on the issue how to finance emergency medical assistance and this requires addition study. communes should be able to calculate their real needs in such type of service and to control/delegate their financial resources to a rayon or oblast level. financial resources of communes (basic level) should be consolidated around a family doctor and family nurse working in outpatient clinics of family medicine or phc centres. at the regional level responsibility for the specialised health care should be laid on a hospital. during transition stage from existing to new administrative-territorial and local self-government system it is feasible to consolidate phc and shc services purchasing at the level of rayon healthcare departments. this coincides to some extent with erb who recommendations about consolidation of phc and shc purchasing. taking into consideration the experience of poland the creation of modern rayon and oblast selfgovernance levels should become the next step in the management system decentralisation (at least in several years). as this will have a cardinal impact on health care, education, and housing and communal services sector, road and communications sector management, it is necessary to prepare and adopt a number of legislative acts. fiscal consolidation for granting health services in a decentralized power in ukraine 9 references kutzin j., 2001. a descriptive framework for country-level analysis of health care financing arrangements, health policy, 56(3), 171–204. lekhan v, rudiy v, shishkin s., 2007, the ukrainian health fi­ nancing system and options for reform, series: health financing policy paper, 2007/1, who regional office for europe, copenhagen, http://www.euro.who.int/__data/ assets/pdf_file/0007/97423/e90754.pdf [19.10.2015]. ведернікова і., 2014, децентралізація: чи ввійде україна у відчинені двері, як польща 1989-го? дзеркало тижня, 26(172), 1–4. закон україни: про добровільне об’єднання тери­ торіальних громад, № 676-viii від 04.09.2015, http:// zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/157-19 [11.10.2015] закон україни: про здійснення державних закупівель, №  1197-vii від 10.04.2014 http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/1197-18?test=qy4mfbtc78fvxyruziyybrh9hi 4kms80msh8ie6 [11.09.2015] закон україни: про ратифікацію додаткового протоколу до європейської хартії місцевого самоврядування про право участі у справах органу місцевого самоврядування, № 1664-vii від 02.09.2014, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1664-18 [14.11.2015] закон україни: про співробітництво територіальних громад, № 1508-vii від 17.06.2014 http://zakon2.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/1508-18 [15.11.2015] попова о., 2015, реформуємо місцеве самоврядування «як у польщі»: хто більше? дзеркало тижня, 4(200), 4–5. проект закону україни: про внесення змін до конституції україни (щодо децентралізації влади), №2217а від 01.07.2015, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/ webproc4_1?pf3511=55812 [18.11.2015] розпорядження кму: про схвалення концепції реформування місцевого самоврядування та територіальної організації влади в україні, №333-р від 01.04.2014 р. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3332014-%d1%80 [30.10.2015] 1. introduction memory politics of the ukrainian government after euromaidan was one of the most discussed topics by scholars, journalists, ukrainian and foreign politicians, local and national activists. although this issue was not identified by citizens as the most important for them (kulyk, 2017), decommunization was one of the topics raised during presidential campaigns (balacuk, 2019). in this research, the data from 6 indepth interviews conducted in august – december 2019 in kharkiv with local experts and activists following the previously prepared questionnaire is used. even though the experts selected for interviews work in various fields1, their opinions certainly reflect only certain narratives. it also may differ from the diversity of opinions of kharkiv city dwellers and the residents of general grigorenko/marshal zhukov avenue, which is discussed in this article. thus, the main tasks of the research are: 1. to analyze how completed in the opinion of the central authorities decommunization process 1 academia, art, and architecture, public administration, education, voluntary organization. some of them are organizers of the local euromaidan and equality parade. journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(3), 55–64 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.3.06 experience of implementing decommunization laws in eastern ukraine: a kharkiv case denys kutsenko department of political science, pultusk academy of humanities, vistula group of universities, mickiewicza 36b, 06-100 pułtusk, poland, orcid: orcid: 00000002-9839-4292 e-mail: denyskutsenko1989@gmail.com citation kutsenko d., 2020, experience of implementing decommunization laws in eastern ukraine: a kharkiv case, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(3), 55–64. abstract the article deals with an instrumental use of the national legislation by the local authorities in kharkiv, the second-largest city in ukraine and shows how the shortcomings in the national legislation on the politics of memory can be used by the local political elites of “borderland city” in an attempt to raise the rating and/or to mobilize the electorate before the elections. consequently, several interviews with local experts and activists were conducted in 2019, and qualitative data analysis was made for the transcribed texts as well as a short review of other papers on the subject. also, the article shows how the local court can accelerate the process of depriving a historical building of the status of an architectural monument using decommunization laws. the study confirms the existence of serious polarization in ukrainian society and the superficial nature of decommunization (started in 2015), which stimulates the deepening of such polarization. key words decommunization, ukraine, kharkiv, politics of memory. received: 01 june 2020 accepted: 30 august 2020 published: 30 september 2020 56 denys kutsenko was instrumentalized by local elites in eastern ukraine. 2. to analyze how decommunization laws were used for corporate business interests in kharkiv. the primary method for this research is the analysis of decisions made by the local authorities and courts in kharkiv as well as qualitative analysis of interviews with experts. 2. decommunization in ukraine and kharkiv oleksandr grytsenko made an in-depth analysis of the decommunization process in his book “decommunization in ukraine as a public policy and as a cultural phenomenon” (grytsenko, 2019). he showed alternative ways of solving problems, which decommunization dealt with (leave it as it is, liberal alternative, radical alternative) as well as presented opinions of some critics of ukrainian historical politics. in the second part of his book, o. grytsenko researched decommunization as a socio-cultural process. georgy kasianov showed the image of ukrainian historical politics from the 1990s to 2010s in his fundamental monography “past continuous: historical policy 1980–2000: ukraine and its neighbours” (kasianov, 2018). as local phenomena, decommunization was described in collective work “politics and memory. dnipro – zaporizhzhya – odesa – kharkiv. from the 1990s till today” (gaidai et al. (eds.), 2018). the authors underlined purposes and attempts of local authorities to make kharkiv a “bourgeois” city, where markers of its proletarian character from soviet times without being noticed were removed (gaidai et al. (eds.), 2018, pp. 84–88)2. some toponymic changes made in kharkiv, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics were explored by m. takhtaulova (2017), a scholar and activist of the local toponymic group during the decommunization process, and from june 2019 a head of the kharkiv department of the institute of national memory (north-east territorial department) (u harkovi..., 2019). as m. takhtaulova showed it, kharkiv urban toponymic space has not changed much after 1991, because local authorities, as well as local citizens, did not consider the soviet monuments and the soviet toponyms as a strange marker of occupation or colonizer. over time, the soviet monuments became almost invisible, and the soviet names of urban objects lost their “semantic sense” (gaidai et al. (eds.), 2 of course, both the proletarian and revolutionary character of kharkiv in soviet time, as well as its bourgeois character after 1991, was rather artificial and did not represent the whole image of this east-ukrainian city. 2018, p. 84). of course, that changed in 2014, when anti-maidan protesters3, as well as those, who supported the federalization of ukraine (or supporters of proclamation so-called “people’s republics,” or supporters of succession to russian federation), started to use the soviet symbols and monuments as their markers and places where they manifested their willings (kozachenko, 2019). one of the reactions of the ukrainian government was decommunization, which started with the adoption of decommunization laws by the ukrainian parliament on april 9, 20154. according to o. grytsenko, decommunization was “all ukrainian ritualized campaign of symbolic liberation from the burden of the soviet totalitarian past” (grytsenko, 2019, p. 317). as o. grytsenko pointed out, there were four groups of main “decommunization narratives,” including the purification of ukraine, regional (decentralized) narrative, opposition narrative of “banderaization” of ukraine, and liberal narrative. in this article, the local narrative in the city of kharkiv is analyzed, where, in o. grytsenko terms, “the patriotic activists have long-lasting experience of not too strong support of ukrainization [...] efforts from the capital” (grytsenko, 2019, p. 209). o. grytsenko shows and considers the efforts of local activists, who supported decommunization and make projects of renaming urbanonyms (like the kharkiv toponymic group) as was coveted for the ukrainian state and should be nationalized. other prominent ukrainian scholars, such as m.  minakov and g. kasianov (mentioned in grytsenko’s work5), criticized decommunization and con3 anti-maidan protest in 2013 were organized by the party of regions to show mass support of president yanukovych (who was honorary chairman of the party), but from february 2014 this movement “suddenly acquired a powerful grassroots dynamic in regions in south-eastern ukraine” (ishchenko, 2016, p. 9). 4 spontaneous decommunization in kharkiv started earlier, with leninopad, and demolishing of the soviet monuments took place. the names of these laws (the english translation cited from grytsenko, 2019): on the legal status and honouring the memory of fighters for ukraine’s independence in the twentieth century (no. 314-viii), on perpetuation of the victory over nazism in world war ii of 1939-1945 (no. 315-viii), on access to archives of repressive agencies of the totalitarian communist regime of 1917-1991 (no. 316-viii), on the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols (no. 317-viii). 5 o. grytsenko did not mention left critics of historical politics in ukraine after 2014. some criticists can be included to one of the narratives, defined by the author, but despite the fact that left-wing in the ukrainian public policy is rather marginalized, the academic and publicist achievements of left intellectuals should be represented in analysis of the memory politics in ukraine (serhiienko, 2017). experience of implementing decommunization laws in eastern ukraine: a kharkiv case 57 sidered it as “an attempt to create a constitutionally barred ideological monopoly” (minakov, 2019); also “anticommunist iconoclasm reminds bolshevik ecstasy in the destruction of monuments of autocracy, “decommunization” of topography is the flip side of its “communization” (kasianov, 2016). the kharkiv toponymic group was created after adopting and signing decommunization laws in 2015. the activists from this group were the most active among other ngo actors of decommunization, and they made their project of renaming and sent it to the city council, which had to provide decommunization in the city. as dominated by the former party of regions6 members with the majority, totally depended on the city mayor gennady kernes, the city council was rather “decommunization-skeptic,” what has been confirmed by the way in which decommunization was represented in the city-owned media as well as in the scandals, provoked by city authorities during a public discussion on the city and district level (kutsenko, 2018). however, decommunization in kharkiv took place7 (221 toponyms changed their names by the decision of the city council and the city mayor, and two toponyms, seven administrative districts and six subway stations by the decision of the head of the oblast (regional) administration) (takhtaulova, 2017), and that were admitted even by the members of the kharkiv toponymic group (v har’kove..., 2016). another decommunization analysis was presented by o. gnatiuk (2018). despite not some ideological bias, oleksiy gnatiuk showed, using data on renaming in 36 ukrainian cities, that “decommunized” kharkiv is not at any of the ideological poles. moreover, somewhere in the kharkiv oblast (even though the only city of the region under this study was kharkiv), there are fault lines between “nationalistic ukraine,” “cossack ukraine” and “post-soviet ukraine.” of course, the reinforcement of gnatiuk’s thesis required the study of the whole array of names in large and medium-sized cities of slobozhanshchyna and donbas. presenting an in-depth sociological analysis of renaming in kharkiv, o. golikov (2020) criticized takhtaulova’s conclusions regarding decommunization in kharkiv and showed that the authors of 6 propresident party of regions had the largest fraction in the ukrainian parliament and formed the ukrainian government in 2010–2014 (kuzio, 2015). expert 3 confirms that the local structures of the party of regions were involved in the beating of the local activists and attacks on the euromaydan in kharkiv. 7 an interactive map of decommunization in kharkiv can be found at https://allkharkov.ua/news/state/nteraktivna-kartadekomynzac-harkvsko-toponmki.html normative acts should be separated in order to analyze the renaming process, taking into account their source of legitimacy. since the president appoints the head of the oblast administration (governor), the sources of legitimization are different for the city council, the city mayor and the governor. the heads of the oblast administration are not inclined to rely on public opinion, but pursue the policy of the centre in the region. as o. golikov (2020) has shown, that was the reason the renaming carried out by the city council is less conflictual and more elaborated and justified for its residents. moreover, the degree of localization of the renaming carried out by the oblast administration is lower in comparison with the city council. however, there was a conflict during the decommunization process between the city council on the one hand and the activists and the oblast administration on the other. both the interviewed experts and one of the specialists of the regional department of the institute of national memory (zub, 2016) pointed out that the majority of the city residents did not show much interest in decommunization. however, speaking about decommunization in kharkiv expert 1 (e1) said: people just do not attach importance to renaming, that is the very weakness of decommunization because it does not explain at all who these people were, whose names we removed from the map. 3. other decommunization actors the complete list of historical political actors was suggested by g. kasianov (2016), and among others, there are ngos. not less than 2000 non-government actors took part in historical politics directly or indirectly. it is impossible to mention all kharkiv out of the government decommunization actors; however, after the process’ period (for the city council – november 21, 2015, for the city mayor – february 21, 2016, for the oblast administration – summer 2016), when all toponyms had to be changed as well as the monuments, memorial plaques had to be removed, the local right-radical activists such as the right-wing youth of the national liberation movement “right sector”– kharkiv region, ngo “svitanok,” spearheaded by the former euromaidan activist, started to gather information about the non-decommunized objects. they removed or forced the local authorities to remove the soviet symbols or memorial plaques to people that were taken to the list of the institute of national memory, or should be removed in their 58 denys kutsenko opinion8. the activists (and the kharkiv toponymic group) used the narrative of “purification of ukraine” from communist and sometimes colonial, imperial, and russian legacy (and that expanded the scope of the decommunization law (riabchuk, 2016)). the local right-wing forces participated in the policy of memory not only by destroying the monuments and memorial plaques but also by installing new monuments. “eastern corps” in 2014 installed in the city center the cossack sirko9 monument, and in 2017 new sirko monument was unveiled in the presence of the city mayor kernes and oleg shyriayev, the head of “eastern corps.” kernes “took the opportunity to show his loyalty to the central authorities, who, despite maidan demands, compromised with the old local elites” (gaidai et al. (eds.), 2018, p. 67). eastern corps, now the national police company, founded mainly by the members of the neo-nazi group “patriot of ukraine” (shekhovtsov, 2020) in 2014. after may 2019, when zelensky won presidential elections in ukraine, kernes was not required to show loyalty and acceptance of poroshenko’s identity politics (of which decommunization was part), so he could openly start a new little memory war. 4. a case of marshal zhukov avenue after the first wave of decommunization, when the city council adopted toponymic changes, the oblast administration (headed by igor raynin) also renamed some urbanonyms. one of the oblast administration decision was to change the name of marshal zhukov avenue to general grigorenko10 avenue. as per o. grytsenko (2019), marshall zhukov as a person was not subject to the law because he took part in the resistance and expulsion of nazis from the territory of ukraine (grytsenko, 2019, pp. 137, 148). at the same time, he was included to the list by uinm, and although this list was recommendatory, the heads of the oblast administrations in different regions of ukraine interpreted it as obligatory 8 sometimes, the excessive activity of these groups caused indignation among the members of the kharkiv toponymical group (and later the specialists of the local branch of the institute of national memory), for example, when the evidence and artefacts of kharkiv binding to the revolutionary events of 1917–1920 were destroyed (see more at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=956566891157844& id=100004136254577). 9 ivan sirko (1605(?)–1680) ukrainian cossack leader, koshovyi otaman of the zaporizhian host. 10 general petro grigorenko (1907–1987) was a dissident and writer, one of the founders of the moscow helsinki group and ukrainian helsinki group. (grytsenko, 2019; golikov, 2020) and changed the street names according to this list. after that renaming, vitalii khomutynnik, a businessman, a member of parliament and co-head of the same party which the mayor kernes belonged to (vidrodzhennya), sent an address to the president administration with the proposition to return marshal zhukov’s name to the avenue and that was actively promoted by the city-owned press (v ap..., 2016) and television (prospektu..., 2016). marshal zhukov avenue was not the historical name of the street that appeared in this area of kharkiv in the 60s (fig. 1). until 1982, that was stadionna street (stadium street), later 60-littya srsr street (60 years of the ussr street), and marshal zhukov avenue since 1990 (kudelko (ed.), 2011). in 1995, next to the district administration, a zhukov’s monument was revealed, and in 1997, a zhukov’s monument appeared in the underground station named “komsomolska” before 1994, and from may 1994 – marshal zhukov11 (har’kovskij enciklopedičeskij slovar’, 2014, p. 251). in 2019 the parliamentary elections were held, and the mayor of kharkiv, gennady kernes, in support the candidates from the opposition bloc in the parliamentary elections, decided to use the tacit opposition of kharkiv citizens to decommunization, publicly urging citizens to sign a petition to return general grigorenko avenue the name of marshal zhukov (commotion..., 2019). the petition registered on a site of the city council on may 8, 2019, and on may 10, it collected the necessary 5000 votes. after that, on june 19, the question of renaming general grigorenko avenue to marshal zhukov avenue was brought on the session of the city council. despite the violations and the protest of the opposition deputies, as well as the protest near the building of the city council, the majority decided to return the name of zhukov avenue, as well as to give the name of general grigorenko to the nameless street in the city center (verhom..., 2019). as early as on june 2, during the party congress with the participation of the mayor of the city in the kharkiv sports palace which is located on the general grigorenko/marshal zhukov avenue, the radical activists (freikorps, that have previously involved in attacks on equality parade in kharkiv (interview with expert 6, december 2019, kharkiv), right sector, ngo svitanok, etc. (troubled..., 2019) demolished the zhukov’s monument. however, on july 10, the monument was restored. parliamentary elections took place in ukraine 11 coincidentally, in moscow, a first zhukov’s monument also was revealed in 1995 due to the 50th anniversary of the victory in wwii. experience of implementing decommunization laws in eastern ukraine: a kharkiv case 59 on july 21, 2019, and a single candidate, supported in kharkiv by gennady kernes, did not get into parliament. reacting to the renaming of the avenue, the activists began to tear down the signs with the new name, but this forced community services to hang signs with the name of the street at an altitude accessible only if special equipment was available (fig. 2) (barkov, 2019). after the city council decided to rename the street, the city council deputy ihor cherniak and the regional council deputy dmytro bulakh appealed to the kharkiv district administrative court (miroshnichenko, 2019), which ruled on september 10 that the city council’s decision to rename the street was illegal. also, the institute of national memory issued a statement according to which the ukrainian legislation forbids to call objects of toponymy by zhukov’s name (z žukovim..., 2019). however, the city authorities appealed and organized online voting on the website of the city council, according to which 86% voted for turning the name of zhukov avenue. on february 26, 2020, the street again was renamed from general grigorenko avenue to marshal zhukov avenue (prospektu..., 2020). the new head of the national institute of memory anton drobovych stated that voting on the website of the mayor’s office was rigged (u harkovi..., 2020). however, the announcement of the uinm about the second renaming was more restrained in comparison with the previous one and stated not only that the decision was against the law, but also that the kharkiv authorities „are engaged in speculation and opposition of two war veterans petro grigorenko and (...) marshal zhukov” (zaâva..., 2020), while the statement of january 27, 2020, mentions that such a decision „contradicts the call of the president to use when naming articles that unite, rather than separate ukrainians” (iniciativa..., 2020). one of the uinm statements also refers to a press conference members of the demsokyra party12, in which they explain why the online voting was rigged (mis’krada..., 2019). while in 2014–2019 (and during yushchenko presidency), there was an antagonism between the regional and the city authorities regarding the policy of memory in the region (zhurzhenko, 2016), now the oblast state administration has limited itself to stating that the local governments, when deciding on the renaming, should “act in strict compliance with the current legislation” (rišennya..., 2019). president zelensky called on kernes to become an arbiter in a dispute over the name of the avenue (lashenko, 2019). thus, the oblast state administration ceased to be a subject of memory policy in the region, at least for a certain period, and the city authorities started the new memory war with the activists. 12 activists from demsokyra also participated in pulling down the zhukov’s monument in june, some experts attribute it to president poroshenko (operaciâ..., 2019). fig. 1. old inscription with the street name, august 2019 source: image by denys kutsenko. 60 denys kutsenko when asked why kernes initiated the renaming of the avenue and provoked the demolition of the zhukov monument, all the interviewed experts agreed that this was done to mobilize the electorate before the elections. e1 (historian, publicist, translator): here is the latest story with zhukov, very revealing. it is a vivid example of a very unhealthy climate that has developed in the last two or three years of poroshenko’s presidency. that is when all failures and low ratings should have been compensated by russophobic and sovietophobic hysteria, and here we are. and then a very clear signal was given with the renaming of the avenue in kyiv after bandera. well, i understand that the vast majority of people involved in the renaming, which took place in a strange procedural form, and those who welcomed it very badly imagine who these people were, what they were doing there. for them, these are just symbols of the struggle against russia, i.e. we renamed the avenue we spit in moscow’s face. e2 (political scientist): humanitarian manipulation and humanitarian speculation on history, language, and cultural identities remain one of the main instruments of mobilization in our policy. we now have the primary phenomenon of zelensky, who was able to unite both anti-maidan and promaidan publics in principle. i think that we will return to this binary schism in some time. roughly speaking, if you look at the electoral maps of the 2004 and 2010, you will see that it is the same electoral map of ukraine, in general. this local [department] of the institute [the institute of national memory] was created as an opposition to the way kernes built his political campaign through zhukov and through it all. and the appearance of the [local department]of the institute of national memory means simply that in future this topic will be long-playing and interesting for the media, it is necessary that it be a conflict one. for me, it is just evidence that the conflict will continue in the local elections and perhaps in our next election cycles. е3 (euromaidan activist): it was a pure election thing. especially, they did it simultaneously in kharkiv and odesa. it did not help in the voting; they really took 8%. e4 (volunteer and political scientist): it was done for the elections so that those 70 percent of sovietophylls in the kharkiv region could show that ‘we will support you, we love you, we are all with you. fig. 2. a sign with a new street name and a trace of an old sign. august 2019 source: image by denys kutsenko. experience of implementing decommunization laws in eastern ukraine: a kharkiv case 61 however, it did not help him – not a single person, a protege of kernes, was elected as a majoritarian. е5 (pr-director, art director, activist): this may not be about their rebellious values, this is about the fact that very quickly finds a response from his electorate in a very simple whirlwind, that there was a struggle against fascism, and now new power comes, and fascism imposes. as can be seen, expert 1 and expert 2 characterized the policy of memory of the last years of the poroshenko presidency as separating the population and leading to polarization. the narrative used by these experts, according to grytsenko’s classification, is rather liberal. 5. a case of the mussuri theater one of the historic buildings in the center of kharkiv, the mussuri theater, was included in the list of architectural monuments as a building in which worked all-ukrainian congresses of councils, congresses and conferences of the communist party of ukraine and lksmu, the congresses of komsomol of ukraine (borisova (ed.), 1977, p. 157). in 2005, the building was removed from the list of monuments due to its emergency condition and was gradually destroyed. at the meeting on january 18, 2019, the аdvisory council on the protection of cultural heritage at the department of culture and tourism of kharkiv oblast state administration decided on the wrong removal of the theatre building from the list of monuments. it petitioned the ministry of culture not to include the object in the list of monuments with “communist” substantiation13 (zasidannâ..., 2019). besides, the owner of the site where the theatre is located filed a lawsuit to the kharkiv regional state administration with the demand to cancel the decision of the kharkiv city council from 25.01.1972 about the inclusion of the building in the list of monuments of the history of local importance. one of the arguments of the exclusion from the list was the law no 317-viii (one of the decommunization laws, (zakon ukraїny…, 2015)). the court took the plaintiff ’s side and cancelled the decision of 1972, repeatedly depriving the theatre of the monument status (decision no 82345242 (rišennya..., 2019)). thus, if the local authorities do not want to defend the monuments of architecture, the law opens the door to the destruction of monumental art objects, 13 probably, council members wanted to prepare a new substantiation report, why the building should be on the list of monuments, but did not have time to do so due to the complexity of bureaucratic procedures. historical monuments, and archives created in the soviet period or related to the establishment of soviet power in ukraine. of course, the reasons why works of monumental art and architecture are destroyed in ukraine are not reduced to mere decommunization, but decommunization opened the door more widely and provided another argument to the authorities in their complete submission of space to their goals. as ievgeniia gubkina, an architect and architectural historian pointed out: “in post-soviet countries, decisions are made only by the authorities, based on their own goals or the goals of a big business with which contemporary governments often have corrupt relations, while communities and activists are not just completely excluded from the decision-making process, but also deprived of any chance of influencing it” (gubkina, 2020). the problems that decommunization created for the art of the soviet period were also pointed out by n. kalita (2019) and y. nikiforov (2017). 6. conclusion two case studies showed how authorities and regional political elites could instrumentalize and manipulate the decommunization laws adopted in 2015 to address the tactical challenges as well as to maximize the benefits of urban space management and access to resources. in the discussion of 2017 between the future director of the kharkiv uinm department maria takhtaulova and a critic ievgeniia gubkina (“otraženie…”, 2016) was the thesis made that instead of discussing the communist system, its undemocratic nature and totalitarianism, the ukrainian society has moved to the destruction of arts and crafts as well as monuments. this case study confirmes gubkina’s thesis. it is essential to pay attention to the significant polarization between the local activists in kharkiv, the city council and the regional administration in 2014–2019. the latter two bodies have different legitimacy, different budgets and a different set of tools to implement a policy of memory in such a complex borderland city as kharkiv. the case of marshal zhukov avenue and the 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(eng. law of ukraine on the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda 64 denys kutsenko of their symbols no 317-viii), 2015, https://zakon.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/317-19#text (accessed 15 april 2020). zhurzhenko t., 2016, memory wars in post-soviet kharkiv [in:] d. segert (ed.), civic education and democratisation in the eastern partnership countries, bundeszentrale für politische bildung, bonn, 102–123. zub e., 2016, eduard zub. toponimični zmini. harkiv (eng. eduard zub. toponymical changes. kharkiv), http://www. historians.in.ua/index.php/en/istoriya-i-pamyat-vazhkipitannya/1751-eduard-zub-toponimichni-zminy-kharkiv (accessed 15 april 2020). 1. introduction the issue of modernization of the state information function of the state becomes extremely urgent at the modern development stage. the topic draws attention of not only specialists, scholars, administrators, politicians, but also the great variety of general public, since modern interpretation of tasks and objectives of the state information policy is a matter of interest, to some extent, of each legally capable citizen. it needs to be mentioned that contemporary studies of the media-state relations, positively view the idea of the state support of local media. thus, the council of europe recommendation no. r (99) 1 „on measures to promote media pluralism” regulates the right of the member states to introduce, with a view to enhancing media pluralism and diversity, state support schemes for the print media, in particular at local level. it is considered that national newspaper markets are more inclined to conformity with external pluralism than local markets. at the same time conceptual models of understanding these factors in a comparative analysis have practically not been developed. on a basic level, the states are distinguished between liberal democracies (usa) and welfare state journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(1), 17–23 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.003.5252 state support of the local press: what mechanism should be implemented? oleksandr bukhtatyi (1) (2) (1) department of information policy, presidential administration of ukraine, bankova 11, 01220 kyiv, ukraine. (2) faculty of information relations and e-government, national academy of public administration, office of the president of ukraine, ezhena pottier 20, 03057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: bukhtatyi@ukr.net citation bukhtatyi o., 2016, state support of the local press: what mechanism should be implemented? journal of geography, politics and society, 6(1), 17–23. abstract the aim of the article is to study the national legislation, the results of which evidence a certain disagreements between legal terminology and understanding of the role and functions of the state in mass media. due to existence of certain reasons, both objective (complexity of regulatory and legislative procedures) and subjective (cumbersomeness of the state administration apparatus, excessive bureaucracy, in competency), the development of the state information policy is lagging behind changes in social development. in particular, it relates to the change of a model and review of the fundamental mechanisms of the state support of media in ukraine. most urgently this issue concerns the print media for local distribution markets. key words expert discussions of the optimal mechanism, criteria of the state support, terms for providing such support; efficiency, control and monitoring indicators. 18 oleksandr bukhtatyi democracies (western europe), which are expected to intervene with media markets to achieve a series of goals – from political pluralism and strengthening the democracy to racial harmony and support of national language and culture. in turn, researchers suggested to review three models of modern mediasystems, among which, we believe, the most suitable for ukraine would be the democratic corporatist model. this model conceptualize a strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies; strong public-service broadcasting. world experience shows that state subsidies of the media is not a unique matter, characteristic only of authoritarian countries. the following forms of the state intervention into economic activities of newspapers are distinguished: • endowment of the media with special state support programs; • budget subsidies; • market regulation, control over ownership, antimonopoly measures; • placement of the state order. 2. state mechanisms for media support ukrainian legislation on press stipulates that “the state shall guarantee economic independence and ensure economic support of the print media activities; shall avoid abusing its monopoly status on the market by editors and distributors of printed materials. measures aimed at ensuring economic support of print media activities shall be established by the cabinet of ministers of ukraine” (закон україни «про друковані засоби масової інформації (пресу) в україні», 1992). at the same time, the study of the acting mechanisms of the state media support, local press in particular, shows that they do not conform to modern challenges and realities. although data of the ministry of justice of ukraine state that during ukraine’s independence over 30 thousand printed periodicals have been registered in ukraine, according i. fedorov knyzhkova palate this information resource today suffers financial, economic and political problems, since in reality only less than 2 thousand newspapers are being issued nowadays. in the years of ukraine’s independence the vast majority of newly-formed editions ceased to exist due to economic problems, and in some cases – due to political and administrative pressure. at the same time, from the entire pool of functioning newspapers a half is classified as pertaining to local and regional distribution areas, a half of which, in turn, is publications with the communal form of ownership. the study demonstrates that the majority of the remote administrative territorial units (oblasts) has only one functioning newspaper, the co-founder of which, in various configurations, have been local state administrations, local self-government bodies and editorial houses’ personnel. please note that these editions can be assessed according to similar criteria: а) economic subsidy indicator: а1. editorial houses that operate without subsides from local budgets (unsubsidized), or the level of such subsidies is insignificant (10–30 000 uah); а2. editorial houses that receive subsidies of 150 000 or more annually; а3. editorial houses that operate without subsidies from local budgets but receive funds according to agreements for coverage of state power and local self-government bodies; b) demographic indicator: b1. editorial houses with distribution on administrative territories with population of under 30 000 people; b2. editorial houses with distribution on administrative territories with population of over 30 000 people. c) competition indicator: c1. editorial houses that have a “monopoly” status within their circulation distribution territory; c2. editorial houses that operate under competitive conditions on distribution territory. please note that the only similar operational aspect of these local newspapers is the fact that none receives funds from the budget of ukraine allocated to the state media. attention should be drawn to the fact that there are also considerable problems in the field of theoretical development dedicated to enhancement of the state information policy mechanisms. state support of media is defined as a combination of legal, economic, social, organizational and other promotional measures by the state aimed at strengthening and development of information field. it is important to keep in mind that media systems of any country are not homogeneous by themselves. many of them have regional differences both in media and political as well as economic systems. besides, media systems are not static, they are constantly changing throughout the entire history of society. state support of the local press: what mechanism should be implemented? 19 3. legal regulation the law of ukraine “on state support of mass media and social protection of journalists” stipulates that the state address support shall be given exclusively to media for children and youth, disabled persons, specialized scientific editions, issued by scientific institutions and educational establishments of not lower than the third accreditation level, and media that purposely promote development of languages and cultures of the national minorities of ukraine, as well as periodical publications of artistic and literary character (закон україни «про державну підтримку засобів масової інформації та соціальний захист журналістів», 1997). the use of funds from the state budget for support of press is conducted according to procedure approved by the resolution of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine dated 27 of april 2011 no 449. this act states that the main administrator of the state funds and authorized executor of the state budget program shall be derzhkomteleradio, and the recipient of the state funds – editorial houses of the print media (постанова кабінету міністрів україни «про затвердження порядку використання у 2007 році коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті для фінансової підтримки преси», 2007). it is stipulated that the state funds shall be used with the aim to provide state support and create favorable conditions for the development and popularization of the print media for children and youth, for disabled persons, specialized scientific editions, issued by scientific institutions and educational establishments of not lower than the third accreditation level, print media that promotes the development of languages and cultures of the national minorities in ukraine, periodic publications of artistic and literary character and directed at acquisition of polygraphic services and paper. as we can see, the legislation does not envision the support from the state budget of local newspapers with social and political orientation. on the other hand it is noted that the state support of media shall be conducted by means of protectionism policy of lowering the use value of information product, including tariff, customs, currency and commercial regulations, reimbursement of expenses, financial support (закон україни «про державну підтримку засобів масової інформації та соціальний захист журналістів», 1997). funds necessary for financial support should be defined in the state budget of ukraine as a separate line item and processed by a central body of executive power that implements the state policy in treasury servicing of budget funds. such funds shall be used, first of all, to reimburse the difference between a calculated (at cost of production) and a fixed tariff for delivery of the state print media to subscribers. funds left after that shall be used to provide: additional economic support (subsidy) to oblast (district), city and microcity newspapers, oblast (district), city and microcity tvand radio broadcasting; financial support to media for children and youth, disabled persons, specialized scientific editions, issued by scientific institutions and educational establishments of not lower than the third accreditation level, as well as periodical publications of artistic and literary character; economic support to tvand radio broadcasting centers and polygraph enterprisers, as well as telecommunications enterprises according to the requirements of article 2 of the above mentioned law. distribution of funds shall be conducted by the cabinet of ministers of ukraine. at the same time the study demonstrates that in reality the state of affairs is absolutely non-conforming to the principles declared in the legislative act. the study of fund allocations from the state budget of ukraine provides grounds to determine that over 500 up to 800 mln hryvnas are being disbursed annually from the state budget of ukraine for financial support of the media; the majority of these funds are used to finance national and oblast state tvand radio broadcasting companies, the ukrainian state information agency “ukrinform”, operations of the ukrainian-speaking version of international channel “euronews” (tab. 1.). moreover, the annual state budget has a separate line item, allocating funds for operations of the state editions “holos ukrainy” and “uriadoviy kur’er” (approximately 10 mln hryvnas). therefore, the study of indicators of the state budget for the last 5 years provides grounds to make a conclusion on the actual “inoperativeness” of the mechanism of the state support of the press from the state budget funds. in practice, financial support of the press is carried out through mechanism of subsidies from local budgets. the legislature determines that a subsidy is an additional state economic support of oblast (district), city and town newspapers and oblast, (district), city and town tvand radio broadcasting which is conducted on account of funds and protectionist measures of the local self-government bodies and local state administrations, on the basis of founding agreements or specific conventions drawn according to the requirements of the law. near 80–100 mln hryvnas are spent from local budgets on subsidies annually. the scale of such 20 oleksandr bukhtatyi subsidies, however, differs considerably: from 3% of the gross income of community editorial houses in sumy oblast to 50% in lviv oblast. the reason of this could be attributed to specifics of the relationship with the authorities which considerably influence on the scale of budget subsidies, or peculiarities of editorial politics (the ability of editorial staff to withstand pressure from the local authorities); marketing activity of editorial houses; demographic peculiarities of the region, development of advertising market, protecting editions reputation within the community etc. one of the main tasks is to find the answer to the question: can local print press operate without subsidies from the local budgets? studies demonstrate that in the first half of 2014 there were 174 profitable community editions (33.9% of the total number) operating in ukraine. it should be noted that the relationship between profitable and non-profitable community editorial houses is distributed unequally. for example, there is a significant disbalance (more than in 2 times) in the cost of annual subscriptions for communal editions. reasons mentioned above are objective and subjective factors as well. please note that looking on july 2014 data, we can find out that out of the total number of communal editions approximately one fifth (21%) were working without subsidies from local budgets. in some cases the amount of subsidy does not exceed 10–15 thousand hryvnas, which can also be considered as the sign of editorial houses’ ability to work unsubsidized. but at the same time there are examples when budget subsidies are several hundred thousand hryvnas. it’s a paradox but the largest regional centers (kyiv, lviv, kharkiv) have often their communal press subsidized with millions of hryvnas, while the actual volume of circulations are 3–4 thousand issues. the law establishes that non-fulfillment of financial obligations by any founder (co-founder) of the print media shall be the grounds for trial , but on practice there are no cases in ukraine of adjudgements in favor of editorial house. obviously, under such conditions, the interaction efficiency between the state authorities and a certain mass media segment will be low, since these media outlets, being under financial and staffing control of the local government officials shall automatically transform into a propaganda tool, and create positive image of local administrators, whose activities are financed at the citizens’ expense to begin with. in general, the existing practice of community press subsidizing from local budgets plays a negative role for the state information policy, since it promotes “loyalty” of the newspapers to the local government’s activities on one hand, and on the other – by playing a role of financial injections, do not promote the strive to increase gross revenues, circulation and decrease expenses. however, the majority of local editions may cease to exist without the budget support which, evidently, will have negative consequences for the development of informational relations on a local level. we believe that the key to solving this problem lies in the field of democratic measures of the state administration which by its nature are transparent and open. we are talking about the obligation of the state authorities and local self-governments to ensure coverage of their activities, first of all, in the media. it is established by law that the procedure of financing by the state authorities and local selfgovernments of media that carries out coverage of tab. 1. comparative disbursements from the state budget of ukraine for media operations in 2010–2015 name of the indicator according to classification of disbursement and financing by the state budget 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 difference between 2015 and 2014 total mln uah % mln uah state committee for television radio broadcasting of ukraine 619.2 680.8 1263.6 711.0 682.5 879.1 196.6 128.8 financial support of the press 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 – 100.0 production and broadcast of the programs for the state needs, collection, processing and distribution of official information product, creation and functioning of ukrainian-speaking international channel „euronews” 569.5 625.2 725.4 609.5 614.6 834.8 220.2 135.8 source: закони україни «про державний бюджет україни на…, 2010–2015. state support of the local press: what mechanism should be implemented? 21 activities of the former and are founders or co-founders thereof, is determined in agreements between the state authorities and local self-governments and media editorial houses, as well as in the statutes of editorial houses of such media. non-state media justifies activities of the state authorities and local self-governments because of agreement between such authorities and media. if such agreement has not been drawn, the editorial house has the right for independent, and in conformity with the legislation of ukraine, covering of the state authorities and local self-governments activities, stating the sources of financing of such coverage in their statutes. the state authorities and local self-governments shall, within the limits of expenses stipulated in the state or local budgets for coverage of their activities, form a request to the media, especially: • to create special reports and broadcasts of important events as regard activities of the state authorities and local self-governments; • to organize (problem, thematical) pages (columns) in print media; • to create and spread information, authorised materials on activities of the state authorities and local self-governments of explanatory nature. although the legislature determines that expenses on media financing related to the coverage of activities of the state authorities and local self-governments are allocated by the state budget of ukraine and local budgets separately, in reality this concerns exclusively the parliament channel “rada” and broadcasting of the meetings of the verkhovna rada of ukraine by the national radio company. and despite the fact that the state authorities and local self-governments in their schedules are required to account expenses for coverage of their activities by the media, legislative regulation of that is not fulfilled (tab. 2). under such circumstances talking about the efficient implementation of the major measures of the state information policy on the local level is totally nonsense. tab. 2. study of certain indicators of communal print media operations by oblast as of 2014 total no of editions in oblast subsidies from local budgets coverage of activity profitable media (units)thousand uah dnipropetrovsk 33 12065.80 1 650.00 16 odesa 30 10611.20 442.10 9 poltava 30 6190.20 – 2 lviv 28 5662.10 162.20 8 vinnytsa 34 4708.80 717.50 11 kyrovohrad 26 3373.00 310.10 10 kyiv 30 3323.92 328.00 5 ternopil 17 2989.50 50.00 1 volyn 19 2892.80 177.79 6 cherkasy 24 2606.00 587.00 10 chernivtsy 11 2512.50 224.80 6 zakarpattia 13 1844.30 9.90 5 kharkiv 27 1638.00 54.00 11 kherson 21 1227.80 344.70 3 chernyhiv 25 1160.60 120.32 5 zaporizhzhya 16 1093.10 339.74 4 ivano-frankivsk 19 1013.77 15.00 11 rivne 17 846.50 674.40 10 khmelnytskyy 25 474.10 532.80 10 mykolayiv 24 396.40 271.29 6 sumy 21 294.00 506.90 8 zhytomyr 25 230.40 638.30 12 total in oblasts: 518 75 288.39 8 364.54 174 source: горобець, бухтати, 2015. 22 oleksandr bukhtatyi level of freedom of communal media is inversely proportional to the level of influence of their cofounders: heads of local bodies of state authorities and local self-government bodies; the stronger is such influence the lesser is the degree of editorial independence. this influence may be carried out through the mechanism of appointing and dismissing of the editor of a communal media, as well as through the mechanism of financial subsidies from local budgets. therefore, it should be stated that up until now the national mechanism of the state information policy about such tool as a print media has been used with extremely low efficiency coefficient. explanation of this phenomena lies in both cumbersome and lifeless structure of the state bodies responsible for implementation of the state information policy, and in existence of stereotypes of “the elite of media”. we believe that existing practice of allocating subsidies from local budgets for operations of local press contradicts their nature. the very first function of local press is in criticizing of the local government, which is practically impossible under conditions of press subsidizing from local budgets. on the other hand, under conditions of military aggression and being related to it force-majeure circumstances, without relevant support, a local newspaper, especially if it takes a pro-state side, seems to be sentenced to extinction. here is an example: almost immediately after liberating sloviansk from terrorists groups in july 2014, the local social political newspaper “visti” renewed its operations. taking into consideration complex of financial, economic, social and political conditions in the specified region, the financing of the edition was carried out with editorial funds, sponsors’ donations and local budget. editorial policy was directed on protecting constitutional system, national integration, critics of separatism etc. the consequence of such activity was a “retaliation” from the local deputies, the majority of which was protégées and members of the party of regions and has the separatists frame of mind. at the same time, it should be noted that the 2015 local budget did not have financing for the editorial house of “visti” newspaper at all, while local radio broadcasting had 150 thousand uah. we believe such decision of the people deputies of sloviansk oblast council elected during the presidency of v. yanukovych (the majority of whom shares separatists’ and anti-ukrainian points of view) was aimed at direct destruction of the pro-ukrainian print edition, the editorial policy of which has a patriotic, sociopolitical orientation. obviously, such discriminatory decision of the local self-government body does not confirm to the goals and objectives of the state information policy, and the destruction of the newspaper shall have a negative impact on the processes of renewal of the constitutional system and regulating the crisis on the territory of the specified region. since such tendency may be present in decisions of the other bodies of local self-government, especially in donetsk and luhansk oblasts, there is a necessity to implement an effective mechanism of the state support of the printed periodicals with local distribution areas. 4. conclusions as conclusions we will demonstrate a possible mechanism for regulation of the stated problem. thus, as we established that the law of ukraine “on state support of mass media and social protection of journalists” does not specify that the state support may be provided to socio-political print editions with local distribution areas. such segment of print media is also not mentioned in the procedure of the use of funds allocated by the state budget for financial support of the press, approved by resolution no. 449 of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine on 27 of april 2011 . moreover, it is worth mentioning that the 2015 state budget of ukraine, under the budget program “financial support of creative associations in the media, press”, only 50 thousand hryvnas has been allocated for the field of print press. at the same time 800 million hryvnas have been allocated to the tv programs. therefore, the problem of the state support of print media with the local distribution area remains unregulated and demands immediate regulation. we believe that nowadays the following must be immediately ensured: • to make amendments to the law of ukraine “on state support of mass media and social protection of journalists” by extending the list of print press resources that can receive the state address support, with the category of socio-political editions with the local distribution areas. (the proposed law is attached); • to make corresponding amendments to the procedure of the use of funds allocated by the state budget procedure for financial support of the press, approved by the resolution no. 449 of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine on 27 of april 2011, as regard to address support of print editions with local distribution areas; state support of the local press: what mechanism should be implemented? 23 • redistribution of disbursements allocated by the 2015 state budget of ukraine for derzhkomteleradio, by decreasing disbursements under the budget program 1701080 “production and broadcast of the tvand radio programs for state needs, collection, processing and distribution of official information product, creation and functioning of ukrainian-speaking international channel «euronews» for 700 thousand hryvnas (approximately) and a corresponding increase in disbursements under the budget program 1701050 “financial support of creative associations in the media, press” with the aim to ensure the address support of print press with local distribution area. perspectives of further research lie in the necessity to define criteria (“saturation” of the circulation, periodicity, theme orientation etc) as regard to the print press with the local area of distribution that will be entitled to the state address support. references горобець в., бухтатий  о, 2015, комунальна преса україни: оцінка готовності до реформи, http://osvita. mediasapiens.ua/print/1411980811/komunalna_presa_ ukraini_otsinka_gotovnosti_do_reformi/ [16.01.2016] закон україни «про державну підтримку засобів масової інформації та соціальний захист журналістів», 1997, відомості верховної ради україни, 23.09. 1997. закон україни «про друковані засоби масової інформації (пресу) в україні», 1992, відомості верховної ради україни, 16.11.1992. закони україни «про державний бюджет україни на 2010 рік», «про державний бюджет україни на 2011 рік», «про державний бюджет україни на 2012 рік», «про державний бюджет україни на 2013 рік», «про державний бюджет україни на 2014 рік», «про державний бюджет україни на 2015 рік», 2010–2015, відомості верховної ради україни. постанова кабінету міністрів україни «про затвердження порядку використання у 2007 році коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті для фінансової підтримки преси», 2007, офіційний вісник україни, 21.03.2007. 1. introduction slovenia is a small central european country, known by its minority policy. regarding the level of minority protection standards per capita, the italian and hungarian community can be counted as the highly protected national minorities in europe. from the other point of view, the national development of slovenes is comparable central-european story, where the creation of ethnic community is much older than the making of political-territorial unit (or state). established in 1991 and internationally recognized in 1992, slovenia is among the youngest countries in europe, but its political borders have much larger (and older) background. the minorities are, however, a result of these dynamic political processes. slovenia lies on crossroads; there, where the eastern part of the alpine arc passes through the lower hills into the dinaric mountains and delineates the continental pannonian basin from the mediterranean northern adriatic. its’ size is 20.273 km² and has 2,066.000 inhabitants. traditional settlement territory of the slovenes borders on the italian, german, hungarian and croatian ethnic area. the area was until the crossroads of the 1990s as part of the non-aligned socialist yugoslav federation at the journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 5–17 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.015.5802 slovene minority issues matjaž klemenčič (1), jernej zupančič (2) (1) department of history, faculty of arts, university of maribor, koroška cesta 60, si-2000 maribor, slovenia, e-mail: matjaz.klemencic@um.si (2) department of geography, faculty of arts, university of ljubljana, aškerčeva 2, 1000 ljubliana, slovenia, e-mail: jernej.zupancic@ff.uni-lj.si citation klemenčič m., zupančič j., 2016, slovene minority issues, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 5–17. abstract the contribution explains the historical development of the political boundaries of slovene states and the creation of minorities as political bodies in slovenia and in the neighboring countries, as well as the creation of slovene diasporas in europe and around the world. the ethnic development of slovenes can only be understood within the context of the general ethno-national, political-territorial and socio-economic processes in europe since the beginning of 19th century. in the treatise, we deal with ethnic minorities and minority policies as typical political heritage of europe: the destiny, problem and challenge, but an advantage as well. due to the size and importance of minorities, slovenia count to the minority sensible countries. legal and actual protection of autochthonous minorities in slovenia is normatively wide and realized consistently, while slovene minorities in neighboring countries have much worse formal-political baseline. key words slovenes, slovenia, ethnic minority, diaspora, slovene history. 6 matjaž klemenčič, jernej zupančič military-strategic point of contact among the nato italy, neutral austria and hungary, which belonged to the warsaw pact. after a brief war slovenia became independent nation in 1991 and less than two decades later joined the eu and nato in 2004 and entered into the eurozone and the schengen area in 2007. slovenia is a country of ethnic slovenes, people of 2.4 million. the majority of them (approximately 1.8 million) lives in slovenia, some 150,000 in neighboring countries and circa 500,000 in diaspora around the world (zupančič, 2001). the ethnic development of slovenes and the political consequences can only be understood within the context of the general ethno-national, political-territorial and economic-social processes in europe since the beginning of 19th century. slovenes are a people with the old and rich culture and relatively late political affirmation. slovenia became an independent country during turbulent geopolitical changes after the fall of communist regimes and dissolution of multinational yugoslav federation. slovenia is often described as “alpine” land, which roughly corresponds to the geological-tectonic criteria as well as economic and social mentality of its inhabitants. most of the state lies between 300 and 700 meters above the sea. it lies on the mountainous terrain and its climate intermingles alpine, continental and mediterranean. these climate types influences varied and rich flora and fauna. the current territory of the slovene state was determined by the previous state systems and their economic, administrative and cultural policy (natek, natek, 1998). slovenes have lived for centuries under the austrian (habsburg) monarchy, which strongly influenced its cultural landscape. also northern italy had an impact on the development of slovenia. because of the time proximity in particular yugoslavia through the socialist social and economic heritage left important traces. these traces can be seen in administrative borders, widely understood material and spiritual culture, regional identities and mentality. mosaic structure of slovene cultural landscape also highlights the predominantly retail-settlement system. slovenia has more than 6,000 settlements, reflecting the adjustment of the potential exploitation of the agricultural land on the rugged hilly terrain. in addition also important are small urban areas which are late result of a very intensive industrialization and relatively weak urbanization; with 51% of the urban population the least urbanized country in europe (natek, natek, 1988). 2. brief slovene national history the ancestors of the slovenes (alpine slavs) inhabited the area of approximately 80,000 km², extending between the eastern alps and western carpathian basin in the north stretched to the danube, in the west to central parts in bavaria, in the east to lake balaton, and to istria in the south, in the 6th century. around the year 900, 10,000 km² of this area in the western part of the pannonian plain was occupied and settled by hungarians (magyars). they magyarized it until the end of the 11th century. off the remaining 70,000 km², approximately 36,000 km² was settled in the 15th century by bavarian-germans, and around 24,000 km² remained populated by the ancestors of today’s slovenes and represent the cornerstone of slovene national development (grafenauer, 1994). the ancestors of the slovenes had their first state formed already in the 7th century. it was the tribal principality of carinthia, which soon came into the feudal relationship (due to defending against avars on the east) with the bavarians and later the franks. a typical residue of the first period of slovene statehood was the ritual of installing carantanian princes, and later dukes of carinthia. it was held in the arhaic slovene language and preserved until 1414 (grafenauer, 1952). because of its unusual shape this ritual aroused the interest of later writers. it is described in the book of the french jurist and political philosopher jean bodin (1580), les six livres de la république, in which also thomas jefferson read about it. based on his bookmark in the book on page 129, where the ceremony is mentioned the theory aroused that the latter inspired jefferson in writing the american declaration of independence (declaration of independence); especially in the part where the equality among human beings and the indivisibility of their fundamental rights is mentioned (felicijan, 1967; štih, 2005). subsequent important events in slovene history until the mid-19th century were peasant uprisings and reformation. the latter brought the codification of the slovene language (grammar and the first translation of the bible in the slovene language). the first modern political manifestation of slovenes as people began in the revolutionary year of 1848, when slovenes in their political program, “unified slovenia”, demanded the unification of all territories inhabited by the slovene population in one political unit within the habsburg monarchy (granda, 1999). administrative reform, or merger of lands with slovene population (carinthia, styria, carniola, gorizia, trieste and istria and in parts of the hungarian zala and vas counties in one unit mainly aimed to slovene minority issues 7 achieve cultural objectives. in this new administrative unit slovene was supposed to be the language of the administrative bodies, teaching and judiciary. surely, the idea was very far from being fulfilled. but since then, the national idea was “alive” during all the time. what followed later was the policy of small steps by the leaders of slovene political parties as the result of the political pragmatism of resistance against germanization, magyarization and partly romanization. these objectives have remained unrealized. the result of a division of the habsburg monarchy in the hungarian and austrian half (1867) was that northeastern parts (s. c. slovene kraina or véndevidek in hungarian) came under the hungarian part of the double-monarchy. a year before (1866) the venetian slovenes decided (by plebiscite) to remain within italy. the idea of “united slovenia”, which was until all popular assemblies movement (so called taborsko gibanje) limited to the narrow circle of students, intellectuals and priests became popular in the years 1868–1871. people gathered in all slovene provinces and demanded the fulfillment of the idea of united slovenia (gestrin, melik, 1966). these political tensions were a part of much larger demands of slavic ethno-nations (czechs, slovaks, poles, ukrainians, croats, serbs, beside slovenes) in the framework of pan-slavic movement within dualmonarchy1. in the second half of the 19th century, slovenes achieved significant successes in the implementation of the demands for slovene language in schools and offices, especially in carniola and southern styria. there slovene language became an official language in municipalities. based on the third article of the carinthian provincial constitution of 1849 which proclaimed equality of both peoples of carinthia bilingual local directories, bilingual code and the provincial constitution was printed in german and slovene also in carinthia (schnabl, 2016). slovene, however, was also partly enforced in municipal administrations throughout the slovene ethnic territory. so this is a period when slovenes became politically aware of themselves and demonstrated their political will: to preserve their language and unique culture by organizing institutions on the basis of their ethnicity. the beginnings of industrialization in the slovene ethnic territory since mid of the 19th century and beyond was marked by intensified germanisation, italianization and hungarization of slovene population; on the one hand due to the immigration of german, italian and hungarian population 1 trialism: political idea and movement for political reconstruction of habsburg-monarchy into three parts: austrian (or german), hungarian and slavonic. to the slovene ethnic territory, on the other hand due to intensive emigration of the slovene population. due to mass emigration and assimilation pressures of numerically stronger nations, the number of slovenes in the slovene ethnic territory grew very slowly. thus, in the lands of the western part of the habsburg monarchy, among which the majority of the slovene ethnic territory was divided, the number of slovenes between 1846 and 1910 increased only from 1.055 million to 1.253 million, or 18.76%. share of slovene population in this period in the region fell from 46.1% to 40.0% (zwitter, 1936). the geopolitical changes came soon in the beginning of 20th century. the first world war marked a turning point in the slovene history, because part of the slovene ethnic territory after the collapse of the habsburg monarchy merged with the territories of other south slavic ethno-nations into the kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes (since 1929 kingdom of yugoslavia). approximately 15,750 km² of the slovene ethnic territory belonged to the kingdom of serbs, croats, outside its borders remained approximately 8,700 km² of territory settled by slovenes (or 65%); from that in italy on approximatelly 6,000 km² with 340,000 slovenes, circa 2,600 km² with 80,000 slovenes in austria and much smaller in hungary: close to 100 km² and close to 8,000 slovenes. outside the kingdom of serbs, croats remained around 428,000 or around one third of all slovenes settled on their traditional territories. after dissolution of multinational habsburg empire, slovenes entered into another multiethnic political unit: the shs state, later kingdom of yugoslavia. in 1918 began the slovene history within the yugoslav state. during this period of slovene history, the slovene politicians fought for decentralization and federalization. the slovene language was introduced as language of the schools, official language in offices and in the courts, but there was no way to establish slovene as an official language at the national level. this is the period when the university opened in ljubljana, as well as a number of secondary schools in other central places in banovina of drava (slov. dravska banovina) was administrativepolitical unit in yugoslav kingdom established in 1929 with predominantly slovene population. after two decades, the peace-period was over. world war ii represented the peak of assimilation pressures on the slovene ethnic territory. after the attack of the axis forces on yugoslavia in april 1941 new partition of the slovene territory occurred. prekmurje, the northeastern part was occupied by hungarians, italians occupied the southeastern regions (notranjska, ljubljana and dolenjska) and the germans occupied the rest of territory settled 8 matjaž klemenčič, jernej zupančič by slovenes (aprox. a good half of it). all parts were included into the occupying-states. the assimilation became most common and mostly very violent policy. soon they forced mass emigration of slovene population, either to concentration camps or to serbia and silesia. it is interesting to note that on the basis of an agreement between hitler and mussolini on the settlement of south tyrolean question italians and germans also agreed upon the emigration of the gottscheer germans “back to the reich” to the area of brežice which was typical ethnic – motivated colonization (ferenc, zupan, 2011). slovenes reacted with the armed resistance of partisans against the occupying forces, which soon came under the yugoslav national liberation movement under the leadership of the communist party. this resistance was part of the “anti-hitler coalition” in europe. it has played an important role in changing the borders with italy in the yugoslav favor. whereas this resistance was also a communist revolution part of the slovene population rebelled against it and collaborated with the occupying forces. after the second world war, the soldiers who joined in the slovene home guard (domobranci) retreated to carinthia, where they were captured by the british occupation forces. they returned part of the soldiers of home guard units to yugoslavia. more than 12,000 of them were executed without any court procedures. this fact has been concealed by official politics of the communist regime until the democratization process took place in slovenia. however, it remained to this day part of the political discourse in slovenia. although the partisan army liberated most of the slovene ethnic territories by the end of world war ii, the borders with austria and hungary remained unchanged. yugoslavia gained only some territory (slovene coastland and istria) in the west that had belonged to italy in the period between world war i and world war ii. however, the city of trieste remained part of italian state when the free territory of trieste established by the peace treaty with italy was divided between yugoslavia and italy by the “memorandum of understanding between the governments of italy, the united kingdom, the united states and yugoslavia regarding the free territory of trieste” in 1954 (jeri, 1961). however, it took more than twenty years to determine finally the border between italy in yugoslavia, by the treaty of ossimo in 1975. altogether more than 200,000 ethnic slovenes remained outside the borders of yugoslavia after world war ii as the national minorities in austria, hungary and italy. the protection of slovene national minorities in the neighboring countries was always an important issue for slovenia that tried to put pressure upon the yugoslav foreign policy for the improvement of the situation and protection of slovene minorities abroad. however, the slovenes in yugoslavia also found themselves in a contradictory position after world war ii. on the basis of the constitution of 1946 they gained the status of a constitutive part of the yugoslav federation. formally, slovenes gained their own state; their independence was, however, only apparent. already by the end of world war ii the slovene partisan units were integrated into the yugoslav army. later, slovenia had to give up much of its autonomy and independence established by the slovene national liberation movement during world war ii, when slovene independent economic, social and cultural policies and institutions were developed. in accordance with the yugoslav federal constitution, slovenia retained its governance in education, culture, socialand health care, planning system and urban development. public administration has common yugoslav platform, but was made in slovenia in slovene language and has, therefore, practically the slovene character. police was slovene as well as limited local military forces (teritorialna obramba)2. as elsewhere in yugoslavia, also in slovenia the communists took over all the powers after world war ii. so they took control over political structures and the communist party was the only party allowed. in 1948, the country was under serious threat of soviet military intervention, which did not occurred. this was the breaking point with the other communist countries in europe in sense of military as well as economic collaboration. yugoslavia however kept the socialist economic and political system – therefore remained the typical socialist society, but the economic relations with the “west” were of a crucial importance. slovenia was the only yugoslav republic territorially bordering with the west (italy, austria) and has – despite typical socialist economy – quite a few economic connections and cooperated with western economies. some enterprises exported up to 80% of their products to the west! otherwise, the economy was until the mid-1950s characterized by state ownership of means of production. in the 1950s a period of socialist self-management with a typical social ownership of the means of production began. 2 teritorialna obramba (eng. territorial defense) was a part of total defense system, developed in yugoslavia due to the geopolitical position of yugoslavia, after 1968. the units based on commune level had to defend the local areas in the case of occupation. among all yugoslav republics, slovene territorial defense forces were far more organized, equipped, led and skilled in military profession than in any other part of yugoslavia. they were however a part of common (yugoslav) military. the commands were all in slovene language. slovene minority issues 9 at the end of the 1980s as in other eastern european countries also in slovenia and yugoslavia the democratization processes began; and with them also demands for greater independence of slovenia; at first, still within yugoslavia. in 1990 the first democratic elections, were carried out in which democratic parties won. the leaders of the new government called for a plebiscite on slovenia’s independence in december 1990 in which almost 90% of all the voters voted for independence, which was declared on 25 june 1991 (klemenčič, žagar, 2004). 3. slovene ethnic minorities in neighboring countries the slovene minorities in neighboring countries are a result of dynamic political processes in first half of 20th century. therefore, they represent a direct result of new political borders after the first and the second world war. slovene communities in the border regions are much older; these spaces were an important part of slovene ethnic body and gave evidently important contribution to the creation of slovene ethno-nation and national movements of slovenes during habsburg rule in these areas. the first world war marked a turning point in the slovene history, because part of the slovene ethnic territory after the collapse of the habsburg monarchy merged with other south slavic peoples in the kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes (since 1929 kingdom of yugoslavia). outside yugoslavia remained around 8,700 km² of the territory settled by 340,000 ethnic slovenes, which was a little bit more than one third of the slovene ethnic territory as well as of ethnic slovenes who lived on this territory. actual and legal protection of slovene indigenous minorities was not adequate in all three countries (italy, austria, and hungary). this was still a period of integral nationalism, during which the nation-states followed the idea of ethnic homogeneity. the minorities were very often seen as a threat to the country where they live. the nation states’ policies towards them aimed to assimilate the minorities, or even worse, to force them to emigrate and thus ethnically cleanse the region of their settlement. the assimilation pressures on the outskirts of the slovene ethnic territory continued and gained strength during this period, thus, in italy the fascists shortly after their arrival (in 1920s) to power prohibited the use of the slovene language in schools and all other public institutions. also physical attacks on the slovene population occurred. for this reason, the slovene mass emigration from the western part of the slovene ethnic territory which was under italian rule (the littoral)3 to yugoslav slovenia, as well as to south america and australia strengthened. the delimitation process between austria and state of serbs, croats and slovenes was turbulent. after some military attempts, the great powers decided for plebiscite4 as a delimitation tool. in southern carinthia (austria) in the year 1920 the majority of the voters decided in a plebiscite that it will belong to the republic of austria. in doing so, they did not decide on ethno-nationality only. it was a political decision and calculation, based on the fact, that austria was at that time advanced and industrially developed republic, and the yugoslav state economically weak back warded balkan kingdom (zupančič, 1999). it is necessary to mention the fact that the carinthian provincial assembly before the plebiscite promised by a solemn declaration to carinthian slovenes that they would be able to maintain and foster their identity in austria. already a few days after the plebiscite all these promises were “forgotten” and slovene was “expelled” from public institutions and schools, slovene intellectuals had to emigrate in large proportions to the yugoslav slovenia or overseas countries. pressures on the carinthian slovenes have reached its peak after the anschluss of austria by the german third reich in 1938. with the intention of ethnic cleansing of the region the nazis sent many slovenes to concentration camps during the world war 2. slovenes in hungary were also exposed to similar assimilation pressures. the situation worsened during the world war ii. after the world war 2 there were several changes of border with italy in favor of slovenia/ yugoslavia, while the national frontier with austria and hungary remained unchanged. the question of protection of slovene minorities in neighbor states became an important political issue for slovenes, since there lived large slovene minorities in italy and austria, and much smaller in hungary. in austria the legal base for protection of the ethnic/ national minorities can be found already in article 19 of austrian constitution in 1867. it is also the treaty of saint germain of 1919. the most important document regarding the protection of slovene minority in austrian provinces of carinthia and styria is the austrian state treaty of 3 littoral (in slovene: primorje or primorska) sourcing from austrian province (austrian littoral), which was (beside city of triest with particular city statute and istria) an administrative unit in austrian part of double austro-hungarian monarchy. the term »littoral« remain and was later used as a common name for the whole territory settled by slovenes (and party croats, in istria) ruled by italy. 4 plebiscite were commonly used in delimitations between new established countries in central europe after ww1. 10 matjaž klemenčič, jernej zupančič 19555, especially its article 7. the austrian authorities continued assimilation pressures on slovenes of carinthia and styria even after 1955. they reached its peak in 1970s with the war of bilingual localities signs and with the special census of population of 1976. with this census the austrian authorities searched for carinthian slovenes in the whole austria; although the world knew where slovenes of austria lived. even during the 1970s and 1980s there were several cases of physical attacks on carinthian slovenes. the changes of the law regulating bilingual education of elementary school children put further pressure on carinthian slovenes. the austrian constitutional court established a few times in 1990s and 2000s that austria failed to realize provisions on minority protection fully. the provincialas well as federal austrian authorities tried to minimize the minority protection (klemenčič, klemenčič, 2010). the situation of the slovene minority in austria improved slightly after years of negotiations the austrian parliament passed a new law on protection of slovene minority in 2011. for slovenes in italy the most important documents regarding their minority protection are the peace treaty with italy of 1947, “memorandum of understanding on trieste of 1954” and some bilateral treaties between italy and yugoslavia; most important among them osimo treaty of 1975 included also provisions on the protection of the slovene minority. however, these provisions have never been fully put into practice and the italian political elites always found reasons and ways how to avoid the fulfillments of these diplomatic agreements. after years of negotiations and political maneuvering the italian parliament passed the special law on the global protection of the slovene national minority in italy as late as 2001. at a formal level this meant that after three decades of endeavors the slovenes in italy at least formally enjoy minority rights throughout the territory of their historical settlement. the law was realized only in 2009. in addition, italian neo-fascists physically attacked slovenes of italy and their institutions physically attacked by italian neo-fascists until late 1980s. nevertheless, in the period of the “cold war” the situation of the slovene national minority living in an underdeveloped part of hungary behind the “iron curtain” was much worse than the situation 5 austrian state treaty of 1955 is an international diplomatic agreement among major powers (usa, united kingdom, france, soviet union) with austria. yugoslavia and some other countries joined the treaty as cosigners. austrian borders remained unchanged as they were from st. germain treaty in 1920. of the slovenes in italy and austria. the situation of this minority started to improve when the gradual liberalization in hungary in the 1980s took place, yet improved substantially in the 1990s when representatives of slovenia and hungary signed a bilateral agreement on the protection of national minorities between slovenia and hungary. today, slovene minorities live in border areas of neighboring countries. the minorities took important part in slovene foreign affairs. slovenia is the successor state of former yugoslavia and therefore has inherited succession of contracts and agreements that were concluded during the existence of yugoslavia. based on these agreements the republic of slovenia with a high degree of autonomy was able to support them. slovenia during the yugoslav period actively took care of yugoslav diplomatic efforts which were made in regulating minority issues as part of diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries. slovenia financially supported activities of slovene minorities. it also took part thru its diplomats in the work of diplomatic and consular missions in the regions where slovenes live and in promoting cross-border economic and cultural cooperation. the policy towards minorities in neighboring countries sometimes has to adapt to general political circumstances and could be less principled – which can also be a problem. the slovene minority in austria inhabits around 2,600 km² of territory in southern carinthia and most southern styria, where lives, according to official austrian census data, in 2001 about 13,000, according to slovene estimates, 45,000 slovenes (klemenčič, klemenčič, 2010; zupančič, 2013). outside these areas in austria live more than 5,000 slovenes, mostly in vienna and graz (zupančič, 1999). basic legal document for the slovenes in austria is the article 7 of the austrian state treaty of 1955, which was written as a compensation to territorial changes in favor of slovenia (then yugoslavia) and provides a wide range of minority rights in a given territory. second austrian republic largely ignored or even violated, as far as education or bilingual topography (klemenčič, klemenčič, 2006). education is organized in the framework of the public education network, but not as a special minority schools, but implement bilingual education. the success of this model is relatively modest. there are many successful private mostly catholic) kindergartens. secondary education stands at the provincial and austrian levels for effective multilingual educational model. minority is organized into three umbrella organizations, left-oriented association of slovene organizations (zso) right-oriented national council of carinthian slovenes (nsks) and the newest organization slovene minority issues 11 community of slovenes (klemenčič, klemenčič, 2008). styrian slovenes are organized in an association (association article 7). at the regional and local level a political party unity list (el) has been successful. slovene minority members were elected also to national parliament as well as to provincial assembly (klemenčič, klemenčič, 2010). slovene minority additionally has some successful economic organizations and is, despite some disadvantages regionally strong and successful. members of the minority are very successful in cultural activities. slovenes in italy live on 1,500 km² in italian region friuli-venezia giulia. the region has a special status because of its cultural diversity. in the region slovenes and friulians live. according to the slovene estimates there are between 83,000 and 100,000 slovenes who live in this region; according to official (italian) estimates there are 52,000. about 10,000 of them live in the friuli plain, outside the territory of the indigenous slovene settlements. the education is organized in the framework of the italian national education through slovene schools. slovene is the teaching language in these schools, while italian is a compulsory subject. school in špeter slovenov/st. pietro natisone in s.c. venetian slovenia is an exception. the education there is bilingual. slovene minority has developed rich cultural, sports and media activities which is partly supported by italy and partly by slovenia partially through tenders. slovenes until 2001 enjoyed different level of protection. after 1954, slovenes in trieste enjoyed the highest level of protection, slovenes in gorizia and udine provinces enjoyed protection to a lesser extent. slovene minority has formed two umbrella political organization, the more left-oriented slovene cultural and economic union (skgz) and right – oriented catholic community of slovene organizations (sso). an umbrella organization means that it unites under its “umbrella” numerous cultural, sport and commercial organizations. slovene minority has more links with leftist parties in italy, although at regional and local level, it has its own political party “slovene community”. ethnic slovenes were elected to national parliament and to provincial and regional assemblies. the minority is also economically quite strong and well organized especially in trieste and gorizia and also at european level realizes integrative role of minorities in cross-border cooperation. slovenes in hungary represents a small traditional ethnic minority in europe. they live in the raba region in vas county on 100 km². according to official census data, in 2001 there were about 2500, according to slovene estimates nearly 5,000 nationwide (about 2,000 slovenes live scattered throughout hungary outside raba region). raba region/porabje is purely peripheral region with low economic advantages (zupančič, 2000). slovenes in hungary have gained the first classic minority rights after the democratic changes in hungary at the crossroads of the 1990s. before the democratic changes took place in hungary they were considered as a “yugoslav” minority and the level of formal protection was very low. however, the range of these rights is still now very modest. the implementation of minority rights and economic development is hindered by the placement of the entire area populated by slovene minority in the őrség national park in 2001 without compensatory measures. a minority has two organizations: the association of slovenes in hungary and “slovene national minority self-government”. education comprises bilingual instruction, but the model failed, partly due to a very modest financial support by hungarian state, small total number and reduced number of intelectuals among minority (šiftar, 2016). traditional slovene minority in croatia is comprised only of a few hundred people. they are settled in five small and mutually separated areas along slovene-croatian border. the slovene community in croatia is much more numerous (around 20.000 of members) if we add also slovene migrants. so most of the slovenes in croatia’ are immigrants and their descendants who reside in major cities especially in pula, zagreb, which is the capital city, and rijeka, important croatian harbor. these cities were attractive as immigrants’ destinations since the middle of the 19th century and most of slovenes in croatia have therefore gained relatively good economic positions as individuals. the community as a group remained practically hidden during the yugoslav period and became visible only after slovenia became an independent nation. they are organized in clubs. slovenes are mentioned as a minority in croatian constitution; but it does not bring them practically any particular advantage (kržišnik, bukić, 1995). 4. the emigration of slovenes and creation of slovene diaspora from late 1870s till the beginning of world war i. the mass emigration took place in most of the areas populated traditionally by slovenes. slovenes were than a part of enormous human stream from europe to north america. the immigrants mainly from east-central and central europe emigrated to the us in search for a better life. the us needed to settle the empty west and support the immense increase of american economy. after several decades the us became the important economic power, 12 matjaž klemenčič, jernej zupančič thank to millions of newcomers, who brought fresh and cheap work force. in less than one generation the immigrants became americans, people of common american culture with diverse ethnic roots. the ethnic background was not forgotten, but was not important in their daily life in the us, either. the culture, awareness and belonging remained, the language mainly not (bodnar, 1987). also slovene immigrants experienced transformation and became first american slovenes and later americans of slovene descent. slovene diaspora remained strong, relatively numerous and influential. the united states was not the only destination of the slovenes, but remained probably the most numerous (klemenčič, 2013). there were many reasons for emigration; and it could not be limited to the economic reasons (in sense of seeking job or better economic position). one of the main reasons for the emigration of slovene population was rapidly reduced income from non-agrarian activities since the mid-19th century onwards. it began to decline due to the construction of the railways which brought cheap products into the region and due to the development of the industry in the areas nearby slovene ethnic territory. it was therefore not surprising that the slovenes began mass emigration, both to the industrial and mining areas within the western part of the habsburg monarchy, particularly to the area of northern styria and vienna, and to industrial area in the rhine in germany, as well as to overseas countries. in the period before the first world war, over 150,000 slovenes settled in the us, 40,000 to the northern areas of styria and other industrial areas of the habsburg monarchy, and about 15,000 to the other areas of western europe. mass migration of slovenes took place from slovene ethnic territory from the mid19th century onwards. in the period before the first world war, they settled mainly in western europe and the usa. the number of slovene emigrants and their descendants from this period can be estimated at around 250,000 (klemenčič, 1995) or even higher, to 300,000 or more (zupančič, 2001). after the first world war, the majority of slovene emigrants settled in western europe, canada, south america. we can estimate their size in the interwar period at around 100,000 (klemenčič, 1987; genorio, 1989). a lot of them were simply political emigrants, escaping from radical treatments of nazi and fascist regimes in italy and austria during the period between both world wars. due to mass emigration and assimilation pressures of numerically stronger peoples, the number of slovenes in the slovene ethnic territory grew very slowly. after the second world war people migrated from slovenia from 1945 onwards first for political reasons to the us, canada, south america and australia partly also to western europe, especially to great britain. they were émigré, who emigrated strictly because of political reasons. they were refugees and displaced persons. they created (particularly in argentina) very close communities and preserved the slovene language very well also among members of second and third generation (genorio, 1993). since the mid-1960s when the then communist authorities opened the border for economic emigration as well as for tourist visits, the trend of emigration continued into all areas of slovene emigration (klemenčič, 1995). this trend has strengthened again with the beginning of the last economic crisis in 2008. in five years since than around 35,000 emigrated. the slovene immigrants are organized worldwide in different forms, as for example in fraternal organizations, ethnic parishes, political organizations, cultural organizations; they have built many national homes and ethnic parishes. naturally, they built there slovene churches. all these forms of organizations have in modified forms, survived until the present day. globally, it is possible to speak of at least a thousand »slovene settlements” if the latter is referred to as part of a settlement in which at least one of the above forms of slovene organization can be found. in the cultural field there are, inter alia, slovene publishing houses as well as drama and choir performances (klemenčič, 2013). thus, it can be argued that even in exile slovene culture in the broadest sense of the word continues to this day. 5. managing ethnic diversity: the minorities in slovenia slovenia belongs to the countries with one of the highest levels of legal and real protection of indigenous ethnic minorities. the slovene constitution explicitly mentions two minorities, italian and hungarian, as well as a special roma ethnic community. all three ethnic communities have a particular laws. italians and hungarians have a comprehensive set of specific minority rights throughout the existence of the independence of slovenia, which dates from the arrangements, which were valid in the after world war ii yugoslav period. specific laws regulate the field of bilingual topography, use of language, political participation, education, cultural and media support as well as the economy (komac et al., 2004). roma were given a special umbrella act of 2007. the construction of special minority rights has origins of the typical normative-legal nature based slovene minority issues 13 on international treaties with italy and hungary and is through constitutional provisions realized in the sectorial laws. they are based in the fundamental premise of collective and territorial nature of (autochthonous) minorities. individual areas of regulation of minority protection is adapted to the specific situations of minorities, while others are universal. first, there is to make a brief explanation the distinction between classical or historical minorities’ protection and immigrant communities. the concept of protection of minorities in slovenia is not much different from these concepts in other european countries. the division into so called historical or traditional minorities which are explicitly mentioned in the constitution is a typical result of diplomatic negotiations and simultaneous drawing of frontiers in which specific minority rights had a character of compensatory measures. ethnic minorities are recognized as specific collective bodies within the nation, on a given territory. the area of autochthonous settlement is mainly a pragmatic instrument of determining the territorial scope, where specific minority rights are implemented. members of immigrant ethnic groups, which are result of subsequent and recent migratory flows do not enjoy these special rights. they enjoy the general rights of citizenship, including the right to ethnic identification and organization and protection of their language and culture. interpretations that these “new” minority communities (ethnic groups) are discriminated against and disadvantaged are completely inaccurate (zupančič, 2004). the ethnic structure of the population of today’s slovenia is the result of several centuries of historical processes. the image of today’s cultural landscape was formed because of economic and spatial development, many political changes and migrations. these factors also determined its boundaries and the basic features of today’s ethnic identity. inclusion in the habsburg monarchy strengthened position and size of german population, especially among a growing layer of civil servants, the nobility, the army, the artisans, miners and traders. germanisation was spontaneous process of linguistic standardization in the urban and commercial environments, because german language was mostly used as language of communication by certain social classes and certainly by intellectuals. there were also quite a few migrants from german speaking territories i.e. miners in mines and serfs who were forced to migrate from one estate of the same landowner to another. as the result of these processes, some german “linguistic islands” were formed. the coastal cities in slovene istria were marked by unbroken tradition of ancient urban continuity from roman times, because of political, economic and cultural links with the republic of venice. the old population remained in these cites although they were constantly experiencing repopulation from the surrounding areas with the slovene population (božič, 1980). in addition to the above mentioned also individuals from other areas within the habsburg monarchy were present in the slovene area (jews, czechs, hungarians, italians, greeks and others). according to the last census in austria-hungary in 1910 the linguistic/ethnic structure on the territory of today’s republic of slovenia was such that there lived in addition to more than 82% of slovenes, almost 10% of germans, 2% italians and 1.5% hungarians. this began to change rapidly after the collapse of the monarchy, when german and hungarian population in the kingdom of yugoslavia became a minority. the number of germans felt from the prewar 106,000 to only 42,000 in 1921 and felt again in 1931 to circa 29,000. the number of hungarians has declined more slowly. the size of both communities have declined partly due to emigration, but even more because of the real or merely “statistical” change of identity. the number of italians increased, because the territory of today’s western slovenia belonged to italy. from there quite massive emigration of at least 40,000 slovenes took place. during the world war ii 80,000, people were killed in battles as members of partisan units, in concentration camps and in post-war killings. over 20,000 slovenes were forced in exile. already during the war the italians deported around 15,000 gottscheer germans to the region of posavje, from where the germans evicted over 40,000 slovenes. most ethnic germans (over 30,000) and italians (circa 22,000) left slovenia after world war ii, due to fear of reprisals and deportations (nećak, 1994). for a decade, slovenia became ethnically homogenous. in 1948, slovenes represented around 97% of the population. however, not for long. after the rapid industrialization of the 1960s, the number of immigrants from areas of the former yugoslavia exceeded the number of slovene emigrants. slovenia has become an immigrant country and society, with all the characteristic features of social relations and processes. members of various yugoslav peoples and ethnic groups, mostly young and less qualified immigrated. they found employment in mining, metallurgy, construction, municipal activities and extensive sectors of industry (klemenčič, 1992). the percentage of croats, serbs, bosnians, macedonians, albanians and montenegrins began to increase and the share of slovenes slightly eroded (gosar, 1993). according to the criteria of the mother tongue, the share of the slovene population is currently around 90%. in the 14 matjaž klemenčič, jernej zupančič 1990s also the number of immigrants from other non-eu and non-european countries started to increase: the chinese, indians, pakistanis, ukrainians etc. (zupančič, 2004). in the areas of autochthonous settlement of slovene minorities in neighboring countries, the number of slovenes is constantly declining primarily due to statistical and real assimilation, partly due to migration from peripheral rural and border areas. therefore, these areas have been characterized by the appearance of spatial expansion of settlement areas and at the same time by the numerical reduction of members of minority communities the area of autochthonous settlement of the hungarians in slovenia comprises 195 km². it lies along the slovene-hungarian border. according to census data, in 2002, in slovenia lived around 6,500 ethnic hungarians; but we can estimate that the number of people who use hungarian language reach up to 10,000. area of settlement is peripheral, which contributes to a reduction in their number and hinders modernization (zupančič, 2000). according to the census of 1991, there were 8503 hungarians slovenia, which represents a relative majority (49%) in the ethnically mixed area. around 15% (around 1,300) of them live in other regions in prekmurje and the rest of slovenia, especially in major cities, because of displacement for economic reasons. there were 9,240  people with hungarian mother tongue, who lived in slovenia in 1981 (zupančič, 2002). tab. 1. slovenia’s population by ethnic affiliation in censuses in 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 ethnic affiliation 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 number % number % number % number % number % total 1 466 425 100.00 1 591 523 100.00 1 727 137 100.00 1 891 864 100.00 1 965 986 100.00 slovenes 1 415 448 96.52 1 522 248 95.65 1 624 029 94.03 1 712 445 90.52 1 727 018 87.84 italians 854 0.06 3 072 0.19 3 001 0.17 2 187 0.12 3 064 0.16 hungarians 11 019 0.75 10 498 0.66 9 785 0.57 9 496 0.50 8 503 0.43 roma 1 663 0.12 158 0.01 977 0.06 1 435 0.08 2 293 0.12 albanians 169 0.01 282 0.02 1 281 0.07 1 985 0.10 3 629 0.18 austrians 289 0.02 254 0.02 278 0.02 180 0.01 199 0.01 bulgarians 49 0.00 180 0.01 139 0.01 105 0.01 169 0.01 czechs 807 0.06 584 0.04 445 0.03 433 0.02 323 0.02 montenegrins 1 356 0.09 1 384 0.09 1 978 0.11 3 217 0.17 4 396 0.22 greeks 24 0.00 50 0.00 24 0.00 18 0.00 23 0.00 croats 17 978 1.23 31 429 1.97 42 657 2.47 55 625 2.94 54 212 2.76 jews 15 0.00 21 0.00 72 0.00 9 0.00 37 0.00 macedonians 640 0.04 1 009 0.06 1613 0.09 3 288 0.17 4 432 0.22 muslims / bosniaks 1 617 0.11 465 0.03 3 231 0.19 13 425 0.71 26 842 1.36 germans 1 617 0.11 732 0.05 422 0.02 380 0.02 546 0.03 poles 275 0.02 222 0.01 194 0.01 204 0.01 204 0.01 romanians 41 0.00 48 0.00 43 0.00 94 0.01 116 0.01 russians 593 0.04 295 0.02 302 0.02 194 0.01 170 0.01 ruthenians 46 0.00 384 0.02 66 0.00 54 0.00 57 0.00 slovaks 60 0.01 71 0.00 85 0.01 144 0.01 141 0.01 serbs 11 225 0.77 13 609 0.86 20 521 1.19 42 182 2.23 47 911 2.44 turks 68 0.01 135 0.01 53 0.00 87 0.00 155 0.01 ukrainians 143 0.01 192 0.01 213 0.01 vlachs 9 0.00 6 0.00 5 0.00 17 0.00 38 0.00 others 352 0.02 449 0.03 307 0.02 577 0.03 1 178 0.06 undeclares 3 073 0.18 2 975 0.16 9 011 0.46 “yugoslavs” 2 784 0.18 6 744 0.39 26 263 1.39 12 307 0.63 regional identity 2 705 0.16 4 018 0.21 5 254 0.27 unknown 211 0.01 1 154 0.07 2 964 0.17 10 635 0.56 53 545 2.72 source: verska, jezikovna…, 2003. slovene minority issues 15 the italian minority lives in the coastal areas of slovene istria on 27 km². according to the ethnic affiliation of the census of 2002, 2,700 ethnic italians lives there. according to the criteria of the mother tongue about 3,400 italians lives in slovenia; estimates show circa 4000 members of italian minority. according to the 1991 census, there lived 2575 people who claim italian as their ethic affiliation and 4009 by mother tongue. the area of settlement is vital and economically active; minority is also locally in the minority. the slovene-yugoslavitalian border since the treaty of ossimo [1976] onwards is very open, which made it easier for minority to communicate with its italian ethnic origin hinterland (zupančič, pipan, 2012). members of roma community are autochthonous ethnic community, present in slovenia for at least 500 years. roma are not settled on a contiguous territory, but are in the majority in over 100 settlements. according to the 2002 census there were around 3,600 and in 1991 2,293 roma according to the ethnic affiliation criteria and 2,847 according to the criteria of the mother tongue. according to estimates by social services around 8,000 roma live in slovenia, scholars estimate their total number at 10,000 (zupančič, 2014). minority protection has due to the poor economic situation of these communities mostly character of social interventionism, rather than keeping the ethnic and cultural nature of the population. in accordance with slovene constitution, representatives of italians and hungarians have secured a permanent (virile) mandate in the slovene parliament. deputies have the same powers as the other mps, additionally they have the right to use their own language and the right of veto in matters that directly affect the rights of minorities. they are elected at the regular election in a special minority electoral roll. members of minorities are included in this roll with the statement that they belong to a minority community. members of minorities can vote for minority candidates and also for the candidates of political parties; thus they have double voting rights. the same is true at the level of local elections. roma do not have their representatives in the national parliament, but they have the right to elect their own representatives or municipal councilors in the municipalities where they are traditionally present. in addition, all three minorities have their own umbrella organizations, which play roles of coordinative bodies. for the level of political and cultural rights, and issues the office for national minorities in the slovene government is responsible. another area of protection of minorities is bilingualism. slovenia is consistently pursuing a policy of bilingualism visible in the topography of settlements, streets and official institutions, which must be bilingual in the areas of minority settlements. officials must master at least the basics of both languages at the local level in the area of autochthonous settlement. officials with knowledge of the minority language are financially stimulated. persons belonging to minorities have the right to a translator in litigation on the entire territory of slovenia and have the right to communication with authorities in their own language. this also includes the right to a name and last name in the language and script of the minority. in the area of autochthonous settlement all, irrespective of ethnicity have bilingual identity documents: identity cards, passports, documents of origin, the various permits and certificates. bilingualism is also possible in courts; if the client is a member of a minority and wants to do business in their own language. written decisions and other documents are always bilingual, regardless of the language in which the proceedings take place. bilingual operations are legally guaranteed in the procedures of the municipal authorities and the authorities of the municipal and local committees. documents (statutes, regulations, rules, etc.) in the municipalities are in both languages. minority languages are used also in the church, although this is not guaranteed by the state. bilingualism in the catholic and protestant churches in slovenia is consistently implemented, even among priests and pastors who are not members of the italian or hungarian community (komac et al., 1999). education is the second most important socializing environment in the life of minorities; the first being family. minority school have a threefold purpose: to provide members of minority sufficiently general and professional knowledge of education in their own language and knowledge of the culture, history and geography of their own ethnic group, to form appropriate values and to assert the values of tolerance and accept differences in the ethnically mixed area. in slovenia, due to peculiarities of historical development and circumstances two entirely different system of minority education were established: italian schools in slovene istria and bilingual schools in prekmurje on the slovene – hungarian border. this education is part of a single slovene state school system. in public schools located in the area of autochthonous settlement of minorities, in all educational institutions all pupils have to learn the minority language. in the italian kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools where teaching takes place in italian, pupils are s also required to learn slovene. also, all communication with parents of school children is conducted in italian in these schools. in total, 16 matjaž klemenčič, jernej zupančič in slovenia there are nine italian primary and three secondary schools. italian language and literature can be studied in ljubljana faculty of arts (there they also train teachers for the italian minority schools). for the needs of the hungarian minority a system of bilingual education was developed, where classes simultaneously take place in slovene and hungarian. in the ethnically mixed areas there are 11 kindergartens, five elementary schools and one bilingual secondary school. at the university level hungarian is taught at the university of ljubljana and maribor, where they train teachers and educators for bilingual schools. mutual recognition of school diplomas at all levels among slovenia, italy and hungary is regulated by separate agreements. in the field of information and media the regulation of minority rights are of threefold nature: • the right of the members of minorities to establish their own media image of themselves and the spread of information about themselves; • the right to the presence of minority issues in the public media, and • to ensure a smooth flow of information between the minority and the country of origin. the italian community in doing so has due to the characteristics of the territory a few advantages. in the context of the national radio and television, radio and television programs in italian language are aired virtually all day and they have a seat in koper. the italian community in slovene istria has at its disposal a range of programs, magazines and newspapers from italy. media of hungarian minority is much poorer. it has available the weekly newspaper, cultural magazine, radio station in lendava and the emission on national tv twice a week. a special program council of radio television of slovenia – public – national broadcaster, in which the minorities have their representatives, governs the content of the program, for both of the minorities. roma community has several emissions in public radio and short magazine. cultural heritage of minorities, its preservation and development is included in the common heritage of the slovene state. hungarian community has established “institute for culture of hungarian nationality”, which includes the activities of civil society with predominantly folklore attitude to literature. in lendava and murska sobota, the rich libraries in the hungarian language exists. cultural activity of italians is organized in six associations. important institutions with their seat in croatia are also available for italians of slovenia: the centre for historical research in rovinj and the italian theatre in rijeka, slovenia allocates certain funds for the activities of both institutions (zupančič, 2014). 6. conclusion slovenes are relatively small european people, which live in contact with others in central europe and the mediterranean. due to historical circumstances, they achieved statehood relatively late. traditional ethnic minorities in slovenia and slovene minorities in neighboring countries are a result of turbulent processes of border-making trough a bit more than last century, when the recent political map of europe has been made. due to the intense emigration of a century ago, and later a relatively large slovene diaspora in north america, australia, argentina and the countries of western and central europe was developed. immigrant communities from the former yugoslavia in slovenia are a result of recent migrations. colorful ethnic heritage is difficult to manage, but is also culturally rich. future cultural development and ethnic existence of slovenes is dependent on both the skills of implementing new socioeconomic paradigm, consistent with the processes in europe, as well as the conscious efforts of the existence of the slovenian language and culture, in the sense of defiance global tendencies universalization of the one and migratory flows, on the other hand. references bodin j., 1580, les six livres de la république, 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(eds.), national atlas of slovenia, rokus, ljubljana, 127–128. zupančič j., 2002, the ethnic development and protection of national minorities in slovenia, mosella, 27(1–2), 63–71. zupančič j., 2004, ethnic structure of slovenia and slovenes in neighbouring countries, [in:] o. adamič (ed.), slovenia: a geographical overview, association of the geographical societies of slovenia, založba zrc, ljubljana, 87–92. zupančič j., 2013, dunajski slovenci v perspektivi skupnega slovenskega kulturnega prostora, [in:] r.  vincenc (ed.), slovenski odnosi z dunajem skozi čas, (srednjeevropska znanstvena knjižnica, bd. 7), slovenski znanstveni inštitut = slowenisches wissenschaftsinstitut and založba zrc and inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, dunaj = wien and ljubljana, 27–42. zupančič j., 2014, romi in romska naselja v sloveniji, znanstvena založba filozofske fakultete, ljubljana. zupančič j., pipan p., 2012, slovensko morje in obala: severni jadran v geopolitični perspektivi ter problemi razmejevanja med italijo, slovenijo in hrvaško, [in:] o. darko (ed.), geografija stika slovenske istre in tržaškega zaliva, znanstvena založba filozofske fakultete, ljubljana, 13–35. zwitter f., 1936, prebivalstvo na slovenskem od xviii. stoletja do današnjih dni, znanstveno društvo v ljubljani, ljubljana. 1. introduction 1 international links of economies of individual countries in the time of globalization are very important. this is particularly visible in the case of small countries, such as the republic of moldova. the country takes 135th place in the world and 32nd in europe in terms of area (33,846 km2), in terms of population (4,055,000 people on 01 jan. 2016) 129th and 29th, respectively (сокиркэ, мытку, 2016), and in terms 1 the project has been financed from the funds of the national centre for science allotted on the basis of decision dec-2011/01/b/hs4/03234. of gdp (6,551  m us dollars in 2015) 150th and 39th, respectively (http://data.worldbank.org). the latter data suggest that the country has little relevance for the world economy. the question arises whether it is really so: what is the nature of foreign economic relations of moldova and what changes has it undergone in the years of independence? the objective of the study is, therefore, to show foreign economic relations of moldova and their changes in terms of trade balance (export and import of goods) and foreign direct investment. those links are also important regarding the research on integration and disintegration processes in newly created states in the post-soviet area. therefore, the study covers journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 59–67 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.013.5458 foreign economic links of the republic of moldova and their dynamics in 1991–20151 cezary mądry (1), vitalie sochircă (2) (1) institute of socio-economic geography and spatial management, adam mickiewicz university, bogumiła krygowskiego 10, 61–680 poznań, poland, e-mail: cezary@amu.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) the faculty of biology and soil science, moldova state university, 65a m. kogalniceanu bl. 3, chisinau md-2009, moldova, e-mail: sorchirca1970@gmail.com citation mądry c., sochircă v., 2016, foreign economic links of the republic of moldova and their dynamics in 1991–2015, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 59–67. abstract the paper presents changes in foreign links of the republic of moldova in the field of trade balance (import and export of goods) and capital ties in the form of foreign direct investment. the focus was not only on the value of turnover but also on its branch structure and geographical directions. the most important determinants forming these relationships, in particular, the natural, historical, political, and institutional ones have also been presented. the collected data show the changes that have taken place during moldova’s independence, with the starting point being 1991, the year in which moldova regained independence. in this way the directions of economic integration of the country could be demonstrated. key words moldova, foreign trade, trade balance, export, import, foreign direct investments. 60 cezary mądry, vitalie sochircă the period of 1991–2015, taking into account earlier conditions. the data do not include parts of moldova called the transnistria republic. 2. natural and economic determinants natural conditions of moldova mark out this country for the development of agriculture. in the north of the country, on the bălți steppe, there is mainly chernozem, in the central part, on the slopes of the kodry hills range rarely reaching above 400 m asl, there is mainly podzol (barański, 1953). common is also loess. the moderately continental climate is characterised by mild winters (the average temperature in january ranges from -5°c in the north to -3°c in the south) and warm summers (from +19°c to +22°c in july, correspondingly) and moderately low rainfall (from 550  mm in north-west to 400  mm in south-east) (maryański, 1987). the development of agriculture affects the low degree of afforestation accounting to 6% of the country’s surface. the traditional form of farming – herding – since the tsarist period has been increasingly replaced by growing crops and by a slow development of industry, mainly the food-processing one. in the early soviet times a division into three agricultural regions appeared: the northern one with a predominance of wheat and sunflower crops, the central one with fruit, tobacco and vineyards crops, and the southern one with a predominance of wheat crops and sheep breeding (barański, 1953). as n.  barański writes (1953, p. 370), “the main export goods” of moldova were then grapes, wines, fruits, nuts, wheat, leather and canned goods. due to its different socio-economic circumstances, moldova did not become part of any of 18 major economic regions of the soviet union (ławriszczew, 1969). later corn became popular, taking up 44% of the cereal crops area, with the ever popular wheat (40%). the sugar beet was introduced in the south of the country, and around the country the sunflower was planted. it was, however, fruit farming that determined the agricultural specificity with 170,000 hectares of orchards and 240,000 hectares of vineyards, which accounted for 22% of the wine-growing area in the entire ussr (maryański, 1987). as part of gorbachev’s fight against alcoholism, most of the vineyards were cut, but the winemaking traditions in moldova have survived and the crops have been quickly restored. intense development of agriculture and a lack of natural resources (only limestone was mined on an industrial scale) resulted in the development of industries complementary to agricultural production. as part of the processing industry it was: wine-making (chişinău, tiraspol, rîbnița, bălţi), fruit and vegetable processing (tiraspol, bendery, grigoriopol), sugar (rîbnița, bălţi) and oil (bălţi, ataki, bendery). the engineering industry developed in chişinău (a tractor plant), light industry in bednary (silk factories), fur industry in bălţi, where there were long leather processing traditions (maryański, 1987). today the disused limestone mines have been converted into wine-production plants and are especially used to store moldavian wines. 3. historical overview the republic of moldova is the legal heir of the moldavian soviet socialist republic (mssr), founded on 2 sep. 1940 as a federal republic of the ussr. previously most of these regions were part of romania; however, on the basis of the molotov-ribbentrop pact, they were occupied and annexed on 28 july 1940. following the outbreak of warfare between germany and the soviet union, these lands along with the areas between the dniester and the boh were again incorporated into romania (demel, 1986). after the war, the border from july 1940 was restored, recreating the mssr, with numerous adjustments to borders with the ukrainian soviet socialist republic (demel, 1986; maryański, 1987; stępniewski, 2011). if the creation of the mssr is taken as a point of reference, since then three stages can be distinguished in shaping international ties of the country: 1) 1940–1991, when moldova was part of the ussr (except the period of world war ii); 2) 1991–2014, includes a period of independence until signing an agreement of association with the eu; 3) from 2014 to today, i.e. the period of independence since signing the above-mentioned agreement. being part of the ussr, moldova’s economic ties mainly focused on other federal republics. in the years 1988–1991 as much as 87.8% of moldova’s trade of goods was with the ussr. the remaining 12.2% was mainly aimed at countries of the socialist bloc (народное хозяйство..., 1992). the collapse of the ussr exposed numerous problems of the country. the economy proved to be non-market and inefficient. social, cultural, political, administrative, etc. problems became apparent. internal separatist trends were an important problem: creation of the transnistria republic in 1990 and the war fought for it with active participation of the russian army (mâtcu, sochircă, 2001) as well as the emerging autonomy of gagaúzia. foreign economic links of the republic of moldova and their dynamics in 1991–2015 61 de facto since the beginning of the 1990s it was necessary to build the state of moldova from the scratch, creating appropriate legal bases (including adoption of the constitution), the state authorities, the army and other state power ministries, the national bank, currency and seeking recognition both within the country (among the population) and abroad. regarding foreign economic links, the priorities involved: • preserving the existing links and developing new ones; • adapting export and import to new realities; • balancing foreign trade; • attracting foreign direct investment; • increasing the competitiveness of the economy and commodity production. in the international arena various opinions about developments in moldova can be found. according to some observers, after the baltic states, moldova is the most europeanised post-soviet country: romanian, one of the official languages of the eu, is de facto the official language, 70% of citizens support integration with the eu structures, more than half of export goes to countries being its members, most economic expatriates work in the eu and, finally, this organization is the main founder of the political and socio-economic changes in moldova. however, the soviet burden is indicated, along with weak democratic traditions, a lack of a longer period of own statehood, low legal awareness and poorly developed civil society (stępniewski, 2011). 4. foreign links in the context of international organizations and agreements the development of foreign relations of moldova was marked by accession to international agreements and organizations. the most important ones are presented in table 1. in the early years of independence, moldova sought to maintain economic links with post-soviet countries, in particular with those which were part of the commonwealth of independent states (cis), including first of all with russia. this cooperation played an important role for the moldovan economy but did not develop it. over time, the significance of the cis began to dwindle, while cooperation with neighbouring countries developed, especially those belonging to the organization of black sea economic cooperation (bsec), primarily with romania and ukraine. joining the wto in 2001 was an important moment for moldova. the most difficult area of eightyear-long negotiations was the agricultural economy – the most important branch of the country’s economy, especially the rules of subsidising agricultural production. moldova agreed to reduce this aid by 16% over 4 years. it also ratified most of the sector agreements concluded in the framework of the wto, except for those to related to the wine industry – the key one for moldova’s export. in the first years after joining the wto, the situation in agriculture worsened: the growth rate of the branch plunged, although after 2004 the situation began to level off. by joining the wto moldova wanted to gain access to wider agricultural markets, especially for its main export good – wine. the objective has been largely fulfilled. export has doubled, especially outside the cis countries (http://trade.ecoaccord.org). the accession of moldova to cefta in 2007 also had a big significance for the country’s economy and foreign trade. besides, the member states also share a common goal – joining the eu, which is connected with adaptation of the law to its standards (www. cefta.int). so far the agreement concluded between the republic of moldova and the european union on 27 june 2014 on nuclear energy has the greatest significance not only for moldova’s foreign links but also for the development of the country (http://lex. justice.md). the agreement on integration of moldova and the eu provides for the adoption by moldova of a number of eu legal solutions in almost all spheres tab. 1. moldova’s membership in selected international organizations no. organization the date of accession the total number of members 1. united nations (un) 2 mar. 1992 193 2. organization of the black sea economic (bsec) 25 june 1992 12 3. commonwealth of independent states (cis) 8 apr. 1994 9 4. food and agriculture organization of the united nations (fao) 1995 194 5. world trade organization (wto) 26 july 2001 162 6. central european free trade agreement (cefta) 26 july 2001 6 (7) source: сокиркэ, мытку, 2016; www.cefta.int. 62 cezary mądry, vitalie sochircă of life, including in the field of free trade. moldova’s strategic objective is, however, full membership in the eu. this event will open new prospects for the country’s economy (by expanding the market, stimulating investment, changing the law, etc.), its modernization and a free flow of the population. 5. foreign trade foreign trade plays the basic role in moldova’s international links. the main data in this regard are presented in tab. 2. on their basis, we can list the following trends: 1) the volume of export had a rising trend with a peak in 2013 (2,428.3 million us dollars), with a temporary dip in 1998-1999, which was connected with the financial and economic crisis of the world economy, in particular in countries that were major trading partners of moldova, especially in russia. the latest drop in the volume of export taking place in 2014–2015 (by 19% compared to 2013) is associated both with a crisis in russia and with the internal economic crisis in moldova caused by stealing usd 1 billion from financial reserves of the national bank of moldova (http://jurnal.md). 2) the volume of import had a rising trend, with a peak also in 2013 (usd  5,492.4  million) and a temporary drop in 1998–99 and 2009. the causes were similar as in the case of export – the economic crisis in moldova›s major trading partners (russia and ukraine). the latest fall in turnover in 2014–2015 (by 27.4% compared to 2013) is a result of the economic crisis in moldova and the armed conflict between russia and ukraine. until then these countries were among the top three trade partners of moldova. 3) the trade balance throughout the whole period is negative, with an average level of usd 2,445.2  million in 2005–2015, and in some years exceeding usd 3  billion, which accounted for 50% of the gdp. 4) the ratio of import to export (in %) had a decreasing trend from 96.4% in 1991 to the minimum at 32.5% in 2008. in the first years of independence (1991–1995) the average value of coverage was 83.4%, and in the last five years (2011–2015) 44.3%. such a large imbalance in the trade balance brings a number of threats for the economy. it is somewhat mitigated by an influx of money from moldovan economic emigrants mostly working in the eu and russia, and by grants from the eu and the usa. however, one can observe an increase in foreign debt of the country and increasingly common and deeper pauperisation of the society due to financial inefficiency of the state (low wages in the public sector, low pensions, insufficient funds for education, health, etc.). in 1991 in the structure of export of the farm and food production prevailed: alcoholic drinks, canned food, juices, cigarettes, sugar, meat and meat products, fresh, frozen and dried fruits and vegetables (fig.  1). the second place was taken by exports of the light industry products. both branches together accounted for 79% of export. compared to that time, on average, the share of agricultural products slightly decreased in the period 2010–2015, while the share of light industry products quite a lot (fig.  2). their total share amounted to 62%. the reason was tab. 2. selected data on foreign trade of moldova in 1991–2015 (in millions of usd) 19911 19921 19931 19941 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 export 8.1 65.0 701.9 2318.5 745.5 795.0 874.1 631.9 463.4 471.5 565.5 643.8 import 8.4 92.9 909.2 2733.9 840.7 1072.3 1171.2 1023.7 586.4 776.4 892.2 1038.0 trade balance -0.3 -27.9 -207.3 -415.4 -95.2 -277.3 -297.1 -391.8 -123.0 -304.9 -326.7 -394.2 coverage index2 96.4 70.0 77.2 84.8 88.7 74.1 74.6 61.7 79.0 60.7 63.4 62.0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 export 789.9 985.2 1090.9 1050.4 1340.0 1591.1 1283.0 1541.5 2216.8 2161.9 2428.3 2339.5 1966.9 import 1402.3 1768.5 2292.3 2693.2 3689.5 4898.8 3278.3 3855.3 5191.3 5212.9 5492.4 5317.0 3986.8 trade balance -612.4 -783.3 -1201.4 -1642.8 -2349.5 -3307.7 -1995.3 -2313.8 -2974.5 -3051.0 -3064.1 -2977.5 -2019.9 coverage index2 56.3 55.7 47.6 39.0 36.3 32.5 39.1 40.0 42.7 41.5 44.2 44.0 49.3 1 data in millions of the moldovan lei (mdl); 2 coverage index = (value of import/ value of export) x 100. source: статистический ежегодник … 1995, 2001; www.statistica.md foreign economic links of the republic of moldova and their dynamics in 1991–2015 63 not so much the mentioned reduction in subsidies for agriculture as the embargo on some products imposed on moldova by russia. also the percentage of sales of energy, minerals and metals declined. by contrast, the share of metals, machinery and equipment, chemical industry products (paraffin-cosmetic, pharmaceutical), furniture, glass, etc. increased. the reason was the arrival of foreign investors. this structure, however, still reflects specialisation of economy towards agriculture. in terms of value, the export of most goods increased. the most important export commodity of moldova is alcohol products: wine, sparkling wine, “divin” – an equivalent of cognac, spirit, liqueurs, vodkas, etc. the mean share of those goods in the total value of exports in 1997–2014 was 20.3%, i.e. about usd  201.5  million per year. this percentage decreased in the last decade, mainly due to the financial crisis in russia in 1998 and the imposition of an embargo on moldovan exports by russia (fig. 3). the maximum volume of the share of alcoholic products in exports was in 1998 (33.1%), and the minimum one in 2015 (7.9%). broken down by types of drinks in 1998 it was respectively: wine – 109.3 million litres (of which 92.8% to russia), sparkling wine – 5.5 million litres (90.1% to russia), natural wine wort – 24.7 million litres (52.5% to russia), vodkas, liqueurs and other spirits – 0.4 million litres (57.9% to russia). the imposition of the russian embargo significantly affected wine producers and resulted in a need to redirect exports, mainly to the eu and chinese markets, but with little success. in addition, producers increased their offer by shifting some of the production to juices and selling fresh grapes and raisins. currently, the walnut is becoming an increasingly important export commodity. in this respect, moldova ranks first among exporters in europe and fourth in the world (сокиркэ, мытку, 2016). according to data from 2014–2015, the biggest moldovan exporters are draexlmaier automotive (car parts), floarea soarelui (vegetable oils; factories in bălţi), tirotex (textiles, in tiraspol), südzuckermoldova (sugar, in drochia and others), moldabela (carpets; in ungien), moldovan metallurgical plants (in rybnica), natur bravo (canned foods; in cupcini, floreşti and others), wine production plants: cricova, mileştii mici, and others. in the goods structure of imports of moldova, on average in the period of 2010–2015 machinery, devices and metals had the largest share, then energy and mineral resources: petroleum products (petrol, diesel oil, mazut, and others), natural gas, coal and electricity (fig.  4). this specificity results from the fig. 1. export from moldova with a breakdown by goods (in % of total exports in 1991) source: www.statistica.md fig. 2. export from moldova with a breakdown by goods (in % of the total export, on average in 2010–2015) source: www.statistica.md 64 cezary mądry, vitalie sochircă absence of natural resources and from certain industries in the economy of moldova. 6. foreign debt permanently persistent negative trade balance is financed with foreign debt. according to data of the national bank of the republic of moldova, its gross value in 2015 was about usd  6.38  billion, which represented 98% of the country’s gdp. in absolute terms, the biggest debt was in 2013: usd  6.67  billion, but with a greater gdp this resulted in less relative debt (83.6% gdp) (http://bloknot-moldova.md). in fact, most of the debt stems from the sale of gas by russia to the so-called transnistria republic. the companies operating there do not settle their accounts, and russia charges the debt to moldova. 7. directions of foreign trade currently, moldova maintains trade relations with over 100 countries. the major trading partners are eu countries (especially romania, italy, germany and poland) (fig.  5), which account for over 50% of the value of foreign trade, including more than 60% of the volume of exports. agricultural produce, shoes, tricot, car parts, etc. are sold to these countries, and machinery and equipment, chemical industry products, etc. are purchased from them. traditional trading partners also include russia, ukraine, belarus and turkey, to which mainly agricultural produce is exported and crude oil, chemicals, electricity, coal, garments, knitted fabrics, light industry products, etc. are imported. 8. foreign direct investment the total value of foreign direct investment (fdi) located in moldova since regaining independence is less than usd 3 billion. according to the world bank data, the value of fdi per capita in moldova is about usd  300. for example, in other post-soviet countries – georgia and armenia – this value exceeds usd  1,000 per person, in neighbouring romania usd 3,000 and in estonia usd 10,000 (http://capital. market.md). foreign capital is located in all major branches of the economy but most often in communications and the it industry (especially in fig. 3. participation of alcoholic products in the total volume of exports (in %, on average, in particular years) source: www.statistica.md fig. 4. import in moldova with breakdown by goods (in %, the mean for 2010–2015) source: www.statistica.md foreign economic links of the republic of moldova and their dynamics in 1991–2015 65 mobile telecommunications), the power industry, the light and food industry, the banking system, and construction. among investors, 52% of the invested capital falls to the eu countries, 11.8% to the cis countries, and 36.0% to other countries (table 3). the example of ukraine, however, shows that the russian capital lies behind most companies registered in cyprus (mądry, 2002). according to data of the ministry of justice of the republic of moldova, 1,600 companies with the romanian capital operate in the country. among the major investors are: rompetrol, petrom, romstal, metro cash&carry. the value of money invested by them was 497 million moldovan lei (mdl). fig. 5. directions of foreign trade of moldova per country (in %, the average for 2013–2015) source: www.statistica.md tab. 3. cumulated foreign direct investments in moldova (as of 01 august 2016) no. country the number of enterprises the number of enterprises with foreign capital in the total number of enterprises (%) the value of investments in million mdl 1. netherlands 160 2 2,289 2. italy 1,228 12 1,724 3. cyprus 303 3 1,447 4. russia 951 9 1,146 5. germany 404 4 683 6. usa 379 4 544 7. great britain 232 2 516 8. romania 1,600 16 497 9. turkey 1,126 11 297 10. ukraine 970 9 250 11. france 225 2 137 12. bulgaria 173 2 51 13. israel 298 3 43 14. syria 231 2 10   other 1,946 9 2,614   total 10,226 100 12,248 source: www.cis.gov.md 66 cezary mądry, vitalie sochircă the netherlands are a leader in terms of the value of investments (mdl 2.3 billion, i.e. 18.7% of the total fdi). the number of enterprises with the dutch capital is 160, and these are mainly companies belonging to the food processing industry, banking, transport and retail trade. a dutch holding company easeur holding bv, which is a majority shareholder (80%) in the giurgiulești international free port (in the cahul region), is one of the biggest foreign investors in moldova. romania, turkey, italy, russia and ukraine have the greatest impact on local markets –investors from these countries deal in billions of euros in companies from the power industry, banking, insurance, retail trade and industry (http://capital.market.md). 951 companies with the russian capital operate in moldova, with the capital of 1,146 million lei. the biggest ones include lukoil, moldovagaz and moldavian power station (known as moldavskaya gres) in dnestrovsc, transnistria, as well as topaz, several banks and wine production plants. germany takes fifth place in terms of the number of foreign companies (404) with a total capital of 683 million lei. the largest german companies in moldova include tirexpetrol (crude oil processing), dräxlmaier group automotive (bmw car parts manufacturer), mercedes benz, knauf (producer of construction materials), and sudzuker-moldova (sugar mill). the biggest french companies include bank mobiasbancă (groupe société générale), lafargeholcim company and orange – a company operating in the telecommunications market. overall, 225 companies with the french capital operate in moldova, with a total value of investments being 125.5 million lei. the remaining larger companies operating on the moldovan market include moldcell (with the moldovan-turkish capital, in the mobile telecommunications industry) and gas natural fenosa (a moldavian-spanish electricity company). relatively small involvement of foreign capital stems from investment barriers of a political, social, infrastructural and economic character. they include: a) political uncertainty as to the strategic political objectives and the unresolved territorial dispute with transnistria; b) deep interference of the state in business activities and frequent government interventions; c) weak, inefficient, corrupt and unjust judicial system, involved, among others, in the case of appropriation of the majority shares packages of some enterprises important for the economy; d) the quality of manpower, poor knowledge of foreign languages; e) poor development of infrastructure; f ) small size of the market, with simultaneously large grey zone; g) effects of the economic crisis from the turn of the century and the susceptibility to the influence of political and economic turmoil in russia and ukraine. in order to encourage investors and stimulate economic development, free economic zones have been created in moldova – investment areas with tax exemptions. their number has increased in recent years. the largest of these is the expo-business chişinău zone in chişinău. the others include zones in the cities of ungien, bălți, taraclia, otaci, vulcănești and tvardița. 9. conclusions in the global period of growth in the importance of trade and capital links (despite slumps in the recent years), moldova is situated on the outskirts of the interests of markets. however, foreign economic links are important for moldova, in particular during the transition from the soviet centrally-controlled to the market economy. the structure of export of goods is closely connected with the country’s economic specialization, still formed in the soviet era. the agricultural character of the country determines the exports of mainly foods and the production of light industry. these are lowly-processed and non-tech goods. this means relegation of the country to the periphery of the european economy and little possibility of bridging the gap. on the contrary, this imbalance is increasing, which entails pauperisation of the society. despite growing and prevailing trade relations with the eu countries, moldova’s economy is still characterised by strong links with post-soviet countries. economic crises in russia and ukraine, political decisions and armed conflicts each time have a negative impact on moldova’s gdp and export. the import structure indicates complementarity to national production (energy and energy resources) and filling in the moldovan market niches, especially in technological and financial fields. the directions of links in this respect also indicate a high dependency on post-soviet countries, especially russia (mainly in the field of energy resources), and in terms of transit on ukraine and transnistria. the deep imbalance in the trade balance results in an increase in the state debt, poverty and, consequently, massive economic migration of mainly young people abroad. paradoxically, their earnings reduce the imbalance in the balance of payments; foreign economic links of the republic of moldova and their dynamics in 1991–2015 67 however, in a longer perspective, they are not a solution and do not reduce the debt of the central budget. the unresolved conflict with transnistria deepens the trade balance and the current account deficit by charging the unsettled by transnistria accounts to the government in chișinău. this increases the moldovan authorities’ vulnerability to external political pressure. the imbalance of payments is only slightly mitigated by the influx of fdi, as the capital links of moldova are maintained at a low level. among the existing ones, one should note the increasing share of the western capital, but adding the russian and cypriot2 investment, investors from these countries take first place in terms of the capital invested in moldova (in total 21.2%) and second place in terms of the number of enterprises (12.3%). only subjects from historically and culturally close romania have a larger number of companies with foreign capital in moldova; however, the value of the capital invested by them gives these investors only eighth place. the industry structure of fdi shows a resemblance to the structure of moldova’s economy. foreign investment does not significantly contribute to the diversification of its structure; on the contrary, one can expect its consolidation, with minor adjustments, mainly in the mobile telecommunications industry (hence the increased import of devices) and the engineering one (production of car parts). clear political objectives (economic integration with the eu or with post-soviet countries) would certainly accelerate the economic growth and the development of the country and increase commercial and capital contacts with foreign countries. this choice is a choice of civilisation for moldova. references barański n., 1953, geografia gospodarcza zsrr, wzws, warszawa. demel j., 1986, historia rumunii, zakład narodowy imienia ossolińskich, wrocław-warszawa-kraków-gdańsk-łódź. ławriszczew a., 1969, geografia ekonomiczna zsrr, pwe, warszawa. mądry c., 2002, spatial structure of foreign direct investments in ukraine, revista română de geografie politică, iv(1-2), 79–86. maryański a., 1987, geografia ekonomiczna związku radzieckiego, pwe, warszawa. 2 thanks to tax-law solutions, cyprus is a country in which the russian business is very active, which allows russian investors to work around a number of sanctions imposed on russia after the annexation of crimea. mâtcu m., sochircă v., 2001, geografia umană a republicii moldova, editura arc, chişinău. stępniewski t., 2011, geopolityka region morza czarnego w pozimnowojennym świecie, instytut europy środkowowschodniej, lublin-warszawa. народное хозяйство республики молдова. anuar statistic 1991, 1992, departamentul de stat pentru statistică al republicii moldova, tipografia c.p.c., chişinău. сокиркэ в., мытку м., 2016, социально-экономическая география республики молдова, м-во просвещения респ. молдова, ed. a 3-a, arc (combinatul poligrafic), chişinău. статистический ежегодник республики молдова 1994, 1995, departamentul statisticii al republicii moldova, chişinău. статистический ежегодник республики молдова 1999, 2001, departamentul analize statistice şi sociologice al republicii moldova, chişinău. http://bloknot-moldova.md [22.05.2016] http://capital.market.md [05.06.2016] http://data.worldbank.org [19.05.2016] http://hdr.undp.org [19.05.2016] http://jurnal.md [22.05.2016] http://lex.justice.md [19.05.2016] http://trade.ecoaccord.org [06.06.2016] http://www.cefta.int [22.05.2016] http://www.cis.gov.md [18.05.2016] http://www.statistica.md [22.05.2016] 1. introduction the sometimes insisting sprout out of new identities is characterizing the current globalization realty; they appear at any scale, from the micro to the macro, almost as a side-effect of parallel phenomena signifying increasingly identity (cultural) and territorial indeterminateness (herb, kaplan (eds.), 1999; wintersteiner et al., (eds.), 2010; jelen, 2011; ilieş et al., 2012). this paper argues that this phenomenon could be connected to a condition of periphericity, in which some communities unexpectedly fund their selves in the new global map (which is in the same time upsetting the usual centre-periphery schema), namely from a sense of vulnerability, outside the umbrella once provided by modern state – that in journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(3), 25–38 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.017.5804 „innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) igor jelen (1), ernst steinicke (2), erica specogna (3) (1) department of political and social science, university of trieste, piazzale europa 1, 34100 trieste, italy, e-mail: igor.jelen@dispes.units.it (corresponding author) (2) faculty of geo and atmospheric sciences, university of innsbruck, innrain 52, 6020 innsbruck, austria, e-mail: ernst.steinicke@uibk.ac.at (3) department of political and social science, university of trieste, piazzale europa 1, 34100 trieste, italy, e-mail: erica.spek@libero.it citation jelen i., steinicke e., specogna e., 2016, „innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy), journal of geography, politics and society, 6(3), 25–38. abstract the current globalization realty is characterized by the constant coming up of new identities, that are appearing at any scale, almost as a side-effect of parallel phenomena signifying increasingly cultural indeterminateness. this paper argues that this phenomenon is connected to a condition of periphericity, namely to a sense of vulnerability that arise outside the umbrella once provided by modern state; furthermore this paper argues that this phenomenon is indifferently affecting any culture, not considering ethnic and linguistic derivation. such situation figures out a sort of paradox of the globalization, which, while extending the hegemony of a uniform code, would induce per reaction the flourishing of local cultures, sometimes evidencing a self-referential character, other times configuring the main stain for a new territorial consciousness. key words region friuli venetia giulia – north eastern italy, local identity revival, geography of peripheral condition, eastern alps, ethnic and linguistic minorities. 26 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna the same time is loosing in charismatic and material power. further elements can be individuated in a post modern phenomenon of revival of local cultures, obliterated in modernistic times by the centralization wave, and in the increasing weakness of modern institutions. these are accumulated problems (public debt, bureaucracy, political inefficiency), evidencing the incapability to accomplish longer their duty both, as provider of social services (safety, welfare, accessibility, pluralistic education) and as reference for an all-comprehensive identity in national terms; a problem common to many contemporary political systems, which is described by the rhetoric of the “end of cycle” of (western) democracy. as a further element to be considered the reaction to a situation of uniformation induced by multiculturalism, with the “mixed” category becoming the most rapidly growing ethnic category in the global era (namely the fear for the disappearing of an usual idea of identity) (ali, 2011). another relevant aspect would be the establishment of a condition of borderless, repurposing the fear for competition of outside economies, namely the loss of some rent position; in the case of the montagna friulana (mf, see fig. 1)1 it means the fear to be exposed to the more efficient “north” and the fast growing “east” in the central-european scenario (borderland effect). further elements would be possible traced to a kind of marketing tactic, the peripheral communities would adopt for making their selves something distinguishable in the “flat” global scenario. this not just for touristic-economic purposes, but also for the possibility of obtaining a share of the public budget usually devoted to protection of environmental and cultural particularities (a usual task for the modernist welfare state). such possibility indeed induces expectations (in terms of public funding, of promotion etc.), then configuring the risk for bringing to some artificial survival of the publicly-funded identity, with local lobbies advocating a minority status, in fact becoming a kind of minority “professionals” (then configuring a dangerous cultural bias). such situation figures out a sort of paradox of the globalization, which, while extending the hegemony of a uniform code, would induce per reaction the flourishing of a mix of local cultures, sometimes evidencing a self-referential character, other 1 for making the reading easier, it has been used in the text the official toponomastic in italian, followed eventually by locally used names either friulian-italian, slovenian or german; see the institutional webpage of the region friuli venetia giulia http://www.regione.fvg.it/rafvg/cms/rafvg/ cultura-sport/patrimonio-culturale/comunita-linguistiche/ [11.11.2016]. times configuring the main stain for a new territorial consciousness. 2. the condition of periphericity: opportunity or condemnation? such perceptions are strongly influenced by the post-modernity “turn”, which means amongst the others the upset of the perception of the territorial order, namely the inversion of centre-periphery disposition. it is a matter of geographical consciousness, about the position a certain group perceives to settle with regard to all the “others” and to other territorial and non-territorial factors; it depends probably on cultural or historical circumstances, which would determine the self-perception of a certain community in terms of being inside or outside (protagonist or victim) of certain context (steinicke et al., 2011a, 2011b). in some case, a condition of periphericity could be perceived as an advantage, in others as a definitive disadvantage; in the range of few km the perception of a certain identity could manifest in opposite significances. this issue is evidently correlated to the identification of the “self ” in a “whole”, what in regional-structural terms means the perception of being included or excluded from something: perhaps it could signify perhaps the level of social collaboration (e.g. functioning of the civil functions), the availability of infrastructures, the connection to “centers” (state, regional, “global” etc.) and the accessibility to wider flows, depending on geographical hierarchy (chai at al., 1986). the fact, that in a context of structural weakening the local emarginated group would tendentially perceive the outside world in a negative way is possibly more than an hypothesis: it would be probably affected by intestine conflicts, manifesting in different way the discomfort and the impossibility of maintaining a rational way of confrontation both, inside the community (among community members) and towards the outside institutions. this until the society will reach a new equilibrium or, at the contrary, until it will definitively weak, with peoples maturing a sense of miss-trust, eventually a sense of self-hatred, risking the definitive desegregation. probably a situation characterized probably by the spread out of instinctive reactions, that are going to characterize both, inside and outside relations, with the outside world being perceived from a condition of inferiority, as well as the local community were a kind of residuum left behind by the mainstream of geography and history. “innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) 27 such motivations manifest in not predictable ways and in not coherent communication modes. sometimes the group, perceiving itself as threatened, would react in an instinctive manner, like an “organic” being, with a whole personality defending his self in a lethal struggle for survival – since in those circumstances the rational confrontation codes are not working anymore. sometimes it would just desegregate and disappear (as e.g. a community demographically weakening and migrating). in such circumstances, single individuals, factions and groups, association and institutions, feeling limited and menaced (in a kind of “territorial trap”), would probably react as endangered “animals”, for pure self-defense purposes, migrating or hiding their selves, fighting or escaping the reality. yet they have as well the chance to positively react, elaborating compromises, starting initiatives and elaborating intermediate (innovative) identities. evidently, social actors and settlement units, as well as economic or political organizations, are not behaving just like “atoms” in an invariable mechanically-determined game, which is just further “replicating”. 3. the case of the mountain area of friuli such situations have been well defined in literature in the post-mod culture frame (supposed to evaporate or to became “liquid”); the same for the case of the alpine rural geography in different circumstances, both, in “critical” and descriptive-quantitative terms (appadurai, 2001; rumley, minghi (eds.), 1991; kaplan, häkli (eds.), 2002; weixlbaumer, 1988). indeed in mountain space – as well as in other spaces characterized by remoteness, natural topographic obstacles, and territorial discontinuities – such condition of periphericity is perceived alternatively as a problem or as an opportunity. probably this considering the expectations the community manifests to become dependent of some “centre”, considering as well further local attitudes (as autonomy tradition or social compactness), as well structural accessibility, availability of infrastructures and economic self-sufficiency. in order to test such connection we would consider the mf, an area comprehensive of the northern and the eastern part of the province of udine fig. 1. the montagna friulana as per e. steinicke, comprehended in the administrative provinces of udine and pordenone, in the northern part of the fvg region, north-eastern italy source: own elaboration based on steinicke (1991, p. 40). 28 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna and pordenone, autonomous region friuli venezia giulia (fvg), italy, bordering with slovenia (east) and austria (north). the area is characterized by many aspects of marginality in terms of loosing capacity, of depopulation, of weakening of welfare systems, with emergence of “ghost” cities and villages (čede, steinicke, 2007). it means, in a context of regional-structural transformations, the degeneration in a new condition of dependency, with the spread off of a perception a self-insufficiency. the settlements are dislocated in a scarcely populated area of about 42.5% of the whole surface of the region fvg (7  857 km²), with a population of 67 946, that is 7% of the whole regional population tab.1. population and demographic trend in the municipalities of the montagna friulana municipalities and sub regions resident population % (1951 =100%) municipalities and sub regions resident population % (1951 =100%) 1951 2011 1951 2011 arta terme 3208 2273 -29 chiusaforte 2187 705 -68 cercivento 1220 705 -42 dogna 987 200 -80 ligosullo 432 180 -58 moggio udinese 3854 1842 -52 paluzza 4271 2403 -44 pontebba 3931 1535 -61 sutrio 1758 1376 -22 resia 3350 1101 -67 treppo carnico 1409 659 -53 resiutta 798 320 -60 zuglio 1150 607 -47 venzone 3592 2223 -38 canale s.pietro 13448 8203 -39 canal del ferro 18699 7926 -58 paularo 4408 2782 -37 lusevera 2377 711 -70 comeglians 1839 540 -71 taipana 2841 699 -75 forni avoltri 1508 653 -57 prealpi giulie nord (torre) 5218 1410 -73 ovaro 3935 2064 -48 drenchia 1392 141 -90 prato carnico 2538 958 -62 grimacco 1737 395 -77 ravascletto 1500 569 -62 pulfero 3735 1052 -72 raveo 739 506 -32 san leonardo 2283 1210 -47 rigolato 2058 513 -75 savogna 2077 506 -76 canale di gorto 14117 5803 -59 stregna 1883 413 -78 ampezzo 2472 1058 -57 prealpi giulie sud (natisone) 13107 3717 -72 enemonzo 1846 1355 -27 bordano 1483 810 -45 forni di sopra 2070 1071 -48 clauzetto 1840 402 -78 forni di sotto 1598 660 -59 forgaria del friuli 3202 1854 -42 preone 655 279 -57 tramonti di sotto 1952 423 -78 socchieve 2253 938 -58 trasaghis 4125 2337 -43 alto tagliamento 10894 5361 -51 vito d’asio 2939 843 -71 sauris 885 429 -52 prealpi carniche ovest 15541 6669 -57 amaro 1199 820 -32 andreis 1125 289 -74 cavazzo carnico 1601 1102 -31 barcis 1056 256 -76 lauco 2529 805 -68 cimolais 1092 431 -61 tolmezzo 8329 10659 28 claut 2408 1027 -57 verzegnis 1818 929 -49 erto e casso 2219 389 -82 villa santina 2002 2223 11 frisanco 1568 683 -56 area tolmezzo 17478 16538 -5 tramonti di sopra 1614 385 -76 marborghetto valbruna 1512 965 -36 prealpi carniche est 11082 3460 -69 tarvisio 6438 4683 -27     valcanale 7950 5648 -29 montagna friulana 132827 67946 -49 source istat italian census bureau; http://www.demo.istat.it; see map 1. “innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) 29 (1  236  103 inhabitants). such figure is getting even worse because of long term trends out-migration, demographic ageing, economic decadence, with proliferation of “wüstungen”, deterioration of social connections, mis-management of landscape and environment, worsening of infrastructural networks, and further signs of decay2. the decrease of population counts for a half in the last 50 years, from 132 827 in the ‘50ies to nearly 67 946 in current census data (tab. 1); the demography is worsening also because of correlated ageing, migrations and “brain drain” effects, with the indicators showing a long-term migration to the leading centers of the southern part of the area, where are settled the administrative and industrial centers, far from the mountain area (especially the cities of udine and trieste). this leads to increasingly marginalization problems, a paradox, if we consider that the mf valleys are historically the “pass-land” on the central-european axis, between the east and the west, the north and the south of the continent, and are currently crossed by relevant infrastructural corridors like highways, high-capacity railways, pipelines etc. actually, local societies can just perceive the dis-advantages of such flows (pollution, crowding, commuting-traffic), that just stream massively up and down the main alpine channel, ignoring the lateral valleys of this area (indeed worsening the sensation of being excluded of the reality). in fact, such streams appear just as the metaphor of the modernity, passing “trough” or “over” the peripheral mf, with flows of peoples, tourists, freights etc. crossing this area, not including and not aiding in any way the local communities. 4. structural and cultural weakening in the late modernity obviously, such weakness is not exclusive of this area; critical long term trends have been observed along the alps and other mountain and emarginated areas (in italy it is the case of western alps and of apennine mountains, at the contrary of well developed and demographically stable dolomite and central-eastern alps). nevertheless, here, although 2 “in nessun territorio della zona alpina il processo di spopolamento è così incessante e così fortemente radicato come nelle alpi friulane, dove accanto ad appezzamenti abbandonati si sono configurati luoghi completamente disabitati (ghost towns); luoghi questi, dove dunque, sono fallite anche le tradizionali strategie di sviluppo economico e territoriale atte ad arginare lo spopolamento” (steinicke et al., 2007, p.549). considering some recent counter-tendency elements, mainly induced by amenity settlement and emigration movements, the crisis manifests an extraordinary persistence, evoking the existence of specific circumstances. such weakness manifests itself in both cultural and structural terms; the former is proved by a progressive lost of social common rituals and by the spread out of indiscriminate outcry attitudes. the latter by the long term deteriorating of economic and demographic situation. indeed it is difficult to state, in which way such processes are correlated and mutually influencing, whether the cultural weakness is the cause or the effect of the territorial crisis (the condition of periphericity), or the reversal. it has to be suppose that such processes are intrinsically connected. such trend began to be irreversible during the time of late modernity, starting from the ‘50ies, when became evident a condition of structural delay of the mf compared with other parts of the region (the southern and coastal plain and cities). it happened almost surprisingly. after the late modernity turn, the valleys suddenly have found their selves in a condition of periphericity (at the contrary, in pre modernity period the mountain valleys have been comparatively flourishing), with the diffusion of the perception, by the side of the mountain populations, of being deprived of something, to the benefit of the urbanized part of the region. during this period the southern alluvial coastal plain (more suitable for developing scale economics for business, communication and production in modern terms) begin to show the characteristics of the rapid development, with massive “third industrialization” and consummistic development (urbanization, spread out of middle class culture, increasing well-being standard, automobile and private mobility etc.), since that time generating an attraction effect on the – from that time – emarginated mountain. since the ‘50s the southern urban-industrial areas began to attract peoples and resources of the mountain, whose economics began reciprocally to show the signs of a weakness, as a consequence. such negative trends developed progressively until the final crisis, configuring a wide desertification effect for entire mf valleys, and once decreased below some threshold, risk to collapse and disappear. such effects seem to evolve in a contextual regional-level “zero sum game”, with economics and societies loosing value and cohesion and depressing irreversibly in a “closing in its self ” system, then giving birth to an ideology based on claims and protestations. 30 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna the structural weakening configures the exactly parallel to the social weakening, which is epitomically described by the disappearing of regulation codes, and furthermore by the spread off of intestine conflictuality. further consequences of such drift are the spread off of several social disturbances, and finally emargination and mass population out-migration. indeed, a vicious circle exerting a dramatic effect for conservation of the local culture: the progressive weakening of communities, loosing self-confidence and the respect in their own culture, loosing codes that demonstrated to be enough efficient to permit the long term survival of the community in the past times. a progressive weakening that would probably combine with further fragmentation tendencies, placing a lethal threat to communities with millennia of history. this especially in an area which is characterized by an extreme variability in cultural linguistic terms: the crisis in mf means the threat to a borderland mixed region, characterized by romance (carnian, friulian and italian), slavonian-slavonic and germanic speaking groups spread out in the valleys. a place representing the transition area between the central-european and the mediterranean space, among the balkans and italian peninsula and the danube valley (wendt, 2001) (in which the different european linguistic cultures have met since ancient times as spontaneous historical diffusion (ilieş et al., 2011)). 5. the flourishing of micro identities nowadays such different cultures nowadays are affected equally by crisis factors and are showing similar reactions. the data describes a long term weakening, in which economic worsening is combining with social uncertainty, affecting inevitably on the identitarian dimension: a context inclined to intestine conflictuality, with cultural and material codes just overlapping any further local contraposition, and inclined as well to proliferation of ethnolinguistic micro-identities – the variable considered in this study, rather than of other character, such as religious, ideological-political, or strictly territorial. on the basis of our investigation it is possible to enlist a sequence of “innovative” identities, from the traditionally recovered to apparently totally invented ones, from what it is possible to define as a revival identity to a neglected one, for variants not (yet) recognized as a national standard or not recognized at all, neither by scientist (philologists, geographers, sociologists) nor by official institutions. some of those are indeed based on the expectation of local groups to be recognized as an authentic culture, or to be accredited as local variants of official language, claiming for ethnographic peculiarities e.g., in culture, traditional music or vernacular literature (mainly oral), or even “genetic” terms (see below the grotesque case of resia valley). such claim would be based alternatively on something primordial (therefore indemonstrable), assuming a “culturalist” marker as the evidence of a peculiar identity, often as a strictly geographical issue (the belonging to a valley, to a village, to a fraction of a village, to a special landscape, mountains or rivers etc.). rarely it develops in civic/rational terms, namely targeting the representation of a common interest (e.g. the claim for a material need, for control on political action or for infrastructure improvement, the spread out of environmental questions movements), demonstrating that in such context the civic approach is usually weaker: due to the social “confusion”, people rarely participates to elaboration of public life in rational terms; e.g. they do not attend to civic assemblies, but they are inclined to undertake informal quarreling or occasional protestations, tendencially assuming rebel attitude. more often the spread out of innovative identitarian movements is the result of a distorted social dynamics, resulting e.g. from the contraposition between two or more associations, each one claiming for “purity” or for a sort of primogeniture. in other cases the acknowledgment of a new culture is just the result of “top down” politics, often pursuing a “positive discrimination” manoeuvre (considering that the modern welfare state usually supports local minorities). sometimes it results from the initiative of some influent local faction or personality (e.g. the major of a small municipality, the vip residing in a rural area, the entrepreneur offering working places) pursuing individual objectives. other times the foundation of a new micro-culture is a direct consequence of a manipulative use of local media, with some association or some individual (just as a hobby or as a game) founding a new “variant” of a certain ethnicity, starting with the organization of a local movement. sometimes the promotion of an innovative identity relies “tout court” on a manipulation of a certain tradition, in other cases it comes form the “refuse” of some innovation (in conservative or escapist terms), eventually perceived as an imposition (it is the case of the superposition of a national linguistic standard on a local dialect). all these, cases potentially inducing domino effects (a kind of “fractalization” of identities, using the appaduray terminology) (appaduraj, 2001, p.  68.), with the creation of apparently innovative “innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) 31 movements, as well as the diffusion of negative attitude, namely of identities induced just by a reaction in contraposition circumstances (korostelina, 2008). such effects are realizing in a fragmented context, with informal groups or just single individuals purposing an innovative language in a sectarian context, in an arbitrary manner – a paradox, considering that the first function of a language is to be an instrument for improving the communication and to enlarge the audience (minnich, 1993). 6. test area such tendencies have been observed in a wide series of case studies, nearly in any village of the mf, assuming different forms and instruments – such as home-printed booklets, social media, blogs and web pages, inter-personal circumstances, start up of spontaneous committees, as well door-to-door communication networks. sometimes the contents of such expressions are similar to an occasional outburst, other times they are the beginning of a wider movements, inclined to assume as well political character with the intention of pursuing objectives of social influence. indeed, such ways of expression are not always significant indicator of a consolidated public opinion, but just “iceberg peaks” signifying a “minority” of organized agitators trying to “opening the door” in the local society, pursuing particular targets. furthermore, beside the usual communication circuits, such movements are spreading out on the web, assuming a typical immaterial form, as a universe of information, opinions and “taking sides”, occasional polemics and disputes on the “blog-sphere”, which is becoming a kind of arena for the local dialectics – indeed often manifesting in self-referential modes, since not inducing a significant feed-back. in general these expressions rely on the tools offered by the free communication, without filters and censure, in order to get a wide communication base (considering also that the accessibility of such instruments is usually easy and inexpensive). all this is configuring a general confusion of expressions and open source media, in which the local society is inclined to express, manifesting sometimes drift effect of the “trash” communication (e.g. indulging in offensive and vulgar language). such material has been analyzed with a screening method: an information base not necessarily expressing something coherent, but a good barometer of local tension, with communication tools used by individuals and associations as simple multiplicators of opinions. indeed, they have to be considered just what they are, namely spontaneous liberatory expressions: either than the purpose of some solution, the simple outburst of some frustration. furthermore it has been performed a search on local newspaper, especially on letters column, as well as on articles written by local correspondents (usually not professional journalists). this assuming that the private readers letters sent to newspapers would represent a way for “measuring” the identityproliferation phenomenon. such newspapers are the messaggeroveneto (mv), based in udine, the il gazzettino from udine-pordenone and the primorski dnevnik, slovenian newspaper of trieste, all of them printed outside the investigated area (since no daily newspaper settles inside the mf). local periodicals with different origin have been as well reviewed, such the dom and the novi matajur (from cividale, in slovenian and partially in local dialects), la vita cattolica and il nuovo friuli (from udine, in italian and friulan). names of privates, when cited, have been punctuated. such letters are – as verified – usually not filtered, even when usually selected by their polemical potential in mobilizing the public opinions, in order to manifest the latent tensions (and presumably to increase newspaper circulation). such letter are supposed to be significant indicators even when considering some biases, as the repetitiveness of some writers: when the polemical “violence” would reach the top, waves of letters inundating the newspaper editorial board, soon disappearing after a while. it has been estimated that about 40% of the letters are targeting directly or indirectly the identity issue, offering material for a possible list of self-defined identities. in particular with these articles it is possible to describe the situation of minority belonging considering the three most important minority groups located in mf, in respective areas of historical settlement, applying a symmetrical investigation on the three linguistic roots. this in order to verify differences in the behavior of such groups, whether they are assuming different attitude evidencing “culturalist” significance. 7. german variant: carnia and valcanale german speaking settlements in mf have a particular form, since they diffuse in isolated rather than continuous settlements (weixlbaumer, 1988; steinicke et al., 2011b; domenig, 1997). it happened because of original formation of such communities, deriving from late medieval colonization of german settlers, who assumed in this area mainly an 32 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna “infiltration” schema, with forestry and mine workers (traditionally using diffusely iron instruments for the diverse activities) settling inside furlan and slavonic populated area (already existent since the early middle age times or even earlier), where the population were devoted mainly to extensive agrarian-pasturage activities. this population settled remote places, at that time not yet occupied, like lateral valleys, high mountain plateau or shadow side of the valley, where there was possibility for forestry, mining and blacksmiths activities (in tarvisio, valcanale valley), or mountain farming and transhumance, like in sauris (ger. zahre), timau (ger. tischelwang, local german dialect tischlbong), and sappada (ger. ploden)3. other groups settled in other periods in valcanale (ger. kanaltal, slo. kanalska dolina, fri. val cjanal), when german speaking peoples followed the expansion of austrian empire in the centuries, namely the consolidation of its administration apparatus, composed mainly by officials, clerks, merchants, businessmen, contributing to the formation of the commercial town of tarvisio (ger, tarvis, slo. trbiž, fri. tarvìs), pontebba (ger. pontafel, slo. tablje, fri. pontajbe) and malborghetto (ger. malborget, slo. naborjet, fri. malborghet). 3 which actually lies in province of belluno, in veneto region, but is in predicate to adhere to the province of udine. further traces of german-austrian culture settlement are spread out in the region, but not represent a compact unity with historical continuity (as eventually in gorizia and trieste, cities which maintain a well recognizable cultural and urbanistic habsburg semblance). about this relatively few and insulated cases there is available scientific literature. in these case it is possible to observe active groups of local revival, culture etc., assuming either than the german official language, the local variant; hochdeutsch is considered for school purposes, but for the local dialectics it is clear a tendency of elaborating an innovative code. such case of “spin off ” of new language (evoking a particular culture) would evidence an incongruence (or, from the localistic point of view, a coherent attitude) between the linguistic code and the national identification; actually such groups are preferably defining their selves as “friulani” with, as mother tongue, a german (austrian) dialect (see fig. 2). a curious approach to such phenomenon, considering the dimensions of this communities, consisting of few hundreds of peoples, with the language used as an instrument for ethnic self identification (inside communication), not really for wider (then “true”) communication purposes. similar questions are common for further high mountain settlements, where the local association seems to be inclined to use an original linguistic marker. at the contrary in fig. 2. the title of village booklet meaning “that’s life… but no devil can understand it”!, a slogan in self codified language, not using german graphic signs, stating implicitly – with some complacency – that nobody can understand it source: zaiting van cirkul kultural va tischelbong, n. 67, august 2011 (cover sheet). “innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) 33 lower parts of traditionally german speaking valleys, the investigation shows a different situation, with the existence of associations claiming hochdeutsch as the own language (the kanaltaler kulturverien in valcanale), organizing standard teaching courses, with some dozens of subscribers; as far as we know, in this circumstance there are not groups claiming austro/german local variants. this possibly happens because of the “urban” character of such community (pivoting the administrative centre of tarvisio), or probably because of the continuity with the austrian territory, or because of the prevalence in the border area of functional use of the language for tourism, business or trade (possibly because the minority is alimented by “fresh blood” cultural inserts as well by economic initiatives from trans-border area). different situations are represented by the traditionally mixed slovenian/german area like camporosso (slo. žabnice, ger. saifniz, fri. cjamparos) and valbruna (slo. ovčija ves, ger. wolsfsbach, fri. valbrune), which can be better to be interpreted in the category steinicke defined of “diffuse ethnizität” and of active multi-lingualism, characterized by the attitude of the local population of adapting the used tongue to circumstances. but such hybrid-multilingual traditions seem to became rare and even to extinguish. 8. the slavonic variant: identity labels and classification refractory cultures the further case is that of the slovenian settlements, which are localized on the western side of the julian alps watershed (approximately) and therefore historically gravitating to venetian (and then italian) political area, either than to slovenian outback (previously under the habsburg and the yugoslavian rule). such settlements are characterized by territorial continuity and ethnic coherence on the eastern belt of mf: indeed a coherence mostly just apparent, since the structure of the slovenian speaking population is composed by rural clusters scattered in a wide topographic fragmented area, scarcely communicating with each other. in fact the relations between these communities with the slovenian upper soča/isonzo valley have been rather weak in the history, and have been further obstructed (hindered) by the superposition of political state borders (especially in venice and habsburg epoch). this fact provoked a dependency on outside areas, preventing integration in a wider slovenian speaking area, in particular preventing the formation of urban elite during the modern time able to represent the ethnic character of the rural population (as it happened e.g. for others slovenians “outside slovenia”, who could refer to the social elite of towns such as gorizia and trieste or klagenfurt) (jelen, 1996; vavti, 2007). the current fragmented pattern is particularly evident in the sequence of valleys along the italianslovenian border from the valcanale in the north, to resia (slo. rezija), torre (slo. ter) and natisone (slo. nediža) valleys, to collio (slo. brda, just north of gorizia), configuring a set of divided settlements, depending culturally and structurally from non-slovene towns of the italian plain, towards them they possibly developed a sense of cultural subalternity. nowadays such situation represents the ground for a tendency to further fragmentation, in several terms, linguistic and cultural, combining with further differentiation schema of social, economic (rural/urban, rich/poor, modern/traditional, conservative/innovative), topographic (plain/mountain) and then of ethnic and linguistic character (slavonic/ romance, and finally local dialect/literary slovenian). such binary classifications are characterizing the discussion about the identity at any level, inside the communities, between the communities and friuli neighbors, the italian provincial authorities, as well the official minority institutions based in trieste and gorizia, and finally the slovenian national outback. a kind of historic and geographic “incoherence” – namely a gap between ethnic identity and political belonging – which seem to incentive an attitude to particularisms, as well as an attitude for escaping any classification (see fig.3 as an example of selfcodification of local vernacular slovenian used on the media). an inclination relying sometimes on a kind of representation of the “self ” as original and non reproducible paleo-slavonic units, that have to be preserved from any “contamination”. a definition contrasting the one purposed by the slovenian nationals, who are advocating the assimilation to the language standard, which sometimes is interpreted by local autonomists as a maneuver pursued by the national lobby for extending the political influence on the valleys (repurposing the image of the former tito’s jugoslavia communist expansionism). a situation exacerbated by the effects of the mentioned structural crisis, prospecting a mix of motivations and of disputes in which material and indentitarian elements are continuously confusing in small communities, that appear to be bound to further divide until a probable auto-destruction. the level of the polemics between standard slovenian and (supposedly) not slovenians assumes an increasing relevance in recent years, reaching the 34 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna juridical/penal level, regarding outrageous outcry and asserted lethal “threats” (“resia: the defense for the italianity now is finally in front of a judge”)4. in some circumstances the identity quarrel reaches the level of the “genetic” discussion, therefore – as the major of resia stated – not to be classified “tour court” as slovenian but as something particular and unique (“strong attacks to c. for the ‘resian race’” [sic])5. in fact such presumed uniqueness of resia (and eventually of others communities) is advocated in a incongruent manner. this lobby alternatively claims the inclusion in a slovenian cultural space (as in occasion of the adherence of resia to the regional law 38/2001 prospecting subsidization for cultural minorities, see below), or the exactly opposite, underlying the uniqueness in “genetic” terms (indeed a usual characteristic for any isolated villages, considering as well the genetic drift, to which were exposed communities in the long term of pre-modern history). such positions mature in circumstances of contraposition among groups, swinging among opposite theories (namely the belonging to the slovenian matrix, the absolute refute to such belonging or something else). finally such attitude would contaminate the local society, who is systematically dividing in factions, contrasting each other and competing for social influence, generating a number of associations inside and outside the valley6, polemizing vainly on local booklets, newspaper rubrics, blog-sphere and further social communication tools. the question has been recently purposed again at official level, considering the decision of the resia municipality of adhere to the status defined by the mentioned regional law 38/2001, prescribing benefits for the promotion of communities classified as slovenian (introducing possibly an asymmetry among slovenian and self declared non-slovenian). in that moment the municipality council decided to adhere to that classification – namely it applied to that project – with probably the intention of not being excluded by the aids that would be provided by the law (whose original intention has been the protection of linguistic minorities). however, the municipality council – following a sudden change in public opinion, probably as a consequence of a disappointment in such expectations – just retired its 4 mv, 15/9/2011, p. 49, a.c.: “resia: la difesa dell’italianità ora finisce davanti al giudice”. 5 mv, 16/6/2010, p. 12, “duri attacchi a c. per la ‘razza resiana’ ”; names of letters authors have been cited per initial letters. 6 like “identità e tutela val resia”, http://itvr.blogspot.it/; “tutela e identità valresia” [11.11.2016], http://www.valresia. it [11.11.2016], and others. adhesion7, and deciding to adhere to the opposite language “front”. then “the municipality council deliberated to comprehend the municipality of resia in the category of those protected in quality of being of friuli origin”8; a decision configuring a paradox and a philological “non sense” considering that the furlan is a romance language. from this point of view, such change of resia municipality derives from a confusing representation of the identity, with lobbies “playing” with the different variants, eventually inventing them. the volatile interpretation of the own identity appears as a tactic, but it could represent as well the “mirror” echoing further disputes (material/economic), and then the sign of an internal weakness, in general the tension induced by a condition of remoteness and the fear of being definitively excluded9. such tensions are expressed by some letters, signed by the president of the association “identità e tutela val resia”, actually based in udine (therefore outside the valley),10 stating that “despite the studies about genetics on resia – a unique ‘ethnic group’ – and the millennial 1400 years long settlement in the valley, we are condemned to be a slovenian national community, robbed of our identity, of our traditions and of our culture”11. in fact the local – scarcely codified – languages represent something suitable of adaptation, with phonetic and graphic signs, lexicon and grammar differences being instrumentally stressed or minimized, alternatively, in order to underline a belonging. the slovenian standard answer to the above assertions is: “pristaž take politike je sam župan s.c., ki si je izmislil nestrokovno pisavo krajevnega narečja, da bi se čim več oddalili od slovenščine”.12 the messaggeroveneto reader n.s.g. in his letter “investimenti ed emigrazione”13, citing prominent slovenian linguists makes clear the rainbow of different position stating that “philologists state scientifically that [the local dialect] belongs to one of the seven dialectological bases, in which the 47 slovenian dialects 7 mv, 15/8/2010, p.11, “resia, il consiglio comunale non vuole la tutela per le minoranze slovene”, a.c. 8 author’s free translation from italian. 9 mv, p.17, “piuttosto che unici, in via di estinzione”, 1/7/2010. 10 signed a.s., mv, p.14, „determinazione ingiusta”, 19/8/2010. 11 author’s free translation from italian. 12 r.d., 2012, ali bodo v reziji slovence izgnali iz doma, ki ga je podarila slovenija? dom. kulturno verski list, xlvii/15, august 31, 2012, p. 11, čedad/ cividale d.f. (names are punctualized since concern private letters). 13 mv, p. 17, 16/9/2010. “innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) 35 were classified, therefore the introduction of the bilingualism is legitimized”14. resia – a remote beautiful alpine valley, with less than 1  000 inhabitants, surrounded by the majestic snow covered peaks of the mount canin – represents the paradox of identity in times of globality, with conflicting associations claiming by chance the exactly opposite, namely the belonging to the slovenian koinè, the friulian-italian loyalty, or the absolutely uniqueness, with a sequence of intermediate positions. 9. romance variants: the friuli culture the friulan situation presents similar aspects, but on a different scale, highlighting the same fundamental question, and the same tendency to arbitrary disputes about something that indeed is impossible to define in positivistic-objective terms (namely the codification of a language that was never been used as a written official language). such language (the “furlan”) is an ancient language, resulting probably form the mix of latin and celtic elements occurred since the time of the roman conquest of the area. this code resisted to different waves of standardization thank to the fact it remains the language of a population occupying peripheral areas, that, indeed thank to this condition, survived for centuries until today – differently as happened to the languages spoken from time to time by the military and urban elites, derived from powers and populations who invaded mf in the past from outside (roman, longobard, slavonic, hungarian, turk, venetians, habsburg etc.). this fact brought to the elaboration indeed rather late in the national history – of the 14 author’s free translation form italian. rhetoric of the “patria del friuli” (fatherland) in the frame of a well definite territorial imaginary, originating by the glorious history of the aquileia patriarchate, the medieval “state” which represented the original myth of such “patria”. geographically these territories lie in the area between the mountains and the see, and between the two rivers tagliamento (on the west) and isonzo/ soča (on the east), configuring something “organic” and ideal, about that any furlan should be conscious. such ideal had in the last decades an important revival – after centuries of being neglected, mainly in favour of official italian standard assuming the significance of the reaction to a supposed imposition (then a “patriotic” idea generated by the reaction to a “cultural imperialism”). finally the furlan culture representatives claim a true national dignity based on a long tradition, being the language spoken in a much wider area, when it was the main language of the whole arc from the central-western side of the alps (connecting with western european gallic languages) to the upper adriatic (trieste and istria). a residuals of such languages would be the ladino spoken on the dolomits, the rumantsch in graubünden (switzerland), and the istrota in istria region (croatia). nowadays it is spoken mainly in udine province, in part in pordenone and gorizia area, by a few hundreds of thousand of peoples. it suffered especially in modern times an emargination process, when it has been confined in rural areas, with the main towns in friuli assuming progressively the language of the authority (usually a venetian dialect, then italian standard). since that times the furlan evidenced a typical minority-subalternity complex (“sotans” vs. “sorestans”) (maniacco, 1985). in many times a set of institutions have been established to improve it. it is the case of the public societât filologjiche furlane (sff), and of fig. 3. promotion of the rural celebration in the village stregna in occasion of the event called “kries”; poster composed in slovenian dialect (or paleo slavonic) self codified written language source: mv 19/6/2011. 36 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna others initiatives that have been promoted in the spirit of the “positive discrimination” principle, the modern welfare state applied in order to sustain the minorities. it provides above all the necessity of codifying the (almost exclusively until then) oral use language, in order to unify the different variants, and to limit the ongoing erosion (typical indeed for any minority languages), which would otherwise endangering the language and the ethnicity in its whole. today the main issue is about a definitive – generally acknowledged – written mode, in order to make of the furlan a code susceptible of being applied as well for institutional purposes, for education at any level of schools and public communication. a question connected with that of lexicon, phonetic, graphic, syntactical and grammar rules, the sff had the statutory duty to elaborate and certify – a task, institutionally promoted, but started immediately a sequence of disputes. in such context the language question assumes further motivations, signifying the reaction against “imperialistic” attitude of the major cultures (targeting alternatively italianstate centralism, “globalization” and multi-cultural society, european “bureaucracy”, computer and television culture etc.). above all, it means especially the arising of a bulk of claims for not “orthodox” variants, eventually accredited as more authentic, sometimes just evidencing slight linguistic differences, symbolized by the academic herudite quarrel for an “o” or an “e” as final word letter or some other apparently not much significant questions. such claims are diffusing in the different areas in the furlan spoken area, especially in the mf and in further peripheral areas. virtually any village would purpose a cultural self defined code, a fact that, whether from a cultural point of view could be considered an element of vitality, from the “tactic” of the promotion of the minority in its whole represent a set of problems. furthermore, such diversification tendency is often superimposing to administrative issues, and to autonomy claims, sometimes justified in terms of the revival of local identities, sometimes just instrumentally used for the purposes of some territorial lobby. it is the case of the mountain movement for establishing a new “province”, to distinguish the “friulani” from the “carnici”, separating them from the “imperialistic” udine, considered the capital town of friuli, for a population supposedly composed by carnian-celtic descendents in the carnia. 10. the lega nord movement this movement realizes by chance in the politicallyoriented movimento friuli, inspired by autonomy ideals, but maintaining rather a moderate tone (it never claimed for secession, just for administrative autonomy and cultural promotion), relying on a popular reformist movement, opposing any centralistic elite – in particular the italian statalistic culture, accused of having de-nationalized the furlan culture once it assimilated friuli in its administrative frame. movimento friuli had some success in the ’70s and in the ’80s, then disappeared and gone into a major wave of an autonomist party with more radical program, which spread out in italy in late modernity times. this can be considered the last stage of a fragmentation processes – indeed assuming eventually radical significances, with the spread out of the wellknown lega nord party. such movement – originating outside the friuli region, namely in lombardy and veneto – would possibly signify a radicalization of similar process assuming immediately political consistence. it would mean the rebellion against the political capital rome, claiming for taxes reduction, state devolution and the transformation in a federal constitution, assuming by chance xenophobic attitudes. it claims a program relying on the foundation of a “totally invented” new identity (agnew, brusa, 1999, p.  123; albertazzi, 2006), recovering a mythical celtic primordiality (representing the image of celtic tribes fiercely resisting to roman invaders), assuming from the beginning the sense of a rebellion. a movement rapidly spreading out, that can be interpreted in many ways, as the reaction to a “endof-the-cycle” welfare state, as a populist variant (cyclical for democratic systems, as happens in many others european countries); it assumes the late modernity typical form of the revolution of the “haves” against the “have-not” (the north against the south), with the aim to resist the re-structuration the welfare system, the modern state built over the years. a “[….] post modernist territorial political movement in its self-conscious manipulation of territorial imaginary” (agnew, brusa, 1999, p. 123). in fact the lega spread out in friuli and elsewhere in north italy, gaining consensus, claiming alternatively secession from rome and form the european union, or “tout court” the fight against multi-cultural ideology, evoking the risk to be invaded by islam fundamentalists, north african refugees, east european immigrants or chinese business men or someone else. finally the movement reached many times the ruling position at several local and regional level and (paradoxically), on italian government in rome (hold “innovative identities“? the issue of cultural and linguistic fragmentation in montagna friulana (north eastern italy) 37 in periods 1994–1995, 2001–2006 and 2008–2011, in a coalition supporting berlusconi’s party). indeed, such movement overlies just to some extent the movimento friuli, which never advocated such extremists claims: the correlation between lega nord and movimento friuli seems not to be very strong, sometimes they are mutually exclusive, even when several movimento friuli leaders took actively part of lega nord movement. in general, it is possible to say the lega nord originated from a domino effect induced by the spreading out of an artificial way of elaborating identities (paradoxically provoking the loss of significance for the concept of “identity”). 11. the ongoing changing inventory of identities – true or fictive? the question of defining an identity represents something new in the new global reality, confusing and upsetting the relatively stable structure of the modernity. in some circumstances it starts a process, which once started – would be impossible to be kept under control, assuming finally political significance (as the lega nord, risking some geopolitical drift, claiming separatists programs). obviously, when the identity becomes suitable of being innovated arbitrarily (or “pluralistically”) innovated, it risks the loss in significance, degenerating in something superficial, suitable of being used instrumentally. therefore, it is difficult to elaborate a method in order to verify such invention as something true or fictive, justified or arbitrary. the fundamental right for anyone of expressing his self with a preferred code (a re-invented “mother tongue”, a new “ethnicity”, a political-territorial movement etc.) appears in conflict with an idea of cultural efficiency of the community, relativizing the same idea of the identity. it is the case of mf with a set of communities persistently breaking in new parts, dissolving the cohesion of settlements and cultures, and the concept of identity properly collocated in a definite geography and history. a process indifferently affecting the language groups in the area, demonstrating that such “syndrome” affects indifferently any ethnicity. finally this process is bringing to the creation of a list of labels configuring a kind of local “babylonia”: a paradox, considering that the language obviously exists for communication purposes (both, inside and outside the group), that prefigure the risk for selfdestruction of some culture. indeed in these circumstances the identity-linguistic marker seems to be used mainly for oblique purposes, as the consolidation of a “faction”, pursuing some particular target. this phenomenon means something different as the arising of a multi-linguistic area (a “diffuse ethnizität” condition theorized just few decades ago) (čede et al., 2012), configuring possibly a self reflexive game, where just the contraposition would represent the original causality for the formation of a new identification code: a vicious circle indeed, that would signify the risk for the relativization and then for the possible extinction of the local culture. furthermore, such “babylonian” uncertainty makes any institutionalization of that code impossible, the question of the acknowledgment of a official status (which seems to be essential in order to give to a local code a chance of survival, e.g. predisposing bilingual tables in public areas, lecturing in schools, using the written language in administrative acts), and the transcription for the written use (which is practically useless when the language is spoken by few hundred of peoples) appear as something impossible to realize. sometime the institutional work of the officially recognized organizations is openly contested, demonstrating once more that in these circumstances the national character of a culture is difficult or either impossible to ascertain. the risk is that the impossibility of standardizing a mixed dialect would bring to the disappearance of such code; it happened recently to many fringes of the investigated area, prospecting a progressive erosion of the multi-linguistic culture of friuli, to the advantage of a standard code. it is the case of the disappeared s.leopoldo area dialect in valcanale (slo. lipalja vas, ger. diepoldskirchen, fri. laglesie), mixed slavonic and german, as well the mixed slovenian-friulian tongue of the montenars village in the gemona area, and of many others; it would be possible today to draw up a map of dissolved local cultures, mainly due to the incapability of maturing a coherent position. indeed the question of the “purity” (a primordialist/ essentialist approach) of some culture (the “hochdeutsch”, the “uncontaminated” slovenian, the official italian, the authentic furlan or the “purity” of the respectively local mixed variants) could bring to something obsessive, but the complete arbitrariness would provoke to lose the sense of social-territorial belonging. in fact, the groups advocating such originality configure a paradox within communities living together since 1 or 2 millennia suddenly discovering to be something different. in such situation, with the infinitesimal proliferation of micro identities, with the communities becoming smaller than the subsistence threshold would require, further criteria for the authenticity accreditation are a need (heynen, 2006; chai et al., 1986). 38 igor jelen, ernst steinicke, erica specogna references agnew j., brusa c., 1999, new rules for national identity? the northern league and political identity in contemporary northern italy, national identities, 1(2), 117–133. 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166–177. weixlbaumer n., 1988, gebietsschutz in europa: konzeption – perzeption – akzeptanz, institut für geographie der universität wien, wien. wendt j., 2001, the geopolitical aspects of transit in central europe, [in]: m. antonsich, v. kolossov, m-p. pagnini (eds.), europe between political geography and geopolitics, t. ii, societa geografica italiana, roma, 651–659. wintersteiner w., gombos g., gronold d., (eds.), 2010, border dis/solutions. multilingualism, transculturality and education, wieser verlag, klagenfurt. http://www.regione.fvg.it [11.11.2016] http://www.valresia.it [11.11.2016] newspapers dom, cividale df novi matajur, cividale df la vita cattolica, udine il nuovo friuli, udine gazzettino, udine and pordenone edition primorski dnevnik, trieste messaggero veneto, udine (mv) 1. introduction the main purpose of this article is to highlight the functional role of regional development. we can assume that the regional issues pose a need for additional derivation and updating of the applied conceptual apparatus. this means the introduction of a number of clarifications and building a system model for the functional nature of regional development. in this direction, the emerging covid-19 crisis has brought to the fore new demographic and urban problems that may change the overall functioning of the modern nation-state. on the other hand, the process of globalization further brought to the fore the importance of information technology which became dominant together with the views of the new green policy. this concentrates spatial development on the demographic, territorial and geoeconomic problems of the modern world with an emphasis on urban planning and the economy of the departments of spaces and territories. in practice, this new geoeconomy is increasingly regionalizing, journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(3), 41–48 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.3.04 methodological problems before regional development in the conditions of post covid-19 governance kamen petrov department regional development, university of national and world economy, 8 december 19, 1700 sofia, bulgaria, orcid: 0000-0002-6295-0664 e-mail: petrovkamen@abv.bg citation petrov k., 2021, methodological problems before regional development in the conditions of post covid-19 governance, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(3), 41–48. abstract this article is devoted to the theoretical problems of regional development in the conditions of post covid-19 management. the text mphasizes the fundamental nature of regional development as a new scientific field, which has its own accumulation of knowledge, based on social sciences and natural sciences. the article focuses on problems with clarifying the place of regional development in post-crisis management. it is accepted that regional development has an important role in managing territorial problems and achieving a pulling development of individual spatial areas. in this direction, the very functional role of regional development brings to the fore the need for targeted measures and policies of a socio-economic nature. some aspects of the regional development of scientific research are also presented. emphasis is placed on the connections of regional development with other scientific directions and its role for effective geo-urban development, local self-government and local communities. key words regional development, region, methodology, problems, structure, management, science. received: 16 september 2021 accepted: 02 november 2021 published: 29 november 2021 42 kamen petrov but in search of complexity, adaptability, competitiveness and sustainability. this further directed our focus on regional development and on search for its practical application. thus, regional development is changing its intensity and modeling and now requires more dynamism and temporal processes to set new stereotypes for the management of territories of different ranks. here is the place to frame a claim that regional development is a fundamental science that studies space and territory with a focus on the study of regional achievements in the field of population-territory – organization and management with an emphasis on solutions of a practical nature (hartshorne,1939). on this occasion, it is important to outline the necessary tools achieved by us in the practical and theoretical training, related to solving a number of management tasks in regional development. in some cases, regional development can be considered as a system of functional connections with socio-economic orientation which have a territorial character. thus, regional development tends to decrease differences, and in other cases, when it is ineffective, the differences increase. in this regard, a number of issues can be raised related to the search for opportunities to expand decentralization and subsidies in the management of regional development, increasingly engaging the regional level in the implementation of a regional development policy, compensating for insufficient „regionalization” and linking national strategies and programs, including those co-financed by  eu funds, with the needs and potential of regional and local communities and territories (georgiyev, 2006). within this theory, it is important to point out the methodological construction that shows why something is so. on the other hand, the economic system alone is in many cases unable to achieve an acceptable equilibrium. therefore, when developing policies aimed at a more even distribution of income between people, groups and territories, we need to derive certain methodological patterns. in this direction, economic activity in europe is highly concentrated in large cities and urban agglomerations. regional policy proposes easing tensions in large cities by directing part of the economically active population to other areas. the pan-european regional policy allows one country to engage in policies that stimulate economic activity in the territories of other countries. solving territorial problems leads to a chain reaction, accumulating positive effects that spread beyond the borders of the individual state, affecting other countries as well (dimitrov, 2021). during all stages of the development of human society, regional science has had its focus and sharpness and has manifested itself through active processes at the local level. in practice, however, regional development is an unconscious priority, which does not allow us to predict in which direction to go with regional development and how to form a sustainable framework. here is the place to emphasize that a person cannot pass without knowing the environment in which he lives and carries out his work. thus, the research of space and territory in the 21st century regains its relevance. 2. implementation of new regional development policies the regional development of bulgaria before 1989 was mainly determined by the spatial location of economic sectors and the impact through regulations by the departments. improving the territorial organization of the economy is a dynamic process that is constantly evolving. this new reality, in turn, reflects on the development of social relations and the achievements of the various socio-economic parts of the world (karastoyanov, 2008). this gives impetus to develop more regional processes and phenomena of different order. in general, regional development has its roots in geography, but geographical science does not remain the same. on the other hand, regional development is gradually arguing its integrity and at the same time strengthening, expanding and deepening its interests and capabilities. at the same time, it gradually sets itself a more complex task of having a functional role that explores the whole complex of socio-economic and natural processes and phenomena, their complex relationships and the impact between nature and man. thus, regional development becomes the basis for the development of projects for economic development of the countries, the economy and the development of the territories. regional development reaches the foundation of its subject the study of the territory in its various states. on the other hand, the problem of the interaction of society with nature comes down to raising a group of questions without a clear and distinct answer. for example – how does the society influence the nature or the nature the society, and respectively, how is the regional development built into these interrelations? this raises the question – what plays a decisive role in the process of interaction, society or nature? in this complex conundrum, regional development is important, and it is designed to answer many of these questions. thus, from a regional point of view, we accept that nature must be seen as an integral part of public life. it is obvious that in accordance with the dialectical logic, when it comes to the unity of society and nature, methodological problems before regional development in the conditions of post covid-19 governance 43 one must keep in mind the role of regional development as a structuring system in which both nature and society are its components and not independent; they are considered in a certain dependence or commitment. it is natural to conclude that regional development is a kind of bridge between nature and society (dimov, 2008). but, in addition, the nature of regional development lies in the assessment and analysis of ongoing demographic and socio-economic processes at the national, regional and local levels. in practice, the existing problems and contradictions at the local level give grounds for seeking concrete solutions, which, however, must be balanced with and open to the national interests of the modern nation state. in this direction, we can assume that regional development in the 21st century is at a turning point, which sets the benchmarks for the next 50 years. this undoubtedly strengthens its applied nature and its complementarity with the economic tools and economic management. this makes the post-covid-19 period from 2022 to 2027 a turning point in the emerging technological change embodying a different geoeconomic environment of socio-economic development. the world is setting new contours of the geoeconomic reality, which will affect not only the main geopolitical players, but also a number of peripheral countries. in this transitional period, the extremely complex and serious problems of structuring regional development in the direction of its complexity and functionality stand out particularly clearly (karakashev et al., 1989). the focus of regional development can again be placed on conditions of change in historical development and cultural traditions in different parts of europe. we are witnessing the tolerance of the departmental approach in the policy for regional development and as a result  – deepening of the regional disparities, which despite the complicated tendencies in bulgaria have achieved significant progress, given the uneven regional development and the emerging information change. in practice, this change will embody the model of development of nation-states, which will have to impose new rules and constitutional models of functioning of the systems. this will also affect regional development. the functioning of regional models will set the stereotypes about the different speeds of social change in different spaces and regions. this will exacerbate inequalities in social and economic development. over time, this problem will become more acute and will increasingly lead to the need for intervention to overcome the discrepancies. thus, the role of the state will be more of a regulator than a carrier of change. in this area, the demographic factor will acquire new significance, and the ability of regional business to enforce market rules will prove to be an essential element for the reliable functioning of the systems. on the other hand, the technical and social tasks for the development of very important practical problems with a strong regional character are gradually increasing, the need for business innovation and new cooperation with science will develop. in this direction, we need to look for the consolidating importance and understanding of the location of regional development in the whole system of sciences. regional development is defined as an intermediate science, as a kind of integrator of the so-called management, and hence public, as well as the natural (natural) block of sciences. this is a great chance for regional development, which gives it priority in solving complex interdisciplinary problems (dimov, 2008). the question also arises as to what the boundaries and the object of study of regional development are. in principle, they cannot be definitively determined, because most sciences partially cover their object of study. with a certain conditionality, the environment for social development (oikumena) or in other words our environment and economic activity in it can be defined as the main object of study of regional development. to a large extent, our environment has its own geographical nuance, which is why we need to emphasize the connection of regional development with the block of geographical sciences (hagget, 1979). this largely corresponds to the fact that the geographical environment includes our environment. we can assume that the geographical environment is part of the geosphere, which is largely assimilated by man, and involved in active economic activity and the material basis for the existence of human society. the main task of regional development is the creation of a scientifically based forecast for the development of our environment (including geographical), related to human society and the spatial systems of the productive forces in the conditions of increasing influence of nature from scientific, technical and technological progress (petrov, 2015). it follows that regional development is a science of the dynamic spatial systems formed on the earth’s surface as a result of the interaction between nature and society, as well as the laws of their development and management. regional policy is a key tool for regulating the development of society, bringing balance and bringing regions closer together in terms of living standards. the availability or provision of serious resources is essential for the management of regional development. the provision of resources for regional development is linked 44 kamen petrov to material, labor and, above all, financial balances at the public level (cheung, 2005). 3. factors influencing the implementation of regional development policies without aiming to make a critical analysis of the nature of regional development in the various known scientific approaches and countries related to regional science, it is necessary to note that in the anglo-saxon scientific literature the regional paradigm prevails, which develops in different directions (kimble, 1951). more precisely, the focus of regional development is derived from leading researchers who believe that regional development seeks to obtain complete knowledge of the territorial differentiation of the earth and, therefore, distinguishes phenomena that change territorially only by their territorial significance or, in other words, by their relation to universal territorial differentiation. the statement that the methodological basis of regional development is the spatial principle and the category of space is the leitmotif of any regional study is becoming increasingly important. this gives grounds for bringing to the fore chronology, accepting three postulates of regional knowledge – the doctrine of the natural resource complex, the chronological or spatial concept and the theory of management of regional development. in addition, the solutions for regulation and management of territorial development should be sought in the skillful combination of the means of state regulation with the market mechanism. regional policy depends on legislative decisions regarding the type of administrative-territorial organization and division of the country, local self-government and administration. in practice, in bulgaria, regional development as a scientific field is relatively new. it is based on some european scientific schools, which shows a tendency to form a solid foundation for regional research, based on the accumulated theoretical and practical experience of the most developed nation states (yokomichi, 2005). regional development as a scientific field related to the state of territorial systems studies objects that represent a significant complexity at each level – global, regional and local. therefore, a precise logic of scientific arrangement is needed, which must make the appropriate efforts to turn intuitive understanding into a clear fundamental and clear theoretical concept of regional development. in this direction, the initial statement must be based on the position that every science uses basic concepts represented by terms. in addition to basic concepts, any scientific theory is based on obvious facts. these simple and very simple, elementary facts play a role in regional knowledge, similar to axioms in mathematics. the difference between them lies in the fact that axioms in mathematics can derive whole mathematical knowledge in a purely deductive way, while in regional development it is necessary to constantly supplement and collect new details and facts and data about them, analyze and summarize these facts in order to derive the results, as well as to accumulate knowledge to complete the given stage of research. the regional development is based on and uses analytical developments, new methods of informatics and others with which it interprets the analyzed facts. it is well known that the process of differentiation dominates in various sciences. a similar process is taking place in regional development. regional development is internally differentiated and forms a system of sciences, which includes five subsystems: general regional studies (complex), foreign studies (natural regional complexes), regional development management (management and administration of public space), regional economics and theories of regional development. in practice, together with the process of differentiation of regional development, another opposite process of integration is carried out, aimed at unification of the regional sciences, at their internal theoretical integrity. this gives grounds for opening new scientific directions on the basis of regional development, mainly three directions: geoecological development, geourbanistics and urban management and strategic planning and forecasting of regional development (lavrov, 1989). on the other hand, the integration of a fundamental science does not aim at the destruction of its branches and directions, created in the process of its differentiation. the aim is to unite their common theoretical concepts. otherwise, regional development will lose its importance as a basic science and will become a kind of collection of theoretical and applied sciences in the field of management and administration. in principle, integration and differentiation are objective trends in the development of each of the basic sciences, but unlike other sciences, these processes must be further scientifically substantiated and focused in an indisputable way. as regional development emerges as a new scientific field based on socio-economic and geographical knowledge, which determines its border with the natural and social sciences, there is a need to derive methodological tools for spatial patterns, and they have the need for competition between socioeconomic and natural resource knowledge to outline the territorial and spatial processes and phenomena. notwithstanding this dichotomy, it can be assumed that regional methodological problems before regional development in the conditions of post covid-19 governance 45 development in itself is a science of the spatial relations of developing territorial objects and spaces. in this direction, it is necessary to assume that „regional development” is a functional process of attitude to our environment, and hence a clearer definition of the content of spatial relations between the elements of the considered territorial systems (hartshorne, 1979). so a system and other geo-systems located in a certain area can be analyzed and monitored in order to conduct certain policies on them. thus, these relations in a purely regional focus operate between natural and social phenomena, having a territorial definition and regional significance, in which they have a multifaceted impact. in trying to further define the problematic area of regional development, we come to the conclusion that the more urban a territory is, the more conditions are created in it for the implementation of many managerial and administrative measures related to the management and functioning of regional communities. to a large extent, this can give grounds for assuming that regional development is a scientific field that is a superstructure of social management and socio-geographical sciences. this gives reasons to look for the practical and applied nature of regional development (naydenov, 2017). the combination of scientific tools related to the manifestations of the individual territory and measuring the state of the economy in the region or territorial community determines the scope of management measures and activities that are called to implement economically and politically active population to achieve development in a purely local and regional scale. to a certain extent, this can strengthen the scope of regional development by imposing a series of other measures, including administrative and legal ones, to optimize the territorial division or spatial planning. in practice, the administrative-territorial changes related to the merger, division or optimization of administrative-territorial units is a key mechanism for the effective functioning of government and the state, which helps to build a modern and stable state with a certain type of socio-economic system. anthony cheung, one of the leading authors on administrative-territorial reforms, suggests that global administrative reforms can be seen as a „new public management” to regulate spatial development processes (cheung, 2005). this new approach to the new public management is a critique of the traditional model of public administration based on state bureaucracy and is expressed in the general failure of effective government management in a territorial aspect, far exceeding the state in which the private interest or the interest of privileged groups dominates the interest of society. cheng accepted the thesis of more effective territorial structuring of administrative structures so that they have high regional competencies in order to be able to prioritize and help local authorities to manage territorial communities more effectively (cheung, 2005). this view is also supported by kiyotaka yokomichi. according to him, after decentralization, within the relevant laws, municipalities are expected to perform all administrative activities, independently and by virtue of the principle of independent decisionmaking and delegation of responsibility. yokomichi suggests that a real de-concentration of governance could lead to a greater focus on regional issues. the aim is to emphasize the promotion of strengths in the regional specifics of each municipality or territorial community (yokomichi, 2005). 4. imposition of innovations and new practices in the management of regional development based on the knowledge of physical geography, which deeply comprehends and defines the features of various natural and geographical phenomena with their impact on the anthropogenic factor, regional differences and specifics are derived as an important feature of the territorial system. such an approach requires the search for more modern approaches in the study of regional specifics and features in the territories of a country. therefore, it is especially important to obtain and analyze information about the natural environment and its components. this significantly contributes to the development of new areas such as „geographic information systems” (gis). these new technologies can be used for specific research, resource management, regional and spatial planning, cartography and in more and more areas of human life. some early developments in europe are also important for the development of gis, such as those of the swedish scientist hägerstrand, who in 1955 studied the analytical potential of spatial data by taking into account location and population information related to households (hägerstrand, 1955). the use of database management systems is especially important in modern gis concepts, as it allows the integration of spatial and non-spatial data. this, in turn, gives impetus to the development of geourbanism and the regional economy. urbanization is an increase in the urban population, but is also determined by the development of industry and other urban activities. the process of urbanization began with the very beginning of civilization, as well as the creation of cities, but intensified after the industrial revolution and the 46 kamen petrov use of new technologies in agriculture, which has reduced the need for human labor and expanded the services sector in the economy. urbanization brings with it a whole range of problems, especially when it is expressed as a sudden large concentration of population in a relatively small area. therefore, there is a need to apply special measures and procedures to help build and organize settlements. big cities need specially organized water supply, sewerage, food and other food supplies, electricity and telecommunications network. in addition, special attention should be paid to the quality of life in the city, including the fight against pollution, crime and other activities. this gives grounds for regional development to focus on the problems of the regional economy. therefore, it is necessary to apply a special theoretical approach to territorial development which imposes three groups of problems. firstly, economies of scale, specific to a certain territory, secondly, the search for advantages arising from the neighborhood to other industries, and thirdly, the urbanization effect, which is expressed in the extremely strong development of urban settlements, concentrating large masses of the population in them. this is related to the location of business companies in the territory with joint use of financial and administrative services, infrastructure, and proximity to the market. addressing these problems, regional development becomes even more functional, it already covers the development of the economy, the sectoral structure and the built infrastructure, determines the territorial differences between the administrative-territorial units and economic regions and gives answers to a number of related questions. the measurement of development through indicators such as: concentration of people on the territory, economic activities located in the territory, working hour income, availability of the industrial, production and social infrastructure, the living status and ecological situation are an additional focus on regional science (hägerstrand, 1992). however, the following indicators are the most widespread and officially used for the purposes of european regional policy: gdp per capita and the unemployment rate, per capita income, inflation, the human development index and others. another popular indicator for measuring differences in different territories is the unemployment rate. unemployment is one of europe’s most serious problems. the differences are mainly between rural areas, declining areas, peripheral areas and highly urbanized areas (karakashev et al., 1989). the reasons for the income lag are the peripheral location, insufficient capital invested in production, insufficient infrastructure for enterprises and private households, as well as the low level of general and professional qualification of the population. it should also be mentioned that with rapid economic growth, the differences between the richest and the poorest regions decrease, and with a decline in economic growth, the differences increase again. in this direction, regional development increases its focus and scope of research, beginning to form as a stable fundamental science, solving the problems of spatial development in its socio-economic integrity. of course, the application for this fundamentality is a path that must be scientifically followed by practical application and definition of various social dimensions and opportunities for attractive socio-economic development. this largely requires a return to the focus of research on another plane, following the normal vision of combining the natural component that affects the economically active population and the actual behavior of the demographic factor on the territorial development of individual territorial communities. 5. environmental aspects of regional development management spatially related to the above judgments, the question is whether it is legitimate to interpret the physiographic environment as „natural” regionalism, if we assume that the object of its study is the geosphere, and its focus is the landscape. it should be recognized that a specific definition of natural regionalism needs to be defined. by linking the natural complex with its use and environmental protection, we undoubtedly arrive at common scientific postulates of natural geography and environmental protection. we can go further in this direction by assuming that geoecology is a combination of natural geography and environmental protection. then „natural regionalism” is called to implement specific management measures and approaches to the rational use of natural resources and environmental management, related to its restoration and prevention of the decline of the territory from active human activity. in this direction, „natural regionalism” may acquire a newer dimension, including sustainable development policy, which may give rise to a new scientific direction „geoecological development” as an upgrade over regional development and geoecology. this gives us reason to refer to p. haggett (1983), who believes that we are dealing with the structure and interaction of two main systems: the ecological, which unites man and the environment, and the spatial, connecting one area with another through a complex volume. we can also mention that s.b. lavrov (1989) largely defines the essence of geoecology as a science from methodological problems before regional development in the conditions of post covid-19 governance 47 which new scientific directions can be defined, such as sustainable development. in practice, the natural sciences, as well as other groups of regional and geographical sciences, are interdisciplinary in nature, as they come into very close contact with other basic sciences or their branches. in practice, the natural sciences, as well as other groups of regional and geographical sciences, are interdisciplinary in nature, as they come into very close contact with other basic sciences or their branches. therefore, it can be assumed that each independent science from the regional scientific branch is both interdisciplinary and intermediate and even fundamental, as long as it has its own coherent theory and methodology. in this case we are talking about specific research methods that can be borrowed from other sciences. the methods used by the regional sciences and geoecology are modified, adapted and improved by inspecting the object studied with their help. the definition of the block of regional sciences is more than positive due to the fact that regional development is special and is an important element of the structure of management sciences. undoubtedly, in methodological and organizational terms, regional development in bulgaria is not adapting successfully enough to world standards. to a large extent, bulgarian scientific thought avoids imposing the concept of regional development. also, regionalism fits in the form of economic regions, as economic geography or as management systems. in these cases, regional development, or more precisely regional aspects, fit into the management and geographical sciences. this requires us to pay attention to the fact that regional development is related to the study of a comprehensive plan of separate territories or regions of the land surface on the basis of ongoing socio-economic changes and management activities related to the state of human society. it is necessary to emphasize once again that the regional paradigm is the core of management sciences. nevertheless, both in the past and now, the question arises as to the place of regional development in the system of administration and management, about the subject of regional development, and whether it replaces the social and natural sciences? in its essence, regional development is a synthesized and localized addition to the management, natural and social sciences. regional development does not replace them. as the basic sciences, including physics, biology and geography, are a bridge between nature and society, so regional development is a kind of integrator between the two main blocks of management and geographical sciences. regional development partially covers the objects of study and the subject of study of the natural and social sciences (stoychev, 2020). the delineation of regional development and its methodology, specific tasks, methods and practical forms are needed primarily for the practice and application of social sciences. however, this is not about creating mechanical mixtures, but about characteristics that contain a logical combination of the most important features of their complete binding. regional development synthesizes specific but different materials for countries and regions, reveals their specificity and without exaggeration represents the very essence of geography, without which it is deprived of the meaning of its existence. from what has been said so far, there is no doubt in the formation of a block of theoretical regional disciplines. this is because regional development covers the problems as a whole. however, this does not mean that regional sciences will not be able to have their own theoretical generalizations, formulations and principles. the theory of regional development summarizes disparate materials as a kind of counterbalance to the differentiation of regional development (stoychev, 2020). in addition, regional development studies the objects of our environment and human society not from different countries, as the individual management sciences, but as a whole. the theoretical basis of regional development creates a new stage of specific regional research. the terms regionalism, regionalization and regional development should not be confused, although they have common features. to a large extent, regionalism precedes regional development, and regionalization is only one process of regional development. the imposition of statistical and cartographic methods, visual analysis and digital modeling can take regional development on a new path of scientific and technological development and strengthen the foundation of regional sciences as a leading scientific field. 6. conclusion the presented structure of the regional development expresses an argumentative point of view. it does not and cannot have claims to be exhaustive. it is necessary to gather many more opinions from foreign and bulgarian authors working on the problems of regional development, meaningful from logical and lexical positions. such opinions would lead to significantly more precise conceptual essence and affirmation of the most correct notions in terms of their content and transcription. at the same time, i hope that this approach and scientific alternative will open the beginning of a series of articles that will ultimately contribute to the rise of regional 48 kamen petrov development as a modern and scientifically based science. references cheung a.b.l., 2005, the politics of administrative reforms in asia: paradigms and legacies, paths and diversities, governance, 18(2), 257–282. doi: 10.1111/j.14680491.2005.00275.x dimitrov k., 2021, important shades in the meaning of military culture – an etymological study, research papers of unwe, 1, 127–164. dimov n., 2008, geografiya i teoriya: kartografiya na prirodnosotsialniya sintez (eng. geography and theory: cartography of natural and social 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municipality – two tiered system after big merger (in japanese), toshi mondai, 96(3), 48–55. journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(3), 5–15 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.3.02 rethinking the toponymic politics in belarus in the 20 – 21 centuries: toward the post-colonial perspective sergei basik school of interdisciplinary studies, conestoga college, 299 doon valley drive, kitchener n2g4m4, canada, orcid: 0000-0002-5952-7515 e-mail: sergei.basik@gmail.com citation basik s., 2020, rethinking the toponymic politics in belarus in the 20 – 21 centuries: toward the post-colonial perspective, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(3), 5–15. abstract the article explores the historical trends and patterns in the politics of space in toponymic landscapes of soviet and postsoviet belarus through the prism of critical toponymy and the post-colonial theoretical approach. this work aims to reveal the colonial essence of the toponymic politics and policies in belarus during the soviet era and explore the unique national (post) colonial context of the post-independent place names. based on the idea of methodological convergence of post-colonial and post-socialist paradigms, this article analyzes the “top-down” hegemonic toponymic practices implemented by the soviet regime in belarus in comparison with the place name policies of the colonial regimes in other parts of the world. using the comparative analysis of historical (re)naming cases from the regional toponymic system of belarus, the work shows that the soviet regime used similar goals, methods, and technologies as other colonial powers. such examples include ignoring the national language, history, and cultural traditions reflected in place names, inadequate renaming criteria and arrogant methods of choosing the new names, banalization of toponymic landscape and inconsistency in renaming, removing the belarusian vocabulary from the toponymic landscape and inserting the foreign words and terms into the toponymic system, phonetic and grammatical mutilations of national toponyms according to the norms of the foreign language, symbolic resistance of local population toward new place names. the post-independent period can be defined by the selective post-colonial toponymic practices, which include the co-existence of the soviet and national toponyms, symbolic (re)naming processes typical for new independent post-colonial states, and the resurrection of the ideologically motivated “toponyms-zombies” from the previous period. therefore, the modern toponymic landscapes in belarus can be considered post-colonial, and methodological and theoretical post-colonial perspectives on toponymic research can be applied to post-socialist states. key words political toponymy, spatial politics, post-socialism, post-colonialism, belarus. received: 10 june 2020 accepted: 30 august 2020 published: 30 september 2020 6 sergei basik 1. introduction in the last two decades, perhaps, since the groundbreaking essay by d.c. moore (2001), the post-colonial theory, as a relatively new methodological approach, has been cautiously applied toward the analysis of the post-socialist world. consequently, despite the abundant amount of criticism, epistemological problems, and solid arguments against, such as the role of the ussr in modernization and political mobilization of its regions (adams, 2008), many scholars asserted that the numerous “overlaps” between post-socialism and post-colonialism have multiple reasons “for treating the communist imposition in east-central europe as a particular historical embodiment of a persistent and widespread imperial drive” (kołodziejczyk, şandru, 2012, p. 115). for instance, some commentators argue that the orders in the russian empire and its successor, the soviet union, “were clearly colonial in character” (lazarus, 2012, p. 118). not surprisingly, due to the unique historical past and the distinctive geopolitical location on the borderland (or a crossroad) between the west and the east in the middle of the european continent, the post-soviet country of belarus serves as “a distinctive case study for the intersection of memory and (post)coloniality” (lewis, 2019, p. 14). intrinsically, the post-colonial methodological approach on belarus has been used in a wide range of recent studies produced both by the scholars working in belarus and western academic institutions (babkoú, 1999; abušenko, 2004; akudovič, 2007; bobkov, 2008; oushakine, 2013, 2017; bekus, 2017a). the politics of space in the colonial and postcolonial world as well as the (geo)political and socio-economic problems, which were reflected in contested toponymic legacy and its transformations, are well discussed in contemporary political toponymic scholarship (yeoh, 1992, 1996; azaryahu, 1996, 2011, 2019; nash, 1999; berg, vuolteenaho (eds.), 2009; bigon (ed.), 2016; rose-redwood et al., 2017; to name but a few). essentially, the colonial power inserts “the mental images” of the colonizers (yeoh, 1992). as a result, different toponymic systems shared similar semantic goals and characteristics that reflected in “an imaginative process of ‘othering’ and ‘peripheralizing’ the colonized populations” (bigon, njoh, 2015, p. 37–38). for instance, in the cities, the impact of colonialism on the place naming is connected to the administrative regulation of urban spatial order, the commemoration of colonial “heroes” and officials, and, sometimes, can cause a co-existence of national and colonial place names systems (azaryahu, 2011). as “a place-making strategy to reinforce the colonial hegemony and ideologies” (wanjiru-mwita, giraut, 2020, p. 12), toponyms have been used in different parts of the (post) colonial world. mostly, for the colonizers, the place names serve as an element of “a larger process of colonial cultural and political subordination” (nash, 1999, p. 461). in some cases, the politics of colonial power can be ambivalent (hui, 2019). in the framework, which interprets the geopolitical contexts of (re)naming, f. giraut and m. houssay-holzschuch (2016) distinguished four main categories that “not mutually exclusive, but do overlap” (giraut, houssay-holzschuch, 2016, p. 9): conquest (including imperial, colonial, national), revolution (a complete change of political system), emergence, and commodification. remarkably, much of the critical toponymic publications in recent decades were related to two main types of geopolitical changes: colonial to post-colonial and socialist to post-socialist (rose-redwood et al., 2017, p. 17). unsurprisingly, these two streams of scholarship often merge when connected to the post-soviet toponymic cases. for instance, in the case of the largest city in kazakhstan, almaty, the post-independence place-naming policies adopted a mix of typical post-colonial toponymic strategies (shelekpayev, 2017). recent toponymic transformations in ukraine as a result of decommunization of landscape can be classified as related to the changes of political regimes, and, at the same time, as the reflected post-colonial and ethnic/nationalistic discourses (gnatiuk, 2018). in some cases, the authors are talking about the ukrainian toponyms as an example of “linguistic colonization” or even “occupation” (demska, 2016, p. 607). it seems that the reasonable question is if the post-colonial methodological approach can be fully or partially applied towards the analysis of the toponymic systems of post-soviet, or, even, the entire post-socialist world. thus far, there has been a minimal number of attempts to apply the post-colonial approach for the critical analysis of the political toponyms in belarus in the 20–21 centuries. the only exceptions are the work of s.n. basik and d.a. rogovcov (2017), where the authors sporadically mentioned some similarities between the colonial toponymic politics and the examples of hegemonic toponymic practices in soviet-era belarus, and the interpretation of the minsk’s main street renaming from the point of view of post-colonial theory by s.a. oushakine (2017). the current paper addresses this under-researched component of the post-soviet place-name studies. this work is theoretically based on the idea of a methodological convergence of both post-socialist and post-colonial paradigms. using a critical toponymic approach and driven upon belarusian rethinking the toponymic politics in belarus in the 20–21 centuries: toward the post-colonial perspective 7 toponymic materials, this study formulates two key goals: 1) to reveal the colonial essence of the toponymic politics and policies in belarus during the soviet era, comparing and contrasting them with the well-known colonial examples around the globe; 2) to explore the unique national (post)colonial context of the post-independent toponyms in belarus. it is also crucial to consider all these questions from the belarusian national perspective. 2. data and methods in this work, i concentrate attention on place names both from diachronic and synchronic perspectives and apply some quantitative interpretations and historical toponomastics methods through the lens of the critical toponymic approach. throughout, i also use the elements of comparative analyses of place names in belarus and different world regions. this paper is focusing on soviet-era and post-independent toponymic examples, policy and practices without considering other significant historical periods in 20 century, such as the russian empire (up to 1917), poland (western part of belarus, 1921–1939), or the third reich occupation (1941–1944). some examples from these periods are considered only tangentially. the data for the analysis includes several sources such as cartographic and archival materials, the author’s in situ observations in 2000–2009 (the city of minsk and the brest region settlements), and a list of 450 place names renamed from 1918 to 1972 (žučkevič, 1974, addendum, p. 439–447). i explore the key patterns of the soviet toponymic changes mostly based on oikonyms, the names of the settlements. importantly, some toponymic examples in this research also include hydronyms, the names of the hydrographic objects, oronyms, the names of the orographic objects, hodonyms, the urban street names, and urbohoronyms, the names of urban administrative regions. indeed, there are shortcomings with the list of 450 place names: for example, not 100 % of all the renamed place names were included, and the renamed toponyms after 1972 were not analyzed. however, as per the paper’s goals, these materials and data are evident and show the dynamics, extent and general nature of the soviet period toponymic transformations in belarus, which is crucial for the comparative post-colonial analysis. additionally, in this work, as a historical toponomastics method, i apply a slightly modified general classification of urban place names (stiperski et al., 2011; basik, rahautsou, 2019) and discuss six semantic naming categories: 1) persons; 2) history; 3) geography; 4) professional activities, institutions; 5) descriptive and euphonic; 6) other. this classification is applicable toward the list of 450 oikonyms because they are not formed as a result of the natural process of toponymic formation. instead, they are artificially created by the soviet authorities, in the same way as the urban place names, which are, in most cases, also artificially created features of the urban landscapes. some limitations in this and other similar classifications are related to the polysemantic qualities of some place-names that might be included in two or more categories (see more basik, rahautsou, 2019, p. 110). the latin transliteration of belarussian place names in this study is provided according to тhe roman alphabet transliteration of belarusian geographical names (2012), the official international document, adopted by the united nations. 3. results and discussion for the territory of modern belarus, the period of 1917–1920 included the wwi, two revolutions and the collapse of the russian empire in 1917, the german occupation in 1918, the russian civil war, the war between poland and soviets in 1920 with the polish occupation and the bolshevik’s recapturing. during these years, there were “no less than six attempts” at declaring belarusian state (rudling, 2014). among them, the belarusian people’s republic, which remained independent less than a year in 1918, was the only one real attempt to establish the national sovereign country, but the red army regained this territory again. in 1921, after the partition of the belarusian lands between poland (received western belarus, 1921–1939) and soviet russia as a result of the riga treaty, the bolsheviks “easily adopted and adapted” the imperial national identity, and the “russian and soviet identities were closely intertwined” (forest, johnson, 2002, p. 527). in 1922, soviet bielorussiya became one of the “creators” of the soviet union. consequently, since the first years of soviet power, despite the policy of korenizatsiia (“nativization”) in the 1920s, new place names were entered into the toponymic system, and belarusian national vocabulary was partially deleted from the toponymic landscape following the (re)naming practices. accordingly, for the place names of belarus, there were several “waves” of renaming (fig. 1). one “wave” was related to a specific period, a stalin era before wwii, when 69 place names were renamed in 1938–1939. however, the most destructive 8 sergei basik period was the “wave” of the 1960s. in particular, 307 place names (68 % of the analyzed renamed toponyms) were changed in 1964, and 42 toponyms were renamed in 1969. analyzing the list of place names from the historical toponomastics perspective, i distinguish several semantic groups: • religious toponyms, e.g. ihumien (hegumen, abbot), manastyr (monastery), papoŭka (pop means priest), dziaki (deacons), carkoŭščyna (carkva – church), ikonki (icons); • toponyms reflect (or similar to) the names and titles of kings, tsars, nobles, landlords, e.g. kniažyca (kniaź means duke), karali (kings), caroŭsk (car – tsar), panskaje (pan – landlord), šliahtoŭščyna (šliachta – gentry), ramanava (the romanov dynasty); • place names that remind the surnames of the white army generals and other enemies of the soviet power, e.g. judzieničy, karnilavičy (the russian white army generals); • toponyms reflect the elements of the previous social, economic and administrative systems and relationships, e.g. majontak (estate), faĺvarak (manor), poddanyja (servants), haspody (masters), halopkavičy (halop – serf ); • place names that reflect “foreign” origin or “foreign” place names, e.g. aŭhustbierg, amieryka, mar’ janfieĺd, ershtermaj; • toponyms usually originated from the local nicknames and terms, that show the poor social and economic conditions of the local population, e.g. biaschlebičy (no-bread people), machajedy (moss-eaters), lukajedy (onion-eaters), halodničy (halodny – starving), biadovičy (biada – trouble); • profane toponyms usually originated from the local nicknames, e.g. blievačy (bliavać – to vomit), durnievičy (durni – idiots), neumyvaky (unwashed), pliašyŭcy (bald); • place-names originated from the local nicknames with “animals’” roots, e.g. barany (rams), byki (bulls), kabyličy (kabyla – mare), kazly (goats), tarakany (cockroaches); • ancient belarusian place names which are homonyms to modern russian terms with negative connotations, e.g. marhi (morh is a medieval measure of length, but a modern russian homonym morg means morgue), zascienki (zasceinak is a medieval type of settlement, but a modern russian homonym zastenok means jail), jazvy (jazvy – a local physiographic term “natural pond,” but a modern russian homonym jazva means ulcer). notably, most of these toponyms were unaccepted from the standpoint of communist ideology and were eventually destroyed by the soviet renaming practices. admittedly, the toponymic system was viciously cleansed from ideologically “wrong” place names (religious, pre-soviet powerful figures 1 9 1 8 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 6 1 9 3 8 1 9 4 0 1 9 4 2 1 9 4 4 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 fig. 1. the temporal dynamics of place names renaming in soviet belarus (1918–1972) source: žučkevič (1974, addendum, p. 439–447), compiled by the author. rethinking the toponymic politics in belarus in the 20–21 centuries: toward the post-colonial perspective 9 such as kings, tsars, nobles). remarkably, however, that, at the same time, the renaming process was characterized by inconsistency, especially for the toponyms originated from the nicknames and the socio-economic terms. very often, the same forms of place names were deleted in one region but kept untouched in another part of belarus. for example, three toponyms kabak, kabaki (kabak – in russian empire, a tavern, a pub) were renamed, whereas the same place names in other regions (e.g. liepieĺski and biarozaúski districts) were not changed and still exist. this aspect can probably be explained by the different understanding of renaming criteria by regional authorities, unprofessionalism, and other local factors. one more critical aspect of the toponymic renaming in soviet-era belarus is the semantic assortment of new names attached to the places (tab. 1). pure ideological motif and the tradition of inserting the commemorative place names from the communist “iconostases” (persons category, soviet subcategory) and from the list of the soviet propaganda and communist mythology (history category, ideologemes, dates, symbols subcategory) on belarusian regional toponymic landscapes correspond with the similar trends in socialist, revolutionary and transitional societies. these names play an important role in the mythicization of toponymic landscapes (david, 2011). thus, for the names of soviet persons, some typical examples include the names of the communist leaders such as lenin (toponyms lienina – four examples) and the derivates from his original family name ul’yanov and patronym il’ych, kirov, dzerzhinskiy, volodarskiy, uritskiy, sverdlov. among other personalities, the name of the soviet aviator v. chkalov was an example of the late 1930s (two toponyms). the historical subcategory of ideologemes, dates, symbols, which is the second largest in this classification and acquires 17.1% of the renamed names in the analyzed period, can be characterized by the various semantic assortment of miscellaneous communist terms. for instance, they include the important dates from the soviet ideological calendar – the 1st of may (pieršaje maja, majskaje, peršamajskaja), october (russian forms of toponyms simply inserted and transliterated – akciabr, akciabrski, should be belarusian kastryčnik, kastryčnicki); the key terms, tab. 1. semantic naming categories of renamed toponyms in belarus in 1918–1972 category subcategory group percentage toponymic examples persons pre-soviet 0.8 kutuzaúka soviet communist leaders, personalities, heroes 6.0 dziaržynsk wwii 0.9 zaslonaúka culture, science, and technology 0.5 haharyna international 0.2 roza liuxemburg unclassified anthroponyms 3.8 ivanaúščyna whole category 12.2 history ideologemes, dates, symbols 17.1 savieckaja (soviet) wwii 3.9 peramoha (victory) whole category 21.0 geography belarussian place names 3.6 paliesse, narač physiographic toponyms topography 2.7 hornaja (hilly) hydrography 2.2 kryničnaja (krynica – spring) phytotoponyms (plants) 26.0 višneúka (višnia – cherry) zootoponyms (animals) 1.3 sakaloúka (sokal – falcon) other 0.5 kamienka (stoney) locational/spatial 10.2 padliesse (“not far from the forest”) ethnic names 0.2 slavianka whole category 46.7 professional activities, institutions 2.4 saúchoznaja (soviet farm) descriptive and euphonic 14.4 svietlaja (bright) other (unclassified) 3.3 krasieúka all categories 100.0 source: žučkevič (1974), compiled by the author. 10 sergei basik symbols and signs of the communist party and the soviet state – bolshevik (baĺšavik), soviet (savieckaja), the red flag (sciah, čyrvonaje znamja, znamienka), the star (zviazda), the red color in general (čyrvony majak – red lighthouse, čyrvony uschod – red sunrise, čyrvony pasiolak – red settlement); the names of the communist newspapers (iskra – spark, praúda  – truth); the names of the pre-soviet socialist movements (paryžskaja kamuna, kamunarka, kamunar – all related to the 19th century paris commune); the names of the communist and soviet military units – red army (čyrvonaarmejskaje); the name of the communist youth organization (kamsamoĺskaje), and other. however, despite the vital symbolic role of the ideologically motivated toponyms for the soviet regime, almost half of the newly minted place names (46.7%) belong to the geography category. the simplified, randomly chosen, banal physiographical and locational names given to the settlements reflect a typical colonial attitude towards belarusian toponyms. primitive locational/spatial names that comprise 10.2% of all toponyms renamed in 1918–1972, simply reflect the spatial position of the settlement with the local natural objects such as forest (zaliesnaja), river (pryrečnaja), lake (zaaziernaja). thus, the monotone and semantically identical place names inundated the toponymic landscape of belarus. phytotoponyms, or the place-names originated from the names of plants, is the most represented subgroup of renamed place names in this period acquiring more than a quarter of all renamed toponyms (26%). among them, there are the common plant names for the belarusian toponymic landscape (birch – biarozaúka, pine – sasnovaja, coniferous forest – baravaja). at the same time, frequently the names of vegetation chosen by the soviet authorities include various types of berries, fruits, and fruit orchards, which is an unusual segment for the national toponymic system: cherry (višneúka, višnia, višniovaja, ten toponyms), raspberry (malinavaja), pear (hruša), red viburnum (kalinavaja), rowan (rabinavaja), berry (jahadnaja), fruit orchard (sadovaja). importantly, these “fruity” and “sweet” place names were not just banal and neutral: they could ideologically and symbolically represent an “idyllic” life of the soviet peasants in the soviet village. some russian plants’ names were inserted in toponymy without any connections or adaptations to the belarussian language. for instance, the authorities used the russian term sirien’ (lilac) instead of belarusian bez to create the toponym sirenevka (in russian), which is transliterated siareneúka in belarussian and exists as a foreign place-name for the locals. one more interesting category, which comprises 14.4% of the renamed toponyms, is descriptive and euphonic names. their neutral and positive connotations played the same role as mentioned earlier “fruity” phytotoponyms: mirnaja (peaceful), svietlaja (bright), sonečnaja (sunny). among this category, many russian terms were simply inserted in the local toponymic system: raduga (rainbow, viasiolka in belarusian), družba (friendship, siabroústva in belarussian), lučezarnaja (radiant, pramianistaja in belarussian). without any doubt, this category of names also played a crucial role in the russification and erosion of the belarusian national toponymic landscape. besides the spatial politics of russification, the toponymic illiteracy of the soviet authorities responsible for renaming can be explained by the complete arrogance towards the belarusian national culture, history, and language. even structurally, from onomastics, these oikonyms remind the artificially created street names. remarkably, based on the data of the register of street and road names, in 2019 among the top five street names in belarus were similar locational and descriptive/euphonic place-names: centraĺnaja (central, 5161 names), maladziožnaja (youth, 2171 names), sadovaja (orchard, 2170 names), liasnaja (forest, 2108 names), and paliavaja (field, 1639 names) (v nacional’nom…, 2019). the politics of place renaming in belarus involved not only oikonyms but also the names of some physiographical objects, first of all, lakes. hence, in 1932, the largest lake in south belarus, kniaź-vozera (duke the lake), received a new ideologically correct name, čyrvonae (red). besides, in 1958, the highest point in belarus, sviataja hara (holly hill), had gotten a new name dziaržynskaja. this name from the soviet pantheon correlated with the location of the hill, not far from the town of dziaržynsk (former kajdanava, renamed in 1932). the role of these objects as the unique elements of the physiographical landscape and their “unacceptable” names for soviet authorities were the main reasons for renaming. this process was typical not only for the ussr (such as for the pamir mountains, see horsman, 2006) but also in colonial and post-colonial regions around the globe. for instance, during the european conquest, the great african lakes received the names of kings and queens (lake victoria, lake albert, lake edward). remarkably, in the post-colonial period, some of these lakes were renamed and received the names of local dictators (lake albert – lake mobutu sese seko, lake edward – lake idi amin dada). however, after the fall of the dictatorship regimes in zaire and uganda, the colonial names were returned to these objects again, even though they have various local names in african languages. rethinking the toponymic politics in belarus in the 20–21 centuries: toward the post-colonial perspective 11 one of the most important characteristics of the toponyms in belarus is their grammatical and phonetic form, which was transformed and mutilated according to the requirements of the foreign languages, the languages of colonizers. the place names experienced “profound standardization to conform to the linguistic norms and tastes of the colonizing powers” (saparov, 2017, p. 535). the regional geopolitical powers have constrained the long-suffering belarusian toponymic system for centuries. since the 16th – 17th centuries, when the old belarusian language’s status as an official language in the polish-lithuanian commonwealth was abolished, the belarusian place names were encrypted on the maps and documents in polonized phonetic and grammatical forms. during this period, the belarusian toponyms were affected by the colonial supremacy of the polish cultural pattern when “the dominant polish culture and the mostly folkloric culture of nations under poland’s domination” (fiut, 2014, p. 37) co-existed. after the polish-lithuanian commonwealth partition in the late 18 century, the belarusian lands were grabbed and attached to the russian empire. during the russian imperial period, the altered, foreign for the locals, polonized forms were just re-written in russian cyrillic graphics, with uncharacteristic phonetics, grammatical and word-forming features (lemcûġova, 2010). besides, many belarusian toponyms were transformed according to russian language tradition, and they are still in use in the 21st century. for instance, the belarusian toponyms with the ancient formants -aú, -oú, -ieú, -in (-yn) were replaced deliberately by the russian forms with -ava, -ova, ieva, -ino: barbaroú – barbarova, halačeú – halačova, chonaú – chonava (lemcûġova, 2010). during the soviet era, in particular, in the 1960s, the russification tendency in renaming was especially evident: the russian terms (not only ideologically motivated) foreign to locals were entered into the belarusian toponymic system. similarly, analyzing the british colonial impact on the toponymic system of india, a. kapur (2016) notices two distinct practices: englishization (insertion of the english terms) and anglicization (a phonetic and orthographic adaptation of indian toponyms to the english language). both practices also ignored the local place-names transcription and pronunciation in favor of the linguistic preferences of colonizers. in the same way, in canadian prairies, the aboriginal toponyms that “survived” the settlers’ colonization exist in “an appropriated, translated or mangled form” (lehr, mcgregor, 2016, p. 83). importantly, the long-term colonizers in belarus were mostly the slavic nations, both poland and russia, with the languages pretty similar to the belarusian language. this linguistic aspect reflects not only “the contested nature of belarusian identity” (bekus, 2017a), but also the contested features of national toponymies. as a result, it was easier for the colonizing power to claim its “ownership” on belarusian toponyms and, consequently, the geographic space, frequently using “simple” phonetic or grammatical modifications of place names in order to synchronize the toponymic systems. certainly, this is a different situation compared to the other regions of the world, for example, africa, the americas, or even ireland, where the languages of the conquerors were different from the native languages of the local population. the local use of an alternative, traditional form of toponym that is “off the radar” of an official name is a typical feature for post-colonial toponymic systems (bigon (ed.), 2016). for the post-socialist realm, it was pointed out that the scholars “have yet to fully give voice to local residents’ take on the toponymic transformations and to account for how they resist, contest, and accommodate to these shifting namescapes” (rusu, 2020, p. 14). there are many examples of symbolic resistance of people in belarus to administrative toponymic power. for instance, locals in everyday life still use the old name bludeń (biarozaúski district; etymology – from the ancient slavic name blud) instead of the official name pieršamajskaja the 1st of may (basik, rogovcov, 2017). as per the critical toponymic literature, the vital post-colonial strategies of toponymic de-colonization include two opposite “radical” methods: complete erasing of colonial past in toponymic landscape or saving of the colonial commemorative place names; significantly, there is also a third option where the erasing of colonial past can be selective depending on regional/local geopolitical situation (azaryahu, 2019). interestingly, s. basik and d. rahautsou (2019) distinguish several symbolic spatial strategies in the urban toponymic system of minsk used by the authorities in post-soviet belarus. among them, besides the imminent soviet toponymic remnants, and the wwii segment related to national trauma, a slight “belarusization” of toponyms, internationalization of the place names through the latinization of the street signs, a reflection of the international political agenda of the independent belarusian state, the branding goals such as the commodification of urban toponyms and promotion of belarus as a regional it hub, and the increasing role of the symbols of independence in urban toponyms are consonant to the similar strategies in post-colonial nations. authorities have utilized selective postcolonial strategy (azaryahu, 2019) based on the belarusian regime’s geopolitical preferences of nation building. besides, all of the strategies fit with 12 sergei basik the mentioned earlier theoretical framework of the “overlapped” geopolitical contexts of (re)naming (giraut, houssay-holzschuch, 2016). according to the register of street and road names, in 2019 in (post)independent belarus, there was a pretty high number of the urban place names (769) commemorated lenin or the derivates of his name (v nacional’nom…, 2019). however, the politics of “toponymic continuity” (light, young, 2017) is reflected not only in the conservation of the soviet-era urban toponyms and oikonyms. it can also be seen in the regional administrative division of the largest cities and represents the toponymic and symbolic legacy of the soviet period (basik, rogovcov, 2003). this situation is typical for many urban centers in the post-soviet realm, such as st. petersburg, russia (marin, 2017). as per the observation, there are twenty-two administrative districts (rajons) in the six most significant cities of belarus, and thirteen names of the rajons (or 59% of all urban rajons’ names) are the soviet ideological products: lieninski (lenin), kastryčnicki (october), saviecki (soviet), pieršamajski (the 1st of may), frunzienski (frunze). for example, the names kastryčnicki and lieninski exist in four cities out of six, and for the cities of hrodna and mahilioŭ, they are the only names of the rajons. the (post)colonial context in belarusian urban toponyms illustrates the never-ending alterations of the city of minsk’s main avenue’s name  (fig 2). as s.  a.  oushakine (2017, p. 444) points out, “the multilayered colonial history reveals itself less through short-lived names than through a long sequence of their perpetual modification.” the street was named zacharievskaja in the early 19-century after the russian governor of minsk, zachary korneev, or st. zachary, his patron saint – a typical toponymic “trick” of the colonial powers widely represented around the world. french, polish and twice german occupations were also shown in colonial names. twice in the 20th century, the avenue returned the name vulica savieckaja (soviet street). the end of the stalinism epoch in 1961, with an erasing of stalin’s name from toponyms, was reflected in the new name, praspiekt lienina (lenin avenue). by the way, in 1961, one of the administrative districts of the city, stalinski rajon, was renamed and received a more neutral “industrial” name zavоdski (zavod – factory) rajon. consequently, there were two names the avenue obtained during the postindependence period. both names reflect the postcolonial ideals and include the name of the national cultural symbol, the first medieval belarusian book printer francysk skaryna, and the term “independence” so prevalent in post-colonial urban landscapes (independence avenue in washington, dc where the united states capitol is located, or the names of the main streets in different african capitals). the re-introduction of colonial names in the post-colonial period is one of the typical characteristics for some sub-saharan african nations (bigon (ed.), 2016). remarkably, in the city of algiers, where fig. 2. (re)naming of the main avenue in minsk, belarus, in the 19–21 centuries source: created by the author. rethinking the toponymic politics in belarus in the 20–21 centuries: toward the post-colonial perspective 13 during the first five years after algeria obtained independence from france in 1962, more than 300 urban place names were renamed, many streets in the city center still go under the french-colonial names among the general public (grabar, 2014). notably, in belarus, the politics of toponymic continuity and the “ideological recycling” (bekus, 2017b) of the soviet legacy supported by the current political regime obtain an unusual form of the symbolic resurrection of the soviet-style “toponyms-zombies.” some examples include the names of the historical-cultural complex the stalin line opened in 2005 not far from minsk or the name of the new shopping center leningrad opened in minsk in 2015. the example of a shopping mall is, in particular, toponymically reflects the concept of “zombie socialism” neoliberalization (chelcea, druţă, 2016). undoubtedly, such place names reflect the general narrative of the current political power in belarus, which is symbolically oriented toward the soviet legacy. however, there was an example of the successful de-colonization of the urban toponymic system in the 1990s. in maladzečna (minsk region), the streets in the city’s core were renamed and received their historical names or the new names with national semantics. for example, lenin avenue became vialiki hascinec (the great path), maksim gorky street became zamkavaja (castle), saveckaia (soviet) became vilienskaja (vilna), karl marx street became ignacij bujnicki street (ġardzeâú, 2017). supported by the nationally oriented local authorities and activists, the (re)naming process declined later for the political reasons, but the possible de-colonizing toponymic solutions for the future policies in belarusian cities have been shown. 4. conclusion as per the critical toponymic theory, “the hegemonic practices of place naming do some of the heavy work of naturalizing and reinforcing the dominance of existing social orders” (vuolteenaho, berg, 2009, p. 14). because the soviet period can be considered as an imperial project, similar to the western imperial colonial projects, the belarusian toponymic system serves as a symbolic reminder about the ideological and imperial superiority of the “elder brother” who implemented the strict “top-down” hegemonic toponymic practices. importantly, however, the key patterns and practices in politics of space in toponymic landscapes of belarus have the same characteristics as other (post)colonial toponymic systems, which often represent the consequences of “toponymic dispossession” (tucker, rose-redwood, 2015, p. 198). they include several examples, briefly discussed in this paper, where one of the most important was ignoring the national language, history, and cultural traditions reflected in place names. besides, the inadequate renaming criteria, together with the arrogant methods of choosing the new names, simplification and banalization of the toponymic landscape, and the inconsistency in the renaming process created a modified messy toponymic landscape. the process of removing the belarusian national vocabulary and inserting the foreign words and terms often alien to the locals into the toponymic system, as well as the phonetic and grammatical transformations and mutilations of national toponyms according to norms of a foreign language, destroyed the belarusian national toponymic landscape. a symbolic resistance of the local belarusian population was reflected in ignoring the new artificial names and using the traditional toponyms in everyday life. the post-independent period can be characterized by the selective toponymic practices that include the co-existence of the national and soviet toponyms and (re)naming practices of an independent national state (first of all, urban place names in the capital city) and re-introduction of the soviet-style names through the symbolic resurrection of the “toponyms-zombies.” in conclusion, this paper shows that the soviet regime implemented a specific form of colonization in belarus reflected in toponymic policies and practices. moreover, adopting such a theoretical viewpoint might open the new avenues for political toponymic research in belarus and the post-socialist countries. interconnections between the post-socialist and post-colonial paradigm in toponymy seem reliable though more thorough comparative analysis and detailed future conceptualization are required. indeed, there are some understandable methodological issues and theoretical disconnections in merging the paradigms related to time, history, space, and place. however, it might be a new promising perspective for critical analysis of toponymic transformations in the post-communist realm. references abušenko v., 2004, kreol’stvo kak ino-modernost’ vostočnoj evropy (vozmožnye 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(accessed 10 june 2020). tucker b., rose-redwood r., 2015, de-colonizing the map? toponymic politics and the rescaling of the salish sea, the canadian geographer/le géographe canadien, 59(2), 194–206. doi: 10.1111/cag.12140 v nacional’nom kadastrovom agenstve sostavili rejting samyh populârnyh nazvanij ulic (eng. the national cadastral agency ranked the most popular street names in belarus), 2019, https://www.belta.by/society/view/v-natsionalnom-kadastrovom-agentstve-sostavili-rejting-samyhpopuljarnyh-v-belarusi-naz vanij-ulits-353880-2019/ (accessed 10 june 2020). vuolteenaho j., berg l.d., 2009, towards critical toponymies, [in] l. berg, j. vuolteenaho (eds.), critical toponymies: the contested politics of place naming, ashgate, farnham – burlington, 1–18. wanjiru-mwita m., giraut f., 2020, toponymy, pioneership, and the politics of ethnic hierarchies in the spatial organization of british colonial nairobi, urban science, 4, 6. https://www.mdpi.com/2413-8851/4/1/6 (accessed 10 june 2020). yeoh b., 1996, street names and nation-building: toponymic inscriptions of nationhood, area, 28(3), 298–307. yeoh b.s.a., 1992, street names in colonial singapore, the geographical review, 82, 313–322. žučkevič v.a., 1974, kratkij toponimičeskij slovar’ belorussii (eng. a short toponymic dictionary of byelorussia), bgu, minsk. place names, or toponyms, which were traditionally considered the geographical markers, the “addresses” on the maps, and were used mostly only as a source of encyclopedic linguistic, historical, and geographical information, can act as an immensely effective political instrument. from the standpoint of contemporary critical geography, they promote and legitimize the ideological values and interests of a political system and elite. notably, a place name serves as a feasible political tool for the authorities during the periods of socio-economic and geopolitical transformations when political power changes the society‘s memorial priorities. as maoz azaryahu (1996) pointed out in his classic work on commemorative place names, the process of streets’ renaming is “a conventional manifestation of a stage of liminal transition in history, when the need of the new regime for legitimacy and self-representation is especially high” (azaryahu, 1996, p. 319). importantly, the spatial politics of the local authorities in the sphere of place naming creates a complex toponymic system, a palimpsest, which often combines contested or mutually exclusive place names with various ideological messages and connotations in the symbolic landscapes. the main goal of this special issue of the journal of geography, politics and society is to discuss some new themes and patterns in contemporary toponymic systems of the post-soviet countries through the combination of multidisciplinary methods in social sciences, the traditional methods of toponomastic research, the theoretical ideas of the national scientific schools, and the emerging, mostly anglophone, critical toponymy approach (vuolteenaho, berg, 2009; rose-redwood et al., 2017). besides, it also aims to analyze the contemporary political aspects of place naming as the reflection of the authorities‘ political discourse and explore how political power is changing the memorial priorities of people and, as a result, is transforming the identities of the post-soviet societies. in recent years, the post-soviet realm has been an object of the growing number of political toponymic studies based on a wide range of the theoretical perspectives and conducted in english on the examples of various countries of the region both journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(3), 1–4 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.3.01 place names as a political instrument in the post-soviet realm: introduction sergei basik school of interdisciplinary studies, conestoga college, 299 doon valley drive, kitchener n2g4m4, canada, orcid: 0000-0002-5952-7515 e-mail: sergei.basik@gmail.com citation basik s., 2020, place names as a political instrument in the post-soviet realm: introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(3), 1–4. received: 20 august 2020 accepted: 30 august 2020 published: 30 september 2020 2 sergei basik by the western (anglophone) authors and some of the post-soviet researchers (see, for example, murray, 2000; saparov, 2003, 2017; gill, 2005; horsman, 2006; dabaghyan, 2011; balode, 2012; marin, 2012; yanushkevich, 2014; manucharyan, 2015; kangaspuro, lassila, 2017; light, young, 2017; shelekpayev, 2017; malikov, 2018; gnatiuk, 2018; basik, rahautsou, 2019; kaşikçi, 2019; gnatiuk, glybovets, 2020; dala costa, 2020; kudriavtseva, 2020). the region serves a model hotspot of geopolitical transformations in the 20–21 centuries with the different examples of, first of all, hegemonic toponymic practices ranging from erasing and cleansing to restoration, memorialization, and even promotional branding. consequently, all of these processes lead to new ideological reality, modified national (or regional) identity, and the transformed politics of memory. importantly, most of these studies concentrate on the political aspects of urban place names of the capitals or the large cities. still, some of these works include analysis of other types of toponyms such as the names of physical geographical objects or various settlements. sadly, however, for the comparative perspective on political toponymy, many works of the post-soviet researchers related to the political dimension of toponyms which rooted in national theoretical and methodological approaches, and, in some cases, applied the elements of critical toponymic analysis, can remain unknown for the anglophone academic community as they were conducted in regional languages. among many of them, it is worth to mention sacukevič (2010, 2013), timofeev (2012), lomakin (2014), nemcev (2014), tererent’ev (2015a, 2015b), galaktionova (2016), demska (2016), ġardzeâú (2017), thakahov (2019), and several recently published non-english papers on ukraine (see the brief english descriptions in kudriavtseva, homanyuk, 2020). the current special issue of the journal of geography, politics and society also fills this gap and expands the horizons of international scientific collaboration. the authors of this special issue represent different countries and fields of social sciences and explore the variety of topics, ideas, and methodological approaches to analyze the various forms of connections between space, the toponymic landscapes, political power, and societies on the example of several postsoviet states, including georgia, russia, ukraine, and belarus. the article by sergei basik, which opens this special issue, explores the critical patterns in hegemonic toponymic politics and its remnants in the 20–21 centuries belarus from the standpoint of the post-colonial approach. the author argues that the top-down toponymic practices implemented in belarus by the soviet political regime adopted similar goals, methods, and technologies as the colonial powers in different parts of the world, and, therefore, the theoretical post-colonial perspective on toponymic research can be applied for the post-socialist states. the second paper by karli storm interrogates the functions of the ultimate toponyms of sakartvelo (georgia) and azerbayçan (azerbaijan) through the prism of the theoretical concept of national imaginary. the author also analyzes the role of the local toponym borchali, which is used as a critical element of regional national identity by the georgian azeriturks. the third paper by nikita lomakin scrutinizes three miscellaneous renaming cases from the russian cities of perm, kazan, and volgograd and identifies the key stakeholders of toponymic changes. consequently, the author unveils three different (re) naming trends and connect them to the main political actors involved in the process. the next article by marina golomidova focuses on the municipal toponymic policy in kazan (russia). the case study interprets the role of regional identity as a fundamental element of local toponymic branding politics in a specific ethnic region of the country, republic of tatarstan. the paper by denis kutsenko, the final segment in this special issue, provides the analysis of two urban case studies in kharkiv, ukraine. the investigation reveals how the regional actors, such as the local authorities and elites, manipulated the politics of memory using ukrainian decommunization law to achieve their political goals and receive economic benefits. to conclude, it would be essential to encourage academics, researchers, and other professionals interested in this emerging topic to join and continue working on the political toponymy of the post-soviet region. some future themes of interest may include contemporary toponymic policy and practices, the toponymic system as a symbolic foundation of national identity, regional geopolitics of toponymy, (geo)political patterns in contemporary (re)naming, decolonization of toponymic landscapes, the regional patterns of toponymic commodification, and toponymic aspects of the people’s everyday life. one more critical goal is to expand the geographies of scholarship and include the cases from the former ussr’s underrepresented regions. past and current socioeconomic and geopolitical shifts in the region provide a wide variety of topics and options to continue political toponymic studies in the post-soviet realm. finally, as a guest editor, i had the privilege of working with a brilliant cohort of authors and reviewers, and i would like to express my gratitude to all of them for their professionalism and commitment during the stressful time of the global place names as a political instrument in the post-soviet realm: introduction 3 pandemic. i would also like to thank the editor-inchief, dr. tomasz michalski, for this unique opportunity to organize this special issue, his constant support and kind attention during 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sociological notes), vestnik tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. folosofiâ. sociologiâ. politologiâ, 29(1), 194–202. terent’ev e.a., 2015b, pereimenovanie sovetskih toponimov v sankt-peterburge: analiz publičnyh diskussij (eng. renaming of the soviet toponyms in sankt-petersburg: the analysis of the public debates), žurnal sociologii i social’noj antropologii, 18(2), 72–86. thakahov v.k., 2019, identičnost’ i pamât’ v urbanonimah vladikavkaza (eng. identity and memory in the urbanonyms of vladikavkaz), discourse, 5(6), 108–119. doi: 10.32603/2412-8562-2019-5-6-108-119 timofeev m., 2012, bes/z kommunizma: krizis ideologii v  sovremennoj rossii (analiz semiotičeskogo diskursa) [eng. the demon of/without communism: the ideological crisis of contemporary russia (the analysis of the semiotic discourse)], labirint. žurnal social‘no-gumanitarnyh issledovanij, 1, 4–18. vuolteenaho j., berg l.d., 2009, towards critical toponymies, [in:] l. berg, j. vuolteenaho (eds.), critical toponymies: the contested politics of place naming, ashgate publishing, farnham – burlington, 1–18. yanushkevich i., 2014, semiotics of social memory in urban space: the case of volgograd (stalingrad), international journal of cognitive research in science, engineering and education, 2(1), 43–50. 1. the definition of business meetings business and tourism started to intertwine in the second half of the twentieth century, when the globalization processes forced the organization of business trips and trade meetings outside the main headquarters of companies. the depth of this symbiosis is emphasized in the words of the director of american express consulting: “a business that needs people to travel so they can generate revenue can’t afford to cut out travel” (rice, 2011), a business meeting is an organized event whose participants gather in order to discuss the topics of their interest, to exchange views, to improve communication, etc. (davidson, cope b.2003). such an event can be commercial in nature (or not) and should be held outside the organizer’s headquarters. it can last from a few hours to a week and the number of participants can vary between a few and a few hundred or even a few thousand people (bartosiewicz et al., 2003). the fundamental features of business trips that differentiate them from traditional travels are the following: 1. it is a tailor-made product meeting the client’s individual needs, which is why each time it is different (this applies especially to corporate products). the component elements are similar to those concerning leisure trips but a business event’s programme is original, strictly matched to the selected group of recipients. 2. the product is a tool serving for the achievement of the company/corporation marketing aims or the institutional clients’ statutory aims (berbeka et al., 2011). the literature includes numerous classifications and criteria concerning the definition of business events journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(1), 35–42 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.006.5255 business meetings organization market and conditions marta jaźwiecka institute of geography, university of gdansk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, e-mail: m.jazwiecka@gmail.com citation jaźwiecka  m., 2016, business meetings organization market and conditions, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(1), 35–42. abstract the development of the organization of business meetings is influenced by many conditions, such as demographic, political, economic, social (including psychological) and cultural conditions. all the business tourism forms function in the area of the business meetings market. the market of business meetings organization is influenced by the environment in which a given enterprise or institution functions. the creation of an appropriate environment and of suitable conditions for business meetings organization positively affects the region’s socio-economic development. key words business meeting, business meeting market, business meeting conditions, business meeting organization environment. 36 marta jaźwiecka types. one of the most often mentioned classifications has been proposed by the world tourism organization (unwto), which has divided business trips into: • individual trips; • group trips. the most important forms of individual trips made by one person or a few people in order to achieve certain work-related objectives (for the period of up to 12 months) include (terminologia turystyczna…, 1995): 1. trade trips to other enterprises. 2. the conclusion of contracts and inspections. 3. the delivery of lectures and concert performances. 4. the installation of devices. 5. trips made in relation to the professional sports practice. 6. governmental and diplomatic missions made by the members of national governments, including diplomatic and military staff. on the other hand, group business trips involve the participation in: 1. training courses, seminars, symposia, study tours and site inspections, 2. conferences. 3. congresses and conventions. 4. motivational journeys. 5. fairs and exhibitions. 2. the business meetings market all the forms of business tourism function in the area of the market of those meetings. a market is the total of exchange relations between the sellers, representing the supply of goods and services, and the purchasers, representing the demand for goods and services (flejterski et al. (eds.), 2005). therefore, the market of business meetings is a place in which the customers (business tourists) and the service providers (business tourism organizers) specify what and on which conditions they want to purchase and sell (kamerschen et al., 2001) demand and supply are represented in the business meetings market by: 1. the business trips purchasers/ordering parties. 2. professional intermediaries. 3. business trips’ service suppliers (davidson, cope, 2003; rogers, 2008). by the form of institution of the business meeting ordering party, we can distinguish three segments: 1. the corporations market. 2. the organizations and associations market. 3. the public sector (berbeka et al., 2011). the division of the service ordering party segment of the market has been presented in fig. 1 and the differences between the business meetings for the market of corporations and those for organizations and associations – in tab. 1. a significant role in the organization of business meetings of any kind is played by professional intermediaries. they are entities whose activity consists in the conclusion of contracts with the suppliers of fig. 1. business meetings market division source: berbeka, et al., 2011 based on statistics report 2010, 2011. business meetings organization market and conditions 37 tourism services ordered by a specific a few types of intermediaries can be distinguished in the meetings industry market: 1. professional congress organizer (pco): an economic entity dealing with the organization and complex service of conferences, congresses and big events of an international scale. pcos act at the commission of companies, governmental institutions, associations. such agencies are often members of the industry’s organizations including the international association of professional congress organizers (iapco) or meeting professionals international (mpi) (berbeka et al., 2011). 2. incentive travel office: an office that organizes motivational trips for a company’s employees, implemented in reward for the results achieved and with the aim of motivating them to work better and get attached to the company. such offices are associated in the international society of incentive & travel executives (site). destination management companies (dmc) are offices acting in the destination of a given business trip (incoming agents). they dispose of detailed information regarding the venue of the tourism reception, and they cooperate with the local service suppliers in order to ensure accommodation, transfers, accompanying events. they often act at the commission of foreign pcos. 3. venue finder agencies: they work at the commission of companies or institutions in order to indicate the best venue for the planned event. they gather offers from the service suppliers and municipalities, and then, they present the best offer to the client, taking into account the location and the costs of tourism services in the given destination. their income amounts to the commission collected from the manager of the venue finally chosen by the client. 4. event and advertising agencies: they deal with the organization of various events and trips as well as business-marketing undertakings for companies and corporations an important role on the meeting industry market is played by business services suppliers (davidson cope b., 2003; rogers, 2008). among them, one can differentiate: 1. carriers (regular airlines and cheap carriers: train, ferry, car transportation). 2. the accommodation and conference base sector, including: 3. hotels (equipped with conference rooms). 4. training and recreation centrem. 5. congress centres adapted to the organization of big conference events. 6. university centrem. 7. exhibition and fair centrem. tab. 1. basic differences between the market of corporations and that of organizations and associations corporate buyers association buyers they work for a commercial company they work for a non-profit organization decisions regarding the purchase of services related to business trips are taken quickly and not much in advance decisions regarding the purchase of services related to business trips are a long process subject to procedures (e.g. tenders) the preparation of a business event requires a relatively short time (measured in weeks or, at the maximum, in months) the preparation of a business event, e.g. an industry congress, requires a long time measured in years business clients organize various events throughout the year association market clients organize less diversified events throughout the year the number of participants of the event usually amounts to less than 100 and rarely does it exceed 200 people the number of participants of the events varies from 100 to a few thousand of participants the costs borne per worker are usually relatively high because they are paid by the employer the costs borne per participant of the event are usually low because they are paid by the member of the association corporate events are held throughout the year organization and association events are held usually in spring and autumn a typical corporate event usually lasts between 0.5 and 1.5 of a day a typical organization/association event lasts 2-3 days accommodation involves 3-5* standard hotels accommodation involves various forms, depending on the type and prestige of the association and the person covering accommodation costs participants are rarely accompanied by family members participants are frequently accompanied by family members source: berbeka et al., 2011 (based on: rogers, 1998, 2008). 38 marta jaźwiecka 8. untypical places: castles, palaces, farms, mines and other post-industrial objects. 9. the sector of gastronomic services (restaurants, banquet halls in hotels, castles, mines and other places; catering companies). 10. the sector of tourism attractions, composed of: a) the organizers of entertainment and recreation (animators); b) the organizers of free time (amusement and theme parks, golf courses, spa & wellness, museums, galleries, cultural institutions, etc.). 11. the suppliers of audio-visual services, i.e. enterprises offering the equipment necessary to hold conferences (the so-called congress rental network, i.e. sound systems, projectors, discussion systems, exhibition equipment, etc.). 12. telecommunications companies offering devices enabling the remote holding of a conference. 13. translators and interpreters. 3. the environment of the organization of business meetings the market of the organization of business meetings is influenced by the environment in which a given enterprise or institution functions. environment is the total of conditions, the interplay of various organizations (institutions) influencing the behaviour of particular entities in the market. the environment imposes limitations, it can create opportunities and influence the development (marek (ed.), 1999). the microeconomic environment is the total of the factors that influence entities creating business meetings. according to m.e. porter (2001), they include: 1. the threat of new entrances (new entrants). 2. the bargaining power of clients (purchasers). 3. the bargaining power of suppliers (suppliers). 4. the threat of substitution products or services (substitution products); 5. the rivalry over positions among the current competitors (competitors). the microeconomic environment is composed of the conditions in which the entity functions, as results from its activity in a specific country, region, climate zone, geopolitical, legal, systemic regime, etc. it is a set of uncontrolled and entity-independent factors, creating specific market possibilities as well as posing certain threats to the entity, thereby conditioning its functioning (gołembski (ed.), 2006). the most important elements of the macro environment include the following environments (gołembski (ed.), 2006): • institutional and legal, • economic, • sociodemographic, • environmental, • technological, • foreign. 4. the conditions of the organization of business meetings the development of the organization of business meetings is influenced by many conditions, such as demographic, political, economic, social (including psychological) and cultural conditions. a multifaceted description of the conditions of the creation and development of the business tourism product as well as a diagnosis of those phenomena require an analysis of information coming from both primary and secondary sources, mainly due to the complexity of the processes and the interdependence in the sphere of tourism as well as the dynamics of the occurring changes (wanagos (ed.), 2004). the general market factors increasing and decreasing the number of business meetings include: 1. tourism assets and a rich tourism infrastructure (in the country or region of the tourism reception). 2. a good economic situation, stable political relations, the lack of financial or administrative limitations (in the country of the tourism emission). 3. transport switches: the condition of the transport equipment, transit obstacles (inspections, fee charges, waiting on the border), delays resulting from switching the means of transport (kaprowski, 2004). 4. the prices of tourism services: the diversification of prices depending on the means of transport, the category of the hotel or the number of services purchased allows for a fuller use of tourism goods (kaprowski, 2004). apart from the general market factors, regional elements favourable to the development of business tourism can be distinguished. among others, they include (cieślikowski, /no date/): • the maintenance and development of convenient communication connections; • the enriching and diversification of the accommodation offer; • the maintenance or opening of a new headquarters of a higher education institution; • the acquisition or maintenance of hotel objects owned by international networks; • the development of infrastructure being favourable to the spending of free time; business meetings organization market and conditions 39 • help with opening the headquarters of the organizer of fairs, exchanges, trade exhibitions; • the launching of an investor/investment’s customer service office; • the development of the existent and the creation of new conference rooms (sidorkiewicz, 2011). 5. the conditions of the organization of business meetings in poland the creation and development of the business meetings product is influenced by (sidorkiewicz, 2011).: • institutional conditions; • human resources conditions; • logistics and transport conditions; • financial conditions; • currency-price conditions; • investment conditions; • innovation conditions; many institutional entities can influence economic growth and the manner of activating and then using the influence of the factors favourable to the satisfactory dynamics of the country’s economy (pajda (ed.), 2000). however, it is not only the government and local government administration organs that can influence the development of the organization of business meetings. within voivodeships, there are organizations whose aim is the development of tourism in the region, as well as sets of entities acting in the sphere of tourism services (they are mainly intermediaries and tourism agents, hotel business companies, catering companies and passenger transport companies) (sidorkiewicz, 2011). the main role in the shaping of the development conditions on the administrative level is played by voivodeship marshal offices (departments responsible for tourism in the voivodeship, related with the development of tourism and the implementation of the statutory tasks specified in the. it is those offices that, through proper cooperation with market entities, create the environment that influences their development and actions as well as create the given city as a modern place and an attractive meeting industry destination. apart from government and local government institutions, associations and nongovernmental organizations acting to the benefit of tourism can be distinguished as beneficial to the conditions of the functioning of business meetings service entities. they include: 1. regional tourism organizations (rot). 2. tourism boards. 3. associations acting in the area of tourism, dealing with thematic publishing houses, training courses, fairs and the service and organization related to tourism-promoting undertakings. 4. branches of the polish tourist and sightseeing society (pttk). 5. branches of the polish youth hostels society (ptsm). 6. convention bureaus, i.e. the entities whose aim is first and foremost the promotion of the given city and the voivodeship within which it acts, presenting them as attractive business tourism destinations (sidorkiewicz, 2011). convention bureaus are the units that have been created in order to promote the city and region as appropriate venues for the organization of business meetings. the tasks of local convention bureaus may involve the following: • business customer acquisition by the active promotion of services in the internet as well as through promotional folders and the participation in industry fairs and articles in foreign press; • the preparation of comprehensive offers for business tourist groups based on the cooperation with the tourism industry entities in the region; • the provision of professional customer service to business tourists during their stay; • the preparation of exemplary offers for free time spending and motivational trips; • the maintenance of a website including the available offers by entities declaring cooperation as well as information concerning the region and its attractions; • advisory services in the field of the selection of the appropriate set of services and the professional organization of business trips; • the organization of a study tour; • the coordination of the activity with the existing structures of the promotion of economic, cultural and sports events as well as the integration of the academic circle of the programme of the polish congress ambassadors; • the dissemination of information regarding hotels, conference bases, business tourism organizers for all the interested entities such as associations, organizations, institutions, enterprises and others; • replies to e-mail and telephone queries; • the cooperation with the industry, the convention bureau of poland, the municipal convention bureaus from the whole of poland and the world, the “conferences and congresses in poland” association, municipal authorities, local and regional tourist organizations, private entities; • the participation in conferences and industry meetings; 40 marta jaźwiecka • the monitoring of the conferences, congresses, fairs and meetings held; • the cooperation with the media regarding the promotion of the congress offer. the key factor influencing the success of the business meetings product creation is the human factor. qualified, creative staff is the guarantee of success of the meeting organized. in poland, the educational offer regarding business meetings organization is relatively poor. however, there is a possibility of further education on vocational training courses within the european academy of conference organizers or the future leaders forum (flf) – a programme dedicated to students with the aim of encouraging them to work in the meetings industry. what is especially important to the development of the business meetings industry in a given region is the possibility and pace of reaching the given area, i.e. the condition of the transport and logistics system (sidorkiewicz, 2011). the areas with poorly organized communication network are less attractive and less successful in business meetings acquisition. meeting/conference venues within easy and fast reach from major cities allow for the organization of a meeting of a larger scale of the guests and participants invited. the major transportation branches directly influencing the effectiveness of business meetings acquisition include air transport, rail transport and road transport. the key transport type is air transport. it is especially important to the organization of international meetings but recently growth has been observed in the use of air transport in the national guests’ service. air transport is a good alternative to rail transport, which lately has been suffering regression with regard to the needs of the meetings served. unfortunately, air transport significantly increases the costs of organizing a big conference meeting as compared to rental within road transport. the lack of direct, fast connections between big cities resulted in few big company meetings of enterprises having their headquarters in warsaw being organized for example in pomerania. after the modernization of the railway network, the launching of pkp intercity premium connections (on 14th december 2014) and the development of highways, the travel time decreased significantly, which opened new possibilities for the organization of business meetings to be used in the future. the general principle of a meetings organizer is to select such locations which do not involve travel time exceeding 2–3 hours. road transport, although it is more economic, is risky in the moment of the organization of the meeting, especially in winter. the polish roads network as well as the lack of a proper number of highways and expressways in some cases result in the resignation from organizing a business meeting in the given region as the risk of a significant delay influencing the whole logistics of the meeting can prove too high. therefore, all the organizers attempt at avoiding such events which would require transporting the participants via the polish roads, which in turn results in the loss of possibilities for the municipalities that are distant from the major cities, for objects, the economy, and for the development of regions (sokołowska, /no date/). until 14th december 2014, despite the good network of connections between the major cities, the rail transport was poorly used as the means of transport related to the organization of conferences. unfortunately, the travel time and the cleanliness of carriages discouraged from taking up such challenges. however, a regularity can be noted according to which rail transport enjoys appreciation among the participants of scientific conferences. the organization of business meetings requires an appropriate, attractive and modern infrastructure and wide information regarding the goods offered. the development of the accommodation and conference infrastructure and the promotion of regions will not be possible without proper money streams. since its entering into the structures of the european union, poland has been using the european funds. thanks to these forms of help, new elements of tourist infrastructure emerge and the need for organizing business meetings increases. all of this positively affects the development of the whole “meetings industry”. big events also entice cash flows into the market. in 2012, poland hosted a great sports show, the uefa european football championship, and in 2014, the volleyball men’s world championship was organized. both of these sports events, apart from promoting poland as an attractive tourist place, brought the growth of the potential of the organization of business meetings. the needs related to the emergence of a new infrastructure allowing for the organization of events of such a type resulted in the inflow of money for the construction of additional roads and sports objects. for example, after the end of the championships, stadiums were transformed into, among other things, venues for the organization of meetings and amusement centres, and the newly constructed hotels that had emerged in order to guarantee the required number of accommodation places, were left at the disposal of tourists. the business meetings market is vulnerable to the economic situation. the progressive economic crisis puts a drag on the business meetings market business meetings organization market and conditions 41 as well as it results in the search for cheaper alternatives for the organization of meetings. on the one hand, it is a negative situation; on the other hand, it creates new solutions, looks for a compromise with the use of less prestigious, cheaper locations. nowadays, technologies have entered our lives for good. the internet and the opportunities it provides have resulted in a constant race with regard to new improvements, the facilitation of the use and acquisition of information from actually each sphere of life. this applies also to the industry of business meetings. each and every essential business location (a conference room, a hotel or a tourist attraction) has its own website thanks to which the necessary information can be acquired without leaving our workplace. there is a set of internet portals gathering the data related to a given topic in one place; the konferencje.pl portal can serve as an example as it provides information related to the possibilities of conference rooms across poland, and thanks to an advance search engine it allows for the fast finding of the rooms equipped with particular devices of our interest. innovations are to be found also with regard to room booking for the participants of our meeting. thanks to such platforms as for example booking.com, expedia.com, venere.com, we can make a fast and easy booking with a true guarantee of the lowest price. apart from the sphere of the meetings organization, innovations have also entered the meeting room. nowadays rarely does one see a lecturer who does not use multimedia presentations screened with the use of a projector for the other participants. paper conference materials have been replaced with information saved on data carriers or sent via the electronic mail to the interested addressees. an interesting form of conferences is represented by videoand teleconferences. these are meetings whose participants are located in various places but communicate and participate in the meeting thanks to an internet or telephone connection. initially it was thought that this form of meetings would dominate the meetings market. saving on the room rental, accommodation booking and catering, and first and foremost, on time, encouraged to this alternative form of conferences, which had supporters and opponents alike. today we know that the traditional form of conferences won. a conference is not only a performance and a lecture. it is also a meeting involving discussion and the exchange of knowledge and experiences. 6. the benefits of the creation of favourable conditions for the organization on business meetings – a summary scientific research conducted in western europe shows that the organization of business meetings can bring numerous benefits, especially with regard to economics. the average daily spending of the participants of national and international congresses are more than two times higher than that related to the classic residential tourism (łobożewicz, bieńczyk, 2001), and the organizers throughout the world reach the annual income amounting to usd 100 billion (hadaj, 2001). the activity of the organization of business meetings is characterized by two features resulting from the progressive globalization, determining its economic influence on the environment. the first one is the demand feature which is expressed by the surge of the international tourist move in relation to the national tourism; the second one is related to the supply, and more specifically, to the increasing incomes of the enterprises whose activity is connected with tourism (e.g. airlines, hotels, cultural organizations, sports undertakings organizers, entertainment, etc.) (sidorkiewicz, 2011). the expenditures of tourists can create a significant income stream for both enterprises and regional and local budgets, therefore contributing to the growth of their economic potential (marciszewska, 2005). a more detailed advantages for local communities can be classified as follows: • investments in the field of the conference and congress infrastructure, the costs of which are borne by public authorities; • the expenditure of participants – tourists – in the host country and cities; • the expenditure of congress organizers; • the subsidies of public authorities (gaworecki, 2006). the economic benefits related to the organization of conferences should also be noted: 1. the contribution to the sustainable balance of payments thanks to the foreign exchange expenses of the foreign congress participants. 2. the stimulation of the tourist economy (e.g. transport, hotel industry, catering industry, local trade). 3. the incomes of the public authorities gained through the direct fiscal policy applied with regard to the economic operations of congresses. 4. the maintenance of employment and the creation of new work places. 5. the multiplier effect of foreign exchange inflows (gaworecki, 2006). 42 marta jaźwiecka references bartosiewicz w., borne-januła h., buczak t., skalska t., socała j., 2003, metodologia badań i badanie pilotażowe turystyki biznesowej, instytut turystyki, warszawa. berbeka j., borodako k., klimek k., niemczyk a., seweryn r., 2011, przemysł spotkań w krakowie w 2011 roku. raport końcowy, kraków. cieślikowski k., /no data/, bariery rozwoju turystyki biznesowej w województwie śląskim, [in:] turystyka biznesowa. produkt i promocja… [cd publication]. davidson r., cope b., 2003, turystyka biznesowa, polska organizacja turystyczna, warszawa. flejterski s., panasiuk a., perenc j., rosa g. (eds.), 2005, współczesna ekonomia usług, wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, warszawa. gaworecki w. w., 2006, turystyka, polskie wydawnictwo ekonomiczne, warszawa. gołembski g. (ed.), 2006, przedsiębiorstwo turystyczne. ujęcie statystyczne i dynamiczne, polskie wydawnictwo ekonomiczne, warszawa. hadaj m., 2001, turystyka kongresów, wprost, 5, 74. kamerschen d. r,., mc kanzie r. b., nardinelli c., 2001, ekonomia, solidarność, gdańsk. kaprowski w., 2004, geografia turystyczna, wyższa szkoła ekonomiczna, warszawa. łobożewicz t., bieńczyk g., 2001, podstawy turystyki, wyższa szkoła turystyki, warszawa. marciszewska b., 2005, polityka turystyczna regionu a działalność konferencyjna i kongresowa, [in:] a. panasiuk (ed.), polityka turystyczna, fundacja na rzecz uniwersytetu szczecińskiego, szczecin – copenhagen, 216. marek s. (ed.), 1999, elementy nauki o przedsiębiorstwie, fundacja na rzecz uniwersytetu szczecińskiego, szczecin. pajda r. (ed.), 2000, wybrane uwarunkowania działalności ekonomicznej, wydział zarządzania akademii górniczo-hutniczej im. stanisława staszica w krakowie, kraków. porter m. e., 2001, konkurencyjna przewaga narodów. porter o konkurencji, polskie wydawnictwo ekonomiczne, warszawa. rice k., 2011, a more incentive way to fly, financial times, 17april. rogers t., 2008, conferences and convention: a global industry, butterworth & heinemann, oxford. sidorkiewicz m., 2011, turystyka biznesowa, difin, warszawa. sokołowska, i., /no data/, turystyka biznesowa – polska specjalność w ocenie stowarzyszenia konferencje i kongresy w polsce, [in:] turystyka biznesowa. produkt i promocja…, [cd publication]. statistics report 2010, 2011, icca, amsterdam. terminologia turystyczna. zalecenia wto, 1995, ukfit, warszawa. wanagos m. (ed.), 2004 uwarunkowania i kierunki rozwoju turystyki w województwie pomorskim, urząd marszałkowski województwa pomorskiego, gdańsk. 1. introduction in this paper, the authors use compliance-gaining theory to analyze how the u.s. supports the free syrian army (fsa) in their fight against the current syrian government led by bashar al-assad. over the past few years, the u.s. has been persuaded by the fsa to provide them support through weaponry and military advising. by and large, compliance-gaining theory describes how one party is able to get another party to comply with specific demands. it employs persuasive tactics to obtain such compliance (marwell, schmidt, 1967). when looking for compliance, a message source directly or indirectly claims that the rules for directives are worthwhile and portray the true nature of reality (wilson et al, 1998). the particular compliance-gaining tactics explored in this analysis are ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise. through ingratiation, a party can make itself more appealing to the other so as to journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(4), 29–36 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.03 compliance-gaining theory as a method to analyze u.s. support of the free syrian army (fsa) peter karleskint (1), jonathan matusitz (2) (1) nicholson school of communication and media, university of central florida, ucf downtown, 500 w. livingston, communication and media building (171c), orlando, fl 32801, usa, e-mail: pakactor@gmail.com (2) nicholson school of communication and media, university of central florida, ucf downtown, 500 w. livingston, communication and media building (171c), orlando, fl 32801, usa, orcid: 0000-0001-8078-3663 e-mail: matusitz@gmail.com (corresponding author) citation karleskint p., matusitz j., 2021, compliance-gaining theory as a method to analyze u.s. support of the free syrian army (fsa), journal of geography, politics and society, 11(4), 29–36. abstract this paper examines u.s. support of the free syrian army (fsa) through compliance-gaining theory. by and large, the theory describes how one party is able to get another party to comply with specific demands. the particular compliance-gaining tactics explored in this analysis are ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise. thanks to these tactics, we can better understand how a rebel group like the fsa has managed to convince a superpower like the u.s. to support it, in spite of the historical implications of supporting rebel groups in the past. to make its compliance-gaining stronger, the fsa has played up ideas or concepts like oil, trust, blame, obligation, and past u.s. military interventions to collaborate with the u.s. so as to bring down the syrian government and, by the same token, resist russian influence in syria. key words civil war, collaboration, compliance-gaining theory, free syrian army, global policy, persuasion, syria, united states. received: 27 october 2021 accepted: 19 november 2021 published: 24 january 2022 30 peter karleskint, jonathan matusitz manipulate the other for subsequent exploitation. when using debt, one party can evoke obligations and responsibilities that the other party owes as a method of inducing compliance. when using guilt, one party tries to win arguments over the other party by making the latter feel guilty (i.e., shifting blame). and compromise refers to an agreement between different parties whereby each side gives up parts of its demands so as to reach mutual goals. thanks to these tactics, we can better understand how a rebel group like the fsa has managed to convince a superpower like the u.s. to support it, in spite of the historical implications of supporting rebel groups in the past. to make its compliance-gaining stronger, the fsa has played up ideas or concepts like oil, trust, blame, obligation, and past  u.s. military interventions to collaborate with the u.s. so as to bring down the syrian government and, by the same token, resist russian influence in syria. an important conclusion of this paper is that compliance-gaining goes beyond that of close relationships and business transactions; it can also deal with the complexities of war, insurgency, and international relations. this paper begins with a brief discussion of compliance-gaining theory, with a particular focus on the origins of the theory. then, the authors proceed to describe the fsa. what comes subsequently is the heart of this analysis: the application of the theory to the fsa’s support provided by the u.s. this paper ends with a discussion that also includes an explanation of the theory’s weaknesses. 2. compliance-gaining theory: a description developed by g. marwell and d.r. schmidt (1967), compliance-gaining theory describes how an individual or group is able to get another individual or group to comply with demands. when asking for compliance, a message source directly or indirectly claims that the rules for directives are worthwhile and portray the true nature of reality (wilson et al., 1998). w.j. schenck-hamlin et al. (1982, p. 99) suggest that “a correspondence between delineation of compliance-gaining properties and subjects’ recognition of them” is important in the compliancegaining process. in order for a tactic to be effective in compliance-gaining, the target has to be relatively unaware of the fact that the actor (or person partaking in the act of using a compliance-gaining strategy) is trying to use a compliance-gaining move on them. this keeps the target from suspecting foul play and further moves him or her toward trusting the actor depending on the tactic used. the specific tactics used in this analysis will be those of ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise. 3. ingratiation ingratiation is a tactic that a party employs to make itself more attractive to the other so as to manipulate the other for subsequent exploitation. the efficacy of ingratiation is based on the other’s very ignorance of the party’s ultimate intentions (ralston, 1985). by using ingratiation, one party does the other party favors and, in so doing, causes that party to lower its guard. certain ingratiation practices include flattery and praising, pretending to agree with the other party’s views, and doing courtesies (gordon, 1996). ingratiation tactics are used to convince the other party that they are held in high esteem. ultimately, ingratiation makes the other feel more confident. doing whatever the other party wants is useful in that, now, the latter looks at new ideas more favorably. ingratiation can easily open channels of communication, foster relationships, make others feel in high spirits (i.e., especially prior to making a request), get into “opinion conformity,” and act in a friendly way (gass, seiter, 1990). 4. debt and guilt debt is a type of compliance-gaining tactic whereby one party recalls obligations and responsibilities that the other party owes as a method of inducing compliance (burgoon et al., 1987). guilt is a type of persuasive argumentation whereby one party tries to win arguments over the other party by making the latter feel guilty. this is usually done by using unfounded reasoning and logical appeals (brinson, benoit, 1999). here, the rhetor tries to shift the blame on others. shifting blame is effective when one makes the other feel blameworthy or responsible for the failure or loss of something (blaney et al., 2002). 5. compromise compromise refers to an agreement between different parties whereby each side gives up parts of its demands so as to reach mutual goals. in argumentation studies, compromise occurs when one finds agreement through communication, through a mutual exchange of terms – often entailing variations from an initial goal or desires (thompson, hastie, 1990). in the context of this analysis, compromise alludes to the methods by which opposing sides commit to an compliance-gaining theory as a method to analyze u.s. support of the free syrian army (fsa) 31 agreement – either temporary or permanent – with each other. in international politics, most compromises are those usually seen as reprehensible deals with dictatorships or insurgent groups. it is almost like a necessary evil (margalit, 2009). 6. the free syrian army (fsa) founded during the syrian civil war in july 2011, the free syrian army (fsa) is an insurgent group consisting of former officers and soldiers of the syrian armed forces. during the arab spring in 2011, thousands of syrian protesters across syria demanded the resignation of president bashar al-assad, who assumed office in 2000. the assad regime responded violently, which led to the syrian civil war and, ultimately, the creation of the fsa (hehir, pattison, 2015). most of the syrian armed forces refused to open fire on the protesters. in fact, some of the officers and soldiers deserted the syrian armed forces to jointly form the fsa with the protesters. accordingly, the peaceful protests amounted to an armed insurgency bent on overthrowing the assad regime (skålén et al., 2015). 7. the fsa today since february 2014, abdul-ilah al-bashir has been the designated chief of staff and frontrunner of the fsa (karam, surk, 2014). in september 2014, a league of moderate islamic insurgent factions – fighting for the supreme military council of syria (including the fsa) – joined forces with a predominantly christian alliance called syriac military council. the objective was to enhance their capabilities against both the assad regime and isis (spencer, 2015). today, the former syrian armed forces officers and soldiers still believe that their prime objective is to protect the opposition neighborhoods and rallies from the assad-led regime snipers (littell, 2015). by january 2016, the fsa already consisted of “about 27 larger factions, each comprised of an average of 1,000 fighters as well as some smaller units or localized militias” (alami, 2016, p. a1), including “thousands” of the latter types of brigades of various proportions. nevertheless, “the opposition movement in syria has been fragmented from its inception, a direct reflection of syria’s social complexity and the decentralized grassroots origin of the uprising” (o’bagy, 2013, p. 9). the precarious condition of the fsa demonstrates the chaotic nature of syria at the present time and “this condition has plagued syria’s armed opposition since peaceful protestors took up arms and began forming rebel groups under the umbrella of the free syrian army” (o’bagy, 2013, p. 9). although the fsa was created in an effort to better coordinate its efforts, the insurgent group continues to show how disorganized and uncooperative the rebel groups have been toward each other. the problem is that, due to the random and chaotic nature of the fsa, the need for adequate troops, weaponry, and logistics is significant (zuhur, 2015). 8. the fsa’s support from the u.s. in june 2012, the cia was purportedly active in covert operations along the turkish-syrian border, where operatives examined insurgent groups, recommending weapons providers which groups they should assist. cia operatives also helped opposition forces build supply routes, and gave them communications training (solomon, malas, 2012). cia agents delivered assault rifles, anti-tank rocket launchers, and other ammo to syrian rebels. by late 2012, the u.s. department of state allegedly provided $15 million for insurgent groups in syria (schmitt, 2012). in april 2013, the obama administration pledged to increase non-lethal aid to syrian rebels (including the fsa) – $250 million to be more precise (deyoung, 2013). in regards to the last statement, e. o’bagy (2013, p. 9) stated that “the u.s. provide[d] non-lethal aid, including food, medicine, and training assistance, through the supreme military command of the free syrian army”. though this event may seem insignificant to some detractors, the ramifications of such a public act of support can be massive. for instance, through this support, the u.s. has further turned the syrian regime against itself. although the u.s. and syrian governments were already enemies, aiding the fsa so directly has made the u.s. an even bigger target. one of the most important facts to remember is that the u.s. helped support osama bin laden during the soviet-afghan war and saddam hussein during the iran-iraq war. with these failed attempts at support in the past, using radical insurgents to defeat the opposition may be a blowback for the u.s. one must wonder why the u.s. is so set on repeating the same course of action with the fsa. though never mentioning osama bin laden by name, s. coll (1992, p. a1) of the washington post stated that, the reagan administration decided to go for victory in the afghan war between 1984 and 1988 has been shrouded in secrecy and clouded by the sharply divergent political agendas of those involved. but 32 peter karleskint, jonathan matusitz with the triumph of the mujaheddin rebels over afghanistan’s leftist government in april and the demise of the soviet union, some intelligence officials involved have decided to reveal how the covert escalation was carried out. this article from 1992 proves that the u.s. supported opposition in afghanistan, which may have contributed to the rise of the taliban, in an effort to defeat russia’s influence and control of an increasingly radical country (coll, 1992). hence, this begs the question: after witnessing the damage that our political/military involvement – in part – has caused in the past, why support another potentially dangerous opposition? the u.s. has increasingly shown support for the fsa – moving from non-lethal support to sending out weapons and guns for free use by them. according to e. schmitt (2012, p. a1), “a small number of c.i.a. officers are operating secretly in southern turkey, helping allies decide which syrian opposition fighters across the border will receive arms to fight the syrian government”. despite the obama administration claiming no involvement in sending weapons across borders (schmitt, 2012), there is no doubt that the u.s. has increased its support of the fsa from basic non-lethal support to full-on support of weapons and the like. in fact, “as of september 2014, the u.s. had allocated more than $287 million in support of the non-armed opposition (including the soc and local activists), more than half of which had been delivered as of late march” (blanchard et al., 2014, p. 24). this was just for non-lethal support alone. c.m. blanchard et al. (2014) seem to believe that, by supporting the fsa, the u.s. has a strategy in mind. this strategy may have to do with covertly opposing russia and the syrian government, but the support has become more open. as c.m. blanchard et al. (2014, p. 24) state, the implementation of u.s. strategy in syria to date has included the provision of both nonlethal and lethal assistance to select syrian opposition groups, a sustained international diplomatic effort to establish a negotiated transition, and the provision of humanitarian assistance in syria and neighboring countries. this type of support is hard to miss and is shown to be accommodating. the support shown, then, further solidifies the u.s. stake in syria. in october 2015, the u.s. officially proclaimed to stop the pentagon’s $500 million pledge to train and arm syrian rebels in an admission that the program had not met its ostensible goals (barnard, shoumali, 2015). however, other undercover but significantly larger programs to equip rebel fighters in syria are still run by the cia (black, 2015; miller, deyoung, 2015). 9. compliance-gaining theory applied to the u.s. support of the free syrian army compliance-gaining theory describes how one party is able to get another party to comply with demands (marwell, schmidt, 1967). with compliancegaining theory come a number of different tactics that can be used to gain compliance in a situation. the specific tactics used in this analysis are those of ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise. there are multiple strategies that fit into the current situation of the u.s. supporting the fsa. e.c.  onyekwere (1991, p. 77) claims that “communication of positive work attitude involves compliance gaining in non-interpersonal situation which may or may not be different from strategies used in gaining compliance in interpersonal situations such as the family”. the goal of analyzing the current u.s. support of the fsa is to identify the everyday compliance-gaining tactics used in a much larger scale for a variety of influential decisions. thanks to those tactics, we can better understand how a rebel group like the fsa has convinced a giant power like the u.s. to support it, despite the historical implications of supporting rebel groups in the past. the fsa is a decentralized, unorganized rebel group that has not gained support from large nations like the u.s. through status alone (o’bagy, 2013). rather, acts of compliance-gaining were used by the syrian rebel leaders. for instance, one tactic of compliance-gaining is ingratiation. 10. ingratiation ingratiation is a strategy in which a party tries to make itself more appealing to the other in order to set up the other for subsequent exploitation. the usefulness of ingratiation comes from the other’s very unawareness of the party’s ultimate intentions (ralston, 1985). it is a process by which “the persuader offers goods, services, and sentiments before making a request for compliance” (onyekwere, 1991, p. 78). the u.s. has a number of advantages to gain from syria if the fsa becomes successful in overthrowing the current regime and if it remains loyal to the u.s. one of the most important resources for the u.s. is oil, which is often found all over the middle east (le billon, el khatib, 2004). by extension, if the current leadership is taken out, russia may lose compliance-gaining theory as a method to analyze u.s. support of the free syrian army (fsa) 33 its ties in the middle east and weaken its influence, which is another goal of the u.s. it is interesting to take into account the effects of having oil. in fact, the u.s. has often referenced oil as delivering “freedom” to local populations (le billon, khatib, 2004). after 9/11, the u.s. went from wanting free access of oil for the world market to this overly patriotic reference (le billon, khatib, 2004). ingratiation is a political process whereby one party seeks one’s own self-interest (ralston, 1985). to make itself more appealing to the u.s., the fsa has offered the u.s. access to oil with “no strings attached,” which has made the u.s. more likely to cooperate with them. as confirmed by t. arango et al., (2012), syrian rebels have captured oil fields so as to increase their leverage with the u.s. and, thereby, asking for more support from the superpower. in line with these contentions, in may 2014, ahmed jarba, the leader of syria’s main political opposition group, paid a visit to the obama administration and asked the u.s. to arm the fsa with shoulderfired antiaircraft weapons (called manpads) (entous, 2014). as mr. jarba explained, “our mission is to convince the u.s. to give us those weapons, or to convince them to allow our friends to provide us with those weapons.” the ingratiation element of jarba’s request was obvious in his constant emphasis on the necessity to collaborate so as to build “trust.” indeed, during his visit, he mentioned the word “trust” many times. for example, he alluded to a recent u.s.-saudi program that sought to equip the fsa, which was an experiment “designed to build trust” (entous, 2014, p. a1). in reality, syrian rebel leaders have always described the u.s. government with words that are antithetical to “trust.” for instance, two years before jarba’s visit to the u.s., syrian rebel leaders were already saying that trusting the u.s. was impossible because they felt “abandoned” and “betrayed” by the u.s. (sly, 2012, p. a1). 11. debt and guilt two other compliance-gaining tactics that seem to work in accordance with each other are debt and guilt. debt occurs when “the persuader bases his message by recalling obligations owed him or her by the target and using this to induce the target to comply (onyekwere, 1991, p. 78) and guilt is “a situation where the actor tells the target that failure to comply will lead to automatic cessation of selfworth. this may include professional incompetence to ethical transgressions” (onyekwere, 1991, p. 78). using both tactics, the fsa has been the persuader trying to convince the u.s. to back them up. recalling a past debt has been an effective method of shifting blame on the u.s. for causing many of the issues currently happening in the middle east, thereby convincing the u.s. that they owe the syrian rebels a favor for such distress. in this case, it was the u.s. obligation to support the fsa in an attempt to overthrow the current syrian government. guilt works in a similar way: the fsa has convinced the u.s. that if they do not get involved in the syrian conflict, then everything they tell the world about valuing the lives of others and finishing what they started would be a lie. as explained by a. newman (2013), immediately after the selection of syrian rebel leaders, the syrian branch of the muslim brotherhood requested that the u.s. “fulfill its obligations” and give additional weapons to the fsa. the fsa has positioned itself as a victimized group entitled to u.s. aid and support, particularly in light of past u.s. actions in the muslim world. already before 9/11, the u.s. had been getting involved in middle-eastern affairs in an attempt to gain control over crucial territories (le billon, khatib, 2004). in fact, this was the initial push that got the u.s. so strongly prominent throughout the middle-eastern world. according to t.g. carpenter (2013, p. 10), the united states has implicitly embraced the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine. that doctrine asserts that when a regime brutalizes its population in a systematic way, the “international community” has not only a right but also an obligation to intervene to protect vulnerable civilians and, if necessary, to depose an offending regime. hence, the u.s. should feel “guilty” for getting involved in the middle east and now has a moral obligation to support the fsa. in a similar vein, as wittebols (1991, p. 13) contends, the net effect of the media’s reliance on government sources for what constitutes terrorism is twofold: the government as the primary source means that media will give less attention to institutional terror which is in some way linked to u.s. government policies and practices. for wittebols, the u.s. has strong ties to terrorist conflicts and, thus, has engendered terrorism on other parts of the world because of the need to become involved. this, too, adds fuel to the fire and justifies the compliance-gaining methods that the fsa has foisted upon the u.s. 12. compromise compromise refers to an agreement between different parties whereby each side gives up parts of its demands so as to reach mutual goals. as e.c. 34 peter karleskint, jonathan matusitz onyekwere (1991, p. 78) explains, compromise “includes those situations where both actors and targets give and take in order to achieve success. accordingly, gains and losses are perceived in relative terms”. in international politics, compromises most often discussed are usually regarded as nefarious deals with dictatorships or insurgent groups (margalit, 2009). in the context of this analysis, critics of the obama administration may have valid reasons to refuse any compromise with the fsa. a case in point is the report of fsa atrocities – such as arbitrary executions of syrian civilians – that has reached global audiences (leenders, 2013). likewise, as of 2015, the fsa has collaborated with the al-nusra front. the alnusra front is no other than al qaeda in syria or al qaeda in the levant (cragin, 2015). no matter what, both the u.s. and fsa have something to gain from their stake in syria. for the u.s., there is ample opportunity for oil that is otherwise hard to come by (le billon, le khatib, 2004); a chance to decrease russian influence in syria thus releasing some control over the middle east (carpenter, 2013; katz, 2006); and, as a result, extending further its own power and control over the world. in regards to the fsa, the group, too, may have plenty to gain. for instance, the fsa will have the ability to overthrow the current regime and government in syria; take over the current state of affairs and people on syrian land; and gain plenty of influence with a big nation like the u.s. backing them (among this influence includes guns and other aid) (carpenter, 2013). this all seems like a highly probable compliancegaining method on account of how both sides most likely feel that the other’s benefits will not interfere with their own. the only problem, then, is not whether these two will support each other through the current war, but instead, whether or not betrayal is in the cards at the end. as history has shown, the u.s. has often thrown in itself with a rogue nation, only to be turned on after they get what they want. for now, only time will tell how syrian rebels will treat the u.s. after they obtain what they want. trust is not easy to earn, but compliance-gaining is the first step toward cooperation. whether or not that cooperation turns into real trust remains to be seen. 13. compromise to fight a proxy war against russia currently, russia is supporting syria, considered a terrorist state by the u.s. department of state. russian support was initiated in 2005 when russia agreed to cut 73% of syria’s debt to russia and sell syria air defense missile systems (katz, 2006). despite israel’s attempts at dissolving russia-syria relations, their relationship continues to grow. due to russian support in syria, the u.s. has covertly supported the opposition to reduce russian influence in syria. in late 2015, senator john mccain asked congress to send the fsa surface-to-air missiles so as to knock down russian planes (buchanan, 2015). as t.g. carpenter (2013, p. 7) explains, “the syrian civil war also has potential negative global implications. it already has had a corrosive effect on the west’s relations with both russia and china”. this further contributes to the u.s. reasoning in supporting the fsa. t.g. carpenter (2013) also goes into the major developments between the u.s. government and that of both russia and china, describing the resulting interactions as bitter. it would seem that the events in syria have wedged the already loosely associated countries further apart, resulting in growing problems such as wavering allied powers and lack of negotiation ability on either side. instead, the countries have resorted to an indirect war with each other through syria. t.g. carpenter (2013) contends that u.s. support of the fsa extends beyond simply wanting to help the syrians. the u.s. is actually waging a proxy war against russia. the main reason lies in the relationships that russia has forged with the syrian government. now, instead of merely wanting to save a country, the u.s. is crossing farther into enemy lines for self-serving reasons. this gives the fsa room to negotiate its relationship with the u.s. while the u.s. remains focused on its own geopolitical agenda. not only is the u.s. trying to promote its self-interests, but it may also be susceptible to manipulation from other sources in its proxy war against russia. 14. discussion what this analysis has demonstrated is that compliance-gaining goes beyond that of close relationships and business transactions; it can also deal with the complexities of war, insurgency, and international relations. the fsa has successfully relayed messages that beget compliance from a giant power like the u.s. so as to gain support. typically, support needed from the u.s. is not so easily earned. yet, through the use of four compliance-gaining tactics, the syrian opposition forces have managed to persuade the u.s. that they can be trusted in fighting the current syrian government led by bashar al-assad. as we have seen, to make its compliance-gaining stronger, the fsa has exploited ideas or concepts like oil, trust, blame, obligation, and past u.s. military compliance-gaining theory as a method to analyze u.s. support of the free syrian army (fsa) 35 interventions to collaborate with the u.s. so as to bring down the syrian government and, by the same token, resist russian influence in syria. the fact that the u.s. has supported the fsa through both lethal and non-lethal means is of utmost importance when examining current world affairs and matters related to terrorism. nevertheless, although the fsa has become the largest opposition to the syrian government, it still leaves a lot of room to be distrustful. if history is a strong indicator to predict the future, supporting rebel groups can do more harm than good – as was the case with support of osama bin laden during the soviet-afghan war and saddam hussein during the iran-iraq war. not only does this put the u.s. in the crosshairs of the enemy; it may also provide an even fiercer or more radical foe in the near future if things do not pan out the way they were meant to be. this is what makes understanding compliancegaining theory so important. compliance-gaining is a method of convincing a second party of agreeing to a specific demand. if compliance-gaining tactics can be identified when negotiating with another group, then one can be more prepared in how effective the argument is, whether or not the group can be trusted, and identify key moves that were made similarly across other situations. in the case of the u.s., understanding compliance-gaining theory will lead to more informed decisions and fewer problems with supposed allies and/or rebels. this would also help increase the effectiveness of the u.s. government and military, allowing resources to be used effectively and when absolutely needed (rather than going off of a group or person’s word alone). compliance-gaining theory has a few shortcomings. to begin, the theory can be difficult to identify, as the main goal of the theory is to apply tactics to unknowing targets. in order for compliance to be gained, the target must be unaware of the messages and tactics being communicated. these ideas not only make it difficult to identify when the theory is being used; they also make it difficult to use compliance-gaining tactics, because the instant the target is aware of what is happening, the progress made is lost. when examining u.s. support of the fsa, this theory could be considered somewhat weak because the u.s. government rarely reveals how communication between the fsa and the u.s. takes place, which can lead to holes in analysis without actual perception and first-hand experience in the communication. second, vis-à-vis ingratiation itself, there are weaknesses that need to be discussed as well. for instance, the use of ingratiation would make the fsa appear weak or exploitable to the u.s. though this is a weakness for a more business-like setting, it may be exactly what the fsa wants to appear to be: weak. if history were to be re-examined, one could see that, in the past, the u.s. has supported a number of rebel groups that initially appeared to be under our control until they came to power. by appearing weak or exploitable, the fsa can easily get the u.s. to be caught off-guard in a moment of victory (even though each side appears to be allied with each other). as the u.s. makes more allies with unknown parties, compliance-gaining will always be present. it is important to be able to identify the tactics of compliance-gaining to help the u.s. make better decisions when aligning itself with other groups or nations. this will also help uncover the motives and underlying reasons for terrorist attacks. terrorism is about changing the world by sending a message; in this way, it becomes clear that terrorists are trying to get the world to comply. by understanding this theory, one may more easily identify the motives of a terrorist organization. it is the authors’ hope that this analysis has enlightened readers on a theory often used in situations outside the geopolitical realm. the idea of the u.s. supporting the fsa was an important topic to be discussed because of how that relationship has developed in just a few years. references alami m., 2016, can fsa get back on its feet after russian intervention?, al-monitor, 1 january 2016, a1. arango t., barnard a., saad h., 2012, syrian rebels tied to al  qaeda play key role in war, the new york times, 8 december 2012, a1. barnard a., shoumali k., 2015, u.s. weaponry is turning syria into proxy war with russia, the new york times, 12 october 2015, a1. black i., 2015, us axes $500m scheme 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10.1111/j.1468-2885.1991. tb00018.x zuhur s., 2015, the syrian opposition: salafi and nationalist jihadism and populist idealism, contemporary review of the middle east, 2(1), 143–163. doi: 10.1177/0169796x15584034 1. introduction after the collapse of the system of communist states, and especially after the collapse of the ussr, processes of systemic transformation began in this european post-communist countries (brusylovska, 2016; norkus, 2012; polìtični ..., 2016). they have not bypassed ukraine either, although they are delayed in it (brusylovskaya, 2018; kuczabski, michalski, 2014; rozumnij (ed.), 2011; tomahìv, 2014). one of the very visible processes in the former european communist countries after 1990 is their population decline (it occurs in most of them) and population aging (it occurs in all of them). it can be argued here whether this mainly results from processes referred to as the second demographic transition (sdt) (lesthaeghe, 2010; mezentseva, kondras, 2015) or whether it is a resultant of sdt and the effects of systemic transformation processes (basten et al., 2013). the aim of the study is to present the changes in the population of ukraine and its demographic structure compared to other european post-communist countries. with this in view, the years 1990 and 2020 were compared, but in some analyses (due to the availability of data), close years were used for the analysis. the spatial scope of the analysis covers journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(4), 46–54 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.05 ukraine’s population compared to european post-communist countries in 1990 and 2020 yevhen matviyishyn institute for public administration, lviv polytechnic national university, sukhomlynskoho 16, 79491 lviv-briukhovychi, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0001-9522-4645 e-mail: evhmat@yahoo.com citation matviyishyn y., 2021, ukraine’s population compared to european post-communist countries in 1990 and 2020, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(4), 46–54. abstract the aim of the study is to present the changes in the population and its demographic structure in ukraine compared to other european post-communist countries. classic demographic indicators were applied. in comparison to other analyzed countries, ukraine has an average pace of population decline, a low aging rate and a persistently clear advantage of the number of women over men. this is the result of all three factors: loss of part of the territory with the population inhabiting it, natural decrease and negative migration balance. key words demography, ukraine, european post-communist countries. received: 23 october 2021 accepted: 04 december 2021 published: 24 january 2022 ukraine’s population compared to european post-communist countries in 1990 and 2020 47 broadly understood european post-communist countries, i.e. the transcaucasia countries were also included in the analysis. 2. data and methods apart from data for kosovo, all other data used in the study come from the world development indicators (world bank). unfortunately, data for kosovo were incomplete in this database. therefore, the decision was made to obtain it directly from the kosovo agency of statistics (demographic..., 2008; kosovo…; kosovo…, 2020). detailed data for ukraine was obtained from the state statistics service of ukraine website (state ...). commonly used statistical methods (see: gerasimenko (ed.), 2000; pedčenko, 2018) and demographic indicators (see: dorošenko, 2005; gudzelâk, 2013) were applied in the analysis. only the aging index structure requires more detailed explanation due to its numerous versions. this is the number of people aged 65 and over per 100 population aged 0–14 (koval’čuk, ìŝenko, 2018). therefore, it belongs to the classic indicators of the old age of the population. however, when looking at the data presented in the further part of the study, one should bear in mind that they only approximate the actual situation. the reason mainly lies in long-term migrations whose effects are largely not reflected in official statistics. hence, the official data on the number of the population, its structure and demographic indicators should be considered approximate. 3. results table 1 shows the official population size at the beginning and the end of the analyzed period. we can see that ukraine was the second largest country among the post-communist european countries. in general, this area is dominated by small or very small countries. only russia can be classified as a country with a large population, and ukraine, poland and romania with an average population. fig. 1 shows what percentage, according to the official data, of the 1990 population was the population in 2020. according to this criterion, countries can be broken down into four groups. countries with a very large decline (>20%) in the population were classified in the first group: from latvia to bulgaria. countries from romania to hungary are among the countries with a large decline in the population (6–20%). ukraine was also placed in this group, with a decrease of 14.9%. the third group includes countries with little changed population (±5%): from russia to slovenia. there is only one country that has recorded a very marked increase in its population size – azerbaijan (by 41.2%). thus, it is clearly visible that the area under analysis is dominated by depopulation or stagnation in the size of the population inhabiting it (with the exception of azerbaijan, of course). the second, even more pronounced process is the rapidly progressing aging of the population. in the period 1990–2020, in all the analyzed countries, this process was very clearly visible (fig. 2). while in 1990 in 67% of the countries the value of the aging index was below 50, and in none it was over 100, in 2020, only in 8% it was below 50 and in as many as 58% it was above 100. for ukraine, it was 56 at the table 1. population (million people) in 1990 and 2020 country 1990 2020 country 1990 2020 albania 3.3 2.8 latvia 2.7 1.9 armenia 3.5 3.0 lithuania 3.7 2.8 azerbaijan 7.2 10.1 moldova 3.0 2.6 belarus 10.2 9.4 montenegro 0.6 0.6 bosnia and herzegovina 4.5 3.3 north macedonia 2.0 2.1 bulgaria 8.7 6.9 poland 38.1 38.0 croatia 4.8 4.0 romania 23.2 19.3 czechia 10.3 10.7 russia 148.0 144.1 estonia 1.6 1.3 serbia 7.6 6.9 georgia 4.8 3.7 slovakia 5.3 5.5 hungary 10.4 9.7 slovenia 2.0 2.1 kosovo 2.0 1.8 ukraine 51.9 44.1 source: world bank; kosovo: demographic ..., 2008; kosovo ... . 48 yevhen matviyishyn 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 l a tv ia b o sn ia a n d h . l it h u a n ia g e o rg ia b u lg a ri a r o m a n ia a rm e n ia c ro a ti a e st o n ia u k ra in e a lb a n ia m o ld o v a s e rb ia k o so v o b e la ru s h u n g a ry r u ss ia p o la n d m o n te n e g ro s lo v a k ia c z e c h ia n . m a c e d o n ia s lo v e n ia a z e rb a ij a n 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 1990 2020 a z e rb a ij a n k o so v o a rm e n ia g e o rg ia m o ld o v a r u ss ia a lb a n ia m o n te n e g ro n . m a c e d o n ia b e la ru s u k ra in e s lo v a k ia p o la n d b o sn ia a n d h . e st o n ia r o m a n ia s e rb ia l a tv ia c z e c h ia l it h u a n ia s lo v e n ia h u n g a ry c ro a ti a b u lg a ri a fig. 1. change in the official population size between 1990 and 2020 [1990 = 100%] source: world bank; kosovo: demographic…, 2008; kosovo… fig. 2. aging index in 1990 and 2020 source: world bank; statistički… 2020 ; kosovo in…, 2020. ukraine’s population compared to european post-communist countries in 1990 and 2020 49 beginning of the analyzed period, and 106 at the end of the analyzed period. looking at the values of the aging index, one may be tempted to claim that it adopts higher values in richer countries, and lower values in poorer countries – but there are also exceptions. the largest increase (by about five times) in the value of the aging index in 2020 compared to 1990 was recorded in bosnia and herzegovina and in albania. the smallest one (less than twofold) was in russia, ukraine and belarus. the process of aging of the population will continue (michalski, stępień, 2021). the third important indicator describing demographic structures is the femininity ratio (fig. 3). there are slight regularities in the fact that its higher values were recorded in the countries of the former soviet union (except for azerbaijan). on the other hand, lower values are in countries with a dominance or a high percentage of people professing islam. looking at the changes in its value, it decreased in 25% of the countries and increased in 75% of them. ukraine was not only among the countries with its high values, but also its further increase was noted (115.0 at the beginning and 115.8 at the end of the analysis period, respectively). fig. 4 shows detailed changes in the total resident population broken down into women and men in ukraine in 1990–2020. it shows that until 1993 the population of ukraine was slightly increasing. the breakthrough year was 1994, when the population decreased by 317,000. until 2006, this decline amounted to over 300,000 residents per year. later, the rate of decline decreased. the second breakthrough year was 2015, when the population decreased by as much as 2.5 million compared to the previous year. but this was due to russia’s annexation of the autonomous republic of crimea and the city of sevastopol, plus the loss of separatist territories in the luhansk and donetsk oblasts. currently, the drops are again high and oscillate around 200,000 people per year. 4. discussion looking at the changes in the population number presented in fig. 1, there are no spatial regularities. there are also no clear correlations with: 1. the dominant religion in a given country. on the one hand, there is muslim azerbaijan with a very large and moderate population growth, and on the other – also muslim kosovo and albania with an average population decline. the same case is with orthodox christianity: a slight population growth in montenegro and north macedonia and a very large decline in georgia and bulgaria. it is no different in the case of catholicism – on the one hand, there is slovenia with a moderate increase in the number of the population, and on the other hand – lithuania with a large decrease. 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 1990 2020 a lb a n ia n . m a c e d o n ia a z e rb a ij a n s lo v e n ia m o n te n e g ro c z e c h ia s e rb ia b o sn ia a n d h . k o so v o s lo v a k ia r o m a n ia b u lg a ri a p o la n d c ro a ti a m o ld o v a g e o rg ia h u n g a ry e st o n ia a rm e n ia b e la ru s r u ss ia u k ra in e l it h u a n ia l a tv ia fig. 3. femininity ratio in 1990 and 2020 source: world bank; statistički… 2020 . 50 yevhen matviyishyn 2. the level of wealth of the society. a comparison of two societies with the highest population growth – azerbaijan (gdp per capita, ppp in 2020 = 14,500 current international $) and slovenia (40,100), and two with the largest population decline: latvia (32,000) and bosnia and herzegovina (15,600) – is the best illustration of this thesis. 3. armed conflicts in some countries during this period. on the one hand, we have azerbaijan and north macedonia, where the population has increased, and on the other – bosnia and herzegovina and georgia, where the population has clearly decreased. in the countries of the region, three groups of factors affect changes in the number of the population. the first two are demographic in nature and are related to vital statistics and international migration. changes in national borders constitute the third factor. apart from the collapse of larger states: the ussr, yugoslavia, czechoslovakia – several countries lost their parts. thus, serbia lost kosovo; moldova lost transnistria, georgia lost abkhazia and south ossetia, azerbaijan lost part of nagorno-karabakh. but ukraine suffered the most losses: russia annexed the autonomous republic of crimea and sevastopol and triggered the emergence of the so-called luhansk people’s republic and the donetsk people’s republic. a decrease in the number of live births is an important factor affecting the number of the population. all the analyzed countries record a decrease in the total fertility rate (tfr). while still in 1990 seven countries ensured replacement fertility, there were none in 2019 (tab. 2). the situation in ukraine is particularly bad, as in 2019 it had the lowest tfr among all the analyzed countries. this is largely due to the economic situation in the country (aksyonova, kurylo, 2018). the decrease in fertility is in line with the sdt, but alarmingly large. the low level of the total fertility rate in most countries also results in a low birth rate (tab. 3). this is combined with medium and high mortality rates. no wonder then that while in 1990 a natural decrease was noted only in two countries, then in 219 already in 15 countries. it is no different in ukraine, where at the beginning of the analyzed period there was a slight positive natural increase, while at the end of this period it amounted to -6.6‰ (and next to bulgaria, it was the worst result in the analyzed group of countries). the third important component affecting the changes in the population number is migration. table 4 presents the net migration rate estimates prepared by specialists from the world bank. however, it should be taken into account that, depending on the country, they may reflect reality better or worse. a lot depends on the adopted definition of 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 2 0 2 0 m a l e f e m a l e fig. 4. change in the official population (in millions) of ukraine in 1990–2020 source: state statistics service of ukraine. ukraine’s population compared to european post-communist countries in 1990 and 2020 51 table 2. total fertility rate in 1990 and 2019 country 1990 2019 country 1990 2019 albania 2.98 1.60 latvia 2.02 1.61 armenia 2.54 1.76 lithuania 2.03 1.61 azerbaijan 2.74 1.80 moldova 2.41 1.27 belarus 1.91 1.38 montenegro 2.08 1.75 bosnia and herzegovina 1.77 1.25 north macedonia 2.21 1.49 bulgaria 1.82 1.58 poland 2.06 1.42 croatia 1.63 1.47 romania 1.83 1.76 czechia 1.90 1.71 russia 1.89 1.50 estonia 2.05 1.66 serbia *1.80 1.52 georgia 2.18 2.06 slovakia 2.09 1.56 hungary 1.87 1.49 slovenia 1.46 1.61 kosovo 3.90 1.97 ukraine 1.85 1.23 * – data for 1991 values ensuring replacement fertility are in bold. following smallwood and chamberlain (2005), the threshold for replacement fertility was adopted at around 2.10 children per woman. source: world bank. table 3. birth, death and natural increase rates (per 1,000 people) in 1990 and 2019 country birth rate death rate natural increase rate 1990 2019 1990 2019 1990 2019 albania 24.9 11.6 6.0 8.1 18.9 3.5 armenia 21.8 13.6 8.5 9.8 13.3 3.8 azerbaijan 25.9 14.1 6.1 5.6 19.8 8.5 belarus 14.0 9.3 10.8 12.8 3.2 -3.5 bosnia and herzegovina 14.8 7.9 7.7 10.9 7.1 -2.9 bulgaria 12.1 8.8 12.5 15.5 -0.4 -6.7 croatia 11.6 8.9 10.9 12.7 0.7 -3.8 czechia 12.6 10.5 12.5 10.5 0.1 0.0 estonia 14.2 10.6 12.4 11.6 1.8 -1.0 georgia 17.3 13.2 9.4 12.8 7.9 0.4 hungary 12.1 9.5 14.0 13.3 -1.9 -3.8 kosovo 29.7 15.6 7.1 6.9 22.6 8.7 latvia 14.2 9.8 13.1 14.5 1.1 -4.7 lithuania 15.4 9.8 10.8 13.7 4.6 -3.9 moldova 18.6 9.9 10.4 11.7 8.2 -1.8 montenegro 16.5 11.7 7.2 10.8 9.3 0.9 north macedonia 17.7 10.7 7.5 10.1 10.2 0.5 poland 14.4 9.9 10.2 10.8 4.2 -0.9 romania 13.6 9.6 10.6 13.4 3.0 -3.8 russia 13.4 9.8 11.2 13.3 2.2 -3.5 serbia *11.9 9.3 *11.7 14.6 *0.2 -5.3 slovakia 15.1 10.5 10.3 9.8 4.8 0.7 slovenia 11.2 9.3 9.3 9.9 1.9 -0.6 ukraine 12.6 8.1 12.1 14.7 0.5 -6.6 * – data for 1991 source: world bank. 52 yevhen matviyishyn a long-term migrant and the techniques used to estimate their number. hence, the data presented in this table should be approached with caution. in the analyzed area, there are many types of migration; also their directions and intensity changed in the following years. in simplified terms, it can be assumed that at the beginning of the transformation process, in almost all countries, emigration was the prevailing type, which then transformed into transit migration in the richer countries, and then into the predominance of immigration. a comparison of czechia, slovakia, poland and ukraine is a good illustration of this thesis. czechia is an example of a rich country and has the most favorable migration balance (drbohlav, janurová, 2019). in the case of slovakia and poland, we see a „transition” of these countries from the emigration to the immigration one. the process is much more advanced in slovakia than in poland. immigrants from ukraine play a large role here (bajziková, bajzik, 2020; jaroszewicz, 2018). on the other hand, ukraine is currently the largest country of emigration in the region (píontkívs´ka et al., 2018; vakhitova, fihel, 2020). however, the data presented in tab. 4 do not reflect that. moreover, in recent years, ukraine has clearly seen changes in the direction of emigration. while in 2005–2008 almost half of the economic emigration from ukraine fell to russia, in 2015–2017 it was slightly over 1/4, and poland came first (prižkov et al. (eds.), 2018). in addition, other types of migration can also be seen in the analyzed region, such as immigration of ethnic russians and economic migrants from the former soviet union republics (lang, 2017). due to warfare, there were unusual migrations in the 1990s in most of the countries of the former yugoslavia (harvey, 2006). 5. conclusions in the first half of the 20th century, ukraine underwent a series of man-made demographic catastrophes: world war i, the bolshevik revolution, holodomor, the massive deportations and executions of stalin’s great terror, and world war ii (kul’čic’kij, 2004; romaniuk , gladun, 2015). the holodomor caused particularly large losses (matviyishyn et al., 2021). there are all signs that, since regaining the independence, the demographic situation in ukraine is bad again. analyzing the changes in the population in ukraine compared to other european post-communist countries, we conclude that the process of depopulation is significant. however, there are nine other countries that have officially recorded an even greater decline in the population. it is accompanied by a progressive aging of the society (here ukraine is in the middle of the rank of countries) and an increase in the already high percentage of women in the society. all three factors influencing the changes in the population number and its age structure discussed in the article are unfavorable for ukraine. in 2015, as a result of direct and indirect russian aggression, the population of ukraine decreased by 2.5 million citizens, and the threat from russia is still real (harris, sonne, 2021). natural increase in ukraine is very clearly negative. next to bulgaria, ukraine has the worst situation table 4. net migration rate (per 1,000 people) in 1990 and 2019 country 1992 2017 country 1992 2017 albania -136.5 -24.4 latvia -44.6 -38.2 armenia -144.2 -8.5 lithuania -27.1 -57.9 azerbaijan -15.6 0.6 moldova -44.3 -2.5 belarus -6.2 4.6 montenegro -33.3 -3.9 bosnia and herzegovina -175.0 -32.2 north macedonia -50.3 -2.4 bulgaria -41.7 -3.4 poland -4.2 -3.9 croatia -31.4 -9.7 romania -22.8 -18.9 czechia 2.9 10.4 russia 16.8 6.3 estonia -73.0 14.8 serbia 23.3 2.8 georgia -121.4 -13.4 slovakia -2.8 1.4 hungary 9.6 3.1 slovenia -8.7 4.8 kosovo no data no data ukraine 1.4 1.1 source: world bank. ukraine’s population compared to european post-communist countries in 1990 and 2020 53 in this respect among the analyzed group of countries. unfortunately, the very low tfr indicates that there will still be few births. simultaneously, the increase in the number of deaths resulting from the covid-19 pandemic will cause the natural decrease in ukraine to be even greater. since regaining independence, ukraine has experienced three “revolutions”: the revolution for independence, the orange revolution and the dignity revolution. two of them did not lead to changes for the better; 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a., 2020, international migration from ukraine: will trends increase or go into reverse?, central and eastern european migration review, 9(2), 125–141. doi: 10.17467/ceemr.2020.14 world bank, world development indicators, https://databank. worldbank.org/home.aspx (accessed 09 october 2021). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00049.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00049.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060019 1. introduction the history of the barents euro-arctic region (bear) as a public-state formation is already 22 years. bear was created on january 11, 1993 in kirkenes (norway) at the meeting of foreign ministers of russia, denmark, norway, finland, iceland, sweden and in the presence of representatives of the european commission as well as observers from the united states, canada, france, germany, japan, poland and the uk (pettersen, 2002). norwegian foreign minister t. stoltenberg is not by chance called “founding father” of the barents region, already in his keynote speech at the signing of the kirkenes declaration on cooperation in bear he made specific proposals that are still relevant for cooperation in the region today. referring specific opportunities of using rich natural resources in the journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 21–31 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.010.5455 development of integration in rational nature management and environmental protection in the barents euro-arctic region galina nikolaevna kharitonova (1), tatyana evgenievna alieva (2), lyudmila victorovna ivanova (3) (1) luzin institute for economic studies, kola science centre, russian academy of sciences, fersman 24a, 184209 apatity, russia, e-mail: kharitonova@iep.kolasc.net.ru (corresponding author) (2) luzin institute for economic studies, kola science centre, russian academy of sciences, fersman 24a, 184209 apatity, russia, e-mail: alieva@iep.kolasc.net.ru (3) luzin institute for economic studies, kola science centre, russian academy of sciences, fersman 24a, 184209 apatity, russia, e-mail: ivanova@iep.kolasc.net.ru citation kharitonova g.n., alieva t.e., ivanova l.v., 2016, development of integration in rational nature management and environmental protection in the barents region euro-arctic region, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 21–31. abstract the article analyzes the integration results in the field of rational nature management and environmental protection in the international regional organization the barents euro-arctic region (bear) for the 22 years of its history in aspects of social, environmental and economic performance in the context of sustainable development of the region and the participating countries. in the historical aspect a description of the prerequisites, qualifying features and actors of the integration process is given. it is proved that the integration regarding environmental issues is the most intense and mutually beneficial. on the basis of strategic analysis of external factors and the environmental situation in the russian part of the barents region the main directions of integration development in the field of nature management and environmental protection are substantiated. key words the barents euro-arctic region, regional integration, preconditions, qualification signs, rational nature management, environmental protection, prospects. 22 galina nikolaevna kharitonova, tatyana evgenievna alieva, lyudmila victorovna ivanova region, t. stoltenberg called cooperation in fisheries and oil and gas development, the most promising. t. stoltenberg referred environmental situation in the region to the most acute problems of the region. as a concrete step, he proposed creation of national parks on both sides of the norwegian-russian border, which together with the finnish national parks would form a huge nature reserve (barentsregionen…, 1993). the main objectives of regional cooperation were set out in the developed in early 1994 barents program that afterwards was corrected each year. the second barents program operated until 2013. environmental cooperation in the barents euroarctic region began in 1994 with a meeting between environment ministers of the participating countries, as well as denmark, iceland and eu in bodoe (norway). representatives from the netherlands, the united states, the amap secretariat, caff (conservation of arctic flora and fauna), nefco (the nordic environment financing corporation) were present as observers. since then ministers meet in a year. the working group on the environment (wge) was established in 1999 and representatives of the member countries lead the group in turn. russia leads wge in 2014– 2015 after the finnish leadership in 2012–2013. today, within the conventional boundaries of the barents region north-western regions of russia and north-eastern regions of norway, sweden and finland are united. the barents region includes the following administrative areas: in russia – murmansk and arkhangelsk regions, the republics of komi and karelia and nenets autonomous district; in norway – finnmark, troms and nordland; in sweden – norrbotten and västerbotten; in finland – lapland and oulu provinces. nenets autonomous district became a full-fledged region of the federation, after signing the agreement with the arkhangelsk region on execution of all powers of a region of russia for seven years, starting from 1 january, 2015. in russia, murmansk and arkhangelsk regions and republics of komi and karelia by the similar climatic conditions and socio-economic indicators are referred to economic region “european north” and to the historical and geographical region “russian north” and included in the administrative unit – northwest federal district. norwegian provinces – finnmark, troms and nordland are traditionally (semi-officially) called “northern norway” or “sampi” territory (land of the saami). norrbotten is located in the very north of sweden and is the largest swedish province. it occupies almost 22% of the total territory of the country; its neighbor is the province of västerbotten. lapland is the northernmost and largest area in finland. together with the province of oulu, it is called “northern finland”. the total area of bear is 1.8 million km2, and 75% of this area is in russia. the russian part of the barents euro-arctic region is slightly smaller than territories of finland, norway and sweden together. the barents region forms a single nature area, connecting the northern parts of europe and russia. the barents region is located on the neighboring tectonic structures on fennoscandia shield, and the baltic and russian plates. ridges are typical for the western parts of the barents region and are located on the baltic plate, and plains and hills form a generally mild relief of the eastern territories, which belong to the russian plate. the region is surrounded by four seas: the norwegian sea in the west, barents, white and kara seas – in the north. pechora and dvina are the largest rivers; onega, ladoga imandra and inari are the largest lakes. the provinces of oulu (finland) and norrbotten (sweden) have access to the baltic sea through the gulf of bothnia. climate of the barents region varies in its different areas, but in general it is wet with cold winters. most of the region belongs to the continental subarctic or boreal climate zones. the north: scandinavian mountain chain, the northern part of the kola peninsula, nenets autonomous district and novaya zemlya archipelago are included in the arctic climate. vegetation and ecosystems of the barents region vary. about half of the barents region is covered by forests, 24% – tundra, 13.8% – marshes, 7.8% – glaciers, and 5.3% – wetlands. boreal forests are divided into the southern, middle and northern taiga, and northern parts of the barents region and territories in high-altitude mountain zones are included in the arctic zone. in the murmansk region in the area of lapland nature reserve, there is the boundary of the northernmost taiga in the world. boreal-arctic nature is one of the largest reserves of surviving intact natural ecosystems on earth. 2. theoretical background to evaluate the process of regional integration in the field of nature management and environmental protection in bear, we relied upon theoretical theses of russian and foreign researchers of integration processes. at the theoretical level, the problem of regional integration has been studied by many scientists of the world, so today there is a reason to talk about the formed theory of integration, at the same time including a variety of methodological approaches and aspects (журавская, 1990; бусыгина, захаров, 2009). development of integration in rational nature management and environmental protection… 23 general theories define integration as a high level of interactions between states, which is expressed in transfer by the participants of the political process of their powers to supranational bodies. this way of interactions between states is natural and reflects the current stage of the world development: the processes of globalization and internationalization. a common point of all theories of integration is the statement that integration is a voluntary association of two or more independent economic entities for mutually beneficial cooperation (бусыгина, захаров, 2009). among theoretical approaches to description of the integration phenomenon the most developed is so-called „communication approach” elaborated by karl deutsch. according to him, a community is considered integrated if it provides “peaceful coexistence of its members”. therefore, an integrated community is called “security community” in which there is a real confidence that its members will not have armed struggles with each other, seeking other ways to solve their contradictions (deutsch, 1957, 1967, 1968). k. deutsch also formulated the basic objective of integration: • peace-keeping; • achieving multilateral purposes; • performance of special tasks (for example, in the field of environmental protection in bear these objectives are conservation of old-growth forests and protecting the world ocean); • acquisition of a new image and role identity. the first barents program formulated objectives of the created integrated community that directly corresponded to the main integration objectives by k. deutsch: • ensuring peaceful and stable development in the region; • reduction of military tension; • strengthening existing and establishing new bilateral and multilateral relations in the region; • establishing a basis for economic and social development of the region with a special emphasis on active and purposeful management of resources and reduction of the gap in living standards between east and west; • reducing environmental threat; • health care; • maintaining the culture of indigenous peoples of the region (the sami and the nenets) and engaging them to participate actively in development of the region; • development of science, technology, culture and tourism; • inclusion of the euro-arctic region in the network of communication transport routes in europe and development of regional infrastructure (the barents programme, 1994). from the point of view of k. deutsch, success of an integrated formation also depends on external circumstances and factors, among which he highlights: • interrelations of states; • compatibility of shared values and merits; • mutual responsibility; • some degree of common identity and loyalty. the generally recognized prerequisites of integration are similar levels of economic development, geographical proximity of integrating countries, common economic and other problems. it should be noted that the level of economic development of foreign member countries of bear and the russian regions differ considerably. the northwestern russian regions are more industrialized than the northeastern regions of the foreign part of bear. during the soviet period giant enterprises of mining, energy, metallurgy, chemical, pulp and paper, timber, fish processing, defense and space industry, shipbuilding and ship repairing, energy and all of transport types were established in these regions. for example, by the level of economic development nenets autonomous district is one of the leaders in russia, along with khanty-mansiysk autonomous district, tyumen and moscow regions, krasnodar territory, republic of tatarstan and yamal-nenets autonomous district. the share of republic of karelia in trout fish-farming is 65–70%, production of iron ore pellets – 26%, wood pulp and cellulose from other fibrous materials – 15% of the whole russian economy. regional integration is an object of general theories and includes mostly interstate unions, whose appearance was caused by civilization, geographic, economic and political factors, and restricted by specific territories. the key analytical category when analyzing regional integration is the region that karl deutsch defined as the area that includes a number of countries, interdependent on a number of directions (deutsch, 1967). in our opinion, to describe inter-regional integration and the degree of its development it is advisable to give a description of indications of the minimum and maximum integration association. the theory suggests a lot of such indications, among which most often are used the following: • by activities; • by formalization degree; • by organization strength; • by the level of control; • by time; • by speed and stages of development (васильева, данилюк, 2009). 24 galina nikolaevna kharitonova, tatyana evgenievna alieva, lyudmila victorovna ivanova by activities integration is divided into political, economic, socio-cultural, international, environmental, and all of these areas are presented in bear. environmental integration includes statement of the problem and the development of strategies for a variety of purposes, which together determine ways out of both environmental and economic crises. by formalization degree integrations are divided into formal and informal, the latter characterize forms of interactions and communications between the states carried out without contract between them or specific policy decisions. regional integration to bear refers to formal integration of mind, since the decision to establish the inter-regional organization was made by the highest authorities of the participating countries. population of the north-western regions of russia did not express their will and did not intend to form bear. moreover most of the inhabitants of the russian regions included in it, did not even know about the decision of the federal government or had no idea of its goals, objectives and benefits. however, for more than twenty years of cooperation in the barents euro-arctic region evolved informal forms of integration also evolved, which is caused by the parallel development of cross-border cooperation, decentralization of state administration and public involvement in integration processes including through social networks. by levels of controllability interstate associations are divided into three groups: “supersystem”, „system” (the level of “policy implementation”), and “mezosystem” (the level of “policy-making”) (peterson, 1995). the first group so far only includes the european union. bear should be ranked at the second level, in which the management is carried out in areas of cooperation. the first group so far only includes the european union. bear should be ranked at the second level, in which the management is carried out in areas of cooperation. by organization strength there are interstate associations with “soft” and “hard” integration. bear is an interstate association with „soft” integration, when member states fully retain their sovereignty, and decisions within the association are only coordinated for solving specific problems. in the history of environmental integration into bear these were problems of radioactive contamination, cross-border air pollution, development of the network of protected areas, forest protection, and formation of the environmental management system (eikeland at al., 2004; ivanova, 2001; харитонова, алиева, 2004). by the time of integration processes there are short integrations (joint solution to a specific problem), integrations for a certain time (implementing systemic transformations), and integrations for an unlimited time (creating the “sense of community”). due to the disintegration of the ussr scandinavian countries reviewed their security policies. in march 1992, the council of baltic sea states (cbss) united germany, denmark, latvia, lithuania, estonia, poland, the southern provinces of sweden, finland and norway, and the north-western regions of russia. bound by close historical, economic, and ethnic-cultural ties, this regional cooperation proclaimed enlargement of eu to the east among the main priorities. the north-eastern dimension, including cooperation of the high north regions of russia and the northern provinces of norway, finland and sweden put forward an alternative vision of regional development, based on formation of the transnational northern identity (northernness). in accordance with the program documents the main task in creation of bear is the desire to give it not only functional nature, but also the nature of an identical region, i.e. an area, where population has certain intra-consciousness, opposed to other regions. in forming the image of general northern identity, the interethnic feeling of integration is one of the main factors in successful functioning of the barents euro-arctic cooperation and the region as a whole (hønneland, 1998; neumann, 1994). the following factors to create the northern are usually indicated as the main ones: • common climatic conditions characterized by harsh climate, vulnerable nature, remoteness from the national centers, low population density. all of this, in terms of the concept of regional development, can identify a common interethnic perspective in formation of an identity on the basis of mutual understanding of the situation of each other, in spite of national boundaries; • common historical and trade relations between norway and the russian pomor areas, and the genetic relationship of finnish and karelian ethnic groups. norway has taken the initiative on creating future cooperation within the barents euro-arctic region and forming the northern identity. for forming the interethnic northern identity considerable time is required, if this idea is supported by all member countries of bear. first of all, it refers to population of the russian north, notable for its own national and ethnic identity, keeping the main cultural achievements of their ancestors and the best features of russian national spirit and character. division of integration into stages of its development makes it possible to reveal patterns, associated with each stage of community formation. the history of integration in bear includes 3 stages, differing by development of integration in rational nature management and environmental protection… 25 barents programs. there were developed two programs for the period 1994–2000 and for 2000–2013, at present a new barents program has not yet been developed. but in certain areas of cooperation, in particular for environmental direction, action plans were developed for 2014–2015. depending on their rates integration processes can be divided into: dynamic and static that allows measuring the pace of changes occurring in integration. in our opinion, reliable indicators integration processes rates are implementation of concrete projects and allocated funds. by funds allocated for program activities the most dynamic was the initial period from 1994 to 2000. the largest amount of funds was allocated by norway, sweden and finland funded bear projects from eu funds. prior to 2003, russian regions did not participate in financing of projects in the framework of barents program. during the second barents program funding from norway, finland and sweden decreased. however, since 2003 russian regions finance joint projects in the ratio of 50% to 50%. 3. interpretation the motive for integration in bear for foreign countries is the presence of significant natural resources in its russian part: from minerals and water biological resources to water resources, the role of which has been increasing under the conditions of the predicted global shortage of fresh water. the russian part of bear has, above all, the huge potential of energy and mineral resources. pechora coal basin is the second in russia’s reserve and a major source of raw materials for development of coke chemistry, energy, and in the future for production of methane. on the continental shelf of the adjacent to the murmansk region barents sea, oil and gas resources have been explored, including the unique shtokman gas condensate field. nenets autonomous district is located in the northern part of timan-pechora oil and gas province, occupying the 4th place in russia by its oil reserves. here are discovered 83 hydrocarbon fields: 71 oil, 6 oil and gas condensate, 1gas and oil, 4 gas condensate, and 1 gas field. only on the kola peninsula, more than 60 large deposits of various minerals were discovered. of them the most important for development of the national economy and export attractiveness are copper-nickel, iron, apatite-nepheline ores, ores of rare metals and rare earths. the deposits explored in republic of komi, contain the following shares of total russian reserves: oil – about 3%, coal – 4.5%, barite – 13%, bauxite – 30%, titanium – about 50%, veined quartz – 80%. in republic of komi there is timan bauxite area with large reserves of aluminum raw materials. yaregskoye oil-titanium (about 50% of total russian reserves) and pizhemskoe titanium deposits contain unique reserves. in republic of karelia there are being developed deposits of high carbonaceous raw materials – shungites (zazhoginskoye), kyanite ores (hizovara), nepheline syenites (elet’ozero) high siliceous quartzites (metchang-jarvi). among the explored deposits of metals the most interesting deposit with complex ores srednyaya padma, containing vanadium with associated components – uranium and precious metals. also, in republic of karelia there are about 90 deposits of various non-metallic minerals. in the arkhangelsk region jsc “severalmaz” develops the europe’s largest m. lomonosov diamond deposit. total diamond reserves are estimated in 12 billion usd. on the russian part of bear there are more than half of timber reserves of the european part of russia and 10% of timber reserves of russia. 1/4 of russian wood, more than half of newsprint, and 1/5 of the country’s saw-timber is produced here. major timber reserves are located within the forest zone in the basins of northern dvina and pechora river as well as in karelia. currently, up 20% of paper produced in russia is made of karelian wood. barents and white seas are rich in aquatic resources. only the murmansk region produces about 15% of fish products and provides 16% of total russian harvest of aquatic organisms. the intensive use of natural resources within 70 years of the soviet period has given rise to a number of regional issues of nature management and environmental problems. especially sharp and large scale are historically accumulated industrial wastes, radioactive wastes from peace nuclear and military facilities, and pollution of the oceans. however, under the planned economic system there were created major nature protection assets at all large industrial enterprises in the russian part of bear. as a result, emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere only in the murmansk region decreased by 85%, and discharges of polluted water – by 76% (доклад…, 2013). the disintegration of the soviet union and the deep crisis of the initial stage of the transformation of the russian economy to a market system of economy had a negative impact on development of environmental management at enterprises in the region and on protection of the environment. spending on environmental protection were the first to 26 galina nikolaevna kharitonova, tatyana evgenievna alieva, lyudmila victorovna ivanova reduce, some enterprises even eliminated departments dealt with environmental issues. only in connection with the introduction in 1994 of paid nature management there appeared a source of funding for rational nature management and environmental protection. however, it was significantly less than state investments for environmental protection, which had been allocated under the planned economy for environmentally hazardous enterprises. but already in 1996 there were eliminated regional environmental funds, which accumulated part of the payments for use of natural resources and environmental taxes, and their resources were accumulated in showing losses regional budgets. as a result, from regional budgets nature protection was financed by the residual principle, that is, basically funds were only enough for maintenance of governing bodies in the field of nature management and environmental protection. monitoring of environmental quality and public health sharply reduced, construction and modernization of environmental assets as well as reproduction of natural resources stopped (харитонова, алиева, 2010). understanding of enhancing environmental threats in the north-western regions of russia was one of the main prerequisites for foreign neighbors to integrate in the field of nature management and environmental protection. in the declaration on the arctic environmental protection strategy (aeps), adopted by the ministers of environment of the eight arctic countries on 14 june, 1991 in rovaniemi (“rovaniemi process”) and in the joint statement of environment ministers of the nordic countries and russia on september 3, 1992 it was concluded that the problem of human impact on nature in the russian part of the region reached its critical phase. it was acknowledged that the main sources of pollution in the region are located in the russian arctic, on the area of mining and processing combines and in the vicinity of mineral deposits. the highest concentration of man-made pollution was noticed near the enterprises of jsc „norilsk nickel” in the murmansk region. the territory of 5,000 km2 was affected. there was noticed high content of heavy metals in soils and losses of forests. giant sulfur dioxide emissions (in 1993 – 230 thousand tons) cover an area of 12,000 km2; they lead to acid rains and reach the seas. by the pollution degree the barents sea was recognized the most „dirty” arctic sea (its biological productivity decreased five times for the last 30 years). the main source of pollution of the white sea is river drain, which brings the bulk of contaminants from pulp and paper industry, energy, utilities, vessels of river and sea fleets. however, the most acute problem was the problem of radionuclide pollution generated by russian nuclear fleet and the kola nuclear power plant. the editorial „reliable neighborhood?” in newspaper “finnmarken” presented the following data on the problem’s scale: 10 thousands nuclear warheads, 180 submarine reactors on nuclear submarines and cruisers of the northern fleet, 100 waste reactors are stored near zapadnaya litsa in approximately 100 km from the norwegian border; 150 reactors – on written off nuclear submarines, 20 units of high-level nuclear fuel, stored on ships in murmansk harbor, as well as the presence of two reactors older than 20 years at the kola nuclear power plant, which are classified as high-risk reactors. therefore, the first section of the declaration on cooperation in the barents euro-arctic region became the section on protection of the environment. this decision was based on both the joint declaration of ministers for the environment of nordic countries and russia, held in kirkenes on september 3, 1992, and the convention on protection of marine environment of the north-east atlantic of september 22, 1992. the most important areas of environmental cooperation were recognized as follows: • expansion of environmental and radiation monitoring in the region; • improvement of works on operational safety of nuclear facilities; • rehabilitation of contaminated territories resulted from the operation of nuclear facilities (the kirkenes declaration, 1993). the choice of these areas was furthered by decisions of the international conference on protection of polar regions of the planet from radioactivity (august 23–27, 1993, kirkenes) and russia’s consent to organize of the russian-norwegian expedition to novaya zemlya (september, 12–25, 1993), accelerated learning the situation around the sunken submarine “komsomolets” and the “atomic pot” in the gulf of ob, improving safety of the kola nuclear power plant (фокин, смирнов, 2012). a special feature of beac is that its activities and projects are focused almost exclusively on the russian part of the region. for example, the list of “hot spots” was formed by nefco amap and approved in 2003 by the ministers of the arctic countries. it included 42 environmental problems in the russian part of the barents region. „hot spots” are limited areas within which manmade sources of pollution have adverse effects on the environment. on these territories environmental pollution exceeds standard levels many times, ecosystems degrade, health deteriorates, biodiversity is lost, and life-support systems are disrupted. wge development of integration in rational nature management and environmental protection… 27 subgroup on hot spot exclusion is a central driving force and coordinator of the work, and nefco conducts pre-feasibility studies to finance modernization projects for elimination of hot spots. the list includes 10 „hot spots” or priority environmental projects in the murmansk region. within the framework of the working group on environment (wge) of beac, the ministry of ecology and natural resources of the murmansk region is involved in the „hot spots” project in the russian part of the barents region. starting from 2011, the procedure on removing objects from the approved list of environmental „hot spots” of the murmansk region started. in 2011, according to the declaration of the tenth conference of environment ministers of the beac (umeå, sweden, november 9, 2011) it was decided to exclude from the list the environmental „hot spot” of the murmansk region “modernization of equipment for disposal of used fluorescent lamps”. the ministry of natural resources and environment ministry of natural resources of the murmansk region sent proposals to the ministry of natural resources and environment ministry of natural resources of rf for exclusion from the list of „hot spots” of two more projects: “reduction of so 2 emissions at “severonikel” combine of jsc “kolskaya mmc” and “reduction of emissions into the atmosphere from apatity heating electric power plant” (доклад…, 2012) using the example of the procedure of exclusion of „hot spots” from their list, for the murmansk region it should be noted that the decision is made at the level of ministers of the environment of beac, because it is necessary to prove efficiency of the funds allocated for the projects. from 2003 to 2015 the list of „hot spots” decreased from 42 to 36, which indicates efficiency of the funds allocated by wge and nefco. it should be recognized that elimination of „hot spots” in the russian part of the barents euro-arctic region for a long time would have been impossible due to lack of funding for environmental activities at russian enterprises and regional governments. priorities of regional international cooperation differ between regions of the russian part of bear, due to their specificities and the degree of urgency of environmental problems. for example, nenets autonomous district is actively involved in the project „management of marine resources”; in republic of komi there is created a center for environmental training in use of water resources for young people from countries and regions – participants of bear; in the arkhangelsk region a special attention is paid to problems of water pollution and rational use and protection of forest resources. in the murmansk region, international cooperation in the framework of bear includes the following priority areas: • prevention of radioactive contamination of the region; • reducing emissions of mining and metallurgical productions; • implementation of programs for development of clean productions in the region; • prevention of contamination during exploration and extraction of oil and gas on the barents sea shelf; • sustainable forest management and biodiversity conservation; • supply of towns and settlements of the murmansk region with clean drinking water (доклад…, 2014). in order to assess economic, social and environmental efficiency of the integration in the environmental area, we performed an analysis of international cooperation in the murmansk region within bear for the period from 2001 to 2013. over the entire period of bear existence areas of cooperation did not change regardless of which of the participating countries was chairing wge. the action plan for each area was developed and implemented by a special wge working group, which was also responsible for its execution. the most difficult thing was to get financing for environmental projects from nefco or eu. russian participants of the projects started investing in their implementation only since 2003, and some businesses or municipalities still do not have an opportunity to participate in funding projects, for example, for elimination of „hot spots”. the tendency of the recent years is inclusion in cooperation areas of issues coinciding with the environmental policy of russia. for example, this is “waste management – regional cooperation” within the program “clean production”. in the murmansk region since 2009 the “pilot project to clean up soil contaminated with oil” has been implemented. as part of the regional target program „environmental protection” it was scheduled to develop a project for construction of industrial facilities for rendering harmless, use and disposal of wastes containing oil and oil products on the territory of the murmansk region. it should be noted that the working groups of wge in all areas of environmental integration did not lag behind progressive international trends and promptly added new relevant directions to the action plan. first of all, they include development of regional strategies for adaptation to climate change and development of „green” energy (projects to 28 galina nikolaevna kharitonova, tatyana evgenievna alieva, lyudmila victorovna ivanova install solar panels on lighthouses instead of radioisotope thermoelectric generators, wind power development projects at the frontier post “ponoy” and tourist camp “lesnaya”) (состояние…, 2001). assessing cost-efficiency of the bear projects on elimination of “hot spots” one should recognize that for the russian side it was high, since russian enterprises and regional authorities actually did not invest their own money in their implementation. norway, as the major investor, as well as finland and sweden received fewer benefits. the point is that the implemented projects did not solve the problems of anthropogenic pollution of the murmansk region, that is did not eliminated the danger to its foreign neighbors. moreover the observed 1.41 times decrease of, for example, emissions of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere in the region by productions of kolskaya mining and metallurgical company as compared to 2000 was not achieved as a result of environmental projects of bear, but because of the implementation of bilateral agreements and international environmental programs of the company (статистический сборник…, 2013). there is no doubt that activities of bear contributed to revitalization of environmental management at enterprises of the murmansk region. first of all, there should be noted the significant contribution of wge, as well as the eu institutions, which was made for introduction of the system of voluntary environmental management (харитонова, алиева, 2004). for example, in murmansk in 1997 there were set up regional center „clean production” and its branch in the town of zapolyarny, where 276 top managers and chief engineers of enterprises were trained, defended graduation projects, and received international certificates. the project was implemented at the enterprises of kandalaksha and kola districts at „pechenganikel” and „severonikel” combines, jsc “apatit”, jsc „olkon”, ship repairing factories, murmansk fishing and commercial ports. at the second meeting of the environment ministers of the barents council, held in rovaniemi in 1995, there was initiated the beac program on „environmental management in the murmansk region” (emp-murmansk), with the main objective of improving competence in the regional system of nature protection and environmental management. emp murmansk organized a series of targeted meetings and seminars in the russian part of the barents region, including seminars on eia and iso 14001 held in murmansk, petrozavodsk and arkhangelsk. it can be stated that thanks to the beac program on „environmental management” in the murmansk region elaboration of “local agenda 21” was organized in several municipalities of the region. cooperation in the field of environmental protection at the beac level also presumes development of activities aimed at solving problems of transboundary pollution in the region. the conducted in 1996 environmental survey on the territories of the murmansk region, finland and norway showed no contamination from industrial emissions by mining and metallurgical combines “pechenganikel” and “severonikel” to territories of finland and norway, with the exception of a narrow border strip (about 5 km) along the border with the province of finnmark in norway. this fact made it possible to drop charges against russian enterprises as the main sources of cross-border transfer of pollutants. in november 2013 murmansk hosted the international conference „protection of the arctic from air pollution.” one of the main issues discussed at the conference was the problem of cross-border and regional air quality management in the arctic region. the government of the murmansk region presented results obtained in the framework of the state contract “evaluation of the negative impact of crossborder transfer of air pollutants their contribution to pollution of the murmansk region and border areas”. the results of the research showed that, despite the relatively remote location of the murmansk region from the major foreign countries-polluters and industrialized regions of russia, it experiences anthropogenic pressures on ecosystems due to cross-border transfer of sulfur and nitrogen (доклад…, 2014). the project “development of a network of protected natural areas in bear (bpan)” (barentsprotectedareanetwork) aimed at preserving the unique nature of the euro-arctic region. bear is one of the last reservations of untouched by human activities taiga and tundra ecosystems in the world. russian protected areas (pas) in the barents area larger than european. but if to take their ratio to the countries’ squares, then russia occupies the last place. in finland, protected areas of the barents region account for over 23% in sweden – about 22.5% in norway – 14%, and in russia – 11%. on the whole, protected areas occupy 13.2% of the total land part of the barents region. according to the strategic plan for conservation and use of biodiversity and the convention on biological diversity in order to preserve the unique ecosystems, it is necessary by 2020 at least 17% of terrestrial areas and inland waters, and 10% of coastal and sea areas to become protected areas. the bpan project involves 13 regions from four countries – russia, finland, sweden and norway. the main idea of the project is the cross-border approach to conservation of nature, regardless of the state and administrative borders. development of integration in rational nature management and environmental protection… 29 an example of implementation of this approach is creation in 2008 of the trilateral transboundary park „pasvik-inari”. the park “pasvik-inari” was established for monitoring and managing the overall biodiversity, developing nature tourism and implementing the „memorandum of understanding on the green belt of fennoscandia” on the adjacent specially protected natural territories between russia, norway and finland. creation of the park is recognized as the most successful project of environmental integration in bear. besides scientific and environmental activities the nature reserve „pasvik” is actively engaged in environmental education. it is no exaggeration to say that it is a leader in this activity in the region. using the means and guidance of the working group on protected areas and other working groups of wge today various environmental and youth organizations are involved in environmental education of population. social efficiency of environmental education is very high, as in foreign countries of bear this activity is significantly better developed than in the russian regions, especially in the work with schoolchildren and students, and importance of transfer of good practices in this area cannot be overestimated. also within bear there are implemented numerous research projects in the field of nature management and environmental protection, both bilateral and multilateral. initiators of the research directions are usually foreign scientific organizations that in their choice are guided not only by progressive tendencies in the science of environmental protection and other environmental sciences, but also by national interests of their countries. despite this, scientific cooperation within the framework of bear is actively developing and can be considered mutually beneficial. in particular because it is not only the process of information exchange, but also exchange of research methods and development of theoretical propositions of the concepts of „sustainable development” and „ecological modernization” in a specific region of the world. overview of just some areas of environmental integration in bear shows that the integration process involves authorities, businesses, ngos and scientific organizations as well as ordinary residents. it can be stated that grants of beac and eu institutions are still practically the only source of financing for russian environmental ngos. the lowest observed cooperation is between wge and managers of russian companies. however, this situation is typical for all member countries of bear. in december 2013 the ministry of natural resources and ecology of the murmansk region took part in the meeting of ministers of the environment of beac in inari (finland), where results cooperation on environmental protection in the barents region were summed up and the way forward was planned. the main areas of joint activities for 2015 with russia’s chairmanship in wge remain projects related to elimination of „hot spots” in the barents region, implementation of the project „barents protected areas network» (bpan) and a number of projects aimed at environmental education. a special attention will be paid to the problems of climate change and implementation of beac’s action plan on climate change in the barents region. russia’s chairmanship in the wge coincided with the emergence and strengthening impacts of external factors on the process of environmental integration in bear. in our opinion, the most significant of them are the following: • the economic crisis in the eu and russia; • complication of the geopolitical situation in the arctic due to the launch of the russian state program on socio-economic revival of the russian arctic (стратегия развития, 2013; государственная программа…, 2009); • the deterioration of international relations and sanctions against russia, joined by norway, sweden and finland; • a fundamental change in the environmental legislation of russia (федеральный закон…, 2014). analysis of the impact of external factors on development of the integration process has shown that they are likely to reduce the opportunities for sustained integration development, that is, they can be defined as risks. for example, implementation of progressive innovations in the russian environmental legislation establishing a transitional period for introduction of best available technologies at all polluting industries may be delayed due to the ban on acquisition of foreign technologies. in this case damage to nature does not require any proof. in connection with the awareness of threats to development of environmental integration it is important to search for joint solutions. in our opinion, perspective directions of joint activities may be the following: • development of scientific research of natural resources and the natural environment of the arctic basing on the approach; • reorientation of cooperation in the framework of the „hot spots” project to help accelerating the transition of russian companies on sound technologies; • transfer of experience and introduction of best foreign practices on environmental management of coastal and marine areas. 30 galina nikolaevna kharitonova, tatyana evgenievna alieva, lyudmila victorovna ivanova 4. conclusion environmental activities of bear throughout the whole period of regional international cooperation should be recognized active and fruitful. currently the process of environmental integration in bear involves representatives of governments of all levels, researchers and experts, ngos, young people and residents of the regions included in bear. in recent years, participation in environmental projects of bear became available for practically every inhabitant of the region. scientific cooperation on environmental issues in bear is interdisciplinary, apart from ecologists and biologists it involves geologists, hydrologists, experts in the field of forestry, water resources and mining, meteorologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and many others. it provides a comprehensive approach to solving environmental problems. for twenty-two years of integration many projects aimed at addressing environmental problems in the barents region have been carried out. however, the capital-intensive projects that could solve the problems were not implemented, since neither norway nor the eu could finance such large-scale projects. it by no means diminishes the enormous financial assistance provided to russia by foreign countries – participants of the bear. only the transition of russian companies to the best available technologies, which should be carried out by 2022, will fully meet environmental safety in the bear. russian companies should implement technological modernization at their own expense and with a state support. methodical assistance within the bear can play an important role. despite the fact that in the course of cooperation the norwegian side as the main investor of all environmental projects, paid most attention to creation of a framework for addressing specific environmental problems, threatening nature and interests of norway, the cooperation can be recognized as meeting national interest, not only of norway but also of russia. however, solution of the main objective of the barents cooperation, which norway set for itself – creation of transnational northern identity with residents of the russian north – cannot be achieved under worsening of international tension and sanctions against russia. 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горнопромышленного комплекса, север и рынок: формирование экономического порядка, 3(14), 123–127. харитонова г.н., алиева т.е., 2010, анализ природоохранной деятельности и эффективности государственного экологического управления в период кризиса, север и рынок, 26, 112–119. 1. introduction the division of europe into west and east is a long lasting phenomenon and borders of such division were changing during the history moving from east to west (hryniewicz, 2015). for ages ‘west’ was almost a synonym to ‘europe’ (ferguson, 2005). historians mentioned about ‘eastern’ tribes penetrating ‘west’ after the  collapse of the roman empire. later, there was a division of europe following the belongings of the roman catholic church and the eastern orthodox church (hryniewicz, 2015). after that, poland could be seen as a bastion against ‘east’ helping survive europe against the mighty turks. later on the frontier has been moved even further as founded st. petersburg was for russians ‘a window on europe’ (ferguson, 2005). the battle of warsaw has settled the border between poland and the ussr as ‘a defensive wall’ of ‘west’ protecting from communism. in the xx c. the border between ‘east’ and ‘west’ were settled by the cold war on the elbe river. nowadays we can say that boundaries of ‘west’ journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 32–44 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.011.5456 cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland jan maciej smutek (1), przemysław łonyszyn (2) (1) faculty of geosciences, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 16, 70-383 szczecin, poland, e-mail: jan.smutek@univ.szczecin.pl (corresponding author) (2) faculty of geosciences, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 16, 70-383 szczecin, poland, e-mail: lonyszyn@onet.eu citation smutek j.m., łonyszyn p., 2016, cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies of western and eastern poland, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 32–44. abstract the main purpose of this paper is to present areas and directions of integration and disintegration in east-central europe. it is based on the comparison of the two development strategies for the two supraregional areas in poland namely: western poland and eastern poland. supraregions are groups of highest administrative units in poland – voivodeships. it is not any kind of administrative unit, and neither statistical. the reason for supraregional strategies are common challenges of development of groups of voivodeships. in our analysis we present differences between those strategies in scope of cross-border cooperation. we concentrate on four thematic issues: transport connections, economy, academia and a role of foreign institutions in a preparation and a modification of documents. in this way, we confirm that in the east-central europe are existing areas of integration and disintegration reflecting also long lasting division of europe into west and east. we stress that those disintegration areas, mostly the eastern frontier of the european union, are the result of state policies. key words supraregional strategies, western poland, eastern poland, cross-border cooperation. cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland 33 are the boundaries of the european union. it moves because frontiers are mainly in our minds, are mental, and it’s much deeper then we could ever recognize. of course, they shows the boundaries of political control but real frontiers shows the boundaries of the cultural influences as well as the style of living (ferguson, 2005). borders influence strongly on the development challenges of regions. central regions have different development possibilities than borderlands and therefore usually are growing faster (miszczuk, 2013). it happens especially with regions where the borders that are closed or poorly permeable, and are a physical barrier of movement and contacts. the splits can appear not only between countries and regions, understood as a group of countries, but also within states. this type of divisions is present in poland and it has its west-east dimension, somehow long lasting. in scope of socio-economic and cultural development poland is divided into so called ‘poland a’ and ‘poland b’. although it is a stereotypic approach, omitting a lot of details, it is a very popular point of view in a discussion about division of poland. the separation line was different during history, once it was vistula river or bug and san rivers, then former border between prussia and russia in xix. this break has been strengthen during the interwar period but its beginning was even earlier, after the partitions of poland. the poland a is mostly the ex-prussian partition with a higher level of transport and industry development. the poland b is mostly the ex-russian partition where lands were mostly agricultural with a low level of urbanization. it’s now a xxi century but this breakdown still exists and the experts shows that it’s even bigger, both economically and politically. what is  important to mention that division is symbolic, therefore sometimes could be seen as not fully logical, as from some points of view ‘east’ starts in konin (especially for people living in poznan), but then it starts on vistula river (and also part of warsaw that is on east bank could be seen in stereotypic way as in east poland). in polish minds this line is the frontier between ‘east’ and ‘west’ or, even more politically incorrect, as a border between ‘europe’ and ‘asia’. moreover, the two ‘polands’ are quite the same as the supraregions of western poland and easter poland and its strategies are the subject of this analysis. the division into western poland (so called poland a) and eastern poland (so called poland b) overlaps the geopolitical division of europe. after accession of poland to the group of western countries (first nato in 1999, then eu in 2004 with schengen zone in 2007) the possibilities of cooperation and integration of development were improved on western and southern polish border. therefore western poland could benefit from growth of cross-border movements. in the same time borders in eastern poland were experiencing different changes and its permeability has been decreased. it is of course not a case of border with lithuania but it is only 104 km length and slovakia that is longer (541 km) but has a mountain character. that division into western and eastern poland is reflected in a specific of polish documents that are covering areas of two or more voivodeships. those documents, called supraregional strategies, were created for eastern and western poland and adopted by polish council of ministers. therefore aim of the paper is to depict differences between two supraregional strategies: strategy for development of western poland 2020 and strategy for socio-economic development of eastern poland until 2020 in scope of cross-border cooperation. then those results will be used for presentation of integration and disintegration areas in polish borderlands. the authors do not aim to validate the mentioned strategies. the comparative analysis should only be a base to start a discussion about the future of the supraregions and its strategies but also to point out possible guidelines for institutions preparing strategies for territories with bigger or smaller area. 2. supraregional strategies in poland supraregional strategies are a new and quite unique type of documents on regional development. in poland they are common strategies for group of voivodeships that are prepared by the ministry responsible for the regional development (at present – the ministry of infrastructure and development; before – the ministry of regional development) with a cooperation of regional authorities. those strategies are based on observations that some regions have similar, common challenges, that cannot be solved by themselves alone or only through the bilateral cooperation. this is the reason for preparation of supraregional strategies in poland. it is similarly as added value of cooperation is a reason for preparing macroregional strategies in the eu (the eu baltic sea region strategy, the danube region strategy, the adriatic-ionian region strategy and the strategy for alp region). describing it in the other way supraregional strategies like other documents settled above administrative borders are based on the territorial approach and the subsidiarity principle. the territorial approach, as well as subsidiarity criteria, is connected with challenges that are above borders and possibilities of regions. the subsidiarity principle is 34 jan maciej smutek, przemysław łonyszyn fulfilled due to the fact that from one side not every development challenge mentioned in strategies can be solved by regions by themselves and from the other side there are different challenges in different regions of the country (strategie ponadregionalne…, 2015). therefore strategies have to differ from each other, as they have to face different challenges. further in the paper there will be presented how the differences in situation of each region are reflected in the priorities of the strategies. the legal basis for the supraregional strategies are created in the act on principles of development policy. there are now strategies for four supraregions in poland: eastern poland, western poland, southern poland, and central poland. in the eu nomenclature voivodeships are nuts 2 regions. supraregional strategies can be for nuts 1 regions (as it is an example of central poland and southern poland), but in some cases (western poland) they are for two nuts 1 regions or are for a nuts 1 region plus an additional voivodeship (eastern poland). the present situation (august 2015) of the supraregional strategies in poland is presented on figure 1. only two voivodeships are not involved into any supraregional strategy: pomorskie and kujawsko-pomorskie. the supraregional strategies in their structure contain (strategie ponadregionalne…, 2015): • a diagnosis of development conditions in the field of a strategic programming with a scope of a state of the environment and the territorial differentiation, • a forecast of development trends, • a definition of priority policies, an intervention aims with indicators of success, • a system of implementation, conditions and procedures regulating process of implementation of strategy, • financial frameworks. the first prepared supraregional strategy it was the strategy for the eastern poland for the years 2007– 2013. it was prepared for better spending of additional eu funding from cohesion policy for weakest regions of eu in term of the gdp per capita, for the moment of negotiations of the eu budget (polish regions lost that status in 2007 after the accession of bulgaria and romania). the spending of that special support was organised in form of the operational programme for all eligible regions. that cooperation was assessed as a success although a low level of the development, that was the reason for the special support from the eu, is a long lasting phenomenon and it was impossible to overcome all of the development obstacles. therefore some other strategic documents, especially the national strategy for regional development 2010–2020 (pol. krajowa strategia rozwoju regionalnego 2010–2020) found valuable a further special support for that area. as a result of that political support, the new strategy for the next programming period of the eu (2014–2020) was prepared. other regions, especially that one, that were losing their economic position in the period after the fig. 1. supraregional strategies in poland source: strategie ponadregionalne…, 2015. cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland 35 accession of poland to the eu were expressing their interest in an additional special support (lubuskie and zachodniopomorskie). some other arguments had been used, among them the problem of a collapse of the former state farming (pol. państwowe gospodarstwa rolne) and a loss of some economic functions of the borderlands due to accession to the schengen zone. regions in the western poland already were cooperating strongly in different issues (mostly on odra river and the development visions for the polish part of the borderland of poland and germany) and therefore they were ready for a joined action as a group of five voivodeships and applied to the state for a special operational programme from the eu founds. that additional support hadn’t been given but at the same time the added value of the integration of priority policies had been found by the regional authorities and the state government. therefore strategy for western poland was created. other voivodeships were observing the struggles of the western poland and had decided to prepare their own supraregional strategies. the strategy for socio-economic development of eastern poland until 2020 was approved in july 2013. the strategy for development of southern poland was adopted in january 2014 and the strategy for development of western poland was approved in april 2014. in time of writing that article the strategy for central poland is in preparation. 3. general geographical characteristic of western and eastern poland the supraregion western poland consists of 5 voivodships: zachodniopomorskie, wielkopolskie, lubuskie, dolnośląskie, and opolskie. the supraregion borders with the czech republic in the south, germany in the west, and the baltic sea in the north (and by that with sweden and danemark). the western frontier is delineated mostly on the oder and neisse rivers. the region is rather better developed than average for poland although some of its parts face large problems with restructuring economy. the biggest cities in region and their functional urban areas are booming, especially wrocław and poznań (szczecin is facing troubles of economic restructuring). high level of welfare is characteristic for legnica-głogów copper mining district, where is located one of the largest producer of copper and silver in the world. a linking element of the whole supraregion is the oder river which flows through four out of five voivodeships. a high level of agriculture is characteristic for wielkopolskie, dolnośląskie and opolskie, while lubuskie and zachodniopomorskie have a large percentage covered by forests. the supraregion has locations attractive for tourist like sandy beaches with high cliffs in the north and the sudety mountains in the south. the western poland is generally better urbanised with smaller importance of agriculture than in the eastern poland. there are located three big cities that are changing into metropolitan areas: wrocław (population of 634 ths. in 2014), poznań (546 ths.) and szczecin (407 ths.). for example, they were identified as weak metropolitan european growth areas (mega) by espon (espon 2005…, 2004) and as metropolitan areas by national concept for spatial development 2030 (koncepcja przestrzennego…, 2012). there are other capitals of voivodships but much smaller like gorzów wielkopolski (124  ths.), opole (120 ths.), and zielona góra (119 ths.). the supraregion called eastern poland consists of 5 voivodships: warmińsko-mazurskie, podlaskie, lubelskie, świętokrzyskie, and podkarpackie. its eastern frontier is mostly the eastern border of the eu. the economy mostly depend on agriculture (especially in the central part – lubelskie voivodeship) and forestry (in the north, warmińsko-mazurskie and podlaskie voivodeships). a high development potential of the southern part of the supraregion is created by the podkarpacie aviation valley (pol. podkarpacka dolina lotnicza) in rzeszów. very important for the region is its high value of natural resources although sometimes it creates barriers for transport links. the supraregion borders with slovakia in the south, ukraina, and belarus in the east, and with lithuania, the russia federation, and the baltic sea in the north. there are no big geographical barriers other than the bug river in the east and the carpathians in the south. comparing to rest of poland the supraregion is sparsely populated. the cities in the eastern poland are generally smaller than in the western poland. the biggest city is lublin with population of 342 ths., then białystok (295  ths.), kielce (199 ths.), rzeszów (185 ths.) and olsztyn (174 ths.). they are not seen as a metropolitan areas neither by polish researchers (e.g. smętkowski et al., 2009) or european studies (espon 2005…, 2004). for the reason of not wasting a development potential of this area the national concept for spatial development 2030 (koncepcja przestrzennego…, 2012) called them as the potential metropolitan areas. what differs western from eastern poland it is a long lasting level of infrastructure development. it is connected e.g. with development of railway transport in the xix century in germany and russia. looking from the historical perspective the railway transport is better developed in the western poland (the 36 jan maciej smutek, przemysław łonyszyn german empire before wwi) than in the eastern (the russian empire before wwi). although an investment negligence of railway transport in the transition time contributed to balance the density of railways, still there are differences in dual-track lines. some of the differences are also the result of the contemporary policies. only the a4 highway was built further to the east than the line of the vistula river. nowadays the missing connections of express motorways are built. taking into account all certainly justified arguments, that are influencing the development policies of polish transport infrastructure on west and east, the differences in those policies are influencing the possibilities of cooperation between regional capitals and other regions in cross-border area. 4. criteria of analysis of documents it was necessary to make a profound reading to do a comparative analysis of both strategies. they were read almost simultaneously chapter by chapter. fortunately, the structure of the strategies was close enough that the task was relatively easy to do. moreover, after finishing reading of both documents the general conclusions has been made. another way to make good and valuable analysis was a separate reading by both authors of the paper without making any consultation. thanks to that the higher level of intersubjectivity has been achieved. all collected conclusions has been analysed and then separated twice. the first split was for the general and detailed separation. the second split took the detailed conclusions and separated them into four different categories: transport connections, an economic cooperation, an academic cooperation and a role of foreign institutions in preparation and modification of documents. this split is reflected in the further part of this paper. 5. general differences between documents in that part we refer only to differences and common characteristic only in areas that are not object of deeper analysis. some of the differences between strategies are coming from the very beginning. as we wrote it before, the intentions of creating that documents were different. the strategy for eastern poland has been inspired by the national government and among main purposes was a proper spending of the eu founds. the inspiration of the strategy for western poland was from the voivodeships that had to convince the ministry for that initiative. therefore the strategy for eastern poland is more concentrating on themes that are connected with special financing from the erdf (european regional development fund) and the esf (european social fund). one of the examples connected to this is a problem of a social inclusion. that isn’t present in the strategy for western poland, whereas, it is important in the implementation system of the strategy for eastern poland. due to the process of the documents preparation the strategy for western poland looks more like a strategy for regions in a federal state. therefore documents look like a result of a bargaining of different interests from different responsible for development of their regions. in the same time, the style of the strategy for eastern poland in much more for unitary state where the state decides (with consultation among regional authorities) what is good for those regions. the differences between those two strategies can be illustrated by a statement that the vision of western poland will be possible ‘only with full involvement in a close cooperation of the regions’ (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 60). that kind of statement is not included in the text of the strategy for eastern poland. for analysis of the integration and disintegration areas it should be stressed that the strategy for western poland see a interregional and cross-border cooperation as the most (the first) important condition for the best development (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 60). such issues, especially an interregional cooperation, are hardly visible in the strategy for eastern poland. there are some differences that are coming from the regional specificity. one of that issues is the general difference in the economic development, which is higher, generally, in the western poland than in the eastern poland. interesting is the importance of the capital of the country which it is much smaller in the strategy for western poland. it should be noted that both of the strategies see a development potential of their regions as an improvement of connections mostly with ‘west’. for the strategy of western poland it is germany and generally the eu. for the strategy of eastern poland it is the central poland, mostly warsaw but also gdansk and cracow, and then countries and regions further to the west. another difference between those two strategies is a presence of tourism issues. it isn’t included in the strategy for eastern poland but it is considered as a potential for the development of some regions of the western poland. the common characteristic of those strategies is a big concentration on ‘repairing mistakes of the past’, and overcoming the weakness from the swot analysis. the authors find it as a quite common problem of polish strategic documents. cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland 37 the vision of the regions in those two documents is similar. the western poland sets stronger emphasis on mobilisation of its endogenous potential, better integration (also transport) of area and innovativeness (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 62). the eastern poland sets priorities on a supraregional, endogenous specialisation, a knowledge based economy and an accessibility of the region (strategy for socioeconomic…, 2013, p. 72). the differences are in fact that the western poland is pointing on tourism as one of its potentials that can be used thanks to better accessibility of the western poland for tourist from the countries richer than poland. the eastern poland is more concentrated on strengthening the major functional urban centres due to the fact, that they are weaker than in the west. the main difference in visions in those two strategies is that the strategy for western poland threat more about an integration of the whole area, and the strategy for eastern poland concentrates on a general growth of economic performances. it  could be seen when we compare the objectives from both strategies, although they are quite similar. for the western poland they are (strategy for western, 2014, p. 63): i. spatial and functional integration of the supraregion. ii. building the macroregion’s economic offer. iii. strengthening the scientific and research potential of the supraregion. for the eastern poland the aims are following (strategy for socioeconomic…, 2013, p. 72): 1. increasing the level of innovativeness of the macro-region (…). 2. activating labour resources and improving the quality of human capital (…). 3. increasing the external accessibility and internal consistency of the macroregion (…). as we can see transportation issues are on the first place in the strategy for western poland and on the last in the strategy for eastern poland. an improvement in innovativeness is on the first place for the eastern poland and on the last for the western poland. the strategy for eastern poland concentrates on issues connected with a development of human capital while the strategy for western poland emphasizes more a better fit and use of existing economic assets (and of course their improvement – among them human capital) in a scope of innovativeness. beside those small differences the main objectives and visions for both areas are quite similar what is an example of one of the weaknesses of present development policies in poland (górniak, mazur, 2012). 6. differences between documents in scope of cross-border cooperation in our paper we’ve examined differences in the following thematic areas: transport infrastructure, an economic cooperation, an academic cooperation and a preparation of documents. from the perspective of a cross-border cooperation they are important, because they enable exchange of goods and ideas (transport connections), make it valuable in scope of exchange of goods (economic cooperation) and ideas (academic cooperation). any kind of cooperation is based on good or bad experiences from the past, therefore actions taken for better flow of information on any level should have potentially positive impact on future cooperation. among those actions is listening to interest expressed by people and institutions from neighbouring regions and countries. because of that all, the above-mentioned areas of analysis had been chosen. 7. transport connections one of the most visible results of development strategies is an improvement in a transport infrastructure. quick and comfortable transport connections are one of the most important conditions of development. bad transport accessibility was described by entrepreneurs as one of the biggest barriers of the economic development in poland (stryjakiewicz,1999). however, there are also researchs arguing that investments in infrastructure have a marginal impact on economic development (crescenzi, rodríguez-pose, 2008), especially when it is not the worst barrier for development. from the perspective of cross-border cooperation investments in transport infrastructure are crucial. lack or poor quality of transport infrastructure is harmful for a cross-border cooperation. it is about general transport connections and specific border infrastructure, namely border crossings. it has to be mentioned that the number and capacity of border crossings on the polish eastern border were growing slower than on the west and are a barrier for development (komornicki, miszczuk, 2011). in that scope, it must be stressed the difference between the western poland and the eastern poland. all of the borders in the western poland are internal borders of the eu and the schengen zone. the situation is quite opposite in the eastern poland. only the borders with lithuania and slovakia are the internal border of the eu. crossing the borders with the russia federation, belarus and ukraine is possible only on 38 jan maciej smutek, przemysław łonyszyn border-crossings, therefore its existence is crucial for a cross-border cooperation. the differences between the strategy for western poland and the strategy for eastern poland in transportation issues are quite clear. generally, in the strategy for western poland transport issues on the interregional scale are more important than in the strategy for eastern poland. what has to be mentioned, it’s that they are concentrating on different axes, not only east-west. summary of those differences was presented in table 1. one of the objectives of the strategy for eastern poland is to get better access to the biggest cities by some kind of centripetal connections or saying this in other words – by investments realized in each region. that should strengthen the paths connecting the voivodship cities of the eastern poland with the biggest cities of poland: cracow, warsaw, and tricity. these connections with the polish economic core should allow diffusion of innovative products. this strategy accepts only two transport paths – express roads (without highways) and railroads. the strategy for western poland treats transportation in a totally different way. at the beginning of the objectives description, there is mentioned that the supraregion should be functionally integrated with cities of poland, germany, czech republic and scandinavia. following this guideline there are sentences about building highways and express roads with a supraregional significance and also about modernization of the existing rail infrastructure that could allow connect western poland with warsaw, tricity, katowice, berlin, dresden, prague, vienna and scandinavian cities. in the result of this actions the transborder relations should be better and stronger (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 43–44). the differences in thinking about cross-border transport connections in both strategies are clear and bright. the strategy for eastern poland omits the significance of transport connections with the adjacent countries, not only with russia federation, belorussia or ukraine but also with the eu-members like slovakia or lithuania. the very important via baltica – a road with a key importance for the eu regarding integration with the baltic states – has been omitted in the development directions and in the diagnosis as well. for the western poland, it looks totally different. the transborder connections have a key role in its development plans. it looks like both strategies concentrate on transport in only one direction – due west, but it means something different for both supraregions – for one it’s the central poland, for another it’s something abroad. an element that appears only in the strategy for western poland it’s a use of water transportation. this document contains sentences about a restoration of the oder waterway and connecting it with all european inland waterways. there is also mentioned about its role in strengthening the competitiveness of the szczecin-świnoujście harbour. the restoration of this waterway should give another platform for a cross-border cooperation within e.g. water management and flood control (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 43). there is no information about waterways in the strategy for eastern poland although the e40 waterway goes across that supraregion. 8. economic cooperation economic cooperation is a field of human activity that in contemporary economies is not ruled by governments. however, economic issues due to their tab. 1. the presence of transport issues connected with a cross-border cooperation in the strategy for western poland and the strategy for eastern poland western poland eastern poland • aims: • improvement of transport connections with warsaw, silesia, gdańsk, berlin, prague, wien and dresden • modernization of oder river waterway and improvement of the cross-border cooperation • better transport connections with berlin and dresden than with warsaw and central poland especially for szczecin and wrocław • bigger importance of north-south than east-west connections in infrastructure priorities • baltic-adriatic connections among them importance of central european transport corridor cetc route-65 – european grouping of territorial cooperation • stressing peripheral location without strong connections with activities • more important is the connection of eastern poland with warsaw and further, to the west • missing information about via baltica • limited information about development of transport connections not only with countries outside of the eu but also within eu that are bordering with eastern poland (lithuania and slovakia) source: own analysis. cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland 39 influence on society, are one of the main topics of political discussions. therefore states are trying to improve their economic development by various measurements. that role is specific in a scope of international economic relations. although states are not involved in direct economic cooperation, they  are generally trying to influence decisions of firms on location of their activities. within that influence is the public aid. from the perspective of an eu-member country possibilities of direct financing of  economic cooperation are very limited. the eu regulations generally forbid the public aid, but there are some exceptions (among them is special support for cohesion regions with the framework of a regional aid). among instruments of the public aid is support for an international cooperation and an entering of firms on new international markets. there are also other forms of support for a cooperation that are growing in importance. some of the very important factors are formal and informal links of cooperation within chambers of commerce, clusters and other associations of entrepreneurs. unfortunately analysis of existing clusters in both strategies does not show any with cross-border members or ambitions for that kind of development even in some of clusters were in more than one voivodeship. cross-border and international economic links are playing generally bigger role in western poland than in eastern. remarkably it could be seen on the example of slovakia. although it is the neighbour of podkarpacie in the eastern poland supraregion the country is not mentioned in the strategy for eastern poland in issues of economic cooperation. the different situation is in the western poland, where it has been mentioned as an important partner in development around the central european transport corridor (cetc 65) (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 32). the inflow of direct foreign investments is generally bigger in the western poland than in the eastern, although differences are getting smaller (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 44). it is due to differences in investment attractiveness (godlewska-majkowska, zarębski, 2011). it is understandable that countries lying west and north-west (scandinavia) of poland are better developed and the biggest inflow of foreign investments comes from the developed countries. for  companies from germany (and denmark or sweden in zachodniopomorskie) poland is one of the closest location for the international expansion. geographical proximity to european growth areas is seen by the strategy for western poland as playing an important role in the competitive position of the supraregion (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 15). it is more important for the western poland regions, cause they are closer than regions in eastern poland. from that point of view the cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries is important for those regions and it could bring directs political benefits for their authorities. differences in the economic situation of the western and the eastern poland in a scope of a cross-border cooperation and a policy response to it is seen in table 2. as it can be seen the economic situation is very different and policy responses are not so much. 9. academic cooperation role of innovations, innovativeness, entrepreneurship and creativity in contemporary economy is  growing. one of the elements of innovativeness is close cooperation of science with business. one tab. 2. the presence of economic cooperation issues connected with a cross-border cooperation in the strategy for western poland and the strategy for eastern poland western poland eastern poland • spatial proximity to european growth zones as a chance for the economic development • local industry heavily export-based (compared with the rest of poland) • strong economic links with germany because of the fdi • cooperation of zachodniopomorskie with scandinavia in maritime economy • building an economic offer for new investments is crucial for the economic success of the supraregion • there is no information about smart specialisations for the whole region • the location peripheral to the european growth zones as a threat for economic development • local industry weak export-based with weak external economic links • a small inflow of foreign investments seen as a problem for development • relatively weak information about economic connections with the neighbouring countries and with the development plans • the main model of development is based on the use of endogenous potential • smart specialisations of the whole region are chosen without any connections with the neighbouring countries source: own analysis. 40 jan maciej smutek, przemysław łonyszyn of the theory explaining relationships between economic growth, innovations and role of the state, business and academia, is triple helix theory (ranga, etzkowitz, 2013). strategy of eastern poland is mentioning it and describing with emphasis that it is crucial element of improvement in innovativeness of whole region (strategy for socioeconomic…, 2013, p. 47). strategy for western poland do not refer to that theory, although is highlighting role of transfer of knowledge between academia and business (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 72). in general view both of the strategies are similar in scope of academic cooperation and differ only in relation to the fact, that generally scientific centres in western poland are better developed than in eastern (smętkowski et al., 2009). therefore strategy for eastern poland is giving stronger emphasis on general development of scientific centres (strategy for socioeconomic…, 2013, p. 76) and strategy for western poland is concentrating more on cooperation of existing institutions but mostly within supraregion (strategy for western… 2014, p. 71). although it should be mentioned that those differences are very slightly cause supraregional and cross-border cooperation is one of the way strategy for eastern poland is planning to improve position of scientific centres (strategy for socioeconomic…, 2013, p. 76). surprisingly cross-border scientific cooperation is not mentioned within the directions of intervention in the strategy of western poland (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 72). it is weakness of that strategy, especially cause neighbouring regions from germany and sweden with denmark (via baltic sea) are on much higher level of innovations and scientific research, what was recognized by authors of the strategy (e.g. referring to european regional innovation scoreboard 2012) (strategy for western…, 2014, p. 72). taking into account that scientific centres in western poland are generally better developed, situation that cross-border links for scientific cooperation are not envisaged in strategy, is also huge loss. it is even if there is existing institutional cooperation between universities from neighbouring cities, like mentioned in strategy cooperation on collegium polonium in słubice. talking about the development of scientific centres in the strategy for eastern poland it has to be mentioned that it is based on an implementation of academic institutions from this supraregion into the network of strong partners in poland and abroad (strategy for socioeconomic…, 2013, p. 76). it is not mentioned from which country or regions those partners will probably come. similar situation is for the strategy of western poland. the strategy for western poland in terms of the scientific and technological development is based on similar foundations as the strategy for eastern poland (strategy for western… 2014, p. 71). presence of cross-border issues in international academic cooperation for both of strategies is presented in table 3. 10. role of foreign institutions in preparation and modification of documents an active role of foreign institutions in the process of preparation and modification of documents is something what is difficult for administration on local, regional and state level due to the legal and cultural barriers. in most of the countries in europe law is generally limiting possibilities of an influence of institutions from other states on local and regional strategies. one of the exemptions from that is cross-border environmental impact assessment existing (only for countries that are in the european union) since 1985 (council directive 85/337/eec). beside of that, the influence of authorities from neighbouring countries are generally limited and based on a goodwill of tab. 3. the presence of academic cooperation issues connected with cross-border cooperation in the strategy for western poland and the strategy for eastern poland. western poland eastern poland • concentrates on support of supraregional and international cooperation but do not mention cross-border academic cooperation • mention common research centre collegium polonicum in słubice established by adam mickiewicz university in poznań and european university viadrina in frankfurt (oder), • academic centres from neighbouring countries are supposed to be included in general process of consultation of multilevel management of the development of western poland • mentioned cooperation of lublin with lviv and bialystok with vilnius on issues of academic cooperation • mentioned general cooperation with ukraine, russia and belarus • threat of a leapfrog development cooperation of warsaw with minsk and kiev without participation of academics from eastern poland • cross-border dimension is important in improvement of r&d cooperation source: own analysis. cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland 41 cooperating partners. it is fully understandable that states are somehow trying to protect their interest from the interest of other states and their administrative units. from a perspective of the political cohesion, it is also understandable that formal restrictions are bigger for regions than for communes. it is a case of poland, where voivodeships are obliged to determine priorities of international cooperation, that needs to be approved by the ministry of foreign affairs (ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym, 1990). such obligation is not required from communes (gminas) and districts (poviats). therefore, it is worth to mention that priorities of the international cooperation of regions in poland also depend on priorities of the state foreign policy. due to differences in political climate there could be seen differences in the role of foreign institutions in the preparation process of documents. existing tradition of the interregional and the cross-border cooperation in the western poland, as we describe it in a further chapter, and strong bottom-up pressure on state administration have influenced to the fact that foreign institutions were included in preparation of the strategy for that supraregion. those institutions are envisaged in further evaluation of strategies and coordination with other documents. there are existing some documents of a common vision for the polish borderland in western poland (studium integracji…, 2013). in contrast such hearings of voices from other side of the border is not envisaged in the strategy for eastern poland. authors find it as one of the weakness that could be easily overcame and is not connected with high additional costs. it is important for example for investments priorities cause motorways on both sides of the border have to meet on border crossing and for higher utility they should be built in similar time. such a need of cooperation concerns not only linear infrastructure but also the development of human capital, joint provision of regional and local services (higher education, health care or fire prevention). on the polish western border with germany, it resulted with subregional studies and projects that can serve for both sides. a good example of an existing cooperation on different issues on a local level is the szczecin metropolitan transborder area (tölle, 2014). this example is especially important when we compare present level of cooperation with existing in that borderland the postwar prejudices and a fact that on the beginning the cooperation was not developing rapidly (miłosz-augustowska, 2014). the existence of that cooperation stimulates coordination of development from both sides and therefore improve efficiency of spending public money on both sides of the border. that efficiency can be better ensured only through cooperation and coordination of common investment priorities. the differences in a way how institutions from foreign states could be seen in both of the strategies is presented in table 4. 11. other supraregional strategic documents concentrating on development of analysed area talking about differences between both analysed documents it cannot be omitted the differences in tradition of cooperation of regions in field of spatial planning and development programming. such traditions are quite strong in western poland and quite week in eastern poland. cooperation of voivodeships in western poland was conducted in many cases in relation to neighbouring countries, mostly tab. 4. the role of foreign institutions in process of preparation and changes of the strategy for western poland and the strategy for eastern poland. western poland eastern poland • existence (or being in preparation) of common strategies for development of polish-german and polish-czech neighbouring regions • participation of foreign partners in the consultation procedure (among them: the berlin senate) • existence of cross-border operational programmes taken under consideration by the managing authority (although in a limited spectrum) • generally predicted participation of foreign institution in evaluation, coordination and consultation of changes in strategy • foreign institutions are envisaged in a multilevel management of the development of the western poland • participation of foreign institution was not mentioned either envisaged in any step of preparation or modification of the document • existence of cross-border operational programmes for poland and lithuania as well as for poland and slovakia are not mentioned in the document source: own analysis. 42 jan maciej smutek, przemysław łonyszyn germany. one of the most important issues of cooperation was odra river, that is also in some part border with germany. some of the documents were prepared together with other side of the border, some were prepared only for one part. purpose for that split is better preparation for future binational cooperation. examples of documents on spatial development of polish and german side of the border prepared in last 25 years are (studium integracji…, 2013): concept for support of odra region (pol. koncepcja wspierania regionu odry) from 1991 and called after name of initiator of the projest, who was a prime minister of land brandenburg, as stolpe plan – which was rather suspiciously received by polish side, polish-german borderland as a problem of regional politics (pol. pogranicze niemiecko-polskie jako problem polityki regionalnej) – so called willers plan and was also prepared by german side, the study of directions of spatial development of area along polish-german border (pol. studium kierunkowego zagospodarowania przestrzennego obszaru wzdłuż granicy polsko–niemieckiej) – prepared by polish side, the guideline study of spatial development alongside the polish-german border from 2005 (pol. studium kierunkowe zagospodarowania przestrzennego obszaru wzdłuż granicy polsko–niemieckiej) that was prepared by team from polish academy of science under coordination of prof. g. węcławowicz and was referring only to polish part, study on integration of poland and germany borderland – polish part from 2013 (pol. studium integracji pogranicza polski i niemiec) – that was prepared by planning administration from three neighbouring regions on polish side: zachodniopomorskie, lubuskie and dolnośląskie, maps of investments plans for polish-german borderland from 2009–2011 (pol. mapa zamierzeń inwestycyjnych polskiej części pogranicza polski i niemiec) – that document was prepared separately first by polish side by ministry of infrastructure, and then by german side by federal institute on building, urban affairs and spatial development. some of the documents listed above were objects of huge critique from both side (guz-vetter, 2002). nature of them and atmosphere of cooperation is changing. mostly it was way from naïve expectations that via that cooperation all of the problems on borderland could be resolved. then after first bitter experiences sometimes connected with misunderstanding it was switch to scepticism mixed with some sort of hostility and rivalry especially among public servants (in purpose from protecting interest of their regions) that were involved in process of cooperation. further cooperation change involved people expectations about motivation and possibilities from other side. people learn how to cooperate from each other and what they can afford via working together and what they cannot. it has also to be mentioned, that is existing also special intergovernmental agreement of poland and germany on issues that has to be implemented. poland does not have such a document signed with any other countries. similar strategies for socio-economic spatial development were prepared for polish and czech borderland (polish-czech border region development study, pol. studium zagospodarowania przestrzennego pogranicza polsko-czeskiego). they are existing studies on development of polish-slovak borderland (więckowski et al., 2012). such documents are not existing on eastern poland although there were prepared studies for use of cross-border cooperation in op eastern poland 2014–2020 (e.g. komornicki, miszczuk, 2011). other important issue connected with crossborder cooperation is existence and nature of euroregions. all of polish borders are covered by euroregions, although generally speaking euroregions on west are smaller and bottom-up initiatives. on eastern border they are rather bigger and top-down initiatives and therefore they are more fragile on present changes in international policies (kaczmarek, 2005). 12. summary analysis conducted in that article proved that there are existing areas of integration and disintegration in space of central-eastern europe. western border of poland and in some extent north-west and south-west border are areas of integration. in contradict eastern border of poland, than in most part is also external border of the eu, is area of disintegration. unfortunately in strategies like strategy for eastern poland it is not clearly visible that there is no big political reasons for strong development of cooperation with other eu countries: slovakia and lithuania. the north-south connections are hardly visible in strategy for eastern poland, what is one of the weakness and threat for future cross-border integration of supraregion. in out article we can confirm what was stated in expertise conducted by t. komornicki and a. miszczuk (2011) for eastern poland strategy for that supraregion border is rather barrier than development possibility. unfortunately strategy for eastern poland rejected ex-ante evaluation result for implementing cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies for western and eastern poland 43 cross-border issues in its content. when the state on the frontier of the eu do not see it as an important issue, then it could be seen as a threat for further deepening of division of europe into west and east and further disintegration of continent. strategy for eastern poland is prepared in order to minimise existing differences within poland and division into so called poland ‘a’ and ‘b’. existing policies are decreasing differences although in some scope they are deepening them or threatening that they will be deeper in future. one of that kind of issues is general accessibility of regions in different directions. while strategy for western poland is taking actions in purpose for general accessibility of region from all directions also cross-border relations, strategy for eastern poland concentrate mostly on accessibility to fastest growing economic centres in poland. it is understandable, as far as bad accessibility from economic centres is one of main present challenges of development for that region. however, in future it is threatening development of that region cause it will remain accessible only from one direction and therefore stay longer as a periphery. it is also growing threat that frontier of the eu will remain disintegration area in scope of transport connections and therefore economic performances. of course all of other assumptions and conditions for development have to be taken into account and threat of overinvestments (crescenzi, rodríguez-pose, 2008) in infrastructure in western and eastern poland is existing. for development of cross-border intraregional cooperation socio-economic situation of biggest cities is very important. the difference in development of metropolitan functions between cities in eastern and western poland (smętkowski et al., 2009) has negative impact on cross-border cooperation in eastern poland. foreseen by the strategy, support for development of metropolitan functions in biggest cities in eastern poland will help in minimalizing existing barriers of economic and academic crossborder cooperation. it should be also mentioned that cross-border scientific cooperation is not fully utilized in strategy for western poland and is less visible than in strategy for eastern poland. it is threat for integration of that area with european science area. comparing both of the strategies we can see that interregional and cross-border cooperation and transport connections are generally more important for strategy that was bottom-up initiative (strategy for western poland). cross-border scientific cooperation is more important in strategy for eastern poland although potential benefits from cooperation with cross-border partners are bigger in western poland (as those regions are better developed in that field). lack of concentration of cross-border scientific research on western border is a bad prognosis for future integration of poland into european research area. another type of activities that are important for local and regional authorities is tourism. it has its reflection in documents, where cross-border changed for tourism development are visible in strategy for western poland and tourism is omitted in eastern poland. on example of strategies for western and eastern poland we can show that integration and disintegration of european space strongly depends from general geopolitical situation. therefore success or defeat in economic development of regions is depending strong from changes in geopolitics (miszczuk, 2013), although they are not only one reasons for economic development. generally speaking opening of borders improve economic performance of regions. those influences are not always clear and easy to predict. sometimes even general opening of economy and abolition of border control can have negative effects on development of border regions due to the fact of leapfrog development. opening of the economy can influence also a directions of trade and therefore has negative impact of development of some regions. one of the good example of that king of bad influence of general geopolitical changes is development path of szczecin and zachodniopomorskie in socio-economic transformation of poland (smutek, łonyszyn, 2014). beside of those exemptions eu integration is supporting of integration on western border of poland and disintegration on eastern direction. 13. recommendations for state policy analysis of those two strategies in context of crossborder issues enabled authors for policy recommendations in future changes of those documents. recommendations for future supraregional strategies are: • for strategy for western poland – bigger support of cross-border scientific cooperation of supraregion with nearest big academic centres (mainly berlin, oresund region and prague), • for strategy for eastern poland – development of cross-border transport connections, especially on north-south axes, with countries within eu and not only with biggest polish economic centres (mainly warsaw), • for strategy for eastern poland – involvement of foreign institutions, mostly 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and private projects on the environment, 1985, (oj l 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40–48). 1. introduction nowadays, consumption of various psychoactive substances has become a mass phenomenon (motyka, marcinkowski, 2014). among them, cannabis1 is one of the most popular in the world. it belongs to the so-called “soft” drugs. in the eu countries, slightly more than a quarter (27.4%) of their residents aged 15–64 (i.e. 91.2 million) declared that they consumed 1 throughout this study, the term “cannabis” is used to describe all psychoactive products obtained from cannabis indica, such as marijuana and hashish. cannabis at least once in their lifetime and 24.7 million of them (7.4%) used cannabis in the last year (emcdda, 2019). the global population of cannabis consumers is estimated to be over 180 million, amounting to 3.8% of the world’s population (unodc, 2016). in poland, the scale of cannabis-based products consumption is close to the european average and this consumption is highest among youth and young adults. 16.3% of polish residents aged 1564 admit to using cannabis at least once in their lifetime, 4.6% during the preceding year (i.e. just over journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(2), 32–43 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.2.04 cannabis consumers in poland andrzej matczak (1), przemysław adam pawlicki (2) (1) institute of urban geography and tourism studies, university of łódź, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-9509-5879 e-mail: andrzej.matczak@geo.uni.lodz.pl (corresponding autor) (2) institute of urban geography and tourism studies, university of łódź, kopcińskiego 31, 90–142 łódź poland, e-mail: przemyslaw.adam.pawlicki@gmail.com citation matczak a., pawlicki p.a., 2019, cannabis consumers in poland, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(2), 32–43. abstract the purpose of this study is an attempt to answer the following questions: (1) is there a regional differentiation of cannabis consumers in poland? (2) what is the scale of this differentiation? (3) what factors affect this differentiation? our empirical study is based on the analysis of an anonymous online survey. the coefficient of variation, taxonomic measures of similarity, synthetic index and spearman correlation coefficient are used in the analysis. it is observed that cannabis consumption in poland is most popular among men, youth and young adults (generation y), as well as among those who are well-educated, relatively well-off and live in cities. the structure of selected demographic and socio-economic features of the respondents is poorly differentiated regionally. regional differentiation in the structure of cannabis consumption frequency is at an average level. the spatial distribution of features characterizing the respondents is highly consistent with the spatial distribution of city dwellers aged 15–44, their sex and 5-year age ranges, the level of education, the size of cities and the level of gross domestic product. key words consumer characteristics, regional differentiation, cannabis, poland received: 02 april 2019 accepted: 29 may 2019 published: 30 june 2019 cannabis consumers in poland 33 1.5 million people) and 2.1% during the preceding month (sierosławski et al., 2015). illegal drug trafficking, together with international organized crime, accounted for 1.5% of all money circulating within the global financial system (unodc, 2011). the us legal marijuana market reached a value of usd 6.7 billion in sales in 2016 and the sale of usd 22 billion is predicted in 2020 (kang et al., 2016). in europe the lowest value of the drug market was estimated to be of eur 24 billion in 2013, with the share of cannabis accounting for about 38% of the total drug market (eur 9.3 billion but other probable estimates fall in a range from eur 8.4 to 12.9 billion (emcdda, 2016, 2018)). expenses for the treatment of drug-related damage to health in the european countries have in recent years ranged from 0.01% to 0.5% of gross domestic product (gdp), with about half of these estimates being in a range between 0.05% and 0.2% of gdp. cannabis consumption, both global and in europe, showed a steady, increasing trend in the period from 1990 to 2009 (emcdda, 2016, 2018, 2019). after this period, cannabis consumption was stabilized and even it declined in certain countries for a short time but recently it increased again. the current level of cannabis consumption is still high compared to that observed 10 or 15 years ago (griffiths et al., 2018). cannabis consumption in poland essentially corresponds to the average level reported for the eu countries. until recently, the production, distribution and use of cannabis were illegal in all countries of the world, with the penalties of imprisonment. however, many countries have lately commuted the penalties for the possession and use of cannabis, under social pressure. furthermore, the sale and consumption of cannabis is permitted under controlled conditions in several countries, e.g. the netherlands (in the so-called coffe shops), the czech republic, portugal, mexico, uruguay, canada (from october 2018), as well as in many states of the us (mróz, 2012). in poland, as in many other countries of the world, there is growing social pressure to legalize cannabis consumption. this social pressure manifests itself in social movements to legalize cannabis (e.g. cannabis liberation marches), in the increasing social tolerance for the use of cannabis, sale offers on the internet, downplaying the harmfulness of cannabis consumption by the press and some public figures, etc. (motyka, marcinkowski, 2014). in poland the purchase of cannabis for medical purposes was legally permitted in 2017 and the first deliveries appeared in pharmacies at the beginning of 2019. the aim of this study is to answer the following questions: (1) is there a regional differentiation of cannabis consumers in poland (in terms of who is a cannabis consumer, how often such a person consumes it and where the consumer lives)? (2) what is the scale (or size) of this differentiation? (3) what variables (or factors) affect this differentiation? 2. review of the literature the production, sale and consumption of drugs, including cannabis, and the consequences of their use are an important social, medical, legal, criminological and moral problem in the modern world. it is of interest to many scientific disciplines: psychology, sociology, pedagogy, medicine, law, etc. numerous reports have been published for many years by international and national institutions, non-governmental organizations (ngos), universities and research centers, e.g. united nations office on drugs and crime (unodc), european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda), european school survey project on alcohol and other drugs (espad), the national bureau for drug prevention in poland, the information center for drugs and drug addiction being the national emcdda contact point in poland, polish centre for public opinion research (commonly known as cbos), to mention only a few most important in the world and in poland. specialized journals dealing with drugs and drug consumption are available, e.g. the international “journal of drug issues”, “international journal of drug policy” or the polish “alcoholism and drug addiction”. the current research on drugs concerns (1) the situation on the drug market and the distribution of drugs, (2) patterns and effects of drug use, (3) the identification of factors determining consumption, (4) the health, legal and other risks of drug use, (5) various actions to reduce the consumption of drugs (development of appropriate social and legal policies), (6) the loss reduction model (jędrzejko, 2011). methodological issues in the research on drugs were also raised in many publications reported by unodc, emcdda and espad. to the best of our knowledge, no broader geographical studies of drug issues have been carried out so far despite the fact that cannabis consumption has an important geographical aspect (taylor et al., 2013; richardson, 2008). this aspect includes the different levels of cannabis consumption in various countries and the identification and detailed knowledge of factors determining these levels. within individual countries, cannabis consumption also shows interregional differences for which determining factors, such as socio-economic and cultural conditions, should be recognized. the progress in 34 andrzej matczak, przemysław adam pawlicki the legalization of cannabis consumption for recreational purposes in europe (the netherlands, the czech republic, portugal) and in americas (canada, the us, uruguay) poses new research challenges for geography (taylor et al., 2013; morrison et al., 2014). these require further studies on the spatial effects of cannabis consumption (levels of consumption, subjective experiences with consumption, etc.), which in turn is associated with undertaking more extensive research into the problem of production (new producers, increase in tetrahydrocannabinol (thc) content, synthetic cannabinoids, etc.), distribution and sale (the role of darknet, drug trafficking, etc.) and changes in national and international policies towards cannabis. today, the consumption of cannabis for recreational purposes is related to mass culture, tourism, social practices and the socio-economic development of countries and regions. these relations can be explained to a great extent by geographical analyses. the assessment of the number, structure and distribution of cannabis consumers is difficult. it is most often based on field observations, surveys, questionnaire interviews, police and court statistics, and on the results of the chemical determination of narcotic substances (mainly amphetamines) in municipal wastewater (kłos et al., 2010; ort et al., 2014). these methods have their own limitations. surveys and questionnaire interviews are important tools in recognizing patterns and trends in drug consumption but they face the problem of representativeness. police and court statistics include only reports of drug-related crimes and convictions, respectively. the results obtained from the chemical determination of narcotic substances in municipal wastewater are unbiased yet underestimated and difficult to make unambiguous comparisons (griffiths et al., 2018). it seems that, if possible, combining the aforementioned methods (that is, triangulation) is a good approach to analyzing and assessing the problem of drug consumption. existing empirical, survey studies of cannabis consumers (emcdda, 2016, 2018; griffiths et al., 2018; czapiński, panek (eds.), 2016; malczewski et al. (eds.), 2015; wieczorek et al., 2018) indicate the following determining factors: 1. sex and age. men are more likely to be cannabis consumers than women are. the ratio of male cannabis users to female ones varies however between countries significantly, e.g. 6.4:1 in portugal and 1.4:1 in austria. cannabis consumption is most popular among adolescents and young adults (15to 34-year-old), with the highest level of consumption for the age category between 15 and 24 years old. the awareness of health risks resulting from cannabis consumption increases with age. 2. place of residence. cities, especially large metropolises, create conditions that are favorable to cannabis consumption. 3. direct neighborhood with a country that legalized cannabis consumption. growing interest in traveling (especially in borderlands) to purchase and consume cannabis is noticeable in poland, france, germany and the us. 4. higher levels of education and income also have a significant impact on the level of cannabis consumption. 3. data and methods empirical research was carried out using an anonymous online survey. it concerned polish citizens whose tourist travels were motivated by their desire to consume cannabis. the survey was carried out in march 2016. the analysis of the survey was restricted to the respondents being polish citizens who lived in the country at that time (excluding those staying abroad then) and who already had some experience in cannabis consumption (they were consumers at that time and/or before). in consequence, 886 respondents fulfilled these criteria. data from the respondents’ particulars (sex, age, level of education, source of income, place of residence) and answers to the question about the frequency of cannabis consumption in the country were analyzed in detail. this analysis allowed us to characterize the level of regional differentiation of consumers and the frequency of cannabis consumption in poland in terms of the sex, age, level of education, source of income and place of residence of the respondents. we are aware that there are some methodological issues associated with the survey. first, the survey was carried out in 2016. this year was one of the declining years of particular interest in cannabis in poland. it was the time of intense media discussions, the development of social movements to legalize cannabis consumption and the widening social liberalization of its use despite the restrictive law, hence the great interest in the survey among cannabis-consuming polish citizens. it seems that repeating this survey on such a large scale is currently much more difficult than it was in 2016, which in retrospect should be recognized as an advantage of the survey. second, the survey was addressed to a group of volunteers (spontaneous selection) who completed an online survey. the survey covered a large group of volunteers recruited through various social media, websites and discussion groups cannabis consumers in poland 35 on the internet. it was ensured that the subject of the survey was interesting for potential respondents who were also convinced that this subject directly concerned them and the results of the survey might contribute to influencing public opinion. the survey was relatively short, composed of nine main questions. third, the subject of the survey actually concerned significantly broader issues than those presented here. the aim of the survey was in fact to answer to what extent the possibility of cannabis consumption had an impact on participation in tourist trips and their nature. therefore, the conclusions drawn on its basis should be interpreted with some caution. in the context of the increasing liberalization of cannabis consumption for medical and recreational purposes, the aforementioned question becomes an important cognitive problem for socioeconomic geography. this problem still requires broader and substantive recognition and a search for a valid research methodology. the regional differentiation of the demographic, socio-economic and spatial structure of respondents declaring cannabis consumption and the frequency of cannabis consumption were analyzed using the coefficient of variation (v), various taxonomic measures of similarity (dik, wo), a synthetic indicator (x’’kj), spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs) and kendall’s coefficient of concordance (rk). the formula defining wo was taken from (rogacki, 2009) and the formulas for the remaining aforementioned quantities were from (runge, 2006). the v coefficient was calculated according to the formula: 100�� x s v where s was a standard deviation and x denoted an arithmetic mean. the v values were expressed in percentage points and they were interpreted as low (< 20%), medium (between 20% and 40%), high (between 40% and 100%) and very high (> 100%). the “city block” distance (dik) between voivodeships i and k was defined by: � � �� yyd 1 where yij and ykj denoted the magnitude of feature j for the i-th and k-th voivodeships (i, k = 1, 2, ... 16; j = 1, 2, ... p). the structural difference indicator (wo) was defined as: � � �� baw 1 200 1 where ai and bi were the shares of voivodeships a and b in a given group of cannabis consumption frequency. the wo values were normalized to fall in the range 0 < wo < 1. the lower limit meant identical structures. when wo grew, the difference between two structures became larger and larger. the x’’kj indicator was calculated according to the formula: m x x � � � ��� 1 where x’kj was the normalized j-th empirical indicator of the k-th form of concentration and m was the number of features. x’kj was defined by: 100 1 ��� � � where xkj was the empirical value of the j-th indicator of the k-th form of concentration and was � �1 the overall magnitude of the j-th indicator. the structure of was examined by which was calculated as: 100 1 � � � ���� � � m j kj kj kj x x x . the values of rs and rk were computed from: nn d r n i i � �� � � 3 1 2 6 1s k 1 1312 22 1 222 � �� � � � n i i where di was the difference between two ranks, n was the number of voivodeships, ri was the sum of the ranks for i-th voivodeship and m was the number of features. 4. results 4.1. characteristics of respondents declaring cannabis consumption the respondents declaring cannabis consumption were characterized by a set of demographic, social, economic and spatial features. generally, 36 andrzej matczak, przemysław adam pawlicki they belonged to the so-called generation y, born between 1981 and 2001. thus, they were between 15 and 34 years old at the time of conducting the survey. the respondents born in the 1970s in poland (the so-called generation x) were marginally represented in the survey, constituting 4.4% of all respondents. within the respondents belonging to generation y, those aged 15–29 formed a dominating group, constituting 88.5% of all respondents. the respondents of this group demonstrated high openness to new products and innovations, and flexibility in relation to the high dynamics of changes in modern times. therefore, this generation is particularly inclined towards experimenting with cannabis. the respondents represented mostly by generation y, and its central age range in particular, started education or were born after the political transformation of the year 1989. in that year poland opened up to western europe and global modernization processes. this rapidly resulted in significant changes in the structure of stimulants consumption in the country. in addition to alcohol consumption (especially beer), experimentation with drugs and their frequent consumption appeared on a larger scale. table 1 presents the characteristics of respondents declaring cannabis consumption. it shows that men were definitely more numerous than women. the age structure of the respondents grouped according to their sex reveals several differences between the two groups. among women, the younger ones, especially in the 20–24 age range, most often responded in the survey. the participation of older women in the survey was significantly smaller. among men, the share of the age range 20–24 was lower and a decrease in the shares of older age ranges was slower than among women. the respondents were mainly characterized by higher levels of education. the vast majority of respondents graduated from secondary schools or universities. among men, the share of secondary education was greater than that of university education. conversely, the share of university education was greater among women. it should be assumed that due to the young age of the respondents, many of them will increase their education level in the future. the young age of respondents also indicates significant dependence on family for their livelihood. financial independence was more often declared by men (nearly half ) than women (one third). over one third of women declared the complete dependence on family for their livelihood. on the other hand, the participation of combined sources of livelihood was equally declared by men and women. they were most often working and/or learning, having sufficient income (from work and family support) for a high level of consumption. the respondents participating in the survey lived in all voivodeships of poland. each voivodeship was represented by an average of 53.1 respondents, with a standard deviation of 38.2 and a variation rate of 71.9%. the lowest numbers of respondents came from the sparsely populated voivodeships (świętokrzyskie, opolskie, lubuskie) and the highest numbers were ascribed to the voivodeships with large populations and cities having over 0.5 million inhabitants (dolnośląskie, łódzkie, małopolskie, mazowieckie, wielkopolskie) or highly urbanized tab. 1. characteristics of respondents declaring cannabis consumption. all values are given in percentage points items men women total sex 72.6 27.4 100.0 age range: 15-19 23.4 22.9 23.2 20-24 45.3 54.2 47.7 25-29 19.4 12.8 17.6 30-34 6.9 7.2 7.0 35-39 3.6 2.4 3.3 40-44 1.4 0.4 1.1 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 education: primary 12.6 6.5 10.9 vocational 10.1 7.7 9.4 secondary 44.2 42.0 43.6 bsc 18.6 22.9 19.8 msc 14.6 20.8 16.3 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 livelihood: from work 48.2 33.8 44.0 from work and family support 29.7 29.2 29.6 family support 22.0 36.9 26.4 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 place of residence: city population (in thousands): 96.6 97.8 96.7 up to 10 2.7 4.0 3.1 10–19.9 12.0 11.0 11.0 20–99.9 21.7 17.6 20.5 100–499.9 26.5 22.0 25.6 500 and over 33.7 43.2 36.5 countryside 3.4 2.2 3.3 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 source: own study. cannabis consumers in poland 37 (śląskie, pomorskie), totalling nearly two third of all respondents. the respondents mainly lived in large cities, especially in those with more than 0.5 million inhabitants (warsaw, cracow, łódź, wrocław and poznań – 36.5% of all respondents in total) and in other major cities (in the śląskie voivodeship, szczecin, gdańsk and others). all these cities are large, with well-developed services providing the best prospects for working, learning (large academic centers), entertainment (night life) and easy access to various stimulants (matczak, pawlicki, 2016). few respondents came from small towns and rural areas. 4.2. regional differentiation of the demographic and socio-economic structure of cannabis consumers men clearly dominated among the respondents in all voivodeships. the ratio of male to female cannabis consumers reached very high values in the following voivodeships: świętokrzyskie (9:1), podlaskie, lubelskie, pomorskie, śląskie, and zachodniopomorskie (3.5–5:1). in contrast, the łódzkie, opolskie, warmińsko-mazurskie and dolnośląskie voivodeships demonstrated significantly lower values of this ratio (1.2–2:1). the inter-voivodeship diversity within given sex was small. the v coefficient was 11.1 and 32.7% for men and women, respectively. the age structure of respondents declaring cannabis consumption was clearly differentiated between voivodeships. six five-year ranges were distinguished within the age from 15 to 44. the representatives of all these ranges lived in only eight of the most socio-economically developed and most urbanized voivodeships. on the other hand, the respondents from the first three age ranges (that is, 15–19, 20–24 and 25–29 years old) lived in all voivodeships. the respondents aged 20–24 were most numerous. only in the podkarpackie voivodeship the youngest consumers turned out to be most numerous. this group of respondents was more numerous than the respondents aged 25–29 in 10 voivodeships. there were no women among the respondents aged 15–19 and 25–29 in the lubuskie and świętokrzyskie voivodeships. generally, the lower levels of socio-economic development and urbanization rate are presented by a voivodeship, the fewer respondents over 30 years old declared cannabis consumption, e.g. there were no respondents over 40 in pomorskie, over 35 in podlaskie and świętokrzyskie and over 30 in lubuskie. the calculated values of v indicate that the inter-voivodeship diversity of individual age ranges was significantly higher than in the case of sex. this differentiation was lowest for young age ranges (v=17.2% for 20–24 years, 32.8% for 15–19, 41.3% for 25–29) and highest for older age ranges (v>70% for over 30 years old). in general, the value of v became higher and higher as the age of respondents increased gradually. the respondents having a secondary education predominated in most voivodeships. higher education (both bachelor’s and master’s degrees) was most common among the respondents residing in the łódzkie, małopolskie and mazowieckie voivodeships. the largest share of primary and vocational education occurred for those voivodeships in which the respondents aged 15–19 were numerous (podkarpackie, warmińsko-mazurskie, lubelskie, śląskie and also mazowieckie, wielkopolskie, lubuskie, podlaskie). the v coefficient was at a medium level. the regional differentiation of education level was much smaller among the respondents having a secondary education (15.5%) than among those having either university (38.5% for bsc and 48.3% for msc) or primary (58.9%) or vocational (43.7%) education. respondents from almost all voivodeships mainly earned their livelihood from work. only respondents from the podkarpackie voivodeship indicated family support as the dominant source of income (46.2%). respondents from the kujawsko-pomorskie and świętokrzyskie voivodeships also declared a share of one third for the family support in the structure of their income sources. in the remaining voivodeships, the family support provided about 1/5–1/4 means of livelihood (except for the zachodniopomorskie voivodeship where this share was only 13.3%). the mixed sources of income (both from work and family support) applied to over 40% of the respondents from the lubelskie, podlaskie and warmińskomazurskie voivodeships. in other voivodeships, the share of the mixed sources of income was around 1/4–1/3. the v coefficient showed a relatively small variation between voivodeships in the source of income: 19.6% for work, 25.4% for mixed sources and 28% for family support. the above analysis of spatial diversity in terms of demographic and socio-economic features enabled the division of voivodeships into groups. the so-called “city block” distance was chosen as the taxonomic measure of similarity between voivodeships. a matrix of such distances was calculated for all voivodeships. the smallest element was searched in each column (or row) of the matrix in order to identify the voivodeship that was most similar to all consecutive voivodeships in the 16-dimensional space of “city block” distances. the voivodeships were arranged in pairs, which were then combined into larger groups being first-order clusters. as the result of the first-order clustering, three groups of voivodeships were obtained (fig. 1). the łódzkie and mazowieckie voivodeships were most 38 andrzej matczak, przemysław adam pawlicki similar in terms of respondents’ sex, age, level of education and source of income and simultaneously they were most different from other voivodeships. the second group consisted of four voivodeships: śląskie, wielkopolskie, małopolskie and dolnośląskie. the remaining 10 voivodeships formed a third group. the grouping scheme based on the “city block” distance was supported by a linear ordering scheme based on the synthetic indicator. the plot of the synthetic indicator for the demographic and socio-economic features of cannabis consumers residing in 16 voivodeships is presented in figure 2. this figure confirms the division of voivodeships into three groups. the respondents living in the łódzkie (especially łódź) and mazowieckie (mainly warsaw) voivodeships formed very similar communities in terms of sex, age, level of education and source of income. the two voivodeships differed in the higher shares of women and respondents having a higher education for łódzkie and in the higher share of respondents over 34 years old for mazowieckie. both voivodeships showed the synthetic indicator between 16.7 and 17.8 points and these values were much greater than those of the second group of voivodeships: małopolskie, śląskie, wielkopolskie and dolnośląskie (8.5–10.5 points). these voivodeships had a highly similar demographic and socioeconomic structure of their residents. among the group i: łódzkie mazowieckie group ii: małopolskie śląskie wielkopolskie dolnoś ąl skie group iii: ś ęwi tokrzyskie opolskie lubuskie podlaskie warmińsko-mazurskie kujawsko-pomorskie zachodniopomorskie podkarpackiepomorskielubelskie 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 łódzkie mazowieckie małopolskie śląskie wielkopolskie dolnośląskie pomorskie lubelskie kujawsko-pomorskie zachodniopomorskie warmińsko-mazurskie podkarpackie lubuskie podlaskie świętokrzyskie opolskie fig. 1. dendrite of voivodeships presenting the highest degree of similarity in the demographic and socio-economic features of cannabis consumers being their residents. source: own study. fig. 2. plot of the synthetic indicator in the demographic and socio-economic features of cannabis consumers residing in 16 voivodeships. source: own study. cannabis consumers in poland 39 voivodeships of the second group the małopolskie voivodeship exhibited a slightly higher share of older respondents and those having a higher education, whereas the śląskie voivodeship presented the highest share of the oldest respondents and those with lower levels of education. 10 remaining voivodeships belonged to the third group, with the synthetic indicator in the range from 1 to 5 points. these voivodeships exhibited similar demographic and socio-economic structures of respondents. however, some of them had larger shares of women (opolskie, warmińsko-mazurskie), young respondents (podkarpackie, lubelskie, opolskie, podlaskie, warmińsko-mazurskie), the dependent on family support (podkarpackie, podlaskie) and respondents with lower levels of education (podkarpackie). 4.3. declared frequency of cannabis consumption it is well established (emcdda, 2008) that the frequency of drug use can be expressed by three indicators: lifetime experience with drugs. this indicator determines the number (or share) of people who used drugs at least once in their lives. in our study this indicator includes the respondents who consumed cannabis very rarely, or several times in their lives or only in the past. the recent use of drugs. this indicator expresses the number (or share) of people who used drugs within the last 12 months. in our study this indicator includes the respondents declaring occasional cannabis consumption. the current use of drugs. this indicator determines the number (or share) of people who used drugs within the last 30 days. in our study this indicator includes the respondents who consumed cannabis often or even almost every day. table 2 presents the frequency of cannabis consumption by the respondents in relation to their sex, age, level of education, source of income and place of residence. as can be seen in this table, the current use of cannabis was declared by more than half of respondents (62.7%). 27.2% of the respondents stated that they consumed cannabis recently. 10.1% of the respondents regarded cannabis consumption as lifetime experience. nearly one third of the respondents experimenting with cannabis use (i.e. 3.5% of all respondents declaring cannabis consumption) gave up consuming cannabis. men consumed cannabis three times more often than women did. this ratio was essentially retained among the current and recent cannabis users. on the other hand, experimentation with cannabis was equally attractive for men and women. in addition to sex, the age of respondents was also a determining factor for the frequency of cannabis consumption. the current cannabis consumption decreased as the respondents got older. a similar yet less pronounced trend was observed among the recent cannabis users. however, the share of the experimenters increased with the age of the respondents. similarly, the increasing level of education was associated with the decreased share of current consumption and with the increased shares of recent consumption and experimentation. the current cannabis users usually earned their livelihood from work and they less often were fully or partially dependent on the financial support of their families. compared to the current consumers, the recent ones and the experimenters more often depended on families for their livelihood. the frequency of cannabis consumption varied between voivodeships. the current cannabis users were most common in all voivodeships. the regional differentiation of current users was large, ranging from 48.4–48.6% (kujawsko-pomorskie, łódzkie) to 80.7–77.8% (świętokrzyskie, warmińsko-mazurskie). the v coefficient was equal to 75.0%. the share of recent users showed larger differences between voivodeships; from 11.1% (świętokrzyskie) to 42.9% (łódzkie) for the v coefficient of 69.7%. the share of experimenters fell in a range from 3.1% (warmińskomazurskie) to 28.9% (łódzkie) for the v coefficient of 90.9%. the wo indicator of cannabis consumption frequency between voivodeships indicated that the greatest similarity occurred between the wielkopolskie voivodeship and małopolskie (0.038), dolnośląskie (0.048), mazowieckie (0.081), lubelskie (0.096) and between the łódzkie voivodeship and kujawsko-pomorskie (0.063), zachodniopomorskie (0.077). the most distinct structures of cannabis consumption frequency were detected for warmińskomazurskie, świętokrzyskie, podkarpackie, podlaskie and also for pomorskie, łódzkie, opolskie, and lubuskie (the corresponding wo values were between 0.2 and 0.5). based on the calculated wo values (see the upper triangle of tab. 2) the dendrite of similarities was generated (fig. 3). 4.4. factors affecting the level of cannabis consumption the above spatial distribution of cannabis consumers residing in individual voivodeships was compared with the spatial distribution of the number of either drug crimes or adults convicted on the basis of the act on counteracting drug addiction (malczewski et al., 2015). a significant correlation between these distributions occurred. the rs coefficient between the spatial distribution of cannabis consumers and that 40 andrzej matczak, przemysław adam pawlicki of drug crimes amounted to 0.729. the rs value of 0.815 was found for the spatial distributions of cannabis consumers and drug-related convictions. both rs values were statistically significant (the critical area of rs(0.025; 15) = 0.5179). the total interdependence of the three spatial distributions was determined using the rk coefficient. the calculated value of rk was equal to 0.879 and it was statistically significant (χ2calculated = 39.555 > χ2tabular = 24.996). the agreement between the three spatial distributions clearly lent support to the reasonableness of our online survey. tab. 2. frequency of cannabis consumption declared in the survey. all values are given in percentage points items frequency of cannabis consumption often or very often occasionally very rarely or a few times in life or only in the past total sex: men 46.0 20.9 5.7 72.6 women 16.7 6.3 4.4 27.4 total 62.7 27.2 10.1 100.0 age range: 15-19 15.8 6.1 1.7 23.6 20-24 29.9 12.2 5.3 47.4 25-29 11.0 5.3 1.4 17.7 30-34 4.1 1.7 1.0 6.8 35-39 1.1 1.6 0.6 3.3 40-44 0.8 0.3 0.1 1.2 total 62.7 27.2 10.1 100.0 education: primary 6.7 4.0 0.5 11.2 vocational 6.3 2.7 0.6 9.6 secondary 29.4 11.7 3.1 44.2 bsc 12.5 4.1 2.9 19.5 msc 7.8 4.7 3.0 15.5 total 62.7 27.2 10.1 100.0 livelihood: from work 30.7 8.9 4.5 44.1 from work and family support 17.1 10.1 2.6 29.8 family support 14.9 8.2 3.0 26.1 total 62.7 27.2 10.1 100.0 place of residence: city population (in thousands): up to 10 2.0 0.7 0.4 3.1 10–19.9 6.6 3.2 1.2 11.0 20–99.9 14.1 4.7 1.7 20.5 100–499.9 15.4 7.1 3.1 25.6 500 and over 22.9 10.4 3.2 36.5 countryside 1.7 1.1 0.5 3.3 total 62.7 27.2 10.1 100 source: own study. cannabis consumers in poland 41 both our results and the findings of previous studies indicate that cannabis consumption is a widespread phenomenon among men, youth and young adults and among the well-educated, relatively well-off and living in cities. therefore, cannabis consumption can be regarded as an urban phenomenon. based on this assumption, the voivodeships in which the respondents resided were correlated with the number of inhabitants in polish cities and then analyzed in terms of sex, age ranges (15–44), levels of education and gdp. the resulting rs values indicate a high correlation between the spatial distribution of cannabis consumers residing in individual voivodeships and the spatial distribution of the number of city dwellers aged 15–44 (rs = 0.909), with this correlation being slightly higher among men (rs = 0.941) than among women (rs = 0.809). the correlation between the spatial distribution of the respondents from small towns (up to 20,000 inhabitants) and the spatial distribution of the number of their inhabitants was at a relatively low level (rs = 0.41). for larger cities the interrelation between the spatial distribution of respondents and the number of their inhabitants reached high levels (rs = 0.8 for cities with 20-99.9 thousand inhabitants, rs = 0.94 for cities with 100.0–199.9 thousand inhabitants, rs = 0.92 for cities with more than 200 thousand inhabitants). however, no significant differences in the age of cannabis consumers and cities dwellers were found. the interrelation between the spatial distribution of respondents and city dwellers was significant (rs = 0.973 for the age range 15–24, rs = 0.823 for 25–34 and rs = 0.85 for 35–44). high rs values were also found between the respondents and city dwellers in terms of their education level; rs = 0.832 for lower levels of education (primary, secondary and vocational), rs = 0.941 for secondary education and rs = 0.862 for university education (both bsc and msc). the spatial distribution of respondents and gdp in voivodeships were also correlated (rs = 0.89). all in all, the rs values presented in this section justify the application of the aforementioned variables to estimate the level of cannabis consumption in individual voivodeships. 5. discussion and conclusions despite the restrictions inherent in an online survey, it gave us opportunity to identify selected demographic (sex, age), socio-economic (level of education, source of income) and spatial (place of residence) features of cannabis consumers in poland and the associated frequency of cannabis consumption. the results of our analysis are essentially in agreement with the findings of previous studies. cannabis consumption in poland was more popular among men, youth and young adults (generation y) and among the well-educated, relatively well-off and living in cities. it was an urban phenomenon, especially widespread in regional metropolises. the regional differentiation of sex, age, education level and sources of livelihood for the respondents declaring cannabis consumption showed a relatively low level of this differentiation (wo < 0.37). the frequency of cannabis consumption was, however, different from the findings of previous studies, according to which 16.3% of the polish aged 15–64 admitted to using cannabis at least once in their lifetime, 4.6% during the preceding year and 2.1% during the preceding month (sierosławski et al., 2015). the respondents participating in our survey declared cannabis use in the last month (62.7%) and the last year (27.2%). it implies that mainly current and recent consumers of cannabis responded to our survey. therefore, our analysis applies to this group of cannabis users. the structure of cannabis consumption frequency was more regionally differentiated (wo was at the level of 0.04–0.5) than the group i: łódzkie mazowieckie group ii: małopolskie group iii: świętokrzyskie opolskie lubelskie podlaskie warmińsko-mazurskie kujawsko-pomorskiezachodniopomorskie podkarpackie pomorskie lubuskie śląskie wielkopolskiedolno ląś skie fig. 3. dendrite of voivodeships presenting the high degree of similarity in their structures of cannabis consumption frequency source: own study. 42 andrzej matczak, przemysław adam pawlicki structure of sex, age, education and income source for the respondents. the spatial distribution of respondents declaring cannabis coexisted with the spatial distribution of the number of crimes identified by the police and the prosecutor’s office, and adults convicted on the basis of the act on counteracting drug addiction. the interdependence of these distributions was significant. the spatial distribution of selected demographic and socio-economic features characterizing the respondents was very similar to the spatial distribution of city dwellers aged 15–44, their sex, individual age ranges, the size of cities, the level of education and the amount of gdp. the high values of statistically significant spearman correlation coefficients indicate the usefulness of these quantities in estimating and describing the spatial distribution of cannabis consumers in poland. polish society has been changing its behavior patterns since the beginning of the 1990s. this also applies to cannabis consumption. this soft drug has been gradually spreading over poland on the basis of diffusion of innovation since the beginning of the 1990s. generation y is the main group of cannabis consumer in poland. cannabis consumption among the polish being over 40 years old almost completely disappears due to the short tradition of cannabis consumption in poland. cannabis is usually consumed by well-educated and relatively well-off people who live in large urban centers in poland. such social and territorial environments are the first to adopt new behavior patterns from the outside. for polish cannabis consumers the distribution of the place of their residence concentrates around the largest urban centers (matczak, pawlicki, 2016). this points to the penetration of cannabis consumption, along with the progressing suburbanization of rural areas surrounding the largest metropolises. the most urbanized voivodeships and the large and medium cities with the high level of gdp show many similarities in their demographic and socio-economic structure of respondents declaring cannabis consumption. these environments are recognized as conducive to cannabis consumption. references czapiński j., panek t. 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(eng. psychoactive substances – attitudes and behavior. report on national surveys carried out in 2014), cbos, warsaw. taylor j.s., jasparro ch., mattson k., 2013, geographers and drugs: a survey of the literature, the geographical review, 103, 415–430. unodc, 2011, estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime. research report, united nations office on drugs and crime, vienna. unodc, 2016, world drug report 2016, united nations publication, sales no. e.16.xi.7, new york. wieczorek ł., sierosławski j., dąbrowska k., 2018, changes in use and availability of cannabis among adolescents over last two decades. situation in poland and selected european countries, alcoholism and drug addiction/alkoholizm i narkomania, 31, 49–64. 1. introduction electronic voting (also known as e-voting or evm) refers to voting using electronic means either to aid or take care of the chores of casting and counting votes. electronic voting is often seen as a tool for making the electoral process more efficient and for increasing trust in its management. properly implemented, e-voting solutions can increase the security of the ballot, speed up the processing of results and make voting easier. however, the challenges are considerable. if not carefully planned and designed, e-voting can undermine the confidence in the whole electoral process (wolf et al., 2011). according to the opinions of theorists and experts, contemporary civilization faces the electronic democracy era, based on employing information and communication tools into various fields of human life. one may thus state that democracy „supported” by modern technologies evolves and begins to function in a new reality, acquiring new dimensions (musiał-karg, 2014). some theoreticians of democracy, e.g. b.n. hague or b. loader, even speak journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(1), 1–8 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.1.01 one small step for e-voting, one giant leap for democracy marina gorbatiuc institute of legal, political and sociological research, stefan cel mare 1, md 2001 chisinau, moldova, e-mail: marina.gorbatiuc@mail.ru citation gorbatiuc m., 2020, one small step for e-voting, one giant leap for democracy, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(1), 1–8. abstract e-voting is the next step of the republic of moldova evolution. the article presents advantages of e-voting, all steps of using it, and its many types. electronic voting refers to elections using electronic means. e-voting can be managed by phones, the internet, private computer networks or special kiosks. reasons for accepting this kind of voting are provided. the analyzed in the article osce/odihr’s (office for democratic institutions and human rights) activities which are related to tolerance and non-discrimination are focus on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring, reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding. conclusions from all odihr activities which are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with osce participating states, osce institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations are given. key words electronic voting, tolerance and non-discrimination, odihr’s (office for democratic institutions and human rights), international organizations, the republic of moldova. received: 23 september 2019 accepted: 15 january 2020 published: 31 march 2020 2 marina gorbatiuc of the change in the way of understanding a democratic system (hague, loader (eds.), 1999). referring to such an attitude, b.r. barber (2003) – introduces the notion of strong (powerful) democracy, and attributes to it a series of virtues – e.g. activeness, engagement, duty. democracy enriched with electronic tools (electronic democracy, e-democracy) – e.g. electronic voting, may reinforce democracy, increase the level of participation among eligible voters, and thus legitimize decisions taken. the world is in the era of globalization. information technology has greatly affected all aspects of life, and to a large extent, this includes politics. the idea behind developing an online voting system was to improve and speed up the process of the traditional way of voting. the concept of e-voting should be embraced by the developing countries because of its advantages over the traditional manual voting system. voting is a method by which groups of people make decisions. these decisions could be political, social or public. voting can also be used to choose between difficult plans of actions or to decide who is best eligible to be awarded a prize. voting can thus be defined as a process that allows a group of individuals to choose between a numbers of options. most voting systems are based on the concept of the majority rule or plurality. for example, in an election, a candidate with a plurality receives more votes than any other candidate, but does not necessarily receive the majority of the total votes cast. elections allow the people to choose their representatives and express their preferences for how they will be governed. naturally, the integrity of the election process is fundamental to the integrity of democracy itself. the election system must be sufficiently robust to withstand a variety of fraudulent behaviors and must be sufficiently transparent and comprehensible so that voters and candidates can accept the results of an election. a voting system must be comprehensible to and usable by the entire voting population, regardless of age, infirmity, or disability. providing accessibility to such a diverse population is an important engineering problem and one where, if other security is done well, electronic voting could be a great improvement over the current paper systems. 2. results and discussion we would like to emphasize that the ministers’ deputies adopted at their 1289th meeting. the new recommendation was developed to ensure that electronic voting complies with principles of democratic elections and is the only existing international standard on e-voting so far. the new recommendation deals with the most critical part of election technology, namely e-voting, which means the use of electronic means to cast and count the vote. this category includes systems such as direct recording electronic (dre) voting machines, ballot scanners, digital pens and internet voting systems. it aims to harmonize the implementation of the principles of democratic elections and referendums when using e-voting, thus building the trust and confidence of voters in their respective voting process and e-voting schemes (council of europe…, 2017). the public thirst for rapid and objective results has led developing countries to adopt new technology in the electoral process. automation is often a complicated process, especially in countries with limited infrastructure. technology, impacts all aspects of elections, including those that seem immune, but eventually may lead to unintended con-sequences. it is obvious that a manual way of conducting election could be difficult to determine transparency in an election process. we carefully identified the following problem associated with the election processes as: the absence of an online registration system where people of voting age can simply logon and register at any time and place convenient to them. there is also a problem of conveying the election result from a pooling unit to the collation center, where the election officials maybe attacked. paper balloting may be damaged as a result of rain-fall or other external interference. people sometimes are unwilling to participate in elections because of the system of election. the traditional system requires people to stand in line for hours to get the chance to vote, while they also have a lot of routine activities to do (bonetti et al., 2000). online voting, on the other hand, gives a large opportunity to vote from any point where internet access is available, such as home, school, office or even a shopping mall. using online voting can reduce the time people need to vote. this means that citizens can vote without waste of time and to avoid long queue of voters which were identified as the biggest problem of every election. citizens can vote without going to the polls, and this may be an efficient way to encourage people’s participation on the election day. in other countries where democracy is celebrated, like the united states and the united kingdom, election time is a period of looking forward to change, a new hope for better leadership. the introduction of the electronic voting has eased the way voting is conducted. the term evoting is used for the variety of different ways of voting where the voter’s intention is expressed and one small step for e-voting, one giant leap for democracy 3 collected using the electronic methods. these technologies have reduced a significant amount of time in conducting the elections and announcing the results. these technologies have also reduced the manpower that used to be spent on the traditional voting system. electronic voting, also known as evoting, is simply voting electronically by deploying biometrics to achieve accuracy. electronic voting technology can speed the counting of ballots, reduce the cost of paying staff to count votes manually and can provide improved accessibility for disabled voters. however, there has been contention, especially in the united states, that electronic voting, especially dre voting, could facilitate electoral fraud and may not be fully auditable. in addition, electronic voting has been criticized as unnecessary and expensive to introduce. while countries like india continue to use electronic voting, several countries have cancelled e-voting systems or decided against a large-scale rollout, notably the netherlands, germany and the united kingdom due to issues in reliability of e-voting. electronic voting systems for electorates have existed in the usa since the 1960s when punched card systems debuted. their first widespread use was in the usa where 7 counties switched to this method for the 1964 presidential election. the newer optical scan voting systems allow a computer to count a voter’s mark on a ballot. dre (a direct-recording electronic voting machines), which collect and tabulate votes in a single machine, are used by all voters in all elections in brazil and india, and also on a large scale in venezuela and the united states. they were also used on a large scale in the netherlands but have been decommissioned after public concerns. voting systems have been around for hundreds of years and, despite different views on their integrity, have always been deemed secure with some fundamental security and anonymity principles. numerous electronic systems have been proposed and implemented, but some suspicion has been raised regarding the integrity of elections due to detected security vulnerabilities within these systems. internet voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums in estonia and switzerland as well as municipal elections in canada and party primary elections in the united states and france. there are also hybrid systems that include an electronic ballot marking device (usually a touch screen system similar to a dre) or other assistive technology to print a voter verified paper audit trail, then a separate machine for electronic tabulation was used. as a matter of fact there will always be people who will try to stop any beginnings and those who will remain in history, because they helped our civilization to develop. but the places where we have lived have changed, rulers have changed and ways of leading have changed during history. the leading system in most developed countries is democracy. although the most aspects in democracy have changed, some remain the same as many years ago. voting is such a thing. during many years people used to lose a lot of time to vote, thronging for many hours to throw a piece of paper in a basket. history is repeating itself: there are two kinds of people nowadays. people who say that everything is perfect and we should remain at the same level, because that ’is what they are used to, and there are those who want to make our life easier by triggering progress. we believe that e-voting is the next step in developing democracy. e-voting is voting using electronic means either to aid or take care of the chores of casting and counting votes. in 1856, the australian state of victoria became the first place to use uniform official ballots. this style of paper ballot listed the names of all candidates and issues in a fixed order, was counted by hand (bellis, 2000). concern about vote fraud and voter privacy was not restricted to england and the united states. one of the most important innovations in voting technology came about in australia. in 1858, an election was held in the state of victoria using standardized paper ballots that listed all candidates for office. these ballots were printed at government expense and distributed to the voters at the polling place, one per voter. this system, while obvious in retrospect, was sufficiently innovative to be known as the australian secret ballot. from today’s viewpoint, the australian ballot seems so natural that we take it for granted as ancient technology, and in much of the world, it is so firmly entrenched that replacing it with mechanical or electronic voting machines is unthinkable. nonetheless, the benefits of the australian ballot were not obvious at the time it was introduced. use of this technology requires, after all, a special print run at government expense, plus the cost of secure ballot storage and transport. faculty from the california institute of technology and the massachusetts institute of technology created the voting technology project in the wake of the 2000 election to provide “strong academic guidance in this intersection of technology with democracy.” they offered several recommendations to improve election administration for the future in their july 2001 report (what is and what could be) (caltech/mit, 2001). in may 2002, the fec released 4 marina gorbatiuc an updated version of the standards for electronic voting systems. in july 2004, nevada became the first state to mandate that all electronic voting machines used for federal elections be equipped with printers that produce a voter-verified paper audit trail (heller, 2004). the general online voting system has been divided into six phases. these are: • registration; • authentication; • voting and saving the votes; • managing the votes; • counting the votes; • auditing. we are agree that e – voting systems have many advantages and disadvantages: increased turnout: one of the biggest advantages of using online voting system is that it could increase the voter turnout. the implementation of e-voting in estonia saw an increase in voter turnout. they increased from 47.4% in the 2005 local elections to 63.5% in the 2011 parliamentary elections, a 16.1% jump. this is not surprising given that evoting makes it more accessible and convenient for citizens to vote (khairul anwar, 2009). convenience: an online voting system will provide citizens the comfort of voting from their own place at their own time. this will also help citizens who are abroad and using special mail ballot to send their vote. also the people who are out of the country for the military service can take advantage of this project. appeal to young voters: online voting would attract young voters to vote. the voter turnout among young people is particularly low. the canadian survey shows that 64% of the young voters who did not vote would prefer to vote online. reduce the expenses: an online voting system will help reduce the expenses involved in the setting up the polling sites and save money in printing and mailing the paper ballot. it will also reduce the expenses on the manpower. more information on the candidates: an online voting system will allow more information to be displayed about the candidates and their policies. comprehensive reporting: an online voting system will instantly provide the informative day-byday statistics about the elections beyond just who has won. save paper: online voting will also help save tons of paper. thus it will contribute to protecting the environment. issues with online voting: there are different issues that need to be considered before developing an online e-voting system. the main issue is security. there are other aspects beside security. some of them are forcibility, vote selling, vote solicitation, registration, etc. malicious payload: there are so many programs available that they can threaten the concept of online voting. the hacker only needs to visits the website of any number of security vendors. once the malicious payload reaches the host or voting platform, it can cause lot of harm that no one can imagine. this program can change the voter’s vote without anyone knowing it regardless of any kind of encryption or voter authentication in place. the main threat with this program is that it can manipulate the votes before the authentication is applied and it erases itself after causing the damage so that there is no evidence of the voting manipulation and fraud. selling of the votes: this issue is a matter of concern, and it is nearly impossible to stop until people realize what difference a single vote can make. it happened in the past that people sold their votes for money. no matter how secure the system, it cannot do anything if the person sells his online voting details to someone else. fraud: this issue comprises the registration part and the voting part. the voter can register more than once online as there is none to see and can vote more than once. there is no point of having election if the voter votes more than once using false identity. further work needs to be done in designing and incorporating extra protocols into the existing one for elections where voters need to vote for multiple candidates at various levels of the government (for example a voter needs to vote for candidate x for presidency, y for senate and z for governor of a state, etc.) at a go without having to vote individually for every candidate at separate times. the day is not far when e-voting will be the norm, and people can exercise their franchise via the internet from their own house rather than go to the voting zone without any corruption. but voters must have a substantive reason for trusting that their intentions have been correctly interpreted and recorded, and that their votes have been counted correctly. future intention regarding electronic voting should improve our capability and increase our knowledge in all the areas of cyber security (statistics…). the new technology should be improved in such way – that anyone can ensure that the intent of the voters is reflected in the official tally of the vote, that they are credible when margins of victory may be as small as a fraction of a percent. thus the future electronic voting environment would satisfy the needs of voters and election officials. thus new rules and reliable, trustworthy voting systems would win over voters and would be known as the solution that overcomes the one small step for e-voting, one giant leap for democracy 5 constraints and saves democracy (the constitutionality…, 2009). we want to present a comparison of e-voting between estonia, germany and the usa. electronic voting in estonia began in october 2005 during local elections when this country became the first to have legally binding general elections using the internet as a means of casting the vote and was declared a success by the estonian election officials. from 2005 till 2009 we can see a progressive growth in the number of participants in elections. voters who have participated in remote voting via the internet in estonia have been on the steady increase over the years from 0.9% in 2005, to 3.4 % in 2007 and in 2009 it was 9% of all eligible voters. (chowdhury, 2010). it is not clear if e-voting could raise the level of voter turn-out. however, it is a measure, which may hinder the steady decrease of turn-out percentage. remote e-voting is regarded as an added value to the voter and a measure of widening of the democracy. growth of online interaction and presence can be witnessed by the exponential increase in the number of people with home computers and internet access. since the idea of e-voting became public in 2001, many people in estonia expect that e-voting becomes an integral part of today’s information society as soon as possible. there are strong views that rapid developments of information society should be taken into account in state’s democratic practice (maaten, 2004). we can assume that e-voting in estonia, when fully analyzed, does not produce the feared political effects that become apparent at first sight. this is rather good news to promoters of e-voting, as political biases introduced due to changes in voting procedures are rarely seen as being “innocent”. we believe that in the estonian case the introduction of e-voting was politically rather innocent, indeed (breuer, trechsel, 2006). germany piloted its first electronic voting machines, supplied by the dutch company nedap, in cologne in 1998. the attempt was seen as successful, and one year later cologne used electronic voting machines for its entire european parliament elections. soon other cities followed suit, and by the 2005 general election nearly 2 million german voters used these nedap machines to cast votes. reaction to the use of these electronic voting machines was generally very positive among voters, who found the machines easy to use, and among election administrators, who were able to reduce the number of polling stations and staff in each polling station (branscomb, 2007). electronic voting also known as e-voting is the type of vote were the election data is stored, recorded and primarily processed as digital information. these electronic vote systems have been used since the 1960s. e-voting in the usa was first used in 1964, when 7 counties switched to this method for the presidential election. e-voting referred to computerized vote machines which used electronic ballots for voting instead of paper ballots (electronic voting in the usa). in 2017, election systems received critical infrastructure designation under the department of homeland security (dhs). the dhs is tasked with protecting the nation from attack. in addition to more obvious attacks against the united states, dhs is also charged with defending the nation against non-linear warfare tactics like propaganda and cyber campaigns. soft power has gained popularity amongst us competitors because the us has dominated militarily for so long that hard power competition is not reasonable. hybrid warfare strategies present a way to circumvent us counteraction, exploit the us binary notion of “war” and “peace”, and undercut the us integrity. competitors flex soft power through propagandistic campaigns that phenomenalize intentionally divisive issues that may not be grounded in truth: fake news tailored to sow chaos, confusion, and divisiveness. attacking election systems is just another way in which adversaries undermine us power. the 2016 us presidential election represents the first time in the modern world in which a country as powerful as the us had its election undermined by a global underdog. russian propaganda successfully affected an american presidential election outcome. attacks by foreign adversaries will not stop now. cyber warfare campaigns are inexpensive and effective; attribution is hard, and attacks are scalable. ahead of the 2020 presidential election, the us and other democratic states anticipate a rise in disruptive activities by bad actors; these attacks will persist as they intensify in the coming years. the general rule of security is that systems are only as strong as its weakest link. some states are not aligned with others in terms of what i’s at risk. of 350,000 electronic voting machines in use today, some machines are more vulnerable than others (“the crisis of election security” 2018). no individual state is equipped to withstand an attack on their election infrastructure; it i’s not in the job description. the confluence of the rise of competent, sophisticated, and motivated external threats; the failures of internal systemic governance and policies; and the inherent vulnerabilities in electronics bring 6 marina gorbatiuc to bear a new question: can we protect american democracy? (cheng, 2019) nowadays electronic voting is also used in other countries like: brazil, norway, germany, venezuela, india, canada, belgium, romania, australia, the uk, italy, ireland, france. as about the republic of moldova, we would like to give our point of view. the republic of moldova is a parliamentary republic. executive powers are exercised by the government headed by a prime minister and legislative power is vested in the parliament. the president serves as the head of the state and holds certain limited authority, including on foreign policy and national defense. as described, the right to vote is one of the fundamental human rights as provided by the universal declaration of human rights, relevant international and european human rights treaties, including the international covenant on civil and political rights, the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, and the european convention for human rights. the introduction of internet voting will provide for additional opportunities for men and women, in particular for those with mobility disabilities; for citizens residing abroad who are willing to vote, but do not have the possibility because the overseas polling stations are far away from them; for internal migrants, including students; as well as for the moldovan citizens who are residing in the transnistria region. recently, the e-governance center of the republic of moldova, the national coordination authority of open data and online public services, have initiated the process of public consultations on a new action plan on open government for the years 2016–2018 (vino cu propuneri…, 2016). thus, as the implementation of open governance principles shall not be limited to the governmental bodies, it is recommended that relevant actions for the preparation, piloting and introduction of internet voting in moldova should be introduced in the respective action plan. this will contribute to the synergy of actions of the central electoral commission and governmental authorities in the implementation of the piloting of internet voting by the regular 2018 national parliamentary elections. according to the official data presented by the report of grammar social media in february 2018, 70% of the households in moldova do have access to the internet, 72% of users access the internet at least once a day (peste 900 de mii…, 2018). the penetration rate for the internet service – (land adsl, fiber) is 14.7% (over 525,000 households). at the same time, according to the report of the national regulatory agency for electronic communication and information technology the mobile telephone penetration rate is 121.8% (over 4.3 mln. users), while mobile data penetration rate is over 8.5% (with over 298,400 users) (market evolution:…, 2016). according to www.internetlivestats.com, there are 1,946,111 internet users in moldova, which represent 47.9% of the population of the republic of moldova in 2016 (internet live…). according to the information provided by the egovernment center, during the inception mission interviews, there are currently over 90,000 users of electronic signatures per year in moldova, including over 55,000 users of mobile signatures (sim) (moldcell…, 2012), over 35,000 users of e-key (in particular legal persons and civil servants), over 200 users of e-id cards. the republic of moldova has a high penetration rate of the internet and very good mobile coverage. the internet is accessible almost everywhere in the country. mobile phones and computers can be found in the majority of households, being very popular among individuals. parliamentary political parties expressed a general support for the introduction of internet voting in the republic of moldova. the main motivation mentioned in this regard was the creation of alternative voting solutions for moldovans living abroad, the young electorate (the participation rate of the youth in the previous parliamentary elections was less than 5%) and for those who usually do not vote in elections due to other agendas during the sunday election-day. however, the majority of the political parties where rather reserved to predict the introduction of internet voting in the republic of moldova in the next 2–4 years. at the same time, all representatives of the political parties have expressed support for the piloting of internet voting during the next ordinary parliamentary elections. some also indicated that a preliminary piloting phase could be considered as well for the elections of the president scheduled for 30 october 2016. special attention will be dedicated to the testing and piloting phases. visibility and popularization of internet voting was also mentioned as important. the republic of moldova has all the basic preconditions for introducing internet voting in the near future: 1. well – developed internet infrastructure. 2. high degree of mobile network coverage. 3. good degree of public ict literacy. 4. reliable voters list (srv). 5. all polling stations are equipped with internet connected computers, and they are constantly online and communicating with saise. one small step for e-voting, one giant leap for democracy 7 despite the fact that the absolute number of bearers of digital certificates for personal identification are still low, popularity of mobile-id is rising rapidly, and it is expected to continue to grow as more e-services will be offered by the government. thus, the authors of this study present two main propositions: • to create an official internet voting information system (ivis); • to implement the ivis pilot version before the general parliamentary elections in 2018. the electoral code of the republic of moldova does not include specific provisions regulating internet voting concepts, policies, rules, procedures, and relevant functioning and the management requirements for the internet voting informational system. in order to create a proper legal framework for the implementation of internet voting, the electoral code is to be modified by introducing internet voting concepts, vote verification and cancellation rules, voting secrecy assurance principles, voter identification aspects, information systems establishing the framework for its functional, security and audit requirements and other elements common to the internet voting. a new title on internet voting shall be introduced in the electoral code. the central electoral commission could also consider, if deemed necessary, to establish a separate internet voting electoral council (ivec). prior to the adoption of the amendments to the electoral cod, introducing specific internet voting legislation, the opinions of the venice commission and osce/odihr shall be consulted. 3. conclusions we have carefully examined an electronic voting system as well as the pilot experiences of many countries. all this suggests that both the extremely optimistic and pessimistic positions about the effects of voting systems are overstated. we have also discussed the security requirements of electronic voting and highlighted the contradiction in some of these requirements. we presented information about limitations and suggested further works that should be done to address them. however, practical testing and pilot projects are the only ways of knowing what will work and what will not. trials of particular methods will give the best insight into understanding what requirements must be met for modern voting to work well as well as the actual pros and cons of electoral systems. modern electronic voting will not act as a panacea for the social causes responsible for electoral disengagement, nor will it remedy negative attitudes toward political entities. it will, however, increase voting opportunities for electors and make casting a vote more accessible. on the other hand, electronic voting will not erode democracy or result in vote buying and election fraud any more than the existing system does. electronic voting has been a topic of active debate, with a significant number of people believing that electronic voting cannot be trusted enough to be used for significant elections due to uncertainty in the authenticity and integrity of the machines, and the votes that have been cast using them. on the other hand, people acknowledge that paper solutions are significantly outdated and can be subject to serious manipulation from a coercer (tarasov, tewari, 2017). voting can be time consuming, inconvenient as well as expensive, especially when the voters and administrators are geographically distributed. with the rapid expansion of the internet, electronic voting appears to be a less expensive alternative to the conventional paper voting. electronic voting overcomes the problem of geographic distribution of voters as well as vote administrators. it also reduces the chances of errors in the voting process. however, in order for electronic voting to replace conventional mechanisms, it must provide the whole range of features that conventional voting systems have. furthermore, due to the inherent lack of security on the internet, electronic voting systems need to be carefully designed; otherwise these systems become more susceptible to fraud than conventional systems (taghavi et al., 2017). the world is in the era of globalization. information technology has greatly affected all aspects of life, and to a large extent, this includes politics. we hereby stress the fact that, the importance and necessity of electronic online voting system cannot be overemphasized. there is no doubt that the new voting protocol has become not only simpler with higher security level, it also offers a better integration of the general public irrespective of their location. all this brings us one step closer to a feasible electronic voting system for elections in the range of operational political elections. necessary and adequate research materials should be made available by the government in the institutions of higher learning so as to ease and assist wider and broader research in the field of computer science and information technology. the process of voter registration/revalidation should be made online. this is with a view of eliminating registration fraud and other electoral malpractices. it is also worth mentioning that, mobility difficulties will be eliminated. 8 marina gorbatiuc references barber b.r., 2003, strong democracy participatory politics for a new age, university of california press, berkeley-los angeles-london. bellis m., 2000, the history of voting machines, inventors. about.com (accessed 28 september). bonetti p., ravaioli s., piergallini s., 2000, the italian academic community’s electronic voting system, computer networks, 34(6), 851–860. doi: 10.1016/s13891286(00)00156-0. branscomb l.m., 2007, elections and the future of e-voting: editor’s note, the bridge, 37(2), 3–4. breuer f., trechsel a.h., 2006, report: e-voting in the 2005 local elections in estonia, edemocracy projects council of europe, https://www.coe.int/t/dgap/goodgovernance/activities/e-voting/coe_studies/finalreportcoe_ evotingestonia2005_en.asp (accessed 28 september 2019). caltech/mit, 2001, voting technology project voting: what is and what could be, http:vote.caltech.edu, (accessed 28 september). cambridge dictionary, cambridge university press, https:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ (accessed 10 september 2019). cheng v., 2019, voting integrity and american democracy, https://www.academia.edu/39720699/voting_integrity_and_american_democracy_2019_1_ (accessed 28 september 2019). chowdhury m.j., 2010, comparison of e-voting schemes: estonian and norwegian solutions, http://courses.cs.ut. ee/2010/security-seminar-fall/uploads/main/chowdhury-final.pdf (accessed 27 september 2019). council of europe adopts new recommendation on standards for e-voting, council of europe, 2017, https://www.coe. int/en/web/cm/news/-/asset_publisher/hwwluk1rcejo/ content/council-of-europe-adopts-new-recommendation-on-standards-for-e-voting/16695?inheritredirect=f alse (accessed 3 september 2019). electronic voting in the usa, http://www.bravenewballot.org/ electronic-voting-in-usa/ (accessed 27 september 2019). hague b.n., loader b. (eds.), 1999, digital democracy: discourse and decision-making in the information age, routledge, new york. heller d.a., 2004, certification of voter verified paper audit trail printer completed, www.sos.state.nv.us (accessed 28 september). internet live stats, moldova internet users, https://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/moldova/ (accessed 22 august 2019). khairul anwar n., 2009, advantages and disadvantages of evoting: the estonian experience, nanyang technological university, https://www.academia.edu/35246981/advantages_and_disadvantages_of_e-voting_the_estonian_ experience (accessed 27 september 2019) maaten e., 2004, towards remote e-voting: estonian case, [in:] electronic voting in europe, 83–90, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/towards-remote-e-voting%3a-estonian-case-maaten/ff4d0a77e7561e62fd0258280c0baa02d8256a03 (accessed 25 august 2019). market evolution: mobile internet access. chart 5. evolution of the number of users (thousand) and penetration rates for 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publika.md/peste-900-de-mii-de-moldoveni-au-conturipe-facebook-cati-dintre-ei-mai-folosesc-odnoklassniki_2995222.html (accessed 9 september 2019). statistics about internet voting in estonia, estonian national electoral committee, https://www.valimised.ee/en/archive/statistics-about-internet-voting-estonia (accessed 25 september 2019). taghavi t., bafghi a.g., kahani m., 2007, an electronic voting scheme through blind signature, [in:] 12th international csi computer conference (csicc’07), https://pdfs. semanticscholar.org/bc81/b813724d94858b85ccd13e5135a91bd45ebb.pdf (accessed 29 october 2019). tarasov p., tewari h., 2017, the future of e-voting, iadis international journal on computer science and information systems, 12(2), 148–165. the constitutionality of electronic voting in germany, 2009, ndi – national democratic institute, https://www.ndi. org/e-voting-guide/examples/constitutionality-of-electronic-voting-germany (accessed 22 august 2019). vino cu propuneri la planul de acțiuni pentru o guvernare deschisă (eng. come up with proposals for the open governance actions plan), 2016, agenţia de guvernare electronică, http://www.egov.md/ro/communication/ news/vino-cu-propuneri-la-planul-de-actiuni-pentru-oguvernare-deschisa (accessed 12 september 2019). wolf p., nackerdien r., tuccinardi d., 2011, introducing electronic voting: essential considerations, international idea publication office, stockholm. 1. introduction the outbreak of covid-19 pandemic in early 2020 brought several significant changes in our daily lives. going beyond the disease or death itself, the restriction shock, at a certain level, paralysed and left an impact on our societies, public and mental health, economics, and many other areas. drug use patterns is one of the areas that has brought attention to researchers. clearly, lockdowns with closure of recreational facilities, mandatory stay at home and limitation of movement urged us to understand how all these changes might affect drug use patterns, what consequences are to be expected and what kind of impact it would leave on the drug using populations. this would then allow societies and governments to prepare for the post-covid-19 situation. similarly to other countries all over the world, up to 2022, latvia experienced covid-19 pandemic with four waves. the severity of restrictions had changed from very mild during summer to very journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(1), 17–27 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.1.04 the covid-19 impact on the illegal retail drugs market in latvia and drug use patterns agnese zīle-veisberga faculty of social sciences, university of latvia, lauvas 4, rīga lv-1003, latvia e-mail: agnese.zile@gmail.com citation zīle-veisberga a., 2022, the covid-19 impact on the illegal retail drugs market in latvia and drug use patterns, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 17–27. abstract the purpose of the study is to explore how the covid-19 situation has affected the illegal retail market and drug use patterns. three research questions were formulated: 1) what has been the covid-19 impact on the retail illegal drugs market? 2) how has the pandemic impacted drug use patterns? 3) are there trends that presumably would have an impact after covid-19? the mixed method with an explanatory sequential design was used in the analysis. at the first stage of the analysis all available quantitative data such as routine administrative data and data from regular surveys were analysed and triangulated. the results of quantitative analysis were supplemented by qualitative data, such as reports. the analysis does not suggest changes on the retail market, except for some increase in cannabis cultivation during the first wave in 2020 and a slight decrease in mdma prevalence on the market in 2021. drug use patterns are similar to those before the pandemic, with some exceptions that might indicate more cannabis and mdma use among frequent users. key words covid-19, retail drugs market, drug use patterns, cannabis, mdma, latvia. received: 31 january 2022 accepted: 18 march 2022 published: 27 may 2022 mailto:agnse.zile@gmail.com 18 agnese zīle-veisberga restrictive during fall and winter times. the recreational settings have been closed for two years and drug use has been moved to private or hidden settings, such as nature or illegal events. at this point, it is not very clear if changes in drug use patterns have been drivers to some considerable and underreported trends in drug use patterns or the illegal market. in order to better understand the possible implication for the situation after covid-19, this study aims to explore if and how the pandemic has affected the retail drugs market and drug use patterns. more in-depth analysis of these two areas will help to understand what has changed and what should be expected in the future. to do so, three research questions were formulated: 1) what has been the covid-19 impact on the retail illegal drugs market? 2) how has the pandemic impacted drug use patterns? 3) are there trends that presumably would have an impact after covid-19? 2. literature review at an early stage of the pandemic, the leading observatories began to monitor the situation at the european level and worldwide. the united nations office on drugs and crime (unodc) collected data on the illegal market, changes in drug use patterns, treatment, drug related death, etc. the summary of all findings is available within the annual world drug report 2021 in booklet 5 (unodc, 2021). available data allows concluding that illegal drugs markets and organised crime have remained resilient by quickly adapting to the situation of the pandemic, with some minor exceptions, such as some difficulties in trafficking drugs that are traditionally trafficked by land routes and an increased use of waterway routes and contactless methods. moreover, more large-scale cases were identified, which could indicate recovery from some disruptions. at the same time, no measurable trends were observed on the illegal market. as regards drug use patterns, cocaine and mdma typically used at recreational settings experience some decrease, while cannabis and use of benzodiazepines showed signs of an increase. moreover, also psychedelics showed some slight increase (unodc, 2021). these results indeed could support the assumption that recreational use experienced a downfall, while other drugs such as cannabis for relaxation or use of benzodiazepines to reduce anxiety could experience an increase. a number of reports prepared by the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) also highlighted that the organised crime and drugs market remained resilient to the covid-19 restriction, but some retail or street markets were disrupted during lockdowns as some local shortages were experienced. in addition, an increase in the role of digital means in purchasing and delivering substances was observed (emcdda, 2020a, 2020b, 2021b; emcdda & europol, 2020). as regards drug use patterns, the use of recreational drugs, such as mdma and cocaine, were reported with a slight decrease, while at-home used drugs, such as cannabis and benzodiazepines, became more prevalent. it was also observed that the use of recreational drugs experienced a rebound when restrictions were lifted (emcdda, 2020a, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c). beside regular reports provided by observatories, a number of studies have been carried out. a. roberts et al. (2021) have published a systematic review on alcohol and other substance use during the covid-19 pandemic. authors concluded that, despite mixed results, an increase in alcohol use was observed in many studies, while in the case of other substances it was impossible to identify any trend. comparative wastewaters analysis in european cities during early lockdowns in 2020 (been et al., 2021) showed some marked decreases in consumption of some substance in some locations, while in other cities such a decrease was not observed. authors conclude that any prediction of covid-19 impact on drug use is difficult; cases are heterogeneous and depend on many factors. a study in israel (bonny-noach et al., 2021) found an increase in alcohol and cannabis use, while significant trends in the use of other substances were not observed. a. bendau et al. (2022) concluded that covid-19 has a major impact on party drugs, and an mdma decrease can be observed, while the use of ghb/gbl was on an increase. changes in the illegal retail market were not observed. moreover, the results showed that motivation for drug use changed from a desire to feel high and euphoric before the pandemic to coping with boredom during the pandemic. in contrast to widely researched drug use patterns, studies of the retail drugs market and covid-19 are less represented. based on the results of annual surveys in australia between 2016 and 2020, o. price et al. (2022) concluded that respondents did not notice any changes in the illegal market, while the self-reported use of mdma decreased due to the lack of opportunities for use. published studies on drug use and covid-19 in latvia are scarce and cover the period of 2020, and studies covering 2021 were not identified. a study on alcohol use showed no significant impact on the use of alcohol during the first waves of the pandemic in latvia (rancāns, martinsone, 2021). also, the mini european web survey in 2020 did not show any the covid-19 impact on the illegal retail drugs market in latvia and drug use patterns 19 considerable changes in the drug use patterns, except for a slight increase in cannabis use among regular users. in addition, any changes in the organisation or drug purchasing patterns were not observed (zīle-veisberga, 2020). 3. methodology the mixed method with an explanatory sequential design was used in the analysis. at the first stage of the analysis all available quantitative data were compared and put in triangulation, or in practical terms, data were added to special templates with a list of indicators or other types of data for each substance group. based on the results of triangulation, general trends and unclear points were identified and later explained or elaborated by available qualitative data, such as reports. to identify possible impact of covid-19 on the retail drugs market and drug use patterns, data were compared between 2018 and 2021, that is before and during the pandemic. by doing so, it was possible to identify those trends that were there already before the pandemic and those that were accelerated or were totally new. the analysis was also carried out by substance groups – cannabis, mdma, amphetamines, cocaine, benzodiazepines, opioids, and hallucinogens. new psychoactive substances were not analysed separately, but integrated with other substance groups, because already before the pandemic, these substances did not have a separate segment on the illegal market. the illegal retail market was analysed with available police data on these indicators: number of seizures, weighted purity, retail prices and production/ cultivation data. for this domain, it is important to add that routine administrative data was used and this type of data must be interpreted with caution.1 to define the retail level threshold, substances were defined by taking into account the amount of substance in grams when price starts decreasing: for cannabis – 20 g, amphetamines – 20 g, cocaine – 10 g, mdma – 50 tablets, opioids – 1 g, 50 tablets, benzodiazepines – 50 tablets, lsd – 10 blotters. in the retail drugs market analysis, only seizure data below thresholds were included in the sample. to explore possible changes on the organisation of purchasing and delivering, a secondary data analysis was carried out of the mini european web 1 there are a number of studies that show the limitation of law enforcement data (e.g. bryman, 2016). these limitations were considered when interpreting results. survey on drugs covid-19 in 2020 mini ewsd on covid-19 (emcdda, 2021e); the european web survey on drugs that was carried out in latvia in 2017 – ewsd 2017 (emcdda, 2021e); and the european web survey on drugs carried out in 2021 – ewsd 2021 (emcdda, 2021d). drug use trends and drug use patterns were identified by using data collected before and during the pandemic, such as the european school survey project on alcohol and other drugs in 2019 (espad group, 2020; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016a; žabko, 2020), general population survey on smoking, use of alcohol and drugs in 2020 (putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016b), mini ewsd on covid-19 in 2020 (zīle-veisberga, a., 2020 and secondary data analysis), ewsd 2021 (emcdda, 2021d and secondary data analysis), wastewater project results between 2019 and 2021 (emcdda, 2022), data on residues from syringes from the escape project in 2020 and 2021 (grinberga, 2021). 4. results 4.1. cannabis (herbal cannabis) herbal cannabis has been the most frequently used substance in the population long before the pandemic (espad group, 2020; putniņa, brants, 2021, sniķere, trapencieris, 2016a, 2016b). at the same time, it seems that, at some level, the pandemic has affected the cannabis retail market and patterns of use. data on the retail illegal drugs market show a peak in seizures in 2020 and a decrease in 2021. the potency of cannabis is not determined, but some fluctuation was observed in drug prices. for 5 grams it remained €60 and for 20 grams €140, but the price for 1 gram was changing. it was rather stable before the pandemic –€12 according to the police data and €15 according to the secondary data analysis of the ewsd 2017 data. in 2020, according to the police data the price was ranging between €7–20 per gram, but according to ewsd 2021, it remained the same as in 2017 – €15 per gram. taking into account that the price monitoring by police is rather based on observation, but ewsd 2017 and ewsd 2021 has a sample and precise methodology, scientifically there is a greater possibility that prices actually did not change, and the retail market was stable. at the same time, during the cognitive interviews in late 2020 for the ewsd 2021 and a micro guerrilla research done by the author on drug prices asked to random known users in summer 2020, indeed most people said that they have noticed some changes in prices of cannabis, mostly reporting an increase. but 20 agnese zīle-veisberga these data are not reported or scientifically analysed; therefore, it should be treated as anecdotal evidence of some changes during the first wave. another characteristic of the cannabis market was the increasing number of detected cultivation sites. for comparison, in 2019, 46 cultivation sites were detected in total, 61 in 2020 and 39 in 2021. even though part of them were profit-driven, approximately 2/3 are related to cultivation of 1–3 plants for personal use or social supply. the cultivation peak happened right after the first wave, when countries closed borders and cross-border commuting was heavily affected. this uncertainty could affect the decision to start own cultivation or start cultivation as an opportunity for profit. on the other hand, this was also the time when people were spending more time at home, including in their gardens and greenhouses. the organisation of purchasing cannabis has not been affected by covid-19. this has not been observed either by law enforcement or surveys. the data of ewsd 2021 show that personal contact is important in obtaining cannabis; for example, 27% of cannabis module respondents replied that they mostly got cannabis for free. out of those who purchase cannabis, a vast majority or 72% reported purchasing it from their dealer, 11% found their source on social platforms, but the use of encrypted sites and the surface internet is rare – 5% and 2%, respectively. the role of social ties in the cannabis retail market has been explored by k. bebre (2021). the author concluded that personal contact is essential in selling and purchasing cannabis. easy availability and the role of personal contact can be reasons why cannabis purchasing on encrypted websites is not common. and it seems that the pandemic has not changed it. as regards prevalence of use, already before the pandemic an increasing trend was observed. the espad survey carried out in 2019 observed that lifetime prevalence had increased by 9%, if compared to 2015 data (from 17% to 26%). last year prevalence increased by 10% (from 11% to 21%) and last month’s prevalence by 6% (4.2% to 10%) (espad group, 2020). the general population survey that was carried out in 2015 and 2020 also shows an increase in lifetime prevalence by 5% (from 10% to 15%), but no changes in last year or last month prevalence (putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016b). more information on cannabis use patterns during covid-19 is available from ewsd 2021, where 21% reported less use, 36% no changes, 34% more use and another 9% could not answer that table 1. data on retail drugs market and use of herbal cannabis 2018 2019 2020 2021 additional data seizures (> 20 g)* 793 871 896 679 purity (> 20 g) no data no data no data no data   typical (mode) price per 1 g €12 €12 €7–20 no data €15 in ewsd 2017 and ewsd 2021 surveys number of cultivation cases 51 46 63 39 espad (ltp/lyp/lmp) 26%/21%/10% 17%/11%/4.2% (espad 2015) gps (ltp/lyp/lmp) 15%/4%/2% 10%/ 4%/ 2% (gps 2015) mini ewsd covid-19 less – 13% the same – 62% more – 24% don’t know –1% ewsd 2021 less – 21% the same – 33% more – 30% don’t know – 16% * – explanation: for seizures, the purity amount in brackets indicates the threshold of cases that were included in the sample; ltp – lifetime prevalence; lyp – last year prevalence; lmp – last month prevalence; question in mini ewsd covid-19 – have you changed your use of [substance] as a result of covid-19 restrictions? answers were grouped into 4 categories similar to ewsd 2021; the question in the ewsd 2021 – has the covid-19 pandemic had any impact on your use of [substance]? sources: unpublished data of the state police; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016a, 2016b; espad group, 2020; putniņa, brants, 2021; žabko, 2020; and secondary data analysis of ewsd 2017, mini ewsd covid-19, ewsd 2021. the covid-19 impact on the illegal retail drugs market in latvia and drug use patterns 21 question. it is also important to add that a significant difference was observed in answers between frequent users and those who use less often (chi square test, χ2 = 136.586 (n = 3), p < 0.001). frequent users more often reported an increase in cannabis use (40%), while only 14% reported a decrease. by contrast, those who had used cannabis in the past 12 months more often reported a decrease in use (35%) and less often an increase – 9%. similar patterns were also observed from the secondary data analysis of the results of mini ewsd on covid-19. already during the first wave, an increase in use by frequent users was observed, and boredom was the main reported reason for use (zīle-veisberga, 2020) (see table 1). to summarise the covid-19 impact on the cannabis retail market and patterns of use, it can be concluded that the market experienced some changes at the beginning of the pandemic, which was mirrored in cultivation and, possibly, in short-term prices, but after some distress, the market in 2021 seemed to be functioning as previously. the patterns of use were mixed, and indeed for some part of population restrictions, a lack of socialisation and cultural possibilities might have led to less frequent use, while for frequent users the use most likely increased. 4.2. mdma a few years before the pandemic, the availability of mdma increased. this was mostly visible in seizure data in postal shipments that arrived from other countries, mainly the netherlands. the actual seizures in the country were rather rare. in addition, the results of the espad 2019 survey indicated a slight increase in the mdma use among school students. by comparing seizure, price, and purity data before and during the pandemic, no stable trend was observed. the number of seizures in 2018 and 2020 was higher, but less in 2019 and 2021. the price has not changed considerably, in 2018 it was €4–5 per tablet, but in 2020 the monitored range was wider – €3.50 to €15, which could also be related to the size of a tablet. as regards the price, it is important to add that respondents of the ewsd 2021 indicated a price of €10 per 1 tablet. the purity of mdma has gradually decreased from 41% in 2018 to 34% in 2021. depending on the size of tablets, on average, one tablet weighed 0.45 grams and contained approximately 160 to 170 mg active substance per tablet (please see table 2). mdma purchasing and delivering has not changed due to covid-19 according to law enforcement and survey data. the results of ewsd 2021 indicate that 64% usually buy substances by themselves, while 30% mostly get it for free. those who buy usually buy them from dealers (60%), but other sources are also more prevalent than for cannabis – 15% find sources on social networks, 6.6% on the darkweb (emcdda, 2021d and secondary data analy sis). this also could support the assumption that covid-19 table 2. data on retail drugs market and use of mdma tablets 2018 2019 2020 2021 additional data seizures (> 50 tablets) 284 184 292 145 purity (> 50 tablets) 41.5% 38% 38% 34% typical (mode) price per 1 tablet €4–5 €4 €3.50–15 no data €10 in ewsd 2017 and ewsd 2021 number of production sites 0 0 1 processing 0 espad (ltp) 5%   2.7% (espad 2015) gps (ltp/lyp/lmp) 1.9%/0.7%/0.6% 2.4%/0.3%/0.3%gps 2015 mini ewsd covid-19 less – 20% same – 64% more – 7% don’t know – 9% ewsd 2021 less 27% same – 21% more – 21% don’t know – 21% wastewater (annual trend, weekends)* no data 21.95 mg /1000p 54.24 mg /1000p 36.75 mg /1000p * – for wastewaters, annual trend at weekends were selected for mdma (emcdda, 2022) sources: unpublished data of the state police; putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016a, 2016b; espad group, 2020; emcdda, 2022; žabko, 2020; and secondary data analysis of ewsd 2017, mini ewsd on covid-19, ewsd 2021. 22 agnese zīle-veisberga did not bring any considerable changes to the mdma retail market. in terms of the prevalence of use, there are mixed results. the espad 2019 showed a slight increase in life-time prevalence from 2.7% in 2015 to 5% in 2019 right before the pandemic (espad group, 2020), but the general population survey basically does not indicate any change when comparing 2015 data and 2020 data (putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016b). wastewater analysis, in comparison between 2019 and 2021, indicates an increase in mdma presence in 2020, but a decrease in 2021 (emcdda, 2022); moreover, the actual collection of samples usually takes place in march, and both in 2020 and 2021 these periods were with strict covid-19 restrictions. that means that wastewater analysis actually supports law enforcement data that also show an increase in 2020, but then a decrease in 2021. the results of the ewsd 2021 show some mixed results, because 27% agreed that they used less mdma due to covid-19; at the same time, 21% did not observe any changes, and another 21% reported more use, while 32% did not know. similarly to cannabis use, also in the case of mdma, there was a difference in replies between frequent and occasional users (chi square test, χ2=21.452 (n=3), p<0.00). frequent users more often reported that they used more mdma during the pandemic – 38% answered that they used more and 20% that they used less. for occasional users, the trend was opposite – 29% answered that they used less, and 13.5% replied that they used more. this could indicate that there are various ways how covid-19 could affect the retail market and drug use. for some groups, a lack of entertainment opportunities indeed could contribute to less frequent use, while for others it was the opposite, and most likely it could be explained by drug use in private settings. overall, it seems that the pandemic did not affect mdma market in 2020, but in 2021 a decrease was observed. this could be related to more restrictions in 2021 and less opportunities for entertainment, if compared to the situation in 2020. still, according to ewsd 2021 data, there are groups that were not affected and were reporting even more use or no change, which means that users were affected differently; therefore, the situation is rather heterogeneous than one way for everyone. 4.3. amphetamines amphetamines are used both at recreational settings and by high-risk drug users; therefore, in police data, amphetamines are a well-represented substance group. users usually do not distinguish between amphetamine and methamphetamine. if we compare the pre-covid-19 and covid-19 situation, it can be observed that amphetamines remain one of most prevalent substances on the illegal market according to seizure data. before the pandemic, amphetamine was more prevalent on the retail illegal market, but during the pandemic methamphetamine became more prevalent, which might be related to the overall trend in europe (emcdda, 2021b; emcdda, 2021d). drug prices slightly increased in 2019 but have remained stable since then – €15 per 1 gram. at the same time, the retail purity increased for amphetamine from 17% in 2019 to 21% in 2021 but fluctuated for methamphetamine (please see tables 3 and 4). therefore, there are no indications that the amphetamines market experiences a shortage or any other difficulties due to covid-19 (please see table 3). as regards drug use prevalence, amphetamines (not distinguished between amphetamine and methamphetamine) are not well represented in the general population. espad data does not show significant changes before the pandemic – in 2015, 2.9% respondents reported lifetime use of amphetamines, while in 2019, 1.8% reported lifetime amphetamine use (espad group, 2020). also, the general population survey in 2020 did not show any changes compared to the previous round – 1.9% in 2015 and 1.8% in 2020 (putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, 2016b). the analysis of wastewaters supports law enforcement data, showing a decrease in amphetamine and a gradual increase of methamphetamine (emcdda, 2022). of course, this can be related to high-risk drug use patterns that are not visible in samples of the general population surveys or the espad. there is a lack of data that makes it difficult to understand how covid-19 has affected high-risk drug users. the data from the project escape “identification of drug residues in used disposable syringes” confirms that methamphetamine (26%) and, to a lesser extent, amphetamine (9%) were present in used syringes (grinberga, 2021), and this data generally supports the assumption that the position of amphetamines is stable on the market, and covid-19 has not affected that. there is also a lack of data to see if there are any changes in purchasing and organising delivery. with the current knowledge, we can conclude that there are no significant changes in amphetamine use in the general population; on the illegal market there are no indications of shortages or difficulties. still, it is important to underline that amphetamines are used by high-risk drug users, and the last round of cohort study was carried out in 2020, but data are not yet available. the covid-19 impact on the illegal retail drugs market in latvia and drug use patterns 23 4.4. cocaine in the past couple of years, cocaine has become more available and prevalent in european countries (emcdda & europol, 2019; emcdda. 2021b), including latvia. overall, the number of seizures and seized quantities increased at the wholesale level, which was not that visible on the retail market. in 2021 a sharp decrease of retail level seizures was observed. the price of cocaine has remained stable at around €90–100 per gram, but the purity on the retail market has gradually decreased from 61% in 2018 to 55% in 2021 (see table 5). as regards prevalence of use before the pandemic, the espad results did not indicate any new trends before the pandemic, and use of cocaine among students had not increased since 2015, that is, lifetime prevalence was 2.3% in 2015 and 1.8% in 2019 (espad group, 2020). some data on prevalence during the pandemic indicates an increase. results of the general population survey in 2020 showed that cocaine was the most prevalent substance after cannabis, and 3% of respondents reported cocaine lifetime use (1.5% in 2015) (putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016b). in contrast, the wastewater analysis between 2019 and 2021 indicates a stable increase, but the presence of this substance in wastewaters remains one of the lowest among eu cities (emcdda, 2022). also, in the ewsd 2021 respondents more often replied that they used less cocaine (26%), while 16% replied that they used more, 23% used the same and 30% did not know. similarly to other substance groups, these results could table 3. data on retail drugs market and use of amphetamine 2018 2019 2020 2021 other comments seizures (> 10 g) 194 278 174 138 purity (> 10 g) 17% 17% 21% 21% typical (mode) price per 1 g €12 €15–20 €15–20 no data €15 in ewsd 2021 number of production (processing) sites 0 0 1 0   espad (ltp) 1.8% 2.9% in 2015 (not divided between amphetamine and methamphetamine) gps (ltp/lyp/lmp) 1.8%/0.6%/0.5% 1.9%/0.3%/0.1% (gps 2015) (not divided between amphetamine and methamphetamine) mini ewsd covid-19 small sample ewsd 2021 small sample wastewater (annual trend, weekends) no data 57.43 mg / 1000p 62.57 mg / 1000p 42.95 mg / 1000 p residuals in syringes – – 9.5% sources: unpublished data of the state police; putniņa, brants, 2021; grinberga, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016a, 2016b; espad group, 2020; emcdda, 2022; žabko, 2020; and secondary data analysis of ewsd 2017, mini ewsd covid-19, ewsd 2021. table 4. data on retail drugs market and use of methamphetamine 2018 2019 2020 2021 seizures (> 10 g) 284 170 228 275 purity (> 10 g) 25% 20% 30% 26% number of production (processing) sites 0 0 1 0 mini ewsd covid-19 small sample ewsd 2021 small sample wastewater (annual trend, weekends) 31.16 mg / 1000 p 85.4 mg /1000 p 247.61 mg / 1000 p residuals in syringes – – – 26% sources: unpublished data of the state police; grinberga, 2021; emcdda, 2022; and secondary data analysis of ewsd 2017, mini ewsd covid-19, ewsd 2021. 24 agnese zīle-veisberga indicate that there are users that have been affected in different ways. overall, to conclude the section on cocaine, it is worth highlighting that the cocaine market in latvia is rather small; therefore, also data on changes on the market before the pandemic and during the pandemic is too scarce to draw some conclusions. the results are mixed, because law enforcement data does not show an increase, including lower purity of intercepted substances. in addition, the increase in the reported use in the general population survey is insignificant. however, results of wastewater analysis show increasing presence of cocaine in riga since 2019. 4.5. opioids this substance group is difficult to analyse due to lack of data on how covid-19 has affected high-risk drug users. from the point of view of law enforcement data, opioids have always been prevalent mainly because patterns of use and lifestyle can often be encountered by the police. since the disappearance of heroin in around 2014, the opioids market has become what could be described as scattered and polluted. buprenorphine is a substance that is widely represented on the retail market, along with new synthetic opioids or mixtures of different medicine opioids and new synthetic opioids. there are some changes within the market, e.g., in 2020 carfentanil was more prevalent, but in 2021 isotonitazene and metonitazene were more prevalent according to residue data from syringes (grinberga, 2021), but since the situation changes from year to year, trends related to covid-19 could not be identified. as regards the drug use patterns, due to a small sample size it is not possible to tackle the possible impact of the covid-19 from the survey data. furthermore, as already mentioned in the section on amphetamines, the data of the last drug user’s cohort study in 2020 is not yet available; therefore, a better understanding on how covid-19 has impacted high-risk drug users will be available in future cohort studies. 4.6. hallucinogens hallucinogens is another substance group that is difficult to tackle. as regards law enforcement data, a considerable increase can be observed in lsd on boarders in shipments entering latvia, but retail data show few seizure cases in latvia at the retail level (2019 – 67 retail seizures; 2021 – 28 retail seizures). this could be explained with a way how this substance is used – more often in nature or settings that will not attract law enforcement. the espad data show a slight, but not a significant increase in prevalence among students right before the pandemic – 3.7% in 2015 and 4.9% in 2019 (espad group, 2020). data in the general population survey in 2020 show low life-time prevalence in the general population – 1.4% whole population and 3.8% in the age group of 15–34-year-old respondents (putniņa, brants, 2021). due to a scarcity of data, it is not possible to tackle the covid-19 impact on the retail market. however, due to increased shipments to latvia, this is the substance that needs table 5. data on the retail drugs market and use of cocaine 2018 2019 2020 2021 other comments seizures (> 10 g) 131 80 110 65 purity (> 50 g) 62% 62% 53% 56% typical (mode) price per 1 g €90–130 €90–130 €90–130 €90–100 number of production (processing) sites 0 0 0 0 espad (ltp) 1.8% 2.3% (espad 2015) gps (ltp/lyp/lmp) 2.7%/ 1.3%/1.1% 1.5%/0.5%/0.3% (gps 2015) mini ewsd covid-19 small sample ewsd 2021   less – 26% same – 23% more – 16% don’t know – 30% wastewater (annual trend, weekends) no data 60.74 mg / 1000p 94.79 mg / 1000p 137.89 mg / 1000p sources: unpublished data of the state police; putniņa, brants, 2021; sniķere, trapencieris, 2016a, 2016b; espad group, 2020; emcdda, 2022 and secondary data analysis of ewsd 2017, mini ewsd covid-19, ewsd 2021. the covid-19 impact on the illegal retail drugs market in latvia and drug use patterns 25 to be monitored further, especially that the respondents of the ewsd 2021 reported lsd more often than cocaine (emcdda, 2021d and secondary data analysis). 4.7. benzodiazepines benzodiazepines is one of the substance groups that prevails on the illegal market. as regards use of these substances, pre-covid-19 trends were related to two user groups. high-risk users consume benzodiazepines, mainly clonazepam together with opioids. another trendy substance that entered the illegal market before the pandemic was xanax, which was mainly used by some groups of high school students. at the same time, to describe the situation, we have only law enforcement data and some scattered data from surveys. the law enforcement data does not show any sufficient changes on the retail market except for some increase in 2020 as regards the number of seizures of all benzodiazepines and then a decrease in 2021 (150 seizures in 2018; 155 – 2019; 173 – 2020; 139 – 2021). the high use of tranquillisers and sedatives were reported in the last espad survey right before the pandemic – 22% reported a use of such substances (espad group, 2020). when combining these results with other reports, most likely this increase was indeed related to the use of xanax, but there is a lack of data to understand how the pandemic might have affected the use of xanax. the results of the general population survey show the use of prescribed medication with or without an actual prescription; therefore, these results mostly show legal prescription and more frequent use in the older population (putniņa, brants, 2021). 5. discussion overall, the analysis was carried out on a basis of regularly available data without additional survey dedicated only to the impact of the pandemic on the retail drugs market or drug use patterns; therefore, there are several limitations that must be considered. firstly, routine administrative data and wastewater analysis results are the only data that are available on an annual basis. other data were collected in different years and are not comparable methodologywise; therefore, it is possible to tackle some indications without in-depth analysis. secondly, most data collection methodologies were prepared before the pandemic and are not tailored to tackle the impact of the pandemic. on the one hand, this allows us to compare situations before and during the pandemic; on the other hand, some more detailed trends could be left out. finally, it must be underlined that now when this analysis was carried out during pandemics when it is still not over, the real impact would only be visible in the long run. as regards the retail drugs market, the collected data on price, purity, organisation of purchasing and delivering substances does not show any considerable changes, except for some slight fluctuation for cannabis during the first covid-19 wave and a possible decrease in mdma prevalence in 2021. it is also necessary to underline that covid-19 has not changed the means of purchasing and delivering substances. even though initially it was predicted that the role of darknet would increase, for latvia it has not been the case. cannabis seems to be the substance that has been to some extent influenced by the first covid-19 restrictions. since that is the most prevalent substance as regards use, the initial restrictions and uncertainty related to the closure of borders might have boosted domestic production both profitdriven and for personal use. there is some data that could suggest fluctuations in prices during the first wave of the pandemic, which was not observed anymore in 2021 and could indicate that the market was stable. but in the case of cannabis, it is important to add that some data might suggest more use among frequent users similarly as it was observed in other eu countries (emcdda, 2021d). at the same time, an increasing trend in the cannabis use was observed already before the pandemic from the routine administrative data and some surveys (e.g., žabko et al., 2020; espad group, 2020), which could suggest that covid-19 accelerated the trend even more, similarly to some other countries (e.g. bonny-noach et al., 2021). mdma is another substance that was on the increase before the pandemic, but results of how covid-19 could have affected mdma mainly indicate a decrease in 2021. according to routine administrative data and wastewater analysis in 2020, mdma prevalence was still increasing, but in 2021 this prevalence decreased. this could be easily explained with harsher restrictions in 2021, and consequently less entertainment opportunities (similarly to conclusions of bendau et al., 2022; price et al., 2021). however, similarly to cannabis frequent users, also mdma frequent users reported more use due to covid-19. therefore, most likely, we can conclude that there is an overall decreasing trend with some exceptions for some groups. as regards other substance groups, the available data are too scarce to draw a conclusion on how the pandemic has affected the retail market and users. opioids and amphetamines are substances used 26 agnese zīle-veisberga by high-risk users, and available routine data (seizures, purity, price) does not suggest any changes, but a more in-depth study on this group would be necessary. there is also scarce data to understand possible changes in cocaine and hallucinogens use, mainly because this market is small. but more studies are necessary to understand benzodiazepine use, in particular use of xanax among young people, as this might be the area affected by covid-19. finally, as regards possible post-covid-19 implications, it does not seem that the retail illegal market will have any consequences. drug use patterns are similar to those before the pandemic, with some exceptions related to more use among frequent users, which must be considered in future health provisions. according to these results, the covid-19 impact on drug use or the illegal retail market is close to nothing; therefore, there is a question if the situation has not changed and whether there are going to be any implications. at this point it does not seem to be the case, but currently we only have surface short-term observation. presumably, only in a couple of years would it be possible to see long-term effects, including the overload of the health care system that most likely will have an impact on many people, including drug users. 6. conclusion in conclusion, the findings suggest that covid-19 so far has not left any considerable impact on the illegal market. after some uncertainty during the first wave that had caused more cannabis cultivation, the overall market seems to be stable and operating as before. in addition, the role of the darknet has not increased. also, available data suggest that drug use patterns have not changed either, except for some indications that frequent users of cannabis and mdma might be using more because of the covid-19 situation. still, there is a lack of data on high-risk drug use, so currently there is no information on if and how the pandemic has affected this population. possible post-covid-19 implications were not identified, but at the moment of preparing the article, the covid-19 is still present. therefore, possible long-term impact of the pandemic could be visible in forthcoming years. references bebre k., 2021, “you only do it with people you know”: a case study of acquisition strategies by cannabis engagers in riga, latvia, kriminologische 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https://doi.org/10.1111/add.15620 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2021.109150 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2021.109150 1. small businesses development – the condition of the middle class formation as a basis of stability of a state entrepreneurship is seen as a special activity for profit. it covers research, technical and commercial work. it possesses innovative approaches to economic decision-making, creative combination of financial resources, tangible and intangible resources, intellectual property for new products or services that are in demand. employers care about increasing personal income through the use of the latest commercial technologies, production methods. they cover new areas of capital application, care about the most efficient use of resources. entrepreneurship is the force which accelerates the movement of economy through efficiency, rationalization and freshness. it creates innovative environment, destroys traditional structures and opens the way to transformation and growth of society, in particular – to expand the middle class and ensure its prosperity. activities of the middle class and social behavior of its representatives will determine the direction of the ukrainian society. the formation and growth of the middle class in ukraine is the need of time. from the social point of view, the middle class has the following characteristics: adequate income level, high level of education and skills, moderate political journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(2), 25–33 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.009.5165 features of small business development in ukraine yevhen matviyishyn (1), taras mahats (2) 1) lviv regional institute of public administration of the national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, sukhomlynskoho 16, 79491 briukhovychi-lviv, ukraine e-mail: emat@ua.fm (corresponding author) (2) lviv regional institute of public administration of the national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, sukhomlynskoho 16, 79491 briukhovychi-lviv, ukraine e-mail: t.magac@gmail.com citation matviyishyn y., mahats t., 2015, freatures of small business development in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(2), 25–33. abstract the study is to show the main aspects of small business development in ukraine. the features of business formation in the first years of independence have been observed, among which the power and business fusion, the use of political rent and so on. the features ukrainian legislation which regulates the activities of small businesses were described, and the latest legislative changes aimed at simplifying these activities. it is suggested to improve the conditions of freelancers’ activities due to introducing simplified requirements for documenting their work in ukraine. attention is paid to defend the interests of small businesses in ukraine through their ngos. key words entrepreneurship, freelance, middle class, political rent, taxes. 26 yevhen matviyishyn, taras mahats conservatism, interest in maintaining social stability and marginal ideologies rejection, etc (ляпін, 2009). in the developed countries, the middle class constitutes the majority of the population and is the main carrier of public interests and national culture (social values, norms, patterns of behavior, lifestyle, etc.). the middle class is a cultural integrator of a society and distributes the samples of their own culture to other segments of a society. there are no clear parameters that people belong to the middle class. about this group of people, they say, “the middle class – those who earn so much that can not think only about survival but about life”. the gorshenin kyiv institute of management investigation showed that in ukraine the middle class may include no more than 9% of the population, while in the west the middle class are 50–70% of the population (зануда, 2007). the polls have shown that although only 5.8% of ukrainians can afford significant costs and purchases of durable goods, but a significant number of respondents (44%) considered themselves to be of middle class. the researchers explain these results that the respondents do not want to classify themselves with the lower class (кардаш, 2013). academician igor yukhnovsky proved that with no legal provisions protecting the middle class the society is rolled down to so-called bimodal type, which is dominated by the poor, the middle is very small, and the bulk of the wealth is concentrated in a small number of rich (чи можна…, 2008). such a society is unstable, it has revolutionary sentiments, low motivation to achieve business success through legal difficulties for business development. western countries have come the evolutionary path of the middle class on the basis of business development. for example, in poland the small business development provoked social and mental changes in polish society, has helped to create a middle class, made it possible to experience the independence, autonomy from the government, big business and oligarchs. according to rafal sadowski, expert of the centre for eastern studies (poland), ukraine has not recognized the urgent need to develop a small business. therefore, we have some minor changes: licensing procedures reduction, canceled some licenses, but it is not enough (потенціал малого…, 2015). the same view is shared by other experts. they believe that for ukraine “the lack of improvement in the conditions for the development of small and medium-sized firms and the still insufficient deregulation of the economy are being the main problems” (konończuk et al., 2015). however, a comprehensive initiative to support young entrepreneurs must become an effective instrument for the formation of a strong middle class. a key role in the formation and development of entrepreneurship plays a business environment. important factors that environment is legislation, human resources, availability of financial, commodity and energy resources, purchasing power and so on. in ukraine, the conditions of business have been changing since the period of independence of the country in 1991. in the early years of independence of ukraine business formation faced with a population unwillingness to take the initiative and be responsible for it. lacking the pro-market political elite and “homo sovieticus” people dominated (radchenko et al., 2014). at that time there were four types of entrepreneurs: 1. entrepreneurs “of necessity” – people who were forced to engage in small business to survive. it was a numerous group of people, consisting of former employees of companies and research institutions that have become unemployed. the main scope of business activities was a petty trade. 2. “red” entrepreneurs – former heads of state enterprises, party and komsomol organizations, new heads of government. some have access to the means of production and used them for personal profit through formation of various cooperatives and joint stock companies. the latter used the opportunity to influence government in the privatization process, as concluding lucrative contracts, obtaining tax benefits. there was a merger of power and business: the authorities were businessmen, and government officials and their family members founded the company and bought shares. 3. successful entrepreneurs – individuals who were able to quickly use blanks of ukrainian legislation, business contacts, differences in exchange rates and the prices of products in the domestic and global markets. the main areas of business activity were financial, trade and mediation, exports and so on. this group of entrepreneurs could quickly accumulate capital. 4. “criminal” entrepreneurs – came through the legalization of criminal capital. it had various sources. one of them – revenues from “services” that bandit formations gave the entrepreneurs which were not protected by law enforcement. other – formation of various trust organizations that promised investors high profits, but in fact artificially bankrupted them and appropriated the borrowed funds. in general, the formation of business in ukraine began spontaneously, often illegally and through the blending of business with the government. you can not talk about the evolutionary development of features of small business development in ukraine 27 entrepreneurship, but about the accelerated one, accompanied by rapid enrichment of entrepreneurs, particularly through political rent. in ukraine the situation is clearly evident when “governmental intervention in the economy assigns resource allocation power to bureaucracy, and therefore allows capturing political rents through corruption” (lazarev, 2004, p.  11). the above circumstances have caused low orientation of ukrainian entrepreneurs on production and new technologies, and low percentage of people who are of a middle class. 2. features of legislation governing small businee activity in ukraine the choice of legal form of business in ukraine is very important issue before starting business. rights of private entrepreneurs in ukraine are almost the same as the rights of corporate entities, with some benefits and disadvantages in comparison with corporate entities. the law sets limit on the list of people who can conduct business. for example, the militaries, prosecutors, judges, officials of public authorities cannot be private entrepreneurs. and this prohibition applies to persons for which barred the court, or who have not withdrawn or not canceled for acquisitive crimes. legislation regulating business activity in ukraine was undergoing many changes and additions. according to the commercial code small business include entities whose annual income does not exceed 10 million euros and the number of employees not exceed 50 persons. the composition of small business includes so-called micro. there we include entities in which the annual income does not exceed 2 million euros and the number of employees do not exceed 10 persons. significant opportunities for small businesses opened with the introduction and development of a simplified tax system. it was established by presidential decree of ukraine back in 1998 and was reflected in the tax code, adopted in december 2010. simplified tax system – a special tax collection mechanism, which states: • replacement of the payment of certain taxes to pay a single tax; • maintenance of simplified accounting and reporting. tax code considered several groups of single tax payers, depending on the size of revenues, number of employees and economic activities. after 2015 it provided the activities of four groups of single tax payers: 1. individual entrepreneurs who do not use hired labor of persons engaged exclusively in retail sales of goods from trading places in the markets or providing domestic services to the population, if the amount of income for the year does not exceed 300 thousand uah. for this group of single tax payers, the village, town and city councils have a fixed rate within 10% of the minimum wage. 2. individual entrepreneurs who provide various services to single taxpayers and for the public, engaged in the production or sale of goods, are active in the restaurant business if the number of people who are with them in employment is less than 10 persons, and the volume of income for the year does not exceed 1.5 million uah. for this group of taxpayers, a single tax rate is fixed within 20% of the minimum wage. 3. individual entrepreneurs and legal entities – entities in which the amount of income for the year exceeds 20 million uah (after 2016 will be 5 million uah). for this group of single tax payers, it is established a rate of 2% of income (after 2016 will be 3%) – in case of payment of value added tax or 4% of income (after 2016 will be 5%) – in the case of inclusion of vat the single tax under the tax code. 4. agricultural producers, whose share of agricultural commodity production for the previous financial year equals or exceeds 75%. for this group of single taxpayers, the tax rate is set for each hectare of agricultural land or water fund lands. size rate (percentage of the tax base) depends on the category of land and their location according to the tax code. however, not all businesses can be single tax. for example, it can not be single tax entities (legal entities and individual entrepreneurs) engaged in: • organization of gambling, lotteries, tote boards; • foreign currancy exchange; • production, export, import, sale of excisable products; • mining, production, sale of precious metals and precious stones (excluding the production, delivery, sale of jewelery and household articles of precious metals, precious stones); • production, realization of mineral resources, the realization of mineral resources other than local importance; • activities of financial intermediation, except the business of insurance, carried out by insurance agents; • activities of business management; • activities to provide mail services (except courier activities) and communication; 28 yevhen matviyishyn, taras mahats • sales activities of art and antiques, the activities of the organization bidding (auction) products of art, collectibles or antiques; • conducting of touring activities. in spite of the single tax, businesses pay a single social contribution. its size does not depend on revenues, but only – from the number of employees. minimum amount of this contribution is 34.7% of the minimum wage in ukraine of the currant month (after 2016 will be 22%). along with a decrease in the size of this contribution for individual entrepreneurs of the third and fourth groups the single tax rate rises. at the end of 2015 in ukraine there was a wave of protests of agricultural producers, for which the single tax rate increases by 80% and abolished exemptions of vat. to protect their interests, this group of entrepreneurs were even blocking roads in international traffic. farmers unite in civic organizations and associations. for example, the association “land union of ukraine” has shown itself as experienced and professional organization in the field of land relations in ukraine. it is engaged not only in spreading awareness on land issues, but also in regulatory activities. this association grew convinced in its effectiveness while interacting with public authorities and ngos, participating in the development of recommendations to legislation and regulations and promoting adoption thereof. since 2015 the government introduced payment to the local budget the excise tax on the retail sale of excisable goods and simultaneously abolished the duty on the development of viticulture, horticulture and hop growing. payers of this tax are business retailers who sell regardless of the forms of payment, including the pouring glasses in restaurants, cafes, bars and other catering establishments such excisable goods as: beer, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gasoline, diesel fuel, liquefied gas, etc. excise tax is paid to the local budgets of the administrative units in which businesses are situated. the tax is transferred to the budget within 10 calendar days after the tax return for the month. an entity retailer who sells excisable goods, including the places where the main place of residence is not registered must file tax returns to the regulatory agencies that serve territorial administrative units, which are selling items of such goods. for a long time, it was difficult for ukrainian entrepreneurs to terminate the business activities due to time-consuming procedures to close. in 2014 the relevant procedures were considerably simplified. in particular, it was introduced a radically altered order of termination of business for persons, which provided for the reduction of the termination term of individual entrepreneur to one day. it was also simplified the procedure for termination of legal entities and given the opportunity to make changes to the data in the unified state register after the decision to terminate the legal person. for example, now it is not prohibited to provide a state registration of legal person founder (participant) which is a legal person on whom the decision to terminate his business was made. in general, ukrainian legislation regulating entrepreneurial activity is constantly changing. the postmaidan ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and the enormous demand for change among the ukrainian public (konończuk et al., 2015). some steps have already been done. in particular, it was performed a series of measures to deregulate business activities. for example, a number of simplified procedures for architectural control, they also reduced the number of state oversight, simplified procedures for the use of agricultural land. in 2014 at the initiative of the business environment the business ombudsman council was created. it is an independent advisory body under the cabinet of ministers of ukraine, which helps to create transparent conditions of business, preventing corruption in government (business ombudsman council, 2015). in 2015, a system of electronic public procurement prozorro appeared, an idea which originated among entrepreneurs and was supported by the government (prozorro…, 2015). the corresponding changes are aimed at facilitating business and corruption reduction. despite a number of steps to improve legislation governing business activities, ukraine is at the bottom of the list of countries of economic freedom. according to the web-resource index of economic freedom, the rule of law is particularly weak. the investment regime remains closed, with foreign investment competing with large state-owned enterprises. a rigid labor market and bureaucratic business regulations inhibit the development of a dynamic private sector (index of economic freedom, 2015). therefore, it is necessary to carry out many activities to simplify the business environment. 3. dynamics and geographic features of small business processes in ukraine changes in business activity conditions caused that the number of small businesses in ukraine also changed. their number was affected in some regions by the fact of large industrial enterprises and educational and research institutions presence. features of small business development in ukraine 29 since the small business includes entities in which the annual income does not exceed 10 million euros, their number is affected by the change rate of the ukrainian hryvnia. the dynamics of small business in ukraine is presented by quantitative and qualitative indicators. some statistical information about the activities of business entities is hidden because of its confidentiality. fig. 1. the percentage of persons employed in small business in the total population in the regions of ukraine and in cities of kyiv and sevastopol source: calculated according to: діяльність суб’єктів…, 2015. tab. 1. number of workers employed in small businesses in ukraine type of economic activity number of employees, thsd. 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 agriculture, forestry and fisheries 263 233,4 258,3 276,6 296,8 industry 554,4 513,7 509,8 514,1 456,5 building 302 259,2 241,4 ...p ...p wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 2258,5 1990,7 1838,6 1814,8 1763,9 transportation, storage, postal and courier activities 302,5 264,1 258,4 256,1 254,4 the temporary arrangement of catering 182,8 178 190,8 194,5 156,6 information and telecommunications 130,1 129,8 141,9 159 182,1 financial and insurance activities 36,1 31,7 27,9 ...p ...p real estate 187 177,3 216,2 218,3 204,7 professional, scientific and technical activities 257,6 226,2 213,4 216,1 218,4 activities in administrative and support services 181,2 163,5 144,4 145,6 134,1 education 28,3 25,1 22,6 23,9 22,7 health care and social assistance 54,3 58,5 60 59,8 57 arts, sports, entertainment and recreation 24,1 23,3 23,8 ...p 25,2 providing other services 196,7 167,5 137,7 ...p ...p total 4958,6 4442 4285,2 4291,2 4115,2 p – extracted data to enforce the law of ukraine “on state statistics” on privacy source: діяльність суб’єктів…, 2015. 30 yevhen matviyishyn, taras mahats small business is unevenly distributed in the regions of ukraine. we calculated the percentage of people who are employed in small business in the total population in the regions of ukraine, autonomous republic  of crimea, cities of kyiv and sevastopol. data are taken on the results of 2013, to have information before the time of annexation of the ar of crimea and temporary occupation of parts of donetsk and lugansk regions by the russian federation. the calculation results are shown in fig. 1. the obvious leader in percentage of persons employed in small business in the total population is the capital of ukraine. partially, this high figure can be explained by the fact that kyiv actually resides more people than registered: many people rented housing, but they are not registered; that is why the “day” kyiv population is much higher than its official number. in addition, the said percentage is affected by the fact that in kyiv are recorded a lot of small businesses that operate in other areas. after 2014 the percentage of people who are employed in small businesses significantly reduced, in the total population in donetsk (from 3.4% to 1.3%) and luhansk (from 2.8% to 0.7%). this can be explained by the fact that a large number of enterprises were liquidated or re-registered in other regions of ukraine. in general, in ukraine the number of employed in small business decreased from 2.011  mln persons in 2013 to 1.687  mln persons in 2014 (ie 16%). the spread of small business in various economic activities is shown according to data of the number tab. 2. relative number of individual entrepreneurs in the regions of ukraine № region number of individual enterpreneurs for 10 thousand of population growth (decrease) rate for the period, % on 01.01.14 on 01.01.15 1 ar of crimea 733 733 0 2 vinnytsia 670 593 -11,49 3 volyn 526 440 -16,24 4 dnipropetrovsk 664 571 -13,99 5 donetsk 548 406 -25,79 6 zhytomyr 589 491 -16,6 7 transcarpathian 475 413 -12,94 8 zaporizhia 713 581 -18,5 9 ivano-frankivsk 510 424 -16,78 10 kyiv 739 656 -11,24 11 kirovograd 489 412 -15,81 12 luhansk 714 623 -12,73 13 lviv 798 757 -5,12 14 mykolaiv 694 531 -23,49 15 odesa 859 726 -15,5 16 poltava 605 496 -18,03 17 rivne 448 378 -15,67 18 sumy 562 480 -14,57 19 ternopil 541 465 -14,03 20 kharkiv 828 757 -8,59 21 kherson 686 578 -15,74 22 khmelnytsk 524 423 -19,26 23 cherkasy 485 416 -14,1 24 chernivtsi 788 713 -9,6 25 chernihiv 483 387 -19,86 26 kyiv city 918 851 -7,33 27 sevastopol city 898 893 -0,57 total 667 579 -13,25 source: реєстраційні дані…, 2015. features of small business development in ukraine 31 of workers employed (table  1). number of employees is determined on the basis of full-time, freelance and unpaid (owners, founders and members of their families) employees. some small businesses are registered to reduce taxes of large firms. in fact, the number of independent small businesses is less than recorded. a relatively large percentage of persons employed in small business in the total population is in the areas with a strong industrial and scientific base: kyiv, odesa, kharkiv, dnipropetrovsk, zaporizhia, mykolaiv and in sevastopol. the reasons for the uneven spread of small business may be the different possibilities of access to financial resources and government contracts, various capacity markets for products of local manufacturers, different levels of competition from foreign companies, the willingness of the population to entrepreneurship. the latter factor can be judged by the proliferation of individual entrepreneurs in the regions of ukraine. table  2 shows the state registration service of ukraine data: the relative number of individual entrepreneurs (for 10 thousand of population). according to these data, the activity of individual entrepreneurs is most common in the following regions of ukraine: sevastopol, kyiv city, lviv, kharkiv, odesa, chernivtsi regions and the ar of crimea. reducing the number of individuals in all regions of ukraine in 2014 is due to the general economic downturn and the military conflict in the east and the reduction of trade ties with russia. import and export with the country declined for two years, about three times (russia and ukraine…, 2015). in addition, many individual entrepreneurs benefited introduced in 2014 a simplification of the termination of business activities. the numbers of crimean individual entrepreneurs have not changed, because for the termination of their businesses they need to apply what entrepreneurs from autonomous republic of crimea and sevastopol can not do because of the annexation of the territory by the russian federation. 4. freelance development in ukraine expanding economic ties between countries, mobility of people and development of information technologies contribute to the spread of a particular type of enterprise – freelancing. freelancer – a professional who performs tasks for different customers without conclusion of labor contracts with them. freelance has a number of advantages both for employees and for employers. freelancer can choose the order, work at a convenient time and in a convenient location, such as at home. this is especially important for those who care for children or sick relatives and for disabled persons for whom it is a hard task to go to work. freelance can be combined with the main work for additional earnings. for freelance employer the advantage is in that there is no need to equip workplaces for employees moreover they are able to choose the best deals offered by various freelancers. freelance today has no geographical limitations, you can place orders and execute remotely, including via the internet. these circumstances led to rapid growth of freelance in ukraine and in the world as a whole. in august 2015, financial times published that up to 2014 there were recorded 120 thousand ukrainian freelancers, they executed 40 thousand contracts and earned 61 million dollars. (fourth in the world according to online platforms upwork) (new world of…, 2015). ukraine lost to india, usa and the philippines. following the results of 2014 ukraine retains market leadership of freelance programming, executing third orders, attributable to eastern europe (зюзін, 2015). approximately half of the orders were from freelancers living in kyiv, kharkiv and zaporizhia (ящишина, 2015). in terms of earnings freelancers in the it field significantly differ in different regions of ukraine (fig. 2). freelance in ukraine is developing steadily, but somewhat spontaneously. it is important to develop the appropriate legal support. while ukrainian legislation related to business in the form of freelancing is imperfect. in particular, for taxes we need to fill a number of documents both a freelancer and employer. moreover, a freelancer who requires from an employer documents provided by law (including acts of performed works), is less likely to get the order than the one who does not put such demands. analysis of internet forums where ukrainian freelancers communicate shows that many of them do not pay taxes and take risk of being punished by fiscal authorities. they are willing to pay taxes if the procedure has been simplified. some freelancers in ukraine decorate their activity as individual entrepreneurs. however, in this case, they face a number of difficulties associated with full documentation filling of each order. ukraine has implemented some measures to ease freelancers’ activities. in particular, in 2015 the national bank of ukraine has simplified the procedure of cooperation of ukrainian freelancers who work through the internet, with its foreign customers, canceled the contracts and acts of peformed works for freelancers’ work exports. now, it is enough to show an invoice, which will serve as a proof of 32 yevhen matviyishyn, taras mahats completed work and will help to get the earned money quickly. some help for business development in the form of freelancing, is also provided by local authorities. for example, in lviv they established a business incubator “startup depot”, for which the city council has given a room. “startup depot” – is a business incubator for it projects and place of consultation and cooperation for entrepreneurs, designers and other creative people (startup depot…, no data). entrepreneurship in information technology has prospects in ukraine, because here we have a high level of training. to simplify the business environment appropriate for freelancers it is needed to change the requirements for taxes payment. for example, payment of the single social tax could provide only for those months when a freelance has provided the related services. to defend their interests, entrepreneurs of ukraine formed a number of public organizations (ngo). it is advisable to create such civic organizations specifically to defend the interests of freelancers. 5. summary the society is the more stable, the more powerful is its middle class. an important condition of the middle class formation is the development of entrepreneurship. a vivid example is poland, where the small business development led to social and mental changes in the society, it helped to create a middle class, it gave him an opportunity to feel the confidence and independence from the government, big business and oligarchs. in ukraine, it began spontaneously, forming entrepreneurship, using the imperfections of the law. there was a merger of power and business: government officials and their family members founded the companies, using access resources through the political rent. there was no evolution of business but rapid development, accompanied by rapid enrichment of entrepreneurs and low orientation of ukrainian entrepreneurs on production and new technologies. to form a strong middle class, it is necessary to improve legislation and develop infrastructure to promote small business. the benefits of acting as the private entrepreneur in ukraine are: • rather simple procedure of state registration (the procedure of registration is similar to corporate entity, but less complicated); • rather favorable tax regime (especially single tax); • he may transact business directly as entrepreneur with or without the involvement of hired labor. • the main barriers for small business development in ukraine are: • bureaucratic business regulations; • high level of corruption; • low level of willingness of the population to entrepreneurship; • frequent changes of legislation. in ukraine, there have been some positive changes in the laws regulating the business. for example, fig. 2. average earnings of ukrainian freelancers working in the it field (dollars per hour in 2013) source: stats odesk, 2014. features of small business development in ukraine 33 a simplified procedure for business activities termination for individual entrepreneurs now it takes only one day, reduced the number of state oversight, simplified the set of procedures of architectural control. a single social tax paid by employers will be significantly reduced in ukraine. for freelancers who perform work for foreign clients the paper filling work is simplified as well as the documentation of their relationship and the procedure for obtaining payment for works through banks. the electronic public procurement system is established; it helps to attract businesses to fulfill government orders. however, we need some further steps to promote the development of small business. in particular, it is appropriate to simplify the working conditions for freelancers, so that it would be not beneficial to conceal earnings. many of them are willing to pay taxes if the procedure will not hinder their competitiveness in the market. to defend their interests, entrepreneurs, including freelancers need to develop a network of ngos. references business ombudsman council, 2015, https://boi.org.ua/en/ [05.12.2015] index of economic freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/ country/ukraine [30.12.2015] konończuk w., iwański t., olszański t., żochowski p., 2015, the bumpy road. difficult reform process in ukraine, series: osw commentary, no. 192, centre for eastern studies, warsaw. lazarev v., 2004, political rents, promotion incentives, and support for a non-democratic regime, series: center discussion paper, no.  882, leibniz information centre for economics, new haven. new world of work: digital marketplace reshapes casual labour, 2015, financial times, http://www.ft.com/intl/ cms/s/2/6a23a27c-3500-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852. html#axzz3hxyfrofm [05.08.2015] prozorro: ukraine government procurement, http://prozorro. org/en/ [30.12.2015]. radchenko o., kuczabski a., michalski t., 2014, main factors affecting the social transformation process in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 4, 7–17. russia and ukraine finally break up, 2015, bloomberg view http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-30/ russia-and-ukraine-finally-break-up?cmpid=yhoo.headline [30.12.2015] startup depot. lviv business incubator & coworking, http:// startupdepot.lviv.ua/home-page/ [05.01.2016] stats odesk, 2014, http://dou.ua/lenta/articles/odesk-stats/ [14.04.2014] діяльність суб’єктів великого, середнього, малого та мікропідприємництва, 2015, державна служба статистики україни, київ. зануда  а., 2007, в україні малочисельний середній клас, http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/indepth/story/2007/05/ printable/070520_ukr_middleclass_is.shtml [30.12.2015] зюзін  в., 2015, чому фріланс став таким популярним в україні, http://news.finance.ua/ua/news/-/354270/ chomu-frilans-stav-tak ym-populyarnym-v-uk rayini [10.07.2015] кардаш с., 2013, “дивний” середній клас в україні, http:// zavantag.com/docs/116/index-455898.html [30.12.2015] ляпін  д., 2009, лібералізація економіки та розвиток малого підприємництва в україні, вісник київсько го національного торговельно-економічного університету, 5, 66–74. потенціал малого бізнесу? спасибі, не цікавить, 2015, дзеркало тижня, 16.10.2015, 5. реєстраційні дані щодо фізичних осіб-підприємців в україні, 2015, державна реєстраційна служба україни, drsu. gov.ua/file/14219 [01.01.2015] чи можна “скасувати” закони суспільства? про комунізм, утопізм та місію середнього класу, 2008, день, 3, [12.04.2008]. ящишина і. в., 2015, інноваційно-інформаційна економіка: зміни у трудових відносинах, ефективна економіка, http://www.economy.nayk a.com.ua/?op=1&z=3769 [30.12.2015] 1. introduction: globalization and global information society for nearly a quarter of a century we have been observing the development of a new social formation called the global information society (gsi). it is a product of changes taking place all over the world under the influence of technological development, especially in the field of computerization and telecommunications. becoming ubiquitous in everyday life, these areas also affect the economy and the public sphere. it plays a major role in the effective processing and use of information. three important tools for the development of the information society: data, information and knowledge form the basis for building such new fields of science, as knowledge management, and are also resources that affect the functioning of national economies and information society (zins, 2007). financial and industrial capital is replaced by educated human capital, and as part of globalization, a new form of economics is developing – knowledge-based economy (kbe). knowledge is a substitute for all factors of production, which is why, as an american researcher m. castells rightly points out (2010, p. 150): “information is a raw material: there are technologies working on information, journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(1), 15–22 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.1.03 information and communication technology (ict) as a source of development of states and regions in the age of globalization agnieszka bógdał-brzezińska faculty of political science and international studies, university of warsaw, krakowskie przedmieście 26/28, 00-927 warsaw, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-0247-1941 e-mail: bogdal@uw.edu.pl citation bógdał-brzezińska a., 2020, information and communication technology (ict) as a source of development of states and regions in the age of globalization, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(1), 15–22. abstract the article presents the current evolution of the global information society and the problem of digital divide. an additional category is globalization, which has been presented as an accelerator for the development of a global information society. the role of ict in filling the development gap between regions of the world was identified on the basis of the un classification. the concept of “digital divide” was introduced as a synonym for a new kind of development gap between the rich north and the poor south, and analysis of data from un publications showed a constant high diversity of the global information society, which is clearly regionalized. key words global information society, globalization, digital divide, development, information and communications technologies. received: 09 december 2019 accepted: 12 february 2020 published: 31 march 2020 16 agnieszka bógdał-brzezińska just as there are technologies for coal”. therefore, a modern enterprise faces the need to invest in knowledge and innovation as a basic production resource, while human capital becomes a fundamental investment capital. the knowledge-based economy develops unevenly across regions and groups of countries. developmental inequalities can be clearly seen on the example of e-commerce in individual regions. the new economy (a new form of global economy based on the wide use of ict) was to become a panacea for the ills of global underdevelopment of the countries of the south; however, pessimistic scenarios for the development of kbe and the information society (see below) have proven themselves. in the 1990s, un secretary general k. annan assessed that the emergence of e-commerce had radically changed the economic and social landscape (bógdałbrzezińska, 2005). for developing countries, the digital revolution brings unprecedented opportunities for economic growth and development. however, the use of e-commerce requires that consumers and enterprises meet the appropriate conditions: access – cheap computer infrastructure and cheap connection; know-how – an appropriate level of education and skills; trust – resulting from the security of electronic transactions. “globalization is a concept cited in social and economic sciences and popular journalism as often as the concept of information society. it occurs in the context of economic, social, political and cultural theories, as well as in journalism (...) contemporary information societies are subject to all the effects of globalization, and theories of globalization remain in the field of information society theory and practice” (doktorowicz, 2005, p. 95). the relationship between globalization and the development of the information society is noticed by all researchers interested in them, such as: a. giddens (2010), m. castells (2010), and z. bauman (2006). most of them combine globalization with the emergence of conditions for the emancipation of society from the cultural and economic rules governing the modern era. global processes are synchronous with the construction of the information society in the economically and politically dominant regions of the world, where the information sectors of the economy have become the most important force accelerating globalization and integration. globalization processes affect a number of phenomena integrally associated with the development of the information society. one can speak of a correlation between globalization and the information society, without explicitly deciding which of the tested qualities is primary. rather, it should be assumed that at the current stage of their development, the information society stimulates and is subject to the influence of globalization processes. the following reflect this trend: • rapid development of information and communication technologies (heeks, 2010); • universality of e-commerce and e-finance (erdal, burcu, 2014); • global transfer of data and information via the internet; • increase of opinion-forming and political significance of the media (fourth power); • uniformization of social behavior: model and lifestyle, consumption and leisure (debarbieux, 2019); • increasing the political role of ict transnational corporations in the tnc (watson, 2002; ietto-gillies, 2019); • creation of new virtual communities, social networks (duernecker, vega-redondo, 2018); • creating new political elites – knowledge managers and specialists in the field of pr (tomé, figueiredo, 2015); • strengthening the development gap between the rich north and the poor south, and as a consequence – the use of ict as fighting tools by terrorist groups, e.g.: al. kaida, daesh (choi et al., 2018; ranstorp, 2007). in the face of technological changes, not only are the strongest countries tested, but also all social institutions. l.w. zacher (2007) – a careful long-term observer of social and political changes and a gsi theoretician – emphasizes that we are dealing with metamorphosis in this field of an organizational nature. traditional prescriptive and hierarchical industrial society with clear structures and clear levels of decision-making is transformed into an amorphous, networked and atomized society. social practice determines the functioning of existing organizational principles on a macro scale, hitting the institutions and structures poorly adaptable to realities of the digital age. the world is becoming a growing network rather than institutionalized, and its structures are atomized. in this world, however, competition continues in the field of using progress tools technology, access to knowledge, innovation and modern technologies. this competition has a geographical dimension insofar as it takes place between territorial states which are global in nature but possess the headquarters of international enterprises and institutions or intergovernmental organizations. “corporate capital is using the new technology to integrate global markets for finance, technology, and skilled and professional labor but becoming increasingly indifferent to unemployment, rural and urban information and communication technology (ict ) as a source of development of states and regions… 17 blight, and racial and gender problems” (watson, 2002, p. 34). change in employment structures, related to knowledge as production factors, available to the emergence of new social classes, including a class called information workers, of which today, employees providing off sourcing services are a reliable example and offshoring, as well as new knowledge elites called cognitivism, among them managers of information management and scientists. 2. digital divide as a global question in the debate on the impact of ict on international relations, a vast majority of issues are addressed: the impact of digital technologies on the economic and social development of states and changes in the sphere of international security under the influence of ict. more recent studies and analyses aim to update an answer to the question: how do science and technology affect international affairs? (weiss, 2015). the article presents the relationship between changes in ict development in individual countries and regions and the issue of international security. the relationship between the digital divide and the level of democracy in states will be omitted in this paper (cf. e.g. min, 2010). at the end of the 20th century the issue of universal computerization and its effects became the subject of increasingly lively international discussion. for so many months, the global problem was an effect of the year 2000 (y2000, y2m), which is a technical matter of changing the date from 1999 to 2000 in the configuration of computer systems based on microsoft software (li et al., 1999). until the turn of the century, little attention was given to global policy in the relationship between international security and the development of ict. even key researchers primarily considered the relationship between ict and economic and social development in countries (nye, 2004). in the early 2000s, the attention of international institutions was focused on the asymmetry of access to digital technologies. among them, the un and its affiliated organizations played a key role, including itu and undp (role of undp ..., 2001). at the end of the 1990s, actions were taken to organize the world summit on the information society (wsis), the first part of which was held in geneva in 2003 and the second part in 2005 in tunis. owing to the un secretary general koffie annan, the geneva summit became a forum for debate on digital divide and seeking remedies against the deepening of development inequalities between countries leading in digital technologies and countries in a state of digital underdevelopment (bógdał-brzezińska, 2005). the report working group on internet governance (wgig) was an important summary of previous activities (report of the working..., 2005). the then prepared analyses on the asymmetry of technological development of the “rich north” and the “poor south” became a subject of political debate at the highest level. international institutions indicated that “new information and communications technologies are driving globalization, but polarizing the world into the connected and the isolated” (human development report, 1999, p. 5). in “declaration of principles building the information society: a global challenge in the new millennium” (2003), the summit participants committed to: ensuring universal, equal and affordable access to ict infrastructure and services; facilitating access to public domains and expanding knowledge of the possibilities of computer software; protecting freedom of expression and ensuring independence and a variety of mass media; recognizing the individual’s right to free and full development; emphasizing women’s role in creating the information society and ensuring equal access to ict for them. in the researchers’ comments following the wsis in geneva (padovani, 2004), reference was made to forecasts of j. galtung, a researcher of international development inequalities. his visionary concepts concerned both the danger of a downfall of developing countries (failed states) as well as international terrorism and the war against terrorism (galtung, 1969). 3. digital divide – a new formula for the “development gap” in the itu measurements and activities 3.1. digital divide definition and measurement issues at the beginning of this century, the so-called brandt’s line divided the world into the rich north and the poor south with a new phenomenon called the “digital divide”. there have also been opinions that the digital divide is a new form of dependence of developing countries on technologically advanced ones (wade, 2002; schopp et al., 2019). it was emphasized that “less developed countries are poorly equipped with modern information and communication technologies, which are the driving forces of globalization, which pushes them to a further margin. the world is increasingly divided into ‘connected’ and ‘unconnected’, and the lack of access to telephones or the internet only aggravates the 18 agnieszka bógdał-brzezińska backwardness and parochialism of those who have fallen behind. inequalities in ‘information economy’ (…) are self-reproducing. controlling knowledge and information have such an impact on economics that they may be prevented from influencing it” (anioł, 2002, p. 119). what is the digital divide? this is how the gap in access to information and communication technologies is measured, e.g. by the size of telephone networks connected to the internet; the gap in ict skills and free or cheap access to modern technologies; the gap in the use of ict measured by the number of telephone conversations, the number of computer hosts, the number of people online, or the scale of the use of the internet in business and politics, etc.; it is finally a gap in the impact of ict on the functioning of societies – the importance for the economy and finances of the state, e-governance, education, and health care. ways of measuring the digital divide are a subject of scientific discussion (e.g. barzilai-nahon, 2006), and critics of measurement methods note that changing criteria and models for calculating the parameters of this phenomenon bring different results and its perception. (sicherl, 2019). however, from the perspective of international studies, in this study, statistics selected by specialized organizations of the un system have been selected, with the international telecommunications union (itu) as the main intergovernmental institution promoting global activity to overcome the effects of the studied phenomenon. however, some analyses (may, diga, 2015, pp. 88–89) indicate that itu data before 2007 was selective due to the inability of the least-developed countries to provide complete information on ict development, but still ict statistics managed by itu helped illustrate the global deployment of ict. there are many reasons for the digital divide, but the basic weakness will certainly be the underdevelopment of telecommunication and satellite infrastructure. the average number of connections in oecd countries was 70 times higher at the beginning of the 21st century, and 17 times higher in latin american countries than in africa. some countries lack adequate technical facilities and population capital to take advantage of new technologies. in addition, one can mention: governments’ containment of the processes of liberalization of the provider services market; high costs of network access; patent restrictions; duties and taxes on hardware and software further increase the cost of connecting to the internet – in african countries by up to 50%; communication difficulties resulting from language differences – virtually all commercial and financial transactions via the internet are in english. in the research diagnosing the nature of the digital divide in the context of the activities of the un and its affiliated institutions, reference was made to the theories separating the world into the center and periphery, after i. wallerstein and j. galtung: “the digital divide reflects the broader context of international social and economic relations: a centerperiphery order marked by american dominance” (chen, wellman, 2004, p. 41). however, it is worth noting that, unlike in wallerstein and galtung’s theories, the rich north has been undertaking aid initiatives for the poor south related to the development of ict for over fifteen years. an example is the g-8 group (united states, canada, france, germany, italy, japan, united kingdom and russia) – 20% of the global population and 80% of internet hosts. these countries are also responsible for the majority of global network traffic. 3.2. digital divide’s evolution in the analysis of un affiliated organizations for the purposes of preparations for wsis in 2003, the affiliate organization of the un – the international telecommunications union (itu) prepared a report in which the measurement parameter was used: the “digital access indicator” provided convincing technological development data sets (world telecommunication ..., 2003). the digital access index (dai), which was then created, measured the general ability of residents of a country to access and use information and communication technologies, with the studied countries divided into 4 groups, traditionally called: high access group, advanced access, medium and low access (world telecommunication ..., 2003). in the high access group, which comprised 25 countries, sweden came first with the index of 0.85. there were also other nordic countries: denmark, iceland, norway, finland. asian countries, such as south korea, hong kong, taiwan, singapore and japan, also ranked high. the third subgroup of leaders were highly developed countries of western europe, north america and the antipodes. in the advanced access group (40 countries) one could find, among others, poland and russia, as well as many less developed european economies, mexico and brazil, and a number of other latin american countries, and finally – exotic countries, deriving their income from tourism, e.g. the seychelles, the bahamas, barbados. the average access group consisted of 58 countries developing or transforming the economy. these are post-soviet republics: ukraine, belarus, kazakhstan, armenia, georgia, as well as small latin american countries: guatemala, salvador, paraguay, and finally – representatives of sub-saharan africa – namibia, information and communication technology (ict ) as a source of development of states and regions… 19 botswana, as well as arab countries: tunisia, oman, libya. the last group – low access – included 55 mainly african countries, whose presence in the ranking proves that there are no countries in the world not connected to the internet. dai for chad and burkina faso, the last in the ranking, was 0.10 and 0.08, respectively. the report also includes auxiliary rankings, where the asymmetry of technological development between the north and the south was even more pronounced. among the countries most intensively using the internet were: iceland, sweden, south korea, the usa and japan. south korea, hong kong, canada, taiwan and belgium, the netherlands and denmark turned out to be leaders due to the use of broadband connections. users in hong kong, the usa, singapore, denmark and canada enjoyed the highest affordability of internet connection. as calculated, between 1998 and 2002, the highest dai development was recorded in as many as 4 far eastern countries (south korea, taiwan, singapore, hong kong) and only one non-asian – denmark. along with the development of the european strategy for building the information society, the initiative to reduce distance belongs to the union. in central and eastern europe one can observe a low level of infrastructure and a large diversity between individual countries: estonia was leading, the czech republic was second, and slovenia third. before accession to the eu, the countries participated in pilot programs: e-europe+ which were to bring the region closer to the level of western europe. asia and the pacific region, in turn, have demographic potential, which means that 50 million internet users arrive every year. fast, permanent connection systems dominate in japan, china, korea, hong kong which monopolize over 45% share in global broadband connections. however, the transport of goods sold online fails. latin america, in turn, was a polycentric region, in which 4 largest markets, brazil, argentina, mexico, chile, dominated 2/3 of the users in the region. africa was in the most difficult position. currently, data from the international telecommunications union shows that despite the numerical growth of internet users to 4.1 billion in 2019, the problem of development barriers remains. in 2005, this figure was 16.8% of the world population, i.e. around 1.5 billion people, in 2007 – 18.4% of the population, in 2009 – 25.8%, in 2011 – 31.8%, 2013 – 37.0%, in 2015 – 41.5%, in 2017 – 49,0%, and in 2019 – 53.6%. (measuring digital …, 2019). there was a clear increase in internetization – by 5% compared to 2018. the slowdown in internetization is noticeable in those countries that have been leaders of digitization in recent years. their economies are now experiencing market saturation with technology. most offline populations live in the least developed countries, while on average over 87.0% of internet users live in developed countries, 47.0% in developing countries and 19.0% in the least developed countries. the division into world regions is as follows: europe – 82.0%, america – 77.0%, asia and the pacific – 48.5%, africa – 28.2%. it is worth noting that compared to the research conducted for the summary of wsis ii in tunis (huyer et al., 2005), there are no changes towards global ict equality. in light of the itu data from 2019 (measuring digital …, 2019), depending on the level of development of regions and groups of countries, the “digital gender gap” is still visible, which is also related to the education deficit among women, as well as other cultural aspects. while in europe 85.0% of men and 80.0% of women use the internet, in americas 77.0% and 76.0%, in asia-pacific 55.0% and 41,0%, in africa 34.0% and 22.0%. on a global scale, this means 58.0% of male internet users and 48.0% of female internet users, in developed countries 87.0% and 86.0%, in developing countries 53.0% and 41.0%, and in the least developed countries 24.0% and 14.0%. you can see a different way of using the internet for men and women. “compared to men, women have lower frequency of use, lower intensity of use, narrower range of online activities and lower likelihood of reporting strong internet skills” (robinson et al., 2015, p. 572). in recent years, itu has been preparing reports based on statistics on the development of ict in the world “which ranks countries based on a composite number of ict readiness, intensity and impact” (may, diga, 2015, p. 88). the parameter called idi (ict development index) allows the comparison of changes taking place in individual regions and countries with the average values of ict participation in social life and the global economy (the ict development…, 2017). in 2017, the average idi value for the whole world was 5.11, while for africa 2.64, for americas 5.21, for arab countries 4.84, for asia and the pacific 4.83, for cis 6.05, for europe 7.50. in the group of highly developed countries, the idi was 7.52, in the group of developing countries 4.26, and in the group of developed countries the least 2.2 (measuring the information society report, 2017). the first five places among countries in the world in the idi ranking for 2017 were taken by: iceland (8.98), south korea (8.85), switzerland (8.74), denmark (8.71), great britain (8.65). at the beginning of the 21st century, estonia had the highest ratio among eastern european countries – 17th in the world (8.14), while poland ranked 49th (6.89). 20 agnieszka bógdał-brzezińska the results of research conducted over fifteen years by non-itu researchers show that the digital divide has fallen in relative terms, but not in absolute terms. countries, starting from lower ict levels, do not implement ict faster than leaders. continental region-wise analysis also shows that the catch-up is maximum for already developed countries, and minimum for countries in african and oceania (kathuria, oh, 2018). 3.3. contemporary initiatives of itu to reduce the digital divide due to the increase in the qualitative differentiation of problems associated with overcoming the digital divide by groups of countries in individual regions of the world, itu’s activities in the discussed area are becoming increasingly specialized. the organization strives to coordinate national ict policies, fill gaps in the development of knowledge-based economy sectors, and bring together regional priorities for the development of information societies. this trend has recently been reflected in the decisions of the world telecommunication development conference (wtdc 17), which took place on october 9–20, 2017 in buenos aires. before wtdc 17, itu held six regional preparatory meetings (rpms) around the world in 2016–2017: in bishkek, kyrgyzstan, for the commonwealth of independent states (cis); in kigali, rwanda, for africa; in khartoum, sudan, for the arab states; in asunción, paraguay, for americas; in bali, indonesia, for asia and the pacific; and in vilnius, lithuania, for europe. each regional preparatory meeting was preceded by a one-day regional development forum. the regions articulated their specific priorities in 30 regional initiatives — five per region for each of the six regions (africa, americas, arab states, asia-pacific, cis and europe). these regional initiatives were endorsed by wtdc-17 and are featured in the “buenos aires action plan”. regional initiatives are intended to address specific ict priority areas, through partnerships and resource mobilization to implement projects. under each regional initiative, projects are developed and implemented to meet the region’s needs. the final report of the conference specified the so-called regional goals of ict development for the next years (world telecommunication …, 2017). the following goals have been set for africa: building digital economies and fostering innovation in africa, promotion of emerging broadband technologies, building trust and security in the use of telecommunications/information and communication technology, strengthening human and institutional capacity building, management and monitoring of the radio frequency spectrum and transition to digital broadcasting. the following goals have been set for americas: disaster risk reduction and management communications; spectrum management and transition to digital broadcasting, deployment of broadband infrastructure, especially in rural and neglected areas, and strengthening of broadband access to services and applications, accessibility and affordability for an inclusive and sustainable americas region, development of the digital economy, smart cities and communities and the internet of things, promoting innovation. the following goals have been set for the arab states: environment, climate change and emergency telecommunications, confidence and security in the use of telecommunications/information and communication technologies digital financial inclusion, internet of things, smart cities and big data, innovation and entrepreneurship. the following goals have been set for asia and pacific: addressing special needs of the least developed countries, small island developing states, including pacific island countries, and landlocked developing countries, harnessing information and communication technologies to support the digital economy and an inclusive digital society, fostering development of infrastructure to enhance digital connectivity, enabling policy and regulatory environments, contributing to a secure and resilient environment. the following goals have been set for commonwealth of independent states: development of e-health to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all, at all ages, use of telecommunications/information and communication technology to ensure inclusive, equitable, quality and safe education, including the enhancement of women’s knowledge of information and communication technologies and e-government, development and regulation of info communication infrastructure to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe and resilient, fostering innovative solutions and partnership for the implementation of internet of things technologies and their interaction in telecommunication networks, including 4g, imt 2020 and next generation networks, in the interests of sustainable development. the following goals have been set for europe: infrastructure, broadcasting and spectrum management, a citizen centric approach to building services for national administrations, accessibility, affordability and skills development for all to ensure digital inclusion and sustainable development, enhancing trust and confidence in the use of information and communication technologies, information and communication technology centric innovation ecosystems. information and communication technology (ict ) as a source of development of states and regions… 21 4. conclusions the processes of internet control and the use of ict have undergone radical diffusion in recent years. the problem of the digital divide is not the main challenge arising from the global development of digital technologies, especially as a consequence of the high specialization achieved in ict by non-state actors. the most recognized researchers of cyberspace and international relations diagnose that “states will remain the dominant actor on the world stage, but it will be much more crowded and more difficult to control. a much larger proportion of the population, both within and between countries, has access to information-derived power” (nye, 2010, p. 2). barriers to access to cyberspace are decreasing due to the spread of cheap information and communication technologies, but the control of developing countries in terms of the activity of hackers, cybercrime groups or global corporations of the ict industry is insufficient. in the face of the “democratization of ict” and the growing possibilities of using the internet as a battlefield and computers as weapons by organized hacker groups, the threat to the international order has increased. attacks on critical infrastructure (i.e. digitally controlled and internet-connected sectors of the economy and components of the state management agsystem) have worsened the security of countries with the most-developed ict sector. at the current stage of development of the information society, the same development disparities that were diagnosed in the early 21st century remain noticeable. despite the increase in internet access in all regions of the world (internetization), the digital divide has not been eliminated. the possession of telephones with internet access by an increasing number of users does not mean an improvement in the economic level in the least developed countries, including african countries. there is still a correlation between cultural factors (low level of women’s scholarization) and ict development rates in arab countries. optimistic forecasts for the economic growth of the least developed countries under the influence of ict’s are found in the group of countries offering tourist services, but one cannot speak yet of the global nature of the knowledge-based economy. it should be recognized that ict deepens development differences between the rich north and the poor south, becoming a source of power diversification across the world. references anioł w., 2002, paradoksy globalizacji (eng. paradoxes of globalization), instytut polityki społecznej uw, warszawa. barzilai-nahon k., 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latin american perspectives, 29(6), 32–43. weiss ch., 2015, how do science and technology affect international affairs? minerva, 53(4), 411–430. doi: 10.1007/ s11024-015-9286-1 world telecommunication development conference (wtdc17). final report, 2017, itu, buenos aires, https://www.itu. int/en/itu-d/conferences/wtdc/wtdc17/ documents/ wtdc 17_final_report_en.pdf, (accessed 30 november 2019). world telecommunication development report: access indicators for the information society, 2003, international telecommunication union (itu), geneva. zacher l.w., 2007, transformacje społeczeństw od informacji do wiedzy (eng. transformations of societies from information to knowledge), wydawnictwo beck, warszawa. zins c., 2007, conceptual approaches for defining data, information, and knowledge, journal of the american society for information science and technology, 58(4), 479–493. 1. introduction the break-up of the system of the socialist stated had led to a number of reforms in these countries. these reforms caused a change in the social, political and economical situation of the population (illner, 1996; rose, 2009). those reforms also lead to a number of important demographical processes and a change of the mortality data (billingsley, 2011; nolte et al., 2004), birth rates (barakat, durham, 2013; bongaarts, sobotka, 2012), as well as the degree and the directions of the migration. most of the european postcommunist countries starting with 1990s faced primarily a economical migration (careja, 2013; drbohlav, 1997; weinar, 2014). only lately there could be observed a tendency of the migration among the rich layers of the societies (górny, 2017; janská et al., 2014). this article is dedicated to the migration processes in transnistria. the migration situation is a classic indicator which reflect the political and socio-economic trends in the region. transnistria is a region of moldova, located mainly on the left bank of the dniester river and comprising 7 administrative-territorial units. over the past 30 years, it has been characterized by extremely negative migration trends. the negative migration balance has a direct impact on the natural movement of the population and socio-economic development of the region. the combination of migration and natural population decline journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(4), 1–11 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.4.01 migration of the population of transnistria: factors, trends, consequences vladimir fomenco department of socio-economical geography and regional studies, transnistrian state university named after t.g. shevchenko, october 25 128, md-3300 tiraspol, moldova e-mail: fomenkovol@mail.ru citation fomenco v., 2019, migration of the population of transnistria: factors, trends, consequences, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(4), 1–11. abstract the article considers the factors influencing the formation of the modern migration situation in transnistria, the trends of its development and socio-economic costs. particular attention is given to the problems of the migration registration system in transnistria. also are presented the possible ways to optimize migration accounting in the region. key words depopulation, population migration, migration factors, migration surplus, consequences of population migration, migration accounting problems, transnistria. received: 16 august 2019 accepted: 20 november 2019 published: 31 december 2019 2 vladimir fomenco leads to depopulation of the region. therefore, for transnistria, it is vital to optimize migration accounting and develop an effective migration policy. 2. materials and techniques sources of information about migration / population movement are administrative (current) accounting is a system of population registration or registration of foreigners; other administrative sources (residence permits, work permits or asylum applications); data obtained from checkpoints and collected at the border (types of visas at entry and exit from the country); general population censuses and special population surveys-family units and labor force / workforce (cudinovskih, 2011). issues of issuing and canceling a residence permit to foreign citizens are considered by the internal affairs bodies of transnistria with the participation of representatives of the state security and justice departments. long-term registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons is carried out by providing documents confirming employment or the fact of training in the territory of the region, performance of duties on payment of taxes and other obligatory payments, availability of premises for actual residence, as well as other documents. registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons in transnistria is carried out on the basis of a residence permit issued by the internal affairs bodies. residence permit is a document issued in accordance with the legislation to a foreign citizen or a stateless person in confirmation of the right to permanent residence, as well as the right to free exit and entry into the region. the databases of the internal affairs bodies, as well as the population censuses of 2004 and 2015 contain information on the total number of foreigners and stateless persons living in the region; on the share of foreigners in the total population; on the number of permanent population of foreign origin by country of citizenship. in the presence of more complete data on the population of foreign origin, it is possible to carry out additional classification by other subcategories – by age, country of origin of parents, professional status, occupation, level of education (fomenco, 2017). distribution of moldova’s migration checkpoints on the transnistrian section of moldovan-ukrainian border in 2015 included transnistria in the migration registration area of moldova and made its more complete. a significant source that allows to estimate the scale of labor migration and its geography is the information received by the transnistrian (central) bank about cash flows incoming to the region from abroad. experts suppose that among personal transfers realized by physical persons, about 3/4 are made by labor migrants. 3. results and discussion in the general scale of transnistrian depopulation, the share of migration losses over the past thirty years has ranged from 40 to 50%. the remaining part is formed by natural population decline. during the examined period, the region lost more than 200 thousand people, which is about 1/3 of population number in 1991 (predvaritelnye rezultaty…, 2016; demografičeskaâ situaciâ…, 2019). during the 5080ies of the 20th century, the moldavian ssr (and the transnistrian region as well) were magnetic to specialists and ordinary workers who were attracted by all-union constructions, high salaries, comfortable living conditions. on the eve of the collapse of the ussr, in 1990–1991, transnistria still had a significant positive migration balance. the military-political conflict in 1992, the absence of a certain international political-legal status of the region, the spread of many crisis economical phenomena, the external-economic limits, the inability to fully realize the rights of the population caused the depopulation of transnistria, the loss of the region’s migration attractiveness and intensive emigration of the population (fig. 1) (burla et al., 2014; fomenco, 2017). in the summer of 1992, the highest negative migration balance in the modern history of the nation was recorded – residents fled the war to neighboring ukraine. the positive balance of migrations noted in 1993 was of a compensatory (return) nature. also at the turn of 80-90ies. in tiraspol from chisinau was relocated 14th russian army. although the conflict on the banks of the dniester didn’t have a pronounced international character, during this period there was an «exchange» of the population between the left – bank and right – bank regions of moldova-from chisinau to tiraspol moved predominantly russianspeaking population, and in the opposite directionmoldovan-speaking. since 1994, the number of departures (emigrants) has exceeded the number of arrivals (immigrants) annually, which has led to a persistently high migration loss of the population (fig. 2) (fomenco, 2015). significant migration losses of transnistria in 1996 were to a great extent caused by the disbandment and withdrawal of the 14th russian army-together with the servicemen, their family members left the region, and this represented, according to some estimates, to 10 thousand people. a slight positive balance of external migration in 2017 was formed as migration of the population of transnistria: factors, trends, consequences 3 a result of manipulations taking into consideration migrants (fig. 2) (predvaritelnye rezultaty..., 2016; fomenco, 2017; demografičeskaâ situaciâ..., 2019). in the xxi century the main reason for emigration is the uncertainty of the political status of the region, and as a consequence, the lack of clear socioeconomic prospects for the population. this makes 6 8 1 6 8 9 6 9 3 6 8 4 6 8 6 6 8 4 6 3 9 6 3 0 6 1 7 6 0 9 6 0 4 5 9 8 5 9 0 5 8 1 5 7 2 5 6 2 5 5 4 5 4 8 5 4 1 5 3 4 5 2 8 5 2 3 5 1 8 5 1 3 5 0 9 5 0 5 5 0 0 4 7 1 4 6 9 4 6 7 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 –40 000 –30 000 –20 000 –10 000 0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 immigration emigration net migration rate fig. 1. the dynamics of the population of transnistria [thousand inhabitants] source: fomenco, 2017; demografičeskaâ situaciâ …, 2019. fig. 2. the dynamics of the migration of the population of transnistria [thousand inhabitants] source: fomenco, 2017; demografičeskaâ situaciâ …, 2019. 4 vladimir fomenco it difficult for many enterprises to enter foreign markets, causes an increase in unemployment and insufficiently high wages in similar activities compared to neighboring countries (ukraine, russia, belarus, eu countries). therefore, the search for higher-paying jobs and conditions for self-realization also stimulates the «push» of the population from the region (burla, 2015; fomenco, 2015). as a rule, highly skilled workers, scientists and graduates of educational institutions with high labor and intellectual potential leave the region-they show an increased migration tendency, since the level of their knowledge and skills is a significant guarantee of employment (with higher pay) in other countries. as a consequence, many persons temporarily working in russia, ukraine, potentially seek to remain permanently in these countries. the «brain drain» is facilitated by seemingly well-founded (from the point of view of civil rights protection) mechanisms of quota places in universities of russia and ukraine for graduates of pridnestrovian schools. graduates who use these benefits show an increased migration tendency and do not return to the region after graduating from the relevant educational institutions. along with graduates of schools entering by quotas, a significant number of applicants enter foreign universities on their own and also after their graduation do not show any desire to return to transnistria (fomenco, 2017). the region has also become actively involved in the growing migration processes in the postsoviet space and around the world due to its relative geographical proximity to both russia and the european union. since the 1990s, its participation in the process of international migration was carried out through the manifestation of several forms of migration (obliged, «shuttle», labor, educational migration), but in the further and especially at the present time, the predominant role was played by labor migration. more than a quarter of a century, transnistria has been a source of labor migrants to the cis and eu countries. according to sociological researches conducted by the nil «sociology» of the university of pridnestrovie over the past 10 years, for 50% of pridnestrovian families exit abroad for work is the only source of live, and for 20–25% of respondents significant complementary earnings. more than 60% of interviewed indicated a difficult financial situation, more than 50% – difficulties in employment, more than 25% – delays in payment of wages, more than 20% – its reduction. thus, as a reason for moving, respondents mainly noted economic reasons (ostavnaâ, 2016; fomenco, 2017). on average, every year about 1/4 of transnistrians of working age (men – from 15 to 60 years, women – from 15 to 55 years) leave the region for temporary employment. over three-quarters of them choose to take up temporary employment in russia. the share of those leaving for russia until 2014 was about 2/3 of the total number of those leaving transnistria. after ukraine’s entry into the political and economic crisis, its host role decreased from 1/4 to less than 10%. among the priority directions for the labor migrants from transnistria are still the countries like byelorussia, romania, germany, poland, bulgaria (fig. 3) (kivačûk, 2014; fomenco, 2015). the width of the arrows indicated the intensity of the migrational processes one of the main motivation of the migration could be considered the wish of the majority of the population to reunite with the rest of the family who live in the historical country for example, mainly in russian federation, ukraine, bulgaria, israel, germany. fig. 3. the geography of the labour migration of the population of transnistria source: fomenco, 2017; demografičeskaâ situaciâ..., 2019. migration of the population of transnistria: factors, trends, consequences 5 the loss of the attractivity of the region and the outflow of a young, highly skilled and active part of the population leads to a steady decline in the number of the population of working and reproductive age, which creates significant imbalances in the gender and age, professional, ethnic, religious, social structure of the population, as well as in the system of settlements in the region. the gender make-up of the migrating population is traditionally led by women (kivačûk, 2014). so, in 2018, 48% of the total number of both arriving and departing migrants in the region were men. the predominance of women among emigrants is one of the reasons for the spread phenomenon of «social orphanage». this negative social phenomenon is due to the long-term stay of parents outside transnistria to earn money, while children are in the care of grandparents. as the purpose of arrival (departure), migrants mainly indicate the nomination «permanent residence», but for a significant proportion of emigrants, this wording conceals employment and study for a period of more than 1 year. the gradation of migrants in terms of education demonstrates an almost twofold predominance of people with higher education among emigrants over immigrants, which confirms the development of the «brain drain» trend (tab. 1, tab. 2) (demografičeskaâ situaciâ..., 2019). the external migration is traditionally dominated by the urban population. the share of urban residents among immigrants and among emigrants is stable and ranges from 2/3 to 3/4. at the same time, the rural population plays a leading role in internal migration and pendulum movements of the population. the data presented also indicate that there is a tendency towards a decrease in the migratory mobility of the rural population and a decrease in its role in migration flows. at the same time, a tendency toward a general decrease in the number of arrivals and departures to both urban and rural settlements should be taken into consideration, which indicates a reduction in the migration potential of many settlements. tab. 1. data of the immigrating population on the territory of transnistria in 2018 [persons] according to the arriving purpose according to the education levels including: including: labor study permanent residence other higher education vocational and professional secondary other total 7 14 2 956 294 677 1 106 595 893 including: 0-16 years 3 598 47 1 647 17-24 years 2 9 239 19 48 91 83 47 25-29 years 1 235 35 102 92 55 22 30-39 years 2 584 53 200 241 132 66 40-49 years 2 1 419 40 107 217 104 34 50 years and elder 1 881 100 220 465 220 77 source: demografičeskaâ situaciâ..., 2019. tab. 2. data of the emigrating population on the territory of transnistria in 2018 [persons] according to the arriving purpose according to the education levels including: including: labor study permanent residence other higher education vocational and professional secondary other total 7 36 4 085 10 1 155 1 334 650 999 including 0-16 years 2 629 1 632 17-24 years 3 31 633 6 158 191 220 104 25-29 years 3 372 193 118 32 32 30-39 years 1 879 2 361 316 128 77 40-49 years 1 613 218 244 86 66 50 years and elder 2 959 1 225 465 184 88 source: demografičeskaâ situaciâ..., 2019. 6 vladimir fomenco an important indicator that can be regarded as evidence of migration loss in cities and regions is the proportion of the temporarily absent population. in the intercensal period (from 2004 to 2015), this proportion increased markedly. resident population is the number of persons whose permanent residence is located in the relevant territory, including temporarily absent persons. in census statistics there is such a category of accounting as «temporarily absent population». this is an indirect source of information about migrants. thus, in 2004, 6.5% of people in this category were recorded, and the 2015 census recorded a twice as many – almost 15%. of the total share of the temporarily absent population of less than 1 year, 11% are absent, and 3.8% are missing for more than 1 year. if the first category of people left transnistria (usually moving to neighboring countries) for temporary employment, since the migration legislation of these states limits their stay for a period of 3 to 6 months, the second category can be attributed to the so-called «potentially irrevocable» emigrants (tab. 3, tab. 4) (predvaritelnye rezultaty..., 2016; fomenco, 2017). with a high degree of probability, the population is temporarily missing for more than one year – this is a category of people who left the country for permanent residence and for further employment. in the territorial context, the number of temporarily absent during the inter-census period (2004–2015) has increased in the following cities: in tiraspol – it has risen sevenfold, in the dniester – in 2.5 times, in bender – it almost doubled, in rybnitsa district – it grew up in 2.5 times. in rural areas of transnistria, the increase in the number of temporarily missing citizens is less significant, since the vast majority of rural settlements have tab. 3. temporary and permanently absent population of transnistria in 2004 and 2015 total population (2004) temporarily absent population (2004) temporarily absent population and the percentage compared to the total population (2004) total population (2015) temporarily absent population (2015) temporarily absent population and the percentage compared to the total population (2015) transnistria 555 347 36 312 6.54 475 665 70 587 14.84 tiraspol city 146 781 3 669 2.50 129 477 18 808 14.53 dnestrovsk city 12 382 879 7.10 9 756 1 686 17.28 bender city 105 010 11 916 11.35 91 298 18 298 20.04 rybnitsa district 82 699 5 277 6.38 69 560 10 747 15.45 dubossar district 37 449 3 092 8.26 31 222 5 110 16.37 slobodseya district 95 742 4 640 4.85 83 863 7 520 8.97 grigoriopol district 48 000 4 299 8.96 39 819 6 345 15.93 kamenka district 27 284 2 540 9.31 20 670 2 073 10.03 source: predvaritelnye rezultaty…, 2016. tab. 4. temporary absent population of transnistria in 2015 permanent population absent population temporarily absent population less than one year temporarily absent population one year and more transnistria 475 665 52 558 18 029 tiraspol city 129 477 12 263 6 545 dnestrovsk city 9 756 1 216 470 bender city 91 298 15 468 2 830 rybnitsa district 69 560 6 319 4 428 dubossar district 31 222 4 225 885 slobodseya district 83 863 6 455 1 065 grigoriopol district 39 819 4 809 1 536 kamenka district 20 670 1 803 270 source: predvaritelnye rezultaty…, 2016. migration of the population of transnistria: factors, trends, consequences 7 exhausted demographic opportunities the growth potential of emigration (see tab. 3; tab. 4; fig.  4) (predvaritelnye rezultaty..., 2016; otčet o naučnoissledovatelskoi rabote..., 2016; fomenco, 2017). at the same time, the depopulation value of the negative migration balance is most significant in rural areas, where it has a strong cumulative effect along with the natural population loss. as a result, there is not only depopulation of rural areas, but also the deformation of the sex and age structure of the population, which significantly undermines the reproductive and labor potential. the current negative demographic state of the rural areas of the transnistrian moldavian republic results from the severe agriculture crisis, accompanied by the degradation of industrial and social infrastructure. therefore, many villages are covered by demographic ageing and they have lost their production function, retaining only the consumer one. the decrease in transport accessibility, economic and social difficulties of the transnistrian village, the negative demographic situation allow us to make a conclusion that the role of large rural settlements as poles of migration attraction will increase, that is why, the larger villages are characterized by the highest demographic stability and stability of the population, as a result of compensatory migratory flows from small villages to larger ones (fomenco, 2016). in fact, the dimension of international migration of transnistrian residents is carried out at the border and migration registration points on the moldovanukrainian and moldovan-romanian border and at the chisinau international airport by taking into account passports of russia, ukraine and other countries, residence permits and internal passports of the republic of moldova (rm). fig. 4. temporarily absent population of transnistria. source: predvaritelnye rezultaty…, 2016. 8 vladimir fomenco first of all, these are transnistrians who are citizens of moldova (20%), russia (15%) and ukraine (10%). belarus, bulgaria and romania are much less (from 1 to 5%). dual citizenship is allowed in principle, but it requires notification of the passport services of both countries of which citizenship the subject possesses. it is not possible to make a sufficiently complete accounting of the citizenship of the inhabitants of transnistria. moldova’s experts recognize the open border with transnistria as a significant problem of regulating migratory flows. when we speak about the impossibility for the inhabitants of transnistria to cross the border of republic of moldova, especially those who do not have a resident permit or a moldovan identification card, the number of transnistrians who registered their profiles in the passport registration bodies of republic of moldova. nowadays there is a 100% tendency from the part of the registration bodies of republic of moldova to record all migration active transnistrian citizens (krivenko, ostavnaâ, 2013; fomenco, 2017). it is also important to mention that the citizenship of a certain country is not necessarily coinciding with the ethnical identity of the persons. the russian passport is most appreciated and it reflects the tendency of the population to choose russian federation as their future temporary or permanent settlement (volkova, ostavnaâ, 2014). the migration of the population affects a certain defining influence of the number, settlement, structure and dynamics of the population of the discussed region, as well as of the separate administrative units, cities or villages. it mainly influences the age, gender, ethnical, social and professional composition of the population, the territorial organization of the population and of the economy of the republic. the demographic costs of emigration are of a depopulation character. the departure from the region of young people leads to a change of the age structure of the population, to an increase in the demographic burden on the economically active population and reduces the reproductive potential. the demographic problems of the region which are caused by the negative migration balance possess an extremely negative prolonged socio-economic consequence. the labor migration leads to the equalization of wage and consumption levels in different countries. the distribution of the positive economic effect resulting from migration occurs in the form of an increase in the income of migrants, remittances from abroad to their homeland, as a result of lower production costs in countries receiving the remittances. in case when legal status is established, immigrants generally receive less social benefits and pay more taxes and contributions than the native population. this is topical for transnistria as an exporter of workforce. however, currency transfers to the region makes up for these costs. the international movement of workforce is one of the most important factors of production, because it has a direct impact on the economic growth rate of the region. at the same time, workforce emigration from transnistria reduces the unemployment rate in the republic and reduces the potential burden on various social institutions of the state. the current migration situation in transnistria requires solving a number of high priority tasks. the categories of migrants who need to be registered, the procedures for collecting primary data, their accumulation, processing and dissemination should be determined by special regulatory acts. the main task is to put in order the legal framework for migrants. it is necessary not only to audit existing acts, but also to create new ones that will allow the formation of a more efficient system for collecting statistical data. it is necessary to improve the law on migration as the main regulatory framework governing various aspects of migration and the development of an effective migration policy. for example, because of the lack of an internationally defined status of the region, the existing transnistrian migration legislation does not contain provisions governing the status of labor migrants working outside the region. a system that has been debugged for decades and uses the statistical records of migrants has made it possible to obtain sufficiently versatile information suitable not only for description, but also for a comprehensive analysis of migration processes. for example, because of the lack of an internationally defined status of the region, the existing transnistrian migration legislation does not contain provisions governing the status of labor migrants working outside the region. a system that has been debugged for decades and uses the statistical records of migrants has made it possible to obtain sufficiently versatile information suitable not only for description, but also for a comprehensive analysis of migration processes. the system has now been converted to an electronic format. statistics should be disseminated with detailed data, including information on the source of the primary data, the concepts and special used terms, the extent of coverage, frequency and reliability. the functions of the statistical service and other public authorities in the production of data on international migration should be expanded. there is a need for greater coordination among major data producers. these institutional structures have the greatest potential and methodologies for working migration of the population of transnistria: factors, trends, consequences 9 with databases in the field of international migration. however, international requirements in the field of migration statistics are not always observed systematically and correctly. in transnistria, the russian migration accounting standards are applied and in moldova – those which are adopted in the eu. based on the sustainable development goals of the region, census data on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of migrants should be developed in detail. in preparation for subsequent population censuses their programs should be substantially transformed: the range of issues should be expanded and new formulations introduced to obtain more diverse and adequate information on the place of residence (the exact address of places of residence, including the second homes, work and study), the number, origin, composition of migrants and the geography of movements made. also local mobility of the population need to improve the system of storage and processing of census results, to organize sample (1%) of census data for a wide range of users (cesnokova, 2010). the census is a unique opportunity to assess the coverage and completeness of the data in the state population register by comparing the data with the data of persons specified in the census, which will contribute to the introduction of the internationally recommended concept of permanent population in the annual demographic statistics, after the census of transnistria. in addition, the combination of the state population register and census data can serve as a reference point in the creation of a statistical population register, which will better meet the needs for annual statistics and will serve as the basis for further register-based censuses. for this, specific information must be included in the census questionnaire, in which a personal identification number will be of key importance. it is also necessary to introduce into the periodic practice a survey of household budgets (one of four quarterly surveys, as well as an annual survey) an additional program that includes questions identifying migrants, and increase the sample itself to form a population of migrants representative of the country or its large regions. household budget survey data should be accessible to a wide circle of researchers, including in the form of microdata. and a number of questions identifying migrants should be added to the employment survey program, in particular, the length of stay in a given place, place of previous residence, reasons for a change of residence. the additional program should include questions about citizenship, the year since which the respondent lives outside the region, the length of residence in this place, the place of residence one year (or five years) before the survey, reasons for the change of residence, migration intentions, local migration mobility (cesnokova, 2011). a procedure for the extension of registration of people arriving to the territory of transnistria has been introduced in practice in order to avoid reregistration of the same people entering and leaving multiple times over a short period to highlight the totality of long-term migrants registered at their place of residence. statistical reporting forms on registration of citizens by place of residence and place of stay are updated. any migration data produced on the basis of administrative bases should be adjusted through the use of more stringent processing rules, including verification of their authenticity. in such statistics, more attention should be paid to describe various aspects of the migration process, and less attention to monitor activities undertaken by agencies. in addition to the population census once every 10 years, the statistical service recommends two important research sections that include information related to international migration: a labor force survey and a household budget survey. social services may also collect more specific data on children left without parental supervision («social orphans»), as well as on the volume of remittances. various ministries should send some summary data to the statistical service to create and disseminate statistical tables. the provision of such data should be supported in order to expand the number of statistical tables already available to experts and general public, as well as the inclusion of additional relevant topics. the problem of the lack of a common methodology for determining and evaluating the migration process can be offset by separate targeted government and departmental normative legal acts and decrees. there is a need for further training of transnistrian employees and experts who are directly related to the production and analysis of statistics in the field of international migration. in 2017, the transnistria advanced migration profile was developed, which needs further structuring, filling in the existing statistical gaps, and developing a strategy for further updating and improvement (fomenco, 2017). 4. conclusions the migration situation in the region requires the development of a scientifically reasonable and effective migration policy, which includes a set of legal, 10 vladimir fomenco economic, administrative, educational, health care activities. also, creation of favorable conditions for «retention» of potential emigrants and attracting immigrants, which imply expansion of economic measures and firstly, it need to create new jobs. the important direction of migration policy is to reduce the emigration of young people. young generation is the most reproductively valuable and employable part of population. it is also necessary to retain qualified specialists – «brain drain». the key to the optimal migration policy is comprehensive analysis of population migration based on the use of various sources. according to the statistics services are almost the only official source of information on the migration movement of the population of the region. however, the real number of migrant worker is not amenable appropriate statistical accounting. what is promising is the further improvement of statistical tools estimates of migration flows. the rational it should be recognized the use of the experience of the cis countries and other states which have identifying the investigation of work force. likewise, the issue of improving migration legislation remains relevant. references barakat b., durham r., 2013, drop-out mayors and graduate farmers: educational fertility differentials by occupational status and industry in six european countries, demographic research, 28, 1213–1262. doi: 10.4054/ demres.2013.28.42 billingsley s., 2011, exploring the conditions for a mortality 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a., 2014, pridnestrovskaâ trudovaâ migracia: štrihi k potencialnoi socialnoi politike (eng.transnistrian labour migration: sketches for a potential social policy), aktualnye problemy ekonomiki i managementa, 1, 96–103. weinar a., 2014, a look at migrations in the post‐soviet space – the case of eastern europe, south caucasus and russian federation, international migration, 52(5), 47–51. doi: 10.1111/imig.12168 1. introduction attractive cultural and historic heritage are one of the most important resources and the condition for the existence and development of every tourist destination (richards, 2002; popović, 2013). according to d. weaver (2006) the attraction is considering a certain characteristics of the destination that was directly specific towards location and motif of some tourist activities. the old core of sarajevo called baščaršija is located in the municipality of stari grad, one of the municipalities in city of sarajevo. baščaršija is the biggest cultural touristic attraction of the city of sarajevo. baščaršija represents the journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(3), 33–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.3.05 touristic valorization of cultural and historical heritage of the central core of sarajevo based on hilary du cros method alma pobric (1), selma sljivo (2), naida mulaosmanovic (3) (1) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina e-mail: a.pobric@gmail.com (corresponding autor) (2) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina e-mail: selmasljivo1994@gmail.com (3) department of geography, faculty of science, university of sarajevo, zmaja od bosne 33-35, 71000 sarajevo, bosnia and herzegovina e-mail: naida_d94@hotmail.com citation pobric a., sljivo s., mulaosmanovic m., 2019, touristic valorization of cultural and historical heritage of the central core of sarajevo based on hilary du cros method, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(3), 33–41. abstract cultural and historical heritage, as well as rich history, very often represents a very important segment of tourism development in a certain city. tourists are very inclined to the old town centers, which generally have many attractions of this type, and usually they are located in the immediate vicinity. baščaršija is also an example of the old city area, which earlier was intended for commercial purposes only. nowadays baščaršija represents the most attractive part of the city of sarajevo and its cultural features are a real attraction for many tourists. this paper focuses on the evaluation of the cultural historical heritage within baščaršija applying the method of tourist valorization of cultural resources by hilary du cross. baščaršija is home to various religions, peoples and rich legacies from different historical periods that shaped its present-day appearance. the cultural heritage of baščaršija includes numerous museums, religious buildings, fountains, interesting streets, as well as numerous authentic craft shops. key words touristic valorization, cultural heritage, hilary du cros, cultural tourism, baščaršija. received: 12 june 2019 accepted: 15 july 2019 published: 30 september 2019 34 alma pobric, selma sljivo, naida mulaosmanovic historical center of the city. the municipality of stari grad covers an area of 51.4 km². based on the results of the last census held on the territory of the entire state of bosnia and herzegovina in october 2013, stari grad has 36 976 inhabitants with 708 inhabitants/km2. baščaršija is located on the northern part of the municipality, right back of the miljacka river. today baščaršija is the main tourist attraction of the city of sarajevo. many of the most famous sarajevo’s buildings are located in this historical area, including the gazi husrev-beg mosque, the city hall, the jewish museum, the old orthodox church museum etc. baščaršija was built in the 15th century, when isa beg isakovic built a han, and next to it numerous shops. the word baščaršija comes from the word “bas”, which in turkish means “main”, so baščaršija means “main baazar”. at that time, most of the inhabitants of sarajevo lived in the surrounding of the (careva dzamija) emperor`s mosque. that’s why isabeg ishakovic built a bridge over the miljacka river to connect the main sarajevo settlement and the new economic center of the city, baščaršija. a bazaar of bazerzhan was formed around the main entrance. it is important to emphasize that the ottoman development of sarajevo, as a kasaba and then of the seher (big city in ottoman period), begins exactly in the area of the old core of sarajevo, which is the subject of research of this paper. ottoman rule, or culture, is replaced by a new “living” culture under the aegis of the austro-hungarian monarchy. it can be noticed that the passage from saraci street into ferhadija street is a line that separating or connecting the characteristics of the eastern and western culture inherited during the rich history, as well as the entire city of sarajevo. due to the great fire in the 19th century, baščaršija nowadays is twice as small as it used to be in the 16th century. baščaršija reached its greatest growth in the second half of the 16th century (zlatar, 1996). there were 80 different types of crafts organized in the strong trading organizations. baazar was divided by crafts, so in each street there were shops for one or more related crafts (for example, kovaci, curciluk, kazandziluk, saraci etc.). ’’the popular guidebook lonely planet lists sarajevo among europe`s top tourist destinations, and the city has been `discovered` both by backpackers and more up-market tourists… in attractive locations in the city, it has been very common for private investors (both domestic and foreign) to invest in demolished/war-devastated properties or just old, traditional bosnian houses purchased from longterm sarajevo residents who are not in a financial position to restore them. thus, in the central and old part of town around baščaršija (the city’s 54 ha historical precinct, established by the ottomans in the 15th century, with the city’s two major mosques), several hotels (some of them boutique) have been built in attractive locations” (pobric, robinson, 2019, p. 290). 2. cultural and historic facilities of the old city center of sarajevo-baščaršija the area of baščaršija includes a relatively small surface that has been significantly anthropogenized through the history of its formation. due to geographical predispositions, its spread was limited. distance from the main bus and train stations in sarajevo is 4.5 km. within the wider area of baščaršija there are local bus stops which connect the surrounding settlements with the old town core. the proximity of tram stops, which are located along the core of baščaršija, is also contributing to the favorable tourist-geographical position. in order to facilitate the unhindered pedestrian access, in the last few years, car traffic in the old city core has been completely banned. due to the lack of space, the number of parkings and parking spaces is insufficient in relation to the needs of the local population and visitors. within the field work it was identified about 200 parking spaces fig. 1. parking – zero zone, hotel ‚’europe’’ & gazi husrev’s bey’s bezistan (about 80 parking lots) source: the authors. touristic valorization of cultural and historical heritage… 35 on small parking lots, which are not aesthetically integrated into the surroundings of baščaršija. the parking fee per hour is 2 bam. the largest number of parking spaces is located by the city hall, hotel europe, and along the gazi-husrev’s bey’s bezistan. access to these parking spaces is easy from the main street of obala kulina bana, but most of the parking spaces are located in one of the roadways. because of this, parking spaces are unsafe for cars, endangering pedestrians and their movement, jeopardizing the movement of tourists, and aesthetically disturbing the environment. the negative aspect of tourist arrivals is the lack of parking spaces for buses (fig. 1). so, during the season it is very difficult to control the traffic and this create clutter. this contributes to the dissatisfaction of foreign tourists, but also hinders the everyday life of domicile population in the old core of the city of sarajevo (fig. 2). in the narrow core, not far from sebilj, there is a taxi stand, while two public toilets are located in the very center of baščaršija, one in the street called curciluk veliki and the other in bravadziluk street. there are also many exchange offices that are very important for tourists and their easier functioning in a tourist place. when it comes to labels for tourist, there are a large number of info boards that refer tourists to accommodation and catering facilities, as well as to cultural and historical monuments and objects. tourist info centres are available for information on the city and its services. there are no electronic boards on baščaršija that would facilitate the use of tourists in the area. some of the basic features of valorised cultural and historical heritage will be highlighted below. sebilj or sebil is the arabic word and it represents ottomanstyle wooden fountain. in the middle of the 17th century, there were over 300 fountains similar this one in sarajevo. during the arrival of eugen savojski with his army, the fountains were all set on fire and destroyed. sarajevo is going to be without this kind of fountains until 1753 when bosnian vizier mehmed-pasa kukavica decided to build a new one with his own money (this sebilj was destroyed in the fire in 1850.), today’s sebilj was built in 1891, and his architect was josip vancas. it was built in a pseudo moorish style with three stairs and two fountains. vijecnica or city hall is the largest and most representative building of the austro-hungarian period in sarajevo, and it served as the city hall. it was built on the right side of miljacka river with the project of architect karl parzik in 1891. it was critisized by the minister baron benjamin kallay, so the parzik fig. 2. surface of the old city core of sarajevo source: the authors. 36 alma pobric, selma sljivo, naida mulaosmanovic stopped his work on the project. after parzik, project was assigned to aleksandar vitek. in a period of 120 years, this building served as city hall, city court, and during the period between 1910–1911 it served as the seat of the bosnian parliament, then as the seat of academy of sciences and arts, and in period 1948–1992 it was the national and university library of bosnia and herzegovina. during the last war in bih, the city hall was hitted with flammable projectiles and totally destroyed. after the war, the structural repair started and it was reopened on may 9, 2014. baščaršija mosque or havadza durak’s mosque is placed at the main square of the old trade marketbaščaršija. this mosque is a one-room, undercover mosque, with open porch covered with small domes and stone minaret (bibanović, 2015). gazi husrev bey’s mosque known as (begova dzamija) bey’s mosque was built in 1530, in the heart of baščaršija. mosque was designed by adzam esir ali, a persian from tabriz, who was in that time the main architect in the ottoman empire. the mosque was built as gazi husrev bey’s vafuk (endowment) who governed in bosnia in the period from 1521, until his death in 1541. today, this mosque is one of the most important and the most representative architectural monument from the ottoman period in bosnia and herzegovina. gazi husrev bey’s library was established as a special cultural and research institution for the fields of islamic sciences, islamic cultural heritage and other similar disciplines. it was part of kurshumli madrasah until 1863. because of the constant growth of library collection, in 1935 it was moved in another building near emperor’s mosque. after the war (1992–1995), the library was moved near gazi hurev bey’s madresa in drvenija, and then finally in 2013 it was moved to a specially designed facility. gazi husrev bey’s madrasah is the oldest educational institution of its kind in bosnia and herzegovina. it was established in 1537 as bey’s endowment. it is located across the main entrance to gazi husrev bey’s mosque. gazi husrev bey had this islamic school built as the monument dedicated to his mother, seldzuk-sultanija, daughter of sultan bayazid ii, so this object is also known as seldzuklija. later, because of the roof made of lead, the same material used in making bullets (kursumi), people later on referred to the medresa as kurshumli madrasah (bibanović, 2015). brusa bezistan was the market place, built by order of vezair sulejman velicanstveni rustem-pasa. now, this object is the part of the museum of sarajevo with permanent exhibition. exhibition is organized in three chronological parts: the prehistory, the classical period and the middle century. in the gallery, there are exhibited artifacts from ottoman period and austro-hungarian period as well. taslihan was one of three sarajevo’s caravanserai, who were used for accommodation of people and horses. it was set on fire several times, and the last time in 1879 it was totally destroyed. the remains of building were moved in 1912, except walls built along gazi husrev bey’s bezistan. gazi husrev bey’s bezistan known also as old bezistan and great bezistan, is part of bey’s endowment. it was built around 1540. textiles trades were organized in the inner part, and the outdoor shops were used for jewelry trade. sevdah art house is dedicated to tradicional urban song-sevdalinka and the famous singers who have interpreted them. museum is located in baščaršija. the museum includes biographies of sevadah performers, and the instruments they played, old concert posters, archived recordings etc. jewish museum of bosnia and herzegovina is an annex of the museum of sarajevo placed in the old jewish temple, which is one of the most beautiful exhibit spaces in bih. it contains exhibits about jewish life in bosnia and herzegovina. large part of the exhibition is dedicated to the great losses that the jews suffered during world war ii in bosnia and herzegovina. the old orthodox church is dedicated to arhangels mihailo and gavrilo, is one of the oldest sacral objects in sarajevo. it was built in 16th century. in her long history, church has been burned several times, but every time it was rebuilt so it keeps her authentic style. the old orthodox church museum is located by the church, which contains very important, valuable and beautiful icons. because of that it is considered as one of the most important orthodox museums in the world. sarajevo’s old clock tower is 30 meters high, and it is built in the 16th century. the tower’s clock is the only public clock in the world that keeps luna time to indicate the times for the daily prayers. the tower’s current clock mechanism was brought from london in 1875 by sarajevan merchants. morica han is sarajevo’s only remaining caravanserai, a place where merchant caravans could find accommodation during the ottoman period. it was built between the 16th and 17th centuries as part of the gazi husrev bey’s endowment. nowadays in morica han are situated a few cafes, shops, and restaurant. 3. tourists visits in canton sarajevo the number of tourists’ arrivals in canton sarajevo in 2017 increased for 73,607 tourists, when it compared to 408,887 in 2016 (fig. 3). the total number of tourist arrivals in 2018 was 573,227 with a growth rate of 18.8 %, and recorded 1,189,159 overnight stays with a growth rate of 22.9%. the number of touristic valorization of cultural and historical heritage… 37 domestic tourist visitors in 2018 increased by 14,492 compared to 59,850 in 2017, with a growth rate of 24.2%. a number of foreign tourists in 2018 were 87% of all tourists’ arrivals. in municipality stari grad the number of arrivals in 2017 was 122,438 with 274,667 tourist overnight stays while that number in 0 200 000 400 000 600 000 800 000 1 000 000 1 200 000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 number of arrivals number of overnight stays 0 50 000 100 000 150 000 200 000 250 000 300 000 350 000 400 000 450 000 centar hadzici ilidza ilijas novi grad novo sarajevo stari grad trnovo vogosca number of tourist arrivals number of tourist overnight stays fig. 3. number of arrivals & number of overnight stays in canton sarajevo source: compiled by the authors from data supplied by the federal office of statistics. fig. 4. number of tourist arrivals and overnight stays in municipalities in canton sarajevo, 2017 source: compiled by the authors from data supplied by the federal office of statistics. 38 alma pobric, selma sljivo, naida mulaosmanovic 2018 was 137,145 with 298,961 overnight stays (fig. 4). in 2017 the number of accommodation facilities in canton sarajevo was 163, with 11,831 beds, and in 2018 it increased to 350 accommodation facilities which is a growth rate of 15.9%. the most numerous accommodation in 2018 was in hotels with 89.9% of the total number of visitors. in the municipality stari grad in 2018 existed 82 accommodation facilities with 2,860 beds. concerning the structure of foreign tourist overnight stays, most of them were realised by tourists from croatia 12.5%, serbia 8.7%, turkey 8.0%. united arab emirates tourists contributed with 5.6% while from italy 5.2%, slovenia 5.1%, poland 4.9% and germany 3.7%. tourists from other countries realized 46.3% of tourist nights. regarding the average detention of foreign overnight stays, on the first place comes kuwait with average stay with 3.6 nights, ireland with 3.4 nights, iran and qatar by 3.2 nights and bahrain and malta by 3.0 nights. so, the average detention of foreign overnight stays in 2018 was 2.1 days and canton sarajevo visited tourists from 167 foreign countries. a major problem in the presentation of tourist traffic in sarajevo is unregistered arrivals in statistical reports. those are mostly private places, adapted for tourists and easily reachable via online sites like booking.com, airbnb.com etc. searching these sites it was noticed big disparity in registered accommodation places and those find accessible online. this causes a huge loss of money inflow for municipality and canton, and for the entire country as well. 4. methodology according to m. pantović & i. stamenković, (2013) cultural resources are not just aesthetic, but also economic value in particular city, and should be evaluated to provide the basis for the creation of tourist products. the hilary du cros model is one of the scientifically recognized and complete models of tourist valorization of cultural resources. the main purpose of this model is to look at the possibility of including cultural objects in the sustainable development of tourism (lakicević, srdjević, 2011). h. du cros (2000) introduced the process of tourist valorization of a destination, cultural tourist sub-indicators and the levels of their graduation, especially for the tourism sector and the cultural management sector. sub-indicators are valued from 0 to 5, and some subindicators may have smaller range of points. tab. 1. tourist valorization of cultural and historical heritage, sub-indicators tourism sector cultural management sector market attractiveness of cultural heritage cultural significance factors of importance in the designing tourist product robustness source: du cros, 2000. market attractiveness of cultural heritage (tab. 1): 1. environment (weak 0-1, adequate 2-3, good 4, excellent 5). 2. well-known outside the local area (not 0-1, at least 2-3, very good 4-5). 3. an important national symbol (not 0, has a certain potential 1-3, yes 4-5). 4. can be told the “interesting story” about the cultural heritage (no 0, with a certain potential 1-3, yes 4-5). 5. has certain characteristics that clearly differentiate it from surrounding cultural goods (poor 0, adequately 2-3, good 4, excellent 5). 6. attractive for special needs, enabling greater access for tourists, such as organizing a festival (not at all 0, having a certain potential 1-3, yes 4-5). 7. is complementary to other tourist products at the destination or region (not at all 0, it has a certain potential of 1-3, yes 4-5). 8. tourism activity in the region (almost no 0, there are some 2-3, high 4-5). 9. the destination is associated with culture (not at all 0, to a certain extent 2-3, high 4-5). factors of importance in designing tourist products: 1. access to cultural heritage (not allowed 0, restricted access 1-2, allowed access to all elements of cultural heritage 3-4). 2. good transport from the population center to the cultural good (very remote / difficult access 0, easy accessibility 1-2, excellent accessibility 3). 3. close to other cultural attractions (very remote / difficult 0, easy access 1-2, distance can be easily and quickly crossed by foot 3). 4. service benefits-parking, marked roads to cultural goods, refreshments, availability of information (weak 0, adequate 1-2, good 3-4, excellent 5). cultural significance: 1. aesthetic value, including architectural value, if it is a construction object (low 0, medium 1, high 2). 2. historic value (low 0, medium 1, high 2). 3. educational value (low 0, medium 1, high 2). 4. social value (low 0, medium 1, high 2). 5. scientific-research value (low 0, medium 1, high 2). touristic valorization of cultural and historical heritage… 39 6. rarity of cultural heritage on the destination or region (common cultural goods of the same type 0, less common cultural goods of the same type 1, rare cultural goods of the same type 2, unique cultural good of the same type 3). 7. representativity for destination (weak 1, good 2-3, excellent 4). robustness: 1. sensitivity of the cultural heritage (big 0, quite 2-3, not sensitive 4). 2. preparation status (poorly 0, somewhat executed 1, good 2-3, excellent 4). 3. the existence of a cultural heritage management plan (no plan 0, in preparation 1-4, yes 5). 4. regular monitoring and maintenance (low 0, somewhat 1-2, good 3-4, excellent 5). 5. potential for current investment and consultation of key stakeholders (weak 0, adequate 1-2, good 3-4, excellent 5). 6. the possibility of a negative impact of a large number of visitors on the physical condition of the cultural property, or the lifestyle and cultural traditions of the local community (large possibility 1, medium 2-4, small possibility 5). 7. the possibility that modification, as part of product development, has a negative impact on the physical condition of the cultural good, or on the lifestyle and cultural traditions of the local community (large possibility 1, medium 2-4, small possibility 5). on the basis of the analysis performed, a 9-cell “market attractiveness/ robustness matrix” marked by m (i, j) (i, j = 1, 2, 3) is set and for each cultural good is determined which cell belongs to, depending on rating obtained in the previous grading procedure (du cros, 2000). cells are defined as follows (tab. 2): • m (1,1) – high cultural significance/ robustness and low market appeal; • m (1,2) – high cultural significance/ robustness and moderate market appeal; • m (1,3) – high cultural significance/ robustness and high market appeal; • m (2,1) – moderate cultural significance/ robustness and low market appeal; • m (2,2) – moderate cultural significance/ robustness and moderate market appeal; • m (2,3) – moderate cultural significance/ robustness and high market appeal; • m (3,1) – low cultural significance/ robustness and low market appeal; • m (3,2) – low cultural significance/ robustness and moderate market appeal; • m (3,3) – low cultural significance/ robustness and high market appeal. tab. 2. market attractiveness / robustness matrix indicator market appeal robustness overall score 0-20 21-40 41-60 0-20 m(3,1) m(3,2) m(3,3) 21-40 m(2,1) m(2,2) m(2,3) 41-60 m(1,1) m(1,2) m(1,3) source: du cros, 2000. 5. results and discussions cultural tourism can be defined as a process of commoditisation, a nostalgia for heritage and for the past, a psychological experience, process of learning and curiosity, a modern form of pilgrimage, as an industry which represents cultural values and as a specific way of cultural consumption. cultural tourism can play a crucial role in construction and reconstruction of identity for the sake of tourism consumption. cultural tourism is not just about consuming cultural products of the past; it also deals with contemporary way of life and culture of people (mousavi et.al., 2016). market attractiveness of baščaršija is high rated in the evaluation process because it is a unique cultural heritage in sarajevo but also in the region. baščaršija is a symbol of sarajevo, and as that is also seen by tourists. baščaršija is the center of sarajevo and it represent touristic place with a large number of attractive sites which are close to each other. this characteristic is important and it helps a lot in tourism promotion. cultural significance of baščaršija gets the highest marks because it is historical, educational and aesthetic place which is rare in the region. the big problem for future touristic development of bacarsija is lack of a touristic plan which should be essential for managing this important heritage. there are also possibilities for a negative impact on the local community because of the fast increase in the number of tourists. it can be seen that m1 (market attractiveness) = 41+14=55/60 and m2 (robustness) = 17+24= 41/60 which means that baščaršija belongs to cell m (1, 3) so that includes the high value of the indicator cultural significance/robustness and great market attractiveness (tab. 3). 6. conclusions this paper has outlined and determined the attractiveness of the market and the robustness of the cultural and hipotentials for tourism development 40 alma pobric, selma sljivo, naida mulaosmanovic of baščaršija based on methods developed by hilary du cros. a significant number of cultural and historical heritage/attractions already is and have the potential to become a tourist product for the development of tourism. the old core of the city of sarajevo presents in a unique way a rich and diverse history of the area, way of life, customs, and enable the improvement and enrichment of the tourist offer. the cultural and historical significance of baščaršija for tourism in sarajevo is of great importance. it represents a favourable tourists asset that in the future should be seen as a place of systematic tab. 3. touristic valorization of baščaršija with hilary du cros model ambiental unit baščaršija evaluation market attractiveness 41/45 environment 5 well-known outside the local area 4 an important national symbol 4 evocative object 5 differentation from other objects 5 attractive for special needs 5 complementary 5 tourist activities in the region 3 the destination is associated with culture 5 important factors for forming tourist product 14/15 access to cultural heritage 4 connection from the centar to heritage 3 close to other cultural attractions 3 service equipment 4 cultural significance 17/17 aesthetic value 2 historical value 2 educational value 2 social value 2 scientific-research value 2 rarity of the cultural good in destination 3 representativity for destination 4 robustness 24/43 sensitivity of the cultural heritage 3 reparation state 2 existance of management plan 0 monitoring and maintenance 3 investment potential 4 possibility of negative tourist impact 3 negative impact of modification 3 possibility of negative tourist impact on local community 3 negative impact of modification on local community 3 robustness 41-60 m (1,1) m (1,2) m (1,3) 21-40 m (2,1) m (2,2) m (2,3) 0-20 m (3,1) m (3,2) m (3,3) 0-20 21-40 41-60 market attractivness source: compiled by the authors using hilary du cros model. touristic valorization of cultural and historical heritage… 41 management and planning. one of the most valuable feature of baščaršija is its uniqueness and market attractiveness which is proven with this methodology. baščaršija belongs to the cell m (1,3) which represents high cultural significance/ robustness and high market appeal. in post-war sarajevo tourism as an economic activity has helped stimulate and breathing new hope and life into the old baščaršija. development of the cultural tourism in sarajevo has increased in recent years. available statistical data illustrate substantial growth of tourist visits. the numbers of arrivals and overnight stays grew in the analysed period. one of the challenges for both city authorities and canton sarajevo government is to attract investment to improve the accessibility of cultural and historical heritage outside the central business area and city core of baščaršija. if the number of tourists visiting sarajevo is significantly grew will be considerable challenge and questionable how to manage sustainable development in the coming years. the aim of the study was to present the value of the old core of sarajevo, but also to draw attention to the negative impacts of tourism development. that means some changes should be taken in the tourist use of place and planning, but also the enrichment of the tourist content. as the most important cultural heritage of sarajevo, and as the main touristic attraction in the canton sarajevo, baščaršija should have a special place in planning and managing tourism development. references bibanović z., 2015, kulturno i prirodno naslijeđe sarajeva (eng. cultural and natural heritage of sarajevo), priručnik za turističko vođenje, marketinško-informativni biro, sarajevo. du cros h., 2000, planning for sustainable cultural heritage tourism in hong kong, final 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cities 89, 281–295. doi: 10.1016/j.cities.2019.03.001 popović m., 2013, kulturno – turistička valorizacija istorijskog jezgra cetinja (eng. cultural – tourist valorization of the historical core of cetinje), godišnjak fakulteta za kulturu i medije, 5, 695–708. richards g., 2002, tourism attraction systems: exploring cultural behaviour, annals of tourism research, 29(4), 1048– 1064, doi: 10.1016/s0160-7383(02)00026-9 strategija razvoja turizma federacije bosne i hercegovine za period 2008.–2018. (eng. strategy of tourism development federation of bosnia and herzegovina 2008–2018), 2008, jnženjerski biro d.d., prosinac. the archaeological site of the remains of tašlihan in sarajevo, 2004, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the architectural ensemble of the brusa bezistan (rustem pasha bezistan, small bezistan) with shops in sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the architectural ensemble of the ferhadija mosque (ferhad beg mosque) with harem in sarajevo, 2004, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the architectural ensemble of the gazi husref-bey (bey’s) mosque in sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the architectural ensemble of the gazi husrev-beg bezistan with shops in sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the architectural ensemble of the gazi husrev-beg medresa with the site and remains of the khanaqah in sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the historic building of the baščaršija (havadža durak) mosque in sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the historic building of the city hall in sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the historic building of the old jewish synagogue in sarajevo (il kal grandi – great temple, or il kal vježu – old temple or old synagogue), 2003, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. the historic monument of the clock tower in sarajevo, municipality stari grad sarajevo, 2006, commission to preserve national monuments, sarajevo. weaver d., 2006, sustainable tourism – theory and practice, elsevier butterworth – heinemann, oxford. zavod za informatiku i statistiku kantona sarajevo (eng. institute for informatics and statistics of the canton sarajevo, http://zis.ks.gov.ba (accessed: 25 april 2019). zlatar b., 1996, zlatno doba sarajeva xvi stoljeće (eng. the golden age of sarajevo xvi century), svjetlost, sarajevo. 1. introduction the area under study, located in the northern part of poland, is a vast alluvial plain with a territory of approximately 1,700 km2 (kondracki, 1988) and clear natural boundaries, which form the west, south, and east edges of the moraine hills of the kashubian, starogardzkie, iławskie and elbląg uplands, and from to the north, the dune embankment of the vistula spit (fig. 1). this region is not very diversified in terms of hypsometry. depressions with a total area of 465 km2 (augustowski, 1976) mainly cover the northern and eastern part of the area, with the lowest point – 1.8 m below sea level located in the eastern part near druzno lake. the monotonous landscape of the żuławy alluvial plain is diversified by numerous drainage ditches and canals as well as embankments of the main watercourses. due to very good soils (meadows, brown soils, and muck soils), agriculture is the dominant function in this area, especially the cultivation of cereals, rape, and sugar beet (protection program ..., 2018). however, in recent years there has been an interest of local authorities in the development of tourist functions in journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(3), 49–58 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.3.05 climatic conditions of the development of tourism and leisure on the żuławy alluvial plain mirosława malinowska department of meteorology and climatology, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0001-7218-8143 e-mail: miroslawa.malinowska@ug.edu.pl citation malinowska m., 2021, climatic conditions of the development of tourism and leisure on the żuławy alluvial plain, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(3), 49–58. abstract based on the data for the years 1981–2014 from two meteorological stations located in the central and northern part of the żuławy alluvial plain, the climatic conditions for the development of tourism and recreation in this area were analyzed. the factors contributing to this type of activity are the average temperatures in the fall and winter months higher than in central poland and lower temperatures in the summer months, a relatively small number of hot and very hot days, as well as ice and very ice days. the central part of the analyzed area is characterized by lower precipitation totals, lower relative humidity, lower number of steamy days, lower cloud cover, and a high number of days with less than 50% cloudiness than the northern part, which is favorable to tourism in this area. due to the small number of days with snowfall and snow cover over 8 cm thick, the possibility of skiing here is limited. key words climate, tourism, żuławy alluvial plain. received: 11 may 2021 accepted: 23 august 2021 published: 29 november 2021 50 mirosława malinowska communes. this is evidenced by k. nowicka’s (2019) analysis of strategic documents carried out in rural communes of the pomeranian voivodeship, which showed that one-third of them have issues related to the development of tourism in their strategic or operational goals. in addition to agritourism, these documents mention cycling, hiking, canoeing, sailing, nordic walking, and geocaching as touristic activities that may be promoted in this region. also, the values of cultural and natural heritage may attract visitors. the greatest values of cultural heritage in this area include the traces of mennonite settlement, arcaded houses, churches, currently few windmills, and historic hydro-technical structures. based on these artifacts of the region’s rich history, the authorities of various levels and various associations are trying to shape the identity of local communities (paprot-wielopolska, 2018), which in connection with the promotion of communes by organizing various events, bringing closer local traditions, rituals, art, artistic craftsmanship or cuisine, contributes to the development of tourism in this area. interest in the development of tourism in this region is also evidenced by investments implemented in recent years in żuławy wiślane, such as a modern yacht marina in błotnik, built in 2012 as part of the „żuławska loop” project, which involves the construction of a network of ports and sailing marinas and mooring bridges along the żuławy section of the vistula, the nogat and the szkarpawa (błotnik – marina, 2021; pętla żuławska ..., 2018) or the development of the northern part of the vistula cycling route (powstaną dwa ..., 2017). the ditch of the vistula spit may contribute to the expansion of the tourist offer in the region in the future, especially that in recent years there has been a significant increase in passenger shipments in the port of elbląg (puzdrakiewicz, połom, 2021). the suburbanization processes taking place, especially in the western part of the żuławy alluvial plain, may also contribute to the increased interest in tourism and recreation in the analyzed area. g. masik (2018) included the nowodworski poviat, the gdańsk poviat and the northern part of the tczew poviat in the functional zone of the gdańsk-gdynia-sopot metropolitan area. these poviats are fully or partially located in the area of the żuławy alluvial plain. in 2006–2016 there was a significant increase in the number of inhabitants (by 17%) and the number of newly built apartments fig. 1. topography and location of meteorological stations on the żuławy alluvial plain source: own study based on the mogc public data and solon, 2018. climatic conditions of the development of tourism and leisure on the żuławy alluvial plain 51 (by  33%). new, professionally active residents may probably be more willing to spend their free time actively. the terms tourism and recreation used in this study require some explanation. in view of numerous ambiguities and difficulties in defining the term tourism (liszewski, 2013), in this study, tourism is considered to be all forms of activity undertaken in free time, aimed at getting to know new areas, their inhabitants, and culture or leisure (recreation). one of the elements deciding about taking up outdoor physical activity, including tourism, is weather conditions. the impact of meteorological elements may cause positive or negative functional, metabolic or morphological changes in the human body (kozłowska-szczęsna et al., 1997). on the one hand, unfavorable meteorological conditions may discourage tourists from taking up a tourist or recreational activity, and on the other hand, limit or prevent it. the aim of this article is to characterize the climatic conditions of the żuławy alluvial plain in terms of tourism or recreation opportunities. in the literature on the subject, there is no analysis of the climatic conditions of the analyzed area from the point of view of the possibility of practicing various forms of tourism. much, although very generalized, information about the climate stimulus of the żuławy alluvial plain can be found in the study by t. kozłowska-szczęsna et al. (1997). k. błażejczyk and a. kunert (2011) conducted a detailed analysis of poland’s biometeorological and bioclimatic indicators, including the żuławy alluvial plain in the coastal region. the climate of the south baltic coast was analyzed by m. miętus and his team (miętus et al., 2004). u. radzka and e. dragańska (2015) characterized in detail the bioclimatic conditions of tourism and recreation in the warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeship, whose western edges include the eastern part of the żuławy alluvial plain. studies referring to other regions with a seaside location in poland may be a certain reference to the climatic conditions in the żuławy alluvial plain considered in the context of their tourist use. the analysis of bioclimatic conditions, taking into account both the characteristics of individual meteorological elements of biometeorological importance and bioclimatic complex indicators for the hel peninsula, was carried out by m. owczarek (2005). e. kalbarczyk and r. kalbarczyk (2007) presented a detailed and comprehensive assessment of the climate in central pomerania in terms of tourism development. the annual course of biometeorological indicators on the southern baltic coast from greifswald to gdynia was described by m. świątek (2014). analyses of bioclimatic conditions on the polish coast of the baltic sea, which covered the vistula spit with the świbno station in gdańsk, are the works of m. owczarek (2012) and m. owczarek et al. (2019). data from the station in the żuławy alluvial plain was not used in any of the studies mentioned. taking up the topic should be considered justified. basic characteristics of meteorological elements were used to assess the conditions in the żuławy alluvial plain , such as: • the annual and monthly air temperature averages; • the annual and monthly mean numbers of sweltering days (tmax≥30°c), hot days (25°c≤tmax≤30°c), ice days (tmax <0c) and very ice days (tmax≤-10°c); • the annual and monthly average relative humidity of the air at 12 utc (f ); • the annual and monthly average number of sultry days (with water vapor pressure e ≥ 18.8 hpa at 12 utc). • the average annual and monthly value of the total cloudiness at 12 utc; • the average annual and monthly number of days with total cloudiness ≤ 50% at 12 utc; • the average annual and monthly number of days with cloud cover = 100% at 12 utc; • the average annual and monthly precipitation totals; • the average annual and monthly number of days with precipitation ≥0.1 mm, including days with snowfall; • the number of days with snow cover thickness of at least 8 mm. as mentioned earlier, the żuławy alluvial plain does not border directly on the gulf of gdańsk, and are separated from it by a narrow dune strip of the vistula spit. when discussing the climatic conditions for the development of tourism in this area, it is impossible to ignore what is characteristic of the coastal zone. therefore, the study used data for the years 1981–2014, published in the imwm-pib database, coming from two stations (fig. 1). located in the central part of the region, the kmiecin climatic station represents the climatic conditions characteristic of the vast żuławy delta. thanks to the data from the gdańsk-świbno synoptic station, it is possible to characterize the climatic conditions of the northern part of the region and the coastal belt. 52 mirosława malinowska 2. climatic conditions of the żuławy alluvial plain 2.1. air temperature the average annual air temperature in gdańskświbno is higher than in kmiecin (8.1 and 7.8°c, respectively) (table 1). such a situation is typical of most of the year, except for april and may, when the kmiecin station is slightly warmer than the gdańskświbno station. such a course of air temperature in the analyzed area is influenced by the vicinity of the baltic sea and the gulf of gdańsk, which in spring have a cooling effect on the narrow coastal zone. in the remaining months, the average monthly air temperatures are higher in gdańsk-świbno, than the temperatures at the kmiecin station by 0.2–0.7°c. july is the warmest month with average temperatures of 17.8°c in kmiecin and 18.0°c in gdańskświbno. january is the coldest at both stations (–1.9°c in kmiecin and –1.2°c in gdańsk-świbno). in kmiecin, the average monthly temperature in december is negative (–0.3°c) and in gdańsk-świbno it is positive (0.2°c). the annual average number of hot days is clearly higher in kmiecin (23.9) than in gdańsk-sobieszewo (16.1) (table 2). hot days are recorded at the analyzed stations in the months from april to september, and the greatest number of them occurs in august (on average 8.0 in kmiecin and 5.3 in gdańsk-świbno). the average number of hot days in july is slightly lower (7.4 and 4.9 in kmiecin and gdańsk-świbno, respectively). about 2–3 such days may occur at both stations in may and june. at both stations, sweltering days are rarely observed. on average, in the summer season, there are 2–3 such days, the earliest ones in the analyzed period were recorded in may; they also occurred in september. in the analyzed period, the highest air temperatures were recorded at both stations on august 10, 1992. in kmiecin it reached 36.3°c, and in gdańsk-świbno 35.8°c. in general, the number of hot and sweltering days in the żuławy alluvial plain should not limit tourist and recreational activity in this area. ice days, with the maximum temperature not exceeding 0°c, are recorded at the analyzed stations in the period from november to march (table 3). in april, in the analyzed period, ice days occurred sporadically and only at the station in kmiecin. the average annual number of ice days at both stations is similar, slightly higher in kmiecin (28.8) than in gdańsk-świbno (26.6). the largest number of such days occurs at both stations in the winter season, with a maximum in january (an average of 10.0 days in kmiecin and 9.1 in gdańsk-świbno), in february a slightly higher number of ice days characterizes the station in gdańsk-świbno. very ice days occur in the analyzed area extremely rarely. in the winter season, their average annual tab. 1. average monthly and annual air temperature in kmiecin and gdańsk-świbno, 1981–2014 station jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec year kmiecin –1.9 –1.4 1.9 7.1 12.4 15.2 17.8 17.3 13.1 8.3 3.3 –0.3 7.8 gdańsk-świbno –1.2 –0.7 2.3 7.0 12.2 15.4 18.0 17.6 13.5 8.7 3.7 0.2 8.1 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. tab. 2. average monthly and annual number of hot and sweltering days in kmiecin and gdańsk-świbno, 1981–2014. air temperature station apr may jun jul aug sep annual hot days (25°c≤tmax≤30°c) kmiecin 0.6 2.8 3.8 7.4 8.0 1.4 23.9 gdańsk-świbno 0.3 2.2 2.5 4.9 5.3 0.9 16.1 sweltering days (tmax≥30°c) kmiecin – – 0.2 1.7 1.6 0.1 3.5 gdańsk-świbno – 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.8 0.0 2.6 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. tab. 3. average monthly and annual number of ice and very ice days in kmiecin and gdańsk-świbno, 1981–2014 air temperature station nov dec jan feb mar apr annual ice days (tmax<0°c) kmiecin 2.0 7.2 10.0 7.5 2.0 0.0 28.8 gdańsk-świbno 1.5 6.1 9.1 7.7 2.1 – 26.6 very ice days (tmax≤-10°c) kmiecin – 0.3 0.9 0.6 – – 1.8 gdańsk-świbno – 0.2 1.0 0.3 – – 1.5 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. climatic conditions of the development of tourism and leisure on the żuławy alluvial plain 53 number does not exceed two. while in january at both stations you can expect one very ice day every year, in december and february very ice days are recorded every 2–5 years, depending on the station. in kmiecin, the absolute minimum in the analyzed period was recorded on january 11, 1987, when the temperature dropped to -23.0°c. in gdańsk-świbno, the cold record was recorded on january 7, 2003, when the thermometer showed -19.0°c. the low number of ice and very ice days in the żuławy alluvial plain is not a factor limiting the practice of such forms of tourism as cycling, hiking, or nordic walking. 2.2. air humidity air humidity is an important meteorological element, influencing the conditions for tourism development, because its high values on days with the air temperature above 12°c intensify the feeling of warmth, while on days with low temperature they intensify the feeling of coolness (kozłowska-szczesna et al., 1997). the article analyzes the annual course of relative air humidity and the number of sultry days, i.e. when the water vapor pressure (e) is not less than 18.8 hpa. the latter indicator is the so-called scharlau’s criterion (after kozłowska-szczęsna et al., 1997), defining the conditions in which a person staying or doing light work outdoors has difficulty with dissipating heat from the body. the analyses were carried out for 12 utc (in poland, 1:00 p.m. in the cold half-year and 2:00 p.m. in the warm half-year), because one usually undertakes recreational and tourist activities in the open air in the middle of the day. this approach was also used by m. owczarek (2005, 2012). the northern part of the żuławy alluvial plain is clearly wetter than the central part. the average annual relative humidity in kmiecin is 71.7%. in gdańskświbno, it is higher, reaching the value of 75.8% (table 4). the least humid month at both stations is august. the average relative humidity in this month at the station in kmiecin is 62.4%, in gdańsk-świbno it is clearly higher – 68.9%. december is the month with the highest relative humidity in the analyzed area. this characteristic reaches the value of almost 82% in kmiecin and 86.5% in gdańsk-świbno. the differences in relative humidity at both stations result from the location of gdańsk-świbno in the vicinity of the gulf of gdańsk, unlimited source of water vapor. sultry days at both stations are recorded in the period from april to october (table 4). there is a clearly higher number of them in gdańsk-świbno (on average 48.5 per year) than in kmiecin (19.9). as in the case of relative humidity, the proximity of an unlimited source of moisture determines the greater frequency of such days in gdańsk-świbno, especially in july and august, when statistically almost every second day in a month may be a sultry day. in kmiecin, there is an average of 6–7 such days in these months. 2.3. cloudiness general cloud cover is one of the factors taken into account in the first place when it comes to making decisions about physical activity or engaging in various forms of tourism. days with the cloudiness of ≤ 50% are considered the most favorable for sunbathing (owczarek, 2005; kozłowska-szczęsna et al, 1997), whereas days with the full cloud cover (cloudiness = 100%) discourage people from outdoor activities. as in the case of air humidity, the cloud characteristics were analyzed based on data from 12 utc. average annual total cloudiness at 12 utc at both stations clearly differs, assuming the value of 55% in kmiecin, and 66% in gdańsk-świbno (table  5). in the annual course, there is an increase in total cloudiness in the winter season, when its values in kmiecin in the period from november to february are above 60%, and in gdańsk-świbno they are even higher, exceeding 70%. the highest total cloudiness in kmiecin is recorded in december (72%) and in gdańsk-świbno in november (77%). the most convenient conditions for tourism and recreation in the żuławy alluvial plain in terms of cloudiness occur from april to september. in these months, the average total cloudiness in kmiecin at 12 utc does not tab. 4. average monthly and annual relative humidity [%] and the number of days with water vapor pressure ≥ 62.4% a18.8 hpa (sultry days) at 12 utc in kmiecin and gdańsk-świbno, 1981–2014 humidity station jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec annual relative humidity [%] at 12 utc kmiecin 81.5 78.9 73.7 68.1 64.1 65.4 63.8 62.4 68.1 72.4 79.6 81.9 71.7 gdańskświbno 84.8 81.7 74.9 69.1 69.6 70.6 71.6 68.9 69.7 76.8 85.2 86.5 75.8 no of sultry days at 12 utc kmiecin – – – 0.5 1.8 3.1 6.7 6.2 1.4 0.2 – – 19.9 gdańskświbno – – – 1.0 4.4 8.2 14.9 14.4 5.0 0.7 – – 48.5 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. 54 mirosława malinowska exceed 50%. the exception is july, when this characteristic reaches on average 51%. the least cloudy months at this station are april and may. the average total cloudiness in gdańsk-świbno ranges from 57% to 62% in this period. slightly higher values of the total cloudiness are recorded in june, when its average value reaches 63%. in the coastal belt, the most favorable conditions occur in may when average monthly total cloudiness is 57%. the central part of the żuławy alluvial plain is privileged over the coastal zone in terms of the number of days with cloudiness ≤50% annually, reaching 118.0 days and 201.6 days in gdańsk–świbno and kmiecin, respectively (table 5). from april to september, two-thirds of the days are characterized by such cloudiness in kmiecin, and the highest values are observed in may and august (on average 21.2 days). the obtained results are only slightly higher than those presented by t. kozłowska-szczęsna et al. (1997). in the winter months, about 10–12 days are convenient for outdoor activities. the average monthly number of days with cloudiness ≤50% at 12  utc in gdańsk-świbno ranges from 5.7 in november to 12.4 in july and 13.6 in may. these values, however, are similar to those obtained by owczarek (2005) for hel. the average annual number of days with cloudiness = 100% in kmiecin is higher than in gdańskświbno (95.8 and 75.4, respectively) (table 5). between november and february, the number of such days varies from 12 to almost 15 in kmiecin, and from 9 to 11 in gdańsk-świbno. in the months of the warm half-year, the number of days with cloudiness = 100% ranges from 4.0 in august to 5.5 in april in kmiecin, and from 2.6 in august to 4.4 in april in gdańsk-świbno. 2.4. precipitation and snow cover the average annual totals of precipitation at the analyzed stations are low (510.5 mm in kmiecin and  557.4 mm in gdańsk-świbno) (table 6) compared to the average annual precipitation total in poland (623.7 mm), and in the south-baltic coast (642.7 mm) (limanówka et al., 2012). the lowest monthly totals of precipitation are recorded from january to march; in kmiecin they do not exceed 20 mm, and in gdańsk-świbno 30 mm. the highest monthly totals of rainfall are noted in the summer tab. 5. average monthly and annual total cloudiness [%] at 12 utc and the number of days with cloudiness ≤ 50% and equal to 100% in kmiecin and gdańsk-świbno, 1981–2014 cloudiness station jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec annual total cloudiness [%] at 12 utc kmiecin 68 64 53 46 45 51 49 48 48 52 70 72 55 gdańskświbno 75 73 64 60 57 63 59 61 62 64 77 76 66 no of days with cloudiness ≤ 50% at 12 utc kmiecin 11.8 11.9 17.4 19.6 21.2 18.8 20.2 21.2 20.0 18.0 11.3 10.1 201.6 gdańskświbno 6.9 6.8 10.7 11.8 13.6 10.8 12.4 11.6 11.3 10.6 5.7 5.9 118.0 no of days with cloudiness = 100% at 12 utc kmiecin 13.2 12.0 8.3 5.5 4.2 5.1 4.1 4.0 5.1 7.0 12.6 14.6 95.8 gdańskświbno 10.6 9.3 7.4 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.1 2.6 3.8 5.6 10.1 10.7 75.4 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. tab. 6. average monthly and annual precipitation totals and number of days with precipitation in kmiecin and gdańskświbno, 1981–2014 precipitation station jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec annual precipitation totals [mm] kmiecin 19.1 12.4 18.8 27.2 51.3 67.7 68.3 73.6 61.4 47.8 37.2 25.5 510.5 gdańskświbno 29.3 22.5 26.6 30.2 53.8 65.7 69.3 68.3 62.1 47.7 45.0 36.9 557.4 no of days with precipitation ≥ 0.1mm kmiecin 14.1 12.1 11.4 9.9 12.1 13.4 13.1 13.2 12.8 12.6 13.4 14.1 152.2 gdańskświbno 17.1 14.5 14.0 12.0 12.8 14.3 13.1 14.1 13.1 14.9 16.4 18.0 174.3 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. climatic conditions of the development of tourism and leisure on the żuławy alluvial plain 55 months, in kmiecin in august (73.6 mm on average) and in gdańsk-świbno in july (69.3 mm on average). the average annual number of days with precipitation is also clearly lower in kmiecin (152.2 days) than in gdańsk-świbno, where the characteristic reaches 174.3 days (table 6). the annual course of the average monthly number of days with precipitation at the kmiecin station is very even, with a minimum of less than 10 days in april and a maximum of 14.1 days in december and january. in gdańsk-świbno, the lowest number of days with precipitation is also observed in april and the highest in december (12.0 and 18.0 on average, respectively). the average seasonal number of days with snowfall ranges from 37.4 in gdańsk-świbno to 43.6 in kmiecin (table 7). snowfall is observed here from october to april, and occasionally in may. in the analyzed years, both stations recorded an average from  7 to 10 days with such precipitation, with the maximum in january. the number of days with a snow cover thickness of at least 8 mm was analyzed, as ski tourism can be practiced in the presence of such a snow layer (bednorz, 2010). in the analyzed years, on average from 20 (kmiecin) to 24 (gdańsk-świbno) days suitable for skiing tourism were recorded in the żuławy alluvial plain with the maximum in january and february (table 7). 3. discussion the average annual air temperature at the level of 7.8–8.1°c in the żuławy alluvial plain strongly corresponds to the results obtained by m. owczarek and j. filipiak (2016), who stated that the annual average air temperature did not drop below 8°c in the 21st century. from the perspective of tourism development, it is important that in autumn and winter the analyzed area, like other areas located in the coastal belt, is the warmest region of poland, while in summer and spring, it is cooler than the rest of the country due to the cooling effect of the baltic sea (marosz et al., 2011). since the 1990s, an increase in air temperature in poland has been observed (marosz et al., 2011; owczarek, filipiak, 2016) and an increase in the duration of thermal spring and summer (czernecki, miętus, 2017). if these trends continue, the period of the year when conditions favorable for active forms of tourism and outdoor recreation in the żuławy alluvial plain will be extended. the average number of hot days (25°c≤tmax ≤30°c) in kmiecin is clearly higher than in gdańskświbno, where thermal contrasts are mitigated by the vicinity of the gulf of gdańsk waters. in the central part of the żuławy alluvial plain, hot days in july and august may constitute an average of 25% of the days a month, while in the northern part of the area under investigation there are about 5 such days noted during the warmest months. sweltering days (tmax≥30c) are much less frequent. in july and august the maximum temperature exceeds 30°c once a month on average. the number of hot and sweltering days recorded in gdańsk-świbno is similar to that of hel (owczarek, 2005). in the winter season (december-february), from 7 to10 ice days (–10°c<tmax <0°c) are recorded in the analyzed area, and very ice days (tmax≤-10°c) occur only sporadically. the appearance of hot and sweltering days in the warm season and ice and very ice days in the cold season may be a factor limiting the possibilities of tourism and recreation development in the analyzed area. positive trends in the average and maximum air temperature changes (marosz et al., 2011, owczarek, filipiak, 2016) will cause a decrease in the frequency of ice and very ice days in the future, which will be a positive factor in terms of the development of tourism and leisure in this area. at the same time, the consequence of these trends will be an increase in the frequency of hot and sweltering days, which may limit tourist and leisure activity. the increase in the frequency of unfavorable thermal conditions at stations located in the coastal belt will also result from the increasing number of days classified as heat waves (owczarek 2012; owczarek, filipiak, 2016). taking into account the thermal tab. 7. average monthly and annual number of days with snowfall and with snow cover ≥8mm in kmiecin and gdańskświbno, 1981–2014 precipitation station oct nov dec jan feb mar apr may annual no of days with snowfall kmiecin 0.6 4.1 9.6 10.4 9.4 7.0 2.5 0.1 43.6 gdańskświbno 0.4 3.3 7.9 9.3 8.7 5.4 2.3 0.1 37.4 no of days with snow cover depth ≥ 8mm kmiecin – 0.2 3.0 7.1 6.8 3.3 – – 20.4 gdańskświbno – 0.3 3.7 7.4 8.6 4.3 0.0 – 24.3 source: own study based on the imwm-nri public data. 56 mirosława malinowska conditions and the trends in their changes, the season favorable for various forms of outdoor activity may extend from april to october, with some limitations in july and august. during these months, people staying outdoors in the afternoon hours may experience a burden of „strong or very strong heat stress” (owczarek et al., 2019). the average values of relative humidity are 75% and 71%, in gdańsk-świbno and kmiecin, respectively. these values correspond to those calculated by m. owczarek (2005) for hel. lower, both annual and monthly mean values of relative humidity in kmiecin show that in terms of humidity conditions, the central part of the żuławy alluvial plain is better for tourism and recreation throughout the year. this is also evidenced by the clearly lower number of sultry days in kmiecin (around 19 a year) than in gdańsk-świbno (around 45 a year). this contrast may even deepen, because rising air temperatures will result in a faster evaporation rate, a higher water vapor content in the air (limanówka et al., 2012), and a greater frequency of sultry days especially in close vicinity of the gulf of gdańsk. the average values of the total cloudiness in gdańsk-świbno, both on an annual (66%) and monthly (57–77%) basis, do not significantly differ from those in ustka and hel (woś, 2010). in kmiecin, the values of this indicator are clearly lower throughout the year (annual average 55%), in april and may not exceeding 50%. the results are consistent with the research of j. filipiak and m. miętus (2009), who indicated the shores of the gulf of gdańsk as areas with the lowest cloudiness in poland. this feature predestines the central part of the żuławy alluvial plain as a good place to practice various forms of tourism and recreation, as does the average number of days with cloudiness below 50%. in kmiecin, over 200 days a year are days with such cloudiness, while in gdańsk-świbno there are about 118 such days a year. however, the average number of days with cloudiness = 100% in kmiecin is higher than in gdańsk-świbno, by an average of 20. if the tendencies of a decrease in total cloudiness, demonstrated by filipiak and mietus (2008) for elbląg and hel, and by limanówka et al. (2012) for the whole of poland remain, cloudiness will not limit the possibilities of tourism and recreation in the żuławy alluvial plain. the central part of the żuławy alluvial plain receives less rainfall and has fewer rainy days than its northern part; however, the difference in the number of days with rainfall in favor of kmiecin is clearly visible in the cold season. in the warm season, the pluvial conditions at both stations are similar. analysis of the variability of precipitation sums, carried out by limanówka et al. (2012), showed a growing trend of precipitation totals in the belt of the south baltic coastlines and the east baltic coasts. similar trends regarding the increase in precipitation sums in this region and the increase in the number of days with precipitation were shown by m. marosz et al. (2011). the persistence of such trends in the future may be a factor limiting tourism and recreation in the vistula river delta. the average annual number of days with snow conditions good for cross-country skiing in the range of 20–24 is lower by about 6–10 days than the analogous characteristics presented by e. bednorz (2010) for the winter seasons 1960/1961–2007/2008. this is the effect of an increase in average air temperatures observed in poland (marosz et al., 2011; owczarek, filipiak, 2016), and thus the decreasing number of days with snow cover, especially in december and january (czarnecka, 2012). it could be assumed that in january and february one can count on 6–8 days with snow cover enabling this kind of outdoor activity, but these are average figures. winters during which snow cover has appropriate thickness occur in northern poland once every few years. s. paczos [1990, quoting: woś, 2010] estimated the frequency of snow winters in the analyzed area below 20%, and m. czarnecka (2012) indicated a decreasing number of days with snow cover over 5 cm thick, especially in december. in the light of these results, this form of tourism has no chance of development in the żuławy alluvial plain. 4. conclusions the climatic conditions in the żuławy alluvial plain are characterized by a certain spatial diversification, and their observed changes may favor tourism and recreation here in the future or may be a factor limiting this type of activity. the żuławy alluvial plain is distinguished by quite high average annual air temperatures and clearly warmer autumns and winters than in the rest of the country. in turn, springs and summers are cooler. there are few hot and sweltering days, as well as ice and very ice days here. such a course of temperatures, with thermal contrasts lower than in the interior, may favor the development of hiking and cycling, as long as the number of hot and sweltering days does not significantly increase in the future. in the central part of the investigated area, the relative humidity, and especially the number of sultry days, is clearly lower than in its northern part, as is the total cloudiness and the number of days with cloudiness ≤ 50%. these factors are also beneficial to the development of tourism and recreation. in climatic conditions of the development of tourism and leisure on the żuławy alluvial plain 57 the analyzed area, lower amounts of precipitation are observed, and in kmiecin also the number of rainy days. such a situation encourages spending free time outdoors. however, this factor, especially during prolonged periods without rainfall, may limit the possibility of sailing due to the decreasing water level in the streams. the possibility of practicing winter sports, especially skiing, is limited here due to the small number of days with snowfall and, above all, the very low number of days with snow cover at least 8 cm thick. references augustowski b., 1976, żuławy wiślane (eng. the żuławy alluvial 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voivodeship), wydawnictwo uwm, olsztyn. solon j., 2018, physico-geographical mesoregions of poland: verification and adjustment of boundaries on the basis of contemporary spatial data, geographia polonica, 91(2), 143–170. świątek m., 2014, seasonal variability of climatic conditions for tourism and recreation along the southern coast of the baltic sea, bulletin of geography. physical geography series, 7, 57–80. doi: 10.2478/bgeo-2014-0003 woś a., 2010, klimat polski w drugiej połowie xx wieku (eng. the climate of poland in the second half of the 20th century), wydawnictwo naukowe uam, poznań. 1. introduction social inequalities in the 21st century belong to global problems, both in the socio-economic and political dimensions. inequalities are most often manifested in the fact that some individuals cannot fully use the privileges available to others or that they are treated differently (worse) only because they belong to a certain social group or category (zachorowskamazurkiewicz, 2011). inequalities are commonly associated with poorer countries identified as developing areas. however, the problem affects every part of the world, and it is just its spatial scale that differs. researchers of social inequalities emphasise an extremely important role of factors influencing their emergence. many of them point to the so-called inheritance of inequalities or their transmission from generation to generation. this fact is often referred to by j. e. stiglitz, a nobel prize winner in economics. he writes, it would seem that there is more justice in the united states and europe, but this is only an appearance. those who graduate from the best universities with the highest scores are more likely to get a good job. but the system is unfair, because these are rich parents who send their children to the best kindergartens, the best primary and secondary schools, and their graduates then have a much greater chance of getting into elite universities (stiglitz, 2015, p. 43). journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(3), 14–29 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.3.02 social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective iwona kiniorska institute of geography and environmental sciences, jan kochanowski university, uniwersytecka 7, 25–406 poland, orcid: 0000-0001-5630-4554 e-mail: iwona.kiniorska@ujk.edu.pl citation kiniorska i., 2021, social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(3), 14–29. abstract contemporary considerations on social inequalities are more and more often of an interdisciplinary character. particular interest in the above-mentioned issues becomes noticeable in sociological and economic sciences and is also gradually increasing in geographical disciplines. the aim of this study is to present the problem of social inequalities from an interdisciplinary perspective. the analysis highlights the contribution of research conducted by representatives of sociology, economics, and geography. the methods of classification and identification of factors shaping social inequalities were also discussed. key words social inequalities, exclusion, poverty. received: 01 june 2021 accepted: 31 august 2021 published: 29 november 2021 social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective 15 for those born in poverty, it is very difficult to get out of their position. numerous representatives of the social sciences prove that traditional social stratification variables, such as social class, education, or employment status, are still important predictors of the emergence of social inequalities (diprete, mcmanaus, 2000; fouarge, layte, 2005; whelan, maitre, 2008; vandecasteele, 2015). currently, the problem of social inequalities is studied by representatives of many scientific disciplines. they are widely discussed, among others, by sociologists who interpret them differently. according to g. lissowski et al. (2011) and z. sawiński (2012), we always talk about inequalities when socially desirable values or socially valued resources are unequally distributed among the members of a given community. within the economic sciences, we find a number of definitions of social inequalities indicating unequal access to socially valued goods. they emphasise the impact of a differentiated income distribution as the basic element shaping the emergence of inequalities. there are many dimensions in the context of which social inequalities can be studied, including income, property, access to healthcare, knowledge, and gender. social inequalities are noticeable in every area of social life and have an impact on the material and non-material human existence (krot, lewicka, 2016). to a large extent, they result from unequal life chances and the possibility of using the social economic goods of individuals and social groups. in geographical terms, it can be assumed that social inequalities are all limitations resulting from unequal access to socially valued goods and resources, with an emphasis on the impact of the spatial factor on the emergence of disproportions (kiniorska, 2020). 2. research areas concerning social inequalities there exists a large amount of literature related to social inequalities, both domestic and foreign. in theoretical considerations, first of all, the emphasis is put on identifying the factors that cause them to emerge, while constructing a number of theories and models of the formation of inequalities. however, as j. czerny notes, there is no indication of the sources of inequality, the so-called primary causes. the author rightly points to the importance of axiological contrasts in the emergence of a number of cases of social turmoil, as in: it is not a social problem that the dog of a rich man eats better than many people. but the social problem is that many people have nothing to eat at all. this is an example of axiological contrast. if a footballer from a reputable team earns as much a month as 30 university professors, then such a phenomenon is considered an example of an axiological contrast. if an actress of a television series earns as much as eight university professors, this is another example of an axiological contrast (czerny, 2014, p. 19). the phenomena of axiological contrast are intensifying in the contemporary world, because civilisation creates particularly favourable conditions for situations in which it is not reliable work but economic anarchy called market liberalisation that makes a model outstrip several professors with her high yields. naturally, this is a philosophical approach, but it indicates the need for further research in scientific discussions and for putting a theoretical order into the issues of social inequalities and their interpretation in the scope of the construction of theories and models. in the research on social inequalities, a lot of space is devoted to identification of factors influencing formation of social inequalities (kiniorska, 2020). sociologists often focus on the role of education. hence, an important research area in sociological research is the issue of the relationship between access to education and social stratification (table 1). in the economic and geographical perspective, significant importance is also attached to factors resulting from human capital. geographical studies also emphasise the impact of social marginalisation and poverty on shaping social inequalities. the problems raised in the discussion on social inequalities can be divided into several thematic groups. the first one concerns inequalities resulting from personal characteristics and inherited social capital and is composed of studies conducted mainly by representatives of sociology and psychology (table 2). in the sociological literature, the main emphasis is on examining the differences between social groups with different levels of privilege. almost everywhere in the world, social position primarily depends on economic resources, politics and the way the country is managed. also, the population’s education, occupation, ethnic and religious group, age, disability may be the factors causing inequalities to emerge or deepening the already existing ones (pantyley, 2018). for geographers as well as for economists, an interesting research field is the one concerning the influence of geographic location (spatial factor) on the formation of inequalities. w. pantyley (2018), who focused her research on health inequalities, mentions in her considerations that the concept of place and space is of fundamental importance to the issue. the author emphasises that the concept of space comes down to the measurements 16 iwona kiniorska of distance and proximity as well as of the spatial distribution of both protective and risk factors in shaping the health condition. on the other hand, the concept of place concerns administrative divisions within the country, as well as belonging to a specific place of residence. contemporary research on social inequalities covers many thematic groups. the research on the cumulative effects of social inequalities in urban and rural areas is among the constantly developing ones. the assessment concerns, inter alia, the impact of the social welfare reforms and the economic crisis of 2008 on the processes of changes in the policies of particular governments (gkartzios, 2013; murphy, scott, 2013; zavras et al., 2012; zografakis, karanikolas, 2012). society, especially young people around the world, is facing far-reaching economic, political, and social changes and „are often blocked in the labour market” (black et al., 2019, p. 264). the literature on the subject indicates that the cumulative effect of these changes in urban and rural areas leads to an increase in social inequalities and polarisation in some socio-economic groups (asenova et al., 2015). scientific research carried out in various research centres in europe covers, among others, the assessment of the impact of austerity policy on shaping the life path of young people in rural areas, as, for example, the research conducted by the british centre (black et al., 2019; shucksmith, 2004; sturzaker, shucksmith, 2011). there is a lot of interest among researchers in the mechanisms through which social inequalities are passed from generation to generation as well as in references to p. bourdieu’s theory (1977, 1987). the influence of social origin on the classic dimensions of social inequalities is widely discussed. quantitative and qualitative analyses are conducted through assessment of the quality of life. numerous studies show a positive correlation between life satisfaction and education (e.g. hadjar et al., 2008; yang, 2008), employment opportunities (di tella et al., 2010; winkelmann, & winkelmann, 1998), income (wolbring et al., 2013) and health (deaton, 2008; gwozdz, sousa-poza, 2010). the role of place as an important factor shaping „social relations” is also emphasised (savage, 2010; sherman, 2009, 2013). in addition to the above-mentioned, the research includes an assessment of people’s attitudes towards social inequalities. they are discussed both in theoretical (alesina et al., 2012; bénabou, tirole, 2006) and empirical (bavetta et al., 2017; kuhn, 2011, 2019; schneider, 2012) aspects. as a consequence, growing social inequalities may lead to antisocial tab. 1. the role of factors in shaping social inequalities from an interdisciplinary perspective discipline research area authors economics impact of inequalities on economic growth through human capital atkinson, 2015; bartak, 2015; bell, freeman, 2001; fishman, simhon, 2002; foellmi, zweimüller, 2003; galor, zeira, 1993; galor, 2011; halter et al., 2014; piketty, wilkinson, 2009; piketty, 2015. sociology education vs. social stratification breen, goldthorpe, 1997; breen, jonsson, 2005; coleman, 1986; coleman, fararo, 1992; domański, 2004; goldthorpe, 2012; mare, 1981,1991; marshall, 1988; suchocka, 2010; therborn, 2015. geography marginalisation and poverty bartnicka, 1991; czerny, 2012; kamińska, 2011; lisowski, 2000; marcińczak, 2009; rembowska, 1990; rykiel, 2000; węcławowicz, 2002; wójcik, tomczyk, 2015. source: own work. tab. 2. selected research areas of social inequalities in an interdisciplinary approach research area discipline inequalities resulting from personal characteristics and family-conditioned inherited social capital sociology, psychology inequalities resulting from the degree of peripherality and gradation between the centre and periphery geography, economics inequalities among subregions within regions sociology, psychology, geography inequalities resulting from the weaknesses and negative qualities of social capital sociology, psychology, geography educational inequalities sociology, economics, geography, psychology source: own work based on popławski, 2009. social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective 17 behaviour, as indicated by numerous researchers, including l. gangadharan et al. (2019). the authors emphasise that social behaviour can negatively impact society, continually threatening social security and cohesion, and discouraging investment and business activities. therefore, it is very important to study the sources, goals, intensity, and patterns of antisocial behaviour (gangadharan et al., 2019). 3. inequalities and related terms a number of related terms are associated with the concept of social inequalities, often mistaken as synonyms. however, these are most often phenomena that accompany or result from social inequalities. poverty and social exclusion are manifestations of social inequalities. in the literature on the subject, we can find various definitions of poverty. initially, definitions of poverty focused only on basic needs. the poverty zone was identified mainly due to the income situation (or based on expenditure) of households. later, the multidimensionality of poverty gained an increasing number of supporters (sen, 1997; mikuła, 2016). nevertheless, as pointed out by t. panek and j. zwierzchowski (2013), in the practice of poverty measurement, the so-called economic definition of the phenomenon is most often adopted. poverty is defined as a situation in which an individual (person, family, household) does not have sufficient funds (both in the form of income from previous periods and in the form of accumulated material resources) to meet their needs. the cultural, political and sociological aspects of living in poverty, related to exclusion from social life, remain beyond the definition of poverty. in the european social policy, a more preferred category is social exclusion, which is multidimensional and is defined in terms of the inability to participate in important aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life of a given society (kiniorska 2020). when pointing to the differences between the terms used, a number of elements are taken into account, including the time perspective, the number of dimensions and the reasons for the occurrence of the analysed phenomena (table 3). in practice, the terms poverty and social exclusion are often used interchangeably. however, the concepts are related but not identical. exclusion is a much broader concept than poverty, as it draws attention not only to the low level of income, but also to other factors leading to the exclusion of an individual from society (table 4). the relationship between exclusion and poverty takes the form of a feedback loop (poverty may lead to or result from exclusion) (panek, 2011). according to k. mokrzycka (2013), we can distinguish seven types of social exclusion, which are presented in table 5 below. tab. 3. elements differentiating the terms: poverty and social exclusion terms poverty social exclusion subject of analysis individuals, household whole society and larger areas time perspective static dynamic processes of degradation and impoverishment number of dimensions included one-dimensionality (monetary dimension) multidimensionality measurement and type of indicators easily measured (monetary indicators) difficult to measure, many indicators applied simultaneously, measurement of the process reasons unmet needs, inequalities in access to resources. discrimination in access to integrating institutions. source: own work based on firlit-fesnak, szylko-skoczny, 2007. tab. 4. differences between social exclusion and poverty area of analysis social exclusion poverty discipline sociology economics reason discrimination in access to integrating institutions unmet needs type of social stratification level (inside and outside of the group) vertical (higher and lower classes) suggested remedy social services (activating measures) social transfers (guaranteed minimum income) source: elaborated based on panek, 2011. 18 iwona kiniorska 4. theories and models of social inequalities starting from the late 1970s, researchers in the field of social sciences have shown a growing interest in social theory (table 6). this theory creates a space where interdisciplinary debates are encouraged, channelled and coordinated, just as over the past century mathematics has become the language through which findings from one branch of natural sciences spread to others (beck, 2004). table 6 presents selected theories of social inequalities from an interdisciplinary perspective. representatives of sociology make a substantial contribution to shaping the theoretical basis of social inequalities. in explaining the causes of social inequalities, special emphasis is placed on educational inequalities. the classical theories of educational inequalities include: k. davis and w. moore’s (1945) functional theory of stratification (classification), r. collins’s theory (1975), s. bowles and h. gintis’s theory (1976) and p. bourdieu’s theory of reproduction (1977). the functional theory of stratification (classification) formulated by american scientists k. davis and w. moore was based on an assumption that every society is divided and diversified as to material benefits and social prestige. the basic conclusion of this theory was that positions in society depend on individuals’ qualifications and preparation. nowadays, the theses of this theory do not sound original, and it has been widely criticised for the statement about promotion saying that the best prepared people occupy the highest positions in society. first of all, scientists emphasised that there are a number of barriers limiting this statement (collins, 1975; domański, 2004; tumin, 1953; wesołowski, 1966). however, as noted by h. domański (2004), the functional theory of stratification had a strong influence on research practice, even though the conclusions drawn from it – referring to the positive consequences of social stratification – became the subject of stormy criticism. in the 1990s, in turn, the question of the reasons for the persistence of inequalities in the context of a systematic increase in the level of enrolment became the focus of researchers’ interest. in post-transformation societies, educational inequalities and exclusion are an even greater problem, because along with the transformation, the system of support for education by the state was abolished and left to a neoliberal policy (borowicz, 2008; długosz, 2017). the issue of social inequalities is also discussed in the theory of political economy of old age, the age stratification model and the subculture of the ageing theory (klimczuk, 2011). the first one assumes tab. 5. selected types of social exclusion type characteristics economic exclusion related to poverty, unemployment, homelessness exclusion from education and culture lack of adequate financial resources limiting access to education and culture, lack of adequate job training and preparation to function in the labour market spatial exclusion encompasses communities living in isolated areas (slums, blocks of flats), peripheral areas (small towns and rural areas located outside the zone of influence of large urban centres) structural exclusion related primarily to people with disabilities, ethnic, racial or gender minorities digital exclusion related to the lack of adequate knowledge in the use of information and communication technologies political exclusion concerns citizens deprived of means of information and without opportunities to engage in political life mental exclusion related to difficulties in accessing privileges, professions, or functions due to belonging to a minority, race, or age group (e.g., problems with finding a job for women over 40) source: elaborated based on mokrzycka, 2013. tab. 6. selected theories of social inequalities from an interdisciplinary perspective theories disciplines authors functional theory of stratification, theory of social conflict, theory of reproduction sociology bourdieu, 1977; dahrendorf, 1975; davis, moore, 1945 taste-based discrimination theory, human capital theory, information cost theory, theory of job market signalling economics arrow, 1973; becker, 1957,1964; spence, 1973, 1974; zellner, 1975 stages of growth theory, the theory of cumulative causation geography friedmann, 1974; myrdal, 1957 source: own work. social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective 19 that old age is the result of social policy, division of labour, economic and social differences; therefore, the problems of the elderly should be considered in the context of the world economy, the functions of the state, the labour market and divisions into sex, age, ethnic groups and classes (halicki, 2006; synak, 1999; szatur-jaworska, 2000). attention is drawn to discrimination based on age, granting the elderly the status of dependent persons and higher profitability of social programmes for political elites or entrepreneurs than for the elderly. the age stratification model assumes the division of society into age groups that differ in access to goods and social roles, norms, values, and identity (synak, 1999; halicki, 2006). this approach emphasises the differentiation of the elderly depending on the time of their birth and ignores the subjective dimension of the individual’s perception of age. on the other hand, the subculture of the ageing theory assumes that as a result of exclusion from interaction with other age groups, increased contacts with peers and a sense of community of views and interests, the elderly create communities characterised by separate norms, values and way of living, which can transform into lobby groups and then political parties being in opposition to the dominant culture (halicki, 2006; niezabitowski, 2007; synak, 1999). in economic theories, identification of factors determining the formation of social inequalities focuses on the labour market. already in the early 1920s, an english economist f.y. edgeworth formulated the first hypothesis of this type which, fifty years later, was developed by b. bergman. this theory applies to gender inequality and discrimination against national and ethnic minorities. it assumes that salaries depend on the supply of and demand for labour. it explains that a lower level of earnings of women and national and ethnic minorities is a result of an artificial increase in their labour supply, which, in its turn, results in lowering their salaries (zwiech, 2013). the processes of social segregation in the labour market constitute the basis for the theory of job market signalling, formulated by a.m. spence in 1974. it points to the basic factor of inequality in the labour market resulting from employers’ beliefs that certain social groups are less productive. this theory lacks explanations as to the determinants of these beliefs about the diversified productivity of particular social groups. it ignores structural and institutional factors. only the individualistic factor of social discrimination is emphasised. a. rosen’s model of discrimination, formulated in 1993, is a convergent theory referring to segregation in the labour market. the author assumes that employers discriminate on the basis of visible characteristics (for example: gender, race, nationality) and do not address job offers to representatives of the discriminated group. by synthesising the basic expressions included in economic theories according to p. zwiech (2013), we can indicate the following elements: • in g.s. becker’s taste-based discrimination theory: deliberate wage discrimination related to a taste for discrimination by employers, employees from the dominant group, and clients; • in the human capital theory: lower resource of human capital of some social groups, differentiation of individual levels of abilities, skills, and qualifications; • in the theory of job market signalling: employers’ beliefs on lower productivity of certain social groups; • in k. arrow’s information cost theory: costs of information about the suitability of job applicants and fluctuation costs; • in the hypothesis of limited spatial mobility of women: limitation of women’s spatial mobility due to non-economic roles performed by women and self-selection; • in a. rosen’s discrimination model: bad association of an employee with a workplace due to fewer job offers for people from discriminated groups and a lower level of the minimum wage required by people from these groups. the above-mentioned theories do not take into account the social context of the undertaken economic activities. they completely ignore cultural aspects as well as institutional and structural factors (trade unions’ activities, state intervention and modern organisation of the economy). economic theories developed after world war ii emphasise the role of human capital (asteriou, agiomirgianakis, 2001; becker, 1964; mankiw et al., 1992; shultz, 1975). they indicate that human capital is the basic element and social factor explaining the differences in the level of development or the formation of inequalities between regions (jones, manuelli, 1990; klenow, rodríguez-clare, 2004; lucas, 1988; mankiw et al., 1992). the second half of the 20th century brought a flourishing of theories emphasising the importance of knowledge, human and social capital, and institutions (wilkin, 2001). the theory of human capital explains in a simple way where inequalities come from: people who have greater abilities and better conditions for development, i.e. social categories „better equipped” with capital, will be more willing to learn, because as compensation for the effort they will get greater benefits, while lower abilities, unfavourable environment and perspectives of lower income among members of lower 20 iwona kiniorska classes are factors that discourage them from studying longer (zawistowska, 2012). in geographical research, an important role in the formation and growth of social inequalities is assigned to the spatial factor. in the description of these phenomena, the polarisation theories, formulated in the light of the concept of interaction between cities and villages and the relationship between the centre and the periphery, become particularly relevant. in the literature on the subject, there is a dichotomous division of theories. in the first case, it is about references to the path of sustainable development. the second group includes theories based on the path of unsustainable development. the theories relating to the path of unsustainable development can be classified into two groups: according to a topdown and bottom-up approach. they refer to different development impulses. the top-down concepts emphasise the importance of the exogenous factor in development. according to the representatives of these concepts, it is assumed that development starts in a few places and spreads to other areas. on the other hand, in the bottom-up concept, it is the endogenous factor which is of fundamental importance. emphasis is placed on the occurrence of bottom-up initiatives (coming from local communities) (dyjach, 2013). the top-down theories are represented by the concepts of polarisation, elaborated in the works by f. perroux (1955), a.o. hirschman (1958), g. myrdal (1957) (see: grzeszczak, 1999; churski, 2008). the precursor of these theories was a french economist f. perroux, who in the 1950s used the concept of a growth pole for the first time. he used this term to describe places where economic development is faster than in other areas. in turn, their impact on the neighbourhood is diversified and depends on various factors of a socio-demographic or institutional nature (stanny, 2013). the second group of the so-called top-down concepts consists of theories determining the dependence of the core and the periphery. a commonly cited concept is the centre-periphery theory by r. prebisch (1959). its main theses are based on a model composed of two regions: central and peripheral. the author derived his thesis from observation of the varying degree of industrialisation in different parts of the world. as a result, only economic factors were stressed, and in turn, sociological and political factors, among others, were ignored. j. friedman drew attention to this problem in more detail in his conceptual deliberations, constructing the model of the core and the periphery, which extended a.o.  hirschman’s theory of unbalanced growth. j. friedmann pointed to specific mechanisms strengthening the dominance of the core over the periphery. these are, among others, the transfer of capital, of natural and human resources from the periphery to the core and the resulting faster development, faster modernisation processes or agglomeration benefits occurring in the core (stanny, strzelczyk, 2018). the emergence of regional disproportions is conditioned by various factors (table 7). at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, particular emphasis in theoretical considerations was placed on the importance of knowledge and creativity for the development of regions. here, the assumptions of the concept of the learning region by r. florida (1995) can be indicated as an example. according to the author, learning regions are territorial units indispensable for the development of a knowledge-based economy. learning regions are the areas that are poles of knowledge, experience and competences, primarily based on human capital. in this theory, the author emphasised the importance of the process of creating and acquiring knowledge, taking place at the level of individuals, companies and institutions through cooperation, with the use of new information and communication technologies. hence, much attention is currently paid to social inequalities studied in the context of tab. 7. factors deepening regional disproportions factors description the domination effect the weakness of the peripheral regions results from the net transfer of development potential to the centre. influence of information due to development and innovations, the centre increases its information and technological potential. psychological effects they consist in creating a climate conducive to innovation in the centre and deepening the feeling of inferiority and dependence on the periphery. modernisation there is a growing readiness of the centre to engage in innovations, caused by the accumulation of development trends and profits derived from them. the “feedback” effect innovations in some areas of the economy stimulate their emergence in others. increase in productivity reduction of innovation costs is achieved through internal and external savings. source: kłysik-uryszek, 2010; dyjach, 2013. social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective 21 diversified access to knowledge. when talking about inequalities in access to knowledge, we are increasingly referring to digital inequalities. as a. basińska (2009) writes in the literature on the subject, digital inequalities are often treated as new social inequalities or a new dimension of social inequalities. an interesting way of presenting digital inequalities is shown in j. de haan’s model (2004). inequalities are created by differences between individuals in terms of such characteristics as age and gender, but also through the context of the possibilities that characterise individuals: level of education, income, work. as j. de haan (2004) points out, the structural context of opportunities provides an unequal distribution of resources. unequal distribution of resources causes unequal access to digital technologies, which results in increasing social inequalities. nowadays, in the age of the information society, the lack of access to means of communication worsens the position of an individual in society and, consequently, may lead to social exclusion (marczak, 2015). it should be noted that social inequalities have many dimensions, but the elements indicated in the models orient the basic assumptions that may determine the nature of social inequalities. the importance of social capital is also emphasised in theoretical assumptions and model approaches. the models that define the principles of formation of inequalities largely focus on determinants resulting from socio-cultural contexts. w. warzywoda-kruszyńska, e. rokicka (2008) constructed an analytical model, pointing to the intergenerational transmission of inequalities as a result of the intersecting influences of family, origin, country and local community, as well as individual abilities and activities. in social sciences, a special place is occupied by research on child population and sociological analyses of discrimination against children and adolescents. in poland, the idea of examining children and childhood was widely promoted by w. warzywodakruszyńska (2011, 2014, 2015). according to w. pantyley (2018), the sociological approach to childhood and children resulted in them beginning to be perceived as competent and capable entities, able to influence their environment. the concept of „children’s well-being” as a multidimensional research concept has attracted the attention of not only sociologists, but also of representatives of other sciences, including geography, as exemplified by the work of the author of the present study covering the issues of the children’s population in theoretical and practical terms. numerous studies primarily focus on parents’ socio-economic status, which essentially affects the living and health conditions of children as well. the impact of social conditions determines health inequalities that are conditioned by many factors. the socio-economic status, which is the main component of the social position, has a very significant impact on their formation (table 8). the levels of social determinants, as indicated in the table below, refer to the socio-ecological model of health and g. dahlgren and m. whitehead’ scheme (cianciara, 2015). on this basis, health inequalities can be analysed at five levels. the following levels illustrate the factors operating at the level of society (level i), living and working environment (level ii), social group (level iii) and individuals (iv, v). inequalities are the cause of many social problems. foreign literature more and more often emphasises the importance of the social and environmental factor, which can significantly reduce accumulation of various types of disproportions. research conducted in great britain can serve as an example here. in their analyses, the researchers emphasise that the nature of problems of rural areas is determined by the level of social distribution and environmental resources. research on social inequalities often combines features describing social phenomena with environmental elements. among others, a. de bruin et al. (2009) indicated the following features: • pollutant emissions and air quality; • flood hazards; • landfills; tab. 8. social determinants of health inequalities according to e. blas, a. sivasankara kurup, 2010 level potential determinants i – social status (society) globalisation, urbanisation, social status, education, social exclusion ii – exposure (environment) social infrastructure, working conditions, social norms iii – susceptibility (group, subpopulation) poverty, unemployment, low education, limited access to health care, addictions iv, v – health effects poor quality of health services, discrimination health diversification, educational consequences related to employment and income, social exclusion, stigma source: elaborated based on blas, sivasankara kurup, 2010. 22 iwona kiniorska • education level; • employment structure; • social capital; • place of migrants’ origin. authors indicate that political programmes commonly focus on issues of social and environmental inequalities, which are often analysed jointly in foreign literature. however, there is a lack of comparative and interdisciplinary studies. the results of social and environmental inequalities began to be increasingly noticeable in rural areas (elgar, aitken, 2011; pickett, wilkinson, 2009; wilkinson, marmot, 2003; wilkinson, pickett, 2009). in the groups of factors describing inequalities, the importance of conditions detailing the accessibility to various levels of education, as well as environmental barriers and the level of social capital are stressed. nowadays, the level of education and the human capital, which is closely related to it and consists of knowledge and skills acquired in the education process, are perceived as key factors of development, but also of the emergence of social inequalities. they explain the causes of uneven development of territorial systems much better than the classical economic factors used previously (czapiewski, janc, 2012). rural residents have limited access to education. this is related to the financial situation of households and educational aspirations, as well as to the conditions of functioning of the educational system. the first visible barrier in this respect is the hindered educational advancement due to limited access to pre-school education institutions. the skills that young children learn from kindergarten pay off at school with better learning outcomes, and at a later stage – better functioning in social and professional life. the view that rural residents have worse education opportunities has long been dominant, which, given the low level of education of the rural population, is one of the most important barriers to building a knowledge-based farming and introducing non-agricultural functions to the polish countryside (flaga, wesołowska, 2002, 2015; matysiak-błaszczyk, słupska, 2013; rydz, 2002; wawrzyniak, 2001). j. wilkin (2001) divides the barriers to access to education into economic, spatial-locational, and environmental-cultural ones. in particular, he draws attention to worse conditions and an average lower level of education in rural schools. another factor that determines the poorer development opportunities of rural areas is their location and distance from cities, which is also a manifestation of limited access to sources of knowledge. this is confirmed, inter alia, by worse results in examinations at particular levels of education (table 9). digital exclusion is a new social problem, also conditioned by difficult access to education. its causes may result from living in poor and peripheral regions. the extremely fast development of technology often requires the users of modern media to constantly adapt to changes. once acquired skills and knowledge become obsolete very quickly. many other issues have an impact on the emergence tab. 9. average exam results of students of last years of lower secondary and primary schools due to the location of the school exam subject countryside city with less than 20 thousand inhabitants city with 20 to 100 thousand of inhabitants city with more than 100 thousand inhabitants exam after the 6th grade of primary school year 2016 polish language 69 69 71 74 maths 51 50 54 60 english language 66 69 73 78 exam after the 3rd grade of lower secondary school year 2019 history and knowledge about society 57 59 63 63 polish language 62 61 63 67 sciences 47 47 49 54 maths 40 40 43 49 english language basic level 62 64 70 77 english language extended level 48 50 51 58 exam after the 8th grade of the primary school year 2019 polish language 62 60 63 67 maths 42 42 45 52 english language 52 56 61 69 source: elaborated based on czyżewski, kryszak, 2021. social inequalities – theoretical considerations from an interdisciplinary perspective 23 of social inequalities in rural areas, such as the position of women and the importance of the traditional family model in shaping social attitudes. it is also possible to associate demographic phenomena with social processes, especially their unfavourable aspects resulting from the increasing ageing of the society and depopulation. these processes, however, do not proceed at the same pace throughout poland and, as a result, the demographic structure of the rural population is spatially diversified. eastern poland is a special case of an area characterised by ageing society. this phenomenon has been observed there for a long time. the process varies in intensity in the studied area and is also prone to multi-faceted fluctuations. according to forecasts, this problem will gradually worsen as the areas of poland, previously considered to be demographically younger, are ageing rapidly. the process of double ageing of the population is also visible, when, along with the increase in the percentage of elderly people, the structure of this sub-population changes, consisting in an even faster increase in the number of very old people, i.e. at least 80-year-olds. availability of health care facilities and the quality of services provided are a measure strongly emphasising the differences in rural development. the problems of inequalities in access to health care resulting from the place of residence in the urban-rural system are confirmed by scientific studies (casey et al., 2001; michalski, 2002; bennett et al., 2012). rural residents are less likely to visit doctors regularly (arcury et al., 2005), including preventive examinations (valet et al., 2009), and usually have less access to emergency services (watts et al., 1999, fan et al., 2011) which are more often located in urban areas (ucieklak-jeż, bem, 2017). numerous measurements carried out for rural areas in poland indicate differentiated access to health care in rural areas. the researchers point out that, regardless of regional diversity, it is of particular concern that most regions have not implemented effective health policies which would lead to improved access to services for rural residents. the consequence of this phenomenon is a lower level of health and a greater incidence of diseases. a measurable example of this are deaths and their structure in rural areas being the consequence of limited access to healthcare. this is a worrying situation that proves that problems in access to health care do exist (michalski, pierkhacz 2001, michalski 2010). another important factor influencing the unequal access to health services is lower mobility of the rural population resulting from many elements, such as health, the condition of the road network or the lack of public transport. the large dispersion of medical infrastructure also plays its role (ucieklak-jeż, bem 2017). all the above-mentioned factors affect particular social groups with varying intensity, which is one of the main causes of social inequalities in health (marek et al., 2011). panel studies, conducted by j. czapiński and t. panek as part of social diagnosis until the year 2015, indicated three groups of factors responsible for the formation of inequalities, namely: structural exclusion (living in the countryside, one’s education lower than of secondary level, father’s education of primary level or lower, and poverty), physical exclusion (age 50+, disability) and normative exclusion (loneliness, addiction, conflict with the law, being discriminated). it may be concluded that this phenomenon is conditioned by many factors. a common feature of numerous considerations is that they indicate rural areas in poland as particularly vulnerable to the emergence of social inequalities. nowadays, as a result of increasing polarisation processes, rural areas are characterised by different trends of change. to a large extent, they depend on the location of the village, but naturally also on the historical factor and the contemporary socio-economic changes that have taken place in these areas. another element is the attitude of the residents themselves. it became apparent, among others, in the research by w. kałamucka (2017) conducted in the light of the concept of securing existence in selected rural areas of the lublin voivodeship. these areas often experience the consequences of economic and ownership transformations. the author conducted varied quantitative and qualitative research based on official statistics and interviews with residents. she pointed out that these are the areas most exposed to poverty and social exclusion and, consequently, to consolidation of inequalities, where development processes take place very slowly. as w. kałamucka (2017) writes, unemployment and depopulation are the main problems. the research shows that better located and connected municipalities and towns gain the most from development processes. as a result of all these phenomena, the distance between particular villages is increasing. in addition, the belief, confirmed by decades of experience, that development depends on actions of the state or municipal authorities does not favour any activity of the inhabitants. 5. conclusion social inequalities are the subject of extensive analyses for various fields of science. nowadays, research is primarily focused on the assessment of relations, both interpersonal and among individual social groups. hence, there is a growing interest in the issue 24 iwona kiniorska of social inequalities which result, inter alia, from the deepening gap between wealthy and poorer parts of society. they are also conditioned by the concentration of poverty and other negative phenomena in certain regions. social inequalities can affect many aspects of life, from income to access to information, the ability to profit from cultural goods and to develop one’s own talents. therefore, they should be analysed in many aspects, indicating the barrier to participation in the full mainstream of social life. considerations on social inequalities should be preceded by a reflection on the personal characteristics of an individual and his/her position in social life. as 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activities theory (andresen, 2014, 33–45, 185–203). many empirical studies confirmed its assumptions (see e.g. lewis, alford, 1975; farrell, peace, 1994; ceccato, 2005; ratcliffe, 2006; andresen, malleson, 2013). according to l. cohen and m. felson (1979) most common routine human activities in the city: work, school, shopping, recreation (as well as journeys between the locations of them) most often occur at the same or similar times in each year, each month, each week, and each day. these activities occurring at the same time (rhythm), might be measured by their frequency rate (tempo), at these activities involved the coordination of multiple individuals and groups (timing). it means, that the opportunities, to commit a crime, connected with persons and their property, change over time as well. m.  felson and e.  poulsen (2003) highlighted that tempo, rhythm, and timing are crucial for understanding temporal crime patterns. natural crime conditions, like daylight and weather, are subject to temporal changes as well. some of them stimulate and some inhibit the journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(2), 37–45 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.011.5167 temporal patterns of urban crime natalia sypion-dutkowska spatial management unit, faculty of geosciences, university of szczecin, mickiewicza 18, 70–383 szczecin, poland, e-mail: natalia.sypion@univ.szczecin.pl citation sypion-dutkowska n., 2015, temporal patterns of urban crime, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(2), 37–45. abstract urban crime is differentiated among space and time. recognition of temporal patterns of urban crime will help us for better understanding crime phenomenon in the city. the routine activity theory is the most widespread methodological framework of its empirical research. tempo, rhythm, and timing of the routine activities are crucial for understanding temporal crime patterns. it is proved that the particular seven types of crime (fights and battery, robbery, drug crimes, residential crimes, commercial crimes, car crimes, theft of property) have different temporal pattern in: long-run, seasonal, monthly, weekly, and daily patterns of urban crimes, taking the city of gdynia in the years 2004-2014 as an example. key words urban crime, routine activity theory, temporal patterns of crime. 38 natalia sypion-dutkowska criminal events (cohn, rotton, 2000; rotton, cohn, 2003; murrataya, gutiérrez, 2013). in this paper long-run, seasonal, monthly, weekly, and daily patterns of urban crimes, taking the city of gdynia as an example, are discussed with explanations in routine activity theory. 2. crime in gdynia in comparison with other polish cities in comparison with other polish cities, gdynia is at the average crime risk level, measured by indicator of the total number of crimes (criminal crimes, economic crimes, and traffic offences) per 1,000 residents1. in 2014, a very high level of crime, more than 50 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants was in cities such as: sopot, katowice, and wałbrzych. high crime rate (between 40 and 50) show great, rich and rapidly developing city of poznań and wrocław. the average level of crime rate (from 33 to 40) is a larger group of analyzed cities: bytom, sosnowiec, opole, gliwice, kraków, szczecin, bielsko-biala and gdynia with the indicator of 34.3 crimes per 1,000 residents. the relatively low crime rate (25 to 30) occurs in: kielce, łódź, toruń, warszawa, olsztyn, lublin, elbląg, gdańsk and częstochowa. the lowest delinquency (ratio below 25) is in rzeszow, bydgoszcz, and białystok. 3. source data and methods crime data were provided by the criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk for the crimes recorded in gdynia in the time period 2004–2014. the following types of crime were obtained: fights and battery, robbery, drug crimes, residential crimes, commercial crimes, car crimes, theft of property. the analysis of time patterns of urban crime in gdynia in the years 2004–2014 determined different time hot spots of different types of crime. knowledge of the time distribution of crime concentration is the first step to determine when the crime is a persistent and serious social problem (see. chainey, ratcliffe, 2005). time concentration determines the probability of contact with the criminal offense in certain seasons, months, days of the week, or times of day. the growth rate was calculated for the analyzed eleven-year period of time for the crimes in total and for crimes by type. for individual years shows the 1 own study based on https://www.mojapolis.pl/ dynamics of the types of crimes in years, crime in total and by type of months. there is also a summary of crimes in total and crime by type such as: • the warm and cold seasons of the year (cold season: january, february, march, october, november, december; warm season: april, may, june, july, august, september); • days of week (from monday to sunday); • times of day (divided into four 6-hour intervals: 6.00–11.59; 12.00–17,59; 18.00–23.59; 24.00– 5.59). 4. the dynamics and structure by type of crimes in total in the years, 2004–2014 in gdynia 46076 crimes was recorded in total. most of them were committed in 2004, almost 7 thousand. the number of crimes decreased rapidly until 2007 (four thousand). between 2008 and 2009 there was a slight increase in their numbers – over four thousand. in the following years of the period the numbers of crime were still decreasing. in 2014, their number dropped below three thousand. the growth rate of crime in the period (2004 = 100) is 38.9 percentage points, which is a decrease by almost 2/3. more than half of analyzed types of crimes (52.4%) were theft of property, almost 25 thousand. the second largest group is composed of residential crimes and drug crimes, 13.5% and 12.7%, ca. 6 thousand each. another group in terms of numbers constitute of a car crimes (8.2%), almost 4,000. robberies reported about a three thousand (6.1%). commercial crimes were slightly more than 2 thousand (4.7%). the smallest group of offenses, approx. one thousand, were fights and battery (2.3%) (fig. 1.). 5. long-run temporal crime patterns in the period 2004–2014 was recorded an overall declining trend of all types of crime (fig. 2), as shown by growth rate, assuming that the number of crimes in 2004 equals 100. the largest decrease was observed in car crimes, the growth rate is 19.4, what equals 4/5. the number of robberies was significantly reduced – the growth rate is 25.8, which means a decrease by 3/4. distinct decrease was recorded for residential crimes, theft of property and fights and battery their growth rate were respectively 32.9, 37.4 and 37.6, which means a decrease in the number of these crimes by ca. 2/3. the number of commercial crimes dropped by 1/4, the growth rate is 74.9. the temporal patterns of urban crime 39 smallest decline, only 5.3%, was recorded for drug crimes. in general, there is a downward trend in the number of crimes with small fluctuations in the period 2008–2010. 6. seasonal crime patterns generally, the number of crime events registered in warm season of a year is on average ca. 10% higher than in the cold season of the year. only in three years (2006, 2010 and 2014) the relation is opposite. fig. 1. the types of crimes recorded in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. fig. 2. the dynamics of types of crimes recorded in gdynia in the years 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. 40 natalia sypion-dutkowska fig. 3. numbers of crime in total in the cold and warm seasons of the year recorded in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. fig. 4. numbers of crime by type in total in the cold and warm seasons of the year recorded in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. temporal patterns of urban crime 41 in these years, there were registered extremely high temperatures in july and in august. because more than a half crimes are theft of property – typical outdoor crime, the weather condition may be inhibiting the criminal activity (fig. 3.). the influence of weather conditions on particular crime types is differentiated. for such crime types: fights and battery and commercial crimes the number of crime events is balanced over the year. drug crimes, residential crimes, and car crimes occurred slightly more often in the cold season of the year. as already mentioned above only the number of the thefts of property is about 20% higher in the warm than in the cold season of the year. in summer there are lots of tourists visit gdynia who are easy victims of the thieves. only extremely high temperatures decrease these type of criminal activity (fig. 4.). 7. monthly crime patterns the changes in the numbers of crime in total and in different types of crime in gdynia, in the years 2004– 2014, involving a significant systematic decrease in most of them (with the exception of drug crimes and commercial crimes) influenced on the structure of different types of crime (fig. 5.). the largest share, about half, were theft of property. this share ranged from 58% in 2007 to 44% in 2009, mainly due to a big increase in the number of drug crimes. the share of car crimes and residential crimes, steadily decreased accordingly from ca. 10% to ca. 5% and from 18% to 15%. however, the share of commercial crimes increased from 4% to 7%. the share of drug crimes ranged from 7% in 2004 increased to 25% in 2009, and fall up to 11% in 2012 and increased again to 16% in 2014. there is also systematically falling share of robberies from 8% in 2004 to 5% in 2014. the share of fights and battery both in 2004 and in 2014 was 2%, but in the period 2009–2011 was slight increase 3%. despite these changes and noticeable trends, the structure of crime in gdynia in these years characterized by a certain stability and is similar to the structure of crime in other polish large cities (mordwa, 2013, sypion-dutkowska, 2014). crimes are committed with various intensity at different times of the year or day. time characteristics of individual types of crime varies. this is due to the different and sometimes specific conditions and factors of crime associated with the criminals and their victim’s activity, and even the length of day and weather as well. among the 46 thousand of crimes events in the period 2004–2014, their number in each month varied from 4,600 in july to 3,400 in december. in january, march, august, and october ca. 4,000 crimes was committed in each month. another group consists of the following months: february, april, may, june and september – ca. 3500 crimes per month. the least number of recorded crimes was in the months of unfavorable weather conditions, with fig. 5. crimes in total by months in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. 42 natalia sypion-dutkowska short days, such as december and november – less than 3500. the least safe months in gdynia are summer months, especially july. in particular months number of crimes their structure by type is varied (fig. 6). the most common crime – theft of property was the most numerous in july, and the least numerous in february, november, and december. residential crimes usually are committed in january, and the least in april and june. drug crimes appear particularly common in september and october, and the least is in april, may, and june. car crimes are dominated in january and march, and the least number of it is in june. robberies threaten residents mainly in march and september, at least in december. commercial crimes usually are carried out in march and july, and the least in may, october, and november. fights and battery occur very often in january and june, and the least in may, august, and september. an attempt to clarify the distribution of such crime within a year is as follows: • theft of property is conditioned primarily tourist season. • concentrated in march: residential crimes, car crimes, and commercial crimes can be associated with improvement in weather conditions, lengthening the day, and perhaps also with an increase in the activity of criminals in connection with the spring growth “in demand” on stolen vehicles, objects and furniture. • temporal variations of drug crimes, in polish circumstances of youth, can be associated with the beginning of the (intensification) and the end (weakness) of school and academic year. • fights and battery can be explained by events during the carnival. 8. weekly crime patterns everyday activity of inhabitants, visitors and tourists are changing over the week. from monday to thursday – the standard working days – the number of committed crimes is more or less on the same level for each type (fig. 7.). friday is a working day as well, but in the second half of the day shopping, preparation for the weekend and free time activities starts. friday is also the last working day for offenders, they work really hard and get rest during the weekend. the number of crimes are the most numerous on friday and is dramatically dropping during the weekend. after the weekend offenders activity goes back to the working days level. the difference between the number of crimes committed in the weekends and the rest of the week can be observed for all of types of them. the only one exception is for fights and battery which are significantly growing for the weekend. the riskiest day of the week is friday. tuesday, wednesday, and thursday are rather safe days in terms of criminality. fig. 6. crimes by types in months in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. temporal patterns of urban crime 43 9. daily crime patterns a total number of crimes committed in different times of day (6.00–11.59, 12.00–17.59, 18.00– 23.59, 24.00–5.59) is differentiated (fig. 8.). in the years, 2004–2014 in gdynia the safest time of day is morning, from 6.00 till 11.59. at the time of day, every seventh crime is committed. in the next time of the day from 12.00–17.59, the number of committed crimes is doubled. a similar number of crimes is committed during the night’s hours (24.00–5.59). in these times of the day approx. 60% of crimes in total fig. 7. numbers of crime by type in total in the days of the week recorded in gdynia in the years 2004–2014 (axle x is in logarithmic scale; monday repeated) source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. fig. 8. crimes in total recorded by times of day in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. 44 natalia sypion-dutkowska fig. 9. crimes by type recorded by times of day in gdynia in the period 2004–2014 source: own study based on criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. temporal patterns of urban crime 45 were committed. in the evening hours (6.00–23.59) every fourth crime was committed. the time schedule of particular types of crimes in times of the day can be described by several types (fig. 9.): • the first type – domination of crimes recorded in the afternoon and at night hours, here are fights and battery and robberies, respectively 77% and 66% of crimes recorded in these times of day; • the second type – domination of crimes recorded in the night hours, here are only drug crimes, 64% of these crimes was registered; • the third type – number of crimes is compensated in times of the day with a slight dominance of afternoon hours, here are residential crimes and theft of property; • the fourth type – the dominance of crimes recorded in the afternoon’s and evening’s hours, here are car crimes and commercial crimes, respectively 73% and 71% of crimes recorded in these times of day. 10. summary the state of public safety in the city is good and is improving. the level of crime in total in gdynia in comparison with other polish cities is average. in the period 2004–2014, the number of crimes decreased steadily from ca. 7 thousand to ca. 3 thousand. crime by type is dominated by theft of property, which is about a half of total numbers of crime. the number of residential crimes fell in 2004–2008 from ca. 1200 to 400, and has continued since then at a constant level. the number of car crimes decreases constantly. the number of commercial crimes is constantly growing. the number of particularly dangerous fights and battery and robberies decreased in the years 2004–2014 respectively from ca. 150 to ca. 50 and ca. 550 to ca. 150. generally, the number of crime events registered in warm season of a year is on average ca. 10 % higher than in the cold season of the year. the influence of weather conditions on particular crime types is varied by different type of crime. in the period 2004–2014 the least crimes registered in december and november. the least safe month in gdynia is july. from monday to thursday there are standard working days, the number of committed crimes is more or less on the same level for each type. the only one exception is for fights and battery which are significantly growing for a weekend. the riskiest day of the week is friday. tuesday, wednesday, and thursday are rather safe days in terms of criminality. the safest time of day were the early morning hours (6.00–11.59). the next time of day (12.00– 17.59) is the most dangerous one, the number of crime is doubled, the night hours (24.00–5.59) has almost the same number of crimes. in these times of the day there ca. 60% of crimes in total were registered. references andresen m.a., 2014, environmental criminology. evolution, theory and practice, routledge, new york. andresen, m.a., malleson n., 2013, crime seasonality and its variations across space, applied geography, 43, 25–35. ceccato v., 2005, homicide in sao paulo, brazil: assessing spatial-temporal and weather variations, journal of environmental psychology, 25, 249–360. chainey s., ratcliffe j., 2005, gis and crime mapping, john wiley & sons, chichester. cohen l.e., felson m., 1979, social change and crime rate trends: routine activity approach, american sociological review, 44, 588–608. cohn e., rotton j., 2000, weather, seasonal trends, and property crimes in minneapolis, 1987–1988: a moderator-variable time-series analysis of routine activities, journal of environmental psychology, 20(3), 257–272. farrell g., pease k., 1994, crime seasonality: domestic disputes and residential burglary in merseyside 1988–1990, british journal of criminology, 34(4), 487–498. felson m., poulsen e., 2003, simple indicators of crime by time of day, international journal forecasting, 19(4), 595–601. lewis l.t., alford j.j., 1975, the influence of season on assault, professional geographer, 27, 214–217. mordwa s., 2013, przestępczość i poczucie bezpieczeństwa w przestrzeni miasta. przykład łodzi, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu łódzkiego, łódź. murrataya r. gutiérrez d.r., 2013, effects of weather on crime, international journal of humanities and social science, 3(10) special issue – may, 71–75. ratcliffe j.h., 2006, a temporal constraint theory to explain opportunity-based spatial offending patterns, journal of research in crime and delinquency, 43(3), 261–291. rotton j., cohn e.g., 2003, global warming and u.s. crime rates: an application of routine activity theory, environment and behavior, 35, 802–825. sypion-dutkowska n., 2014, uwarunkowania przestrzenne przestępczości w wielkim mieście w ujęciu gis (na przykładzie szczecina), studia kpzk pan, clix. https://www.mojapolis.pl/ [15.03.2015] crime data from: criminal intelligence department of the headquarter of voivodeship police in gdańsk. 1. introduction geographically, the kurdistan region refers to the three governorates: duhok, erbil, and sulaymaniyah, which are governed by the krg. in addition, the kurdistan region claims the three so-called disputed territories: nineveh, kirkuk, and diyala, as well as the makhmur district (fig. 1). with a population of 5.2 million that covers approximately 40,000 square kilometers, the kurdish region is larger than the netherlands and four times the area of lebanon (the kurdistan region in brief, 2018). according to k. hawrami (2016), the krg region had an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil reserves (mills, 2016). if true, this meant that if the krg region were independent, it would possess the world’s sixth-largest oil reserve. the krg also has a potential of some 100-200 trillion standard cubic feet of natural gas (gunter, 2011). given the kurdistan geostrategic importance, located between europe and asia, and especially with huge natural resource (oil and gas), it could become a central new actor in european energy security. in journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(1), 33–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.1.05 kurdistan’s role in european energy security hemin mohammed ismael department of geography, faculty of arts, soran university, kawa 44002, soran, erbil, kurdistan region – iraq, e-mail: hemn.ismail@soran.edu.iq citation ismael m.h., 2020, kurdistan’s role in european energy security, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(1), 33–41. abstract the paper analyzes the kurdistan regional government’s (krg) natural resource strategies, such as how it deals with huge reserves of many trillion cubic feet of its natural gas as significant energy. because natural gas belongs to the cleanest burning fossil fuels, with 30 percent less carbon than oil, it plays a role in the global fuel economy. as krg transports its natural gas to international markets, like european countries, via turkey it means they also participate in energy security as a new actor. because the krg is landlocked, strong factors may affect kurdish natural gas strategies because krg is surrounded by today’s partners and yesterday’s enemies politically and economically. turkey, the neighbor of krg, also buys its gas and has an influence on these strategies after the ukraine crisis that pushed european countries to make a turn towards caspian natural gas. kurdistan is part of the best option for european energy security as it plans to diversify natural gas imports. while the krg benefits from selling its natural gas directly to international markets, this will come with some struggles. many of these obstacles can be classified into two types: internal and external obstacles, such as a conflict with the central government regarding how to share gas revenues. others problems include iranian neighbor interest on natural resources in kurdistan and russia that looks to kurdish gas as its ally if kurdistan joins the southern gas corridor pipeline. key words kurdistan region, iraq, european energy security, natural gas. received: 11 december 2019 accepted: 16 march 2020 published: 31 march 2020 34 hemin mohammed ismael spite of the political instability in iraq, a possibility of exporting kurdistan gas reserve to turkey and then to the european market has recently appeared. this is why the iraq government as well as the kurdistan region government (krg) is discussing exporting kurdistan gas to the european market through turkey. turkey and azerbaijan are two countries that are more related to kurdistan gas exporting. turkey wants kurdistan gas and oil first as a transition route to europe and also gets fulfill internal needs. azerbaijan, as an emerging new provider to europe, wants kurdistan to participate in the trans-anatolian natural gas pipeline to fill the gap in the shah deniz natural gas field pipeline, which was built to transport gas to southern european countries. turkey has already talked with the iraqi government to import gas for domestic use and as well as to transport gas to europe (austivk, gulmira, 2016). the biggest concern for the eu in the field of energy today is the security of supply and reducing russia’s monopoly in the european market. the eu has to diversify its external supplies by diversifying fig. 1. kurdistan region source: own study. kurdistan’s role in european energy security 35 supplier countries and routes. the eu and the markets in southeastern europe would be the most important customers for kurdish gas. therefore, kurdistan is a place that many international companies will invest in, especially oil & gas companies from europe and the united states. the huge oil and gas companies that entered kurdistan, such as exxon mobil, genel energy and gazprom, have signed agreements with the kurdistan region. however, the kurdistan region faces more challenges for oil and gas exploration and exploitation, including sharing revenue with the central government in baghdad. also, the kurdistan region is geographically landlocked. this paper will analyze the importance of kurdistan’s natural resource plan (gas) and how to market its gas to european countries. further, it will outline how kurdistan could participate in the securing of energy to buyers in the west and discuss the obstacles and opportunities of the krg plans. 2. kurdistan hydrocarbon strategies and its problems the kurdistan region of iraq holds 2.8 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves – approximately five times more than azerbaijani reserves – and at some point may be able to supply its gas to europe (okumuş, 2013). the kurdistan oil and gas law were approved by the kurdistan parliament in august 2007. erbil, the capital of the kurdish autonomous region, not only has a long history of tensions with the government in baghdad, but it is currently in the midst of a dispute over territory, degrees of autonomy, its budget, and power as well as control over oil and gas reserves (paasche, howri, 2014). in terms of oil and gas law interpretation, the kurdistan region and central governments have many conflicts. for example, dr. hawrami, minister of natural resources of the kurdistan government, strongly maintained that article 115 of the new iraqi constitution states the supremacy of regional laws over federal laws. he also argued that article 112 only permits the iraqi government an administrative role confined to the handling, i.e. exporting and marketing, of the extracted oil and gas from the existing not new gas and oil fields. despite this, the krg has signed 37 contracts with 40 companies leading to $10 billion of investment in exploration and production in the oil sector (gunter, 2011). among the most notable were the u.s. companies marathon oil and murphy oil, exxon mobil, the spanish company repsol, and the chinese company sinopec. three refineries have been commissioned with a total capacity of 200,000 b/d. three power plants have been built, providing 80 percent of the krg’s energy needs. kurdish production can reach 1 million b/d by 2014. they have built an infrastructure to carry their energy resources to global markets with turkey and they managed to sell their oil abroad. moreover, in november 2013, the governments of turkey and the krg signed a gas sales agreement governing the export of natural gas from to the krg to turkey, as they expected in 2017 the krg could export 4 bcm and rising to 10 bcm by 2020 (humeyra, orhan, 2013). therefore, the krg’s gas market is now the most attractive sector for turkish companies like genel energy and botas. those actions make the central government inconvenienced, thus the central government blacklisted turkish oil and gas companies, such as genel energy, for their involvement with the kurdistan regional government (chmaytelli, 2017). in 2012 iraq cut the kurdistan budget which was 17% of all iraqi budgets. also, after iraq objected to us buyers from kurdistan, a court in texas made the decision and rejected delivery of cargoes from tankers near texas, which means the united states do not like kurdistan selling oil and gas independently (driver, julia, 2014). kurds are unlikely to wait for the approval of the central iraqi government to sell their own gas, iraqi kurdistan region sell oil with the support of obama’ administration, but they don’t hide their fear that oil will dispute in iraq and would threaten the political and economical stability (zhdannikov, et al., 2014). other issues that kurdistan has always been concerned about include the political stability and security in iraq that makes more issues for gas and foreign oil companies. these include the threat of isis that controls vast swaths of iraqi territory including oil and gas fields in kirkuk and ninawa, such as khabz and anzala, and also the religious and ethnic tensions. additionally, the kurdistan region leaves only turkey to the north as a viable partner for the export of the krg natural resources. 95% of the iraqi budget — 13% of which goes to the krg — literally flows from natural resources, thus making iraq and the krg classical rentier states’ states (gunter, 2011). in addition to the mentioned issues that make the krg slow to progress in term of developing the gas and oil sector, there are other issues related to selling large volumes of natural resources that do not match. this begs the question as to where the rest of money is going and whether this will lead to less economic growth in kurdistan. 36 hemin mohammed ismael 3. kurdistan region and marking gas to europe via turkey there are many factors as to why consumers around the world pay attention to kurdistan gas. ongoing events in ukraine are raising concerns regarding the stable supply of gas to europe. in 2016, gazprom export supplied 178.3 billion cubic meters of gas to european countries. western european countries accounted for approximately 80% of the company’s exports from russia, while central european states took 20% (gazprom export 2018, 2018). but europe’s annual demand for additional gas import may reach 80 billion cubic meters by 2020 and surpass 140 billion cubic meters by 2030 (eu-u.s. joint…, 2019). for that europeans countries needs more gas, and other gas resources such as kurdistan are one of the best options. according to data estimated by industry experts, the krg has 45 billion barrels of oil and 99 trillion to 201 trillion cubic feet of gas. even the distance of kurdistan to european southern countries is close. therefore, the european countries searching for other alternatives may reduce their dependence on russia’s gas. in 2011 tony hayward, the former ceo of bp, described kurdistan as “one of the last great oil and gas frontiers (martin, 2017). kurdistan gas and oil will soon become one of the best options for many states in the west and the united states regarding security of energy. overseas companies, such as the turkish company genel fig. 2. oil and gas infrastructure in kurdistan source: gas pipelines…, 2015. kurdistan’s role in european energy security 37 energy, norway’s dno bp, total, china’s petroleum, russia’s gazprom, american chevron and exxon mobil, had signed agreements with the kurdistan region government. turkey, azerbaijan, and iran also have interest in kurdish gas marketing for many reasons. nevertheless, the european countries will focus on kurdistan oil and gas as good supplies in the near futures. they will start with the close neighbors to the krg, the turkish government, that decided to let the new kurdish pipeline to tie up to its ceyhan line. the genel energy company has signed an agreement with krg to develop two big gas fields, miran and bina bawi, and is helping kurdistan meet its commitments under an agreement to sell gas to turkey by 2016–2017 (fig. 3). turkey needs kurdish gas for domestic use first because it is cheaper than what imported from russia, iran, and azerbaijan, which means turkey would secure a low price for gas. for turkey it means cheaper access to natural gas and oil resources only 150–200 km from its border. turkey’s energy costs are too high. instead of paying an average of $450 for 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas purchased from russia, iran, and azerbaijan, turkey will now be paying $200–250 for this amount. ankara and erbil are reported to have agreed on a package of deals including gas exports. under the agreement, the krg will sell gas to turkey at the low price of $6–$7 per 1,000 cubic feet (cf ), which is “attractive for turkey given current purchase prices of as much as $12–$14 cf ” (roberts, 2016). turkey as a new developing country needs more gas. the krg appears as a new oil and gas market as many big and medium sized companies have begun to extract and invest in the kurdistan region. selling will need new routes, and turkey is the best option for the krg to export their natural resources to foreign markets. therefore, a turkish company is suited for the kurdistan gas business in the long run, just as many other companies like bp did in the caspian region two decades ago. in the old maps of the original nabucco gas pipeline plan, a southern gas supply leg to northern iraqi gas sources was represented by a dotted line. but with domestic tensions in iraq and the shah deniz consortium’s strategic politics, this second leg disappeared (okumuş, 2013). the southern gas corridor project envisages the transportation of gas from the caspian region through georgia and turkey to europe. kurdistan gas may link up with this project. the trans-anatolian gas pipeline (tanap) will be a central part of the southern gas corridor which will connect the shah deniz field in azerbaijan to europe. the construction of the pipeline formally began in march and was expected to be completed in 2018 (austivk, gulmira, 2016) (fig. 4). the state oil company of the azerbaijan republic, or socar, has a 58% stake in the project, with turkey’s state-owned botaş holding 30% and bp, operator of shah deniz, with the remaining 12%. appraisals for the cost of the pipeline’s construction stand at around $10 billion–11 billion (work begins…, 2015). the southern gas corridor is one of the eu’s highest energy security priorities to reduce the russian monopoly on gas marketing in europe especially after the ukrainian crisis. the transport of kurdish gas to the turkish market is planned to start by 2017 or 2018. over fig. 3. miran and bina bawi gas fields source: genel gets…, 2018. 38 hemin mohammed ismael 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) of kurdish gas may be carried to the turkish market by 2020, according to deputy head of the natural resources committee in the kurdistan parliament, kurdistan could fulfill 30% of gas needs in europe (hawrami, 2016). sha’ban continued, “recently, we met with the french consul in the kurdistan region who emphasized that france and europe in general are hoping the kurdistan region’s natural gas will fulfill a portion of their requirements” (ismael, 2018). experts speculated that the kurdish gas infrastructure would not be ready by 2015. even the turkish pipeline corporation (botas) according to some energy experts is not in a good condition in terms of capacity and delivery of kurdistan gas to europe (austivk, gulmira, 2016). also, hawrami said exports constituted the second stage of his government’s gas policy, the first being to cater for the domestic demand. the kurdistan policy is to be self-sufficient as soon as possible, with any surplus gas going to the international market. the kurdistan regional struggle against isis will make the crisis for kurdistan push european countries to make more connections with kurdistan, as for example, when germany donated 13 million dollars to kurdistan to support the kurdish force peshmerga. however, other political interests interpret this support as geopolitical because of energy in the region. so far, 28 countries have opened their consulates in kurdistan, most of them being european countries, but also the united states and russia. these countries are considering this move as a good opportunity of krg to bypass baghdad and its energy exports, and are making a symbolic step towards economic and political independence. 4. russia, iran, and the krg hydrocarbon plans ongoing tension between russia and european countries on the ukraine crisis exists, with each of them looking for alternatives to buy gas. ukrainian issues are pushing european countries to turn towards the middle east for new gas resources and to reduce the russia’s gas monopoly. russia was soon aware of the geopolitical importance of the kurdistan region’s resource. it opened a consulate in erbil and sent its big oil and gas companies to the region, such as lukoil and gazprom. gazprom signed agreements with the krg to develop three gas fields in garmian blocks of halabja, shakal and qaradakh. even if the krg supplies natural gas to european countries by 2017, it cannot completely substitute russian natural gas unless europe reduces their demand by 30%. if 30 years ago the russian and iraqi governments had very good relationships in many aspects, economically and politically, especially during iraq-iran 8 years’ war, this dilemma would not currently arise. the russia’s lukoil oil and gas company has a big agreement with baghdad to develop the west qurna-2 field in basra, which are big oil fields in southern iraq that produce around 43 billion barrels of recoverable reserves, making it the second largest field in the world after saudi arabia’s. this confuses russia on how to deal with both the krg and the central government at the same time. some experts say if one wants iraqi gas and oil, the interested parties should talk with baghdad, but if they want delivery they have to talk with the krg. iraq with its ongoing instability crisis has difficulty in delivering its natural gas and oil without kurdistan because gas and oil delivery is controlled by isis. isis controls the turkey yumurtalık kirkuk–ceyhan oil pipeline which is a 600-mile (970 km) pipeline (fig. 5). fig. 4. important gas pipelines from the caspian region to europe source: mubaris, 2010. kurdistan’s role in european energy security 39 on 3 september 2013, the iraq petroleum company reported that two bomb attacks halted the flow of crude oil through a severely damaged pipeline running from iraq’s kirkuk oil fields to the mediterranean port of ceyhan in turkey (bomb…, 2013). however, iran is powerful and the nearest neighbor to kurdistan, they stopped to observe natural resources in iraqi kurdistan region. iran has more interests in iraq’s oil and gas due the approximate iran has agreed to export 25 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas a day to iraq, and will start at seven mcm per day (iran’s…, 2018). in addition, for the same purpose, kurdistan was visited by an iranian delegation led by ghasemi, head of the iran-iraq trade mission, and included ardistani, advisor to iran’s oil minister, and rafzani, head of iran’s national gas company (kurdistan…, 2015). the krg had talked to iran to build a pipeline that would carry iranian gas to kurdistan to generate electricity and for domestic use especially in winter. in 2014, the krg and iran already agreed to build two pipelines from iran to kurdistan. the second one is for the krg to export oil to iran; in return, iran would supply 3–4  million liters of fuel for power stations (mills, 2016). also, iran has a hidden agenda in kurdistan especially in the green zone area. this area is dominated by the patriotic union of kurdistan (puk) and has good ties with iran rather than kurdistan, which is led by president of the kurdistan region, masoud barzani, and the goran movement. the reserves of natural gas in the sulaymaniyah (zone area) province is 5 tcm , which is 80% of all reserve gas in the kurdistan region. iran wants dominance over krg gas and oil strategies by dividing the kurdistan region into two main zones, yellow and green; because they know that in 2017 kurdistan will export gas to turkey and europe markets. i expect iran will make all efforts before 2017 and make amendments to the krg energy plan. in most events, russia and iran use gas as politics and it is to make pressure on turkey and europe. russia is also looking to kurdistan anxiously as a competitor and alternative to its nabucco project. this means russia’s role in providing gas is likely to be replaced by the kurdistan region. all those deals and agreements that the krg takes on the ground are not empty of challenges. for instance, it seems that kurdistan workers party (pkk) is a big threat for turkish gas and oil strategies. on oct. 2013, gas exports from iran were halted after an explosion at a pipeline in eastern turkey near the iranian border occurred in the early morning (coskun, 2015). the pkk had repeatedly attacked pipelines in turkey in the past. it is right that tanap would be constructed in the north and far from the heart of the nationalist activity. the pkk remains active although gas pipelines from iraq and iran are embattled repeatedly. there are solutions to secure gas in europe if the southern gas corridor gets damaged inside turkey. the turkish government could hold negotiations with the pkk, which would give kurdish people more rights and freedom. this may be better for turkey and europe not to be pkk’s hostage. even during the conflict between armenia and azerbaijan in the nagorno-karabakh region, the pkk conducted activity inside azerbaijan, and they accusation against armenia for supporting pkk leads to actual kurdistan-turkey pipeline kirkuk-turkey pipeline fig. 5. iraq-turkey oil pipeline controlled by isis source: lee, 2017. 40 hemin mohammed ismael threatening toward gas and oil agreements. as a result, the august 2008 baku-tbilisi-ceyhan (btc) oil pipeline explosion in refahiye, turkey, occurred. the pkk, a militant pro-kurdish organization, claimed credit for the explosion – which was plausible, because of the pkk’s history of bombing pipelines and other turkish infrastructure assets (2008 turkish…, 2014). that means pkk activities in those areas may threaten the turkish interests if no decision is made. 5. conclusion until 2007, kurdistan was considered a sleeping giant and is now awakening as an energy region in the middle east. kurdistan with huge reserves of gas and its geographic proximity to europe, however, could become a crucial new actor in european energy security. the kurdistan region holds as much as (5.67 bcm) of natural gas reserves, around 3% of the world’s total reserves (the kurdistan region in brief, 2018). however, there are issues that the kurdistan natural resource-developing plan are facing, such as extracting and exporting gas to world markets. this is due to conflicts with central governments on the interpretation of some articles in the iraq constitution related to the gas and oil law. kurdistan being landlocked faces obstacles such as being highly dependent on the adjacent states, like turkey, in exporting its gas. it is true the krg has no real alternative export routes other than turkey (paasche, howri, 2014). also, some neighboring countries to kurdistan may consider kurdistan as an alternative to their natural resources, such as turkey, iran, russia, and azerbaijan. for example, the two neighbor countries, such as iran and turkey, have their own strategy to get benefits from natural gas resources in kurdistan. even azerbaijan and some european countries have interest in kurdistan natural resources. azerbaijan and turkey want kurdistan gas for two different purposes, as azeri need kurdistan gas as supplement to shah denis gas fields that support most european gas needs by means of the southern gas corridor. turkey, however, wants kurdish gas first for domestic use and to export to international markets. iran is another neighbor of kurdistan that has interests in kurdistan gas and oil. iran does not want kurdistan to emerge as a new gas producer competing for gas markets in europe. therefore, iran tries to dominate kurdish natural resource strategies in many ways, such as creating problems between two big political parties that formed the government in kurdistan. this includes their support for the puk against the pdk, specifically against masoud barzani, the president of the kurdistan region. european countries also want kurdish gas for many reasons; for example, the volume of kurdish gas may make the azerbaijan gas project succeed and make european less dependent on russian gas. therefore, many european gas companies have invested in the region. ongoing crises in kurdistan, such as the isis terrorist group, gave europeans more pretenses to contribute to kurdish strategies. germany sent arms to kurdistan to assist the force army peshmerga, and they supported the krg with 13 million dollars to fight wars against isis. if the krg takes advantage of these changes in the relationships that occur in the middle east, they may lead kurdistan to become an independent economic power and make the region more prosperous. references austivk g., gulmira r., 2016, turkey in the geopolitics of natural gas, m-rcbg associate working paper series: harvard university, center for business & government or of harvard university, www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg (accessed:18 november 2019). bomb attacks halt kirkuk-ceyhan oil pipeline: iraq officials, 2013, reuters: 21 august 2013, https://www.reuters. com/ar ticle/us-iraqoil-pipeline/bomb-attacks-haltk i r k u kce y h a n o i l p i p e l i n e i ra q o f f i c i a l s i d u s b r e 97k09n20130821 (accessed:19 november 2019). chmaytelli m., 2017, iraqi government asks foreign countries to stop oil trade with kurdist, reuters: 24 september 2017, 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introduction the break-up of the “eastern bloc” and the political transformation of countries which co-created it bore a significant influence not only on the political or economic dimension of social life, but to an equal extent involved the sphere of organization of science, as well as the direction of research that was pursued. it seems that these, in turn, had a special significance in the development of disciplines, which from a standpoint of the assumptions of real socialism, could have had a functional or dysfunctional influence on the ideological legitimization of the regime. undoubtedly, among such disciplines a prominent place was occupied by political science, hence in a socialist reality it was to a greater or lesser extent monitored, subject to control, and sometimes exposed to the restrictions imposed by state authority. the practice had in essence applied on one hand to different forms of administrative, and material support of research referring to the theoretical perspective of marxism, championed by authorities of that journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(4), 35–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.4.04 changes of political theories in the countries of central and eastern europe jarosław nocoń institute of political sciences, university of gdansk, bażynskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-1202-7580 e-mail: poljn@ug.edu.pl citation nocoń j., 2019, changes of political theories in the countres of central and eastern europe, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(4), 35–41. abstract in the countries of middle and eastern europe the collapse of „real socialism” was followed by the annulment of political and ideological supervision over scientific researches. since then the political theory has been developing in an unembarrassed way, drawing investigative patterns with the tradition of western political sciences. form this perspective, the expression „westernization” used with regard to political theory signifies the process of going away from marxism and historical materialism. the article focuses on two essential trends of this process. the main consequence is the pluralization of theoretical bases of investigations, which signifies not only differentation, but also the lack of predominant theory. the international program for monitoring the development since 1990, shows that new investigative trends disclose a division between the traditional and current model of politology, which demonstrates the topicality of arguments raised in western academic debatesover the theoretical condition and status of political science discipline. key words political theory, political sciences, european politology. received: 27 june 2019 accepted: 25 october 2019 published: 31 december 2019 36 jarosław nocoń time, on the other hand to the attempts of limiting the development of alternative theoretical streams, in that especially such that could potentially disavow or critically verify these scientific achievements. undoubtedly, the mechanisms of material and symbolic support of an ideologically involved political science appeared in diversified intensity, and with varying effect on the territories of particular socialist countries. h.d. klingemann (2002), one of the coordinators of the international programme analyzing these matters, among others, specifies three groups of countries. among those enlisted as imposing a high level of ideological control were estonia, latvia, lithuania, czechoslovakia, bulgaria, and romania. in poland and hungary there was rather a limited degree of ideological involvement of science in politics, and the least involved country was slovenia. independently, however of the degree of political interference in scientific research, the sheer fact of the existence of such practice was considered an important factor allowing the possibility of development of a modern political science and shaping the structure of research in the discipline. it is worth emphasizing, that in reality the preconditions of research in political science of that period are much more complex. on one hand, an ideological relationship of political science does not imply a complete lack of its development, on the other hand non-political factors also had influenced its shape. as stressed by t. klementewicz (1991), a prominent role in the development of political theory was played, among others by the practice of substituting of the sphere of methodology with vernacular consciousness. in this sense a part of the research had an „atheoretical” character, founded on a colloquial vision of the world, and an interpretation of politics resulting from it that is generically different from the conceptual implications which follow from marxist theory. together with the abolition of ideological control over the direction of research in political science in these countries, unhampered development of approaches differing from historical materialism was initiated, which to a significant degree has shaped modern traditions of research in political science. international monitoring of research, which began in the nineteen nineties allows us presently to formulate generalized conclusions and observations characterizing the directions of development, as well as theoretical tendencies in the development of political science in this region. among many interesting conclusions, it is worth pondering especially on three issues characterizing current trends in the transformation of theoretical foundations of political science research in countries of central and eastern europe, associated with „westernization” and pluralization of political theory. 2. „westernization” as a trend of changes it ought, however to be emphasized, that branding the processes of acquiring theoretical standards of research in politics as “westernization” has a rather conventional and somewhat subversive resonance. after all, the theory of karl marx, which in the countries of real socialism subsequently became the standard of “objective” insight into the processes of social development, is undoubtedly a product of western thought. paradoxically, through developing a scientific worldview socialist countries preserved western norms of perception of reality, based on strong faith in the power of knowledge and reason. currently, together with acquiring other standards of research from western political science, they somewhat reluctantly refer to the class social theory. meanwhile, a research perspective referring to marxist tradition is still an important, inspiring and increasingly often explored theoretical approach in western countries. according to d. marsh (2002), current references to marxist theory offer instruments of analysis of market conditions of the current social world that are very cognitively attractive. societal realities characteristic of liberal systems, designating contradictions and economic inequalities also on the international plane, creating susceptible ground for enlivening, as well as the development of tradition in social science. assumptions referring to historical materialism and dialectic analysis of social contradictions are still a valid subject of polemics associated with methodological foundations of contemporary political science research, pertaining to comparatistics of theoretical approaches, and also the possibility of applying functional explaining (elster, 2003; cohen, 2003). the meaning of this tradition is illustrated inter alia by the fact that marxist social theory is treated as one of the main inspirations in the thought of j. baudrillard and j.f. lyotard, two prominent theorists of postmodernism, exerting probably the strongest influence on the transformations of contemporary social research (benton, craib, 2003). what westernization of political theory means here is rather that presently, in place of a model of research based on historical materialism, what is implemented is theoretical standards, shaped and developed within the political science of western european countries and the united states. the focus is above all on approaches alluding to the assumptions of postbehavioralism, neoinstitutionalism, changes of political theories in the countries of central and eastern europe 37 systemic analysis, the theory of rational choice and functionalism. this regularity is illustrated by a selection of reports characterizing the theoretical structure of research conducted in faculties of political science in countries of central and eastern europe, which evidently exhibits references to the research tradition of western political science (tab. 1). the phenomenon of „westernization” of political theory in countries of the former eastern bloc understood in this way should not however be identified with a simple transfer and an analogous representation of research streams developed in western political science. the theoretical influences of englishspeaking political science overlap with the cultural specificity and historically determined research tradition, which grant an idiosyncratic feature to interpretations of research ideas in conditions of the socio-economic transformation of central and eastern europe. characterizing this constancy j. gunnell and d. easton (1991) had emphasized, that even if in different countries reference and transfer of assumptions, methods, discoveries or theories from american political science takes place, it does not imply direct cloning of the attainments of this discipline in other countries. during this import many aspects are subject to significant modifications under the influence of cultural adaptation to local conditions. hence, the nature of the international exchange of knowledge cannot be judged in isolation from its cultural varieties and modifications associated with it. one should not forget, that the exchange of ideas that inspires research approaches can be a decisive milestone. it does not only happen unidirectionally or unilaterally from the western tradition to other regions. works of political scientists from particular countries can be equally successfully, however in different degree aggregated to the area of american political science or at least become an inspiration leading to an especial degree of absorbtion or interpretation. presently, however, it is difficult to negate the fact, that dominating research trends are shaped within western research facilities, where the “mainstream” of political science discourse takes place. although their domination does not have to be associated with qualitatively better research practice, the leading role of western political science is ensured by at least two significant factors. the first, associated with the numerical superiority of researchers of political science, as well as the work published by them, and the second with the material potential, that constitutes a significant source of aid for the realization of bold scientific undertakings, as well as a necessary means for the dissemination and popularisation of results obtained. in this context it is demographic factors, alongside material-organizational resources, which cause contemporary global political science discourse to become dominated by representatives of english speaking countries, and in the quantitative dimension, by the continent of north america. symptomatic in this respect is the data quoted by evron kirkpatrick, who in the nineteen-seventies of the 20th century as executive director of apsa (american political science association), famously tab. 1. comparison of the theoretical basis of political research in countries of eastern europe and germany central and eastern europe (in the year 2000) west germany (in the year 1996) theoretical approach number of faculties, where particular approaches are pursued position in the ranking of importance percentage of respondents considering a given stream as important for the realization of their research historical 32 2 52 systemic theory 27 3 38 functionalism 19 6 18 neo-institutionalism 18 1 54 behavioralism 16 7 16 theory of rational choice 14 5 26 hermeneutics 12 4 41 game theory 5 9 13 marxism 5 10 12 existentialism 2 12 4 phenomenology 2 8 15 cybernetics 1 10 11 source: klingemann (2002, p. 211). 38 jarosław nocoń stated: “out of the seventeen thousand political scientists currently working, fourteen thousand live and work in the united states of america. regardless of the overall number of publications in the field of political science, 95 percent is also published in the united states of america” (freeman, 1991, p. 22). moreover, expenditures destined for conducting scientific research, especially popularisation of knowledge about political science in western countries are incomparable with the possibilities of countries that had once experienced the command-andquota economy. the socio-economic transformation in central and eastern europe is associated with different priorities than supporting ambitious research undertakings, which are however often seen as tangential. as a consequence, not only the most important centers and research programmes, but also the main channels of distribution and resources of knowledge organizations became the domain of western countries. meanwhile, the influences and impact on the research orientation of the leading theoretical streams should be perceived as a consequence of easier access to channels of knowledge distribution, which, through engaging economic means are considered more prestigious and opinion-forming. during organization of research it is primarily those means, which have meaning in the process of structuring, authorization, and legitimization of research approaches that are the result of discussion, negotiation and agreement on a position. they pertain, among other things, to editorial control of publishers or research facilities over the most prestigious and influential journals, and also the possibility of their financing, advertising and marketing strategies popularising particular academic accomplishments (almond, 1990). resources of global institutions such as blackwell publishing, sage or sunny press, and also the means, which are at the disposal of these publishing behemoths assigned to promoting a publication, regardless of the epistemic value of approaches it presents, significantly contributes to the range of their influence. in consequence, the work published there acquires publicity, prestige, and recognition due to an ability to effectively combine cognitive effort with material organization of the popularizing efforts. these organizational-economic and cultural determinants of scientific discourse put political scientists from central and eastern europe in a difficult situation, who naturally are faced with difficulties resulting from a need to build up proficiency in the english language. difficulties in mastering the language, as a basic medium of communication, reduce the influence of non-english speaking political science discourses on the development of main research traditions. these can develop or apply the peripheral surrounding of the core of particular theoretical traditions, having a modest chance of a significant voice in global discourse without an english translation. this constancy also pertains to western countries where the language is other than english. the remarks of j. łoziński, a translator of germanlanguage publications from the area of political science are especially telling in this matter. whilst justifying why he preferred the polish translation of a book by german political scientist k. von beyme, he noticed a significant cultural fact. “hence, firstly the american social sciences makes ample use of the achievements (also terminological) of german – understanding – social science, and after more or less three-quarters of a century we can observe how german political science obediently acquires ready english phrases, or even the syntax of the language of american political science. (…) as we can see they became technical terms in different language circles as well” (łoziński, 2005, p. 11). the processes of transforming the theoretical structure of political science research in particular countries, however, took place at different pace, depending on the degree of institutionalization of political science, as well as the communication skills and participation of research environments in international academic discourse. an important role is ascribed especially to international conferences, research associations and their domestic branches. these institutions presently constitute representative centers of knowledge, fulfilling basic functions in the processes of standardization of knowledge, scientific legitimation of new theoretical streams, and also the formation of a hierarchical structure together with research elites in academic circles. among the most important international organizations bringing together researchers of politics the following are often listed: international political science association (apsa), central european political science association (cepsa) and the european consortium for political research (ecpr). whereby all of these international organisations seek the creation of national branches, the international political science association (ipsa) can be an example, with its national branches (ptnp in poland), within the framework of which special organs are established, which aim to concentrate on particular issues, e.g. the formed as part of ipsa in the nineteen-seventies special committee on conceptual and terminological analysis (cocta). the main role of any structure of this type is – as emphasized by w. mckinley (2003) – the aggregation of subjective perceptions of reality on its subjective reception. as part of changes of political theories in the countries of central and eastern europe 39 these processes sanctioning of a particular order of speech and methodological discipline of investigation characteristic of a given tradition in research programmes carried out is accomplished. 3. pluralization as a result of modernization a substantial phenomenon connected with the processes of aggregating theoretical models of political science investigation is a tendency to pluralize political theory, which is clearly on the rise. although in the western research tradition periods were recorded when a particular theoretical perspective that referred to the historical-comparative, behavioral or functional paradigm of research had dominated, they had never gained supremacy as outright as the historical materialism in the countries of the former ussr. since the early stages in the formation of political science as a separate academic discipline, the theoretical basis of research was more or less diverse and drew upon different research approaches. temporary domination of particular theoretical streams was to a greater extent the result of “internal” rivalry in academic debate, as well as confrontation of justifications and arguments clashing within scientific discourse, rather than a result of political pressures or institutional limitations. from the nineteen seventies in western political science what had increasingly intensified was a tendency to undermine the possibility of a complex explanation of the political sphere in a homogeneous methodological perspective in favor of accepting a wider catalogue of theoretically varied and scientifically equitable research approaches. in research practice, this implied a differentiation of methodological orientations and conceptualizations, as well as legitimization of theoretical pluralism. in circumstances of free debate conditions are created that are in favor of forming new approaches based on theoretical interpretations that are groundbreaking for a particular discipline (lecompte, 1990). as emphasized by d. latin (2003), political science discourse of that period was focused on great dilemmas and all types of “isms”, which were supposed to be a potential epistemic alternative for research tradition up to date. according to views of enthusiasts of this process, a wider opening to theoretical pluralism means passing from research that is unidimensional, reductionist and concentrated on a scientistic methodological to a perspective that is multidimensional, directed on attempts of a more complete clarification – within the scope of a wider panorama – of research approaches and rational assessment of the explanatory usefulness of assertions. in some interpretations this turn is also presented as a consequence of scientific „maturation” of political science, which does not only concentrate on a simple description and explanation of political practice, but also acquires features of an autoreflexive discipline (oren, 2006). meanwhile, the experience of real socialism in countries of central and eastern europe had to a great extent limited open debates on the possibilities of discursive exploration of politics. hence, it can be expected, accustomation to a particular cognitive formula as the only possibility of scientific legitimization of political science research can be significantly stronger, than in western political science. ultimately, however the decisive factor will be an ability to demonstrate openness to new ideas and theoretical streams, as well as critical tolerance of development of alternative research approaches. currently, in poland, the main research traditions are rather continuously monitored, and to a greater or lesser extent permeate to the domestic accomplishments of political scientists. these influences were, in fact, visible earlier, independently of the approach dominating in research practice, and have shaped the consciousness of the diverseness of theoretical-methodological approaches in political science. assurance of the existence of such consciousness in the polish tradition of political science can be obtained, for instance by contemplating the reflections of f. ryszka, found in a textbook from 1981. this elaboration, apart from describing methods representative of the empirical approach, widely treats on the subject of systemic analysis in the cybernetic interpretation of d. easton, functional interpretation of t. parsons, and the communication interpretation of k. deutsch, in addition, it mentions the application of game theory along with the decision-making approach in political science research (ryszka, 1981). however, until the nineteen nineties matters of issues resulting from the theoretically diversified structure of research were usually perceived at an average level of generalization and rather only aspectually mentioned along with discussing categories or political science terms. the issues of theoretical diversification of political science were raised to a significantly greater extent in later years. an overview of all of the compelling theoretical streams shaping contemporary approaches to politics research can be found in polish-language articles and elaborations of that period (more see: nocoń, 2010). echoes occur here of a discussion undertaken over modernization and theoretical diversification of approaches in political science, taking into consideration observations of the skeptics of these tendencies. this concerns especially the arguments of g.g. almond or j. gunnell, perceiving the dangers of fragmentation 40 jarosław nocoń and a lack of correlation between particular research traditions, and also fears of ahistoricity and alienation of modern political science(gunnell, 1991). correspondingly as in american political science, with which a particular model of political science is associated, a division into traditionally oriented political scientists and researchers more open to contemporary trends becomes noticeable. finally however, in the light of analysis of the theoretical foundation of political science research in poland, it seems, that presently a traditional model of political science, based on the historical and empirical cognitive perspective dominates. data prepared at the beginning of the new millennium, as part of the international programme of research on the development of political science in countries of central-eastern europe illustrate, that the main research approaches represented are: behavioralism – 3, cybernetics – 0, existentialism – 0, hermeneutics – 2, marxism – 0, theory of rational choice – 4, game theory – 2, neoinstitutionalism – 3, historical approach – 7, functionalism – 2, phenomenology – 0, systemic approach – 4, organizational theory – 4. authors of the report on the state of political science research – s. gebethner and r. markowski – notice that despite new theoretical approaches are recognized, their presence is limited to detailing the methodological debates conducted in western elaborations, rather than using them in research practice (gebethner, markowski, 2002). a certain degree of conservatism in this matter is visible also in some textbook studies in the field of political theory, methodology of political science research, or an introduction to political science, all of which exhibit a problem structure that takes into considertation the paradigmatic aspects of political science analysis only marginally, or not at all. their undisputed advantage is, however, drawing from the polish variation of research tradition, which preserves properties characteristic of it, independently of the influence of historical materialism and the impact of german, french, british, and finally american political science. the focus here is especially on the influences of normatively oriented theory in the works of f. ryszka, j. baszkiewicz, analytically oriented approach of the so called “bodnarowska school” organized around the central methodic hub and the so-called “poznańska school” of j. kmita, j. topolski and l. nowak, in which elements can be found referring to hermeneutics and the “humanist interpretation”. in the context of relations between a homogeneous and pluralist model of political science, it seems that an observation by t. klementewicz formulated at the beginning of the nineteen nineties, stating that in poland “the dispute between traditional and theoretical political science has a hidden, or likewise silent nature” (klemetewicz, 1991, p. 8) does not currently loose relevance. together with the globalization and mass communication processes, it can be expected that in countries of central and eastern europe the ties between political science and a theoretical tradition developed within the limits of western political science will tighten. this process will have a significant influence on directions of transformation within political science as a discipline, and a shift of the prevailing manner of perceiving the structure of knowledge about politics. certainly a wider debate on the role and meaning of political theory in processes of conceptualization and interpretation of results of empirical research becomes unavoidable (levy, 1998) the process can be considered, according to t. klementewicz’s designation, as theoretization of political science, which became “the direction of reorientation of the theoretically-methodological awareness of political scientists” (klementewicz, 1991, p. 45). subsequently, following the path of western political science, it can be expected that interest in historical studies on the development of political science will rise, what in a situation of theoretical diversification can constitute an important point of departure for serious discussions over the condition, identity, methodological status and growth trends of the discipline in countries of central and eastern europe (condren, 1997). 4. conclusion western trends in the transformations of the theoretical structure of political science research presumably imply a need to recognize and appreciate the social roles and cultural determinants of the research conducted. they are a phenomenon strongly justifying arguments in favor of perceiving science as one of the social processes, which has a dynamic character and is distinguished by particular modernization trends. this pertains also to the epistemic and methodological standards, which in a traditional model of political science were often considered constant and unchanging. this feature of scientific knowledge is emphasized inter alia by b. krauz-mozer, who wrote: “the system of rules and procedures which are in force in research and constituting of the value of scientific knowledge is not something unchanging or infallible. (...) these socially created and socially accepted norms of epistemic behavior are not eternal, do not hold universal value, moreover, they change depending on the time, place or cultural distinctiveness of societies” (krauz-mozer, 2007, p. 20–21). from this point of view the dynamics and transformations changes of political theories in the countries of central and eastern europe 41 of the theoretical structure of knowledge about politics can be perceived not so much as a manifestation of an anomaly, but rather a natural symptom of developmental trends in political science. with the passage of time it can certainly be expected that in countries of central and eastern europe, not unlike western political science, wider acceptance will be acquired by postulates of a greater opening of political science to new ideas and a critical tolerance towards competing research approaches, which is a necessary step in the progressive development of political science. of course, it is not about perfunctory incorporation of any theoretical “fads”, but of open possibilities of their participation in wider academic debate, as part of which their critical verification, potential modification, and in effect, at times also association into existing epistemic standards takes place. references almond g., 1990, a discipline divided schools and sects in political science, sage publications, new york. benton t., craib i., 2003, filozofia nauk społecznych. od pozytywizmu do postmodernizmu (eng. philospohy of social sciences. from positivism to postmodernism), wydawnictwo dolnośląskiej szkoły wyższej edukacji twp, wrocław. cohen g.a., 2003, reply to elster on “marxism, functionalism and game theory”, [in:] d. matavers, j.e. pike (eds.), debates in contemporary political philosophy, routledge, new york, 40–53. condren c., 1997, political theory and the problem of anachronism, [in:] a. vincent (ed.), political theory: tradition and diversity, cambridge university press, cambridge, 45–66. elster j., 2003, marxism, functionalism, and game theory: a case for methodological individualism, [in:] d. matavers, j.e. pike (eds.), debates in contemporary political philosophy, routledge, new york, 20–39. freeman d.m., 1991, the making of a discipline, [in:] w.j. crotty (ed.), political science: looking to the future, northwestern university press, illinois, 15–44. gebethner s., markowski r. 2002, poland, [in:] m. kaase, v. sparschuh (eds.), three social science disciplines in central and eastern europe: handbook of economics, political science and sociology (1989-2001), social science information centre – collegium budapest, berlin-bonn-budapest, 317–325. gunnell j.g. 1991, the historiography of american political science, [in:] j.g. gunnell, d. easton, l. graziano (eds.), the development of political science. a comparative survey, routledge, new york, 13–33. gunnell j.g., easton d., 1991, introduction, [in:] j.g. gunnell, d. easton, l. graziano (eds.), the development of political science. a comparative survey, routledge, new york, 1–11. klementewicz t., 1991, spór o model metodologiczny nauki o polityce (eng. dispute about metodological model of political science), instytut studiów politycznych polskiej akademii nauk, warszawa. klingemann h.d., 2002, political science in central and eastern europe: national development and international integration, [in:] m. kaase, v. sparschuh (eds.), three social science disciplines in central and eastern europe: handbook of economics, political science and sociology (19892001), social science information centre – collegium budapest, berlin-bonn-budapest, 206–212. krauz-mozer b., 2007, teorie polityki. założenia metodologiczne (eng. theories of politics. metodological assumptions) , pwn, warszawa. latin d., 2003, the political science discipline, [in:] e.d. mansfield, r. sisson (eds.), the evolution of political knowledge: theory and inquiry in american politics, the ohio state university press, ohio, 31–36. lecompte m. d., 1990 emergent paradigms: how new? how necessary, [in:] e.g. guba (ed.), the paradigm dialog, sage publications, newbury park, 246–254. levy m. b.,1998, political theory and the emergence of policy science, [in:] e.d. portis, m.b. levy (eds.), handbook of political theory and the emergence of policy science, greenwood, westport, 3–16. łoziński j., 2005, translator’s notes, [in:] k. von beyme (ed.), współczesne teorie polityczne (eng. contemporary political theories), scholar, warszawa, 9–13. marsh d., 2002, marxism, [in:] g. stoker, d. marsh (eds.), theory and methods in political science, macmillan, new york, 170–178. mckinley w., 2003, from subjectivity to objectivity: a constructivist account of objectivity in organization theory, [in:] r.i. westwood., s. clegg (eds.), debating organization. point-counterpoint in organization studies, wiley-blackwell, malden, 142-155 nocoń, j., 2010, między tradycją a modernizacją. przeobrażenia badań politologicznych w świetle neofunkcjonalizmu j.  c.  alexandra (eng. between tradition and modernisation. transformations of political science research in the light of j. c. alexander neofunctionalism), wydawnictwo ukw, bydgoszcz. oren i., 2006, political science as history: a reflexive approach, [in:] d. yanow, p. schwartz-shea, m. e. sharpe (eds.), interpretation and method. empirical research methods and the interpretative turn, routledge, new york, 216–218. ryszka f., 1981, wstęp do nauki o polityce. uwagi metodologiczne (eng. introduction to political science), pwn, warszawa. 1. introduction the research of the economic impact of one country to other is the key method in modern economic geography. the influence of one economic system on other may increase or decrease depending on the historical, geographical, institutional and other features of countries’ cooperation. the border and historical links with such a large state as the russian federation, of course, affects the economy of the baltic states. however, the existing different political views and rather “cool” relations at the international level between russia and the baltic states disrupt economic links to a certain degree. after the dissolution of the soviet union estonia, latvia and lithuania became independent and the vector of their economies was sent to the european union, in particular – to the states of fennoscandia. currently sweden, finland, germany and the netherlands are the main trade and economic partners of the baltic states. however, certain russian interests in the baltic states and current economic and transport links make russia as one of the most important partners of estonia, latvia and lithuania. the initial hypothesis is that russia lost during last 23 years its status as the main economic partner of the baltic states, but saved important role in some parts of economy (transport, industry) and that modern russian interests are not only in industry, but also in financial sector. journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 68–75 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.014.5487 russia’s role in the baltic states’ investment aleksandr sergeevich pestich department of economic and social geography of russia, faculty of geography, lomonosov moscow state university, leninskie gory, 119991 moscow gsp-1, russia, e-mail: alpestich@gmail.com citation pestich a.s., 2016, russian’s role in the baltic states’ investment, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 68–75. abstract the aim of this article is to determine the modern role of russia in the investment space of the baltic states and to assess the current stage of integration of russian and the baltic states’ economies. the basis of the work is the analysis of the dynamics and structure of russian investment in estonia, latvia and lithuania. this article shows the decreasing role of russia in the baltic states’ investment, but russia is still an important economic partner for these states. absolute amounts of investment are growing, while the share of russia in different countries varies in different ways and, depending on the implementation of any project. structure of russian investments is different in all countries. key words russia, estonia, latvia, lithuania, investment, business. russia’s role in the baltic states’ investment 69 2. russian role in trade and investment after the dissolution of the soviet union estonia, latvia and lithuania have started pro-western policies, trying to focus mostly on european union, not on russia. during the soviet period, about 95% of economic and trade balance were in communication with the other republics of the union. nowadays russia’s share in the trade balance of the baltic states rarely exceeds 25%, but is not the same for estonia, latvia and lithuania (fig. 1). russia’s share in the trade balance of lithuania is much higher than other baltic states. more than 90% of russian import to lithuania are oil and oil fig. 1. russia’s share in the trade balance of the baltic states source: statistics departments of estonia, latvia, and lithuania. 70 aleksandr sergeevich pestich products, because the only oil refinery in the baltic states is in mazeikiai, lithuania. at the same time, in estonia and latvia russian share is lower than 10–12% during last 10 years. the share of russia changed wavy: recessions are connected with crisis in 1998 and 2008. it is remarkable that only lithuania still has trade deficit with russia: estonia got trade surplus in 2008, latvia – in 2013. the delay of russian economic growth in 2013-2014 and developing of russian ports in leningrad oblast had negative impact on trade between the baltic states and russia: exports from estonia began to decline, and from lithuania – slowed; imports stagnated in estonia and in lithuania – decreased significantly. russia was not the major investor in the baltic states in 2014 (tab. 1). share and place of russia in 2014 in the incoming flow of foreign direct investment (hereinafter – fdi) tab. 1. main investors in the baltic states in 2014 № estonia latvia lithuania country share country share country share 1 sweden 26.4% sweden 21.1% sweden 23.0% 2 finland 21.8% netherlands 8.2% germany 10.1% 3 netherlands 10.4% cyprus 7.3% poland 9.8% 4 norway 5.5% russia 6.9% netherlands 9.1% 5 russia 5.5% germany 5.6% norway 6.0% 6 cyprus 3.4% norway 5.5% estonia 5.6% 7 denmark 3.2% estonia 4.7% denmark 5.4% 8 lithuania 2.7% denmark 4.0% finland 4.5% 9 latvia 2.7% lithuania 3.0% russia 4.1% 10 usa 2.2% the united kingdom 2.7% cyprus 3.5% source: statistics departments of estonia, latvia and lithuania. fig. 2. dynamics of the russian volume of fdi in the economy of the baltic countries and russia’s share in total fdi source: statistics departments of estonia, latvia and lithuania. russia’s role in the baltic states’ investment 71 in the countries differ slightly. however, consider the volume and share of fdi in one year is not quite correct, so consider the dynamics of the volume of fdi in the economy of the baltic countries and russia’s share in total fdi (fig. 2.). absolute figures of russian investments grow in all the baltic states (except lithuania), and the proportion varies in different ways: in latvia decreases with the increase in 2014, in estonia – is growing, in lithuania – changes in waves. to understand the causes of this dynamics, it is necessary to analyze the structure of russian investments in the economy of these countries (fig. 3). fig. 3. the structure of russian investments in the economy of the baltic states source: statistics departments of estonia, latvia and lithuania, eurostat. 72 aleksandr sergeevich pestich analysis of the data shows that all three countries have different structure of russian investments. it shows different directions of russian interests in the baltic states. dynamics of investment in latvia shows that the most interesting for russian investors are the financial sector and the production and distribution of electricity, gas and water. this is explained by increased activity of russian banks in the latvian financial sector and the fact that 50% of the shares of the largest gas company in latvia «latvijas gāze», controlling pipelines latvia, belong to russian companies (“gazprom” – 34%, “itera”1 – 16%). the share of investment in real estate is growing since 2008. russian bought real estate in latvia to receive permanent residency, but since 2014, it is forbidden to the russian citizens. this can decrease russian investment in latvian real estate in future. from the rest of the baltic states lithuania is allocated with the least level of diversification of russian investments. in 2004–2005 manufacturing attracted more than 60% of all russian investments. in 2005 also was the largest volume of russian investment in lithuania, and in 2006 was a sharp recession. in the same year, the share of manufacturing in the structure of russian investment felt sharply and sharply increased the share of energy production and distribution, gas and water. the reason is that mazeikiai oil refinery was bought in 2003 by the russian company «yukos» and sold out to the polish company «pkn orlen» in 2006. also in 2004 russian company “mechel” bought iron and steel works in kaunas. in 2010, investment increased because the crisis was over and the transaction on purchase chemical plant lifosa in kėdainiai by russian «eurochem» was over too. the high proportion of investment in energy production and distribution is explained in a similar manner as in the case of latvia: 37% of the company «lietuvos dujos, controlling gts lithuania belong to «gazprom». russian investment in lithuanian financial sector rapidly increased in 2007, but because of crisis in 2008 they quickly decreased in 2008. estonia is a country with the most the most diversified flow of russian investments. no one sector is significantly stands out, as in lithuania. nevertheless, should be noted the highest share among all countries on volume of investments in trade and real estate, and a significant amount of investment in the financial sector. gradually declined investment in manufacturing (to zero in 2012), and production and distribution of energy. quite difficult to estimate the number of enterprises with russian capital. according to various sources, the number of enterprises with russian 1 “rosneft” subsidiary company. capital in latvia is about 4.5 thousand, in estonia – 2.4 thousand. if remove the companies that are not russian, but have russian capital, their number decreased markedly. representation of russian companies weakly correlated with the volume of russian investments (tab. 2). tab.  2. the number of russian companies in the baltic states year estonia latvia lithuania 2003 10 93 58 2004 19 99 71 2005 19 91 82 2006 26 129 86 2007 29 146 90 2008 25 153 92 2009 28 175 90 2010 32 228 116 2011 34 240 128 2012 28 261 – source: unctad. among the largest foreign branches in the baltic states2 only three are allocated: «severstallat as» (latvia) and lukoil baltija (latvia and lithuania). riga’s plant «severstal» is one of the largest branches of foreign enterprises in latvia in the manufacturing sector, and lukoil baltija is the largest company on the sale of gasoline in lithuania. enterprises with russian capital are not the major foreign investor in the baltic countries. in latvia in the top twenty of the largest foreign investors is only one russian company – «transnefteproduct», which has invested in the subsidiary sia latrostrans 51,6 million euros. there are 8 more russian companies in top-100 foreign investors in latvia (tab. 3). however, even the total amount of investment from the largest russian investors in latvia is not even a one third of the investments of the swedish bank «swedbank ab» (tab. 4). in the first ten largest investors in latvia seven companies belong to financial sector. among the directions of investment of major russian investors in latvia the main are the financial sector and companies associated with the transport of minerals, because of favorable conditions and simple implementation of financial activity in latvia, and the convenience of latvian ports for transportation of goods to western europe. “gazprom” investments should be considered from the political point of view to control the baltic pipeline in order to reduce costs and increase the impact on the energy 2 by unctad. russia’s role in the baltic states’ investment 73 market of the baltic states, poland and germany. however, there are reports in recent years about the desire of governments of the baltic countries to buy out the share of “gazprom” in gas companies, especially in view of the desire of the german shareholders to sell their share of the company “latvijas gāze”. four of top-100 companies in estonia are russian subsidiaries. all these companies connected with transportation and storage (tab. 5). russian companies actively invest in estonian ports. „acron” is the largest shareholder of the terminal complex as dbt capacity of 160 thousand tons in port muuga, tallinn. also „acron” has as bct terminal for transportation and storage of ammonia and liquid fertilizers in sillamae port with capacity of 80 thousand tons, launched in 2009. besides „akron”, own terminal in sillamae for transshipment of liquid chemicals has „eurochem”. vopak eos – a subsidiary of the russian “global ports” engaged in service terminals for storage and handling of liquid cargo. capitalization of some companies considerably reduced from 2012 (vopak – from 626 million to 366 million euros, dbt – 73 to 50 million euros). that is connected with the gradual reorientation of russian trade flows from ports in estonia to ports in leningrad oblast. eesti gaas is the fourth company, which tab. 3. top russian investors in latvia in 2014 № company/person investment (mln. euros) subsidiary sector 1 transnefteproduct 51.90 sia latrostrans oil transportation 2 property department of moscow 28.53 ao amo plant motor vehicle production 3 andrey vdovin 27.86 bank m2m europe financial 4 igor tsyplakov 22.07 rigensis bank financial 5 mine „zarechnaya” 20.02 indtec baltic coal sia coal terminal in ventspils port 6 gazprom 19.26 ао latvijas gāze gas transportation 7 smp bank 15.02 smp bank financial 8 igor kim 11.64 expobank financial 9 „stroyrazvitie „ 10.20 stroyrazvitie lv construction source: www.lursoft.lv tab. 4. top foreign companies-investors in latvia in 2014 № company investment (mln. euros) country sector 1 swedbank ab 942.8 sweden financial 2 ge capital 226.3 usa financial 3 dnb bank asa 190.8 norway financial 4 skandinaviska enskilda banken 146.9 sweden financial 5 rugby holding b.v. 137.2 netherland financial 6 ektornet latvia ab 137.0 sweden financial 7 unicredit bank austria ag 127.8 austria financial 8 tilts communications a/s 101.7 denmark communication 9 bergvik skog ab 99.5 sweden forestry 10 bite lietuva uab 98.8 lithuania communication source: www.lursoft.lv tab. 5. top companies with russian capital in estonia in 2014 № company subsidiary in estonia sector capitalization (mln. euros) 7 global ports vopak e.o.s. as transport 366 18 global trans spacecom as transport 151 23 gazprom eesti gaas gas transport 138 88 acron dbt as transport 50 source: gild100. 74 aleksandr sergeevich pestich specialization is transportation and storage of gas. in next few years, „gazprom” may lose control of the estonian gas pipelines because the estonian government plans to allocate from the jurisdiction of the company eesti gaas gas pipelines to bring the law „on natural gas” to the requirements of the european union. interests of the russian capital in lithuania differ from those in latvia and estonia. first it should be noted that half (three of six) companies connected with chemical industry (tab. 6). the high activity of russian business in the chemical industry can be explained by several facts. lithuania is the only baltic state with oil refinery in mazeikiai. the presence of a large petrochemical plant contributed to the migration of skilled staff in the field of chemistry, and development of the following stages of the chemical industry. the accumulated potential with interest of russian companies in entering international markets and increasing production capacities abroad helped to attract russian capital in the lithuanian chemical industry. one of the first companies to have passed under the control of the russian company became the oil refinery in mazeikiai. more than a half of the company «mažeikių nafta» until 2006 belonged to the dutch subsidiary „yukos” “yukos international uk-bv”. however, after the bankruptcy of „yukos” oil refinery was sold to the polish orlen. originally, plant lifosa, located in kedainiai, and belonged to american company «cargill». ffter reducing prices for ammonium phosphate on the global market and crisis of the production in 2003, it came under the control of „eurochem”. now the modernization of plant is over, and the volume of production is about 1 mln. tons of phosphate fertilizers. since 2014, the company planned to switch completely to the karelian raw materials. the russian company for the production of plastic packaging „retal industries” owns two enterprises in lithuania: neo group and retal europe. capacity of plant neogroup is more than 300 thousand tons per year, and the products are exported mainly to western europe, scandinavia and the baltic states. as in the other baltic countries, „gazprom” is one of the largest shareholders of the main gas company of the country – „lietuvos dujos”. the lithuanian government was concerned about this fact, and in the middle of 2013 the company was separated in two: „lietuvos dujos” – selling gas and „amber grid” – gas transportation. „gazprom” received 37.1% of the new company, but it is possible to get all shares by the lithuanian government. according to analysts, there is a possibility of such an operation, while guaranteeing the uninterrupted supply of gas to the kaliningrad region and an end to litigation. inter rao is represented in lithuania by subsidiary interrao lietuva, engaged in the production and distribution of electricity. in 2007 inter rao bought the largest baltic wind power plant for 53 mln. dollars. this purchase caused by the desire to gain a foothold in the baltic market and the desire to demonstrate to the international community interest in the development of alternative energy. also in 2011, was signed an agreement for the sale electricity from currently under construction kaliningrad npp from 2017 to 2036 to the baltic states. this npp, as well as the agreement may be a barrier to the construction of visaginas npp. 3. summing up thus, because of analysis of the main indicators of russian investment activity in the baltic states, the following conclusions are: russia’s share in foreign trade is maximum in lithuania (30% of total imports of lithuania). lithuania is the only republic with trade deficit with russia, but in the next years may be trade surplus. russia is important, but not the main investment partner of the baltic states. absolute amounts of investment are growing, while the share of russia in tab. 6. top companies with russian capital in lithuania in 2014 № company subsidiary in lithuania sector capitalization (mln. euros) 6 eurochem lifosa production of mineral fertilizers 1417 10 gazprom lietuvos dujos gas transport 970 20 retal industries neo group production of plastic packaging 648 27 inter rao interrao lietuva producing and distribution of energy 396 36 retal industries retal europe production of plastic packaging 242 84 lukoil lukoil baltija oil products 111 source: gild100. russia’s role in the baltic states’ investment 75 different countries varies in different ways and, depending on the implementation of any project. structure of russian investments is different in all countries, but there is a general trend: in the structure of investment in all countries, especially in recent years, stand out investment in energy production and distribution and in the financial sector. major russian companies are not among the leaders by the volume of investments and capitalization. the main are swedish and other western european companies (swedbank ab invested in 2014 in latvia nearly 1 billion euros, transnefteproduct – 52 million). the main interest of russian business is different in every country: in estonia – transportation and storage, in latvia – the financial sector and the transportation of minerals, in lithuania – chemical industry and transportation of energy. russian companies are trying to use the profitability of the baltic ports and a convenient institutional environment for business. one of the geopolitical interests of the russian capital in the baltic states is to control the gas pipelines. in order to comply with the legislation and reduce the influence of “gazprom” current gas companies should be separated in two: company for gas sale and for gas transportation. this process has already taken place in lithuania and will take place in latvia and estonia. references eesti statistica, http://www.stat.ee/ [15.03.2015] eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ [15.03.2015] gild100, ranks the 100 most valuable estonian and lithuanian companies, http://www.gildcf.com/ [15.03.2015] latvijas statistika, http://www.csb.gov.lv/ [15.03.2015] lietuvos statisticos departamentas, http://www.stat.gov.lt/ [15.03.2015] lursoft data bases of enterprises, https://www.lursoft.lv [15.03.2015] unctad (united nations conference on trade and development), http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ [15.03.2015] 1. introduction the reforming process in the matter of the state registration of the rights on the estate property is taking place in ukraine. thus, the institute of registration of the rights on the estate property still remains the less researched in modern science. before the end of the 20th century the registration institute was in the process of the long-term development and was disordered and non systematic. and only beginning from the end of the xix century the state registration of the rights, objects and legal deed with the estate property were clearly distinguished. the characteristics of the main historic periods of the development of the systems of the state regulation in terms of the estate property are the object of the present article. 2. historical tools to protect the rights to land lots and to estate property (x–xvi centuries) we should agree with those scholars who believe that the origins of instruments for the protection of real property rights is the situation of the ancient customs and traditions aimed at providing security of land property from illegal encroachments by others. indeed, land property appeared much earlier than the property to the estate property objects that journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(1), 10–16 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.002.5251 the historical perspectives of the development of systems of state regulation of estate property in ukraine olga lietnieva political sciences and philosophy chair of kharkiv regional institute of public administration of national academy of public administration attached to the office of president of ukraine, moskovskiy 75, 61001 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: o.lietnieva@gmail.com citation lietnieva o., 2016, the historical perspectives of the development of systems of state regulation of estate property in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(1), 10–16. abstract the article is about the development of the legal regulation in the matter of the registration of law of estate on estate property beginning from the kyiyv rus times till nowadays. the registration of rights on estate property is a newish phenomenon for the majority of governance systems and whereas it was unmethodical and unsystematic before the early 20th century, in the beginning of the 20th century the state registration of rights, objects or transactions is complied as a fully functional institution. besides the main historic periods of development of the systems of legal regulation in the matter of the state registration of the rights on the estate property is reviewed. key words estate property, property, title to estate property, property rights, state registration. the historical perspectives of the development of systems of state regulation of estate property in ukraine 11 were built using human labor. it should be remembered the fact that for long time farming was considered as the only method of farm management and production that resulted in land wars and disputes on it. according to some sources the institute of mandatory registration of estate property (or preconditions for its appearance – from the author) existed in the i century bc in ancient egypt. besides, similar institutions were found in the organization of the society of american indians, the aztecs of precolumbian era (романюк, 2010). without resorting to in-depth analysis of the preconditions of the origin of the property on the land and instruments of protection of the relevant rights note that specific circumstances that were the impetus for the development of the public-enforcement mechanisms for the protection of property rights to estate property and in the construction of the system of land accounting are fixed rules of law, are obligatory normative character. on the territory of ukraine one of the first uniform acts, which regulated social relations was “rus’ka pravda”. the distinction between the concepts of “landed estate” and “tenure” in the x–xiii centuries by incorporating customary rules in the provisions of the “russkaya pravda” can be considered as a starting point in the regulation of relations in the sphere of turnover of the estate property, particularly land. one of the tasks of the “rus’ka pravda” was the protection of private property that was clearly from some of its provisions. in particular in article 71 of the prostorovoy pravdy, the destruction of property signs on the trees was fined in the amount of 12 uah that, in fact, meant the implementation and protection of the principle of the private property (мартинюк, 2007). in addition, a penalty in the same amount fixed in article 34 of the korotkaya pravda for the violation of the land limits. for comparison, the fine for stealing the knyaz’s horse was set at 3 uah (рубаник, 2002). in this regard, we can make two assumptions – either the right to the land property was under special protection in that time due to its status as an object of circulation, or, according to i. p. safronova and v. e. rubanok, such penalties were established for violations in the sphere of the tenure of the land, but only for those that were directed against the property rights of the knyaz (рубаник, 2002). the specifics of statutory regulation of property relations of land lots in kievan russia was the fact that the statements of the “rus’ka pravda” laid the foundation for the record of the land lots and the defense of rights of them, besides it also laid down the foundation for the formation of the institute of the state registration of the legal deeds as the rights on the estate property were verified by the princely credentials for a long time. due to the lack of the developed notions about the measurement of the land in the kievan russia and their fixation in relation to each other, we can assume that a clear accounting of kniazes and of other lands didn’t exist, and in fact could not exist, because in fact, until the xviii century on the territory of modern ukraine in the relations of the property acted in the different interpretations of the principle of “squatting” (мартинюк, 2007; slobodyanyuk, 2010). when a person, holding a certain social position had the right to process and use “abandoned” land rights had not been assigned to anyone (squattings – the development of vacant land by the slaves and dependent peasants; “okniazinia”, “oboyarenia” is the seizure of the land in the neighborhood local communities (рубаник, 2002). in this regard, if we assume that there was a certain order of registration of the lands in kievan russia, it was fairly conventional. in addition, in favor of the fact that such an order still existed is evidenced by the fact that one of the ways of acquiring ownership or other rights over the land in kievan russia was to receive the knyaz’s lands for its service and for the duty. such reception was accompanied by granting the person immunity – the rights to perform certain, independent of the direct will of the knyaz of action in this domain (рубаник, 2002). the above mentioned circumstances show that the knyaz had to take up their possessions in order to be able more or less accurately to divide them and to emit the member of a voluntary public order squador or the boyars for their special achievements before the knyaz, or to serve, for example, in the border regions. in this regard, the only possible way and the principle by which account is taken of the land was the principle benefits of ownership of the knyaz over the property of the other entities, i.e. everything that does not belong to anyone in particular belongs to the knyaz. the conventional way of the measuring land could be settlements, and in the era of feudal decentralization, patrimony, specific knyaz, boyar etc. a significant role in the development of the institute of state registration in turn of the estate property played statutory source of lithuanian-russian state and the polish-lithuanian commonwealth. the specific feature of the legal relations in xv–xvi centuries was the fact that the rights to the land lots in particular the title to estate property were regulated by the relevant party – the knyaz, counsil of messieurs etc. inspite of the way the land came into property – whether from the lands of the state, the knyaz or under agreement of the people. the documents confirmed the property rights to the land 12 olga lietnieva were the grand-ducal letters, the judicial decisions, written permissions, testaments as well as the letters to the on-duty estate property. for example, the lithuanian statute in the edition of 1566 established that if the owner wished to sell he owned estate property, he or by old custom is bound to be the grand knyaz of lithuania, or to the provincial government, to declare the disposition of property and to record this fact to zemsky books (мартинюк, 2007). this means that the lithuanian statute for the first time expressly established the necessity for mandatory confirmation of the ownership of the estate property to move into civil circulation (бойко, 2008; слободянюк, 2011). in our opinion, this moment should be considered as a clear description of the functions of the public authorities (speaking about a particular subject or body) in the regulation of the relations, the subject of which is estate property. if in the times of kievan rus it had an episodic form, with the development of mechanisms of the legal regulation of the social relations it emerges in a clear required by the state, what happened on the stage when the part of the modern territory of ukraine was part of the rech pospolita. we can say that in this period the quasimechanism of the state registration in the estate property turnover was formed, which has not yet been divided into registration of the object, rights or transactions. in addition, it is possible to distinguish two stages of the system development authorization (legalization) of the emergence and change of the ownership or other rights to land. the first stage, characterized by legitimizing the nature of the relevant actors – representatives of public authorities, and the lack of clear requirements regarding the establishment of boundaries of land ownership. for the second stage is characterized by the existence legtenberg nature of the relevant actors and the introduction of a clear mapping of the land boundaries, rights which arise or pass. in time the first stage existed before the middle xvcentury and the second from the mid-fifteenth century to mid sixteenth century (the time of liberation war) is continuous, and in principle up to the present time. 3. historical tools to protect the rights to land lots and to estate property in russian empire in xvii–xx centuries in the times of the russian empire when the part of modern ukraine was under its control the mechanism of estate property accountancy as well as the rights to it were formed almost as they are in nowadays. by the way such significant act for ukraine as “the rights using to juge the little russian (ukraininan) people” (1743 year) clearly defined the procedure of granting the force of legal deed for passing the estate property in the property. the provisions of the chapter 14 of this regulatory legal act defined the obligation of the parties to real estate transactions, contact the local authorities to make inscriptions in the books, by the alienation of immovable property. in particular, if the owner was willing to alienate its immovable property, he had first write a letter of the assignment of the property in the presence of and signed by two or three witnesses (respectable citizens). after that, the owner needs to come to the local authority and in the presence of officials to disclose the contents of the letter. officials had to check the legality of ownership and when there were no reasons that prevent making appropriate entries in the books, then made their contents the text of the letter. according to the results of the entries of the corresponding book was published extract with the print of authorized persons. deviation from this procedure caused a consequence in the form of the impossibility of further alienation of the estate property by the new owner (мартинюк, 2007). legally this meant that the failure to comply with public law the registration procedure caused the consequence in the form of the non-recognition by the state of the fact of the transfer of rights, and therefore their occurrence from the new owner in the connection with the relevant transaction was one that was made. this mandatory mechanism indicates the direct interference of the state in the administration processes in the sphere of turnover of the immovable property and rights and legitimate interests of the parties to the transaction. in the aspect of the reporting provisions of the legislation of the epoch of the russian empire, it was impossible to assert whether the right or the legal deed was subject to registration. most probably, it was registration of act and right to be certified. the positive point of such registration is the possibility to keep a record of the estate property that is in the turnover and also the storage of the history of the legal fate of the relevant land lots. the parties who arranged the relevant actions were the public persons of self-governing authorities. in general, we cannot say that the institution of the state registration in the estate property circulation of the left-bank ukraine was formed under a powerful influence of laws of the russian empire, at least until the early eighteenth century. in support of this conclusion is evidenced by the fact that the public authority in the territory of ukraine before the signing of the “march articles” (1654) used the state the historical perspectives of the development of systems of state regulation of estate property in ukraine 13 registration to administer the real estate. in this regard, the institution of registration on the territory of ukraine was developing its own power. is that because in the organization of the life of the cossack society has not found distribution legal act as a source of the regulation of the social relations, they were guided by customs, and therefore the question of fixing of the rights on the land are not very acute, especially bearing in mind the principles of “free conduct” which did not envisage the need for the strict regulation of property relations. in addition, as noted in her dissertation, v. v. senchuk, the tumultuous events of the liberation war (1648–1654 years from the author) led to the complete destruction of the existing system of the land tenure (сенчук, 2009). at the same time, after the authorities of the hetmanate, it was established in accordance with the “march articles” how public education has been forced to devote attention to the organization of management of various spheres of the public life in their territories in connection with the accounting of the land was put on the hetman’s administration (мартинюк, 2007), which performed the functions of registration of the rights to the land, certification of transactions, checking the legality of the ownership of the real estate. in common practice those days, the appropriate entries are reflected in the various books. as for the right-bank ukraine, on its territory for political reasons these laws were those of the austrian empire, which also assumed the existence of the institute of the state registration. in particular, article 321 of the civil code of the austrian empire of 1811 it was assumed that legitimate possession of the property right over real estate is acquired only through proper registration in the public books. moreover, according to the article 431 of the code specified for the transfer of the ownership of the immovable property, the acquisition must be made in public for his books (романюк, 2008). the fact is, as noted in their study, v. v. senchuk (сенчук, 2009), the so -called “teresian cadastre” was introduced in austria-hungary in 1751, and subsequently appeared the classic “phreatic” (“land”) books. however, perfect and correct idea underlying the registration of the rights to real property, worked well in germany, but in ukraine it was completely discredited by the technical deficiencies in the maintenance of the current registration. the low level of the reliability and accuracy of the initial registration resulted in the fact that over time, it became impossible to use the phreatic books with reference to this the law of december 11, 1906 was provided for the introduction of the new books for the actual condition of the property, however, continuous improvement and state registration of peasant land ownership was halted by the first world war (сенчук, 2009). returning and concluding the consideration of the question of the state registration of rights to estate property during the stay of the ukrainian lands under the influence of the russian empire, it should be noted that with the final dissolution of the autonomy of ukraine the legal impact of the empire got empowerment on its territory. in connection with this the system of the registration of the rights on the estate property adopted the traits of imperial analogue. on the territory of modern russian federation the system was well-developed. from the end of xv century (the time of the acquisition of property during conquest by ivan the terrible), first locally and then in the general system, there started “pistceva books” – the acts of economic and financial description of the land relating to all counties of the cottages and mills, with an indication of the tracts, wetlands, settlements and other household supplies every possession. pistceva book also served as a legal certificate of the ownership, found the clerk in this or that area, but not postul rights that could exist without the reflections in this book even though in pistceva book was looking for the information about an estate property object (description of the component parts of a city or a county) and about who or what right (private or state) has the relevant estate property (победоносцев, 2004). “pistceva book” was the prototype of the modern land cadastre, whose main purpose is, first of all, the registration of the land, rights to them. although, at the same time, modern inventories are combined, and therefore they may contain information about the estate property objects and rights to them (дьоміна, 2012). in addition to cadastre there were also watch books and correction books that contained the additions and corrections that were made with the former description to align the changes that have taken place in a particular locality and their rights to appropriate real property. buildings and abatis books were made to build cities, jail or bins in the wild steppes. they were described as constructed buildings and structures and land transferred to the serving men. boundary books describing the boundaries of the land holdings, sometimes with the measurements lands of its borders – in such cases, the book is called dimensional (победоносцев, 2004). since the xv century the functions of the registration of the land lots and conducting the registration of the changes of the feudal tenure were carried out by the local izba (история…, 2013). later, in the reign of ivan iv the “order system” was formed as the registration of the rights to estate 14 olga lietnieva property (сенчук, 2009) according to which it was the obligation to produce bills of sale in the orders normatively, where it was recorded in the book of order and from that moment the person became the owner of the property. till the xvii century, any transaction for the sale of real property recorded in the book of order (история…, 2013), which was the name of pistceva book (сенчук, 2009). in 1719 peter i has created in at justice college “office fortress” (house fortress affairs), and in 1721 was created by the central government authority – patrimonial board, which together with fortified office was in charge of the land tenure issues and land boundary surveys. under catherine ii the functions of the registration of liens transferred to provincial authorities. instead of house fortress affairs functions of making acts of the fortress was entrusted to the civil chamber and the district courts, under which are organized the institutions of the fortress of cases (история…, 2013). with the adoption of the emperor alexander i “regulation on notarial part”, dated 14 april 1866 as a logical continuation of the sobornoye ulozheniye “code of laws of the russian state” in 1649 (ахмадгазизов, 2008; сенчук, 2009), in capitals, provincial cities and, if necessary, in the provincial towns were the posts of notaries, which is entrusted with the registration of transactions. on the level with modern notari notaries since 1866 checked the encumbrances on the estate property, certified to the transaction and thus provided them legal force. the base of patrimonial rights is not implemented. the when was the moment of making appropriate entries in the registry (сенчук, 2009). 4. historical tools to protect the rights to land lots and to estate property during soviet and post-soviet period (xx–xxi centuries) as for contemporary times, pointed by y. m. romaniuk (романюк, 2010), during soviet period the special regime system of consolidation of rights to estate property was abolished. private land property and the possibility of its passing from one person to another were forbidden. the reason was the social ideology that denied the private property on production means among them on land, and also due to social collectivization as a result of introduction this ideology to life. at the same time, the system of the registration of the estate property has intensified significantly in the connection with the beginning of the twentieth century the functions of such accounting was endowed with the nkvd, and then they gradually shifted to the people’s commissariat of agriculture of the rsfsr. on the 21st of may 1927 at the meeting of the economic rsfsr “on approval of the inventory of the property of local councils” the regulation was adopted. the features inventory and registration of the estate property agencies got technical inventory, which initially acted within the nkvd, and later – at the people’s commissariat of national economy of the rsfsr. according to the decree of the council of ministers of the ussr from 10th of february 1985 no. 136 “on the procedure of state registration of the housing fund” the bureau of technical inventory carried out registration and technical inventory of the housing stock in the country. according to the council of ministers on february 10, 1985 № 136 “on the procedure for the state registration of housing stock” the bureau of technical inventory registers and make technical inventory of housing stock in the country. it should be noted that the provisions of the civil code of the ukrainian ssr, in particular article 227 the preconditions for the development of the institute of registration of transactions were formed, as in accordance with contracts of sale and purchase of the residential houses subject to registration in the executive committee of local council of people’s deputies (цивільний кодекс української рср, 1963). with the independence of ukraine and delineating the patterns of development of the country in 2004 it was adopted the law of ukraine “on the state registration of in rem rights to the estate property and their restrictions”. the law laid foundations in regulation of relations within the state registration of in rem rights to estate property, specified a new structure of the bodies that have to exercise functions, fixed the distinctions of the information part of the implementation of the state registration. however, paragraph 5 of section v “final and transitional provisions” of the above law was clearly established that before creation of uniform system of registration and before the formation of the state register of rights to estate property and their limitations in the composition of the state land cadastre registration of the real estate objects is carried out by utilities bureau of technical inventory (про державну реєстрацію речових прав на нерухоме майно та їх обтяжень: закон україни, 2004). in connection with a number of organizational and economic obstacles to implement the act fully failed in this connection to 1st of january 2013 the state registration of the land lots and rights to them were carried out by the territorial bodies of the state committee of the land resources authorities (since 2010 the state agency for land resources). the state registration of rights to estate property artificially the historical perspectives of the development of systems of state regulation of estate property in ukraine 15 created bureau of technical inventory and state registration of transactions and encumbrance of the rights to estate property – notaries. registration of artificially created objects of immovable property as a single procedure for the registration or administrative procedure was not carried out. the first of january is considered to be the start of the new system of state registration to the estate property and its encumbrance. 5. summary summarizing the abovementioned, it is possible to define some features of the historical development of the institute of state registration of in rem rights to estate property in ukraine. firstly, the state registration within the turnover of the estate property and the role of the public authority in managing of the origin, passing and termination of the rights to estate property is the essential part of the legal status of the estate property units and its turnover. almost with the origin of property relations and the emergence of the estate property rights, particularly on the land of public education in the form of genera, tribes, communities or public education used a different kind of custom or the legal instruments for the protection of the real property rights, what then can be considered the prototype of the modern registration of the real property rights or the legal actions with estate property. secondly, up to the end of the 19th the registration institute has been developing for a long period of time without any system. particularly, there was no due division on rights registration, estate property units or the documents on estate property, but at the same time the legal nature of the registration had high-profile legitimist character, i.e. it was directed to provide legal force to the definite facts of reality. and only in the end of xix century the state registration of rights, lots and legal deeds were strictly delimited. thirdly, during all this historical period of development of institute of state registration in turnover of the estate property on the territory of today’s ukraine, the registration functions were executed by the self-governing bodies or by the government authorities. at the same time, the trends of the late xix century and in the modern conditions, the priority of the registration is provided to the government authorities. today this practice is prevalent in the most countries of the world testifies to its effectiveness and prospects of the development. fourthly, before the beginning of the xx century the process of the one type record of estate property was duly delinked, because the information about the land lots could appear in several record books simultaneously, i.e. the record was non systematic. only in the beginning of the xx century when passing to the new economic structure the state monopoly on the production means including on land made the background for the centralized record keeping of estate property, without registration of rights to it or to legal deeds at all. moreover, one should pay attention that, as noted above, the state registration of rights to estate property is a relatively new phenomenon for the most legal systems, and if at the beginning of the 20th century, it had a chaotic and unsystematic nature, since the beginning of the xx century the worldwide state registration of the rights, objects or transactions begins to form as a full-fledged institute. this proves the fact that in the country where the lawyer takes part in almost all of the least important from a legal point of view the processes – england, compulsory registration of real property was stipulated by the act on registration of land of 1925 (martin, 2003). references ахмадгазизов и., 2008, о государственной регистрации вещных прав на недвижимость при их переходе, хозяйство и право, 11, 124–128. бойко і., 2009, формування та функціонування інституту права власності у галичині в складі польського королівства (1349–1569), вісник львівського університету, 48, 32–38. дьоміна о. 2012, до питання державної реєстрації земельної ділянки (в аспекті реформування інституту державної реєстрації речових прав на нерухоме майно та їх обтяжень), часопис цивільного і кримінального судочинства, 2, 98–104. история государственной регистрации прав на недвижимо имущество и сделок с ним, http://av-ue.ru/just. php?d=hist_grp.htm [22.05.2016] мартинюк о., 2007, еволюція правового регулювання державної реєстрації речових прав на нерухоме майно в україні (x – xviii ст.), держава і право: серія: юридичні і політичні науки, 36, 146–152. победоносцев к., 2004, курс гражданского права : первая часть вотчинные права, издательство “статут”, москва. закон україни від 01 липня 2004 року № 1952–iv про державну реєстрацію речових прав на нерухоме майно та їх обтяжень (зі змінами), 2004, відомості верховної ради україни, № 51, 553. романюк я., 2010, державна реєстрація правочинів: її суть та правове значення, вісник верховного суду україни, № 5 (117), 40 – 46. 16 olga lietnieva рубаник в., 2002, інститут права власності в україні: проблеми зародження, становлення й розвитку від найдавніших часів до 1917 року: історико-правове дослідження, видавництво “легас”, харків. сенчук в., 2009, правове забезпечення реєстрації нерухомого майна та прав на нього в україні: історико-правовий аналіз, інститут законодавства верховної ради україни, київ. слободянюк с., 2011, окремі аспекти становлення та розвитку інституту державної реєстрації речових прав в  україні, приватне право і підприємництво: збірник наукових праць, 10, 66–69. цивільний кодекс української рср (зі змінами), 1963, відомості верховної ради україни, № 30, 463. martin e. a., 2003, a dictionary of law, cambridge university press, cambridge. 1. introduction competitiveness is important economic category, which is considered at different spheres and different levels. competitiveness in the tourism industry has fundamental differences, related to functions, which tourism industry enterprises perform, to place of their activity, to market size with tourism enterprises being oriented at it, to specific service sphere features, where competitive struggle is of particular tension. the necessity of creation of competitive tourism product at home market and world markets is indicated in the concept of development of tourism to 2022 (розпорядження кабінету міністрів …, 2013), and is regarded as one of the factors ensuring integrated regional development. research of competitiveness in the tourism industry is based on a strategic approach and is closely associated with notions of competitiveness of the tourism product, tourism enterprises, marketing of destinations, strategies of competition of tourism enterprises and destinations. strategic approach to tourism development should be directly consistent to the project approach, which allows converting strategic plan into specific projects and programs of territory development. journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(2), 7–18 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.007.5163 competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision arthur levytskyy admission department, odessa regional institute of public administration, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, genyez’ka 22, 65009 odessa, ukraine citation levytskyy a., 2015, competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(2), 7–18. abstract the analysis of main components of ukrainian tourism competitiveness showed the necessity of forming of effective strategically-oriented public policy in this sphere. the most effective means of its implementation is to use competitive strategies based on a combination of strategic and project approach. the basis of its formation is quantitative evaluation of competitiveness in tourism that at the micro level is based on the analysis of two main facilities: tourism product and tourism organization. marketing approach to destination, which provides the elaboration of complex tourism product, is considered. the activities of management and marketing of destinations are considered as integrity of strategic, project and operational activities. the article proves the necessity of using the project approach, which enables to convert strategic plan into specific goals and programs of territory development. key words competitiveness, tourism product, tourism organization competitive strategies, tourism enterprises, marketing of destinations, project approach. 8 arthur levytskyy 2. the competitiveness of tourism market of ukraine the concept of “competitiveness” reflects potential capabilities of subject to function effectively in comparison with other market players in a competitive environment. the competitiveness of the tourism market is considered in three aspects: the competitiveness of the tourism industry, the competitiveness of the tourism enterprises and the competitiveness of tourism product. a positive feature of the definition that is advisable to consider when interpreting the essential characteristics of the competitiveness of the tourism industry, is the prospect of its provision with using the competitive advantages in components of the system of knowledge, abilities and skills – formation of modern competitive strategy based on competence. yu. mihuschenko (мігущенко, 2013) understands the competitiveness in the tourism industry as the ability of enterprises involved in the creation and implementation of tourist services, to resist competition in the dynamic changes in the domestic and international markets while effective using the endogenous competitive advantages of its internal environment and exogenous influence in order to maximize customer satisfaction of tourism products (services) and to make profit. evaluation of static or dynamic competitiveness of tourism industry in order to justify priorities and strategic measures of its strengthening needs the development of multilevel technique , which would generalize most used methodical approaches at different levels in the sequence of several stages – preparatory, analytical and resulting. one of the methods of diagnosis of tourism industry development at the national level is to study the internal and external environment using swot-analysis. swotanalysis of the competitiveness of the tourism market of ukraine (фролова, 2015) showed that the future development of tourism in the country should be based on the following components: investment and innovation in the tourism and hotel industry; reorganization of transportation services; training of qualified personnel; normalization of political, economic and legislative climate; informational communication. tourism and travel competitiveness index (ttci), developed by the world economic forum (geneva, switzerland), assesses the factors and policies that promote the development of tourism sector in one country (the travel & tourism …, 2013). the annual rating research conducted from 2007 to 2009 and from 2010 studies are conducted every two years. ukraine is included in the study since 2007. according to the tourism and travel competitiveness index in 2013, ukraine was able to improve the global competitiveness of this sector, rising by 2 years to 9 positions in the ranking of 140 countries. unfortunately, in 2015 ukraine missed a rating of attractive tourist countries. ukraine in the ranking in 2013 has been assessed at 3.98 points out of seven possible and took 76th place in the ranking of 140 countries. this is the highest place that ukraine occupied during the period of calculation of the index, however, this result says more about the renovation of the lost positions after the crisis (respectively 78th and 77th place in 2007 and 2008). one of the reasons of low competitiveness of the tourism sector in ukraine is that it is outside the priority agenda of the government (126th in the world). the relative size of budget funds allocated for the development of the sector, is not inferior to world leaders (38th), indicating a lack of efficient use of these funds. despite the resource provision of ukraine, unfortunately, it cannot compete with developed tourist states. the only way to solve this problem – is to form a solid, strategically-oriented state policy, whose main task would be really identify tourism as one of the main priorities of the state, to create a strong authority to manage tourism development, to implement proven worldwide economic mechanisms of successful conduct of tourism business and encourage investors to invest in tourism infrastructure in ukraine. today there is a trend of transformation of the international tourism market – the market of manufacturers, it turns into a market of consumers. competition not only between enterprises of the tourism industry, but also between countries and local destinations is exacerbated. 3. the key factors of competitiveness of tourism product at the standpoint of manufacturer tourism product is a combination of a quantity and quality of products and services predominantly recreational character prepared in the very time for the implementation for specific customers and fixed in tour program. for consumers, the tourism product (potential demand) – is an abstract product, consisting of benefits, the sources of which are in the nature (climate) in the material (buildings, infrastructure, goods of tourist destination) and immaterial (services, social environment) form which is offered on the market and the potential opportunity for its acquisition and consumption exists. competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision 9 combining all of these benefits in one notion is an objective necessity, because the consumer cannot meet their diverse needs in restoring vitality only by one type of tourism goods or services, but only in the complex, and thus in a certain place and a certain atmosphere. clearly, consumers are interested in the basic conditions of travel, his safety, comfort degree that is realized through the level of completeness and quality of services and goods. the impressions that the consumer gets from expected and seen historical monuments, the beauty of the natural environment, traditions, culture and life of local people, etc. remain the main factor of satisfaction (мігущенко, 2013). considering the content that is embedded in the product concept that is offered and implemented by tourism enterprises and consumed by tourist we may assert that the proposal of tourism product in terms of developed market relations has dual nature, and accordingly, description: economic and marketing. the totality of travel products from an economic point of view is represented in the international document on statistics “tourism satellite account” (art), which is developed by the un on the position of demand (tourism satellite account …, 2001). typical tourism products art include services of temporary accommodation, drinks and food, passenger transport services, travel agents, tour operators and tourist guide services in the field of culture, recreation and entertainment, and other services (financial and insurance, rental of tourist goods and services). characteristics of the tourism product from the marketing point of view can have several approaches. one of them may be based on the classification of the resources represented in the report of the wto (сенин, 1999), in which resources are divided into seven specific groups: natural resources; energy wealth; “human factor”, which is considered in terms of demographics data, living conditions, habits and preferences of the population in relation to tourism and in terms of data on various aspects of culture; institutional, political, legal and administrative aspects; social aspects, particularly the social structure of the country, popular participation in government, the relationship between working time and leisure time, the presence of paid holidays, traditions and level of education, health and recreation; various goods and services, transport and equipment that form infrastructure of recreation and leisure areas; economic and financial activities. therefore, the competitiveness of the tourism product is caused by a synergistic combination of economic and marketing component, in the proportion of price and quality “impression” as integral characteristics that is defined as its advantage over another product that is similar to destination or its substitute while the potential buyer satisfies his needs. however, keep in mind that for assessing the quality of the tourist product there is no real measurement values. in this regard there are areas of concern to identify and evaluate the competitiveness of the tourism product: • how to assess the level of quality and customer value of tourism product; • how to define an objective basis for tourism product price; • how to determine the competitive advantages of the tourist product. considering that the basis for the competitiveness of the tourism product is the quality of its provision to consumer one should stress the lack of a complete system of standardization activities in the tourism sector. we note that harmonization of standards in tourism is a must according to the signed agreement on association between ukraine and the european union. to fulfill this task in march 2015 an order was issued by the cabinet of ministers of ukraine “on approval of the prepared by the ministry of infrastructure plan on implementing the eu council directive of 13 june 1990 90/314 / eec of organized tourist travels and leisure with a full range of services and comprehensive tour”. according to the plan of implementation in june 2015 it was planned to make a list of defined standards to national standards development plan for 2016–2017, and in december 2017 to adopt act on the introduction of the standards that stipulate requirements for travel services provided within countries (розпорядження кабінету міністрів …, 2015): a) services to provide transport service; b) services of hotels and other tourist accommodation; c) conditions for the organization of tourist services; d) requirements for the camps, recreation centers; e) services of ecotourism; f ) tourist and excursions services and language support; g) security of life and health of tourists; h) informing consumers of tourism services; i) services for consumers with limited physical capabilities; j) other services. implementation the work in a technical regulation area of tourism will ensure the compliance of commitments taken by ukraine to eu countries, will provide domestic tourist products with european level of quality and will improve the country’s image in the international arena. 10 arthur levytskyy for an objective assessment of the competitiveness of the tourism product one should use criteria, which consumer operates, first of all, one should determine the range of parameters to be analysis, and is significant from a consumer perspective. criteria of competitiveness of tourism product include competitiveness of the product itself and competitiveness of an offer and providing product. 1. the first criterion – competitiveness of products – describe indicators such as assortment, price and quality of the product (лойко, 2005): 1.1. assortment – is ordered set of tourism products by a certain characteristics that are a set of products, their species and varieties, grouped according to certain criteria. 1.2. the tourist product price characterizes consumer spending for the purchase of the tour and depend on the price of transportation and distance to the subject of a tourist destination, how many stars the hotel has and location of hotel, sales volume, the currency of payment, the duration and nature of business relations with clients, the firm’s image and more. 1.3. product quality is regarded as its ability to meet the specific needs of prospective customers. the quality of the tourism product involves not only the comfort and convenience of accommodation, food and motor transport service, but also the attractiveness of tourism resources. 2. the second criterion – competitiveness of offers and providing product – characterize the indicators of service mode of the tourist site, the average time of service, environment care, qualification and skills staff (шахова, 2014): 2.1. the form of service – a way to take order for the tour and its providing to consumers. by individual indicators characterizing the form of services we can include: the availability of direct contact with service, customers’ time savings, saving of firm resources. 2.2. operating mode of tourism enterprises – is astronomical and calendar time at which services are offered. depending on the specific conditions in one case one use optimally distributed one-shift mode, taking into account consumers’ free time, and the in the second case – the extended, two-shift and three shifts working day. 2.3. time of service – the time from taking to performing the order. since the implementation of services in tourism enterprises (during the execution of documents, making payments on the tour, etc.), hotels (at the time of checkin, guests settlement), restaurant industry institutions, trade (during the calculation) the satisfaction of consumers depends at most on implementation of services. 2.4. environment service, which includes external design, state of maintenance and environment of tourist enterprise and is characterized by indicators that assess the exterior (facade design, the availability of signboard, advertising design stands) and interior enterprises (size, furnishings, maintaining order and cleanliness in reception hall and at personnel workplace). 2.5. compliance with the requirements to the exterior and staff. constant communication with customers makes special demands on corporate clothes, physique face, hair, attractiveness, personal care, moves and facial expressions, that everything that can be attributed to the appearance of employees. no less important are staff and relationships with customers, their professional skills and qualifications, mannerisms, way of servicing operations. thus the main parameters to assess the quality and customer value of tourism products include indicators that determine the technical, functional and ethical quality of certain services and integrated tourism product and indicators of their public-necessary costs. through the use of a differentiated approach to the criteria and parameters of assessing the quality of tourism product grounds for the answers to a number of topical issues, including on achieving the planned level of competitiveness of tourism product as a whole are created; identifying specific parameters that have not been achieved in the process provision of tourist services; singling out those parameters which have the largest difference on the qualitative sample offered or provided tourism services. this approach to determining the degree of approximation to the qualitative standard rate should be a reference model for the future application of the relevant criteria for assessing the quality of services or individual product when determining the appropriate price, i.e. be the main element segment of pricing and competitiveness in the market of high-quality tourist services, and further – image component of the tourism product. competitive advantages of the integrated tourism product characteristic “price-quality” must be supported by a system of values that is created as a result of the work of tourism enterprises. creating a system of values can be considered the defining feature of tourist enterprise in terms of its competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision 11 competitiveness both on domestic and international tourism market. thus, the tourism product as the product is characterized by the consumer cost that is utility or the ability to meet the very recreational needs of specific people. the usefulness of the tourism product is determined by its value to the consumer. accordingly, the travel company (tour operator) seeks to create a tourism product that would be most valuable to more people. competitive power of suppliers in the tourism sector is determined by the possibility and the cost in changing the supplier of components of the tourist product or services (transport, insurance company, excursion organization, accommodation and catering facilities, etc.). suppliers are able to show market power above the participants in tourism industry threatening by increasing prices or reducing the quality of the products and services provided. competitive strength is determined by consumer demand, which they form due to their needs and expectations. precisely them, in full accordance with certain conditions the travel company must satisfy. if the buyer has information about the supply and demand of tourism products, the actual market prices and alternative products or services, existing competitors, it gives him more opportunities to get a reasonable price compared to others. considering the competitive forces discussed above, we can establish that the criteria for determining the competitiveness of the tourism enterprises are competitiveness of products (services). in turn, competitiveness of the tourism product depends on two groups of factors: external those are independent of the company, and internal, which depend on the enterprise (мігущенко, 2013). the external factors may include: the image and reputation of the country; customs policy; state tax policy; the price of goods of services; currency fluctuations; political system. the internal factors: the company’s reputation, experience; circle of business partners (hotels and tour operators, insurance and transportation companies); terms of the contract for travel services; the reliability of the company to provide services that are included in the tourism product on time and in full; the possibility of acquiring a loan tourism product; the level of complexity and individuality of tourism product; channel strategy and sales. 4. competitive strategies of tourism enterprises the competitiveness of tourism enterprises – a general characteristic of viability, due to the efficiency of use of available resources, the ability to provide attractive on price and non-price characteristics of tourist services, the ability to adapt to dynamic changes in the competitive environment (гаврилюк, 2006). the competitiveness of tourism enterprise can be assessed by comparing the most important criteria, summarizing the results of the company in terms of establishing a system of values, namely: • indicators of competitiveness of comprehensive tourism product; • share of the enterprise on the tourism market and its dynamics; • stable position on the market; • the size of a functioning capital and return on equity that characterize the financial capabilities of the company and effectiveness of capital using; • qualification of personnel structure and stability of the company; • hr organizational structure. the analysis of competitors and the development of specific actions against main rivals often do more good than real growth in this market segment. knowing the strengths and weaknesses of competitors, we can estimate their potential, objectives, present and future strategy. this will allow the company to expand its own advantages in the competition (фатхундинов, 2000). accordingly, development of the strategy – is also an element of competition. competitive strategy – is a way to get sustainable competitive advantage in each strategic business area of enterprise by competitive struggle, meet the diverse and changing needs of customers better than competitors do. in the activities of tourism enterprises different competitive strategies based on certain conditions are used: the presence of competitive advantages, the type of competition in the market, the nature of demand for tourist services, the size of the market share, the nature of tourist services, the level of expenses; price range and quality of products, the costs of innovation. use of competitive strategy relevant to certain conjunctual conditions is one of the measures of sustainable business position in changing market conditions. the effectiveness of competitive strategy depends on the level of competitiveness of the enterprise. considering that the competition strategy is primarily focused on the formation of its own market space, inaccessible to most competitors, the main task of enterprise is to use effectively competitive advantages to create a new (additional) consumer value. to achieve this goal a competitive strategy should be developed for a particular method that the will ensure accountability and controllability of internal competitive factors: information, resource, 12 arthur levytskyy financial, technical and technological, marketing, organizational and structural. the combination of these factors is a component of the internal functional areas of creating competitive advantages. the development of competitive strategies is a key element of strategic planning of development and activities of tourism enterprise in unpredictable changes in external and internal environment. the application of strategic management technologies creates opportunities for sustainable development of tourism industry businesses, improvement their activities, preservation and development of competitive advantages in the long term in a dynamic development of tourism field. traditionally it is decided to consider four basic competitive strategies: cost leadership, differentiation, focus (porter, 2005) and early market entry. the strategy of leadership in costs, which requires advantages by setting lower than the competition, the level of prices due to minimization of costs through mass production of standardized services, suggests that consumer bases his choice on the basis of price, which leads to the random nature of demand and the inability to attract tourists who spend a lot. currently, a similar approach (based essentially on ford models of production) in the developed countries in regard to tourism is regarded as hopeless as its implementation is contrary to trends in demand towards individualization (евдокимов, 2008). the advantage in cost, based on mass production and consumption, suggests unlimited extension of production capacity, which is unacceptable in the tourism industry. combined with the seasonality of tourism this determines the instability of the industry, generates demand peaks that create an excessive burden on destinations and deplete its natural and sociocultural resources. in modern terms a priority for the tourism industry of developed in tourism way countries becomes differentiation strategy is based on achieving competitive advantage through unique, specificity of created tourism product and provides no focus on the power flow but the quality of the product. as a means of differentiation tourist services may be considered: expanding the range of services provided; an individual approach to customers; improve service; offer specific services. today many organizations of the tourism industry in ukraine insufficiently appreciate promising strategy of differentiation, the system of measures to ensure the highest level of quality is implemented not fully. a lot of what this situation is caused by unsatisfactory state of tourism infrastructure, including underdeveloped transport infrastructure, worn but very expensive hotel fund for consumers and the poor quality of service. the deficit in most regions of ukraine qualitative hotel funds is one of the most urgent problems of the industry. the focus strategy involves concentration on a small target group of consumers, a special orientation of the company specializing in serving certain preferred market segments, providing an exceptional level of service. the examples of realization of focus strategy in the hotel industry can serve as mini-hotels, congress-hotels, hostels, motels, spa hotels, etc., focused on placing of certain categories of customers. in ukraine, the benefits of using a focus strategy are not fully implemented. it is necessary for further development of specialized types of tourism (religious, cruise, cutter and yacht and others) and expanding the network of specific accommodation facilities (such as hostels, motels, congress-hotels). the strategy of early market entry (pioneer) suggests a tour operator or travel agent to offer a radically new tour, providing some original hotel services, opening new unusual destinations or innovative trends in tourism. for enterprises of the domestic tourism industry initiatives of developing innovative products and use the same pioneering strategies are not widespread. the offers of traditional options of tourist services prevail. this is a prime example of odessa – event tourism – yumorina, film festival, jazz festival, gastronomic festival, festival tourism, etc. however, for the bringing the new products to the market requires substantial support of regional and local authorities, product development within the inter-regional programs, the main objectives of which is to increase entry tourist flow and leveling of seasonality by increasing interest in the ukrainian destinations as a whole under further development cultural and educational tourism. thus, within the strategic management of domestic enterprises of the tourism industry the priority options of strategic development should be focusing on the issues of quality of service within a comprehensive transition to a strategy of differentiation, providing strategic advantages through greater use of certain areas of the focus strategy and also the offer of innovative travel programs as an option of effective realization of pioneer strategy. thus, for the effective implementation of these policies the support of all levels of government is necessary, involving improvement of the legal and regulatory framework governing the various areas of tourism and comprehensive development of tourism infrastructure, which requires, in turn, significant investments. the situation in the tourism market is adjustable in three ways: to initiate changes in demand via the formation of corresponding proposals; to change competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision 13 the size and structure of commodity offer due to changes in rates and structure of demand; to affect simultaneously supply and demand in the tourism market to achieve goals. business activity of tourism enterprises is focused on meeting market demand. for this purpose one solves the problem of finding target markets, development of products with new consumer properties by their market positioning. in conditions of growing competition, increasing demand both in international and domestic tourism products, increasing consumer demands to filling, diversity and quality of tourism services the development of scientifically based marketing strategy is becoming increasingly important for tourism activity subjects. the marketing strategy is the basis of tourism enterprise market activities. it helps to optimize its internal environment and provides advantages in competition, achieved by providing the range of products (services), which more fully meet customers’ high level of service and guise of psychology and behaviour of consumer through the use of motifs belonging, mode of expression, preferences and knowledge (кулєшова, 2007). stable functioning of tourism enterprise in the market is determined not so much by its size, price, quality or breadth of the range of services but by the advantage of the set of these indicators compared to other companies that provide similar services. it acts as an indicator of competitiveness of an enterprise choice of marketing strategy for its development in the tourist market. in addition, the very selected development marketing strategy by the tourism enterprise determines its positioning in the competitive environment in the services market. 5. the marketing of tourism destination considering the competitiveness of the regional tourism product, special attention should be paid to the marketing of tourist areas. marketing of tourist areas is very specific because it is determined, first, the nature of the tourism product, and secondly, the peculiarities of each tourism region. in its turn the development level of tourism in the region depends on the development of the region and the state as a whole. tourism in relation to the regional development performs marketing functions as it helps to identify, to maximize and to meet the demand for regional products. ph. kotler, k. asplund, i. rein, d. haider first drew attention to tourism, when gave a definition of marketing areas as entrepreneurial activities undertaken to create, maintain or change relationships and / or behavior relating to specific places. in his four aspect marketing model of areas he especially identifies a particular concept of marketing – marketing of resting places that aims at attracting visitors and tourists to the resorts in the cities and countries (kotler et al., 2007). through the introduction of the marketing ideas into the tourist activity, its destination has become the concept, having formed the direction of activity – marketing of destinations in the following aspects: definition, formation and forecasting destinations; analysis of the behavior and motives of consumers in various tourist destinations; assessment of destinations attractiveness for investors, public and tourists; promotion destinations (зорин, 2009). the ability prevail in the tourism space by assigning scarce of tourist benefits – is the basis of competitive of destinations. competition between destinations is on the tourist flows, which requires investments that provide competitive advantage to destinations in increasing accessibility. big tourism companies consider accessibility of destinations as one of the most important components of the struggle for the consumer market and its competitive advantage. investing in accessibility now provides serious benefits. for this purpose, principles and methods of market segmentation, aimed at identifying potential consumer groups of specific tourism product are used. increasing importance in the struggle for accessibility acquires logistics – planning, monitoring and control of operations carried out in the process of the tour, delivering travelers to destinations with minimal costs for the fullest satisfaction of individual needs of tourists. many travel companies are considering their competence in logistics as a key strategic resource to support the lifecycle destinations. another factor for the competition of destinations for physical space acts habitus, which is understood as a place of comfortable life, cultural communication and social capitalization. habitus – is a beginning that generates, unifies and brings their internal and relational characteristics of any position in a single lifestyle, a single ensemble of choosing of people, goods and practices (bourdieu, 1994). as a result one and the same destination or the same benefit of the destination may seem subtle for one, ambitious or “bizarre” for other and vulgar to third. due to the fact that tourists cannot meet their recreational needs outside and independent of destinations (which are necessary conditions and prerequisites of tourism itself ), tourists as social agents can operate only “inside” the existing destinations and, thus, only reproduce or transform them. hence, marketing of destinations – are activities aimed at creating the best conditions to meet 14 arthur levytskyy the recreational needs of tourists, changing not only their motivation, but the entire system of spiritual guidance and human values. at the core of management system of competitiveness of tourist destination – is a qualitative tourism product (тарасенок, 2010), which is the main target task of functioning of management system of competitiveness of tourism destinations and all management decisions must be evaluated in terms of their impact on this indicator. it is important to understand that the whole tourism resources are not a product of tourist destinations. the product has to represent a complete set attractive for target segment of tourists. all the elements of the product must meet the actual state of tourist demand. it is fundamentally important that the composition of the main tourism product in its quality and quantity was sufficient to attract tourists. marketing approach to destination involves the development of an integrated product destination, which will be offered to the tourist as a whole. all the elements of the product of destination must match the needs of each other and target segment. when the destination has several target segments that are fundamentally different in their motives, demands and expectations of tourists, it is necessary to develop a product for each of them. thus, the basis of destination marketing is the creation and development of demanded competitive destination product. destination marketing strategy – is part of a larger strategy of tourism development in the region, including infrastructure development, optimization legislation, the distribution of financial flows, attracting investment and so on. marketing strategy identifies – who are potential consumers of that product and what characteristics (properties) will be most demanded by tourists, what the destination has to develop this product, how will the product of destination promote to market. destination marketing strategy should be built depending on the selected priority types of tourism activities provided with personnel, infrastructure facilities, formed tourist product. however, the strategy itself does not guarantee development and success of destinations. to obtain the expected results the activities of management and marketing of destinations should be considered as integrity of strategic, project and operational activities. such integrity should be reflected in the structure of the strategy itself: developed action plan to achieve the mission must be brought to the level of alternative projects. description of projects, in turn, should give an idea of what values will the consumers of tourist destination products get during the realization of strategy by taking an active part in this. 5. project approach to provision of competitiveness of tourism product reorientation of domestic tourist flows from the crimea to the resorts of greece, bulgaria, turkey, uae and foreign flows to asian and african countries require quick action to ensure the attractiveness of domestic tourist product, which should be small projects focused on short-term travel and high quality tourist service by reasonable prices for ukrainian tourists and interesting tourist routes and tours are not yet known to foreign tourists places. therefore, the basis for the formation and implementation of strategies providing the competitiveness of the national / regional tourism product should be the project approach with tools of cognitive marketing, based on the prevention of the occurrence of consumers’ needs on the quality of tourist services, innovative tourism products and their components, new routes and different forms of meeting the tourist demand. considering the lack of targeted planning of tourism in ukraine and in the majority of its regions, fragmentation, vagueness, time uncertainty of the proposed measures of realization of strategy of tourism and resorts development, the turbulence of the environment, it is reasonable to use the project approach, built on the integration of management functions and project structuring processes aimed at the effective achievement of its objectives through the use of modern methods and ways, techniques and technology management to get the planned project results on the composition and scope of work, cost, time, quality and satisfaction of participants. designing – is a special kind of management technology based on project approach. the basis of the project approach is the project view as a controlled change of initial state of any system (e.g., state, region, organization or company) related to the time and money expenses. investigation of process and regulation changes, implemented in advance by developed rules within the budget and time constraints, are the essence of project management. under the project we understand the of complex structured logically interrelated tasks and measures ordered in-time, aimed at solving the most important problems of the state development, some sectors of the economy, administrative and territorial units or local communities, organizations and institutions and are carried out in terms of financial competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision 15 and other resource constraints in due time. thus in conditions of limited time and resources unique products or services that were not developed earlier and different from existing analogues are created. designing is carried out by appropriate management technique. potential possibilities of project approach allow: to imagine the ideal model of functioning and development of a particular object; to describe the actual and future challenges in respect of the object; to identify mechanisms to achieve the objectives and their relationship; to project a new image and structure of the researched phenomenon through appropriate programs; to compare ideally constructed samples of the object with the forms and stages of its real function. development of a new tourism product needs its design. tourism or tourism and recreational designing – is a project activity in tourism and recreation sphere. from the basic definition of “design” we can understand its multifunctionality relatively to tourist-recreational activities: (1) it can refer to specific objects (such as tourist base); (2) may be associated with the formation of a specific prototype state – development of concept, program, tourism development strategy in a particular area; (3) can be oriented to the development of a specific tourism product (or service). thus, tourist and recreational designing can be viewed at three levels: designing of tourism industry; designing of tourism products; designing of destination development (tourist and recreational complex) or the tourism industry as a whole in a particular area. tourism designing – is a combination of types of creative and innovative activity, during which tourism project appears – materialized or intangible result, which shows signs of novelty and created specifically for the needs of tourism industry development, optimization of enterprises tourism activities, meeting the demand of consumers of tourism services. tourism designing has certain characteristics: limited terms of designing and construction of specific projects; the novelty of the product (service); sequence of stages, development and implementation of the project. tourism project should be based on a reasonable balance between timing and budget to create a unique product, which delivering to the consumer is the purpose of the project. creating a unique product (service) is possible only by providing the effective use of tourist and recreational potential of the territory, taking into account formed and potential needs of the population in tourist and recreational activities, willingness of stakeholders to develop tourism in a particular area. bases of designing of tourist activities is the use of an integrated set of management methods and tools of influence on project participants through the development of personal responsibility for the safety and quality of services to be offered. therefore, the methodology of project management in tourism aimed at meeting the needs of tourists while traveling through the initiation and implementation of projects in the destination, which is based on a set of methods to influence the management of each individual project to provide systematic unity of their portfolio. high dependence on influence of environment and the large proportion of innovation in tourism designing require specific management techniques such as dynamic programming, systems analysis, probability theory, queuing theory, and others. it should be noted that the methodology of the project approach in tourism at all levels of the economic systems is state standard of ukraine (ssu) iso 10006 are: 2005 “quality management systems. guidelines for quality management in projects” (дсту iso 10006:2005 …, 2005), as requirements for all groups of project management processes are described in this standard. it is appropriate to note that the project-oriented management is used when we clearly define: project objectives and the end result; allocated or available resources; timeframe and constraints. project-oriented management is characterized by a clear focus on the goal achieving – the creation of “project product”. project-oriented management is seen as a new “flexible” method, which provides interconnection of creative efforts with the overall tasks of mangers. its essence is to develop management objectives, identify problems requiring study and effective solution, develop program or strategic plan for solving the problems, removing obstacles to the achievement of the goals (безверхнюк, 2014). successful implementation of the strategic goals of tourism and recreation industry development requires not only significant financial cost, but also well-organized control work progress at all stages, which depends on the skills, experience and personal abilities of managers. professional use of tools, methods and techniques of project management will allow tourism business subjects to ensure the effectiveness of project activities, reduce costs and perform the project in due time. project approach differs from traditional approaches to management by the following methodological features and tool capabilities: a clear focus on product / result (financial resources sent not to the region or the industry in general but to the specific project); innovativeness (new quality product is funded – its social value); state support and social 16 arthur levytskyy orientation; a high level of structural and functional coordination of all project participants because of their focus on the overall result; organized and wellplanned monitoring of the project progress; the creation of a common informative space; rigid system of responsibility for the proper use of funds; multichannel financing model and so on. we know project lifecycle is in the basis of project approach, which is determined by the sequence of phases through which the project passes throughout its existence: conceptualization, development, implementation, closure. since the projects are implemented in the destinations in tourism activities, so it is important to take into account the stage of the project lifecycle of destinations when developing the project. at the initiation of the project at destination during ascent stage should be considered weak development of tourism, which is characterized by poor quality of tourist services, low prices, the initial formation of tourist image and low tourist traffic to destinations requiring a more detailed comprehensive project analysis, financial feasibility study, planning and structuring project. extensive stage of destination lifecycle is characterized by expansion of the use of tourism resources, the gradual development of tourism infrastructure, increasing domestic and foreign tourist flow by maintaining low prices for tourist product and requires a large number of quality projects aimed at expanding and improving infrastructure to create an attractive image of territory. for example, the destination “ukrainian venice” (m. vylkove) “kobleve” (mykolaiv region), “zatoka” (odesa region) and others. destinations of intensive stage of development need projects to increase the quality of tourist services, to improve facilities for the provision of tourism services, which is caused by the ongoing development of tourism infrastructure, increasing of tourism product prices, increasing domestic and foreign investment. examples of such destinations in ukraine can serve lviv, truskavets resort, resort “bukovel”, odesa, kyiv etc. the cosmopolitan stage of destinations development involves the conceptualization and implementation of high-cost, well-planned, qualificationally provided, integrated high-quality projects aimed at getting the multiplier effect of tourism and aimed only at the wealthy, both domestic and foreign tourists. unfortunately, ukraine does not have these destinations yet. in our opinion, the initiation of projects should be precisely in destinations with the support of local government and cooperation with scientific, project organizations, since knowledge of features of territory, tourists’ requirements on the material and technical base and the quality of tourist services, additional services require not only the definition of the problem, but forming the concept of the project, the comprehensive analysis, financial and economic justification, planning and structuring, using modern computer programs to control the project, integrated with project management systems into a single information system by the private, public and foreign investment. considering these features of the project management accordingly to the life cycle stage of destinations will effectively initiate, implement and complete projects, and for the tourism sector in ukraine – systematically develop. thus, the project approach as the convergence of traditional and innovative methods and technologies forms a basic platform for the adoption and implementation of effective management decisions. most importantly, the project approach involves the use of modern information technology planning (ms project, oracle primavera; turbo project, spider project, clarizen etc.) and tools of monitoring that adapt depending on the structural characteristics of the planning processes, types and spatial-temporal conditions of realization of projects of tourism development within the existing and new programs as mid-term and strategic nature. strategic approach should be consistent directly to the project approach. so no matter how well the strategy of development of one or another region has been discharged if it is not backed up by specific projects, it can remain on paper. the project approach precisely makes it possible to convert the strategic plan into specific projects and programs of development of a territory. the combination of strategic and project approach makes it possible to form a strategic project portfolio. it is necessary to define the strategic pyramid: which projects of a certain region primarily need support and finance. the strategic orientation of tourism designing requires its regulation at the state and regional levels through the adoption of targeted programs of tourism development that will ensure the socioeconomic efficiency of tourism and increase tourist attractiveness of ukraine in the global tourism market. it should be noted that the development of tourism at the macroeconomic level, based on the detection of its regularities, trends, social, scientific and technical process requires the coordination of all sectors of the economy related to tourism. this relation will ensure the integration of efforts of the government and business to create a perfect tourist infrastructure based project approach. application of project approach at macro level aimed at creating competitiveness of tourism product: evaluation and approaches to provision 17 opportunities for searching and definition of attractively investment projects in the regions, on the one hand and their implementation through the use of social initiatives, tenders, competitions, creation of clusters, marketing research, on the other. this approach allows you to create an integrated set of innovative projects for comprehensive tourism development of each region through the use of local creative intelligence, able to implement developed and economically sound projects. 6. summary analysis of the main components of the tourism competitiveness of ukraine has shown that, despite the availability of resource, our country, unfortunately, cannot compete with developed tourist countries. the only way to solve this problem – is to form a solid, strategically-oriented state policy, whose main task would be really identify tourism as one of the main priorities of the state, to create a strong authority to manage tourism development, to implement proven worldwide economic mechanisms of successful conducting of tourism business and to encourage investors to invest in tourism infrastructure in ukraine. competitiveness in tourism along with such characteristics as quality of tourism product, investment attraction, social and economic potential is a complex concept. this means that its quantitative assessment provides the previous formation of set of different groups of indicators, determining their importance in integrated assessment or rating. techniques for assessing the competitiveness in tourism are now the most developed and popular at the macro level. evaluation of competitiveness in tourism at the micro level involves the selection and analysis of two major facilities – tourism product and tourism enterprises. the competitiveness of the tourism product is caused by a synergistic combination of economic and marketing component, in the proportion of price and quality “impression” as integral characteristics that is defined as its advantage over another product that is similar to destination or its substitute while the potential buyer satisfies his needs. however, keep in mind that for assessing the quality of the tourist product there is no real measurement values. for objective evaluation one should use the criteria, which operates a consumer and which are essential in his view – the competitiveness of the product itself and competitiveness of an offer and provision of product. the competitiveness of tourism enterprise can be assessed by comparing the most important criteria, summarizing the results of the company in terms of establishing a system of values. in the activities of tourism enterprises different competitive strategies based on certain conditions are used: the presence of competitive advantages, the type of competition in the market, the nature of demand for tourist services, the size of the market share, the nature of tourist services, the level of expenses; price range and quality of products, the costs of innovation. use of competitive strategy relevant to certain conjunctual conditions is one of the measures of sustainable business position in changing market conditions. developing the competitiveness of the regional tourism product, special attention should be paid to marketing destinations. marketing approach to destination involves the development of an integrated product destination, which will be offered to the tourist as a whole. all the elements of the product of destination must match the needs of each other and target segment. when the destination has several target segments that are fundamentally different in their motives, demands and expectations of tourists, it is necessary to develop a product for each of them. thus, the basis of destination marketing is the creation and development of demanded competitive destination product. to obtain the expected results the activities of management and marketing of destinations should be considered as integrity of strategic, project and operational activities. such integrity should be reflected in the structure of the strategy itself: developed action plan to achieve the mission must be brought to the level of alternative projects. description of projects, in turn, should give an idea of what values will the consumers of tourist destination products get during the realization of strategy by taking an active part in this. strategic approach should be consistent directly to the project approach. so no matter how well the strategy of development of one or another region has been discharged if it is not backed up by specific projects, it can remain on paper. the project approach precisely makes it possible to convert the strategic plan into specific projects and programs of development of a territory. the combination of strategic and project approach makes it possible to form a strategic project portfolio. it is necessary to define the strategic pyramid: which projects of a certain region primarily need support and finance. considering the lack of targeted planning of tourism in ukraine and in the majority of its regions, fragmentation, vagueness, time uncertainty of the proposed measures of realization of strategy of tourism and resorts development, the turbulence 18 arthur levytskyy of the environment, it is reasonable to use the project approach, built on the integration of management functions and project structuring processes aimed at the effective achievement of its objectives through the use of modern methods and ways, techniques and technology management to get the planned project results on the composition and scope of work, cost, time, quality and satisfaction of participants. references bourdieu p., 1987, choses dites, paris, minuit, http://bourdieu. name/content/burde-nachala [15.01.2016] kotler ph., asplund k., rein i., haider d., 2005, marketing places europe: how to attract investments, industries, resi­ dents and visitors to cities, communities, regions and na­ tions in europe, stockgolm school of economics in russia, st. petersburg, http://www.detc.ls.urfu.ru/courses/ cphilos0031/ch6_book_2.pdf [15.01.2016] porter m., 2005, on competition, viliams, moscow. the travel & tourism competitiveness report 2013, 2013, world economic forum http://www3.weforum.org/docs/wef_ tt_competitiveness_report_2013.pdf [15.01.2016] tourism satellite account: recommended methodological framework, 2001, commission of the european communities eurostat, organization for economic co-operation and development, world tourism organization, united nations statistics division. luxembourg, madrid, new york, paris, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesf/seriesf_80e.pdf [15.01.2016] безверхнюк т., 2014, технологія управління соціальними проектами. монографія, оріду наду, одеса. гаврилюк с., 2006, конкурентоспроможність підпри­ ємств у сфері туристичного бізнесу, видавництво національний торговий економічний університет, київ. дсту iso 10006:2005 (iso 10006:2003, idт) национальный стандарт украины. системы управления качеством. руководство по управлению качеством в проектах, 2005, http://metrology.com.ua/download/iso-iec-ohsasi-dr/61-iso/281-dstu-iso-10006-2005 [15.01.2016] евдокимов к., 2008, применение конкурентных стратегий в российском туризме, успехи современного естествознания, 12, 62–65. зорин а., 2009, дестинация, издательство рмат, москва. кулєшова н., 2007, маркетингова стратегія як інструмент ефективної діяльності підприємства, економіка: проблеми теорії та практики, 230(1), 131–142. лойко о., 2005, туризм и гостиничное хозяйство: учебное пособие, издательство томский политехнический университет, томск. мігущенко ю., 2013, методика оцінки конкурентоспроможності туристичної сфери україни. економіка. управління. інновації., 1(9), 39–56. розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 01 серпня 2013 р. «про схвалення концепції державної цільової програми розвитку туризму та курортів на пері­ од до 2022 року», 2013, офіційний вісник україни від 13.09.2013, 2013, № 68, ст. 224. розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 11 березня 2015 р. № 200­р «про схвалення розробленого мініс­ терством інфраструктури плану імплементації ди­ рективи ради єс від 13 червня 1990 р. 90/314/єес про організовані туристичні подорожі, відпочинок з по­ вним комплексом послуг та комплексні турне», 2015, офіційний вісник україни від 24.03.2015, 2015, № 21, ст. 230. сенин в., 1999, организация международного туризма: учебник, финансы и статистика, москва. тарасенок а., 2010, новые подходы к структурированию туристского пространства: от рекреационных районов к геоэкономическим системам, вестник белорус­ ского государственного университета, серия 2: хи­ мия. биология. география., 1, 95–98. фатхундинов р., 2000, конкурентоспособность: эконо­ мика, стратегия, управление, инфа-м, москва. фролова в., 2015, swot-аналіз конкурентоспроможності туристичного ринку україни, вісник бердянського університету менеджменту і бізнесу, 1, 42–46. шахова о., 2014, индустрия и инфраструктура туризма: учебно­методическое пособие, издательство нижневартовского государственного университета, нижневартовск. 1. introduction the appearance of the covid-19 pandemic resulted in far-reaching changes in the functioning of polish society in many dimensions, such as health care (sagan et al., 2021; education (hibszer, tracz, 2021), or spatial mobility (stępień et al., 2021). however, in the context of this study, a wide spectrum of symptoms and problems of a psychological nature is the most important (kęsieska-koszałka, 2021). the problems with the mental health of polish society are not exceptional, as they have affected all societies in the world (cf. ahrens et al., 2021; chawla et al., 2021; saladino et al., 2021). these problems may have influenced the drug situation as well. journal of geography, politics and society 2022, 12(1), 42–58 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.1.06 has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? artur malczewski (1), michał kidawa (2), małgorzata dalmata (3) (1) research, monitoring and international cooperation department, national center for prevention of addiction, dereniowa 52/54, 02–776 warsaw, poland e-mail: artur.malczewski@kcpu.gov.pl (corresponding author) (2) research, monitoring and international cooperation department, national center for prevention of addiction, dereniowa 52/54, 02–776 warsaw, poland e-mail: michal.kidawa@kcpu.gov.pl (3) research, monitoring and international cooperation department, national center for prevention of addiction, dereniowa 52/54, 02-776 warsaw, poland e-mail: malgorzata.dalmata@kcpu.gov.pl citation malczewski a., kidawa m., dalmata m., 2022, has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland?, journal of geography, politics and society, 12(1), 42–58. abstract the aim of this paper is to examine the impact of covid-19 on the prevalence of substance use. moreover, the analysis will focus on the impact of the pandemic on the drug market and drug-related crime in poland. the tested hypothesis assumes that the covid-19 pandemic has increased the prevalence of substance use and the related problems, and that the availability of drugs decreased. the data presented and processed for the purposes of this publication come from the monitoring of drugs and drug addiction and from different studies from 2020 to 2022. the analyses presented in the article do not show an increase in the use of psychoactive substances during the pandemic; furthermore, it is possible to indicate a decrease in the consumption of alcoholic beverages in 2020. it seems that the covid-19 pandemic did not have a large impact on the availability and use of new psychoactive substances (nps). the analysis of the drug market during the pandemic covid-19 did not show a fall in the availability of drugs at the national level. key words covid-19, drug use patterns, drugs market, new psychoactive substances, drug treatment, poland. received: 27 january 2022 accepted: 13 april 2022 published: 27 may 2022 mailto:artur.malczewski@kcpu.gov.pl mailto:michal.kidawa@kcpu.gov.pl mailto:malgorzata.dalmata@kcpu.gov.pl has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 43 the aim of this paper is to examine the impact of covid-19 on the prevalence of substance use. moreover, the analysis will focus on the impact of the pandemic on the drug market and drug-related crime in poland. the tested hypothesis assumes that the covid-19 pandemic has increased the prevalence of substance use and the related problems, and that the availability of drugs decreased. 2. data the data presented and processed for the purposes of this publication come from the monitoring of drugs and drug addiction performed by the research, monitoring and international cooperation department of the national centre for prevention of addictions (pl: krajowe centrum przeciwdziałania uzależnieniom (kcpu)) – polish reitox focal point emcdda as well as research commissioned and conducted by kcpu. youth research was conducted by cbos public opinion and research centre and kcpu towards the end of 2021. research among users injecting drugs was conducted by the national institute of public health – national institute of hygiene (nizp pzh-pib) at the beginning of 2021 and by kcpu the end of 2020. two studies on alcohol were commissioned by kcpu in 2020. moreover, in 2020, kcpu conducted a rapid assessment of drug services concerning the impact of the covid-19 pandemic supplemented by three online in-depth interviews. in 2021, kcpu collected data from local governments (boroughs) on the implementation of local drugs strategies, and in the same year, an online survey among drug users (web survey) was conducted in partnership with the emcdda. the following data were provided by the institutions combating drugs and drug addictions: proceedings instigated and suspects by the police headquarters (kgp), drug seizures by the kgp and the border guard, purity of drugs by the central forensic laboratory of the police, drug-related deaths by statistics poland (gus), and data on new psychoactive substances by the laboratories under the early warning system of kcpu. 3. results and discussion 3.1. substance use among youth at the end of 2021, ‘youth’ survey on the prevalence of psychoactive substances was conducted by the cbos public opinion and research centre and kcpu. this school-based project was implemented in october and november on a representative sample (n=1531) of students from final grades of secondary schools (18-year-olds). the results of the 2021 survey were compared with the measurement from the end of 2018, i.e. the time before the covid-19 pandemic. as the results showed, lifetime prevalence rates for cannabis use stood at 36% (37.5% in 2018), last 12-month prevalence was 19.4% (20.2% in 2018) and last 30-day prevalence was 9.3% (9.8% in 2018). cannabis is the most prevalent illegal psychoactive substance in europe (emcdda, 2020). amphetamine came second in terms of prevalence in the analysed survey at 5.9% (6.0% in 2018 – lifetime prevalence), 3.1% in the last 12 months (3.2% in 2018) and 1.7% in the last 30 days (1.3% in 2018). taking a closer look at ecstasy use (mdma), we can observe that this drug has been used at least once in lifetime by 3.8% of the respondents (4.2% in 2018), 1.8% of the respondents have used it in the last 12 months (1.8% in 2018) and 0.9% in the last 30 days (1.1% in 2018). in the survey, which has been conducted since 1992, students were asked to report their drug use in the last 12 months without specifying the substances. according to the latest survey, this rate stood at 13.1%, while in 2018 it was 16.0% (fundacja cbos..., 2022). 3.2. alcohol consumption during covid-19 pandemic the youth survey carried out by the cbos public opinion and research centre and the national centre for prevention of addictions examined the prevalence of alcohol use. in 2021, in the last month prior to the research, 63.0% (74% in 2018) of the students drank beer at least once, 58.9% (62.0% in 2018) drank vodka and other liquor, and 34.8% (43.0% in 2018) consumed wine. in comparison with 2018, there was a fall in the alcohol use rates among students at the end of 2021 (fundacja cbos..., 2022). in 2020, the state agency for the prevention of alcohol-related problems (parpa) commissioned a study entitled “life in the age of a pandemic” (chodkiewicz, 2020). the research contractor was the institute of psychology of the university of łódź. the study included a group of people (n=177) who took part in the online research twice. the first measurement took place in april 2020 and the second in september 2020. one of the objectives of the study was to answer the question about the use of psychoactive substances by the respondents during the pandemic as well as to learn about the factors related to alcohol use during this period. the results of the study revealed, on the one hand, a decrease in the percentage of people who reported an increase in the amount of alcohol consumed since the pandemic, and, on the other 44 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata hand, a decrease in the percentage of people who declared themselves abstinent (chodkiewicz, 2020). in september and october 2020, a nationwide survey by the state agency for the prevention of alcohol-related problems was carried out using the capi method on a sample of 2,000 people randomly selected from the general population aged 18+. the vast majority of alcohol consumers said that the pandemic had not changed their current pattern of alcohol consumption (79.4%). according to the study, 8.1% of people declared that they drank more during the pandemic, and the same percentage of consumers reported that they drank less alcohol during the pandemic (rowicka et al., 2021). referring to the consumption of alcoholic beverages by adolescents, it is worth noting that average yearly consumption of pure alcohol per capita stood at 9.62 litres in 2020, and it was lower compared to 2019 (9.78). this trend was rising from 2014 only to be halted by the covid-19 pandemic in 2020 (parpa, 2022). 3.3. infections among injecting drug users between 1985, i.e. the moment of introducing a routine epidemiological monitoring system for hiv/ aids in poland, and the end of 2020, 26,383 hiv infections were reported. out of these infections 6,416 (24.3%) were in people who injected drugs, including 4,830 men (75%) and 1,529 women (24%) (in 57 cases the information on gender was missing). analysing the above monitoring period in terms of aids, 3,815 cases were diagnosed. out of these, 1,608 (42%) were people who injected drugs (pwid), including 1,271 men (79%) and 337 (21%) women. figure 1 presents the number of new hiv infections reported until 31 december 2020 by the year of detection. last data presented a decreased number of new hiv infections including people who injected drugs (polish harms and harm reduction workbook, 2021). the analysis of the impact of the pandemic on the problem of drugs and drug addiction includes the research conducted by the national institute of public health – national institute of hygiene (nizp pzhpib). upon the request of kcpu, the research covered the topic of sars-cov-2. the cross-sectional survey among injecting drug users was conducted in three polish cities: chorzow, warsaw and wroclaw. the survey featured rapid hiv tests (anti-hiv antibodies), hcv tests (anti-hcv antibodies), treponema pallidum test (igg/igm), sars-cov-2 (igg/igm) tests as well as a questionnaire interview (zakrzewska, rosińska, 2022). the survey intake was conducted by means of respondent driven sampling (rds) (heckathorn, 1997). the survey included participants over the age of 18 who had injected psychoactive substances at least once in a lifetime (intravenously, intramuscularly and/or hypodermically). the project lasted from february to march 2021. almost three quarters of the respondents were male. the most numerous age group included individuals aged 35+. most of the respondents had injected drugs in the last 12 months 554 838 955 1134 1318 1210 1551 709 1420 1278 11001113 1104 958 804815 701689 706 582 640 9242130 3951504750 72 47 6861 103 137 162 228 278 213 305 351 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 2 0 2 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 all hiv cases pwid-inducted hiv infections fig. 1. number of new hiv infections, including people who inject drugs (recorded number) detected in years 2000–2020. source: emcdda, 2021b. has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 45 prior to research (74.5%) (n  =  150). the results indicated varied prevalence rates in the respective cities. in the city of chorzów, the most prevalent substance was morphine (76.9%). in the other two cities, it was heroin: 50% in warsaw and 82.4% in wroclaw. based on rapid tests and estimation, hiv prevalence in the population stood at 8% remaining at a level similar to the survey of 2017 (zakrzewska, rosińska, 2022). hcv prevalence in the population, according to rapid test results and the rds estimation, was at 31.2%, with indications similar, though somewhat higher, to those of 2017 (zakrzewska, roksińska, 2022). prevalence of igm/igg antibodies against sars-cov-2 in the analysed sample stood at 2.8%, while, using the rds method, it was estimated in the population at 1.6%. since april 2021 a representative sample of poles has been recruited in order to verify the sarscov-2 seroprevalence level. the obser-co research methodology was different – the participants were tested by means of anti-s elisa test in central laboratories. compared to the obser-co, the results are much lower – 49% (n  =  145) (instytut..., 2021). according to the nizp pzh-pib researchers, the polish data and the swedish data (lindqvist et al., 2021) suggest that drug users could have been less exposed to sars-cov-2 transmission than the general population. they argue that it can be explained, for example, by the limited spread and homogeneity of social networks. the survey primarily included clients of syringe and needle exchange programmes as well as opioid substitution treatment patients. as part of monitoring of the scale and type of psychoactive substance use among injecting drug users, questionnaire interviews are conducted every two years by kcpu among injecting drug users. in 2018 (n  =  419) and in 2020 (n = 327), the studies were conducted in november. over the course of two weeks, harm reduction programmes’ staff conducted questionnaire interviews with clients of needle and syringe programs. the results of the study showed a substantial decrease in the percentage of respondents using alcohol, marijuana, amphetamines, cocaine, cathinone and polish heroin (fig. 2). the percentage of respondents using methadone increased (dalmata, 2021). 3.4. impact of the covid-19 pandemic on drug use according to the web survey soon after the first outbreak of the covid 19 pandemic, a european online survey was conducted by the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda). crucial information on the impact of covid-19 on drug users and on the services that support them was collected via a special round of the european web survey on drugs, launched in april 2020 (two months of data collection). the survey — the mini european web survey on drugs: covid-19 — was coordinated by the emcdda in collaboration with its reitox network of national 2 8 .2 % 1 1 .0 % 2 7 .5 % 1 0 .5 % 2 8 .9 % 1 3 .6 % 1 0 .0 % 4 6 .1 % 6 .7 % 9 .3 % 8 .1 % 5 5 .4 % 3 .8 % 4 7 .0 % 8 0 .2 % 2 5 .7 % 1 .5 % 6 3 .6 % 7 .6 % 2 5 .7 % 7 .6 % 2 .8 % 3 4 .6 % 5 .8 % 6 .7 % 9 .2 % 5 5 .4 % 2 .4 % 4 1 .6 % 6 8 .5 % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 h e ro in p o lis h h e ro in m e th a d o n e b u p re n o rp h in e m e p h e d ro n e o th e r c a th in o n e s c o c a in e a m p h e ta m in e m e th a c a th in o n e m d m a b a rb it u ra te s b e n z o d ia z e p in e s l s d c a n n a b is a lc o h o l 2018 2020 fig. 2. drug use prevalence among syringe/needle exchange programmes clients – last month prevalence (%), 2018 and 2020. source: dalmata, 2021; malczewski, jabłoński, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/mini-ewsd-covid-19 https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/mini-ewsd-covid-19 https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/mini-ewsd-covid-19 46 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata focal points. the online questionnaire was filled out by 500 poles using illegal psychoactive substances who had been recruited by facebook. the sample included adults between the ages of 18 and 69, 157 females, 320 males, 18 nonbinary people and 4 other respondents who preferred not to tell their gender. the majority of subjects were currently living in cities (almost 70%) and towns (almost 20%), while 10% were living in the countryside when the survey was conducted. the purpose of the survey was to find out if and how the pandemic changed the way people used drugs and if they received the help they needed. the majority of people in poland who used cannabis in the last 30 days in the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic were using it at least once a month (32%), 41% smoked a few times a week, and 13% were doing it every day (fig. 3). among the respondents who used cannabis in one-year period, also the majority answered that they were using it at least once a month (24%) (fig. 4). the findings were very similar to the results of the previous 2017 european web survey on drugs (n=2625), in which 21% of subjects gave the same answer (fig 5). fig. 3. cannabis use patterns – the frequency of using cannabis in the past 30 days (%) n= 331, 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. fig. 4. cannabis use patterns – the frequency of using cannabis in the past 12 months (%) n=331, 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. 32% 14% 22% 19% 13% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 daily almost daily not daily but more than once a week once a week less than once a week, but at least once a month 13% 14% 24% 14% 17% 11% 7% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 daily almost daily not daily but more than once a week once a week less than once a week, but at least once a month less than once a month once or twice has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 47 the comparison of the results of the web survey from 2020 (fig. 4) to the outcomes of the previous one from 2017 (fig. 5) shows that the results for cannabis use in the last 12 months are similar for both editions of the study. most of the respondents reported using cannabis at least once a month, but less than once a week; the second most frequently chosen option was using cannabis more than once a week. weekly and daily usage both slightly rose from the survey in 2017 to the 2020 survey. it is noteworthy that in 2017 there was a question about weed alone while in 2020 about weed and resin combined. nevertheless, there are not many resin users in poland. the numbers for mdma usage are lower than in the case of cannabis. only 109 of 500 respondents admitted using it in the last 30 days. most survey respondents (87%) reported that they used ecstasy at least once a month, but only 6% used it once a week and 7% even more often (fig 6). in the 2017 web fig. 5. cannabis use patterns – the frequency of using weed/skunk in the past 12 months (%) n=2625, web survey 2017. source: emcdda calculationweb survey 2017 data for poland. fig. 6. mdma use patterns – the frequency of using ecstasy/mdma in the past 30 days (%) n=109, web survey 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. 14% 17% 21% 9% 18% 14% 7% 0 5 10 15 20 25 daily almost daily not daily but more than once a week once a week less than once a week, but at least once a month less than once a month once or twice 87% 6%5% 2% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 daily not daily but more than once a week once a week less than once a week, but at least once a month 48 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata survey on drugs, 45% declared that they had taken mdma once in the last 30 days, and 25% reported that they had taken it on two occasions during that period. considering that mdma is known as a “party drug”, it is surprising that its users did not change their pattern of use, comparing to the web survey from before the pandemic. in both studies, mdma was declared to be used less than once a month by 41% of the respondents in 2020 and by 31% in 2017) and once or twice in 12 months by 40% of the respondents in 2017 and by 36% in 2020 (fig. 7). on the european scale (european web survey on drugs 2021 n=48469), 35% declared taking mdma on at least one occasion in the last 12 months. fig. 7. mdma use patterns – the frequency of using ecstasy/mdma in the past 12 months (%) n=298, web survey 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. fig. 8. the amount of illicit drugs used since the start of the covid-19 epidemic in the respondent’s country (%) n=452, web survey 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. 1% 1% 1% 20% 36% 41% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 daily not daily but more than once a week once a week less than once a week, but at least once a month less than once a month once or twice 7% 28% 22% 29% 14% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 have not used illicit drugs during covid-19 restrictions in your country used less illicit drugs during covid-19 restrictions in your country used the same amount of illicit drugs during covid-19 restrictions in your country used more illicit drugs during covid-19 restrictions in your country don't know has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 49 the 2020 web survey mainly focused on the changes in the patterns of use caused by the covid pandemic. 29% (n = 452) reported that they had used less drugs during the period of covid-19 restrictions in poland, but 28% of the same group declared that they had used more illicit psychoactive substances than before the covid restrictions were introduced. 22% of the respondents did not change the amount of drugs they used (fig. 8). 3.5. the impact of covid-19 on the response to the addiction problem in the course of monitoring the drug services and implementing preventive activities during the covid-19 pandemic, the national bureau for drug prevention (nbdp) conducted two analyses of the situation in 2020. at the beginning of the pandemic (in april and may 2020), questionnaire surveys among staff of drug treatment units were carried out. in november 2020 three online group discussion sessions were held on the impact of the pandemic on drug services. the first session was attended by provincial drug information experts (16 november). the second session (17 november) included representatives of drug and alcohol treatment service, while the third meeting was organised for staff members of opioid substitution therapy (ost) facilities (18 november 2020). during the discussion on the functioning of treatment units during the covid-19 pandemic, the representatives of the implementors of opioid substitution therapy programmes suggested various strategies and changes to modify the operation of the services in order to meet the sanitary requirements (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). the waiting time to admit patients to treatment units was getting extended, as admissions were only allowed following a negative coronavirus test. some activities were suspended in treatment and ost centres (e.g. the patient’s club) in order to minimise social contact between patients. most programmes ceased to take in patients during the lockdown due to the inability to hold a diagnostic visit. 15-minute breaks were introduced to allow for social distance between patients as they received their methadone doses. therapeutic groups in substitution treatment programmes were suspended while all the individual therapeutic sessions continued normally. changes in the operation of the programmes were introduced, e.g. cancelling patients meetings, communicating in paper, drawing up information leaflets on new procedures, etc. (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). in one facility, a quarantine room was set up. most of the panellists signalled that the cost of the covid-19 diagnostic tests was borne by the treatment units, especially in large cities. it was a common practice since contacting sanitary services was impossible due to overloading. diagnostic tests were conducted selectively. due to high costs of testing, only the individuals suspected of being positive were tested. in the case of in-hospital programmes, all the nurses employed in hospitals were regularly tested for covid-19, as it was a standard procedure. the covid-19 pandemic did not result in a considerable increase in the number of ost patients. however, in some programmes, a trend of more frequent reporting of firsttime patients to the programme was observed. it is worth noting that according to the panellists, the patients strictly followed the restrictions, and whenever a patient was suspected of being coronavirus positive, they were provided with methadone outside the facility. patients made sure they were wearing face masks and gloves, sanitized their hands and asked for the door handles to be sanitized once they had left the facility. ost programmes introduced various solutions during the pandemic in order to eliminate or reduce the risk of contracting covid-19. during the group discussion, a number of challenges affecting the operation of drug services during the covid-19 pandemic were identified. firstly, it was necessary to follow sanitary procedures in order to protect the staff and patients, which required online services wherever possible. the issue of employing new staff was raised, as many employees were on sick leaves or self-isolation. family therapy was reduced as a number of facilities were unable to admit families due to sanitary restrictions. patients found it hard to get to the facility. sometimes, it was impossible due to changes in the operation of public transport. treatment units tried to continue their services despite the emerging problems (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). moreover, due to the pandemic, drug services incurred additional costs such as the purchase of computers to enable work in the new circumstances, for telehealth purposes, contacting other staff members, conducting interviews, for patient use (one facility) or the purchase of disinfection lamps. such expenses had not been included in the budgets of drug treatment services. during the discussion, it was stressed that a number of solutions had been introduced to assist the drug-dependent individuals, especially switching to telehealth services. in one residential facility, outdoor services during walks or in a tent were introduced. one of the ways of preventing the spread of covid-19 was the start of the week-on/week-off shift work, which substantially limited physical contacts between the employees (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). additionally, in some facilities, all patients and personnel started to be tested before entering the premises. in one facility, in case of a positive covid-19 test 50 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata result among the personnel, the infected individuals still continued to work with the infected patients in a designated section of the facility separated from the rest. in order to isolate patients and keep social distance, confinement rooms were prepared in 24-hour service facilities. they were camper vans (for patients) and tents for outdoor meetings: “from april we have been admitting new patients in a new building, new patients must spend 5 days in an isolation ward” (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020, p. 51). such a solution was possible if the facility had sufficient space. in the case of small facilities, no special ward for isolating purposes could be created. during the discussion, issues of covid-19 diagnostic tests in drug treatment units were raised. testing in treatment facilities located in small towns or villages was possible, as in such places cooperation with sanitary services was more efficient. in the case of large cities, it was impossible to finance testing with sanitary services’ funds. as a consequence, some facilities resigned from administering tests, as their own funds were insufficient (no financing by the sanitary inspectorate) (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). during the meeting, an opinion was expressed that testing increased the sense of security while in the facility; however, some employees were reluctant to undergo tests as they considered them unreliable. moreover, psychologists and therapists had direct contact with the patients, which made them vulnerable to the covid-19 infection on a daily basis. the dire situation in drug services was manifested by the fact that 50% of clinical supervisions involved therapists not patients since it was the specialist who suffered various problems caused by the current epidemiological situation; they were exhausted, overworked and stressed out (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). the arrival of an infected individual made it difficult to work and prevented new admissions. drop-in (daily shelter for drug users) centres found it hard to operate as the patients stayed together for long, e.g. they had meals together and socialized. the number of patients dropped by approx. 30%, and this type of treatment was affected by the pandemic the hardest (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). another issue that hampered the application of telehealth was that appointments by phone were difficult to conduct because patients had little privacy at home (hard to find a quiet place to have a conversation). most of the facilities whose representatives participated in the group discussions introduced new solutions to their daily work, mainly in the form of telehealth. during the discussion, the panellists also raised the matter of using local government funds to improve the safety of drug treatment facilities, e.g. the option of using the revenues from the alcohol license fees to purchase disinfectant lamps or other sanitizing and protective equipment (malczewski, jabłoński, 2020). 3.6. covid-19 and local initiatives in the course of collecting data on the implementation of local drugs strategies in 2020, local governments were asked about the impact of the pandemic on their activities. the survey questionnaire is annually distributed by the kcpu under the monitoring of drug problems. in 2021, the questionnaire was completed by 2212 local governments1 of the total number of 2477. changes in 2020 in local government operations compared to the year before the covid-19 pandemic are presented in table 1. according to the information, from 2212 local governments, 25% did not continue universal prevention programs as an effect of covid-19 pandemic. in total, 62% of the local governments responded that there had been changes in the drug prevention operations as a result of the pandemic of 2020. the subsequent question in the kcpu survey concerned main problems and challenges that local governments had faced in 20202 following the covid-19 pandemic, with reference to the implementation of the local drugs strategy. the local governments indicated online lessons (44.9%) as the main problem. it possibly resulted from the fact that most universal drug prevention programmes were implemented in schools. a second major problem was the limited working hours of youth centres (14.8%). it is worth noting that every tenth local government responded that failure to adapt prevention programmes to online education was a challenge during the covid-19 pandemic, which was most likely caused by the lack of prevention programmes to be implemented online. local governments made efforts to introduce online prevention; however, one might certainly argue that they were not full-scale operations. the results of the surveys showed that almost all local governments were affected by the covid-19 pandemic, as it did not impact only 1.2% of the drug prevention tasks, according to the received responses. it is worth planning online prevention and education in new drugs strategies in order to ensure that such tasks are continued during the times of pandemic (malczewski, 2022). 1 pl. gmina – this is the level of lau-2. 2 the questionnaire is annually sent by the national centre for prevention of addictions (former national bureau for drug prevention) in the course of the monitoring of alcohol problems. 2212 local governments completed the questionnaire in 2021. has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 51 3.7. black market during covid-19 pandemic table 2 shows seizures revealed by the police and border guard, i.e. main institutions responsible for combating drug-related crime. due to high discrepancies in quantities of seized drugs and the considerable role of the random factor, the trend analysis is seriously hampered. a single large weight seizure might cause a considerable rise in the overall weight of seizures in a given year. in 2020 a rise in hashish, heroin, cocaine and marihuana drugs seizures were recorded. moreover, the police detected and dismantled 55 clandestine synthetic drug laboratories, where amphetamine was the most frequently produced narcotic drug. it was the highest figure ever (emcdda, 2021a). fig. 9 shows the analysis of results of amphetamine purity and thc content in marijuana. the analyses were conducted by the central forensic laboratory of the police. since 2005, the average purity of amphetamine has decreased from over 50% to  13%, and thc content in marijuana increased from 1% to 10%. based on the data collected in the course of the reitox focal point survey from march to may 2020 (malczewski et al. 2020), no significant developments across the country in terms of access to drugs can be observed. there were situations when some drugs were in short supply, e.g. in the city of wroclaw there was a fall in the availability of methamphetamine trafficked from czechia following the closure of borders. in krakow, the lack of new psychoactive substances (synthetic cathinones) was reported. another development observed was a drop in drug prices, which is a result of the lower purchasing capacity of harm reduction clients, who were mainly injecting drug user. moreover, the prices data from the police (fig. 10) does not indicate changes in availability of drugs in poland at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic (emcdda, 2021a). table 1. changes in 2020 in local government operations compared to the year before the covid-19 pandemic. operations suspended* noticeable reduction slight reduction no data available slight improvement noticeable improvement does not apply** a) tasks concerning information and education 20.5% 30.5% 21.1% 16.7% 1.3% 0.5% 9.5% b) universal prevention 25.0% 31.9% 16.6% 12.6% 0.7% 0.1% 13.2% c) selective and indicated prevention 19.7% 8.9% 6.2% 15.5% 0.4% 0.1% 49.1% d) rehabilitation and postrehabilitation of drug-dependent individuals 11.1% 3.7% 3.6% 15.7% 0.5% 0.1% 65.4% e) harm reduction 12.0% 4.4% 4.0% 15.8% 0.5% 0.1% 63.2% f ) monitoring the epidemiological situation 11.0% 5.7% 3.3% 16.0% 1.8% 3.6% 58.6% g) other tasks 12.2% 2.3% 1.0% 10.7% 0.2% 0.5% 73.2% *tasks were not completed due to the pandemic. ** tasks were not planned for implementation under local drugs strategies in 2020. source: malczewski 2022. table 2. drug seizures in poland (by police or border guard), 2017–2020. drugs 2017 2018 2019 2020 hashish (kg) 1,237.16 8,313.193 436.151 1,994.474 marijuana (kg) 3,620.08 4,259.799 3,494.674 5,315.641 heroin (kg) 2.49 8.839 21.464 426.9 cocaine (kg) 81.05 277.417 2,247.828 3,886.844 amphetamine (kg) 582.41 1,322.86 1,676.518 1,921.343 methamphetamine (kg) 25.60 30.88 537.876 303.139 ecstasy (tablets) 112,614 218,442 260,112 164,528 lsd (blotters) 866 3,544 1,981 1,975.7 (g) source: emcdda, 2021a. 52 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata as part of the web survey 2020, which was described in the paper in section 2.4, respondents were asked whether they had difficulties in getting access to drugs. nearly half of the respondents (46%) answered that they had no problems at all and 8% that it was very difficult for them to get drugs (fig. 11). respondents were also asked if there were changes in the purity or strength of the drugs they used. with this question, nearly two-thirds (62%) replied that no changes had been made, and 12% that the purity or strength was lower (fig. 12). to the same question about prices, a similar percentage replied that the prices had not changed 63% and 28% that they had increased (fig. 13). 10%10% 12% 11% 10%10% 10%10% 9% 10% 8%8% 7% 5% 1%1%1% 13%13% 15% 16%16% 20% 13%13%12% 18% 13% 24% 26% 35% 43% 53% 35% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 marijuana amphetamine 41 494849 434239 198219214 178198 215 189 236 244 230 223 218217 223 38404041404039 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 october 2019 november 2019 december 2019 january 2020 february 2020 march 2020 april 2020 marijuana heroin cocaine amphetamine fig. 9. purity of marijuana (thc concentration) and amphetamine in years 2004–2020. source: emcdda, 2021a. fig. 10. drug prices 2019–2020 (police data) – typical price per gram (pln). sources: emcdda, 2021a. has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 53 fig. 11. have you had difficulties in accessing illicit drugs because of covid-19? n=298, web survey 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. fig. 12. since the outbreak of covid-19, has there been a change in the purity, price, or amount of drugs you have obtained?: purity/strength. n=297, web survey 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. 25% 46% 20% 8% 1% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 dont't know extremely moderately not at all somewhat 62% 12% 9% 17% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 don't know higher lower the same 54 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata 3.8. drug offences in 2019, 34,341 proceedings instigated under the drug act were initiated, out of which 87% concerned article 62, i.e. possession of drugs followed by cultivation crimes (article 63: 4%) and drug trafficking (article 59: supplying drugs with intent to gain benefit: 3%). in 2020, 34,056 proceedings instigated under the act were initiated, out of which almost 90% concerned article 62 i.e. possession of drugs followed by cultivation crimes (article 63: 4%) and drug trafficking (article 59: supplying drugs with intent to gain benefit: 3%). in 2020 there were 35,435 suspects under the act of counteracting drugs. the highest percentage accounted for article 62 (88%), followed by article 59 (3%). in 2019 there were 33,831 suspects under the act of counteracting drug. the highest percentage accounted for article 62 (85%) followed by article 59 (3.5%) (polish drug market and crime workbook, 2021). comparing the data on drug offenses, a slight increase in the number of proceedings instigated and suspects in 2020 can be seen. 3.9. new psychoactive substances (nps) on the drug market in poland when analysing the number of substances identified in laboratories in poland, the dynamics of the development of the nps phenomenon in years 2012–2016 is clearly visible. the number of these identifications increased from around 1,300 in 2012 to over 28,000 in 2016. then, in years 2017–2020, this number significantly dropped. in 2020, it amounted to 3,317. the polish market in this period was dominated by two groups of substances: synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids. while in the early years the number of identified synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones remained at a similar level, the dominance of synthetic cathinones has been systematically increasing since 2015. in 2020, they accounted for approximately 75% of all identified nps. when analysing the dynamics of the number of samples containing synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids, it should be noted that in the case of both groups of substances, after a sharp increase in 2012–2016, there was a significant decrease. synthetic cannabinoids in 2014 were identified in over 2,400 cases. in 2016, this number was over 7,800, and in 2018 it fell again to the level of 2014. the downward trend in this respect continued, and the number of synthetic cannabinoid samples identified in poland dropped to 441 in 2020. a similar situation occurred in the case of synthetic cathinones, where the number of cases of identifying substances in this group in 2014 amounted to over 2,100 cases, and two years later (2016) it hit over 18,000, then dropped to around 9,800 in 2018 and 2,488 in 2020. a slightly different picture of the dynamics of this phenomenon is provided by the analysis of the weights of the seized substances, in particular cathinones (fig. 14). in the period of 2017–2020, the weight of the fig. 13. since the outbreak of covid-19, has there been a change in the purity, price, or amount of drugs you have obtained?: prices. n=198, web survey 2020. source: own calculations based on web survey 2020 data for poland. 62% 12% 9% 17% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 don't know higher lower the same has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 55 seized cathinones oscillated around 200 kg, except for 2018, when it reached 300 kg. when interpreting these data, it should be mentioned that in 2018 the law changed, and the police received the new power to prosecute crime of manufacturing, trafficking and to some extent possession of nps. when excluding 2018 from analyses, the data shows that when the amount of analysed cathinones significantly dropped, the weight stayed at the same or more or less the same level. moreover, there are indications that substances from this group are increasingly more often produced in the territory of the republic of poland. this conclusion is prompted by the fact that since 2019 the number of illegal cathinone-producing laboratories in poland identified by the police has significantly increased (perkowska, 2021), and there have been several individual cases of seizures concerning a significant volume. the latter would explain the downward trend in the number of samples analysed and, at the same time, the relatively constant values for the weights of the seized cathinones. in addition, when analysing particular substances, it should be noted that most of the substances that dominate the market are currently on the lists of controlled substances. there are signs that substances that were banned many years ago are returning to the market. one such example is mephedrone, which practically disappeared from the market after being banned in 2010, but has started to appear again for several years. in 2016–2018, the weight of seized mephedrone was approx. 2–3 kg, in 2019 it dropped to approx. 0.6 kg, while in 2020 it was already 9 kg. the information presented above may suggest that the nps market in poland is becoming more and more similar to the traditional drug market, and organized criminal groups are increasingly involved in their production and sale. in addition to the synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids discussed above, there are two more groups of substances important for the analysis of the nps market. these are new benzodiazepines and synthetic opioids. substances from both of these groups are much less common; however, due to their mechanism of action, they may pose a significant threat to public health. often, substances from these groups have a much stronger effect on human body and are active in smaller doses than their predecessors. when analysing the trends of their occurrence, it should be noted that they had completely different dynamics compared to the synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids. substances from these two groups (fig. 15) practically did not exist on the market before 2014. benzodiazepines appeared around 2015 and the number of their identifications in laboratories was increasing steadily, reaching over 500 cases in 2017 and 2018. synthetic opioids appeared later, and in years 2017–2018 their number hovered around over 150 cases. however, in both of fig. 14. weight of seized synthetic cathinones and cannabinoids in years 2017–2020 (kg). source: kidawa, 2021. 215.9 300.6 191.5 207.3 16.3 30.3 65.2 11.3 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 2017 2018 2019 2020 cathinones cannabinoids 56 artur malczewski, michał kidawa, małgorzata dalmata fig. 15. number of nps identifications broken down by benzodiazepines and opioids in years 2013–2020. source: kidawa, 2021. 349 527 311 175 23 564 74 64 154 58 24 169 140 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 benzodiasepines opioids these groups of substances, in 2019 and 2020, significant decreases were recorded. 4. conclusions the years 2020 and 2021 were dominated in poland by the covid-19 pandemic, which badly affected the drug services and prevention activities, especially at the beginning of the year. the drug services predominantly focused on ensuring the availability of services in the new circumstances and tried not to limit new admissions. residential and drop-in centres reduced their operations most radically but ambulatory facilities also needed to wind down their operations. as a result of the pandemic, drug treatment units, mainly counselling centres, were forced to considerably transform their operations by means of telehealth solutions. it can be clearly seen that in the first half of the year the pandemic contributed to the significant reduction of new treatment admissions. the ost programme dispensed substitute drugs for longer periods. in the case of harm reduction activities, we could also observe limitations caused by the pandemic restrictions in the first half of 2020. harm reduction programme developed new forms of outreach, such as distribution of food or protective equipment. the whole outreach system, including drug services, was confronted with the lack of previously prepared procedures in relation to the covid-19 pandemic. however, in response to the pandemic, 83% of the drug services surveyed by the kcpu in the first half of 2020 introduced telehealth drug treatment or harm reduction services (e.g. phone calls, video calls, online access) (malczewski, 2020). consequently, the drug treatment system could be supplemented by new forms of patient work. it is also worth noting that following the response to the covid-19 pandemic, drugdependent individuals, especially the homeless, suffered most. the analyses presented in the article do not show an increase in the use of psychoactive substances during the pandemic; moreover, it is possible to indicate a decrease in the consumption of alcoholic beverages in 2020. the recommendation of the research carried out by nizp pzh-pib was to intensify the covid-19 vaccine rollout in the population of psychoactive substance users in order to reduce the risk of severe complications (zakrzewska, rosińska, 2022). the analysis of the drug market during the pandemic covid-19 did not show a fall in the availability of drugs at the national level. the prices data from the police (emcdda, 2021a) does not indicate changes in the availability of drug in poland at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, and the amount of seized drugs did not drop in 2020 (emcdda, 2021a). in regard to nps, it seems that the phenomenon of nps has been limited, and law enforcement has the covid-19 pandemic changed substance use patterns, drug market and drug response in poland? 57 agencies, along with the 2018 drug law amendment, received tools that allowed them to counteract this phenomenon more efficiently. these tools are being used more and more efficiently. the phenomenon of new substances itself is becoming similar to the traditional illicit drug market. however, the level of threat to users from the above-mentioned substances has not changed much. new substances are still appearing which, through their mechanism of action, can cause poisoning and death on a larger scale. we may draw the conclusion that one should not count on the fact that new psychoactive substances will completely disappear from the market. it is more likely that they will permanently take their place in the illegal drug market. it seems that the covid-19 pandemic did not have a large impact on the availability and use of nps, although in some cities, such as in krakow, there were problems with access to nps. as a result, users began using injectable amphetamines in place of the 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(eng. patterns of alcohol consumption in poland – report on the questionnaire research 2020), państwowa agencja rozwiązywania problemów alkoholowych, warszawa, https://www.parpa.pl/images/wzorykonsumpcji_2020.pdf (accessed 25 january 2022). sagan a., bryndova l., kowalska-bobko i., smatana m., spranger a., szerences v., webb e., gaal p., 2021, a reversal of fortune: comparison of health system responses to covid-19 in the visegrad group during the early phases of the pandemic, health policy, in press. doi: 10.1016/j. healthpol.2021.10.009 saladino v., algeri d., auriemma v., 2020, the psychological and social impact of covid-19: new perspectives of wellbeing, frontiers of psychology, 11, 577684. doi: 10.3389/ fpsyg.2020.577684 stępień j., michalski t., grabowski j., waszak p., grabkowska m., macul a., rojek j., 2021, social response and spatial mobility change due to covid-19 pandemic in poland, geographia polonica, 94(3), 381–396. doi: 10.7163/ gpol.0210 web survey 2020 data for poland – own calculation-based database from on-line survey, krajowe centrum przeciwdziałania uzależnieniom, warszawa. zakrzewska k., rosińska m., 2022, pwidhealth, stan zdrowia osób przyjmujących iniekcyjnie substancje w zakresie chorób zakaźnych (eng. pwidhealth, health status of people who inject substances in the field of infectious diseases – final report), instytutu zdrowia publicznego pzh – państwowy instytut badawczy, warszawa. https://www.parpa.pl/images/wzorykonsumpcji_2020.pdf https://www.parpa.pl/images/wzorykonsumpcji_2020.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.10.009 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.10.009 https://doi.org/10.7163/gpol.0210 https://doi.org/10.7163/gpol.0210 1. introduction in the territory of the present-day slovenia several tourism resorts developed already in the 19th century, but their number remained very limited. throughout the history tourism development was closely related to the events in the countries/states whose part was the slovenian ethnic territory (austrian empire, austria-hungary, yugoslavia). since 1991, slovenia is an independent state with its own tourism policy. due to its modest size and a lack of tradition as an independent state the tourism identity of slovenia is still relatively weak. guidebooks situate slovenia within the eastern and central european sub-regional frameworks. despite its inclusion in eastern european travel guides, slovenia is consistently defined as central european (nelson, 2012). within the european context, slovenia is moderately developed tourist destination. according to espon study (espon …, 2006) slovenia was “mediumhigh penetrated” destination. in 2016 it ranked 23rd among 28 eu member states (eurostat, 2019) in journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(3), 4–13 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.3.02 some changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia since its independence dejan cigale faculty of arts, university of ljubljana, aškerčeva 2, si-1000, ljubljana, slovenia, e-mail: dejan.cigale@ff.uni-lj.si citation cigale d., 2019, some changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia since its independence, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(3), 4–13. abstract the paper discusses the processes and changes in slovenian tourism in the last three decades, after the disintegration of yugoslavia. they have been related to the influence of factors both within the field of tourism and outside of it (external factors, such as geopolitical events, economic changes and shocks, etc.). empirical analysis is focused particularly on the spatial characteristics of tourism, with the emphasis on the geographical origin of tourist flows and, on the other hand, stability/variability of geographical distribution of tourism within slovenia. in regard to the latter, especially a very intense growth of tourist numbers in slovenian capital (ljubljana) is worth mentioning. the most evident change regarding inbound tourist flows is a strongly increased number of non-european tourists. the observed changes point out the fact that slovenian tourism is increasingly embedded into globalization processes. despite the growth in non-european tourist arrivals, the relatively short-distance tourist flows still prevail in the majority of slovenian tourist destinations. they are also less sensitive to economic and political shocks and they will most probably remain crucial for slovenian tourism. key words tourism, tourism development, slovenia, tourist flows. received: 4 july 2019 accepted: 25 september 2019 published: 30 september 2019 some changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia since its independence 5 regard to the number of tourist nights. the picture is considerably different if taking into account number of tourist nights per country area; according to this indicator slovenia ranked 17th (545.4 tourist nights/ km2). if number of tourist nights is compared with the population number, than slovenia ranked even higher – 15th (5.4 nights spent per inhabitant). in the last decade, slovenia experienced a marked tourism growth. in the period 2010–2017 number of tourist nights increased by 47.9% (eurostat, 2019). in the same period, increase in eu (28 member states) was just 32.85%. tourism is becoming an important (or even crucial) industry in many slovenian regions. even at the national level it is an important economic activity: its total contribution to gdp in 2017 was, according to world economic forum (travel & tourism…, 2017), 11.9% and to total employment 12.3%, i.e. 101,500 working places. visitor exports generated eur 2,488.7 million, what was 7.7% of total exports in 2017 (travel & tourism…, 2017). tourism decisively transformed the appearance of many slovenian regions and changed their economic and social structure. tourism development is influenced by many factors (accessibility, changes in economic conditions, environmental situation, government policies, political environment, fashion, etc.). its study can be approached from various perspectives (e.g. mckercher, 1999; butler, 2004) and at various spatial levels. although tourism development at the national level is often the focus of research (e.g. formica, uysal, 1996; petrevska, collins-kreiner, 2017), this necessarily means a high level of generalization. this could be questionable since there are often very divergent development paths in various tourism places/resorts within a single country. this is the case also in slovenia (cigale, 2012). tourism as an economic and social phenomenon is much diversified. it has an inherently spatial nature. as a consequence, it is of traditional interest for geography. in the 1970s, d.g. pearce (1979) identified six major areas of geographical interest in tourism: spatial aspects of supply, spatial aspects of demand, the geography of resorts, patterns of movements and flows, the impact of tourism, and models of tourist space. tourism necessarily involves movements in space, including the ones between the place of residence and tourism destination or between several destinations. distance is one of the most important determinants, affecting tourist flows. nevertheless, its influence is mediated by numerous other factors. on the other hand, tourism is an integral part of the globalization process and tourist flows are increasingly internationalized and globalized. this paper discusses the processes and changes in slovenian tourism in the last three decades, after the disintegration of yugoslavia. they have been related to the influence of factors both within the field of tourism and outside of it (external factors, such as geopolitical events, economic changes and shocks, etc.). the aim of the paper is not to offer a holistic picture of tourism in slovenia since its independence. instead it pays attention to several relevant, and inter-related, aspects of tourism development. it takes into account the influence of various factors, related to social and environmental changes. these factors are relevant at various spatial scales – from local to global. empirical analysis is focused particularly on the spatial characteristics of tourism demand (with the emphasis on the geographical origin of tourist flows and, on the other hand, stability/variability of geographical distribution of tourism within slovenia), which are a reflection of broader social and economic processes. generally, distance is a factor which, to a large extent, influences the volume of tourism demand. tourist travel requires an input of time, money and effort. this input increases with a distance; consequently, demand diminishes (mckercher, lew, 2003). 80% of international travel is directed to destinations located within a 1000 km radius from the country of origin (mckercher et al., 2008). although distance is an objective, measurable spatial characteristic, its role and perception change. furthermore, distance is only one of many factors influencing tourist movements. in this paper, attention is paid to the changes of inbound tourist flows through time in relation to the distance travelled (tourists’ countries of origin) and to the question, how has the role of distance changed through time and which are the factors that have influenced these changes. for the analysis of tourist flows, available data, collected by the statistical office of the republic of slovenia (surs), have been used. in order to make out more general patterns, data on tourist nights spent in regard to tourists’ country of origin (see chapter 4.1.) have been aggregated into five groups: slovenia, neighbouring countries (italy, austria, hungary, croatia), nearby european countries (i.e. countries which are wholly or to a considerable extent within a 500 km radius, excluding neighbouring countries), the other european countries (including only partly european countries, i.e. russia and turkey) and non-european countries. additionally, tourism policy documents were used and available tourism literature has been synthesised. 6 dejan cigale 2. slovenian tourism within yugoslavia before the breakup of yugoslavia, slovenia was moderately popular tourist destination. however, numbers of tourist visits were much smaller than the ones on the (croatian) adriatic coast. slovenia used to be a transit area for tourist flows toward the adriatic coast (mihalič, 1999). despite this, it received many foreign and national overnight visitors. the largest number of tourist arrivals and tourist nights was registered in 1986 (2,821,396 and 9,213,434). afterwards, a decline of the numbers of “domestic” tourists (i.e. tourists from slovenia as well as other yugoslav republics) and tourist nights followed while the number of foreign tourist nights was still increasing and was the highest in 1989. this was the last year with “normal” tourist flows, since the effects of political instability in the country had not yet been obvious. in this year, the number of foreign tourist arrivals was higher than any time during the post-world war ii period. slovenia received 13.0% of all tourist arrivals in the country but only 8.5% of tourist nights. the largest numbers of tourists came from nearby areas (fig. 1). in 1990, 32.8% of tourist nights were spent by slovenian tourists, 9.7% by german and 9.0% by italian tourists. among the tourists from other yugoslav republics, the most numerous were tourists from the neighbouring croatia (8.6% of tourist nights). tourism industry was an important part of slovenian economy. slovenian tourism industry played a major middleman role in distributing foreign visitors to the adriatic (mostly croatian) seaside resorts. the former yugoslavia’s largest travel agencies, kompas and globtour, with their headquarters in slovenia, had in the 1980s a share of close to 50% of package tours and organized leisure stays in the northern adriatic (gosar, 1999, 2001, 2004). slovenian companies also invested into tourist accommodation and infrastructure in several republics of the former federation (gosar, 1999). the breakup of yugoslavia interrupted these connections. 3. slovenian tourism after independence in 1991, with the disintegration of the former common federal yugoslav state, slovenian tourism experienced an unprecedented shock and decline in tourist visits. in june, after slovenia declared independence, armed conflict in slovenia broke out but it was soon finished and the country was spared much of the bloodshed and violence. nevertheless, in 1991 only 4,885,842 tourist nights were registered (61.4% of the 1990 number, i.e. 38.6% drop). although slovenia became an independent state, tourism demand remained under strong influence of the events in the territory of former yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. ethnic violence and war in the neighbourhood stopped most of international arrivals. wars in croatia (1991–1995) and in bosnia and herzegovina (1992–1995) resulted in very small numbers of foreign tourists visiting slovenia. till 1997 number of tourist nights increased to 6,384,062 (fig. 2), what is, in comparison with 1991, only 30.7% growth. despite considerable spatial distance even the influence of the events in kosovo (1998–1999) was strongly felt in slovenian tourism: in fig. 1. share (%) of tourist nights in 1990 by tourists’ country/place of origin source: letni pregled turizma 1990, 1992. some changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia since its independence 7 1998, number of tourist nights dropped to 6,295,308 and in 1999 to only 6,056,563. changes in the volume of tourism demand were, above all, related to the decline in foreign tourist visits, while domestic tourism remained stable or even slightly increased. many slovenian tourists who were used to spending their holidays in the croatian coastal areas stayed in their home country as a result of war in croatia. in 1996, after the end of the war, they returned to croatia (mihalič, 1999) and domestic tourism dropped 5 per cent, compared to 1995. foreign tourism demand grew only gradually and hesitatingly. in 1992, share of foreign overnights was just 39.5% and in 1995 it increased to 41.1%. publicity in the mass media was negative, while even more enduring were the consequences of the fact that slovenia as a tourist destination was put on the black list of tour operators (mihalič, 1999). many tourism businesses were negatively affected by the disintegration of the former common state, in particular, travel agencies (globtour), tour bus enterprises (kompas hertz, slavnik), airlines (adria airways) and excursion resorts (postojna, lipica) (gosar, 1999; 2001). political events triggered various changes in the slovenian tourism industry, e.g. a reduction of available beds and the increase of quality of tourist amenities (gosar, 2004). besides, there were changes in the travel agencies sector. previously, within yugoslavia, a limited number of travel agencies have had a sole control of the market. afterwards, several dozen smaller enterprises controlled similar shares of the market (gosar, 1999). instead of serving as a middleman for the foreign (predominantly german) market, the slovenian travel agencies increasingly served domestic demand (gosar, 1999). in the new millennium, tourism in slovenia has been marked by several events. in 2004, slovenia joined european union, in 2007 adopted the euro as the national currency and in 2009 it joined the schengen area. the direct impacts of these events were not very evident while the indirect ones were doubtlessly much more important. e.g. joining eu meant also the influx of eu funds (butowski, 2010), which were used also for many tourism related projects. the introduction of the euro eliminated exchange-rate transaction costs, facilitated price comparisons in the euro zone, and caused higher prices (nemec rudež, bojnec, 2008). joining the schengen area eliminated border formalities and consequently entirely simplified cross-border tourist flows. in 2008, slovenia was hard hit by the global economic and financial crisis. the consequences were felt also by tourism industry and resulted especially in decline of foreign tourist visitation in 2009 and 2010. tourism has been affected also by environmental processes. in the last couple of decades, the most salient of them is global warming which is of relevance especially for winter tourism resorts 7 9 5 6 4 0 6 4 8 8 5 8 4 2 4 8 8 5 8 4 2 5 3 8 4 6 2 6 5 8 6 5 6 0 8 5 8 8 3 0 4 6 5 8 8 3 0 4 6 6 3 8 4 0 6 2 6 2 9 5 3 0 8 6 2 9 5 3 0 8 6 2 9 5 3 0 8 7 1 2 9 6 0 2 7 3 2 1 0 6 1 7 5 0 2 5 6 9 7 5 8 8 7 3 7 7 5 7 2 5 8 4 7 7 2 2 2 6 7 8 2 6 1 3 0 8 9 3 1 4 0 3 8 9 0 1 3 7 7 3 9 0 1 3 7 7 3 9 0 1 3 7 7 3 1 0 6 0 4 3 5 2 1 0 7 0 8 4 0 8 1 0 7 0 8 4 0 8 1 1 6 5 3 7 6 4 1 2 6 4 7 8 7 6 1 4 2 0 8 5 4 5 1 5 6 9 4 7 0 5 0 2 000 000 4 000 000 6 000 000 8 000 000 10 000 000 12 000 000 14 000 000 16 000 000 18 000 000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 fig. 2. tourist nights in slovenia in the period 1990–2018 source: statistical office of the republic of slovenia, 2019; letni pregledi turizma, 1990–2002. 8 dejan cigale (vrtačnik garbas, 2008, 2009). snow conditions have changed significantly, especially at lower elevations (ogrin et al., 2011). the main adaptation strategy of slovenian ski resorts has been introduction of snow-making facilities (vrtačnik garbas, 2008). in the decades since the independence, slovenian tourism policy experienced fundamental changes. in the 1990s, slovenian tourism industry struggled to survive and this was reflected also in tourism policy with its emphasis on competitiveness and “quality tourism products” (strategija razvoja turizma…, 1994). in 2002, in the strategy of that time, it was for the first time stated, that the new development paradigm of slovenian tourism follows »the concept of sustainable socio-economic development« (kovač et al., 2002). tourism strategy for the period 2012–2016 was even titled partnership for the sustainable development of slovenian tourism (strategija razvoja slovenskega…, 2012). similarly, the recent strategy is named strategy for the sustainable growth of slovenian tourism for 2017–2021 and gives “the utmost emphasis on development of innovative, sustainable [all emphases by the author] and integral tourism products, services and solutions” (mihalič et al., 2017, p. 33). therefore, in the 21st century, slovenian tourism policy is, at least formally, focused on sustainable tourism. the leading discourse is the discourse of sustainable development. in 2018, 5,933,266 tourist arrivals and 15,694,705 tourist nights were registered. in comparison to 2010, when the effects of economic crisis could still be felt, this was 76.2% increase. the majority of foreign tourist nights were spent by germans (8.7% of all tourist nights) and italians (8.5%), while slovenian citizens spent 31.9% of tourist nights. 4. some spatial characteristics of slovenian tourism and their changes slovenia as a tourism space performs various roles. for the majority of tourists, slovenia is only a transit space while their destinations are located on the adriatic coast. even for tourists, who spend at least one night in the country, slovenia is only partly an independent destination. in the summer season 2012 the share of foreign tourists for whom slovenia was the only destination, was just 57.5%, while 42.5% of foreign tourists had at least one travel destination in some other country (statistical office…, 2019). this can be attributed, among other things, to slovenia’s modest territorial size and to the fact that many tourists prefer to link within a single journey visits to several countries. such behaviour is especially characteristic for tourists from more distant (non-european) countries who choose europe or a part of europe (and not exclusively slovenia) as their travel destination. these data show that a considerable share of all tourist travel to slovenia is multi-destination travel (slovenia and at least one other country). even numerous journeys with slovenia as the only visited country are in fact multi-destination journeys. because of slovenia’s modest territorial size, the number of such journeys is comparatively limited. according to the surs surveys among foreign tourists (anketa o tujih turistih…, 2004), in 1994 45.2% of foreign tourists stayed in slovenia for only 1–3 nights, while in the place, where a tourist was interviewed, this share was 62.7%. the difference between both numbers is the result of tourists spending their time in slovenia in more than one place. in the first decade of the 21st century (in 2003), situation was a similar one: 41.7% of foreign tourists spent in slovenia just 1–3 nights while in the place of the interview this share was 54.0%. 4.1. tourists’ countries of origin data on tourism demand have been already briefly presented in chapter 3. in slovenia tourists from nearby regions (neighbouring and other nearby countries, together with slovenia) traditionally prevailed. in the ten year period 2008–2017 the total share of nights spent by tourists from slovenia and from four neighbouring countries varied between 68.3% and 54.5%. beside the changes in the size of tourist flows, one of the most obvious changes in tourism demand in the decade after slovenia’s independence was the spatial shift of the origins of the inbound tourist flows. spatial proximity not only remained an important factor of influence but has even gained in importance. thus, the biggest drop of tourist numbers was characteristic of non-european tourists and tourists from the more distant european countries (»the other european countries«; tab. 1). this was to a large extent related to the quantity of the available information on slovenia and its interpretation. tourists from nearby countries were more familiar with the situation in slovenia; as a result, they returned to slovenia sooner and in greater numbers. another important factor was the behaviour of the various actors (e.g. tour operators, tourists, etc.). in the more distant markets the image of slovenia remained negative throughout the 1990s; the demand was at least till 1995 influenced by the wars in nearby croatia and bosnia and herzegovina and later by events in kosovo (1998–1999). the reaction of tourists from more distant countries was some changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia since its independence 9 stronger because many of them used to visit slovenia by charter flights organised by tour operators. not all destinations were equally affected. spas were not particularly linked to large tour operators (mihalič, 1999). therefore, decline of foreign tourism was less obvious. in some (eg. mountain) destinations, the war caused shift from “package tourism” organised by tour operators to non-organised, individual tourism. tourists from nearby countries, e.g. germany and italy, came to slovenia individually, by cars. they started to come back after the war sooner than the others (mihalič, 1999). the situation at the beginning of the 21st century gradually returned to normality. tourists from the previously key inbound markets to a large extent returned to slovenia. the exception was the area of the former yugoslavia. the dissolution of yugoslavia caused a drastic decline in the numbers of tourists from the other areas of the former common state. in 1990, these tourists spent 21.0% of all tourist nights in slovenia. in the middle of the 1990s (in 1995) their share was just 6.3%. the decline was in a long-term perspective even greater than with other foreign tourists. tourists from the territory of former yugoslavia failed to appear not only during the time of military conflict, which effectively precluded their visits, but also later on (in 2000, the share of tourist nights spent by them was just 6.0%). partly, this can be attributed to the economic problems, related to the chaotic socio-economic and geopolitical situation in the area, and consequently low purchasing power of the majority of the population, and partly, this can be seen as a consequence of the increased perceived distance related to the fact that slovenia was no longer a part of the same country. the entrance into slovenia required increased effort (currency exchange, visa requirements, border formalities). additionally, relations among countries were often rather tense. in 2010, the abolition of visa requirements for tourists from montenegro, macedonia (now north macedonia) and serbia resulted in a more obvious increase in the number of tourists from these countries. the number of nights spent by tourists from macedonia, montenegro, and serbia increased from 167,167 in 2009 to 251,534 (50.5 % increase) in 2010. similar, although more moderate, increase was a consequence of the visa abolition for the tab. 1. shares of tourist nights (in %) by regions in the period 1990–2018 1990 1991 1992 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 slovenia 32.8 55.4 60.5 58.6 49.3 41.9 44.0 35.8 28.8 neighbouring countries 22.2 23.1 21.5 18.7 22.5 25.1 22.3 22.3 21.4 nearby european countries 22.4 12.5 11.9 13.4 15.0 13.0 12.3 14.1 17.2 other european countries 20.1 7.8 5.1 8.0 10.6 16.1 16.5 18.9 22.7 non-european countries 2.5 1.2 1.0 1.4 2.4 3.9 4.8 8.9 9.9 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 note: nearby european countries include bosnia and herzegovina, czechia, germany, montenegro, serbia, slovakia, and switzerland. other european countries include also partly european countries (turkey and russia). 1990 data include other yugoslav republics in other groups of countries (neighbouring countries, nearby european countries, other european countries), although they were part of the same country as slovenia. source: statistical office of the republic of slovenia, 2019; letni pregledi turizma, 1990–2002. tab. 2. nights spent by tourists from the countries with the fastest growth of tourist visitation to slovenia in the period 2008–2017 country tourist nights 2008 tourist nights 2017 % increase republic of korea (south korea) 8,373 163,289 1850.2 china 10,159 89,080 776.9 other asian countries 27,313 203,894 646.5 malta 5,761 27,121 370.8 brazil 6,315 24,165 282.7 other countries of south and middle america 10,827 34,068 214.7 south africa 2,428 7,527 210.0 turkey 20,352 51,901 155.0 source: statistical office of the republic of slovenia, 2019. 10 dejan cigale citizens of bosnia and herzegovina. thus, number of their nights spent increased from 66,611 in 2010 to 70,478 in 2011 (5.8 % increase). irrespective of this, the share of nights spent by tourists from all of the countries in the area of former yugoslavia (excluding slovenia) remains below 7% (6.7% in 2017). on the other hand, increasingly obvious are the changes in the number of arrivals of tourists from the most distant countries. previous focus of slovenian tourism on the european tourists has gradually started to diminish. they have been partly replaced by tourists from other continents. when slovenia was still a part of yugoslavia, the share of non-european tourists was almost negligible. in 1990, the total share of tourist nights of all non-european tourists was 2.5%. in 1992, this share dropped to just 1.0%. likewise, in the middle of the 1990s, this share – because of various reasons (perception of slovenia as a potentially dangerous, politically unstable country, vicinity of war areas, etc.) – remained very low: in 1995 total share of overnights of all non-european tourists was 1.4% (the share of asian overnights just 0.15%). in the last decade, the growth of non-european tourist visits has been gradual, but very evident. in 2010, only 4.8% nights were spent by non-european tourists, while in 2018 this share increased to 9.9%. the increase is not just a consequence of an outstanding growth in only one important non-european market or in a small group of them but is linked to the growth in large number of noneuropean countries (tab. 2). thus, in the ten year period 2008–2017 number of nights spent by tourists from south africa increased by 210% (from 2,428 to 7,527), tourists from brazil by 283% (from 6,315 to 24,165), tourists from china by 777% (from 10,159 to 89,080) while the nights spent by tourists from south korea increased by even 1850% (from 8,373 to 163,289). trends, related to the increase in numbers of tourists from the most distant countries, are reflected also in the data on means of transportation used by foreign tourists. traditionally, the vast majority of tourists came by car. in 1994, among the tourists in the summer season, the share of tourists coming by plane was just 8.5% (anketa o tujih…, 2004). growth of the non-european tourist arrivals (and arrivals of tourists from a more distant european countries) resulted in the increase of tourists coming by plane to 24.4% in 2015 (statistical office…, 2019). 4.2. spatial distribution of tourist flows within slovenia another aspect of the spatial changes in the slovenian tourism is related to the spatial distribution of tourist flows within the territory of slovenia. in the second half of the 20th century – apart from some relatively isolated tourist resorts dispersed fig. 3. tourist nights by municipalities in 2018 source: statistical office of the republic of slovenia, 2019. some changes in the spatial characteristics of tourism in slovenia since its independence 11 throughout slovenian territory (especially spas in the eastern half of slovenia) – three distinct concentrations of tourism demand were easily recognisable (fig. 3). the first, spatially the least extensive, was the area of the slovenian capital of ljubljana, while the other two were more extensive: the julian alps area in north-western slovenia and slovenian istria, i.e. the seaside municipalities. the popularity of these places was linked to especially attractive natural settings (alpine mountains, adriatic sea) or urban tourism attractions. the popularity of particular areas has been constantly changing, although the changes were very gradual. in 1990, the relative majority (26.4%) of all tourist nights was spent in slovenian istria (tab. 3). its main attraction was, of course, the adriatic sea coast. to a lesser extent, the area was attracting tourists by its entertainment opportunities (especially in portorož) and cultural heritage (piran). the majority of tourist nights was spent by foreign (non-yugoslav) tourists (in 1990 66.0%), followed by slovenian (25.6%) and (other) yugoslav tourists (8.4%). in 1991, the number of foreign tourists drastically fell. as a result, the share of slovenian istria in the total number of tourist nights in slovenia dropped to just 20.5%. at the beginning of the 21st century the tourism image of slovenia was no longer associated with war and political instability and foreign tourists returned to istria. the share of nights spent in seaside resorts increased to the pre-war level and even exceeded it a little. afterwards, another drop (tab. 3) could be observed – primarily as a consequence of higher growth in several regions in the interior of slovenia. in the last years, numbers of tourists are still moderately increasing, but slovenian istria is already a mature tourism area and there are limited growth possibilities. julian alps were attracting tourists because of visually attractive mountain scenery, outdoor recreation opportunities, and winter tourism offer, related to alpine skiing. even to a larger extent than slovenian istria, some municipalities in the julian alps depended on foreign tourism (bled in the first place). after the breakup of yugoslavia, the share of julian alps in slovenian tourism declined from 23.4% tourist nights in 1990 to 17.8% in 1992. till 2010, the share of tourist nights, spent in this region, was around 20%. the changes in the last decade caused very explicit growth of the share of julian alps: in 2018, it was even 24.5%. winter tourism remains stable despite the problems, related to unreliable snow cover. its survival has been made possible by investments into snow-making equipment and by the fact that in the majority of cases summer season was traditionally of equal (or even greater) importance as the winter season (cigale, 2013). in summer, various forms of outdoor recreation (adventure tourism) are gaining in importance. bled as probably the most recognisable slovenian tourist destination (along with ljubljana) has also become a frequent part of european travel itineraries. in 2017, in bled the largest number of nights was spent by tourists from the united kingdom (11.9%), followed by germans (9.2%), italians (8.5%), tourists from the united states (6.3%) and tourists from “other asian countries” (i.e. the sum of all asian countries, with the exception of israel, china, japan and republic of korea, and, of course, russia and turkey; 5.9%). the most marked growth has been experienced by the slovenian capital of ljubljana. ljubljana has been traditionally slovenian cultural, administrative and economic centre; therefore, a typical urban tourism has been developed. in 1990, 7.2% of tourist nights in slovenia were registered in ljubljana. the capital’s share remained small throughout the 1990s (tab. 3) and in 2000 it was just 5.5%. in the last two decades, many changes (numerous events, introduction of pedestrian zones, old city centre renewal, etc.) have contributed to the increase of tourism attractiveness of ljubljana. in 2018, after several years of constant increase of tourist numbers, 13.9% of all tourist nights were spent in ljubljana. for the first time after 1991 it was the most visited slovenian tourist destination. therefore, the data show that a spatial reconfiguration of slovenian tourism took place, but only to a limited extent. the growth of the significance of the slovenian capital should be mentioned in the tab. 3. tourist nights by regions in % (1990–2018) 1990 1991 1992 2000 2010 2018 slovenian istria 26.4 20.5 24.8 28.0 22.2 19.2 julian alps 23.4 21.8 17.8 19.8 19.9 24.5 ljubljana 7.2 6.6 7.8 5.5 8.3 13.9 slovenia 100 100 100 100 100 100 note: julian alps area: the present-day municipalities bled, bohinj, gorje, kranjska gora, jesenice, radovljica, bovec, kobarid, tolmin, žirovnica; slovenian istria: the present-day municipalities piran, izola, koper, ankaran. source: statistical office of the republic of slovenia, 2019; letni pregledi turizma, 1990–2002. 12 dejan cigale first place. it is becoming a very popular destination of “global tourists”, who are visiting europe or central europe (and not just slovenia). on the other hand, strengthening of mountain destinations of the julian alps took place as well. nowadays, their attraction is not related solely to aesthetic qualities of the mountain landscapes, but to an increasing extent to a numerous outdoor recreation opportunities, including artificial ones (e.g. bike parks, zip-line, etc.). it should also be pointed out that, since 1991, the concentration of tourist visits to these three areas has even intensified: the share of nights spent increased from 48.9% in 1991 to 57.6% in 2018. 5. conclusions slovenian tourism after the independence underwent numerous changes, related to various factors. its development was partly influenced by processes within the country and partly by more general social and environmental processes. this paper has focused only on some aspects of these changes. among them are, in the first place, the ones, which are reflected in the changes of spatial characteristics of tourism. spatial distribution of tourist flows within slovenia in the last three decades has been relatively stable. concentrations of tourism have been related to spatially fixed place attributes, especially attributes of natural environment. despite changing tastes and fashions, these attributes retain their importance, although their role can be changed or re-evaluated. inbound tourist flows to slovenia have been more dynamic and affected by a wide array of factors. the most evident change is a strongly increased number of non-european tourists. on the one hand, it is influenced by slovenian tourism policy, marketing and promotion activities, increasing diversity and richness of tourism offer, etc. on the other hand, it is affected by numerous interrelated events and processes on the global level, e.g. an increase of intercontinental tourist flows, especially from asia, increasingly simplified travel planning and preparation (growing availability of information, ease of booking of various tourism services, etc.), which facilitate travel also for independent travellers, redirection of tourist flows to europe (including slovenia) because of deteriorating security and safety situation in several previously popular tourist destinations, etc. the observed changes point out the fact that slovenian tourism is increasingly embedded into globalization processes. these processes are, of course, not limited just to the increased share of tourists from non-european countries. globalization related processes include the foreign ownership of tourism enterprises (accommodation facilities, transport companies, both major airports, etc.), increasingly international workforce in tourism, or the increasing role of web sites, such as booking.com and airbnb. although “time-space compression” is very evident also within tourism, the role of distance is still very important and it greatly affects the nature of tourist flows in slovenia. the majority of tourists still come from relatively nearby areas. this is especially true for short vacation trips, which are growing in importance. the regional tourist flows in the majority of slovenian 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(eng. climate change: damnation or opportunity for winter sport centres in slovenia?), geografski obzornik, 55(1/2), 25–31. vrtačnik garbas k., 2009, razvojne možnosti zimskošportnih središč v sloveniji v luči klimatskih sprememb (eng. developmental possibilities of winter-sport centres in slovenia in the light of climate change), academica turistica, 2(1–2), 56–62. 1. introduction nowadays the state building requires new approaches aimed at managing the political and social development. the reforms in the political and administrative spheres require changes in the way of communication between institutions, affect the system qualities of their components, and require the use of modern approaches to politics and public administration. this is reflected in the development trends under which the government system, presented by an interaction of a large group of hierarchically dependent managers, no longer remains a superstructure that controls the development of the society and under the influence of democratic processes gradually transforms into institutions providing public services to society. it leads to a system approach implementation, which has been practically applied in the political and social management, meets the demands of the time and aims at provision of social and psychological conditions for political and administrative interaction. paper objective is to substantiate the use of a system approach in the political-administrative management in order to improve the efficiency of administrative activity under the conditions of social transformation. 2. theoretical aspects of system approach to management it should be noted that the public-political relations – is a specific branch of social life with its funjournal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(1), 37-42 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.005.5161 a system approach in the political-administrative management igor reshevets regional development and local self-government department, kharkiv regional institute of public administration, national academy of public administration under the office of the president of ukraine, prospect maskovskiy 75, 61001, kharkiv, ukraine e-mail: lerhnettv@mail.ru citation reshevets i., 2015, a system approach in the political-administrative management, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(1), 37-42. abstract the article presents the results of the study on a system approach in the political-administrative management in order to improve the efficiency of administrative activity under the social transformation conditions. the system approach value in the process of a modern ukrainian state development is grounded. key words public administration, political and administrative management, governance paradigm, system approach, management interaction, managing group dynamics, group processes management. 38 igor reshevets damental laws, internal links, development sources and environment interdependence channels. an unsurpassed heuristic impact on conditionality processes conception in political life has been made by a system approach which developed in the western political sociology in the mid-twentieth century. the most important principles of this approach are: • integrity of the system, i.e. a new state of connected various events and institutions, generating new properties and features of a single entity; • quantity and variety of internal and external systems links which reflect the complexity and richness of relationships between elements in the middle of integrity and interactions with the environment; • viability of the system is determined by the balance of interaction processes; change and stability, upgrades and preservation; implementation and routine, etc. system approach function is to identify the means of achieving and maintaining a balanced, stable condition of a political and administrative system, its ability to adapt to the external environment. the modern world is becoming more complex; the risk of global disasters, crises and conflicts is increasing, because of social, economic, ethnic, national, environmental, demographic and other reasons. the understanding of the complexity of the processes of social and political development and the need for their regulation is the order of the day. the political and administrative system in all its structural and functional diversity is a means of social integration, containment of damaging effects of destructive processes and indigenous social differences for a single interconnected existence of the social elements. new trends in policy and management development are to shift attention to process management and the human factor activation. it requires from the politicians and civil servants to take over new types of competencies, including group dynamics menegement and group processes management which are becoming particularly important in the context of policy and management cooperation, interpersonal and group awareness phenomena, psychological competence. a new wave of modern political development is based on increasing importance of a human factor as the central one in the strategic and tactical management. a holistic management paradigm is becoming increasingly popular as it challenges the linear thinking and helps to integrate different management approaches. tom peters and robert waterman in their study of 62 successful us companies point to a new period of management theory evolution: “in stead of rational actors comes a complex social and active image – a man with the achievements and shortcomings, limitations, contradictions and even irrationality. teams, isolated from the outside world, are changed by an organization affected by constantly moving highly dynamic set of forces – the objectives, means and external transformations” (питерс, 2011). in the area of policy and management interaction system approach technologies in managing organizational processes can be used in solving the following managerial tasks: • decision-making; • management relations improvement; • provision of social and psychological support of managerial activities; • policy-making; • distribution and delegation of authority; • self-management; • feedback provision; • the monitoring system improvement; • identification of management aspects which require assistance, training and research. every management system has a huge potential that can remain unrealized. application of system approach technologies in political and administrative activity has already found its practical implementation, because their ideology is based on common patterns of interaction between living systems and the environment. herewith, if the need for individual development can be satisfied at a personal level, it will probably correlate with the process of group, organization or community life at the “social organism” level. system theories in the context of administrative activity optimization as one of the important aspects of modern management have been reflected in studies of western scholars u. grau et al. (1988). an important aspect of the practical application of psychological counseling technologies is their usage in decision-making processes. summarizing practical experience of system technologies application in administrative cooperation processes, we can formulate the main goal of their implementation: management of social development processes, ensurance of human resources efficient use, their professional and social development (афонін et al. (eds.), 2010). application of system approach technologies in administrative activity is an important lever for improving interactions of political and administrative management as their scientific and practical achievements are looking for the answers to the question what determine the efficiency of administrative cooperation? in the process of political and administrative interaction the feature of system counseling is a sysa system approach in the political-administrative management 39 tem view of the existing situation and the subject of system consultants’ activity is to focus their attention on the living system of relationships that can be presented through a variety of its manifestations, namely: • managerial (who sets the rules, what rules have power); • functional (ways of communication and interaction, coalitions, alliances, symptoms and their functional role in the system); • morphological (structure, organization construction in terms of hierarchy and borders, organization history and myths); • axiological (values, precepts of previous generations). the hypothesis of problem areas availability and strategies for further development of the system are based around these concepts. the focus of their work is a system understanding of the issue, which reflects the main idea of a problem emergence where it’s not a system that „has” a problem, but rather the opposite – a situationally characterized system is created around some fortuitous behavior, activity or topic in the process of communication about the problem. from a perspective system approach scientists propose an algorithm of detection and identification of problematic issues as those that can lead to a system approach in management. according to k. ludewig (2002, p. 98), a problem is “any communication subject that contains undesirable but potentially able to change components”, that is someone sees as an undesirable condition requiring changes. the scientist offers a step by step algorithm to determine and identify a problem that can be applied to make analysis in politics and public administration. this algorithm includes the following components: 1. “condition”: the problem is determined by experts or participants of a public management process as a certain condition. that means that the priorities were selected: from many simultaneous processes one or some were chosen and placed in the spotlight. this condition is given its own name, and other processes retreat into the background. 2. “who?” are experts: the identification and description of a particular “condition” is carried out by one or more observers who define such a “condition” as an important, draw attention to it and can agree or argue about it. 3. ”undesirable, or one that requires changes”: there are experts of this condition who see it as undesirable for public management, or as one that requires changes. this is the basis for own motivation or for encouraging others to make changes. 4. ”capacity for change”: condition of public management activity is subject to change and there are at least some experts describing it as capable of change. as well as there are those in public management process who can take responsibility, or at least believe that the situation can be changed. the interaction of these four abovementioned factors determines the complete description of the problem and is an important part of the consultation process. its purpose is to identify (detect) links and people involved in the problem situation and therefore – their “live” inclusion or, at least, alleged one in the process of solving problems. thus, all the process participants who recognize this problem and have undesirable consequences from it are taken into account. in general, systemic counseling should be seen as an attempt to transfer problematic condition into unproblematic one which means an attempt to find an adequate solution. this strategy is implemented through various approaches: the initiation of new processes or new conditions, another assessment of the existing problem (positive reinterpretation), that is called reframing in neurolinguistic programming framework, i.e. new reformulation. the feasibility and nature of psychological system consultation is well reflected in the following statement: “the challenge is not whether here should come all those whom the problem concerns, – the challenge is: here may come anyone who is able and can contribute to solving problems” (фон шліппе, 2004). 3. the system approach introduction to political and administrative management the concept of political and administrative management can not be considered without communication, interaction, influence. in the course of this interaction managerial influence is exercised and effectiveness and implementation of public policies and social development are stipulated for. the political process covers the political system of the society, the functioning of which is provided through a specific interaction among policy actors (головатий, 2005). the main content of the political process is a set of actions taken by political subjects in order to implement their political interests. in the most general terms the political process is a “form of a political system of the society which evolves in space and time” (головатий, 2005). the political process is developing together with the political 40 igor reshevets system and depends on factors that are part of the political system and the political process. the basis of political and public administrative activity process is made up with relationships which are developing in the process of interaction. “certain relations on the policy itself and its individual features (components), such as power” belong to the political interaction (головатий, 2005). any interaction, including political, exists in two basic forms: informal and formal (through political institutions – formal structures or with their help) (головатий, 2005). moreover, relations within the government include: • relationship between the politician and his political group; • relationship developing within the political group; • relationship between the political leader and a member of a political party; • relationship developing among political groups. power relations (between those who govern and those who are governed): • relationship between any politician and government authorities; • relationship between a political group and government authorities. relations within the social system: • relationship between any politician and social groups; • relationship between a political group and communities. essentially psychological process of any social interaction is performed by certain actors – individuals, groups, masses. for all that each of them interreacts more or less under the conditions of the current social environment. the combination of such conditions and interactions forms a kind of “socio-psychological field” (which in different paradigms is also called “social context”, „inter-subjective foundation of social actions”, “collective fabric”, etc.). the concepts of “field”, “space” are here mostly figurative in nature (донченко, романеско, 2001). any interaction and any possible relationship are possible in community with other people and stipulate for the impact of an individual and groups of people on the management process and a return impact of management relations on the psychology of an individual or a group. the effectiveness of joint interaction is influenced by various factors: executives’ legal authority, work incentives, age and gender differences, personal relationships and more. interaction mechanism shortcomings also manifest themselves in various forms: conflicts, psychological barriers, etc. as a result of a contact setting among people there is an influence of one person on another, information exchange and development of a common strategy for interaction, perception, understanding of another person. communication satisfies the need for another person. communication is important in the formation of the human psyche, person’s development and the formation of reasonable, cultural behavior. through communication a person acquires and develops all his higher cognitive abilities and qualities, through active intercommunication he becomes a personality himself. system consulting in organizational processes management draws attention to the importance of the activity that can be carried out being aware of the dominant needs of the individual and the dominant group or organization needs, realization of significant objects or subjects of the environment which can help to satisfy this need, and awareness of ways of interacting with them. system approach emphasizes mutual influences that make up the system, the importance of the context in which the interaction occurs and draws attention to the lack of a single recipe for achivieving success in different kinds of systems. this is based on the assumption that the originality and uniqueness of an individual or a separate organization and the environment, in which they are located, may contribute to their adoption of “authorship” or responsibility for the choice of aims and means, as well as motivate them for changes. this approach brings not only an individual system but also an organization system to another level of development and opens up wide opportunities for the needs satisfaction, their coordination and achievement of the objectives of the management system development. the application of psychological technologies in the management interaction process has its own peculiarity, which is a prerequisite for their effectiveness. the special features of a consultating process in management include the following: • the specific content of this activity; • the structure of public management; • solution targeting; • traditions and rules existing in public institutions; • factors of professional impact on the personalityof a public manager; • characteristics and patterns of interaction; • short durability; • focus on resources. based on the system theory of public authority’s levels – these are its system components in relation to the context. any system is both a whole and a part a system approach in the political-administrative management 41 of a larger system. as well as people who work in the organization, on the one hand, are an independent whole system, and on the other hand they are the constituent elements of a larger system. the boundaries between the system and the environment (and among units within the system) first create identity of the system or its parts, its uniqueness – difference from the environment and other systems. in management systems, complex in structure, there is a constant tension between integration (awareness of the whole – we) and differentiation (awareness of its own autonomy – i). hereat the parts can contribute to the whole, subjecting their goals to it and sharing their purposes, or, what often occurs, causing imbalance. there are three levels of organization – individual, group and organizational. system consulting in organization management deal with six major levels: an individual or intrapersonal, interpersonal, subgroup (sub level), group or collective, and intergroup level of an integrated organization. and we always have to take into account how the interaction in the middle of the system occurs and how the system interacts with the environment. in this case, two more levels are added tj the analysis: a society level and a culture level (лєбєдєва, 2009). according to the needs each level provides the system interaction with the environment and has a tendency for another level interaction. the concept of “interaction” is extremely multiciphered. in terms of philosophy, this category is one of the common forms of relationship between phenomena. its essence is to reverse the impact of one object or phenomenon to another. so interaction reproduces processes of objects impact at each other, their mutual conditionality and the derivation of one object from another. in sociology the definition of “social interaction” is used to determine such forms of communication among people, social communities, groups where there is a system impact made on each other, social performance of each partner is realized, adjustment of one’s actions and to another’s actions is achieved, a community in understanding the situation, sense of actions and a certain level of solidarity or agreement between them. a society is a complex system of interactions among people. various social relations, the subject of which is a personality, are conditioned by diverse social interests. social relations have an objective character, but for every person they, refracting through his inner world, obtain a personal color, which is manifested in a particular human behavior, his feelings, sentiments, etc. that is why an interpersonal social and psychological aspect of social relations appears as a fact of the specific reality. so interpersonal relationships are formed not outside public relations but in their midst as personified reflection of impersonal social ties. in other words, in the interaction social relations are “given” through that real social activity, the part (or a form of an organization) of which it is. all interactions are traditionally divided into two groups: cooperation and competition. the first group includes actions that promote the organization of joint activities and ensure their success, consistency, efficiency (there are other terms to refer to this type of interaction: cooperation, consent, adjustment, association). the second group includes actions which to some extent prevent joint activities, creating barriers to understanding. this type of interaction defines such concepts as competition, conflict, opposition, dissociation. this classification uses the so-called dichotomous division of all kinds of interactions. another classification is based on a quantitative aspect which refers to the number of entities involved in the interaction. according to this classification interaction among groups, between an individual and a group, between two individuals are distinguished (афонін et al. (eds.), 2010). it should be noted that in the management process the implementation of innovative changes are accompanied by resistance, because the system needs time in order to estimate future benefits. resistance forms can vary. passive resistance becomes apparent in hiding and ignoring information, solutions, in delaying their adoption and implementation, in limiting the initiators’ activity and other factors. active resistance may include providing false information, intentionally false orders, and diversion of resources to other purposes. “usually the resistance depends on the destruction degree of established life foundations, traditions, customs, principles and rules; on speed and intensity of understanding the need for change process, involving people, trust in the initiators and leaders” (загороднюк, 2000). j.  pfeffer (2007) defines power as “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance and force people to do things that otherwise would not be made”. 4. conclusions in the interaction of politics and management a system approach can be used to solve management problems, to find optimal solutions, to identify and reformulate the problematic situation. the feasibility of a system approach depends on the ability of managers to contribute to the solution of the existing problems of state-management. 42 igor reshevets the system approach to the process of politics and management interaction has its own specificity, which is a prerequisite for its effectiveness. it is likely that on the way of its implementation into public authoritative bodies the resistance can arise which can be caused by psychological braking factors (or psychological barriers). system approach reveals the essence of political and administrative coherence; provides tools for analysis of interaction forms with nature, economy, culture and social structure; highlights channels of influence of political and managerial behavior on the nature of political and administrative institutions and structures. references grau u., möller j., gunnarsson j.i., 1988, a new concept of counselling: a systemic approach for counselling coaches in team sports, applied psychology, 37(1), 65–83. ludewig k., 2002, leitmotive systemischer therapie, klettcotta, stuttgart. pfeffer j., 2007, what were they thinking: unconventional wisdom about management, harvard business school press, brighton. афонін е. а., бережний я. в., валевський о. л. (eds), 2010, концептуальні засади взаємодії політики й управління, наду, київ. головатий м. ф., 2005, політичний менеджмент, навчальний посібник, мауп, київ. донченко о. а., романеско ю. в., 2001, архетипи соціального життя і політика, либідь, київ. загороднюк с. в., 2000, управлінське спілкування як засіб оптимізації професійної діяльності державних службовців, [in:] збірник наукових праць, видавництво уаду, київ, 346-352. лєбєдєва н. м., 2009, організаційне консультування: гештальт-підхід, видавництво речь, санкт-петербург. питерс t., 2011, в поисках совершенства. уроки самых успешных кампаний америки, альпина паблишер, москва. фон шліппе а., 2004, системна психотерапія та консультування, внтл-класика, львів. 1. introduction 2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the beginning of democratic changes in bulgaria. while neighbouring romania underwent a bloody revolution, and yugoslavia, a series of violent civil wars, bulgaria managed to go thought the system change peacefully. there was a fundamental shift in the geopolitical position of bulgaria in that period. ideological priorities have been re-evaluated and the political and economic relations were thoroughly reoriented geographically. the same happened to the bulgarian governments’ approach to internal geopolitics. the most fundamental changes occurred in the state’s policy towards its muslim minority, especially towards the turks. in the mid-1980s, at the end of the communist journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(4), 12–23 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.4.02 bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019) valentin mihaylov institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, faculty of natural sciences, university of silesia, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-5888-6583 e-mail: valentin.mihaylov@us.edu.pl citation mihaylov v., 2019, bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019), journal of geography, politics and society, 9(4), 12–23. abstract until the late 1980s and the dawn of the end of the eastern bloc, communist bulgaria was considered to be the closest ally of the soviet union. now, 30 years later, the bulgarian state has been integrated into the main euro-atlantic organisations. taking these radical changes as its starting point, this article outlines the process and consequences of post-1989 geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation of bulgaria. the aim was also to present the main geopolitical challenges in bulgaria’s relations with russia and turkey. these states have been influencing the political, economic and cultural development of bulgaria for centuries. the effects of their influence have remained problematic to this day. as bulgaria remains a country with a complex geopolitical position, it continues its twentieth-century strategy and tries to maintain balance between its own national interest and the influence of the main centres of power. the author draws particular attention to the fact that the model based on the variability of geopolitical priorities was once again confirmed in the analysed period. this model is not only based on pragmatism in relations with the outside world, which is traditional for the bulgarian political elite, but is also dependant on the temporary distribution of power within the balkan geopolitical knot. it seems that the model will continue to be valid, at least in the near future. key words bulgaria, balkans, european union, russia, geopolitical reorientation, energy geopolitics. received: 10 october 2019 accepted: 04 november 2019 published: 31 december 2019 bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019) 13 era, the state apparatus began to use various measures aimed at denationalising and assimilating this population, a significant part of which was forced to flee to turkey. as a result, bulgaria was internationally isolated. however, when todor zhivkov was removed from power, the discriminatory laws were very quickly removed from the books. bulgaria has become an example of ethnic and religious tolerance (lütem, 1999; anagnostou, 2005), which has undoubtedly become a great asset in the process of euro-atlantic integration. given the fundamental transformation of bulgaria’s geopolitical position on the map of eurasia, the article attempts to formulate a synthetic overview of the results of this evolution, indicating the most significant changes which have taken place in 1989–2019. it is an important and timely issue, as 30 years after the political changes, there has been a recent increase in eurocepticism. just like poland and hungary, bulgaria is influenced by an internal, heated debate over advantages and disadvantages of its presence within the european community and the issue of its national sovereignty. one of the main reasons for addressing this topic in this article is the fact that publications devoted to the geopolitics and foreign policy of contemporary bulgaria are few and far between in english-language literature and their scope is often limited to repeating general stereotypes. there have been several comparative analyses of bulgaria and romania with an emphasis on the countries’ economic problems, their difficulties with adopting the eu regulations and their contribution to nato military operations (e.g. linden, 2009), as well as publications focused on bulgaria’s role in the security policy in the balkans and the black sea region (tashev, 2005; triantaphyllou, 2007) and bulgaria’s place in modern energy geopolitics (tchalakov et al., 2013; maltby, hiteva, 2017; tchalakov, mitev, 2019). this article presents and discusses the ideas of selected bulgarian geopoliticians and takes into account the deeper historical context, which is necessary to understand the complex geopolitical situation of bulgaria and its centuries-old attempts to conduct multi-vector relations on a european and global scale. without this context, knowledge of bulgaria’s geopolitical identity would be not even incomplete but simply devoid of objectivity and cognitive depth. these are the factors that are necessary to predict possible scenarios of future actions of the state on the international stage. 2. bulgaria’s geopolitical identification the geopolitical orientation of each state, bulgaria’s in particular, depends on the dynamics of european and world geopolitics, as well as internal political and ideological conditions. in the era dominated by the confrontation between the eastern and western bloc (1945–1990), the socialist identity of bulgaria, and of other eastern bloc countries, was the only applicable or rather the only possible option. there were no alternatives during this period, because there was only one geopolitical division in europe – into socialist and capitalist states. understanding bulgaria’s geopolitics is impossible without knowledge of its long and complicated history (the beginnings of the bulgarian state date back to the end of the seventh century), which is inextricably linked to bulgaria’s location within the balkan geopolitical knot, between europe and asia, at the meeting point between orthodoxy, western christianity and islam. the interests of great powers have always collided within this complex space. these conditions and complex environment, especially after the end of the nineteenth century, have made it impossible to maintain a clear geopolitical line, with clearly defined allies and enemies, for a longer period of time. it is particularly true in the case of small and medium-sized countries that are unable to conduct independent geopolitical strategies and always have to take into account the interests of larger, economically and militarily stronger countries when defining their own objectives. as noted by s. siedlecka and m. sułkowski (2017), bulgarian compasses point in the west-east direction, where west means technology and money, and east means raw materials. v. krăstev (2008) emphasised that bulgaria’s position in the geopolitical structure of the world is determined by several objective premises: the geographical location of the state’s territory, the neighbouring geopolitical regions (eurasia, central europe, western europe, middle east, etc.); its close proximity of conflict-driven and unstable regions, and location in the heart of the balkan geopolitical knot. the key elements of bulgaria’s geopolitical potential include the size of its territory (111 thousand km2) and population (7 million people in 2018). another indicator is gdp, which shows the country’s global economic position. according to the world bank, bulgaria’s gdp amounted to usd 65 billion in 2018, which gave the country 74th place among 205 countries across the world (the word bank, nd). all these basic data indicate that the rank of bulgaria’s geopolitical position is relatively low, both on the global and continental scale. the state’s geopolitical 14 valentin mihaylov orientation is highly dependent on strong external influences, mainly those of great powers (krăstev, 2008). in the early 1990s, many varied, foremost nonstandard suggestions concerning the future place of bulgaria within the political and civilization geography of europe were made both by politicians and academics. the place dictates specific geopolitical priorities of the state. in the opinion of political scientist kiril neshev, bulgaria’s old strategic path led either in the direction of north-west (germany) or north-east (russia). however, according to neshev, these geostrategic directions did not bring much benefit to the country. he did not recommend completely ignoring the north-west and north-east axes in the new post-1990 reality, but recommended supplementing them with another geopolitical direction – south and southwest, aimed at such countries as greece, spain or portugal. this political scientist justified his idea by stating that there are more similarities between bulgarians and southern europeans not only in terms of their temperament and way of life, but also in the scope of tradition, culture and economy (neshev, 1994). in one of the few monographs devoted to the political geography of bulgaria, todor hristov combined an analysis of the geopolitical situation of the state with an attempt to formulate a list of priorities for its geostrategy and foreign policy. according to the author, bulgaria’s main assets are its black sea coast, which it shares with significant countries, i.e. russia, ukraine and turkey, the fact that the national territory belongs to the danube’s geopolitical and economic axis, and its location on the routes which connect transport corridors with the baltic region, belarus, russia, moldova, romania and the aegean sea, as well as turkey and the middle east with the balkans and central and western europe (hristov, 2001). in the context of the macedonian-albanian conflict, which began at the dawn of the twenty-first century, t. hristov proposed a non-standard solution – reorganisation of macedonia on a federal basis or even establishment of a federation composed of bulgaria, serbia and macedonia. e. kazakov, a specialist in foreign policy, whose research and analytical skills were shaped under the influence of the french school of geopolitics, highlighted two fundamental aspects of the impact of the new post-1990 geopolitical situation on bulgaria’s foreign policy. first of all, in the strategic foreign policy approach, there is a unanimous agreement as to the state’s main goal – belonging to the european union. secondly, the structure of bulgaria’s foreign policy and geostrategic thinking remains divided in an antagonistic way. the main geostrategic dividing line passes between “neutralists” and “atlanticists”. big differences are also noticeable between “rightwing” and “left-wing” nationalism. “left-wing” nationalism sees the orthodox religion and slavic solidarity as values, which makes russia, serbia and greece its natural main allies. on the other hand, “right-wing” nationalism is excessively focused, especially in historic terms, on macedonia, defending the thesis of the bulgarian character of its slavic population. in the context of the “right-wing” nationalism, bulgaria’s opponents and allies are defined solely on the basis of the principle stating that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. as emphasised by kazakov, this is the basis upon which right-wing nationalists have identified their enemies (yugoslavia/serbia, greece and russia) and allies (germany, croatia and turkey) almost throughout the entire twentieth century (kazakov, 2007). taking into account the dynamics of the situation in eurasia and bulgaria’s position in the international arena, s. ralchev (2015) describes bulgaria as a state with dichotomous identity. on the one hand, its membership in nato and the eu places bulgaria among the countries of the euro-atlantic geopolitical circle whose objectives have been growing increasingly divergent from russia’s since 2013–2014, slowly turning into open distrust and political hostility. on the other hand, the country remains relatively strongly dependant on russia. this dependency is determined by several factors: energy dependence (e.g.: bulgaria imports 90-100% of its natural gas from russia; since 1999 its sole oil refinery is owned by russian lukoil); bulgaria is dependent on spare parts and maintenance of its military equipment, most of it russian-made; russian tourists are among the most numerous and well-off foreign tourists in bulgaria. the fact that relations between the countries of the eu-russia-turkey have chilled and became more ambiguous has a clear negative impact on bulgaria as a country located on the border between east and west. the shift is in turn motivated by the fact that whenever bulgarian governments and their advisers define strategic geopolitical priorities, they have to strive to maintain equilibrium between: (1) its current commitments to its allies and democratic values; (2) two eurasian powers with which bulgarian society has very deep historical connections and relations, which are additionally determined by geography, demography and economy (especially in the energy sector). it can therefore be concluded that although the importance of some of the above-mentioned premises can be slowly minimised, they cannot be completely eliminated from geopolitical and geohistorical awareness of the bulgarian society. bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019) 15 3. from the closest ally of the soviet union to a nato member. bulgaria’s repositioning in the european and global geopolitical space 1989 is the beginning of a new historical phase for the geopolitics of bulgaria. however, it its worth to start by first identifying the difference between the current geopolitics and the strategies which dominated in the previous decades of the twentieth century. from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of world war ii, bulgaria was politically, militarily and economically connected with germany and austria, which it supported during both world wars. in september 1944, the communists, who had hitherto constituted the main force acting against the progerman regime, seized control of the country with the help of the red army, which did not in fact carry out war operations on the territory of bulgaria. tens of thousands of pre-war politicians, entrepreneurs and intellectuals who were associated or suspected of having ties with western european countries, not only fascist germany, were removed from power, and often killed. this was the context in which a new socialist identity was imposed on bulgaria, and the state spent 45 years as a member of the communist bloc. at that time, bulgaria became the state which had the closest relation with the soviet union. after 1989, a new radical concept was formed in accordance to which bulgarians had to make a “civilisational choice” between the “liberal and rich” euro-atlantic west and the “totalitarian and poorer” russia. the freedom, prosperity and security of bulgarians depended, and still depends, on this choice. since the beginning of the 1990s, the state’s foreign policy has gradually begun to support the priorities of western powers and their approach to solving urgent international problems, including those taking place beyond the bulgarian western border. the old ideology of the slavic and orthodox “brotherhood” was forgotten, giving way to cool-headed pragmatism, and the government supported nato’s intervention in yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. this position was most accurately summed up in the then political slogan – “nato – yes, milošević – no”. the right-wing nationalists (in kazakov’s understanding of the term) were in power at that point. still, most of the population strongly opposed the use of military to resolve the conflict. however, after the end of the cold war, bulgaria’s traditional enemy and historical partitioner, turkey, became one of its most significant geopolitical and geoeconomic partners. since the very beginning of bulgaria’s political transformation, the country’s bilateral relations with ankara have been based on an unprecedentedly positive and open dialogue. the two countries are also connected by their membership in nato (mihaylov, 2010a, 2010b). after the dissolution of the warsaw pact, bulgaria had to reorient itself in the new security situation and decided to focus on the nato membership. after joining this organisation in 2004, bulgaria became a member of the largest military alliance in the world, seven years after the country’s membership aspirations had been first announced by its then president. political circles which immediately after 1989 opposed such a solution, fearing that it may lead to a direct confrontation with russia, have long reconciled with bulgaria’s nato membership. the country took part in military operations in afghanistan, iraq and afghanistan, and four military bases were created on the territory of bulgaria, primarily used by the us. those who oppose nato bases in bulgaria, usually leftist in their political orientations, are critical of foreign bases, arguing that even during the communist era, there was no soviet army, representing the “big brother” of the time, stationed in bulgaria. a similar response arose in mid-2019, when a contract was signed for the purchase of eight american f-16 block 70 fighters, which are to be delivered by the end of 2023, with eight more arriving in the future. the public opinion does not oppose the idea of purchasing a new generation of fighters for the bulgarian air force to replace the outdated and depleted russian air planes. still, a heat discussion arose in response to the high price of the fighters ($ 1.256 billion), which was especially strongly criticised by left-wing president, rumen radev, a general and military pilot. additionally, some part of the public opinion opposed the deal due to unfavourable conditions, i.e. the requirement to prepay the entire amount, which forced an update of the state budget. at the beginning of the twenty-first century, external relations with the european union are the most important in both political and economic terms. the rapprochement and integration with the european community was the leading priority of the state after the fall of communism (tab. 1). when bulgaria acceded to the eu on 1 january 2007, some state politicians described this event as the most achievement achievement in the long national history. compared to the first half of the twentieth century, the direction of the western bulgarian geopolitics was significantly diversified in the postcommunist period. there have been some changes in relations with the west, which were dictated by the new distribution of forces within this geopolitical and cultural circle. the united states’s presence in the southeastern europe became significant only 16 valentin mihaylov in the 1990s. washington took over from germany, france and the uk, who used to set the pace for europe for more than a century, especially in the field of security. these european states’ indecisive reaction and policy towards the yugoslav wars, the eu’s in particular, was a sure signal that, in both political and military terms, western european powers’ role in this region would decrease. traditionally, for bulgaria, orientation towards the west meant an alliance with germany, because their geostrategic interests were divergent with the interests of bulgaria’s regional enemies. france, in turn, traditionally supported the aspirations of romania, and serbia/yugoslavia, while the united kingdom offered its backing to greece. despite some economic benefits, such as supply of modern military equipment or fostering of social modernisation of bulgaria, the alliances from the first half of the twentieth century have always resulted in failures. sofia failed to achieve its geostrategic goals in their entirety, losing territories to romania, yugoslavia and greece. it is worth mentioning bulgaria’s relations with another power. in 1985 sir jeffrey howe became the first british foreign secretary to visit bulgaria in the twentieth century (curtis (ed.), 1992). as k. metodiev stresses, bulgaria has never been among britain’s foreign policy priorities as it has been underlined in numerous statements by british diplomats, researchers and politicians. all neighbour countries, with no exception, traditionally have maintained a closer relationship to london. british-bulgarian relations started to change gradually, together with bulgarian application for a membership in eu in the middle of 1990s (metodiev, 2015). but, in spite of this changes which were mainly symbolic ones, political and economic relations with the united kingdom do not matter much for sofia as they are with germany, united states, russia or turkey. the exception is the process of formation of a relatively large bulgarian emigrant population in great britain in the last 10– 15 years. despite its membership in the eu and nato, bulgaria remains a country where the influences and interests of several geopolitical centres intersect. this divisions are visible in the stated geopolitical priorities of the country’s leading political parties and in the politics and positions adopted by many mass media and non-governmental organisations in international politics. some of the most active foundations and media operating in the country are financed by western foundations (mainly german and american) and use anti-russian rhetoric when commenting on ideological, military and economic issues. in turn, other institutions are directly or indirectly financed by russian entities, especially by known oligarchs or energy companies operating in bulgaria. they argue that deepening cooperation with russia would bring economic benefits to the country and work to undermine bulgaria’s attempts to deepen its euro-atlantic integration. a serious scandal occurred in september 2019, when the leaders of the so-called “russophiles”, considered to be one of the largest ngos in the country, were accused of spying on behalf of russia and trying to turn bulgaria away from the west. relations with russia have always been an important element of the national socio-psychological discourse. the only exceptions are macedonia and the eu as a whole. there are more russia-focused scientific and media publications than publications about any other country. it should be remembered that after several unsuccessful uprisings, bulgaria finally gained its independence from the ottoman empire at the end of the nineteenth century with the help of russia. despite this, in the years immediately following the russian-turkish war (1877–1878), there was rapid reorientation towards germany and austria-hungary. this behaviour is in line with bulgaria’s traditional pragmatism in the international sphere, not only in relation to political, but also military and economic issues. after 1990, relations with russia went into a slump. however, despite the chosen pro-western tab. 1. major post-1989 events of bulgaria’s geopolitics and its international relations date event 10 november 1989 the collapse of the communist regime; todor zhivkov is removed from power 04 april 1991 establishment of the bulgarian atlantic club – the first non-government organisation of this type in a non-nato country 14 february 1994 bulgaria joins the partnership for peace programme 14 december 1995 application for eu membership 15 february 2000 commencement of negotiations concerning bulgaria’s membership in the european union 29 march 2004 bulgaria joins nato 01 january 2007 accession to the european union source: elaborated by the author. bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019) 17 course, bulgaria’s geopolitics and some of its tactical foreign policy decisions always had a very specific character in the context of relations with russia. unlike poland, lithuania, estonia or ukraine, bulgaria has never been part of the russian empire or the soviet union. for this and other reasons, the image of russia does not evoke as strong anti-russian resentments. bulgarians and russians share a common religion and use the same cyrillic alphabet, which, importantly, originates from medieval bulgaria. however, it does not mean that bulgarians would always opt for a political or economic alliance with russia. it should also be taken into account that there have always been large, determined and influential anti-russian circles in bulgaria, which did not accept russia’s political and social system or any further rapprochement between the two countries in terms of politics and security. the exception was the communist period, when pro-western groups were eliminated from social life. during the post-communist transition, and especially after joining the eu, a political and media discourse developed which criticised bulgaria for its “insufficient gratitude” towards russia for its role in the revival of the bulgarian state in the second half of the nineteenth century. key representatives of the russian state and society tend to have a paternalistic or even disregarding attitude towards bulgaria. for example, in 2016, pyotr tolstoy, a well-known tv journalist and mp, representing the united russia party, almost caused a diplomatic scandal when he stated the following: “we will soon buy the entire bulgaria. we have already bought a half of the coast” (ruski deputat...). out of all other global powers, the one which shows the greatest potential for political and economic influence is china, which has only recently become more active in bulgaria. just as in the case of the other balkan states, beijing’s influence is mainly limited to the economic sphere, especially projects concerning energy, infrastructure, as well as rail and sea transport (sokolov, 2016). at the beginning of the twenty-first century, china has become one of bulgaria’s top ten trading partners, mainly as the result of significant imports from this country. the trade balance is clearly negative from bulgaria’s point of view, with the deficit of almost 300 million dollars (2018). 4. zero problems with neighbours. the regional geopolitical relations of bulgaria it is worth to begin this section by commenting briefly on the regional aspects of bulgarian geopolitics, although they are not the primary topic of this article. after all, it is a sphere in which bulgaria still has some resources and persuasive tools to conduct its own policy in the field of energy, transport, protection of minority rights, and regulation of disputed historical issues, etc. with the exception of turkey, other countries with which bulgaria shares a common border (macedonia, serbia, romania and greece) are inhabited mostly by nations which are ethnically, linguistically or religiously related to bulgarians. because of turkey’s growing significance, it is very important for bulgaria, and the balkans as a whole, to maintain a constructive dialogue between brussels and ankara (sokolov, 2016). this is even truer nowadays when the migration route from the middle east to western europe passes through bulgaria, and there are about 3 million refugees in turkey. bulgaria itself was affected by the refugee crisis, which reached its peak in 2015, when the largest number of refugees submitted their applications for asylum. in the face of the great number of refugees, the bulgarian state built costly, over 230-kilometre-long fence on its border with turkey. a new, ambitious course of turkey’s foreign policy emerged in the 1980s. turkey has shown great progress in science, technology and economics, becoming a modern role model for the countries of the former ottoman sphere of influence. from the turkish perspective, those are precisely the countries on which turkey should focus in its geopolitical efforts, especially those related to economy (hinkova, 2014). one of the most important conditions conducive to the turkish influence on bulgaria is the fact that the country has a large turkish minority which represent about 9.0% of its population. citing a study conducted among this ethnic minority, s. hinkova (2014) noted that they have great respect for turkey, especially ethnic turks and pomaks. what is more, respondents to the study emphasised turkey’s successful economic development and higher salaries earned by their relatives and friends who live in turkey. the muslim minority in bulgaria unanimously considers turkey to be a positive lifestyle model. however, because of the 500-year rule of the ottoman empire over the bulgarian lands and the inhibition of the country’s civilisational development, the anti-turkish ideology is one of the pillars of the modern bulgarian identity. it is still firmly rooted in 18 valentin mihaylov people’s consciousness (mihaylov, 2015). nonetheless, at the beginning of the twenty-first century bulgaria is probably the only neighbour of turkey that maintains normal relations with this country, meeting all the requirements required by the modern democratic standards (lütem, 1999; bishku, 2003; rusev, 2006). many post-1989 bulgarian governments and most political groups have demonstrated openness and willingness to cooperate with turkey. this is a further proof that pragmatism plays an important role in the bulgarian geopolitics and foreign policy. however, the bulgarian state and secret services are closely following some of the turkish state’s actions in the country, as ankara finances muslim parties and organisations in bulgaria and regularly intervenes in parliamentary and local elections. as m. sokolov states (2016), while turkey is a nato member, its relationship with moscow can change the political environment in the whole balkan region. with realisation of turkish stream and the renewed friendship between presidents erdogan and putin it is uncertain what this will mean for bulgaria and the balkan states. conceptually, instead of an open confrontation, in the first half of the 20th century, bulgaria chose to apply the tactics of modern turkey and its policy known as “zero problems with neighbours”. this approach is evident, for example, in bulgaria’s approach towards macedonia, which it accuses of falsifying history, but still treats much mildly than, for example, greece. the exception to this rule was the above-mentioned lack of solidarity with serbia during the breakup of yugoslavia, although contemporary relations between the two countries are undoubtedly positive. bulgaria’s relations with greece and romania are also constructive and friendly. in the past, these two neighbouring countries and serbia have been the traditional enemies of the state which together pursued anti-bulgarian policy and in the twentieth century became the main obstacle on the path to the complete unification of the bulgarian lands. today, however, bulgaria does make any territorial claims against its neighbours (and neither do them) and managed to establish with them proper partnership-like relations within the eu and nato. macedonia (north macedonia) still remains the country which evokes the greatest emotional response in the context of bulgaria’s geopolitics. historically, bulgarians have long had a complex about macedonia. this complex is among the biggest obstacles on bulgaria’s road to achieving its geopolitical goals (pavlov, 1999). bulgaria’s relations with macedonia gained new quality and dynamism after the breakup of yugoslavia. at that time, the bulgarian authorities demonstrated their independence in the realm of foreign policy. bulgaria became the first country in the world to recognize macedonia’s independence on 15 january 1992. despite this gesture, many unresolved and controversial issues still plague the bulgarian-macedonian relations, especially matters regarding their common history, genesis of the language and identity of the macedonian nation which has been traditionally treated in a paternalistic manner by bulgarians, as a regional faction of the bulgarian nation. already in 2006, the then president and minister of foreign affairs of bulgaria made it clear that the country’s support for the european integration of macedonia would depend on skopje’s willingness to pursue a policy of good neighbourly relations (bozhinov, stoyanova-toneva, 2018). even more so, as both the eu and nato require their candidates for members to resolve all territorial disputes in the accession process. the two agreements for friendships signed in 1999 and 2017 respectively were to help solve problems in the bulgarian-macedonian relations during the transformation years. the signing of these agreements was a testimony to the temporary goodwill of the leaders of both countries, but the documents did not resolve any of the difficult issues. according to v. bozhinov and y. stoyanova-toneva (2018), bulgaria should set at least several requirements before signing any agreements for good neighbourly relations with macedonia – renovation of bulgarian cultural monuments, honouring the memory of thousands of bulgarians who gave their lives in the struggle for national liberation, and stop of harassment of macedonian citizens who identify as bulgarians (police interrogations, dismissals from work, no possibility to freely express their views). relations between bulgaria and macedonia should be regulated on the basis of bilateral agreements, which should become part of macedonia’s future eu accession treaty. 5. reorientation of bulgaria’s economic ties and undecided attempts to change its energy geopolitics as part of the global economy, bulgaria has significantly diversified the number of its foreign trading partners. the change in geopolitical priorities went hand in hand with the diversification of export directions. significantly, in 1985, bulgaria maintained trading relations with 113 countries, while 20 years later (2005), the number of its trading partners increased to 206. 30 years after the system change, the national economy became more open and flexible (nestorov, 2002). bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019) 19 until 1990, the soviet union and the countries of the council for mutual economic assistance (fig. 1 and 2) dominated bulgaria’s foreign trade (84.5% of total export and 76.7% of total import). russia’s importance has been gradually decreasing until it was significantly reduced, mainly through the loss of the russian/soviet market for bulgarian agricultural, pharmaceutical, electrotechnical and other products. as shown in fig. 3, in 2018, russia’s share in bulgarian export amounted to mere 1.4%, which proves that the significance of this former main trading partner is now incomparably smaller, especially in comparison with germany, and the eu countries in general. the significant share of raw materials and energy resources is definitely a drawback of bulgaria’s foreign trade, with a clear trade deficit on the state’s side. the country’s share in world trade is definitely weaker when it comes to consumer goods. a large part of the foreign trade deficit is caused by the negative trade balance with the post-soviet countries, mainly with russia and ukraine, which supply 3/4 of all of bulgaria’s imported energy resources (levkov, 2013). in total, export to european union countries amounts to more than 52.0% of all country’s export, while import to the eu members represents over 70.0% (fig. 4). thus, bulgaria also has a negative trade balance in relation to this group of countries. the share of eu countries in bulgaria’s trade in consumer goods is particularly high (over 70.0%) (levkov, 2013). energy policy, especially the supply of russian gas and oil, is one of the most critical issues in the soviet union 62.8% comecon countries (excluding soviet union) 21.7% european economic community 4.6% other countries 10.9% ue countries (excluding germany) 54.5% germany 16.3% russia 1.4% other countries 27.8% fig. 1. structure of bulgaria’s export in 1988, by economic partners source: elaborated by the author on the basis of: national…, nd; nestorov, 2002. fig. 2. structure of bulgaria’s export in 2018, by economic partners source: elaborated by the author on the basis of: national…, nd; nestorov, 2002. 20 valentin mihaylov bulgaria-eu-russia triangle. the european union, as the world’s largest importer of the above-mentioned energy sources, seeks to diversify the supply sources. how do bulgaria’s interests and possibilities fit into this situation? although bulgaria did not give up other energy projects, there was some rapprochement with russia in the field of strategic energy projects during the presidency of left-lining georgi parvanov (2002–2012). in 2008, the then president announced bulgaria’s winning “grand slam” strategy, which involved contracts signed with russia for the construction of the south stream gas pipeline, the burgasalexandroupolis pipeline and the second bulgarian nuclear power plant in belene. these projects were to solidify bulgaria’s role as an energy centre in the balkans. the bulgarian state was to profit, especially through the transit of russian gas to italy and austria. bulgaria and other member states felt the consequences of the imperfect eu energy policy in the winter of 2009, during suspension of the russian gas supplies to europe. bulgaria was one of the most affected countries. it was a clear signal to join the debate concerning the common eu energy policy, as individual member states are unable to solve this problem on their own (pargov et al., 2009). after breaks in supplies of russian gas, which had a serious impact on the national economy, it became clear that the vision of bulgaria’s future as an energy centre of the balkans would not be possible to implement in the near future. the most important challenges for bulgarian energy geopolitics include completion of the construction of the second nuclear power plant in belene. in soviet union 53.7% comecon countries (excluding soviet union) 23.0% european economic community 9.7% other countries 13.6% ue countries (excluding germany) 52.5% germany 12.7% russia 8.9% other countries 25.9% fig. 3. structure of bulgaria’s import in 1988, by economic partners source: elaborated by the author on the basis of: national…, nd; nestorov, 2002. fig. 4. structure of bulgaria’s import in 2018, by economic partners source: elaborated by the author on the basis of: national…, nd; nestorov, 2002. bulgaria’s geopolitical and geoeconomic reorientation (1989–2019) 21 2016, the international court of arbitration of the international chamber of commerce in geneva issued a verdict that bulgaria’s national electric company must pay russian company rosatom 550 million euros for the ordered nuclear reactors. bulgaria resigned from the purchase of these reactors after deciding to cancel the plan to construct the second nuclear power plant. finally, in 2017, both russian reactors were transported to belene. after the tender announced by the bulgarian government in mid-2019, several candidates submitted their tender bids for the power plant construction, including rosatom, the chinese national nuclear company, and korean hydro & nuclear power co. additionally, french company framatome and general electric are interested in supplying equipment for the new power plant. currently, there are several projects underway, at various implementation stages, whose objective is to diversify bulgaria’s gas suppliers. the “balkan” gas hub project has received support from the european commission. the goal of this project is to connect the most important gas pipelines in southeastern europe and to guarantee transparent access to a wide range of suppliers, with the exception of russian ones who have declared that they will not participate in this project in any way. another project which is meant to contribute to the making the gas market more competitive is the turkey–bulgaria gas interconnector (itb) – a gas pipeline with an annual capacity of about 3 billion m3 and a length of almost 200 km. 75 of those kilometres will be located on the territory of bulgaria. itb is expected to be completed by 2022. there is one biggest project that is to be completed by the same date. in 2018, an agreement was signed to implement a gas interconnector between bulgaria and serbia. aside from other advantages, this project will provide opportunities for gas imports from serbia in the event of suspension of supplies from russia. the gas pipeline connecting sofia with serbian niš will have a length of 170 km, and its capacity is estimated to be between 1.8 and 3.2 billion m³. out of all the discussed group of energy projects, the construction of the interconnector between bulgaria and greece (igb) is the most advanced. the route of this gas pipeline (from stara zagora in bulgaria to the greek komotini) is 140-kilometre-long. according to the bulgarian ministry of energy, its annual capacity will be between 3 and 5.5 billion m3. in addition to the above-listed initiatives, bulgaria is taking part in the “eastring” project which it plans to implement together with slovakia, hungary and romania. this project is also supported by the european union and its objective is to search for alternative gas sources and ensure secure gas supplies for the countries of the region (bălgaria…, 2019). the most crucial issue remains – what gas will flow through these pipelines? it is quite possible that in many cases it will be russian gas. all the more so, because in september 2019, the russian minister of energy signed a contract with the bulgarian government for building the section of the turkish stream gas pipeline which goes from the turkish border to the border with serbia. despite all the declarations, intentions and new energy initiatives, in 2019, just as 30 years earlier, almost all of bulgaria’s imported oil and gas came from russia. the concept of bulgaria as an energy centre of the balkans turned out to be a pipe-dream. all major international projects for the transit of natural gas or oil through the national territory (e.g. nabucco, burgas-alexandroupolis, south stream) have failed to materialise, and the earliest date for the launch of the second nuclear power plant is 2030. bulgaria is still counting on more decisive support from western partners in strategic sectors, such as natural gas supply and nuclear energy. for example, the fact that investments of eu countries in energy, or support and promotion of “second-hand” energy projects, such as gas hubs, and interconnectors (marinov, 2017), are very limited leaves an opening for other players, mainly russia and china. 6. conclusions this article presents a synthetic overview of the process of bulgaria’s post-1989 geopolitical reorientation and its consequences. the model based on the variability of geopolitical priorities was once again confirmed in the analysed period. it is based on pragmatism, which is traditional for the national political elite, and the search for the optimal configuration of relations with great powers. bulgaria has always had to bear in mind the interests of the balkans states and the multilateral pressure of great powers. at the end of the nineteenth and throughout the entire twentieth century, bulgarian governments followed the tactic of joining any coalition which would ensure implementation of the project of unification of bulgarian lands. at various times, bulgaria’s allies included russia, germany, austria, and, during the first world war, even turkey. after 1989, bulgaria’s foreign partners in the fields of politics, economy, culture and science became more diversified. compared to the early years of transformation, in 2019 bulgaria is a politically stable country with clear foreign policy priorities and geopolitical allies. 22 valentin mihaylov economic and political life, as well as the external relations of the country, are influenced by russia (although its influence is incomparably weaker than during the cold war period) and turkey (whose influence increased significantly during this period). despite its geographical location at the historical civilizational, economic and political crossroad, bulgaria is an internally stable and predictable partner within the euro-atlantic community. at the same time, the number of threats to national security is increasing in the area of south-eastern europe, the black sea region and the broader contact zone between europe, asia and africa. because of the decisive role of external factors, the yugoslavian knot is currently in its peaceful phase. however, the area still includes several countries that do not have a wellestablished geopolitical orientation and are still not fully internally consolidated. the war in syria and the migration crisis have had a significant impact on the balkan geopolitics. the caucasian geopolitical knot is also located near the region. other potential threats for bulgaria include the radicalisation and islamisation of turkish society and turkey’s growing economic and cultural influence, especially among the muslim population in bulgaria. the tense situation concerning crimea and relations between russia and ukraine, which are very important countries from the point of view of geopolitical rivalry in the black sea region, also indirectly affect bulgaria and require rethinking of its security strategy. a general overview of bulgarian geopolitics from 1878 to the present allows to draw one more general conclusion. bulgaria’s geopolitics are only tangentially based on history, or such links as a common language or civilisation. the decisive factors include foremost temporary interests of the state and a desire for alliances that, in the subjective opinion of the national authorities, can bring the greatest political and 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and common foreign and security policy (cfsp): the wider black sea area context, southeast european and black sea studies, 7(2), 289–302. doi: 10.1080/14683850701402227 1. introduction numerous challenges to the system of public administration, provoked by a political and socioeconomic crisis against the backdrop of unfinished reforms is a precondition for reviewing of management approaches. in this situation, an important step to address the priorities of ukraine’s development strategy for 2020 is developing of comprehensive managerial decision-making mechanism that consists of clear, intelligible and effective harmonization, coordination of actions of responsible participants. practice of using of the “coordination” category indicates its use, usually when it is necessary to unite efforts of some institutions under the patronage of an institution, which is endowed with coordinating powers regarding them to achieve a certain goal. for example, the main task of the interagency coordinating committee on regional development is the coordination and harmonization of activities of journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(1), 7-15 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.001.5157 coordination as function, method and form of cooperation between the public administration subjects under the conditions of decentralization of power tatyana bezverkhnyuk (1) oleksandra kubrak (2) (1) department of project management, odessa regional institute for public administration, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, genyez’ka 22, 65009 odessa, ukraine e-mail: bezverkhnuk@list.ru (2) department of project management, odessa regional institute for public administration, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, genyez’ka 22, 65009 odessa, ukraine citation bezverkhnyuk t., kubrak o., 2015, coordination as function, method and form of cooperation between the public administration subjects under the conditions of decentralization of power, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(1), 7-15 abstract research of modern thesaurus of “coordination” concept and generalization according to deductive analysis of different scientific views allowed us to conclude that coordination should be considered in the form in which it acts at the level of management practice. in a specific manifestation in public administration, coordination is vigorous activity of the subject that stipulated the disclosure of its essence through the managerial relations thesaurus and its related categories: managerial interrelations, managerial interaction, managerial communications. it is proved that for the public administration system the most appropriate classification is the division of managerial relations, depending on the way of achieving the end result of public authorities staying in relations: subordinated, coordinative, reordinated. key words public administration subjects, managerial relations, subordination, coordination, interaction. 8 tatyana bezverkhnyuk, oleksandra kubrak central and local executive authorities whilst the formation and implementation of state regional policy. an important component of effective coordination is establishing proper communication between the responsible participants of management relations. however, their formal character in practice has determined the existence of a number of problems: the lack of mutual access to databases and the availability of different information platforms and different timeframe of information flow that makes impossible the effective use of mentioned information for regulatory purposes; roles regulations in solving conflict situations with a clear giving of decisionmaking authority to one of the bodies in order to avoid ambiguity or controversy missing is lacking. as of today three important trends in changing of the approach to coordination, are in evidence: reduction of rigidity of vertical relationships; expansion of horizontal relationships; departure from the hierarchy as the main principle of coordination, and as a consequence, the replacement of vertical mechanism of coordination by the horizontal one. 2. modern thesaurus of “coordination” concept coordination is a difficult concept, which is exposed to various interpretations, causing views on the nature of coordination that are significantly different from each other. various areas of focus of management theory, legal science, and economic theory have influenced their formation. fragmentary consideration of types and manifestations of coordination causes advisability of disclosure of this category by the scientific method of deductive analysis from the abstract to the concrete. this method makes it possible on the basis of the most general ideas, to reach specific manifestations of coordination and study it as a manifestation of general. coordination should be considered in the form in which it acts at the level of management practice but the correct definition of its problem and correct decisions are possible only if there is the general concept of the essence of coordination. according to the great dictionary of modern ukrainian language (бусел (ed.), 2007, p. 572) coordination is a harmonization, bringing to accordance, establishment of interrelations, contact in people’s activities, between operations, concepts and so on. e. kubko (кубко, 2001) defines that coordination – is a harmonization, combination, bringing to a certain order or according to the objectives of components of something (concepts, actions, objects, etc.). it is seen at once dual nature of the concept, which allows different ways to interpret it. on the one hand, coordination can be considered as a concept that expresses a definite correlation between the elements of the system. coordination – is a certain coherence, corresponding components of whole to each other, the very special nature of their interdependence, which ensures dynamic balance system. in this aspect, coordination appears as quality. regardless of the fact that the interrelation between the elements is dynamic in nature, coordination is a condition that is characterized by its completeness and relative immutability, i.e. coordination in this aspect – is static concept. on the other hand, coordination is considered as a process of action on the elements of the system to bring them into line with each other. coordination of subsystems means such action into subsystems which forces them to act in a coherent manner. coordination in this case serves as a dynamic activity of subject of management, to ensure consistency between parts of the whole system, which it manages. at that, coordination-correlation is the result of coordination-action. thus, coordination should be considered as a system and as a process. coordination – is a process to ensure the circulation of information flows between subjects of interaction. the main function of the coordinator is establishing common principles of information flows circulation and ensuring compliance of general rules of their redistribution. coordination is a system of ordered and regulated interrelations between the subjects of management activities. in the scientific literature on cybernetics and systems analysis coordination usually is interpreted (in order from the general to the specific definition) as: • overcoming of excessive degrees of freedom of movable governing body, i.e. turning it into a system that can be managed (бернштейн, 1935); • the process of achieving unity of efforts of all subsystems (units) of organization to realize its tasks and targets (васильев, 2008); • managing activities that ensures the interrelation and consistency of subjects, objects and work processes in time and space (гапоненко, 2003); • management function in establishing of ties, organization of interaction and coordination of system components, operational dispatching of plans and tasks implementation (погостинский, 2006b). thus, the theory of coordination is intended to identify the causes inconsistency and fragmentation of processes, weaknesses in governance. to coordinate means to harmonize, clarify, set transparency, restore order between something in the process of interaction. coordination as function, method and form of cooperation… 9 coordination is a function of social management, which harmonize, organize the different parts of the management system. coordination in public administration – is one of the basic management functions, the content of which is to provide normalization of interrelations and interactions between participants of public administration process in order to coordinate actions and joint efforts to solve common problems (кубко, 2001). authors expressed different points of view on the essence of coordination as management function; however, we can conclude the similarity of their positions. in particular, b. lazarev (лазарев, 1972, p. 35) regards coordination as the management function of “coordinating the actions of various entities, organizations and bodies in order to achieve any common goals”. according to v. averianov (авер’янов, 2004), establishing of coordination involves strengthening of opportunities for harmonization managerial actions between several bodies of one structural level to achieve common goal. this method is used primarily in the regulation of social relations, whose members are on the same organizational and legal level. between these bodies there are no subordinate relations. e. kubko (кубко, 1998, p.  61) terms coordinating relations as organizational ones arising “at the level of interaction of subjects and objects of management”, while stressing several kinds of coordinating relations: coordination, subject-technological interaction, hierarchical or complex interaction. the idea of coordination as a function of public administration would be incomplete without features that reflect the essence of coordination in public administration – to ensure unity and coherence of activities as subjects of management between themselves and subjects of law, whose activity takes place within specific areas of management. it appears insufficient to determine the scope of coordination only as activity as subjects of law in one or another field of management. the object of management (relations emerging in economic, environmental, social and cultural or administrative and political areas) requires not only concerted actions of subjects of management, but also concerted actions of numerous subjects of law by these subjects, which activities is in within this management object which is the part of management system. such harmonization can be achieved not only by direct intervention, but also by indirect impact – coordination, as feature and function management. in a specific manifestation, coordination is vigorous activity of the subject that allows us to disclose its essence through the management relations thesaurus and its related categories. 3. management relations thesaurus and their classification managerial relations – are the kind of social relations that reflect the mode of existence of subjects of management. management relations arise primarily as a result of comparing two or more subjects of management by the selected (or set) comparison criteria (feature). thus managerial relations arise when comparing juxtaposed objects that are not within the same management system and do not interact while comparing. consequently, managerial relations is the basis for managerial relations (дерець, 2007). managerial relations – are stable relations that occur between the elements of one management system or between management systems. managerial relations are the result of the transition from potential opportunity to enter into the relationship (managerial relations) to the actual managerial relations (алексєєв, 2012; нижник, олуйко, 2009). managerial interaction – influence of subjects of managerial interrelations at each other resulting from the establishment of managerial interrelations and forming a unified management system. managerial communications – are the manifestation of management relations in which the presence (absence) or changing of one subjects of management is a condition of presence (absence) or changing of other subjects of management (єсипчук, 2004). management relations should be investigated using appropriate kinds of relations and communications. in the scientific literature, the problem of classification of managerial relations has been raised repeatedly. arguably, the universal classification of administrative relations does not exist. only a set of classifications can depict the content of managerial relations. in particular, yu. surmin (сурмин, 2003) depicted quite accurately and vividly varieties relations in systems. by the number of state authorities involved in the interaction there is a division between a bilateral and multilateral cooperation. in the bilateral interaction there are two authorities; multilateral cooperation three or more bodies combine their efforts in the direction of solving common tasks. depending on the object, seven basic types of interaction are proposed: informational (object – information); interfunctional (object – authority); program (object – the program); interdindustry (object – the public administration); documentary (object – documents); personnel (object – staff ). despite these classifications, in our opinion for a public administration system in terms of reform10 tatyana bezverkhnyuk, oleksandra kubrak ing the most appropriate classification is the division of managerial relations, depending on the way of achieving the end result of public authorities staying in relations. totally agreeing with v. deretsya’s (дерець, 2007) scientific position, we consider it appropriate to single out subordinated, coordinative, reordinated relations, because public administration finds its manifestation precisely in these relations. it should be mentioned that this classification covers most such mark of content of managerial relations in the system of state authority as the presence of authority in bodies, based on their analysis and the functions analysis carried out by bodies and also take into account their status. the most powerful among managerial relations in the system of executive power is subordinated relations, because only in public administration based on power, using it, it is possible to perform publicadministrative influence. b. kurashvili (курашвили, 1987, p.  35) defined subordination as “vertical” cooperation between the parties when one party is subject to another, as well as the powers available in top-level management system in relation to the lower level. subordination also defined as relations which provide activity subordination of an individual to a single will of organization. excessive interference with daily operations, providing guidance is characteristic for subordination. the parties in relations of subordination act unequally, interact with each other basing on the “power-subordination” principle. each higher level of management because of its competence and volume activities accumulates and expresses broader, more complex social needs and interests than lower level. subordinate ties may provide higher exclusive competence for organizational and legal level body to body on the lower level; immediate, direct and linear subordination; functional and methodical subordination; right of project approval decision; controllability, accountability. the nature of subordinated managerial relations is manifested in the activities of bodies of executive power on authority implementation and revealed, primarily, with the “subordination” category. however, subordinate relations do not exhaust the content of managerial relations. subordination is closely related to coordination, moreover bodies of executive power can simultaneously be both in subordinated and in coordination relations. currently an action of coordinative relations and mechanisms that they meet is expanding; a “crowding out” of imperative and legal ways of management is happening. coordination – is a type of social interaction where the parties stand as equal partners (курашвили, 1987). such relations are based on mutual interest of various parts of the public administration to coordinate their regulatory effect on the same object (when each part operates in its characteristic aspect) or various objects (when their activities should be linked between each other). coordinated structural relations occur between parts of both one and different structural levels if these parts in terms of regulation of these social relations act as equal. in public administration coordination is regarded as one of the basic management functions, the content of which is to provide normalization of interrelations and interactions between participants of public administration process in order to coordinate actions and joint efforts to solve common problems and is carried out at all management levels by the heads of relevant state bodies or special coordination units (кубко, 2001). we agree with the opinion that coordination can be a special function and special integrating form of organization management (дерець, 2007). as a function it provides a certain dependence of some decisions (actions) from others in process of functioning of any organized system, but as a form of organization management creates a special apparatus in achieving common goals by autonomous organizational systems, harmonize or links their activities to meet universally priorities (дьяченко, 2003). coordinating relations in the system of public authorities can be defined as managerial relations in which state authorities act, so to speak, as memberspartners, while one of them has authority on the other, and using them (relations) they reach common tasks which set before them and jointly fulfill their authorities (максимюк, 2009). in the system of functioning of bodies of executive power, there are three forms of coordinating interaction: • forms of coordinating interaction of units or individual servants of bodies of executive power, which is the result of their direct official duties (request, meeting, agreement documents, traditional consultation, social network); • forms of coordinating interaction based on specially formed interagency structures (permanent or temporary),participants of which may be various representatives of bodies of executive authorities (coordinating and advisory bodies according to field of concern); • other forms of coordinating interaction (workshop, symposium, conference, specialists training). coordination as function, method and form of cooperation… 11 the main aim of coordinating interaction is increasing of qualitative characteristics of decisions that are jointly developed and implemented by the authorities and aimed at achieving set results. in accordance with this goal, the coordinating interaction tasks are: • identifying and discussing the range of urgent problems and their solutions; • the establishment of a mutual information exchange between the authorities about changing the situation around common problem; • the achievement of agreed fields of concerns; • consideration and discussion of relevant draft laws and of proposals on amending the existing legislation; • discussion of mechanisms for implementing measures in support of specific initiatives, and their method of financing; • other specific tasks depending on emerging ties. the influence of the state is carried out through public administration mechanisms that are the practical steps, tools, instruments, incentives, through which public authorities influence society, production, any social system to achieve their goals, and in the case of involvement of several state institutions in the management process, mechanisms of interaction between them are becoming important. considering coordination in public administration, one can define three basic types – an administrative, coordinated and uncoordinated. 1. forced or administrative type: interdependence is observed in planning and logistics systems with vertical channels of communication and is associated with coordination based on principles of planning and logistics (hierarchical coordination). 2. the coordinated type: interdependence is observed in groups with “horizontal communication” and is connected with coordination based on the principles of mutual management. effective coordination via horizontal networks is becoming increasingly crucial in the subjects understanding of their future than management hierarchy, which can be either invisible or inadmissible. 3. the uncoordinated type – the interdependence that exists between the agents of the market system, associated with coordination based on the principles of “standardization” and competition. by this market form is guessed, in which there are weak bonds between the participants and the essential elements of standardization in the organization (free coordination). the strategic task of coordinating of activities of public administration subjects is working out a mechanism of harmonization of common position of government in matters discussed and accepted by the main institutions in this area. the purpose of all coordination is to achieve understanding. undoubtedly, the basis of coordination system are ties (actions). in public administration among the potential links, there is a set of them that will ensure the best realization of objectives. the task of coordination – to create conditions for choosing and implementation precisely such links in each institution, which together constitute the “best set of links.” the role of the coordinator is important exactly here – the person who decides and determines the best set of links on his opinion (operations, actions, interactions), using the two methods (погостинский, 2006a): • formation of limitations (standards, manuals) to prevent unacceptable acts; • informing (communication events) to ensure permanent coordination of actions in real time. 3. the essence of coordination activity mechanism of public administration subjects passing directly to defining the essence of coordination activity mechanism one should emphasize several important methodological aspects. first, we should note that coordination is not the main activity of its subjects and participants. in this aspect, one should pay attention to the relationship between the “coordination” and “interaction” concepts. coordination, unlike the interaction is more general and is not connected by the boundaries of any particular action or process. secondly, coordinating activities – is a complex systemic legal phenomenon, that is why its studying needs the definition of certain types of coordination. the need for classification is stipulated by the fact that on the one hand, coordinating activities is carried out by different subjects, unequal by the legal nature, in volume of competencies, forms and methods of work, and on the other hand – it is implemented relatively to objects, which are also different in legal status and relations with the coordination subject. the implementation of coordinating activities requires a relevant mechanisms as ways to achieve its goals. the ways of coordination are: sighting and other forms of mutual control; allocation of tasks in the hierarchy of management; creation of committees and commissions; meetings between departments; distribution of information; negotiations; 12 tatyana bezverkhnyuk, oleksandra kubrak direct observation; developing rules, procedures, charts etc. thus, the mechanism of coordination activities of public administration subjects – is the creation of the very set of relationships between the subjects of making management decisions that will the coordination of common positions and understanding in the matters discussed and accepted by the main institutions in this area. the mechanism of coordination of activities is developed by the government, which must ensure the effectiveness of public policy on improving the political, social and economic situation in ukraine. the above analysis allows us to determine the following types of coordination activities of public administration subjects: 1. according to organizational interrelations of coordination subjects: corporate (coordination between departments of one authority, organization); inter-organizational (coordination activities of central, territorial and specialized units of one authority); external (coordination between not subordinated to each other in the organizational sense public authorities). 2. according to hierarchical position of coordination subjects of: vertical and horizontal. vertical coordination has a clear legal basis and is implemented under competence of the relevant subjects of management. horizontal coordination is quite difficult, due to the ability of subjects to formulate and implement their own goals, to lobby the recognized interests and needs realized through purposeful activity. the target function of vertical coordination is direct control, reallocation of resources and activity standardization, horizontal function – is the formation of agreed solutions. as of today three important trends in changing of the approach to coordination, are in evidence: • reduction of rigidity of vertical relationships; • expansion of horizontal relationships; • departure from the hierarchy as the main principle of coordination, and as a consequence, the replacement of vertical mechanisms of coordination by the horizontal ones. 4. coordination mechanisms of activities of public administration subjects under the conditions of decentralization of power forming coordination mechanism of activities of public administration subjects under the conditions of decentralization of power one should consider the following. the degree of interdependence of subjects is directly related to a certain level of coordination. depending on the number of degrees of submission and subordination and coordination, we can distinguish three levels of interdependence (месарович, 1978): • a high – exists in systems with two or more degrees of submission and subordination i.e. a subject that is on the fourth degree should coordinate its actions with the subjects of the third, second and first degree (three stages of approval), observing a certain sequence coordination; • an average – is in systems with one degree of coordination, i.e. with one step of coordination, with that the information is transmitted at one degree and beyond it does not work; • a weak – is incidental to independent subjects that do not coordinate their actions, with that the subject makes decisions independently and proceeds to the activity. the more levels of harmonization, the higher level of coordination, and the longer it takes to coordinate actions. it should be noticed that according to general features vertical coordination is identical to subordination, because of the direction of activities. the most striking example of effective vertical coordination is the creation of the regional offices of reforms in april 2015. offices of reforms on decentralization provide organizational, advisory, informational assistance in the implementation of reforms in local government, decentralization of authorities of bodies of executive power to strengthen the institutional, administrative and expert provision of reforms at local and regional level. ministry for regional development, building and housing of ukraine as the main coordinator performs the following functions: on the recommendation of the heads of oblast state administration, determines the nominees of experts to work in the office of reforms; provides organizational and methodological support; ensure cooperation between regional administrations and the office of reforms; promotes taking into account the proposals of offices concerning development of perspective plans by state administrations, approving of perspective plans by oblast councils, submitting for examination and approving of perspective plans by the cabinet of ministers. an expert group is also established at central level for the effective coordination (central office) for interaction with the regions, monitoring the results of the communication campaign, sociological research. mechanisms of horizontal coordination of activities of public administration subjects are quite difficult, due to the ability of subjects to formulate and implement their own goals, to lobby the recognized interests and needs realized through purposeful accoordination as function, method and form of cooperation… 13 tivity. it should be noticed that current legislation does not clearly regulates forms of coordination activities of public administration subjects. only some of them are envisaged by separate legal acts regarding such forms of interaction as the formation of joint consultative and advisory and expert bodies, councils, committees, groups and other subsidiary bodies. to ensure the horizontal coordination of different subjects and improvement of the quality of decisions, it is appropriate to apply a mechanism of cross-sector partnerships and stakeholder engagement. we should emphasize that in the system of public administration, making coordinative decisions – is a process of realization of public interests. correspondingly, one of the instruments of coordination should be holding public consultations with stakeholders in making decisions. at the level of key strategic documents and programs, ukrainian legislation assumes necessity of consultation with the public on issues relating to the development and implementation of public policy. without a thorough analysis of needs, expectations, requirements, motives of stakeholders’ behavior one cannot clear formulate and detail a public issue that will be solved in the form of coordinative solution. by european standards (біла книга…, 2002), target groups are the subject of consultations. the body that consults reveals the entire required target groups before their conducting, actively distributes consultation documents among them, puts them questions, and collects their comments and suggestions. for example, conducting various seminars by regional offices of reforms aims at determining the positions of stakeholders about the current development problems and possible ways of solutions. between stakeholders, there are different interrelations and relations that can be formal and informal, but what is important is the mutual influence of the various parties to the process of making a coordination decision. it is important to emphasize that stakeholders during the consultation are not in subordinate relations, and their interaction is not hierarchical subordination. relations between stakeholders in the consultation process form the construct network when public interests prevail over private ones. the form of such many subjects coordination is network, as an informal non-hierarchical organized institution with a relatively permanent membership and informal relations between members in order to realize the set goals. in fact, the creation of network is a rejection of vertical hierarchy of bureaucratic organization, creating of independent working groups instead of functional structures, transition to horizontal structure of the organization and the replacement in significant degree of administrative relations by contract ones. 5. coordination as a specific type of public administration activities under the conditions of decentralization of power the above proves that the coordination is a separate type of management activities on the organization of ensuring the interaction between the parties – the interrelation and consistency of subjects, objects and processes in time and space. tactical coordination task is to create conditions for proportional and continuous functioning of management system by installing continuous links between the subjects activity. the subjects of interaction in the process of realization of reform of decentralization of power are the significant number of governmental, public and nongovernmental institutions that are in the process of joint activities in achieving common goals, become objects of coordination. should be emphasized that the joint activities of subjects of the process of reform realization takes various organizational and legal forms, depending on the target orientation of their actions. this allows to define coordination as a set of interrelated organizational forms of management relations: • management relations between state regulators of reform process based on collaboration and communication to perform direct official duties and specific actions (subordinate and coordinate relations); • coordinating the interaction between subjects of formulating target orientation of reform implementation (government, public and non-governmental institutions), based mainly on horizontal relations for the development and implementation of state policy in the relevant area; • network connection between subjects of making the coordinative decisions (government, state regulators, state bodies, non-governmental institutions, ngos), based on partnership relations to meet the public interest and the needs of stakeholders. accordingly, coordination, as a form of organization of interrelations between subjects of the process reform implementation, depends directly both on the authority and functional responsibilities of objects coordination and on the objectives of their communication and joint actions. in other words, a multichannel, differently directed and ordered in a com14 tatyana bezverkhnyuk, oleksandra kubrak plicated way system of management interrelations / communication and functional harmonization process of common position and understanding on issues discussed and adopted by key institutions in this area are being formed. the main purpose of coordination, as separate type of public administration activity, is to improve the quality characteristics of decisions that are jointly developed and implemented by the authorities and aimed at achieving specified results. in accordance with this goal, the tasks of coordinative interaction of public administration subjects under the conditions of implementation of decentralization reform of power are: • identifying and discussing the range of urgent problems and their solutions; • the establishment of a mutual information exchange between the authorities about changing the situation around common problem; • the achievement of agreed fields of concerns; • consideration and discussion of relevant draft laws and of proposals on amending the existing legislation; • discussion of mechanisms for implementing measures in support of specific initiatives, and their method of financing. considering the complexity of relations of subordination between subjects of interaction in the process of implementation of reform of decentralization of power, hierarchy of objectives and variety of functions of public and non-governmental institutions, only the establishment of leaders-coordinators institution can solve the problem of coordination process compliance to the system of objects of coordination. thus, the main function of the central office of reforms on decentralization of power is the overall coordination of responsible participants’ activities through the formation of a set of optimal links and the establishment of a particular mode of interaction through coordination centers – regional offices. mode of coordinating interaction is a form of regulatory regime and it has the following characteristics: it is set by the a and authorities and is provided by them; regulates the specific subject-subject relations; is a special procedure regulation, consisting of a set of economic and legal, organizational and administrative facilities; creates relevant measure of the receptivity or contrariety to meet the subjects’ interests. in other words, the regime of coordination – is a stable regulation of interrelations of subjects of implementation of reform of decentralization of power, which consists of rules and procedures. the mechanism of coordinating of activities subjects of implementation of reform of decentralization of power – is the regulation of communication between subjects of interaction based on set common principles of the information flows circulation and standardization of performing of general rules of their reallocation. the regulation structure may have the following form: 1. initiation of joint activities of subjects of implementation of reform of decentralization of power should begin with the carrying out on the carpet issues and formulating target orienting points of its solution. initiation is held by the central office of reforms, which establishes the main participants, terms, forms (discussion, dialogue, expert judgment) of discussing the problem; forms the optimal set of ties and establishes the form of making a coordinative decision (some strategic program, tactical tasks etc.). making a coordinative decision confirms the beginning of joint actions / interaction. 2. the institutionalization of interrelations is directed by central office of reforms by signing agreements or memorandums on interaction and cooperation with clear indication of goals, tasks, resources, responsible persons and regulation of procedure of official registration of papers that require approval. then the direction of information flows is set and communication model is determined based on the availability of the technological elements of the subsystem. 3. integration of planning of coordination activities of the organizational structure of the coordination mechanism is carried out by the central office of reforms by identifying coordination centers – regional offices in implementing the planned joint activities and appointment of chief coordinator within the coordination processes of consolidating his authority regarding objects of coordination. according to the functional tasks of each regional office of reforms (coordination center) a structural plan and interagency coordination plan are developed, certain limitations (permissible actions) are set and the sources and amounts of resource provision of performing of the joint actions are identified. 4. direct coordination is performed within the process of making the coordinative decisions according to legally established procedure based on a combination of appropriate methods of communication with using the available tools. the basis of direct communication is the single information portal, openness and availability of information. 5. the result of effective coordination is the new information that connects and binds target orientation of participants. this information is procoordination as function, method and form of cooperation… 15 cessed by the central office of reforms and becomes the basis of new information flows. 6. summary the result of the presented study is the scientific substantiation of expediency of improving the mechanism of coordination of activities of the public administration subjects under the conditions of decentralization of power. it is proved that the basis of effective implementation of reform of decentralization of power is to become coordination of actions not only of government institutions but also of other public administration subjects that make decisions in this area. in order to get that done the transition from understanding the coordination as management function, according to which – one party organizes the relations and the other – only fulfills the conditions of relations to coordination as a form of organization of interaction by which all parties (participants) are obliged to organize the interrelation is to happen, because the reluctance of a participant ceases the existence of relations. to make this transition happen the structure of regulation of communication between subjects of interaction is proposed. the main coordinator must be defined as central office of reforms, which within its authorities will provide public consultation with the maximum necessary number of stakeholders. the basis of effective communication and coherence of activities of subjects of implementation of reform of decentralization of power in making the coordinative decisions has to become a single information portal, openness and availability of information. the basis of portal content has to become multidirectional communication on ensuring the exchange of information for different functional purposes. information content of the portal should be done by creating temporary alliances in adjacent areas for making certain coordinative decisions (memorandum, protocol) on the target orientation of information provision of joint activities. thus, the coordination, as a separate type of public administration activities under the conditions of decentralization of power, has a dual nature: • according to the functional purpose – provides a certain dependency of one actions from others within the organized system of communication flows; • as a form of organization of management – creates a special organizational subsystem coordination to achieve the common goal of autonomous institutions. references авер’янов в., 2004, адміністративне право україни, видво «юридична думка», київ. алексєєв в., 2012, суспільство та держава: управлінські взаємовідносини, вид-во технодрук, чернівці. бернштейн н., 1935, проблема взаимоотношений координации и локализации, архив биологических наук, 38/1, 1-34. біла книга «європейська управлінська поведінка», 2001, європейська комісія. брюссель. бусел в. (ed.), 2007, великий тлумачний словник сучасної української мови, видавництво «перун», київ. васильев ю., 2008, теория управления, издательство финансы и статистика, москва. гапоненко а., 2003, теория управления, издательство рагс, москва. дерець в., 2007, органи виконавчої влади україни та управлінські відносини, вид-во юридична думка, київ. дьяченко  а., 2003, система органов исполнительной власти и принципы их построения, [in:] административное право украины, издательство право, харьков, 71-75. єсипчук н., 2004, взаємодія місцевих державних адміністрацій та органів місцевого самоврядування як умова ефективного функціонування механізму державного управління, вісник наду, 4, 326-332. кубко є., 1998, теорія організації і структури державного управління. реформування державного управління в україні: проблеми і перспективи, вид-во юрінком інтер, київ. кубко є., 2001, координація, [in:] юридична енциклопедія, т. 3, видавництво “українська енциклопедія”, київ, 235. курашвили  б., 1987, очерк теории государственного управления, издательство наука, москва. лазарев б., 1972, компетенция органов управления, издательство юридична література, москва. максимюк і., 2009, класифікація координаційних зв’язків в мережі взаємодії органів виконавчої влади, теоретичні та прикладні питання державотворення, 2, 117-121. месарович м., 1978, общая теория систем, изд-во мир, москва. нижник н., олуйко в. (eds.), 2009, громадські організації та органи державного управління: питання взаємовідносин, вид-во чабаненко ю., черкаси. погостинский ю., 2006a, координационный механизм стратегического управления, изд-во питер, санктпетербург. погостинский ю., 2006b, системный анализ функций стратегического управления, издательство нева, санкт-петербург. сурмин ю., 2003, теория систем и системный анализ, видво мауп, київ. 1. introduction at the present stage of economic development of ukraine, relevant and repeatedly substantiated by scholars and practitioners issues are the issues of formation of comfortable business environment, increase of investment attractiveness of the state, the maximum of attracting foreign and domestic investments. one of the tools of structural transformation of the economic system is special economic zones (sezs) and territories of priority development (tpd), by introduction of preferential modes of conducting business, in particular, concerning the taxation of profits and importation of goods and equipment. the need for the formation of territories with a special tax regime through new forms of development is a problem, the urgency of which has been proven repeatedly. however, despite of the fact that implementation will allow to lead out the management of socio-economic processes on qualitatively new level and is an effective way of organizing the regional economy, which is quite fit to the national interests. the activities of sez and tpd in ukraine has still been criticized, both by scientists and representatives of authorities. promotion of the creation of tpd in the world and the economic effects of preferential tax treatment of investment activity were the subject of numerous studies by scholars such as l.  bezgubenko, b.  vasenko, l.  tobosa, a.  egorova, v.  zaykin, a.  kovalyuk, v.  kosova, n.  krupko, w.  mazola, s.  ogorodnikov, v.  saw, v.  rodionova, v.  sidenko, v.  fedosov, a.  chmyr, s.  yuri and others. due to the high level of scientific research of the authors listed above, we journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(1), 30–34 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.005.5254 the rationale of creation of priority development territories of tourist type alla krushynska department of management, economic theory and finance, khmelnitsky university of management and law, heroiv maidanu 8, 29013, khmelnytsky, ukraine, e-mail: alla_maruschak@ukr.net citation krushynska a., 2016, the rationale of creation of priority development of tourist type, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(1), 30–34. abstract the necessity of creation of priority development territories of tourist type in ukraine, where benefits will be provided for investors, has been highlighted in the paper. the author deals with the problems of legal regulation of priority development territories. the main conditions has been defined according to which the effective functioning of territories of priority development of tourist type should be provided. key words tourism, tourist complex, priority development territory, investment, tax credits, special mode of investment activity, the special economic zone. the rationale of creation of priority development territories of tourist type 31 should note that not enough attention is paid to the peculiarities of creating a functional tpd in ukraine and the issues of preferential taxation of investors, which determine the relevance of the topic of this study and the appropriateness of its choice. the main objective of the study caused by the need to outline the main issues of tax stimulation of investment processes, which in general can be divided into incentive problems of priority activities and promotion of priority of areas. this requires the necessity of defining of the legal basis of the territories functioning of priority development and tax advantages that will allow to highlight the key issues on which they will be functioning, by implementing of special regimes of investment activity. 2. the main material of the study one of the steps of achieving the investment activity of economic entities is the state support, in particular in the field of taxation of investment projects, approved in accordance with the law of ukraine „on stimulation of investment activity in priority sectors of the economy to create new jobs”. it is impossible to ignore the abolished law of ukraine no. 5211-vi, regulating the tax on profit of enterprises-investors. we shall note that the last one together with the norms of the tax code provided for sufficient materiality of granted tax preferences, according to which, the profits obtained by the subjects of investment activity, provided for taxation at a reduced rate, which will amount from 1 january 2013 to 31 december 2017 to 0% and from 1 january 2018 to 31 december 2022 – 8% and an immunity from taxation until 1 january 2018. however, despite of such incentives, it is impossible to talk about the effectiveness of these preferences, because according to the state register of investment projects in priority sectors of the economy, the last demand is not used. this fact in conjunction with the crisis situation in ukraine formed the basis of the cancellation of those privileges in accordance with the law of ukraine №71-viii, which provides for the exception of paragraphs 8 to 11 of paragraph 10 of subsection 4 of section xx of the tax code. as a result we have had the cancellation of quite substantial tax benefit, which aimed to establish favorableconditions to attract investments in priority sectors of ukraine’s economy to create new jobs; increasing the production of high quality domestic goods and services; creating a modern industrial, transport and market infrastructure. we believe that the abolition of the rule negatively affects the formation of investment attractiveness of ukraine. however, the use of specified benefits is accompanied by a set of specific problematic issues, which significantly reduced its effectiveness. therefore, the renewal of preferences of this kind must necessarily be raised and based on practice for their use. let us detail on certain problematic aspects of the mechanism of stimulating investment in priority sectors. thus, to the list of priority activities the production of alternative energy devices should be included what is very actual nowadays. another significant complication is the presence of criteria for evaluating of investment projects with a total estimated cost and the number of created new jobs, which significantly limit the range of possible investors, particularly among small businesses, for which these criteria are too high. this, in turn, there is the need to highlight in detail the essence of the tax benefits, which includes lowering tax rates, but the amount received tax advantages from this tax may not exceed the amount of investment actually undertaken in this subject. but, in this case the mentioned above tool, in meaningful content, is close enough to the investment tax credit, which provides the reduction of the tax liability of the enterprise to pay tax on profit of enterprises in the amount equivalent to a fraction of the cost of the current tax period, were directed to finance of the investment of r & d projects. therefore, perhaps more appropriate is the use of the investment tax credit, as an alternative to the preferential tax rate. a similar position regarding tax preferences shared by professor s. surrey, who has identified regressively introduction among the disadvantages of tax incentives in tax policy, which implies that the effective action in favor of those who pay large amounts of taxes. small businesses pay taxes in miniscule amounts, and therefore lose the profit from benefits (серебрянський, 2012). it is impossible to go round complication in administration and control of such instrument tax stimulation, whereas, except the organs of fiscal service, that certainly is more difficult to control the system with many exceptions, projects have to be obligatory registrated in the ministry of economic development of ukraine. another aspect is that the entities who intend to participate in the selection of investment projects in priority sectors of the economy submit to local executive authorities the list of relevant documents which must be checked, and this in turn raises the basic quality characteristics such tax system as neutrality and fairness. in general, the procedure for obtaining state support, under the laws of ukraine, for investment projects in priority sectors of the economy involves five stages quite complex, involving 32 alla krushynska authorities from the cabinet of ministers of ukraine to regional administrations. we think that these difficulties have been resulted by low activity of investors on the submission of investment projects and it should primarily be considered while improving mechanisms of investment stimulation. summarizing the above, we note the urgent need in the formation of favorable investment climate in ukraine, through tax incentives, but their use should take into account the previous experience of their application. the territories of priority development are considered to be not less complex problems from the beginning of establishment. they form a special legal regime of economic activity which began to appear in ukraine in 1998, and soon 72 pdt 8 regions of ukraine and crimea were established. it indicates about a certain ungovernability in gaining public regional scale processes policy of overcoming depression of regions, moreover, that the application of pdt was along with special economic zones (sez), technology parks and science parks. despite of this, indicators of socio-economic performance of the entity pdt bring them a positive role at the regional level. by 2005 most dynamically developing pdt build-up of major economic indicators registered in their businesses. the reasons for cancellation of preferences fez and tpd are the following: • opaque procedure for the establishment of these territories and areas and participation in specific companies. the concept of „zone” requires clear limitations of the scope of the special rules. in ukraine the status of sez and tpd the whole areas have received; • the desire of using the fez and tpd, not only as a way to attract investment, but also as a tool for solving social problems of the regions; • low state control over the work of sez and tpd. a lot of offenses in special zones confirms the fact that from the 225 companies operating in sez and tpd selectively tested tax inspection in 2003, the 201 tax and customs legislation; • violations were detected; • poor infrastructural state support of areas of preferential taxation. so, on the one hand, we have a positive experience of sez and tpd in several european countries (проскурнін, 2004) and partly in ukraine (чмир, 2011; єгорова, 2014); on the other hand – failure of the economic effects and lack of strategic vision of the tasks to which they are assigned. one way of overcoming these shortcomings is to create functional sez and tpd. thus creating forms of organization of territories with special tax regime it is advisable to support this preferential treatment. consequently, the focus of a potential activation area is attraction of investment resources by encouraging investment attractiveness leading industries in the area. in this case, we note that, according to the purposes of investing in ukraine, the industry can be divided into four groups: high profitable, stable, perspective, venture. in our opinion, there is the biggest need of revitalization tax incentives in third sector groups. also there should be encouraged industries relative competitive advantage and longterm attractiveness of which (investment of importance) are between low and medium. analyzing the main differences between fez and pda is that sezs are established for the specific purpose and on a relatively small, artificially limited terrain. pda are formed in terrains within the administrative limits of regions, cities (tpd in kharkiv.) or regions (tpd in transcarpathian region) (васенко, 2004) and within the configuration of the legal regime (complex benefits, guarantees, forms of government support, as well as restrictions) in the territories where they have been created (мілаш, 2010). before the creation of pdt there is a clear need of the formation of clearly-defined conceptual apparatus, because the legislation is a range of issues relating to the tpa, which is primarily manifested in some differences in the various laws and regional regulations of pdt. logically, this situation is unacceptable. also legal act on creation of pdt has not been defined. in our opinion, creation of general conditions and procedure for stimulating areas should be determined by the laws of ukraine, and the creation of separate pdt by the decrees of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine, and the amount and size of benefits can not be exceeded the limits prescribed by law. as for the special regimes of economic activity (sreas), neither of these laws nor in the tax code of ukraine they are not provided and it creates another legislative gap. however, concept of the law of ukraine „on the territory of perspective development”, deserves attention, which more corresponds to tackle regional disparities. we believe that the criteria of such projects, subjected to the special regime of investment activity, including the total cost of the project and the minimum wage is high enough not to receive benefits of small investors and facilitate to the flow of capital to highly profitable sectors. this, in turn, may create conditions of individual objects, but not territories. note that for a number of industries, the development of the territory is decisive. therefore, special investment regime should also be applied as part of pdt. despite of the suspension the rationale of creation of priority development territories of tourist type 33 of preferential regimes in areas are still generating proposals for the introduction of new functional units pdt. in particular, in the supreme council the bill number 4637 of 10 june 2009 was registered on the introduction of a special regime of investment activity in the tpa in ten districts of khmelnitsky region. the project was rejected for several reasons, including the need to highlight the proposal referred to in ch. 1, art. 4 of the draft, according to which „in the special mode of investment activity may be all kinds of business activity,” the latter, in turn, was proposed to narrow to the priority (івашко, 2010). given the opportunities for tourism in khmelnytsky, the proposal to create a pdt tourist type, in our opinion, would be more effective. summarizing, we note that the creation of pdt is the way to solve as sectorial so territorial problems of social and economic leveling, and the way to attract investment resources. let us turn tothe basic organizational creation of pdt. we believe that the main initiators of creation should be the local authorities, especially in terms of increasing their powers and at the same time they have to assume some of their obligationspromoting, granting exemptions from local taxes and so on. in particular, we should not ignore the commitment to the people of the territory in case of inefficient organization of the pda. certainly, the submission of projects to create tpd should take place on a competitive basis, on the principle of maximum transparency. tpd should be established minimum in terms of 5 years, after that the activity of tpd has to hold thorough inspection and may be extended on condition that the amount of income (or cost savings) budget will exceed the budget arrears due to tax benefits. also, the assessment of efficiency of pdt should be regularly conducted not only on indicators such as investment returns exemption for tpd budgetary impact of investments, the coefficient of efficiency of investment, innovation orientation ratio investment return rate of industrial investment return rate of production tax incentives, budget output per worker in pdt, the coefficient of efficiency of budgetary privileges used (івашко, 2010), but also indicators of the development of industries that are stimulated. according to the rules of assist to underdeveloped regions of the eu, tpd state aid may not exceed 30% of the investment made, if per capita gdp of territory is less than 75% of eu gdp per capita and 40% respectively at 60% of eu gdp per capita and 50% while 45% of eu gdp per capita. tpd hasto be created in geographically limited area where the potential settlement has accumulated. note that this restriction will help to overcome the current situation in ukraine, when legally prescribed operation counts 72 tpd in 9 regions of the country, while in some regions their area is not more than 0.2% of the territory of region, and some where there are up to 33 tpd, their total area is more than half of the region, and tpd in the transcarpathian region embraces the entire region. thus, the total area of all tpd is 62,451km², representing 27% of the regions of their location and 10.3% of the whole country (єгорова, 2014). according to estimations by western economists, to justify their existence sezs, the state must spend at least $ 400. per each job, provide infrastructure, advertising, etc. so it should be kept in mind that along with positive trends observed from implementation of pdt may appear negative problems, and the problems associated with the effect of the special tax regime and investment, including „shadow” economy, arrears payments to the budget, the outflow of profits abroad, abuse of tax incentives, raise of prices, etc. in ukraine, only 3% of projects has been implemented in the sez and the tpd has fulfilled all investment obligations. however, even these amounts of implementation of projects gave a significant positive effect on the economy of ukraine and separate regions. in modern conditions to minimize the negative effects of the introduction of tpa, it is useful to analyze the international experience of their operation. indeed, the efforts of state agencies still tend to aim at „fighting fires”, the effect of which is being exhausted in the short term but a systematic approach to problem solving has been ignored. while the more significant factors to the investor are political stability, investment guarantees, transparent regulatory framework, simplification of administrative procedures, land value, quality of infrastructure, qualification and labor costs and the amount of the consumer market (проскурнін, 2004). 3. summary lack of clear regulation of the tpa in legislative field of the state is one of the reasons of the low activity of investors. thus, the existing legal framework, to some extent, summarizes the activities of all tpa without regard to their functionality. despite of the fact that each such area is created to solve specific problems, the relationship between the territory and the type of management is not evident. therefore, it is reasonable to start functional tpa. however, such changes require making a number of amendments, namely questions relating to the order of creation and the term of the special regime of economic powers of administration, the size and scope 34 alla krushynska of benefits and so on. particularly important is the reduction of criteria for evaluating investment projects, simplifying procedures for their adoption and reduce the impact of government on this process, in order to observe the principle of neutrality of tax policy. therefore, in our opinion, unlike the exemption from income tax is a justified use of investment tax credit, which provides a simple and unified mechanism for implementation. the above survey results will give further opportunity to deepen the theoretical foundations of the nature of special 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пріоритетного розвитку в хмельницькій області» від 10.06.2009 № 4637. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34 ?id=&pf3511=35496&pf35401=187914 [05.11.2015]. івашко о. а., 2010, фінансовий механізм реалізації спеціальних режимів інвестиційної діяльності. автореф. дис. ... канд. екон. наук, львів. нац. ун-т ім. і. франка, львів. 1. introduction kazakhstan is unique on a condition of natural landscapes which differ in an amazing variety and inexhaustible opportunities for active holiday. it has all necessary – the huge territory, rich historical and cultural heritage, and in certain regions – the untouched, wild nature. we can offer tourists different types of tourism and we have everything to develop ecological, active, extreme, historical and informative types of tourism. kazakhstan promptly develops in the conditions of market economy, but develop mainly oilextracting and the metallurgical industries, as for tourism, it at a stage of prolonged origin (keneeva, 2016). the international tourism at us has not the best times. backwardness of tourist infrastructure, low quality of service, the steady myth about kazakhstan as about the country of the increased risk led to the problems and prospects of development of tourism infrastructure in the republic of kazakhstan тangal tursynova (1), zharas berdenov (2), roza faley (3) (1) department of physical and economic geography, l. n. gumilyov eurasian national university, kazhymukan 13, 010008, astana, kazakhstan, orcid: 00000003-4403-6737 e-mail: tangaltt@mail.ru (2) department of physical and economic geography, l. n. gumilyov eurasian national university, kazhymukan 13, 010008, astana, kazakhstan, orcid: 00000002-2898-8212 e-mail: berdenov-z@mail.ru (corresponding autor) (3) department of physical and economic geography, l. n. gumilyov eurasian national university, kazhymukan 13, 010008, astana, kazakhstan, orcid: 00000003-4197-4576 e-mail: rozika_9595@mail.ru citation tursynova t., berdenov a., faley r., 2019, problems and prospects of development of tourism infrastructure in the republic of kazahstan, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 28–32. abstract analyzed the state of tourism infrastructure in the republic of kazakhstan. displaying poor development of the basic elements of tourism infrastructure: transport, accommodation, catering, training. thеre were formulated the ways of solving the existing problems of development of tourism infrastructure, particularly in the information and organizational support. key words international tourism, tourism infrastructure, accommodation facilities, tourist activities, foreign investors, public-private partnership, kazakhstan. received: 24 december 2018 accepted: 30 january 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 28–32 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.04 problems and prospects of development of tourism infrastructure in the republic of kazakhstan 29 fact that now less than 1% of a world tourist stream are the share of our country (vahitova, 2008). according the growing importance of the development of tourism, this activity has increasing importance in the modern economy (berdenov…, 2016). the relevance of development of a national tourist brand is that tourism in kazakhstan is one of the priority industries of development of the non-oil sector of economy. so, during the 27th meeting of council of foreign investors at the president of kazakhstan the head of state declared unilateral establishment of a visa-free regime for citizens of 10 states which showed the highest investment activity in kazakhstan. in this list the usa, the netherlands, great britain, france, germany, italy, malaysia, the uae, the republic of korea and japan (esembekova, 2015). in view of actions taken within implementation of the concept of development of the tourist industry of rk till 2020 and also potential of a number of actions of the international scale (ehro-2017, nomination of candidate of kazakhstan for holding the winter olympic games of 2022, etc.), it is possible to speak about discovery of ample opportunities for increase in degree of recognition of kazakhstan in the world market of tourism and attraction to the country of foreign guests. the joint-stock company „national agency on export and investments of „kaznex invest” is engaged in attraction of investments into construction of infrastructure including in the tourism industry. primary activity of kaznex invest is attraction of direct foreign investments, and our tourism industry can have a big future when begin to make investments in it, including, foreign investors. now in the ministry for investments and development (world) the department of the industry of tourism which deals with this issue works, kaznex invest closely cooperates with it (ministry…). ”after all, it is necessary to develop the tourist industry – to pave ways, to build hotel complexes that is impossible without the corresponding investments” (keneeva, 2016). 2. materials and methods creation of the developed competitive tourist industry with competitive tourist’s products will provide jobs (nikolaev, 2003), stable growth in incomes of the state due to increase in volumes of entrance and internal tourism. development of a tourist cluster will define positioning of the territory and will influence forming of positive image of the state. the main work consists in search of the investors ready to invest in tourism infrastructure. meanwhile this beginning of a way. projects which actively keeps are created and even already attracts tourists. also work with the national companies, in particular, is conducted with astana expo 2017, air astana. for example, recently in tokyo signed the memorandum with the japanese company on attraction of investments and tourists to kazakhstan, meetings with representatives of national carrier were organized. in korea documents were also signed with the companies in the field of attraction of investments, contacts in spain are come. during different holding actions abroad we see the interest of other countries wishing to cooperate (sovmestnoe..., 2016). also there is an analysis of the existing problems, there are barriers in development of tourism and a way of their decision. in general, tourism needs to be considered the important industry, the second after oil which can bring income in economy of kazakhstan. development of tourism will also significantly affect investment attractiveness of the country (the strategic plan…, 2011). first of all, investors come to kazakhstan as ordinary tourists – so there is their acquaintance to kazakhstan. in many states it is developed by country „promotion” – focus of the companies on tourism. for example, in finland it is finpro. kaznex invest conducts work in the same direction and selected the separate kaznex tourism invest project. within this project, first, work on formation of favorable investment image of kazakhstan in the international community will be carried out. secondly, work on attraction of financial resources on creation of modern resorts for mass internal tourism will be conducted. thirdly, work with the companies on export of the kazakhstan tourist’s product is planned. the memorandum was signed with the german company on development of tourist capacity of mangystau region. the company will build several hotels on the bank of the caspian sea. ahead there is a lot of work – creation of the road map, signing of intergovernmental agreement (baktiyarova, 2018). also the republic of kazakhstan at a stage of negotiations with many other foreign companies. for example, inovnik, investors. also interesting projects on construction of hotel complexes are offered. decided to set the object – development of beach tourism in kazakhstan. so far were focused on mangystau region to create the resort area on the caspian sea. the beach season in kazakhstan very short also lasts two – at most three months. many hotel complexes will belong to individuals or the companies, and they need to get profit all the year round. 30 тangal tursynova, zharas berdenov, roza faley therefore it is necessary to develop them as yearround health resorts that they functioned also in the winter. there is a set of problems: infrastructure, transport, visa, insurance, service. today in kazakhstan the set of travel agencies most of which part literally survives works or even is on the verge of bankruptcy. many of them are focused on outbound tourism (fig. 1). 3. analysis and discussion the problem at us exists with national tourist brands. for example, if we are invited to japan, we know that there – an oriental cherry, a kimono, geishas, a tea ceremony. with kazakhstan at foreigners such association is not present. therefore to accounts necessary to begin work with creation of a tourist brand a logo which has to be bright, substantial, positive, transfer an image of kazakhstan, our hospitality. further it is necessary to create anchor brands which have to be associated with the country. and it is necessary to approach it from the scientific point of view. one of big problems is an absence of tourist experts in the market (kvartalnov, romanov, 2008). though, training in tourism in higher education institutions of kazakhstan is conducted, among them there are no experts, understanding tourism as the industry. the problem still exists that there are no professional guides. it is also required to begin work on training of specialists, the receiving guests at the airport, in hotels. experts in management of the industry are necessary. pay attention: all participants of the tourist market say about same that we lack infrastructure, roads and toilets. nobody speaks about tourism, as about the system industry which demands an integrated approach. many foreign tourists already come to the east kazakhstan region of the republic of kazakhstan, the ecotourism when the traveler gets to the virgin nature is interesting to them, there can take place treatment. constant guests to mangystau region come to see underground mosques and surprising landscapes of the ancient sea. for creation of positive image of kazakhstan in the international tourist community cluster approach should be applicable. in recent years in huge attention it is given to problems of hospitality and tourism and also the sharp growth of attention to clusters and cluster policy is noted. their essential value for creation of long-term competitive benefits of the territories aimed at successful involvement of wide group of tourists is emphasized. in general the concept provides development of five tourist clusters of the country: astana, almaty, east, southern and western kazakhstan (fig. 2). the northern (astana city) and southern (almaty city) capitals are positioned as the centers of business tourism, almaty also as the center of the international mountaineering (fig. 2). cluster east kazakhstan – the center of development of ecological tourism. cluster the southern kazakhstan – cultural tourism. !( !( !( !( !( !( ¬«7¬« 3 ¬«8 ¬«10 ¬« 2 ¬«9 ¬«11 ¬«5 ¬«1 ¬«6 ¬«14 ¬«13 ¬«4 ¬«12 aktau atyrau almaty astana shymkent karaganda 90°80°70°60°50° 55° 50° 45° 40° map of tour operators in the regions of kazakhstan 0 290 580145 miles . regions of kazakhstan number of tour operators by city !( atyrau 1 !( aktau 2 !( karaganda 5 !( shymkent 8 !( astana 13 !( almaty 26 1 akmola region 3 aktobe region 2 almaty region 4 atyrau region 8 east kazakhstan region 6 jambyl region 7 karaganda region 9 kostanay region 10 kyzylorda region 11 mangistau region 12-north-kazakhstan region 14 pavlodar region 13 turkestan region 5 west-kazakhstan region fig. 1. card of a sosredocheniye kazakhstan tour of operators source: own study. problems and prospects of development of tourism infrastructure in the republic of kazakhstan 31 cluster the western kazakhstan – cultural and beach tourism. 4. outputs three clusters envisage the implementation of national projects: burabai in the astana cluster, the ski resort southern kaskelen and kuk zhailau in the almaty cluster, bukhtarma and katon-karagai in the east kazakhstan cluster, kenderli in the west kazakhstan cluster. creation of the resort area assumes three elements of capital expenditure – external trunk infrastructure, internal engineering and tourist infrastructure and commercial objects. considering that today the public-private partnership (ppp) is at the peak of activity of discussion, it is possible to assume that its mechanisms are basic construction of attraction of off-budget investments into development of tourism in kazakhstan. effective development of the principles of ppp in the field of tourism assumes „distribution of obligations” between the state and private partners. a main objective of ppp is development of infrastructure for the benefit of society by a join path of resources and experience of the state and business, implementation of socially significant projects with the smallest expenses and to risks on condition of providing high-quality services to economic subjects. besides, within the new law „about ppp” the private initiative within which the private partner can initiate implementation of the project on the mechanism of ppp concerning the object which is at it on the property rights or long-term rent is possible. it agrees, statistics of tourism of kazakhstan for 2015 – 97% of the tourist organizations are in a private property, in state only 3% of the tourist organizations (esembekova, 2015). in other words, the world practice of use of the mechanism of ppp in the sphere of tourism answers the main objectives of development of the industry: • formation of positive image of kazakhstan for growth of popularity of the country in the international tourist community; • increase in cultural and educational level of kazakhstan citizens and also familiarizing of foreign citizens with knowledge of history, culture and life of the people of our country; • attraction of the foreign capital to the country. indicator of tourist mobility of the population of kazakhstan – one of the lowest in the world. on export of tourist services kazakhstan takes the 78th place in the world. on availability, the price and level of service, tourist services of kazakhstan are not competitive in the world market and much more concede to foreign analogs. limited opportunities of citizens, insufficiently developed tourist infrastructure, inconsistency of interests of the state and the private sector are deterrents for development of the tourist industry of kazakhstan. in kazakhstan more than 2000 travel agencies, from them function, only 30% are engaged in the organization of entrance tourism, the others work for outbound tourism, especially for commercial shop tourism. 90°80°70°60°50° 55° 50° 45° 40° map of tourism development clusters in kazakhstan 0 280 560140 miles . ca sp ia n s ea 1 2 2 2 3 3 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '9 8 7 5 4 3 2 1 74°72°70°68°66° 52° 50° 0 130 26065 miles tourist areas of akmola region ü 1-sights of astana 2-cultural monuments of kokshetau 3-monuments of atbasar culture 4-the graves of the andronovo culture 5-national park buyratau 7-kokshetau national park 8-burabay national park 9-kurgazhinsky reserve 1 the center of development of ecological tourism 3 cultural and beach tourism 2 cultural tourism fig. 2. five tourist clusters of kazakhstan source: own study. 32 тangal tursynova, zharas berdenov, roza faley entrance tourism in kazakhstan is generally business tourism: the international conferences, exhibitions, seminars, by the way, of 90% of tourists visit kazakhstan only once (isabekov et al., 2016). income gained from rendering tourist services is distributed between tourism organizations (domestic and foreign) and the state (taxes and fees). the greatest income connected with tourist activity has to create entrance tourism (belyk, 2012), and today kazakhstan gains the greatest income (72%) from activity of the tourism organizations working at the exit direction, entrance tourism yields 13% of revenue, internal tourism – 15%. internal tourism in the majority of the developed „tourist” countries gives from 30% to 50% of all receipts in the budget. in kazakhstan, for today, internal tourism is spontaneous and unorganized and has only 3% of all receipts from tourism (90% turistov…). proceeding from the above and the analysis of the current state of development of the branch of tourism, in kazakhstan the measures of the state support directed to improvement and development of tourist activity are extremely necessary. references 90% turistov poseŝaût kazahstan tol’ko odin raz (eng. 90% of tourists visit kazakhstan only once), 2010, http://oskemen.info/3180-90-turistov-poseshhayut-kazaxstantolko-odin-raz.html (accessed 22 august 2018). baktiyarova a., 2018, kak budet privlekat’ turistov mangistauskaya oblast’ (eng. how will attract tourists mangystau region), https://kapital.kz/economic/72749/kak-budetprivlekat-turistov-mangistauskaya-oblast.html (acessed 18 october, 2018). berdenov zh.g., atasoy e., mendybayev e.h., ataeva g., wendt j.a., 2016, geosystems geoecological assessment of the basin of rivers for tourist valorization. case study of ilek river basin, geojournal of tourism and geosites, 18, 187–188. belyk e., 2012, meždunarodnye dohody ot turizma b’ût bovyj rekord (eng. international tourism revenues hit a new record), http://www.tourprom.ru/news/16936/ (accessed 11 september 2018). esembekova d., 2015, sfera turizma – vozmožnosti dlâ investora (eng. tourism – opportunities for investors), https:// kapital.kz/economic/45983/sfera-turizma-vozmozhnostidlya-investora.html (accessed 22 october, 2018). isabekov s.b, ayapbekova a.e, demeuov a.b., 2016, turizm – ehkonomika – gosudarstvo (eng.tourism-economicsstate), https://yvision.kz/post/695533. (accessed 31 september 2018). keneeva g., 2016, kak razvitie turizma vliâet na investicionnuû privlekatel’nost’ strany (eng. as tourism development affects the investment attractiveness of the country), http:// forbes.kz/finances/investment/kak_razvitie_turizma_vliyaet_na_investitsionnuyu_privlekatelnost_stranyi_1/ (accessed 20 december 2018). kvartalnov v.a., romanov a.a., 2008, mezhdunarodnyj turizm: politika razvitiya (eng. international tourism development policy), finansy i statistika, moskva. ministry of industry and infrastructural development of the republic of kazakhstan, http://miid.gov.kz/en (accessed 28 september 2018). nikolaev i.p., 2003, mirovaya ehkonomika (eng. the world economy: textbook for universities), [in:] i.p. nikolaev (ed.), uchebnoe posobie dlya vuzov, yuniti, moskva, 45–46. sovmestnoe zaâvlenie âponii i respubliki kazahstan «o rasširennom strategičeskom partnerstve v vek procvetaniâ azii» (eng. joint statement of japan and the republic of kazakhstan “on expanded strategic partnership in the age of asian prosperity”), 2016, https://www. kz.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000202021.pdf (30 september 2018). the strategic plan of the ministry of tourism and sports of kazakhstan for 2010-2015. no. 101 from 08.02.2011 g., 2011, ministry of tourism and sports of the republic of kazakhstan, astana. vahitova d., 2008, razvitie turistskoj infrastruktury v regionah (eng. development of tourist infrastructure in the regions), expert kazakhstan, 7, 15–16. 1. introduction according to o.w. karpenko “modernisation in providing public administration services may base on optimising management resources, and favourable client oriented management of organisation processes”, i.e. transferring customer relation management (crm) to services provided by the authorities” (карпенко, 2013, p. 116). however, every concept is implemented by people and it is their behaviour that plays the decisive role in ensuring quality of the service processes. positive examples of applying the business model referred to above in western management (e.g.: bates, 2014; marsden, 2014), and early ukraine experience (карпенко, 2013; машкарьов, 2011; клименко et al., 2010), were surely conditioned by the fact that service providing in the administration sector to the benefit of society, represented by a specific number of clients, is superior in moral and ethic terms to specific private matters. as the term ‘serving’ is to a certain extent contrary to the economic term ‘working’, traditionally higher moral and ethical (spiritual) standards are required for discharging civil duties to avoid using power for personal purposes. difficult and diversified aspects of civil officers work in the complicated interaction between authority representatives and society continue to remain the subject of scientific studies in the strive to adapt to world and european management standards (серьогін, 2007) and organisational culture (сергієнко, 2011). well known positive european journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(1), 43–49 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.007.5256 behaviour models – interaction of civil officers, as administrative service providers, and their clients on the example of ukraine andrij lys chair of the state and local government, ivano-frankivsk national technical university of oil and gas: karpatska 15, 76019 ivano-frankivsk, ukraine, e-mail: e-mail: alys@mvk.if.ua citation lys a., 2016, behaviour models – interaction of civil officers, as administrative service providers, and their clients on the example of ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(1), 43–49. abstract the article proves the possibility and terms of applying the well known thomas-kilmann model and research methodology to identify individuals assuming dominating behaviours in conflict. the objective is to solve problems in recruiting top candidates for civil officers called “service providers” in response to the needs of “clients” and to formulate recommendations for decision making based on the relevant test results. key words management, public officer, client, service provider, model, dominating behaviour, personality, research methodology. 44 andrij lys examples and good practice of effective management, as well as lack of corruption, do not stem from a secret mental organisation structure of the western world but are rather the result of applying a set of techniques and instruments to reach transparency and power effectiveness. one of the, no doubt, positive trends affecting reduction of improper (corruptive, irresponsible, impolite, etc.) behaviours of state and local civil officers in their interactions with citizens is upgrading both the technology of providing services and administrative services themselves, as well as social monitoring mechanisms of their quality, completeness, timeliness, etc. ukraine research studies fail to provide practical technological and instrumental recommendations for shaping staff providing administrative services for residents, thus the search for innovative solutions is definitely a current issue. 2. analysis reference in this context to client oriented crm is understood as internal standards and client services business processes. it should be emphasised that the majority of ukraine studies in the field focused and remains focused on the options provided by applying e-governance, software including algorithms, implementation of these or those it-technologies, etc. in providing services (клименко et al., 2010; технології для…, 2009; кандзюба, 2007; серенок, 2010). it is purposeful to refer to studying the most specific moments of simple and direct participation in processes and procedures related to providing administrative services to people – ‘clients’ and administrative officers – ‘service providers’. this is conditioned in the opinion of n.r. nyżnyk (нижник, 1995, p. 98) “if people continue to feel as the object of influence and not participant shaping life there will be no effective relations in state management”. authors of the research study (серьогін, письменний, 2008, p.  28) proposed “to synthesise the best methodology to a uniform system of self rearing and self organisation of individuals, development of intuition and creative thinking, transformation of personal attitudes and stereotypes to meet contemporary needs”. as at least two equally entitled parties interact in generating a positive result in providing administrative services, it seems adequate to review known models, recommendations and technologies ensuring successful interaction based on the self organisation and self rearing methodology referred to above (серьогін, письменний, 2008). the present drive to eliminate all contacts between a civil officer and a petitioner, between the clerk and the visitor, between the briber and the bribed, and finally the service provider and the client cannot be enacted to the end. fundamental social and psychological research on interpersonal collaboration led to the development of theoretical models and practical recommendations for effective collaboration processes (e.g. крутій, 2007, 2008; кулешов, 2011; ложкин, рябоконь, 2000; селютіна, 2013; науменко, 2004), where “real business relations ethics does not mean formal respect of moral standards but revealing in everyday practice authentic intelligence, collective experiencing and active influence on circumstances, and helping people in scope of own competencies” (науменко, 2004). nevertheless, according to o.  krutij (крутій, 2007, p. 47-55) “have insufficiently studied interpersonal collaboration of subjects” because of what he suggests should be used to“ shape the readiness of state management subjects to dialogue and collaboration”, i.e. the known thomas-kilmann concept and model to characterise behaviour of both sides, specifically transformed to “theoretical analysis of interpersonal strategic collaboration of subjects managing the state”. it should be noted that this is not the first application of the thomas-kilmann (ткі – thomas-kilmann conflict mode instrument) tool by ukraine researchers to define and introduce ways of efficient collaboration of both parties. examples of successful application of the model elements and modification of these elements were achieved in the studies by n.e. vasilisnina and i.m. danilijuk-cernih (василишина, 2008; данилюк-черних, 2014). the objective analysis of these examples, however, refers to ensuring conflict free collaboration inside the organisation and between organisations, whereas our case involves collaboration of two persons, behaviour options limited by existing rules, structures, regimes, regulations, etc. this is a different aspect of using the model and recommendations shaping behaviour strategy not of “subjects managing the state” but the service provider and the client. if the behaviour strategy of the client is not in full the subject of management then the service provider is and should be managed by the state management authorities or local authorities and is obliged to show work behaviour compliant with the law, regulations and rules in force. behaviour models – interaction of civil officers, as administrative service providers… 45 distribution and application of the thomas-kilmann (herk, 2011) concept and model on a global scale as a tool to ensure fruitful interpersonal relations (sample, 2008), as well as their creative upgrading by some authors to achieve other objectives (combined use of behaviour styles, personnel assessment, defining priorities in preparing and developing personnel, teams, leadership, coaching etc.) (василишина, 2008; крутій, 2008; altmae, türk, toomet, 2011; mcmahon, 2016; introduction to…, 2011) justifies in full the study and the revealing of options applicable in formulating recommendations on organisation of effective collaboration of the services provider and the client. the specifics of the innovative application of tki tools in our study involve the following assumptions. the client may use the entire set of styles, strategies, mannerism depicted in the thomas-kilmann model in interacting with the service provider, whereas the latter’s behaviour is restricted, some behaviours are excluded, some may be partially recommended or only applicable in combination with other behaviours. the model with collaborating – competing coordinates in fig. 1, presenting behaviour patterns of interacting individuals in the process of receiving and providing administrative services, demonstrates 5 theoretically admissible options to both parties: 1 – avoiding; 2 – competing, 3 – compromising, 4 – accommodating, 5 – collaborating. without disclosing exactly the content of the listed behaviour options, we should emphasise that the suggested hypothetical objective of adapting the model to the environment of the service provider of administrative services, is achieving efficient group work of the service providing personnel, capable of performing all entrusted tasks and fruitful cooperativeness with the client, as well as minimising the number and scale of conflicts starting from re-applications. k. thomas and r. kilmann once justified their approach to studying and solving conflicts between individuals and to assessing their behaviour by the need to change the traditional approach to conflicts, and that the phrase “solving problems” should be understood as the possibility and the necessity of reaching successful solutions, eliminating or, as in our case, counteracting the development of a conflict. therefore, the objective of applying this methodology and instrument is not solving conflicts but prevention and pre-emptive action to create a conflict free situation and harmony in the interaction between the service provider and the client. taking as a benchmark the statement of tki authors that neither party in a conflict is successful by assuming such behaviours as avoiding, and in the case of a competing, accommodating and compromising attitude only one party wins, leaving the other party a looser, we must identify behaviours best recommended in discharging administrative functions and duties by the employees providing administrative services, the optimal or most desirable employee behaviours at the work place of the service provider (ideal – 100%) is the collaboration option contributing most efficiently to counteracting conflicts. if we suppose that every compromise of the parties (participants of the process of providing services to the inhabitants by the authorities) is generally fig. 1. two dimensional thomas-kilmann model of behaviour in conflict source: herk, 2011; sample, 2008. 46 andrij lys achieved, and exceptionally in result of mutual collaboration, it seems purposeful to recommend this behaviour option as a less desirable but a possible behaviour pattern for employees of the service provider, which leads to positive results. as compromising together with competing or accommodating is illogical, such behaviour patterns may be recommended to employees of the service provider in performance of services for clients only in combination with collaboration. adoption in pure form of such behaviours as avoiding, competing and accommodating must be withdrawn or subject to the following restrictions: • “competing” – a behaviour pattern that may be applied by the employees of the service provider should the client demonstrate inadequate behaviour (breaching the regime, rules or standards) and exclusively in exceptional situations and only together with cooperating. at the same time collaborating should dominate competing. • “accommodating” – the least desirable behaviour in our behaviour study pattern, which in literature on conflicts is interpreted as seeking options to favour the opponent or submit own behaviour to client’s interests and needs counting on future benefits of such behaviour. for this reason such behaviours must be withdrawn from admissible employee behaviours of the service provider to the extent possible. it is obvious that in future these options may potentially evolve to regular undesirable interactions of service providers and clients compromising behaviour regimes, rules and standards as well as deviated benefitoriented behaviours of the parties. nevertheless, this behaviour option generates a specific positive value. the employee of the service provider desires to show empathy, etc. to the extent admissible by law, in response to the attitude of the client, therefore, it can be recommended when combined with collaborating and compromising. • “avoiding” – analysing the potential of this behaviour, we may come to the conclusion that employees tending to adopt this behaviour either wish to avoid contacts with clients at any cost, neglecting performance of duties (if you do not work you do not make mistakes), or are ready to turn a blind eye to all infringing of the regime, rules and standards of processes and procedures in service providing to avoid own discomfort in entering into conflict. this behaviour pattern is inadmissible in both cases for proper employee operation of the service provider. thus, avoiding, with its destructive nature, should be brought to a minimum and fully eliminated with time. taking into account the above, the recommended behaviour model for employees discharging duties of the service provider must comprise mainly of collaborating and partially combining this option with such constituents as compromising, competing, accommodating and avoiding, provided the latter are minimised. two modified options (in line with our proposal of interpreting test results) of the thomas-kilmann model for selecting recommended behaviours of administrative service providers, including the restrictions proposed in terms of minimising the components compromising, competing, accommodating and avoiding, are shown in figures 2 and 3. fig. 2. modified model of recommended behaviour patterns for employees of the administrative service provider (option no 1) source: own studies based on herk, 2011; sample, 2008 behaviour models – interaction of civil officers, as administrative service providers… 47 the spheres identified as undesirable behaviour of service provider personel are shaded in figures 2 and 3, whereas preferential behaviours are left clean. obviously, the difference between the proposed options concerns only restricting undesirable personnel behaviours of the service provider. the restrictions shown in the second option of the modified model are more qualitative because the collaborating and compromising patterns can be applied in 100% whereas competing, accommodating and avoiding are limited to the maximum. due to the fact that all these behaviours are part of every individual and that avoiding cannot be fully eliminated, the option presented in the second modified model is more acceptable in searching candidates with minimal level of competing, accommodating and avoiding. thus, the option of the best set of behaviours in accordance with model 2 may deem collaborating as a dominating feature of candidates → maximum , and sub dominating elements showing a decline with compromising < maximum, avoiding << maximum and competing and accommodating minimum. it should be noted that in describing people in conflict к. thomas and r. кіlmann at the same time suggested a relevant testing tool for performing a quantitative assessment. additionally, testing according to the tki methodology is possible in the generally accessible on-line system (e.g.: thomas-kilmann conflict..., no data) with presentation of both individual and group results. what more, authors of the monograph (єлагіна et al., 2004) mentioned tki test results of the effects of using dialogue in interaction (of civil officers) at the interpersonal level, and showed the following breakdown of behaviour features: competing (10.9), compromising (8.4), avoiding (4.8), collaborating (4.6), accommodating (1.4) on the grounds of these results o.m. krutij (крутій, 2008) suggested, in order to popularise collaboration of individuals, groups, institutions where all participants have equal rights, and the rights and values of each party are respected, an original diagnostic, development methodology and scientific description of implementing social partnership and dialogue in practice for subjects involved in state management. obviously, the proposed methodology may be applied in diagnosing and shaping desirable behaviour patterns in the interaction between the client and the service provider by creative merging of traditional psycho diagnosis and less traditional contemporary methodology based on the principles of assessing professional behaviour and performance of a participant or candidate for the management team (крутій, 2008). 3. conclusions on the basis of the proposed modified thomas-kilmann model, we can draw the conclusion that the most desirable professional behaviour of the service provider in performing administrative services fig. 3. modified model of recommended behaviour dominents of employees of the service provider (option 2) source: own studies based on herk, 2011; sample, 2008. 48 andrij lys in processes and procedures involving clients is collaboration. wherein a possible behaviour of the service provider towards the client is compromising and competing, whereas accommodating and avoiding must be limited to the minimum. selection and recommendation of applicants for the post of civil officer performing administrative services for the inhabitants should follow prior tki methodology tests showing tendencies of individuals towards the justified behaviour patterns necessary and targeted for providing quality services. references altmae s., türk k., toomet o-s., 2011, thomas-kilmann’s conflict management modes and their relationship to fiedler’s leadership styles (basing on estonian organizations), http://www.academia.edu/5278851/ thomas-k 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проблеми державного управління, 2(44), http://kbuapa.kharkov.ua/e-book/ apdu/2013-2/doc/4/04.pdf [11.01.2016] сергієнко е. о., 2011, організаційна культура як фактор підвищення якості муніципального управління, phd typescript in дріду наду при президентові україни, дніпропетровськ. серенок а. о., 2010, механізми взаємодії органів влади з громадянами в системі електронного уряду, phd typescript in харріду наду при президентові україни, харків. серьогін с. м., письменний і. в., 2008, застосування синергетичних підходів до оптимізації системи органів публічної влади: наук. pозробка, наду, київ. серьогін с. м., 2004, державний службовець у взаємовідносинах влади і суспільства, habilitation paper in національної академії державного управління при президентові україни, київ. технології для державного сектору. як організувати швидке і ефективне обслуговування громадян, no data, http://www.microsoft.com/ukraine/government/ technology/default.mspx [09.01.2016] 1. introduction conception of “political identity” is a very complex category. it comprises content characteristics worked out in other spheres of humanistic knowledge which are projected on the political aspect. its content depends on the scientific approaches to the definition of “identity” and the subject of research. an identity has no static character, and self-identity of a person is realized upon different bases and different levels. a human being has to define himself and his place in a constantly changing society and world, so self-identification is an open, flexible and dynamic process, an individual mobility and psychological features of an individual being of great importance. the economic, political and cultural changes result in transformation of political identity, which in its turn influences greatly the transformation of all social spheres. on the basis of mentioned above, the process of political self-identity plays the main role in joining peoples’ efforts for the decision of socially significant tasks for providing life activity of political institutions. this defines a significance of political identity as one of the main factors of contemporary development and social transformations. 2. crisis political identity development and types of political identity are determined, as well as its functions, by the specificity of political process. for the modern societies the most specific are typologies carried out according to the following indications: party, value – ideological, depending on duration, degree of internalization journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(2), 34–36 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.010.5166 negative identity in crisis-ridden society: essence and functions nataliya pashina department international relations and foreign affairs chair, mariupol state university, stroiteley 129, 87500 mariupol, ukraine e-mail: npash@mail.ru citation pashina n., 2015, negative identity in crisis-ridden society: essence and functions, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(2), 34–36. abstract the main approaches and characteristics of political identity types connected with transformation of political regimes and society crises are analyzed. it is revealed that the state of the society results in the dominance of crisis and negative identity. the functional peculiarities of negative identity in the period of war conflicts have been considered. key words political identity, types of political identity, crisis political identity, negative political identity, positive political identity. negative identity in crisis-ridden society: essence and functions 35 and steadiness, according to the criteria of subject and object of identity. it is necessary to admit that different types of social identity (ethnical, religious, regional, demographic, professional and so on) can acquire a politicized character in certain conditions and be used by political subjects (state, parties, political elites and leaders) as a political resourse. transformation of political regimes and crisis of political identity in post-communist countries have actualized in political science the theme of a crisis, positive and negative identity. thus, political practice in countries with transitional regimes has not only complicated understanding of political identity in the whole but displayed new types of political identity connected with transformation of political consciousness and crisis state of the social system. scientists have come to the conclusion that a crisis state of the society predetermines the dominance of a crisis state of identity which is displayed first of all in the disparity of his ideological, party and personified levels with the dominance of the last one, as well as in formation of a negative way of self – determination in the political space. the duration of this crisis is determined by the speed of mass consciousness adaptation to new realities (попова, 2002a). it is necessary to reveal a crisis state of political identity in the context of general socio – cultural crisis which is characterized by breaking of not only the structure of rational values and norms predominant in the society but the system of traditional symbols and stereotypes formed in it as well. o.v. popova (попова, 2002b) asserts that four situations are typical for the crisis of a political identity. first of all, the broken systems of identification are not substituted by new ones (“ideal” models for imitation do not exist). in the second place, in the course of re-socialization an individual “gets stuck” at the negative stage of identification. third, discoordination of ideological, party and personified levels takes place. in the fourth place, as a result of re-socialization the old and new identities are overlapped by each other, being often based on mutually excluding valuable directives. 3. crisis negative political identity and its functions a crisis state of the society is characterized by not only a crisis identity but also by the predominance of a negative model of political identity. the essence of a negative identification is determined by the collective “we” through the image of enemy, “division” of the world into “us” and “them” (“friendly” and “alien”), assignment of responsibility for somebody’s own failures on the collective “other”. the signs of a negative identity are self-affirmation based on the “contradiction” and aggressive attitude towards representatives of any political movement taken as “alien”, growth of xenophobia and simplification of the picture of the world, political demagogy and ideologization of the social consciousness (гудков, 2004). a negative political identity is inherent for not only crisis transforming systems, it is a necessary stage of personal development, that is why it takes place also in the states with a developed democracy. at the same time it is in the transforming non – established political systems where a negative identity is one of characteristic features of political life. negative identification is often formed purposefully by political leaders, movements and associations for mobilization and consolidation of their supporters in the process of achieving certain political purposes. according to o.v. popova (попова, 2002b), negative identification in the crisis society realizes philosophical, compensatory and consolidating functions. l.b. gudkov (гудков, 2005) supplements this classification by a mobilizing function and introduces a concept of “negative mobilization”. l.b. gudkov (гудков, 2005) describes a mechanism of population consolidation on the basis of growth of “diffusion mass irritation, fear, hatred”, accompanied by a feeling of community grounded by appearance of “enemy” with a perspective of “unwanted development of events”. the author admits “an uttermost non-constructiveness” and threat of such type of consolidation for the society, as it blocks a way out of crisis. “negative mobilization resulting in the social consciousness represents a state of moral disorientation, inability to make any practical estimation.” negative mobilization provokes cynicism, leaving behind “a scorched value space” and impossibility of appearing any innovations of purport (gudkov, 2007). d.v. trubitsyn (трубицин, 2010) proposes to interpret a concept “negative mobilization” as contramodernistic strategy of the society behavior in the conditions of sociocultural crisis, because it can take a part of “a mechanism of return”. 4. crisis negative identity in the period of war conflict a period of war conflict is characterized by a deep public crisis which happens to be some kind of a point of bifurcation of social development and is accompanied by “wars for identification”, durable and exhausting for the population. a conductor of this or that identity is in the first place mass media, 36 nataliya pashina which helps to introduce definite orientations and stereotypes (for example, in modern ukraine: “vatniks”, “ukrops”, “kolorads”, “natsiks” and so on) into the social consciousness. a better-defined and more definite demarcation of the society in relation to the purposes and values is characteristic for the war conflict. and if in the time of peace the characteristic feature of a political identity of the main part of the population is ambivalence (duality), non-stability of self-identification, hard confrontation and aggravation of identities conflict are inherent in the war conflict. “other” as a marker of any social groups, takes a role not only of “alien” but a role of “enemy”. identification is realized not according to the social criteria, but first of all according to the political and ideological values. the society is united on the basis of negation, negative mobilization. a negative identity of the war conflict period successfully realizes all its functions: philosophical, compensatory and consolidating. however, with approaching the phase of war conflict the regulation of a negative identity can fulfill a part of “a mechanism of return”, block the process of peaceful life, interfere with a collective identity on the basis of constructive peaceful purposes, consensus, compromise. a difficult task of creating a positive identity, consolidation of the society in the state of peace faces the state, which is more complicated in comparison with the process of forming a negative identity in the time of war. not without reason, a post-war phenomenon of conflicts turns out to be so-called post-war syndromes (vietnamese, afghan, iraqi, chechen and so on), which characteristic feature is a difficulty of human adaptation to peaceful life. positive identification presupposes identification of an individual with some group or community on the ground of prescribed positive qualities and features (such as success, status, dignity and so on). the essence of a positive identity is a feeling of proudness and self-respect aroused from being connected with a group or community which an individual associates himself with (пантин, семененко, 2004). forming a positive collective identity is a deep-laid, mighty factor of capability of any state as an identity in the last analysis determines a vector of social development. 5. summary the subject of political identity requires a constant scientific monitoring. it is conditioned by the fact that political identity is an “alive”, dynamic construct determined at each historical stage of public development by a specific unique combination of political, economic, sociocultural and other circumstances and factors. the problem of political identity is actualized in the epoch of crisis and changes. breaking the traditional sociocultural and political myths, values and norms, which have determined a process of political self-identification of a person, results in the crisis of a political identity, predominance of a negative model of political identification, performing a set of functions (consolidation, mobilization, compensation and others). at the same time the predominance of a negative model of political identity, negative consolidation of the society can block the society’s way out of crisis on the basis of consensus related to the constructive purposes. that is why the major task of an identity policy in the period of finding a way out of crisis is the formation of such a nationwide identity that could be revealed not only in collective positioning in relation to other nations-states, as the ground of integrity of the nation but also as a subject of consent on the problem how this community conceives public purposes, principles and values. it is in this sense that political identity presents the basis and mechanism of public transformations and is actual in the context of contemporary science. references гудков л.б., 2005, феномен негативной мобилизации, общественные науки и современность, 6, 43–53. гудков л.н., 2004, к проблеме негативной идентификации, [in:] негативная идентичность. статьи 1997–2002 годов, новое литературное обозрение, «вциом – а», москва, 262–299. gudkov l., 2007, rublands systemkrise: negative mobolisierung und kollektiver zynismus, osteuropa, 1, 3–15. пантин в.и. , семененко и.с., 2004, проблемы идентичности и российская модернизация, [in:] и.с. семененко, http://spkurdyumov.narod.ru/pantin.htm. [03.12.2015]. попова о.в., 2002а, политическая идентификация в условиях стабильности и трансформации общества, дисс. … доктора политических наук : 23.00.02, санктпетербург. попова о.в., 2002b, политическая идентификация в условиях трансформации общества, изд-во с.-петерб. ун-та, санкт-петербург. трубицин д.в., 2010, модернизация и негативная мобилизация. конструкты и сущность, социс, 5, 3–13. this issue of the magazine “geography, politics and society” hides a wide range of topical problems related to the conducting of the anti-terrorist operation in ukraine. the modern collection of scientific works of the ukrainian researchers-scientists presents information about their researchers and studies of the other countries’ experience. in addition to this, they show the results of their own implementations and the received achievements in the development of new approaches to improve the socio-humanitarian sphere, which needs close attention of scientists, managers, citizens in the modern living conditions of the country. the intensification of the integration processes at the global and regional levels, considerable instability, the dynamism of changes, as well as the growing competition between the world and regional power centers to preserve and strengthen their influence on the development of relations, have affected the development of various forms of military-political conflicts. it is, in fact, one of the greatest threats to the international safety. ukraine has not escaped the tragedy. the military aggression of the russian federation against ukraine, the war in eastern ukraine, especially in the donetsk and luhansk regions, where, along with the separatists, the regular units of the russian armed forces have been fighting against ukraine since 2014, the annexation of the crimea became a serious test for the ukrainians. for the first time in the twenty-first century the country – a permanent member of the un security council – was aggressing against neighboring states, despite their commitment to maintaining peace and security. by its actions, russia has destroyed the existing system of the international security. the widescale military conflict, the so-called “hybrid war”, defined at the legal level by the decree of the president of ukraine “on the decision of the council of national security and defense of ukraine dated april 13, 2014” on urgent measures to overcome the terrorist threat and preserve the territorial integrity of ukraine “as” anti-terrorist operation “(hereinafter – ato), undoubtedly, has a very negative effect on the country’s potential and development. a hybrid of the information war, spreading panic and disbelief, manipulation, stimulation and simulation of protest movements, sabotage groups, terrorist acts, etc. on the backgrounds of fighting, actualize the study of trends of the social development of modern ukraine. specific features of this “hybrid war”, in particular, are its orientation not only to the annexation of journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 5–7 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.001.8153 introduction olena korolchuk (1) (2), marina bilуnska (3) (1) department of social and humanitarian policy, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, tsedika, 20, 02000 kyiv, ukraine, (2) department of health systems management, ariel university, ariel 40700, israel, e-mail: terrasanitas@gmail.com (corresponding author) (3) national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, tsedika, 20, 02000 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: bilynska@ukr.net citation korolchuk o., bilуnska m., 2018, introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 5–7. 6 olena korolchuk, marina bilуnska individual territories, but to the general weakening and disorganization of the ukrainian authorities, the restriction of sovereignty and international legal personality of the ukrainian state, the destruction of its economic potential, industrial, transport, social infrastructures and national unity and identity. there was a need to intensify the systemic reform, ensuring the european choice of ukraine, first of all, to develop an optimal model of foreign policy guaranteeing national security, as well as the internal with the formation of adequate modern standards of social security for certain categories of the population – affected persons (ap) from combat actions in the east of ukraine – ato participants and internally displaced persons (idp). today, the ukrainian information space, broken by hostile invasions, cause concerns in various aspects both inside and outside the country, due to the sluggish reaction of the media to the conjunctural challenges of the external and internal media space that is transforming every day. at the level of the virtual fight in ukraine, a new segment of the media is formed that is hardened by hostile attacks on the freedom of the spirit and will of the ukrainian people. under these conditions, today every media channel carries out its own information struggle, receiving victories in the war of semantic contradictions. radio broadcasting potential a safety valve, a source of up-to-date information, a means of communication and exchange of ideas – should be conceptualized at the scientific level and concentrated on informational support, focused on the life stories of the listeners, united by common problems people that will be heard and understood. in peacetime, it will become an environment that unites not indifferent patriotic citizens. ukrainian researchers have proved that the potential of broadcasting the coverage of the military conflict in ukraine is today focused on issues of social adaptation of officials and ap due to ato and annexation to effective and productive life in peaceful conditions. there is also the lack of attention of radio companies to the topics of the ato. it has been established that the most specific for the ukrainian ether are entertaining, social and psychological, artistic-cultural, patriotic (ideological and propaganda), historical, informational and analytical projects that are closer to the listener not only at home but also in the trenches or during the adaptation after military service. usually, an entertaining, easily perceptible, energetic and exciting form of radio broadcast in the new conditions of ato faces a difficult dilemma: it is necessary to find a unique compromise between its traditionally positive nature and the deeply offended spirit of public consciousness. as a result, some moved the traditional focus corresponding to the challenges of the present, while others ignored topics that contradict the radio serenity concept. there is great anxiety about the problem of informational support of ato participants and local residents since the beginning of the conflict. state broadcasters should be the flagships of broadcasting in the east of ukraine, because the information vacuum may be more deafening than weapons, and a victim of hostile propaganda can be both civilian and military. in order to reduce the prorussian regional identity in the east, it is necessary to prepare and implement the most effective measures of the socio-humanitarian, ethnic and, especially, information policy. the ukrainian state and society are at a new stage of profound transformations, burdened by the consequences of the military conflict, that affects the condition of society, the main spheres of life of the country and each individual, including internal migration, socio-economic, political tension and social disadaptation, mobilization of the army, difficult losses (more than 10 thousand servicemen and civilians), as well as unresolved needs in the adjustment and socialization of thousands of wounded and disabled people, ato participants and ap as a result of the ato. problems require attention: society, preserving livelihoods for the benefit of the state in the modern realities of external aggression and economic crisis (ukraine lost about 1/5 of its economic power), a sharp decline in living standards, bitter losses and considerable material damage, remains dissatisfied with the level and quality of life, the activity of the authorities – distrust in the state institutions. these problems are turning into deep despair, apathy and depression. in order to eliminate this danger, it is necessary to peremptorily and quickly react and act, properly diagnose and rank challenges, treats, and develop, formulate and provide timely adequate responses. in particular, the system of anti-crisis public administration was introduced in order to make concrete dynamic decisions at the right time on the basis of civil-military cooperation technologies. what is more, the development of a network of military-civilian administrations has been activated, which allows solving the issue of the absence of governments in the liberated territories and preserve the system of public administration in conditions that are capable of functioning. additionally, it solves the problem of the effectiveness of democratic civilian control in the security sector, reforming civil-military relations, and introduction 7 ensuring the effectiveness of public administration in the security and defense sectors. the launch of a complex of urgent political, social and economic reforms has now opened up different opportunities for adequate responses and, at the same time, it requires a very clear agreement between the specific, addressed to the east of the country, and general innovations, that will help ukraine to stand, defend, change and go ahead. modern ukrainian socio-political life and sociallyoriented state administration require revision and improvement of the mechanisms of state governance, adequate to time and situation, actualizing research both in theoretical and practical terms. one of the most important issues in this context is the development and introduction of modern mechanisms of public administration with the purpose of high-quality and effective realization of sociohumanitarian policy – organizational principles and corresponding modern tools of state management system of social protection of separate groups of the population, especially ato participants, internally displaced persons (idps), aps as a result of atos and their families. during 2014–2015 six waves of mobilization were conducted in ukraine, through which about 200 thousand citizens passed. since 2016, a contracted army was introduced, when servicemen became the military base, who voluntarily went to the army under contract. during 2016–2017, more than 100 thousand people were recruited and reserved to the armed forces of ukraine. the number of contributing members of the ato and their family members is constantly increasing – as at february 2017, 283,895 persons became the “veteran of the battle”, about 7 thousand – members of the families of the dead. furthermore, more than 4,100 people became invalids (data of the state veterans service and ato participants). additional pressure on the social infrastructure of the country and local communities, on state and local budgets creates 1.7 million idp, that left their homes, lost their property, broke social ties, and, in most cases, – became less competitive. thus, there appeared two new categories of ap due to ato in ukraine – the recipients of social services that require special attention of the state since the social vulnerability of these people is a phenomenon that arose suddenly. it dramatically changed the habitual life of citizens, most of which did not require state support until 2014. the aforementioned separate categories of the population of aps – the participants of the ato and the idps, and their family members, who need proper state assistance and support, rehabilitation, social and psychological adaptation, etc. in accordance with the theory of social space p. burdue, a new “actually functioning group of people” has been formed in ukraine since 2015, which act as autonomous subjects in multidimensional social spheres and ukrainian society has not yet solved problems of several areas of social policy : socio-economic welfare, employment, health with the necessary component of rehabilitation, aps integration as a result of ato, idps, and, most importantly, socialization of ato participants and veterans, members of their families. the future development of the ukrainian nation, carried out in the newly created conditions of economic, ecological, socio-psychological and political realities, another mental reality, requires carrying out prolonged scientific researchers in order to formulate and implement state policy; directed primarily at reducing the powerful socio-psychological tension, integration of ukrainian society, catalyze the strengthening of national identity and national unity on the backdrop of a significant increase in the level and quality of life of ukrainians. the editor is grateful to all the scientists – the authors and co-authors of the articles-texts of this collection, working in the research centers of various institutions of ukraine. also, a special gratitude is expressed to reviewers and co-editors, polish colleagues, for their work. at the same time, he hopes that the presented topics are interesting. olena korolchuk, marina bilуnska 1. introduction reflection on the social functions and the possibilities of applying knowledge generated by geographers in practice accompanies geographical thought at all stages of its development as a modern academic field. as specified by z. chojnicki (2010), despite attempts to create applied geography, in terms of practical functions, the discipline still did not go beyond the methodological programs and individual activities of separate scholars. applied aspects of human geography and their scope are treated differently in national schools and in the views of individual scientists (leszczycki, journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(2), 1–9 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.2.01 applied aspects of human geography. a critical approach to traditionalist views valentin mihaylov institute of social and economic geography and spatial management, university of silesia in katowice, będzińska 60, 41–200 sosnowiec, poland, orcid: 0000-0002-5888-6583 e-mail: valentin.mihaylov@us.edu.pl citation mihaylov v., 2020, applied aspects of human geography. a critical approach to traditionalist views, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(2), 1–9. abstract traditionally, applied aspects of human geography are mainly associated with economic geography, regional development and spatial planning. in the debate on the application potential of the discipline, a number of important problems of social, political and cultural geography, relevant to various contemporary processes on a global and regional scale, are marginalized. for this reason, the author undertakes a critical rethinking of the current debate on the applied aspects of research in human geography. a brief review of the conceptual and institutional development of applied geography in the world and in selected national schools is made. the author also distinguishes two research orientations: 1) strategic orientation – connected to studies carried out at the international, national and macro-regional spatial levels; 2) operational orientation – concerning applied studies undertook on a scale of separate municipalities, cities, neighbourhoods or even separate streets and buildings. taking an attempt to overcome the narrow understandings of the frameworks of applied human geography, the author presents a new definition and tries to identify the main challenges for geographers that work in the field of human geography. applied aspects of basic directions of human geography from the point of view of their broader interdisciplinary ties are also indicated. key words human geography, practical functions, applied geography, constructive geography. received: 25 june 2020 accepted: 31 july 2020 published: 20 november 2020 2 valentin mihaylov 1962; parysek, 1990, 2004; pacione, 1999, 2011; chojncki, 2010; phlipponneau, 2004; aleksandrova, 2006; gladkiy, 2010; anoshko, 2011; lee, sui, 2015; mihaylov, runge, 2018). for this reason, an attempt to systematize the current priorities in application research in the field of human geography was made in the paper. moreover, the specificities of selected national schools have been also taken into consideration. this undertaking required a critical look at the previous ways of defining and interpreting categories as applied geography and constructive geography, and the occurrence of certain understatements in categorizing separate geographical studies and publications as “applied” or “fundamental”. the author has in mind “non-physical” part of the discipline intentionally specified as human geography. the term socio-economic geography, widely used in central and eastern europe, excludes from the debate a number of important currents of social and economic geography, or at least diminishes their meaning. this is one of the chief accents of the paper. thus, the author undertakes a critical re-thinking of the current debate on the application aspects of research in the field of human geography. because of limitations in the volume of papers, some of the author’s theses and arguments are presented in a brief manner. the same also concerns the number of references. this paper focuses on chosen concepts and schools which deal with practical aspects of human geography. contentious issues in this field are addressed in their formal dimension (e.g. in institutional projects or publications) as well as in backstage disputes and relations of geographers. we can arbitrarily divide these disputes into several groups. each of them has its own specificity: 1) from the point of view of methodology, studies carried out on the basis of the positivist approach are considered practical. on the other hand, there is a less favourable attitude towards studies based on humanistic methodology which are rarely treated as potentially applicable in real life. 2) from the point of view of social sphere, excessive emphasis is placed on economic and planning issues. the role of cultural or ethnic factors in solving social problems is insufficiently taken into account or depreciated by geographers. 3) from the point of view of the geographical scale, most geographers mainly focus on solving problems on a national or subnational scale, e.g. regions, individual cities, municipalities, with less attention to international questions. 4) from the institutional point of view, it is usually assumed that the results of research in human geography should be promoted among representatives of public administration, and less often in business or non-governmental organisations. 2. conceptual and institutional development of applied geography in the world and in selected national schools 2.1. general remarks as a science providing practical knowledge, geography has a long history. it dates back to the time when geography was not formally separated as an academic discipline (lee, sui, 2015). the very concept of applied geography originates in the late nineteenth century in great britain. e.w. bunbury (1897; in: pacione, 1999) looks for the roots of the practical function of the discipline at the time of the birth of geography, at the turn of the third and second centuries bc. measurements of the earth and cartographic studies conducted by cartographers and mathematical geographers from alexandria headed by eratosthenes were of application significance. in the sixteenth century, during the great geographical discoveries, geographical knowledge was highly valued by rulers and merchants. part of the generated knowledge still has unquestionable practical significance, especially at a time of rapid spread of new technologies. for example, research of atmospheric phenomena providing reliable information is relevant in the planning and functioning of certain sectors of the economy, in particular agriculture, transport and tourism. however, methods for monitoring and forecasting have been improved. nowadays, the application significance of human geography is assessed in terms of the possibility of applying research results in contemporary economy, regional policy, land use, in forecasting and managing demographic processes in states and regions. one of the first attempts to formulate the essence of applied geography belongs to the british geographer a.j. herbertson (1899). according to him, it is “a specific way of looking at geography, limiting research to one viewpoint. for a businessman it will be an economic viewpoint, for a doctor a climate and demographic viewpoint, and for a missionary it will be an ethical viewpoint” (pacione, 2011, p. 9). despite the romantic nature of this approach to the subject of applied geography, it indicates one important thing. it is a research specialisation and approach to problems limited to the practical needs of specific fields of socio-economic life. attempts to discuss the essence of practical aspects of human geography or selected threads of its development in selected regions and countries were applied aspects of human geography. a critical approach to traditionalist views 3 discussed in geographical publications, e.g. in north america (frazier, 2004), western and southern europe (gaspar, 2004), central europe (enyedi, 2004), russia and the former soviet union (gerasimov, 1966; 1992; sobisevich, snytko, 2019), poland (leszczycki, 1962; parysek, 1990, 2004; chojnicki, 2010). the mentioned authors discuss and define the tasks of applied geography and contribute to its conceptualisation and methodological operationalisation. the institutional form of cooperation in the field of practical aspects of geography is performed by the applied geography commission of the international geographic union (igo). the initiative to create it was taken during the nineteenth igu congress in stockholm in 1960 by m. phlipponneau (leszczycki, 1962). the main goals of the igo applied geography research group include: development and coordination of professional geographers’ networks in the field of applied geography; organisation of meetings and publications; establishing cooperation with non-governmental organisations, private companies, and public agencies; ensuring greater employment opportunities for geography graduates in business and government structures. on the commission’s website, the contribution of geographers to applied science is highlighted, while it is pointed out that this contribution is not always recognised. to some extent, this is due to the fact that geographical institutions are more effective in meeting the needs of geographers from academic environments than those working in other public institutions or in a private sector (website of the applied geography commission). to conclude, summarising studies on specialised literature and author’s own practical experience concerning the intensity of contacts between academic geography and practice, the author distinguishes several channels through which geographical knowledge is promoted in various social spheres: 1) participation of geographers in projects aimed to solve infrastructural, economic and social problems. 2) participation of geographers in teams defining or conducting specific policies at the local, regional, national or international level. however, it should be recollected that the participation of geographers in various commissions and public administration projects does not necessarily involve the use of geographical knowledge, since educated geographers often have knowledge on legal, financial, or administrative issues. 3) preparation by geographic teams at the request of ministries and government agencies, local self-governments or ngos of general or sectoral analyses, spatial evaluations, regional and local development strategies. 4) participation in investment projects and business plans in a new location (expert evaluation of the local tax system, availability of investment plots, modern business centres, situation on the labour market, transport accessibility, access to raw materials, distance from markets, etc.). 5) scientific study in the form of an article, book, map, atlas or report, the results of which can be used for practical purposes. the chief controversies and disagreements are raised by the very distinction between scientific works considered practically applicable in socio-economic life and those perceived as strictly academic ones. 2.2. applied geography in western schools of geography in the english-speaking countries, and broadly – in the english-language publications, practical human geography studies are developing under the name of applied geography. this term is used not only as a cognitive category, but it also represents a separate research discipline. in fact, this trend is a loose collection of quantitative works on various topics related to problems of nature as well as ecological, social, and economic development, or application of gis. despite the fact that human geography studies have been undertaken on various spatial scales, geographers mainly focus on selected socio-economic problems on an urban, local and regional scale. in the english-speaking world, the journal applied geography, founded in 1981, makes a significant contribution to the development and promotion of practical aspects of the discipline. in the age of globalisation and the expanding dominance of english in international scholarly communication, the possibilities of the journal’s influence have increased on a larger scale. applied geography publishes the results of studies using a geographical approach to solving specific research problems of human society that have a spatial dimension. the most frequently addressed ones are the assessment, management and territorial distribution of natural or human resources of the world (website of applied geography journal). m. pacione, who has published a number of papers in this field, treats applied geography as a research approach in which geographical knowledge and skills are undertaken to solve social, economic and environmental problems. the factor that connects various studies in applied geography is not a specific model or theory, but a fundamental philosophy of their importance or utility for society (pacione, 2011). the author advocates the concept 4 valentin mihaylov of “useful knowledge” separating pure from applied geographical research. the author is convinced that “some geographical studies are more useful than others”. simultaneously, he asks important questions: available to whom? who decides about it, and on the basis of what criteria? (pacione, 2011). such dichotomous division suggests that theoretical and methodological achievements fall into the category of pure research. although it is not directly stated, this approach determines which part of the knowledge is “useless” for practitioners. this would mean that creation of a new concept or a development of a new method for spatial analysis by scientists will be treated as “pure knowledge” (implicite – “unuseful”). in turn, the results of application of the same new method by another scientist or practitioner will be considered “practical (‘needed’, ‘useful’) knowledge”. therefore, it seems that in this regard the more traditional division into basic (including theoretical) and application (practical) research is more reliable. reference can be made to chojnicki’s model (2010), which distinguishes two functions of geography in terms of knowledge generation: 1) cognitive functions associated with the progress of research based on detecting, determining and explaining facts; 2)  utilitarian functions serve for solving problems of practice related through transformation of reality by constructing projects or planes connected to the subject matter of geography. lee and sui (2015) made a review of the most discussed topics in practical geographical research published in such journals as: the american association of geographers papers in applied geography (for 2013), papers of the applied geography conferences (2007–2012) and papers and proceedings of the applied geography conferences (1978–2006). these authors provide an empirical picture of the entire applied geography and human geography in particular, at least in the united states. physical and human geography are almost evenly represented. in the entire period from 1978 to 2007, the largest percentage of papers were published in the following branches: environmental planning and management, water resources, transport, planning, development, business and retail trade, tourism and recreation. to a large extent, these problems retained their dominance to the middle of the 2000s. the use of new technologies and methods by geographers resulted in the emergence of new trends in the period from 2007 to 2013. the issue of environmental planning and management has maintained a leading position in the structure of published articles. among the leading topics are also gis / gps, environmental threats, planning, economics, education, crime, and remote sensing. 2.3. constructive geography in the former ussr and russia in the former soviet union, as well as in the states emerged after its decomposition, the concept of constructive geography was developed. this involves the establishment and development of an entire academic school, a number of concepts, publications and conferences. looking critically at the most important characteristics of constructive geography and the reasons for its weaknesses, a. levintov (in: gladkiy, 2010) mentioned the following arguments: 1) complex mathematical quantitative and graphical methods of analysis; 2) a high degree of abstraction and detachment from the real geographical environment; 3) reducing the geographical environment to productive, recreational or cognitive activities; 4) focusing research on the design and transformation of the geographical environment. the development of constructive geography is strongly correlated with the establishment of the institute of geography of the siberian branch of the russian academy of sciences in 1957 with headquarters in irkutsk. over the next decades, this institute carried out a series of studies under the leadership of i. gerasimov, and later v. soczava. till the 1980s, state authorities and some ministries of the soviet union commissioned the institute to conduct a number of scientific evaluations and specialised research: in the field of transport infrastructure development, reversing the siberian rivers, research related to the aral sea crisis, exploitation of oil fields in west siberia, construction of hydropower plants, etc. according to v.m. kotlyakov and a.a. tishkov (2008), due to the development of constructive geography in irkutsk, a “positive hybrid” appeared. this means that the main result of the activity of the institute of geography was the optimisation of relations between fundamental and applied studies. notably, the main feature of constructive geography was based on research programs which combined theoretical, methodological and empirical approaches and methods. these research programs concerned, for example, organisation and management of geographical space, rational use of natural resources and optimisation of relations with the economy and society in conditions of technological progress, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. the soviet school developed a comprehensive practical geography project directed to attempts at solving problems of the geographical environment in a comprehensive manner, which required collaboration between economic and physical geographers. as a whole, constructive geography has emphasized fundamental research primarily focusing on the influence of applied aspects of human geography. a critical approach to traditionalist views 5 socio-economic activities on the geographical environment (gerasimov, 1982). it is worth mentioning that in the former ussr physical geography had a definite advantage in applied research. a similar trend also occurs in modern russian geography. one example can be given here. 28 papers were presented at the conference “the idea of constructive geography and the development of fundamental geographical research”, which took place in the city of kostroma in september 2015. only seven of them concerned the problems of human geography, including the importance of constructive geography in solving geopolitical problems of russia, tourism development, agrarian reforms, socio-ecological systems in mountain areas (naučnaâ..., 2015). 2.4. applied aspects of human geography in poland in the second half of the twentieth century, the development of applied research also intensified in other countries of the eastern bloc. attempts to problematise and conceptualise the practical aspects of geography in poland have a relatively long tradition. unlike the former soviet union, the development of geography in poland puts socio-economic geography in a better position since it is more practical in cognitive terms and has a wider scope of application and richer achievements in practice as well (parysek, 1990). under the influence of marxist ideology and because of full domination of the state in spatial planning and funding of science, human geography has experienced a revolution in terms of application priorities and internal specialisation. the pre-war human geography / anthropogeography was transformed into economic geography. as  m.  kiełczewska-zaleska (1958) critically pointed out, in the post-war years, economic geography became a new direction which moved away from many currents and disciplines of human geography, and thus narrowed the scope of research activities. this model, despite progress in the structure of the discipline and the process of sociologisation of geographical knowledge, undoubtedly influenced the specifics of practical research in polish human geography. as noted by j.j. parysek (2004), the main recipients of the products of geography (including methods and techniques of analysis) are those spheres of social life which deal with shaping structures, organisation and functioning of human living space. socio-economic spatial planning and spatial management play a primary role in this regard. poland is one of the first countries in the former eastern bloc in which the applied problems of human geography became the subject of compact scientific publications. one of the first issues of the english-language magazine geographia polonica (1964) was entitled problems of applied geography. it included works developed as part of the polish-british seminar in keele in 1962. most of them discussed problems of industrialisation, urbanisation and development of small towns. in contemporary polish geography, there is an evolutionary change in the scope and role of geographical research (bański, 2016). the utilitarian functions of geography have been rather underestimated and unused for a long time, while j. bański points out the tendencies of moving away from theoretical and cognitive issues towards applied research (diagnosis and expertise) ordered by various governmental and local self-government institutions. j.j. parysek (2004) specified that in strictly geographical matters, geographers are displaced from their field of competence by economists, sociologists, architects, political scientists, lawyers and representatives of other disciplines. the author justified this unfavourable tendency by the fact that after environmental issues and tourism geographers give other disciplines other spatial issues, i.e. regional and local economy, territorial planning and shaping of living environment. undoubtedly, this is a universal problem that concerns not only human geography in poland. 3. thematic and methodological asymmetry in applied human geography research 3.1. research scale fig. 1 shows a generalised model of applied human geography and highlights its structural and methodological peculiarities. the author proposes an arbitrary division according to the following criteria: scientific orientation (divided by a strategic and operational level), socio-economic sphere with its macro and micro levels, and spatial scale. most of strategic research undertaken on a larger geographical scale concerns such problems as sustainable development, elaborations of characteristics and recommendations on the optimisation of the functioning of international or national transport corridors, concepts of spatial development of countries, studies on the settlement network system, etc. this type of research is often undertaken by scholars from central and eastern european countries, although their scale is limited mainly to separate countries or their regions. there are, certainly, exceptions in which geographers actively took part in the practical implementation of investments on 6 valentin mihaylov a smaller spatial scale merging strategic and operational research. the list of outstanding achievements may not be long, but there are individual examples as the construction of a new waterway (canal) between varna and devnia, west of the varna bay in eastern bulgaria in the 1970s. the geographer a.  beshkov who comes from this city, was the first who proposed the idea of building the waterway and a new port, justifying its location (beshkov, 1957; 1959). based on this strategic investment, the so-called industrial agglomeration of varna – beloslav – devnia, including five ports and several large industrial plants, was established. the potential list of applied research on a micro scale is much broader in terms of the scope of problems. these studies may concern, among others, changes in the structure of land use in settlements, elaboration of models for optimisation of the public transport in urban agglomerations, development of infrastructure in special economic zones, and revitalisation of downtown districts, post-industrial or residential areas. traditionally, the research on a micro scale aimed to generate knowledge which is potentially useful in specific operational activities was more often undertaken by western geographers (for instance: lee, sui, 2015). in turn, for human geography in former communist countries, many strategic studies were often too general and abstract; therefore, they had little chance to be directly applied in a socio-economic life. as already noted, the excessive focus on the large-scale problems and the lack of a clear specialisation of constructive geography in the former soviet union led to the crisis of this discipline. however, in the age of globalisation and more intensive internationalisation of scientific research, these differences are slowly blurring. 3.2. favouritism for reasons of methodological perspective and thematic specialisation taking into account philosophical and methodological criteria, the disputes between supporters of the positivist or the humanistic approach concern the applied importance of one or another performed study. regarding the methods used, the strong and weak points of quantitative and qualitative research are traditionally the most discussed aspects. studies carried out by applying quantitative methods are often accepted a priori as applicable. this applies to both the attitude of reviewers of scientific articles and books, doctoral theses, applications for project funding as well as the policy of decision-making bodies (department council, faculty council, various thematic committees, scientific societies, etc.). the very appearance of quantitative methods in a scientific work, i.e. mathematical and statistical models, encourages evaluators to treat this work as “applied”. such a state of affairs occurs in various cases, regardless of whether it is about political geography (in the case of parametric assessment of the power of states), economic geography (employment level or the dynamics of production) or geodemography (life expectancy calculations). common opinions about the practical significance of works created in human geography depend on subjective factors, thematic specialisation, and particular interests of individual scholars. according to unwritten rules, the practical value of a given geographical work can often be assessed only on the basis of its specialisation. wherein, analyses related to economics and planning are usually treated favourably in terms of their practical value. it concerns research in traditional directions, i.e. agricultural, industrial and service geography, transport geography, geographical aspects of the labour market. studies on regional policy, spatial management, territorial planning and regional development are strategic macro level orientation operational micro level spatial scale global supernational country level macroregional local units (municipality, city, neighbourhood) separate objects (street, building, monument) socio-economic sphere fig. 1. generalised model of research in applied human geography source: author’s elaboration. applied aspects of human geography. a critical approach to traditionalist views 7 undertaken more and more often from an interdisciplinary perspective. studies conducted in this fields combine perspectives and a method of economic geography, economics, management sciences and urban planning. the main purpose of geographers’ research in these directions is to conduct evaluation in human – economy – environment relations, development of forecasts and proposals of specific measures aimed at their spatial optimisation, which will meet the specific needs of society. m. hilpert (2002), g. raagmaa (2002), v. mihaylov & j. runge (2018), k.  zimmerbauer (2018) and other authors wrote about the possibilities of using te humanistic perspective in geography to obtain results of importance for practice. despite this, recognition of works with social or cultural content meets with greater resistance from many conservative scientists. it is no secret that such situations occur during discussions on the choice of subjects for ma or phd theses. this is due to many scholars’ belief that if the author undertakes issues related to spatial planning, the labour market or economic investment, his work is automatically granted with practical significance. all these circumstances influence not only the image of human geography in a society. as indicated in previous parts, the scope of the above-mentioned spheres of social life in which geographers really have something to say is also narrowing. moreover, social or cultural threads still represent a modest share in the works of university graduates, including phd theses. what is more, geographers hardly ever propose solutions that could find application in such fields as diplomacy, international relations, national or international security, or ethnopolitical conflicts. publications of similar themes rarely appear in journals specialised in strictly geographic matters. in this respect, a large difference is noticeable in comparison to the beginning of the twentieth century. this was a crucial time for re-ordering of geopolitical structures and relations. then, the ideas of the most outstanding representatives of geography from various nations, especially from central europe and the balkans, participated in and had a real influence on shaping the political order. for example, in 1913, a geographer anastas ishirkov was a member of the bulgarian delegation at the conference in bucharest after the second balkan war. as m. górny (2013) noted, during the negotiations in versailles, saint-germain-en-laye, neuilly-sur-seine, trianon and sèvres after the first world war there were also geographers from both victorious powers and newly created states. the interests of the french side were represented by emmanuel de martonne, emmanuel de margerie, albert demangeon, lucien gallois and jean brunhes. in turn, jovan cvijić, during the versailles conference, was a member of the serbian delegation. the polish side was represented by eugeniusz romer. these geographers were playing a key role in the work of territorial commissions. after the second world war, the outstanding polish geographer and chairman of the international geographical union, stanisław leszczycki, was an energetic propagator of “the application of geographical research to practical purposes” (leszczycki, 1962). s. leszczycki participated as an expert in the polish delegation that negotiated the final course of the polish-soviet border in moscow in 1945 (eberhardt, 2018). 3.3. author’s concept of applied human geography human geographers often complain that the results of their research are rarely recognised or at least hardly visible in the social, political and economic life, and even that a great deal of the generated geographical knowledge is of little use for modern society. disagreeing with such a widespread, too far-reaching opinion, a few general geographical methods and technics which are widespread and commonly used in social life could be mentioned: the cartographic method and the geographical map which is the final result of its use – an object of everyday use by millions of people; method of regionalisation of the territory (with separation of complex or sectoral regions); a scheme of a comprehensive geographical description of a territory (an inseparable element of each plan or strategy for spatial development of administrative units); gis, etc. among geographers, it is often assumed that the use of more or less complex operations to calculate empirical data automatically gives the published results as a book, article or report an applied essence. the author of this paper is of the opinion that, as long as the results of this study are not implemented in life, we can only speak of their application potential. it is, therefore, worth separating two categories: – first – studies that have already been applied in practice, and – second – study results with a potential to be applied, which are not equal to the first category. the first category concerns geographical studies and their results, ideas, concepts, methods and research tools that have already been used for certain practical purposes; specific works and geographical expertise applied in practice (in spatial management or in the labour market, tourism and recreation, geopolitics, in the protection of cultural heritage, etc.). in the paper, some limitations that brake the separation of the common application potential of human geography were indicated. in the future, 8 valentin mihaylov in order to increase the impact of their research in practice, geographers should undoubtedly consider new topics and problems in relations between society and space. therefore, the author proposes the following definition of applied geography: a current in human geography, which includes research generating propositions for changes in the state of certain phenomena, structures, relationships, movements, flows in their spatial dimension, in order to increase the quality of human life and optimise relations with both natural and anthropogenic environments. unlike other concepts and definitions on the subject, this approach does not limit practical geographical research exclusively to spatial and economic issues or engineering activities aimed to transform and physically modify the current land use condition of a given area, as it was in constructive geography. the positive effects of such an approach may also include citizens’ increased awareness of social, cultural or ecological problems of their neighbourhood, city or region (for example: hilpert, 2002). considering the above presented concept, several proposals can be made for further development and diversification of applied research in the field of human geography: 1) continuation of previous research related to the economy and spatial planning, industry, agriculture, transport and tourism, including an improvement of their theory and methodology. 2) increasing geographers’ awareness of the wider applied potential of human geography, which is not limited to directions of economic geography. 3) extending geographers’ cooperation with institutions other than those specialised in spatial planning and regional policy – e.g. in the field of diplomacy, international relations, security, resolutions of territorial and ethnonational conflicts. 4) attitude change by political and cultural geographers is necessary to prepare a part of their research in a way giving possibilities for application in the activities of specific public institutions, ngos or private companies. 4. closing remarks based on selected publications in geographical literature analysed during the preparation of this paper, we may conclude that a variety of opinions about the practical importance of human geography research exists. there is some agreement between scientists that studies in the field of economic geography and spatial planning, especially those embedded in quantitative methods, perform leading functions in this respect. simultaneously, because of excessive emphasis on spatial-economic issues, cultural factors in solving social and political problems are underestimated. in addition, there is a tendency to give geographical research and methods a secondary function in the process of spatial planning and development. this role is more than once limited to collection and analysis of data for public institutions or business companies, eventually to formulate certain recommendations for regional and local administration. according to the author of this 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chojnicki (ed.), geografia wobec problemów teraźniejszości i przyszłości (eng. geography towards the problems of present and future), bogucki wydawnictwo naukowe, poznań, 119–132. phlipponneau m., 2004, historical foundations of applied geography, [in:] a. bailly, a.j. gibson (eds.), applied geography. a world perspective. springer, dordrecht, 47–67. raagmaa g., 2002, regional identity in regional development and planning. european planning studies, 10(1), 55–76. doi: 10.1080/09654310120099263 sobisevich a.v., snytko v.a., 2019, konstruktivnaâ geografiâ: naučnoe napravlenie o preobrazovanii prirodnoj sredy (eng. constructive geography: a scientific direction on the transformation of the natural environment), [in]: sbornik trudov meždunarodnoj naučnoj konferencii „steny i mosty vii” (eng. proceedings of the international scientific conference “walls and bridges vii”), rggu, moskva, 245–251. website of applied geography journal. www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-geography (accessed 22 march 2017). website of the applied geography commission. https:// agcigu.wordpress.com/ (accessed 13 may 2017). zimmerbauer k., 2018, supranational identities in planning, regional studies, vol. 52 (no 7), 911–921. doi: 10.1080/00343404.2017.1360481 1. introduction military actions and social conflicts in the country have a bitter price, measured by the lost lives and health of its citizens. in addition to a direct threat to life during conduct of hostilities,the inevitable decadence of health in the conflict region contributes to the contravention of normal living conditions, the lack of necessary medical care (or its delay), defective medicine and forced non-compliance with the necessary treatment. negative influence is felt by the population on the rest of ukraine territories due to constant stress, reduction of budget financing of health care, decrease in availability of medicines and medical services. in 1991–2002, armed conflicts of varying intensity in the past yugoslavia led to significant human victims – according to estimates was killed more than 125,000 and up to 3 million people were forced to change their place of residence. the breakup of the ussr also caused a series of incidents od violence. according to unconfirmed data, the collisions in tajikistan, abkhazia, nagorny karabakh, transnistria and the north caucasus took lives of more than 200 thousand people (rockenschaub et al. (eds), 2007, p. 41). according to official data of the assessment of the health losses resulted from the internal armed conflict in ukraine and public health tasks natalia ryngach (1), olena korolchuk (2) (3) (1) ptoukha institute for demography and social studies of the national academy of sciences of ukraine, shevchenka 60, 01032, kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: n_ryngach@ukr.net (2) department of social and humanitarian policy, the national academy of public administration under to the office of president of ukraine, tsedika 20, 02000 kyiv, ukraine, (3) department of health systems management, ariel university, ariel 40700, israel, e-mail: terrasanitas@gmail.com (corresponding author) citation ryngach n., korolchuk o., 2018, assessment of the health losses resulted from the internal armed conflict in ukraine and public health tasks, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 18–24. abstract the article is devoted to the health and lives losses resulted from the armed conflict in ukraine. it shows the real and potential consequences for the social health and determination of major (priority) activity directions and tasks for public health menagement, with the aim of their minimisation or prevention. key words lives and health losses in ukraine, internal armed conflict, public health. received: 13 september 2017 accepted: 05 december 2017 published: 31 august 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 18–24 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.018.8787 assessment of the health losses resulted from the internal armed conflict… 19 state statistics service of 2014, there are only 3,394 deaths recorded as «damage due to hostilities», but the expert account of losses is significantly higher. thus, the head of the united nations observer mission on human rights situation in ukraine a. harutyunyan noted that from the middle of april 2014 to february 2015, the death of at least 5,809 people was documented, moreover, the number of deaths on the donbass on both sides and among civilians continues to grow (інтерв’ю голови…, 2015). if according to the ministry of defense data from the beginning of the antiterrorist operation and the beginning of russian aggression against ukraine in june 2017, 2,696 ukrainian soldiers were killed (9,903 injured), then according to the unofficial statistics of the book of memory site, only 1,736 fighters of various departments and territorial battalions were killed during 2014, in 2015 – 1,117; in 2016 – 556. on ocober, 24, 2017 their number has increased by another 244 persons (сайт проекту «книга пам’яті», 2017). the statistics of deaths of the civilian population, especially those from uncontrolled territories of ukraine, are incomplete, and health disorders are also reported in a timely or incomplete manner. the complicated current situation in ukraine has affected the deepening of the gender imbalance of death – as more than 90% of deaths officially registered as deaths due to hostilities – the loss of life of young men. with the continuation of hostilities on the territory of ukraine, the problem of direct and indirect losses and man’s death will only aggravate. timely, clear and proven health system measures can save lives and health of many people. besides those facts, health is a vital element of the recovery process: it is unreal without a healthy population. therefore, the effective functioning of the national oz system, which is impossible without proper, wellbalanced management, is no less important than a military or economic one, a factor in ensuring national security. the aim of the work was to assess the loss of life and health due to the internal armed conflict in ukraine and to identify the urgent directions and tasks for managing health care with a view to minimizing and preventing them. 2. research results analysis routine health indicators, such as the level of morbidity and the prevalence of illnesses that are formed after applications to health care facilities, characterize it not quite reliable. this concerns to the whole country, and especially to the donbas. after all, regardless of whether it is a territory under the control of ukraine or as a part of self-proclaimed republics, due to difficult life circumstances, the number of applications to medical institutions is sharply reduced. according to the statistics center of the ministry of health (показники здоров’я…, 2015), since summer 2014, information from the luhansk region is fragmentary (for example, in august 2014 – without data from 4 cities and 4 districts, september – without data from 7 cities and 3 districts, etc.). however, relatively complete (in the territorial coverage) (показники здоров’я…, 2015) statistics from donetsk oblast demonstrated an unprecedented decrease in the prevalence of diseases: if in 2013 the level of 182,773 per 100 thousand citizents was fixed, then in 2014 the number of registered is more than twice lower! of course, it is not only the failure of not appealing of population (for various reasons), but also the migration outflow, and ignorance of the real quantity of population living in these territories. the decrease in morbidity, according to available statistics (показники здоров’я…, 2015), is also striking – the number of newly diagnosed diseases per 100 thousand population fell from 60 188.1 to 23 685.3! for example, the incidence of diabetes in the donetsk region declined by 2.8 times, psychiatric and behavioral disorders were 2.9, circulatory system diseases 2.6, diseases of the digestive system 2.8 times, and so on. reduction in the level of injuries is relatively less – 2.2 times. it can be assumed that, in fact, for example, health damage due to unnatural causes is higher (considering the number of fatal cases). mortality, as opposed to morbidity, is a more reliable indicator. if we abstract from the problem of a reliable population and analyze the changes in the registered absolute number of deaths in the donetsk region for the reasons, then we can confirm the increase in the importance of external causes (injuries, poisonings, and accidents). the number of deaths due to unnatural reasons has increased by almost 30% compared to 2013 (while due to all reasons – by 3%). currently, statistics on morbidity and prevalence are available only with the donbas territories controlled by the government. incomplete information from the territory where about one in ten citizens is ukrainian significantly reduces the reliability of general statistics in ukraine, which negatively affects the quality of data for making management decisions at all levels. one of the most urgent issues is the problem of fighting against hiv/aids, tuberculosis, drug addiction. according to the du «ukrainian center of the control of socially dangerous diseases of the ministry of health of ukraine», over 16 thousand hivpositive people lived in the territory uncontrolled for the government (at the beginning of 2015), 7,700 of 20 natalia ryngach, olena korolchuk whom received antiretroviral therapy (art), more than 2.3 thousand people have an active form of tuberculosis, including more than 500 people with multi-resistant (resistant to treatment) tuberculosis. on luly 1 in 2017, 1,660 hiv-infected persons, including 1,226 people (73,9%) from donetsk oblast, 319 people (19.2%) from lugansk oblast and 115 persons (6.9%) – from crimea arrived from settlements in the territory of which the state authorities temporarily fail to exercise their powers and are under the medical supervision of the aids service in other regions of ukraine (оперативна інформація…, 2015). there is a high risk of outbreaks of socially dangerous diseases in the country. nowadays there is a worsening of the situation with hiv/aids due to the complicated humanitarian situation, hostilities in the eastern part of the country and the increase in the number of internally displaced persons from donetsk and luhansk oblasts, because these regions are among the most affected by the epidemic. nearly 700 patients in the ato area were forced to stop treatment under the substitution maintenance therapy program (оперативна інформація…, 2015). when not all patients can get vital medicines, migrants may be at increased risk of returning to the use of drugs due to their difficult psychological state and difficult living conditions. as you know, continues stay in a state of stress determines the aggravation of existing and the development of new diseases. the sociological study of the kyiv international institute of sociology (понад 90%..., 2015) in june 2015 revealed that more than 90% of citizens living in cities not controlled by ukraine have psychological symptoms related to «war trauma» (post-traumatic stress disorder). residents of these territories assume that in the future there will be a need in treatment of alcoholism among the population. a prolonged conflict situation can provoke mental health problems or worsen already existing disorders, often at the same time when the existing state infrastructure of mental health care is weakened. some of the victims develop mental disorders that can lead to disability; many others are in condition of psychological distress. and those who previously had a mental illness often need more serious help than before an emergency. according to the institute of sociology of the national academy of sciences of ukraine, in 2014 in ukraine the level of anxiety was the highest since 1996 and counted to 49.7, while in donetsk and luhansk oblasts – 53.5 (the highest level is the index of 80). among women, the rate is higher than that among men, with age it is rising, the highest anxiety is among respondents with a low level of education (страх як міріло…, 2014; ворона, шульга (eds.), 2016). the focus sociological research carried out by the ukrainian research institute of social and forensic psychiatry and narcology of the ministry of health of ukraine showed that one in four (24%) of the interviewed internally displaced persons (most of them residents of the donbas) have depressed mood and anxiety. clinical and psychological examination of 140 military in the dnipropetrovsk military hospital wounded while performing official duties in the ato area revealed, among other things, a high prevalence of depression (according to the beck scale, the rates of depression were clinical at 23%, subclinical – in 66% of cases) (коваленкo, корнацький (eds.), 2015, p. 188). the problem of the availability of the necessary treatment intensified both for the whole population, especially because of the catastrophic rise in prices of medicines, and (especially!) for the population in the zone of conflict. according to the study of humanitarian needs of residents of donetsk and luhansk oblasts, performed at the request of the humanitarian headquarters r. akhmetov, the situation with the availability of medicines is steadily difficult: more than half of the respondents reported that there is a lack of the necessary medicines. thus, from september 2014 to june 2015, the need of medicines was even higher than in food (сайт проекту…, 2015). one more pressing problem is the safety of water. we remind that in 2011 only 2 outbreaks of viral hepatitis a related to the water transmission factor were registered (64 people were affected, including 37 children in bakhchysaray, crimea, sinelnikovo, dnipropetrovsk region), and in 2014 – 8 outbreaks (щорічна доповідь…, 2015). in donetsk in 2014, compared to the previous year, the incidence of acute hepatitis a (botkin’s disease) was associated with the pollution of drinking water, a violation of sanitary rules in the manufacture and sale of food products increased in 2 points. besides, epidemic increase was noted in 8 regions neighboring to the conflict and those who took a significant number of migrants: in dnipropetrovsk region – 5.5 times, zaporizhzhia region – 2 times, kyiv region and kyiv – more than 3 times, kharkiv – 4 times. the luhansk region has the largest number of water pipelines that do not meet the sanitary standards – 16.5% (in ukraine – 3.1%). violations of the vaccination process and the reduction of the proportion of timely vaccinated contingent, especially children, can lead to outbreaks of dangerous infections (measles, scarlet assessment of the health losses resulted from the internal armed conflict… 21 fever, diphtheria, poliomyelitis, tetanus). according to the state sanitary and epidemiological service of ukraine, in 2010–2013 the need in vaccines was satisfied only by 60–70% (the norm was not less than 95.0%), while the supply of them was nonrhythmic (щорічна доповідь…, 2015). the risk for the population of donbass to overdue or not to get at all the necessary vaccination is higher. despite the different marks of the significance and risk of the polio disease of two children in transcarpathia in september 2015 (caused by a virus derived from the vaccine strain), it is undeniable that the coverage level of children vaccination against polio in ukraine is extremely low – in 2014 only 49% , for the first half of 2015 – 14.1% (моз підтверджує…, 2015), and this threatens to be a large epidemic in the future. by the results of the national immunization coverage survey conducted by who and unicef in 2016, there are still 8 countries where the coverage of three doses of vacine against diphtheria, tetanus and kidney (dtp) is below 50%. this is equatorial guinea, nigeria, south sudan, syria, somalia, the central african republic, chad and ukraine (1 in 10 infants…, 2017). at the high-level round table on the theme of immunization, organized by the ministry of health care of ukraine and unicef on the occasion of the world polio day (24.10.2016), vice-prime minister mr. rosenko declared that the question of immunization increade to be an important and one of the priorities of the government, as well as questions of national security. after all, according to the ministry of health, in august 2016, only 30% of children in ukraine were fully immunized against measles, 10% against hepatitis b, and 3% against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. in addition, only 44% of children under the age of 18 mounths were fully vaccinated against poliomyelitis (віце-прем’єр-міністр…, 2016). the deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation, in our opinion, is the most significant (after a direct threat to life during the conduct of hostilities) risk to the health of the population both for the whole country and donbass, as well as for the restoration of economic activity in these territories. undoubtedly, in emergencies, hospitals and medical institutions of all types are faced with a sharp increase in demand for their services. immediate access to high-quality care is a determinant factor in reducing the number of deaths. medical institutions have to work in a mode that is very different from the usual one, or by providing unusual help (in peaceful conditions, for example, not every surgeon has experience of hardships for gunshot wounds, contusions). switching is not easy, because it requires reorganization of the provision of services, employee work, personnel management and attitude towards people. it is also necessary to coordinate activities with a wide range of non-hospital partners (military, volunteers, international and domestic civic organizations, the media, etc.). so, physicians from regions neighboring the donbas took a huge burden on their shoulders. since the beginning of the conflict, a significant number of both wounded and civilian soldiers from the combat zone have been brought to dnipropetrovsk hospitals, which has led to a sharp increase in drug requirements, staff and burden on staff and infrastructure. accordingly, the region shifted to the leading place in the ranking for prevalence and morbidity, occupying in 2015 first, in 2016 – second place (fig. 1). the management of public health protection face the task to develop and bring to the attention of management the algorithm of actions in specific emergency situations with a clear definition of the order and content of activity and performers. such algorithms should be provided with the necessary material resources and assimilated (through the training system) to the automatic execution. reduction of functional and structural vulnerability of medical institutions – including due to the creation of backup water supply lines and heat supply – is obligatory for ensuring the continuity of their activities. the system for alerting and assisting in emergencies, including possible sabotage, terrorist acts, needs to be improved. some steps in this direction are already taken. so, in 2015, a single operational-dispatch service of the center of emergency medical aid and disaster medicine was opened in kherson (на херсонщині…, 2015). a separate task is to minimize the losses due to fighting through the provision of timely and effective medical care and, what is equally important, the organization of conditions for the fulfillment of military duty (sanitary and hygiene, adequate nutrition and uniforms, prevention of injuries of non-military character and offenses, etc.). in may 2015, were held in verkhovna rada of ukraine parliamentary hearings (ukr. про військовомедичну доктрину україни; eng. on the militarymedical doctrine of ukraine), where the draft doctrine prepared by the ministry of defense (mo) for the performance of the presidential decree of 14.11.2014 was discussed. during the parliamentary hearings were observed various models of military medical doctrine. according to o. bogomolets, the military-medical doctrine is a system of views and knowledge that will save lives of military and civilians, both in military and in peacetime, at the expense of 22 natalia ryngach, olena korolchuk awareness of each the duty to the state and society, the exact knowledge of their place in the mechanism of joint actions and deliberate skilled cooperation in a definite coordinate system. specialists of the mo stopped on problems in medical care during the ato (lack of unified individual medical devices, modern means of finding wounded, armored sanitary transport, autostrading, mobile radiological rooms, outdated medical equipment, etc.). the doctrine was approved by the verkhovna rada of ukraine from november 25, 2015, no. 827-viii (постанова…, 2015). as emphasized by the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of israel to ukraine e. belotserkovsky, the main principle of israel medicine (20 травня…, 2015) is the saving lives of every soldier, and this has not only universal value, but also practical value – servicemen are not afraid to risk their lives, because they know that everything possible will be done in order to prevent their death. therefore, the military medical doctrine of israel is based on three principles – a combination of military and civilian medical services, provided with a budget for the use of the most effective medicines and equipment and as close as possible to the battlefield of medical assistance. today there is an exchange of experience with ukrainian partners (in particular, trainings for psychologists who are working with victims of post-traumatic syndrome). assistance to the wounded and victims as a result of the antiterrorist operation requires significant amount of money, trained personnell, necessary equipment and medicines. the increase in the number of combatants increases the need for rehabilitation (physical and mental) and medical and social assistance (see матяш, марченко, 2016). negative consequences for public health can be both simultaneous and felt in the long run. losses of life, health and human sufferings associated with military actions, forced displacements, food and drug deficits, outbreaks of diseases, violations of human rights and dignity of a person take place not only directly during a social conflict. n. boney from the bureau of crisis prevention and recovery undp believes that long-term damage to people and for the development of society may be even greater than direct damage (building…, 2014). it should be aware that the sphere of negative influence also affects future life, especially this concerns mental and social health. both during and after emergencies increases the risk of mental health problems. separated families, children lose opportunities for education, fig. 1. incidence and prevalence of diseases (а00-т98) among total population per 100,000 population, by territorial and administrative unit, 2016. source: щорічна доповідь…, 2017. assessment of the health losses resulted from the internal armed conflict… 23 adults decent work, suddenly (and for a long period!) can almost disappear the most important social and health services, which fatally causes significant damage to mental health. a separate problem is the adaptation to the peaceful life of veterans who received significant psychological injuries while taking part in hostilities. we must prepare for the “donbass” syndrome (like vietnamese, afghan and chechen) today. international agencies of humanitarian help are doing all they can to help people meet their psychosocial support needs immediately after an emergency, but efforts should be made to strengthen the national mental health system in the long term, using the help and experience of the international community. these possibilities should not be overlooked, since mental, neurological, narcological disorders in the background of seemingly more important problems, pay less attention. however, it is mental health that plays a significant role in the overall well-being and productivity of people, communities and countries those are recovering from emergencies. for example, after a war and a civil conflict in kosovo, rapid political changes have created an opportunity to reform the mental health system. a new strategic plan has been drawn up to guide and coordinate these efforts, and today, a wide range of mental health services is provided in each of the districts at the level of local communities (building..., 2014). guidelines for assessing and providing assistance in acute stress disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder and hardship in nonspecialized medical facilities (mhgap…, 2013) will be useful for ukraine in the area of mental health of the who action program for ukraine. according to who experts, the humanitarian crisis in ukraine has affected approximately 5 million people and led to the displacement of 1.6 million. the awareness and support of the international community, as well as ongoing funding, are critical to responding to this health emergency. the following are areas of great concern that require immediate mobilization and action: low vaccination coverage; poor communicable diseases surveillance; inadequate access to medications for cancer patients; and lack of access to mental health and rehabilitation care (health response…, 2017). 3. summary reliable, well-trained and well-managed health care system can effectively help to prevent the growth of specific health emergency situations during a crisis of public safety. the main task for public administration with the aim of minimizing the negative impact of social conflict on the health of the population (both in modern and in the future) should be the transition from the current crisis response policy to a comprehensive long-term strategy to prevent life and health (of course, with the simultaneous resolution of the conflict and the restoration of the economy and the social sphere). to this end, existing and potential risks to public health and the national health system should be assessed; identify those that can really be influenced (at the state and industry levels) and consistently lobby interests aimed at the survival of the ukrainian people and the health care system in the development and realization of anti-crisis politics of the state. the most important tasks facing public health are: effective control of the sanitary and epidemiological situation, prevention of epidemics of infectious diseases (first of all, with emphasis on ensuring the planned immunization of the population (coverage level, completeness, timeliness and quality of drugs); organization provided with the necessary personnel and material resources of actions in emergency situations of various kinds, which carry a potential danger to life and health, provision of urgent needs in services of health protection both for the general population and combatants and victims during their civil conduct. references 1 in 10 infants worldwide did not receive any vaccinations in 2016, 2017, world health organization, http://www.who. int/mediacentre/news/releases/2017/infants-worldwidevaccinations/en/ [17.07.2017]. 20 травня 2015 року у верховній раді україни відбулися парламентські слухання на тему: “про військово-медичну доктрину україни”, 2015, http://iportal.rada.gov. ua/print/109944.html [21.05.2015]. building back better. sustainable mental health care after emergencies, 2014, who, geneva. health response to the humanitarian crisis in ukraine (2017) http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/emergencies/ health-response-to-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-ukraine/ health-response-to-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-ukraine 01.09.2017 mhgap module assessment management of conditions specifically related to stress, 2013, who, geneva. rockenschaub g., pukkila j., profili m.c. (eds.), 2007, пути повышения безопасности здоровья населения, вооз европейское региональное бюро, copenhagen. віце-прем’єр-міністр україни п. розенко, представники українського уряду та адміністрації президента заявили про свій намір відновити планову програму іму24 natalia ryngach, olena korolchuk нізації в україні, 2016, моз україни, http://moz.gov.ua/ ua/portal/pre_20161024_a.html [24.10.2016]. ворона в., шульга м. (eds.), 2016, українське суспільство 1992–2016. стан та динаміка змін. соціологічний моніторинг, іс нан україни, київ. інтерв’ю голови місії оон з моніторингу ситуації з прав людини в україні, 2015, радіо свобода, http://www. r a d i o s vo b o d a . o rg / c o n t e n t / a r t i c l e / 2 6 8 8 0 1 8 1 . h t m l [03.03.2015]. коваленкo в.м., корнацький в.м. (eds.), 2015, стрес і хвороби системи кровообігу, ду «ннц «інститут кардіології ім. акад. м.д. стражеска», київ. матяш м.м., марченко о.м. 2016, український синдром: медико-психологічний аспект, видавництво «артек», київ. моз підтверджує спалах поліомієліту в україні, 2015, моз, https://www.moz.gov.ua/ua/portal/pre_20150903_b. html [03.09.2015]. на херсонщині діятиме єдина оперативно-диспетчерська служба центру екстреної медичної допомоги і медицини катастроф, 2015, прес-служба моз україни, http://moz.gov.ua/ua/portal/pre_20151022_f.html [22.10.2015]. оперативна інформація щодо ситуації з програмами профілактики та лікування віл/тб/вгс/зпт у донецькій та луганській областях (на 01.04.2015), 2015, мбф «міжнародний альянс з віл/снід в україні», http:// www.aidsalliance.org.ua/ru/news/pdf/01-12_2015/04/ sitrep_01042015_final.pdf [20.11.2016]. постанова верховної ради україни від 25 листопада 2015 року № 827-viii «про рекомендації парламентських слухань на тему: «про військово-медичну доктрину україни», 2015, відомості верховної ради україни on december 18, 2015. – № 51, page 2495, article 477. сайт проекту «допоможемо тв гуманитарная карта ситуации и потребностей донецкой и луганской областей, 2015, http://map.dopomozhemo.tv/?lang=en [10.11.2015]. сайт проекту «книга пам’яті», 2017, http:// http:// m e m o r y b o o k . o r g . u a / i n d e x f i l e / s t a t m o n t h . h t m memorybook.org.ua/indexfile/statistic.htm [01.11.2017]. страх як міріло якості життя (результати моніторингу інституту соціології нану «українське суспільство-2014», 2014, http://e-news.com.ua/show/352810. html [20.10.2014]. щорічна доповідь про стан здоров’я населення, санітарноепідемічну ситуацію та результати діяльності системи охорони здоров’я україни. 2016 рік, 2017, моз україни, ду «уісд моз україни», київ. 1. introduction an important feature of combat in modern warfare is the use of modern weapon systems, including mines, grenades and rocket munitions. in our time the deadly force and the contusion/commotion component of contemporary mine blast injury have largely increased. this is due to the impact on human body exerted by the hazardous factors of these high-power weapons. these factors include the notions of fugacity (the ability of the explosion to impact the surrounding environment by a shock wave) and brisance (shattering action), that is, the ability of the explosion to fragment the surrounding environment by the ultrahigh pressure of explosive gases. the literature describes various types of mine blast closed traumatic brain injury (mb tbi) or head injury, including the severe fulminant mb tbi, the brain contusion type of mb tbi and the brain commotion type of mb tbi. a mine blast injury is always viewed as a complex polytrauma. therefore, the clinical presentation in its victims may include the sequelae of both brain injury and cardiopulmonary/abdominal injury, as well as the fragmentation of bones. acute patients with such injuries are given on-site first aid with immediate transfer to secondary level medical psychotherapeutic strategies for management of neurotic disorders in veterans of modern combat mikhailo mykolaiovych matiash (1), liudmila ivanivna khudenko (2) (1) department of neurology, psychiatry and reflexology, kyiv medical university, tolstoho 9, 01004 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: drmatiash@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) department of neurology, psychiatry and reflexology, kyiv medical university, tolstoho 9, 01004 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: khudenko.l@gmail.com citation matiash m.m., khudenko l.i., 2018, psychotherapeutic strategies for management of neurotic disorders in veterans of modern combat, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 31–37. abstract as a result of using a multi-modality neurological/mental assessment and a multifaceted rehabilitation program (including group therapy), 108 patients with sequelae of mine blast closed traumatic brain injury (mb ctbi) and post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) have demonstrated positive trends concerning their neurological and psychological status. from the standpoint of the pathogenetic concept of neurotic disorders, there are four principal categories of neurotic disorders, namely asthenic, anxiety-depressive, hysteria-like and phobic. a conclusion was made that using the methods of group psychotherapy as a constituent of rehabilitation program was effective. key words mine blast closed traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, rehabilitation, group psychotherapy. received: 04 september 2017 accepted: 25 december 2017 published: 31 august 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 31–37 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.020.8789 32 mikhailo mykolaiovych matiash, liudmila ivanivna khudenko units and then go to specialized military medical centres. we were managing patients with remote consequences of head injuries, who were undergoing a rehabilitation program in a social medical centre for war veterans. during our survey 78.4% patients with a history of a mine blast closed traumatic brain injury (ctbi) were found to have no records of the latter fact in their medical files. we found that military physicians documented tbis only in an open trauma or if the case of mb tbi was severe. taking into consideration the specific situation of hostilities, such failure to recognize tbis was due to frequently impossible early diagnosis and treatment after mb tbi (as well as difficult self-assessment) and due to various combat-related neurological and mental disorders already at early stages of the head injury (partly as complications of polytrauma involving multiple organs and systems). in view of the above reasons, the contusion-type head injury did not receive a targeted medical attention during first aid procedures. a number of authors attribute the issue of tbi sequelae to progressive post-traumatic changes, which develop immediately post-injury. the essence of these changes is the impaired mechanism of metabolic self-regulation of nervous tissue (hart et al., 2008; матяш, 2011. the severe and multifaceted clinical presentation of remote sequelae of head injuries allowed many authors to continue viewing them as a traumatic brain disease or traumatic encephalopathy. the fundamental premise of this understanding includes the phenomenon of energetic and structural remodelling of cerebral structures by virtue of two antagonistic processes: the degenerative/destructive process and the regenerative/ reparative process. traumatic encephalopathy is an aggregate of neurological and mental disorders. the patterns and the severity of neurological and mental disturbances depend on the severity and the site of injury, on the pre-injury mental status of the patient, on his/her adaptive reserves, age, treatment efficiency, etc. an aggregate of complex mental abnormalities occurring in patients with post-traumatic encephalopathy, such as traumatic asthenia, traumatic apathy, psychopathic conditions (abnormal changes in personality), affective disorders, paroxysmal (epileptiform) conditions (traumatic epilepsy) and traumatic psychosis, is an important challenge, since this aggregate adversely affects the progress of disease and the efficacy of rehabilitation. the psychotraumatic effects of hostilities and the difficult economic situation in the country are the very contemporary social stressors, which may trigger disadaptation and social stress disorders in the country’s population. this enhances the dismal strain and deepens depressive sentiments, further leading to intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts in veterans of the anti-terrorist operation (translator’s note: this is an official euphemism for the current undeclared russo-ukrainian war). such disadaptation may result in mental disorders and personality disorders, a surge in psychosomatic conditions (with concomitant alcohol and drug abuse, etc.) and the occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorders (ptsd) (horowitz et al., 1980; holmes et al., 2007). according to icd-10 (international…, 2016), ptsd occurs as a remote and protracted response to a threatening or catastrophic event, which is able to cause a generalized distress in any human person. there is the following important consideration in ptsd: the psychogenic origin of the disorder and the unbearable (by a regular person) severity of psychogenia may be seen both in immediate victims and in the people witnessing the event. the ptsd is diagnosed no sooner than a month after the traumatic experience. the ptsd occurs after a latent period which may last from several weeks to 6 months or (rarely) several years. the impact of the traumatic situation results in cognitive, emotional and behavioural changes of human psyche. according to current psychological studies of human personality in various situations (including traumatic situations), the behaviour-shaping characteristics include individual psychological features, the system of needs, motives, interests and the mechanisms of self-awareness (тарабрина, 2009). therefore, the expected outcome of applying psychotherapy as a part of multimodality management of patients with mb tbi and ptsd is to build new adaptive models of personality functioning and to create positive behavioural patterns. in a setting of a therapy group, it is possible to achieve simultaneous improvement of all basic components of relationships (cognition, emotions and behaviour), to attain a deeper restructuring of the critical characteristics of personality (such as mentality, emotions and volition). group psychotherapy (in different variants) is the most appropriate method for rehabilitation of patients with mb ctbi and ptsd. the treatment in a psychotherapy group (designed as a safe, comfortable and supportive environment) promotes the sense of common goals and appreciation of the person’s own value. belonging to a group reduces the sensation of isolation, promotes restoration of relationships and provides an opportunity to enrich one’s experience by adopting the experiences of other people. unlike individual therapy, therapeutic groups possess a unique feature of mutual psychotherapeutic action through interaction between group members. the peculiar psychotherapeutic strategies for management of neurotic disorders in veterans of modern combat 33 psychotherapeutic action of group psychotherapy is attributed to the inherent therapeutic factors within the group. i.d. yalom (1985) emphasized the following of these factors: 1. instilling hope. 2. the universality of experience. 3. providing information (feedback). 4. altruism. 5. the corrective review of experiences within the parent’s family. 6. promoting the development of socializing habits. 7. imitation behaviour. 8. interpersonal influence. 9. group unity/acceptance. 10. catharsis (venting). 11. existential factors. 2. the aim of the study to review the emergence of neurotic disorders in patients with mb ctbi and ptsd from the standpoint of pathogenetic concept of neurotic disorders. to study the changes of neurological and psychological abnormalities in patients with mb ctbi and ptsd in response to multimodality rehabilitation by group psychotherapy. 3. materials and methods of study at the centre of functional neurology of kyiv regional teaching hospital and at the ukrainian public medical and social centre for war veterans we have selected 108 patients for further assessment and treatment, all of which were combat veterans with mb ctbi and ptsd (102 men and 2 women; age 20 to 42 years). all patients had clinical and neurological assessment and psychological treatment before and after treatment. psychological testing included the following instruments: assessment of personality using the multilateral personality test (mlpt), an adapted and restandardised variant of the minnesota multiphasic personality inventory/mmpi (as modified by f.b. berezin et al. (березин et al., 1976)); the ptsd additional scale for mmpi; assessment of traits of character using the leonhard-shmishek questionnaire of character accentuations; analysis of emotional state using the lüscher’s test; clinical anxiety and depression scale; the spilberger-chanin scale of reactive and personal anxiety; beck depression inventory; the method of structured clinical interview; the scales for clinical diagnosis of ptsd; the scales for assessing the severity of the traumatic event’s impact; method for determination of individual coping-stratagies, (mdics), the technique developed by e. heim. 4. results and discussion as stipulated by the psychology of relationships, which is a foundation of v.n. miasischev’s pathogenetic concept of neurotic disorders (мясищев, 1960), the neurotic conflict and disruptions in meaningful relationships of the personality, are one of the main causes of neurosis. three types of neurotic conflicts are differentiated according to this theory: neurasthenic, hysterical and obsessive-psychasthenic (tab. 1). however, there may be no direct connection between the personality’s type of character and the type of the neurotic conflict. the findings of psychological assessment in patients with mb ctbi and ptsd included the following principal neurotic disorders: asthenic syndrome in 42 patients (38.1%); anxiety and phobia syndrome in 19 patients (26.7%); hysteria-like syndrome in 8 patients (11.3%) and depressive syndrome in 17 patients (23.9%) (fig. 1). both mb ctbi and ptsd, being a pair of comorbidities, impact the personality via processes of tab. 1. the types of neurotic conflicts neurasthenic: manifested as a conflict between the actual capacities of a person on the one hand, and the person’s desires and environment-compliant expectations of themselves, on the other hand. hysterical: this is such a type of conflict, which emerges when a person enters into a conflict with the surrounding reality without finding a satisfaction to their needs. alternatively, this conflict may occur when the reality sets forth the requirements with contradict the needs of the individual. obsessive-psychasthenic: this conflict occurs as a struggle between desires and duty, between moral principles and personal preferences, between instincts and ethical upbringing. source: own study. 34 mikhailo mykolaiovych matiash, liudmila ivanivna khudenko adaptation/disadaptation, which causes abnormal changes in mental and physical condition of the patients. the latter is an important factor to consider when making decisions on selecting diagnostic and therapeutic strategies for rehabilitation of ato combatants. therefore, we have opted for a multifaceted approach to patient management, which increases the importance and enhances the efficacy of psychotherapeutic interventions. when planning pharmacotherapy, the patients were receiving a multimodality pharmacotherapy (including nootropics, vascular drugs, analgesics, venous tone drugs and vitamin/mineral supplements). the actual selection of medications depended on somatic comorbidities and on the varying changes, presentation and progress of both mb ctbi and ptsd in a number of cases, a prominent pain syndrome required analgesics; anxiolytics, hypnotics and antidepressants were used as required. the alcohol abuse frequently seen in ex-combatants called for pharmacological correction of alcohol-related conditions. the treatment program also included reflexotherapy (classical acupuncture, auriculotherapy and electroacupuncture). the abnormal changes of physical and mental condition of patients with mb ctbi and ptsd inevitably change the priorities and values of the individual, disrupt meaningful personal and interpersonal relations as well as impact the ability to evaluate objective reality. neurotic disorders have their underlying abnormal psychological mechanisms, which calls for their correction with psychotherapeutic methods (бріер, скотт, 2015; ніколаєнко, 2014). we have developed a program of psychological treatment in the format of group psychotherapy. the program included the standard stages generally accepted for psychotherapy in the groups: • psychodiagnosis; • psychological education (this stage was intended to provide patients with information to ensure their conscious and motivated participation and acceptance of psychological counselling); • psychocorrection. in terms of group of objective, these were therapeutic groups; in terms of size, these were small groups (8 to 12 participants each). we used the group method with its psychotherapeutic action targeted at the predominant emotional states and self-defeating ideations (the latter having a negative impact upon the adaptive potential of the personality). in addition to that, group therapy may have some long-term objectives, such as improving interpersonal relations, personality development and unleashing the spiritual potential of the group. unlike biological therapies, psychotherapy is targeted at the patient’s personality. therefore, to ensure an effective psychotherapeutic impact, we have taken into consideration individual constitution, character, mentality and personality traits of our patients when using group psychotherapy in patients with mb ctbi and ptsd. although group psychotherapy was used as the main therapeutic modality, it was combined with individual therapy and family therapy. while reviewing the available literature and psychotherapeutic experience of our colleagues, it can be seen that working with a group may involve various methodologies, such as emotive cognitive therapy, existential analysis, psychoanalysis, rational psychotherapy, behavioural therapy, systemic therapy and suggestive therapy (кочюнас, 2010; малкина-пых, 2006). this being said, it should be emphasized that the tasks and objectives of group psychotherapy, the content of the therapeutic fig. 1. distribution of patients in terms of the dominant syndrome (108 pts) source: оwn study. psychotherapeutic strategies for management of neurotic disorders in veterans of modern combat 35 process, the combinations of techniques used and the therapist’s strategy may vary on a case-by-case basis and may derive their theoretical background from various therapeutic schools (козлов, 2007). this involves different interpretations of psychological mechanisms behind neurotic disorders and the psychological strategies for their correction. the following considerations are common: the objective (that is, elimination of abnormal symptoms in mental, neurological and systemic somatic dimensions), the therapeutic resources of the group (based on interpersonal and group-related properties) and the ways through which the patient obtains help during group psychotherapy. all of the above include the properties of the specific therapeutic group, the individual social needs of the patients, the resources beyond the therapeutic group and the resources of the patient’s own personality. in our psychotherapeutic work with the group we have employed the method of inclusive observation, a qualitative test. within this method, the investigator may act in either of the two roles: • the insider; • the neutral outsider. this method has a format of a field study; unlike laboratory experiments, this is a real life test which requires the therapist’s involvement and personal participation in group processes during the therapy. this method allows for better interaction between the therapist and the group to assess the patient’s adaptation to crises and stressful situations and to assess the development of communication resources, which are essential for effective social interactions. we studied the capabilities of the patients to use their own communicational coping resources; in addition to that, the patients were trained to manage and use coping mechanisms and coping strategies to ensure their adequate response to stressors (ткачук, 2012). coping resources are relatively stable characteristics of the personality; these resources may improve or regress during the person’s lifetime. according to literature, in terms of function the adaptive strategies can be conventionally divided into problem-oriented (focused on cognition and directed at solving the problem) and subject-oriented (focused on emotions and directed at the person’s attitude to the situation). however, the study has demonstrated that such clearly segregated division was more of a theoretical value. stress experiences affect all spheres of human psyche; therefore, the best approach is to use a harmonious combination of emotional coping, cognitive coping and behavioural coping. group work included psychotechnics intended to stimulate the use of positive resources, such as using metaphors and parables as psycholinguistic instruments, which allow seeing the problem from a new perspective, while preserving favourable ecology of relations in the group and activating patient’s own problem-solving resources. since cognitive processes initiate emotional responses, emotions impact the perception and comprehension of information, which, in turn, supports the activities of the personality (бек, 2006). to regulate emotional and cognitive realms of psychic activity, group psychotherapy was conducted using the main methods of emotive therapy, rational therapy, cognitive therapy, behavioural therapy and psychoanalysis (малкинапых, 2006). in addition to these classical methods, additional methods were used, such as body-oriented therapy, suggestive therapy (ericsson’s hypnosis), family psychotherapy, neurolinguistic programming and art therapy (tab. 2). the spontaneous non-directive mode of group work allowed using the benefits of group discussion for the psychotherapeutic work. the key substantial issues of group work have been described in literature and are used to conduct socio-psychological trainings. these include the following: introducing group members to each other, discussion of expectations, fears and concerns; re-experiencing and discussion of any tensions in the group; discussion of any therapist-directed resistance and aggression and the connection between such sentiments and prior experiences; exposing the problems related to autonomy and responsibility, activity and attitude to persons of authority; developing an adequate attitude to therapy; creating local norms and culture of psychotherapeutic groups; the predominantly interactive style of communication, importantly characterized by joint decision-making and implementation; review of changes in the group while highlighting the problems of each individual person; discussing the results of treatment; drawing conclusions (слободянюк, 2014). 5. conclusions the result of this work it was concluded: 1. we have reviewed the emergence of neurotic disorders in patients with mb ctbi and ptsd from the standpoint of pathogenetic concept of neurotic disorders, the latter indicating the reciprocal connection between the personality of the patient and the adverse changes in the patient’s system of relations as well as the connections with the patient’s mental disorder(s). a conclusion was made that the core of the above disorders is represented by negative/self-defeating 36 mikhailo mykolaiovych matiash, liudmila ivanivna khudenko skills and false beliefs which lead to personal and interpersonal disorders with involvement of the cognitive, emotive and behavioural aspects of human personality. 2. the findings of psychological assessment in 108 patients with mb ctbi and ptsd included the following principal neurotic disorders: asthenic syndrome in 42 patients (38.1%); anxiety and phobia syndrome in 19 patients (26.7%); hysteria-like syndrome in 8 patients (11.3%) and depressive syndrome in 17 patients (23.9%). 3. in our psychotherapeutic work with the group we have employed the method of inclusive observation. an investigation was undertaken into the adaptation of patients to crises and stressful situations and the level of communicative resources and skills of interaction with the society. 4. we have traced the emotive-cognitive and behavioural pathways of responding to stressors: most stressors impact the personality via processes of cognition (assessment of the stressor and formation of coping strategies and response strategies), namely: stress > negative efficacy > response coping 5. for the purpose of rehabilitation of patients with mb ctbi and ptsd, it is expedient to combine group psychotherapy with individual therapy tab. 2. the psychotherapeutic methods and techniques used for group therapy, individual therapy and family therapy in patients with ctbi and ptsd the method of psychotherapy objectives the mechanisms of action of the method the techniques used cognitive psychotherapy the connection between emotions and cognitions. modification of negative convictions/sentiments. replacement of unrealistic ideations with a realistic approach to reflection of one’s experience. the abc formula; ‘the thoughts drive the emotion’. cognitive charts. resynthesis of the past; decatastrophizing; socratic dialogue. rational emotive therapy working with symptoms of anxiety, depression and aggression. acquiring the experience of controlling one’s own emotions and acquiring the skills of their control. the search for rational and irrational cognitions. ‘rational emotive conceptualization’, ‘the upside of traumatic experience’. behavioural psychotherapy the impact of cognitions on potential reconstruction. acquisition of corrective experience. shaping the ability to act positively; correction of disadaptive stereotypes. self-instruction; self-regulation; communication training; adaptive skills of behaviour in stress situations. transactional analysis actualisation of the adult in the personality; reconstruction of the personality; shaping of a new value system. exiting negative scenarios through mutual trust; attaining autonomy; shaping of the adult. definition of the ego-state model, the mdd model; definition of transactions; time structuring; life scenario; rackeet system; games/game analysis; behaviour change contracts. positive psychotherapy changing the viewpoint of the problem = new coping options. basic abilities of love and cognition. the 5 steps: assessment, inventory; reinforcement; verbalisation; expanding goals. suggestive psychotherapy deactualization of abnormal symptoms. shaping of positive convictions. the technique of inducing a hypnotic trance. body-oriented therapy comprehending somatic symptoms and living them through. impacting the personality via a bodily experience. respiratory exercise; сentre adjustment; vision; sensation; tranquillity. neurolinguistic programming reproduction of a holistic interrelation of a personality. creating a chart of the outside world and patient’s ideas about it the score model; ts-bs; frame – result; reframing. family psychotherapy restoring the resource capabilities of the family. development of positive and productive alternatives for family functioning. effective listening, empathy, dispute training. art therapy improving the patient’s condition through display of emotions and cognitions on a symbolic level. boosting self-esteem through talent development. the stages of therapy and diagnosis: 1) games, physical activity, drawing; 2) narratives; 3) working in small groups; 4) reflective analysis. source: own study. psychotherapeutic strategies for management of neurotic disorders in veterans of modern combat 37 and family therapy. the efficiency of the group psychotherapy, which we employed for rehabilitation of patients with mb ctbi and ptsd, is based on psychotherapeutic involvement of emotive, cognitive and volitional dimensions of human psyche, thereby facilitating behavioural changes in the patients and implementation of their new acquired experience in future real-life situations. 6. as a result of multimodality treatment (including group therapy), the patients had an opportunity to acquire experience of attaining common positive goals owing to their sense of belonging to the group (the latter being a model of society). in addition to that, they developed a sense of significance of their own life experience, reconsidering the latter and perceiving it as a valuable acquisition; the patients obtained a chance to comprehend their disadaptive behavioural strategies and developed the skills of using positive adaptive strategies. references hart j.jr., kimbrell t., fauver p., cherry b.j., pitock j., booe l.q., tillmann g., freeman t.w., 2008, cognitive dysfunctions associated with ptsd: evidence from world war ii prisoners of war, journal of neuropsychiatry and clinical neurosciences, 20(3), 309–316. holmes e.a., crace c., fennel j.v., williams m.g., 2007, imagery about suicide in depression – «flashforward», journal of behavior therapy and experimental psychiatry, 38(4), 423–434. horowitz m.j., wilner n., kaltreider n., 1980, sings and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, archives of general psychiatry, 37(1), 85–92. international statistical classification of diseases and related health problems 10th revision (icd-10), 2016, who, http:// apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en [14.09.2017]. yalom i.d., 1985, the theory and practice of group psychotherapy, basic books, new york. бек д., 2006, когнитивная терапия: полное руководство, ооо «и.д. вильямс», москва. березин ф.б., мирошников м.п., рожанец р.в., 1976, методика многостороннего исследования личности (ммил): структура, основы интерпретации, некоторые области применения, издательство «медицина», москва. бріер дж., скотт к., 2015, основи травмофокусованої психотерапії, свічадо, львів. козлов в.в., 2007, групповая работа: стратегия и методы исследования: метод. пособие, психотерапия, москва. кочюнас р., 2010, психологическое консультирование. групповая психотерапия: учебное пособие для вузов, академический проект: фонд «мир», москва. малкина-пых и., 2006, справочник практического психолога, издательство «эксмо», москва. матяш м.м., 2011, психотерапевтичний аспект реабілітації хворих на травматичну енцефалопатію, збірник наукових праць співробітників нмапо ім. шупика, 20(2), 323–328. мясищев в.н., 1960, личность и неврозы, изд-во лгу, ленинград. ніколаєнко с., 2014, особливості психологічної допомоги учасникам військових дій при посттравматичному стресовому розладі, [in:] «світогляд – філософія – релігія»: збірник наукових праць.заснований у 2011 р., випуск 7, суми двнз “уабс нбу”, 51–61. слободянюк і.а., 2014, психологічна допомога комбатантам: можливості і обмеження центрованого на особистості підходу, [in:] матеріали іі всеукраїнської науково-практичної конференції «регістри стосунків», кну ім. тараса шевченка, київ, 80–86. тарабрина h.в., 2009, психология посттравматического стресса: теория и практика, институт психологии ран, москва. ткачук, т.а., 2012, ефективне використання копінг-стратегій як складових копінг-поведінки молодої особистості, практична психологія та соціальна робота: науково-практичний та освітньо-методичний журнал, 6, 63–67. 1. introduction one of the most serious social and economic problems in ukraine as a result of russian aggression, the annexation of crimea and the actual occupation of certain areas of donbas is the forced displacement of many ukrainians from places of residence to other regions of ukraine and the front zone of donetsk and luhansk oblasts. forcibly displaced persons left their homes, lost their property, severed social ties. as a result, in their new places of residence they became less competitive than locals, as well as themselves in their pre-war life (муромцева, 2015; тищенко, піроцький, 2014; малиха, 2015; коваліско, бубняк, 2016). the employment situation in the regionsmain recipients of internally displaced persons (idp) s impedes the solution of the problem of their employment. even before 2014, the situation in such regions was characterized by significant interregional inequality of employment conditions, in particular, journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 44–48 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.005.8157 ensuring equal regional employment conditions as a mechanism to overcome the problems of employment of internally displaced persons viktoriia semenenko department for human development studies, ptoukha institute for demography and social studies of the national academy of sciences of ukraine, taras shevchenko boulevard 60, 01032 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: vika_vz@ukr.net citation semenenko v., 2018, ensuring equal regional employment conditions as a mechanism to overcome the problems of employment of idps, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 44–48. abstract the scale of interregional inequality of employment conditions for internally displaced persons (idp), in particular, according to the basic indicators of the block «decent work» of the index of regional human development is determined. the manifestations of the irregularity of placement of internally displaced persons in the regional cut are analyzed. this problem complicates the implementation of the employment policy concerning idp’s needs. the experience of solving the idp’s problems connected with their irregular placement, their employment, the balancing of the labor market on the basis of equalization of the dynamic equilibrium of interregional conditions of access to stable employment is generalized. the recommendations for the equalization of interregional conditions of idp’s employment, which are necessary for deepening of the social dialogue in the field of labor relations, are substantiated. key words equalization, internally displaced persons, stable employment, unemployment, ukraine. received: 15 september 2017 accepted: 14 december 2017 published: 30 march 2018 ensuring equal regional employment conditions as a mechanism to overcome the problems… 45 in terms of employment level, unemployment, the share of employees receiving a salary of less than 1.5 subsistence minimums, the share of workers working in conditions that do not meet sanitary and hygiene standards, the ratio of average wages to the minimum, the level of social insurance coverage, etc. (бубняк, 2016; дерев’янко, 2017). in these conditions, it is not enough to use traditional instruments of state support for noncompetitive categories of the population at the labour market (лібанова et al., 2015). the solution of the problem requires the formation of a comprehensive macro-regional policy of ensuring equal territorial employment conditions. 2. research results analysis according to the ministry of social policy in the third quarter of 2017, 1 596 644 internally displaced persons were registered (обліковано…, 2017). the largest number of internally displaced persons is registered in donetsk (676 533 persons), luhansk (251 231 persons), kharkiv (212 557 persons), kyiv (127 026 persons), zaporizhzhia (118 878 persons), dnipropetrovsk (76 457 persons) oblasts. the smallest number of idps was settled in ternopil (2  722 persons), chernivtsi (3 149 persons), rivne (3 204 persons), zakarpattia (3 462 persons), ivanofrankivsk (4 116 persons) and volyn (4 033 persons) oblasts (fig. 1). this demonstrates the unequal regional allocation of idps in ukraine, which leads to the excessive social and administrative burden on local labour markets, social infrastructure of the regions of the occupation. the unequal distribution of internally displaced persons across the regions complicates the employment policy implementation. the concentration of idps in several oblasts (donetsk, luhansk, kharkiv, zaporizhzhia and dnipropetrovsk) further complicates the problem of inequality of regional employment conditions, which was quite urgent before the aggression of the russian federation. for example, in 2013 the difference between the regions with high employment rates1 and the smallest reached 7–8 p.p. with an average of 65.5% in ukraine, and by the unemployment rate the 1 the areas with a relatively high level of any index of the labour market of regional human development index include those whose level exceeds the average regional value of the investigated indicator for more than one standard deviation. accordingly, areas with relatively low values include those whose level is lower than the average regional value of the investigated indicator more than one standard deviation fig. 1. distribution of internally displaced persons from the occupied donbas and crimea by regions of ukraine in 2017 source: http://www.msp.gov.ua/en/ 46 viktoriia semenenko difference was 3–4 p.p. (7.25% in the country as a whole), by the share of workers receiving a salary of less than 1.5 subsistence minimums – 12–16 p.p. (30.7% in the country as a whole), by the share of workers working in conditions that do not meet sanitary and hygienic standards – 31–38 p.p. (29.5% in the country as a whole), by the indicator of the ratio of average wages to the minimum – in 0.9–1.1 times (2.7 times in the country as a whole), by social insurance coverage level – 25–30 p.p. (67.1% in the country as a whole) (методика…, 2012). by the same indicators, dnipropetrovsk, zaporizhzhia and kharkiv oblasts belonged to a group of high employment, low and average unemployment level, while donetsk and luhansk, on the contrary, were characterized by a relatively low level of employment and a high level of unemployment. at the beginning of 2017 these indicators worsened, and the difference between successful and backward regions became greater. thus, even a brief review of the decent work indicators of the regional human development index showed strong regional asymmetries in the economic potential of territories, the differentiation of the population in terms of the availability of material and spiritual goods, the heterogeneity of opportunities for decent working conditions (лібанова et al., 2016). in these conditions, access to employment and employment for idps remains worse than for local people, and in general the inequality in the region deepens. in particular, in poltava oblast the share of managers and specialists among the unemployed idps is 48.3%, while among local unemployed is 27.8%. if the majority of the unemployed idps are persons aged 30–45, then among the locals it is mostly young people. in terms of education, 57.1% of the unemployed idps have higher education, and the share of the unemployed persons with higher education among the so-called ‘native persons’ is 40.1%. the unemployed idps are mostly represented by females. if among all registered the unemployed in all categories, the share of women was 55%, then among the unemployed idps – 65% and it ranged from 56% in chernivtsi oblast to 78% in volyn oblast (інтегральний індекс…, 2013; методика…, 2013; цимбал, 2009). the state realizes that idps’ problems are drastic, but it pays little attention to interregional imbalances in employment conditions. this leads to the fact that much has been done to help idps, but all the measures have proved to be point-blank and not systematically related to the processes of formation of regional employment conditions and interregional imbalances. thus, in accordance with article 24-1 of the law of ukraine ‘on employment of the population’ (про зайнятість …, 2012), the following measures are provided for the promotion of employment of internally displaced persons: • compensation of labour costs for the employed unemployed internally displaced persons to employers; • compensation of expenses for their retraining or advanced training; • compensation of actual expenses for moving to another administrative-territorial unit of the employment place and expenses for passing medical examination, if it is necessary for employment. however, these legislative improvements have not been effective in practice. from march 1, 2014 till the first quarter of 2017, the state employment service promoted the employment of 25.6 thousand internally displaced persons, which is apparently insufficient for the contingent of idps, which ranged from 1 to 1.8 million at different times (ринок праці…, 2016). according to the state employment service, as of august 1, 2017, 5.2 thousand people who received a certificate of registration as persons moving from temporarily occupied territory of ukraine or areas of ato continued to receive services of the state employment service, 3.9 thousands of which had the status of the unemployed (ринок праці …, 2016). therefore, at present, a problem of balancing the labour market based on the support of the dynamic balance of interregional conditions is rather urgent. it is reasonable to proceed from the assumption that most of idps will remain permanently on their new places of residence and the relevant state policy should be based on the creation of conditions for their residence (калачова (eds.), 2013). priorities for developing mechanisms for ensuring equal interregional employment conditions should be stimulation of demand for labour through creating new enterprises and introducing new types of economic activity. this does not mean the inappropriateness of creating jobs at already operating enterprises, but it should be accompanied by creation of new enterprises, processes of demonopolization, search for new forms of their reintegration and cooperation. at the same time, main preference should be given to creating conditions for innovative development and fundamental change in the demography of the entrepreneurial landscape. and not only industrial complexes, but also sectors of infrastructure development, construction, agriculture complex, public administration and social sphere have a potential for that. the next step should be a focus on the creation of high-quality jobs, diversified jobs and jobs of “start-to-finish” specialization and qualifications. the ensuring equal regional employment conditions as a mechanism to overcome the problems… 47 organizational and technological policy of enterprises should provide the demand for skilled workers, operators and service engineers in installation of complex technical systems, specialists of engineering and technical staff, and professional managers. the state should stimulate a policy of abandoning cheap labour, which is especially important for enterprises-locomotives of innovation in the industrial, construction and infrastructure sectors (ринок праці…, 2016). 3. summary it is important to create jobs in small and micro-enterprises to stimulate a creative self-realization of the population; to develop the environment of start-ups and venture companies; to create small and microenterprises that will support large enterprises (within the framework of gravity integration systems), outsourcing and/or competitive contractors of the common production chain, innovation manufacturing networks, service and logistics networks within the territorial clusters. the next step should be overcoming territorial and sectoral imbalances and developing infrastructure and institutions for active labour mediation and consulting (both private and public). it is necessary to create a system of information mediation and consulting on issues of employment with a fundamentally different level of activity. a powerful consulting company should work, which will be capable of expeditiously, targetedly and comprehensively explaining the value of available information, providing professional orientation, adaptation and deactivation services. to activate social partnership in the complex ensuring equal employment interregional conditions and employment of idps, it is necessary to deepen a social dialogue in the field of labour relations, forecast employment in all spectra of relevant parameters, to create a modern system of professional qualification and attestation, professional skilled and professional and educational coordination. this process should not be limited to the traditional circle of “authorities-employer-trade union” participants. any organized forms of collective interest: from labour collectives to territorial communities and public organizations have to be involved. the next step should be support of flexible and non-traditional forms of employment. this will make it possible to formulate approaches to the temporary solution of the problems of mass unemployment of the labour force of low qualification and out-of-date occupations, temporary and part-time employment, informal employment, as well as irregular self-employment, etc. references http://www.msp.gov.ua/en/, ministry of social policy of ukraine. official web-site. бубняк с., 2016, внутрішньо переміщені особи в україні на прикладі м. львова, грані, 140, 16–21. дерев’янко с., 2017, внутрішньо переміщені особи: проблеми політичної соціалізації в галичині, наукові записки інституту політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. і. ф. кураса нан україни, 1, 199–216. інтегральний індекс регіонального людського розвитку за 2013 р., 2013, моніторинг інституту демографії та соціальних досліджень ім. м. в. птухи нан україни, http:// www.idss.org.ua/ukr_index.html [06.10.2017]. калачова і.в. (eds.), 2013, регіональний людський розвиток. статистичний бюлетень, державний комітет статистики україни, київ, http://ukrstat.org/uk/metod_polog/ menu/07_posl.htm [06.10.2017]. коваліско н., бубняк с., 2016, внутрішньо переміщені особи в україні: моніторинг результатів соціологічних досліджень 2014–2015, вісник одеського національного університету. соціологія і політичні науки, 1, 38–46. лібанова е., горбулін в., пирожков с., 2015, політика інтеграції українського суспільства в контексті викликів та загроз подій на донбасі (національна доповідь), національна академія наук україни, київ. лібанова е., цимбал о., ярош о., лісогор л., 2016, перехід на ринок праці молоді україни: результати міжнародного дослідження «school-to-work transition surveys» в україні у 2013 та 2015 роках, міжнародне бюро праці, женева, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/ documents/publication/wcms_536293.pdf [06.10.2017]. малиха м.і., 2015, до проблеми сутності поняття «внутрішньо переміщені особи»: державна політика та регіональна практика, грані, 8, 6–11. методика вимірювання регіонального людського розвитку, 2012, міністерство економічного розвитку й торгівлі україни. державна служба статистики. інститут демографії та соціальних досліджень ім. м.в. птухи нан україни, київ, http://www.idss.org.ua/public.html# [06.10.2017] методика вимірювання регіонального людського розвитку, 2013, [in:] і.в. калачова (eds.), регіональний людський розвиток. статистичний бюлетень, державний комітет статистики україни, київ, 9–36, http://ukrstat.org/uk/metod_polog/menu/07_posl.htm [06.10.2017]. муромцева ю.і., 2015, внутрішньо переміщені особи в  україні та їх вплив на ринок праці регіону, [in:] збірник наукових праць харківського національного педагогічного університету імені г. с. сковороди. економіка,15, 124-131. обліковано 1 596 644 переселенці, – мінсоцполітики, 2017, міністерство соціальної політики україни, 2017, http:// www.msp.gov.ua/news/14003.html [06.10.2017]. 48 viktoriia semenenko про зайнятість населення. закон україни від 05.07.2012 р. № 5067-vi, 2012, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5067-17/page [06.10.2017]. ринок праці у і півріччі 2016 року, 2016, державна служба статистики україни, київ. тищенко н.і., піроцький б.ю., 2014, внутрішньо переміщені особи в україні як проблема сьогодення, молодий вчений, 10(13/2), 124–126. цимбал о.і., 2009, регулювання збалансованого розвитку формальних та імпліцитних структур інституалізації відтворювального простору ринку праці, зайнятість та ринок праці, 21/22, 25–40. 1. introduction ukraine’s independence acquisition in 1991 and especially the victory of the dignity revolution in 2014 determined the relevance of the welfare state development. however different periods of ukrainian history differently affected the relations between government institutions and the community, especially in issues of voluntary socially useful activity. nonetheless, the latter also had different social positions depending on the stage of history. therefore, understanding of such context provides the integrity of a view of volunteering, ccomprehensive review of this phenomenon in the system of state-society relations, the complexity of its study. it should be noted that the history of state-society relations on the basis of volunteering is contextual background of the genesis of volunteerism, because its features characterize the role and the place of the phenomenon in the system of state-society relations at a particular historical moment, and there are reasons, pledge, results or consequences of its state. therefore, it is impossible to consider the historical aspects of state-society relations in the field of volunteering separately from the history of volunteering or history of the state and its people. especially because the volunteering and the state are two closely related categories, as the first arises from the second’s limitation as a consequence of inadequate reaction of government authorities to the needs of the society and its social problems. history shows that the inability or unwillingness of the state to respond to social challenges adequately lead to the occurrence and further development of volunteerjournal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(1), 22-31 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.51.003.5159 historical context of the institutionalization of statesociety relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine vyacheslav golub faculty of public policy and social development national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, ezhena pottier 20, 03057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: vyacheslav_golub@ukr.net citation golub v., 2015, historical context of the institutionalization of state-society relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(1), 22-31 abstract the article analyses the course of the history of the state-society relations in the sphere of volunteering in ukraine. the main purpose of the paper is to systematize existing knowledge in that area. the author characterizes every stage of the development of the state-society relations in the sphere of volunteering. the result of the study is the list of the key stages of the history of the state-society relations in the sphere of volunteering and visual embodiment of chronological axis of this process in ukraine. key words volunteering, state-society relations, historical context, milestones, ukraine historical context of the institutionalization of state-society relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine 23 ing. a striking confirmation of this view in ukraine is the rise of volunteering during the anti-terrorist operation. it demonstrated responsiveness to new realities of ukrainian society, the ability to respond effectively to the challenges of war, the ability to solve extremely complex problems associated with maintaining defence capability, sometimes opposed certain helplessness of government bodies (голуб, 2015). however, the property of volunteerism to accentuate imperfect of a state as a regulator of social processes does not mean the inevitability of an antagonistic nature of the state-society relationship, especially in the area of volunteering. rather, history shows the prevailing harmony in the relations between participants of this social process. it is necessary to take into account the historical experience, which later became the modern understanding of volunteering. it formed the basis for public attitude to such kind of activity and its formation in the system of the state-society relations. some ukrainian researchers consider the charity chronology needs to be started with ancient times, primitive society. in their opinion, standards of mutual assistance appear during that period of history, which greatly influenced the subsequent development of mankind. referring to the data of archaeological research, the scientists argue that mutual support, an expression of humanity in dealing with fellow countrymen were inherent tribal society representatives (бондаренко et al., 2012). however, for the purpose of this work it is more valuable knowledge about such activities in terms of state entities, as consideration of historical aspects of volunteering through the paradigm of state-society relations, ensure the correct approaches to the study subject. 2. middle ages availability of historical forms of contemporary understanding of volunteering as a practice of providing voluntary assistance is typical for ukrainian past. it has its roots in medieval kievan rus. it should be noted that virtues of philanthropists and benefactors are always been inherent in ukrainians. samples of ukrainian folk wisdom clearly demonstrate the importance of the fundamental principles of volunteering for our ancestors. these proverbs praise the desire to help one another, especially those who are in dire need of such assistance. one of their english analogues is: “a single thread from everyone – and there is a shirt for a naked one”. these examples demonstrate a respectful attitude of ukrainians to the archetypes of national volunteering that has passed through the centuries, handed down from generation to generation, and at the same time indicate the significant role of the first germs of modern volunteering in ukrainian society. with the adoption of christianity in kievan rus providing voluntary charitable assistance became a form of embodiment of christian commandment of love for neighbour (юрченко, 2009). researchers believe that the activities of a doctor agapit is the historical fact that confirms rusichi providing unselfish assistance to the needy, based on moral and ethical traditions of orthodoxy. in the eleventh century the doctor provided medical (not quackery!) assistance to the sick and refused to accept payment for it (ковальов, kovaliov, 2015). given the obvious public perception of the modern version of the medieval volunteering, the state’s attitude to samples of mercy and charity as archetypes volunteering, raises important given the research of historical aspects of volunteer activities in the state-society relations. the indicator of the role of volunteering in ancient kyivan state is the princes’ attitude to it as the key link of the governance of that time. historical and literary monuments that have survived, give us reason to believe such activity as a means of social accomplishment and its important place in public policy of kyivan princes. the chronicles tell us about the kind-hearted character of volodymyr, grand prince of kiev, which in 996 ordered “every poor and the needy to come to the prince’s court and take everything they need, drink, and food, and money from the treasury”. in addition, he transported food and beverages for those poor and needy who could not get to the prince’s yard (близнець (ed.), 1989). however, it should not equate charity of rulers, in which they were actively involved, with their princely duties because helping the poor was voluntary matter of benefactors, imbued with the ideas of christian morality. the priorities of the public policy of grand prince of kiev yaroslav unison reflected in his personal charity mission. it is not so much flesh pleasure or everyday needs of rus as a princely assistance aimed at spiritual perfection. it is known that yaroslav mudry founded schools, libraries and took care of them. he also founded the school for three hundred orphans, who studied the art of war as well as reading, painting and various crafts. in his legislative activity he paid special attention to people in need. he formally approved charity by making special section of the charter of the church and the land. according to new rules, priests and bishops were responsible for taking care of the poor and needy. in addition, the researchers noted legislative consolidation of caring for the younger generation, emphasis on care, 24 vyacheslav golub children protection in the first written code of laws ‘ruska pravda’ (матяж, 2009). the successor to the throne, prince vladimir monomakh, clearly emphasized the need for socially useful activity for the benefit of vulnerable groups. at the beginning of the twelfth century in his ‘manual for children’, he calls for the continued care of those who in need. “first of all, do not forget the poor, and if it is possible feed them as well as orphans. and protect widows ... and wherever you come from and wherever you left off, give to drink and feed the needy” (близнець (ed.), 1989). traditions of kiyian rus princes of ‘well doing’ were strengthened throughout the history of galicia-volyn principality (1199–1349). at the same time basic underlying principles of volunteerism gradually took a more confident position in the ukrainian society. so, today we know that prince roman, who died in poverty, gave all his belongings to the poor as well as prince yaroslav osmomysl in his spiritual testament ordered to give all his possessions to beggars and monasteries (вертеловский, 1994). it should be noted that such behaviour of rulers was based on their personal beliefs and desire to help those in need. this situation corresponds to one more key principle of modern volunteerism voluntariness. personal participation of kyivan princes in different forms of volunteering of that time as well as their attention to the problems of normalization of its basic principles give us reason to suggest the important role of the volunteering in the lifestyles of medieval ukrainian state. we can conclude that the launching of foundations of public attitudes to issues of volunteering refers to that time as well as historical gaining of the state favour by the volunteering. during the polish-lithuanian period (xiv – first half xvii) a new stage in the history of national volunteerism has been started. its characteristic features were the organizational embodiment and its systemic signs of charitable activities. the current national volunteering acquired these features thanks to the orthodox brotherhoods, a kind of ukrainian religious and national organizations, uniting artisans, peasants, cossacks, merchants and ukrainian tycoons in their ranks. they had a clear structure. they strictly adhered to organizational discipline in the achievement of the goal – the preservation of ethnic identity of the ukrainian people. in the context of the history of volunteerism, brotherhoods are viewed through the considerable attention that they paid to the social support of the most vulnerable members of society the elderly, disabled, homeless, orphans. this embodied in various forms of assistance, such as the establishment and operation of hospitals, orphanages etc. but the brotherhoods believed that cultural and educational activities are the main means to goal achievement. this led to the appearance of about 30 fraternal schools that were kept at the expense of brotherhoods in the early seventeenth century. children of all strata of society had the right to study in these institutions. it should be noted that children from poor families and orphans studied for free (рощина, 2009). that is why we believe that it is necessary to consider the brotherhoods activity as an important step in strengthening the philosophy of volunteering in ukrainian society. do not neglect the contribution of the brightest representatives of hetman era in the development of ukrainian charity, which is kind of volunteering. scientists believe that ukrainian hetmans, cossack leaders and rank and file cossacks wrote a glorious page in the history of national charity, focusing on church, education and culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (костишак, 2015). among the historical figures of that time, who strengthened the philosophical foundations of modern volunteerism, is necessary to mention such hetmans as ivan mazepa ivan skoropadsky, danylo apostol, cyril razumovsky and his brother alexis. in addition we must recall colonels michael myklashevsky, and constantine mokiyevsky, sich hetman petro kalnyshevsky and other benefactors. they all left their certain mark on public consciousness about the traditions of the attitude of those in power to the problems of ordinary people, about their personal involvement in overcoming of the gaps of social formation and development of ukrainians, and about the model of the relationship between government and the community in matters of charitable and mutual assistance. thus, we can agree with those researchers who say that until the last quarter the eighteenth century, the relationship between government and society in responding to the social needs of population groups that especially needed special assistance, regulated almost exclusively by christian tradition of charity and religious ethics (бондаренко et al., 2012). 3. new history o. bezpal’ko (безпалько, 2006, 66) notes that “rural community was a kind of social institution of support of unprotected layers of population for a long time. its activity was based on the traditions of charity and collective cohabitation that are inherent ukrainian mentality”. the author argues that the role of the peasantry organization of social classes with historical context of the institutionalization of state-society relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine 25 its characteristic feature of mutual assistance, which was inherited from the ancient rus community, defined all aspects of the community life style from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century. the community was responsible for all its members, especially orphans, widows, elders and infirm people. the custom of collective mutual aid was particularly characteristic for traditional way of public life of ukrainians, used typically in exceptional cases. the historian and ethnologist a. ponomar’ov (пономарьов, 1996) notes that people were turning for help to the ‘world’, “when someone burned housing or household head was seriously ill at the time of ploughing or harvest time... it was believed that in such cases it was a sin not to help. so, villagers performed free work together either for the community or individual family or its individual members”. in our opinion, these historical forms of charitable mutual aid is the most close to the classic understanding of volunteering through compliance with its basic principles of voluntary, organized, conscious, free donations of time, effort, knowledge and skills to support especially the needy members of the community or for the benefit of the community in general. that is why we consider it appropriate to dwell on the historical aspects of the system of group mutual aid in the system of state-society relations. it should indicate that it covered the range of various types of public mutual support for the implementation of urgent and time-consuming work. this could be an urgent and collective production of wedding towels or disease control measures as well as construction the church or installation of heavy bells in the belfry (ponomar’ov, 1996). researchers distinguish four forms of group mutual aid, inherent ukrainian peasantry, in the period of new history. each of these forms had several varieties. two of them (‘vidrobitky’1 (or ‘odribschyna’ and ‘obuchy’) and ‘supryaha’2) cannot be attributed to the prototypes of volunteering because the first does not meet the principle of voluntariness and the second does not correspond the principle of social utility. the rest of the forms of group mutual aid that can be seen as the prototype of volunteerism are: • ‘toloka’3 or its regional names ‘medzhiya’, ‘grasa’, ‘shodschyna’, which was realized in such produc1 vidrobitky – one of feudal obligations, which involve performing different jobs for lease land, borrowed money, food, etc. 2 supryaha an ancient form of common work of ukrainian rural poor for which few yards combined draft animals and implements to perform agricultural work. 3 toloka one-time and free of charge group work in order to perform fast large workload, especially housing and farm tion versions as ‘kosovytsya’4, ‘hrebovytsya’5, ‘vozovytsya’6, as well as ‘clacka’7, ‘zakladyny’8, ‘valkuvannya’, ‘mastinnya’ of houses, or ‘na chamur’9; • ‘supryadky’10 – as ‘odenky’11, ‘popryahy’12, ‘posydenky’, or ‘dosvitky’13 and ‘torochyny’14. these forms of collective mutual aid and their variations are interesting for the purposes of this study, not only because of the common ideological principles of volunteerism, but also in terms of representativeness of their role in the system of state-society relations of that time. thus, the value of group mutual aid for feudal society communities is evident through its vast social benefit and favourable attitude of local communities to it. even wealthy villagers considered it their public duty to help during the work on the majority of ukrainian ethnic lands (тарнавський, 2012). the relationship between landlords and peasants in the organization of collective mutual aid can be regarded as a projection of state-society relations the in the field of voluntary charitable activities of that time to the local level. this is because landowners as representatives of the ruling class were exponents of interests and the mainstay of the autocracy. in this regard it should be noted lords attempt to use popular method of public support for their own benefit. indeed, among the various types of toloka scientists distinguish those kinds that were held at the invitation of the landlord, usually to perform agricultural work (пономарьов, 1996). such toloka popularly called ‘proshena’ (‘mandatative’), which was actually one of the obligations varieties through conditionally-voluntary participation in it. however, participation in ‘proshena’ toloka encouraged by obligatory meal, as well as in any classical (that is truly buildings construction, wood removal from the forest, field work, etc. 4 kosovytsya – a kind of toloka of cutting and collection of a grass. 5 hrebovytsya – a kind of toloka of raking hay. 6 vozovytsya – a kind of toloka of moving grain from fields after harvesting. 7 clacka – a kind of toloka on manufacturing building bricks. 8 zakladyny – a kind of toloka of laying the foundation of a new building. 9 valkuvannya, mastinnya or na chamur – a kind of toloka on the construction of clay walls or greasing walls with clay. 10 supryadky – generally, female party at which girls together spun yarn. 11 odenky – joint work of married women (spinning, embroidery, etc.) generally, in winter. 12 popryahy – gathering girls and young married women to spin or perform some other job. 13 posydenky or dosvitky – rural youth gathering to work and fun together in autumn and winter 14 torochyny – wedding ceremony of group sewing towels. 26 vyacheslav golub voluntary) toloka. this may indicate a formal recognition of the feudal power of social forms of collective mutual aid. so toloka, supryadky and other their analogs were the first forms of voluntary and free participation of peasants in a relatively system (depending on needs) and organized activities aimed at addressing the social problems of the community or its individual representatives. it should be noted the important place of prototypes of the modern system of volunteering in the state-society relations in xvii-xix centuries. the effectiveness of group forms of deprivation of consequences in everyday life has led not only to general approval of peasantry, but also to recognition of their nobility as an effective means of meeting the needs, including their own, which led to abuses in the use of public initiatives. volunteering history of ukrainian lands which were part of the russian empire, glorified by the charitable activities of zemstvos, especially of kharkiv, poltava, chernihiv, tauris and ekaterinoslav provinces, established in 1865–1866. as social establishments with signs of local government zemstvos except tireless fight against poverty, “organized various charitable institutions and looked after the needy in the in addition to assisting terminally ill, unable to work persons, the poor, zemstvos organized professional schools, societies of help, built temporary facilities for homeless people (sometimes with the distribution of food), homes for immigrants and workers, opened reference office for the settlement of workers movement as well as for job search” (ступак, 2009, p. 144). zemstvos role in fostering culture of volunteering among ukrainian people is quite significant not only and not so much through the funding of social care, but because of the enthusiasm of active members of zemstvos, on which zemstvo activities in the field of charity was based. zemstvos support (including financial) of charities to solve social problems of the poor can be seen as the historical context of national traditions of state-society relations in the field of volunteering. the second half of the nineteenth century also affected by the intensification of women’s social movement, full of signs of voluntary activities, not only in europe but also in ukrainian lands. s. zvereva said that in that time “association of mutual aid, mutual charity, labour aids and others began to appear in major cities of ukraine such as kiev, kharkov, and odesa. they united women on a professional basis midwives, teachers, seamstress’s communities, and they helped them in various fields of life. the most common areas of associations activities were: search for employment, affordable housing and dining, and also additional training, kindergartens, financial assistance from the common fund and others” (звєрєва, 2015, p. 57). thus, the second half of the nineteenth century was a milestone in the formation of conscious ukrainian community as a prerequisite of institutionalization of volunteering. the social responsibility for the welfare of citizens in the ukrainian lands, embodied in particular organizational forms has become a national authentication feature of european and global trends of classical volunteering nucleation as well as reliable basis of its further development in the system of state-society relations. 4. the twentieth century the history of the twentieth century suggests volunteering as a characteristic feature of today and an indispensable component of system state-society relations. this is a key period in the history of volunteering, because it is characterized by a global volunteer movement deployment as well as by institutionalization of volunteering in the world, and getting the “features of a mass social phenomenon” (апухтін, богомолов, 2015). the first world war and its aftermath as well as social progress, and social and political situation identified the prospective of volunteerism in the early 1900s. in view of the formation of volunteering, the twentieth century was crucial for our country, because this period includes the initial steps of its legal formalization, social institutionalization, state and public recognition. however, more than 90-year history was preceded to this period. during that period, volunteering positions in the system of state-society relations were radically changing depending on the changes of the political regime and socio-political situation in the country. it should agree with the position of scientists who believe that the first volunteer organization in ukraine was the red cross (бондаренко et al., 2012). at the beginning of xx century the activity of ukrainian section of the russian red cross was demilitarized, extending it to civilians. in the created network of medical institutions in the ukrainian provinces founded children’s polyclinics, hospitals, and almshouses. the fight against infectious diseases was conducted at that time. however, with the outbreak of world war the positions of red cross and its ukrainian branches in the system of state-society relations changed not only because of the recovery of dominance of military issues in the practice, but also due to its subordination to the military ambulance department at the military ministry (грибан, 2012). historical context of the institutionalization of state-society relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine 27 even the ukraine red cross, established in 1918 in the best tradition of volunteering, was subsequently doomed to the same long-dependent nature of relations with the state. this is manifested primarily in serving the interests of the soviet state in implementation of its social policy. despite a significant social function that red cross carried out during that period, under the conditions of neglect of voluntary as a key feature of volunteering, red cross contribution to the development of volunteering in ukraine was limited by maintenance of need of providing aid to the needy in the public consciousness. another page of ukrainian red cross history is its clandestine activities in western ukraine during the second world war. fully following the well-established tradition of volunteering of international movement of the red cross, the ukrainian red cross was established on the initiative of ukrainian doctors to organize sanitary and medical assistance the soldiers of ukrainian insurgent army and the local population. ukrainian red cross activities (i.e. health service referenty) took place at all levels of the underground network in the medical, pharmaceutical and social care areas. the organization differed from the soviet red cross society not only because of the clandestine nature of the activity caused due to the occupation, but also because of the compliance with all the basic principles of volunteering as well as of the independence from military government institutions (воробець, 1992). despite the short history of ukrainian red cross that was transformed into other charity institutions after world war ii in exile, it left a significant mark in the history of national volunteering as evidence of mental affinity of ukrainians other european nations, which actively cultivated the idea of voluntary public service in the interest of the state and society. however clandestine nature of the ukrainian red cross activity and its brief history as well as the soviet red cross society dependence of the soviet government do not cause any doubts because of totalitarian state power irreconcilability with any unauthorized manifestations of public performances, activities and initiatives. in the period of communist ideas triumph on the territory of modern ukraine when it was a part of the soviet union, there was total control of the ruling communist party and the soviet government in all spheres of public life, including the field of social activities. this kind of human fulfilment was greeted and permitted only within the institutional framework established by the state, which primarily included the communist party with its socio-political subsidiaries aimed at ideological reach of younger target group: the komsomol and the pioneer organization. modern scholars are united in their attitude to that stage of volunteering development as a period of regression due to excessive politicization and ideologization. the results were binding approach to its proceedings and therefore disregard the principle of voluntariness. as the l. kozhukharenko (кожухаренко, 2015, p.  83) said, “individual’s will was substituted by the will of the state that was considered higher than personality”. soviet ‘volunteering’ demonstrated willingness to “do not serve the interests of some individuals (care for the sick, help the orphans, the infirm, the elderly, etc.) but the party, communist ideas, socialist state” (бондаренко et al., 2012). these circumstances, according to v. apukhtin and o. bogomolov (апухтін, богомолов, 2015), began volunteering brake on progress in the former soviet space, as they caused negative public perception of the public activity in general and volunteering in particular. at the same time soviet kind of volunteering stimulates scientific interest in itself because of its unique position in the system of the state-society relations, where it is not a means of embodiment of public initiative of mutual aid but it is the state instrument for implementing the ideological commitment of the masses. ‘voluntary-compulsory’ work for the good of the state and society, which is officially was considered as ‘honorable’, is known as the socialist reality phenomenon ‘social burden’. of course, it may remind certain traditional volunteering through their specific features; it could not be rejected by any “conscious member of soviet society”. it can be identified a number of varieties of ‘social burden’ that best fit the classic notion of volunteering, taking into account the peculiarities of an era. these include participation in the communist subbotniks as a form of organized unpaid work of soviet citizens in their spare time, at the weekend, for the benefit of society that characterized their communist attitude to work; participation in activities such units as operational komsomol groups that contributed to the maintenance of public order, prevention of crime. in soviet times, the so-called ‘shef work’ (the english equivalent is the term ‘patronage’) was especially close to the phenomenon of volunteering in its characteristics. it was the social burden in the form of free systematic assistance of the strong subject in a particular area (‘patron’) in order to help the weaker object (‘patronized’). examples of such patronage are to help pupils and students who can not master the curriculum; mentoring of experienced workers over young workers; visiting the sick and so on. under the terms of compliance with many principles of volunteering (free of charge, public utility, in his spare time, systematic, organizational implemen28 vyacheslav golub tation, awareness etc.) patronage can not be recognized as a classic volunteering through camouflage of the principles of voluntariness in the system of ‘social burden’. in addition, the position of the state in this work is not as an effort to help a person as to get rid circumstances that “defaming the soviet system.” that is why, in our opinion, forced patronage is not always perceived as an attempt of real help in solving difficult life situations. it was rather a way to control of personal life by the state and society as well as a means of forcing to unmotivated personal growth, and sometimes a tool of humiliation. because of this, ‘patronized’ often resisted given attention. however, the most typical soviet equivalent of traditional volunteering, in our view, was ‘tymur movement’ that was widespread in ukraine as well as in a whole soviet union and the socialist bloc countries. it was a kind of social burden of soviet schoolchildren, in which they provided all possible household help to war veterans, invalids, lonely, infirm, and elderly. this movement has got the name in honor of the main character of the a. gaidar’s story “tymur and his squad” (гайдар, 1975). only some reasons don’t allow admitting a complete existence of classical volunteering in soviet ukraine. these include a stable political and ideological coloration of this activity as well as coercive nature of its implementation. this excludes principles of voluntary and conscious attitude. so, these circumstances exclude the principles of voluntary and conscious attitude. however, despite this, tymur units as well as other kinds of social burden performed an important function of the cultivation of such the best human virtues as dignity, honor, love of neighbor, kindness, willingness to come to the assistance, sympathy. they also furthered the development of such social skills as tolerance, moral responsibility, and tolerance. they also provide some degree of mastering of social norms and behaviors; helped to grow in terms of personality; contributed in socialization and evaluation of human values such as altruism, unselfishness, humanity, compassion, sensitivity, dedication, compassion, partnership. it should be noted that these values are defined as basic features of volunteering now. the period of the ussr collapse and gaining of ukraine’s independence is a kind of dividing line between eras of national ‘volunteer’ history. so, everything that took place before 90 years of the twentieth century is the historical basis of the formation and development of volunteering in the state-society relations in ukraine. despite the fact that all reviewed above refers to ‘prehistory’ of ukrainian volunteering it does not lose its importance on the process of becoming a social phenomenon. this prehistory serves as the key to strong rooting phenomenon of volunteering in the ukrainian soil as well as prerequisite for its obtaining a prominent place at applied and mental levels in the system of the state-society relations. 5. contemporary history the appearance of volunteering in the traditional general scientific understanding in ukraine became possible after gaining the statehood because of its willingness, ability and desire to self-modernization. in parallel with the deployment of activity of peace corps volunteers in ukraine the government focused its efforts on the development of national volunteerism as part of the newly created state network of social services for youth. today, scientists recognize that such centers’ activity has caused active development of national volunteerism (бондаренко et al., 2012). the creation of volunteer groups in the institutional framework of the government institutions was due to several reasons. on the one hand, it was quantitative limitation of a full-time human resource in conditions of incommensurably large amount of social programs and projects that these centres had to implement. on the other hand it was the desire to adapt the international experience of social work to ukrainian conditions. the historical role of the centres of social services regarding volunteering is not only in launching the volunteer movement in ukraine, but also in its distribution across the country, strengthening, the scientific studying of this phenomenon, as well as the gaining of volunteering its place in the state-society relations. the experience of the first volunteer groups demonstrated the public demand for such activities because of its social importance, urgency, ability to solve real problems of people, society and the environment, a wide variety of volunteering tools and so on. these circumstances led to the establishment of ukrainian non-governmental organizations which acted in the field of volunteering, providing a gradual shift of national volunteering to the plane of civil society. among the first and most influential associations of citizens, which aims at strengthen the voluntary basis in the state and society there are ukrainian association for youth cooperation “alternative-v”, ukrainian non-governmental centre “volunteer”, centre for volunteering “good will” and others. the adoption of a number of regulations on volunteering in the early 2000s legitimized the position of this phenomenon in the system of the state-socihistorical context of the institutionalization of state-society relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine 29 ety relations as well as strengthened its institutional framework and prospects. it should be noted that these processes took place against the backdrop of increased attention to issues of volunteering by european and international institutions. the evidence of this is the proclamation of 2001 international year of the volunteer as well as of 2011 european year of volunteering. so, the intensification of attention from the government to the volunteering issues in ukraine at the beginning of the xxi century can be explained through the self-identification of ukraine as a european state. this is evidenced not only ensuring the legal bases of the civilized state-society relations in the sphere of volunteering, but also the state recognition of volunteering as a european human values of mutual aid. it is noteworthy that the european football championship “euro 2012” was the most massive volunteer project during the existence of organized volunteer movement in ukraine. more than 12,000 volunteers were involved in its implementation in the summer of 2012 in ukraine. the phenomenon of euromaidan was the next and the most dramatic step in the national history of volunteering as well as in the chronology of its relations with the state. it demonstrated the importance, the role and the opportunity of the volunteering in achieving social goals, ability and feasibility of uniting voluntary efforts around a common socially useful purpose. the next stage of the national history of the state-society relations in the sphere of volunteering is caused by antiterrorist operation. it is marked by the extraordinary burst of civic activity as well as by the increased attention of the state and society to the volunteering. a main feature of this period is the formation of a new consolidated attitude of the state and the public to volunteering. it comes amid instantly increasing its role in the society and in the state through a critical and sometimes life-saving mission of volunteerism as well as through self-sacrifice and heroism of volunteers. results and implications of national volunteering at this stage determined its new position in the system of the state-society relations. it is caused by the peculiarities of the sociopolitical and military situation in ukraine at the time. volunteering got nationwide respect due to a number of reasons. these are responsiveness to the new realities of ukrainian society; the ability to respond effectively to the challenges of the war; the ability to solve extremely complex problems associated with maintaining defence capability, concern for the defenders of ukraine (sometimes opposed certain helplessness of government agencies which are responsible for addressing these tasks). fig. 1. chronological axis of national volunteering in the system of the state-society relations in ukraine source: own studies. 30 vyacheslav golub thus, the national volunteering reached it’s the highest level in the system of the state-society relations in the middle of the second decade of the xxi century. it manifested in actuality of its forms and methods, social purpose, importance for the state, scale, influence, social perception and support from government institutions and others. this led to changes and additions to the current legislation on volunteering with a view to its improving and bringing into compliance with modern requirements, socio-political situation and ideas about the european prospects of ukraine. 6. conclusion based on the above, the chronology of the existence of volunteering in the state-society relations in ukraine can be divided into two major periods. the first period, ‘prehistory’, during which the foundations for the establishment and development of national volunteerism were laid. the second period, ‘history’, during which the institutionalization of volunteering held in ukraine, as well as development and acquisition of attributes of a significant social phenomenon occurred. a peculiar demarcation line between these periods is the time when ukraine gained independence and choose the democratic way of its development and european values as a guide of own prospects. each of these periods has its own points of reference. their consistent location forms a chronological axis of national volunteering in the system of the statesociety relations in ukraine as shown in fig.1. generally, the review of ukrainian volunteering progress through the prism of the state-society relations shows the european and global trends in this process. there is only a significant difference in terms of volunteering institutionalization. thus, these trends took place in the late twentieth century in the national history as opposed to the global experience, which was ahead of the ukrainian experience for at least 100 years. however, the rapid development of the principles of volunteering in ukraine in the xxi century reveals that the quality corresponding to contemporary international standards. in our view, the current state of volunteering in the state-society relations is entirely conditioned by objective circumstances, including internal sociopolitical situation and the degree of volunteerism in the world. therefore, understanding the basic principles of the state-society relations in the sphere of volunteering in the world is an important because it can be a guide for the modernization of the national system by adapting suitable elements of its western analogues. however, it may be the subject of our further research. references апухтін в., богомолов о., 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109-117. пономарьов а., no data, звичаї колективної взаємодопомоги в україні, мистецька сторінка, http://storinka-m. kiev.ua/article.php?id=452 [16.11.2015]. historical context of the institutionalization of state-society relations in the field of volunteering in ukraine 31 рощина л., 2009, благодійна діяльність українських братств, наука. релігія. суспільство, 1, 38-42. ступак ф., 2009, діяльність земств у галузі суспільної опіки та доброчинності, наука. релігія. суспільство, 4, 143148. тарнавський р., 2012, толока під час будівництва в громадському побуті українських селян (друга половина хіх – перша половина хх ст.), народознавчі зошити, 6(108), 995-1009. юрченко і., 2009, інституціоналізація волонтерського руху в україні, інститут соціології національної академії наук україни, київ. 1. introduction the present reality shows variability and diversity in time (chronology) and space (chorology). chronology is the domain of history, while chorology is the domain of geography. a domain does not mean exclusivity. both history and geography today are “spatiotemporal” sciences. the aim of this study is to describe and evaluate the socio-economic development of poland after 1989 in terms of the features taken into account, with particular emphasis on the graphical method of time series analysis, i.e. the connected trajectory. in other words, it is about the reconstruction of the development process in a relatively long period of time, with special treatment of the applied method. thus, the study pursues two closely related goals: the methodological and the cognitive one. the cognitive goal is important because the period of development lasting almost 30 years, which can be journal of geography, politics and society 2021, 11(4), 1–17 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.01 polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions jerzy j. parysek faculty of human geography and planning, adam mickiewicz university in poznań, krygowskiego 10, 61–680 poznań, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-0044-6582 e-mail: parysek_jerzy@yahoo.com citation parysek j.j., 2021, polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions, journal of geography, politics and society, 11(4), 1–17. abstract thirty years of poland’s economic development in new political conditions is a good opportunity to study the course of the economic development process. this article presents the results of research that takes into account macroeconomic indicators that synthesize important development categories. these indicators concern the demographic situation (population, natural increase, economic activity and unemployment rate), economy (gdp, inflation, number of business entities, investment outlays, budget deficit) and standard of living of the population (remuneration, housing situation, cars). in the study, a graphic method of time series analysis was applied, i.e. a connected trajectory, allowing a synthetic assessment of development processes in terms of aspects that express the considered features. presentation of the research results is preceded by a presentation of the causes of transformation and an indication of development factors and conditions, in particular after 1989. the study is general and synthetic and does not take into account the details that had an impact on the situation described by the size of the indicators taken into account. key words economic development, social development, development trajectories, balance of transformation process in poland. received: 12 april 2021 accepted: 02 september 2021 published: 24 january 2022 2 jerzy j. parysek called the socio-economic transformation of poland or the socio-economic development in the new system conditions, probably ended in 2019. the period unexpectedly and brutally ended with the invasion of the sars cov-2 virus, the consequences of which are difficult to predict. probably the hypothesis that the world after the covid-19 pandemic will not be the same as before will be valid again (although this time in relation to the sars-cov-2 virus). what it will be like cannot be reliably presented even by the greatest minds. as already stated, the aim of this study is to reconstruct the process of poland’s socio-economic development after 1989 in terms of the features taken into account, primarily with the use of the connected trajectory. the time that has elapsed since 1989, i.e. the beginning of systemic changes, is a good opportunity to describe and evaluate the socio-economic development of poland in the new conditions of functioning of the state, society and economy. this is important especially in a situation where the covid-19 pandemic will undoubtedly lead to the creation of a completely new, probably difficult and complicated economic and social situation not only in poland but also in the world. therefore, in the light of current events, this article is, in a sense, a summary of an important stage in poland’s economic and social development during a groundbreaking period. the subject of the research was the polish economy, treated as a whole, in the years 1990–2018 in terms of 12 discussed features. these were: (1) population (persons), (2) natural increase (persons), (3) unemployment rate (%), (4) economic activity (number of employed persons), (5) gdp (pln), (6) inflation (%), (7) economic entities (number), (8) investment outlays (pln), (9) financial result of the state budget (pln), (10) average salary (pln), (11) housing stock (number of dwellings) and (12) registered cars (number). these are the basic features taken into account in research on the socio-economic development of a country. these features also function in the socalled public space, influencing the public mood, politicians’ activity, the behavior of banks and rating agencies, and the decisions taken by authorities. it can be assumed that the first four features characterize the demographic and social situation, the next five – the development of the economy, and the last three – the standard of living of the population. the conducted research covers the period of 1990–2018. in this context, it should be remembered that at the turn of 1989 and 1990 a fundamental change in the political-economic conditions took place in poland. instead of the totalitarian communist system (ironically, called people’s democracy), solutions characteristic of the democratic systems functioning in western europe were being gradually introduced. a deep systemic transformation of the state began, encompassing the political, economic and social spheres. the reality of 1989 was that the change of the political system could be implemented relatively quickly, and so it was done. the transformation of the economy took much more time, because the transition of economic activity from operating in the command economy system to functioning in the free market system is a difficult and long-lasting process. on the one hand, there is the inertia of the old system, and on the other hand, there is a need to work out a model of this economy appropriate to the current situation and possibilities, especially to the particular stages of the development process. it takes similarly long to transform the mentality of society, which has to learn to function in a democratic system and in free market economy. leaving the assessment of political changes as well as social consequences or effects of the transformation to historians, political scientists and sociologists, the present author is particularly interested in economic development and only selected social effects of this development. generally speaking, this study aims to describe and evaluate the course of development processes in selected, substantive categories of economic development (to a lesser extent – social one), and more specifically, the changes that took place in the period after 1989. the research was based on statistics poland statistical data which seem to take into account the basic categories of development. in addition to the analysis of statistical data, the study applied an infrequently used graphical method of time series analysis called the connected trajectory, which allows the reconstruction of development processes in an original and cognitively valuable way1. this method allows minimizing the impact of changes that the redenomination of the zloty and inflation had on the data brought by the statistics poland to comparability2. the conducted research concerns poland as a whole, with full awareness of the regional diversity of the ongoing transformation and development processes. there is a wealth of literature describing the transformation process, including the factors and conditions that had led to the changes. obviously, 1 a description of this method and the interpretation of connected trajectorys can be found, among others, in the following publications: hingel, 1993; ormerod, 1993; parysek, 2002, 2004; parysek, mierzejewska, 2012. 2 each point through which the trajectory is drawn is the relation of the state of a given year to the state of the previous year (see: connected trajectorys). polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions 3 in the conditions changing with time, various kinds of assessments had to be made about the causes of the transformation and its course. the presented point of view often depended on the ideological and political orientation of a particular author and the period in which the analysis and evaluation were conducted. this means that we are dealing with subjective rather than objective assessments of the recent past. over time, this situation worsened so much that it has led to such a level of subjectivism when economic development processes in the same periods were assessed by some authors as a success and by others as a failure. the present author strives to make the most objective assessment of the transformation possible, which, as it seems, should be facilitated by reducing the research to a multifaceted assessment of development processes based only on statistical analysis of data and their graphical interpretation3. 2. causes of the systemic transformation the causes of the collapse of the communist system in poland can be divided into endogenous ones – inherent in the situation that developed in poland before 1989, and exogenous ones – resulting from the political and economic situation in the world, especially in the communist bloc. among the endogenous factors, the following deserve special emphasis (chojnicki et al., 1999): (1) growing dissatisfaction of the society with the low level of consumption, everyday life difficulties, and limited state sovereignty4; (2) changes in the awareness and the critical attitude of the society, especially of the working class, towards the allegedly progressive nature of the communist system and its economic and social efficiency, which resulted in the emergence of opposition organizations5; (3) growing inefficiency and shortages of the economy based on central planning and operation of state-owned enterprises, the consequences of which included, among others: outdated 3 the difficulties in conducting an analysis of socio-economic development in such a long time frame are evidenced by a lack of studies covering the whole period of 1990–2019. 4 this was reflected in subsequent social upheavals and protests (poznań: 1956, the baltic coast: 1970, ursus and radom: 1976, and the whole country, especially large urban and industrial centers, in 1980–1981), which weakened the regime and forced implementation of specific reforms. 5 organizations such as komitet obrony robotników (kor) [eng.: the workers’ defense committee] and niezależny i samorządny związek zawodowy ”solidarność” [eng.: the independent self-governing trade union “solidarity”] were established at that time. and inefficient structure of the economy, a declining level of investment, a constant decrease in national wealth (per capita), as well as growing state debt and a deteriorating condition of the natural and social environment. the exogenous factors include, first of all, the collapse of the ussr’s military, political and economic power and the collapse of that state, unfavorable to the communist system and the world effects of the arms race and the global economic situation, especially emerging crises, e.g. the oil crises in 1974 and 1979 and the economic crisis of the early 1980s, revolution in iran, etc. (chojnicki, 1990; chojnicki et al., 1999; morawski, 2003; rubini et al., 2011; winiecki (ed.), 2009). to a greater or lesser extent, all this influenced attempts of the communist authorities to reach an agreement with the then opposition. in this respect, a special role was played by difficult and often interrupted meetings of the government and solidarity sides, with participation of the catholic church representatives, e.g. in magdalenka (september 16, 1988), and the round table talks (february 6 – april 5, 1989), which were concluded with a differently interpreted agreement6. the latter meetings resulted in the june contract elections (on june 4 and 18, 1989) and an agreement on such systemic solutions as the appointment of the senate, the contract sejm, the national assembly and the office of the president of the republic of poland7. the “contract” sejm introduced the necessary amendments to the constitution and passed a package of 10 economic laws, known as the “balcerowicz plan”, the purpose of which was to build the foundations of a free-market economy. these acts concerned: financial management of (state-owned) enterprises, conducting business activity, taxes, functioning of the banking system (including the role and functioning of the national bank of poland – nbp), loans, customs, foreign exchange turnover and other important matters. another goal of these legal regulations was to lead the country’s economy out of a deep crisis and to prepare the legal basis for the transition 6 from seizing power from the communists (w. frasyniuk), through separation based on an agreement between the parties (l. miller), to an agreement between the communists and the opposition on the communists’ terms (w. czarzasty). 7 the aforementioned meetings of the communist government with the opposition are differently assessed, depending on political views and party sympathies. thus, there are opinions such as the success of the opposition, but also betrayal or collusion of part of the solidarity elite with communists, and recently, expressed in the media by the once prominent activists of the polish united workers’ party (now sld), coming to some arrangement between the authorities and the opposition or a mutual agreement of the sides, as already mentioned. 4 jerzy j. parysek from a centrally planned economy to a free-market economy. the primary aim was to curb inflation, limit the budget deficit, reduce the state debt, support the banking system, and overcome the crisis and enter the path of economic growth8. as for the social transformation, apart from the changes in the society’s mentality shaped in the rejected system (homo sovieticus), the revival of the structures of civil society is worth emphasizing (first, at the level of municipalities) and the freedom of association in order to defend workers’ interests as well as to conduct political, economic and social activity9. this is the assessment of the present author, more or less different from other authors’ assessment (gomułka, 2014; kieżun, 2012; kołodko, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007; kowalik, 2001, 2007; kowalski, 2009; poznański, 2001a, 2001b; woźniak, 2011)10. 3. factors and conditions of development it is generally assumed that both the initial situation and the transformation process were shaped by many different factors, and that a near-truth assessment of the past may be made after many years, probably only by the second generation (kołodko, 1999, 2007, 2009; kowalski, 2009). therefore, in a situation where it is difficult to identify specific factors and determinants of development, and even more difficult to determine their impact on development, in this study, factors and determinants are treated both generally and jointly, as favorable, or not, circumstances, both endogenous and exogenous (pary sek, 2018). as written above, in 1990 the polish economy found itself in a state of deep collapse which was, on the one hand, a result of an inefficient, prescriptive 8 both the balcerowicz plan and the entire transformation process are assessed differently today. the implementation of the aforementioned plan, however, created foundations for the transition to a free-market economy and contributed to curbing inflation, but it was very burdensome for the general public, caused an increase in unemployment and resulted in not always sensible liquidation of state-owned enterprises and sale of national assets (cf. gomułka, 2014; kieżun, 2012; kolodko, 1999, 2000, 2007; kowalik, 2001, 2007; kowalski, 2009; poznański, 2001a, 2001b; wilczyński, 2007; woźniak, 2011). economists also attempt to classify the assessments of both the balcerowicz plan and the transformation process (rolski, 2013; zagóra-joniasto, 2017). 9 poviat and voivodeship self-governments were established only after coming into force of the relevant acts of june 5, 1998. 10 numerical data and appropriate graphs are included in the publication by kołodko (2007). model of its functioning, and on the other hand – a result of political changes in europe, especially in the bloc of the so-called socialist community, and the general political and economic situation in the world. in general, it can be assumed that the primary tasks of the transformation process included: (1) regaining a permanent macroeconomic equilibrium, (2) possibly full liberalization of prices and foreign trade, including the elimination of shortages and queues in front of shops, and (3) restoring the economy’s development capacity with prospective striving to eliminate the civilization gap that had existed for many years between poland and the countries of western europe (gomułka, 2014). the literature also contains records of other priority tasks, to a lesser extent referring to the balcerowicz plan (kołodko, 1999, 2000, 2007; kowalik, 2011). in more detail, the primary directions of remedial actions aimed to fight hyperinflation, increasing unemployment, decreasing industrial production, problems in international trade, growing poverty, poor environmental condition, but most of all it they aimed to create the foundations of a market economy. many state-owned enterprises were unable to adapt to the new systemic conditions and collapsed. it had a particularly hard effect state agricultural farms (in polish: pgr). moreover, globalization gaining in importance and the competitiveness of economies of other countries having a strong impact, especially in the conditions of serious state debt, were not conducive to the processes of economic transformation. dissolution of the council for mutual economic assistance (cmea) also had a negative impact on the economy, despite generally negative assessments of the functioning of this structure. the collapse of the soviet market, with which the polish economy was closely related, was also not without significance. the dissolution of the warsaw pact, a serious consumer of the production of the polish arms industry, was among factors that also contributed to the collapse of this market. one thing is certain, in the situation of 1990, it was difficult to indicate such development factors, apart from direct foreign investments, which could ensure the fastest possible way out of this difficult situation. undeniably, in the period after 1989, despite numerous difficulties and adversities, the dynamics of the polish economy was gaining systematic momentum, which, unfortunately, was not accompanied by a marked improvement in the inhabitants’ living conditions11. in deliberations on development, as 11 the author of this text presents the view that the transformation of the state, economy and society is still under way, although different progress has been achieved in each of these segments. the continuum of transformation, but also the corpolish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions 5 well as factors and determinants of economic development, it seems that the hypothesis should be postulated that, despite different political orientation and adopting its own development concepts, each government after 1990 aimed at economic revival and improvement in living conditions of the population. the lack of a long-term policy of socioeconomic development, resulting from changes in governments in poland after 1989, is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the described state of affairs (tab. 1). therefore, the economic development of 1990–2019 is a product of more or less successful moves in the economic and social sphere. despite this, the political instability manifested in the changes of political parties in power, and hence the directions and priorities of economic and social policy, certainly did not help to overcome the existing difficulties and enter the path of stable, sustainable and relatively fast development12. each new government after 1989 tried to implement its own vision of development, which, given the high degree of politicization of economic decisions as well as the failure to perceive, or tolerance for, pathologies that always accompany periods of revolutionary changes, could not bring the results expected by poles. continuity in the implementation of economic policy is one of the conditions for achieving economic success, assuming that a good model has been chosen and that the authorities’ actions are understood at least, or even better, accepted and supported by the public. the complete politicization of not only exercising power at all levels, but also of the economy, social changes and public life is, unfortunately, an obstacle to such actions. this is not good for the state or the economy, but above all for the society, which expects a greater share in consumption of effects of the expected development. unfortunately, there is no indication that this situation will change in the near future. moreover, it is more likely that the political dispute will be aggravated even more, obviously to the detriment of the state, society and the economy. poland’s membership in the structures of the european union is certainly conducive to economic development, which is primarily related to the availability of the so-called aid funds, which are an important source of supporting and strengthening economic rection of its directions is noted and described in more detail by g.w. kołodko (2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). 12 looking at the matter in general, it can be concluded that the same intentions of those in power may lead to the adoption of different models, different priorities and different development concepts, which on the one hand leads to a distortion and, on the other hand, to a change in the currently implemented development concept, and consequently to slowing down its pace (pace of development). cooperation in view of a lack of domestic capital13. the establishment of national (also regional) priorities for spending eu funds and their rational use is a completely different problem, although certain priorities and specific obligations in this matter are set and imposed by the european union (płowiec, 2004). as results from ministerial documents (the ministry of regional development and the ministry of investment and development), during the period of membership in the eu, a substantial stream of aid funds has come to poland. in the years 2004–2006, it was the amount of €14 billion, in the years 2007– 2013 – €67.5 billion, and for the years 2014–2020 the amount is assumed to be €82.5 billion. foreign direct investment was undoubtedly a major factor in poland’s economic development after 1989. it also contributed to solving important, current problems of the transformation period, especially unemployment, caused both by the collapse of many companies in the centrally planned economy and by the necessity to restructure and modernize it. the crisis that started in 2008 was unfavorable to the polish economic transformation and development, which is obvious in the situation of increasingly strong international economic and financial ties and progressing globalization. still, the polish economy has not been severely affected by this crisis, and the reasons for this situation are a source of dispute, not only among politicians, which may be understandable in the conditions of a fierce political struggle, but also among economists. nevertheless, there was a slight weakening in the dynamics of the gdp growth and foreign investment as well as an increase in the unemployment rate (tab. 3). in any case, compared to the situation of other european countries, including eu members, the economic situation of poland was relatively good. taking into account the financial situation of the country, its geopolitical situation, armed conflicts and international terrorism were and are still significant. political tensions and threats to the country’s security have led to an increase in defense expenditure. the polish armed forces required modernization and development, which as a process is still under implementation. the state’s defense policy is a separate issue, which, like the economic policy, does not show continuity with the changes of governments. fortunately, there have been no terrorist attacks in the country yet, but the existing threat forces the authorities to take costly preventive measures. 13 it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the current government in power would not strive for the highest possible level of eu support. 6 jerzy j. parysek apart from the internal political situation unconducive to development, it is necessary to point out, if only briefly, other situations and processes which are certainly unconducive to economic and social development. thus, the decline in the demographic dynamics and the ensuing aging of the population is a serious problem. the situation in this respect is worsened by the emigration of young, often well-educated poles, causing an imbalance in the labor market, which results in the need to employ immigrants, not only from neighboring countries (ukraine, belarus) but also from distant ones (the philippines, vietnam, china, india). the number of both emigrants and immigrants is estimated at around 2.5 million people for each of these categories. persistent income polarization is not favorable to development, especially social development, although positive changes in this respect should be noticed. an apartment is still an unattainable good for an average citizen, mainly due to the relation between the price of the apartment and the income of the population (specifically, salaries and living costs). despite the assurance of successive governments, the health service, which is struggling with the problems most experienced by the inhabitants, especially the poorest ones, cannot get out of the crisis14. moreover, the spread of both poverty and social pathologies as well as the difficulties in solving them is a serious problem. development, especially at the local level, is not helped by the budget deficit and the increasing debt of local governments. on the one hand, this makes it difficult to solve the basic problems, especially in the field of technical and social infrastructure, and on the other hand, it severely limits the possibilities of making own investments and using eu funds (the so-called own contribution). there are probably more factors but also limitations to development. at this point, the author has 14 fighting the covid-19 pandemic is a completely new and unexpected challenge. tab. 1. governments of the republic of poland after 1989 prime minister period of performing the function government coalition parties political orientation tadeusz mazowiecki september 24, 1989 – november 25, 1990 “solidarność”, pzpr, zsl, ud the effect of the “round table” agreement (us and them) krzysztof bielecki january 12, 1991 – december 5, 1991 kld, zchn, pc, sd christian–democratic jan olszewski december 23, 1991 – july 10, 1992 pc, zchn, psl, pl christian–peasant hanna suchocka july 11, 1992 – october 18, 1993 ud, kld, zchn, pchd, pppp, psl, pl democratic–christian–peasant waldemar pawlak october 26, 1993 – march 1, 1995 sld, psl left-wing–peasant józef oleksy march 6, 1995 – january 26, 1996 sld, psl left-wing–peasant włodzimierz cimoszewicz february 7, 1996 – october 17, 1997 sld, psl left-wing–peasant jerzy buzek october 31, 1997– october 19, 2001 aws, uw christian–democratic leszek miller october 19, 2001 – may 2, 2004 sld, psl, up left-wing–peasant marek belka may 2, 2004 – may 19, 2004; june 11, 2004 – october 19, 2005 sld, up sld left-wing left-wing kazimierz marcinkiewicz october 31, 2005 – july 10. 2006 pis, samoobrona, lpr christian–conservative jarosław kaczyński july 14, 2006 – november 5, 2007 pis, samoobrona, lpr christian–conservative donald tusk november 16, 2007 – november 18, 2011 november 18, 2011 – september 11, 2014 po, psl po, psl liberal–peasant ewa kopacz september 22, 2014 – november 16, 2015 po, psl liberal– peasant beata szydło november 16, 2015 – december 11, 2017 pis, solidarna polska christian–conservative mateusz morawiecki december 11, 2017 – pis, solidarna polska christian–conservative source: own study. polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions 7 limited himself to signaling what seems to be the most significant. 4. general characteristics of poland’s socio-economic development in 1990–2019 in selected development categories 4.1. introduction as written above, polish literature concerning the polish transformation is extremely rich and diverse. unfortunately, works on the analysis of economic and social development since 1990 cover different periods. there are few papers trying to analyze economic development in general, based on data that are usually considered as basic. moreover, publications often refer to ongoing transformation plans and projects, which sometimes leads to, probably unintentionally, taking into account the political context. this primarily applies to those authors who, at a certain time, were associated to a varying degree with the structures of the changing power (zagora-jonsza, 2017). despite these reservations, there are publications which describe the economic development of poland after 1989 in various generic cross-sections15. it should be emphasized once again that tables and figures, prepared on the basis of data from the statistics poland, are an important component of this study. thanks to using them, it will be possible to conduct a more detailed analysis of development processes than it would seem from the presented text. 4.2. demographic situation although the statistics poland quotes the population of poland as of the end of each year, it is impossible to precisely determine the number of inhabitants, mainly due to the lack of reliable information on international migrations16. statistical data for 1990– 2018 indicate a fairly stable number of the country’s inhabitants, oscillating around 38 million people 15 misala, bukowski 2003; chojnicki et al., 1999; parysek 1997, 1999; bałtowski, miszewski 2006; kolodko 2000, 2007, 2010a, 2010b; kowalski 2009; woźniak 2011; bal-woźniak, woźniak 2011; gomułka 2014; of course, there are more publications of a similar nature; there are also foreign publications devoted to the polish transformation, at least partially (e.g. slay 1994; hare, turley 2013). 16 it is assumed that there are currently about 2.5 million immigrants in poland, mainly from ukraine, but also from other countries, and that a significant number of poles staying abroad are still counted as residents of poland, and that emigration and immigration are certainly do not balance each other. (tab. 2). during this period, the lowest number of the population was recorded in 1990 (38,073,000), and the highest one in 1998 (38,667,000). however, the trajectory shows that there is no clear trend in poland’s demographic development, although on a microscale (slight changes), it shows turbulence in this respect. there are two loops of changes, albeit small, in the number of people, which results from many various factors that are difficult to clearly identify without detailed research (fig. 1). this situation is also documented by the year-to-year dynamics of changes in the number of the population, with greater changes in the years 1994–1996 and 2009– 2011 (tab. 3). the natural increase is at an unsatisfactory level, as in the analyzed period it dropped from 157,400 people in 1990 to -26,000 people in 2018. as in the case of the population number, the natural increase trajectory is also looped, yet only since 1998. until then, there was a gradual decline in natural increase (fig. 2). until 1999, the dynamics of natural increase (year-to-year) shows a relative stability, disturbed by changes in the years 1999–2001 which are difficult to explain, followed by a period of relative stability, lasting until 2013, and ending with a clear differentiation of dynamics (tab. 3). the reasons for this state of affairs are, on the one hand, a low number of births (including the lowest fertility rate in europe, 1.3), and, on the other hand, a high mortality rate17. this trend was marked in 2012 and, in various proportions (births:deaths), persisted until 2019 (see tables 2 and 3 and fig. 1 and 2). 17 the highest fertility rate is characteristic of countries open to immigrants, i.e. france, great britain, ireland, belgium, the netherlands and scandinavian countries (data for germany are not available or are unreliable). fig. 1. number of the population – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. 8 jerzy j. parysek both professional activity and unemployment remain related to the population size and natural increase, as well as to the migration movement, difficult to define reliably, especially the economic emigration of poles, and the condition of the economy. the situation primarily results from the terrible state of the economy inherited from the old system in 1990, as well as from the course of the transformation in the first years, called the shock or painful transformation for the population18. although in the first years of the transformation the unemployment rate was not high, it should be remembered that in the years before 1990, such a category as unemployment did not officially appear in the statistics. for example, in 1988 there were only 5,000 jobseekers for 430,000 job vacancies (parysek, 1993). in subsequent years of the transformation, the unemployment rate showed cyclical changes in terms of nature (tab. 2 and 3). fluctuations in the unemployment rate are reflected in the trajectory, which shows three complete loops in the years 1990–2017, indicating clear non-linearity in the process of changes (fig. 3). as in the case of changes in the size of the population and in the natural increase, the trajectory indicates great complexity of the causes of the situation, and thus the complexity of the transformation process. this situation is also confirmed by an analysis of the dynamics of changes in the year-to-year unemployment rate (tab. 3). the level of unemployment should 18 we will not learn the truth about the mistakes made in the first years of the transformation soon, because the interpretation of the taken economic decisions and their effects, especially after 2005, was part of a political conflict. however, representatives of the scientific community should not be part of it. be collated with the population’s professional activity, which, similarly to the unemployment rate, shows periodic fluctuations. it is characteristic that in 2018 the situation in this respect returned to the initial state from 1990, i.e. to 16.5 million economically active people19. these are the two years in which the number of economically active people reached the highest level. the lowest level (13.6 million) was recorded for 2004 (tab. 2). the trajectory of changes in the economic activity of the development of entrepreneurship (the number of business entities) generally indicates a decline in economic activity until 2003 and a renewed increase in subsequent years (fig. 4). thus, the reversal of the decline in economic 19 the number of employed people is the measure of professional activity of the population. fig. 2. natural increase – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. fig. 3. unemployment rate – a connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. fig. 4. professional activity – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions 9 activity in 2003 and a renewed growth are characteristic of the changes taking place in this respect. the dynamics of changes in the number of economically active people shows three culminations of growth: in the years 1992–1997, 2002–2007 and since 2010 a gradual increase, with variable year-to-year dynamics. in the years 1991–1994, 1999–2003 and in 2010 and 2013, there was a negative growth rate in the number of economically active people (tab. 2). 4.3. economic development gross domestic product (gdp) is a certain synthetic measure of the level of economic development. in the years 1990–2018, gross domestic product showed a steady, monotonic growth – specifically, from pln 59.1 billion in 1990 to pln 1,989.3 billion in 201720. however, the trajectory points to the loop that characterized the gdp growth process in 1990–1994, i.e. in the first period of transformation. however, since 1994, the increase in the gdp value has shown a monotonic course, which indicates a certain stabilization of economic development (tab. 2, fig. 5). the dynamics of the year-to-year gdp growth, apart from the difficult to explain surge in the years 1993–1995, generally shows an even pace (tab. 3). overall, this situation seems to indicate the lack of major perturbations in the process of economic development, as measured by gdp, or at least their blurring by various processes that were not included in the conducted research. 20 the zloty redenomination in 1995 was taken into consideration in the gdp value; gdp values are expressed in prices of a given year, i.e. including inflation. the price index of goods and services (inflation) decreased systematically, though not monotonically. hyperinflation recorded in 1990 at the level of 685.8% (the inflation rate of 585.8%) fell to 101.6% (the inflation rate of 1.6%) in 2017. this high level of increase in the prices of goods and services in the first years of transformation, called hyperinflation, began to take average values since 1997, and since 2002, low values, with slight increases in the period until 2018 (tab. 2). the trajectory of changes shows a dynamic, but gradually weakening, decline in inflation until 1998, followed by a disturbance of the falling trend in this process (fig. 6). in the period up to 2018, there is a year-to-year change in the level of inflation, with a zero level in 2014, deflation in 2015 (99.1%) and 2016 (99.4%) and a slight increase again in the following years. the year-to-year dynamics steadily decreased until 1993, gradually stabilizing over time, at the level of 101–102% (tab. 2 and 3). based on the results of the conducted research, one can ascertain a progressing process of price stabilization in which the economic crisis of 2008–2011 was not clearly marked. privatization of the economy was one of its most important changes, whose result, but also a measure with all the weaknesses of this indicator, may be the number of economic entities. the number of economic entities increased from 1,205,500 in 1990 to 4,365,400 in 2018. the increase was monotonic, and statistically documented disturbances to this monotony were slight. the course of this process is documented by both statistical data and the trajectory (tables 2 and 3, fig. 7). fig. 5. gross domestic product (gdp) – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. fig. 6. inflation rate – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. 10 jerzy j. parysek undoubtedly, investments were of decisive importance for the entire economic transformation and for the socio-economic development during the research period. while in 1990 they amounted to a total of pln 11.6 billion, in 2017 this was already the amount of 267 billion zloty. also in this case, the increase in investment outlays was monotonic, with a greater forward leap in 2006–2008, stability in 2008–2010, another significant increase in 2011– 2015 and a slight weakening in investment in 2016 and 2017 (tab. 2). taking into account the fact that the total amount of outlays includes all the outlays incurred in subsequent years, regardless of their source, also in this case it is difficult to point to a specific cause of the disturbance in the monotonicity of growth in 2010–2017. in principle, the trajectory of the investment process shows a monotonic increase in which, however, there are two periods of disturbance of this process. the first one is the “loop” of 1998–2004 and the disruptions after 2009 (fig.  8). on the other hand, the dynamics of investment outlays shows gradually decreasing irregularities. in the years 2000–2002, 2009–2010, 2011–2013 and 2015– 2016 there was a decrease (below 100%) in the dynamics of outlays (tab. 3). just as the indicators taken into account so far indicated progressing economic development, the financial result of the state budget (balance) shows continuing imbalance in the budget. in fact, only in 1990 there was a surplus of income over expenditure, at the level of 2.4 billion zloty. since then, there has been a budget deficit which in different years had different values, the largest being 46.1 billion in 2016 and 44.6 billion in 2010, 42.6 billion in 2015, 42.2 billion in 2013 and 41.4 billion in 2004. however, it is positive that in 2018 it decreased to the level of 10.4 billion zloty, the lowest level since 1999 (tab. 2). however, in this assessment category it is important to compare the deficit to gdp. thus, the largest share of the budget deficit in gdp was the years: 1992 (6.0%), 2002 (4.9%), 2003 and 2004 (4.4% each), 2001–2004 (over 4% in each year), 1991 (3.7%) and 2010 (3.1%). the trajectory of the budget deficit shows an extremely complicated course, which is due to the lack of a clear and unequivocal trend in this respect. there were relatively clear trends only in 1997– 2001  – a general increase in the deficit, and after 2015 – a decrease in the deficit (fig. 9). the dynamics of the budget deficit shows abrupt changes in pace. the improvement in the situation can concern the years 1992–1993, 1996–1997, 2004–2007, 2010– 2011, 2013–2014 and after 2015 (tab. 3). however, the budget deficit will always be a product of the economic situation, and more specifically the balancing of the possibilities and needs, which results both from the economic policy of the state (and its successes or failures) and from the social policy (the possibility of satisfying the range of unmet needs and social expectations). 4.4. standard of living of the inhabitants the description and assessment of the changes in the discussed field, which can be taken as the assessment of the living conditions of the population, were clearly defined by the availability of a series of data. one should also keep in mind that the standard of living of the population (of course, also the indicators taken into account) was influenced by such processes as: inflation, redenomination of the zloty, freeing the housing market and an increase in house prices, as well as changes in the consumption fig. 7. economic entities – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. fig. 8. investment outlays – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions 11 structure and a relative decrease in car prices, along with a high demand for this particular good that is of a prestigious character in polish conditions, which is not justified by the financial situation of the population (parysek, 2016). however, remuneration is, above all, the main factor shaping the income of the population. in the period 1990-2018, the average remuneration increased from pln 102.96 in 1990 to pln 4,834.76 in 2018 (tab. 2)21. the trajectory of the growth of the average salary takes the form of a straight line, indicating a monotonic increase (fig.  10). understandably, after years of gradual and serious decline in the living standard of the inhabitants (until 1990), 21 however, remuneration estimated by statistics poland in 1990, after recalculations and corrections, seems to be definitely too low the increase in remuneration in the first years of the transformation had to show high dynamics, much greater than in later years. until 2000, the dynamics was generally weakening, and in the following years, it stabilized at the level of 103–110%, changing from year to year (tab. 2 and 3). the standard of living may also be demonstrated by the housing situation (specifically, the apartment area). housing resources in the analyzed period increased from 11,180,000 dwellings in 1990 to 14,615,000 in 2018, with only a slightly higher number of inhabitants (38.4 million in 2018 compared to 38.1 million in 1990). such a situation generally indicates an improvement in the situation in this respect (tab. 2). however, one should remember that the statistics include both inhabited and uninhabited dwellings (abandoned due to degradation and uninhabited due to the high cost of purchase or rent). while in 1990 there were 3.4 people per 1 dwelling, in 2018 – these were 2.6 people, and this, despite the above-mentioned reservations, indicates a certain improvement in the standard of living, namely in terms of residence. the trajectory of the increase in housing resources shows a monotonic increase, with a greater increase in the years 2000–2002 (fig. 11). the dynamics, excluding its slight weakening in 1992–1994 and surge in 2001–2002, indicates a stable situation in this respect. the dynamics oscillates around the level of the indicator being from 100.05% to 100.1% (tab. 3). despite these doubts, a certain improvement in the housing situation has probably become a fact. the number of passenger cars that are registered and probably used by residents (but also by companies) seems to be a much better indicator of the standard of living (wealth of the society). the number of cars increased from 5,261,000 in 1990 to fig. 9. financial result of the state budget – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. fig. 10. average monthly salary – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. fig. 11. housing resources – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. 12 jerzy j. parysek 23,429,000 in 2018. it is almost 4.5 times more than in the base year (tab. 2). the respective indicators per 1,000 inhabitants were at the level of 130 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990 and 610 cars per 1,000 inhabitants. the latter indicator is one of the highest, not only in europe but also in the world. the car in poland has unexpectedly become the most desirable good, which is not justified either by the level of income or by the consumption structure (parysek, 2016). the trajectory of the increase in the number of cars has a rectilinear course, which indicates the monotonicity of the increase in the number of cars and the undisturbed course of this process and indirectly, the gradual increase in the level of wealth of the country’s inhabitants (fig. 12). however, this does not mean the same dynamics from year to year. although the pace of growth in the number of passenger cars was gradually decreasing, after a sharp decline until 1993, it oscillated around 105–106%, with a greater increase in 2005–2008. since 2010, it has leveled off and, with slight fluctuations, remained at the level of 104% (tab. 3). 5. economic development and the standard of living of the population although the statistical data collected for the years 1990–2018 show a link between economic and social development, which should be the case in healthy economies, they do not provide a basis for determining, and especially dimensioning, the impact of the economy on the standard of living of the inhabitants. however, some conclusions can be drawn from the correlation and regression analysis. the correlation analysis between series of listed features allowed distinguishing two clusters of correlated features. the first cluster consists of features describing: gdp, investment outlays, economic entities, economic activity, remuneration, housing situation, number of cars and the population size (with relatively high correlation coefficients). this allows for the conclusion that in the analyzed period, economic development, measured in terms of: gdp, investment, entrepreneurship and professional activity, resulted in social development, which was reflected in an increase in salaries, an improvement in the housing situation and progressing individual motorization (the number of passenger cars). simultaneously, this it allows considering the discussed indicators to be quite good to describe the economic and social situation. the second cluster is also created by quite clearly correlated features (although at a lower level than the above-mentioned ones): population growth, inflation, unemployment and public debt, which generally have a negative impact on economic development, and indirectly also on the standard of living of the population. by formulating equations in which the explained variables included gdp as a measure of the level of economic development and remuneration as a measure of the standard of living, regression analysis enabled refining the relationships indicated by the calculated correlation coefficients. in the model aiming to estimate the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable gdp (y), the following variables were considered that describe economic activity (x1) and capital expenditure (x3), which theoretically have a positive impact on the level of gdp, and inflation (x2), unemployment (x4) and budget deficit (x5) which have a negative impact on the level of gdp. in the calculation procedure in which variables with a negligible impact on the level of the dependent variable (gdp) were gradually eliminated, the following form of the regression equation was obtained: y=80,266.4+6.269x3–6.03x5, with the coefficient of determination r2=97.42%. this means that the gross domestic product (gdp) is mainly affected by investments (x3), having a positive effect, and by the budget deficit (x5), having a negative effect. this is only a confirmation of generally accepted regularities, yet obtained as a result of the conducted calculations. the model aiming to estimate the effect of independent variables on remuneration (dependent variable y) includes variables describing: level of entrepreneurship (x1) and investment outlays (x3), which theoretically have a positive impact on the remuneration level, and inflation (x2), unemployment (x4) and budget deficit (x5) having a negative impact on the remuneration level. in the calculation procedure in which, as in the case of the first model (gdp), fig. 12. passenger cars – connected trajectory source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. polish economy in 1990–2018: balance of development in new political conditions 13 variables with a negligible impact on the remuneration level were gradually eliminated, the following form of the regression equation was obtained: y=80.996+0.0134x3–0.0207x5, with the coefficient of determination r2=98.04%. this means that investments (x3) are the basic factor influencing the remuneration level, while the state budget deficit (x5) has a negative effect. in other words, investments are the main factor of both economic and social development, and the budget deficit is a brake on development – obvious, but now confirmed by research. 6. conclusions the results of the conducted research allow formulating the following final conclusions: the economic transformation of poland after 1989, just like the political and social transformation, was a serious problem whose solution was determined by many, sometimes complex factors and conditions of an endogenous and exogenous nature. assessed on the basis of the discussed indicators, economic development, which is both a component and a result of systemic transformation, generally proceeded without major complications in the years 1990–2018. the results obtained in the field of economic development concern poland as a whole, with full awareness of interregional differences in the crosssections of features taken into account. the same applies to the standard of living, which additionally differs in social cross-sections. the above-mentioned situation does not mean that in the case of more detailed approaches to the issues of development, it will not be possible to indicate not only some disruptions in the course of the development process, but also errors or shortcomings. gdp, the number of economic entities, average remuneration, as well as the number of dwellings and passenger cars basically manifest a monotonic uninterrupted growth in the period of 1990–2018. some disturbances of monotonicity, but generally an improvement in the situation, concern: the natural increase (since 1996), investments (disturbances in 1997–2004 and since 2008), and inflation (since 1998). on the other hand, serious disturbances in development in the years 1990–2018 were shown by: the financial result of the state budget, the number of economically active persons, unemployment and the number of the population, although the latter was slightly changing (see fig. 1–12). on the one hand, features relating to economic development, such as gdp, investments, economic entities and professional activity, as well as features that can be identified with the effects of development, i.e. the average salary and the number of dwellings and passenger cars were correlated. on the other hand, such features as inflation, unemployment and public debt, which do not reflect well on economic development or even hinder this development, as well as the gradually declining birth rate were also correlated. investments were 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(ed.), 2009, kryzys globalny. początek czy koniec (eng. global crisis. the beginning or the end), wydawnictwo regan, gdańsk. woźniak m.g., 2011, gospodarka polski 1990–2011. transformacja. modernizacja. droga do spójności społeczno-ekonomicznej. tom i – transformacja (eng. polish economy 1990–2011. transformation. modernization. the path to socio-economic cohesion. volume i transformation), wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, warszawa. zagóra-jonszta u., 2017, polscy ekonomiści o przebiegu i skutkach transformacji (eng. polish economists on the course and effects of the transformation), studia ekonomiczne, 316, 208–2019. tab. 2. selected indicators of the economic and social development of poland in the years 1990–2018 year population (in thousand people) natural increase (in thousand people) unemployment rate (in %) economic activity (in thousand people) total gdp (pln billion) inflation (in %) business entities (in thousands) investment outlays (in million pln) financial result of the state budget (in million pln) average monthly salary (in pln) housing resources (in thousand dwellings) passenger cars (in thousand) 1990 38,073 157.40 6.50 16,474 59.15 685.80 1,205.48 11,581.00 2,439.20 102.96 11,180 5,261 1991 38,144 142.00 11.40 15,861 82.43 170.30 1,504.80 16,883.70 –3,097.30 177.00 11,309 6,112 1992 38,203 120.50 13.70 15,135 114.24 142.40 1,731.66 20,159.70 –6,911.50 348.33 11,437 6,505 1993 38,239 102.00 14.90 14,772 155.78 135.30 1,896.90 24,715.90 –4,342.00 466.05 11,524 6,771 1994 38,265 94.90 16.00 14,747 210.41 132.20 2,163.05 33,865.10 –5,739.80 628.08 11,434 7,153 1995 38,609 47.03 14.90 14,791 301.35 127.80 2,112.70 47,144.70 –7,448.00 702.62 11,491 7,517 1996 38,639 42.71 13.20 14,969 382.55 119.90 2,414.18 65,622.00 –9,167.20 873.00 11,547 8,054 1997 38,660 32.43 10.30 15,177 465.67 114.90 2,599.04 90,437.70 –2,182.60 1,061.93 11,613 8,533 1998 38,667 20.27 7.88 15,356 549.47 111.80 2,844.26 112,813.50 –3,296.60 1,239.49 11,688 8,891 1999 38,263 0.59 10.20 14,757 615.12 107.30 3,041.40 125,954.42 –12,479.00 1,706.74 11,763 9,283 2000 38,254 10.32 11.62 14,526 747.03 110.10 3,186.70 133,160.16 –15,391.00 1,923.81 11,845 9,991 2001 38,242 4.99 13.24 14,207 779.98 105.50 3,325.54 121,362.88 –32,358.30 2,061.85 11,946 10,503 2002 38,219 –5.72 13.52 13,782 810.62 101.90 3,468.22 109,265.86 –39,402.60 2,239.56 12,438 11,029 2003 38,191 –14.16 13.21 13,617 845.93 100.80 3,581.59 110,859.78 –37,043.00 2,314.66 12,596 11,244 2004 38,174 –7.39 19.00 13,795 933.06 103.50 3,576.83 120,466.71 –41,417.00 2,409.69 12,683 11,975 2005 38,157 –3.90 17.60 14,116 990.47 102.10 3,615.62 131,054.93 –28,361.00 2,506.93 12,776 12,339 2006 38,125 4.56 14.80 14,594 1,069.82 101.00 3,636.04 154,880.28 –25,063.00 2,636.81 12,877 13,384 2007 38,116 10.65 11.20 15,241 1,187.61 102.50 3,685.61 191,713.54 –15,956.00 2,866.04 12,994 14,589 2008 38,136 35.10 9.50 15,800 1,286.07 104.20 3,757.09 217,259.71 –24,346.00 3,158.48 13,150 16,080 2009 38,167 32.65 12.10 15,868 1,372.21 103.50 3,742.67 218,580.91 –23,845.00 3,315.38 13,302 16,495 2010 38,530 34.82 12.40 15,473 1,445.30 102.60 3,909.80 217,287.28 –44,591.00 3,435.00 13,470 17,240 2011 38,538 12.92 12.50 15,562 1,566.82 104.30 3,869.90 243,346.19 –25,124.00 3,625.21 13,587 18,125 2012 38,533 1.47 13.40 15,591 1,629.43 103.70 3,975.33 237,627.29 –30,407.00 3,744.38 13,723 18,744 2013 38,496 –17.74 13.40 15,568 1,656.90 100.90 4,070.26 231,155.49 –42,194.00 3,877.43 13,853 19,389 2014 38,479 –1.31 11.40 15,862 1,720.43 100.00 4,119.67 250,776.38 –28,977.00 4,003.99 13,983 20,004 2015 38,437 –25.61 9.70 16,084 1,800.24 99.10 4,184.41 271,839.28 –42,607.00 4,150.86 14,119 20,723 2016 38,433 –5.75 8.20 16,197 1,861.15 99.40 4,237.69 244,429.03 –46,160.00 4,290.52 14,272 21,675 2017 38,434 –0.87 6.60 16,423 1,989.35 102.00 4,309.80 257,966.04 –25,354.00 4,527.89 14,440 22,504 2018 38,411 –26.022 5.80 16,484 . 101.60 4,365.38 . –10,406.00 4,834.76 14,615 23,429 source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. table 3. dynamics of economic and social development in poland in 1990–2018 (year-to-year) year population (in thousand people) natural increase (in thousand people) unemployment rate (in %) economic activity (in thousand people) total gdp (billion pln) inflation (in %) business entities (in thousands) investment outlays (in million pln) financial result of the state budget (in million pln) average monthly salary (in pln) housing resources (in thousand dwellings) passenger cars (in thousand) 1991/1990 100.19 90.22 175.38 96.28 139.36 24.83 124.83 145.79 –126.98 171.91 101.15 116.18 1992/1991 100.15 84.86 120.18 95.42 138.59 83.62 115.08 119.40 223.15 196.80 101.13 106.43 1993/1992 100.09 84.65 108.76 97.60 136.36 95.01 109.54 122.60 62.82 133.80 100.76 104.09 1994/1993 100.07 93.04 107.38 99.83 135.07 97.71 114.03 137.02 132.19 134.77 99.22 105.78 1995/1994 100.90 49.55 93.13 100.30 143.22 96.67 97.67 139.21 129.76 111.87 100.50 104.15 1996/1995 100.08 90.82 88.59 101.20 126.94 93.82 114.27 139.19 123.08 124.25 100.49 107.06 1997/1996 100.05 75.95 78.03 101.39 121.73 95.83 107.66 137.82 23.81 121.64 100.57 105.89 1998/1997 100.02 62.48 76.50 101.18 118.00 97.30 109.43 124.74 151.04 116.72 100.65 104.18 1999/1998 98.96 2.90 129.44 96.10 111.95 95.97 106.93 111.65 378.54 137.70 100.65 105.36 2000/1999 99.98 1,758.09 113.92 98.43 121.45 102.61 104.78 105.72 123.34 112.72 100.69 107.63 2001/2000 99.97 48.30 113.94 97.80 104.41 95.82 104.36 91.14 210.24 107.18 100.85 105.12 2002/2001 99.94 –114.76 102.11 97.01 103.93 96.59 104.29 90.03 121.77 108.62 104.12 105.28 2003/2002 99.93 247.47 97.71 98.80 104.36 98.92 103.27 101.46 94.01 103.35 101.27 102.01 2004/2003 99.96 52.20 143.83 101.31 110.30 102.68 99.87 108.67 111.81 104.11 100.69 106.56 2005/2004 99.96 52.79 92.63 102.33 106.15 98.65 101.08 108.79 68.48 104.04 100.73 103.09 2006/2005 99.92 –116.81 84.09 103.39 108.01 98.92 100.56 118.18 88.37 105.18 100.79 108.57 2007/2006 99.97 233.59 75.68 104.43 111.01 101.49 101.36 123.78 63.66 108.69 100.91 109.00 2008/2007 100.05 329.67 84.82 103.67 108.29 101.66 101.94 113.33 152.58 110.20 101.21 110.16 2009/2008 100.08 93.02 127.37 100.43 106.70 99.33 99.62 100.61 97.94 104.97 101.16 102.51 2010/2009 100.95 106.66 102.48 97.51 105.33 99.13 104.47 99.41 187.00 103.61 101.26 103.52 2011/2010 100.02 37.09 100.81 100.58 108.41 101.66 98.98 111.99 56.34 105.54 100.87 105.12 2012/2011 99.99 11.37 107.20 100.19 104.00 99.42 102.72 97.65 121.03 103.29 101.00 103.42 2013/2012 99.90 –1,207.35 100.00 99.85 101.69 97.30 102.39 97.28 138.76 103.55 100.95 103.56 2014/2013 99.96 7.37 85.07 101.89 103.83 99.11 101.21 108.49 68.68 103.26 100.94 103.22 2015/2014 99.89 1,959.68 85.09 101.40 104.64 99.10 101.57 108.40 147.04 103.67 100.98 103.70 2016/2015 99.99 22.46 84.54 100.70 103.38 100.30 101.27 89.92 108.34 103.36 101.08 104.61 2017/2016 100.00 15.13 80.49 101.40 106.89 102.62 101.70 105.54 54.93 105.53 101.18 103.82 2018/2017 99.94 2,991.03 87.88 100.37 . 99.61 101.29 . 41.04 106.78 101.21 104.17 source: own study based on the data of statistics poland. 1. introduction the space of petroşani depression has been subjected to colonization, due to important coal basement resources. with the second half of the 19th century, especially after the entry of the space under austrohungarian domination, the alohton demographic contribution increased considerably. the aim of the work is to analyze the ethnic and religious structure, and to pursue the ethnic and religious continuity in the analyzed space from 1850 to 2011. in parallel with numerical developments, causes have been identified that led to the growth or decrease of religious and ethnic herds. the territory under study comprises 7 administrative-territorial units: petroşani, vulcan, lupeni, aninoasa, petrila, uricani and băniţa (fig. 1). the petroşani depression is positioned in the romanian carpathian space in the south-eastern part of hunedoara county (fig. 1). romanian geographic literature comprises little studies on ethnic and religious demographic structures. several geographic studies at the beginning of the century analyzed in depth the ethnic and religious structure of some historical regions ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity in the petroșani depression in the period: 1850–2011 mădălin-sebastian lung doctoral school of geography, faculty of geography, babeș-bolyai university, clinic street 5-7, 400006 cluj-napoca, romania, e-mail: lungmadalin@yahoo.com citation lung m-s., 2019, ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity in the petroşani depression in the period: 1850–2011, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 12–22. abstract the aim of the study is to comprise in one work the cyclicality and ethnic and religious continuity of the petroşani depression between 1850-2011. in the second half of the 19th century, the depression was subjected to cycles of colonization that had consequences for the ethnic and religious structure. the ethnic and religious continuity was preserved throughout this period, even though after 1930, some of the settlers remigrated to their birthplace. compared to the late 19-century censuses, the herds have fallen to 2011, but none of the ethnics and confessions have completely disappeared. the statistical data used were taken from the literature mentioned during the work and on the online platform of the national institute of statistics. the geographic information systems were used to achieve the geographical position map at the county and national level of the petroşani depression. key words ethnicity, confession, continuity, cyclicality, petroșani depression. received: 12 november 2018 accepted: 14 january 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 12–22 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.02 ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity… 13 (transilvania, banat, crișana, maramureș) for large temporal periods (ilieş, 1998; creţan, 1999; bodocan, 2001; şişeştean, 2002). these first studies analyse ethnicity and confessional together with the tendency of electoral behaviour of the population. other research has resulted in the emergence of articles on smaller territories such as counties (tofan, 2015, 2014; tofan et al., 2014). researchers from other states, treats ethnicity and confession as causes of outbreaks of riots or even wars, a cause that can be used to destabilise a country (rothchild, 1978; horowitz, 1985; levinson, 1998; scarritt, shaheen, 1999; vanhanen, 1999; reilly, 2000/2001; fearon, david, 2003). 2. methodology a first methodological stage was the realization of a map on the administrative-territorial units that form the depression (fig. 1), respectively to geographically position the petroşani depression at county and national level, arcgis version 10.3 was used to perform this map (fig. 1). the second stage of the work focused on obtaining the statistical data needed to achieve the study. statistical data from censuses of 1850, 1857, 1880, 1900, 1930 and 2011 were used to analyse the demographic evolution, but especially the ethnic and religious structure of the population. the data for the first five censuses were obtained following consultation of the specialized bibliography (rotariu et al., 1996; rotariu et al., 1997a; rotariu et al., 1997b; rotariu et al., 1999; rotariu et al., 2011), and for 2011 was used the census of population and housing 2011 made available by the national institute of statistics. after obtaining the necessary statistical data, it has been processed, using the microsoft excel 2013 program. a series of graphs were made that represented the developments of ethnic and religious weights during the studied period. a table was also drawn up illustrating the demographic evolution of administrative units in the petroşani depression, respectively the percentages of growth or demographic decrease. the other two tables illustrate the ethnic and religious structure of the population of the year 2011. fig. 1. geographical position of petroşani depression at county and national level source: own study. 14 mădălin-sebastian lung 3. results and discussions the petroşani depression represents the largest and most important coal deposit in the romanian carpathian space. following the settlements from the 18th century and continuing with the 19th century, changes occurred in the geodemografice structures of the population. the operation of the extraction and coal processing industry requires a large and skilled workforce. the miners were brought in large numbers in the space of petroşani depression from the second half of the 19th century, when the space carpathian transylvanian came under dualistic occupation. as the region of petroşani depression was and is a great coal basin, this time both the habsburg authorities as well as the dualistic were concerned about the statistical knowledge of demography. the focus on the censuses of the second half of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century was due to cycles of high-importance colonization for mining evolution. with the contribution of the new workforce, the demographic evolution of the administrative-units of the petroşani depression was ascended in the second decade of the 19th century. the demographic evolution of the petroşani depression in the period 1850–2011 is shown in tab. 1. from 1850 to 1900, during the 50 years the population of the petroşani region increased greatly with 297%, from 7,098 people to 28,210 people. between 1850 and 1857, the largest demographic increase was in uricani, 155%. it was followed, the vulcan, which had an increase of 100%. băniţa was ranked on the last position of demographic growth for this first temporal interval, with less than 1%. at the level of all administrativeunits the increase was 40% from 1850 to 1857. in the next 23 years, from 1857 to 1880, the demographic evolution was constantly increasing, this time in the first position by petroşani, with an increase in the 23 years of 159%. in the second place, with an increase of 42% was uricani, and with the lowest increase of only 13% was positioned aninoasa. băniţa was the least populated administrative unit, being in continuous demographic decrease, starting with the 20th century and the second census of the 21st century. referring to all six administrative units the increase was 60%, in the 23 years, higher by 20% compared to the period 1850–1857. over the next 20 years, from 1880 to the end of the 19th century, the ascending demographic continuity began in the middle of the century was maintained in highvalue rhythms. this period would be a very prolific one for lupeni, registering a demographic increase of 333%. slight demographic decline was at uricani, where the population has declined over the last 20 years by 22%. decrease may be placed on account of the migration of part of the labor mass to the other adjacent mining areas. in the first three decades of the 20th century, the demographics of the petroşani depression were continuously increasing. the disadvantages of world war i were surmounteded after the year 1918, when foreign companies holding the mining fields in the pool, made donations to the romanian authorities. the mining industry took a new momentum in the first interwar decade, which was perpetuated throughout the interwar period. the demographic growth in depression has been closely linked to mining activities, continuing during the world war. the end of the war brought the installation of socialism to românia. socialists have not lost concern for the industry in the jiu valley, with activities continuing until 1989. after 1989 the industry went into regression, the closings of me succeeded. the ethnic structure (fig. 2) of the population of the coal basin has suffered influence due to the intake of foreign settlers. the structure of 1850 is similar to that of 1857, without significant changes, because the habsburgs did not put so much emphasis on the importance of ethnicities. between these years, the ethnic structure of petroşani was composed of two tab. 1. demographic evolution of petroşani depression administrative unit year 1850 year 1857 % year 1880 % year 1900 % year 1930 % year 2011 % petroșani 1,459 2,219 +52 5,755 +159 11,152 +93 18,211 +63 37,160 +104 petrila 2,075 2,309 +11 3,226 +39 4,497 +39 10,496 +133 22,692 +116 vulcan 817 1,636 +100 2,030 +24 3,016 +48 14,053 +365 24,160 +71 lupeni 743 937 +26 1,244 +32 5,393 +333 15,093 +179 23,390 +54 aninoasa 500 653 +30 738 +13 1,070 +44 5,318 +397 4,360 -18 uricani 460 1,174 +155 1,677 +42 1,306 -22 1,848 +41 8,972 +385 bănița 1,044 1,049 +0.4 1,331 +26 1,776 +33 1,734 -2 1,211 -30 total 7,098 9,977 +40 16,001 +60 28,210 +76 66,753 +136 121,945 +82 source: data source and own calculation based on data based on data from: rotariu et all., 1996; rotariu et all., 1997a; rotariu et all., 1997b; rotariu et all., 1999; rotariu et all., 2011, national institute of statistics. ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity… 15 ethnic, romanian and gypsy. the gypsy population was still present in aninoasa (12 people), the petrila (59 people) and the vulcan (7 people). the most diversified ethnic structure was in the vulcan where they cohabited four ethnicities: romanians, gypsies, hungarians and germans. in lupeni, in addition to the romanian population were ethnic armenians, but only eight people, being the only ones in the entire depression during this period. since the census of 1880, the ethnic structure has begun to diversify much more for all administrativeunits. the armenian and gypsy population disappeared completely, at the expense of other ethnicities that were brought from the austro-hungarian territories. a cause, the inexistence of ethnic gypsies in hungarian censuses starting with the 1880, can be placed on account of the fact that they have identified themselves as hungarians, being incorporated into the herd of ethnic hungarians. the romanian population was majority in 1880 by 78%, but ethnic hungarians showed 10% and germans in the 7% weight. both germans and hungarians were heavily cantoned in petroşani, their flocks reaching 926 and 1,081 people respectively. the second ethnicity after the romanian one, in petroşani was the hungarian one, followed by the german one. other fairly significant flocks were taken to the petrila, 266 hungarians and 161 germans. only in the two units their number was higher, in the other units being under 100 persons for each of the two nationalities. at lupeni in 1880 there was no german, and 28 rusyns and 2 croats/serbs were recorded at the time, being the only cases recorded in the entire depression of these two ethnicities. small number, but not overlooked, was that of slovaks, with only 66 people. the territorial distribution of slovaks comprised three administrative-units: petrila (29 persons), petroşani (26) and uricani (11). at băniţa, in 1880, the romanian population was very clearly dominated, with the remaining ethnicities very low. the slovak population had four people, and among croats/serbs only one. the confessional structure of 1880 (fig. 3), positioned the greek catholics in the first place, with a weight of 42% (6,744 people). the greek catholic confession was followed by the orthodox one, with a weight of 37% (5,957 people). the third religion is the roman catholic who holds a weight of 17% (2,669 people). these three confessions have the highest values, the following having much lower percentages. only in the petroşani and the petrila, dominate the orthodox, in the other units their number being very low. the number of orthodox in petroşani was 3,094 people, and in the petrila of 2,552. something higher was at băniţa, but only 230 followers, however visible higher than in the rest of the units. the other units barely reach 54 to lupeni, 20 to vulcan, and at aninoasa and uricani the number of orthodox is very low, 3 and 4 respectively. settlements significantly put their footprint on the confessional structure, with evidence being the majority confessional diversity at the level of the units. the greek catholic confession dominates five units, but the highest flock of the followers of this confession was at the vulcan with 1,962 people. vulcan, is followed not far from uricani, with 1,611 greek catholics and lupeni where there were 1,189 greek catholics. their number decreases to băniţa where there were 984 greek catholics, and the lowest effective of only 677 in aninoasa, but still remain a majority. roman catholics were massively positioned at petroşani, and there were 1,888 people, where it is the second confession as effective after the orthodox. the second highest value with 568 roman catholic followers is at the petrila, following the trend at petroşani, following the băniţa with 77. this confession is almost non-existent at lupeni, in 1880 a single person was registered. the 17% share is supported by the high number recorded at petroşani and petrila. the spread of evangelicals at the level of depression is unhomogeneous, so that their maximum number was 162 people in petroşani. the second flock was at băniţa with a reduced value of 17 persons, and at aninoasa the number was only 6 persons. there were slovaks 1% other nationalities 4% germans 7% hungarians 10% romanianas 78% fig. 2. the ethnic structure of petroşani depression in 1880 source: own study based on rotariu t-i. et al., 1997b. 16 mădălin-sebastian lung only two cases at uricani. in petrila and vulcan, one case was recorded for each unit. the only unit where evangelicals were not registered was at lupeni. the confessional structure of lupeni was in 1880 the most homogeneous and very little diversified, with only three present, orthodox, greek catholic, and roman catholic religions. the weight of less than 0% of unitarians is explained by the fact that their flock was only 20 people in the entire depression. this confession was present in three administrative units. the maximum number was at petroşani with 17 followers, at aninoasa 2, and at vulcan one person. jew concentrated with preponderance at petroşani where 150 of jew lived, and the second most numerous jew community was at the petrila with only 16 people. the jew community was very low as followers in the other units. at vulcan and băniţa were five people, at uricani four, and at aninoasa one. in the year 1900, the ethnic structure of the petroşani depression presented a great diversity (fig. 4). the end of the 19th century was marked by the presence of a multi-ethnic workforce in the coal industry in the petroşani region. the workforce consisted of various tribes, populated for industrial purposes. the majority ethnicity was the romanian one but flanked by many others, brought from parts of moravia, poland, italy. romanians owned 54% of the total ethnicity, meaning 15,472 people. following them were hungarians with a weight of 29%, increasing compared to 1880, numerical values reaching from 1,468 to 8,277 people. the evolution of hungarians is one of the biggest gains of an ethnicity in the 20 years, with an increase of 463%. hungarians in 1900 held the majority in petroşani, growing in only 20 years with 373%. it is the only administrative unit in which the hungarians and any other ethnicity possess the majority at the expense of romanians. at lupeni, in 1900 the number of romanians is slightly higher than the hungarians, the surplus of romanians being only 32 people. the hungarian population of lupeni has grown extremely much in the 20 years. in 1880, there was only one person, and in 1900 the number reached 1,738 hungarians, imposing as the most extreme ethnic growth in the second half of the 19th century in the petroșani mining region. the second most important increase in the hungarians was to vulcan. the german population grew numerically with 1,241 people, and this growth was more than a doubling of german workers specializing in the mining industry. the largest number of the germans was registered at petroşani of 1,165 people, and their second largest flock decreases by almost half to the petrila, where there were 604 germans. in the temporal range of the two censuses of the population at the end of the 19th century, we can mention two administrative-units in which the evolution of the germans was considerable. the most interesting case was at lupeni where in 1880, there was no german citizen registered, following that in 1900, their number would be 363. the second situation in which the germans increased, is at the petrila, the increase being 275%, from 161 to 604 by the germans. at aninoasa and uricani their flocks were minima from depression, 21 germans, respectively 22 and with a minimum change from 1880. the flock of the slovak population increased by 127% compared with 1880, from 70 people to 159. in the year 1900, the slovak population was widespread in all administrative-units of the petroşani depression, compared to 1880 when ethnic slovak was present in four units: petroşani, petrila, uricani and băniţa. in aninoasa, lupeni and vulcan, slovaks were brought in after 1880, so the census of 1900, in lupeni, lived 23 slovaks at vulcan 9, and at aninoasa 10. ethnic croats/serbs have had an upward trend similar to the slovaks. the remarkable difference is that in 1880 croatia-serbs were almost inexistent in depression, only two cases were recorded at the petrila and one case at băniţa. ethnic croats/serbs populated five of the six administrative units, missing perfection at greek catholics 42% orthodox 37% roman catholics 17% reformed 2% jew 1% evangelical 1% fig. 3. confessional structure of petroşani depression in 1880 source: own study based on rotariu t-i. et al., 1997b. ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity… 17 uricani. the maximum number was at petroşani (17), followed by aninoasa (10) and equal values for lupeni and vulcan (7). at the petrila, the value recorded in 1880 was maintained. the two ethnics, slovak and croats/serbs, had a share of less than 0% in 1900, but their importance was felt on the economic and commercial level. ruthenians have evolved percentages, at a value similar to that of croats/serbs. the increase was exponential from 28 in 1880, to 538 in the year 1900. the resemblance between the two ethnicities continues through their territorial distribution. the ruthenian population just like the croats/serbs, existed only in the trill in the year 1880, to grow by the end of the age. in 1900, at the level of depression, two geographical positioning polluters are highlighted, which keep between them considerable values. a first pole, with the maximum number of ruthenians in the depression was at lupeni (457 people), and the second was at the petrila with 63 people. in the other administrative-units, the herds were very low, only 14 to the vulcan, to petroşani three people and to uricani one person. in the administrative area of aninoasei, ethnic ruthenians lacked perfection in 1900. their share of the total ethnic structure was 2%. for the year 1900, we cannot omit a few words about the 7% share of other ethnicities. the most numerous were poles that only at lupeni were 1,035 people, but their distribution was also in other units. polish miners and czechmoravians were brought in as specialized workers in mining. the petroşani mining was brought 362 by italians, poles and czech-moravians. a flock of 148 czech-moravians and italians were also taken to the petrila and vulcan 75 by poles and czech-moravians. 130 italian and polish workers reinforced mining activities at aninoasa. from those mentioned, we can see that the workers in the preferences of austriahungary were the miners in the czech-moravian regions, which they brought and colonized in the vast coal basin that overlaps the petroşani depression. in 1900, the confessional structure (fig. 5) in depression was much changed compared to the year 1880. the great diversity of workers brought to carry out mining activities has made significant contributions to the denominational modification of administrative-units at the end of the 19th century. all the confessions had increased followers, however, there are several cases where the number of followers in a given religion has risen much in just 20 years. where people who identified themselves as unitarians increased from 20 to 301. the herd of the reformers increased 7 times from 242 to 1,876. as a result of the reformations, there were jew, numerical growth compared to 1880 being higher by 822 people. the evangelical confession had an increase of 336%, from 189 to 825 people. the number of roman catholics rose from 2,669 to 8,177, which places them on the first position as a depresionar-level share. the increase was no less than 206%. roman catholics had the most upward numerical increase of all depressed denominations. among orthodox and greek catholics, developments are identical and maintain equal weights, but somewhat lower than in 1880. the largest growth of the orthodox was at aninoasa (from 3 persons to 144) and vulcan (from 20 people to 210). at the administrative unit level, the rises among the roman catholic community were considerable for each unit. the most visible case was at lupeni where in 1880 there was a single roman catholic person in the 1900, the number increased to 2,300. it is the largest growth in the entire half of the nineteenth century, among a depressed confession. at vulcan, roman catholics increased from 39 people to 437, and at petroşani rose by 111% from 1,888 to 3,991. these significant increases in roman catholic confession are due to the hungarian population brought after 1880. in 1850, at băniţa there was no orthodox, only greek catholics and two reformed. 50 years later, the confessional structure was composed of a great diversity of religions. only after 50 years, the băniţa lived 343 orthodox, growing slovaks 1% other nationalities 6%ruthenians 2% germans 8% hungarians 29% romanianas 54% fig. 4. ethnic structure of petroşani depression in 1900 source: own study based on rotariu t-i. et al., 1999. 18 mădălin-sebastian lung steadily starting with 1857. the weakest confessions are the unitarian with 12 people, jew with eight people and evangelize with five people. in the ethnic structure of the year 1930 (fig. 6), the influences of the moment of the great union of 1918 were visible. the romanian population was majority by 52%, which marks the beginning of the supremacy of ethnic romanians in depression. compared to 1900, the romanian population increased by 57%, thus doubling the number of romanians was due to the passing of the transylvanian space, the default of the depression with all mining activities under the control and administration of the austro-hungarian under romanian leadership. the hungarian population had a weight of 35%, increasing by 65%, but which would enter a downward meaning after 1930. the hungarian population no longer dominates in any administrative unit, in two their number being decreasing compared to 1900. at uricani was registered in 1930 a single hungarian person, and the hungarians fell by 187% (from 204 to 71) to băniţa. the remarkable industry in the petroşani has led to the continuity of the hungarians, the numerical evolution being increasing throughout the period of dualistic dominion and more than a decade after the surrender of the territory of the romanian authorities. the german population had 5% of the ethnic structure of 1930, with an increase of 35%. like the hungarians, the germans were stationed in the highest number at petroşani. numerically, decreased from 1900 to petroşani, vulcan, uricani and băniţa, and in other units their number increased. these decreases were due to the labor migration from the four administrative-units, to the others where the need for specialised german workers was larger, due to the opening of new mining holdings. the slovak population retained ascendancy as other ethnicities, growing from 1900 to 1930 in most units, except băniței. in 1930, no person of slovak ethnicity was registered at băniţa. the majority of ethnic slovaks was established at the petrila. the croats/serbs share was less than 1%, but in numerical growth at depresionar-level from 44 to 62 people. in the three units, the vulcan, the petrila, lupeni their flock increased, and at uricani there was no ethnic croat/ serb. the ruthenian population decreased numerically at depresionar level in the 30 years, but most of the population was in lupeni with 467 people. ruthenians are missing with perfection at aninoasa and uricani, and the rest of the depression barely reaches 16 people (4 to petroşani, 4 to petrila, 8 to vulcan). other nationalities in the census are mostly ethnic jews, registered 1,057 people at petroşani, 64 to aninoasa, 242 to lupeni, 230 to petrila, 5 to uricani, evangelical 3% unitartians 1%jew 4%reformed 7% orthodox 27% greek catholics 30% roman catholics 28% slovaks 1% romanianas 52%hungarians 35% germans 5% other nationalities 7% fig. 5. confessional structure of petroşani depression in 1900 source: own study based on rotariu t-i. et al., 1999. fig. 6. ethnic structure of petroşani depression in 1930 source: own study based on rotariu t-i. et al., 2011. ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity… 19 416 to vulcan and 7 to băniţa. the jewish population was practically established in the whole depression, in larger or lower numerical herds, but their importance was increased in the conduct of commercial activities. it is probably the only ethnicity in the depression, which has not been colonised, its presence due to the trade achieved amid the magnitude of the mining industry. at the census of 1930, the presence of the gypsy population was recorded in a flock of 330 people, missing only in băniţa. this ethnicity was only present in the censuses of 1850 and 1857, and in those of 1880, 1900 these ethnics no longer existed. the return to depression took place after the great union, as a necessity for employment under precarious conditions. aninoasa hosted the highest number of gypsies, in 1930 there were 135 people. in the rest of the depression, their number decreased under 100 persons for each administrative unit. at vulcan, it was the second gypsy community with 62 people, followed uricani with 47, the petrila with 43, petroşani with 38 and the smallest community of only 5 people at lupeni. at the census of 1930, the reins were taken over by the romanian authorities, and the population census was conducted by high-value scientific researchers. it was a first census carried out by the romanian authorities and the first to be carried out according to well-chosen criteria that would include as broad information as possible about the population. under the confessional aspect, all religions recorded increases in the 30 years of the 20th century. even under the impediment of world war i, the population of the coal basin thrived, and new religions appeared that until 1930 did not exist, or at least were not recorded in the previous censuses. the confessional structure of 1930 appears in fig. 7. the baptist and adventist confession was the new religions that joined in addition to the depressed confessional painting. at the level of depression, the greek catholics were moved from the first position from 1900 to 1930. the majority religion in 1930 was the orthodox one, growing in the 30 years by 155%, from 7,819 to 19,988. the entry of the coal basin region, under romanian rule, was achieved by the growth of orthodox and their dominance as a weight and flock. roman catholics have considerably increased the second confession, after the orthodox one. their number reached from 8,177 in 1900 to 17,078 in 1930, registering the growth of 108%. the greek catholics were barely the third confession in 1930, being the first time this religion surpassed so much, the increase being 81% compared to 1900. however, greek catholics were the majority in aninoasa, lupeni, uricani, vulcan and băniţa. the unitarian confession had the most significant growth in this early 20th century, increasing by 370%, from 301 people to 1,415. the new two religions for 1930 were disproportionate as followers, thus the baptist confession adhered to 503 people, and to the adventist only 55. at the local level, the largest growth among the orthodox was at the vulcan, with a registered increase of 94%. the most unhomogeneous, confessional structure was in uricani, where greek catholics were clearly dominant with 1,780 people, and in their wake were orthodox with only 39 people. in 1930, the uricani were absent with perfection, evangelicals and unitarians, but 16 cases of baptists were recorded instead. the baptist confession, existed in six administrative units, and the largest number was at lupeni by 281 people. in the rest of the units, the herds were under 100 persons. adventists were present in five units, completely missing in uricani and băniţa. the maxim adventists was at petroşani with 21 people, followed by the vulcan by 14. at the petrila there were 10 and 5 in aninoasa and lupeni. with the passage of the depression under the romanian command, the confessional structure changed from the second half of the 19th century. some confessions grew in weights, others decreased what a confessional movement showed, representing a cause of the time of the union in the year 1918. babtist 1% unitartians 2%jew 3% evangelical 2% reformed 12% greek catholics 24% roman catholics 26% orthodox 30% fig. 7. confessional structure of petroşani depression in 1930 source: own study based on rotariu t-i. et al., 2011. 20 mădălin-sebastian lung from 1930, passing through the period of world war ii, the socialist period that period post-socialist the ethnic diversity in depression increased much compared to previous periods, especially those of colonization when they were brought into several waves the same populations. since the second decade of the interwar period, most of the colonized populations have remigrated to their native places, following the entry of the territory under another leadership, namely due to restructuring in the industry. the romanian population has established its domination categorically, a fact emerged from the data obtained from the census in the year 2011, romanians holding 92%, meaning numerically 104,502 people. the increase of the romanian population from 1930 to 2011 was 66%. all ethnicities have tab. 2. ethnic structure of petroşani depression in 2011 ethnicities petroșani vulcan lupeni aninoasa petrila uricani bănița total romanians 30,926 21,250 19,365 3,711 19,969 8,097 1,184 104,502 hungarians 2,250 1,155 1,566 172 1,048 251 8 6,450 gypsy 597 321 771 298 165 173 2,325 ukrainians 4 4 4 12 germans 116 47 69 5 38 4 279 turkish 3 3 serbs 3 3 slovaks 7 3 10 italians 15 3 7 3 28 jews 6 3 4 13 czechs 3 4 7 poles 9 5 19 33 chinese 6 6 other ethnicities 36 5 14 4 59 date source: national institute of statistics. tab. 3. confessional structure of petroşani depression in 2011 confessions petroșani vulcan lupeni aninoasa petrila uricani bănița total orthodox 28,585 19,145 17,717 3,592 17,244 7,363 1,144 94,790 roman catholic 2,474 1,513 1,249 278 1,312 293 6 7,125 reformed 1,017 707 957 65 506 135 27 3,387 pentecostal 779 545 603 133 1,479 423 3,989 greek catholic 207 142 338 23 67 42 819 baptist 174 112 320 19 83 55 4 767 adventist 71 32 68 31 17 219 muslim 13 4 6 5 28 unitarian 113 55 140 10 69 5 392 jehovah 260 287 189 52 281 92 1,161 christian after gospel 41 34 34 43 36 11 199 christian of rite old 4 8 6 18 evangelist lutherana 16 3 19 orthodox serbian 3 3 evangelical 18 7 18 3 6 52 evangelical of confession augustana 12 4 17 5 38 mozaica 11 7 18 atheists 57 40 36 3 21 7 164 other religions 55 53 39 4 21 4 176 date source: national institute of statistics. ethnic-confessional cyclicality and continuity… 21 fallen numerically to 2011, with the exception of the romanian and gypsy population (tab. 2). after romanians, the second major increase was among the gypsy community. the gypsy community of depression increased by 86%, in 2011 as the third largest ethnicity at the depresionar-level. this ethnicity at the last census had no representative at băniţa, in the other units being present. migrations affected hungarian and german ethnicity. the hungarian population fell by 72%, from 23,611 in 1930, to only 6,450 in 2011. at petroşani was the largest population of hungarians in the middle of the interwar period, but decreasing to 2011 by 200%. only at uricani the hungarian population prospered from 1930, when only one person was registered, with 250 people up to 2011. their lowest flock was at băniţa with only eight people, decreasing by 63 people compared to 1930. the german population has migrated massively from depression to 2011, decrease being with 2,953 people, from 3,232 to only 279. from the figure below you can see the dominance of romanians, namely the two ethnically distant, 6% hungarian population and 2% gypsy population. no fewer than 13 ethnicities were reviewed at the last census, of which ten had a weight of less than 1%. ethnicities such as ukrainians, serbs, slovaks, czechs, poles, jews continued to exist in depression throughout the 20th century and early 21st century. although, in smaller herds than in period of colonization, ethnicities have retained their character of continuity. the confessional structure has diversified very much, with 17 religions registered in 2011 (tab. 3). many of the new religions registered in 2011, appeared after the year 1990. thus we can talk about confessional continuity only to the religions that existed since the second half of the 19th century. of the 17 only seven have weights of 1 or more 1%, which shows that there are many confessions that are less represented, as the orthodox religion dominates with 84% (94,790 people). roman catholics positioned from the orthodox, but at very high distance by only 6% (7,125 people). two new religions emerged after 1990 in the depresionar space, came to be among the top five most represented confessions. pentecostals, ranks in the third position as the share of 4% respectively 3,989 people and the confession of jehovah’s witnesses with 1,161 people and 1%. following the pentecostal are reformed with 3% and 3,387 people. compared to 1930, religions that were continuously ascending, such as the greek catholic, reformed, roman catholic arrived in 2011 to hold very low weights and numbers. these decreases were due to the migrations of the hungarian, german-depressed population. among the great religions, the greek catholic confession fell from 1930, with 15,018 followers, from 15,837 people to just 819. the roman catholic religion was the second in 1930, with 17,078 followers, and in 2011 their number reached 7,125, a decrease by 139%. however, even though the numerical numbers of these great denominations decreased due to demographic migrations, they kept their character of continuity from the second half of the 19th century, continuing throughout the 20th century to the beginning of the 21 century. 4. conclusions the petroşani depression was extensively subjected to colonization phenomena especially during the austro-hungarian domination period. in order to exploit the coal resources as highly as possible, skilled workers were brought in from various origins. the infusion of workers led to ethnic and confessional diversification in the space of depression. all ethnicities and confessions existing in the petroşani depression from the second half of the 19th century retained continuity in the 20th century and until the first part of the 21st century. even though the numerical data of some ethnicities and confessions fell after the great union of 1918, they continued to exist in lower herds. the ethnic and confessional cyclicality in the petroşani depression was closely linked to the cycles of demographic colonization, politicalhistorical events that destabilised the ethnic and confessional depression. the numerical numbers of the two demographic structures have undergone continuous changes. the cyclicality of herds has been influenced by the historical and political factor. this factor would change with the great union of 1918, when the romanian authorities took control of transylvania and the petroşani depression. after this moment, among the two demographic structures there were significant changes. the ethnic structure has changed, due to the departure of ethnics, and this has led to a change in the confessional structure. basically, the confessional structure was directly influenced by the changes in the ethnic structure. to note, it is that in addition to existing ethnicities and confessions, since the second half of the 19th century, new ethnicities and confessions have 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tofan g-b., 2015, etnie, confesiune şi comportament electoral în judeţele harghita, covasna şi mureş: studiu geografic (2008–2014) (eng. ethnicity, confession and electoral behaviour in harghita, covasna and mureş counties: geographical study (2008–2014), editura casa cărţii de ştiinţă, cluj-napoca. tofan g-b., niță a., nimară c., 2014, the confessional structure of harghita, covasna and mureș counties, in 2011, analele universităţii din oradea: seria geografie, 24(2), 166–179. vanhanen t., 1999, domestic ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism: a comparative analysis, journal of peace research, 36(1), 55–73. doi: 10.1177/0022343399036001004 1. introduction by the time of the dissolution of the ussr about 25 millions of russians were inhabitants of the union republics. about a half of this demographic group accrued to the ukrainian ssr. thus, ethno-demographic and sociocultural perspectives of russians in the post-soviet ukraine have nearly central significance in the problem of keeping of the modern russian ethnocultural expatriate community. journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(2), 26–32 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.012.8218 russians in ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-soviet period (results and perspectives) sergey sushchiy institute of social, economic and humanitarian research, southern scientific center, russian academy of sciences, chekhov 41, 344006 rostov-on-don, russia, e-mail: ss7707@mail.ru citation sushchiy s., 2018, russians in ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-soviet period (results and perspectives), journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 26–32. abstract the article studies quantitative and spatial dynamics of the russian speaking population of the post soviet ukraine. the factors accelerating the demographic shrinkage of the russians of the country by 3 million people during 1989–2001 are analyzed. on the basis of a comparative analysis of the results of the 2001 ukrainian census and the data of the ethnic and linguistic surveys of the ukrainian population the conclusion is drawn that the core role in a prompt reduction of the number of the russians belong to the assimilation. the analysis of the dynamic trends of the last several years allows affirming that within the borders of the modern ukraine without the crimea and the donbas which is politically independent from kyiv there may live about 4.1–4.5 million russians. the study of eventual middle term prospects prove that by 2030 the given number may reduce to 3.3–3.7 million people. the important role in this process will play all three factors of the number dynamics: natural decline, outward migration flow, assimilation. but the core role in the demographic shrinkage of the russian community belongs to the assimilation or the transition from the russian to the ukrainian self identity of a part of the biological and ethnic community of ukraine. however the number of the russians in the country recorded by all ensuing censuses of the population was lower than the real ethnic and cultural presence of the “russian world” in ukraine as the above mentioned identity transfer was not accompanied by an acculturation. the russian language and culture not only dominate in the russian environment but also keep a weighty role within the dominant country group. only by prolongation of several decades of tough of a severe anti russian course ukraine is capable of undermining the social and cultural potential of the russian world. key words russian population of ukraine, demographical dynamics, biological and ethnic community, middle term forecast, outward migration flow, assimilation. received: 06 october 2017 accepted: 21 november 2017 published: 31 may 2018 russians in ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-soviet period (results and perspectives) 27 russian population in ukraine was growing during the postwar decades, rising from 7.1 million people in 1959 to 11.4 million people in 1989 (more than 1/5 of its inhabitants). the most significant part of russians focuses in the southern and eastern regions of ukraine. mostly there were citizens. only in crimea and voroshilovgrad (luhansk) regions russian population was fairly wide settled in the rural areas (всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года…). the dissolution of the soviet union gave birth to the new trend connected with the reduction in numbers of russians in ukraine and extensive reduction of their geography. this tendency was strengthened by the linguistic culture and language policy of the ukrainian authorities, since the early 1990s successively oriented on ethnical and sociocultural «ukrainization» of the russian inhabitants. this policy issued from a variety of premises (фролов, 2000): – closeness of russian and ukrainian people, essentially relieving ethnical mutual transitions, – active interethnic russian-ukrainian marriage rate, – presence of a wide biethnic group of inhabitants (bi-ethnophores), that should have been motivated to the “right” national identity. 2. the end of the хх century the results of the ukrainian population census of 2001 demonstrated the apparent success of the state policy of ukrainization of russians (всеукраинская перепись населения, 2001). the census recorded a rapid demographic squeeze of the russian population of the country. in 1989–2001, it declined from 11.4 to 8.3 million people. decrease of it was all-round. in absolute terms, the maximum declines were suffered by the russian communities of the southeast (only within the donetsk region declines of russians were more than half a million people, kharkiv and dnipropetrovsk oblasts lost 300 thousands of russians each). but in terms of specific weight decline of the western regions proved to be more significant. two of them (lviv and ivano-frankivsk) lost more than half of their russian population. the scale of the reduction was much greater than the natural decline or possible migration of russians outside ukraine. calculations show that of 3 million recorded demographic decline of the order of 2/3 should be attributed to the identification transition from the russians to the ukrainians. the central role in this process was played not by ukrainization of «pure» russians, but by the transformation of identification of bi-ethnophores. according to opinion polls, in the middle of 1990s, 20% of russian ukrainians had a ukrainian mother, 10% a ukrainian father (савоскул, 2001), that is about 30% of the «russian» population of the country were ethnic «semi-ukrainians». taking into account those who had a third/quarter of the ukrainian «blood», the share of bi-ethnophores was even higher. nevertheless, the biethnic variety of the country also had a second component – «ukrainian-russian». about 6% of ukrainians had a russian father, 8% had a russian mother. in fact, ethnically «semi-russian» in ukraine was 14% of ukrainians, not counting those who had a smaller share of russian «blood» (савоскул, 2001). the displacement of a certain number of representatives of this wide bi-ethnic set from its russian part to the ukrainian (and in the opposite direction) was extensively the type of determination of the whole demographic dynamics of the russian population of post-soviet ukraine. calculations show that even in the first half of the 1990s, this biethnic group was divided between the russian and ukrainian identification parts with a noticeable preponderance of the second one (40 and 60%). by the beginning of the 21st century, according to the studies of the specialists of the kiev international institute of sociology (kiis), the mixed russian-ukrainian population had grown to 23% of the total population of the country (хмелько, 2004) and amounted to more than 11 million people (contrary to 8.6 million in the early 1990s). at the same time, the «ukraine-identical» part of this variety increased to 70% (correspondingly, the russian one was reduced to 30%). 3. the beginning of the xxi century: 2001–2013 due to the fact that after 2001 there were no censuses in ukraine, ethno-demographic dynamics of its population in recent 15–16 years can be showed only in the form of expert evidence. according to the calculations of the ukrainian demographer a. poznyak, in 2014 the share of russians in the population of the country was about 16.0–16.5% (миколюк, 2014). if this figure corresponds to reality, the number of the russian population of ukraine could decrease during 2001–2013 by 1.0–1.2 million people (up to 7.1–7.3 million). such a result could be considered almost the most optimistic of the real ones. however there were certain grounds for it since the migration 28 sergey sushchiy outflow of russians throughout the 2000s remained very insignificant (about 10–15 thousand people in the average annual calculation), and after the socioeconomic stabilization of the country, the natural decline began to reducing. it is worth taking into account the coming to power of viktor yanukovych’s political team, which policy of cultural and linguistic ukrainization of the russian population was essentially softened. according to s. savoscul (савоскул, 2001), in the mid-1990s, 45% of russian families in ukraine already had a ukrainian wife or husband. the distribution of this variety by age group is unknown, but it is obvious that this indicator correlated with the age of married couples. modern children’s and young generation of russian ukrainians (natives of the 1990–2010-ies) by approximately 50% (or even more) should consist of bi-ethnophores. and taking into account all those having the ukrainian ethnic component, we can talk about 60–70% of all russian youth in the country. as mentioned above, the share of bi-ethnophores in the structure of the entire russian population of ukraine grew in the 1990s – early 2000s from 30% to 41%. according to our estimates, by 2014 it had to rise to 44–45%. in addition, in parallel in the biethnic set of ukraine the further growth of the share of the ukrainian-identical population continued. from 70% at the beginning of the 21st century it increased to 76.5–77.0% by 2014 (table 1). if this expert evidence is correct, then the total demographic decline of russians in ukraine for the period 2001–2013 really could be limited to 1.0–1.2  million people: a natural decline of the order of 0.45–0.50 million people. (with an average annual rate of natural decline within the range of 4.5–5.5 ‰), migration in the range of 150–200 thousand people, assimilation – 0.4–0.5 million people. 4. period 2014−2016 the events of spring-summer of 2014 most significantly affected the ethno-demographic structure of the population of ukraine. inclusion in the russian federation of crimea and sevastopol “withdrew” from ukraine 2.3 million people, including 1.5 million russians. no less significant demographic declines led to the emergence of two pro-russian republics of donbas, whose total demographic potential is about 2.5–3.0 million people (with the possibility of growth of up to 3.5 million) (сущий, 2013). thus, the population of ukraine decreased by 5.0–5.5 million people, and by mid-2016 there were about 39.5–40.0 million people. in this case, the decline of russians (including bi-ethnophores with russian identity), according to our calculations, amounted to about 2.6–2.9 million people, ukrainians (also taking into account “their” bi-ethnophores) – 2.4–2.6 million this means that the number of russian ukrainians in 2015–2016 could be in the range of 4.2–4.6 million people. in other words, their share in the population of the country actually decreased to 10.6–11.5% (table 2). tab. 1. structural dynamics of the ukrainian bi-ethnophores, 1989–2015 (%) year distribution of bi-ethnophores share of bi-ethnophores wishin self-identified as ukrainians self-identified as russians ukrainians of ukraine russians of ukraine 1989 60.5 39.5 14.0 30.0 2001 69.4 30.6 20.5 41.0 2013 76.6–76.9 23.1–23.4 29.2–29.7 45–45.2 2015 81.2–81.8 18.2–18.8 26.9–27.5 47.6–47.8 source: own studies based on: савоскул, 2001; хмелько, 2011. tab. 2. dynamics of the relative share of the largest ethnic varieties in the population of ukraine, 1989–2015 (%) year share in the population of ukraine share in the population of ukraine taking into account bi-ethnophores «pure» ukrainians bi-ethnophores «pure» russians other ukrainians russians 1989 62.7 16.7 15.6 5.0 72.8 22.2 2001 62.0 23.0 10.2 5.0 78.0 17.1 2013 56.7–57.8 30.4–31.8 8.7–8.9 2.9–3.8 80–82.2 14.9–16.2 2015 62.0–62.5 27.8–29.0 5.6–6.2 3.0–3.8 84.8–86.3 10.6–11.5 source: own studies based on: савоскул, 2001; хмелько, 2011. russians in ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-soviet period (results and perspectives) 29 the geography of russian resettlement in ukraine has not undergone internal changes in recent years, but has been significantly transformed as a result of changes in the territorial contours of the country. after the loss of crimea and the eastern donbas, a number of other areas of the southeast – kharkov, dnepropetrovsk, and also zaporizhia and odessa – moved to the position of the main centers of the russians. but donetsk region remained in this row too, in the ukrainian part of which still lives up to 550–600 thousand of russian population (table 3). in the five areas listed, at present, there are about 65–70% of all russian ukrainians. if we add to them the ukrainian part of the luhansk region and kiev, then seven regions that make up a third of the territory of the country concentrate about 80–85% of its russian array. the share of russians in the population of these regions also remains quite high: in the ukrainian part of the donetsk region they account for 30–33% of inhabitants, in kharkiv and zaporizhia – about 1/4, in odessa – up to 20%, in dnepropetrovsk – in the range of 16.5–17.0%. in the rest of the country the proportion of russians as a rule, does not reach 10%, and in 11 regions of the center and west of ukraine it is only a few percent. thus, in most of western ukraine, the process of de-russification of the local population has entered its final stages (local russian communities are mostly made up of elderly people and can almost completely cease to exist in the coming decades). tab. 3. dynamics of the russian population by regions of ukraine, 1959–2016 (thousand people) territory 1959 1970 1979 1989 2001 2013 2015-2016 crime 858.3 1385.0 1461.0 1629.5 1180.4 1350–1380 *** luhansk 950.0 1148.3 1222.0 1279.0 991.8 840–865 240–270 donetsk 1601.3 1987.2 2225.4 2316.1 1844.4 1630–1680 550–600 kharkiv 665.5 829.4 966.4 1054.2 742.0 660–680 640–660 zaporizhzhya 379.1 534.0 606.3 664.1 476.8 420–435 410–420 odesa 440.4 578.2 656.3 719.0 508.5 460–480 440–470 dnipropetrovsk 466.0 697.2 834.6 935.7 627.5 540–570 520–550 mikolayiv 139.2 184.9 223.9 258.0 177.5 155–165 150–160 kherson 128.2 186.6 228.5 249.5 165.2 145–150 140–145 kyiv 254.3 373.6 474.4 536.7 337.3 300–310 290–300 sumy 167.6 176.6 182.3 190.1 121.7 100–105 95–100 kirovohrad 102.2 115.8 129.4 144.1 83.9 70–72 67–70 poltava 83.3 123.2 157.2 179.0 117.1 100–105 95–100 kyiv region 82.4 111.5 146.7 167.9 109.3 95–105 95–100 cherkasy 66.9 87.7 105.6 122.3 75.6 65–67 60–64 zhytomyr 87.0 100.6 112.2 121.4 68.9 60–62 58–60 chernihiv 61.1 73.5 87.6 96.6 62.2 50–52 48–50 chernivtsi 51.3 53.4 59.3 63.1 37.9 33–36 30–33 vinnytsya 93.5 102.8 109.4 112.5 67.5 55–60 55–57 khmelnytskiy 61.6 69.1 76.3 88.0 50.7 45–47 40–43 lviv 181.1 199.8 194.3 195.1 92.6 80–87 75–80 rivne 39.1 44.6 51.8 53.6 30.1 25–27 23–25 zakarpattya 29.6 35.2 41.7 49.5 31.0 27–29 26–28 volyn 37.1 39.8 43.8 46.9 25.1 22–24 20–22 ivano-frankivsk 37.9 46.5 49.8 57.0 24.9 20–23 19–22 ternopil 26.9 26.3 25.7 26.6 14.2 11–12 9–11 ukraine 7090.8 9126.3 10471.6 11355.6 8334.1 7358–7628 4195–4440 source: figures for the years 1959–2001 obtained from the population censuses of the soviet union and the 1959–1989 census of ukraine in 2001 (всесоюзные переписи населения 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 гг.; всеукраинская перепись населения 2001); for 2013–2016 – own studies. 30 sergey sushchiy 5. medium-term geodemographic perspectives of the russian population of ukraine the sharp deterioration in the relations between ukraine and russia (2014–2017) greatly exacerbated the question of the possible quantitative dynamics of the russian population of the country. there is no doubt that the next ukrainian census will inevitably record the ubiquitous and most significant reduction in the russian ethnic presence. and in the composition of this very “wrinkled” demographic array, the share of bi-ethnophores. if we confine ourselves only to the analysis of ethnic dynamics, the current situation of russians in ukraine almost mirrors the situation that existed in the south of russia in the 1920s, when the local ukrainian array, externally preserving the most impressive quantitative scales, is in fact already largely consisted of a mixed, semi-assimilated population. another 10–15 years passed, and it in its majority self-determined as russian. in addition, the south russian ukrainian community collapsed quantitatively, declining for 1926–1939 almost by an order of magnitude (from 3.3 million to 422 thousand people) (сущий, 2013). however, it seems to us that the dynamics of russians in post-soviet ukraine will be different: not a rapid contraction, but a progressive demographic reduction for many decades. does this stable trend have a certain quantitative threshold that the russian community of ukraine will stabilize or at least significantly slow down its further reduction? at what level (in what quantitative range) can such a zone of stability be located? it is hardly possible to give exact answers to these questions. in our medium-term forecast, we proceeded from the calculations already carried out, suggesting that in 2015 there were about 4.2–4.6 million russians living in ukraine without the crimea and the eastern part of the donbas. under the current conditions, all three factors of demographic dynamics will simultaneously work to reduce this number: natural decline, outflow and assimilation. natural decline in the early 2010s of local russians (3.5–4.0‰ per year) was slightly higher than the same rate for ukrainians (3.1–3.5‰). the crisis affected the natural dynamics of the entire population of the country – in 2014, the decline increased to 3.9‰, in 2015–2016 – up to 4.4–4.6‰. obviously, with the overall socio-psychological depression of the russians in ukraine, they could have a decline rate of 5.5–6.0‰. in addition, for 2015–2020 years the number of russians in the country can be reduced by 3–4% (by 130–180 thousand people). the degree of the migration of russians has also grown. the net outflow, which amounted to 5–10 thousand people a year before the crisis, most likely increased by several times in 2014 (up to 30–40 thousand people). these figures are, most likely, the lowest bar of possible migration. the outflow could be much higher, given that many activists of the russian protest movement of the spring of 2014, crushed by the ukrainian special services, had to leave for russia. in 2015, migration could be reduced to 20–25 thousand. if in the second half of this decade it falls to the level of the 2000s (10–15 thousand per year), the total outflow for 2015–2020 will figure up 70–100 thousand people. assimilation losses will also be significant. part of bi-ethnophores as early as 2014 self-identified as russians, later changed (or will change to 2020) their identity for ukrainian. moreover, in recent years this process has most likely intensified. the rise of ukrainian civil patriotism undoubtedly played a role, but the growth of systemic pressure on the russian population of ukraine was no less important. moreover, not only the state, but also from the side of civil society, which has substantially increased the degree of its nationalism. russians who are not ready to put up with an increasingly tangible “ukrainization” of social life, are more likely to prefer to leave for russia, and among those who remain, masking strategies will necessarily dominate. if about 10–20% of modern russian bi-ethnophores changed and change their identity to ukrainian by 2020 (quite probable value), this will result in the loss of another 200–400/440 thousand people. as a result, for the period 2015–2020 the total number of russian ukrainians may decrease by 400–700 thousand and by the beginning of the third decade will amount to 3.7–4.1 million people, of which about 1.8–2.0 million may be accounted for by biethnofores. if for the forecast of the demographic dynamics of the russian population of ukraine in the 2020s as the basic parameters take an annual natural decline of 3–4‰ (pre-crisis level of the 2000s), an annual net outflow of 8-10 thousand people and assimilation into amounting to 10–15% of the total number of biethnic russians, the total demographic loss of the russian array in this decade will be about 350–550 thousand people, and its total population will decline by 2030, to 3.3–3.7 million people. and in this variety, bi-ethnophores will already dominate quantitatively (table 4). the post-soviet demographic dynamics of russian ukraine, it would seem, fully confirms the conclusion that the proximity of the two east slavic peoples significantly facilitates the process of mutual russians in ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-soviet period (results and perspectives) 31 assimilation, allowing gradually to “dissolve” even powerful ethnic arrays, whether they are ukrainians in the south of russia or russians of southeast of ukraine. yet, the processes of assimilation of soviet ukrainians in the 1930s and russians in post-soviet ukraine have very significant differences. complex assimilation implies a certain graduality. the first is the period of acculturation (change of language and culture), after which the stage of assimilation (change of national self-identification). this is how, in particular, the “transformation” of the kuban ukrainians into russians took place in the 1920s–1930s. the 1926 census recorded a very significant scale of russian-speaking local ukrainians (1/2–3/4 of their total number in various districts of kuban). thus, the massive change in ethnic identity was preceded by a large-scale cultural and linguistic russification. the ukrainianization of the russian population of modern ukraine proceeds in a different way. the number of russians in the country is steadily declining, but this process is practically not accompanied by linguistic ukrainization of the population. moreover, data from sociological polls indicate that the russian language in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s was not only not lost by local russians, but even strengthened its position in the titular nationality of ukraine (хмелько, 2004). “former” russians, self-determined themselves as ukrainians, remained faithful to their native language and culture, “assimilated” without preliminary acculturation. however, the reliability of such an ethnic metamorphosis is not large enough and overall is a conjuncture, since a stable russian-speaking and “russian culture” preserves for its bearer the possibility of returning to its former identity. therefore, the number of russians registered by all future ukrainian censuses will be less than the real ethno-cultural presence of the “russian world” in ukraine. hypothetically, in case of change in the socio-political situation in the country and the normalization of relations with russia, the flow of bi-ethnophores can go in the opposite direction, and some of the “new” ukrainians will become russian again decades later. the modern ukrainian government understands this perfectly and will do everything in its power to maximize the cultural and linguistic distancing of ukrainian society from russia. it is almost impossible to hope for an early change of this course. obviously, the “russian world” of ukraine is doomed to a prolonged existence in the conditions of strict targeted pressure. if not for years, then over a number of decades this pressure can significantly reduce the sociocultural potential of the russian (russianspeaking) set. moreover, the loss of this potential will further accelerate the demographic contraction of the russian massif of the country will make this process completely irreversible. although the issue in this case should be a very remote perspective, which goes far beyond the first half of the 21st century. acknowledgements the paper is written in the laboratory of social and economic researches of the fis southern scientific center of the russian academy of sciences in the framework of a grant of the russian scientific fund, the project no. 17-19-01411. “wars and population in the south of russia in the 18th – the early 21st centuries: history, demography, and anthropology”. it is based on the materials of the publication tab. 4. the demographic dynamics of the russian population of ukraine and the structure of growth / decline in 1959– 2030 (million people, %) period growth/decline of russians (million people) structure of growth / decline (%) assimilation migration natural dynamics 1959–1970 2.04 20–30 35-42 33-35 1970–1979 1.34 15–20 40–55 30–35 1979–1989 0.89 5–12 25–35 60–65 1989–2001 –3.0 63–70 17–20 13–17 2001–2013 –1.0–1.2 35–45 15–20 35–45 2013–2015 –2.7–2.9 reduction in connection with the loss of the crimea and the eastern donbass 2015–2020 –0.4–0.7 50–60 14–17 26–33 2020–2030 –0.35–0.55 47–53 18–22 29–31 source: own studies based on: всесоюзные переписи населения 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 гг.; всеукраинская перепись населения 2001; for 2013–2030 – own studies. 32 sergey sushchiy in the journal “sociological research” (no. 8, 2017, pp.  45–58): i.v. mitrofanova, s.y. suschiy: russians in ukraine – geodemographic results of the post-soviet period and medium-term prospects. references всесоюзные переписи населения 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 гг. распределение городского и сельского населения областей республик ссср (кроме рсфср) по полу и национальности, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ resp_nac_59-89.php [15.11.2017]. всеукраинская перепись населения 2001, http://2001. ukrcensus.gov.ua/ [25.06.2017]. миколюк o., 2014, к 2065 году нас будет 35 миллионов? «день», 29 января 2014 года, http://www.demoscope. ru/weekly/2014/0583/gazeta024.php [20.05.2017]. савоскул с.с., 2001, русские нового зарубежья: выбор судьбы, наука, москва. сущий с.я., 2013, украинцы юга россии, копи-центр, ростов-на-дону. фролов к., 2000, русский вопрос на украине и проблема украинской диаспоры в россии, [in:] страны снг. русские и русскоязычные в новом зарубежье. информационно-аналитический бюллетень. № 16, институт стран снг, москва, 12–20; http://www.pravoslavie.ru/ analit/rusideo/rusvoprosukr.htm [15.11.2017]. хмелько в.е., 2004, лингво-этническая структура украины: региональные особенности и тенденции изменений за годы независимости, научные записки наукма. социологические науки, 32, 3–15. хмелько в.е., 2011, социальная основа расхождения электоральных предпочтений двух частей украины на выборах 2004–2007 годов, [in:] социология вчера, сегодня, завтра. новые ракурсы, эйдос, санкт-петербург, 398–409. 1. introduction from the beginning of the shiite mullah’s rule in iran, it is always talked of “shi’a theocracy” (trofimov, 2015), shi’a political ideology (thiessen, 2009), islamic radicalism (richards, 2003), the exploitation of religion (abrahamian, 2004), etc. on this basis, there is the question of what connection can be seen between the regime’s such character on the one hand and its west hostility on the other. the relationship between anti-westernism and religion can be explained at least in such a way that the religious institution specifically in the case of iran theocracy government after the revolution, could not and cannot be turned into a political tool for the government without borrowing a motorized motivation from outside of itself. essentially, it can anti-westernism as a criterion for pretending to be revolutionary in iran and its application as an effective tool in removing political rivals shokrollah kamari majin institute of international relations, faculty of journalism and political science, university of warsaw, żurawia 4, 00-503 warsaw, poland, e-mail: sh.kamari@yahoo.com citation kamari majin s., 2019, anti-westernism as a criterion for pretending to be revolutionary in iran and its application as an effective tool in removing political rivals, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 39–45. abstract what has been less visible to observers over more than iran’s thirty years political events or, in other words, what was actually formed the motivation power of government system after the 1979 revolution, was located under the shadow of a vast tree of religion, is a kind of xenophobia and, in its particular form, is anti-western. it can be argued that the contents, capacity and role of this religion without any “anti-western” anticipation were useless and deficient to the iranian shiite rulers. the basis of the discussion in this article is the context in which a kind of anti-modernization grew from within and became the dominant discourse of society headed by traditional clergy. what is being discussed in this article is to fingers on the main stimulus and the central tool of production of legitimacy, and its role and application in conjunction with the political ideology of rule in iran. in this regard, the present article seeks to explain how this primary stimulus has evolved and how it is used as a political tool but in the form of ideology. key words anti-western, anti-modernization, islamic radicalism, theocracy, extremism, holy values. received: 01 september 2017 accepted: 27 january 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 39–45 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.06 40 shokrollah kamari majin be said that religion as a powerful institution, by the conditions of time, has come out in the context of the practice of producing and cultivating a discourse, can act within itself and provides its strength, stability, the power of action and purposeful orientation through this way. the relationship between a religious skeleton and the force that drives this skeleton can be likened to one device so that religion is the body of that device, and the political motivation is considered as a driving force. this engine is the driving force behind political islam in our era, and especially since the collapse of the eastern bloc, is extreme anti-westernism. since the iranian revolution of 1979 was formed in a non-friendly context with the western advocates of the former regime, new governors were willing or unwilling to define their political identity with a kind of anti-westernism. a decade after the iranian revolution and the establishment of a new regime, when the “collapse of the east” came to an end and the “cold war” ended, the jihad against the “dar al-harb idols” was also ended and because of the radical sunni islam that was yesterday’s alley of the west. it was now necessary to enter a war and jihad with a new enemy that was united before. on the other hand, the western world needed a new enemy in order to continue to survive, continue the cycle of reconstruction and the advancement of its internal and external policies. hence, “the true islam” following its “real predecessor” – salaf al sadeqin – from one side, and western farunyt – arrogance, on the other hand, came to the scene to do not stop the cycle of human slaughter and destruction. samuel huntington spoke of the clash of civilizations this time between western civilization and islam as their peak. consequently, the iranian shiite government, which introduced itself as the gonfalonier of the fight for the west arrogant for a decade, could not stand back from this anti-western carriage. even though there were these sunni extremists and jihadists now threatened western interests anywhere in the world. the shiite regime of iran must continue to insist on its anti-western identity, maintaining its borders with the sunni world and kept the official slogan of “death to america,” because it considered itself the “almighty” of islam and the hopes of the disadvantaged throughout the world. a significant difference amongst all those various anti-western islamic groups on the one hand and the iranian government, on the other hand, was that these groups did not identify themselves with any country. they did not speak of any government or nation and in every part of the world, even in the most concentrated western cities, they could form themselves and take their actions under the name of islam and with the slogan of “allah akbar”. these were the terrorist cells that, at least in appearance, were not linked to any government, and therefore they were responsible for their actions and did not target the preventive results of these measures by western governments for a particular country. the actions, positions, threats and verbal attacks of a united nations member state, but in the eyes of the world and international law, is ultimately a different case from the case of jihadist groups. in this situation, any unconsidered speech can even have adverse consequences and results for the national interests of a country. however, this was not something that iranian rulers had been worried about since they were in power in iran from the beginning and throughout their rule. it is now nearly four decades that the shiite regime of iran has continued its survival by assuming “anti-western” positions as a political tool. although under international pressure and the crushing sanctions of the western world, it had to be “flexible heroic”, but this system of governance in its entirety is aware of a fact. it’s that the “anti-western” positions, albeit only in words but not in practice, remain the most important source of legitimacy of the state, and in the end, the most successful political means to deal with the profound economic, social, cultural and the political problems in today’s society of iran. in the past forty years, many political analysts have emphasized the ideological nature of the iranian government, the sectarian behavior of this government and its interventions in other countries of the middle east. during this time, domestic reformers also struggled to maintain their acceptance of the ideology and the sectarian nature of the government, indicating its differences with the western world as subordinate, temporary, and conditional. they tried to make a bridge between this government and the western world and show that their ideology and anti-westernism were two separate issues so that they could be both a true shiite and a friend of the west. however, the relationship between these two is beyond these. like the one above, “anti-westernism” is the driving engine that keeps the political identity of the government alive. this engine is embedded in the body of “religion”. what more emphasis is placed on the ideology of this regime and sectarianism and to foster sectarian disagreements. what is less talked about is the inseparability of this “being ideological” and that “being anti-western”. separating these two in a theoretical discussion and looking at them, apart from each other, and finally looking at the relationship between these two can bring us a better anti-westernism as a criterion for pretending to be revolutionary… 41 understanding of the political identity of the current iranian government. 2. anti-western backgrounds in iran the iranian community had begun to call for modernization since the qajar era (baker, saldanha, 2009). the effects of this contact between the two very different worlds of that day had different aspects of their own. on the one hand, part of the ideas related to liberation and social progress were inspired by western ideas and western experiences in their societies. to some of the intellectual elites of the community, these ideas were accepted, and the use of those experiences was worthwhile and, in some cases, desirable. in the early years of growing contact with the west, the first group of expedition students traveled to european countries (1845) and the “dar-alfonoon school” was established (1851). however, on the other hand, for another section of the elites, the west was the enemy of muslim nations. the relationship between the colonial european countries and the colonized asian and african societies is based on the opposition’s reactions to this relationship. these objections grew in various ways. in the islamic societies, part of the leaders and religious affiliates were among the forerunners of these objections. among the same section of the opposition to the west, there was a group that called for the awakening of muslim nations through resistance to the colonialism of europeans and the preservation of their values for the purpose of the independence and pride of these nations. however, there was another category, whose only concern was their loss of social power and social standing among the people. they did not care about the awakening of the nations, nor worried about their independence and pride. for them, the entry of “alien” into “privacy” was accompanied by a threat to their traditional and long-standing interests. aside from coherence to the first or second category, the opposition to “frankish unrestrained” – the common idiom of that time – was sitting in a boat, and they resisted to this “threat” with every initial motive. shiite leaders who have long claimed that “ruling” is their right, historically, they have carried a particular pessimism with what they do not know. therefore, they always fear a new belief, a different thought with their common arguments, a new school or a new way of life. they always deny anything that is unknown to them because it could be a threat to shiite thought. for this reason, during the constitutional revolution in 1906, the first positions of the shiite leaders were based on their fear of losing their political, economic and social status in the then iranian society. however, they quickly realized that they could not go against the open opposition to that movement. they did not oppose the constitutional movement in its entirety but tried to change it. this change was, in fact, a turning point in the demands of a libertarian, inspired by “modernity” (mashrouteh means constitutional), to the terms and conditions that ensure the implementation of “sharia” (mashroueh – religious law). they also succeeded in so many ways. after the constitutional revolution, the struggle between the advocates of modernism and the opponents of modernism intensified further. at the end of the qajar era, the great interest of some of the political and cultural elites of the society was evident in the western culture, and their efforts found its apparent phenomenon to enter their values which were well-liked by this culture. in the middle of such a war and controversy, reza khan sardar sepah emerged. pahlavi the father and then his son and the agents of that rule appeared in the role of representatives of a kind of imported modernism in the social life of iran. some analysts believe that the actions associated with this modernization were not “popular with the iranians” (matin-askari, 2012). the pahlavis propagated a kind of extremism of “self-interpretation” of modernism. instead of trying to understand the conditions for the growth of alienation and class hatred among the people, the pahlavis tried to promote the symbolic aspects rather than its original aspects with a superficial understanding of the features of modernism. this understanding was mostly based on the assimilated conception type of western culture, based on the elimination of appearances of the recession and the stagnation of the iranian community (wright, 1989), rather than an attempt to attain the progressive values and evolution of modernism experienced by western societies. according to robin wright, “westernization became synonymous with modernization in a country with a civilization that dated back thousands of years” (wright, 1989). during the reign of reza shah, there were many civilization efforts and much effort for new urbanization, but at that time, the prevailing perception of modernism was based solely on activities, such as urbanization, bridge building, dam building and so on, not to promote the level of participation and social responsibility, economic security, or 42 shokrollah kamari majin fundamental political developments, including the participation of people in decisions that directly deal with their lives. of course, the establishment of a national railway was a valuable step in facilitating communications, but at the same time finding a “suspicious” book with a person could have led to the imprisonment of that person .immigration from the countryside to the cities was a desirable or inevitable way to find work, but the gathering of curious and questionable young people to discuss the causes of european progress and the recession of islamic countries could have been a suspicious and threatening move. even the establishment of modern universities, which was a manifestation of european progress, was seen as a positive step, but the young student spirit of questioning and taboobreaking would face government resistance. pahlavi, the son, was a kind of father’s path. urban, industrial, and military innovations went through different stages one by one, but intellectual innovation and social-cultural development were not popular with governments. despite all, the masters of religion in all these years had a great deal of space and therefore, they performed the realities of the world for the people whatever they wanted. it is clear that the freedom of expression and the formation of assemblies and the collective activity are the indisputable rights of the peoples of every society. but, how was that at the same time that student’s small and limited groups and meetings were under the shadow of fear and prosecution the leaders, missionaries, agents and clerics of the religious organization enjoyed a great deal of freedom, and even many of them were financed by the government? mohammad reza shah’s regime, even with the “instrumental use of religion” (moazzami, 2013) and its affiliated institutions to overcome their more serious enemies, which were mostly “left-wing threats” or “liberals” (moazzami, 2013) and progressive and national forces, it had a superficial understanding of western modernism whose actions ultimately led to exacerbate the contradictions of that regime with the religious community. mirsepassi (2004, p. 76) believes that “the pahlavi regime was both proud and deeply conservative, and iranian intellectuals did not value any of these two attributes”. mirsepassi (2004, p. 77) even emphasizes “an aggressive reaction to modernity” among iranian “intellectuals”. in addition, the dominant discourse on the intellectual revolutionary atmosphere on a global level in decades after world war ii, which was under the intellectual influence of the “left camp”, was not ineffective to forming the process of an extreme anti -westernism in third world countries, such as iran. regardless of whether an intellectual-minded stream had religious foundations or marxism, credibility and reputation were taken from its anti-westernism. here the purpose is not to question or criticize this “anti-western”, but rather, it is a reference to a kind of blind anti-westernism, not a consciousness one. it even brought progressive and libertarian intellectuals close to religious currents with retrogressive trends. thus, both religious and secular intellectuals tried to condemn the appearance of western civilization and pretending to avoid these appearances. in this way, they could show to being pro-people. the famous work of “westernization” was published by the famous writer “jalal al ahmad” during this period. due to socio-economic disadvantages, especially influenced by historical changes in society and the transformation of texture from rural to urban life, gradually, the significant number of dissenters was added. several factors and reasons in the society made conditions that the masters of the religious system to able to place this massive dissatisfied people as their audience and move them toward a kind of “pessimism” against “foreign west” and “their assistants” as the cause of these black days of people, and finally introduce a kind of “return to genuine religious traditions” as a way of salvation for them. it is somewhat unreasonable to claim that “dissatisfaction” began only with the observation of appearances and the encounter with the manifestations of western civilization, and was continued only for this reason. it is more logical to state that the economic and social deprivations described in the description of “alienation growth” in the above line would have led to the growth of this alienation between the lower and upper classes of society and in its advanced conditions. this alienation became a form of hatred and a sense of revenge. an israeli who spent several years at shah’s time working in abadan – iran’s largest oil refinery located in this oil-rich city – described the city as “the poorest creatures on earth” (kinzer, 2003). under these conditions, those who could exploit this alienation between the more affluent classes and the disadvantaged classes, with this unique skill, distorted this border and turned the border between “tradition” and “modernity”. they were dependent on a particular religious/political current which was formed during decades. thus, it can be said that the grounds for the growth of a kind of alienation and ultimately hatred in the face of growing social economic gaps among the people arose before the 1979 revolution, as part anti-westernism as a criterion for pretending to be revolutionary… 43 of iran’s policy analysts believe that “the iranian revolution was mass-based and transformative of basic socio-cultural and socioeconomic relationships in iran” (gürbüz, 2003). this is, of course, a general condition that every society experience more or less in its life cycle. ankony (1999 p. 121) defines this type of alienation on the basis of social gaps “a condition in social relationships reflected by a low degree of integration or common values and a high degree of distance or isolation between individuals, or between an individual and a group of people in a community or work environment”. if we look at different societies from this perspective, then the specific characteristics of these societies over and above the general situation must also be considered, which distinguishes each society from another society. these specific characteristics are associated with the level of awareness of the people and the development of their social knowledge in a continuous link. these characteristics also relate to the nature and role of the intellectual elite of the community, in such a way that it affects economic, political, military and cultural intellectual powers, and at last, it affects the process of public opinion. 3. the xenophobia subject in the hands of the clergy and the deformation of this subject 3.1. confrontation between tradition and modernity political or religious culture is not a phenomenon that a government can create easily or shortly, but a government, for its particular purposes, can highlight the values and norms within that political or religious culture that can grow in the society. in a planned way, the government emphasize them. in other words, a state machine or political power exploits the existing ideological or cultural capacities in society and tries to build its foundations on solid ideological ground. governmental extremist anti-semitism or antialien, in the period after the establishment of the islamic state of iran is often used as a mechanism by forces that are not located in the center of power but on the sidelines of the center or even entirely marginal. the forces and elements that are at the core of power are aware of the internal conditions, external pressures, regional developments, and so on. they even, at sometimes, ride on extremist waves that are out of their control or placed against actions taken even though they do not logically agree. but forces that have less direct responsibilities and are marginal, using extremism subject, try to attack the center of power, to get the power out of their rivals, and to gain full influence or entering the main core of power in order to become partners in economic and political dominance. it is also a process that begins with trying to survive, and finally, its ultimate goal is to grab all the leverages of economic and political power. specifically, authoritarian circles adorned with religion, often regarded as part of the power structure, but not at the decision-making center, use the “xenophobia” to drive public attention to this discourse that “aliens” threatening against “holy” and “transcendental” religious values. at the same time, they induce people that it is the religious leaders who guard those values against “threats”. this “xenophobia” in the early stages is a process of self-proving, continues to be at the later stages of the goal of consolidating power, and ultimately, it aims to enter the main core of power. the anti-modernism, which became part of the property of the islamic clerics and served their purposes since constitutional revolution, gradually set itself in the iranian society as a principle of the political culture, and played a significant role in the political arena of iran. this anti-modernization intensified continuously by the traditional clergy until it became one of the clergy’s instruments for strengthening its position in the iranian society. while the entrance of western culture into the iranian society was not the root of the public dissatisfaction, it could have been one of the factors of it, not all of them. nevertheless, the role of the traditional clergy during all 70 years between the constitutional revolution and the anti-royal revolution of 1979 was to point out this case and amplify this anti-modernism. m. thiessen (2009, p. 19) writes: “the iranians were caught between two very different worlds: a traditional one, and a modern one. an important aspect of this feeling of alienation was the influx of western influences into iran”. but the more fundamental point was that religious circles led the feeling toward such an impression that “a disease poisoning iranian culture, something they had to get rid of “ as soon as possible (thiessen, 2009, p. 20). this was one of the main levers of this traditional clergy in their ride on the wave of the 1979 revolution and their rapid takeover of the revolution. it should also be recalled that in the early 1960s, a collision between a part of the traditional clergy which had moved away from its traditional base for 44 shokrollah kamari majin a while earlier and annexed itself to the revolutionary clergy on the one hand and the ruling apparatus on the other hand occurred. this collision, eventually leading to the may 22th event (15th khordad), was one of the historical manifestations of the collision between this part of the traditional clergy and the government. the traditional clergy, who propagandized hatred of modernism, and the government that regarded itself as the masterpiece of the interpretation and dissemination of modernism in iran. another factor that should not be ignored is the existence of a conflict of interests in the western world and helping some of the proprietors of those interests to the religious circles and provoke antiwestern sentiment in islamic countries to confront other interests. after world war ii, widespread and unbridled domination of europe declined, but instead, the enormous economic and political power “beyond the waters” and, moreover, the growing dominance of such power became more perceptible than before. after the aftermath of the world war, two superpowers gradually came to power, as two skyscrapers in a city holding other city buildings in their shadows. this was not so appealing to the “powerful past” europe. thus, from the 1950s and 1960s, the islamic radical currents emerged in muslim countries that attacked america as the leader of the “western” dominance. these currents benefited from friendship with europe and, most notably, britain, insofar as the slogan “death to england” on the streets of tehran in 1952–1953, began to turn into “death to america” in 1978–1979. 3.2. metamorphosis of westernization and its transformation into a political cutting weapon after the 1979 revolution, known as the “bahman revolution”, this political culture became a political tool serving the totalitarian groups. these groups needed such a tool to overcome political rivals in the internal power struggle in iran. hatred deriving from anti-modernism and its synonym for antiwesternism (according to the traditional religious community) was now a seemingly “revolutionary” dominant discourse within the scope of iran’s socialpolitical atmosphere and transformed into a crashing and powerful machine that could take any movement out of its way. this led to the foundation of the post-revolutionary type of radicalism in iran’s political and social life. due to this, for the new conquerors of all large and small squares of cities and towns, there was no reason to give up such a massive crushing machine and suffice their old and traditional tools. in the meantime, however, another factor was involved in the preservation and continuation of this anti-westernism. this factor was the role of the seemingly leftist revolutionary forces that were deceiving by new conquerors and accompanying them in providing firewood for the fire of the anti-western. there are several questions around such a claim, including: • if they did not, was not the situation the same today as it is now? • can it be said that these revolutionary leftist forces played an effective role? • were their analyses and their positions in that time and in relation to the events of that historical period inevitable, or is there any other way to imagine? these are some questions that deserve to be presented in a discussion, separated from this essay. 4. the consequences of anti-westernism process the power struggle in the form of “radical growth” of the type of anti-western religious extremism has had profound and lasting effects on the internal and external political conditions of iran and, hence, on the security and national interests of the country. this kind of radicalism in these more than thirty years has had many harmful consequences for both the iranian people and the entire middle east region. on the horizon of the future, it is also challenging to predict a clear situation. this kind of extremism that today’s people are struggling with, in its early forms and in the midst of the rise of the lower level people of urban communities in february 1979 in the hope of a better life, was combined with a kind of inclusive revolutionary without purpose and specific content. however, at the core of that primary forms, an unquestioning will, if not very planned but determined to take all power, was created before the february 1979 period. it was the will that since the first day after the revolution launched its killing machine with the execution of military officers and top officials of the kingdom system. it attempted decisively to eradicate the opponents and even in many cases “sinful and innocent together”, insofar that even in the words of the famous “revolutions also eat their own children.” this determined will to destroy anything except itself has attempted to eliminate everything on its way. the only thing it didn’t care about during these forty anti-westernism as a criterion for pretending to be revolutionary… 45 years was the national interest, prosperity and social progress of iran’s people. the results of such an anti-westernism in this long time were among other things, a change in many of the political equations, at least in the middle east. these were not regarding building up and serving human beings but rather aimed at promoting violence, hatred, destruction, chaos, and extremism. by insisting on the continuity of this approach, directly and indirectly, this anti-westernism helped to strengthen many reactionary governments and various reactive currents in the region, it pleased the artillery industry of the great world powers and contributed to the killing and destruction of many people in different countries of the middle east. 5. conclusion the radicalism referred to as the “post-revolutionary type”, had to protect and reproduce itself in order to survive. the ruling power in iran, using its own special “extremism” tool, continues to move in the same direction over four decades and it is fully aware that returning from, or even procrastinating in this way, can wrap its life up and put into the archive of history. it looks supposedly today that iran’s current system is supporting and protecting “divine holy values”. however, the reality is that, if we remove the denouncing western culture, declaring hostile attitudes and verbal attacks and slogans against the west from this “divine holy values”, there is almost nothing left to issue to the leaders and political elites of iran’s ruling apparatus to provide. what remains of these “holy values” are the religious debates within the religious schools, the ethical recommendations of the preachers and the establishment of traditional ceremonies among the people. but this is not what the nowadays rulers of iran want. the role of religion, or better to say more precise and realistic, the religion utilization factor in order to legitimize the ruling power is not only undeniable but also the basis of the current ruling system in iran. however, this “religion” itself, as a huge container to place external elements, in its soul, cannot alone be a source of thought or an origin of movement or transformation. this huge dish, or this bulky thousand-year-old ideological machine, uses countless concepts and tools that are considered in today’s world. without any kinship or reasonable relationship with these concepts and literary instruments, the religion captures them and brings them under its tent, and after that, it has used them, it throws them out like trash. what is related to the “iran” case is that a mixture of anti-western sentiments inherited from intellectuals of the period after shahrivar 1320 (september 1941), as the main source of a “political identity” on the one hand and “shi’ite” traditions reserved in a tough and impenetrable castle for “rule”, on the other hand, formed the basis of a state apparatus that has managed to survive in its entirety for almost forty years. for such a system of governance, there has never been a possibility to dilute the main plot, nor to dare to modify its islamic appearance and abandon the claims of its “shiite paradise”. a special type of anti-westernism today is given in the form of “sacred religious values” to a society with a rich cultural background. however, the connection between this anti-westernism and those religious values is not based on any reasonable logic. in fact, this anti-westernism is just a political tool that has put a group to be in power for nearly four decades. references abrahamian e., cronin s., 2004, reformers and revolutionaries in modern iran, [in:] new perspectives on the iranian left, routledgecurzon, , london – new york, 268–279. ankony r.c., kelley t.m., 1999, the impact of perceived alienation on police officers’ sense of mastery and subsequent motivation for proactive enforcement, policing: an international journal of police strategies & management, 22(2), 120–132, doi: 10.1108/13639519910271193 baker m., saldanha g., 2009, routledge encyclopedia of translation studies, routledge taylor & francis group, london new york. gürbüz m.v., 2003, the iranian revolution, ankara üniversitesi sbf dergisi, 58(4), 107–122. kinzer s., 2003, all the shah’s men : an american coup and the roots of middle east terror, john wiley & sons, hoboken. matin-asgari a., 2012, the pahlavi era; iranian modernity in global context, [in:] the oxford handbook of iranian history”, oxford university press, oxford, 346–364. mirsepasse a., 2004, intellectual discourse and the politics of modernization: negotiating modernity in iran, cambridge university press, cambridge. moazami b., 2013, state, religion, and revolution in iran, 1796 to the present, palgrave macmillan, new york. richards a., 2003, socio-economic roots of radicalism? towards explanining the appeal of islamic radicals, strategic studies institute, u.s. army war college, carlisle. thiessen m., 2009, an island of stability: the islamic revolution of iran and the dutch opinion, sidestone press, leiden. trofimov j., 2015, iran’s sway undermined by sunni-shiite split, the wall street journal, july 15, http://www.wsj. com/articles/irans-sway-undermined-by-sunni-shiitesplit-1436982046 (accessed 15 july 2015). wright r., 1989, in the name of god: the khomeini decade, simon and schuster, new york. 1. introduction issues related to the formation of optimal for ukraine model of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulating land relations on the way of realization of the integration state’s choice are prospective nowadays for scientific discourse realization. at the same time, for the detailing and disclosure of the concept and the content of the measures of state policy of regulating land relations, it is necessary to determine probabilistic changes of the main structural and dynamic indicators of land resources, which will take place during the implementation of a certain type of strategy management of these processes. according to this, the character and pace of the measures of state administration of land relations development should take into account modern experience of its implementation in the frames of each component of the system of land relations. the effectiveness of realization of economic-statistical analysis and the usage of prognostic and diagnostic methods of scientific knowledge will protect the development of the optimal for ukraine conceptual-analytical model of the strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulating land relations in ukraine. in the context of solving tasks on the building of conceptual and analytical model of the strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulating land relations in ukraine. i want to journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(2), 46–50 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.012.5168 conceptual and analytical model of strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine tetiana tytarenko department of theory and history of state and law, constitutional law, teaching and research institute of law and social technologies, chernihiv national university of technology, shevchenko 95, 14027 сhernihiv, ukraine. e-mail: tytarenko_tg@ukr.net citation tytarenko t., 2015, conceptual and analytical model of strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(2), 46–50. abstract in this article the key provisions of using strategic planning in the management of land relations are revealed and justified in the context of formalizing of optimal for ukraine conceptual and analytical model of strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulating land relations. according to the results of development of the conceptual and analytical model, four strategic goals are defined, under which operational objectives of state policy of regulating land relations in ukraine are represented. key words strategy of state policy, conceptual and analytical model, state policy of regulating land relations. conceptual and analytical model of strategy of formation and implementation of state policy… 47 emphasize, that a number of scientific papers are devoted to the theoretical and applied aspects of target modernization and reformation of state land administration by land relations, written by such scientists such as: o. alymov a. kuzmin, a. miroshnychenko, l. nowakowskyi, v. nosik, a. tretiak, m. shulha, s. ibatullina, o. stepenko and others. however, the majority of scientific researches, firstly, consider theoretical and practical aspects of land reform and land relations` development from the point of view of formation of the system of state administration by land relations and land resources. thus, we consider, there is an urgent need to conduct a systematic study of the problems of constructing the optimal for ukraine strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulation of land relations of enterprises on the base of formalization of adequate conceptual and analytical model. the main aim of this article is to develop the optimal for ukraine conceptual and analytical model of the strategy of formation and implementation of state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine on the base of generalization of conceptual approaches to the implementation of strategic planning in state administration of land relations. 2. strategic planning of state regulation of land relations land policy is a fundamental part of the general economic policy that defines aspects of development and usage of other measures of state regulation; reduces corruption risks and provides dynamism to the processes of modernization of economic development. environmental, transport, investment, industrial and other policies, one way or another, should be based on the current foundation, as well as on the plans of medium and long-term land policy of the state. we confirm that implementation of state policy is a continuous, dynamic process of achieving goals, which involves various government agencies and civil society institutions. therefore, the aim of implementation of the state policy of land relations is the practical organization of actions of land relations` participants, distribution and redistribution of land resources, providing the order in land usage, protection of land resources and their preservation for future generations. according to this, fundamental society`s interests, strategic demands of the modern stage of state`s development expressed by political leaders and elites in the form of basic principles and strategic objectives, which have found the appropriate public support, should be the base for the development of state land policy, which must meet modern requirements to the policy-making process (morrison, 2002). therefore, objectively, development of the effective state policy in the society is practically impossible without strategic planning, based on the implementation of provisions of the program-oriented approach to the formation of optimization complex of measures, methods and tools of targeted impact on the determined sphere of administrative activity. the relevance and urgency of usage of methods of strategic planning is additionally explained by its rationality and the global integration, and it can be seen in several possible options for the implementation into the society`s practice of ukraine (the conclusions of which provide consideration of the developments (суворов, 2014)). in state administration strategic planning – is the planning of the goals of the state development, that provides looking for optimal set of trajectories of its movement oriented to achieve some long-term objectives in the conditions of real resource constraints. such planning is one of the most important tasks of the state-management activity. it covers the conceptualization of policies, programmes and projects, regulatory, organizational and coordinationplanned design and provides achievement of their balance and assurance of the synchronous development (сурмін et al., 2010). its characteristic feature is the large-scale coverage of problems of rational land usage and land protection in the state. strategic planning allows, in a certain way, to make a clear definition of development objectives and to forecast the search/creation of the optimal set of trajectories of movement of a certain area of economic and administrative activity oriented on the achievement of defined long-term objectives in the conditions of real threats and resources` constraints. according to this, such type of planning becomes one of the main tasks of state-administrative activity in the field of land relations` regulation. it covers the conceptualization of components of the general policy of land relations` regulation, as well as target programmes and projects, regulatory, organizational and coordination-planned design and provides achievement of their balance and assurance of their synchronous development. along with the specified, the author confirms that the strategic planning in the field of state regulation of land relations, in fact, is able to combine several types of administrative activity, in particular: a) definition of objectives of development of land relations; b) forecasting of expenditures and changes in the quality of land resources; 48 tetiana tytarenko c) assessment of the adequacy of the defined list of resources and reserves; d) adaptation of the system of state and regional management in the field of land usage to the environment; e) internal coordination, which are reflected in the detailed comprehensive plan aimed at the ensuring of the achievement of the objectives. according to this we confirm that the essence of strategic planning, developed with the usage of provisions of the programme-target approach is the allocation of a substantial, in the whole complex of changes, in the sphere of land ownership, land usage and land protection, desirable and possible state of land relations in the country, region or local community in future. therefore, we recognize that according to the specified (tytarenko, 2014) major issues of the state policy of regulation of land relations that currently inhibit its development and implementation, proposed for the usage in the practice of the state scientific-applied measures on completion of the land reform and the development and implementation of new state policy of regulating land relations (using the provisions of the programme-oriented approach) may become the fundamental basis to prepare draft regulations and implement effective policy by executive authorities in full performance of their powers granted by the law. that is why, the original conceptual and analytical model of the strategy of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine can be represented in the form of structural-logical scheme, which is shown on the tab. 1. the systematic understanding of complex, voluminous and multifaceted issue of development and justification of the strategy of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine and, respectively, clear definition of content-richness of the last (титаренко, 2014) has provided holistic, comprehensive understanding of the priorities and possible directions of formalization of conceptual and analytical model, which is represented by the formula 1: where: s str – the strategy of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine; m – the mechanism of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine, which is represented together with its six components. that is, in the following composition of submechanisms: sm l – legal; sm ad – administrative; sm ol – organizational and land-managerial; sm fe – financial-economic; sm flp – formation of land property and land ownership; sm spl – security of protection of land; – multiple function from the structural and dynamic construction, based on different by nature dominants of state administration. in particular, on: the clear definiteness of: (а) essence and content of components of state policy of regulation of land relations, represented in the form of multidimensional system of economic, organizational and legal measures to rationalize land relations ( ); (b) principles of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations (p flrl ). it is also necessary to specify that objectification of the last involves incorporation and consideration of the modern experience of formation and implementation of the appropriate type of policy in three, recognized as priority ones, directions of realization of a complex of measures ( ); r ⊂ sui – closed feedback that occurs when performing administrative decisions and solving administrative tasks provided on the results of identification of the main systematicuniversal issues in sphere of regulation of land relations; df / dqpta – derivative structural and functional component that provides efficiency formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations according to the consequences of using provisions of programme-target approach during its development; st | op (g slrl ) | – to which (the mechanism, functionals and derivatives – see formula 1) incorporatively identified and justified as correlates strategic and operational objectives of state regulation of land relations in ukraine, that provides creation and selection of optimization complex of strategic tools (si srlr ) and, accordingly, development of a complex of measures for each of the (defined by the author of dissertation) two stages of the strategy implementation ( ) of the appropriate type (that is in the context of formation and implementation of the modern state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine). analysis and evaluation of the modern state of state management of land relations and, respectively, the use and protection of land in ukraine, confirms that there is a number of issues that require urgent solutions. the most acute problems of state policy of regulation of land relations that arose during their reformation and that are still not resolved, are also characterized on the table 1. conceptual and analytical model of strategy of formation and implementation of state policy… 49 thus, we prove: the presented calculations of the conceptual and analytical model of strategy of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine will protect from unit costs reduction, will provide the involvement of existing reserves and innovation opportunities for the development, improvement or radical change in land relations in the direction that is a priority one for the state, to rationalize the use and protection of land, food security and the creation of environmentally safe conditions for business and residence of citizens. the stated above is shown on the table 1 to identify the mechanisms of formation and implementation of state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine and to determine the optimal strategic goals. since it is the formalization of strategic and operational objectives and involvement of strategic potential of industrial and economic systems that will secure efficiency of technologies of strategic management of land relations in terms of resource limitations. tab. 1. conceptual and analytical model of the strategy of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine fomation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine essence, content and components of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine mechanism of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine, that includes six submechanisms: legal, administrative, financial-economic, organizational and landmanagerial; formation of land property, provision of land protection. principles of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine on the basis of systematic, resourcefunctional, structural and functional, situational, programmetarget and conflictological approaches. experience of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in the world a n al ys is a n d e va lu at io n o f t h e st at e p o lic y o f re g u la ti o n o f l an d re la ti o n s in u kr ai n e basic system-universal issues: 1) lack of the strategy and programmes of reforming and development of land relations and land protection; 2) imperfection and instability of land legislation and land law norms dispersion in different legal acts; 3) lack of interaction between state executive authorities and local self-government (with low efficiency of functioning of local government because of irrational allocation of functions and powers between them and state administrations, as well as due to the lack of resources); 4) closed nature and unavailability for usage by physical and legal persons without cadastral and registration information (incomplete process of formation of the state land cadastre); 5) politicization state management of land relations; 6) corruption in state governance bodies; 7) technological chain gaps in the adoption and implementation of decisions that lead to unsystematic, fragmented state land policy; 8) lack of a single authority of land management of state property; 9) incomplete processes of reforming the economic and legal ownership relations; 10) imperfect system of state administration in the sphere of usage, protection of land and control of land use (absence of the appropriate type of mechanism); 11) inefficient use of agricultural and nonagricultural land; 12) incomplete introduction into economic circulation of land plots and rights on them; 13) low efficiency of the system of payment for land when there is evasion of the land tax, rent (search and formalization of not deserved benefits on payment for land) etc. application of the programme-target approach: scientific justification and formulation of strategic goals, building a hierarchy of sub-goals for the programme sections, creating organizational structures that are adequate to programme methods of management. strategic goals: 1) reformation of relations of land ownership; 2) accounting and valuation of land resources as national wealth of ukraine; 3) organization of effective management of land relations in ukraine; 4) rationalization of land use and land protection. operational objectives: 1) guaranteeing constitutional rights to land, protection of land ownership; 2) creation of the land market infrastructure; 3) strengthen the institution of land ownership; 4) raise the level of investment attractiveness of land use; 5) quantitative and qualitative account of the state land resources; 6) account of especially valuable land; 7) evaluation of land resources of the state; 8) formation of the effective system of land relations management; 9) creation of an integrated system of state executive bodies and local government bodies in the sphere of land relations; 10) improvement of the regulatory framework in the field of regulation of land relations; 11) rationalization of land use; 12) land protection. source: own studies. 50 tetiana tytarenko 3. summary according to the results of the analysis of strategic planning in state administration of land relations, the conceptual and analytical model of the strategy of formation and implementation of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine is developed and visualized, under which the following is proposed: a) major steps towards completion of the land reform and development and implementation of a new state policy of regulation of land relations; b) apply the provisions of the programme-target approach as the basic method of improvement of the state policy of regulation of land relations in ukraine. summarizing the above presented calculations, the author believes that today the strategic planning on the basis of the programme-target approach can be seen as a methodological base, quite adequate for the present and able to increase the effectiveness of state management of land relations both in the state as a whole and its separate regions. the use of strategic planning in the state administration of land relations will promote the transition from the practice of using funds for the development of land relations to the evaluation of final results and increasing of responsibility during the implementation of relevant programmes, which makes it necessary to continue research in this area. references morrison t., 2002, actionable learning. a handbook for capaciti building throuhg case based learning, asian development bank institute, tokyo. суворов в.п., 2014, концептуальні основи стратегії розвитку державного регулювання земельних відносин у сфері містобудування, електронне наукове фахове видання «державне будівництво», 2, http://nbuv.gov. ua/j-pdf/debu_2014_2_16.pdf [10.09.2015] сурмін ю.п., бакуменко в.д., михненко а.м., 2010, енциклопедичний словник з державного управління, наду, київ. титаренко т.г., 2014, поняття державного регулювання і державного управління земельними відносинами, вісник чернігівського державного технологічного університету. серія: економічні науки, 4, 72-78. титаренко т.г., 2015, поняття та сутність і зміст державної політки регулювання земельних відносин в україні, електронне наукове фахове видання «державне управління: удосконалення та розвиток», 8, http:// www.dy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=873 [01.09.2015] указ президента «про стратегію сталого розвитку «україна 2020» від 12.01.2015 № 5/2015. http://zakon1. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5/2015 [30.10.2015] юрченко а.д., греков л.д., мірошниченко а.м., кузьмін а.в., 2009, сучасна земельна політика україни. монографія. інтертехнологія. київ. 1. introduction political processes of the present time are characterized by more rapid pace, complexity and scale than in previous years. this is due to the formation of the information society, the complex interconnection of globalization and regionalization, the development of democracy. the tendency of politicization of ethnic groups is typical for the world; it is one of the consequences of globalization. ethnopolitical processes largely determine the dynamic picture of the modern world; the nature of interaction between different ethnic groups is critical for these processes. a distinctive type of interethnic relations is uniting irredentist movements of representatives of one ethnic group that are members of different states; this type of relationship goes beyond domestic and affects the interests of several states. quite often, they cause interstate conflicts, which are characterized by duration, irrationality and difficulty in settling (gokcek, 2010; kim, 2016). the problem is urgent due to the fact that irredentism creates difficulties for many modern states. ukraine is no exception, while irredentism from a potential, to a certain extent latent problem, connected with the existence of pro-russian sentiments reasons for emergence and ideological explanation of the irredentist policy natalia horlo department of political sciences, zaporizhzhya national university, zhukovskogo 66, 69000 zaporizhzhya, ukrainе, e-mail: ngml@ukr.net citation horlo n., 2018, reasons for emergence and ideological explanation of the irredentist policy, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 45–52. abstract the article deals with the policy of irredentism, which is viewed as a state policy, aimed at joining the part of the territory of other states under the pretence of protection of the kin-groups from a perspective of rational approach. the author investigates the reasons for emergence of irredentism, emphasizes the decisive role of the “great idea”, which justifies the irredentist policy of the state, and draws attention to the influence of nationalism on the formation of the policy of irredentism. it gives a detailed analysis of the content of irredentist project of the russian federation because of which the annexation of the ukrainian crimea was carried out. key words irredentism, the policy of irredentism, national minority, kin-state, “the great idea”, nationalism, “the russian world”, the crimea, the donbass. received: 20 november 2017 accepted: 07 january 2018 published: 31 august 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 45–52 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.022.8791 46 natalia horlo in crimea and eastern regions of ukraine, turned into a real threat to the territorial integrity of the state in the context of a nationwide political crisis in early 2014. taking in the account the powerful influence of irredentism on domestic and foreign policy processes in the modern world, the question of the causes of irredentism, as well as the argumentation developed by irredentist states deserves the attention of scholars. the article proposes to distinguish between irredentism as a form of separatism initiated by national minorities and the policy of irredentism as a course of a kin-state. the analysis of this problem will be more productive from the perspective of a rational approach, which focuses on investigation of the actions of political actors as those seeking to achieve maximum results. с. offe (оффе, 1996) emphasizes that for individual and collective actors the participation in ethnopolitics becomes a «rational» act when they are guided by economic, political or military rational considerations. the rational factor in ethnopolitical conflicts is more closely linked to the actions of political leaders and elites who use the potential of an ethnic group to achieve their own or collective goals, most often – to increase the political, socioeconomic or territorial status of the group. 2. approaches to the definition of the essence of irredentism the story of irredentism originates in the second half of the 19th century, when a nationalist movement which emerged in italy, demanded to introduce as a part of the state “terre irredente” (“unredeemed land”), in other words – neighbouring territories of other states where italian-speaking population formed a majority. since then irredentism has begun to acquire features of expansionism. the variety of forms of its manifestation in different historical periods and among different nations resulted in the absence of a single conventional definition that would satisfy the entire scientific community. in addition, there are many other forms of ethnopolitical behaviour that have some common features with irredentism. this issue causes scientists to equate them (irredentism and unionism, irredentism and pan-nationalism). scientific works propose different views on the essence of irredentism, which is considered not only as an ideology that justifies unifying movements, but also as the unifying movements of ethnic groups (аклаев, 2005), a political course of the state (євтух, 2012) or even the type of ethnopolitical conflict (gokcek, 2010). the definitions of irredentist always use the criterion of purpose, which is the unification of groups of separated people, but the differences in the various definitions are due to the problem whom the researchers themselves consider as subjects of the unifying strategy, while the status of participants in the movement may differ. the variant of unifying when one part of the separated people has already created its own state (“kin-state”), while the other lives compactly on the adjacent territory of the neighbouring state (minority-irredenta) is the most common. d. yagcioglu (1996) connects irredentism only with the fact of the existence of tense relations between the national minority in the state and the dominant ethno-cultural group. this situation leads to the interference of another neighbouring state, because «the ethnic group that happens to be the minority in the country where the conflict is taking place, is the majority in the country that decides to get involved». the purpose of the neighbouring country is more radical than protecting the rights and interests of minority, and consists in the «liberation» of the minority and the territory in which it lives. however, irredentism quite often is viewed as all the cases of unifying that involves ethnic groups with different status – both nationalised and ungoverned, they seek to reunite within a single state formation. d. horowitz (1991) defines irredentism both an attempt to detach land and people of one state in order to incorporate them in another, and as an attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state. m. saideman and v. ayres (2000) believe that the desire of ethnic groups to join their «ungoverned» relatives in order to form a new state is also irredentist and calls it a “kurdish-style” irredentism. moreover, the kurdish precedent is not the only one, because there is an idea of creating the tibetan state, which should unite the territories of several provinces of the people’s republic of china, nepal and bhutan. many scholars (kornprobst, 2008; landau,1991; mayall, 1990; євтух, 2012) associate irredentism with the actions of institutional actors – states, socio-political movements or parties. in «legal encyclopedia» (юридична енциклопедія, 1999), irredentism is defined as a type of the national policy of the state (as well as political movement or party) aimed at uniting the people and ethnic groups scattered around the world and as a demand for the return of previously lost territories of a particular state in order to unite them within the borders of another state. from the point of view of a rational approach, the phenomenon under investigation should be interpreted reasons for emergence and ideological explanation of the irredentist policy 47 precisely as a «policy of irredentism», that is, a purposeful course to unite within one state such groups that are considered to be related by ethnocultural or other characteristics. the policy of irredentism is usually carried out under the slogans of protecting ethnic relatives who suffer distress in the country of residence. it is important to emphasize that by the subjects of irredentist policy such unification is considered to be possible only along with the territory in which the kin-groups live. that is why the annexation of the territory acts as the most radical instrument for implementing the policy of irredentism. 3. premises and causes of irredentism irredentism as a political phenomenon has objective causes for the emergence and development. it is associated with the existence of separated people as an irrefutable historical fact. a. semchenkov and r. barash (семченков, бараш, 2009) rightly point out that from the historical point of view the phenomenon of separated people is not uncommon. on the contrary, the complete correspondence of administrative and state boundaries to ethnocultural areas occurs rare. however, such a problem of separation did not exist for a long time; it arose only in the 19th century during the intensification of national liberation struggles and the growth of the level of national consciousness. historical premises for the formation of irredentism are connected with the change of state borders due to areal conquests, the emergence or disintegration of states and territorial divisions as a result of signing international treaties. this led to the fact that representatives of one ethnic group became residents of different states. the most extensive «redesigning» of the political space in eastern europe took place after the first world war, when many new states arose as a result of the collapse of the empires and due to imperfect delimitation of borders the problem of minorities intensified; and after the end of cold war, collapse of the countries of the socialist camp, namely the ussr and yugoslavia. the compact near-border localization of groups of separated people determines their territorial proximity, and therefore irredentist intentions live on the memory of the common historical past and historical ties with the «great fatherland». cultural factors such as language and religion also play an important role in the irredentist strategy of minorities and kin-states. from the standpoint of organicism, ethnicity can be regarded as a peculiar social organism endowed with collective memory and will, so the characteristics that unite ethnic members into one community do not disappear under the conditions of separation. a common identity is quite stable and difficult to transform. by its nature, it is a group (collective) identity, and, accordingly, in certain circumstances it can stipulate the attraction to the unification of the ethnic group not only mentally, but virtually – in the physical space. ethnic and territorial factors are closely intertwined within irredentism. the idea of the localization of one’s ethnos in space and possession of a certain territory for representatives of the ethnic group is no less important than the realization of its natural cognation. according to r. barash (бараш, 2010a), the division of territory and ethnic group living on it is emotionally perceived as a violation of a given historical order. that is why irredentist assumes not only the unification of the population, but also the territory of its residence, because if the territorial factor were insignificant, the problem of separation would be entirely solved by migration. according to the author, the fact of the separation of people is not itself an immediate condition for the emergence of irredentism, but it is actualized in the process of relations between polyethnic states and minorities within them regarding the status of the group, the accession to power, the volume of authority, and also depends on strategic interests of kin-minorities of the neighbouring states. in scientific literature, irredentism is traditionally described as a triad, represented by and an irredenta – a national minority within a polyethnic state, which seeks to be part of a neighbouring state on the basis of kinship; an irredentist state (“a kin-state”); a multi-ethnic state, from which a national minority tries to detach itself. a national minority within a polyethnic state may form irredentist sentiment as a result of dissatisfaction with its political, economic or cultural status, when it feels a certain distance between itself and the rest of the population, which is the result of ignoring the interests of this minority. the irredentist sentiment arises on the ground of a conflict of identities when ethnic identity dominates civic. the polyethnic state, which has the minorityirredenta, experience a threat to its internal political stability due to the strengthening of irredentist sentiments. if the authorities want to avoid an escalation of interethnic conflicts, it should pursue an effective ethnonational policy. the consideration of the ethnonational factor in the domestic policy of the state is an important factor in the legitimacy of state power. in addition, the type of political regime itself influences the possibility of the emergence of irredentist. it would seem that democracy does not 48 natalia horlo allow the emergence of irredentist sentiments, but their emergence is quite possible under the conditions of liberal regimes, because they proclaim freedom of choice and speech, so the political leaders who declare irredentist slogans take advantage of it. a kin-state is a neighboring state in which the ethnos, which has formed irredentist aspirations, as a rule, quantitatively dominates. this state can support ethnic relatives differently, ranging from cultural cooperation and ending with the formation of a course to the adherence of ethnic groups along with the territories of their residence as a part of a state. attracting various resources to achieve the goal, including informational and military, can transform irredentism into a serious clear threat to the integrity of the polyethnic state. in addition to objective factors, irredentism is fuelled by subjective reasons, because politicians who pursue rational goals in their activities and declare the need for the return of ethnic relatives to the state actively articulate the problem of separation. irredentists often appeal to the right of people to self-determination, which they attribute to ethnic groups. relevant rhetoric always finds sympathizers. the combination of a set of objective and subjective factors can be observed in all cases of irredentism, ranging from italian irredentism or greek enosis. under the slogans of irredentism, the german lands were united in the 19th century and later, in order to achieve national reunification, the acquisition of a territory of other states took place – the german annexation of the sudetenland from czechoslovakia under the munich treaty and the austrian anschluss in 1938. these are textbook examples of the implementation of irredentist policy, but irredentism was formed in other people of europe as well. it is known that irredentism also existed in romania, hungary, bulgaria, lithuania, but it did not originate in other european countries – france, great britain, spain, benelux countries. r. barash (бараш, 2010b) explains this by the fact that in countries where irredentism originated, the establishment of a centralized state was late – either because of a long confrontation with its neighbours, or due to the existence once within a multiethnic state, where ethnic identity prevailed over civic. 4. the role of ethnic ideology in the conceptual substantiation of the policy of irredentism for an ethnopolitical mobilization of groups of separated people in support of the irredentist course, a kin-state develops an ethnic ideology – a set of doctrines, concepts and programs that interpret the history of the ethnic group, its mental characteristics, indicate the prospects for the development of the given ethnic group in a necessary way. the emergence of irredentist as a strategy and political movement becomes possible on the basis of nationalism as a collective idea. according to e. gellner (гелнер, 2010), nationalism is, first and foremost, the political principle according to which political and national units must coincide. this is the very principle that correlates with the unifying strategy of the separated people. irredentism is one of the practical embodiments of nationalism and activity based on his ideas, since the desire and movement for the unification of the «separated» people is best suited to the idea of social integration offered by nationalism. irredentism as one of the ways of self-determination of an ethnic group develops as part of ethnic nationalism, which involves the unification of the people based on common history, language, culture. the nationalist idea provides a powerful potential to all participants of the irredentist triangle. it is worth mentioning r. brubaker (брюбейкер, 2006), who identified three modern forms of nationalism that together form the «triadic nexus»: «nationalizing» nationalism of newly independent or newly reconfigured states, transborder nationalism, carried out by an external national homeland, and nationalism of national minorities. these nationalisms interact and conflict, cause civil and interstate conflicts. an integral part of the ethnic ideology of irredentists is the “great idea”, which should be understood as a set of representations of the historical mission of the people and the priority tasks that the nation faces in the process of national construction functioning in the public consciousness. in the process of formation of the idea an important part plays both objective (including historical memory), and subjective (associated with the efforts of politicians and scholars) factors. the “great idea” uniquely combines the past and the future: the image of an ideal state tends to be in the past, which is idealized as the “golden age”, the period of political, economic and cultural prosperity of the people; it becomes the basis for the formation of the idea of desired future. the positive attitude of the population towards irredentist slogans is facilitated by the ruling groups’ policy of actualization historical memory. for the separated people, the phenomenon of divided ethnic memory is typical, which is realized in several ethnic fields formed as a result of the division of the ethnic community and the presence of its parts in various ethnopolitical organisms (євтух, 2012). reasons for emergence and ideological explanation of the irredentist policy 49 however, representatives of one nation, despite the separation, preserve some common images and representations in historical memory. appealing to the historical past is a very effective means of influencing individuals and can strengthen their collective solidarity. the policy of memory is extremely important for legitimizing the foreign policy of the state. a distinctive feature for the coverage of the historical past of the ethnic group in the ethnic ideology is its mythologization. national myths have a positive impact and show the ancient history of the ethnic group and the continuity of the traditions of statebuilding. what actually happens is that the calls for the protection of kin-groups may mask the true motives of the irredentists to increase the influence of the state in the region. that is why the idea of “great power” can dominate in the irredentist ideology. the idea is to restore control over the territories that were previously part of a large state formation. all the doctrines of the “great power” emphasize the importance of the territorial factor in the national liberation movement, which confirms the high territorial status of the people. however, in ethnopolitical interstate conflicts it is difficult to find a way to meet such a requirement as the return of the original territories, because this “primordiality” can always be challenged, namely, the question of the primacy of ownership of the territory is quite manipulative. the “great ideas” arose in the 19th century – at the beginning of the 20th century among many european nations, mostly those who have experienced a long period of separation, and still remain relevant and nourish the irredentist policies of many states. perhaps the most famous is the greek megali idea, which is still relevant to the greeks. the ideas of a “great power” are widespread in albania, bulgaria, romania, serbia, and hungary. while borders between states are considered inviolable according to international norms, the “great idea” exists to a greater extent in a latent form, due to the fact that it is a call to the revision of state borders, that is, an offence against sovereignty of a neighbouring state. it is presented mainly in the programs of radical nationalist political parties. in general, the “great idea” played and plays an extremely important part in the implementation of the policy of irredentism, stimulating the state to apply various means for the accession of territories recognized as “unredeemed”. however, irredentism, despite a powerful ideological background, rarely reaches the goal, because it encounters considerable resistance. history shows that conflicts and war with the irredentist component could not be avoided, especially in the countries that arose after the collapse of yugoslavia, where several “great ideas” collided, in particular, political projects on the revival of “great serbia” and “great croatia”. nowadays ukraine and russia are in the long-standing military confrontation with the irredentist component. 5. russian irredentism in ukraine ukraine is a polyethnic state and has representatives of more than 130 nationalities and nationalities. some of them live compactly near the borders of their historic homelands – kin-states, and it is possible that irredentist sentiments will arise in those regions. this is exactly the case with regions adjacent to the russian federation – the crimea and the donbass. the quantitative prevalence of russians is characteristic only for the crimea, where in 2001 the share of russians among all inhabitants of the republic was 58.3%; in the donbass their share in the ethnic composition of the population of the region was smaller and amounted to 38.2% in the donetsk region and 39% in lugansk (про кількість…, 2001). russian politicians were showing interest in these regions for a long time, trying to fit them into the context of the “russian world”. back in 1999 in the russian federation adopted “federal law of the russian federation about state policy of the russian federation concerning compatriots abroad» (федеральный закон…, 1999). with the help of informational influence on the ethnic russian and prorussian population of the crimea and the donbass, the idea of “historical injustice” of the inclusion of these regions into ukraine and the desire to “reunite with the historical homeland” was quite active. the realization of russian irredentism led to the annexation of the ukrainian crimea. at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014, the revolution of dignity took place in ukraine, leading to the fall of v. yanukovych’s regime. separatist movements in the crimea and the donbass intensified immediately and developed under the russian scenario. even during the period of revolutionary events, the state leadership of the russian federation used a complicated political situation in ukraine in order to prepare the annexation of the crimea. with the support of the russian authorities and under the control of the russian military, a so-called “referendum” on the status of the autonomous republic of crimea was held in crimea on march 16, 2014, which resulted in the illegal annexion of this region into russia. the un general assembly recognized the illegitimacy of the referendum. resolution 68/262 (2014) states that the referendum held in the autonomous republic of crimea and the city 50 natalia horlo of sevastopol on 16 march 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the their status (резолюция, принятая генеральной ассамблеей 27 марта 2014 года, 2014). at the same time, separatists in the donbass became more active, which led to the formation of terrorist organizations «dnr» and «lnr», which have been receiving significant support in military and armor by the russian authorities for a long time already. in this regard, in early 2015, the verkhovna rada of ukraine recognized the russian federation as an aggressor state (постанова верховної ради україни, 2015b, p. 68), and the dpr and lnr as terrorist organizations (постанова верховної ради україни, 2015a, p. 77). nevertheless, if in the crimean version of separatism the irredentist goal was obvious, for the donbas separatists it is quite vague, more like a remote and amorphic perspective. it seems that the highest russian politicum is not interested in annexion of this region to the russian federation. russia’s support of separatists in the donbass is a means of dismantlement of the situation in ukraine. it is obvious that in the foreign policy of russia the irredentists’ slogans mask expansionist policies aimed at the restoration of a «great power». on this occasion z. brzezinski (бжезинський, 2014 noted that «the ukrainian crisis is not a result of some kind of sudden quarrel, ...but a symptom of a more serious problem: the appearance of a policy packed within a larger philosophical concept». the russian “great idea” exists in the form of an extensive concept of the “russian world” which synthesizes many elements, among which is not only the great-power idea of the revival of the empire as “third rome” but also a special civilization mission of the russian people in confrontation with western influence. this concept, along with the popular slogans of the “russian people as separated”, “protecting compatriots abroad”, “the great russian house” forms the basis for the expansionist irredentist policies of russian government. the russia’s foreign policy has become imperial in nature and is actually aimed at the reconstruction of the image of a mighty state, which was the russian empire, and later – the ussr. in our opinion, the importance of the very imperial idea in the policy of irredentism proves the situation in the crimea and the donbass. a large part of the population of these regions accepted the so-called “soviet identity” for a long time. after the collapse of the ussr, a part of the population could not get used to the new conditions and was nostalgic about the lost state. this proves the presence of a pro-soviet identity rather than pro-russian. it also explains the relatively low level of support for the pro-russian forces in the crimea at the local elections in 2010 (притула, 2011). but already in 2014, according to the results of the pseudo-referendum, the crimea was annexed by russia. of course, voting at gunpoint and falsifications could not provide another result, but all of these ultimately proves that irredentism as an integral part of the foreign policy of the state is, in fact, a technology that, in order to achieve the desired result, involves the use of any manipulations. the interference of russia in the affairs of other states is due to the militaristic ideology as a component of the idea of the «russian world». for example, russia’s intervention in the affairs of syria is a continuation of its aggressive foreign policy; it looks like a revenge for the ussr’s defeat in the cold war, and, consequently, indicates a continuation of the great imperial course. the irredentist policy of the russian federation regarding the crimea is a flagrant violation of the norms of international law. annexion of the crimea to russia contradicts the norms of ukrainian legislation (for example, illegal all-crimean referendum due to the lack of legislative basis for its securing) and international law (violation of the territorial integrity of the state, the use of force). the russian federation has violated the international borders of ukraine and is currently committing oppression of the rights of the indigenous crimean tatar population (очередные притеснения крымских татар…, 2017). in december 2016, the un general assembly recognized the human rights abuse of the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied crimea by the russian occupation authorities (резолюция, принятая генеральной ассамблеей 19 декабря 2016 года, 2016). it was then that russia was named an invading state for the first time in the united nations documents.the world does not recognize the crimea as a part of the russian federation and applies sanctions against russia, but radical nationalist forces in different countries see this as a precedent that is favourable to them. 6. conclusion thus, irredentism is a political phenomenon, the emergence of which can be explained by a whole set of reasons, both objective and subjective. in the nature of irredentism both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies are manifested simultaneously. centric tendencies are evident in the fact that irredentism contributes to the unification of the separated people within the boundaries of one state. the centrifugal tendencies are shown in the desire of the reasons for emergence and ideological explanation of the irredentist policy 51 national minority to withdraw from the multiethnic state, which allows us to interpret irredentism as a type of separatism. the attitude towards irredentism is also controversial: irredentism can be evaluated quite positively from the point of view of the realization of the right of the ethnic group to selfdetermination, but it is considered negatively from the standpoint of maintaining the integrity of the borders of the state in which the irredenta resides. the systematic registration of irredentist demands is due to ethnic ideology, the core of which is the “great idea”, which justifies the special historical mission of the people. the unification of groups of separated people is recognized as one of the priority tasks. in fact, the current policy of irredentism has the nature of expansionism and seeks to revive a “great power.” a striking example is russia’s policy regarding the border areas of ukraine. the world community should develop a coordinated position so that russian irredentism, guided by the idea of spreading the «russian world», has not become a dangerous precedent. references gokcek g., 2010, irredentism versus secessionism: the potential for international conflict, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595095 [03.05.2015]. 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horlo семченков а.с., бараш р.е., 2009, проблема разделенных народов в контексте трансформации мирового политического пространства, политическая наука, 1, 137–167. федеральный закон «о государственной политике российской федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом», 1999. принят государственной думой 5 марта 1999 года. одобрен советом федерации 17  марта 1999 года, 1999, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/ bank/13875 [30.11.2017]. юридична енциклопедія, 1999, укр. енцикл., київ, http:// leksika.com.ua/15460225/legal/iredentizm [04.03.2017]. 1. introduction ukrainian state and society are at a new stage of deep changes, which affect the condition of the society, the major spheres of life and for each individual person (горбулін, 2016). the present ukraine is marked by aggression of russia and the severe consequences of military conflict (гай-нижник, 2017): internal migration (about 1.5 million internally displaced persons), socio-economic, political tensions and social disadaptation, the mobilization of the army (about 100 thousand people mobilized) heavy casualties (over 10 thousand persons’ military and civilian dead) and unmet need for rehabilitation and re-socialization of thousands of wounded and disabled veterans, participants in anti-terrorist operations (ato). post-revolutionary ukrainian government has failed a test not only on the ability to effectively counter the russian force pressure, the ability to actually start and promote systemic reform, but also on the ability to provide european choice of ukraine is primarily the development of an optimal model of foreign policy which are guarantees national security and domestic policies that would ensured adequate social welfare standards to needy categories of the journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 56–63 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.007.8159 technology mediation as an effective procedure of public administration in social protection of antiterrorist operations participants iurii zhogno department of public management, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, ezhen pottier 20, kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: zhuyrii@gmail.com citation zhogno i., 2018, technology mediation as an effective procedure of public administration in social protection of antiterrorist operations participants, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 56–63. abstract this article discusses the efficiency of the technology as mediation procedures of public administration in the social protection of members of the anti-terrorist operation (ato) and their families. the author introduced empirical research, study results which allowed the present three-factor model of efficiency mediation. the validity of the model is confirmed using standardized statistical criteria. empirically found that the effectiveness of technology mediation procedures as public administration correlated, both individual and social characteristics combatant of ato and communicative competence of public servants involved in the process of mediation. key words ukraine, public administration, mediation, member of the anti-terrorist operation, social injuries. received: 08 june 2017 accepted: 23 december 2017 published: 30 march 2018 technology mediation as an effective procedure of public administration in social protection… 57 population, which in the first place, are victims by armed russian aggression. from the spring of 2015 in ukraine formed a new, according to the theory of social space p. bourdieu (бурдье, 2007), “actually operating group of people”, which act as autonomous actors in a multidimensional social fields. detailed explication of this social field reveals at least several vectors of social policy is still not settled in the ukrainian society: the social and economic welfare, employment, health care with extensive rehabilitation component, integration of internal migrants, and, most importantly, the reintegration of ato’s combatants and members of their families. these groups are situational and at the legislative level are differentially conditional on subgroups of social agents: • military subgroup – combatants (military personnel and volunteers involved in the fighting and the ato), ato veterans and people with disabilities, members of ato and their families; • migrant subgroup – is internally displaced persons, including those who need social protection of the disabled, the unemployed, pensioners and the others. therefore, in the modern social life of ukrainian society actually latest social topology is objectified (including the above group of social agents with the appropriate set of operating status, characteristics, needs, opportunities, etc.) that the military reality of ukraine. in the author’s concept of p. bourdieu (бурдье, 2007), agent capital in the social space is defined by its position on the various dimensions of this space – economic, cultural, legal and etc. certain types of social capital determine the patterns of social interaction at this dimension of social space (“rules of the game”) and “chances to win” of a particular social agent in this interaction (the probability of satisfaction of own needs). it should also be noted that the explication of ukrainian realities today it distinguishes characteristic feature – the “existence of conditions and actions for social injury” (решетніченко et al., 2012, p. 37), as a result of layers of social, physical and psychological trauma individual and collective quality of regional social field. it is also clear that the chances of winning the above populations is not currently high and, not least, depending on the mechanism involved public administration and competencies of civil servants. civil servants are an important subject of public administration and relevant state social policy, as you know, helps optimize the use of resources of different countries to pursue national interests and ensure effective dialogue of citizens and public officials, which includes differentiated and balanced approach to meet the needs of social vulnerable groups (білинська, 2013). in this context there is a need for purposeful formation of certain competencies of civil servants, including and the ability to adequately respond to conflicts in the interaction of social groups (the conflict or communicative competence). this civil servant must effectively settle conflicts relevant to broadcast social and cultural values have negotiation skills and business communication, and exchange of basic social values and communication with mass addresser. conflictogenes of new social reality continues to be produced through permanent military confrontation in the east of ukraine and it induced social tension that creates some social challenges and problematic situations (решетніченко et al., 2012). social policy, as the activity of state regulation of socio-economic conditions of society to the welfare of its members, eliminate the negative effects of maladaptive functioning processes for social and political stability in the country confronts public service related goals and objectives. as the main objectives of social policy is to provide every citizen effective medium that allows him to work for the welfare of the family and strengthen targeted social assistance to vulnerable groups of the population with low income (головатий, 2005), and relevant goals of social policy at the present stage of socio-economic development of ukraine is to implement comprehensive measures of social security settlers and ato’s combatants, particularly in the areas of social protection and employment, palliative care, health and social services, increase social guarantees for families with children and persons with disabilities. the relevance of these objectives is increasing because of the increasing social polarization, mind blowing falling living standards and income levels differentiated by different groups; crisis spiritual sphere of society – deformation value sphere of individual and collective consciousness that produces the crisis of social identity; total social instability and a high level of conflict within the social structure of ukrainian society; growth of criminal activity and suicide (решетніченко et al., 2012). as a result, according to experts, a characteristic feature of ukrainian reality is «the existence of conditions and actions for social injuries». after the demonstration psychosomatic phenomenon of maladjustment components, usually caused its social component with the appropriate set of problems produced around ato’s combatant. the complex of such potentially problematic situations that represent a group of ato’s combatants locally suffer and the system of public administration in the social sphere of ukraine’s regions are involved in active measures ato, particularly in the odesa region. despite the obvious processing and seriousness of 58 iurii zhogno the problem of social exclusion, it remains understudied and is still relevant for ukraine. therefore, we believe that social genesis of trauma to the military subgroups social agents in the odessa region develops in the following way (fig. 1). the upward trend of social injuries has obviously some related factors of different quality, one of which reproduces the communication features of interaction of social agents in the region in terms of ato. this mechanism of regional public administration and communication as the plane of its implementation, have a direct impact on the factors produced by the process of social injuries. it seems that the use of innovative technologies in the practice of regional public administration in conditions of social injuries, in fact, is a problematic situation of our study. the theoretical construct “communication – social injuries – public administration”, in this case, appears to the researcher as implicit functional dependency that requires some explication. the main aim of our research is a experimental study efficient use of mediation as a procedure of public administration in the field of social protection of ato’s combatants, which is of considerable practical importance for the implementation of highly effective public administration at the regional level. the object of our study is the process of public administration social issues ato’s combatants. the subject of the study, respectively, is the effectiveness of technology mediation procedures as public administration in social security ato combatants and their families. the main methods of study were: content analysis of professional literature, field experiment and statistical analysis of the results by the experiment methods of mathematical statistics (z-criterion kolmogorov-smirnov, u-mann-whitney criterion for two independent samples, factor analysis). purposeful mechanism of public administration in social security management system is carried out, which includes government, local governments, political parties, ngos, etc. public administration social sphere in the context of post-revolutionary ukraine should be a mechanism, based primarily on european imperatives that determine the real quality of life, social welfare, employment, social support, mitigating the negative effects of individual and social inequality, social and economic tensions in society (скуратівський et al., 2007). at the same time, it is clear that ukraine can avoid the influence of factors of globalization, so there is the need to apply modern scientific approaches to adapt to the specifics of globalization and development of scientifically based recommendations for public administration of various spheres of society in the context of globalization and military aggression. according to the civilizational paradigm, ukraine, as a country on the border of western and eastern civilizations, will not escape the relevant civilizational choice. it refers to the evolutionary paradigm of standards and highly international community, including the principles and methods of effective public administration. these standards, in addition to political, include economic, technological, environmental and communication standards, including technology mediation as a method of pre constructive resolution of conflicts involving a neutral third party (редлих, миронов, 2009). today, technology mediation in ukraine is not institutionalized (03.11.2016, parliament of ukraine adopted “law on mediation” only in the first reading), which allows free use of a relatively wide range of social agents. it should be noted that the problem of re-socialization of ato’s combatants is extremely important fig. 1. genesis of social injuries in the region source: own study. technology mediation as an effective procedure of public administration in social protection… 59 for civil servants and local government because of its potential threat to the stability of social welfare in the region, diversity and novelty. despite the large number of scientific publications and studies on the social and psychological rehabilitation of combatants of armed conflict still unresolved pressing issues of socio-economic, medical, social and psychological support ato’s combatants who faced with a total vacuum in the field of socio-economic needs. in particular, the study of domestic and foreign experts indicate significant number of combatants (according to different estimates 7–10% in general) with the worst version of combat the effects of stress, which manifests complex psychosomatic symptoms, including stress disorders – ptsd, etc. (ursano et al., 2010). this includes psychosocial features combatant experiencing combat stress, particularly during resocialization, actually, when and produced symptoms of maladjustment and social injuries of micro-, mesoand macro levels (see fig. 1). today, there are a few basic scientific concepts, experiences combatant on trauma and its social and existential aspects and biological factors of development. ptsd, according to researchers, is a complex phenomenon involving symptoms of hyper-arousal, intrusive experiences of traumatic events, dissociation, anger / aggression, disruption of information processing / memory disorders, anxiety / panic, etc. (ursano et al., 2010). obviously, if this state of the processes of communication and social interaction combatants have the potential complications and the likelihood of injury increases social induction that would attract the attention of public administration, as well as mediators and researchers. in the context of re-socialization of combatants and the reduction of social injuries in the region particularly important to establish effective communication with the public servant ato’s combatant and members of his family at all stages of re-socialization, including: 1. during treatment and rehabilitation – by increasing awareness ato’s combatant psychosocial impact of traumatic events and active adaptive overcome the influence of medication and cognitive behavioral therapy (how to…, 2008), optimize compliance with treatment and rehabilitation team, hospital, government representatives, etc. 2. during resocialization – conducting psycho-education and motivational measures moderation ato’s combatant compliance with rehabilitation team. 3. at all stages of re-socialization – monitoring the quality of the process of socialization ato’s combatant and his family using social-psychological technologies (the psychosocial and legal support, the mediation / moderation, etc.); study the effectiveness of using technology as mediation procedures of public administration in the social protection of ato’s combatants. 2. the results of the experiment our message highlights the results of the social project of the ngo “eleos” in the social project “palliative care seriously ill ato’s combatants at home in the post-hospital period”, which was introduced in 2015 under the “programs solving priority social problems of the city with the use of social order”, in particular, joint mediators of the ngo “eleos”, civil servants of the municipality of odessa (department of labor and social assistance) and the military commissariat of odessa region. at the time of this project the specialists of the ngo “eleos” made a number of social events such as: • distance and group psychosocial and legal counseling ato’s combatants and their families; • social, mediation, legal and psychological assistance to ato’s combatants and their families at home and on the request; • monitoring and evaluation: individual request of ato’s combatants and their families, their social capital (family, social support groups, etc.), typology and dynamics of resolving social difficulties ato’s combatants need to involve local authorities, the conflict combatant audit request and the need for specific social, psychological and legal services, including legal aid and mediation. the main pool problem situations on the stages of treatment, rehabilitation and re-socialization of ato’s combatants shown in fig. 2. main field experiment sample (n1=78) mainly homogeneous: all 78 combatants – males, all are members of ato, all combatants are military status ranks or junior officers, middle age: 35.7±11.2 years. the experiment also included requests for mediation received from family members of ato’s combatants (n2=112). based on clinical and psychopathological research method ato mental state combatants, with the main medical diagnosis, it was found that all of them have symptoms severe reactions to stress and adaptation disorders (code f43 according to icd-10 (international…, 2016)). thus, the study sample is representative enough as gender, age, medical diagnosis and the military status of ato’s combatants. it should be noted that the active use of social and psychological activities in our project, including: psychosocial intervention in the process of resocialization of the consultants and the number of 60 iurii zhogno fig. 2. pool problematic situations on the stages of treatment, rehabilitation and re-socialization of ato’s combatants (n = 78) source: own study. fig. 3. socio-psychological technologies of social project of ngo “eleos” source: own study. technology mediation as an effective procedure of public administration in social protection… 61 cases that were processed by consulting / mediation / legal aid – corresponded to the level of social tension in the target group (fig. 3). subsample (subgroups) field experiment made experimental group (n3=23) – cases using mediation and control group (n4=45) – cases without using a mediation procedure. a preliminary statistical analysis of the study z-sided kolmogorov-smirnov criterion testified (ρ≤0.001), all variables that describe the overall sample is nonparametric. these two subgroups, which are separated by the criterion “use of technology mediation” checked for authenticity differences results through u-mann-whitney for 2 independent subsamples that confirming their homogeneity. this criterion has found reliable differences between them (ρ≤0.05) with only 2 interchangeable field experiment: • motivation ato’s combatants family on request for mediation, u=617.4; • duration of the previous process of resocialization, including treatment and rehabilitation, u=222.0. in addition, to reduce the variables of the experiment we conducted factor analysis procedure for experimental subgroups, which helped make the next 3-factor model (tab. 1) 3. discussion of results it seems necessary to initiate such preliminary generalizations about the estimated 3-factor model efficiency technologies as mediation procedures of public administration in the social protection of ato’s combatants: • accumulated percentage of the total variance of model constructed (74.94% of the total variance results of subgroup), mentioned criteria sampling adequacy kaiser-meyer-olkin and bartlett sphericity samples allow collectively implement meaningful interpretation of the results of factor analysis of subgroups for the purpose of research; • model is sufficiently differentiated, since almost all variables factorization procedure (indicators characterizing subgroup) grouped according to the fate of variance due to the influence of certain factors; • model is polarized, while the positive pole vulnerable: performance indicator mediation, chartab. 1. matrix factors weighting coefficients models (n3=23) replacement procedure factorization factors model 1 2 3 motivation in family ato’s combatant to request mediation 0.255 level of socio-economic well-ato’s combatant (economic status) 0.318 the duration of the previous re-socialization process (including treatment and rehabilitation) 0.199 level of psychosomatic disorders combatant (medical diagnosis) -0.315 category conflict in continuum „social-criminal” ** -0.172 category (a. b. c) a public servant. that is a party to the conflict -0.120 the success of the mediation procedure 0.264 resocialization combatant phase (treatment. rehabilitation. re-socialization) -0.230 category (a. b. c) a public servant co-mediator 0.166 ato combatant motivation to request a mediation 0.152 compliance level civil servants mediator 0.297 communicative competence level civil servant (peer review) 0.329 conclusion of mediation agreement (duration. costs premediation) -0.306 the duration of the mediation procedure 0.290 readiness to innovate public servant co-mediator (peer review) 0.334 percentage of the total variance factor.% 33.98 22.45 18.51 the accumulated percentage of the total variance.% 33.98 56.43 74.94 method of extraction factors principal component analysis method rotation factors varimax with kaiser normalization criterion sampling adequacy kaiser-meyer-olkin. k = 0.444 sphericity criterion sampling bartlett. s = 248.13 (ρ ≥ 0.001) notes: * data derived from expert assessment of experts of consultant ngo “eleos”; ** see explanation in fig. 2. source: own study. 62 iurii zhogno acteristics of the mediation procedure, professional quality of public servant (in the case where he is involved as a co-mediator) and motivational characteristics combatant ato; at the opposite pole in the reciprocal ratio found themselves: the level of physical and neuropsychiatric disorders of ato’s combatants (medical diagnosis), the fact of the presence of combatants in the early stages of re-socialization, character themes of conflict and the fact that the presence of a civil servant in the conflict. thus, the model efficiency technologies as mediation procedures of public administration in the social protection of combatants ato has 3 factors, including: • factor №1 “co-mediation” (holds 33.98% of the total variance subsample) – reflects the peculiarities of public administration using technology mediation, which involved a public servant as co-mediator; factor focuses on the correlation length of the mediation procedure with the duration of the previous process of re-socialization, communication and reciprocal closeness to the criminal status of the conflict and the presence of a civil servant in the conflict; • factor №2 “efficiency mediation” (holds 22.45% of the total variance subsample) – plays connection efficiency mediation procedure with the level of motivation of combatants to participate in mediation, the level of compliance with the mediator civil servant at the time of mediation; not least proved successful mediation correlation with the level of communicative competence of a civil servant and reciprocal relationship with the duration of the initial stages of mediation; • factor №3 “features of combatant” (holds 18.51% of the total variance subsample) – plays the reciprocal relationship of psychosomatic disorders combatant ato and its location on the route resocialization of its economic status as well as the practical experience of civil servant co-mediator. 4. discussion of results and conclusions during the process the results of empirical research presented factor model of efficiency technologies as mediation procedures of public administration in the social protection of ato’s combatants. the validity of the model is confirmed using standardized statistical criteria. empirically found that the efficiency of the technology as mediation procedures public administration correlated as combatants with the characteristics (individual, social) and professional characteristics of public official involved in the mediation. note that the issues of effective communication, communicative competence of public administration, including use of social and psychological interaction interactive technologies (mediation) is an important and significant factor in social protection of ato’s combatants. in this context, there is need for purposeful formation of certain skills of public servants able to adequately respond to conflict situations in cooperation with social groups. therefore, the department of public management of napa under the president of ukraine in collaboration with hamburg university and other partners to develop scientific and practical research on communication issues, introduce projects to develop technologies dialogue interactions in the system of public administration. note that this research themes consistent with the context of establishing the institute of mediation in ukraine, and why are devoted to our further scientific research and study. references international statistical classification of diseases and related health problems 10th revision (icd-10) – who version for, 2016, http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/ browse/2016/en [28.01.2017]. sexual abuse task force and research & practice core, 2004, national center for child traumatic stress, https://goo.gl/ cs9yav [28.01.2017]. ursano r.j., bell c., eth s., friedman m., norwood a., pfefferbaum b., pynoos r.s., zatzick d.f., benedek d.m., 2010, practice guideline for the treatment of patients with acute stress disorder and 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protection… 63 решетніченко а.в., кірєєва о.б., голубчик г.д., хміль т.в., брус т.м., шевченко с.о., каховська о.в., романенко к.м., кринична і.п., бессараб є.і., попович ю.д., ковальова д.в., киричук ю.л., лисенко в.в., поспєхова г.м., черкасова а.с., сотнікова і.в., 2012, базові засади соціального розвитку як сфери публічного адміністрування, наду, київ, https://goo.gl/q9abdu [28.01.2017]. скуратівський в., палій о., лібанова е., 2007, соціальна політика, вид-во уаду, київ. 1. introduction there is no country with a highly developed economy, which would be eliminated from the regulation of key social and economic processes (дмитрук, 2012). therefore, the implementation of scientific and methodological characteristics of the features of public administration practice to ensure the steady social development abroad with the aim of its use in ukraine is actual. it should be noted, that there is the growing of interest and attention of scientists (p. dmytruk, n. starostenko, o. saienko, v. kolosova, n.slynko etc. (дмитрук, 2012; старостенко et al., 2014)) to the matters of the state policy to ensure social development. however, the search for the optimal model for this development necessitates the realization of further research and methodological development works to determine the most effective scenarios of the implementation of the state social policy taking journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 41–45 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.036.7636 the implementation of the state social policy in ukraine and abroad: methodological approaches to assessment of effectiveness alina leonidivna pomaza-ponomarenko scientific department of problems on state security of educational-scientific-production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: a_pp_l@i.ua citation pomaza-ponomarenko a.l., 2017, the implementation of the state social policy in ukraine and abroad: methodological approaches to assessment of effectiveness, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 41–45. abstract the analysis of the condition of financial support of the state social policy in the economically developed countries and in ukraine was made. the idea about the influence of the gdp growth rates dynamics on the share of social expenditures of these states was expressed and verified. it was defined that a relatively stable and high level of government social expenditures (nearly 20 percent) is achieved after several medium-term economic cycles, after which the economic system adapts to market relations, and the stabilization of social expenditures occurs. it makes it possible to assert that there is a certain optimum of the level of social expenditures, and the state aims to maintain it after its achievement. this level of expenditures ensures the implementation of the main goals of the state social policy. key words regional systems of ukraine, object of state management, academic mobility, the concept of public administration in ukraine, development trends. received: 22 november 2016 accepted: 13 june 2017 published: 29 december 2017 42 alina leonidivna pomaza-ponomarenko into account a number of objective and subjective factors that affect it. therefore, the purpose of the article is the study of the modern state of the financial provision of the state social policy abroad and in ukraine, and also the study of the methodological approaches to evaluating of the effectiveness of the implementation of such policy. 2. effectiveness and assessment of the state social policy the study of the socio-economic dynamics and its impact on the functioning of the state social policy allows us to determine the modern trends of its development and, therefore, to consider its cycling, if it is available. it is a relevant observation of a number of scientists (n. starostenko, o. saienko, v. kolosova, n. slynko, a. degtyar, o. degtyar, v. covalchuk, i. gritsyak, d. dzvinchuk, m. arakelyan, o. vishnyakova etc.) (старостенко et al., 2014; дєгтяр et al., 2015; грицяк, дзвінчук, 2013; аракелян, вишнякова, 2010) that the dynamics of the economy directly depends on the innovation and social progress, that is, on the one hand, accompanied by the significant spending, investment, and, on the other hand, it can generate the cyclical fluctuations. the study of this impact requires the implementation of the generalization, which is achieved by the empirical data on the development of the socioeconomic systems. we believe that the information base of this research can be data, such as the organization for economic cooperation and development, which are grouped by it with respect to the countries within a particular model of their development. during the world economic forum in davos in 2015, the desire (including by the organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd…, 2016)) was expressed concerning the deepening of the cross-border cooperation with ukraine, the importance of adaptation of the best global practices (in the context of the modernization of its public administration system), which such organization has mastered for it. the development of the state social policy is determined by the economic evolution (дєгтяр et al., 2015). there is the hypothesis, that it can be expressed in the growth / decline of the government social activity and orientation by the growth / decline of the amounts of government social support and «financial scope» of the relevant social programs. this hypothesis requires the verification of several assumptions and scenarios, namely: in any cycles (short, medium or long-term) the fluctuations of the economic activity affect the state social policy, determining the amount of government expenditures. we believe that it is possible to carry out such verification of the hypothesis, first, by the comparing of the dynamics of change of the share of government expenditures in the social sector (we are talking about the education, health, pensions accounts and other social payments etc.), and secondly, by the providing a comparison of the dynamics of change of the share of government expenditures and gdp per capita. the organization for economic cooperation and development singled out several models of the state social policy, given the impact of the economic processes taking place in one or another country (oecd…, 2016). however, this definition of the flexibility of government social expenditures depending on the state of economy and the change of paces of its development is beneficial in the medium and long term perspective. we believe that it is possible to evaluate, including perspective view on the financial support of the state social policy in the long term also using the regulations of national social programs. they are an original indicator of the quantitative characteristics of this policy. it should be noted, that the dynamics of the state social policy can be represented as the changing of the amount, directions and volume of the implementation of the social measures. the practice of its (dynamics) determination shows that mathematically it can be expressed in the light of change of the share of government social expenditures in the gross domestic product. however, the dynamics of the economic development is largely reflected in the growth rates of real gdp and in the objective laws of fluctuations in the economic activities. in addition, the inclusion in the analysis of the state social policy and other meaningful information indicator – the growth rates of gdp per capita is common (oecd…, 2016). based on the empirical data concerning the development of social and economic systems of the organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd…, 2016) during the period from 1985 to 2015 can be achieved corresponding calculation, characteristics and prognosis of the general laws of evolution of the modern world economy, and assessed their impact on the development of the state social policy. this period (1985–2015) was named of kondratievskyi’s (дєгтяр et al., 2015). the implementation of the state social policy in ukraine and abroad… 43 in xx century the critical phases synchronicity of the national and global cycles was established, as a result, the market cycles and the economic development cycles have actually coincided. it allows to design the trends, found in some countries, of the total world economy influence. it is obvious that the long waves (especially kondratievska’s) of the economic and social development are derived from the medium and short ones. the analysis of the information-analytical material (oecd…, 2016) suggests that the share of government social expenditures in gdp of the organization for economic cooperation and development countries made up almost 16% (in 1985) and in 1995 it was its growth and stabilization within 20%. in this way the phases of the economic cycle during the 1985–2015 years performed moderate impact on the intensity of financial expenditures on the implementation of the social programs in the organization for economic cooperation and development countries. the organization for economic cooperation and development conducted comparing and conventionally singled out several groups of countries that meet such models of the state social policy as (oecd…, 2016): a) the anglo-saxon model, which includes the us, canada and england; b) the european model is presented by the eu countries; c) the scandinavian model, which is formed by norway, sweden, finland; d) the east asian model, it includes japan, south korea, hong kong, singapore; e) the «post-soviet model” is formed by hungary, poland, russia, czech republic, slovakia and ukraine. the consideration of the growth rates of real gdp, gdp per capita and the share of government social expenditures in countries that have adopted anglosaxon model, allows to determine the following regularities: in the us the growth rates of the economy as a whole from 1985 to 2015 were in the range of 15% and do not exceed the same indicators calculated in relation to all the countries in the organization for economic cooperation and development. as for the share of government social expenditures in gdp in the us, it was consistently at the level of 10–15% (with an average median value of 15%). in addition to that the significant dependence of the intensity of the implementation and financing of the government social programs in relation to the economic activitiess, as well as the relatively low share of government social expenditures is characterized for the united states. it occurs to the existing of the advanced feedback mechanism established during the formation and implementation of the state social policy, which is weighted by the solution of problems of the social protection and development and rapid response to changes in the state economy. almost a similar situation was in england. however, during the test period the share of government social expenditures in gdp of this country was on average 2–4% higher than in the us. on the one hand, it undoubtedly indicates the special place of this country in the anglo-saxon group, on the other hand, it can be attributed to the economic system of england to the european group of countries singled out by the organisation for economic cooperation and development. it should be noted that during the analyzable period in germany the government social expenditures remain the relatively stability (ranging around 25% of gdp mark). in france, a similar value was reached in 1990, but since 1999, the state has come close to 30%, that is typical, especially, scandinavian model (аракелян, вишнякова, 2010; oecd…, 2016). sweden has the typical features of the scandinavian model of the state social policy. in it during 1985–2015 years it’s observed the conservation the same level of the indicator of the share of government social expenditures in gdp, namely 28–30%. a similar situation can be seen in the economy of finland, where the range of the share of these expenditures amounted to 20–35% in the test period. interestingly, the economy of sweden and finland to the significant slowdown of economic growth rates in the world (in 2008) responded to the relative increase in social expenditures. a separate group is constituted by the east asian model of the state social policy countries. in this model, japan ranks a special place. by 1993, it was inherent in some reduction of the economic growth rates dynamics along with the large range of the fluctuations (from 5% to 20%), compared with european countries. however, this situation is accompanied by the sustained value of the share of government social expenditures in gdp (oecd…, 2016). in respect of the post-soviet countries, it is highlighted because of the following: in the middle of the twentieth century the ussr managed to achieve 20% of government social expenditures in quite a short time and to keep this figure of social 44 alina leonidivna pomaza-ponomarenko guarantees providing at a high level for 30 years (дмитрук, 2012; дєгтяр et al., 2015; грицяк, дзвінчук, 2013). therefore, this precedent in the world economic history was called the “soviet model of the state social policy”. the research of the socio-economic development in the post-socialist countries is somewhat complicated. as the formation of market relations some of which has not yet occurred, so the value of macroeconomic indicators can not be measured in the same manner as in the countries with the sustained socio-economic development. in addition, the existing difficulties regarding the use of the methods of calculation of macroeconomic indicators, because they are different from those which used in other countries. however, the performance of a number of objective and subjective factors brings the trends of the development of the social policy of the post-socialist european countries. as for ukraine, its budget priorities differ substantially from those which are in the member countries of the eurozone, particularly for all of the expenditures on health, education, pensions, unemployment benefits, social benefits of accidents at work and occupational diseases, etc. (tab. 1.). allow for the state statistics service of ukraine data (база…, 2016), we can insist that our state largely exceeded the expenditures on social protection and ensuring, in comparison with the countries of the eu-28, in which they amount to 1.9% of gdp. the share of these expenditures in ukraine is almost half of the total dimension and amounts to 6.5% of gdp. the spending such significant amounts of financial resources for the implementation of the state social functions leads to the formation of the budget «eating away». however, this expenditure policy can be afford by those countries that have introduced the system of state social insurance. given of the global trend of population ageing and the migration of a significant number of ablebodied population of ukraine abroad, the continuation of current budget policy is invalid because it compels to increase the share of social expenditures. so in the near future it may adversely affect the financial stability of ukraine and the pace of development of its economy. 3. conclusions of the research therefore, after analyzing the dynamics of gdp growth and the share of social expenditures in the economically developed countries (the usa, eu, near east, etc.) and the post-socialist countries we can claim that the hypothesis about the existence of dependencies between these indicators and the cyclical nature in the development of the state social policy can be confirmed only partially. because of during the recession of the average wave of economic cycle, there is a slight increase in the share of social expenditures (in fact, its social activity). in the economically developed countries it mainly can last 1–2 years. the presence of such time limitation is accounted for the fact that public authorities need the time to assess and adjust their expenditure policy to minimize the negative effects of the slowdown in the economic growth. as for ukraine, it is possible to predict the development of social policy in two ways – positive (activity) and negative (inertial). if ukraine’s economy will grow by inertia, it is expected the increase of social expenditures. in this case, there is the significant probability that the increase of the quality and tab.  1. structure of government expenditures in the european union countries and ukraine (by structural-functional classification in 2014) № sector, to the support of which the government funds are appropriated eu-28 ukraine % of gdp % % of gdp % 1 social protection and ensuring 19.6 39.9 14.5 28.0 2 health 13.9 24.4 13.1 22.7 3 education, recreation, culture and religion 6.4 17.1 5.2 14.0 4 economic affairs 4.0 8.2 3.8 7.5 5 defence, public order and safety 3.1 6.9 12.9 23.9 6 housing and community amenities 0.9 1.7 1.1 3.1 7 environmental protection 0.9 1.7 0.4 0.8 8 total 49.1 100.0 51.0 100.0 sources: it’s compiled on the basis of: база…, 2016; старостенко et al., 2016; oecd…, 2016; дєгтяр et al., 2015. the implementation of the state social policy in ukraine and abroad… 45 standard of living does not happen in a few medium-term cycles. the comparing of the parameters can also define that relatively stable and high level of government social expenditures (20%) is achieved the conditions of the path of several medium-term economic cycles. in their range the adapting of the economic system to the market economy exists, as well as the government assuring of declared social guarantees. this trend covers a specific definition of the optimum for the implementation of social policy and government social expenditures. having achieved this optimal level, one or another country tends to keep it, because it contributes to the effective and balanced implementation of the basic social functions of the state. references oecd factbook 2016: economic, environmental and social statistics, 2016, oecd, paris, http://www.iberglobal.com/ files/2016/oecd_factbook_15_16.pdf [31.10.2016]. аракелян м., вишнякова о., 2010, право європейського союзу, видавництво «істина», київ. база даних державної служби статистики україни, http:// www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ [31.10.2016]. грицяк і., дзвінчук д., 2013, європейська інтеграція, 2013, видавництво «місто нв», івано-франківськ. дєгтяр о., дєгтяр а., степанов в., ковальчук в., 2015, державне та регіональне управління в соціальній сфері, видавництво «с.а.м.», харків. дмитрук п.м., 2012, особливості зарубіжної практики забезпечення безпеки в соціально-економічній сфері, http://www.academy.gov.ua/ej/ej12/txts/10dpmses.pdf [01.11.2016]. старостенко н., саєнко о., колосова в., слинько н., 2014, бюджетна підтримка єс в україні, видавництво фоп москаленко о.м., київ. 1. introduction in the last six decades, tourism has been undergoing expansion and diversification processes, becoming one of the fastest growing sectors of the world economy. the rapid growth of the tourist sector is a problem in terms of irrational use of resources, degradation of natural and cultural heritage, as well as negative social consequences. this grounds the need to change the paradigm of the development of tourism in the direction of rational and responsible use of recreational and tourist resources in accordance with the principles of sustainable development. it is tourism that combines all three components of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental), contributing to the preservation journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 53–56 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.038.7638 unwto sustainable tourism observatory in ukraine: national priorities kostyantin babov (1), tetyana bezverkhniuk (2), iryna babova (3), ivan liptuga (4) (1) si “ukrainian research institute of medical rehabilitation and resort therapy of ministry of health of ukraine”, lermontovsky lane 6, 65014, odessa, ukraine, e-mail: mrik@kurort.odessa.net (2) odessa regional institute of public administration of national academy of public administration under the president of ukraine, genuezka 22, 65009, odessa, ukraine, e-mail: tatiana.bezverkhniuk@gmail.com (corresponding author) (3) si “ukrainian research institute of medical rehabilitation and resort therapy of ministry of health of ukraine”, lermontovsky lane 6, 65014, odessa, ukraine, e-mail: babovairina@gmail.com (4) advisor to the first vice primeminister-minister of economic development and trade, ministry of economic development and trade of ukraine, hrushevskoho 12/2, 01008, kiev, ukraine, e-mail: iptuga@gmail.com citation babov k., bezverkhniuk t., babova i., liptuga i., 2017, unwto sustainable tourism observatory in ukraine: natural priorities, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 53–56. abstract the article focuses on working out sustainable tourism indicators taking into account national priorities of ukraine. among national priorities of tourism in ukraine the varied and diverse natural healing resources (mineral waters, peloids (medical mud), climate, rump of estuaries and lakes, seawater, ozocerite, bischofite) and resort territories are the leading ones. assessment of the state of natural healing resources and resort territories is suggested as a national priority among nine mandatory problem areas according to unwto recommendations for monitoring in observatories of sustainable tourism. key words sustainable tourism observatory, national priorities, ukraine, resorts, natural healing resources, indicators. received: 12 august 2017 accepted: 29 september 2017 published: 29 december 2017 54 kostyantin babov, tetyana bezverkhniuk, iryna babova, ivan liptuga and protection of the environment, economic growth and social well-being. the beginning of the implementation of the principles of sustainable development in the tourism sector dates back to 1980–1990 (butler, 1999), but these attempts were unsystematic and sporadic (ткаченко, 2009). taking into account the resolution of the xxi session of the general assembly of the world tourism organization (unwto) in 2015 «international year of sustainable tourism for development in 2017», the united nations (un) decided to proclaim 2017 as the international year of sustainable tourism for development (resolution adopted by the general assembly of united nations 2015). the decree of president of ukraine dated january 12, 2015, no. 5/2015, approved the strategy of sustainable development of ukraine 2020 in which tourism is in the list of priority programs (указ президента україни…, 2015). the resolution of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine dated 16 march 2017 no. 168-r approved the strategy for the development of tourism and resorts for the period up to 2026, which emphasized the need to adhere to the principles of sustainable tourism development (розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни…, 2017). the un general assembly in 2015 adopted a sustainable development program until 2030 and set 17 sustainable development goals aimed at combating poverty, protecting the environment and improving the quality of life of mankind (transforming…, 2015): 1. end poverty in all its forms everywhere. 2. end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. 3. ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. 4. ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. 5. achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. 6. ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. 7. ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 8. promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. 9. build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. 10. reduce inequality within and among countries. 11. make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. 12. ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. 13. take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. 14. conserve and sustainable use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. 15. protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainable manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss. 16. promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. 17. strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. un and unwto highlight the priority of tourism in the implementation of goals 8, 12 and 14 (tourism…, 2015), although it is fully certain that tourism plays a leading role in addressing all sustainable development goals. unwto’s initiative to realize the global goals of sustainable development was the establishment in 2004 of the international network of sustainable tourism observatories (insto), which monitors the economic, environmental and social impact of tourism at the level of the destinations (unwto, international network of sustainable tourism observatories). there are currently 20 observatories in the world: 8 in china, 1 in greece, 1 in mexico, 1 in brazil, 5 in indonesia, 1 in croatia, 2 in the usa and 1 in new zealand. the objectives of the observatories of sustainable tourism development are: 1. integrated approach to provide a framework for the systematic, timely and regular monitoring of resource-use and a better understanding of the impact of tourism. 2. evidence to establish a strong foundation of tangible and structured data for well-informed decision making. 3. stakeholder empowerment to actively engage local stakeholders in the measurement of risks, costs, impacts, limits and opportunities through an inclusive and participatory approach. 4. network and learn to exchange information for improved knowledge, collaboration, communication and greater public accountability. 5. performance measurement to monitor and advise on the implementation of sustainable development plans, policies and management actions. 6. continuity to foster long-term commitment for regular monitoring. unwto sustainable tourism observatory in ukraine: national priorities 55 various indicators have been developed in the tourism sector for measuring and managing tourism development (practical…, 2017; indicators…, 2004) in the past decades. the possibility of a correct comparison of results between destinations is the most often motive and the main purpose of these initiatives (torres-delgado, saarinen, 2014). according to unwto recommendations for monitoring observatories of sustainable tourism, nine mandatory problem areas need to be assessed: tourism seasonality, employment, destination economic benefits, governance, local satisfaction, energy management, water management, waste water (sewage) management, solid waste management (international…, /no data/; measuring…, 2017). however, each destination is a complex ecosystem with its own individual characteristics, which necessitates the development of indicators taking into account national priorities. 2. analysis of national priorities of ukraine in unwto sustainable tourism observatory we consider that monitoring of the status of resort tourist destinations and recreational resources is ukraine’s national priority for the sustainable tourism observatory. in ukraine are concentrated 47% of all healing mineral resources of europe, which are located almost in all the regions of the country forming an incomparable tourist potential. according to the law of ukraine “on resorts” healing mineral resources are mineral waters, peloids (medical mud), climate, rump of estuaries and lakes, seawater, ozocerite, bischofite (закон україни…, 2000). the resort complex of ukraine is a large socially oriented industry of health and recreation, the main component of which are the largest reserves of recreational and healing mineral resources in europe. it is a healing climate and recreational areas, mineral waters and peloids (medical mud) of all balneological types due to the country›s good geographical location, modern hydrosphere dynamics, geological structure, represented by the ancient tectonic form – the ukrainian crystalline massif, huge hollows of several kilometres and active mountain formations. almost all types of underground and surface mineral waters are found in ukraine, both for internal and external uses, among them there are such rare waters as the ones with specific organic substances («naftusya», truskavets resort, lviv region), organic substances and metasilic acid (berezovsky mineral waters, kharkiv region); carbonic, ferruginous, arsenic, sulphide, radon, thermal waters, etc.; sulphide, peat, sapropel, soponic peloids (medical mud), bischofite and ozocerite (бабов et al. (eds.), 2009). only in ukraine there are estuary complexes of the north-western black sea and azov region, the deposits of thermal (zakarpattia, kherson, odessa region) and radon (vinnytsia region) mineral waters, ozokerite (lviv region), bishofit (poltava region), unique therapeutic climatic conditions, in particular solotvin salt caves (transcarpathian region), etc., which allows creating unique climatic, balneological, mud resorts. significant are deposits of amber, which in other countries (poland, lithuania, czech republic, russia, japan) is successfully used in the resort and tourist sector. today the only institution that carries out fundamental researches of natural healing resources of ukraine, forms strategy of resort area development and provides sustainable development of tourism and resorts in ukraine, is the state institution “research institute of medical rehabilitation and resorts of the ministry of health of ukraine” (institute). it has been a number one scientific task of the institute during 90 years of its work. the main directions of the institute›s activities are systematic scientific studies of the state of recreational territories, natural healing resources, working out of complex programs for the resort areas development and sustainable tourism in ukraine. in particular, expert-analytical support for conferring the status of state or local resorts (due to presence of unique natural healing resources in resort territory – state resorts, or common ones – local resort) to recreational resort territories (бабов, нікіпелова (eds.), 2010), monitoring the state cadastre of natural healing resources (бабов et al. (eds.), 2017), medical and biological evaluation of natural healing resources (mineral waters, medical mud, climatic conditions, etc.) and their monitoring. the institute has provided more than 500 medical balneological conclusions on mineral waters, medical mud (peloids), ozocerite, bischofite, which is the basis for their therapeutic usage and industrial packaging. with regard to the requirements of the law of ukraine «on resorts» on the basis the institute’s scientific researches as the state resorts were declared resort khmelnik (vinnitsa region), berdyansk (zaporozhye region), saky (crimea), skadovsk (kherson region), mirgorod (poltava region), slavyansk (donetsk region); as the local resorts – solotvyno (transcarpathian region) and kosiv (ivano-frankivsk region). the institute identified prospective territories for the development as resort tourist destinations, in particular, in the lviv region (skhidnytsia, truskavets, morshyn – state resorts, nemirov, lubin velikiyt – local resorts), volyn region (shatsk – state resort), 56 kostyantin babov, tetyana bezverkhniuk, iryna babova, ivan liptuga odessa region (kuyalnik – state resort, sergievka, zatoka – local resorts), mykolaiv region (koblevoe – local resort), kharkiv region (lyubotin – local resort), khmelnitsky region (sataniv, kamyanets-podilskyi – local resorts), kyiv region (vorzel – local resort), etc. resort and touristic orientation has a town-creating potential for the mentioned resort territories as well as increases their investment potential and attractiveness (іжа et al. (eds.), 2016). 3. conclusions the creation of a sustainable tourism observatory in “research institute of medical rehabilitation and resorts of the ministry of health of ukraine” fully meets the goals of sustainable development established by the united nations and the activities of the world tourism organization (unwto) to create a worldwide international network of sustainable tourism observatories (insto). the initiative was supported by the department of tourism and resorts of ministry of economic development and trade of ukraine, national tourism organization with the institute being the basis for the implementation of the strategy for the development of tourism and resorts in ukraine taking into account the principles of sustainable tourism development. diversity of natural healing resources and resort areas in ukraine determine the priority of their assessment in the development of the sustainable tourism indicators for the sustainable tourism observatory. the implementation of the principles of sustainable tourism development in resort and tourist regions will promote their environmental safety and proper protection of the natural resources, increase of economic indicators, investment attractiveness and social well-being (creation of new year-round workplaces, improvement of transport infrastructure of the region, etc.). references butler r., 1999, sustainable tourism: a state-of-the-art review, tourism geographies, 1(1), 7–25. indicators of sustainable development for tourism destinations: a guidebook, 2004, unwto, madrid. international network of sustainable tourism observatories (insto), /no data/, the world tourism organization (unwto), http://insto.unwto.org/ [29.07.2017]. measuring sustainable tourism: a call for action – report of the 6th international conference on tourism statistics, manila, philippines, 21 – 23 june 2017, 2017, unwto, madrid. practical guidelines for integrated quality management in tourism destinations – concepts, implementation and tools for destination management organizations, 2017, world tourism organization, madrid. resolution adopted by the general assembly of united nations on 22 december 2015 [on the report of the second committee (a/70/472)] 70/193. international year of sustainable tourism for development, 2017. torres-delgado а., saarinen j., 2014, using indicators to assess sustainable tourism development: a review, tourism geographies, 16(1), 31–47. tourism and the sustainable development goals, 2015, world tourism organization (unwto), madrid. transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, 2015, united nations, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org a/res/70/1 [23.07.2017]. бабов к.д., єжов в.в., торохтін о.м. (eds.), 2009, курорти та санаторії україни: науково-практичний довідник, фолігрант, київ. бабов к.д., нікіпелова о.м. (eds.), 2010, курорти україни державного та місцевого значення, пальміра, одеса. бабов к.д., нікіпелова о.м., мокієнко а.в. (eds.), 2017, державний кадастр природних лікувальних ресурсів. здобутки і перспективи, фенікс, одеса. закон україни № 2026-ііі від 05.10.2000 р. «про курорти», 2000, відомості верховної ради україни, 2000, № 50, стаття 435. іжа м.м., бабов к.д., безверхнюк т.м. (eds.), 2016, регіональний туристичний продукт: проектний підхід до забезпечення конкурентоспроможності, оріду наду, одеса. розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни № 168-р від 16.03.2017 р. «про схвалення стратегії розвитку туризму та курортів на період до 2026 року», 2017, офіційний вісник україни, 2017, № 26. ткаченко т.і., 2009, сталий розвиток туризму: теорія, методологія, реалії бізнесу, київський національний торговельно-економічний університет, київ. указ президента україни № 5/2015 від 12.01.2015 р. «про стратегію сталого розвитку «україна – 2020», 2015, урядовий кур’єр, № 6. 1. introduction the sugar industry is one of the most important branches of the polish farm and food industry with decades of tradition – in 1801-1802 the world’s first sugar factory processing sugar beets was built in konary in lower silesia (głębocki, 2007). since the beginning of systemic transformation, the process of restructuring and privatisation has been taking place. the sugar market in countries of the european community, and now the european union, has been regulated since 1968, and first and foremost it intends to protect the internal market. since 2004, the regulatory system has also applied to the polish market. today’s changes are related to the eu sugar market regulation reform in 2006-2010. this reform assumed a concentration of sugar beets production in areas with the best soil and climatic conditions and an increase in productivity in the remaining sugar factories. with the winding-up of sugar factories, a change in the profile of agricultural production in the surrounding area followed, due to close links between the sugar industry and the raw material base. in addition to growers and producers of sugar beets, restructuring of the sugar industry also had an impact on workers in sugar factories, providers of services using farm machinery, and local authorities. this multi-faceted research problem applies to both geography of agriculture, geography of industry, economics, but also social geography and spatial management. journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(1), 16-21 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.002.5158 the social dimension of the reform of the sugar market in the european union (based on the example of poland) anna dubownik department of spatial management and tourism, nicolaus copernicus university, lwowska 1, 87-100 toruń, poland e-mail: a_dubownik@umk.pl citation dubownik a., 2015, the social dimension of the reform of the sugar market in the european union (based on the example of poland), journal of geography, politics and society, 5(1), 16-21 abstract the study is an attempt to determine the consequences of the reform of the sugar market in the european union (2006-2010) for small towns which were affected by liquidation of sugar beets foot-processing plants. this multifaceted research problem, apart from producers and growers, also concerns local communities often from small towns and in some cases also villages. despite the fact that this first reform of the polish sugar market has already finished, its consequences for the local development and the level of social capital are still difficult to grasp. key words reform of the eu sugar market, sugar factories, social development, local development, poland the social dimension of the reform of the sugar market in the european union… 17 2. the reform of the sugar market in the european union polish membership in the european union determines the modernisation of economy in accordance with the community policies, including the field of the sugar market. acceptance of regulations of the common agricultural policy in the context of the sugar market is associated with compliance with production quotas. they result from limiting the volume of sugar production in relation to the possessed potential, which causes the closing of less profitable sugar factories. the european union countries are among the world leaders in the production of sugar from sugar beets. according to reports of the world trade organization (wto), as a result of internal regulations of this organisation, destabilisation of the global sugar market took place. in order to heal the situation, an attempt was made to reform the sugar market of the european union and to restructure the sugar industry. before the reform, in the eu market there were intervention prices of the produced sugar and minimum (guaranteed) prices for the purchase of sugar beets. the scale of sugar production was limited according to the quota system. also refunds were given if the produced sugar was earmarked for the chemical industry, with a view to increasing the domestic demand and the purchase of sugar surplus. there were also subsidies to sugar exports within a specified quota and an obligation to export sugar without subsidy if its amount exceeded the designated limit. in addition, the eu market was protected by high customs duty and quotas for importing duty-free or reduced-duty sugar. limiting the production of sugar substitutes – isoglucose and insulin syrup was also an important tool. areas with the best soil and climate conditions for the production of sugar beets in the eu form the so called „sugar beet belt”. the following countries are included in the area of intensive sugar beets production: great britain, france, belgium, the netherlands, germany and poland. the reform of the european union sugar market introduced in the 2006/2007 season mainly regarded the listed countries. it was assumed that as a result of the reform the competitiveness of the eu sugar market in the global market will increase, and this effect would be achieved mainly through the concentration of sugar production in larger and more efficient enterprises in areas with the best conditions for cultivation of sugar beets. these changes would increase the length of a sugar campaign, and thus boost the efficiency of sugar production per one hectare of crops and raise the average production value per one sugar factory. it should be noted that, in addition to the countries not involved in the production of sugar (cyprus, malta, estonia) and those which as a result of the reform gave up its production (bulgaria, latvia, ireland, mainland portugal and slovenia), among the remaining 18 eu members – in conditions of limitation of the production scale – the concentration process primarily involved countries of the „sugar beets belt” (dubownik, rudnicki 2015). according to reports of the european commission, in accordance with the premises of the reform, only those growers are to remain on the market who show the highest yield of sugar beets, and those sugar factories which boast the highest productivity. nevertheless, the situation on the sugar market in various counties of the „sugar beets belt” is different. in all member states, including poland, the annual quotas of sugar production have dropped. however, the smallest decrease was reported in the netherlands, the united kingdom and france. a positive change in the growth of the yields of sugar beets in the studied years was noted, yet the starting level of the yields in poland was much lower (43 t/ha) than the average yields in the other five countries of the designated region (65 t/h), and in the studied period it increased on average by 10 points in all countries. since the 2006/2007 season the first stage of the sugar market reform was introduced in the european union countries, which was to be implemented over four years. one of the most important instruments of this reform were sugar payments paid to farmers who having previously concluded a contract of supply of sugar beets with a manufacturer then resigned from the granted quotas and ceased cultivation. in poland the rates of so specified financial compensation ranged from pln 33.94 (2006) to pln 50.45 (2010) per tonne of sugar beets (cf. rudnicki, 2014, p. 102). since the beginning of the first reform of the eu sugar market in 2006/2007–2010/2011, the number of sugar beet processing factories in poland has decreased by half. initially, in 2006 there were 36 food processing factories, but not all of them used their full capacity. in the 2010/2011 season only 18 sugar factories functioned. poland takes the third place in the european union in terms of the number of existing sugar factories, after france and germany. however, in our country the greatest number of them were closed. in 2010, most sugar factories in poland were located in the greater poland voivodeship (4) and the kuyavian-pomeranian (3) voivodeship. in the lower silesian, lublin, and subcarpathian voivodeships there were two sugar factories in each. in the next 18 anna dubownik five voivodeships there was one sugar factory, and in six there were none. in the polish sugar industry already since the mid-1990s, four foreign investors have been operating, three german ones and one british (niemczak, 2008). sugar beet factories located in poland belonged to five companies in 2006 and to 4 in 2010. still, krajowa spółka cukrowa s.a. was the largest one owning seven sugar factories; next five belonged to südzucker polska s.a. company; an enterprise with the german capital pfeifer&langen polska s.a. owned four sugar factories, and two remaining two belonged to nordzucker polska s.a. during the studied period the most closed sugar factories belonged to krajowa spółka cukrowa (10) and to südzucker (6) (fig. 1., fig. 2.). 3. social consequences of the reform one of the objectives of the reform of the eu sugar market was to introduce instruments to mitigate the direct and indirect social and economic effects of the reforms for the farming population. the eu documentation concerning the reforms stipulated strict requirements for sugar producers who voluntarily renounced the production quotas and, in consequence, closed their sugar factories. a producer fig. 1. distribution and the ownership structure of sugar factories in poland in 2006 source: own elaboration based on the data of the association of sugar technicians. the social dimension of the reform of the sugar market in the european union… 19 could receive the so-called „restructuring aid” if he drew up a restructuring plan containing: • a social plan, specifying actions, in particular with regard to employees’ retraining, job relocation and early retirement; • an environmental plan specifying the measures to comply with the requirements of environmental protection; • a business plan setting out the ways, the schedule and the costs of closing a factory or factories and the total or partial dismantling of production facilities. therefore, the responsibility for changes in the local labour market caused by the closed sugar factory lay with the producer. just as well the post-industrial buildings were to be dismantled, or their function was to change, so as a consequence, they should be revitalised. it is hard to resist an impression that in the polish conditions these assumptions remained provisions reposed in the archives. at the moment one cannot unequivocally determine the extent to which the introduced instruments mitigated the direct and indirect social and economic effects for the agricultural population and that involved in the production of sugar in the regions affected by the reform. fig. 2. distribution and the ownership structure of sugar factories in poland in 2010 source: own elaboration based on the data of the association of sugar technicians. 20 anna dubownik the problem of social consequences resulting from closed sugar factories may be viewed at two levels, the social and the spatial-economic one. firstly, as a result of the closure of sugar factories, there were transformations of the local labour market, on which the factory was often the largest employer. in addition, growers living within the impact of the factory were forced to change their production profile, which could result in a rapid decrease in incomes in the farms. changes in the labour market can be limited by foreseeing such a situation and introducing instruments allowing the local population to retrain. however, in the economic reality of poland, the population from the surveyed areas migrated to larger cities or abroad in search of work, causing depopulation of the abandoned areas, while the population at the immobile age may be threatened by social exclusion. property and premises remaining after the food processing factory following the collapse of the sugar industry become a very important problem for the municipality. it depends on who they belong to, but also whether they have any historical value. there is a chance to restore their economic activity as part of market processes; however, usually it is necessary to take revitalising actions of the character of local authorities’ and owners’ interventions. a feature of areas for industrial production is their inaccessibility and exclusion from the area of the city inhabitants’ activity, and thus their objective and subjective exclusion from the public space. hence brownfield redevelopment often has the nature of integrating them with the space of the whole city both in the functional and social terms. the above action can be implemented by applying for investment means from european funds aimed at revitalising post-industrial areas. it is important that revitalising processes take place with the so-called social participation. if the look and functions of the post-industrial area of a city or a village is agreed on by the local community during consultations, chances are that the restored space will be accepted and used by the residents, resulting in „real” urban regeneration, i.e. including this area in the social space. today there are still few examples of successfully developed and implemented projects to redevelop post sugar factory premises. one of them is the „sugar zone – a social concept of developing the premises after the pruszcz sugar refinery”, prepared by the association of friends of pruszcz gdański and the surrounding communities in cooperation with the institute for sustainable development. the sugar zone is a project of participatory planning of the public space – the premises of the closed sugar refinery in pruszcz gdański (broks et al., 2013). the aim of the initiative was to create a platform for dialogue and cooperation at the level of residents, the local government and entrepreneurs, which would reach far beyond the statutory public consultation. the end result is a common vision of the sugar factory site published in the form of a land development concept. in addition to the existing roads, the project assumes building new bike paths for new residents of the area. adaptation of the existing buildings has been planned or constructing new buildings of a service, residential or cultural character, and an area for a town marketplace and green areas available to all city residents have been designated. 4. summary the first reform of the sugar market on the polish market since joining the european union finished in the 2010/2011 season, but it still is impossible to examine in detail its consequences for the local communities. the research problem seems particularly important because another reform is imminent, which will result in lifting sugar production quotas and minimal prices for sugar beets. it will be possible to make the total eu production available on the internal market. reference prices of sugar and the price reporting system will remain only serving the observation of the market. export limits for the world markets will also be lifted, while keeping the previously agreed as part of free trade agreements import of cane sugar on the eu market. a new contracting system will be introduced, with the planter signing a farming contract two years before the sale of sugar. it is uncertain whether the level of duties on sugar imported from the european union will be maintained and what it will be (the eu sugar market post 2017, iso, 14). it is hard to predict how the forthcoming reform will affect the polish sugar market. it may turn out that while our country lies in the eu „sugar beet belt”, the period of adaptation of sugar factories in poland to the standards of western european countries has been too short, which may contribute to losing the competition on the internal market with more efficient growers and sugar factories of other eu countries. today, however, the collapse of the sugar industry in small towns resulted in a decrease in own revenue of communes and an increase in unemployment rates, and consequently in social changes leading to social exclusion. a phenomenon of (especially mobile-age) population migration has taken place. the closed processing plants have been and often still are degraded post-industrial areas, situated in the social dimension of the reform of the sugar market in the european union… 21 small towns which, as a result of the capital deficit and a lack of social participation, have not been and are not able to revitalised those areas. references brokos p., kołacz p. ślebioda k., 2013, strefa cukru – społeczna koncepcja zagospodarowania nieczynnej cukrowni pruszcz – raport końcowy, toruń. dubownik a., rudnicki r., 2015, oddziaływanie reformy rynku cukru unii europejskiej na produkcję buraków cukrowych w polsce – ujęcie przestrzenne. studia obszarów wiejskich [in press]. głębocki b., 2007, rolnictwo, [in:] h. rogacki (ed.), geografia społeczno-gospodarcza polski, wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, warszawa, 185–271. niemczak m., 2008, przemiany struktur polskiego przemysłu cukrowniczego jako efekt procesu restrukturyzacji. procesy transformacji układów przemysłu na tle zmieniającego się otoczenia, prace komisji geografii przemysłu ptg, 10, 109–122. rudnicki r., 2014, przemiany struktury zasiewów w rolnictwie polskim w warunkach oddziaływania instrumentów wspólnej polityki rolnej (lata 2002–2010), [in:] w. kamińska, k. heffner (eds.), polityka spójności ue a rozwój obszarów wiejskich: stare problemy i nowe wyzwania, studia kpzk pan, clvi, 98–128. the eu sugar market post 2017 market evaluation consumption and statistics committee, international sugar organization, april 2014, www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/798022868.pdf [28.10.2015] 1. introduction devastated and abandoned locations in the city of oradea, so called decommissioned industrial areas, are today one of the most important planning issues. building lands are a resource that will form the basis for future cities’ development, so there is a clear need to systematically address the problem of disused industrial areas through the implementation of urban renewal projects (weiss, tribe, 2016) swer. as a by-product of rapid industrialization, the city of oradea has a lot of urban areas that have been in distress and degrading. the poorly depleted pockets diminish the city’s image, viability and productivity, areas such as where different factories were once constructed such as: the oil factory, the yeast and spirit factory, oradea. they are usually the result of changes in urban growth and productivity patterns. rarely, urban regeneration projects are implemented exclusively by the public sector. the need for massive financial resources is a driving factor. however, even if governments and local authorities could provide the resources needed to regenerate urban land, it is necessary to have the engagement of the community and the business sector to ensure the sustainability and viability of regeneration efforts. consequently, private sector participation is a determining factor in the success of the regeneration of unused land. theoretical and practical aspects of regeneration of decommissioned industrial areas in oradea, romania miruna cristina boca department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, universității 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: mirunaboca@yahoo.com citation boca m.c., 2019, theoretical and practical aspects of regeneration of decommissioned industrial areas in oradea, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 33–38. abstract urban regeneration is known to be an experienced but complex phenomenon. even though, over the years, urban regeneration, in europe, has been widely used, but in romania, the concept is still new, many formal industrial spaces are abandoned and there is a lack of interest in bringing these areas back to life. the aim of this paper is to study the concept of urban regeneration, figure out the practical aspects of it and observing the current situation of sites in the city of oradea, romania. key words urban regeneration, renewal, industrial sites, urban development, romaniy. received: 25 may 2018 accepted: 8 january 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 33–38 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.05 34 miruna cristina boca 2. urban regeneration the term “urban regeneration” was officially introduced in romania through ordinance number 27, published on the 27th of august for amending and completing the law no. 350/2001 concerning landscaping and urban planning (2008), under spatial planning and urban planning, being defined as “bringing urban areas to life with the cooperative effort of the municipalities, owners and other actors involved in order to improve the living conditions, to increase the quality of the environment and the social climate and to strengthen the local economy” (ordonanţă…, 2008). because of the semantic differences in the current vocabulary, the term urban regeneration is rather complex and again polysemantic in itself, often being confused with other terms, but in romanian language seems to have a close meaning. many times, the term urban regeneration is confused with the term urban renewal, however, situations caused by the amalgam of meanings may be different. in french, for example, due to its lexical variety and the already accepted and establish meanings of key words and terminology, in the field of territorial development and spatial planning, the notion of urban refurbishment has another meaning in the current national vocabulary (chaline, 1999). usually, the term is associated with the partial or complete demolition of buildings in a given territory to make room for new ones, which sits at an almost ethical juxtaposition to the goals and ethos of urban regeneration in the context in which it is being discussed (couch, 1990). urban regeneration has been studied by different international and national authors, being a very complex action. for this paper, the author has studied ministerial papers, the urban planning of oradea (plan urbanistic general al municipiului oradea), but also authors such as claude chaline, guillem cervera pascual, john weiss, michael tribe, christopher tweed, margaret sutherland, and romanian authors such as andrei lakatos, liviu chelcea, sebastian jucu, marius cristian neacșu. according to the ministerial information meeting on urban development statement (reuniunea…, 2010), that urban regeneration needs to be coordinated by different departments, communities and also by the government, in order to have a successful result. it is not only a process that needs doing only by town hall or only by investors, but it needs to be a collaboration between everybody involved. the resources needed to revitalize the area include human, technological, financial and natural resources. following an examination of the effects of economic globalization and growing challenges in european real estate markets, it turns out that the economic role of the brownfields has become much more important (trifa, 2015). 3. urban regeneration in romania urban regeneration is a process of reconversion and bringing ‘back to life’ of former industrial areas by creating attractive environments in close connection with the deindustrialisation process and the transition to a predominant tertiary-industrial economic base (nae, 2015). building rehabilitation, physical improvement and infrastructure modernization are not just requirements essential for the attractiveness of a city, but also for sectors where the need for labor is high and therefore is a new potential source of employment that can help absorb the unemployed, particularly those in the construction sector (which is currently experiencing a major crisis in some member states) (lakatoş, 2017). according to the ministerial information meeting on urban development statement, the operational tools that could favor integrated urban regeneration are (reuniunea…, 2010): launching integrated regeneration plans, set urban development guidelines, public fund the projects and strengthening the existing forms of public-private partnerships and the skills to solve economic, social and environmental problems. the new challenge related to the changes in urban structures emerged at the beginning of the 21st century as, during the 1990s transformation, many former industrial, residential, military, agricultural and other localities lost their original use and were neglected, abandoned, and quickly becoming detrimental factors within the local populous and towards the environment the causes that led to the reorganization of the industrial activity of the companies were various, which can be synthesized as follows (lakatoş, 2017): • lack of orders on the market for products obtained by them; • the impossibility of adapting to the new market requirements resulting from the specialization for serial production and the realization of an infrastructure adapted to the specificity of the production; theoretical and practical aspects of regeneration of decommissioned industrial areas in oradea 35 • massive lay-off of the labor force as a result of reduced market orders; • the need for massive investment in equipment and machinery to adapt to the needs of consumers. the industrial areas have been gradually incorporated into the cities that were constantly growing, the buildings being built on the outskirts of the city, but due to the expansion of the cities, the majority of factories are located near the center. revitalizing industrial buildings will be a component of urban revitalization, precisely because of their location. as they migrated to the market economy, they could not adapt to the rigors imposed by the market economy due to the giant dimensions at which the plants were designed irrespective of their activity profile and more because of the system in which they operated. during the communist era, each factory knew its target market, but after the 90s, due to the economical changes, they did not identify with the market where it was supposed for them to sell their products. this has led, over time, to an acute shortage of culture in relation to the consumer as well as to the relationship with suppliers that are vital in the conditions in which the market operates according to the harsh rules of demand and supply of goods and services (metodologie de intervenție, …., 2015) it is necessary to involve the administrativeterritorial institutions for this purpose: • integrated approach to land use planning (economic development / culture / environmental protection and preservation); • reducing the costs of access to quality services; • improving the competitiveness and attractiveness of the space; • controlled development in relation to the support of the territory; • organizing the real estate market and diminishing its speculative size. 5. the situation today in oradea municipality in recent years, a large number of integrated urban regeneration projects have been implemented (the brewery was demolished and on it’s site there was built a mall and a center for business, înfrățirea factory was demolished and on it’s site there were built residential buildings, malls, shopping galleries (fig. 1, 2, 3)) and most of the former industrial platforms in the central area have been integrated into urban area. the policy of support and redevelopment carried out by local authorities has led to the reindustrialization of the city, raising living standards and improving environmental conditions (since 2011, oradea was declared “the green capital city”, according to the studies done by ministry of environment and forests of romania (planul…, 2014)). the local industry is currently in a relative decline due to a complex of internal and external factors. although the heavy and light industry is at present in decline, the city finds an unprecedented explosion of companies involved in the it & c industry, with a number of them focusing on the production of electronic components and appliances (flextronix, hanil, celestica, bronx, etc.). during the past years there have been built 3 industrial parks, a forth one will be built in the future. three thousand people work in industrial parks, and their number will reach 7 thousand by 2020. most of them come from neighboring localities (strategia…, 2017). there is also a pressing need, and therefore continued demand from investors in the field of information technology and industry for new industrial sites, equipped with the basic infrastructure and located within new industrial parks that were created. at present, there have been implemented a number of urban regeneration projects in oradea, projects that have been done either by town hall or by investors. these are done either on keeping the buildings, and giving them a new function, or demolishing the existing constructions and building new ones. such projects include moara răsărit mill, where the existing buildings are kept (fig. 4, 5). the investors, at the moment are doing an urban regeneration project, the mill, at present, being an open space for cultural events such as: national and international festivals and fairs, theater performances, concerts and musical events, art exhibitions, private or public conferences and debates, film screenings, video shows, dance performances, workshops, performing arts, etc. space is bidding on architectural, symbolic, and subject matter for exposure to the art object. the mill attracts a large number of cultural events and wants to be defined as a space for the most present and authentic art, not only nationally but also internationally. at present, the city hall of oradea has developed an urban planning project for mill, which proposes the rehabilitation and conversion of the assembly, by building collective dwellings and parking spaces. rehabilitated and newly built buildings will have economic destinations specific to tourism (accommodation, restaurants, commerce), but especially cultural. 36 miruna cristina boca 6. conclusion although urban regeneration is still a new process in romania, the term being introduced only in 2008, it is of interest for developers and for the authorities, the last trying to implement different actions to encourage the urban regeneration. in the 21st century romania, most of the industrial premises that have not been demolished have been abandoned, left in a major state of deterioration. at present, there are a significant number of industrial sites in oradea that have been demolished for the purpose of land liberation or for the construction of functions such as supermarkets (furniture factory), malls (brewery, înfrățirea), or for building collective housing fig. 1. image of main façade of înfrățirea factory, 2012 source: own study. fig . 2. demolition of main façade înfrățirea factory, 2015 source: own study. fig. 3. image of residential building and outdoor shopping center, înfrățirea factory, 2019 source: own study. theoretical and practical aspects of regeneration of decommissioned industrial areas in oradea 37 (înfrățirea, emilia mill), but also there have been done projects to keep the existing buildings and changing the functionality of them (moara răsărit mill, rovex factory). during the past years, there has been an increasing interest in urban regeneration of areas in oradea, but there are still a lot of sites that are abandoned by investors, areas that could be profitable in the future. references chaline c., 1999, la regeneration urbaine (eng. urban regeneration), presses universitaires de france, paris. couch c, 1990, urban renewal. theory and practice, macmillan education, london. guillem. p. c., 2013, la renovación urbana y su régimen jurídico (eng. urban regeneration and it’s legal regime), reus, madrid. http://moara-rasarit.ro/spatii-disponibile/ (accessed 25 april 2018). lakatoş a.e, 2017, conversia în context. despre regenerarea spaţiilor industriale (eng. conversion into context. about the regeneration of industrial spaces), editura fundatiei arhitext design, bucuresti. ministerul dezvoltării regionale și administrației publice. direcția generală dezvoltare regională și infrastructură, metodologie de intervenție privind regenerarea urbană pentru anumite tipuri de teritorii, (eng ministry of regional development and public administration. general, regional development and infrastructure, intervention methodology on urban regeneration for certain types of territories), 2015. nae, m., 2015, regenerarea și reconversia teritoriilor (eng. regeneration and conversion of territories), editura universitară, bucurești. ordonanţă nr. 27 din 27 august 2008 pentru modificarea şi completarea legii nr. 350/2001 privind amenajarea teritoriului şi urbanismul (eng. no 27 ordinance, 27th of august for amending and completing the law no. 350/2001 config. 4. exterior image of moara răsărit mill, 2016 source: http://moara-rasarit.ro/spatii-disponibile/ fig. 5. interior image of moara răsărit mill, 2016 source: http://moara-rasarit.ro/spatii-disponibile/ 38 miruna cristina boca cerning landscaping and urban planning, 2008, https:// www.oar-bucuresti.ro/legislatie/2008/ordonanta_27_ din_27_aug_2008_modif_si_complet_lg_350.pdf (accessed 28 november 2017). planul integrat de dezvoltare al municipiului oradea (eng. integrated development plan of oradea),2014, http:// www.oradea.ro/fisiere/module_fisiere/20681/pidu%20 final%20final%20cu%20completare.pdf (accessed 15 march 2017). reuniunea informală ministerială provind dezvoltarea urbană declaraţie. toledo, 22 iune 2010 (eng. ministerial information meeting on urban development statement. toledo, 22 june 2010), 2010, http://www.mdrap.ro/userfiles/ declaratie_toledo_ro.pdf (accessed 05 february 2018). strategia integrată de dezvoltare urbană a municipiului oradea 2017-2023 (eng. integrated urban development strategy of oradea city 2017–2023), 2017, www.oradea.ro/fisiere/ module_fisiere/26163/sidu%20oradea.pdf (accessed 02 january 2019). sutherland m., teller j., tweed c., 2002, learning perceptions and attitudes as a way of defining heritage built at affordable prices. management and analysis of the local environment, suit position paper, 5. http://gaston.lema.arch.ulg. ac.be/research/suit (accessed 15 april 2018). trifa, r. m., 2015, structure, de-structure, re-structure. the second life of industrial heritage, in acta technica napocensis: civil engineering & architecture, volume 58, nr. 4, p. 48–55; weiss j., tribe m., 2016, routledge handbook of industry and development, routledge, london and new york. http://moara-rasarit.ro/spatii-disponibile/nae, m.2015, regenerarea și reconversia teritoriilor, editura universitară, bucurești 1. introduction it has become an axiom for today’s market economy that it requires proper maintaining at the appropriate quality level (so-called “standard of living”) of all sectors of both the economy and society. modern economy is known to be “a knowledge economy”. this requires continuous improvement in the educational level of society, because otherwise it is impossible to create a competitive economy in a whole country and its regions in particular (поступна, 2011). the aforementioned idea does not require active scientific-theoretical or practical discussion and debate to be proved. at the same time, there is a problem of improving in quality of education, with the aim to ensure its competitiveness among the educational systems of other countries and support the state’s reputation on the global stage. first of all, this requires us to give exact definition and description of such phenomenon as the “quality of education” journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 31–35 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.024.7180 quality of education and economic security of higher education institutions: dialectical unity and management specifics in ukraine volodymyr kovrehin department of finance, national university of civil protection of ukraine, lermontovska 28, 61023 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: dergupr@nuczu.edu.ua citation kovrehin v., 2017, quality of education and economic security of higher education institutions: dialectical unity and management specifics in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 31–38. abstract the relation and dialectical unity of such categories as quality of education and economic security of higher education institutions are scientifically proven in the paper. among such institutions the following two groups are distinguished: state (i.e., all-ukrainian) and regional. the operation state of the latter is investigated on an example of the kharkiv oblast. the main components of the management cycle of education sector in ukraine and such elements of quality of education as quality of the educational process, quality of students training, quality of educational services and quality (state) of education economics in whole country, region, or a single educational institution are determined. current study proves that the education quality issues need regular state and public monitoring, as they are caused by the requirements of today’s market and by increasing competition for students between higher education institutions. key words management cycle, higher education institution of ukraine, quality of education, economic security, human resources, economic and innovative potential of ukraine. 32 volodymyr kovrehin because formation of market relations in the sphere of education put forward new requirements for the strategic development of higher education institutions as a unified educational, and scientific, and industrial complex. one of the directions of this strategy is to form a fundamentally new set of economic relations in the higher education institutions. it must be the direction of innovation and entrepreneurship economic security (dombrovska, 2016). its main point lies in the fact that higher education institution must provide academic activities (training of qualified specialists and scientific research), and support entrepreneurship, focused on the use of its potential with the aim of: (1) the further integration of education, science and industry; (2) staff training in the field of administrative, innovative and regional management; (3) extension of the institution’s economic opportunities. the scientific method of our research is based on theoretical and methodological principles of organization, state management and economics of education (домбровська, 2010; бєлова, 2014). however, in today’s market conditions the study of main matter and improving of state management in the field of education requires us to use the complex and innovative approaches in order to ensure the economic security of an higher education institution and regional socio-economic systems. therefore, the aim of this paper is to define the dialectical unity of quality of education and economic security of the higher education institution, and to regulate the legislative background of its activities organization in this context. 2. features of the quality of management education in ukraine the quality of education is not a permanent category, and requires continuous improvement, and changes, i.e., management. though, before managing the quality, it is necessary to carry out such activities as planning, motivation and control. moreover, the education quality level and the direction of changes must be determined first. this, in its turn, requires an evaluation of education quality. consequently, a management cycle in the education field is as follows: management of education quality → monitoring of educational quality → evaluation of educational quality → change of education quality → improving of education quality by using the appropriate management tools (fig. 1.). modern education is a complex system, formalization of which is a multifaceted challenge. however, it is impossible to evaluate education quality without such transformation. that is why problems arise at the stage of educational quality monitoring, which involves evaluating of such condition. therefore, there is a problem, which can be resolved only if educational system is divided into subsystems (elements) for their further formalization with transforming quality of education in the categories available for the evaluation, monitoring and management. we can make an assumption that the different subsystems can be formalized with varying degrees of success. accordingly, the different efficiency is likely in process of monitoring, control and management of quality of the various elements of the education system. for the ease of analysis, in terms of interaction and mutual influence of the education quality and economic security, the author of the research underlined four key elements of education quality, based on which education may be considered as an integral system. consequently, an education quality is as elements: (1) quality of the educational process, (2) quality of students training, (3) quality of the educational services and (4) quality (state) of education economics (fig. 2.). 1. the first element is quality of the educational process. if we talk about education as a development, it is certainly a complex, multi-step process. the base of it lies in the learning process itself. in the management and memetics categories, it can be defined as the process of transfer and perception of a certain number of memes. according to the objectives of the research we distinguish two forms of the learning process (the current practice and the regulatory framework of education involve a greater number of forms, but the scope of the current work is limited to the following two): fig. 1. the management cycle in the education source: own study. quality of education and economic security of higher education institutions:… 33 1) direct communication “lecturer—student”. in the process of communication, a lecturer using a variety of techniques transfers to students a set of memes, which are enough to form required competences. this way of learning is known to be a full-time in the ukrainian educational practice. 2) training with predominance of student’s unsupervised work. in this case, the learning process is carried out without the direct guidance of the lecturer, but with their tasks and under their control. consequently, students learn most of the memes by themselves, but the lecturer has ability to control the content of a set of these memes and the learning process. one of the type of this form of education is known to be distance learning. in the ukrainian educational practice, this form of education can be both full-time and part-time, evening, external. these forms vary in the degree of direct involvement of the lecturer in the learning process. all background information about the relation of different forms of learning in modern ukrainian system of higher education (for the period from 1990 to 2016) can be found on the official website of the state statistics service of ukraine. in addition, the service offers data on the number of enrolled students in higher educational institutions of i-ii and iii-iv levels of accreditation, as well as on the number of trained professionals in these institutions for the same period of time (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua). it is worth noting that ukraine has one of the largest number of extramural students in the world. on the one hand it is an indicator of the ukrainians’ desire to get higher education, and on the other hand, we can suppose that quality of education of full-time students is higher than quality of education of extramural students. as a rule, when speaking today about quality of education, we imply, first of all, quality of the learning (educational) process, including such elements as educational technologies. 2. the second element of the education quality is quality of students training. speaking about quality of education, the author refers to the standard iso 9000, according to which each process has both input and output. consequently, quality of education also means quality of the input and output products. in this case, quality of learning of a memes set by students is such a product. the content of this set at the output is determined by government in the educational standards (see: закон україни…, 1991). current tool for monitoring of the education level of enrollees, who enter higher education, is external independent evaluation (eit). the present demographic crisis, which cannot be mentioned, has led to a decrease in the number of students and it, in turn, resulted in relaxed requirements to quality of education of enrollees even in the leading higher education institutions of the country. thus, some researches outline the engineering and technology education crisis (сиченко, 2010). up to 50 % enrollees in the relevant areas are graduates of schools with eit scores below average in mathematics and physics. it is likely to be very difficult for people with this level of knowledge to develop relevant professional competence. it is interestingly, there is a group of enrolled students with much higher rates than others in some higher education institutions. experts have called these higher education institutions “trendy” because low-performing enrollees agree to enter such higher education institution in the less popular field of study (which do not attract them in other higher education institutions), including paid education programs. for example, the kharkiv national automobile and highway university have a very high average and a passing grades for paid training on the road-building faculty (specialty “ecology and environment”) (інформація абітурієнту харківського…, 2016). these characteristics for enrolment on state-financed openings are appropriate to such well-known and top-rated universities as, firstly, the v.n. karazin kharkiv national university (the ecological faculty, specialty “ecology, environmental protection and balanced use of natural resources”) and, secondly, the national university of civil protection of ukraine (faculty of technogenic and ecological safety, specialties “environmental security”, “health and safety”) (інформація щодо…, 2016; інформація абітурієнту національного…, 2016). fig. 2. the key elements of education quality source: own study. 34 volodymyr kovrehin today almost all of the technical, technological, educational and other “specialized” higher education institutions have several educational programs in such fields as economics, management, computer science, humanities and law. the scales of the enrolment for the “non-core” fields are comparable to the “core” fields. furthermore, the average and passing grades among entrants of the “core” fields, as a rule, are significantly lower (10–15 points) than among those who entered the “non-core” fields. by analyzing the information of kharkiv region higher education institutions websites, we reach a conclusion that the largest group of high-achieving entrants invests a lot at their future career, which, as it seems to them, is provided by economic-administrative and humanitarian education. most of these students enter the “top five” best universities of kharkiv region and one third of these persons chose “core” education. according to the ministry of education and science of ukraine, quality of education of entrants, monitored by eit, proves that higher education institutions, which are evaluated by various ratings as giving the most quality education, usually attract the most prominent students (http://mon.gov.ua, 2016). this certainly gives the higher education institutions an advantage over the others. taking into consideration that an enrollee is the main resource, which the higher education institution works with and which must be transformed into high-quality specialist, we can affirm that quality of training of recent graduates directly depends on quality of training of the entrants. in ukraine, state control of education quality is traditionally common, but today the development of the system of public control, public and professional accreditation of higher education institutions operating in the industrialized countries become actual. in the 1990th (at the beginning of ukrainian independence), many parents and employers were poorly competent in quality of education, and educational results in a variety of higher education institutions were not clear, but today the situation has changed. demand for education and for graduate shifted to the group of higher education institutions, graduates of which demonstrate the ability to get a prestigious job, make a career and earn more than others. the two following groups of such higher education institutions can be identified: all-ukrainian and regional. at all these higher education institutions, the attention is increasingly focused on both the effective demand and the demand from high-achieving entrants (the winners of olympiads and those, who have eit average score above 90 out of 100). 3. the third element of quality of education is quality of the educational services provided to the population and satisfying specific needs of society. we can affirm that the classification of services in ukraine is based on a sectoral approach and is related to the traditional practice of management and issues of state regulation of the service sector. ukraine does not buy educational services for its residents. our government creates the state higher educational institutions and funds them, i.e., pays their expenses from the funds of the budget. private educational institutions can get budget funds only if they are accredited and implement the general education program. from an economic point of view, we can say that the educational services are services paid by a private person. nevertheless, the ukrainian experience shows that, as a rule, students who have paid for educational services and students who get it at state expense can study in one group. accordingly, it is necessary to divide the concepts “quality of education” and “quality of educational services”. this is due to several factors as requirements of today’s market and increasing competition for students between higher education institutions. 4. the fourth element of the education quality is quality (state) of education economics. it must be considered either at the state and regional level or at the level of higher education institutions. in our opinion, the most important indicator of quality of education economics is the level of economic security of the educational institution. 3. features of the relation between the education quality and economic security in ukraine speaking about the current state of the economy of the modern ukrainian higher education it is necessary to note that the number of non-state higher education institutions has increased during the last 20 years. due to the recent structural changes in the state management system of ukraine the number of fee-paying students at the state higher education institutions also has grown. the relation between the education quality and economic security depends on the duration of improvement or deterioration of education quality and economic security indicators. in our opinion, short-term increase or decrease in the level of one aspect does not affect the second aspect, as well as single violations of education quality or economic security does not affect their interdependence and interplay. however, the issues of education quality require permanent state and public control and attention, as well as in-depth scientific quality of education and economic security of higher education institutions:… 35 study. this is due to the requirements of today’s market and increasing of competition for students between higher education institutions. references dombrovska s., 2016, scientific and methodological basis for the formation and implementation of economic safety management of higher educational establishment, scientific light, 2, 19–24. http://mon.gov.ua, the official website of ministry of education and science of ukraine [06.11.2016]. http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua, database of state statistics service of ukraine [06.11.2016] бєлова л.о., 2014, реформування системи управління освітою за умови децентралізації місцевого самоврядування, актуальні проблеми державного управління, 1(45), 109–118. домбровська с.м., 2010, державне управління вищою освітою україни в умовах трансформаційних змін, оберіг, харків. закон україни від 23 травня 1991 р. “про освіту”, 1991, відомості верховної ради україни, 1997 №34 ст. 451. інформація абітурієнту національного університету цивільного захисту україни, 2016, http://nuczu.edu.ua/ ukr/for_entrants [06.11.2016]. інформація абітурієнту харківського національного автомобільно-дорожнього університету, 2016. http://www.khadi.kharkov.ua/abiturijentu/priiom-douniversitetu/nakazi-na-zarakhuvannja.html [06.11.2016]. інформація щодо напрямків підготовки та спеціальностей у харківському національному університеті імені в. н. каразіна, 2016, http://www.univer.kharkov.ua/ru/ study/student/bakalavrat [06.11.2016]. поступна о.в. et al., 2011, державна політика і управління в освіті, асоціація докторів наук державного управління, харків. сиченко в.в., 2010, механізми регулювання системи освіти: сучасний стан та перспективи розвитку, юговосток, донецьк. 1. introduction today ukrainian information space torn by invasive enemy hands is a concern in various aspects both within the country and abroad. this is largely related to the sluggish response of the media to the challenges posed by the conjuncture of external and internal media space, which is transforming daily. under the influence of enemy attacks both at the contact level and in a plane of virtual fight a new segment of media hardened by enemy attacks on freedom of the spirit and will of ukrainian people is forming in ukraine. in this conditions today every media channel carries out own information fight and has small victories in the war of semantic contradictions, by which the enemy litters the civils thoughts. usually entertaining, easy to perceive, energetic and exciting radio broadcast in conditions of the military conflict faced a difficult dilemma. the management of every radio station looked for an own unique compromise between the own traditional positive nature and deeply offended spirit of public conscience. as a result, some have decided to shift the traditional focus in the radio broadcast to accommodate challenges of modern times, while others began to ignore topics that are contrary journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 64–70 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.008.8160 ukrainian practice of the military radio broadcasting development during the military conflict tetiana hyrina advertisement, journalism and social communications department, classic private university, zhukovsky 70b, 69000 zaporizhzhya, ukraine, e-mail: hirinatetyana@gmail.com citation hyrina т., 2018, ukrainian practice of the military radio broadcasting development during the military conflict, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 64–70. abstract the article explored the potential of radio broadcasting in a coverage of the military conflict in ukraine. it is determined that the most specific for ukrainian broadcast is an entertaining, social and psychological, arts and cultural, patriotic (ideological and agitational), historical, information and analytics projects, demonstrating that the potentiality of radio broadcasting make such radio programmes closer to the broadcast listener not only at home, but and in the trenches or in the adaptation after the combat area service. the author notes the lack of attention of radio companies to the topics of anti-terrorist operation (ato), and focuses on the potential of radio broadcasting for the social adaptation of service members and people affected by military conflict in eastern ukraine and crimea in the postwar period. key words military conflict in ukraine, social adaptation, type of radio programme, ukrainian radio broadcasting. received: 09 june 2017 accepted: 02 december 2017 published: 30 march 2018 ukrainian practice of the military radio broadcasting development during the military conflict 65 to the editorial concept of carelessness of radio broadcast. however, the closer a radio station is to the demarcation zone, the harder it is getting to avoid topics that sound polyphonically from the window of every car, home or office. in a situation of permanent stress a radio set can become just so a safety valve, so a source of latest information, medium of communication and exchange of ideas. special aspects of performing by journalists their duties in conditions of military conflict are described in the works of ukrainian and foreign researchers of mass media. among these are works of m.e. garcia raya (2003), d. reljiic (2004). results of ukrainian scientists’ explorations devoted to this topic regularly appear. these include works of h. rodyk (родик, 2012), o. pashnina (пашніна, 2009), h. kobra (кобра, 2009), m. kondratiuk (кондратюк, 2013), l. putkalets (путькалець, 2015) and others. vitally valuable for ukrainian journalists working in conditions of military conflict are recommendations developed by a group of scholars, including m. buromenskyi (буроменський, 2016). however, the potential of radio broadcasting both in the process of chronicle coverage of military events and as an entertaining, social and adaptive media channel has not yet been conceptualized in complex on a scientific level. 2. research results analysis in the ukrainian radio broadcast the programs devoted to the subject of ato are reflected in entertainment, social and psychological, arts and cultural, patriotic (ideological and agitational), historical, information and analytics projects. according to the results of the monitoring study we identified and analyzed 47 specialized radio programmes on military topics on the broadcasting of 246 studied ukrainian radio stations1 (fig.  1) (гиріна, 2016). the important specifics of such programmes is their acute compliance with the challenges of the times, so they have not only an entertainment function, a traditional one for them, but also an approach of interests’ function. in fact, central figures of the programmes – yesterday’s neighbors, brothers, children and husbands of ukraine people from everywhere – today send greetings from the trenches, speak about their health condition, report from rehabilitation centers, and volunteers coordinate the directions of further cooperation. thus, on the other hand, a small number (at first glance) of specialized radio projects on ato topics can be seen as an effective ground for development. and vitally important and telling is the fact that the state does not remain on the sidelines of such processes supporting the projects financially. the conducted monitoring of ukrainian radio stations showed the following division of radio programmes on the military conflict topics (fig.  2) (гиріна, 2016). unfortunately, despite the numerical superiority of private radio companies over the state ones, the figure enabled to document an inversely proportional level of attention to radio programmes on ato topics. while the broadcasting of almost every regional branch or the national radio company of ukraine presents certain projects, revealing the situation in eastern ukraine and crimea, for the majority of nonstate radio stations an issue of coverage the military conflict within special radio projects does not exist. 1 including 29 satellite radio stations, 5 internet radio stations, 9 ukrainian-speaking radio stations of the world and 203 regional radio stations in november, 2016. fig. 1. quantitative characteristics of the presence of radio programmes of military topics in the broadcasting of ukrainian radio stations (november, 2016) source: own studies. 66 tetiana hyrina instead, we note a systematic address to events in the area of military conflict in the news releases, programmes of greetings and congratulations, dialogue of djs, the music content. here a pleasant exception is the broadcast schedule of the “ера fm” (era fm) radio, where during the week at once several programmes, devoted to analyzed problems, are introduced to the listeners, and some episodes of other programmes also refer to the theme of military conflict. but in this case we also have to remember that this radio station is a talk one, while the most part of stations in the ukrainian radio space is the music and entertainment ones, so they do not dare to emphasize the militaristic topic in their broadcasting. ukrainian-speaking editorial staff of foreign radio stations also talk about the war within the territory of ukraine, but they mostly do it not in specific programmes, but within thematic rubrics. we connect such a trend with the geographic remoteness from the conflict zone and complexity of obtaining unique information by journalists. the opposite trend consolidates in the public broadcasting sector. for example, for the broadcast on the “громадське радіо” (hromadske radio; public radio) journalists are preparing four appropriate radio programmes. with the financial support of the state the donetsk regional directorate of public tv and radio company of ukraine, which is represented by the “голос донбасу” (holos donbasu; voice of donbas) radio station, resumed the broadcasting. by early 2017 four radio companies got a license from the national council on television and radio broadcasting of ukraine to broadcast in the occupied crimea. so across the peninsula the “українське радіо” (ukrainske radio; ukrainian radio) (100.7 fm) and “meydan radiosı” (101.4 and 90.8 fm) can already be heard. the start of broadcasting of the “радіо крим реалії” (radio krym realii; radio crimea realia) and the “херсон fm” (kherson fm) is scheduled (на окупований крим почали мовлення..., 2017). but a special part in the national information space plays the comprehensive ukrainian state military “армія fm” (armiia fm; army fm) radio station, which broadcasts under the slogan of “to inform, to hear, to support.” it is unique not only because it was established to inform about the activities of ukrainian military, but also because it is the first radio station of the ministry of defense of ukraine created since 1992. in this respect more than for two decades a unique one was the “бриз” (bryz; breeze) tv and radio company, which after the annexation of crimea was moved to odesa and transformed into a tv studio. and the newly established at march 1, 2016 “армія fm” radio station now has become not only an information platform for the military, but next to the one unprejudiced ukrainian-speaking source for obtaining of information from ukraine in settlements front-line to the demarcation zone. although the radio station is the state-owned, the financial support of the foreign charitable organization “spirit of america” (usa) was involved to its creation (сша проспонсируют создание в украине военного радио, 2015). in an interview in celebration of the first anniversary of the station, its founder and leader, lieutenant colonel of the armed forces of ukraine ya. kholodna noted that “the “армія fm” is one of the few examples of successful state projects in the information sphere. the radio, created by the military and for the military, it would seem, was doomed to be a sort of audio version of army regulations, however, fig. 2. presentation of radio programmes on the ato topics in the broadcasting of radio stations of different forms of ownership (november, 2016) source: own studies. ukrainian practice of the military radio broadcasting development during the military conflict 67 quality music and creative work of radio station’s staff made almost impossible – today the military radio wave is gaining more and more supporters, and not only among the service members, but including civilians of ato zone” (лаптєв, 2017). in addition to the broadcasting in the world wide web in the format of the audio stream on the “svoeradio” (svoie radio; own radio) portal (військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016, 2016), today the radio station can be heard in the fm gamut in kramatorsk (105.3 fm), bakhmut (105.3 fm), kostiantynivka (105.3 fm), pokrovske (105.3 fm), mariupol (89.5 fm), volnovakha (87.6 fm), hirnyk (87.8 fm), ocheretyne (89.1 fm), sloviansk (88.9 fm), novoaidar (91.6 fm), shchastia (98.5 fm), luhanska cossack village (90.8 fm), novotoshkivka (90.8 fm), krasnohorivka (105.3 fm), svitlodarsk (107.4 fm), hranitne (98.5 fm) and shyrokyne (95.  fm) (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016). the management declares that “the radio is heard almost throughout the ato zone – we cover 70%, and maybe more, given the fact that our radio waves reach the temporarily occupied territories of ukraine” (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016). thus from the project addressed only to military, the radio turns into a source for the obtaining of reliable information about events in the country, that takes a particular significance in the conditions of information vacuum in which people live in those areas. despite the seemingly predictable political and ideological influence of the ministry of defense of tab. 1. broadcast schedule of “армія фм” radio station (april 2016) no broadcast title day and time of going on the air presenter 1. “рота, підйом!” (rota, pidiom! troop, wakey!) mon, 7:00–11:00 tue-fri 7:00–10:00 p. boiko 2. “правовий інструктаж” (pravovyi instruktazh; juristic instruction) mon-fri, 10:30–10:35 mon-fri, 15:30–15:35 m. markevych 3. “неформат” (neformat; non-format) mon, wed-fri, 13:30–13:40 tue, 13:30–13:40 i. kravchenko 4. “привіт в ато” (pryvit v ato; hello to ato) mon, wed-fri, 14:00–15:00 5. “уроки англійської” (uroky anhliiskoi; english lessons) mon, wed-fri 12:30–12:35 mon, 16:30–16:35 6. “ветерано бізнес” (veterano biznes; veteran business) mon, 17:00–18:00 l. ostaltsev 7. “тепер ти в армії” (teper ty v armii; you in the army now) mon, 20:30–20:35 sat, 15:30–15:35 d. ishchenko 8. “під сумнівом” (pid sumnivom; in ambiguo) tue, 9:30–9:40 a. bulharov 9. “алло! ми шукаємо штірліца!” (allo! my shukaiemo shtirlitsa! hallo! we are looking for stierlitz!) tue, 12:30–12:35 tue, thu, 16:30–16:35 a. krachenko 10. “незламна” (nezlamna; (she is) adamant) tue, 14:00–15:00 m. markevych) 11. “сектор л” (sektor l; sector l) tue, 17:00–18:00 k. potapenko, m. muzyka 12. “мінбрест” (minbrest) tue, 19:00–21:00 m. brest 13. “спецоперації” (spetsoperatsii; special ops) tue, wed, 20:30–20:35 нд 20.30-20.35 v. shvachkin 14. “зброяua” (zbroiaua; weaponua) wed, 16:15–16:45 sun, 16:15–16:45 s. kaminskyi 15. “анатомія зради” (anatomiia zrady; anatomy of treachery) wed, 17:00–18:00 m. dyzhechko 16. “будемо жити” (budemo zhyty; we will live) wed, 19:30–19:40 sat, 12:30–12:35 17. “точка доступу” (tochka dostupu; access point) thu, 14:00–15:00 i. sampan 18. “тop ua” (тop ua) thu, 17:00–18:00 n. hross 19. “хіт-парад «тop 40»” (khit-parad “top 40”; “top 40” hit parade) fri, 17:00–19:00 sun, 12:00–14:00 v. smirnov, n. hross 20. “рейволюція” (reivoliutsiia; ravolution) fri, sun, 21:00–21:30 o. bezsonov 21. “рейверський уікенд” (reiverskyi uikend; rave weekend) sat, 19:00–21:00 o. bezsonov source: own studies. 68 tetiana hyrina ukraine on the radio station’s content, a subordinate body of which the company is, the broadcast surprises not only with a polyphony of ideas about the programmes content, but also with the level of skill, dedication and quality of their performance.fulltime broadcasting of the music and information (as it determined by the employees themselves) station consists of both talk-show blocks, and of the music content, the style of which deserves more attention. in the air of “армія fm” you can hear not only songs performed by stars of ukrainian show business, but also foreign rock songs, as well as compositions of other styles. approximately a half or the broadcasting is granted to national performers. the broadcast schedule of the station consists of projects of various thematic focus, which most of all are designed in the format of dialogue of radio presenter with guests in the studio. one feature of the radio is that during the year of its work the own website had not been created. therefore, all information about its activities can be obtained on the “facebook” page (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016), or by the link on the “svoeradio” portal (військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016). in order to obtain a complex picture of the radio company activities we consider it expedient to provide a list of radio programmes with the indication of presenters, time and frequency of broadcasting (tab.1). the provided list of radio projects tellingly proves that a military radio broadcast can be polythematic, diverse, interesting and not boring at all. in addition to traditional information programmes the listeners are provided with musical, educational and informative, historical and culturological, entertaining, topical blocks that may be interesting for both service members (because some issues concerning the military service) and civilians (who live in the ato zone and out of its bounds throughout the state). technologies of the programmes creation is re-structured in such a way that many of them are broadcast live. among these are the “рота, підйом!” (rota, pidiom! troop, wakey!) morning show with p.  boiko, the “незламна” (nezlamna; (she is) adamant) with m.  markevych, the “сектор  л” (sektor  l; sector  l) with k.  potapenko and m.  muzyka, the “мінбрест” (minbrest) with m.  brest, the “анатомія зради” (anatomiia zrady; anatomy of treachery) with м.  дижечко (m.  dyzhechko), the “точка доступу” (tochka dostupu; access point) with i. sampan, “тop ua”, the “хіт-парад «тop  40»” (khit-parad “top  40”; hit parade “top  40”) with v. smirnov, n.  hross (військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016). traditionally for the specialized radio station of this type the daily news block is widely presented; it consists of hourly newscast, sport review at 17:00, the “інформаційний дайджест за минулу добу” (informatsiinyi daidzhest za mynulu dobu; information digest for the last day), which is a daily ten-minute information programme broadcasted at 08:50 and at 20:00 in expanded format. besides that news items appears in the air of radio programmes broadcasted live and becomes known to listeners from the dialogue of a presenter with a guest. a special place in the broadcasting take short radio programmes lasting for 5–10 minutes, which in express mode, without bending a listener, convey some useful information. the thematic focus of such projects is diverse, from the education and informative “уроки англійської” (uroky anhliiskoi; english lessons) programme to the problematic “будемо жити” (budemo zhyty; we will live) one; the last one is a ten-minute programme that can be heard on wednesday at 19:30 and on saturday at 12:30. in fact, this is a radio broadcasting of the tv programme of the same name, which goes on the air every sunday on the “5 канал” (5 kanal; channel 5) (kyiv) and tells nonfictional life histories of people whose spirit has not broken by the war, and in defiance of incredible hardships they remain optimistic and believe in a bright future. an example of programmes of another type is the comic and informative “алло! ми шукаємо штірліца!” (allo! my shukaiemo shtirlitsa! hallo! we are looking for stierlitz!) one. funny and witty flavours of the programme perform an important function of comfort and once again prove the statement that the ridiculed problem is not so terrible. then a joke helps to survive a stress, comforts, especially in conditions of a constant tension faced by the service members. evening blocks are presented by the expanded in a runtime and range of covered issues programmes, such as: “анатомія зради” (anatomiia zrady; anatomy of treachery) with m.  dyzhechko, “спецоперації” (spetsoperatsii; special ops) with v.  shvachkin, “мінбрест” (minbrest) with m.  brest, “точка доступу” (tochka dostupu; access point) with i.  sampan. in the air of the last one the presenter invites officials, businessmen and volunteers to conversations. for example, one of the programme’s guest was a.  okuieva; she is a volunteer who after the maidan went to the east part of ukraine to serve in the chechen volunteer battalion named after d.  dudaiev. one of the next programmes was focused on the story of a.  andrieiev, a former prosecutor of luhansk region, who in 2014 resigned, witnessed the capture of the luhansk oblast state administration by the separatists, and volunteered together with his colleagues to assist units of the ukrainian practice of the military radio broadcasting development during the military conflict 69 armed forces of ukraine (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016). unique for the ukrainian information space is a number of projects. for example, the literary “сектор  л” (sektor  l; sector  l) programme, a slogan which the presenters k.  potapenko and m.  muzyka have formulated as “«sector l»”  – it is always intellectually, invites to the conversation writers who served in the ato zone, or directly relevant to it due to their volunteering activities or personal relations, etc. the guest of one of the programme issues was l.  yakymchuk, a journalist and a poet, the author of the “абрикоси донбасу” (abrykosy donbasu; donbas appricots) book. she was born and lived for a long time in the luhansk oblast, and in 2015 published a book included in the rating of the best books about the ato according to the ukrainian “forbes”. in the air the poet talked about her creative work and shared plans for the future. a noteworthy one is the “ветерано бізнес” (veterano biznes; veteran business) radio program, where l.  ostaltsev in the form of an interview tells the listeners about the success stories in the entrepreneurial field of former members of the armed conflict. judging by the fact that the program is aired every monday with an hour long timing for a long time, we can draw a conclusion about the sufficient number of characters, and therefore about the short success stories for the listeners. in march 2017 a guest of one of the programme issues has become a veteran of “айдар” (aidar) v.  khartman. after the receiving a military injuries compensation he opened two coffee bars. in the studio, he persuades that money have to be spent wisely, and it is quite possible to start an own business [військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016]. and there are a lot of such stories. in the broadcasting schedule an entertainment segment is allocated for the “рота, підйом!” (rota, pidiom! troop, wakey!) morning show. three-hour broadcast is composed on the principle laid by the presenter: “without unnecessary advertising and talks! only interesting rubrics and cool music!” (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016). in addition, guests are invited here to talk, gifts are drawn, and the listeners are informed about the most important events that occurred during the last hours. in the format of the programme of greetings and congratulations the “привіт в ато” (pryvit v ato; hello to ato) project is issued, where everyone who want to can send kind words to service members, who are on duty; moreover, participants in the air have an opportunity to address to their folks. the messages are received through the page on “facebook” and “viber”. musical blocks are presented by such programmes as “top ua” by n. hross, “top 40” hit parade by v.  smirnov and n.  hross, and author projects of the weekend: “рейволюція” (reivoliutsiia; ravolution) and “рейверський уікенд” (reiverskyi uikend; rave weekend). both of them belong to an evening time slot of weekends. for the listeners, presenter o.  bezsonov is a kind of guide to the world of music. according to the head of the station ya. kholodna, “he was by a miracle transferred from the 14th brigade. there, in mariinka, with the help of chinese transmitter, he all by himself and voluntarily managed to set up a small radio, started to broadcast music, even made the news. now we are expecting that he will sign a contract and will continue to serve here” (лаптєв, 2017). in the programmes he addresses the subjects of musical styles emergence, of inventions and events related to art, reveals the issues of music history. here you can get to know the musical novelties from around the world, which the author carefully picks for the listeners. for example, the announcement of one of the programme is: “today in the #rave_weekend programme you will find out when the international dj day is celebrated, when this holiday emerged and who introduced it. and also there will be a lot of great music for a party weekend. do not miss, it will be fun!” (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016). since the radio station has no certain site, the exchange of information with the listeners takes place mainly through the page on “facebook”. more than eight thousand of followers tracking the news of the company, so they are its supporters. over a short period of time the radio station has become a platform uniting patriotic ukrainian not only in the donetsk and luhansk regions, but also across the country. indicative in this context is the message left by one of the users on the radio station page on the “svoeradio”. a girl under the “jen” nickname wrote: “say hello to my friend – his name is illia, from lviv – soon he will go to war again. hello from zhenichka from kharkiv” (військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016). the quote aptly illustrates not only the fact that people listen to the radio station far beyond the territories next to conflict area, but that during the war there are no citizens whose lives have not been affected by the conflict. however, we would most like to note a thirst for life, strong emotions and desire to win, which is particularly strongly felt in the listeners messages; just look at these messages: “our guys definitely will win. we believe in them!” (user “olha”), or “finally a normal radio appeared” (user “balabina”) (військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016). such friendly attitude of the listeners is a result of understanding by the administration and management of all responsibility 70 tetiana hyrina that falls on the shoulders of members of the “first radio in ukraine made by the military” (військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016). thus the founder of the radio station ya. kholodna notes: “i will never allow to read regulations or conduct a drill training in the broadcasting of our radio station from morning till night. our listeners, combatants, they are first and foremost are people and need the appropriate attitude. they have enough “military” on locations, but in some way they have to rest from this, to relax, to get some interesting information” (військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016). 3. summary there is much concern about the problem of information support of member service who are in the ato zone and of local citizens since the beginning of the conflict. and if the owners of private radio stations master the broadcasting time at their own discretion and often immolates such programmes, then the state broadcasters become flagships of radio signal broadcasting on the east of ukraine. the information vacuum about which ukrainian soldiers complain, can be more deafening than salvos of military weaponry, because as victims of the hostile propaganda fall not only civilians, but service members too, who are on the frontline. the realia of the military situation development, as well as the media focus on the information support of this topic creates new forms of radio broadcasting. we can see trends of the development of complete specialized military radio stations, which focus on a narrow but loyal audience that is co-thinkers. in the future, such channels can become a gathering place for the listeners united by common problems, by life stories, which can be understood and heard be people who were caught in similar life situations. and when the long-awaited peace will come to ukrainian land, these radio stations will be the medium which unite around them non-indifferent patriotic public. references garcia raya m.e., 2003, strategy in internal armed conflicts, television & new media, 4, 71–84. reljiic d., 2004, the news media and the transformation of ethnopolitucal conflicts, berghof research center for constructive conflict management, berghof. буроменський м., 2016, журналістика в умовах конфлікту: передовий досвід та рекомендації: посібник рекомендацій для працівників змі, компанія ваіте, київ. військове радіо “армія fm” на “facebook”, 2016, https:// www.facebook.com/armyuafm/ [01.02.2017]. військове радіо “армія fm” на “svoeradio”, 2016, http://svoeradio.com/listen/arm-ya-fm-retranslation [01.02.2016]. гиріна т., 2016, соціальна роль радіомовлення в період військового конфлікту на сході україни: сучасний стан та перспективи трансформації, держава та регіони. серія: соціальні комунікації, 4, 45–51. кобра г, 2009, сучасні збройні конфлікти у виданнях “rzeczpospolita”, та “gazeta wyborcza”, вісник львівського університету. серія журналістика, 32, 252–260. кондратюк м., 2013, інформаційна війна та роль мас-медіа в  міжнародних конфліктах, вісник харківської державної академії культури, 41, 108–113. лаптєв ю., 2017, яна холодна: “ми змогли позбутися “совка”, і це насправді надихає”, http://m.tyzhden.ua/ society/186606 [01.03.2017]. на окупований крим почали мовлення дві українські радіостанції, 2017, http://espreso.tv/news/2017/02/09/ na_ok upovany y_k r ymu_pochaly_movlennya_dvi_ ukrayinski_radiostanciyi [09.02.2017]. пашніна о., 2009, особливості висвітлення військових конфліктів телемережею cnn науковий вісник волинського національного університету імені лесі українки, науковий вісник волинського національного університету імені лесі українки, 25, 72–76. путькалець л., 2015, роль державних телерадіокомпаній у формуванні інформаційного простору регіону, теле та радіожурналістика, 14, 82–86. родик г., 2012, роль засобів масової комунікації в міжетнічних конфліктах, панорама політологічних студій: науковий вісник рівненського державного гуманітарного університету, 8, 41–46. сша проспонсируют создание в украине военного радио, 2015, http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3604620-sshaprosponsyruuit-sozdanye-v-ukrayne-voennoho-radyo [01.02.2017]. 1. introduction in the era of ongoing globalization process, the implementation of the assumptions of the regional education is a very important part of the curriculum in schools of various levels. during the learning process, students should acquire a comprehensive knowledge of the region in which they function on a daily basis and thus expand and develop its own regional identity. issues relating to the regional education can be implemented in the content of different subjects, and the task of the leading teacher, is the selection of appropriate methods and forms in order to get the best possible learning outcomes in this area. of course, the knowledge gained during a lesson is just one of the available sources of information about their region. building teacher’s skills and tools for the regional education, the teacher can and should also benefit from cooperation with individuals and institutions concerned with or related to regionalism in the area. the main purpose of this article is to present the statutory activities of the pedestrian tourist club “mikołajek” pttk słupsk (hereinafter referred to as journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(2), 19–24 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.008.5164 the implementation of the concept of regional education in the light of the curriculum activities of the pedestrian tourist club “mikołajek” pttk słupsk łukasz marszałek institute of geography and regional studies, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76-200 słupsk, poland, e-mail: marszalmen@o2.pl citation marszałek  ł., 2015, the implementation of the concept of regional education in the light of the curriculum activities of the pedestrian tourist club “mikołajek” pttk słupsk, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(2), 19–24. abstract in the times of the omnipresent globalization, an important place in the education of children and adolescents takes the regional education and the associated with it deepening of the regional identity. the content related to this subject is woven into the issues of different subjects: history, polish language, geography and civics. currently available forms and methods of education are offering the teacher conducting classes, many opportunities to prepare the best workshop to achieve his or her goals in this area. one of them is the cooperation with external institutions dealing with regionalism. the curriculum activities of the pedestrian tourist club “mikołajek” pttk (polish tourist and sightseeing society) słupsk in cooperation with słupsk schools is an excellent example of this. years of experience, the regional knowledge and qualifications possessed by the staff of the club provide a solid foundation that can be used and is used in the regional education of children and adolescents, thus implementing the main objectives of “mikołajek”. key words regional education, the pedestrian tourist club “mikołajek” pttk (polish tourist and sightseeing society) słupsk, słupsk region. 20 łukasz marszałek ktp “mikołajek”), in particular based on cooperation with schools in słupsk and its surroundings in the implementation of the regional education. a secondary objective is to provide, in this example, the possibilities of utilizing external institutions in the work of a teacher dealing with regionalism. 2. the regional education – concepts and objectives the concept of regional education in the curriculum is a problem well known in the history of geographical sciences. it is also an issue of several studies and analysis, the results of which are presented in a number of publications on this subject. as early as in the eighteenth century, an outstanding czech educator j. a. n. komensky rightly pointed out that teaching geography at school, should be initiated by getting to know the local area. he expressed this in “the great didactics”, “the material should be constantly devided in such a way to first give information about what is the nearest” (komensky, 1956, by hibszer, 2004, p. 10). over time, the idea of regional education flourished which is evidenced by appearing in the literature various definitions of this concept. d. jankowski (1990, p. 107) presents the regional education as “the introduction of units and small social groups in the tradition and present socio-cultural life of the region and the local community (...).it involves the formation of a sense of identity of the local and regional as well as on strengthening the ties between an individual and the groups which constitute the necessary complement and concretization of ties with the entire national and state society”. on the other hand a. awramiuk (2009, p. 11) explains this concept as “all activities of teaching and upbringing, which are associated with the transmission of knowledge about the region, shaping positive attitudes and behaviors, and strengthening regional awareness undertaken by both the teacher and students “. according to j. nikitorowicz (2009, p. 502), however, the regional education constitute “all actions forwarding the knowledge about the” private homeland “and forming ties with it, with the world of the original roots. he meets a man through the shaping the ability of coexistence, cooperation and continuing involvement “in the small homeland”, while ensuring the continuity of cultural groups by equipping with the knowledge, raising awareness of universal values based on local ties.” among the previously developed concepts in this area of education, the idea of k. kossak-główczewski appeared (2003, p. 39–40) which says: “the essence of regional education is to return home to the sources of life of every human being, to the sources of his ethics and his language, and thus to the sources of domestic, local, regional, national and human culture.” apart from the above definition, an attempt to explain the concept of regional education was also undertook by other authors in their publications (see: kowolik, 1999; petrykowski, 2003; mistarz, 2011). nevertheless, an important problem discussed in the scientific literature are issues related to the definition of the objectives of regional education. a. hibszer stresses that clearly defined general objectives provide a basis for the creation of specific objectives, which in its content should include the category of knowledge, skills and attitudes. in his deliberations the author cites three main objectives of the regional education contained in the programme of education in 1997, together with the ways of their implementation. these include: 1. “equiping the student in the geographical knowledge about the “small homeland”, in close liaison with the knowledge of their home country, by: • supporting a large part of the learning on direct observations in the field (learning about the environment throuh using various senses); • creating conditions for comparing the book knowledge with the knowledge obtained in the field. 2. the shaping in students a sense of regional identity, which is the basis for involvement in the life of the local community, by: • portraying student’s relationships with the nearest natural and social environment; • arousing the interest of the problems of the local environment; • perception of the value of the local geographical environment. 3. preparing the student to act responsibly in adulthood, mainly in the local community, by: • acquiring the skills of evaluating, assessing and making choices needed for functioning in a multicultural society in our country, while preserving the cultural values of their own community” (hibszer, 2004, p.15). whereas, t. nawrocki (2003, p. 226) formulates one primary goal of regional education that is “shaping students’ sense of their own regional identity as an attitude of commitment to the functioning of their environment and authentic openness towards other communities and cultures.” in a similar form also p.  petrykowski (1997) speaks. in addition, the author explains that this objective can be achieved by developing and strengthening a sense of regional identity, which would increase the awareness of belonging to a certain place, area, community and culture. the implementation of the concept of regional education in the light of the curriculum activities… 21 k. kopeć (2004) rightly draws attention to the need to implement the tasks of regional education at every stage of education, because only then it will be possible to achieve the final effect which is to develop in students a complete image and understanding of their own region. undoubtedly, this is possible by the objectives set for regional education in schools at all levels. in the core curriculum of general education, until recently in force (rozporządzenie…, 2002), the implementation of educational paths was assumed. one of them was “the regional education – cultural heritage in the region”. for the best of its implementation, in the regulation was prepared a set of goals, objectives, content and achievements appropriate for each type of school. according to the regulations, the main objectives for the mentioned path, valid in the primary school are: • “getting to know the nearest environment and the specifics of their region; • the development of family values related to the cultural values of the local community; • the development of patriotic attitudes related to regional culture.” in the next stage of education namely the education at junior high schools for “regional education – cultural heritage in the region”, there are the following purposes: • “the development of knowledge about the culture of their region and its relations with national culture; • establishing contact with the local and regional level in order to form close relationships and understanding of the diverse belonging for the human; • strengthening the sense of national identity through the development of regional identity; • development of knowledge about the history of the region in conjunction with the traditions of his own family.” a. religa refers to them in his publication (2003), that presents, among others, the link between the regional content with the geographical content in junior high school. in a joint publication of w. srokosz and m. k. szmigiel (2002) was presented in accordance with the regulation of the ministry of education dated 26 february 2002., the main objectives for the path “the regional education – cultural heritage in the region”, included in the core curriculum for general education at secondary schools, specialized secondary schools and secondary technical schools. these include: • “learning about their region, including cultural heritage, as part of poland and europe; • deepening ties with their community, region, country; • shaping of regional identity in the context of national and european values; • preparation for adult life in the regional, national, state and european structures; • developing respect for other regional communities of ethnic and national.” similar to the idea of a. hibszer (2004) here as well, on the basis of the main objectives several specific objectives on regional education in malopolska were formulated. at this stage of education it is also worth of attention, to present the regional content, against the background of the whole country, the nation and europe. a supporter of this type of concept is s. bednarek (1999) who considers the need for exploring the student’s knowledge of their own region in comparison with the knowledge of the country and international subject matter. a similar solution was introduced in the project of geographical blocks for secondary schools, which include the basic content of the curriculum and those contained in the educational paths. in line with the objectives presented above, one of the branches of the curriculum devoted to regional education was titled “my region on the background of poland and the world” (sołohubiak-borchert, michalski, 2002). in the accordance with currently applicable core curriculum, the curricular themes were abandoned from the further leading at schools, one of which was also “the regional education – cultural heritage in the region”. transferring knowledge to students about their own region was not abandoned, however. currently, the main goals and objectives of regional education are woven into the curriculum of individual subjects. the task of the teacher conducting classes is, however, the selection of appropriate forms and methods to achieve the expected learning outcomes in this regard. 3. the regional education in the activities of ktp “mikołajek” one way of implementing the regional education in schools is the cooperation of the teacher conducting the subject with various institutions dealing with regionalism. these may be museums, memorial exhibition rooms, libraries, community centers, regional associations of culture, folklore groups, institutions dealing with tourism and touring. an example of this is the cooperation of schools from słupsk and the surrounding area with the pedestrian tourist 22 łukasz marszałek club “mikołajek” pttk słupsk. the club was founded march 15, 1968 in słupsk by a group of 39 hikers, at the same time members of pttk. the club from the beginning of its existence is strongly linked with the regional division of pttk in słupsk, where it also has its headquarters. the area of its activity has become the area where the department, that is the słupsk region of pttk operates. this is the name functioning in the structures of pttk and refers to the area of the former province of słupsk (fig. 1). the region covers an area of 7347 square kilometers and is located in the north-western part of the pomorskie voivodeship and partly in the north-eastern part of zachodniopomorskie province. in its boundaries there is located 5 counties: sławno (sławno and postomino municipality), słupsk, lębork, bytów and człuchów and including 35 municipalities and 11 cities (grabowski, 2015). with the commencement of operations the club members wanted to emphasize their commitment to the nearest surroundings. the effect of this is giving the club the name “mikołajek”, which comes from the name of a plant – mikołajek nadmorski (eryngium maritimum). in poland the plant is under strict species protection, whose natural area of occurrence are coastal dunes. in słupsk region mainly in the area of rowy and in the słowiński national park. the first event organized by “mikołajek” was “the rally on parts” which route led from rowy to ustka. it was attended by 12 people. in june 1968, the first in this part of the coast a pedestrian rally in słowiński national park was organized. these are the two events that gave rise to ongoing for already 48 years activities closely related to tourism, touring and regional education. the objectives and targets contained in the regulations of the club refer to it. these are among others: • “getting to know the country, its sights, interesting towns, natural values, developing young people’s interest in touring and tourism; fig. 1. słupsk region of pttk source: own elaboration based on: pomorskie.eu/documents/39036/61458/powiaty_i_gminy_d.jpg the implementation of the concept of regional education in the light of the curriculum activities… 23 • organization of tourist events, rallies, tours, hikes, trips; • assisting in the organization of hiking events” (regulamin klubu turystów pieszych “mikołajek” pttk słupsk). although not included in the regulations, the aforementioned guidelines are implemented with a strong focus on regional education. this results mainly from the fact that since the beginning of the work the club community was created by the people associated with the culture and regionalism in the area. although due to historical reasons their roots were scattered in different parts of poland, yet thanks to their passion, courage and commitment they decided to build upon this earth, the słupsk homeland, to which attached will be people born here: poles, kashubians and other słupsk residents (zielonka, 2000). among others those people deserve special attention: kazimierz świderski, władysław lachowicz, wojciech wypiśniak, stefania jóźwik, józef cieplik, zenon frąckiewicz. the high regional activity of club activists gave a solid foundation to establish a strong, long-term cooperation of the club with schools from słupsk, słupsk district, and not only. its origins date back to 1971, when the organization of hiking events, prepared specifically for the students was launched. that is when the first rally of primary schools youth of słupsk earth took place. it was organized within the period 9th–10th june. the route led from słupsk to nearby włynkówko where the camping under tents was organized, while the second day of the trek brought the participants back to słupsk. during the youth rallies the organizers always put great emphasis on the regional education. young tourists participating in hiking in the surroundings, were gaining the knowledge on history, culture, geography, nature and historical sites associated with the region, where they exist on daily basis. they were held on the region’s designated hiking trails, which system enables to present the participants of hiking, the most valuable natural and anthropogenic of the area. very often the support and assistance in organizing this series of events was given by the board of education in słupsk and the faculty of education of the municipal office in słupsk the rallies of primary schools youth of słupsk earth were organized uninterruptedly till 1999. on 24th september 2005, the jubilee and last xxx rally of primary schools youth of słupsk earth was organized. 215 young tourists arrived to two one-day long prepared hiking routes. this did not mean, however, completion of the activities related to the regional education. moreover, they have been extended by further hiking rallies. currently in the event calendar of ktp “mikołajek” there are 6 generally accessible hiking events organized in the region of słupsk. in each of them a large part of the participants are students and teachers from słupsk and surrounding primary schools, junior high schools and high schools. apart from this, the club supports the activities of słupsk pttk branch in preparing and conducting subsequent 2 events designed for children and teenagers. these are rallies: “powitanie wiosny” – “welcoming spring” (march) and “mikołajkowy” – “santa claus” (december), which are held regularly in recreational areas of the słupsk city. the participation of preschool children in these events is worth noting. in addition, according to the assumptions of the club regulations, the activities of it recently significantly expanded to support schools and educational institutions in the preparation of thematic events concerning regional issues. the work on individual events is not limited to accompany the group through a certain section of the walking trail. the qualified club staff provide participants with a lot of interesting information related to the area where they are currently are. for the rallies are often invited people, who in the course of short lectures, help to deepen previously acquired knowledge. these include employees of the national park, landscape park, forest district or people related to the culture of the region. during each hiking children and young people have the opportunity to participate in a pre-prepared contests of knowledge about the area in which the current event is taking place. all the above activities are planned, thinking about the students participating in club trips and awakening and deepening their knowledge and regional identity. in the idea of activities of ktp “mikołajek” and described rallies, one cannot ignore the concept contained in the above-mentioned definitions of regional education by komeński, jankowski, nikitorowicz, kossak-główczewski. the method of learning the immediate area, thanks to the organized hiking trips, gives schools and teachers involved, the possibility of implementation, presented in the first part of the article, objectives used to achieve the best learning outcomes in terms of knowledge about their own region. knowledge, thanks to pedestrian tours, about the cultural heritage and characteristics of the physical-geographical area, obviously requires further expansion of information on the social environment and the economy. only in this perspective, it gives students a comprehensive regional knowledge. properly conducted and organized by the school the regional education, therefore becomes a key tool for building students’ regional identity and awareness of the opportunities and developmental barriers of their region (michalski, 2003). 24 łukasz marszałek 4. conclusions the activity of the pedestrian tourist club “mikołajek” pttk słupsk virtually from the beginning was associated with cooperation with schools from słupsk and the surrounding area. through 48 years of activity within the słupsk region, it permanently grown into a program of work and philosophy of the club. apart from the desire to instilling in youth the idea of hiking and sightseeing, the primary aim is also to provide participants with the greatest knowledge of their own region. mainly it is based on a hiking organized in the form of rallies and tours, for which the available network of hiking trails in the region is used. the requirements and the progress of modern education forced the organizers to introduce additional methods of achieving the objectives of regional education. the program events included: lectures, discussions, presentations, meetings with interesting personalities and knowledge competitions. everything about the region in which the students are functioning on a daily basis. from the point of view of teachers, cooperation with “mikołajek” gave the possibility of introducing interesting and varied training methods concerning natural, anthropogenic and cultural values of the region. in conjunction with the analysis of the socio-economic area, schools tend to provide pupils with a comprehensive knowledge of their own region. the cooperation of ktp “mikołajek”, schools from słupsk and the surrounding area is an example of the good and the applicable practices in the transfer of knowledge in the field of the regional education. references awramiuk a., 2009, pogranicze kultur. percepcja „własnego regionu” przez uczniów a edukacja regionalna, wyd. uniwersytetu warszawskiego, warszawa. bednarek s., 1999, edukacja regionalna dziedzictwo kulturowe w zreformowanej szkole, wydawnictwo dtsk silesia, wrocław. grabowski j., 2015, region słupski pttk – walory krajoznawcze, wyd. ro pttk słupsk, słupsk. hibszer a., 2004, koncepcja poznawania „małej ojczyzny” (najbliższej okolicy i własnego regionu) w szkolnej edukacji geograficznej, [in:] t. michalski (ed.), region i edukacja regionalna – zarys problematyki, wyd. diecezji pelplińskiej „bernardinum”, pelplin, 8–20. jankowski d., 1990, edukacja regionalna jako czynnik regionotwórczy, [in:] s. dąbrowski, a. kociszewski, a. omelaniuk, c. niedzielski (eds.), regionalizm polski, wyd. krajowy ośrodek dokumentacji regionalnych towarzystw kultury, ciechanów, 101–113. kopeć k., 2004, własny region w szkolnej edukacji geograficznej wobec procesu globalizacji, [in:] europa – region – turystyka. specyfika przestrzeni regionalnej – jej ochrona, zachowanie i rozwój, ecovast – europejski ruch odnowy wsi i małych miast – sekcja polska, polskie towarzystwo geograficzne – oddział białostocki, białowieża, 224–230. kossak-główczewski k., 2003, edukacja regionalna – pytania o realizację, [in:] p. petrykowski (ed.), edukacja regionalna. problemy podstawowe i otwarte, wyd. umk, toruń, 39–40. kowolik p., 1999, edukacja regionalna w przedszkolu, [in:] m.t. michalewska (ed.), edukacja regionalna – z historii, teorii i praktyki, oficyna wydawnicza impuls, kraków, 119–120. michalski t., 2003, nowe wyzwania stojące przed edukacją regionalną, [in:] t. michalski (ed.), nowe wyzwania i tematy w edukacji regionalnej, wyd. carta blanca, warszawa, 12–17. mistarz r., 2011, wielokulturowość a edukacja regionalna, informator oświatowy, 3/2011, 29–31. nawrocki t., 2003, dylematy edukacji regionalnej w województwie śląskim, [in:] j. nikitorowicz, j. halicki, j. muszyńska (eds.), międzygeneracyjna transmisja dziedzictwa kulturowego. globalizm versus regionalizm, wyd. „trans humana”, białystok, 226–233. nikitorowicz j., 2009, edukacja regionalna i międzykulturowa, wyd. waip, warszawa. orłowski a., 1998, szlaki turystyki pieszej w regionie słupskim, wyd. wojewódzki ośrodek informacji turystycznej, słupsk petrykowski p., 1997, o edukacji regionalnej, wychowanie na co dzień, 7/8, 22–26. petrykowski p., 2003, edukacja regionalna. problemy podstawowe i otwarte, wyd. umk, toruń. region słupsk – mapa turystyczna 1:300000, wyd. wojewódzki ośrodek informacji turystycznej w słupsku, słupsk regulamin klubu turystów pieszych „mikołajek” pttk słupsk, słupsk. religa a., 2003, cele i treści ścieżek edukacyjnych w powiązaniu z treściami geograficznymi programu gimnazjum, [in:] m. nowak (ed.), edukacja regionalna w gimnazjum – lubelszczyzna, wyd. umcs, lublin, 11–13. rozporządzenie ministra edukacji narodowej i sportu z dnia 26 lutego 2002 r. w sprawie podstawy programowej wychowania przedszkolnego oraz kształcenia ogólnego w poszczególnych typach szkół, 2002 (dz.u. 2002, poz. 458). sołohubiak-borchert e., michalski t., 2002, klocki geograficzne, [in:] k. hall (ed.), program szkolny. klocki autonomiczne dla liceum ogólnokształcącego, liceum profilowego i technikum, wyd. nowa era, warszawa, 87–98. srokosz w., szmigiel m. k., 2002, edukacja regionalna – dziedzictwo kulturowe w regionie małopolska. w granicach administracyjnych województwa małopolskiego. program nauczania ścieżki edukacyjnej dla liceum ogólnokształcącego, liceum profilowanego i technikum, wyd. stowarzyszenie oświatowców polskich, toruń. zielonka z., 2000, region i regionalizm słupski, [in:] j. cieplik (ed.), materiały do poznania regionalizmu słupskiego. tom iii, wyd. słupskie towarzystwo społeczno-kulturalne, słupsk, 14–20. pomorskie.eu/documents/39036/61458/powiaty_i_gminy_d.jpg [20.01.2015] 1. introduction transport is an integral part of life in any territory; it engenders links that consolidate the region. at the same time, the actual functioning of a unified regional transport system depends not only on the areal features of the region, but also on the decisions of authorities of a russian federation entity. they develop a concept for functioning of this complex in all its aspects. the inherent task is to provide the population with passenger traffic service in the region. in the present-day russia, the organization of passenger transportation process within a regional transport system through the local (suburban) and long-distance traffic is one of the functions of the regional authorities. forming orders for transportation services, entering into contracts with carrier companies, providing necessary documentation, organizing a system for subsidizing unprofitable means of transport – all this falls directly within a spectrum of responsibilities of a russian federation entity. each of them, proceeding from their rights and responsibilities as well as own resources, develops its own strategy for realization of transport policy provision of the population with transport. many aspects of life of the population depend precisely on how it is implemented. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 32–40 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.035.7635 typology of russian regions by level of suburban railway transport: development and areal aspects of management kirill samburov institute of earth sciences, st. petersburg state university, 10th line of the vasilivsky island, 33-35, 199004 st. petersburg, russia, e-mail: blok04@gmail.com citation samburov k., 2017, typology of russian regions by level of suburban railway transport: development and areal aspects of management, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 32–40. abstract the post-reform period of development of the railway passenger complex was marked by a significant number of crises that led to aggravation of the transport situation in a number of russian federation entities. this article is devoted to the problems of regional analysis of the level of suburban service development; it outlines the main trends in management of the local railway transport. the main development indicators have been identified; the grading of russian regions in these terms has been traced; two key models of regional policy in the sphere of railway suburban service to the population have been defined. key words suburban train, russian railway service, passenger service, regional policy, typology of russian regions, transport geography. received: 03 october 2017 accepted: 10 november 2017 published: 29 december 2017 typology of russian regions by level of suburban railway transport… 33 one of the key means of transport in local service in most regions is a suburban train. the current stage of development of the railway passenger complex in the russian federation can be correctly called a post-reform period. the railway transport reform has resulted in creation of an entirely new system of forming regional orders for passenger traffic, as well as in change of subsidizing system for commercially unfeasible, though socially important, routes in subsidized regions, where commuter trains often were a single means of public transport, connecting towns and settlements with regional or local centres. this resulted in increased competition between the railway and road transport in the sphere of suburban service. this reform was by no means painless. some researchers in particular believe that a return to the original centralized system of passenger traffic would be necessary (колин, 2015). these ideas originated because of the conflicts in a number of regions, both between regional authorities and carrier companies and between the population and the authorities, which conflicts were a result of serious blunders when setting up subsidiary companies of russian railways joint-stock company. it should be noted that the process of setting off the suburban service as a separate business unit involved some contradicting tendencies: on the one hand, preservation of socially oriented suburban routes, and on the other hand, deriving maximum profit. the impossibility of lossless operation of such companies in most of the country’s territory is confirmed by the experience of other states; in particular, significant state subsidies are characteristic of germany, france, italy and a number of other states (шнейдер, 2013). a great number of problems revealed in the course of the suburban complex reform resulted in a significant reduction of railway traffic as well as number of routes in several regions of the country. 2. key indicators of the level of local passenger service development let us analyze the main characteristics of suburban railway transportation in the present-day russia. the local railway communication is not always aimed at provision of due commuting service in large-city agglomerations; therefore division into the following types would be feasible (неретин, 2015): 1. routes in agglomerations of large cities – they are aimed at servicing the intensive passenger traffic both in intraregional and interregional transportation. this type should include commuter trains in moscow, st. petersburg, novosibirsk and a number of other agglomerations. 2. suburban routes in medium-size cities – they are aimed at servicing relatively thinly-populated agglomerations. this type should include commuter trains of khabarovsk region, kurgan region and a number of other areas. 3. routes of peripheral territories – they are characterized by insignificant passenger traffic, but the service may not be liquidated due to the absence of alternative means of transport. the dno – morino route in pskov region can be given as an example of such route, where a number of settlements have no other connection with the district centre. also this type may include the routes between major railway junctions having no in-between big cities, for instance, the route nevinnomysskaya – mineralnye vody in stavropol region. the following marker indicators are important characteristics for studying the specific features of suburban railway service in the regional context: • share of suburban service in the overall structure of railway traffic in the region; • percentage of coverage of suburban passenger companies’ losses by regional authorities; the grading of regions in terms of these indicators was made using the sturgess formula: n = 1 + 3,322 lgn, where n is the number of groups; n is the number of aggregate units (number of subjects). however, the resulting groups were enlarged to reflect the differences more accurately – more fractional division for medium and high values. on the average, the share of suburban railway service in the russian federation is 90.29% (регионы россии..., 2015), which is a consequence of high proportion of federal-importance cities for this type of rail transportation. it should be noted that the medial index for the regions is 73.41%, which is closer to understanding the actual structure of the railway traffic. 40 of 82 explored russian federation entities� (fig. 1) belong to two categories: regions with medium and high share of suburban service. these types include regions with a centre in million-plus cities or regions where the regional centre share is significant, for instance, primorsky territory. the russian federation entities representing these types have a highly developed suburban service, as a rule (exceptions are the republic of adygea, the republic of karachaevo-cherkessia and the jewish autonomous region), that is, the regions where suburban routes are predominant in the agglomerations of large cities. the following trend is also noticeable: the higher 34 kirill samburov the density of railways in the region, the higher the proportion of suburban service. 32 of 82 russian federation entities have low shares of suburban service – the regions of three types: with a share below the average; low and extremely low shares. in addition to the above gradation, they are divided into two groups: 1. regions with underdeveloped suburban complex – this type is characterized by a mismatch in development of communication routes to the scope of suburban service. it includes the following russian federation entities: belgorod region, ivanovo region, kursk region, orel region, tambov region, pskov region, the republic of kabardino-balkaria, penza region, lipetsk region, vologda region, novgorod region, the republic of dagestan, the republic of mordovia, the republic of chuvashia, ulyanovsk region, the republic of north ossetia – alania, the chechen republic, the republic of mari el. 2. regions with highly developed long-distance railway service this type includes regions with an underdeveloped network of railways and/or a large area; the main passenger transportation in such regions is carried out by long-distance trains astrakhan region, tomsk region, the republic of karelia, arkhangelsk region, tyumen region, the republic of khakassia, transbaikal region, khabarovsk region, sakhalin region, the republic of komi, murmansk region, the khanty-mansiysk autonomous area, the republic of buryatia, amur region. there also exist four regions with the absence of suburban railway service and six regions with a total absence of railway transport. one should note, taking the regions with the total absence of suburban service, the yamal-nenets autonomous area and the republic of sakha-yakutia, that are characterized by a quite well-developed complex of long-distance communication and a small number of settlements located along the railway. the republic of ingushetia, on the other hand, is a region where suburban railway service can become the key transport in the future, as the only railroad in the region connects the largest settlements of the republic: nazran, karabulak, sunzha. the analysis of current trends in development of the suburban railway complex in the russian federation entities would be impossible without taking the factor of regional authorities’ policy into account – since the regional authorities in the present-day russia have one of the key tools of management – provision of transport service to the population living in a particular region. as it was already mentioned, the range of their powers includes conclusion of contracts for transport service to the public fig. 1. types of regions by share of commuter trains in the structure of passenger railway traffic 2014. source: регионы россии.., 2015. typology of russian regions by level of suburban railway transport… 35 with companies operating in the field of passenger service, and, accordingly, their subsidizing aimed at compensating for shortfall in incomes. the system of subsidizing suburban railway traffic, functioning in all regions since 2011, has not found support with the russian federation entities’ authorities. most of them are incapable or unwilling to fully compensate the shortfall in incomes to suburban passenger companies, which leads to regular conflicts in this sphere between the authorities and the carriers. only 11 regions, as of the year 2014, completely subsidize the suburban complex (щукин, 2015), another four function without loss (moscow, st. petersburg, moscow and astrakhan regions). this situation shows that we are facing a crisis of this means of railway transportation. it should be noted that it is predominantly the regions with the poorly developed suburban complex (for instance, the republic of adygea and the republic of karachaevocherkessia, the khanty-mansiysk autonomous area, tomsk and sakhalin regions) that fully compensate the losses as they are characterized by insignificant losses due to small scope of traffic; this extends as well to the regions with high-intensity and highdemand suburban complex (for instance, vladimir and ryazan regions). the first group will also include astrakhan region which has become loss-free due to the low-intensity suburban traffic; while the second group will include moscow region, as they are similar in their characteristics to the above-mentioned territories. also, 18 regions can be classified as fairly problem-free, being marked by quite full or nearly full compensation policy. this category can be also correctly divided into two groups according to the features of operation of the suburban complex: 1. regions with low-intensity suburban service, and accordingly, with a low level of suburban companies’ losses – the republic of mordovia, the republic of north ossetia and the republic of khakassia; lipetsk, murmansk and orenburg regions. 2. regions with a relatively developed suburban complex – normally this list includes the regions that are holders of suburban companies’ shares (щукин, 2015) (krasnodar, krasnoyarsk and perm regions; volgograd, kemerovo, novosibirsk, omsk, samara and sverdlovsk regions, the republic of tatarstan), the exceptions are the republic of bashkortostan and the republic of udmurtia. the most extensive are two groups that include the regions that compensate the lost income to carrier companies incompletely (slightly more than a half ) or partially. each of these groups comprises 14 regions. this category can be characterized as most unbalanced, since the lack of subsidizing can lead to a situation of crisis in the region, which has actually happened to a number of them. it should be noted that the russian federation as a whole also falls into this category, which evidences the recessive state of the complex in general within the country. accordingly, it can also be divided into several types: 1. relatively prosperous areas – arkhangelsk, irkutsk, kaluga, nizhny novgorod, rostov and yaroslavl regions, the republic of komi, altai and primorsky territories, jewish autonomous region. these russian federation entities are characterized by preservation of acceptable traffic intensity values, however the lack of subsidizing can lead to negative consequences for the region. 2. pre-recessionary areas – amur, voronezh, ivanovo, kaliningrad, kirov, kursk, penza, saratov, tambov, tula and chelyabinsk regions, the republic of kabardino-balkaria and the republic of chuvashia. these regions are characterized by gradual decrease in intensity of traffic, in the number of transported passengers, as well as by significant extent of cancellation of commuter trains. for instance, in 2015 there was a threat of total withdrawal from suburban traffic in tula region. 3. recessionary areas – the republics of dagestan, karelia, mari el and chechnya, novgorod region. they are primarily characterized by preservation of minimum traffic, as well as by prospects of complete renouncement of suburban traffic; for most republics this will not be critical, while possible cancellation of railway service for karelia and novgorod region would lead to significant deterioration of the situation in a number of populated areas. among the recessionary regions are 10 areas characterized by a low level of compensation to suburban passenger companies, as well as two regions that have not envisaged the costs of subsidizing the carriers in their budget. these regions are in the most dangerous situation with respect to full-value functioning of the suburban railway complex. it is worth noting that almost all the regions relating to this type have faced the menace of complete or almost complete liquidation of traffic at some point. for instance, in january 2015, vologda region (ильин, 2015) was completely denied of suburban service; a similar situation took shape in pskov region at the same period. tver region and a number of routes in leningrad region were under threat of almost complete withdrawal from railway service. summing up, it can be noted that this factor affects the operation 36 kirill samburov of passenger service in the region significantly, so highlighting it as one of the indicators for development of the suburban railway complex is justified. as already mentioned, a critical situation took shape in the sphere of suburban service at the onset of 2015; it was recorded not only in the above recessionary areas, but also in relatively prosperous regions. in january 2015, termination of service of more than 300 commuter trains in 39 regions of russia was announced (власов, илюхина, 2016). this situation took shape as a result of a conflict between the regional authorities and the carriers because of the russian federation entities’ debts to the said companies. as far as the routes and regions performing socially important functions were affected in the first place, the conflicts gave rise to a new aspect – dissatisfied residents; rallies and picketing, demanding return of commuter trains (including the republic of buryatia, the republic of karelia, vologda and pskov regions and a number of other regions), took place in a number of areas. the greatest activity was recorded in vologda region where actions of protest were held almost weekly in the period from december 2014 to february 2015. the protests, court disputes between regional authorities and carrier companies, frequent cancellation of particular commuter trains – all this took place in virtually all constituent entities of the russian federation, which makes it possible to compare them in regional aspect. for this purpose, a content analysis of a group «suburban train» in the social network «vkontakte» was undertaken, where the users recorded major conflict events in the sphere of local passenger railway service. a conflict event was understood in this case as an event caused by disagreement between the authorities, carriers and passengers, which resulted in drastic deterioration in transport accessibility in a number of settlements, or was its consequence. the analysis of publications in the group was carried out in the period from january 1, 2013 to march 1, 2016. during that period, 362 conflict events were recorded in 58 russian federation entities (fig. 2). it should be noted that there exists a negative correlation of pearson (-0.42) between the amount of compensation provided for by the regional budget and the number of events. in this case, even full compensation in a region (taking even the profitability of the suburban complex) does not exclude possible conflicts in the sphere of local railway service. for instance, in vladimir region, in spite of full compensation of the shortfall in the carriers’ income, fig. 2. number of conflict situations in the russian federation entities within the period from january 1, 2013 to march 1, 2016 source: own elaboration. typology of russian regions by level of suburban railway transport… 37 12 commuter trains were cancelled simultaneously in january 2015. in the same year, the regional authorities of kurgan region expressed dissatisfaction in the press regarding the volume of funds specified in the agreement with the carrier company, and in 2014 the passengers were picketing in connection with cancellation of a train chelyabinsk-kurgan. however, the greatest number of conflicts arose in the regions where compensation was provided for in the insignificant amount, which aggravated the negative trends in the suburban complex. in pskov region, where 37 events were recorded, only 21% of the required amount was compensated in 2014; in novgorod region – 31 events and 47% respectively, in vologda region – 20 events, with no compensation from the regional budget. 3. typology of the russian regions by level of development of suburban service in order to justify the offered models of operation of suburban passenger service in the regions, and to identify the approximate level of development of this type of transportation (more precise definition is not possible due to inadequate statistics), it is necessary to typify all the regions. it was concluded, proceeding from the results of analysis of the statistical base, that it is most optimal to study the developmental characteristics of the local passenger service on the basis of calculation of development indices using the methodology similar to the human development index. the efficiency of use of this type of indices for passenger traffic was proved in a monograph by с.а. тархов (2015) devoted to the areal coherence of territories. the book describes the coherence processes within the russian federation and measures the transformation of this phenomenon on their basis. accordingly, it is possible to apply this calculation method for studying other transport characteristics; despite the fact that the development of suburban railway transport in the region is conditioned by many factors, it is still possible to assess its current state by determining the railway suburban service development index (rssdi): rssdi = (w + ps + k)/3 where w = wi/100; ps = psi / pmax ; k = ki /100; w is the share of suburban service in the overall structure of railway traffic; ps is the number of suburban trips per resident of a region; k – the percentage ratio of coverage of suburban passenger companies’ losses. according to the received data, a regional typology sketch map was developed (fig. 3), showing the development of suburban railway service in the regions. fig 3. typology of regions in terms of development of suburban railway service 2014 source: own elaboration. 38 kirill samburov the regions were divided into six types according to the level of development of the above complex: • regions without suburban railway service – the republics of altai, kalmykia, sakha-yakutia and tyva; nenets, chukotka and yamalo-nenets autonomous areas, magadan region and kamchatka territory. • regions with expressly underdeveloped suburban service – rssdi from 0.001 to 0.200 – no such regions were revealed in the research. • regions with underdeveloped suburban service – rssdi from 0.201 to 0.400; 20 regions of this type were found. they are characterized by low railway passenger traffic, great importance of long-distance railway service, often a low level of compensation for shortfall in income. these regions, as a rule, are recessionary in terms of passenger railway service; the operation of this complex involves a significant number of conflicts between regional authorities and carrier companies. the exceptions within this type are poorly developed large-area regions of the european north and siberia (the komi republic, arkhangelsk and murmansk regions, the khanty-mansiysk autonomous area), where the low index values are conditioned by areal characteristics, not by actions of regional authorities. the most demonstrative example of regions of this type is vologda region that has the lowest index among the russian federation entities; this region, as already mentioned, was barred from suburban service in january 2015 because of a conflict between the regional authorities and the northern suburban passenger company. an example of another type of conflict was belgorod region where the authorities repeatedly sued the suburban passenger company “chernozemie” and the north caucasian suburban passenger company. • regions with a medium-developed suburban service – rssdi from 0.401 to 0.600. this type includes 28 regions which are characterized by relatively low rates of traffic; however the operation takes place in the conditions of a harmoniously developed complex that provides the population with its services to a full extent. the group is still not crisis-free, as various conflicts are typical for it as well; for instance, tula region could lose suburban service in february 2015. but in general it is worth noting that this type is quite stable, and various problems affecting the operation of the suburban service are resolved quickly in a dialogue between the regional authorities and carrier companies. • regions with highly developed suburban service – rssdi from 0.601 to 0.800. this type includes 20 russian federation entities characterized by high figures of transported passengers, full or nearly full subsidization of the suburban passenger companies operating in the region, high share of suburban service in the structure of railway traffic. they include both small-size regions with a relatively developed suburban complex (the republics of adygeya and karachaevo-cherkessia; kaliningrad, kaluga and ryazan regions) and large regions that comprehensively develop the railway service as one of the key means of passenger traffic – volgograd, irkutsk, kirov, kurgan, nizhny novgorod, samara and sverdlovsk regions; krasnoyarsk, perm and primorsky territories, the republic of tatarstan. leningrad region should be characterized separately since this region is closely connected with st. petersburg; it has high figures of passenger traffic. however, the regional authorities did not ratify the costs of subsidizing the suburban complex in the budget, which ended in a winter crisis of 2014–2015, when there was a threat of cancellation of trains in a number of socially significant routes. • regions with extremely highly-developed suburban service – rssdi from 0.801 to 1.000. this type includes only three regions – vladimir, moscow and novosibirsk regions. they are characterized by the highest figures of transported passengers, by profitability or full compensation for losses of suburban passenger companies. the authorities of these regions make the suburban railway service a key element of operation of the passenger service in the region. this typology, operating with three indicators and a development index based on them, highlights the key features of the current state of the suburban railway complex in the regions. the analysis of these features makes it possible not only to identify the current characteristics of the complex, but also to base the further development of suburban service in the russian federation entities upon them. 4. directions of regional policy in the sphere of suburban railway traffic one may conclude, on the basis on the held analysis, that all the russian federation entities having a suburban railway service can be divided into two groups (fig. 4): • regions characterized by a policy of preferential withdrawal from suburban railway service in favour of bus transportation – they are characterized by frequent conflicts, steady decline in orders for transportation. only those suburban typology of russian regions by level of suburban railway transport… 39 routes that provide for no alternative means of transport remain. • regions characterized by a policy of maintaining acceptable scope of service for full-value functioning of the suburban railway complex – the conflicts in these regions are less frequent; at the same time not only the geography of routes, but also the pairing of trains is predominantly preserved. in some regions, the routes that were previously closed are resumed – in primorsky territory, saratov region and in several others. it should be noted that it is impossible to single out any regions in the russian federation preserving the tendency to extend the geography of commuter train routes and/or to increase the frequency in their service in the post-reform period. some success in the development of this type of railway service was characteristic of leningrad and moscow regions (introduction of high-speed trains in a number of routes), altai territory (increase in traffic frequency on the route barnaul-biysk) and a number of others. however, it is worth noting that one can observe shortage of passengers and reduction in traffic volumes even in these regions. 5. brief conclusion summarizing the results of the research, it is worth noting that the post-reform period at the suburban railway service was characterized by considerable recessionary phenomena. since the emergence of a fundamentally different operation scheme for the railway complex in 2011, the preservation of acceptable volume of traffic has become increasingly difficult for regional authorities due to significant losses involved in this type of transport communication. at the same time, the need to preserve socially important routes, along with the expressed temptation to withdraw from commuter trains in favour of bus transportation, entail a significant complication in making decisions regarding development of passenger transport. one should note as well the emerging contradictions between the regional authorities and carrier companies that often lead to development of protest moods among the population. all this encourages the managers to pay more attention to the micro-regional level in order to take into account both the peculiarities of transport systems at the local level and the demands of the population. for more detailed specification of characteristics of the suburban railway complex, it is necessary to study the current trends at the regional level and to make a detailed analysis of every route on their basis. fig. 4. types of regional policy in the sphere of suburban railway passenger service 2014 source: own elaboration. 40 kirill samburov references map of russian regions, https://upload.wikimedia.org/ wikipedia/commons/5/5c/russia-subdivisions_with_ crimea.png [19.09.2017] власов а.в., илюхина с.с., 2016, развитие российских региональных систем железнодорожных пассажирских сообщений с использованием зарубежного опыта (на примере österreichischen bundesbahnen ag.; deutsche bahn ag.), модернизация. инновации. развитие, 1(25), 141–146. ильин в.а., 2015, настораживающие тенденции, экономические и социальные перемены: факты, тенденции, прогноз, 1(37), 9–15. колин а.в., 2015, актуальность системных преобразований в пригородных железнодорожных перевозках, транспорт российской федерации. журнал о науке, практике, экономике, 1(56), 7–11. неретин а.с., 2015, роль местного железнодорожного сообщения в обеспечении мобильности населения малолюдных районов (на примере костромской области), региональные исследования, 4(50), 34–42. регионы россии. социально-экономические показатели – 2015 г., 2015, федеральная служба государственной статистики, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_14p/main. htm [22.09.2017]. тархов с.а., 2015, изменение связности пространства россии (на примере авиапассажирского сообщения), издательство «ойкумена», москва смоленск. шнейдер м.а., 2013, механизм взаимодействия субъектов рынка пригородных железнодорожных перевозок, вестник государственного университета морского и речного флота им. адмирала с.о. макарова, 2(18), 179–185. щукин в.в., 2015, экономическое обоснование системы субсидирования железнодорожных пригородных перевозок. phd typescript in мгупс, москва. 1. introduction russian-ukrainian relations have been complicated and unstable since the first days after the collapse of the soviet union. the annexation of crimea and the war in donbass radically transformed the character of neighbourhood. ukrainians are a kin people to russians which have lived for centuries in the common state. they are related by mentality and traditions, closely accrete cultures, economic ties and, finally, on the individual level by family bonds existing between millions of people. so, the break up between russia and ukraine turned to be rather painful, as it often happens among close relatives. shrinking contacts and interactions have a particularly considerable impact on economy and everyday life in border regions of both countries. these regions are historically closely related with each other. on the one hand, some of them made in the past a part of different states but on another hand, they have for many years developed within russian empire and then the soviet union. the soviet period was marked for them by intensive socio-economic modernization. they were built in all-state chains of journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(2), 7–15 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.010.8216 radical shifts in russian-ukrainian relations and geopolitics of neighbourhood vladimir kolosov centre of geopolitical studies, institute of geography of russian academy of sciences, staromonetnyi per. 29, moscow 119017, russia, e-mail: kolosov@igras.ru citation kolosov v., 2018, radical shifts in russian-ukrainian relations and geopolitics of neighbourhood, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 7–15. abstract the break-up between russia and ukraine was rather painful for both sides though it was not unavoidable, it was prepared by the developments in both countries since the disintegration of the soviet union and to a certain extent resulted from the very model of state-building adopted by ukrainian political elite and based on the opposition of ukraine to russia seen as the way to the emancipation from the burden of the imperial/soviet past. it involved, in particular, a radical revision of ukrainian territory’s symbolic perception, provoked, on its turn, by the russian-ukrainian “battles of memory” initiated well before the crisis of 2014. recent events deeply transformed public opinion in ukraine and identity of ukrainians. the author describes some consequences of the break up between two countries for ordinary citizens, especially living in border regions. he briefly considers the adaptation of economy and population to the new conditions of neighbourhood. key words russian-ukrainian relations, identity, state-building, battles of memory, neighbourhood, crisis, adaptation, borderlands. received: 19 february 2018 accepted: 26 february 2018 published: 31 may 2018 8 vladimir kolosov production not depending on the borders between inner political or administrative borders. the objective of this paper is two-fold: firstly, to show that the 2014 crisis was prepared by the policy and rhetoric of all post-soviet years; though it was not unavoidable, it is to a certain extent a natural result of the very model of state-building adopted in ukraine; secondly, to consider the transformation of neighbourhood between two countries after the crisis. 2. the ways of state-building in ukraine and geopolitical alternatives the dynamics of russian-ukrainian relations since the disintegration of the soviet union is directly connected with the ways of stateand nation-building in both states and reflect a complicated hierarchy of territorial identities. the territory of the ukrainian state has been shaped relatively recently, and its boundaries do not match the administrative boundaries of imperial provinces (gubernia) and have been many times changed already in the soviet period (пантин, лапкин (eds.), 2014). political and administrative boundaries of the past are clearly visible in the inhabitants’ identity and often match religious, linguistic, socio-economic and cultural-political borders. a deep relation between regional, linguistic and confessional identity and electoral behaviour was explored by numerous studies of ukrainian, russian and western experts with the use of sociological and geographical methods and statistical models (субтельный, 1994; hesli et al., 1998; kubicek, 2000; o’loughlin, 2001; wilson, 2015). ukrainian foreign policy has been until recently a direct manifestation of dual economic, cultural and political structures. a search of geopolitical orientation and “codes” of the country’s relations with its neighbours as part of national and ethnic building was closely intertwined with the key problems of ukrainian statehood, political and economic reforms (kuzio, 1998; d’anieri et al., 1999). economic factors pushed ukraine to the east while political and ideological factors lying at the basis of state-building – to the west. these contradictions can be considered as a conflict between the objectives of nationand state-building and the constraints of economic development. ukrainian ethnic and political identity is stronger in western regions, while the intellectual and industrial potential are concentrated mainly on the east. in the conditions of socio-cultural polarization between the east and the west (in reality the country’s cultural differentiation is much more complicated) ukrainian political elite as early as in the 1990s came to the conclusion that ukraine could become a modern state only when its society reached a certain cultural and linguistic homogeneity. fearing the split of the country along regional watersheds, ukrainian intellectuals and statesmen headed on building a political identity integrating all citizens not depending on their ethnic, linguistic, confessional and regional belonging on the basis of ukrainian national (often just west ukrainian) culture, historical representations and stereotypes. many authors emphasized that each state needed a particular system of national myths, symbols and representations, and therefore, the dominant ukrainian historiography is not nationalist but national (kuzio, 1998). they selected the well-known “oppositional” model of identity building: they tried to cement a common political identity and to transform ukraine into a large democratic european state in opposing their country to russia. the “national idea” suggested by political and intellectual elite was grounded on the representation on ukrainians as a european people always gravitating around the advanced european countries but violently torn away from europe after the “reunification” with russia. the denial of cultural unity of eastern slavs, though with some hesitations, has naturally led to the acceptance of the “western” geopolitical doctrine (вендина et al., 2014). as the ukrainian identity is opposed to the russian and “little russian” ones (the identity of russian-speaking and “russified” ukrainians), it involves the need in shortening social and cultural distance between the regions and the building of a centralized unitary state in which the questions of culture and education are solved mainly in the capital. national stereotypes always include the images of space: different areas of the state receive a kind of codes, and many of them become national symbols, and are considered as a statehood cradle, the strongholds of national consciousness and the struggle for independence. geographical images are backing projects of state-building and foreign policy’s strategies – for instance, the accession to nato or eu. the contemporary “national idea” supposes a radical revision of ukrainian territory’s symbolic perception and its borders as an organic part of identity. the east has been the main region of ukraine in the soviet period for both economic and ideological reasons: a high concentration of the working class considered as the main support of the soviet power, an ethnically mixed structure of population and the diffusion of russian language. the east included donbass, one of the most important industrial regions of the soviet union, kharkiv, the first capital of soviet radical shifts in russian-ukrainian relations and geopolitics of neighbourhood 9 ukraine and the third city of the ussr by the number of inhabitants hosting large industrial plants strategically important for all country, etc. the great number of natives from the east constantly joined the ranks of top soviet party and military authorities, intellectual elite and creative intellectuals. on the contrary, the west, which has never been part of a common state with russia before world war two, was perceived as a rural, agrarian periphery and associated with the guerrilla fight against the soviet power in the first post-war years and its leader stepan bandera. but since independence the west became in national mythology the cradle of the national liberation movement and of the real, pure ukrainian identity, the stronghold of democratisation and the driving force of social progress making sure the desired rapprochement with europe, while the inhabitants of donbass are often represented as russified, poorly educated “quilted jackets” (vatniki) fooled by communist, and later by russian propaganda which cannot remember who they are. their position was interpreted as an obstacle to europeinisation and democratic transformation of the country, and russian – as a symbol of pro-communist orientation and nostalgia about the soviet past (рябчук, 1992). the discourse about “indigenous population” and its culture, national security, imagined or real external threats, historical myths and stereotypes determines the attitude of the people to neighbours and the borders with them. in the east those who share the concept of three brother east slavic peoples believed that thanks to many centuries of life within the same state ukrainian and russian cultures deeply penetrated each other, and russian and ukrainian identities became very close – at least, in their region. according to this opinion, the common russian-ukrainian cultural and linguistic space was split as a result of the “clash of civilisations” by external forces which liked to change the geo-cultural “code” of the ukrainian people and to transform ukraine into a periphery of the global west. radical ukrainian nationalism in its galician version became an instrument of these forces. it is just west ukraine, a remote periphery of the west which is “stranger” in the ukrainian state (алексеев, 2008). the idea of federalization of ukraine as a mean to take into account the diversity of different regional interests and the pronounced cultural specifics was close to the inhabitants of the east. they worried not so much about the status of russian and not about the “national idea” preached by national political elite but its fundamental anti-russian component, the imposed representation on their inferiority and culturally peripheral character, and the dependence of “russified” territories on the “nationally conscious” west. a deep difference in the collective historical memory and values between the east and the west played an important role in their contradictions. “easterners” did not perceive themselves only as victims of the soviet regime established by “strangers” from russia but felt active actors of the communist period and kept souvenirs not only about its failures, injustice and misfortunes but also achievements, asserting the right on their own interpretation of the recent past (zhurzhenko, 2002), especially as the economic and intellectual potential and the level of well-being were higher on the east. cultural and political cleavage between the east and the west was aggravated by the conflict between regional elites which disputed control over national political institutes. the parties representing different parts of the country monopolized the support of voters in their regional strongholds: in donbass, most people supported first the communist party and later the party of regions. political polarization conserved regional myths and stereotypes, and relative cultural isolation of the east and the west. sociologists from luhansk showed that in 2007 54% of this city’s inhabitants had never been in the western part of the country, and at the same time 65% of the inhabitants of l’viv had never visited donbass (скоркин, 2018). “the european perspective” served a reference point for social and institutional modernisation to many countries of central-east europe, including russia during its first post-soviet decade. in ukraine, it was transformed into an ideology of identityand state-building in the framework of the concept “ukraine is not russia” (the title of a big volume signed by the then president leonid kuchma and published in both countries) (кучма, 2003). this idea kept its key importance in course of all post-soviet period, though the degree of its practical implementation varied depending on political circumstances and persons at power. the ukrainian leaders proclaimed european integration as the main goal of ukrainian foreign policy and state building since the first years of independence. yet in 1998 president leonid kuchma published the decree “strategy of integration of ukraine into the eu” which contained a list of measures necessary for the country’s adaptation to european norms (указ…, 1998). therefore, the commitment of ukraine to the “european vector” has undoubtedly a longterm, and non-tactical character. it is based on rational and objective considerations. ukrainian elite believes that russia can offer little except energy resources. it suffers from similar economic problems. russian 10 vladimir kolosov economy is not diversified enough and is specialized in the production of fuel and raw materials. export and transit of oil and gas is a too narrow basis for economic integration. it is always better to have access to a larger market, and the ratio of economic potential of eu and russia was about 8 to 1. besides, ukrainian elite has always feared that moscow considered massive russian investments in strategic branches of ukrainian economy as a soft way to recreate its empire and that in cooperating with russia ukraine is doomed to remain its “younger brother”. as they estimated that russia was the origin of the main threat to national sovereignty and the perspectives of state building, since the 1990s ukrainian leaders were convinced that the cooperation and then the accession to nato could provide the country with convincing international guarantees. yet during the presidency of l. kuchma ukraine started to adapt its armed forces to the standards of nato. his successor, viktor yushchenko declared his firm intention to get membership in this organization. russia perceives these steps very painfully. it considered the approach of nato to its borders as the fundamental threat to its ability to conduct independent foreign policy and to keep an autonomous and visible role on the international scene, especially after the events in kosovo and iraq. the 2009 version of the strategy of national security (указ…, 2009) read that the plans to move nato military infrastructure closer to russian borders remained unacceptable and continued to be the determining factor of its relations with the alliance. in june 2008 the state duma adopted the document claiming to withdraw from the so called big treaty with ukraine in case if it joins the action plan for preparation to the membership in nato (госдума…, 2008)�. russian foreign minister s. lavrov stated: “we will do everything to prevent the accession of ukraine and georgia to nato and to avoid degradation of our relations with the alliance, its leading members and our neighbours inevitably involved by this potential accession” (мид…, 2008). moscow believed that washington’s declarations on “strategic partnership” with russia hided the policy “the winner gets everything”: ukraine and other former soviet republics have been parts of russia’s security system, and now washington claimed them for “our key security zone”. russian public opinion has always perceived nato as an important threat. in 2002–2008 51 to 53% of russian citizens shared this conviction. only 20% had the opposite view, and their ratio was decreasing. not surprisingly, the attitude of 59% of respondents to the perspective of ukraine’s accession to nato was negative. they believed that the country’s membership in nato would put it in a subordinate position with respect to the us, which would cause extensive damage to russian-ukrainian relations (отношение…, 2008). moscow blamed ukrainian leadership in wishing to involve the country in nato despite the negative opinion of its own citizens. indeed, in 2008 45% of ukrainians fully disagreed with this perspective, and 14.5% partly disagreed with it. the accession to nato was fully supported by only 10% of respondents (бунин, макаркин, 2009). 3. “battles of memory” and “realpolitik” the reaction of russia to the early 2014 events in ukraine was based on the sad experience of the deterioration of the relations with ukraine under “proeuropean” president viktor yushchenko (2005–2010) who came to power as a result of the “orange revolution”. it provoked in the kremlin a sharp rejection. russian leaders formulated the doctrine of ”destructive revolutionary shocks” in the post-soviet space inspired by the us and the collective west. moscow put all its influence at stake to prevent the victory of yushchenko. either the “right” forces win, and ukraine concludes an alliance with russia on the belarusian example, or it breaks up, and russia reunites with its “brothers” in the east and the south of the country while “western ukrainians” can integrate the desired west. under yushchenko all trends in ukrainian domestic and foreign policy negatively perceived in moscow have strongly amplified. his administration presented russia to ukrainian public opinion as an exclusively reactionary force, the former empire which liked to impose a political choice to the country and to slow down its modernisation. yushchenko and his supporters believed particularly important overcoming the dependence of ukraine on russian energy as a basis of possible dictate by moscow. they did not forget in ukraine the summit of b. yeltsin and the first president l. kravchuk when the russian side claimed in a categorical form to pass her the black sea fleet as compensation of a debt for energy carriers. kyiv fought russian investors in reconsidering the results of large enterprises’ privatization. the compliance of joint projects to the policy of integration into the eu was proclaimed the main criterion of their evaluation. yushchenko stated: “our idea is the single people, the single state language, the single nation” (ющенко…, 2007). by the end of the 2000s russian and other minorities’ languages were gradually forbidden in office-work, advertising, cinema, legal proceedings. not only entrance examinations in all higher educational institutions, but also teaching radical shifts in russian-ukrainian relations and geopolitics of neighbourhood 11 (except few special faculties) had to be carried out only in the «state» language; thesis are accepted also only in ukrainian, even in crimea though it formally had the status of autonomous republic with russian majority. yet in 2007 in the city of kharkiv, where 66% of population declared that russian was their mother tongue they taught only in ukrainian in all professional colleges, and only 28% of pupils studied in russian schools or forms. these steps contradicting the charter for regional or minority languages ratified by the parliament provoked the decisions on the return to russian of the rights provided by this document taken by the councils of many large cities of east and southern ukraine – kharkiv, luhansk, mykolaiv, donetsk, dnipropetrovsk (now called dnipro), odesa, and sevastopol. but local prosecutor’s offices recognized these decisions incompatible with the constitution, and they were canceled in a judicial proceeding (alekseev, 2008). russian tv was banned, and the distribution of russian newspapers radically decreased. it was just under yushchenko that the ukrainian side intensified the “battles of memory” initiated long ago, at the end of the 1980s. there were three principal “fields” of these battles: 1) the origin of ukrainians and ukrainian statehood; 2) the annexation (or the “reunification”, according to the traditional russian/soviet version) of ukraine by the muscovy in 1654; 3) the outcomes for ukraine of the co-existence in a common state with russia. the ethnocentric, unequivocal and uncompromising ukrainian interpretation of history is irreconcilably opposite to the russian one and makes up the basis of young citizen’s socialisation and indoctrination at school. ukrainian historians stress that their country is the only and the direct heir of the kievan rus’ and stress that it was just ukraine, and not common ancestors of eastern slavs, who adopted christianity in 988, and its great princes kept close contacts with european dynasties, while russians are a mixture product of slavic, turkic and finno-ugric tribes and have never been a truly european people. the authors of school textbooks wrote that the disintegration of the kievan rus’ in the early 13th century (sic!) proceeded “along ethnic lines” (ладиченко et al., 2007, p.143). they needed this statement for grounding the ancient origin and the continuity of ukrainian statehood. common history is portrayed exclusively as an uninterrupted struggle of advanced figures of ukrainian society against national oppression. collective traumas are represented as the main content of this history and were used in constructing a deeply hostile image of the northern neighbour. they involved into current political discourse one tragic event after another and conferred responsibility for them only on russia and russians. all economic and political risks and difficulties of post-soviet state-building were related with russia which was blamed in continuing to exploit ukraine and to profit from its “dependent” position. soviet ukraine was described in school textbooks as a special kind of colony: “ukraine has not been a colony of the asian type – a poor, without its own industry, from which the empire just extorts resources. it has been a colony of the european type, an industrially developed one which has been deprived not so much of resources but of capital and potential profits” (турченко, мороко, 2009, p. 193–194). according to the authors, it became “a european type colony” contrary to the empire which tried to slow down its economic development. they state that in building railways in the late 19th century the empire tried “to connect ukrainian lands not with ukrainian cities but with the moscow region which contradicted the interests of ukraine” (турченко, мороко, 2009, p. 199). particularly heated was the issue of holodomor – a result of the adventurous and misanthropic stalin collectivisation of agriculture in 1932–1933 which has entailed mass hunger and the death of millions of people. holodomor was officially declared the genocide of ukrainian people – a purposeful attempt of moscow authorities to exterminate ukrainians for getting control of their territory. the russian side used archival documents for proving that not only ukrainians have fallen the victims of collectivisation but also millions of russians (especially in the middle volga regions), kazakhs and other peoples of the soviet union (see, for instance, голод…, 2008; зеленин et al., 1994; ивницкий, 2009; кондрашин, 2008; современная…, 2011; kondrashine, 2013). moscow replied to the policy of yushchenko by the attempts to use economic leverages: by sharply increasing the prices for gas, banning under different pretexts the import of some kinds of ukrainian products or applying other restrictions to foreign trade focusing on the most sensitive branches of ukrainian economy. the sides unleashed “gas wars” involving eu countries. russian leadership blamed ukraine in unfair partnership, unauthorized gas intake, violation of international obligations, etc. on its turn, ukraine interpreted these actions as blackmail. russian federal tv channels controlled by the state conducted a practically non-stop anti-ukrainian propaganda campaign. covering the events in ukraine, they selected news about political scandals, disasters, accidents, poverty, etc. ukraine was represented as a poor, unfriendly and unstable country surviving a permanent political crisis. political 12 vladimir kolosov summits became limited and later were blocked. a great number of bilateral agreements concluded earlier were not implemented. at the same time, for historical reasons and because of a wide use of russian many people in russia before the 2014 crisis still considered ukraine as an organically kin country. it explains the belief in a “particular character” of russian-ukrainian relations. russian authorities perceived ukraine as a country which can hardly conduct an independent foreign policy but was rather an arena of competition between russia and the west. they confessed a stereotyped representation about a “due” behaviour of ukraine in foreign relations, and its actions not matching this stereotype were considered as unfriendly. sharp contradictions between two states were softened by viktor yanukovich dismissed from the post of president as a result of the coup (or the revolution) in february 2014. he was often represented in western media as pro-russian politician though he continued the politics initiated by his predecessors even more actively. but the strategy of “eurointegration” preached by yushchenko was replaced by the strategy of “national pragmatism”. it was based on the assumption that good neighbourhood with russia creates “a healthy political environment” which contributes to the association of ukraine with europe (выступление…, 2010). the hesitations of yanukovich who tried to sign the agreement about the association with eu and at the same time to keep acceptable relations with russia and the irreconcilable positions of the sides unleashed the conflict which has been prepared by all post-soviet developments in ukraine and russia. 4. after 2014: radical transformations of neighbourhood and the adaptation to the new situation the events of 2014 have deeply transformed public opinion in ukraine. on the one hand, they provoked de facto secession of some areas of donetsk and luhansk oblasts but on the other hand, they strongly contributed to the consolidation of ukrainian political nation (o’loughlin et al., , toal and kolosov, 2017). nationalism is one of the main forms of territorial ideology and the basis of state-building. it supposes the battle for territory or the defense of the rights on it (paasi, 1996). after 2014, the trends in cultural-linguistic policy observed earlier quite logically led to the clearly pronounced policy of minorities’ assimilation on the territory of ukraine. it confirmed the fears they expressed on the days of a new revolution in kyiv. in september 2017 verkhovna rada (ukrainian parliament) adopted the new law on education (закон украïни…, 2017). since the 2018/2019 academic year teaching in russian and in all other minorities’ languages (hungarian, romanian, etc.) will be possible only in primary school, and since the next year should be banned at all, though russian is the mother tongue for at least a third of population. the only exception is made for crimean tatars as an “indigenous” ethnic group, though most of them live in de facto russian crimea. surnames are “ukrainised” even if a person prefers their russian version: elena becomes olena, konstantin – kostyantyn, etc. (паромный, 2017). the governments of hungary and romania protested and believe that the new law violates the rights of the hungarian and the romanian minorities. experts from the opposition emphasize that it will enhance the split in society. the institute of national memory created under yushchenko was transformed into part of the executive authorities directly run by the government. it initiated the policy of “decommunisation” which in particular returned to hundreds of cities and villages their historical names and eliminated from the map of the country countless toponyms related with the names communist leaders of the 1930s and reminding about the dark times of stalinism. at the same time, many streets and squares in ukrainian cities were renamed after bandera and his supporters. this institute now claims to recognize the soviet epoch as the period of “occupation”, counting the history of independent ukraine since the declaration of the ephemeral ukrainian people’s republic in november 1917 after the collapse of the russian empire�. its boundaries varied depending on the peripeteias of the civil war and did not match the boundaries of contemporary ukraine. this act would create a legal basis for disputing the belonging to it of eastern and south-eastern as well as the western regions which were included to (occupied by?) the territories of neighbouring states of central europe (ивженко, 2018). political crisis in russian-ukrainian relations continuing since 2014 has radically transformed crossborder interactions between the countries which concern vital interests of millions of people. firstly, the cross-border circulation of people and passenger connections are radically reduced. the ukrainian side banned direct flights between the cities of two countries and the flights of russian companies over the ukrainian territory, and moscow replied by reciprocal measures. the number of long distance trains crossing the boundary felt down from more than 30 in 2013 to 9–10 per day (all of them are ukrainian radical shifts in russian-ukrainian relations and geopolitics of neighbourhood 13 or moldovan). the number of their passengers decreased between 2013 and 2016 by 60%. all local cross-border trains are cancelled. there were in 2017 only a half of cross-border bus routes existed in 2013. it takes two to six hours to cross the boundary by bus. it is not surprising considering that russian male citizens between 16 and 60 are as a rule stopped at the boundary by ukrainian border guards as they are suspected in going to the zone of fighting in donbass. all russian citizens must now pass biometric control, possess certified invitations and provide in advance ukrainian authorities with information on the purpose, the length and other details of their visit. as a result, ukrainian citizens make up about 80% of the cross-border flow. according to ukrainian data, 2.1 million ukrainian citizens work in russia, and in total more than 4 million crossed russian boundary in 2016 (the number of crossings was higher only at the boundary of ukraine with poland – 9.5 million) (сколько…, 2016). so, paradoxically, new restrictions concern ukrainian citizens more than russians. secondly, all local crossing points at the border with russia are closed by the ukrainian side. the opening time of road crossing points which can be used now only by ukrainian citizens is limited as the flow of people and vehicles is too low. for instance, in belgorod oblast where there were 22 crossing points and their density per 100 km of the boundary was the highest, there remained in 2016 only four international road crossings and one railway crossing point (колосов, вендинa (eds.), 2011; родной край…, 2017). all agreements on cooperation concluded by ukrainian and russian partners on the regional and local level are not implemented or broken by the ukrainian side. ukrainian officials, professionals, scholars, etc. cannot participate at any event in russia. very few of them take the risk to come on the individual basis carrying about hiding their presence. the trade turnover between two countries decreased in 2013–2016 by the ratio of more than four. but the exchanges between border regions shrank less than in average. moreover, since late 2016 a fast compensation growth of russian-ukrainian trade is noticed; its 2017 estimation riches 23%. this growth is particularly visible in border regions. for example, the export from rostov oblast to ukraine increased in 2016 by 45% as compared with the previous year and exceeded its historical maximum (королева, 2017; экспорт товаров…, 2017). it is certainly explained by the trade with the break away regions of donetsk and luhansk oblasts which is included in statistical data on all ukraine. whatever, different fields of activity are being gradually adapted to the current situation. transport service was restructured first. regular trains and buses belonging to large state or municipal companies were replaced by ukrainian private carriers who organized either direct trips to russian cities or bring their passengers to a crossing point, where russian carriers wait for them on their side of the boundary (it is difficult for them to cross the border because of formalities and restrictions). as a result, at some sections of the border the passenger turnover is being restored. at the boundary with self-proclaimed donetsk and luhansk republics (dnr and lnr) local crossing points were not closed, and their inhabitants can cross the border using their internal passports. consequences of the war which often separated family members and led to the shortcoming of some consumer goods provoked the doubling of cross-border flows. large retailers built new superand hypermarkets in neighboring towns of rostov oblast for customers from dnr and lnr; the turnover of distribution centres in rostov and taganrog increased. these facts are evidence that it is difficult or even impossible to completely break the relations, which have been shaped during a long time, even by emergency political and administrative measures. 5. conclusion the deep crisis in russian-ukrainian relations unleashed in 2014 was prepared by the policy and rhetoric in two countries since the very disintegration of the soviet union. the question is whether they contributed to the processes of nationand state-building in ukraine, helped to create a well integrated independent european state. more than three centuries of common history of russia and ukraine make their separation and delimitation particularly difficult. before the crisis a careful shaping of a strongly negative image of russia and other anti-russian measures seemed to be a growth disease and a natural though perhaps temporary phenomenon. nowadays, it appears as an inevitable result of the annexation of crimea and the war in donbass. this explanation is convincing but it still leaves a space for a question to what extent it was useful for ukraine. the experience of poland – the country historically closely related with both russia and ukraine – can probably help to answer to this question. polish sociologist tomasz zarycki (зарицкий, 2006, p. 64) wrote: “the image of russia plays a key role in shaping contemporary polish identity and performs 14 vladimir kolosov in discursive mechanisms a number of functions related with the compensation of poland’s peripheral weakness as compared with the west”. polish experience is certainly well known in ukraine. but it was shown that it could not be simply copied (вендина et al., 2014). in particular, in poland russia is an object for “consolatory» comparisons. on the background of russia represented as a country rich in natural resources but poor, militarized, authoritarian and with underdeveloped civil society poland looks very attractive. but for ukraine russia is rather an object of very controversial comparisons – at least, until now. a higher level of freedom for media is a not so much a manifestation of a democratic character of society, but rather of conflicts between different strata of political elite, often based on regional interests. acknowledgements this study was carried out in the institute of geography of russian academy of sciences. the theme “spatial dynamics, gradients and territorial conflicts in contemporary russia, funded from the budget, № 01201356200 (№ 0148-2014-0014). references d’anieri p., kravchuk r., kuzio t., 1999, politics and society in ukraine, westview press, boulder. hesli v., reisinger w., miller a., 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according to the european union, it is still part of ukraine (note by the editor-in-chief ). citation shvets a., voronin i., 2018, the change of trends in political and geographical subjectivity of crimea, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 44–53. abstract the article analyzes spatial indicators of changing trends in political and geographical subjectivity of crimea. linguistic and religious contradictions outlined crimea among other regions of ukraine. limitation of linguistic diversity in crimea, disregard towards complex contradictions between split orthodox christianity and politicized islam made crimea create background for separation from ukrainian project of framing russophobic state on the territory of modern ukraine. key words political geography, conflict, region, crimea. received: 06 october 2017 accepted: 08 february 2018 published: 31 may 2018 the change of trends in political and geographical subjectivity of crimea 45 state ones. in such a case a region strives either to become autonomous inside a state or creates background for regional separatism. autonomy in a unitary country is not recognized as a state formation and its political subjectivity is significantly limited. for more than a quarter of a century the pendulum “autonomy-separatism” was a steady trend in the modern history and geography of crimea inside ukrainian state. any movement of this pendulum to some extent affected not only general ukrainian political situation but could cause biased reaction of the world’s community. as a proof we can mention the fact of specific economic sanctions that the usa and europe established against not only russian federation but particularly against the republic of crimea and sevastopol. these sanctions are like punishment for political and cultural orientation of crimea towards russia demonstrated by its residents in 2014 during the referendum of regional identity. reunion of crimea (further saying crimea we mean the geographical unity of administrative formations – the republic of crimea and sevastopol) with the russian federation interrupted paradoxical trends of the regional development as a territorial autonomy inside a unitary state which ukraine is according to the constitution. the new sense of political and geographical subjectivity of crimea is determined by its inclusion into the system of russian federalism. for crimea, being limited by economic and political sanctions from western countries, to be a part of the federation means refusal from international political ambitions (they are implemented by reunion with russia) and focusing on the rational unification of state and local interests. change from the trend “autonomy” to the process of federalization creates for the crimean political and managerial elite a so-called situation of “error correction” and dealing with the risks of the time when administratively crimea was a part of ukraine. geographers can identify spatial indicators of such risks. the purpose of this article is to analyze spatial indicators that allow defining possible risks of regional political and geographical subjectivity change. the fundamental method to determine possible risks of regional political and geographical subjectivity change is based on monitoring (content-analyzing) social and cultural conflicts featured in printed and electronic types of mass media. grounding the nature of social and cultural conflicts, one should imagine a society that produces competing systems of values. in social and cultural conflicts it is difficult to find reasons of collision from each competing part. thus it is hard to classify these competing parts as “positive” or “negative”. any conflicting part protects its “own” system of values in contrast to the “other” one, often dictated by powerful elite of the society that initiates conflicts. social and cultural conflicts in the sphere of ethnical and religious relationship between members of territorial communities are the most common ones. the author’s methods of passporting social and cultural conflicts (швец, 2007; 2008) allowed analyzing situation of conflicting behavior in the sphere of religious relationship within ukrainian and crimean regions. passporting of social and cultural conflicts is supplied with cartographic interpretation of its territorial demonstration in ukraine. 2. crimea in the context of ukrainian regionalism discussions about the essence of the ukrainian regional space were conducted in the academic community of ukraine throughout all the years of independence. the content of the disputes was framed around the postulate that the regions of ukraine are really diverse, but this diversity is natural, characteristic of many countries of the world and does not fragment, but strengthens the country. to prove this postulate, the idea of the essence of ukrainian independence was employed. this idea had many facets, but its regional component manifested itself in the desire of the political and administrative elite to see the country united in everything: language, religion, interpretation of the history of ukraine as identical with the history of the national movement, in the perception of the world as a copy of western rather than the slavic-orthodox civilization. these aspects were the basis for the integration mechanism aimed at attracting ukrainian regions, which was created as a part of the ideology of establishing independent ukraine. the reality of the regional context of ukrainian independence turned out to be more complicated. the postulate on ukraine’s unity was refuted by the practice of electoral preferences of its residents. western, central, eastern and southern regions of ukraine voted from year to year in the elections not for the ideological tracing of the integrators of the country, but for candidates defending the pro-ukrainian or pro-russian identity of their territories. it is the electoral geography of ukraine that has revealed in the country the phenomenon of the irresistible diversity of its regions, encountering the centralist practice of creating a monolithic unity of the country. the geographers of ukraine were interested in the discussion of the problem because the spatial method of research allowed proving or refuting 46 alexandra shvets , igor voronin the regional monolithic nature of ukraine. in this respect, the work of m. dnistriansky “ethnopolitical geography of ukraine” (дністрянський, 2006), rich in a variety of cartographic material proving the existence of different ukraines, can be seen as a significant contribution of the ukrainian geographers to the discussion of the regional originality of the country. however, the above monograph, relying on an objective cartographic interpretation of the regional ethno-political diversity of the ukrainian regions, has many signs of the author’s adherence to the idea of a monolithic unity of ukraine and its ethno-cultural integrity, which reflects the essence of the “unitaristic” point of view in the debate about the fragmentation of the ukrainian regional space. in 2001, ukraine adopted the first concept of state regional policy (указ президента україни.., 2001). it turned out to be inoperative and seven years later a new concept of regional development of the country appeared, which subsequently was periodically changed and supplemented. ukrainian geographers in 2008–2010 tried to embed their point of view into the ideology of the state regional policy (бортник, олещенко, 2008; багров et al., 2009). the meaning of the proposal of geographers was to ascertain the well-known fact about the structural reorganization of the world geopolitical order under the influence of two differently directed, opposing trends – globalization and regionalization. it was noted that regionalization had affected ukraine. therefore, the role of the regions became for ukraine not only the factor of a stable economy, but also of national independence (багров, 2010). among the actual geographical concepts that can enhance the effectiveness of state regional policy, the concept of sustainable development of the territory was defined. its practical implementation was to ensure (and in our conviction, did not do so) “a holistic development of the state taking into account regional peculiarities” (бортник, олещенко, 2008, p. 103). the issues related to crimea occupied a very important position in the regionalist discussion in ukraine. that was represented in works that had an explicit or implicit reference to the idea of federalization of the country. federalism as a political project and the goals of development of ukraine, aspiring to the european geopolitical space, is most fully described in the work of the crimean historian a. malgin “ukraine: sobornost and regionalism” (мальгин, 2005). the author of this monograph considered the possible federalization of ukraine as a variant of its integration into the european community of countries, considering federalism as “democracy in space”. at the same time, he noted that by the end of the 20th century the historical space of ukraine had changed. there appeared territories with a high proportion of ethnically non-ukrainian population (crimea, a number of territories of donbass, transcarpathia, northern bukovina). consequently, the modern context of ukrainian sobornost transformed from the unity of ethnic ukrainian lands to the problem of the unity of the multinational regions of the ukrainian state. this new content of sobornost is often in conflict with the traditional one. political and geographical subjectivity of crimea was widely studied in the works of geographers and political scientists up to 2013. the works of n. bagrov (багров, 2002), o. gabrielyan (габриелян, 2000), v.  grigoriants (григорьянц et al., 2011), s. kyseliov (киселёв, 2006, 2008), a. malgin (мальгин, 2000), a. nikiforov (никифоров, 2003, 2012), a. shvets (швец, 2011), a. shevchuk (шевчук, 2013), a. yakovlev (яковлев, 2013) lay the foundation for the formation of the political and geographical conflictology school in crimea. the above-mentioned researchers in different historical periods defined crimea as a “nervous knot” of ukraine’s geopolitical system, a region located on the “geopolitical break of the state plates”, “geovolcanic region”, a territory that violates the isotropic socio-cultural space of ukraine. after the events in ukraine in 2014, all these definitions were to some extent justified. at the same time, the rapid pace of transformations of the regional development of ukraine and crimea in 2013–2016 has not still been fully comprehended by the crimean geographers. we should note the depth of the inferences on the ukrainian and crimean transformations expressed in the monograph of the moscow colleagues o. vendina, v. kolosov, f. popov, a. sebentsov (вендина et al., 2014) as well as in the articles and dissertation by d. olifir (олифир, 2014, 2015). the works of the political scientist a. baranov (баранов, 2015a, 2015b) seem remarkable due to their original approaches to the analysis of the current political and geographical subjectivity of crimea. the dissimilarity of crimea to the other ukrainian regions is multifacet. geographer s. kyseliov (киселёв, 2006) formulated five postulates of the crimean regional identity: natural (features of the geological structure of the crimean peninsula – it is not a part of the mainland, but was joined to it, high endemicity of flora, landscape diversity); ethnical (in terms of the population structure crimea has the highest percentage of the russians in ukraine and the lowest percentage of the ukrainians, there are also the natives: the crimean tatars, the krymchaks, the karaites); historical (over-saturation of the territory with historical and cultural monuments, giving the change of trends in political and geographical subjectivity of crimea 47 birth to local patriotism and regional identity); economic (specialization of the region on recreational services, creating the privileged status of the crimean residence permit); political (the base of the black sea fleet of the russian federation, possession of nuclear weapons, the repatriation and resettlement of the deported nationalities, the russian language widespread usability). ignoring the objective attributes of the regional identity of crimea by the central government of ukraine, the attitude towards the region as a peripheral part of the country became one of the many factors of the 2014 spring events. crimean researchers of the crimean regional diversity, among which there was a geographer and one of the initiators of the crimean autonomy, who held the post of the chairman of the supreme council of the crimean assr in 1991–1994, an academician of the national academy of sciences of ukraine nikolay bagrov, did not deny the idea that the existence of the crimean autonomy is an outstanding achievement of the young ukrainian statehood (багров, 2002). however, without taking into account the peculiarities of the historical process in the regions, any achievements of the autonomy may appear underestimated. n. bagrov (багров, 2003) and o. gabrielyan (габриелян, 2000) proved that idea on the example of the interaction of the ukrainian center with the regional authorities of crimea. the overall trend of this interaction was confined to limiting the autonomy of crimea. the problem of limiting crimean political subjectivity was raised in many literary resources, analyzed in detail by a. malgin (мальгин, 2000) and v. grigoriants et al. (григорьянц et al., 2011). since crimea gained autonomy in 1991 ukraine did not want to accept it as an integral part and a state, the idea of which was documented in the constitution of the republic of crimea in 1992 (габриелян, 2000). the ukrainian center constantly criticized the act of independence of the republic of crimea and some provisions of its constitution, which further led to the elimination of the presidency in crimea. by the beginning of the 21st century, crimea had lost its legislative and budgetary powers, independence in the formation of judicial, law enforcement agencies and local government bodies. instead it received the institute of the representative office of the president of ukraine, which ensured the implementation of the constitution and laws of ukraine. the region actually turned into an administrative area of ukraine, endowed with some special rights. it should be noted that the curtailment of the political subjectivity of crimea was partly triggered by the adventurism of the crimean political leaders who came to power in 1994. their pro-russian sentiments, bordering on frank separatism, consolidated the kiev center tradition of political deterrence and mistrust towards any authority in crimea during the period of 1994–1998. 3. sociocultural conflict as a marker of public discomfort among the reasons that led to the desire of crimea to change its political and geographical subjectivity in 2014–2015, we singled out those associated with the growth of socio-cultural discomfort in the regional community. the state of socio-cultural discomfort arises when the authorities try to reform the basic values of the society. for the residents of crimea, the policy of the ukrainian authorities regarding the russian language and solving some ethno-religious problems was a painful reformatting. the issue of the russian language functioning as a regional one and, in fact, the second state language in crimea, was recorded in 2012 by the law of ukraine ‘on the basics of the state language policy’ (закон україни…, 2013). 77 per cent of the population of the autonomous republic of crimea and 90.6 percent of sevastopol residents who, according to the 2001 all-ukrainian population census (языковой состав населения автономной республики крым…, 2001; языковой состав населения севастопольского горсовета…, 2001) called themselves russian language natives, demonstrated an extremely negative reaction and protested against the decision to abolish the above mentioned law by the verkhovna rada of ukraine emergency meeting on february 23, 2014 (верховна рада україни…, 2014). without going into the analysis of the legal aspects of the imperfections of the law on languages, it is necessary to note that for the russian-speaking population of crimea the attempt to abolish the law on the hot wave of events that followed the socalled “revolutionism in kiev” was perceived as the desire of the new government to change linguistic autonomy of the south and east ukrainian regions. in simferopol, on february 25, 2014, a protest began with a demand not to recognize the new ukrainian government and its laws. the attack on russian language in crimea was activated at the turn of 2003–2004. this is an important marker of the newest history of ukraine. in 2003, the anti-russian vector was publicly identified in the political process of the ukrainian state. the confirmation of that fact was the concept of ‘ukraine is not russia’, formulated by president l. kuchma (кучма, 2003) and subsequently manifested in the actions of 48 alexandra shvets , igor voronin ukrainian politicians of the highest echelon of power with varying degrees of intensity. in the policy of distancing from russia the ukrainian state used two channels: linguistic and religious, which are the most important for the formation of the ethnic identity. in 2004, the process of ukrainization took its rise in the linguistic space of crimea. according to the crimean ministry of education in 2003, there were 457 russian-language schools in crimea (excluding data from the city of sevastopol), in 2004 their number decreased to 435, in 2005 fell to 414, in 2006 it dropped to 393, in 2007 – there were only 378 schools, 2008 their number reduced to 365, and in 2009 it totaled 340 (киселёва, 2010). in the same period negative dynamics was observed in russian-speaking classes and the number of pupils studying in russian. the number of russianspeaking classes decreased by 25 percent between 2003 and 2009, and the number of pupils in classes and schools with the russian language of instruction reduced by 37 percent. the process of quantitative increase in schools with the ukrainian and crimean-tatar language of instruction was in progress at the same time in the crimean educational system. by 2009 the number of ukrainian schools increased from 4 to 8 (one of them was in sevastopol), and with the crimean-tatar language – from 12 to 15. the ukrainian center often drew attention to the inequality in the number of russian and ukrainian schools in crimea, thus refuting the thesis on prospects of imposing restrictions by ukrainian legislation on the free use of the russian language on the peninsula. note that the crimean schools were russian only in terms of the language of teaching and communication. all curricula, as well as textbooks, were compiled and approved by the ukrainian state bodies. for this reason, russian-language schools in crimea could have been considered to be ukrainian schools. our analysis of the facts of the religious contradictions in the ukrainian society, which took place in 2000-2010 and were featured in the printed mass media of ukraine (228 cases), showed that during this period crimea was one of four centers of religious instability (fig. 1). along with crimea, centers of religious instability were formed in l’viv and lugansk regions as well as in kiev. these regions during the marked decade had more than 20 disputes, connected mainly with the property claims between the parishes of christian religions. crimea accounted for 69.2 percent of all cases of religious disagreement within the decade. but unlike other regions of ukraine, crimean contradictions were formed not fig. 1. factors of the genesis and manifestation of religious contradictions in ukraine (2000–2010) source: own studies based on the analysis of the ukrainian mass media. the change of trends in political and geographical subjectivity of crimea 49 only within christian confessions, but also between christianity and islam. the first signs of the growing religious contradictions in crimea appeared after 1995. before that time, there was a so-called “religious renaissance” on the peninsula: the number of religious communities in orthodoxy and islam grew, new churches and mosques were built, religious education and pilgrimage-missionary activity developed. in 1995, on the peninsula, a formal alternative to the monopoly influence of the ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) appeared – two first communities of the ukrainian orthodox church (kyiv patriarchate) – uoc (kp) were established. the uoc (kp) is a religious organization that calls itself orthodox, local and autocephalous church of ukraine. it has no official recognition from the world orthodoxy and it is not in eucharistic communion with any of the canonical local orthodox churches of the world. it arose as a result of the unification of two church groups that advocated independence from the ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate). in ukraine, the uoc (kp) claims to be a “state” or “national” church, supporting the aspiration of the modern ukrainian state to the european union and nato, sharply reproving the events of the holodomor, thus forming a particular point of view on the issue, or so-called ‘mental fixations’, which however are not shared by the majority of the russian-oriented crimean population. considering the mental opposition to the values that are guided by the uoc, the schismatic kyiv patriarchate did not receive wide circulation in crimea. until 2014, its parishes accounted for no more than 3 per cent of the network of religious organizations in crimea, but the ideology of creating a single local ukrainian church that violated the canonical unity of ukrainian and russian orthodoxy was introduced into the mentality of the crimean orthodox believers. the emergence of the communities of the uoc (kp) in crimea was of a political nature. this confession was associated with the strengthening of the influence of pro-ukrainian churches in opposition to the pro-russian uoc, which is in sympathy with such mental values as rejection of the ideas of western liberalism, support for the value complex of slavic sobornost (unification), russian language, etc. the emergence of ideologues of schism in orthodoxy in crimea prompted the simferopol and crimean diocese of the uoc to intensify its presence in the region. the diocesan leadership in 2000 agreed to erect special monuments in some populated areas in the form of one of the symbols of orthodoxy – memorial crosses – free-standing christian crosses traditionally erected at the side of the road for the believers to bow and to worship; as well as signboards at the side of the main roads, near the tourist sites with the inscriptions «crimea is the cradle of orthodoxy». muslims of crimea in the person of the spiritual board of muslims of crimea (sвmс) immediately reacted to the orthodox action and demanded from the authorities of the crimean republic to stop illegal from their point of view installation of religious monuments and billboards in crimea and dismantle the already installed illegal structures. prior to meeting these requirements, sвmс notified of the suspension of its membership in the interfaith association of the crimea “peace is a gift of god”. crimean experts noted that the statement of the sвmс appeared a few days after the visit of the head of the uoc (kp), patriarch filaret, who was excommunicated from the church and who met the chairman of the mejlis of the crimean tatar people (an organization currently banned in russia) to express joint displeasure with attempts of positioning of “cradle of orthodoxy” in crimea (григорьянц, 2003). after the decision of the muftiate on the withdrawal from the interfaith association “peace is a gift of god” there followed the events that received the name “crossfall” in the media. in four settlements of crimea memorial crosses were demolished and destroyed. protest actions of the crimean tatar population caused by appearance of new crosses continued until 2004. the overall result of the “crossfall” was the legalization of a politicized strategy of inter-religious conflict relations between the slavic orthodox and crimean tatar muslim communities of crimea. the history of emergence of religious contradictions in the period of the administrative and territorial entry of crimea into ukraine shows that their nature had a political basis in the autonomous republic. in the policy of the ukrainian state, aimed at limiting the political and geographic subjectivity of crimea, the central authorities needed allies. they were artificially formed in the face of the split between the two patriarchates of orthodoxy and the mejlis of the crimean tatar people, which was opposed to the crimean authorities, and who the spiritual board of muslims of crimea cooperated closely with. it is interesting to note that after crimea transferred from administrative and territorial jurisdiction of ukraine in 2014, the territorial pattern of religious contradictions in the orthodoxy of ukraine has changed (fig. 2). we analyzed the resonant cases of material and financial contradictions between the communities of the uoc and uoc (kp) concerning the unfairly held, as some religious organizations of both patriarchates believe, restitution of the former church 50 alexandra shvets , igor voronin property. the restitution of church property in ukraine which was carried out after the declaration of independence was indeed implemented without a restitution law in the country. for this reason, the return of property from the state to religious organizations gave birth to an illegal, and therefore controversial, restitution. moreover, in the all-ukrainian version of restitution documents, only the question of the religious buildings return has been raised, without raising the land question. the rights to receive property are not granted to monasteries, diocesan administrations, religious schools, religious communities, and missions. in crimea, the restitution problem was complicated by the need for its legislative approval by the central authorities. the results of our research have shown that property disputes between the orthodox patriarchates shifted to the north (to the borders with belarus and russia). there they were complicated by some controversial situations not only between the uoc and uoc (kp) but also between the ukrainian greek catholic church which in the early 20th century owned large land allotments in volynia and polesie region. in the south of ukraine (on the territory of odessa, nikolayev, kherson, zaporozhe regions) property disputes acquired a stable but not a confrontational character. here controversial situations emerge basically when building new churches. in our opinion the character of these disputes was not confrontational, in other words, it was not marked with irreconcilable forms of opposition accompanied by a human life threat. in this religious conflict movement further to the south of ukraine one can notice not only the danger of property disputes between confessions but also the deepening of religious schism between the regions. there is a territorial advance on the part of the divisive (dissenting) patriarchate of the uoc (kp) on the area of the prevailing influence of the uoc. the results of this advance have already been marked by sociologists. according to a survey conducted in february 2015 by a group of sociological companies – rating, socis, razumkov centre and kiev international institute of sociology (kiis) the religious identification of orthodox believers has changed in ukraine (вопрос веры…, 2016; религиозные предпочтения.., 2015). it should be mentioned that crimea and the donbas regions which are not controlled by the ukrainian state were not taken into consideration in the poll. within the ukrainian orthodoxy in january 1,  2017 more than 12,000 religious communities belonged to the uoc and only 4,000 – to the uoc (kp).the relative majority of the poll responders (38 percent) attributed themselves to the parishioners of uoc (kp) and nearly half as many (20 percent) fig. 2. conflicts in the orthodox church of ukraine (2014–2016) source: own studies based on the analysis of the ukrainian mass media the change of trends in political and geographical subjectivity of crimea 51 – to the uoc (религиозные предпочтения.., 2015; релігійні організації в україні.., 2017). in 2010 the described ratio was in the proportion of 34.2 and 18.2 percent respectively. sociologists from kiev mark that this misalignment between the number of communities and the number of believers who identify themselves as the uoc (kp) parishioners is caused by the poor awareness of respondents about the essential differences between the uoc and the uoc (kp). sociologists of the company rating (религиозные предпочтения.., 2015) mark that in the southern and eastern areas of ukraine, except for donbas and odessa region, there are more supporters of the kiev patriarchate than those of moscow. in this regard the farther to the south and to the east the more often the respondents consider themselves simply orthodox belonging to no orthodox jurisdiction. the greatest part of these respondents turned out to be in kirovograd, nikolayev, kharkov, zaporozhe, dnepropetrovsk, sumy, odessa, donetsk and lugansk regions. these territories constitute a kind of buffer zone between supporters of pro-russian and anti-russian projects of development of ukraine. the geography of the buffer zone in ukrainian orthodoxy (except for sumy region) coincides with the territories identified by us (fig. 2) as regions of stably insignificant conflict on religious grounds. 4. the crimea in russia. what next? the change in the political and geographical subjectivity of crimea in 2014 allowed the region to get out of the influence of the anti-russian concept of “ukraine is not russia”. the new russian reality posed the question of the future meaning of the political and geographical subjectivity of crimea. in the mentality of the inhabitants of the republic, the trend is laid for the construction of new crimea. new crimea is at present a space of disputable status. according to the official position of ukraine and the un general assembly, crimea is a temporarily occupied territory of ukraine, and according to the official position of the russian federation, based on the will of crimean residents, expressed in the march 2014 referendum, crimea is the subject of the federal system of russia. thus, two mutually exclusive projects for crimean political and geographical subjectivity are defined: the russian and ukrainian. according to the russian project, crimea has demonstrated to the world community and the cis countries a model of its reintegration with the large geopolitical space, namely russia. the imperative of fitting into this great geopolitical space is to preserve its regional self-sustainability, not to turn into an ordinary russian province. in the ukrainian project, crimea is regarded as a region that violated the mythology of the existence of national and territorial unity (sobornost) of ukraine. such territory is subject to the various blockades: water, energy, food, transport. relying on the sanctions support of the western countries, the ukrainian project is aimed at the developing of sanctions fatigue in the inhabitants of crimea. the future of crimea lies with wise overcoming the obstacles created by the ukrainian project, which pose risks to the russian governance of crimea. thus, for example, the ban of the mejlis of the crimean tatar people as a terrorist organization in russia created a precedent for a split between its members into pro-russian and pro-ukrainian. the split provoked comicality about the aspirations of pro-ukrainian members of the mejlis, who, having left for ukraine, seek to organize crimean-tatar autonomy there, without their own people as the bearers of its subjectivity. 5. conclusions the crimean region proved its political and geographical subjectivity at different historic stages of development. subjectivity is understood as a recognized by the top leaders need to make a strategy for the region development, which can change its administrative and territorial status significantly. in 2014 crimea proved to the whole world that it has its political and socio-cultural interests, different from those that dominated in ukraine. the will of the people of crimea in the referendum was the instrument that let those interests be realized. was this decision spontaneous? no, there were too many contradictions accumulated in the autonomous subject of ukrainian crimea which were regarded by the ukrainian authorities as the threat for the sovereignty. such reluctance to take a closer look at what was happening with the ethnic and religious spheres of crimea which were directly related to the formation of regional identity of its inhabitants became one of the channels for changing the trend of the autonomous political and geographical subjectivity of the peninsula to the federal one. the spheres of linguistic, religious and ethnic contradictions became geographic markers of the growing socio-cultural discomfort in crimea. in ukraine, the russian language was gradually supplanted from the sphere of interregional and nationwide communication, and the religious conflict was not accepted by the expert community as a catalyst 52 alexandra shvets , igor voronin for changing the political and geographical subjectivity. at the same time, the space of this conflict had its own poles, and crimea was one of them. the spatial polarity of contradictions in crimea differed from the rest of ukraine by the presence of a multilayered – political, ethnic and religious –conflict. the religious part of this conflict reflected the discrepancy of the official ideology of the ukrainian government aimed at building a russophobic state and the real aspiration of the southern and eastern regions of ukraine. the project of building the “new crimea” within the framework of russian federalism should be aimed at preserving the regional identity of the peninsula and shouldn’t be turned into one of the peripheral parts of the russian federation. such scenario of the crimea’s development is possible taking into account the risks of the 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http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/ general/language/crimea/ [6/02/2018]. языковой состав населения севастопольского горсовета, основные итоги всеукраинской переписи населения, 2001, http: //2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/ language/sevastopol/ [6/02/2018]. яковлев а.н., 2013, особенности локализации социокультурной конфликтности в крыму (2011–2012 г.г.), этнокультурные и межконфессиональные отношения в крыму, 3, 43–50. 1. introduction stadiality of development of urban settlements is one of popular subjects of scientific researches and classical researches of j. gibbs (1963) are particularly famous in this field. he marked out five consecutive stages of urbanization (fig. 1), namely: pre-urbanization (villages grow faster than towns); initial urbanization (towns grow faster than villages); classical urbanization (villages depopulate due to urban drift); late urbanization (it is an apogee of growth of large cities but villages and small towns lose their population); and equalization of growth rates of different size settlements as a result of population deconcentration (this stage later became known as counterurbanization). journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 14–24 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.033.7633 center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus henadzi rydzeuski mogilev regional center of social and economic researches, economy research institute, ministry of economy of the republic of belarus, boldina 4, 212030 mogilev, belarus, e-mail: ridgeo@yandex.ru citation rydzeuski h., 2017, center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 14–24. abstract basing on active and hierarchically organized center-periphery processes, functional typology of urban settlements of belarus is presented and stages of the country’s urbanization development are revealed. this functional typology of urban settlements reflects their role in settlement systems and urbanization stages are marked out in view of growth or decline of population in urban settlements of any functional type. such a concept which reflects urbanization stages of urban settlements performing different functions in hierarchically organized settlement systems can be called the functional urbanization concept. revealed urbanization stages indicate competition of polycentric and monocentric models of the territorial structure of belarus during the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. as monocentric development generates overconcentration of the population, economy and environmental management processes and intensifies social, economic and environmental problems, the country’s optimum development strategy should be the polycentric one, which can be achieved through active regional policy aimed at sustainable and inclusive development. key words center-periphery processes, social, ecological and economic regions, functional types of urban settlements, urbanization stages, regional policy, republic of belarus. received: 05 may 2017 accepted: 23 august 2017 published: 29 december 2017 center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus 15 transition of a number of highly urbanized regions of the world to the fifth stage of gibbs’ model in the early seventies promoted development of a universal concept of differential urbanization of h.s. geyer and t.a. kontuly (1993). this concept considers an urbanization process as the transition from a monocentric settlement system with large city domination to the polycentric settlement system with migration of population between cities of various ranks. this transformation is performed in three main stages, namely urbanization, polarization reversal and counterurbanization (fig. 2). at the first stage, large cities grow faster than the others thus forming monocentric settlement systems. the second stage is characterized by faster growth of medium-sized cities which form polycentric settlement systems, and the third stage shows faster growth of small cities. the third stage termination completes the first cycle of agglomerative processes and starts a new urbanization cycle, i.e. the transition to the first stage. russian researchers t.g. nefedova and a.i. treivish (нефёдова, трейвиш, 2005) tried to verify the differential urbanization scheme by russian population dynamics, but could not confirm full compliance of theoretical ideas of authors of this concept with realities of russia. however, that was to be expected because various regions of that vast country were at different urbanization stages and not all of them were involved in agglomerative processes. unfortunately, j. gibbs (1963), h.s. geyer and t.a. kontuly (1993) provided no accurate criteria for classification of cities by population. h.s. geyer and t.a. kontuly (1993) have directly specified in their paper that uniform criteria for division of cities into large, medium-sized and small ones are absent at different stages of urban development since sizes of cities depend on world population, levels of transport and technology development and other factors. according to e.a. kolbina, s.n. nayden (колбина, найден, 2013), a main defect of stadial and differential urbanization concepts is their abstract nature. they consider urbanization in ideal and homogeneous space, i.e. ignore peculiarities of spatial settlement structures of specific countries and regions. it should be noted that the fifth urbanization stage of j. gibbs (1963) and stages of the differential urbanization of h.s. geyer and t.a. kontuly (1993) characterize formation of urban agglomerations and the transition to formation of urbanized areas such as megapolises and conurbations. however, not all urban settlements are involved in these processes, i.e. this urbanization stage is not universal. in addition, small and medium-sized cities of urban agglomerations actually lose their independence and become satellites of urban agglomeration centers. therefore, it is not quite legitimate to rank them as small and medium-sized cities. population sizes of these cities have been eroded by agglomerative processes and turn into conventional indices, which do not make it possible to estimate adequately their fig. 1. growth rates of various settlements (average annual values in arbitrary %) and five stages of urbanization according to j. gibbs (1963) source: j. gibbs, 1963. 16 henadzi rydzeuski true role in any settlement system. that is why the place and role of a city in the settlement system, i.e. its functional typology is important now for analyzing the urbanization stadiality. it seems that research of urbanization stadiality is to be considered from empirical points and based on analysis of development of specific settlement systems which have been formed historically and are integral rural-urban continuums, i.e. town areas according to v.о. klyuchevsky (ключевский / no data/). their development is greatly affected by center-periphery processes (cpps) occurring at various hierarchical levels. it also appears that combination of theoretical ideas about cpp with modern concepts of evolution of urban settlements can be a basis for construction of more specific and practice-oriented concepts of urbanization and regional development. the republic of belarus may become a beneficial ground for researches of urbanization stadiality because of active cpps of different hierarchical levels within its borders, the achieved high level of urbanization, and the presence of reliable statistics reflecting development of urban settlements for a number of last decades (1959–2017). in addition, a country scale makes it possible to consider development of all urban settlements of belarus and not just of the most significant ones. 2. center-periphery processes and their role in regional and urban development a study of cpps that are processes of polarization of geographical space resulting in differentiation of spatial structures with formation of centers and surrounding peripheral territories has long traditions in social and economic geography. a model of j.h. thünen (тюнен, 1926) that has made it possible to reveal the phenomenon of socio-geographical or nodal zonality in the case of an «isolated state» can be considered to be one of the first attempts of such studies. through researches of i. m. wallerstein (валлерстайн, 2001), j. friedmann (1966) and their numerous followers, a center-periphery approach has been firmly established in science as a new universal scientific research method since the 1960s and 1970s. the center-periphery approach involves division of an object of study into two (center and periphery) or three (center, semi-periphery and periphery) parts and research of their interrelations in the form of cpps. these processes have a hierarchical nature and manifest themselves at global, national, regional and local levels (ридевский, 2013). from the point of view of distribution of productive forces, that results in growth of urban centers and transformation of their systems of settlement, economic and environmental management (tab. 1). depending on the hierarchical level, one can mark out three main cpps, namely metropolization, fig. 2. growth rates of various urban settlements (average annual values in arbitrary %) and three stages of urbanization according to h.s. geyer and t.a. kontuly (1993) source: h.s. geyer, t.a. kontuly, 1993. center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus 17 regionopolization and locopolization in the republic of belarus. deconcentration processes are antipodes of the above ones and occur at national, regional, and local levels, too. metropolization is to be understood as the process of growth of the country’s main urban center, usually the capital, in the course of its socio-economic, demographic, ecological and sociocultural development (алаев, 2003). the metropolization process is particularly evident in concentration of population in a metropolis and its urban agglomeration. the only metropolis of belarus is its capital. from 1959 to the beginning of 2017 the population of minsk has increased from 516 to 1974.8 thousand persons. today, 20.8% of the country’s population is concentrated in minsk (fig. 3). in addition, the minsk urban agglomeration is actively developed around the city. except for minsk, this agglomeration includes ten more urban settlements with the population exceeding 114.5 thousand persons in early 2017. some satellites of minsk are periodically included in its structure, for example, urban settlements of socol, vostochny, and sosny were included in the structure of minsk in the 1990s. regionopolization (regiopolization or regional metropolization according to e.b. alayev (алаев, 1983)) is a process similar to metropolization. in belarus, it manifests itself within boundaries of intraregional areas, which are to be considered as integral systems of settlement, economic and environmental management or as social, ecological and economic regions (seers). these regions are historical town areas, some of them can be traced over centuries (ридевский, 2003). a system of 15 seer has formed in belarus since the early 1970s (fig. 4). these regions in belarus are spatial analogs of nuts-2 regions, which are considered as the main objects of regional policy in the states of the european union. thirteen seers of belarus have a monocentric nature, i.e. each has a single clearly marked urban center called a regionopolis (regiopolis). two seers have a polycentric nature, their centers consist of 2–3 regionopolises, for example, soligorsk and slutsk in the soligorsk seer and krichev, klimovichi and kostyukovichi in the krichev seer. fig. 3. share of minsk in the population of belarus in 1959-2017, % source: calculated on the base of data from (перепись населения 2009…, 2010; численность населения на 1 января 2017 …, 2017). tab. 1. center-periphery processes and results of their manifestation hierarchical levels of cpp manifestation cpp results of cpp manifestation global level oligopolization oligopolises, world cities national level metropolization metropolises regional level regionopolization regionopolises (regiopolises) local level locopolization locopolises source: ридевский, 2013. 18 henadzi rydzeuski two monocentric seers of belarus are led by pair centers formed by almost united cities. these are polotsk and nopovopolotsk and mozyr and kalinkovichi, which are pair centers of the polotsk and mozyr seers, respectively. in the minsk seer, one can mark out ex-regionopolises of molodechno and borisov, which led independent seers until the early 1970s and then became parts of the minsk seer as a result of essential expansion of a zone of direct influence of minsk in the course of fast growth of its population and electrification of railway transport in surrounding areas. this is a classical example of the explosion or space compression due to development of transport infrastructure around a large urban center. in the bobruisk seer, in addition to bobruisk, one can mark out zhodino, which is a quasi-regionopolis. its population is significantly less than that in bobruisk but its economic potential is considerably greater. data presented in table 2 show that regionopolization is general and natural in belarus. in early 2017, 58.4% of the country’s population lived in regionopolises including ex-regionopolises of molodechno and borisov and the quasi-regionopolis of zhlobin. allowing for interconnection of the population settlement with the economy distribution pattern and territorial arrangement of environmental management processes, one can say that regionopolization is a leading process in transformation of territorial systems of settlement, economy and environmental management. regressive regionopolization characterized by an increase in the regionopolis share in the seer population and a decrease in the regionopolis population itself takes place in a number of seers of modern belarus. in recent years, the regressive regionopolization has been observed in bobruisk, polotsk, pinsk, orsha and krichev seers, i.e. in most of regionopolises of belarus without the regional center status. this regionopolization is due to much slower reduction of the population of the regionopolis in comparison with that of its peripheral territories. in other seers, one can observe the progressive regionopolization accompanied with growth of both the regionopolis population and its share in the region population. especially high rates of the regionopolization are in the grodno, brest and minsk seers. the role of locopolises in development of local settlement systems increases in the course of locopolization. both small towns and large rural settlements can act as locopolises. urban settlements being the centers of all administrative districts are considered as locopolises in table 3. some of them a – boundaries of administrative districts; б – boundaries of seers; b – centers of seers. fig. 4. social, ecological and economic regions of belarus since the early 1970s. source: ридевский, 2003. center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus 19 tab. 2. regionopolization in seers of belarus in 1970-2017 in terms of population concentration in regionopolises social, ecological and economic regions (seers) percentage of regional centers in the population size, % 1970 1979 1989 1999 2009 2017 brest seer 21.6 29.3 37.9 40.2 44.9 48.5 baranovichi seer 18.4 23.6 28.6 30.2 33.8 37.9 pinsk seer 15.5 21.8 28.3 31.5 34.3 37.8 vitebsk seer 48.1 56.7 62.0 63.6 70.2 73.9 orsha seer 32.4 37.4 40.7 42.0 51.6 53.7 polotsk seer 21.2 28.5 29.1 35.2 44.6 48.4 gomel seer 35.4 45.4 53.9 56.5 61.1 64.5 mozyr seer 16.5 24.7 34.4 41.4 45.9 50.0 grodno seer 25.2 34.8 44.4 47.8 55.0 60.6 lida seer 13.8 19.7 27.8 31.5 35.7 39.5 minsk seer 38.8 47.0 52.3 54.5 59.1 61.3 soligorsk seer 22.9 26.4 35.9 40.0 45.2 49.1 mogilev seer 38.8 51.8 59.5 61.8 66.5 70.2 bobruisk seer 22.3 29.8 32.2 32.7 34.9 36.8 krichev seer 15.4 21.2 26.8 31.2 35.7 39.0 the republic of belarus 29.0 37.7 44.8 47.3 52.4 55.0 notes: 1. data for 1970-2009 are presented at the beginning of the corresponding population census, data for 2017 are presented at the beginning of the year. 2. satellite towns are not included in regionopolises forming urban agglomerations. settlements subordinated to executive committees of novopolotsk, vitebsk, and gomel are included in novopolotsk, vitebsk, and gomel, respectively. 3. the pair cities of polotsk-novopolotsk and mozyr-kalinkovichi are considered as regional centers of the polotsk and mozyr seers, respectively. 4. regionopolises of soligorsk and slutsk and those of krichev, klimovichi and kostyukovichi are considered as regional centers of the polycentric soligorsk and krichev seers, respectively. 5. ex-regionopolises of molodechno and borisov and quasi-regionopolis of zhlobin are not considered as regional centers of the minsk and bobruisk seers, respectively. 6. regional centers of all seers are considered as regional centers of the republic of belarus. source: calculated on the base of data from (перепись населения 2009…, 2010; численность населения на 1 января 2017, …, 2017). tab. 3. locopolization in administrative districts of belarus in 1970–2016 in terms of population concentration in district centers 1970 1979 1989 1999 2009 2016 share of district centers in population of belarus, % 40.6 52.2 62.5 66.1 71.3 74.6 share of district centers in urban population of belarus, % 93.4 95.0 95.5 95.3 95.9 96.2 number of districts with the administrative center population share exceeding 80.0% 1 6 7 9 11 13 number of districts with the administrative center population share in the range of 50.1 – 80.0% 13 14 23 26 36 47 number of districts with the administrative center population share in the range of 30.1 – 50.0% 13 19 43 51 56 50 number of districts with the administrative center population share not exceeding 30.0% 90 78 44 32 15 8 total number of districts in the republic of belarus 117 117 117 118 118 118 notes: 1. centers of regions and minsk were included in relevant districts; novopolotsk and zhodino were included in the polotsk and smolevichi districts, respectively. 2. zhodino and smolevichi were conditionally considered as the center of the smolevichi district. the pair city of polotsk-novopolotsk was considered as the center of the polotsk district. 3. data of population censuses of 1970, 1979, 1989, 1999, and 2009 as well as current records of 2016 were used. source: calculated on the base of data from (перепись населения 2009…, 2010; численность населения на 1 января 2017, …, 2017). 20 henadzi rydzeuski are both the regionopolises and the regional centers. it is quite lawful because locopolization, regionopolization and metropolization processes intersect and overlap. the metropolis acts as the regionopolis and the locopolis with respect to the intraregional settlement system and the local one, respectively. similarly, regionopolises also act as centers of local settlement systems. locopolization has a regressive nature in most of administrative districts. the progressive locopolization is typical only for a limited number of districts whose centers are regionopolises in general. formation of urban agglomerations or an agglomeration process can also be considered as cpp. according to e.b. alayev (алаев, 1983), the agglomeration process is concentration followed by territorial extension of a concentration core, resulting in the emergence of the agglomeration. in other words, it is a special cpp exhibiting itself in combination with oligopolization, metropolization, regionopolization and locopolization processes at global, country, regional and local levels. considering agglomeration processes as cpps of a special type, all cpps can be divided into two groups: geographically structured cpps exhibiting themselves in the territory of a certain hierarchical level (oligopolization, metropolization, regionopolization, locopolization) and geographically indifferent cpps (end-to-end or elastic) exhibiting themselves at global, country, regional and local levels (agglomeration processes). at the beginning of 2017, 18 urban agglomerations uniting 55 urban settlements can be marked out in belarus. formation of urban agglomerations of belarus is more evident in combination with processes of metropolization (the minsk urban agglomeration), regionopolization (agglomerations of regional centers and most of the main regionopolises which are seer centers), and locopolization (agglomeration of small towns). 3. functional typology of urban settlements of belarus allowing for metropolization, regionopolization and locopolization processes, one can propose the typology of urban settlements of belarus in accordance with their places in the territorial structure of settlement, economy, and environmental management. this typology can be called the functional one because it reflects functions that are executed by an urban center for associated territories. all urban settlements of the country can be categorized into six main types (orders) (ридевский, 2016): 1. metropolis (minsk) and urban settlements of a metropolitan area (minsk urban agglomeration). the metropolis and urban settlements of the metropolitan area are developed under the influence of the metropolization process. 2. regionopolises of the first order include most significant cities with the status of centers of regions, which are administrative and territorial units of belarus of a subnational level. regional capitals are centers of seers and differ significantly from other regionopolis of belarus for most parameters. all regional centers lead corresponding urban agglomerations. 3. regionopolises of the second order include main centers of other seers, namely mozyr, bobruisk, krichev, orsha, polotsk, soligorsk, pinsk, baranovichi, and lida seers. ex-regionopolises of molodechno and borisov as well as the quasi-regionopolis of zhlobin, which is actively claiming to be the regionopolis in the bobruisk seer, should also be included in this group of cities. most of the second-order regionopolises also lead urban agglomerations. 4. regionopolises of the third order and subregional centers. third-order regionopolises are non-principal urban centers of polycentric soligorsk and krichev seers (slutsk, klimovichi, and kostyukovichi). subregional centers are centers of settlement and social services for two or three nearest administrative districts. subregional centers of svetlogorsk and volkovysk became centers of urban agglomerations. 5. locopolises of the first order are towns and urban villages and involve administrative district centers not included in the groups mentioned above. locopolises of nesvizh, stolin, and ivatsevichi became centers of urban agglomerations. 6. other urban settlements (locopolises of the second order). this group includes small urban settlements without the status of administrative district centers but many of them performed administrative functions in the past. most of the settlements of this group are actual locopolises for territorial settlement systems of a district level and today some urban settlements are almost identical to the rural ones. basing on the typology proposed above, all types of urban settlements of belarus for early 2017 are shown in table 4. six types of urban settlements of belarus can be divided into three groups, namely cities of national significance (metropolis and all first and second center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus 21 tab. 4. typology of urban settlements of belarus, 2017 types of urban settlements urban settlements metropolis and urban settlements of the metropolitan area minsk (with zaslavl, fanipol, dzerzhinsk, smolevichi, logoysk, rudensk, smilovichi, radoshkovichi, machulishchi, svisloch) regionopolises of the first order vitebsk (with ruba), mogilev (with shklov), gomel (with bolshevik, dobrush, vetka), grodno (with skidel, gp sopotskin), brest (with zhabinka) regionopolises of the second order bobruisk (with kirovsk), polotsk-novopolotsk (with borovukha, vetrino), baranovichi (with lyakhovichi), pinsk, orsha (with baran, bolbasovo, kopys, orekhovsk), mozyr-kalinkovichi, lida, soligorsk (with starobin), krichev, borisov (with zhodino, zelenyi bor), molodechno, zhlobin regionopolises of the third order and subregional centers slutsk, klimovichi, kostyukovichi, postavy, glubokoe, lepel, gorki, osipovichi, rogachev, svetlogorsk (with sosnovyi bor), rechitsa, luninets, kobrin, bereza, slonim, novogrudok, volkovysk (with ross and krasnoselsky), vileyka, smorgon locopolises of the first order bykhov, klichev, mstislavl, slavgorod, chausy, cherikov, berezino, volozhin, kletsk, kopyl, krupki, lyuban, myadel, nesvizh (with gorodeya), mar’ina gorka, starye dorogi, stolbtsy, uzda, cherven, gantsevichi, drogichin, ivanovo, ivatsevichi (with kosovo), kamenets, malorita, pruzhany, stolin (with rechitsa), dyatlovo, iv’e, mosty, oshmyany, svisloch, shchuchin, buda-koshelevo, elsk, zhitkovichi, narovlya, petrikov, hoyniki, chechersk, braslav, verkhnedvinsk, gorodok, dokshitsy, dubrovno, miora, senno, tolochin, chashniki, belynichi, glusk, dribin, krasnopol’e, krugloe, khotimsk, bol’shaya berestovitsa, voronovo, zel’va, korelichi, ostrovets, bragin, korma, lel’chitsy, loev, octyabr’sky, beshenkovichi, liozno, rossony, ushachi, sharkovshchina, shumilino other urban settlements (locopolises of the second order) beryozovka, beloozersk, vysokoe, mikashevichi, david-gorodok, turov, vasilevichi, novolukoml, disna, bobr, ivenets, kholopenichi, pleshchinitsy, urech’e, krivichi, svir, krasnaya sloboda, gorodishche, domachevo, antopol, telekhany, logishin, shereshovo, ruzhany, radun, novoelnya, kozlovshchina, yuratishki, mir, lyubcha, porozovo, zheludok, ostrino, komarin, uvarovichi, streshin, zarech’e, terekhovka, ozarichi, kopatkevichi, parichi, vidzy, osvea, surazh, podsvil’e, yanovichi,ezerishche, begoml, voropaevo, lyntupy, bogushevsk, kokhanovo, obol, naroch, elizovo, tatarka, pravdinsky. note: urban settlements in parentheses are satellite towns included in relevant urban agglomerations. source: urban settlements are presented as at 1 january 2017 in accordance with (численность населения на 1 января 2017, …, 2017). tab. 5. number, population and share of main types of urban settlements in total and urban population of belarus at early 2017 type of urban settlements number of urban settlements average population of an urban settlement (thousands) share in urban population of the country (%) share in total population of the country (%) cities of national significance 18 (49) 323.5 78.7 61.3 metropolis 1 (11) 2089.3 28.2 22.0 first order regionopolises 5 (13) 415.4 28.1 21.9 second order regionopolises 12 (25) 138.0 22.4 17.4 urban settlements of regional significance 90 (96) 15.7 19.1 14.8 third order regionopolises and subregional centers 19 (22) 36.5 9.4 7.3 first order locopolises 71 (74) 10.1 9.7 7.5 urban settlements of local significance 57 2.9 2.2 1.8 other urban settlements 57 2.9 2.2 1.8 in total 165 (202) 44.9 100.0 77.9 notes: 1. the number of urban settlements is specified without satellite towns, i.e. urban settlements entering urban agglomerations of belarus. the number of all urban settlements of a group including satellite towns is specified in parentheses. 2. the average population of urban settlements is calculated without satellite towns. 3. shares of various groups of urban settlements in urban and total population of the country are calculated allowing for satellite towns. source: calculated on the base of data from (численность населения на 1 января 2017 …, 2017). 22 henadzi rydzeuski order regionopolises), urban settlements of regional significance (third order regionopolises, subregional centers and first order locopolises) and urban settlements of local significance (second order locopolises). cities of national significance are a basis of the structure of settlement of total and urban population of the country (tab. 5). 4. urbanization stadiality in belarus using a population growth rate for different types of urban settlements of belarus as an indicator, three main stages of urbanization can be marked out in belarus between 1959 and 2015. (tab. 6; fig. 5). first stage. the stage of general urbanization (1959–1989). population grew in all types of urban settlements of the country. the highest population growth rates were observed in cities of national significance, and especially in minsk and its metropolitan area. the share of citizens in the country’s population increased from 31.1 to 68.6%. cities of national significance concentrated 69.1% of the urban population by the end of the period under consideration. tab. 6. dynamics of population for various types of urban settlements and stages of urbanization in belarus between 1959 and 2015 in percents as compared to the corresponding census year types of settlements stages of development of urbanization 2017/1959i ii iii 1989/1959 1999/1989 2017/1999 metropolis and settlements of the metropolitan area 306.8 104.9 117.6 378.4 first order regionopolises 287.8 101.2 112.2 326.9 second order regionopolises 284.0 105.9 102.2 304.0 urban settlements of regional significance 236.3 106.3 95.1 238.7 third order regionopolises and subregional centers 261.0 108.7 96.8 274.4 first order locopolises 217.7 104.1 93.5 212.0 urban settlements of local significance 116.7 99.2 79.5 92.0 other settlements 116.7 99.2 79.5 92.0 all urban settlements 266.6 104.2 106.3 295.4 rural settlements 63.0 87.9 68.2 37.7 all settlements of the country 126.0 99.0 94.6 118.0 source: calculated on the base of data from (перепись населения 2009…, 2010; численность населения на 1 января 2017…, 2017). fig. 5. growth rates of main functional types of urban settlements and three stages of urbanization in belarus between 1959 and 2017, in % as compared to 1959. source: calculated on the base of data from (перепись населения 2009…, 2010; численность населения на 1 января 2017…, 2017). center-periphery processes and urbanization stadiality in belarus 23 second stage. the stage of polycentric two-level urbanization (1989–1999). cities of national and regional significance continued their growth, population of other urban settlements or second order locopolises began to go down. highest population growth rates were observed in cities of regional significance and especially in third order regionopolises and subregional centers. the share of citizens increased from 68.6 to 69.3%. by the end of the period, population of cities of national significance reached 75.7% of the urban population and exceeded half (52.4%) the total population of the country for the first time. third stage. the stage of polycentric one-level urbanization (1999–2017). population increases only in cities of national significance. cities of regional significance began to depopulate thus joining cities of local significance. highest rates of urban population growth are observed in minsk and its metropolitan area. the share of citizens reached 77.9% of total population. in early 2017, cities of national significance concentrated 78.7% and 61.3% of urban and total population, respectively. 5. main conclusions application of the center-periphery approach is greatly significant for researches of urbanization processes because it gives fresh insights into typology of urban settlements and identification of main stages of their growth. it is important for further development of regional researches and optimization of regional policy. the presented researches make it possible to draw a number of methodological and practice-oriented conclusions based on materials of development of urban settlements of belarus: 1. as intensive center-periphery processes take place in any country of the world, in order to reveal stages in urbanization development, urban growth rates based on formal criteria of population size are not as important as a place of cities in the relevant settlement system, i.e. their functional typology determined by nature and hierarchical levels of center-periphery processes they are involved in. the concept reflecting urbanization stadiality based on functional typology of urban settlements can be called the functional urbanization concept. 2. a proposed scheme of urbanization stadiality in belarus in 1959-2017 is based on functional typology of urban settlements allowing for active agglomeration processes and makes it possible to predict the outlined transition to the next fourth stage of urbanization. just like second and third stages, this stage will be focal and initiate depopulation of second order regionopolises, i.e. urban settlements leading large territorial systems of settlement, economic and environmental management or seers. this stage can be called the stage of oligocentric urbanization, i.e. urbanization of a few urban centers (from greek oligos — few). minsk and its actively developing urban agglomeration can further become the only center of demographic and economic growth in the country (the possible fifth stage of monocentric urbanization). 3. as all seers are nodal in nature, their leading regionopolises are the link between central and peripheral regions thus materializing the unity of the center and the periphery. depopulation of these urban centers can have extremely negative effects on social and economic development of corresponding seers. at the same time, monocentric development of the country is an active threat to further development of the state as it generates overconcentration of the population, economy and environmental management processes and intensifies social, economic, and environmental problems. 4. revealed and predicted stages of urbanization are indicative of competition of polycentric and monocentric models of the territorial structure of belarus during the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. it is evident that the strategy of polycentric development that can be achieved through active regional policy aimed at the sustainable and inclusive development is to be the optimum one for territorial development of the country. 5. special measures of regional and macroeconomic policy can preserve a polycentric model of further development of belarus allowing for the polycentric nature of settlement, economic and environmental management and the hierarchy of center-periphery processes that constantly reproduce polycentrity of the territorial structure of the state. the most important measures are: strategic programming of social and economic development; territorially differentiated regional policy; state regulation of a remuneration system through convergence in the minimum and average wage levels; and other effective measures. 6. it is evident that territorial systems of settlement, economic and environmental management or seers in belarus should be considered as main objects of regional policy aimed at sustainable and inclusive development. these seers can be regarded as analogs of nuts-2 regions that 24 henadzi rydzeuski which are main objects of regional policy in the european union countries. references friedmann j., 1966, regional development policy: a case study of venezuela, mit press, cambridge. geyer h.s., kontuly t.a., 1993, a theoretical foundation for the concept of differential urbanization, international regional science review, 5(2), 157-177. gibbs j., 1963, the evolution of population concentration, economic geography, 2, 119-129. алаев э.б., 1983, социально-экономическая география: понятийно-терминологический словарь, мысль, москва. валлерстайн и.м., 2001, анализ мировых систем и  ситуация в современном мире, университетская книга, санкт-петербург. ключевский в.о., /no data/, курс русской истории. лекция ix. http://www.kulichki.com/inkwell/text/special/history/ kluch/kluch09.htm [07.03.2017]. колбина е.о., найден с.н., 2013, эволюция процессов урбанизации на дальнем востоке россии, пространственная экономика, 4, 44-69. нефёдова т.г., трейвиш а.и., 2005, теория «дифференциальной урбанизации» и иерархия городов в россии на рубеже xxi века, демоскоп wekle, 217-218, http:// www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2005/0217/analit01.php [07.03.2017]. перепись населения 2009. население республики беларусь: его численность и состав, т.2, 2010, национальный статистический комитет республики беларусь, минск. ридевский г.в., 2003, социально-эколого-экономическое районирование республики беларусь, [in:] восточная европа: вопросы исторической, общественной и политической географии. сборник научных статей, издательство пгпи, псков, 87-96. ридевский г.в., 2013, центр-периферийные процессы в расселении населения современной беларуси, региональные исследования, 2, 94-99. ридевский г.в., 2016, типология городских поселений и  стадиальность урбанизации в беларуси, [in:] проблемы и перспективы социально-экономической географии (к 100-летию со дня рождения и.и. трухана): материалы межд. научно-практ. конф., 12-14 ноября 2015 г., бгу, минск, 178-181. тюнен и.г., 1926, изолированное государство, экономическая жизнь, москва. численность населения на 1 января 2017 г. и среднегодовая численность населения за 2016 год по республике беларусь в разрезе областей, районов, городов, поселков городского типа, 2017, национальный статистический комитет республики беларусь, минск. 1. introduction the collapse of the eastern bloc and the soviet union initiated several waves of place names changing. these waves affected both russia and all the other countries of central and eastern europe. in russia, the renamings were heterogenous in terms of typology, geography and chronology. there were examples of restoring of older place names, changing of names to completely new ones or simply adjusting the names to local languages. in big cities, the renamings affected central parts in the first place, while distant districts kept their soviet toponymy. on the other hand, some regions were not involved into renaming campaigns, and villages and smaller cities mostly ignored them. finally, each russian region has witnessed several peaks of renaming activity during the 1990–2000s depending on local politics. this initial period of “toponymic cleansing” (roseredwood et al., 2010) is relatively well described and researched in different aspects: political struggles for the renamings (gill, 2005; marin, 2012), discussions and popular responses (nemcev, 2014; journal of geography, politics and society 2020, 10(3), 29–41 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2020.3.04 institutions, stakeholders and the city in the 2010s renaming policy in russia nikita lomakin institute of anthropology and ethnography of russian academy of sciences, lenin ave 32a, 119017 moscow, russia e-mail: lomakinu@gmail.com citation lomakin n., 2020, institutions, stakeholders and the city in the 2010s renaming policy in russia, journal of geography, politics and society, 10(3), 29–41. abstract the article presents an overview of the renaming tendencies in russia of the 2010s and the main stakeholders of the name changing. on the base of the administration websites, online media petitions and other open sources, three cases are examined in detail: 1) perm, where half of maksim gorky street was renamed after the surgeon sergey sukhanov in 2015; 2) kazan, where at the same time esperanto street was renamed after nursultan nazarbaev, causing mass protests for several years; 3) volgograd, with the discussions about returning to its older name stalingrad being led for years. based on the analysis of these cases, the following tendencies are identified: changes of stakeholders motivation for renamings, transfer of power to name from parliamentary institutions to administration, a new perception of the city center and distant districts; and, finally, the appearance of alternative mechanisms of social memory encouraged by the wiping out of older names. key words political toponymy, memory culture, russia, renamings. received: 01 june 2020 accepted: 30 august 2020 published: 30 september 2020 30 nikita lomakin terentiev, 2015; kangaspuro, lassila, 2018; nikitin, 2020), memory politics (galaktionova, 2016; thakakhov, 2019). these studies correspond to the studies of similar processes in post-communist eastern europe (palonen, 2008; light, young, 2014; crețan, matthews, 2016). however, there seem to exist fewer studies of what is going on after the landscape has been considerably transformed and society has got tired of symbolical changes and discussions. the 2010s witnessed the decrease of interest to the restoration of older names or “nation building” renamings both in popular discussions and in political milieux. the disappearance of one of the most famous ‘players’ in the field – restoration foundation in the early 2010s is an unmistakable sign of this process. during this period, political parties paid less attention to the topic, just rarely speculating on ‘loud’ renamings. the renamings became more individual and less paradigmatic. new stakeholders lobbied the memorialisation of a single person or (and) smaller corporate interests. in this article i will try to describe several features of this new period by analysing three cases of renamings from different cities of the russian federation: perm, volgograd, and kazan. examining these cases, i will reconstruct the chronology, logic and results of the decisionmaking process as well as the views and opinions of the main and secondary stakeholders. in conclusion, i will focus on institutional changes (changes in decision-making process), new stakeholders and the new perception of “palimpsest” urban space (a result of renamings of 1990–2000s) by stakeholders. 2. methodology and sources the cases from perm, volgograd and kazan are reconstructed with the help of websites of local and federal media, social networks (facebook, vkontakte, livejournal), official websites of administrative and representative bodies of the russian federation and its regional authorities. to provide background for these stories, the news aggregator platform yandex. news was used. using keywords like “renaming”, “street”, “square”, “station” i detected 111 more cases of urban objects renaming disputes in the russian federation in 2010–2020, among them 34 successive renamings. the disputes of 2011–2012 are covered by the project “monitoring the politics of history” (ngo international memorial). this project gathered news of online and offline media dealing with the culture of memory and political debates about history. the archive of the project is available on livejournal.com and contains 74 more news about renamings. undoubtedly, it is the tip of the iceberg: many renamings did not attract any attention of the media. but these stories help to understand the dynamics better. in this article, i will follow the critical toponymy approach, which considers toponymy as a result of cultural, social and political interaction (eller, hackl, l’upták (eds.), 2008; berg, voulteenaho (eds.), 2009; rose-redwood et al., 2010) and focus on stakeholder analysis. i will proceed with three cases of renaming: in perm in 2015, in kazan in 2015, and discussion about the renaming of volgograd in 2000–2010s. 3. perm, 2015 sergey sukhanov, a famous cardio surgeon from perm, founder and head of the public cardio surgery centre “the city of heart”, died of cancer on the 24th of july, 2015. he was known as one of the best surgeons in russia and had performed thousands of heart surgeries. since its opening in 2012, “the city of heart” had a contradictory reputation. the centre was praised as one of the best of its kind in russia and as a world-class cardiology hospital (zverintseva, 2013). however, there had been a series of scandals caused by several patients’ deaths of infections, by chasing off the number of surgeries to the detriment of their quality and by a patient being beaten by the doctor (pleshakova, 2013; federal’nyj centr…, 2019). being a famous surgeon, sergey sukhanov couldn’t avoid making himself a political career. indeed, since 2013 he was a co-chair of the permian branch of all-russia people’s front (an ngo coalition around vladimir putin and ruling united russia party) (permskij kraj…, 2013). in 2014, the documentary “cardiopolitics” (dir. s. strelnikova (2014)) about “the political price” of “the city of heart” was filmed: to get money for the construction, sukhanov had to become the face of the pro-putin local elite. later, the film received several awards at film festivals. the first measures to memorialise sergei sukhanov on city maps were taken right after his death. on the 1st of august 2015 (only a week after the surgeon’s death), local media announced the future naming of the garden in front of the “the city of heart” after sukhanov (belkina, 2015). a plate on the wall of the hospital was to be installed sometime later. the situation began to change rapidly after an initiative group for memorialisation of sergey sukhanov was created. it consisted of the widow of the surgeon, doctor natalia chernysheva, the secretary of the local branch of united russia party nikolay demkin and the businessman piotr pavlov. the institutions, stakeholders and the city in the 2010s renaming policy in russia 31 initiative group set a new goal: to rename a street after sukhanov. all negotiations of the initiative group with local authorities were conducted secretly. but in november 2016, nikolay demkin addressed a public speech to the city parliament. in this speech, he complained that the renaming decision was being slowed down because of formal obstacles. he argued that sukhanov should be memorialised as soon as possible because of his reputation and his fame all over the world. no need to wait – “always, there were and there are exceptions”, said the parliamentarian and mentioned two permian streets named after famous permian citizens right after their death. the head of the city seemed to be making excuses, confirming that the plate installation was already approved, and new more radical measures for memorialisation would soon take place (emelianova, sukhanov, 2015). the “formal obstacles” mentioned by the parliamentarian were permian rules of urban objects naming (2013). according to them, streets could be renamed only to restore their older names or to avoid the duplication of names. meanwhile, the head of the city ordered to find a street or an object to rename (the naming of a new street on the outskirts of the city was considered unsatisfactory by the initiative group). some of the offers were rejected by the initiative group, and the consensus was finally reached on the idea to rename the karl marx square in the city centre. the square could be renamed because its name is hard to pronounce (according to the rules, easy pronunciation is one of the criteria a place name should satisfy) (emelianova, sukhanov, 2015). the fate of this idea is unknown, but soon a new way of renaming was invented. the maxim gorky street, which is located in the proximity of “the city of heart”, was split into two streets, one of which was named after sukhanov. the widow of sukhanov presented this idea to the toponymic commission. while arguing for renaming, she mentioned that the prestige of all the doctors should be honoured by making the “right” decision. a representative of the government referred to a survey showing that 91% of citizens approved the renaming. the suggestion of commission members to wait for a little and name a new street after sukhanov was rejected by the initiative group. finally, on the 18th of february 2016, the decision was made and the renaming was approved (chuvatova, 2016). the new name of the street appeared even before the memorial plate was installed on “the city of heart”, which in the same month was also renamed in honour of the surgeon (viktor basargin…, 2016). the renaming was criticised in the media, two members of the toponymical commission were also among the critics – the blogger and local activist denis galitsky and the head of the regional archive andrei borisov. discussions took place on the pages of several permian media (where comments were allowed) and in social networks (emelianova, sukhanov, 2015; galitsky, 2015, 2016; tolmachev, 2016). there were two points of criticism. firstly, renaming (or naming) of a street after a person shouldn’t directly follow her/his death. some commenters even mentioned the contradictory reputation of “the city of heart”. secondly – and this point was more popular the renaming will be bad in any case. the initiative group should agree on the naming of a new street and stop lobbying the renaming of the already existing ones. this criticism was disregarded both by the toponymic commission and the initiative group. 4. kazan, 2015–2017 the esperanto street, the only one devoted to this artificial language in russia, existed in kazan (capital of the tatarstan republic) between 1927 and 1949 and then from 1988 till 2015. the restoration of this older name in 1988 was one of the first renamings of the 1990s wave. in june 2015, the street changed its name again, adopting the name of nazarbaev (in honour of the leader of kazakhstan, on the eve of his 75th anniversary). the first rumours about the renaming appeared on the 24th of june (alexey, 2015), while the document establishing the new name of the street was published on the 26th of june. despite them, no one was ready for such an extraordinary decision. indeed, renamings were rather uncommon for the capital of kazakhstan in 2010-s. from 2005 till 2018, there were only eight cases of renaming (reestr…, 2016). almost all of the renamed streets were located on the outskirts of the city. thus, the renaming of a street in the centre seemed to be very unusual. another uncommon thing was that nursultan nazarbaev was a still-living person, while “recommendations” (reshenie…, 2015) for the street naming allow to name streets only after people who died 10 years ago or earlier. finally, the last astonishing point consisted of a complete absence of discussion preceding the decision (antonov, 2015a). the process of decision-making remains unclear and can be reconstructed only in general terms. as most documents of the kind, the act of renaming (postanovlenije…,2015b) referred to the recommendation of the city toponymic commission and was signed by the head of the city government, 32 nikita lomakin denis kalinkin. however, the document contained an unusual trait, which was the motivation of decision. indeed, instead of the standard mentioning of “a group of ” petitioners, which is a formal requirement, it mentions only one petitioner, “the head of the national cultural autonomy of kazakhs of tatarstan s. djaksybaev”. on the 3rd of july, an opening ceremony of the new street name took place. at the beginning of the ceremony, the petitioner and head of kazakhs of tatarstan association djaksybaev said that it had taken two months to consider his petition (v kazani…, 2015). it means that the petition had to be sent to the authorities of kazan not later than the end of april, while in his interview from early february 2015 the idea of renaming isn’t even mentioned (dzhaksybaev…, 2015). therefore, the petition had to be written between february and april 2015. it seems that the starting point of the renaming process was the visit of a kazakh delegation led by the head of the kazakh’s government karin masimov to kazan on the 5th of february 2015. the delegates visited the kazan it-park, the university, the helicopter factory, and had a meeting with rustam minnikhanov, the head of the tatarstan republic. the speed of decision-making, as well as the neglect of formal rules and unwillingness of authorities to discuss the renaming, show that the real decision was made even before the petition of djaksybaev was considered. the meeting on the 5th of february most probably was the starting point of the whole process. after the petition for renaming was registered, there were only three steps left. on the next stage of the decision making, the authorities had to choose the object for renaming. it seems that they were bound by the initial arrangements. although the street after nazarbayev could be located on the outskirts of the city or in the new futuristic it district (innopolis), which was being constructed to the west of kazan1, they still opt for a street in the centre of the city. esperanto street seems to have been chosen because of the strangeness of its name for the functionaries. the author of the language had never been to kazan and had no connections to the city. «esperanto is a nonsense name. i would reconsider the decision if the street in hand was named after a person. it is not, so the name change shouldn’t insult anybody», pointed out rasil valeev, the head of the committee of culture and nations of tatarstan state council (antonov, 2015a). there were a couple 1 this idea was proposed by one of the activists during the later discussions. it seems to be obvious that the authorities had to consider this option before. of additional arguments for the renaming of esperanto street. firstly, the tatarstan nations friendship house is situated here, which allows to treat the street as a place of friendship of tatars and kazakhs. secondly, it was planned to install the sculpture in honour of kazakhstan in the public garden nearby (na ulice…, 2015). some of these reasons were revealed by the government in the formal answers to the criticism (alexey, 2015). on the next stage, the recommendation from the toponymic commission had to be gained. in june 2015, the commission consisted of 21 members, 11 of whom were delegates from the city government or parliament, while 10 others represented the academic community and civil society (reshenie…, 2014). to avoid tension, the head of the commission and vice mayor liudmila andreeva decided not to gather the commission and to vote via email. according to the interview of the commission member farida zabirova (antonov, 2015a), members of the commission were not allowed to see the results of the voting, only the final decision: the commission recommended to rename esperanto street. as zabirova pointed out, at least four people (including her) voted against the renaming. the final step was to sign the decree and to publish it on the governmental website. the interesting point here is that on the 4th of march 2015 the naming procedure was changed (reshenie…, 2015). according to the former legislation, it was the city parliament who voted for (re)naming of urban objects. the new procedure didn’t include voting in the parliament, the only decision-making institute was the city government. changes in the legislation occurred after the supposed date of the agreement on nazarbaev street (the 5th of february), but obviously, we cannot be entirely sure whether these events are connected. denis kalinkin, the head of the city government, signed the document about renaming on friday, 26th of june. the replacement of signs started immediately. no one anticipated that instead of the benefits of making a present to the 75th anniversary of nazarbayev, the authorities will gain a headache for several years ahead. the inhabitants were informed about the decision by the workers who installed new signs during the weekend. very soon, an initiative group was formed to start the resistance activities. a few days after, several protest petitions were written and published online (alexey, 2015; ivanov, 2015), the most popular of which was signed by more than 5,000 people. the inhabitants brought a civil suit against the government because of multiple violations of the procedure and sent a letter to the embassy of kazakhstan (yankova, 2015). the institutions, stakeholders and the city in the 2010s renaming policy in russia 33 extraordinary name changing of one of the central streets followed by the protests inevitably attracted the attention of the media. since the 26th of june, the struggle for the name was covered by the local press. the oppositional parties “yabloko” and “parnas” issued statements supporting the inhabitants. on the 1st of july, the administration invited several members of the initiative group as well as journalists for the discussion. as “vechernyaya kazan” newspaper explains, the functionaries insisted that resistance is pointless as all the decisions have already been made, adding that the new name would attract investments from kazakhstan and that the street will be decorated and repaired. on the 3rd of july, a pompous opening ceremony was scheduled. this meeting gathered the first president of tatarstan mintimir shaimeiv, the current president rustam minnikhanov, the ambassador of kazakhstan marat tazhin and the mayor of kazan. curiously, the street opening ceremony was held indoors. as some of the newspapers pointed out, initially it was planned to be held in the square near the city philharmonic. the organisers, however, feared that protesters would ruin it. as a result, the vips gathered in the house of nations friendship, while the protesters (eight people) stayed outside holding posters with anti-renaming slogans. even after a short conversation with the mayor, who tried to calm them down, the protesters refused to leave the place. later, four of them were arrested (and charged, with one person even sentenced to 20 hours of public work) (antonov, 2015c; grigorieva, 2015). the campaign for returning the esperanto name included the installation of self-made street-name signs, several meetings in public places, lots of petitions. according to some statements of the officials, the authorities even acknowledge that the renaming was a mistake, but could not take the decision back. during the talk with protesters on the 3rd of july, the mayor admitted “hastiness” and “bad work of the city government”, but insisted that the decision had already been made (metshin izvinilsja…, 2015). on the 22 of july, farid mukhametshin, the speaker of tatarstan state council, called the decision “premature” (muhametshin nazval…, 2015). still, the last hope for the inhabitants was the court. the claim was registered on the 21st of july. the idea of a legal claim was to stress the violations of the formal procedure: indeed, there was only one petitioner (instead of a formally required group of more than 10 people), the street was named after a living person (which was prohibited), this person has no connection to the history of kazan (while lots of tatar men of culture were esperantists). on the 12th of august, the court announced its decision: most of these arguments were inconsistent because they refer to the recommendations to the toponymic commission, not to the strict requirements; therefore, their violation can’t be considered as a reason to cancel the renaming (antonov, 2015d). later, on the 3rd of december, the supreme court of tatarstan repeated the arguments of the lower insertion court (delo № 33a-15912/2015…, 2015). the court became a place where different approaches to the toponymic policy clashed. however, both sides just repeated the same arguments. the only new one was that, among other rhetorics, representatives of the initiative group stressed the fact that the government monopolised the right to name and rename the streets. the promises to reconstruct the street and gain special attention of kazakh companies to the inhabitants of the street came true later. in august 2015, some repair works were done. in february 2016, it was announced that the inhabitants of nazarbaev street could attend the basketball match between the kazan team unix and the kazakh astana for free (by showing their passports with the registration on nazarbaev street). in spring 2016, a new monument in honour of the friendship between kazakhstan and tatarstan was erected. in march, discounts on an air-trip to kazakhstan for all the inhabitants of nazarbaev street were announced but were not confirmed later. however, all these efforts turned out to be in vain and did not change the attitude of the inhabitants towards the renaming. indeed, the reparation works were claimed to be cheap and of low quality, the free basketball tickets were regarded as a joke, while air-discounts caused a scandal (antonov, 2016; yankova, 2016). surprisingly, the discussion about nazarbaev street resulted in the modification of the naming procedure. the first changes were made in march 2015, when the city parliament refused to approve the names and handed this responsibility over to the government. in december 2015, a reform of toponymic commission was introduced: formerly part of the city parliament, it became henceforth a consulting body of the mayor. the prohibition of naming after living persons was abolished (postanovlenie…, 2015a; v kazanskoj…, 2016). this renaming has had a long echo. in 2019, a petition to name one of the streets after vladimir putin was published. according to its author, the tatar capital already has a street named after a living head of state, so why not memorialise vladimir putin, who has done more than nazarbaev for kazan? (v kazani…, 2019) in several petitions, the kazan’s inhabitants proposed to rename nazarbaev street 34 nikita lomakin after somebody else (v kazani…, 2016) and to name some other object after esperanto (yankova, 2017). every year, several actions of “symbolical renaming” (e.g. installing self-made street signs) take place. on the 26th of july 2016, the activists celebrated the esperanto day by projecting letters of the esperanto alphabet (ĉ, ĵ, and ŝ) on the walls of the former esperanto street. 5. volgograd, 2003–2018 volgograd is one of the biggest cities in the south of russia and a place where one of the cruelest battles in the history of wwii took place. during the 20th century, the city changed its name twice: in 1921 tsarisyn became stalingrad, and in 1961 stalingrad turned into volgograd. the latter renaming was a part of the destalinisation company initiated by nikita khrushchev in 1956. in the history of modern russia, the debates about the name of the city are the most famous and most politicised toponymic topic (kangaspuro, lassila, 2018). the arguments for and against restoring one of the older names have remained the same for decades. the supporters of the name tsaritsyn stress that it is the “original” name of the city, existing since 1589. stalingrad, on the other hand, seems to be a significant name because of the heroic and most tragic battle. stalinists regard this name as a way of commemorating joseph stalin. antistalinists, from their part, ignore this connotation and emphasise the crucial role of the stalingrad battle in the history of ww2. their standard argument refers to toponyms outside the ussr named after stalingrad battle, the most famous of them being a square in paris. the name volgograd is praised as a depoliticised one and a name that has existed for more than 60 years. its supporters consider the renaming as a sign of restalinisation of the country. still, the most pragmatic argument against renaming is the surveys. since the1990s, there has been no survey that would show the majority of renaming supporters in the city (serenko, 2003; ukolov, 2014). the first discussions about renaming started in one of the crisis moments of federal policy, during the presidential election of 1996. the first president of russia boris yeltsin started his campaign on a very low basis with almost no supporters in the country. in may 1996, the obvious leader was the head of the communist party gennadiy zyuganov. the campaign of yeltsin started in volgograd. speaking with veterans of stalingrad battle, he did everything to gain their hearts, in case of victory promising among other things to rename volgograd (after holding a referendum in the city). it seemed to be a good move because before that (and after) the idea of renaming was monopolised by the communists (serenko, 2003). yeltsin won the elections in volgograd and the country, but no referendum was held. the next attempt to rename the city was made by its governor, communist nikolay maksuta, who held the office in 1997–2010. in august 2001, maksuta promised to return the name of stalingrad before the 60th anniversary of the stalingrad battle (2003). while proposing this, maksuta admitted the possibility of a referendum (gubernator…, 2001). the idea of renaming was supported by zyuganov, the leader the communist party, but leaders of other parties were against it. among them, vladimir zhirinovsky (liberal democrats) pointed out that “returning of the name stalingrad is a justification of the stalin regime” (gubernator…, 2001). the reaction of federal authorities came much later. during the broadcasting “direct line” in december 2002, vladimir putin shared his negative attitude towards the renaming using the same argument as zhirinovsky (prezident…, 2002). meanwhile, maksuta did not stop his attempts. on the 21st of january 2003, the parliament of volgogradskaya oblast voted for the renaming bill. according to it, the renaming after voting in the state parliament and the council of federation became possible, with no direct referendum needed (which violated federal legislation on the matter) (svyatoslavskaya, 2003). the project was sent to the state parliament, where it was lobbied by alexey mitrofanov, a member of the liberal democrats party. on the 5th of march 2003, the bill was rejected (golosovanie…, 2003), having failed to gain the support of the ruling party united russia. on the 24th of july 2004, putin ordered to change the name of the city on the main monument to the fallen during wwii – the tomb of the unknown soldier under the walls of kremlin. “stalingrad” was to be written there instead of “volgograd” (the monument dates back to 1967) (vladimirov, 2004). this decision can be considered a model one for all the later cases of cancelled renamings. here, a symbolical gesture was made instead of a full-scale renaming. the next stage of discussions was initiated by the communist party together with their conservative allies labor-union of nations of russia and “the nature of the time” movement. in november 2012, several not very numerous demonstrations in volgograd started a campaign of collection of signatures to rename the city (filimonova, 2012). in january 2013, the leader of the communists gennady zyuganov stated that more than 100,000 signatures were collected and sent to the presidential administration (g. a. zyuganov…, 2013). the president institutions, stakeholders and the city in the 2010s renaming policy in russia 35 didn’t react this time, but soon the parliament of volgograd (where united russia party constituted the majority) issued a bill which allowed to symbolically rename the city on the fest days (vneocherednoe…, 2013). this renaming means that every year, for six days volgograd becomes the hero city of stalingrad. on the 2nd of february 2013, vladimir putin demonstrated how this new symbolism works in practice. he visited volgograd for festivities in honour of the 70th anniversary of the stalingrad battle and made a speech, where stalingrad was mentioned 14 times, while the name volgograd wasn’t mentioned at all (putin, 2013). alexander strizoe, a political scientist from volgograd, commented then that “personally for the president of russia, the changing of names did take place” (serenko, 2013). in general terms, putin reacted to the starting discussion the same way as ten years before, i.e. by performing a symbolical action that partially made further discussion useless. however, for most people, the question was not yet solved. in early february, the renaming was discussed on all the levels of state hierarchy and in all the media (kuznetsova, 2013). officials of higher-level (e.g. valentina matvienko, the head of the federation council) agreed that a referendum should take place shortly. parties tried to take political advantage of the discussions (e.g. v. zhirinovsky, the head of the liberal democrats, stated once more that the renaming meant the justification of stalin and his actions); there were political associations which became famous while discussing the toponymic. on local levels, the discussion revealed itself in bus branding (so-called stalinobus) (the “stalinobus”…, 2013) or “self-made” street renamings (volgogradskaya street was unofficially renamed into stalingradskaya in ekaterinburg) (v ekaterinburge…, 2013). after the 2nd of february, kremlin officials commented on the situation only once: dmitry peskov, the press secretary of vladimir putin, stated that the renaming was now unnecessary (lednev, 2013). after several months of discussions and pr companies, no referendum was organised. a new wave of discussions rose in june 2014 after putin’s statement that he doesn’t object to the renaming of volgograd and supports the idea of a referendum (putin predlozhil…, 2014). later, the press-secretary of president specified that it shouldn’t be considered as a demonstration of presidential support (peskov: smi…, 2014). meanwhile, putin’s phrase initiated a new series of statements from political activists, representatives of parties, and church. however, the scale of the campaign was much smaller than the year before. it seems that this wave as well as the approaching anniversary of the victory inspired the communists to a new initiative. on the 11th of february 2015, they introduced a project of a state parliament statement: volgograd must be renamed into stalingrad, one of the central squares in moscow must be renamed and decorated with a stalin’s monument (projekt…, 2015). the project was doomed from the beginning and it is hard to believe that the communists didn’t understand it. while the idea of renaming volgograd could find supporters outside the party, the renaming of a central square in moscow and the installation of a monument sounded so prostalinist that no other party or fraction in the state parliament could support it. it seemed that the main purpose of the bill (rejected on the 25th of february 2015) (rezul’taty…, 2015) was to restore control over the idea of renaming the city (pertsev 2015). the last attempt to rename volgograd was connected to a new anniversary of the battle in 2018 and the presidential election of 2018. while most politicians didn’t use the opportunity to speculate on the matter, vladimir zhirinovsky, the former opponent of the renaming, used the idea for his electoral campaign (fest, 2017). simultaneously, local authorities began to promote the idea of the renaming of the volgograd airport. they insisted on changing the name of gumrak into stalingrad (aeroport…, 2016; markush, 2018). if the idea seizes the minds of the russians once again, the renaming of the airport could become a new symbolical answer to it. in the meantime, zhirinovsky obtained 5.65% votes, and gumrak was never renamed. 6. comparison in this paper, i investigated three cases of renaming from different regions, where different types of stakeholders took part and which had different results. the renaming in perm, one of the main russian cities in the ural region, was initiated by a local (and yet influential) initiative group. alliance with the ruling party and support of the administration of the city allowed it to rename one of the streets in the city centre. the new name caused almost no resistance because of the successful choice of the place, which is both central and unpopulated. on the contrary, the renaming in kazan, the capital of the tatarstan republic, was lobbied by the government of another country. the unsuccessful choice of a street to rename combined with a short-sighted interaction with inhabitants caused protests and a wave of blaming the city administration, the aftermath of which is still visible. the last case has almost no connection to local communities and was included in the federal agenda by parties and federal functionaries to 36 nikita lomakin speculate on painful topics of wwii and memory of repressions. thus, it can be regarded as an example of the interaction of moscow and regional elites. based on these three cases, we can identify different types of initiators and stakeholders of toponymic discussions and decisions. the permian case shows the collaboration between the city government (the initiative to name a garden in the proximity of “the city of heart”), individual initiative, and party leaders. it seems to be impossible to achieve the desired outcome (i.d. to rename a square or a street in the city centre) without such a collaboration. while arguing for renaming, its supporters refer to the ideas of local memorialisation (the permian citizens memorialised in street names) opposing them to typical soviet toponyms (e.g. karl marx square, maksim gorky street). the hastiness and persistence of the initiators reveal their mistrust of the procedure and the local government. they simply seize an opportunity when they have enough influence to memorialise their friend or relative and write them down in the history of the city. the kazan case presents a completely different situation. the decision about renaming and memorialisation of a living person was made against all formal recommendations and procedures. the task of the city functionaries was to find a street, the renaming of which would cause less protest. the choice was bad but it was the renaming procedure itself which made things worse. indeed, by neglecting all preparation, failing to give explanations, and provide a satisfactory discussion, the administration did cause a conflict. but as this case shows, the main problem consists not in political mistakes, but in the very tendency to exclude non-governmental or representative bodies from toponymic discussions. in this case, for instance, the main argument of the authorities consisted of their right to make this decision regardless of other points of view. the changes made in the toponymic legislation after the renaming of the esperanto street also confirm this point. it is hard to identify the initiators of discussions about the name of volgograd. sometimes, it seems that the discussion emerges “out of nowhere” (e.g. in june 2014), while in others it is initiated by a political party (communists or liberal democrats) and their local institutions. surprisingly, the discussion on the federal level is much more competitive and at the same time more disposed to compromise. here, the case of volgograd shows how symbolical gestures can reduce tension. permian and kazan cases reveal the organisation and tactics of protest against a naming decision. in both cases, the protest did not have any institution or organisation behind it. the initiative group in kazan was organised specifically to fight for the street name. no civil organisation openly supported the protesters, although the oppositional parties issued several statements in kazan. this can be regarded as a determining factor in defining the resistance tactics. in perm, the website livejournal became the main platform for discussions. in kazan, the internet also played a crucial role. indeed, numerous petitions and publications issued by the protesters were used by the media to exert strong informational pressure on the administration. the unique trait of the kazan case is its strong offline component: some discussions were set offline in the cafes or streets, there were also so-called “partisan” renamings, when people installed street-name signs with the name esperanto. the most important platform, however, was the court. the decisions of local and supreme court revealed the absence of a unified procedure as well as the legal weakness of the “recommendations” to the toponymic commission. three cases demonstrate the key role of administration in decision making. the differences in the regional legislation do not affect this tendency: in kazan, the toponymic commission was part of the parliament, but the decision was made outside the parliament. as the volgograd case shows, no one but the president has enough power and influence to allow or to prohibit the referendum, which up to date remains a part of the formal procedure of renaming. in perm, the parliament was used only as a platform for blaming speeches against the head of the city. the judicial authorities, such as courts in kazan, just repeated the arguments already formulated by the administration. the key role of the administration results in two features of decision making. firstly, the decision is prepared and made in a non-transparent way. the logic, motivation and circumstances of the decision are not clear at first sight and have to be reconstructed in most cases and reveal themselves only in critical situations like the ones we have seen in perm and kazan. for the administration, this inner motivation is regarded as more important than the formal toponymic regulations. in kazan, the “recommendations” were not treated as law and for this reason ignored. however, we can refer to several cases in moscow toponymу where renamings were made against the law (e.g. renamings in honour of the writer alexander solzhenitsyn and the politician akhmat kadyrov). secondly, ordinary citizens do not have any influence on the decision. although in the toponymic discussions both sides refer to the results of public surveys, no one explains the methodology used while conducting them. the cheapest way to understand institutions, stakeholders and the city in the 2010s renaming policy in russia 37 the public opinion is the internet poll, which is frequently used both by the administration and local newspapers. however, there is no technology allowing to restrict the possibility of participation only to a specific region or audience, which hampers the conduction of such surveys online. another way to show that public opinion has been taken into consideration is to refer to petitions signed by a group of people. as can be seen in kazan, it is a standard preamble for all the (re)naming decrees. this approach is more formal and seemingly more reliable than just citing survey results. another way to determine what people really think of renaming is a referendum which, being very expensive, still remains a very rare procedure (in the 2010s russia, the only referendum on the question of renaming was conducted in 2017 in tutaev, where people voted against restoring the older name) (tikhonov, 2017). however, we might see a much more intensive use of such referenda in the future, as, according to some analytics, they will attract voters to the polling stations when a federal election is held at the same time (rozhkova, 2017). the last important point concerns the semantics of space revealed in the discussions described above. first of all, both in perm and kazan, stakeholders were interested in renaming a street in the city centre and refused the opportunity to name a new street in a distant district. this attitude can be explained by the “palimpsest” state of the city centre toponymy. in soviet cities, most central streets were named after core concepts or figures in the communist pantheon. such naming practice protected the centre against the renaming and equalised the “prestige” of all other districts of the city (efremov, 1985). the fall of the soviet union and waves of place name changing disturbed this balance. the city centre became “available’ for the renamings of all kinds. in practice, it meant that the groups seeking for the most prestigious place to name were primarily attracted by renaming soviet or other “vulnerable” layers of toponymy in the centre. naming a street on the outskirts was considered far less prestigious. from this perspective, the choice to rename esperanto street in kazan is significant. in the 1990s and 2000s, kazan street names experienced waves of nationalisation. for this reason, most streets were named after national heroes or kept their “soviet” names. while deciding which street to rename, functionaries did not choose a soviet toponym, but a “strange” international one. it can be considered as a demonstration of hierarchy: national toponyms are the most valuable, then go soviet one, and only then get everything else. 7. conclusion indeed, three cases are not enough to provide the full dynamics of discussions around the topic of toponymic changes, but they allow to at least trace some trends on the matter. the first of them is the appearance of new types of stakeholders in the renaming discussions, who are less politicised and paradigmatic than “players” of the previous period. the restoration of older names or nationalisation of the landscape cannot be regarded as motto anymore, while private and corporate interests are much more respected. the discussion around the renaming of volgograd demonstrates the tiredness of society: in 2013, the renaming of volgograd was a topic discussed all over the country, while in 2017 the same topic did not attract any attention of the media outside volgograd. the second trend was revealed in the kazan case. it shows that the power to name is gradually being transferred from parliamentary institutions to administration, which is secured by the changes in legislation. the decision-making process has thus become even less transparent. as the volgograd case shows, it is only the president who can successfully lobby or prohibit renaming on the national level. the third trend concerns the city space. the city centre toponymy has become more prestigious and because of that changeable. for larger cities, it means that the city centre has become the most toponymically heterogeneous place, soviet districts will keep their original toponymy while the newer ones will follow recent trends in commercial naming. finally, the last trend shows that even discussions and fights brought to an end do not vanish without traces. for instance, the renaming of esperanto street in kazan has served as a stimulus for some people in kazan to form a group with a purpose to preserve memory 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the map), vechernyaya kazan, 3  june 2017, http://www.evening-kazan.ru/articles/kazancy-ne-teryayut-nadezhdy-vernut-na-kartu-esperanto. html (accessed 10 may 2020). zverintseva t., 2013, poshhady jetomu cheloveku ne budet (eng. “there will be no mercy for this man), lenta.ru, https://lenta.ru/articles/2013/07/05/doctor/ (accessed 10 may 2020). 1. introduction on 1st may 2004 poland became a member state of the european union. during the first ten years of the eu membership the polish transportation system changed significantly. it was an outstanding period in the context of structural, quantitative as well as qualitative changes. thanks to the structural funds it was possible to develop transport infrastructure in poland what has reduced the development gap between our country and western european countries. nonetheless, not only the investment possibilities, but also legal issues, including liberalization of railway, automobile and aviation markets, had to be introduced. it was also a great chance for polish entrepreneurs to enter international markets (pieregud, 2014a; rosik et. al., 2015b). the transformation which took place during the analyzed 10-year period is clearly reflected by the number of cars per 1000 people. in 2004 there were 314 such vehicles while in 2015 as much as 539 (fig. 1). table 1 presents a detailed structure of polish passenger transport in the period of 2005–2015 and its dynamics of changes. in 2005 over 5 million people used means of passenger transport while in 2015 slightly over 4.5 billion. the share of urban transport decreased over the discussed period and journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 41–49 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.026.7182 transport in poland during the period of accession to the european union marcin połom (1), sławomir goliszek (2) (1) department of regional development geography, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 gdańsk, poland, e-mail: marcin.polom@ug.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of geography and spatial organization, polish academy of sciences, twarda 51/55, 00-818 warszawa, poland, e-mail: sgoliszek@twarda.pan.pl citation połom m., goliszek s., 2017, transport in poland during the period of accession to the european union, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 41–49. abstract transportation is an important area of the economy. the transport fills a series of tasks daily functioning of the state. the period of the accession of central and eastern europe countries to the european union, including poland is the time of intensive investments financed by structural funds. the countries of the region have gained significant resources to improve the infrastructure and operation of most types of transport modes. this article is a review and ordering information on the functioning and development of major modes of transport. it retains the traditional distinction between road, rail, inland waterways and air transport. quoted statistics for the period 2005-2015 in order to compare changes in transport infrastructure development. key words transport, poland, european union, transformation period, changes of transport modes. 42 marcin połom, sławomir goliszek a clear influence of individual transport (passenger cars) is visible. when excluding urban transport from the structure, the share of road transport was dominating. however, the share of railway transport also increased (mainly around agglomerations, e.g. warsaw) during the analyzed period. other types of transport, including maritime transport and inland waterway transport, were marginal. a significant change was observed for air transport and its share increased significantly over the period 2005–2015. the share of air transport was 15.1% in 2005 while in 2015 it was 25.7%. 2. railway transport polish railway transport system has a historical background. due to many years of partitions in different regions of the country different railway systems (different rail gauge) were developed. the dynamics of these systems is also differentiated. the railway systems inherited after the first world war were devastated and, what is more important, heterogeneous. although many years have passed, poland is still divided into regions (eastern, north-western and southern) with more and less developed railway networks. the retrogressive development of railway transport observed after 1989, at times of economic and fig. 1. the number of passenger cars per 1,000 people in 2004–2015 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. tab. 1. transport of passengers in 2005–2015 specification in thous. passengers 2005 2010 2015 2005 2015 in absolute numbers in percent all passengers 5 134 809 4 883 086 4 547 157 100.0 100.0 in urban transport 4 087 879 4 045 062 3 843 415 79.5 84.5 excluding urban transport 1 046 930 838 024 703 742 20.4 15.5 100.0 100.0 railway transport 258 110 261 314 277 321 24.7 39.4 road transport 782 025 569 652 416 774 74.7 59.2 maritime transport 714 671 597 0.1 0.1 inland waterway transport 1 444 1 397 1 762 0.1 0.3 air transport 8 504 8 273 13 486 15.1 25.7 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. transport in poland during the period of accession to the european union 43 political transformation, has balanced the density of railway network in many regions. however, it was the effect of reduction in the length of railway lines in the west while there were no development projects implemented in the east. table 2 presents a decrease in the number of active railway lines – from 20 thousand km in 2005 to more than 19 thousand km in 2015. railway lines in poland are managed by the pkp company polskie linie kolejowe (plk) [polish railway lines] and the main operators are also polish companies – pkp intercity and polregio (former pkp przewozy regionalne). in many regions local authorities have established local railway operators supplementing agglomeration traffic. koleje mazowieckie, koleje wielkopolskie, koleje dolnośląskie, koleje fig. 2. main railway infrastructural development projects in poland source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. tab. 2. railway infrastructure in the period of 2005–2015 (as at 31 xii) specification 2005 2010 2015 railway lines operated in km 20 253 20 228 19 231 of which standard gauge 19 843 20 089 19 231 of which electrified 11 884 11 916 11 865 of which single track 11 096 11 353 10 505 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. 44 marcin połom, sławomir goliszek małopolskie, koleje śląskie and łódzka kolej aglomeracyjna consist a group of the largest such entities. in addition to passenger operators, there are numerous cargo operators and the national pkp cargo is the largest of them. as it has already been mentioned the main body managing the infrastructure is pkp plk. in order to get access to polish railway lines a special fee for carriers has to be paid. the most important international railway lines running through poland are: e30 (from germany to ukraine), e20 (from germany to belarus) and e65 (from ports in gdynia and gdańśk to the czech republic). polish railway market is one of the largest in europe. during the last few years the structure of railway services has been changing. there are more than 60 cargo and more than 10 passenger operators exploiting the railway network of more than 19,2 thousand km length (pieregud, 2014b). during the analysed period railway infrastructure was a factor negatively influencing development of transport. the expenditures on railway infrastructure grew significantly, from 1 billion zloty in 2004 to 5.3 billion in 2013 and some more in the following years. however, the average speed of trains is still low. what is more, the long-lasting construction works usually discouraged potential passengers. figure 2 presents main railway infrastructural development projects in poland, both implemented and planned. the modernisation projects are presented at the background of the existing railway infrastructure. 3. road transport 3.1. road infrastructure road transport dominates in poland and it is a base for the integrated transport system of our country as it fulfils the needs of more than 99% of domestic cargo and passengers transport. more than 85% of cargo is carried by trucks. moreover, poland is a transit tab. 3. road transport infrastructure between 2005–2015 (as of 31 xii) specification 2005 2010 2015 public roads (urban and non-urban) in thous. km 381 406 420 of wich hard surface in thous. km 254 274 291 of which: improved in thous. km 227 250 268 expressways in km 258 675 1 492 motorways in km 552 857 1 559 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. fig. 3. changes in road infrastructure between 2004 and 2016 (as of 31 xii) source: own elaboration based on: gddkia (the general directorate for national roads and motorways). transport in poland during the period of accession to the european union 45 country for many carriers travelling between western and easterm europe as well as between the sea ports in the north and the southern poland. that is why, special attention has been paid to improving quality of public roads in poland. according to the report of the supreme audit office (nik) on road and railway transport published in 2005, only 8% of polish domestic roads meet the european union axel-load limit standards (paprocki, 2014). in the period of 2004–2016 a considerable percentage of eu funds was spent on improvement of polish domestic roads quality. the total length of polish domestic roads grew from 381 thousand km in 2005 to 420 thousand km in 2015 (tab. 3). motorways and expressways were the most important part as they are of key significance in both international and regional scales. according to the existing development plans (as at the end of 2016), the projected total length of expressways is to be approx. 7650 km and the length of motorways is to grow from 2000 km to 5650 km (komornicki et. al., 2013). during the period of 2005–2015 the dynamics of motorways development was as follows: 552 km in 2005, 857 km in 2010 and 1559 km in 2015. total length of expressways was growing even faster – from 258 km in 2005 to 1492 km in 2015. figure 3 presents changes in length of highways and expressways which took place in the period of 2004–2016. the latitudinal layout of the road system is worth mentioning as it perfectly reflects the transit character of poland. the figure for 2016 shows the actual state of construction of motorways and expressways at the background of the planned road network. connecting voivodship cities with the capital is considered a key priority. 3.2. car transport road transport plays the most important element of the polish transport system. this situation is clearly depicted by the number of cars registered in poland. at the end of 2005 there were only about 17 million vehicles, including approx. 12.5 million passenger cars (tab. 4). a dynamic growth in the number of cars observed over the next years resulted in reaching the level of 21 million cars in 2015. this growth is mainly the result of importing second-hand cars from western europe. at the same time sales of new cars have decreased. however, some legal regulations introduced in the following years have resulted in a decrease in passenger cars imported from abroad. not only the number of passenger cars has increased, but the number of other vehicles has also grown, i.e. buses, lorries, motorcycles and others. however, this growth in the number of vehicles is not correlated with an increase in quality of public roads. the pace of infrastructural development is not fast enough in the context of the rapidly growing number of road users. the entire process affects the road congestion. a significant increase in the number of users of public roads was not associated with an increase in the number of accidents. in this aspect significantly decreased car accidents from more than 48 thous. in 2005 to less than 33 thous. in 2015. also the number tab. 4. registered road vehicles and tractors in 2005–2015 (as of 31 xii), in thous. units specification 2005 2010 2015 total (road vehicles and tractors) 16 816 23 037 27 409 of which: passenger cars 12 339 17 240 20 723 buses 80 97 110 lorries and road tractors 2 305 2 982 3 428 ballast and agricultural tractors 1 243 1 669 1 703 motorcycles 754 1 013 1 272 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. tab. 5. road traffic accidents in 2005–2015 (as of 31 xii) specification 2005 2010 2015 road vehicles in thous. units 48 100 38 832 32 967 per 10 thous. registered motor vehicles and tractors 28.6 16.9 12.0 road traffic casualties in units 66 635 52 859 42 716 fatalities 5 444 3 907 2 938 injured 61 191 48 952 39 778 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. 46 marcin połom, sławomir goliszek of casualties and victims has decreased significantly (tab. 5). 3.3. urban transport urban transport in poland regards mainly buses and trams. the underground system operates only in warsaw. over the last few years the majority of structural funds was granted to those cities which invest in development of public transport. development of those transport systems has been observed, in the context of both infrastructure and fleet (beister et al, 2015; wolański, 2014). table 6 presents the dynamics of changes in development of public transport lines in the period of 2005–2015, with reference to different types of urban transport. progress has been observed for all the mentioned in the table types. a significant growth in the length of tram lines is worth mentioning – from 2253 km in 2005 to 2425 km in 2015. it is a result of fulfilling the european union recommendations on sustainable development of transport in cities. moreover, high dynamics has been observed in relation to few trolleybus networks. the length of trolleybus lines grew from 258 km in 2005 to 387 km in 2015. most polish cities have urban bus systems. in 19 cities there are also other means of public transportation. since december 2015 there are 15 tram systems in polish cities, including 10 with standard gauge and 5 with narrow gauge. those cities are as follows: gdańsk, elbląg, olsztyn, grudziądz, szczecin, bydgoszcz, toruń, gorzów wielkopolski, poznań, łódź (with neighbouring towns), warszawa, wrocław, częstochowa, katowice (with neighbouring towns) and kraków. all the above-mentioned cities, except gorzów wielkopolski, have used the eu funds in order to modernise their tram systems. in olsztyn an entirely new tram system was established. it is the only city in poland where a new tram system has been created for 50 years. during the analysed period three trolleybus systems were operating (in gdynia with sopot, lublin and tychy). the share of trolleybus transport in the whole urban transport system is relatively small, but locally trolleybuses play an important role. all the already-mentioned cities have gained structural funds for development of trolleybus transport in the recent years, especially numerous infrastructural projects have been implemented, including construction of a new depot, development of trolleybus lines and power systems (połom, 2015). the only one operating underground system in poland is in warsaw. the first part of the underground line began operation in 1995 and over the following years more stations were added. the first line was fully operational in 2008. in 2010 construction works on the second underground line started, the first part (7 stations) was opened in 2015. 4. air transport development of air transport in the recent years was connected with the ongoing process of the market deregulation triggered by accession to the european union (hoszman, 2014). it is a means of transportation which developed the fastest in the period 2005–2015. in 2005 the number of passengers, both tab. 6. urban transport lines in km between 2005–2015 (as of 31 xii). specification 2005 2010 2015 ground transport 54 029 56 287 56 764 bus 51 418 53 728 53 952 tramway 2 253 2 254 2 425 trolleybus 258 305 387 metro 17 23 29 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. tab. 7. passenger traffic at airports in 2005-2015. specification 2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 from domestic airports to domestic airports 868 164 984 841 1 578 764 837 751 992 079 1 580 391 from foreign airports to foreign aiports 4 861 860 9 234 901 13 633 398 4 946 296 9 335 840 13 695 880 total 5 730 024 10 219 742 15 212 162 5 784 047 10 327 919 15 276 271 source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. transport in poland during the period of accession to the european union 47 arriving at and departing from polish airports, was 11.5 million while in 2015 it was slightly less than 30.5 million (tab. 7). in poland there is a relatively dense network of civil airports. warszawa-okęcie is the most important one. for many years it was the only intercontinental airport in poland. regional airports have undergone vital changes. new runways, terminals and technical rooms have emerged. the fact that poland was a co-organizer of the 2012 uefa european football championship was an important factor contributing to the air transport development (pijet-migoń, 2013). while preparing to this sports event four host cities have gained the necessary transport infrastructure, including modernization of the airports. large development projects were implemented in gdańsk, poznań, warsaw and wrocław. during the analysed period, mainly thanks to the european union, new civil airports were open in lublin, olsztyn and radom (some existing infrastructure was also used) (fig. 4). a similar project was implemented in gdynia where the already existing military infrastructure was used. however, after finishing the construction works, the european commission questioned the legitimacy of such spending under the structural funds and ordered the airport to repay the subsidy granted what made it impossible to open the airport for civil traffic. the main airlines in poland are the low-cost carriers, especially ryanair and wizzair. among the traditional airlines there are polish lot as well as other european companies, especially lufthansa and sas. the main airport for lot is warsaw. fig. 4. localization of airports in 2016 (as of 31 xii) source: own elaboration. 48 marcin połom, sławomir goliszek 5. maritime and inland waterways transport since poland has an access to the baltic sea, it is obvious that the maritime transport shall be of key meaning. among the main sea ports of poland there are szczecin, świnoujście, gdynia and gdańsk. these four ports are of key importance for the state economy. other ports like elbląg, darłowo dziwnów, kołobrzeg, stepnica, ustka and hel have rather small loading berths. when considering the main sea ports a visible growth in transhipment, which reached 42% of the turnover. the period of 2010–2013 is considered to be the especially good in this context 2013 (matczak, 2014). in 2013 the limit of 70 million tonnes for all polish sea port was exceeded for the first time. in comparison, a year before polish accession to the eu total amount of transhipment was almost 50 million tonnes. beside cargo transport, there are also regular ferry connections between domestic and scandinavian ports. four carriers operate on routes from świnoujście to ystad and trelleborg, from gdynia to karlskrona and from gdańsk to nynäshamn, near stockholm. among the above-mentioned carriers there are two national ones: polska żegluga bałtycka (polferries) and polska żegluga morska (unity line). the other two companies are private entities stena line and tt-line, well-known on the european market. development of cheap air transport in the baltic sea region has contributed to a decrease in the number of passengers carried by sea. in 2003 there were 1.6 million of passengers while in 2005 and 2007 there were only about 1.2 million of them. nonetheless, an increase in ro-ro traffic contributed to stabilization of the situation and finally, the passenger traffic has increased to approx. 1.5 million in the recent years (matczak, 2014). inland waterways transport in the least popular means of transport in poland mainly due to lack of properly regulated natural and artificial waterways. however, a well-developed river network creates a great possibility to develop this type of transportation (2005 year: 3638 km, 2010 year: 3659, 2015 year: 3655). inland waterways transport has been neglected by many years and there have not been any development projects implemented in the scope of the infrastructure. that is why, a retrogressive development of this type of transport is being observed nowadays. most river ports are situated on the odra river – a river being a border between poland and germany, which is a country investing in this type of transport. the most important river ports are gliwice, kędzierzyn-koźle and wrocław. fig. 5. comparison of changes of transport modes [km] in poland in the period of eu accession source: rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016; transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016. transport in poland during the period of accession to the european union 49 6. summary the period of poland’s membership in the european union is unprecedented for development of the polish tsl sector. from 2004 to 2016 many positive quantitative, qualitative and structural changes in polish transport system took place. among the most significant quantitative achievements there are four that have to be mentioned: a threefold increase in road performance (rosik, goliszek, 2015), a 300% increase in passenger traffic at polish airports, almost fivefold increase in the number of containers in intermodal railway transport, a sixfold increase in container transhipment in the sea ports. development of the transport infrastructure comprised construction of 3 thousand km motorways and expressways, modernisation and construction of approx. 13.8 thousand of national, provincial and regional roads, modernisation of about 3 thousand km of railroads (fig. 5), construction of three new airports and construction a container terminal in the sea port of gdańsk. modernisation of transport in poland has resulted in improved safety of travelling as well as it has contributed to a significant decrease in the number of accidents and casualties (rosik et. al., 2015a). the safer the roads, the safer the passengers. however, not only the infrastructure has been improved, but also the fleet. many new rail vehicles and buses (used in public and regional transport) were purchased. these new vehicles contributed to better perception of the public transport and such actions are in line with the eu public transport policy. references beister m., górny j., połom m., 2015, rozwój infrastruktury tramwajowej w polsce w okresie członkostwo w unii europejskiej, technika transportu szynowego, 7–8, 20–36. hoszman a., 2014, transport lotniczy, [in:] j. pieregud (ed.), system transportowy polski, 10 lat w unii europejskiej, oficyna wydawnicza szkoła główna handlowa, warszawa, 59–76. komornicki t., rosik p., śleszyński p., solon j., wiśniewski r., stępniak m., czapiewski k., goliszek s., 2013, impact of the construction of motorways and expressways on socio-economic and territorial development of poland, ministry of infrastructure and development, warsaw. matczak m., 2014, transport morski, [in:] j. pieregud (ed.), system transportowy polski, 10 lat w unii europejskiej, oficyna wydawnicza szkoła główna handlowa, warszawa, 77–94. paprocki w., 2014, transport drogowy, [in:] j. pieregud (ed.), system transportowy polski, 10 lat w unii europejskiej, oficyna wydawnicza szkoła główna handlowa, warszawa, 13–34. pieregud j., 2014a, wstęp, [in:] j. pieregud (ed.), system transportowy polski, 10 lat w unii europejskiej, oficyna wydawnicza szkoła główna handlowa, warszawa, 9–12. pieregud j., 2014b, transport kolejowy, [in:] j. pieregud (ed.), system transportowy polski, 10 lat w unii europejskiej, oficyna wydawnicza szkoła główna handlowa, warszawa, 35–58. pijet-migoń, e., 2013, zmiany rynku lotniczych przewozów pasażerskich w polsce po akcesji do unii europejskiej, uniwersytet wrocławski, wrocław. połom m., 2015, przemiany funkcjonowania komunikacji trolejbusowej w polsce w latach 1989–2013, uniwersytet gdański, gdańsk. rocznik statystyczny rzeczpospolitej polskiej, 2016, główny urząd statystyczny, warszawa. rosik p., goliszek s., 2015, the impact of selected road projects on changes in traffic intensity, europa xxi, 28, 71-90. rosik p., goliszek s., kowalczyk k., 2015a, impact of selected road investments on traffic safety, europa xxi, 28, 9–32. rosik p., stępniak m., komornicki t., 2015b, the decade of the big push to roads in poland: impact on improvement in accessibility and territorial cohesion from a policy perspective, transport policy, 37, 134–146. transport, wyniki działalności w 2015, 2016, główny urząd statystyczny, warszawa. wolański m., 2014, komunikacja miejska, [in:] j. pieregud (ed.), system transportowy polski, 10 lat w unii europejskiej, oficyna wydawnicza szkoła główna handlowa, warszawa, 95–112. 1. introduction tourist industry acquires more and more value for development of economy and social sphere in the ternopil oblast development of inbound and internal tourism, excursion activity has a tendency for upgrading of life in that area, process of creation additional workplaces, filling of local budget and increase of authority of region both on internal and on international tourist markets. the ternopil oblast having an advantageous geopolitical location owns considerable touristrecreational potential favorable climatic terms, plain and mountain landscapes, riches of flora and fauna, developed transport network, plenty of historical sights of culture and architecture. tourist industry in the area needs an additional advertising. the special attention should be turned on forming of the positive image of the region in the tourist market of the country and europe, applying journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 57–63 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.028.7184 tourist flows in ternopil oblast current state and development prospects oresta bordun (1), liubov althaim (2) (1) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: obordun@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) geography of ukraine and tourism department, faculty of geography, ternopol national pedagogical university named after vladimir gnatyuk, kryvonosa 2, 46027 ternopol, ukraine, e-mail: altheim@ukr.net citation bordun o., althaim l., 2017, tourist flows in ternopil oblast: current state and development prospects, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 57–63. abstract the features of development of inbound and internal tourism, excursion activity in the ternopil oblast are exposed in the article. the analysis of tourist activity of touristic agents and tour operators, directions and structure of tourist streams of the ternopil oblast suggestions of tourist enterprises and level of tourist market of area development is conducted. the special attention is paid to the tourist infrastructure, namely to establishments of placing, feed and leisure. absence of specialized programs for people of senior age, that elect memorial, biographic or religiously-sentimental tours that are organized, as a rule, without participation of tourist enterprises of the area is marked, and also not enough developed infrastructure, low quality of tourist services, not formed the internal touristic product are mentioned as the components that prevent market from tourist services development. key words ternopil oblast, tourist industry, inbound tourism, internal tourism, excursion activity, tourist activity, tourist-recreational potential of the area, tourist services, tourist market, excursion routes, tourist infrastructure. 58 oresta bordun, liubov althaim pr-technology. development of infrastructure and creation of favorable terms for business-tourism will give a synergistic effect: workplaces, gap-fillingness of regional budget, stimulation of business activity and bringing in of investments. 2. analysis tourist market in ternopil oblast is represented by tour operators and travel agents who are engaged in creation and sale of tourist products aimed at domestic and foreign areas. according to the statistics department of ternopil oblast tourism activity involved 43 subjects, including 8 tour operators, 33 travel agents and 2 tour operators engaged exclusively in sightseeing activities in 2015. the vast majority (88,4%) of tourism activities was in ternopil, kremenets and zbarazh districts. income from tourism services (without vat, excise taxes and similar mandatory payments) amounted to 5884.3 thousand uah in 2015 (4282 thousand uah in 2014) (статистичний…, 2016). information on tourist flows in the ternopil oblast in 2014 and 2015 is given in figure 1. foreign tourism dominates in the structure of tourist flows in ternopil oblast as domestic tourism products are undeveloped. domestic offer of travel companies in the oblast is very limited with infrastructure therefore tourist flows are directed to well-known tourist centres such as pochaiv, zbarazh, zarvanytsia, karst caves, dzhurynskyi waterfall, terebovlia, mykulyntsi, ternopil etc. compared to the year 2014, the number of citizens of the oblast, who travelled abroad, increased by 5.9% and amounted 4 970 people most of whom spent there their holidays. the residents of the ternopil oblast visited forty-two countries. in 2015 the most popular among the trips abroad were egypt (1 515 people), turkey (1 232 people) and bulgaria (783 people). typically, tour operators are focused on these tourist countries and this is caused by their pricing. among the citizens of the oblast, who travelled abroad, 768 people (15.5%) were children aged 0–17 years. domestic tourists travelled more often with the purpose of leisure and recreation; statistically their number was 1 643 people. 20 museums of the oblast were visited by 618.6 thousand people in 2015. this figure is much higher than the official number of excursionists and that can be explained by the fact that a majority of tourism enterprises include in a guided tour many museums, memorial estate museum or historical and cultural reserves. in the tourism market there can be observed a revival of tourist flows outside the oblast centre and the residents of other oblast gradually increase interest in local touristic attractions (http://www.te.ukrstat.gov.ua). to determine the level of development of the tourism market of the oblast it is necessary to analyse statistics on the number of tourists served by the subjects of tourism in the oblast and the total cost of sales of travel packages for the 2014–2015 years and compare them in table 1. as you can see the number of sold travel packages over the last year has decreased, but their total value increased by more than 10 thousand usd. such trends are related to changes in exchange rates and significant inflation in ukraine. in 2015 services of tourism enterprises were used by 6.9 thousand people (in 2014 – 9.1 thousand people). these were people aged 15–44 years mostly; rarely firm’s clients are children under 14 years old, which go on a trip alone. it was found that the fig. 1. number of tourists (person) served the subjects of tourism source: http://www.te.ukrstat.gov.ua tab. 1. the number and cost of travel packages sold by the subjects of tourism year number of sold travel packages the cost of travel packages sold [thous. uah] 2014 3786 25151.4 2015 3479 37006.6 source: http://www.te.ukrstat.gov.ua tourist flows in ternopil oblast current state and development prospects 59 proportion of school-age children of all travellers is about 5% and this is due, primarily, to the lack of specialized children’s tours in the local tourism product. usually children’s holiday is health improvement in children’s camps. a significant proportion of domestic tourists are pupils, which together with students predominate among the visitors of museums (80%), and therefore among people on an excursions (програма…, 2016). the oblast does not have specialized programs for older people, that’s why these residents don’t use very much the proposals of local tourist companies, although these are the tourists to consume nostalgic tours, the organization which is promising for the ternopil oblast because of many suitable tourist facilities for these activities. retirement age visitors, whose share does not exceed 5%, have already been registered in the memorial museums and historical and cultural reserves in general. among the older visitors greatly dominate foreigners (usually of ukrainian origin) who choose memorial, biographical or religious and sentimental tours organized usually without the involvement of travel companies of the oblast (програма…, 2016). tourism infrastructure is an important part of the tourism market besides subjects of tourist market. tourist infrastructure is a set of enterprises and institutions, which are aimed at meeting the needs of people, who are involved in the rehabilitation or recreation, and it includes means of communication, transport and accommodation of tourists providing stable operation conditions. we consider it an integral system consisting of two subsystems: social and production that are interconnected and interdependent regarding service entity (кузик, 2010, p. 170). tourist infrastructure of separate territorial unit is considered to be a combination of companies that provide various services: • hotels and hostels; • catering; • entertainment places etc. accommodation facilities. one of the main components of the tourism industry in ternopil oblast, which determines the real tourism potential, is hotel industry. hotel enterprises perform one of the most important functions in the service of tourists – accommodation; the quality of accommodation and related services affect the level of tourist service. hotel industry of ternopil oblast is represented with different types of temporarily placement for tourists. although the hotel infrastructure could be much better, you can find both private apartments and estates for rent for tourists, deluxe hotel and some star hotels. at the beginning of 2015 accommodation facilities operated on the territory of ternopil oblast reached number of 70; their distribution can be seen in table 2. however, the actual number of hotel establishments in ternopil oblast is greater, because many existing hotels are not officially put into operation and are not covered by the statistical reporting. daily rent services are provided using residential apartments and private hostels in the cities; most of them are unregistered in the state register. tab. 2. accommodation facilities in ternopil oblast 2014 2015 number of accommodation facilities 70 70 hotels and their analogues 58 58 hotels 39 39 motels 2 2 hostels for visitors 1 1 tourist centres, mountain shelters, student summer camps and other places for temporary accommodation 16 16 special arrangement of vehicles (units) 12 12 resorts 3 3 children’s sanatoria 5 5 health centres 2 2 recreation, leisure other institutions (excluding hostels) 2 2 health institutions of 1-2 days stay – – capacity of hotels and their analogues (people) 2361 2361 the number of suits in hotel and their analogues (apartments) 1158 1158 source: програма…, 2016. 60 oresta bordun, liubov althaim the demand for hotel services in many cities and districts of ternopil oblast often far exceeds supply of the existing accommodation facilities. acute fluctuations in demand for hotels occur during religious pilgrimages to the pilgrimage centres of the oblast i.e. zarvanytsia, (terebovlia district) and pochaiv (kremenets district). they also lack the capacity of accommodation establishments. many local tourist centres (kryvche, kasperivtsi, nyrkiv) have no hotel enterprises at all, while demand for their services here in the summer is quite high. according to the central statistical office accommodation facilities received 138 435 people in ternopil oblast during 2015. most people used the services of accommodation in hotels 78 103 people, including 7 079 foreigners. however, at present there is insufficient number of budget hotels and hostels. the majority of travellers and active tourists are people with low incomes and, oddly enough, most hotel companies in our oblast are not focused on them. ternopil oblast lacks quite popular among young people low-cost hostels, network of which is actively developing in other oblasts of ukraine. demand for hotel services in parts of the oblast can be seen in fig. 2. as we can see the largest number of people used the services of accommodation in ternopil (38 320) kremenets (22 739) borshchiv (3 381) and zalishchyky (3 532) districts. 58 hotels and similar accommodation facilities provided accommodation service in the oblast in 2015. among them 14 legal entities and 44 individuals, including 39 hotels, two motels, one hostel for visitors and 16 other places for temporary residence (http://www.te.ukrstat.gov.ua). the most common are hotels (67.2% of total), the others are tourist centres, summer camps, seasonal recreation centres, summer houses, which offer a full range of services for reception, accommodation, food and other temporary accommodation facilities. in 2015, there were 12 specialized accommodation facilities (0.6% of all specialized accommodation facilities in ukraine), including 8 health centres (including 5 for children), 2 health and recreation resorts and two recreation centres. there are health resorts centres: “zbruch” and “medobory” (now not operating) in gusyatin, ophthalmologic centre “barvinok” in village manyuky of zborivsky district, “veselka” in the village petrykiv of ternopil region and “medobory” in village konopkivka of terebovlia district. the largest share of people, which improved health, is 38б2% of the total and they did it in health resort centre “medobory” (village konopkivka, terebovlia district), 15,6% used “barvinok” (village mshanets of zboriv area) and 13% — in the sanatorium “veselka” (village petrykiv of ternopil district). public catering establishments. the restaurant business of ternopil oblast includes: restaurants, bars, cafes, canteens, pizzerias and catering services. according to the central statistical office at the beginning of 2015 there were about 1 800 institutions of restaurant industry in the ternopil oblast. most fig. 2. number of people received in ternopil oblast during 2015 source: статистичний..., 2016. tourist flows in ternopil oblast current state and development prospects 61 of these facilities are concentrated in ternopil; they count about 300 objects. a large number of catering companies is also in buchach, kremenets and terebovlia district. least-developed restaurant business is located in pidgaetskyi and monastyrysk districts; there operate about two dozen in each. most of public catering establishments operate in urban areas, but in recent years, they increase their number and in rural areas. first of all many restaurant establishments are opened in the villages located on the roads of international and national importance. in recent years the segment of specialized and conceptual institutions is actively developing in the market of restaurant services. such enterprises are also being opened in ternopil oblast. for example, there are beer pubs in ternopil and nearby village mykulyntsi of terebovlia district. brewery restaurant “kovcheg” is the first environmental project in ternopil. it is partially secured with its own energy sources and designed using technologies applicable for old buildings. the museum restaurant “stariy mlyn” in ternopil is an original conceptual restaurant that surprises visitors not only with delicious food, but also with the unique interior. modern restaurants and ukrainian cuisine cafes, besides of ternopil, have been opened in towns and villages of zbarazh, zborivsk, husyatyn, kremenets, terebovlia and ternopil districts. the issue of quality of products offered to travellers, individuals and organized tourist groups is very important. large facilities of the hotel and restaurant business with a wide range of products and services have regular suppliers of raw materials, but most of catering establishments use products of their own farms and of surrounding villages. entertainment facilities. leisure facilities play an important role in creating tourist product for the young and older generation in the field of tourism market. tourist route becomes more interesting when it is combined with sightseeing leisure activities. however, most entertainment centres are located in ternopil, some are in kremenets, zalishchyky, husyatyn and borshchiv districts. please note that entertainment is an integral part of any tourism product. entertainment facilities in the ternopil oblast and the services they offer are presented in table 3. tab. 3. entertainment facilities in ternopil oblast name entertainment venue type of institution location institution services provided by the institution alligator hotel and recreation complex ternopil water park, fitness, aerobics, swimming pool, spa centre podolyany shopping and entertainment centre ternopil ice centre, bowling alley, cinema, billiards, etc. somiy okean shopping and entertainment centre ternopil indoor water park stara pidkova riding club ternopil horseback riding eskimos shopping and entertainment centre ternopil ice centre maxim entertainment complex ternopil karaoke pub, nightclub, restaurant allure, riverpool, bomb night clubs ternopil disco, karaoke symphony  hotel & entertainment complex urban type settlement husiatyn, husiatyn district hotel, restaurant orysya tourist & hotel complex village oryshkivtsi, husiatyn district the hotel sauna, health-care complex “rapa” zatyshok tourist & hotel complex borschiv, borshchiv district restaurant, hotel, sauna, museum tavern panorama hotel & entertainment complex kremenets, kremenets district hotel, restaurant and entertainment complex, bicycle rental, bobsleigh track mishin city tourist & hotel complex village dobrovlyany, zalishchyky district hotel, restaurant oasis hotel complex zalischyky, zalishchyky district sauna, pool, gym source: own studies. 62 oresta bordun, liubov althaim development of tourism market in the region is prevented with insufficient infrastructure, poor quality of tourist services and undeveloped domestic tourism products. tourist industry in the oblast is in need of additional advertising. particular attention should be paid to creating a positive image of the oblast on the tourism market of the state and europe; pr-technology should be used as well. the development of infrastructure and creation of favourable conditions for business tourism will have synergistic effect: jobs, pumping the regional budget, business activity stimulation and investment attraction. 3. analysis of tourist legislation in ternopil oblast regulation in the tourism sphere is done by the verkhovna rada of ukraine, the cabinet of ministers of ukraine, central executive authorities, which provide public policy in tourism and resorts, local state administration, local authorities and other bodies within their jurisdiction. representative bodies of local self-government – village, town, city and regional councils under their authority approve local tourism development program; make local budgets fund the development of local tourism development programs; instruct its executive bodies to fund local programs for tourism development at the expense of the local budget; take measures to encourage business entities engaged in the provision of travel services (закон…, 1995 p. 181). tourism is an important factor of regional development as the principal amount of cultural heritage is concentrated in the small historic centres, which include almost all regional centres. policies aimed at developing tourism in the regions are an integral part of public policy in the tourism sector and must meet all of the criteria. today ukraine has approved on august 1, 2013 the state programme of tourism and resorts for the period until 2022 (концепція…, 2013). the program has its aim to create conditions to increase the flow of tourists a competitive tourism infrastructure developed through rational use of tourism resources, which will increase revenues to budgets of all levels from the proceedings of tourism (концепція..., 2013). in order to achieve a new level of tourism and recreation industry ternopil oblast has created a competitive tourist product, which is called “the program of tourism development in the ternopil oblast in 2016–2020 years” (програма…, 2016). it notes that ternopil oblast is a recognized tourist region positioned in ukraine and abroad thanks to well-known brands such as “dniester canyon”, “castles of ternopil”, “caves of ternopil oblast”, “borshchiv embroidery”, “buchach and pinsel”, “chervonohorod natural landmark” “picturesque berezhany”, “medobory, tovtry invite”. it also defines priority directions of tourism development in the oblast based on existing tourism resources (програма….., 2016). the program aims at: • development and implementation at the national and international markets competitive tourism product able to meet the travel needs of area residents and their guests; • creation and development of logistics and modern tourism infrastructure, of favourable conditions for investment, of efficient use of natural, historical and cultural tourist and recreational potential and ensuring conditions for full functioning of tourism; • improvement of the quality and range of tourist services, expansion of the network of tourist and excursion routes, the implementation of a system of advertisement and information activities, support for inbound and domestic tourism, improvement of the staffing of the tourism industry in the region. this program is intended to be a conceptual basis for the development of tourism in the oblast as a highly profitable sector of the economy. taking into account the magnitude of the task, the program needs a strong funding from the state, regional, district and city budgets as well as extra-budgetary funds. the program is designed in accordance with current law and takes into account the basic requirements of laws of ukraine “on tourism” (закон україни «про туризм» від 15.09.1995), “on foreign economic activity” (закон україни «про зовнішньоекономічну діяльність» від 16.04.1991), “on local government in ukraine” (закон україни «про місцеве самоврядування в україні» від 21.05.1997), “on innovation activity” (закон україни «про інноваційну діяльність» від 04.07.2002), “on local state administrations” (закон україни «про місцеві державні адміністрації» закон від 09.04.1999) and other legal acts governing tourism and recreation industry in ukraine. while program development there were defined following strategic objectives: strategic goal a. formation of regional tourism product of high-quality. strategic goal b. formation of an effective system of promoting tourism brand and integrated regional tourism product on the ukrainian and international markets. tourist flows in ternopil oblast current state and development prospects 63 strategic goal c. formation of a favourable environment for business and investment processes in the tourism and recreation industry in the region. 4. conclusions most of tourist enterprises of the ternopil oblast are orientated on outbound tourism and offer foreign tours. however the domestic tourist product becomes more popular lately. touristic agencies develop excursion routes in territory of area, but very often tourists are beware of their services due to the shortage of information and advertisement. advancement of tourist product of the ternopil region both on the internal and international markets of tourist services is impossible without the proper advertisement providing. it is a very effective constituent of the system of marketing communications and it needs considerable charges. introduction of pr marketing communications in a tourist sphere is necessary pre-condition of it’s development. not less important are objectivity of information, lightness of access and operationability of it receipt, plenitude, evidentness, possibility of interactive registration of orders and payment of services. an advertisement must answer the requirements of the tourist business, and also individual necessities of tourists and sightseers. references головне управління статистики у тернопільській області, тернопіль, http://www.te.ukrstat.gov.ua, [10.03.2017] закон україни «про зовнішньоекономічну діяльність» від 16.04.1991 № 959-xii, 1991, чинний, поточна редакція від 03.01.2017, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/959-12 [10.03.2017] закон україни «про інноваційну діяльність» від 04.07.2002 № 40-iv, 2002, чинний, поточна редакція від 05.12.2012, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/40-15 [10.03.2017] закон україни «про місцеве самоврядування в україні» від 21.05.1997 № 280/97-вр, 1997, чинний, поточна редакція від 01.01.2017, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/280/97 [10.03.2017] закон україни «про місцеві державні адміністрації» закон від 09.04.1999 № 586-xiv, 1999, чинний, поточна редакція від 01.05.2016, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/586-14 [10.03.2017] закон україни «про туризм» від 15.09.1995 № 324/95-вр, 1995, чинний, поточна редакція від 11.02.2015, http:// zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/324/95 [10.03.2017] концепція державної цільової програми розвитку туризму та курортів на період до 2022 року від 1 серпня 2013 р. № 638-р, 2013, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua [10.03.2017] кузик с., 2010, теоретичні проблеми туризму: суспільногеографічний підхід, видавничий центр лну ім. івана франка, львів. програма розвитку туризму в тернопільській області на 2016–2020 роки, 2016, тернопільська обласна державна адміністрація, тернопіль, http://www.oda.te.gov.ua [10.03.2017] статистичний бюлетень «туристична діяльність у тернопільській області», 2016, головне управління статистики у тернопільській області, тернопіль. russia and ukraine are not only neighbours. they are connected by centuries-old common historical past. both peoples emerged from the same ethnic basis; most of them share a common confession and similar traditions. most contemporary ukrainian territories have been parts of russian empire. in the 1617th centuries its borders were gradually moved to the south, toward the black sea, as far as the russian state could ensure the security of these lands from the incursions of crimean tatars supported by turks, so the area of ukrainians’ settlement was expanding too. these new lands were also settled by russians which created the unique culture. the ethnic structure of population became even more mixed in the period of industrialisation, since the late 19th century, particularly in cities. in the soviet union, ukraine was the second union republic by the demographic and economic potential (after the rsfsr). in this period when their territory and other basic geographical have been definitively shaped. in february 1954 crimea, formerly a part of the rsfsr, was passed to ukraine by the decision of the soviet leadership. since late 1991, ukraine is a sovereign state. both russia and ukraine survived a similar transition crisis which involved a deep restructuring of their economy and radical social transformations. particularly difficult was the situation of ukraine because unlike russia it has no important oil and gas deposits and the main branches of its industry were often incorporated into production chains embracing neighbouring new independent states, particularly russia, which were broken in the conditions of market economy. their separation of russia and ukraine provoked a number of crises in bilateral relations) and the conflicts of economic and political interests. however, the countries kept human and economic contacts. in 2014 the annexation of crimea after the coup in kyiv and the large-scale military conflict in eastern ukraine, the formation of donetsk and luhansk people’s republics have radically changed the nature of russian-ukrainian relations, provoked a significant decline in bilateral trade, transformed the boundaries between the countries into important economic and socio-cultural barriers, and deeply affected people’s identity. the situation in ukraine provoked an unprecedented crisis in the relations between the west (primarily the us and the european union) and the russian federation. it became a major factor of russia’s “turn” to the east and had a big influence on the eurasian economic union which has been recently created under the auspices of russia. still, journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(2), 5–6 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.009.8215 introduction alexander druzhinin (1) (2), vladimir kolosov (3) (1) north-caucasus research institute of economic and social problems, south federal university, sadovaya 105, 344006, rostov-on-don, russia, (2) immanuel kant baltic federal university, nevsky 14, 236022 kaliningrad, russia, e-mail: alexdru9@gmail.com (3) centre of geopolitical studies institute of geography of russian academy of sciences, staromonetnyi per. 29, moscow 119017, russia, e-mail: vladimirkolossov@gmail.com citation druzhinin a., kolosov v., 2018, introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 5–6. 6 alexander druzhinin, vladimir kolosov sociological surveys show that russian citizens keep a good attitude towards ukrainians. we suggest to our readers a special issue of “journal of geography, politics and society” which includes a collection of articles by russian scholars from different cities (geographers, economists, sociologists) devoted to the conceptualization of the post-soviet trends in russian-ukrainian relations and current important issues. as guest editors, we would like to thank the contributors and to express our gratitude to the distinguished polish colleague, dr. tomasz michalski, editor-in-chief of the journal for the initiative to prepare such issue. alexander druzhinin, vladimir kolosov 1. introduction providing optimal nutrition status is one of the most pressing problems facing humanity in the fight against the epidemic of non-infectious diseases, which include diseases of the digestive system (dds) (товма, єгоров, 2013; чепелевська, 2015). the armed forces of ukraine (the armed forces) are an integral part of the state infrastructure and society, carry out specific military and combat tasks, the main of which in recent years is the carrying out of the antiterrorist operation (ato) in the eastern region of the country. the conditions of the ato are characterized by the negative influence of environmental factors, among which the leading place is the influence of analysis of the actual nutrition status of servicemen of the transcarpathian region who participated in the ato and its influence on the development of the pathology of the digestive organs ivan m. rogach (1), angelika o. keretsman (2), ivan i. gadzhega (3) (1) department of social medicine and hygiene, faculty of medicine, uzhhorod national university, pl. narodna 3, 88000 uzhhorod ukraine, e-mail: kaf-socmed@uzhnu.edu.ua (corresponding author) (2) department of social medicine and hygiene, faculty of medicine, uzhhorod national university, pl. narodna 3, 88000 uzhhorod ukraine, e-mail: angelika.keretsman@gmail.com (3) department of social medicine and hygiene, faculty of medicine, uzhhorod national university, pl. narodna 3, 88000 uzhhorod ukraine, e-mail: ivan.gadzhega@uzhnu.edu.ua citation rogach m., keretsman a.o., gadzhega i.i., 2018, analysis of the actual nutrition status of servicemen of the transcarpathian region who participated in the ato and its influence on the development of the pathology of the digestive organs, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 25–30. abstract the influence of lifestyle factors, namely rationality of nutrition, on the health of the population is the strongest relative to other risk factors that may be manifested by the development and complication of diseases of the digestive system. this gain is particularly gaining in people who work in conditions of increased stress, physical and psychological overload. to such a contingent of population are also servicemen of the armed forces of ukraine. this article describes the results of the analysis of the actual state of nutrition of the transcarpathian military who participated in the anti-terrorist operation in the eastern region of ukraine. key words antiterrorist operation, servicemen, nutrition, diseases of the digestive system, ukraine, transcarpathian region. received: 20 april 2018 accepted: 18 june 2018 published: 31 august 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 25–30 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.019.8788 26 ivan m. rogach, angelika o. keretsman, ivan i. gadzhega the military on the organism of the climatologic – weather conditions of the terrain, constant stress, lack of sleep, moral and physical exhaustion of the organism, and in particular, inappropriate nutrition. the organization of high-grade and high-quality nutrition of troops is one of the most important tasks of the medical service. military food is based on scientific data taking into account the specifics of the service of the soldiers of the armed forces. it contributes to the improvement of the health and physical development of servicemen, increases the body’s resistance to various physical and mental stresses and, to a large extent, positively affects the combat readiness of troops (товма, єгоров, 2013). during the last decade, increased stress-relatedness at the mass population level has become an inevitable companion of socio-economic and social changes in the state and, naturally, has caused a change in the level and composition of the class of pathology of the digestive organs (hop), including among military personnel (швец, сластин, 2015). as a result, at the end of 2014, almost half of the number of mobilized servicemen who arrived from the troops to the treatment and care facilities for preexamination and the passing of the military medical commission was found unfit for military service with different degrees of restriction. in dismissed from the service for health, the leading place was occupied by stress disorders, cardiovascular diseases, diseases of the nervous system, diseases of the digestive system and only in the fifth place – wounded and injured (щорічна…, 2017). considering that nutrition is one of the main risk factors for the development of non-infectious diseases, including hop, we consider it expedient to conduct an analysis of the actual state of nutrition of military personnel in the context of the ato, which determined the purpose and objectives of the study. the purpose of this article is to study and analyze the problem issues of supplying foodstuffs to the armed forces of ukraine, to determine the directions and ways of its improvement. in order to study the actual nutrition status of servicemen in the area of ato, a questionnaire survey of respondents was conducted on the basis of the sociological method. method and system approach, bibliosemantic and analytical methods are used to analyze problem issues. 2. research results according to modern scientific views, nutrition standards in terms of nutritional physiology should meet the following basic requirements: • to contain in certain ratios the required amount of nutrients (proteins, fats, carbohydrates, vitamins, minerals) sufficient to ensure the growth and functioning of the organism; • provide the body with a certain amount of energy (in potential), sufficient to maintain processes and replenish various energy costs; • consist of a variety of products that are well absorbed and allow you to prepare delicious and high-calorie foods from them; • provide hot meals in accordance with the requirements of the diet. at the same time, the standards of nutrition must meet the economic requirements of the country, the conditions and nature of the work laid. in accordance with the physiological requirements of the body in the diet, proteins should provide 12– 15% of the total energy value of the daily ration, fats – up to 30%, and carbohydrates up to 55–58%. the standards of nutrition for the personnel of the armed forces are developed taking into account the basic requirements of the theory of balanced nutrition and the specific conditions and nature of military labor. each norm is intended for a certain contingent of servicemen and the total energy value should ensure the replenishment of the energy consumption of this contingent. the cabinet of ministers of ukraine by resolution no. 252 of april 29, 2015 (про внесення…, 2015), introduced changes to the standards of nutrition of servicemen of the armed forces and other military formations. for those who participate in the ato, changes have been made to the standards of nutrition for expanding the range of food, that is, the troops will receive a «flight rate». that is, such as for a combat pilot who performs tasks with overload. calorie content of servicemen involved in the execution of combat missions, brought to 4800 kilocalories (kkal) norms of supply of bottled water – up to three liters per day. also, in the area of ato, starting in april 2014, the system of food security is being expanded. today, in cooperation with the center for development and support of material support of the armed forces of ukraine, new dry solips were developed according to nato standards, which provided assistance in their development (про внесення…, 2016). in order to study the actual state of nutrition of servicemen in the area of ato, we conducted a questionnaire survey among military personnel of the military unit a1556 of uzhhorod, zakarpattia oblast, where at the time of the study there was a personnel of 128 separate mountain infantry brigades (ogpb). this unit actively participated in the ato during the last 3 years. the last transfer of the brigade to the analysis of the actual nutrition status of servicemen of the transcarpathian region… 27 combat zone was in june 2017, and the withdrawal from the zone ato – in december 2017. in total, 166 people took part in the survey: 147 military personnel and 19 military medical personnel (doctors and nurses). respondents answered the questions regarding the quantitative and qualitative composition of the daily diet. in particular, which particular groups of products are part of the dishes they used to be in the ato zone. as the results of statistical data show, the overwhelming majority of servicemen note the lack of daily food rations of fresh food – vegetables and fruits, meat and bakery products, and, in particular, dairy products (fig. 1). thus, the overwhelming majority of respondents (86.3%) noted a very low level of availability of fresh vegetables and fruits. moreover, 66.1% of them stressed that the lion’s share of cases when they still received vegetables and fruits was due to the initiative, organization and honesty of volunteer organizations. at the same time, 82.7% of respondents noted the very low level of supply of meat products (fresh and frozen). after all, even an updated dry solder contains canned meat. at the same time, 93.1% of respondents stress that even when the products described above came to the location of the unit, their number did not allow to adequately distribute this stock for a long period. the main reason for this situation was the lack of cooling devices in the specific conditions of the unit’s dislocation, especially in the summer. in the case of dried meat products, 74.9% of the polled soldiers also indicated a low level of security. a small proportion of servicemen (4.2%), who responded to the lack of milk and dairy products, was explained by the fact that the majority of respondents did not answer the questionnaire on the issues related to the provision of this group of food products. in the verbal conversation, the answer to the answer was explained by the almost complete absence of the products of this group in their diets of daily nutrition. we also received similar replies regarding fresh bread and bakery products. based on the data obtained from the questionnaires, only 7.8% of respondents indicated their lack of, other respondents did not answer this question by commenting on the fact that in most cases they bought them at their own expense in order to use the maximum-fresh products of this groups daily. the questionnaire also included questions about the sources of food in their subdivision. in particular, what proportion of the availability of the given resource of their brigade belongs to the ministry of the armed forces of ukraine, volunteer organizations, local residents, and the proportion of products purchased at their own expense (fig. 2). as can be seen from the results presented, the vast majority of food products (47.1%) come into the zone of combat operations precisely because of the initiative, perseverance and sustainability of volunteer organizations. the armed forces, financed by the state, according to military personnel, provide only 32.8% of food revenues in the area of combat operations. 19.9% of all food products soldiers are looking for themselves and buy at their own fig. 1. the level of lack of major food groups source: own research (results of the questionnaire). 28 ivan m. rogach, angelika o. keretsman, ivan i. gadzhega expense. and only in 0.2% of cases the aid comes from the inhabitants who stayed in the territory of carrying out of hostilities. we also conducted an analysis of responses regarding manifestations of gastroenterological diseases among this contingent of military personnel. 100% of respondents emphasize the functional manifestations of gastroenterological diseases: cramping, burping, bloating, discomfort in the abdominal cavity, violations of physiological items, heartburn, and the like. in 76.5% of the military (127 people), two weeks later, pain was noted: 59.0% in the stomach, 48.5% in the left hypochondrium, 89.0% in the intestine. all respondents indicated that the occurrence of pain and functional gastroenterological disorders were due to food intake. thus, in 76.0% of cases, these manifestations were associated with inappropriate nutrition, when, due to the impossibility of three meals a day (during the intensification of hostilities), significant interruptions were observed between meals. 89.2% of the functional manifestations of the servicemen are associated with overstress and stress, in 56.4% of cases – with the “admission” of the main set of food products, and 83.0% – with a lack of fresh food. summarizing the results of the conducted analysis, one can state the lack of daily food rations of servicemen who were in the zone of combat operations ato, fresh food. the current standard field ration of a ukrainian soldier does not spoil the diversity. daily dry rations include a breakfast, lunch and dinner menu. breakfast may consist of canned pastas, pearl porridge with beef and cooked bread. the lunch menu consists of a canned “tourist’s breakfast” and the same gastronomic cookie. finally, for dinner, buckwheat porridge with beef (again in canned food), grate again, tea and honey in stickers can be served. in addition to the “dry ration”, tea and coffee in bags, sugar and hygienic napkins are both dry and wet. in this set of products, hunger can be frozen, but the appearance of canned food looks rather unpopular. in western armies, the main dishes for soldiers consist of natural food. the daily diet of the us army soldier meal ready to eat (mre) includes 24 dishes, one of which is vegetarian. the soldier will know what exactly he should eat when he opens a package with dry rations. food can be warmed up with a special chemical that should be diluted with water so that it begins to heat. in addition to food in rations include all sorts of things, such as matches, packing with chewing gum, a tube with a sauce, as well as a set of sanitary napkins. soldiers of british army soldiers and soldiers of the german bundeswehr get packed in a box of thick foil (in such boxes, sometimes feeding to aircraft passengers). at the same time, the compilers of british and german rations respect the national traditions, investing in the solder the necessary products: the british even in the trenches love to drink tea, and german sausage is known all over the world (ветров, 2016). by the decree of the cabinet of ministers dated october 3, 2016, no. 696 «on amendments to the nutrition standards of servicemen of the armed forces and other military forces» (про внесення…, 2016), the standards of nutrition have been improved, provision is made for an occasional (breakfast, lunch, dinner) issue of a new norm taking into account the amount of rations necessary to provide troops a full meal. thanks to the new packaging technologies (retort pack), ready-made dishes can be obtained without pre-heat treatment, which will ensure compactness and ease of use during use. in the area of ato in the norm, it is assumed to use fig. 2. the share of sources of food income to military units in the zone of ato source: own research (results of the questionnaire). analysis of the actual nutrition status of servicemen of the transcarpathian region… 29 a nonflammable heater of food, which will allow servicemen to independently provide themselves with hot meals without exposing their location to the enemy. however, according to one of the information services (бірюков, 2014) in an interview with the advisor to the president of ukraine, only 23 hryvnias are allocated per day for one soldier of the armed forces, even taking into account the «airspace norm» in the zone of the ato’s activity. at the same time, the state only reimburses the cost of the food service, and the purchase of food lies with commercial enterprises that have entered into an agreement to feed the armed forces (their 4). that is, all parts of the armed forces in the ato zone have the same norm, serviced by the same companies from the same warehouses. at the same time, they are not in a position to provide cooking in the field, the food is cooked by the military themselves (chefs). thus, the main problem in the ato environment is the provision of a variety of food products and the delivery of basic, in particular, fresh food. after all, on the distant fronts delivery of food products is carried out by the military units themselves. in such a situation, in the future, even after returning to military units outside the ato’s area, conditions for a better quality and adequate nutrition that corresponds to daily needs and norms should allow the soldier’s contingent to display manifestations of violations of the digestive system. after all, it is well-known that the main factors of the development of pathologies of the dds class are irrational and inferior nutrition, stress, bad habits, untimely diagnosis and treatment of gastroenterological diseases, etc. (чепелевська, 2015). at the heart of the preventive measures of the onset and progression of hop is not only the reduction of the stress level of the given contingent population, but also the provision of its high quality, fresh products in the optimum quantity for the purpose of preparation of useful and nutritious food. 3. conclusions the result of this work it was concluded: 1. the importance and relevance of the problem studied requires further study in order to improve the management and distribution of food in medical units of the armed forces of ukraine. the first step can be the participation of medical staff in the organization of providing medical formations with food in order to prevent the onset and complication of diseases of the gastrointestinal tract. 2. the modern provision of military forces with products, their delivery and preparation systems are based on soviet principles with some modern additions, and therefore requires full revision and improvement in connection with changes in production technologies in the food industry, as well as changes in the health of the population of ukraine at the present stage. 3. a detailed analysis of the existing experience of providing food to troops in the ato zone indicates the existence of a number of unresolved problems of their actual nutrition: the lack of fresh food products, their storage conditions and their diversity, due to the peculiarities of delivery to military units. 4. in such a situation, state priority measures should be to ensure a mechanism for the delivery of food products and the quality of their preparation, if necessary, by participating in the process of providing the servicemen of the relevant specialists, in particular representatives of logistics enterprises and cooks. 5. based on the analysis, the influence of the actual nutritional status of servicemen in the zone of ato on the risk of development of gastroenterological diseases was revealed. in particular, it has been proven that prolonged irrational nutrition (inadequate and inadequate nutrition for its qualitative and quantitative composition) poses a risk of developing pathologies of the class of digestive organs, even upon returning to normal nutritional conditions. 6. provision of food for servicemen needs further improvement of its normative and legal regulation concerning the mechanism of delivery of food to the zone of ato, in particular during active military operations. 7. in the interests of strengthening the state’s defense capability and maintaining the health of servicemen, when developing a nutrition policy, it is necessary to rely on the existing mechanisms for providing food for servicemen in combat situations, taking into account international experience and experience gained during the ato. references бірюков ю., 2014, як годують військових у зоні атo. розповідь волонтера, ipress.ua, http://ipress.ua/ljlive/ y a k _ g o d u y u t _ v i y s k o v y h _ u _ z o n i _ a t o _ r o z p o v i d _ volontera_99946.html [23.03.2018]. ветров i., 2016, чим пайок солдатів зсу відрізняється від закордонних: західна кухня в українській армії, сьогодні, https://ukr.segodnya.ua/ukraine/chem-paek-soldat30 ivan m. rogach, angelika o. keretsman, ivan i. gadzhega vsu-otlichaetsya-ot-zagranichnyh-zapadnaya-kuhnya-vukrainskoy-armii-688146.html [23.03.2018]. про внесення змін до норм харчування військовослужбовців збройних сил та інших військових формувань, 2015, постанова кабінету міністрів україни № 252 від 29 квітня 2015 р., сьогодні, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/252-2015-п [21.03.2018]. про внесення змін до норм харчування військовослужбовців збройних сил та інших військових формувань, 2016, постанова кабінету міністрів україни № 696 від 3 жовтня 2016 р., сьогодні, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/696-2016-п [23.03.2018]. товма л.ф., єгоров д.в., 2013, вдосконалення продовольчого забезпечення військових частин та підрозділів внутрішніх військ в умовах комплектування військовослужбовцями військової служби за контрактом, збірник наукових праць харківського університету повітряних сил, 4(37), 229–232. чепелевська л.а., 2015, сучасні проблеми смертності населення україни від хвороб органів травлення, україна. здоров’я нації, 1(33), 15–21. швец о.в., сластин в.в., 2015, безопасность и качество пищевых продуктов в контексте охраны общественного здоровья, східноєвропейський журнал громадського здоров’я, 1(22), 20–25. щорічна доповідь про стан здоров’я населення, санітарно-епідемічну ситуацію та результати діяльності системи охорони здоров’я україни, 2016 рік, 2017, моз україни, ду «уісд моз україни», київ. 1. introduction in recent decades, an increasing attention of scientists, politicians, businessmen, investors, tourists and even of various events organizations is focused on attractiveness of cities. the cities interrelate in the global urban system and, according to their specific performance in different sectors and activities as well as spheres of influence (regional, national, international), compete for employment, investments, new technologies, tourists, national projects, preferential policies etc. the most attractive cities are characterized by high investment attraction, the abundance and development of business, highly qualified professionals, developed economic, social and engineering infrastructure, providing maximal satisfaction of various economic subjects groups’ demands, positive net migration, high quality of life and journal of geography, politics and society 2016, 6(2), 45–58 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.16.012.5457 critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions: the viewpoints of businessmen and youth jurgita bruneckienė (1), ineta zykienė (2), vytautas stankevičius (3) (1) school of economics and business, kaunas university of technology, gedimino str. 50, 44249 kaunas, lithuania, e-mail: jurgita.bruneckiene@ktu.lt (corresponding author) (2) school of economics and business, kaunas university of technology, gedimino str. 50, 44249 kaunas, lithuania, e-mail: ineta.zykiene@ktu.lt (3) school of economics and business, kaunas university of technology, gedimino str. 50, 44249 kaunas, lithuania, e-mail: vytautas.stankevicius@ktu.lt citation bruneckienė j., zykienė i., stankevičius v., 2016, critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions: the viewpoints of businessmen and youth, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 45–58. abstract rapid development of the global dimension of globalization and information technology has determined the phenomenon when not only countries, but also cities began to compete with one another. for this reason, the city is facing the problem of attractiveness for investment, business and living. it is the identification and development of city attractiveness factors, their incorporation in the city’s strategic development level and their publicity that is focused on the desire to attract new investors, create favorable conditions for entrepreneurs to develop business in the city, maintain or recover/attract young and highly qualified specialists to the city and thus create as a higher quality of life and economic welfare. this article analyzes the main factors of city attractiveness which were identified by businessmen and young people from lithuania-poland cross-border cities alytus and ełk. key words city attractiveness, cross-border region, lithuania, poland. 46 jurgita bruneckienė, ineta zykienė, vytautas stankevičius the level of satisfaction of the population and business. it is obvious that the city cannot be attractive in all areas and for all groups of economic subjects. therefore, the cities, in order to build their competitive with other cities strategies and to manage their attractiveness, first of all specify the target group of the city, which is most important for ensuring its long-term socio-economic growth and competitiveness, identify, develop and create city attractiveness factors, integrate them into the city’s strategic development level and actively disseminate them (spread a message to appropriate groups of economic subjects). only a purposeful and targeted formation and publicity of city attractiveness factors will ensure the city’s competitive position against the competing subjects and objects and create or maintain the appropriate economic and social well-being of the city. it is generally recognized that the country’s border cities, remote from the central regions of the country, are often economically ‘distant’ and are territories of a slower development. scientists refer to different causes of border regions socio-economic disparities at the national level, ranging from geographic and physiographic characteristics, historical and cultural differences (both within the country and between different countries), language differences between different countries, the lack of coordination of the development process, ending with transportation costs, at the timely introduction of innovation and technological development level, political and institutional factors, and even the specifics of the same cross-border area (which determines the restrictions on personal freedom and economic activity (construction, road infrastructure development, entrepreneurship, new business development)). despite certain peculiarities of the development of economic activity and specificity of the cross-border region (which can be approached as an opportunity or an obstacle for business development and investment), every city wants to be attractive for entrepreneurs, investors, population or other target groups, and thus achieve a high quality of life and welfare in it. this article aims to identify the main city attractiveness factors for business, investment and youth to live in lithuania-poland cross border region and to provide strategic recommendation for increasing the attractiveness of alytus and ełk cities. methods of the research: systemic, comparative and logical scientific literature analysis; empirical research employing systemic analysis of data from questionnaire study and focus group. 2. the city attractiveness concept and its importance in urban economic development and competitiveness in the scientific literature, the concept of city attractiveness is often associated with urban economic development and competitiveness. scientists agree that city attractiveness is an important precondition of competitiveness. l. litavniece (2014) treats the attractiveness factors as the city’s strengths, essential for ensuring a long-term development. the author also treats city attractiveness as a way to strengthen the city’s competitive advantage. j.p.  lemaire and m. viassone (2015) distinguish substantial differences between the city attractiveness and competitiveness concepts, arguing that attractiveness occurs from the visitor’s perspective, whereas competitiveness causes interest of the interested parties of the target areas (managers, entrepreneurs). v.  snieska, i.  zykiene (2011) emphasize that attractiveness includes resources available in a specific area: natural, social and economic, also the ability to maintain them and attract the new ones. attractiveness is perceived as a continuous process, during which the created result contributes to the formation of further result. the authors emphasize that city attractiveness is not fixed, it is constantly changing, as it is influenced by various factors: technological progress, the intensity of competition between other cities, political changes, etc. the scientific literature (litavniece, 2014; litavniece, ežmale, 2012; snieska, zykiene, 2011; sinkiene, kromalcas, 2010) often emphasizes that city attractiveness is associated with attracting the following main target groups from less attractive areas or their maintenance in the current city: (a) population, concerned about the quality of the living environment, access to education, employment and availability of motivating remuneration; (b) entrepreneurs, concerned about the attractive business development environment, skilled and available labor force and acceptable business results; (c) investors, concerned about the attractive conditions for investment, and acceptable investment results; (d) tourists who wish to familiarize and visit the best-known places in the area and make use of various tourist services. the maintenance /attraction of each target group generates added value to the area: the attraction of population increases consumption, improves the demographic characteristics and creates a community, the attraction of investors promotes business development and economic value creation, reduces unemployment, and increases visibility of the area, attraction of tourists generates revenues in the tourism sector, which contributes to the local financial critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions… 47 well-being. j. sinkiene and s. kromalcas (2010) argue that a city equally attractive to all target groups does not exist, and probably this cannot be achieved. the authors draw attention that while shaping the strategies on city attractiveness, it is important first to define satisfying which target group needs will be focused on. summarizing the factors of city attractiveness, it is possible to divide them into two groups: basic and distinctive. basic factors are essential and often identical factors for all cities: e.g. cleanliness of the living environment, adequate supply of housing, good transport connections. exclusive factors of city attractiveness involve specific buildings in the city character to particular cities, objects or the available natural resources, which determine the status of the city at the national or international level (e.g., the capital city, sea resorts), etc. the scientific literature (kilijoniene, bruneckiene, 2012; sabonienė, zykiene, 2012; van gorp, 2009) also distinguishes the specifics of cross-border region cities and their inherent attractiveness aspects: (a) investment – for taking advantage of the benefits offered by the state border, e.g. favorable exchange rate in neighboring countries, etc.; (b) tourist – cultural exchanges in cross-border regions often determine a certain uniqueness of tourist resources, unusual for domestic regions located inside the country; the possibility to visit several countries during a single trip, etc.; (c) social – the mobile labor force of the cross-border regions can often take an opportunity to work in the country where working conditions are more favorable. analyzing attractiveness of the future city, researchers (boes et al., 2015; el segundo, 2014; sinkiene et al., 2014), define the city as smart, digital, intellectual or ubiquitous. summarizing the research it can be said that the city of the future will be based on information technology; urban development will be based on the sustainable and responsible development principles, and economic value will be created based on smart specialization. future city’s services will be oriented to create the best quality services to the residents and guests. in the future, cities will compete for innovation, creativity, skilled human capital, because only the harmony in these areas will allow creating attractive products and services to the city. according to v.  snieska and i.  zykiene (2014), the attractive future city will have the following characteristics: (a) easily accessible internationally: a developed range of transport infrastructure within and outside the city; (b) economically viable, with a notable competitive business sector; (c) innovative: modern technology implemented in the infrastructure, business and social sectors; (d) safe: ensuring public and information safety in the city; (e) healthy: the city population live in ecological environment and promote a healthy lifestyle; (f ) interesting: natural and tourist attractions of the city are attractive to the city guests; (g) comfortable: public services ensure comfortable living conditions; (h) distinguished by a responsible community: the population is actively involved in all activities. characteristics of an attractive city found in the scientific literature suggest that the economic and social attractiveness of the city is closely interrelated: the environment favorable for business development and investment attracts investment, enhances business development which directly contributes to the city’s economic well-being, enhancing the city’s attractiveness to live and work and making the city the center of attraction (glebova et al., 2015). g.  staskeviciute and r. tamosiuniene (2010) the attractiveness for business and the ability to attract a skilled workforce and investors assign to the key indicators characterizing competitiveness at the macro level. a city attractive for investment is seen as a city with a formed investment–friendly environment and availability of a variety of resources (natural, human, intellectual, etc.) aimed at achieving the economic result of investment empowerment. investment–friendly environment is characterized by an effective institutional activity, optimal tax system and developed infrastructure. according to j.  sinkiene and s.  kromalcas (2010), territorial attractiveness of the investment climate is positively affected by the following external factors: geographical location, ensuring good accessibility, favorable land prices, local taxes and regulatory requirements and a sufficient and quality supply of labor supply. scientists (glebova et al., 2015; kinda, 2013) have additionally distinguished the market access and competitive operational costs. investors are seeking for a relatively cheaper, geographically attractive, with adequate resources (logistics, human resources, market size, economic and political stability and operating costs) region or city. it is important to note that potential investors are also concerned about the city’s public infrastructure, the quality of public services, the quality of the living environment (a developed social infrastructure, environmental policy, etc.). the survey on the baltic states investors (investment…, 2011) includes a statement that the main factors attracting investors in the baltic countries include the following: geographic location, stability, security, preferential taxes and benefits, access to responsible people in public institutions, low labor costs. the conducted analysis of scientific literature has justified that the city’s economic development is directly linked, however directly dependent on human 48 jurgita bruneckienė, ineta zykienė, vytautas stankevičius resources, living in or visiting the city. attractive to live, study and work conditions in the city attract, maintain and form the city’s labor market essential for economic development, and the labor market which satisfies the needs of business is a factor for enhancing business and investment. young people are one of the most sensitive and most mobile subjects of the labor market. young people make an important proportion of the city and the whole country’s population. these are the people who create and will create their own city and the country’s future. an increasing number of young people acquire a wide range of education, they want to establish their own business or are seeking a career in various areas, by their skills and education they are not lacking behind young people of other european countries, they are mobile and innovative. the youth of today face various economic and social problems that lead to high levels of (qualified) youth’s unemployment, declining motivation for work and increasing processes of emigration, thus creating a negative synergistic effect. individual lithuanian and polish cities, as cities of other countries which lack developed businesses that could offer a sufficient number of jobs for young people, are particularly exposed to young people’s emigration and not returning to their native city, which is a big loss for the city’s economy. according to the ‘eurostat’ data, the unemployment rate among young people’s less than 25 years of age in the eu countries in november 2014 amounted to the average of 21.9 percent. during this period, the lithuanian youth unemployment rate was 15.5 per cent and it is by 6.4 per cent points lower than the eu average, while in poland – 23.2 per cent and it is by 1.3 per cent higher than the eu average. so, the problem of alytus and ełk cities, as an attractive city for young people to work and live, is a particularly urgent problem of today and will persist in the nearest future. one of the main reserves to increase the employment of young people is raising the level of youth entrepreneurship (establishing new businesses, selfemployment and entrepreneurship). however, as noted in the “eu youth work policy implementation report” (2009), only a very small proportion of young people are involved in their own business. in the eu countries self-employment reached only 4 percent of the total number of 15-24 year-old people. referring to the survey on business success factors, only less than 15 per cent of all entrepreneurs are under 30 years of age (zidonis, 2012). the importance of youth entrepreneurship emerges in the following areas: • youth entrepreneurship brings back the isolated and marginalized groups of young people to the epicenter of economic activities and has a direct positive effect on youth employment. secondly, new small enterprises established by young people ‘revive’ local communities, raise the level of competitiveness and thus increase possibilities for the consumer choice. • having acquired the necessary skills and abilities, young entrepreneurs prove to be extremely receptive and creative when discovering and exploiting business opportunities, new market trends and responding to the challenges of globalization. it is widely recognized that young entrepreneurs can create new alternatives for the organization of work and new ways of technology use. • youth businesses provide young people with the feeling of ‘sense’ and ‘belonging to a community’, that helps to shape a young person’s identity and facilitates his better adaptation in the society. promotion and democratization of entrepreneurship provides the youth with a future of their own (zidonis, 2012; balderjahn, 2004). there are specific entrepreneurial issues related to the entrepreneurs’ age: they have neither initial financial nor social capital, they are not trusted, and they lack both the business development and general life experience. thus, through implementation of various projects and initiatives aimed at the development of entrepreneurship among young people, it is possible to increase the level of youth entrepreneurship and solve a whole set of young people’s socio-economic problems, and at the same time to keep or return the youth and young professionals to the city, thus contributing to the solution of economic and social problems in the city and ensuring the development of well-being in the future. 3. research methodology justifying the relevance of a low alytus and ełk cities’ attractiveness for investment and the lack of business conditions to ensure a competitive business development of both individual people and the economic well-being of the city was based on the economic competitiveness assessment results of 2008–2013 of the polish–lithuanian cross-border region cities (alytus, marijampole (lithuania) and ełk, białystok (poland)), comprehensively represented in the authors’ other articles (bruneckiene, sinkiene, 2015). in addition, studies show that in order to highlight and strengthen individual cities strengths and weaknesses and improve the city’s economic competitiveness, it is important to analyze not only the official statistics or dynamics of changes in statistics critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions… 49 data, but also in detail to identify the key reasons for this. given the fact that during the assessment of economic competitiveness it has been established that one of the reasons that have led to a low alytus and ełk competitive position among other cities – insufficient investment attractiveness of the city and business conditions, ensuring a competitive business development in the city, a qualitative study of the problem was conducted. the investors and entrepreneurs questionnaire study was aimed to find out: • the opinion of alytus and ełk cities’ companies and investors about investment attractiveness of their city and opportunities to develop economic cooperation with the relevant polish or lithuanian companies. • the opinion of companies and investors who did not select alytus and ełk cities for investment about the investment attractiveness of alytus and ełk cities. the survey was conducted by applying direct and indirect methods. the investigator (researcher) visited the respondents and by communicating directly with them questioned them under a prearranged questionnaire form and recorded their answers in the questionnaire. to the other respondents the questionnaire was sent by e-mail, asking them to return the completed form by e-mail as well. in addition, the researcher communicated with the respondent on the phone before and after the questionnaire was sent. both for direct and indirect survey methods the same questionnaire was used. two different questionnaires were prepared for different target groups: a questionnaire for companies operating in alytus or ełk; a questionnaire for companies which decided not to invest in alytus or ełk; questionnaires for the survey on lithuanian companies have been prepared in the lithuanian language, for poland – in polish. 100 questionnaires were sent to the lithuanian and polish respondents, including: 45 companies operating in alytus city and 15 companies which have not chosen alytus city, 35 companies operating in ełk and 5 companies which have not chosen ełk city. 42 questionnaires received from the companies operating in alytus, 13 – from the companies which have not chosen alytus city, 31 – from the companies operating in ełk and 3 questionnaires from the companies which have not invested in ełk. the questionnaire survey was conducted in july-september of 2014. youth survey was aimed at finding out characteristics of a city attractive for young people to live and work, distinguish the current alytus and ełk cities unattractive characteristics and incentives to improve the city’s attractiveness proposed by the youth. youth survey was conducted through the project ‘business without borders’ implemented by alytus and ełk municipal administrations (project no. spf/1.2/pl-e/01). during the project two youth leader camps were arranged in alytus and ełk cities. the camp was attended and comments were made by thirty 17-23 year-old people from alytus and thirty from ełk, studying in senior classes of high school and the first year at university or college. young people have been questioned by applying the focus group methodology, where a group discussion was led by two moderators. in total 4 focus groups of 15 people were formed (2 lithuanian and 2 polish groups (such an arrangement was aimed at eliminating the language barrier and ensuring knowledge of the topic under discussion). the duration of each focus group was 1 hour. 4. factors, forming alytus and ełk cities’ attractiveness for business and investment the conducted survey of alytus and ełk cities’ entrepreneurs revealed that both the lithuanian and polish entrepreneurs have selected a particular location for business and investment based on similar factors, corresponding to the assumptions outlined in the scientific literature. some of the most important investment attracting factors in alytus and ełk cities involved the established alytus industrial park and ełk science and technology park investment package and the availability of public services for business. these factors were named by 75 per cent of the surveyed investors from the lithuanian and by 65 per cent of investors from the polish side: the infrastructure fully accessible to the production and business, tax relief, local municipality’s interest in attracting new investors (66.67 per cent of the surveyed entrepreneurs from alytus a rapid clearance in the municipality assigned to the factors that strongly influenced their decision, while 40.39 per cent of ełk entrepreneurs – flexibility of the municipality with regard to their requirements). for the entrepreneurs of alytus and ełk cities the investment attractiveness of city was strengthened by the activities carried out by major and the national and internationally well-known business leaders in the city: this factor was named by 56.5 per cent of alytus entrepreneurs under survey and by 55.5 per cent of the ełk city respondents. both lithuanian and polish entrepreneurs to the factors that strongly affected their decision (respectively 58.33 and 45.33 per cent of the respondents) assigned cheaper labor force than in other major 50 jurgita bruneckienė, ineta zykienė, vytautas stankevičius cities of the country. about 50 per cent of alytus and ełk cities’ entrepreneurs named personal contacts as a very important argument for the choice on local investment. entrepreneurs of both cities indicated that their decision was significantly affected by attractive real estate purchase/lease prices (approved by 66.67 per cent of the surveyed alytus entrepreneurs and 40 per cent of ełk entrepreneurs). the cities’ close location to foreign markets is also considered as one of the key factors accounting in particular for their choice of alytus city. investors and entrepreneurs from lithuania emphasized that alytus is located close to the polish border, and considered this as an economic springboard to western europe. accordingly, investors and entrepreneurs from the polish side emphasized that ełk city is located close to the lithuanian border, where a close co-operation with lithuanian businessmen opens the way to eastern europe and russia. not all factors distinguished by the entrepreneurs coincide, which proves the specificity of attractiveness of the cities from different countries for business and investment. the sufficiency of skilled labor force was assigned to very important factors by 75 percent of alytus entrepreneurs and low competition in the market – by 33.33 percent. to a large extent these arguments are related to the specifics of the city: alytus has a well-developed science and education infrastructure, supplying the labor market with a qualified labor force of working-age. low competition shows the potential of unexploited market in alytus. factors that slightly influenced the choice of alytus and ełk cities involve lower than the average land and property taxes and awareness of the city internationally. alytus businessmen also stated that their decision to invest in alytus was slightly influenced by the development of the road infrastructure and convenient access to major metropolitan areas. accordingly, prompt clearance in the municipality had a slight effect on the ełk entrepreneurs’ decision to invest in ełk. systematized survey information is presented in table 1, where two groups of factors affecting attractiveness are distinguished. the first group involves strategic factors that can be considered as the instruments of alytus and ełk cities’ investment attractiveness and positioning the business environment. these factors have been identified as the main and most attractive factors for investors and entrepreneurs. they directly create the city’s well-being, investment attractiveness and business environment, and at the same time, through the measures facilitating an efficient use of the basic factors, form the city’s competitiveness. the second group of factors basic factors; these are the factors having a slight effect on the decision to start a business or invest in alytus and ełk cities. they usually involve factors that are common to all similar territories competing with each other, so they do tab. 1. factors, forming attractiveness of alytus and ełk cities for business and investment factors respondent distribution alytus city ełk city strategic the functioning alytus industrial park and ełk science and technology park 75 percent 65 percent attractive real estate purchase / lease prices 66.67 percent 40 percent activities of major business leaders carried out in the city 56.5 percent 55.5 percent inexpensive labor force 58.33 percent 45.33 percent proximity of foreign markets 58 per cent 40.1 percent personal contacts 50 percent 48.39 percent sufficiency of skilled labor force 75 percent operative administration of solemnities in the municipality 66.67 percent low competition in the market 33.33 percent municipalities flexibility given to the investor’s requirements 40.39 percent basic factors lower than the average land and real estate taxes 63.64 percent 61.29 percent awareness of the city internationally 50 per cent 60 percent well-developed road infrastructure 58.33 percent convenient access to major metropolitan areas 50 percent operative administration of solemnities in the municipality 35.48 percent source: own studies. critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions… 51 not have any special exclusivity in terms of attracting investment in alytus or ełk cities; however, they matter when making a decision to invest in principle. the factors are set out in the table in the order of their significance. summarizing the survey results, it is possible to conclude that alytus and ełk cities’ attractiveness for investment and business was majorly determined by the following factors: establishment of a public business support infrastructure, including the investment conditions package, and attractive labor and real property acquisition costs. investors were impressed by a convenient geographic location of the cities, close to foreign markets, as well as by the fact of major companies operating in the city. it should be noted that for the start-up of a business, the efficiency of municipalities’ work with investors and personal contacts have been distinguished among important factors as well. the entrepreneurs who did not invest in alytus and ełk described the factors, which would encourage them to transfer their business respectively to alytus or ełk city: (a) formation of the attractive for investment image of the city (alytus and ełk); (b) a clear and stable business development strategy in alytus and ełk cities; (c) fast approval of decisions in the city council; (d) co-financing of the youth entrepreneurship promotional projects; (e) co-financing of creation of new jobs; (f ) partial reimbursement of youth employment related costs. 5. factors, forming alytus and ełk cities’ attractiveness for young people to live and work analysis of ideas expressed by both lithuanian and polish young people reveals similar trends and the same order of assessment priority for different areas of the city (stated in the order of significance): 1. learning conditions: (a) the established opportunities to learn (to acquire higher or vocational education) with interesting, attractive and modern programs of studies; (b) educational institutions provide conditions to undergo practice in business companies. 2. working conditions: (a) great job choice (large companies operate in the city and provide many different jobs); (b) attractive for young people remuneration (corresponding to their qualifications and experience); (c) flexible employers who are concerned about youth employment, not afraid to train the employee themselves and provide training to the employee; (d) unexploited market to start a new business. 3. living conditions: (a) budget accommodation: a possibility to have your own or rent housing; (b) a well-functioning public transport (running both in the evenings and at weekends); (c) easy access to the city from outside; (d) good layout of urban space for parking; (e) safe city both day and night; (f ) the city is characterized by developed information technology (wi-fi available in the city); (g) abundance of places for spending leisure time (night clubs, movies, the zoo, circus, the established network of internationally wellknown companies or branches in the city (mcdonald’s, kfc)); (h) promotion of the active lifestyle options: natural areas in or around the city (lakes, rivers, forests, mountains); sport facilities (sports clubs, bike trails, sports fields); (i) abundance of cultural and sporting events (the possibility of meeting famous people) (young people are especially attracted by foreign musical groups arrival in the city); (j) the city promoting the organic industry and nature protection policy; (k) the city with its own history (old town, historic objects); (l) modern architecture in the city; (m) abundance of shopping centers, providing shopping opportunities; (n) urban environment designed for children and residents with physical disabilities (playgrounds, clean parks, environment adapted for disabled children); (o) friendly, active and tolerant population; (p) a developed health care infrastructure. 4. political situation: (a) local authority’s focus (strategy and measures) on young families; (b) the city actively cooperates with other domestic and foreign cities. 5. the image of the city: the city known among young people throughout the country. summarizing the factors distinguished by the youth and attractive for them to live and work, it can be said that the essential characteristics are directly related to the factors which have an immediate affect or affect them every day: learning, work and life. most attractive characteristics that attract or keep young people in the city are the following learning conditions and career opportunities (earnings). living conditions are classified as less important factors. if the city is attractive to live, but it lacks learning and career opportunities and does not provide opportunities for higher remuneration, such a city is considered less attractive. thus, young people consider the city attractive if, compared to other cities; it provides advantageous learning and career opportunities and prospects. meanwhile the areas that are more general and do not apply to the respondents directly (the political situation and image of the city) have been identified much less frequently. characteristics 52 jurgita bruneckienė, ineta zykienė, vytautas stankevičius tab. 2. characteristics of unattractiveness of alytus and ełk for young people to live and work and measures characteristics of the current unattractiveness of the city proposed city attractiveness enhancing measures alytus ełk alytus ełk characteristics of learning environment unsatisfied demand for places to undergo practice promote cooperation between lithuanian universities and colleges and enterprises of alytus for undergoing practice insufficiently interesting, attractive and modern university studies programs for ełk universities, in cooperation with the polish universities-leaders and ełk enterprises to develop modern studies curricula. improve the qualifications of teachers, attract new professionals to educational institutions characteristics of working environment lack of jobs for young people to encourage businesses to admit students for undergoing practice; improve the city’s investment and business environment by attracting new businesses or promoting the establishment of new or development of the existing businesses; encourage the youth’s self-employment, by providing preferential conditions to be granted a credit to start a business; setting up more places for the refresher or retraining courses organized by the labor exchange. characteristics of living environment small and decreasing number of young people in the city create cooperation and excellence networks among young people and companies in the city inefficiently functioning public transport (rarely running and crowded transport, the lack of buses at a later time of the day) optimize the flow of public transport post a precise schedule in the bus stops there is no city ‘card’ establish a single student ticket for the whole urban transport lack of car parking spaces for the local self-government authorities and non-governmental organizations to seek for sponsors prepare and implement eu funded projects there is no airport there is no electric train going to korsze lobbying activities of the local government are focused on building an airport in or near ełk city and functioning of the electric train wifi is not available in public areas install the free wireless internet access in public areas. intolerant community towards foreigners implementation of events for developing public tolerance unenlightened streets, broken video cameras, few city officials on duty fix the city’s streets lighting, repair video cameras. ensure safety by patrolling officers many abandoned buildings and areas (e.g. the central station) for the local self-government authorities and nongovernmental organizations to seek for sponsors prepare and implement the eu funded projects improve the investment and business environment of the city, attracting new businesses or promoting the establishment of new or development of the existing businesses insufficient number of night clubs and dancing floors improve the city’s investment and business environment, attracting new businesses or promoting the establishment of new or development of the existing businesseslack of spaces for youth gatherings in the city (ramps for bicycles, etc.) there is no network of internationally renowned companies or branches (mcdonald’s, kfc) insufficient number of shopping centers where you could buy fashionable clothes critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions… 53 of a city attractive for young people do not differ between lithuanian and polish population. current characteristics of unattractiveness of alytus and ełk cities identified by the research, as well as the proposed measures for increasing the city’s attractiveness are presented in table 2. 6. the importance of co-operation between cross-border region cities for enhancing city attractiveness the problems of individual social – economic groups (investors, entrepreneurs and the youth) which are closely interrelated will be solved slower, unless comprehensively approached, because these groups often overlap or have similar problems. modern companies have realized that their own economic objectives and the company’s competitiveness are directly related to the city’s economic and social welfare and progress. therefore, the business leaders are increasingly making their competitive strategies based on the shared value concept, when the company’s competitiveness is combined with the city’s development. only the company’s strategic actions focused on not only improving the company’s competitiveness but also on the creation of the city’s welfare, in the long term perspective ensures and generates extra benefit to the company from the city’s welfare. thus, implementation of the share value concept principles within the city’s economic value creation process would ensure a long-term economic competitiveness of both the companies and the city, and this is a mandatory condition for ensuring the city’s economic growth. thus, an active co-operation between the municipality, entrepreneurs and young people has become not an issue of fashion but rather a necessity and an essential condition for maintaining the city’s competitiveness and welfare. moreover, international economic cooperation undoubtedly benefits to both cities of different countries, so the establishment, development and maintenance of economic relations is an important, and, under the context of globalization, essential condition for increasing competitiveness and welfare of the city. although the research has revealed that financial or ‘hard’ (i.e. infrastructural) measures are most valued in alytus and ełk cities, but the most recent analysis of scientific literature suggests that the development of cooperation, experience and competencies networking, partial assumption of business risks is becoming an important factor in making a decision to start and build a business. so, the implementation of new, innovative and smart ideas and initiatives would promote business development both in alytus and ełk (see table 3, introducing additionally recommended business development measures, not included in the strategic urban development plans). characteristics of the current unattractiveness of the city proposed city attractiveness enhancing measures alytus ełk alytus ełk the urban environment is not designed for children and young people with physical disabilities for the local self-government authorities and non-governmental organizations to seek for sponsors. prepare and implement eu funded projects characteristics of political environment little support for youth self-employment dissemination of information on the markets outside the local market. creation of spaces designed for promoting youth entrepreneurship visibility and promotion little awareness of the city among young people all over the country develop the image of the city designed for young people (e.g. ełk – a city of events and walking); organize more cultural (e.g. in ełk – hip-hop) and sports (athletics, soccer) events; organize and more widely advertise cultural events taking place in the city areas; widely advertise urban spaces (e.g. in ełk – ‘promenade’ (a space designed for walking)); clean up the water bodies and adjust them to the public needs; in ełk – to renovate the city castle and use it for the city’s image. source: made by authors. 54 jurgita bruneckienė, ineta zykienė, vytautas stankevičius tab. 3. recommended measures for enhancing the city‘s attractiveness for investment and business goal objective measure recommended additional measures to c re at e fa vo ra b le c o n d it io n s to s ta rt a n d d ev el o p a b u si n es s, to p ro m o te e n tr ep re n eu rs h ip in t h e p o p u la ti o n im p ro ve in fo rm at io n al b u si n es s en vi ro n m en t an d d ev el o p t h e p ro vi si o n o f p u b lic s er vi ce s organization of business conditions analysis and research analysis of the city entrepreneurs’ needs, identifying weaknesses in the business environment and development opportunities. provision of consulting and training services placing the basic tips for business start-up and development on the city’s municipal website. development and empowerment of the section ‘ask an expert or specialist advice’ on the municipal website. implementation of business development promotional projects setting the calendar and the map of the planned for implementation and implemented business development projects. in cr ea se t h e co m p et it iv en es s o f b u si n es s co m p an ie s development of business and scientific partnerships and networks establishment and empowerment of the city competencies network: – identification of the city’s competences; – formation and institutionalization of the city competence network; – creation of technological environment, ensuring functioning of the city competence network. creation of clusters implementation of the cooperate through competing culture: dissemination of the benefits of clustering; organization of events on clustering problems. organization of business exhibitions and missions, aimed to increase exports of goods and services targeted organization of conferences/forums and exhibitions ‘economic cooperation between alytus and ełk’. organization of bilateral missions to and from poland and meetings with polish entrepreneurs. pr o m o te e n tr ep re n eu rs h ip a n d e m p lo ym en t o f t h e p o p u la ti o n subsidizing the start-up costs of new enterprises establishing the monitoring on effectiveness of the use of support and long term liabilities. subsidizing the creation of new jobs increasing the supply of premises, customized for business development: – arrangement of abandoned and the municipality-owned buildings and their rental to business; provision of support to startup businesses establishment of preferential conditions for young people to start a business: – partial reimbursement of interest to young people who have started a new business; – establishment of startup support groups, ready to share their experience and help the started business; – formation of the business ideas bank; specialist training and retraining identification of the forgotten professions and creation of apprenticeship programs. education of entrepreneurial generation: – establishment of a system for identification of entrepreneurial children and their education for entrepreneurship. critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions… 55 alytus and ełk cities are located in lithuania and poland cross-border region, apart from each other within a small distance. in addition, there is an established bilateral (between lithuania and poland) economic confidence at both countries’ level, a close and long-term co-operation between alytus and ełk municipalities, a variety and abundance of business companies create excellent conditions for the development of economic cooperation which will generate mutual benefit not only to individual business companies but to the cross-border region cities and the entire socio-economic development as well. incentives on enhancing economic cooperation between alytus and ełk cities are presented in table 4. the positioning of the city means creation of a clear and desired image of the city in the mind of the target group, which distinguishes it from the other cities-competitors. in the global competitive arena positioning starts at the national level, so the city, in order to remain attractive and known, has to re-think self-presenting messages in order to highlight the characteristics of the city that are attractive to the target groups. in particular, it is important to formulate the directional image of the city concept, because if failing to do this properly, there is still a possibility to miss the overall functional, urban, stylistic, aesthetic unity, thus forming an eclectic, organically heterogeneous face of the city. alytus and ełk cities, implementing joint marketing communications, should commonly convey such messages on the lithuanian-polish cross-border region cities’ investment, business and living environment, which build confidence in the cities. the evaluation of the survey results resulted in distinguishing the following essential factors, forming alytus and ełk cities’ attractiveness for investment and business that positively represent the city: • in the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities, well-known national and global companies operate, and their positive feedback is the best reliable recommendation for the cross-border region cities. • in the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities, alytus industrial park and ełk science and technology park are functioning, which, for the developed infrastructure, ensure a fast start of new activities. • alytus industrial park and ełk science and technology park, a significant long-term land and property tax relief is applied. • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities have operating industrial-commercial areas, with a developed engineering infrastructure and a number of already operating companies. goal objective measure recommended additional measures to im p ro ve t h e im ag e o f t h e ci ty a n d c re at e at tr ac ti ve c o n d it io n s fo r i n ve st m en t to c re at e fa vo ra b le c o n d it io n s to a tt ra ct p ri va te in ve st m en t improvement of the city’s industrial and commercial zones infrastructure improving the quality of road infrastructure: – setting the map of the city roads quality; improving the internet accessibility and speed: – establishment of wi-fi zones in the city; improving the quality of electricity supply; – creating conditions for the establishment of powerful transformer stations; – increasing the city’s lighting. construction of residential buildings for highly skilled specialists establishing conditions of providing highly skilled specialists with accommodation: – temporary grant of social apartments for skilled specialists to accommodate and settle in the city; – establishing conditions of land acquisition for skilled specialists. im p ro vi n g t h e im ag e o f t h e ci ty , en co u ra g in g in ve st m en t an d in co m in g to u ri sm formation and improvement of the image of the city creation of entrepreneurial spirit in the city: – arranging the alley of the city‘s deserving residents in the city center and appointing an individual nominal tile to them or arranging the ‚honorary park‘ where the city‘s deserving people or enterprises could plant a nominal tree and take care of the tree; – publication of the city‘s calendar and installation of social advertisements on the city streets, with the city’s deserving individuals’ thoughts, attitudes or the companies’ vision/strategic slogans; – establishment of the section ‘business city’ on the municipal website, where the success stories, the city entrepreneurs’ thoughts, reflections and suggestions could be constantly presented. source: made by authors. 56 jurgita bruneckienė, ineta zykienė, vytautas stankevičius • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities have attractive real estate purchase/lease and labor force prices. • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities have a sufficient variety of skilled workers. • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities are located close to the belarusian and russian markets; these cities can be used as an economic springboard to western and eastern europe. • in the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities, labor drain is relatively low, posing no threat to the staff turnover: a relatively small emigration. • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities have built the ongoing development of businessoriented policies. • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities have enabled the scientific and business partnerships: a developed science and education infrastructure, implementation of international exchanges. • the lithuania–poland cross-border region cities promote the employment of young people. 7. summing up the specificity of the concept of city attractiveness, analyzed in the article, reflects an increasingly growing interest of the scientists, practitioners, tab. 4. incentives on enhancing economic cooperation between alytus and ełk cities measure incentives organizing analysis and research on business conditions 1. development of a common alytus and ełk cities’ information platform, which would involve entrepreneurs and schools – so that the entrepreneurs could get involved in business training activities in schools so that not only the theory is taught. established working groups which would meet regularly and analyze the efficiency of ongoing actions. 2. implementation and publicity of the joint alytus and ełk municipal activities, where the entrepreneurs could meet, communicate and exchange contacts. development of the business and science partnership networks 1. continue discussions on the purposefulness and possibilities of recovering the polish-lithuanian chamber of commerce activities. organization of business exhibitions and missions, in order to increase exports of goods and services 1. organization of specialized exhibitions and missions in alytus and ełk cities. specialist training and retraining 1. development of common leaders and talent education programs. 2. organization of the joint labor/professional youth camps 3. extension of functioning of the social entrepreneurship school in putinų gymnasium by involving the other schools in the city of alytus and ełk. 4. placement of good business practices in the virtual environment and their use in the learning process in schools. formation and improvement of the image of the cities 1. implementation of joint marketing communications actions. source: made by authors. policymakers, businessmen, investors and society in this problematic and justifies the relevance and timeliness of the topic. the most attractive cities are characterized by high investment attraction, the abundance and development of business, highly qualified professionals, developed economic, social and engineering infrastructure, providing maximal satisfaction of various economic subjects groups’ demands, positive net migration, high quality of life and the level of satisfaction of the population and business. it is obvious that the city cannot be attractive in all areas and for all groups of economic subjects. only a purposeful and targeted formation and publicity of city attractiveness factors will ensure the city’s competitive position against the competing cities and create or maintain the appropriate wellbeing of the city. the city which will be attractive in future stands out with certain features: is easily internationally accessible, economically livable, innovative, safe, and healthy, interesting for city visitors, comfortable to live, has responsible society. alytus and ełk cities’ attractiveness for investment and business was majorly determined by the following factors: establishment of a public business support infrastructure, including the investment conditions package, and attractive labor and real property acquisition costs. investors were impressed by a convenient geographic location of the cities, critical analysis of city attractiveness factors in lithuania – poland cross-border regions… 57 close to foreign markets, as well as by the fact of major companies operating in the city. it should be noted that for the start-up of a business, the efficiency of municipalities’ work with investors and personal contacts have been distinguished among important factors as well. the survey of alytus and ełk cities’ entrepreneurs showed that personal contacts are a very important factor affecting the decision to invest in a particular city. the economic development of a city depends on availability of human resources, who live or visit the city. youth activities in a city play a big role for city vitality and for this reason cities are oriented to attract young people to study, work and create business. conditions for working, studying and living attract and retain labor market necessary for economic development and investment promotion. by losing its young people, the city loses its potential and the possible added value, as well as efforts and resources invested in a young person’s education. therefore, it is important to monitor and try to manage the emigration of young people from the city both from the social and economic perspective. the entrepreneurs who did not invest in alytus and ełk described the factors, which would encourage them to transfer their business respectively to alytus or ełk city: (a) formation of the attractive for investment image of the city (alytus and ełk); (b) a clear and stable business development strategy in alytus and ełk cities; (c) fast approval of decisions in the city council; (d) co-financing of the youth entrepreneurship promotional projects; (e) co-financing of creation of new jobs; (f ) partial reimbursement of youth employment related costs. the survey of alytus and ełk cities’ youth show, that the most 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conference economics and management 2014, icem-2014, 23-25 april 2014, riga, latvia, 156, 247–251. staskevičiūtė g., tamošiūnienė r., 2010, šalies konkurencingumas: sampratos raida laiko perspektyvoje, verslas: teorija ir praktika, 11(2), 159–167. van  gorp  n., 2009, backwardness of border regions, tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie, 100(3), 358–364. židonis ž., 2012, es struktūrinių fondų parama lietuvos jaunimo verslumui skatinti: valstybės intervencijos logikos rekonstrukcija, viesoji politika ir administravimas – public policy and administration, 11(2), 222–234. journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(2), 10–19 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.2.02 similarities and differences in changing nps market brought by new regulatory approaches in selected eastern and central european states with mostly focus on poland and latvia artur malczewski (1), agnese zīle-veisberga (2) (1) national bureau for drug prevention, reitox focal point emcdda, 52/54 dereniowa, 02-776 warsaw, poland,. e-mail: artur.malczewski@kbpn.gov.pl (corresponding author) (2) agnese zile-veisberga sectoral policy department ministry of the interior of latvia, čiekurkalna 1.līnija 1 k-2, riga, latvia , e-mail: agnese.veisberga@iem.gov.lv citation malczewski a., zīle-veisberga a., 2019, similarities and differences in changing nps market brought by new regulatory approaches in selected eastern and central european states with mostly focus on poland and latvia, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(2), 10–19. abstract the main objective of the paper is to explain, compare and conclude the effect on the new psychoactive substances (nps) market brought by new and innovative responses to regulate the nps (mostly between 2010 and 2014) in estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland, the czech republic, hungary, and romania. countries where nps problem reached the peak, the traditional response or simply substance scheduling did not work. since the nps do not fall under market regulations, also the response to the problem was innovative stepping out of the existing system (for example, temporary prohibition in poland, latvia). moreover, a political and social pressure has been a factor to speed up the development of new regulations, sometime affecting the quality. seemingly harsh sanctions and immediate reaction are main elements to close the nps street shops. meanwhile this approach hasn’t caused a step back for chemical industry or science. still is open question if national regulations against nps market are fully enough. nps market reacts very quickly for changing and only very strong and fast reaction from the institutional level seems to be effectiveness. although nps market differs in each country, study shows that harsh sanctions such as criminal liability and immediate reaction significantly decrease the availability of nps, and thus contribute in decreasing acute health problems and prevalence. it was observed that at the time when stricter measure came into force, hospital emergencies were increased (poland, romania and in same extent latvia). key words new psychoactive substances, law on new psychoactive substances, post-communist countries received: 11 may 2018 accepted: 04 april 2019 published: 30 june 2019 similarities and differences in changing nps market… 11 1. introduction the study focuses on various regulatory approaches introduced (mostly between 2010 and 2014) in estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland, czech republic, hungary, and romania, with a more in-depth research on situations in latvia and poland. the main objective is to explain, compare and conclude the effect on the new psychoactive substances (nps) market brought by new and innovative responses to regulate the nps. the first result of the study was presented on the annual conference of international society for the study of drug policy on may 2016 in sydney. the subject of the study is the nps market – a place where seller meets buyer and exchange their goods. to acknowledge the changes in the nps market, different qualitative and quantitative data were used, e.g. nps seizure data, data on hospital emergencies, surveys on prevalence, and interviews with field experts on demand and supply side and policy makers. nps became a major problem for the drug control systems as the nps market was developing rapidly and offering increasingly more new substances. the number of nps identified under the eu early warning system increased from 41 (in 2010) to 101 (in 2014) (european…, 2015 monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, 2015). moreover, the nps sold might have contained other substances than the ones reported by the vendors (brunt et al., 2017). nearly all the countries which encountered the nps problem introduced regulations aimed to delegalize such substances (new psychoactive…, 2016european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction and eurojust, 2016), except new zealand, which legalized them for a short time (rychert, wilkins, 2015). traditionally, the control systems which delegalized individual substances proved to be too slow and ineffective. consequently, solutions intended to delegalize the whole groups of substances were introduced. 2. poland nps were present on the polish drug scene before 2008. as soon as by the end of 2008, 40 nps shops were operational in the centres of major polish cities offering an increasingly wide range of psychoactive products. nps were arriving rapidly including synthetic cannabinoids, mephedrone and later on a whole range of cathinone-type substances. businessmen who established the biggest legal highs retail chains promoted the trade on a franchise. nps shops started springing up exponentially and soon, by the end of 2010, 1 300 nps shops (brick and mortar) were up and running across the country. the sale was conducted through both online and offline distribution channels with two arguably largest smart shop chains, i.e. ‘dopalacze.com’ (booster) and “smartshop’, being the main competitors. the first battery of actions resulted in controlling over 40 new substances under two consecutive amendments of the drug law in 2009–2010. the second amended came into force on 25 august 2010 and resulted in controlling mephedrone and mainly synthetic cannabinoids. on 4 march 2011, the polish parliament adopted another amendment of the drug law, which controlled 23 new agents discovered in new psychoactive substances. listing nps is necessary, yet it is a passive and reactive way of responding to new threats. the general sanitary inspector (gsi) was the direct operation against nps street shops, which finally led to the closure or liquidation thereof on october 2010. the crackdown on nps shops was necessitated by the growing number of nps-related hospitalizations as well as media reports of several acute poisonings or even deaths caused by nps. as of 3 october 2010, officers of the gsi accompanied by police officers closed down all nps shops and nps wholesale businesses (total of over 1300). a direct consequence of the operation was the elimination of nps street shops. according to the 2008 youth survey, nps had ever been used by 4% while in 2010 this rate stood at 11%. the youth survey results from 2013 indicate a drop in the prevalence of nps (5%) (malczewski, 2014). the 2013 measurement shows that the closure of the nps shops had an impact on the consumption rates. the date from others surveys are presented on the figure 1. a different type of modification was introduced by the amendment of 8 october 2010 of the drug law and act on state sanitary inspection (ssi). it introduced a definition of nps as a substitute drug. such a drug is to be understood as any substances used instead of drug or for the same purposes as a drug, whose manufacture and placing on the market is not governed by separate regulations. in order to halt the further development of the supply of substitute drugs onto the polish market, legislators focused on banning the manufacture of nps and their introduction to trade. whoever engages in the abovementioned activity shall be subject to a financial penalty between 5000 and 250 000 euro. at the same time, the enforcement of the regulations was vested in the ssi. according to the amended law, in the event of a reasonable suspicion that a product poses a threat to human health or life the ssi has the right to withdraw the product from the market for 12 artur malczewski, agnese zīle-veisberga the period necessary to conduct an assessment and research into its safety. it is worth noting that the new law clearly targets individuals and entities introducing nps to trade and not the consumers, who are treated more as victims of such practices. the closure of street nps shops gave rise to a fall in the nps-related poisonings in 2011. according to the espad surveys of 2011 and 2015 the percentage of nps users remained at the same level of 10% ltp (age group 15–16) (sierosławski, 2015). the nps market started growing in 2012. in the end of 2012 the number of nps-related poisonings started growing. the highest number was recorded in july 2015 (1966 cases) following the 1 july control of 114 nps, which had been sold at high street shops and online (table 1). similarly to previous years, nps sellers made efforts to get ready for the criminalization. one of major nps distributors had their products lab tested to ready for new law changing. in previous years the controlled nps were replaced with new ones. in the case of stimulant nps the control of bzp in 2009 resulted in the arrival of mephedrone. after mephedrone was criminalized, mdpv started to be sold and then all kinds of synthetic cathinones such as penthedrone or alpha-pvp (malczewski, 2015a). it is worth noting that similarly to 2010, when in october following the closure of nps shops the highest number of nps-related poisonings was recorded in july 2015, in the subsequent months the number of poisonings began to fall (table 1). the most prevalent nps in 2014 were cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids: 3-mmc; ethcathinone; penthedrone; 3,4-dmmc; alpha-pvp; brephedrone; pmppp as well as ur-144 and am-2201 (malczewski, sałustowicz, 2015). the data on the table 2 showed that polish nps market seems to be one of the biggest in the region. in 2014, there were 100 smart shops operational in poland (malczewski, 2015b). the shops are being inspected and closed down by the ssi. however, some owners reopen them under 10.5 10 3.1 1.4 1.3 3.5 11.4 5.2 10 12 36 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 espad (students 15-16 years old) lifetime prevalance ltp gps (15-64 years old) ltp cbos & kbpn youth survey (students 18-19 years old) ltp survey among needles and syringes clients (last month prevalance, mephedrone) fig. 1. prevalence of nps in general population and sub-populations, 2008–2015 (%) source: several sources was used for prepared figure: espad: sierosławski, 2015; gps: malczewski, misiurek, 2015; cbos & kbpn youth survey: malczewski, 2015a; survey among needles and syringes clients: malczewski, 2016. tab. 1. medical interventions due to overdoses of nps in poland (number of cases) year i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii 2010 30 70 123 258 60 21 2011 15 9 14 16 12 6 12 5 13 20 26 25 2012 24 14 20 16 17 20 17 19 33 36 41 42 2013 41 35 60 80 79 88 76 98 110 137 136 139 2014 138 157 165 178 183 176 230 201 252 258 286 289 2015 291 283 526 510 603 539 1966 661 449 761 528 source: burda, 2014, 2015. similarities and differences in changing nps market… 13 different business names. the ssi imposed more than 3.5 millions euro in 2014 worth of fines on nps owners (gsi, 2016a). however, fines are hard to collect as the businesses often wind down once the ssi begins to look into their activities. in poland, apart from nps street shops there are over a dozen online stores where nps can be purchased. although ssi has made an effort to close the market since 2011 they were 170 nps street shops in poland in 2015 (gsi, 2016b). nps are also selling by dealers. 3. latvia the spread of new psychoactive substances at larger extent started in 2008 when several stores selling smoking mixtures that contained synthetic cannabinoids opened. these nps shops were closed when in 2009 in total 25 new substances were added to the list of controlled substances, however, it was not for a long time and in 2010/2011 new retail and internet shops selling nps were opened. according to the police data at the beginning of 2013 there were at around 70 selling places operating in latvia. moreover, in 2007 the forensic department of the state police, which in practice is the only institution performing expertises on seized drug in the country, performed 15 expertises of nps, than in 2014 it performed 1 387 expertises. majority of seized nps belonged to the group of synthetic cannabinoids – 91.8% in 2014 (sīle, 2015). moreover, results of sociological surveys also showed use of nps in general population and high use in some sub-populations. in 2013, 38% respondents of a study among people with high risk drug use confirmed that they had had bought these substances at least once in their lives. surveys also showed high life-time prevalence among 15–16 years old students (11% in 2011 and 15% in 2015), young people (9% in 2011 and 9% in 2014), partygoers (18%) and prisoners (18%) (see fig. 2). although there were clear indication from treatment centres that intoxication and addiction from nps is increasing noticeably, data to justify it are scarce. for example, there are some data available from years 2013 and 2014 from the register of the narcological patients (national coverage) showing that in 2013 in total 245 and in 2014 307 had used nps. in addition, in 2014, 416 drug overdose cases have been recorded, in which the patient has received inpatient care, in 2013 – 345 and in 2012 – 277 such cases were recorded. peak in the data of 2014 can be explained with the “boom” in the use of nps in latvia (pūgule et al., 2016). initially, government responded to this problem by simply listing substances in the list of controlled substances, as a result, by the end of 2013 in total 60 new substances had been added to the list (sīle, 2015). however, by this time it had been acknowledged that simple listing system did not stop the emergence of nps. for example, newly controlled substances were immediately replaced by new uncontrolled substances. due to the high pressure of society, the aim the policy makers became a closure of the nps market, therefore, new and innovative response. then followed a line of amendment in legislation to find a proper system that could close nps market, initially falling to reach their aims. currently there are two main elements in the legislation to control the emergence of nps in the market: – substance control by a generic system was introduced in april 2013. in broad lines, it means that only basic formula of chemical group is listed, at the same time stating that every substance that falls under the particular group is also controlled. however, practice showed that market easily reacted to these changes and sellers found new substances that were not controlled by the generic system, and the list needed to be updated regularly. besides it, in order to control new substances as soon as they appear on the tab. 2. the total number of nps detected and reported to emcdda ews in 2014 (samples) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 czechia 120 23 26 57 33 romania 971 415 169 212 35 hungary 534 2 335 2 118 2 538 5 506 poland 241 762 1 403 4 061 5 383 lithuania 0 0 62 78 132 latvia 133 142 289 819 889 estonia 0 70 105 98 134 source: early warning system database of emcdda 2015. 14 artur malczewski, agnese zīle-veisberga market, a more rapid tool temporary ban was introduced in the legislation. – temporary ban of nps defines that the centre for disease prevention and control of latvia may take a decision regarding imposing a ban or restriction for up to 12 months on the manufacturing, acquisition, storage, transportation, forwarding or distribution of nps or their preparations that are not included in the lists of controlled substances in latvia, but regarding which information has been received from the early warning system or a conclusion of a forensic expert institution regarding (law on procedures for the legal trade of the narcotic and psychotropic substances). in analogy this system treats nps in the same way as illicit drugs – criminal liability for use, possession, smuggling, selling etc. foreseeing harsh sanctions. practice also showed that in order to keep this system effective generic system must be updated regularly and temporary bans issued when necessary. by the end of 2015, there are 18 generic groups introduced, covering synthetic cannabinoids, cathinones, phenethylamines, amphetamines and other. in practice, the list is still being updated regularly – the latest amendments came into force in june 2015. as regards temporary bans, by april 2016 in total 35 bans have been issued. seemingly, that nps market was closed or at least considerably suspended when in april 2014, due to the amendments in the criminal law, violation of the temporary ban became a criminal offence. when these amendments in came into force, all detected 43 “legal high” selling places were closed and, according the observation of the police, new ones have not been opened. also some data on registered intoxication cases by emergency services might indicate that the number of acute health problems has decreased, for example, just before the closure of nps market in march 2014 the number of acute drug intoxications (diagnoses f11-f19, intoxications of nps not distinguished) reached 95 cases, but after the closure of nps retail market in june 2014 the state emergency service registered 34 intoxications with diagnoses f11-f19 (sīle, 2015). data on latest sociological surveys on prevalence are not available yet. in addition, the closure of the nps market, taking into consideration that it has been significant in case of latvia, could have brought some changes in the illicit drugs market, however analysis of it is still too early since the data for 2015 has not been collected. 11 15 9 9 18 3 18 32 38 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2011 2012 2013 2014 espad (student 15-16 years old) eurobarometer (15-24 years old) party-goers gps (15-64 years old) prisons drug users cohort study (q: have you ever bought nps?) fig. 2. lifetime prevalence of nps in general population and sub-populations, 2011–2014 (%) source: several sources were used to prepare this figure and words in survey questions, in most of the cases – “spice”, “smoking mixture”, espad: espad report…, group 2012; trapencieris et al., 2013; eurobarometer: flash eurobarometer 330…; flash eurobarometer 401…; party-goers: koroļeva et al., 2012; gps – general population survey: sniķere et al., 2011; prisons: kļave et al., 2014; drug users cohort study: trapencieris et al., 2014. similarities and differences in changing nps market… 15 4. others countries several countries of central and eastern europe were selected for analysis. poland and latvia were especially targeted as those countries had the highest nps use prevalence rates as the widest stationary distribution networks. it was worth comparing the situation in latvia to the two other baltic states. in the case of poland, it was worth looking at the situation in czechia where, after the closure of nps stores in poland, the new stores were emerging on the polish-czech border (jabłoński, malczewski, 2014). romania and hungary were also the countries particularly stricken with the nps problem. 4.1. estonia estonia seems to be a country where nps market has not developed. neither retail, nor internet sale has developed. available data show that there have been few emergency cases related to synthetic cannabinoids (ab-chminaca), but in overall nps use is quite low. in a study carried out in narva city in 2014 among people who inject drugs, 4% (n = 14) reported 3d (bath salts – alfa-pvp) use and one person reported the use of new psychoactive substances (e.g., spice, pmma, mcpp, bzp) (vorobjov, 2015). even though the nps prevalence is low, estonia authorities regularly schedule new substances in their list of controlled substances with a decree of the minister of health and social affairs. in 2013 a new schedule v was introduced into the narcotic and psychotropic substances act ( pugūle et al., 2015). substances under this schedule are prohibited only if the intension or use is to cause human intoxication. in 2014, in total 21 substances was added to the v schedule (salekesin, 2015). 4.2. lithuania also in lithuania nps market can be assessed as small. these substances are mainly sold via the internet and in 2014 there were 40 such on-line shops identified. in 2015, an omnibus survey was carried out and results showed that 3% respondents have used nps (jasaitis, 2015a). lithuanian authorities also put efforts in their legislation in order to avoid development and in 2011 first generic group of cathinone derivatives and 6 groups of cannabinoid derivatives were introduced in the list. since then this list is updated regularly and, for example, in 2013, five generic groups were modified and 58 individual substances scheduled, in 2014 – 25 substance scheduled. moreover, the scheduling takes from 2 to 7 moths, which apparently is enough to keep the nps market underdeveloped (jasaitis, 2015b). 4.3. the czech republic in the czech republic in 2010 there was a massive increase in the supply of nps. in effect, the government decided to extend the list of narcotic and psychotropic substances by 33 new substances. imports of new substances into the czech republic were reduced. in 2010, there were over 20 shops selling nps. after april 2011 almost all of them were closed. nps started to be available through the internet. in 2013: 19 e-shops with a czech interface were identified (grohmannova, 2013). the prevalence of nps in czech republic is not high. the general population survey of 2011 showed the lifetime prevalence rate of 1.6% (age group 15–64). one year later in the next survey the result was similar – 1.1% (mravčík et al., 2015). the peak of the nps prevalence was reached in 2010/2011 when 20 and 50 shops respectively operated in the country (běláčková, 2013). mainly it was caused by the closure of the shops in poland. as in poland, the highest prevalence was noticed among clients of low threshold programs. according to the survey of 2013, among 1797 clients of such programs 11% used nps (grohmannova, 2013). the most popular group of nps seems to be cathinones in 2014. according to the top-10 of the i-trend project there were: 3-mmc, 4-fa (4-fluoroamphetamine), 4-mec, 6-apb, amt, bk-mdma (methylone), ethcathinone (eth-cat), mdpbp, methoxetamine (mxe), mppp, penthedrone. the list of controlled substances has been updated twice in 2011 and 2015. the street shop nps market ceased to exist. however, the nps started to be available online. in may 2014, there were 30 active nps online shops in the czech republic (martinez et al., 2016). 4.4. hungary between 2010 and 2014, nps completely restructured the hungarian drug market. following the large-scale increase in the amount of mephedrone available in the summer of 2010, the proportion of the new psychoactive substances, as compared to the classical drugs, rose continuously. in 2014, the new substances constituted nearly 60% of police seizures (2015 national… report, 2015). out of the total 6509 drug-related offences registered in 2014, 347 offences (5.3%) involved substances classified as new psychoactive substances according to the hungarian law (2015 national… report, 2015). the most frequent nps types were cathinone derivatives, phenethylamines, synthetic cannabinoids and piperazine derivatives. in hungary, there were few shops in 2010–2011. however, they were shut down 3/4 years ago. it seems that retail nps shops don’t exist anymore. online stores use mostly webpages. 16 artur malczewski, agnese zīle-veisberga nps sales are done through dealers, which are one of the main sources of the supply. the prevalence of the nps compared to other drugs seems to be relatively high. any use of nps in hungary could be at the level similar to that of cannabis (horvath: hungarian reitox focal point personal communication) (fig. 3). according to treatment data and data from needle/ syringe programmes nps (synthetic cathinone) use is widespread among idus in hungary. according to research data nps (synthetic cathinone) use is also observed among ost clients (2015 national report, 2015).. increasing supply of nps forced hungarian decision-makers to elaborate a new monitoring and risk-assessment system, which can be used to provide the appropriate information for the making of responsible decisions on the control of nps. act xcv of 2005 (hereinafter: medicines act, gytv.) lays down the framework of the new legislation, while government decree 66/2012 (iv. 2.) determines the process and persons responsible in connection with the reporting of new psychoactive substances, their preliminary specialist assessment, their scheduling and risk assessment. the gytv. created the definition of “new psychoactive substance” as substances or groups of compounds recently appearing on the market that have no medicinal use and that, due to their effect on the central nervous system, are suitable for altering a person’s state of consciousness, behaviour or senses, and therefore represent a threat to public health similar to the substances appearing in the illicit drug and psychotropic substance schedules, and so with respect to this, in the past the government, currently the minister responsible for health, classified these as such materials in a decree. the medicines act and the government decree created a new schedule for the new psychoactive substances, which contains both individual compounds and compound groups (through this providing both a list of individual compounds and a generic approach) (2015 national report, 2015). the hungarian legal approach is based on generic and individual approach and includes risk assessment procedure. 4.5. romania romania was one of the countries where there had been a rapid increase in the number of nps shops. in 2010, 35% of drug patients reported using nsp as primary drug. in 2011, romania introduced solutions similar to the polish ones such in the form of a wide definition of controlled nps. the list of controlled substances has been updated twice in 2010 and 2014. in 2011, a new legislation package along with complex control measures of several institutions contributed to the closure of the nps market. in 2011, the joint order of several ministers and national authorities was issued. 33 new substances were added to the list and joint teams performed inspections of the locations in which nps were 4.1 3.4 3.0 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 6.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 h e rb a l c a n n a b il s … s y n th e ti c … e c ta s y a m p h e ta m in e n p s l s d (s ta m p ) c o c a in e m a g ic m u s h ro o m s g h b o th e r o p ia te s c ra c k h e rb a l d ru g s h e ro in d u m m y d ru g ru s h w h ip p e ts /b a ll o o n s ip o w d e r o th e r d ru g s a n g e l d u s t fig. 3. lifetime prevalence of different illicit drugs in the 19–64 age group in hungary in 2013 (%) source: 2015 national… report, 2015. similarities and differences in changing nps market… 17 manufactured, sold or used, according to their field of expertise. in that year 867 locations, where nps were likely to be sold, were inspected. a year later the number of shops halved to 442 (gheorghe, 2014). in 2014, most probably synthetic cannabis was the main nps on the market but in 2010/2011, they were synthetic cathinones. in 2011 (march), 158 retail outlets were closed (2012 national…, 2012). in 2015, some online shops but not only focus on nps. as a consequence of the measures taken in 2011 the retail shops were closed. the data in figure 4 show an increase in the number of poisonings following the closure of nps shops and a decrease in poisonings in 2013. among the drug patients in 2013 every tenth reported using nps, which constitutes over a threefold drop compared to 2010 (gheorghe, 2014). 5. findings countries where problem reached the peak, the traditional response or simply substance scheduling did not work. since the nps do not fall under market regulations, also the response to the problem was innovative stepping out of the existing system (for example, temporary prohibition in poland, latvia, nps list in hungary, criminal liability or harsh sanctions in several countries, generic law in latvia, lithuania and hungary). moreover, a political and social pressure has been a factor to speed up the development of new regulations, sometime affecting the quality. seemingly harsh sanctions and immediate reaction are main elements to close the nps street shops. meanwhile this approach hasn’t caused a stepback for chemical industry or science. at the begging 2015 the retail market seems to be closed in latvia and romania but in poland is developing because nps distributor has been prepared to overcome new legislation again nps market from 2011. still is open question if national regulations against nps market are fully enough. in case of drugs european countries are using un convention as core document for controlling psychoactive substances. in case of nps there are different approach and different substances are putting in the control in eu member countries. nps market reacts very quickly for changing and only very strong and fast reaction from the institutional level seems to be effectiveness. according to the principle that every action is accompanied by a reaction, a decrease in the availability of nps in nps shops gave rise to a greater online supply, transferring the trade to the neighbouring countries (czech republic) or the arrival of more alternatives to controlled substances. although nps market differs in each country, study shows that harsh sanctions such as criminal liability and immediate reaction significantly decrease the availability of nps, and thus contribute in decreasing acute health problems and prevalence. it was observed that at the time when stricter measure came into 668 1 384 1 395 1 279 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 2010 2011 2012 2013 fig. 4. evolution of medical emergencies caused by nps use, data compared 2010–2013 (number of cases) source: gheorghe, 2014. 18 artur malczewski, agnese zīle-veisberga force, hospital emergencies were increased (poland, romania and in same extent latvia). reference 2012 national report (2011 data) to the emcdda by the reitox national focal point, 2012, romanian reitox focal point, bucharest. 2015 national report (2014 data) to the 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sierosławski j., 2015, używanie substancji psychoaktywnych przez młodzież w 2015 roku espad (eng. psychoactive substances using by youth in 2015 espad), presentation from the press conference on 30 november 2015, kbpn, parpa, ipin. warsaw. sīle l., 2015, jaunās psihoaktīvās vielas latvijā: situācijas analīze 2007–2014 (eng. new psychoactive substances in latvia: analysis of the situation between 2014 and 2017), slimību profilakses in kontroles centrs, rīga. sniķere s., trapencieris m., koroļeva i., mieriņa i., priekule s., aleksandrovs a., jankovskis m., 2012, atkarību izraisošo vielu lietošanas izplatība iedzīvotāju vidū. pētījuma rezultāti (eng. addictive substance use among the general population) , slimību profilakses in kontroles centrs, rīga. trapencieris m., pētersons a., sniķere s., 2013, alkohola, tabakas un narkotiku lietošanas izplatība skolēnu vidū latvijā. metodoloģiskā pētījuma rezultāti (eng. the prevalence of alcohol, tabaco and drug use among students: methodological study,), slimību profialkases un kontroles centrs, sia “socioloģisko pētījumu institūts”, rīga. trapencieris m., sniķere s., kaupe r., 2014, narkotiku lietošanas tendences un paradumi latvijā: narkotiku lietotāju kohortas pētījuma septītā posma (2013. gada) rezultāti (eng. drug use patterns and trends in latvia: cohort study of drug users. the seventh phase). biedrība “dialogs”, rīga. vorobjov s., 2015, new psychoactive substances in estonia, available data from recent surveys, presentation for reitox baltic academy in cracow – poland, 3–4 september 2015. 1. introduction the concept of sustainability has become one of today’s most widely used and controversial concepts. brundtland commission definition of sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs is very famous. but there are several definitions of sustainability. definitions of sustainability vary and focus on different things, but it is undoubtedly common model for sustainable development based on three, partly overlapping, definitions: the ecological system, the economic system and the socio-cultural system. in this model, the integration of the core of these aspects is of importance for achieving sustainable development (park, allaby, 2016). it is therefore important to develop this systemic point of intersection for the development of location or activity in the right direction. to produce goods and services which meet our needs and remain within the limits of the carrying capacity of nature and the ecological integrity and contributes to society’s well-being. this can also be seen as a basis for national environmental policy. as for tourism or journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 5–11 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.021.7177 processes for understanding sustainability as a goal and practice anette oxenswärdh department of industrial engineering, division of quality sciences, uppsala university – campus gotland, se-621 67 visby, sweden, e-mail: anette.oxenswardh@angstrom.uu.se citation oxenswärdh a., 2017, processes for understanding sustainability as a goal and practice, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3) 5–11. abstract the concept of sustainability has become one of today’s most widely used and controversial concepts. it is therefore important to develop activities within organizational context in order to increase co-workers understanding of the goals for more sustainable practice. to produce goods and services, e.g. that is to meet our needs and still remain within the limits of the carrying capacity of nature and the ecological integrity and contributes to society’s well-being, is a big challenge for all organizations. one way to start to deal with the problem and define sustainability at the operational level is to discuss goals and meaning of them in groups. while discussing we shape our understanding of the meaning of the goals and this in turn even shapes our understanding of assignment in whole. most importantly do this collective learning even shape our understanding of responsibilities in working towards more sustainable practise. this paper aims to study how co-workers through collective learning processes and discussions together can create more sustainable practice. key words sustainability, organizational learning, collective learning, responsibility, assignment. 6 anette oxenswärdh hospitality industry and durability, the world tourism organization unwto (unwto annual report 2014, 2015) described the development of sustainable tourism as something that should take into account the current and future economic, social and environmental influences and that should satisfy visitors, industry, the environment and the operators’ needs. there are other definitions which take into account reduced substance leakage to the ecosystem, secure employment conditions, reduced noise and impacts on animal and plant life, less waste, proliferation of roam and reduced crime. in this study, sustainability can be seen as a goal for any organization to strive for. in order to understand the assignment and responsibilities it carries there is a need of learning process. collective learning can be seen as a process, which can activate other processes important for understanding the meaning of assignment and sustainability as a goal in organizational context. 2. sustainability and responsibility as concepts and goals sustainability is a well-used term, appearing almost daily in the media and increasingly in everyday conversation, often as something to strive for. moving towards a more sustainable way of living will inevitably require some radical changes in attitudes, values and behaviour (hahn et al., 2014; gullikson, holmgren, 2015). and perhaps the best way to strive for sustainability is through organizational change initiative (appelbaum et al., 2016a). during the last decades, it is undoubtedly so that environmental problems, e.g. pollution, deforestation and desertification have become real to us. the environmental threats are consequences from the exploitation of nature. those threats together with structural changes in manufacturing and production of goods and services, i.e. how we live and consume, shows that we still have environmental challenges a head of us (hahn et al., 2014; gullikson, holmgren, 2015; thurén, 2015). there have been discussions about the definition of sustainable development (dobson, 2008; rambaud, richard, 2015; appelbaum et al., 2016a), about how to interpret the concept in organisations and companies (hahn et al., 2014; appelbaum et al., 2016b). also, research about how companies can create measures in order to get facts for decisions has been conducted. for instance, the triple-bottom-line (tbl), created by elkington in the 1990s is nowadays a well-known concept that many organizations use (slaper, hall, 2011). according to a. naess (1995), the essential ideas informing an environmental worldview can be broadly shared without prescribing or predetermining ultimate premises, or specific interpretations and actions. we are in need of plural interpretations and actions appropriate to local cultures and conditions – echoing the ecological principle of diversity in unity. paradoxically an environmental worldview yields many different views of the same thing, and the same view of many different things. it is obvious that the result from the brundtland commission created challenges for countries and corporations. corporate managers and other leaders in organizations have to make decisions in their companies and organization with economic, environmental and social considerations, which is to some extent paradoxical and difficult (hahn et al., 2014). responsibility is a word and a concept that is increasingly being mentioned in our society. it is pointed out how important it is, in any organizational context, to develop co-workers into responsible actors. in the scientific sense, the concept of responsibility is first and foremost a philosophical question. philosophy and responsibility are interconnected on the one hand in the general question of what responsibility possibly is and on the other side of the normative question: what responsibility should be? (kernell, 2002). “responsibility is so integral part of human relationship that in its various meanings and shadings it serves as a synonym for almost every important political word” (wildavsky, 1986, p. 1). responsibility is one of the major political concepts alongside freedom, equality and solidarity, etc. that are easily to use but the more precise meaning often remain vague. (wildavsky, 1986) in practice meets the talk of responsibility often an approach that has been called sunday concept. this means that everyone uses the word only in rhetorical sense as referring to responsibilities seems generally acceptable and it causes no harm. m. bovens (1998) points out, however, that responsibility is a real concept that is even known by everyone. it is hard to imagine that anyone would deny or ignore their responsibility or deliberately behave irresponsibly. at the same time the term is used as a spiritual or emergency solution, e.g. with in the party and government programs. in fact, responsibility as a concept is understood in many ways and used for many different purposes: responsibility changes depending on the time, venue and speakers (bovens, 1998). as a legal term the concept of responsibility is describing personal or financial penalties. in law and political science implies responsibilities consequences of processes for understanding sustainability as a goal and practice 7 an act or not acting. a person who commits a crime must take her responsibility through paying fines or imprisonment. she is forced to face the consequences of her action. the law has been developed from the basic idea that one is free by choosing action alternatives, because otherwise it would be just as meaningless to ask people to be accountable as it is to punish machines (mackie, 1990; permer, permer, 1994). in political science are the terms political responsibility and civic responsibility presented. to take active responsibility is an opportunity to free us from being held responsible/accountable. be assigned responsibility, to be accountable, does not automatically result taking or acting responsibly. an assigned responsibility is a passive form of responsibility. taking responsibility is an active action, based on the subject’s own free will? to be liable, however is based on future requirements. but to be held responsible for an act, must include that the actor have understood the responsibilities that the task/mission contains. additionally must the one who is held accountable had had the opportunity and own the ability to perform the task. the responsibility is a complicated concept, according to r. ingarden (1970, 1983); it commits us to study its different dimensions together. j.r. lucas (1995) claims that, before we can form us a clear idea of what the real responsibility includes, we must also take into account the circumstances in which we are not responsible. 3. understanding the assignment and responsibilities there is a certain dynamic between individuals, groups and organizations. broadly speaking, responsibility in any organizational context can be described as a relationship between the commissioner and the actor. relations of responsibility constitute the arena where both the exaction and the assumption of responsibility can take place. responsibility/ accountability is a crucial question in all organizations working towards sustainability. issues of accountability consequently have a direct relationship to professional development in organizations. an essential part of the organization’s assignment is to assume responsibility. different actors can understand both, the assignment and the responsibility, in different ways. this can be described in terms of the understanding of assignment and responsibility. the actors’ understanding and interpretation of the assignment is significant for the way in which they assume responsibility for fulfilling what they are commissioned to do. the understanding includes the cognitive and psychological processes and shows in turn how the assumption of responsibility can be shaped (abrahamsson, andersen, 2005; oxenswärdh, 2011). when the understanding of responsibility describes what happens to the professionals and in turn leads to heightened competence, the concept of responsibility can also be viewed as a pedagogical concept. the understanding of assignment and responsibility can thus be regarded as a learning process, which is in turn essential for active assumption of responsibility. this learning process is deemed to be an important part of the organization staff ’s competence development and professional development. these processes of understanding can be seen as a part of process of collective learning (oxenswärdh, 2011). process of understanding one’s responsibility is, however, a more unexplored concept – unlike understanding the mission and it has to do with operator’s own approach in question the nature of the professional obligation to consider themselves obliged on assignment. to illustrate the difference between the terms, it would be quite possible finding cases where assignments understanding of a co-worker is high, i.e. it is a clear picture of the tasks they believe the decision maker expects be implemented. despite this understanding, responsibility taking can be low, i.e. a number of different – e.g. moral /ethical/cultural – causes, may hamper actors accountability to really carry out the assignment. one way to express the distinction between mission understanding and the responsibility of understanding is to assume that the former rests on the legal and the latter on legitimate grounds. concepts of legality and legitimacy disclose relations’ between justice and morality. legality focuses on social actions in a formal sense and is sanctioned by the state, e.g. by orders and rules of law. legitimacy is more unspoken value system that has nothing to do with the formal legal system but in stead rests on ethical foundations (bertilsson, 1987; oxenswärdh, 2011). at the core of mission understanding exists seemingly even understanding of responsibility. responsibility understanding is formed in the core of actor’s competences. thus, it is further emphasized that actors’ responsibilities also include understanding of the approach to change and development. 4. collective learning organizational learning is more complex and dynamic than a mere magnification of individual learning. 8 anette oxenswärdh the level of complexity increases tremendously in the change from a single individual to a large collection of diverse individuals. issues of motivation and reward, for instance, which are an integral part of human learning, become doubly complicated within organizations. although the meaning of the term “learning” remains essentially the same as in the individual case, the learning process is fundamentally different at the organizational level. a model of organizational learning has to resolve the dilemma of imparting intelligence and learning capabilities to a nonhuman entity without anthropomorphizing it. what do we mean by organizational learning? in the early stages of an organization’s existence, organizational learning is often synonymous with individual learning because the organization consists of a small group of people and has minimal structure. as an organization grows, however, a distinction between individual and organizational learning emerges, and a system for capturing the learning of its individual members evolves. c. argyris and d.a. schön (1978) posed one of the main dilemmas shared by all who tackle this issue: there is something paradoxical here. organizations are not merely collections of individuals, yet there are no organizations without such collections. similarly, organizational learning is not merely individual learning, yet organizations learn only through the experience and actions of individuals. collective, collaborative and collegial learning are terms often used in the context of joint learning processes. j. ohlsson (2008) describes learning as a social process when the individual change their way of thinking about something. collaborative learning in turn can be considered as a form of joint learning, as a special type of phenomenon, where the starting point is that all learning is based in social activities, but with the collaborative learning processes is meant something beyond the social. collaborative learning is a situation in which at least two people learn something together (bruffee, 1993; dillenbourg, 1999). collaborative learning activities can include collaborative writing, group projects, joint problem solving, debates, study teams, and other activities. the approach is closely related to cooperative learning, which is the instructional use of small groups so that individuals work together to maximize their own and each other’s learning (johnson et al., 2008). the difference between collaborative and collective learning is still vague. but according to o. granberg and j. ohlsson (ed., 2016) this difference can consist of that in collaborative learning there is group of individuals trying to learn something together but without to specify or clarify the social context. in collective learning however it is decisive to try to achieve a common understanding. collegial learning however, often used when schools and teachers are discussed, is related to the concept of collaborative learning. collegial learning can be seen as a combination term for various forms of professional development where colleagues through structured cooperation acquire knowledge from a broad concept of knowledge, which also contains abilities and skills. in general it is emphasized that peer learning or collegial learning is a method by which a more experienced person helps a less experienced to absorb specific knowledge. useful methods for peer learning are among others, learning study, lesson study and auscultation with feedback and peer tutoring. the importance of the joint learning synergistic effect is often highlighted in the descriptions of the collective learning (wilhelmson, 1998; döös et al., 2001; döös, wilhelmson, 2011). synergy means that collective processes based on interaction and communication, leads to the new common beliefs that had not been possible for individuals to come up with on their own (granberg, 1996; ohlsson, 1996; wilhelmson, 1998; döös, wilhelmson, 2005; granberg, ohlsson, 2005). l. wilhelmson (1998) also draws attention to the importance of symmetry between the participants in a dialogue. symmetry means that all participants’ observations and opinions are given the same weight in the conversation, and to recognize each other’s experiences as valid. an asymmetric situation means a situation where power positions and opinions consolidation and an evaluative approach prevent an open and common search for new opportunities. symmetrical relationships can thus be seen as favourable to collective learning. j. habermas (1996) argues that inter-subjective founded collective agreement will not occur from the fact that someone has been manipulated or forced to a particular approach, but requires certain symmetry between the participants. j. ohlsson (1996) has developed the concept of collective learning and created a model of the relationship between individual and collaborative learning, which can be used to illustrate the collective learning. j. ohlsson (1996) notes, that the collective learning shapes how the individual perceive their practical work and thereby shape the collective learning individual experience potential. it is important for the collective learning that the experiences described in the collective so that the community can jointly problematize and reflect on the experience (dixon, 1994; granberg, 1996; ohlsson, 1996; wilhelmson, 1998; larsson, 2004). processes for understanding sustainability as a goal and practice 9 j. ohlsson (1996) points out the learning dynamic character and the on-going co-constructing of borders for example, the permissible and the impermissible, is something, which can be perceived as a condition for learning processes. there is a critical, emancipatory dimension of awareness rising of these unconscious conditions for learning. if the individual is unaware of its potential and limitations, the individual cannot respond fully to promote learning. the actors’ understanding and interpretation of the change in thinking is significant for the way in which they assume change for fulfilling what they are commissioned to do. the understanding includes the cognitive and psychological processes and shows in turn how the assumption of change can be shaped (reeve, 2009). when the understanding of change describes what happens to the professionals and in turn leads to heightened competence, the concept of change can also be viewed as a pedagogical concept (lindensjö, lundgren, 2002; scherp, 1998; ohlsson (ed.), 2004; alexandersson, 1994). the understanding of assignment and change of thinking can thus be regarded as a learning process, which is in turn essential for active assumption of collective learning. this learning process is deemed to be an important part of the organization staff ’s competence development and professional development (ellström, 2011; madsén (ed.), 1994; ohlsson, stedt, 2003; ohlsson (ed.), 2004; goodson, 2005). d.a. schön (1995) integrates values and beliefs in a theory on learning. according to d.a. schön cognition cannot be separated from values and beliefs, nor can cognition and action. importance of by illuminating the relationship between learning and action, that is, between thinking and doing by d.a. schön (1995) sheds light on the nature of the changes that an innovative project must seek to provoke. changes in so called theories-in-use that often are tacit, remain implicit and go unnoticed. in order to challenge them, they need to be brought to the surface: people will have to be made aware of their tacit rationalities, and be tempted to reconsider them. a second relevant aspect of d.a. schön’s insights is that, even though theories-in-use play a role in the actions of various actors in a similar way, they differ in terms of contents depending on professional training and experience, social background, upbringing and so on. because of their intrinsic and fundamental divergence, the theories-in-use that people from different professional and cultural backgrounds hold, will influence the possibility for them to learn collectively. 5. discussion and conclusions the understanding of the goals for assignment and especially those towards sustainability has attained a greater role in organizations today. even more important, if possible, however, is the understanding of the responsibility embedded in the assignment. this understanding of responsibility may be viewed as a path, as a process to the active assumption of responsibility that is demanded of all the actors in organization working towards more sustainable solutions. changes in professional competence do not take place without initiative. reflection on the assignment engenders a better ability to assess reality, which in turn shapes a qualitative aspect of professional know-how. this shows a need to specialize by refining the language and to develop tools with which to handle the work better. the difficulties for managers and leaders and the need for changes in attitudes and values in general in our way of living generate the necessity of learning. perhaps the best way to do it is, as appelbaum et al. (2016a, 2016b) suggest, through organizational change initiative and collective learning processes. hence, the purpose of this paper, which was to discuss collective learning in organizational context as a tool for deeper understanding of sustainability as a concept and a goal. any planned, directed change by individuals or collectives is built on learning. learning can be defined more generally as the process of acquiring knowledge, skills, norms, values, or understanding through experience, imitation, observation, modelling, practice, or study; by being taught; or as a result of collaboration. this learning process activates several other processes: processes of understanding the assignment and its responsibilities. being able to develop one’s professional competence to match the practical needs is probably a viable path to learning where the motivation is greatest among professionals. in this light, the organizational and collective competence development measures alone are not sufficient. highlighting and being able to discuss, reflect, and learn more about the profession-specific areas, both individually and collectively, is of great significance for professional development. based on this reasoning, the learning process provides the professionals with their knowledge and sharpens their tools. organizations can thus be continuously improved through the professionals’ own power. this process as a model for enhancing aspects of the professionals’ competence can become an important part of their development, where professionals themselves shape and continuously revise their know-how in their work by relying 10 anette oxenswärdh on their own and their colleagues’ competence and professionalism. responsibility issues are a part of the ethical competence in organization and a vital part in the work towards sustainable organization. without ethical discussions at a deeper level, professionals deceive themselves and can deceive their customers. this leads to ethical stances being taken on unethical grounds. the balance between freedom on the one hand and responsibility on the other is upset, and the result is an organization like a stage with a nicely designed set but with a play that does not affect anyone. organization development towards more sustainable activities can be regarded as a force whereby the diversity, through reflection and dialogue, results in new solutions that can be beneficial to everyone. responsibility of the mission thus becomes a matter of debate among the professionals. discussions intend to jointly interpret the responsibilities that the task contains. as the road to the mission and responsibility of understanding and accountability can be seen as a learning process, both in individually and collectively, emphasized the psychological and pedagogical dimension of the concepts of responsibility and sustainability. regarding to mission and responsibility understanding, these can be seen as formed by learning 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(eds.), 2016, kollektivt lärande. studentlitteratur, lund. granberg o., ohlsson j., 2005, kollektivt lärande i team, pedagogisk forskning i sverige, 10(3–4), 227–243. gullikson h., holmgren u., 2015, hållbar utveckling: livskvalitet, beteende, teknik. studentlitteratur, lund. habermas j., 1996, kommunikativt handlande. texter om språk, rationalitet och samhälle, daidalos, gothenburg. hahn t., preuss l., pinkse j., figge f., 2014, cognitive frames in corporate sustainability: managerial sense making with paradoxical and business case frames, academy of management review, 39(4), 463–487. ingarden r., 1970, der streit um die existenz der welt, bd.i, ii/i, ii/2, maxniemeyer, tübingen. ingarden r., 1983, man and value, the catholic university of america press, washington. johnson d.w., johnson r.t., holubec e., 2008, cooperation in the classroom, interaction book company, edina. kernell l-å., 2002, att hitta balanser, studentlitteratur, lund. processes for understanding sustainability as a goal and practice 11 larsson p., 2004, förändringens villkor. en studie av organisatoriskt lärande och förändring inom skolan, doktorsavhandling vid handelshögskolan i stockholm, stockholm. lindensjö b., lundgren u.p., 2002, politisk styrning och utbildningsreformer, liber utbildningsförlaget, stockholm. lucas j.r., 1995, responsibility, oxford university press, oxford. mackie j., 1990, ethics, penguin books, london. madsén t. 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kirk, 1996; szreter, 1993). initially it was a three phase process but in the process of consecutive studies the present five phase model emerged comprising the following phases: • the first phase features high birth and mortality rate with slight population growth. this model phase is connected with short average life span. • the second phase features a decreasing number of deaths and a continually high birth rate and consequently increasing population growth. average life time clearly increases. • the third phase shows a falling but fading tendency of mortality rate. it is accompanied by a clear drop in birth rate and initially population growth that later fades. longer life time slowly appears. • the fourth phase features both a low mortality and birth rate. population growth remains at a minimum level and the average life span is longer. journal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(1), 32-36 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.004.5160 specifics of demographic transitions in ukraine after the country gained independence oleksandr radczenko (1), tomasz michalski (2) (1) institute of geography and regional studies, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76-200 słupsk, poland e-mail: oleksandr.radchenko@apsl.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) institute of geography, university of gdansk, bażyńskiego 4, 80-952 gdańsk, poland e-mail: tomasz.michalski@ug.edu.pl citation radczenko o., michalski t., 2015, specifics of demographic transitions in ukraine after the country gained independence, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(1), 32–36 abstract demographic transition processes in ukraine following the country gaining independence correspond neither to the demographic transition model nor the second demographic transition model. unsuccessful political, social and economic reforms at the time in ukraine and pressure exerted by russia are deemed to be the cause of the situation. this means that demographic transition in ukraine (both in terms of mortality and births) is far more detrimental than the premises of both models. key words demographic transition model, second demographic transition model, demography, ukraine. specifics of demographic transitions in ukraine after the country gained independence 33 • in the fifth we note (a temporary or permanent) higher mortality than birth rate. in consequence we observe a negative population growth rate. observing the mechanisms governing demographic changes described in the model we should note the significant impact of social and economic development on changes in human reproduction. in the meantime the second demographic transition (sdt) model appeared (compare lesthaeghe, 1995; kotowska, 1999). the key difference of this model lies in the interpretation of falling fertility. the first model explains the low fertility as adapting the fertility rate to the falling mortality rate and is interpreted in terms of care for the family, particularly the number of children that can be fed and raised. dropping fertility according to the second model (at a very low mortality rate) is deemed to originate from growing individualism of potential parents, and their will to assure self-realisation potential. the direct objective of this study is to compare demographic transitions in ukraine to both models referred to above. the study covers the years 1991– 2014 from the moment of gaining independence to the year for which the latest data is available. the study relies on data made available by the state statistics service of ukraine. the autoregressive model was applied in time analysis (the following functions were taken into consideration: linear function, power function, logarithmic function, exponential function, quadratic function; with a regression function with the highest value of the coefficient of determination selected; if for all the tested function r² was below 0.70, the analysis was abandoned). 2. a brief characteristic of the demographic process conditions irrespective of the model applied to explain the present demographic situation in ukraine, whether the first or the second demographic transition model, we come across substantial problems. they result from the deterioration of the social and economic conditions following independence that can be illustrated by the changes in gni per capita, ppp (current international $) (fig. 1.). statistics indicate that theoretically the level of wealth increased not earlier than in 2006. it must be noted that the economic development rate (rather low in ukraine (rapacki (ed.), 2009), has an impact not only on economic security reflected in procreation attitudes and capacity for own healthcare but also on “fairness” in distribution of income among population groups (relatively disadvantageous (холод, 2009) the deteriorating situation results from many both internal and external factors. the major internal factors include the lack of elites originating from democratic oppositions (which could have taken over power following independence and start actual reforms), lack of social acceptance and a drive for reform, strong russian influence and sovietisation, no realistic direct democracy mechanisms, strong cultural and economic diversity of ukraine. external fig. 1. changes in gni per capita, ppp (current international $) in ukraine in the years 1991–2014 source: own study based on: word bank open data. 34 oleksandr radczenko , tomasz michalski factors include predominantly the destructive policy of the russian federation towards the ukrainian state (compare конончук, 2006; kuczabski, michalski, 2014; радченко, 2008). the consequences of these adverse processes are the chronic malfunctioning of the state healthcare system (lekhan et al., 2010; tymkovych, 2005) additionally subject to omnipresent corruption (compare karklins, 2005). 3. analysis of main demographic changes demographic changes in ukraine society may be no doubt classified to the fifth phase of demographic transition. however, the assignment of demographic transition in ukraine to the fifth dtm phase is questionable as the model assumes the decreasing birth rate “adapting” to the decreasing mortality rate. the situation in ukraine is just the opposite – the drop in birth rate is accompanied by a growing mortality rate (fig. 2.). in the case of the second model of demographic transitions the falling fertility rate is justified by the growing individualism of potential parents. in the case of ukraine this factor is applicable to a lesser degree than assumed by the authors of the model. the difficult economic situation in ukraine (see fig.  1) limits substantially the self realisation drive of young people replacing it by a “struggle” for survival. we should also bear in mind the homo sovieticus (tischner, 2005; zinoviev, 1985) specifics and its adverse impact on the population health condition. the rising incidence of certain illnesses among ukrainian youth, particularly stds, conducive widespread alcoholism, drug addiction and risky sexual behaviour is of significance (compare barnett et al., 2000; ivanov, 1999; levchuk, 2009; mavrov, bondarenko, 2002; richens, mircea, 2009), having no doubt an adverse impact on procreation potential of young ukrainians. the diversified demographic situation in ukraine is quite interesting in the spatial perspective. we can note a positive or oscillating around zero population growth in western ukraine and in kiev and negative in other parts of the country (fig. 3.). the reasons underlying such spatial diversification of the demographic situation originate unquestionably from cultural diversity, which in ukraine is considerable. the fall of the communist system in central and eastern europe revived national movements (vojtěch, 2010) partially stimulated by russian operations, such as the “russkij mir” (bondar, 2014; jilge, 2014; moskwa, 2013). contemporary history of the post stalin period also affected western ukraine (together with the three baltic republics), which was believed to be a mecca of alternative lifestyle in the soviet union” (kuzio, 2015). on the other hand we should not overestimate the role of national and ethnic diversity, as, e.g. v. sokolnikv (2012a) states that the mortality rate of russians and ukrainians inhabiting ukraine barely differs. the demographic specifics of kiev in terms of central ukraine indicate that it is an attractive place for settlement due to, among others, the inflow of foreign investments (chuzhykov, 2014). fig. 2. changes in natural increase/decrease [in ‰] in ukraine in the years 1991–2014 source: own study based on: населення україни…, 2015. specifics of demographic transitions in ukraine after the country gained independence 35 a specific factor affecting the contemporary diversified demographic situation in the country includes the consequences of traumatic events related to holodomor in the interwar period, world war ii and later stalin repressions (compare костя (ed.), 2012; sokolnikv, 2012b; vallin et al., 2012a, 2012b). 4. summary we should agree with the opinion expressed by t.  sobotka (2008) that the presented demographic models referring to transitions in european post communist countries should be treated more as a framework concept than as operational models. this opinion seems to fit well to ukraine where the difficult social and economic conditions as well as military and political aspects strongly disarray factors identified as shaping demographic transitions in contemporary european societies. furthermore, we can note a clear impact of the past on the present spatial diversification of the demographic situation in ukraine. the present demographic situation in ukraine, apart from the possibility or its lack of attributing it to a demographic theoretical framework, is a threat for the future development of the country due to dropping human potential (compare adomanis, 2015; стефанишин, 2006; заствний, 2006) with overall indications that the situation will become worse. for example, according to g.  safarov et al. 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(ed.), 2012, голодомор 1932–1933 років в укрїні, лну імені івана франка, львів. населення україни за 2014 рік. демографічний щорічник, 2015, державна служба статистики україни, київ. радченко о. в., 2008, латинська україна: нескінченість демократичного транзиту? теорія та практика державного управління, 3(22), 64–71. стефанишин  о., 2006, людськй потенціал економіки україни, видавничий центр лну імені івана франка, львів. холод  н., 2009, розподіл доходів та бідність у перехідних еконоіках, видавничий центр лну імені івана франка, львів. 1. introduction in today’s world, each of us uses services that are offered by the banks, starting from ordinary, mundane services like daily payments with a card, right up to various kinds of credits or deposits. activity of the banks is something common, and many of us cannot imagine an everyday life without non-cash transactions. along with the functioning of the banks many issues appear, which require relevant legal regulations, including, inter alia, the bank secrecy. its main aim is to protect our privacy in the financial circuit, to secure our data used for concluding transactions and contracts with the bank. in the article, i will try to analyse how the bank secrecy functions, both in poland and in the european union and its selected countries. bank secrecy in the present meaning formally appeared for the first time in swiss banking law in 1934. however, the beginnings of its existence and functioning reaches back into antiquity. although banking institutions did not operate at that time, nevertheless 4 000 years ago the code of hammurabi contained provisions permitting the protection of confidential information of bankers’ clients: the banker, also serving as a notary, could in the event of a dispute with the client disclose the entrusted documentation. such a manner of exclusion, namely in the event of dispute with a client, allows to assume journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 82–87 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.031.7187 bank secrecy in poland and the european union – selected issues paulina jaszczuk collegium iuridicum, faculty of law, canon law and administration, the john paul ii catholic university of lublin, spokojna 1, 20-074 lublin, poland, e-mail: jaszczuk.paulinaa@gmail.com citation jaszczuk p., 2017, bank secrecy in poland and the european union – selected issues, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 82–87. abstract bank secrecy has a rich history and it may have originated as early as in the code of hammurabi, according to which particular regulations allowed for the protection of information of bankers’ clients. currently, the bank secrecy functions in most countries of the world. its main aim is to protect our privacy in the financial circuit, mainly the data used for concluding transactions and contracts with the bank, so that our information was not given to the third parties. in the article, i will try to analyse the essence of the bank secrecy and and its functioning based on legal regulations, both in poland and in the european union on the example of selected states.. key words bank, banking law, bank secrecy, poland. bank secrecy in poland and the european union – selected issues 83 that, as a rule, disclosure of information was prohibited (żygadło, 2011). in addition, the beginnings of the bank secrecy can also be sought in ancient rome, where the principle of discretion was protected by actio iniuriarum, and in the customary law of barbaric tribes in lex visigothorum institution. on the other hand, reaching back to modern times, the austrian consumer law from the 16th century should also be indicated, which was familiar with the principles of the financial secrecy. financial privacy in the 19th century germany even became a constitutional law. currently, the bank secrecy exists nearly in every law system. special attention should be paid to switzerland, for the historical reasons and also due to the importance of this institution in the banking system. switzerland is also an example of a country, which with the use of the biding principle of discretion in the client – bank relations, has strengthened its economy in the world. on the other hand, the example of great britain depicts how the bank secrecy was shaped in the common law system, different from the positive law (żygadło, 2011). 2. the secret of banking in poland in order to analyse legal regulations of the bank secrecy in poland, it should be emphasized that the bank secrecy underwent an evolution in the course of the changes of the political system. the basis of bank secrecy may be sought in the constitution of the republic of poland1, in articles 47 and 51, which stipulate the right for protection of privacy and information on oneself, respectively. information may be disclosed only based on provisions of statutory law, whereas the authorities can not gather, attain or share it. the bank secrecy exclusions are classified according to interests indicated in the article 31(3) of the constitution of the republic of poland, for which limitation of right or freedom is acceptable, namely for the safety or public order, or for protection of environment, health and public morals, or freedom and rights of other persons. these restrictions cannot infringe the essence of rights and freedoms. during the period of validity of the regulations of the banking law act from 19892, there was an attempt to qualify the bank secrecy as type of state secret, treated as information important due to the 1 konstytucja rzeczypospolitej polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., dz. u. z 1997 r. nr 78, poz. 483 z późn. zm. 2 ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1989 r. prawo bankowe, dz.u. 1989 nr 4 poz. 21. interests of the state with regard to defence or safety, or as a type of professional secret, with which an employee becomes familiar during the performance of duties in a state-owned or a cooperative organizational unit. analysing valid regulations of the banking law act it should be emphasized that a concept was chosen, in accordance with which the bank secrecy is a special type of secrecy, the so-called professional confidentiality (sikorski, 2011). bank secrecy main law in the banking act3, art. 104 of the law regulating the provision of individual as well as personal banking secrecy. the material scope of secrecy has been formulated according to the maximalism principle. it is worth emphasizing that bank secrecy also covers, apart from the contract itself, a business plan of the borrower, the content of contracts establishing credit claim provided as collateral, the financial condition of the borrower, the size and character of the borrower’s assets and other additional information, which the bank came to possess, taking actions concerning this contractual relationship (kaszubski, tupaj-cholewa, 2010). it suggests relatively wide range of validity of the bank secrecy. bank secrecy includes all information regarding bank’s activity, and thus also the activities consisting in issuing payment cards, which have been obtained at the stage of negotiations of the contract terms, at the time of entering into the contract and during its implementation (and thus, for instance, in the course of executing a payment order made with a debit card). owing to the use of the phrase „all information”, such operation reinforces protection of such information, because the discussed provision results in an obligation to apply the broad interpretation in relation to the information as to which there is a doubt whether it should be classified within the scope of the bank secrecy. hence, such information includes, inter alia, the number of the payment card, the data of the card holder, the pin code and others (kaszubski, obzejta, 2012). the scope and the principles of provision of information by the banks to some entities are regulated by separate acts, apart from the banking law act. this applies to: • tax authorities (on this basis of the tax code); • the general inspector for the financial information, on this basis of the act of 16 november 2000 on counteracting money laundering and terrorism financing4 (under this law, banks conducting 3 ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. – prawo bankowe, dz.u. 1997 nr 140 poz. 939 z późn. zm. 4 ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz finansowaniu terroryzmu, t.j. dz.u. z 2017 r. poz. 1049. 84 paulina jaszczuk a transaction whose value exceeds 15 000 eur are obliged to register such a transaction and inform it of this information by sending or providing transaction log data, among others transaction details, transaction date and amount); • fiscal control authorities, on the basis of the act of 28 september 1991 on fiscal control; • confidant and its deputy, on the basis of the provisions of the act on mortgage bonds and mortgage banks (kawulski, 2013). in addition, the ordinances lay down rules of processing the databases and other data containing information falling within the scope of bank secrecy by cba5 or abw67. data, which are collected by the banks already basically include not only our personal data, but also information regarding our financial situation, as well as our banking activities. all these data together, constitute the basis for determination of many aspects of our life. by analysing our transactions it can be easily determined what we like, what we do and where we are. usually bearing in mind the freedom and ease of making non-cash transactions, we often forget that we are not completely anonymous when using this form of payment, and, in this case, we do not take into account issues concerning the safety and the confidentiality of such solutions (mendis, gałęziowska, 2015). as it has been indicated in the decision of the provincial administrative court in warsaw, banks, in their very essence, are institutions of public trust8. for this reason, the banks are bound by an obligation of particular diligence in undertaking any actions, and in particular with regard to the obligation to keep bank secrecy and examination whether 5 pl. centralne biuro antykorupcyjne – central anti-corruption buremu. 6 pl. agencja bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego – internal security agency. 7 these are, for example: 1) rozporządzenie prezesa rady ministrów z dnia 6 maja 2013 r. w sprawie przetwarzania przez centralne biuro antykorupcyjne informacji i danych stanowiących tajemnicę bankową oraz informacji dotyczących umów o rachunek papierów wartościowych, umów o rachunek pieniężny, umów ubezpieczenia lub innych umów dotyczących obrotu instrumentami finansowymi (dz. u. z dnia 17 maja 2013 r.) dz.u.2013.572 and (2) rozporządzenie prezesa rady ministrów z dnia 18 lipca 2016 r. w sprawie przetwarzanie przez centralne biuro antykorupcyjne informacji i danych stanowiących tajemnicę bankową oraz informacji dotyczących umów o rachunek papierów wartościowych, umów o rachunek pieniężny, umów ubezpieczenia lub innych umów dotyczących obrotu instrumentami finansowymi (dz. u. z dnia 19 lipca 2016 r.), dz.u.2016.1057. 8 wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego w warszawie z dnia 27 lutego 2004 r., sygn. ii sa 291/03, lex nr 569664. there are statutory premises allowing for waiving of this secrecy. their primary role is to safeguard the interests of consumers, while maintaining adequate discretion. as aptly reasoned by the court of appeal in katowice, for the application for waiving of the bank secrecy it is unjustified to formulate non-statutory condition so that such information protected by the bank secrecy could not be obtained in any other way9. however, it should be pointed out that there is sufficient justification for the offense to be committed and that disclosure of the data subject to banking secrecy is sufficient to achieve the objectives of the criminal proceedings, including the efficiency and the process, which are intended to ensure that the offender is taken as soon as possible. the prosecutor may request the revocation of bank secrecy at any time and regardless of the state of the case, otherwise the purpose of the criminal proceedings could be terminated10. these regulations aiming at the speedy and effective conduct of both preparatory and judicial proceedings. when indicating the material scope of the bank secrecy, it should be pointed out that it includes not only information about activities of the banks, but also data carriers (including documents) containing this information. it is important that we would otherwise have to deal with the situation, in which a carrier of information would be issued without waiving the bank secrecy, and provision of information included on this carrier would be subject to secrecy. all information entrusted to the bank by the client are covered by bank secrecy, including information necessary for preparation of banking activities, such as credit application and its justification, along with the enclosed documents. this information determines banking activities, constituting the basis for undertaking subsequent activities, therefore premises for including them in the bank secrecy are identical as premises for the secrecy of the activities themselves11. it is worth noting about the new act on exchange of fiscal information with other states12, which sets principles and procedures of exchange of fiscal information with other states as well as obligations of financial institutions regarding exchange of that information. this might seem to interfere with the 9 postanowienie sądu apelacyjnego w katowicach z dnia 1 września 2010 roku, sygn.. ii akz 573/10, kzs 1/11 poz. 114. 10 postanowienie z dnia 6 marca 2014 roku – ii akz 65/14 do iii kp 52/14 so kraków. 11 postanowienie sądu apelacyjnego w krakowie z dnia 30 marca 2009 r., sygn. ii akz 106/09, kzs 2009/5/48. 12 ustawa z dnia 9 marca 2017 r. o wymianie informacji podatkowych z innymi państwami, dz.u. z 2017 r. poz. 648. bank secrecy in poland and the european union – selected issues 85 rules on bank secrecy. pursuant to article 6 of the said act the provisions limiting the access to the information legally protected, except for classified information, shall not be applicable to disclosure of information to the minister of finance and empowered institutions. the reason behind this regulation is to protect the financial institutions from claims on infringement of bank secrecy. 3. bank secrecy in the european union as for the legislation of the european union, the references to the bank secrecy are regulated in the essential legal act for the operation of the banks, namely the second council directive of 15 december 198913. in the article 16, the bank secrecy was defined as professional secrecy, and at the same time the principles of the disclosure of secrecy was introduced. the provisions of the council impose on the member states of the european union an obligation of introduction to their national legislation biding with bank secrecy of persons who have not only worked or are working for bank institutions, but also persons being auditors or experts, performing specific activities on behalf of the banks. it is also worth stressing that disclosure of information may occur only in the following circumstances: • in the event of insolvency proceedings; • towards banking supervisory authorities; • as part of international cooperation concerning the exchange of information between competent state authorities (pyzioł, 2001). knf14 in its letter of 28 december 2011 indicates that one of the objectives of the bank supervision is to ensure protection of confidential data covered by the bank secrecy. this protection bounds the banks and bank staff involved in the performance of banking operations. access to the data covered by the bank secrecy is strictly regulated, and their disclosure can be done provided that the bank grants authorization for such activity. the guarantee of protection of bank secrecy is also applied in the eu law, in accordance with directive 2006/48/ec relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions. it is worth emphasizing that waiving of the bank secrecy inconsistently with the provisions may result in tortious, contractual and criminal liability of 13 druga dyrektywa rady z dnia 15 grudnia 1989 r. w sprawie koordynacji przepisów ustawowych, wykonawczych i administracyjnych odnoszących się do podejmowania i prowadzenia działalności przez instytucje kredytowe, zmieniająca dyrektywę 77/780/ewg. 14 pl. komisja nadzoru finansowego – polish financial supervision commission the bank, which prejudges a particularly significant role of the bank secrecy in the act of 2002-banking law act”15. turning to the detailed discussion of the bank secrecy in the selected other european countries, taking into account the member states of the european union, the aforementioned directive 2006/48/ ec of the european parliament and of the council of 14.06.2006 on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions16 should also be discussed. in the context of the bank secrecy, articles 42, 44–52 should first be emphasized, pursuant to which member states are obliged to provide non-disclosure of professional confidentiality. in addition, article 46 of the aforementioned directive states that the member states may conclude cooperation agreement with competent authorities of third states allowing for the exchange of information only when disclosed information are covered by guarantees of protection of professional confidentiality. on the other hand, information originating from another member state may only be disclosed on the basis of an explicit and necessary permission of competent authorities, which disclosed it. the significance of the bank secrecy was also emphasized by the european court of human rights in the case of m. n. and others v. san marino, emphasizing that the right for private life includes also the use of the bank secrecy. in the judgment it has been indicated that the information obtained from bank documents indisputably constitutes personal data concerning a natural person, regardless of the sensitivity of such information. in addition, such information may also relate to professional activities and, in principle, there is no justification for excluding professional or economic activities from the concept of „private life” [from art. 8 convention]. it follows that the concept of ‚private life’ is applicable in the present case17. going to discuss bank secrecy in selected other european union countries,it should be pointed out that the english law shapes the bank secrecy based on the court rulings within the common law system, biding in this legal order. in the uk the obligation to secure the bank secrecy is an implied element of agreement between the client ant the bank. however, it is not of an absolute but rather of a conditional nature. it may be defined 15 pismo z dnia 28 grudnia 2011 r. komisja nadzoru finansowego dnb/iv/7111/179/1/msz/11, m.pr.bank. 2012/9/4-6 16 dyrektywa 2006/48/we parlamentu europejskiego i rady z dnia 14 czerwca 2006 r. w sprawie podejmowania i prowadzenia działalności przez instytucje kredytowe. 17 wyrok europejskiego trybunału praw człowieka m.n. i inni v. san marino z dnia 7 lipca 2015 r., sygn 28005/12. 86 paulina jaszczuk as “contractual”, which allow to set the level of responsibility for potential infringements. in terms of subjective perimeter of the bank secrecy the case from the 20s of xx century was crucial. it is connected with the genesis of the bank secrecy in the uk – the tournier case18. it was decided that the secrecy coveres not only the balance of the client’s account, but also the transactions and all collaterals encumbering the given account. additionally, all the data that the bank has attained during the time the account was opened is also included (zawirska, 2010). on the other hand, the examples of exemption from the bank secrecy were also included. these rules are still applicable. these are the following: disclosure of information upon the client’s acceptance, disclosure under the provisions of law, public duty or the interest of the bank (żygadło, 2011). prior to this verdict it was considered whether the confidentiality between the client and the bank is an outcome of a moral imperative. for instance in case foster v. bank of london from 1862 it was deliberated whether there is an obligation binding the bankers to keep secrecy with regard to balance of the client’s accounts. the jury decided that there is such an obligation and the judge confirmed that any rule opposed to the jury’s view had not existed (żygadło, 2011). it is worth pointing out that in english legislation, penal liability has not been provided in the case of violation of the obligation of confidentiality. on the other hand, the legal-civil liability is bound by the responsibility for the violation of the contract (zawirska, 2010). another example is the aforementioned switzerland, where banks and banking system became a symbol, and the history of the banking system stretches back to the 18th century, although officially the banking secrecy of the regulated in 1934 in the banking law. it is caused, inter alia, by the adopted principle of inviolability of the bank secrecy, which consolidated the trust in switzerland as the financial centre of europe and the world. the bank secrecy is additionally stemming from the right to protect the privacy and wealth of the clients stipulated in the civil code. a characteristic feature of swiss banks is the rigorous compliance with the bank secrecy. both wilful and unintentional violation of the bank secrecy constitutes criminal offences punishable with 6 months in prison or a fine in the amount 50 000 chf, respectively. in addition, the disclosure of the bank secrecy takes place only in the cases strictly defined by the 18 tournier v. national provincial and union bank of england, 1924, kings bench division 461. regulations, which also applies to the foreign prosecution bodies(gostomski, 2007). in france, austria, luxembourg and the netherlands, likwise in switzerland, infringement of the bank secrecy is punished however only if made deliberately. the bank secrecy is strongly protected also in liechtenstein and singapore. 4. conclusion bearing in mind the issues indicated above, i think that preservation of the bank secrecy is an extremely important obligation, which the banks must face. in conclusion, it must be stated that in the face of continual changes, in europe, and not coincide with the functioning of banking secrecy, banks as institutions of public trust should strive even more to ensure loyalty of clients, in the face of the willingness to protect personal data and the additional information, which the banks possess, due to the tasks performed by them. certainly building trust is not the case when bank employees steal customer data and databases, all of which contribute to the fact that people sometimes simply fear to produce their identity card, even necessary to set up a bank account. it seems that looking at such situations is a good solution, to exacerbate the penalties in polish penal law for such behavior and action as it is in the above described switzerland. references druga dyrektywa rady z dnia 15 grudnia 1989 r. w sprawie koordynacji przepisów ustawowych, wykonawczych i administracyjnych odnoszących się do podejmowania i prowadzenia działalności przez instytucje kredytowe, zmieniająca dyrektywę 77/780/ewg. dyrektywa 2006/48/we parlamentu europejskiego i rady z dnia 14 czerwca 2006 r. w sprawie podejmowania i prowadzenia działalności przez instytucje kredytowe. gostomski e., 2007, system bankowy w szwajcarii, acta universistatis lodziensis, folia oeconomica, 209, 93–101. kaszubski r., obzejta ł., 2012, karty płatnicze w polsce, lex wolters kluwer businnes, warszawa. kaszubski r., tupaj-cholewa a., 2010, prawo bankowe, wolters kluwer business, warszawa. kawulski a., 2013, prawo bankowe – komentarz, lexisnexis, warszawa. konstytucja rzeczypospolitej polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., dz. u. z 1997 r. nr 78, poz. 483 z późn. zm. mendis a., gałęziowska k., 2015, ochrona tajemnicy bankowej w świecie „big data”, ochrona danych osobowych, 5, 12–15. pismo z dnia 28 grudnia 2011 r. komisja nadzoru finansowego dnb/iv/7111/179/1/msz/11, m. pr. bank. 2012/9/4-6. bank secrecy in poland and the european union – selected issues 87 postanowienie sądu apelacyjnego w katowicach z dnia 1  września 2010 roku, sygn.. ii akz 573/10, kzs 1/11 poz. 114 postanowienie sądu apelacyjnego w krakowie z dnia 30 marca 2009 r., sygn. ii akz 106/09, kzs 2009/5/48. postanowienie z dnia 6 marca 2014 roku – ii akz 65/14 do iii kp 52/14 so kraków. pyzioł w., 2001, encyklopedia prawa bankowego, lexisnexis, warszawa. rozporządzenie prezesa rady ministrów z dnia 18 lipca 2016  r. w sprawie przetwarzanie przez centralne biuro antykorupcyjne informacji i danych stanowiących tajemnicę bankową oraz informacji dotyczących umów o rachunek papierów wartościowych, umów o rachunek pieniężny, umów ubezpieczenia lub innych umów dotyczących obrotu instrumentami finansowymi (dz. u. z dnia 19 lipca 2016 r.), dz.u.2016.1057. rozporządzenie prezesa rady ministrów z dnia 6 maja 2013  r. w sprawie przetwarzania przez centralne biuro antykorupcyjne informacji i danych stanowiących tajemnicę bankową oraz informacji dotyczących umów o rachunek papierów wartościowych, umów o rachunek pieniężny, umów ubezpieczenia lub innych umów dotyczących obrotu instrumentami finansowymi (dz. u. z dnia 17 maja 2013 r.) dz.u.2013.572 sikorski g., 2011, egzekucja z rachunków bankowych, currenda, numer 159421, lex. tournier v. national provincial and union bank of england, 1924, kings bench division 461. ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r.o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz finansowaniu terroryzmu, t.j. dz.u. z 2017 r. poz. 1049. ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. – prawo bankowe, dz.u. 1997 nr 140 poz. 939 z późn. zm. ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1989 r. prawo bankowe, dz.u. 1989 nr 4 poz. 21. ustawa z dnia 9 marca 2017 r. o wymianie informacji podatkowych z innymi państwami, dz.u. z 2017 r. poz. 648. wyrok europejskiego trybunału praw człowieka m.n. i inni v. san marino z dnia 7 lipca 2015 r., sygn. 28005/12. wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego w warszawie z dnia 27 lutego 2004 r., sygn. ii sa 291/03, lex nr 569664. zawirska p., 2010, tajemnica bankowa a prywatność – przykład szwajcarii i anglii, studia prawnicze, 3–4, 9–47. żygadło a., 2011, wyłączenia tajemnicy bankowej a prawo do prywatności, lex wolters kluwer businnes, warszawa. 1. introduction in the age of contemporary, in principle substantially unlimited, travel opportunities across europe, an important role is played by cross-border health services. each of us being abroad can become ill, may experience an injury, or accident. health as a superior value is subject to particular protection. in my article i will try to synthesize the regulations governing the indicated problems related to crossborder health services as well as demonstrate that these provisions do not allow an ordinary citizen to fully use cross-border health services. it is worth emphasising that one of human rights is the right to health, which is provided by the most important legal acts both on the domestic and international level (e.g. iccpr). the constitution of the republic of poland1, in article 68 section 1, guarantees the right to health protection to every citizen. it is a basic right, resulting from inherent and inalienable human dignity. as indicated by a. rabiega (2009), the functioning of the democratic state of law inseparably involves the necessity to respect the values which are both life and health, and the obligation to protect such rights rests on the state. in this context it is important to protect health through the implementation of cross-border health services. 1 konstytucja rzeczypospolitej polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., (dz. u. nr 78, poz. 483 ze zm.) cross-border health services – selected issues paulina jaszczuk collegium iuridicum, faculty of law, canon law and administration, john paul ii catholic university of lublin in lublin, spokojna 1, 20-074 lublin, poland, e-mail: jaszczuk.paulinaa@gmail.com citation jaszczuk p., 2018, cross-border health services – selected issues, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 32–36. abstract one of the superior principles in integrated europe is free flow of persons, services and capital. an expression of this freedom are regulations about coordination of social security systems binding both in eu and efta member states. the principles of granting health services and their scope are determined by the provisions about coordination of social security systems. in the article i will try to discuss the most important regulations regarding the issues related to cross-border health care, both eu regulations and the related provisions of the domestic law. key words health, health services, cross-border health services received: 09 july 2018 accepted: 25 august 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 32–36 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.026.9013 cross-border health services – selected issues 33 2. cross-border health services in the light of the eu law at the beginning of the deliberations, it should be indicated that one of the superior principles in integrated europe is free flow of persons, services and capital. an expression of this freedom are regulations about coordination of social security systems binding both in eu and efta member states. the principles of granting health services and their scope are determined by the provisions about coordination of social security systems. coordination consists in introducing and applying principles common for all member states, which determine the terms of receiving medical assistance by the patient (having the right to health care benefits in their country). they also allow each of the ue member states to retain its own, previously binding social and health security system (kowalska-mańkowska, 2018). coordination of the benefits provided under social security systems assumes granting the given individual access to health services to the extent they could use such benefits in their home country. in addition national authorities are obliged to respect and exercise the individual’s right to receive health care when staying abroad, at the same time, it should be pointed out that it is of no importance whether the person uses the benefits granted by a public, or a private institution, if they are refunded in the home country (tabaszewski, 2016). in accordance with the content of article 35 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union, everybody has the right to access prophylactic health care and the right to use treatment on the terms of established in domestic legislations and practices2. as indicated by r. tabaszewski (2016), the language interpretation of this provision excludes differentiation of the status of eu citizens and other persons. the eu legislator also, in article 168 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfue), indicates that, when determining and pursuing all the policies and actions of the european union, a high level of protection of human health is ensured3. the action of the european union which supplements national policies, is focused on improvement in public health as well as among others monitoring serious cross-border health hazards, early warning in the case of such hazards and combating them. moreover, in accordance with article 168 section 2 karta praw podstawowych unii europejskiej, dz.u.ue.c.2007.303.1. 3 traktat o funkcjonowaniu unii europejskiej, dz.u.2004.90.864/2, dz.u.ue.l.2016.200.137 2, the european union encourages the eu member states to cooperate in the fields of public health and supports any actions taken in this respect, also in particular encouraging collaboration between the eu member states in order to improve complementarily of their health services in border regions. it should be noted, that pursuant to article 6 letter a of tfue, the competence of the european union in public health is only supporting, coordinating and supplementary in nature towards the member states’ actions. therefore, performance of these competences consists, on the one hand, in receiving recommendations, opinions, resolutions, conclusions, messages, while on the other hand in financing member states’ actions (stankiewicz, 2016). eu’s basic derivative legislation governing the matters related to cross-border health care is directive of the european parliament and the council 2011/24/eu of 9 march 2011 on exercising patients’ rights in cross-border health care4. the purposes of the directive include: establishing principles to facilitate patients’ access to safe cross-border health care, ensuring patients’ mobility, promoting cooperation in health care between the member states, with full respect for the competences of the member states in organization and provision of health care (transgraniczna…). in addition, the primary goal is elimination of barriers in access to health protection for member states’ citizens moving between ue states. the directive establishes principles ensuring equal, non-discriminating access to high quality safe cross-border health care. essential for this discussion is also the legal definition of “the insured person”. clearly, according to the vocabulary of the definition from article 1 of the regulation of the european parliament and the council (ec) no. 883/204 of 29 april 2004 on coordination of social security systems it is each person meeting the conditions required on the basis of the laws of the member state to have the right to benefits5. it should be indicated that the insured person in one ue/efta member state is entitled to – while temporarily staying in a different ue/efta member state than the state of insurance, namely residence – use the material benefits which have become necessary in the course of such stay from the medical point of view, subject to the nature of these benefits 4 dyrektywa parlamentu europejskiego i rady 2011/24/ue z dnia 9 marca 2011 r. w sprawie stosowania praw pacjentów w transgranicznej opiece zdrowotnej, dz.u.ue.l.2011.88.45 5 rozporządzenie parlamentu europejskiego i rady (we) nr 883/204 z dnia 29 kwietnia 2004 r. w sprawie koordynacji systemów zabezpieczenia społecznego, dz.u.ue.l.2004.166.1, dz.u.ue-sp.05-5-72 34 paulina jaszczuk and duration of the stay, to be granted in order to avoid situations when the patient would be forced to return to the territory of the state of insurance to obtain treatment. such benefits should thus be described as unplanned. it seems necessary while staying abroad in connection with a sudden illness, an unexpected deterioration of the existing chronic disease or an accident6 (kowalska-mańkowska, 2018). 3. cross-border health services and the polish law issues associated with health care benefits granted outside the borders of poland have also been regulated in the domestic law and more specifically in chapter 2a of the act of 26th august 2004 on health care services financed from the public funds7. even before implementing the cross-border directive e. nojszewska pointed to the disadvantages and advantages of the introduced regulations, stressing the disadvantages of the new solutions being additional costs for the health care system related to the need to perform institutional – administrative obligations resulting from the directive (among others establishment of contact points or starting cooperation between the specified institutions). as the advantages, she regarded among others the possibility to pay for the benefits granted abroad using the domestic rates (nojszewska, 2011). regulations implementing the cross-border directive have given the polish patients the possibility to claim back the costs of the provided health care, but subject to the specified conditions, namely the given benefit in poland is included in the catalog of guaranteed services, the benefit has been granted within the area of another ue member state. in addition, it should be noted that this opportunity can only be used by persons who are able to finance the performed services on their own, because the funds from the national health fund (nfz) are received in the form of a refund. in performing some benefits limitations have also been introduced in applying for refund of costs by introducing the required prior approval, granted in the form of an administrative decision by the director of the national health fund (nfz) branch (nik informacja…, 2017)8. 6 efta – european free trade association. 7 ustawa z dnia 26 sierpnia 2004 r. o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych, dz.u.2017.1938 j.t. 8 eng. nik information on the post-control results, respecting patients’ rights in cross-border health care, lop.430 001.2017, register no. 45/2017/p/16/084/lop, warsaw, 29.06.2017 according to the ruling of the provincial administrative court in warsaw of 27 october 2017 when stating that the given health care benefit is not in the guaranteed services basket, as included in the respective, due to date of resolution of the case, regulation of the minister of health, the authority is under the obligation to refuse refund of the treatment costs in the above indicated procedure. the beneficiary, on the basis of article 42b of the act from 2004 on health care services financed from public funds, is only authorized to refund of the costs of benefits being guaranteed services (vi sa/wa 1323/17). in the case concerned the national health fund branch, examining the documentation, stated that the treatment concerned consisted in performing prosthetic supplements, which are not guaranteed services in poland pursuant to the binding legal act, namely the regulation of the minister of health of 6 november 2013 on guaranteed dental treatment services. the president of the national health fund also confirmed that the completed surgery was not within the scope of guaranteed services which the beneficiary is entitled to receive the refund for9. it should be noted that pursuant to article 42d section 2 item 6 of the act of 26 august 2004 on health care services financed from public funds10 the beneficiary is obligated to present documents containing sufficient date concerning the diagnostic or therapeutic process, allowing identification of the health care services related to the application for reimbursement of costs, and in the event of no cooperation from the party in this regard with the authority, the binding regulations envisage adverse effects for the party, namely issuing the decision on refusing refund of the costs by the director of the provincial branch of the national health fund. it clearly results from this provision that in the procedure for reimbursement of costs mentioned in article 42b of the act on benefits, the burden of proof with regard to the data concerning the diagnostic or therapeutic process, necessary to identify the health care services related to the application for reimbursement of costs, rests with the applicant party. in addition, it should be indicated that the matters related to insurance are strictly administrative cases, which has been clearly stressed by the supreme court in the decision of 28 may 201511, where 9 wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego w warszawie z dnia 27 października 2017 r., vi sa/wa 1323/17, lex nr 2446506. 10 ustawa z dnia 26 sierpnia 2004 r. o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych, dz.u.2017.1938 j.t. 11 postanowienie sądu najwyższego z dnia 28 maja 2015 r., iii czp 26/15, lex nr 1764817, biul.sn 2015/8/10 cross-border health services – selected issues 35 it indicated that the case for reimbursement of costs of treatment granted abroad, in spite of its property nature, is not a civil case as defined by article 1 and 2 of the code of civil procedure, as the recipient of this claim can only be the state as a public law entity. therefore, any case for reimbursement of costs of treatment granted abroad is an administrative case, to be resolved under the administrative procedure. what is significant for the right of the party applying for refund of costs on the basis of article 42b of the act of 2004 on health care services financed from public funds, it is of no importance whether the beneficiary went to another member state of the european union in order to obtain health services, or the treatment was not to be the main objective of the trip12. the cross-border directive assumes costs refund to the level to which the costs would be covered by the member state of insurance if the same health care was provided on its territory and in such amount as not to exceed the actual cost of the received health care. freedom has been left for the member states with regard to refund of costs in the full amount as well as in coverage of the costs of accommodation and travel. the national health fund is authorized to make refund of costs for the beneficiary in the amount it would finance the given benefit within the agreements concluded for the provision of health care services with polish service providers13. the application for reimbursement of costs is submitted within 6 months from the day of issuing the bill for provided health care the application relates to. it should also be noted that there is the institution named the national contact point, responsible for any cross-border health care matters. it is an institution operating in each ue member state. its tasks include, among others provision of information and assistance to persons which intend to or have already used health services on the terms specified in the cross-border directive (dyrektywa…). in addition, patients can also apply for reimbursement of costs of drugs or medical products purchased in another ue country based on a prescription issued by a polish doctor, or one from another ue country. the same thing applies to a prescription issued by a doctor from another ue state and realized in a polish pharmacy. the refund is concerned with medicines reimbursed in poland, according to the announcement of the minister of health valid on 12 wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego z dnia 27 maja 2016 r., vi sa/wa 250/16, lex nr 2113749. 13 wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego z dnia 27 maja 2016 r., vi sa/wa 250/16, lex nr 2113749. the day of realizing the prescription in the pharmacy. “cross-border” prescription is issued on the same print as the “regular” prescription, valid in a particular country (dyrektywa…). the supreme chamber of control has also made a statement about treatment abroad. it has been clearly indicated in the conclusions from the completed inspections that the introduction of the cross-border directive allowing polish patients to obtain refund of costs for treatment in other countries of the european union has not significantly increased access to health services. the main barrier in using fully the possibility of treatment abroad is, in their opinion, the need to independently finance the treatments by the patients who are then refunded treatment costs by nfz after the end of treatment. briefly referring to the statistics, it should be indicated that in the years 2014–2017 (until february) all nfz branches received only 86 applications concerning prior consent to benefits planned outside the borders of poland. at the same time it has to be stressed that only one consent to treatment abroad, later changed on the patient’s request, resulting in applying the regulations on coordination of social security systems and not the procedure established as a result introducing the cross-border directive (nik o leczeniu…, 2017). in the post-control conclusions, nik (supreme chamber of control) indicated the need to simplify the procedure for examination of the applications for reimbursement of costs of health care obtained in an ue member state other than the republic of poland and making of the refunds as well as to develop and implement mechanisms providing persons, who have used health care outside the borders of poland and require further medical observation, access to the observation what would be provided in the case of using health care on the state’s territory (nik o leczeniu…, 2017). it should also be noted that the right to health protection which, as earlier indicated, is a right of each person, is not identical with the right to health services financed by public funds which is only granted to polish citizens. persons not meeting the criterion of citizenship have guaranteed access to health services, but with the exception of these benefits which are financed by public funds (jaroszyński, 2016). 4. conclusions to sum up, it should be stated that cross-border health care is ensured by both domestic and european regulations, which i have referred to above. 36 paulina jaszczuk it should be indicated that this is a proper solution providing travelling citizens access to medical care. however, as it results from the statistics quoted by nik, few people use the opportunity of using medical services in the european union member countries. this can result from among others small awareness of people in this respect and concerns that even if there is a possibility to use a particular service abroad, these costs will not be refunded. perhaps, it would be reasonable to e.g. start activities described in article, promoting the possibility to use medical services outside poland, e.g. by presenting how the procedure of applying for refund of such benefits looks like. it seems that some actions in this respect could also be performed by local government units as, according to the principle of decentralization of public authority, some public authority rights and responsibilities are transferred from state authorities to local government authorities on as low level as possible. references dyrektywa parlamentu europejskiego i rady 2011/24/ue z dnia 9 marca 2011 r. w sprawie stosowania praw pacjentów w transgranicznej opiece zdrowotnej, dz.u.ue.l.2011.88.45. dyrektywa transgraniczna, /no data/, narodowy fundusz zdrowia zachodniopomorski oddział wojewódzki w szczecinie, szczecin, http://www.nfz-szczecin.pl/nguqv_dyrektywa_transgraniczna.htm [08.08.2018]. jaroszyński j., 2013, finansowanie produktów leczniczych w polsce, [in.] m. szewczak, b. drop, r. śmiech (eds.), prawo w ochronie zdrowia. doświadczenia i perspektywy rozwoju, wydawnictwo kul, lublin, 197–254. karta praw podstawowych unii europejskiej, dz.u.ue.c.2007.303.1. konstytucja rzeczypospolitej polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., dz. u. nr 78, poz. 483 uniform text. kowalska-mańkowska i., 2018, komentarz do art.42(a) ustawy o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych, [in.] a. pietraszewska-macheta (ed.), ustawa o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych. komentarz, wpk lex. nik informacja o wynikach po kontroli, 29.06.2017 r., respektowanie praw pacjentów w transgranicznej opiece zdrowotnej, lop.430.001.2017, nr ewid. 45/2017/p/16/084/lop, warszawa. nik o leczeniu za granicą, 2017, najwyższa izba kontroli, warszawa, https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/nik-o-leczeniu-za-granica.html [04.07.2018]. nojszewska e., 2011, funkcjonowanie systemu ochrony zdrowia w polsce na tle wybranych krajów europejskich, [in.] k. ryć, z. skrzypczak (ed.), ochrona zdrowia na świecie, wolters kluwer polska, warszawa, 49–90. postanowienie sądu najwyższego z dnia 28 maja 2015 r., iii czp 26/15, lex nr 1764817, biul.sn 2015/8/10. rabiega a., 2009, ochrona życia i zdrowia ludzkiego w działaniach podmiotów administrujących w sferze opieki zdrowotnej, wydawnictwo sejmowe, warszawa. rozporządzenie parlamentu europejskiego i rady (we) nr  883/204 z dnia 29 kwietnia 2004r. w sprawie koordynacji systemów zabezpieczenia społecznego, dz.u.ue.l.2004.166.1, dz.u.ue-sp.05-5-72. stankiewicz r., 2016, krajowe systemy ochrony zdrowia a unia europejska. przykład polski, wolters kluwer polska. tabaszewski r., 2016, prawo do zdrowia w systemach ochrony praw człowieka, wydawnictwo kul, lublin. traktat o funkcjonowaniu unii europejskiej, dz.u.2004.90.864/2, dz.u.ue.l.2016.200.137. transgraniczna opieka zdrowotna, /no data/, rzecznik praw pacjenta, warszawa, https://www.bpp.gov.pl/dla-pacjenta/transgraniczna-opieka-zdrowotna/ [03.07.2017]. ustawa z dnia 26 sierpnia 2004 r. o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych, dz.u.2017.1938 uniform text. wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego w warszawie z dnia 27 października 2017 r., vi sa/wa 1323/17, lex nr 2446506. wyrok wojewódzkiego sądu administracyjnego z dnia 27 maja 2016 r., vi sa/wa 250/16, lex nr 2113749. 1. introduction today, the issue of exercising the rights to land is becoming increasingly important in front of ukraine as an independent state, which is heading towards the european community. one of the key vectors of the transformation of the land system in ukraine is a fundamental modernization of the system of public administration in the field of land use and protection (bondar, 2018). according to the constitution of ukraine (konstytucìâ…, 1996), the land is proclaimed the main national wealth of our country. in addition, the land code of ukraine (zemel’nij…, 2001) establishes the pluralism of land ownership forms, defines the types of land rights, as well as the circle of subjects of ownership and use of land. the above-mentioned legal acts and other laws adopted for their development determine precisely the objective land rights, the characteristic feature of which is their static nature. however, issues related to the content and mechanism of exercising of subjective land rights are actualized today. the exercising of such rights is inherent in the dynamics, which manifests itself in the behavior of certain actors in order to meet the needs and legitimate interests associated with the use of land in general or individual plots of land. through the exercise of the corresponding rights to land, the subjects realize the objective rights of land provided for by the constitution of ukraine, the land code of ukraine and other normative-legal acts. at the same time, the volume of such implementation is not always the same due about restrictions of land rights in ukraine dmytro fedchyshyn (1), iryna ignatenko (2) (1) department of civil law, zaporizhzhia national university, zhukovskoho 6b, 69600 zaporizhzhia, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0002-1565-8150 e-mail: marlynkh@gmail.com (corresponding autor) (2) department of land and agrarian law, yaroslav mudryi national law university, pushkinska 77, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0003-0398-9891 e-mail: irena.nekosargot@gmail.com citation fedchyshyn d., ignatenko i., 2019, about restrictions of land rights in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 23–27. abstract the article deals with restrictions on the exercise of land rights. attention is paid to the consideration of the content of the concept of “restriction of subjective right to land” and the views of domestic scientists regarding its definition are analyzed. the classification of restrictions on rights to land by different criteria is proposed. the peculiarities of reconciliation of public and private interests in the establishment of restrictions on the rights to land are explored. key words restriction of land rights, land use, land ownership, public interests, private interests, ukraine. received: 14 january 2018 accepted: 26 january 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 23–27 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.03 24 dmytro fedchyshyn, iryna ignatenko to factors of a legal nature. in this context, attention should be paid to restriction of land rights. issues related to restrictions of rights, including land rights, were the subject of scientific research of such famous domestic scientists as: v. andreytsev (2006), t. kharytonova (2016), o. kot (2016), p. kulynych (2011), v. nosik (2006), m. shulga (1998) and others. the land plot is the object of the interests of an unlimited number of natural and legal persons, who are obliged to refrain from committing actions that may violate the rights of owners or users of the land or prevent them from carrying out transactions within the ownership, use or disposal of a land plot (part thereof ). as v. nosik (2006) proclaims, in accordance with the constitution of ukraine, the right to own, use and dispose of land by citizens, legal entities must be carried out within the limits specified by law. at the same time, the legal framework in which a person exercises his powers of the owner or user of the land as an obstacle that prevents anyone, without the consent of the owner or user without proper legal grounds, to interfere in the realization of their land rights. these frameworks provide landowners and land users with the opportunity to choose the legal forms, means of protecting ownership rights or the right to use land from unlawful actions of state authorities and local self-government, as well as third parties. at the same time, the lawful establishment of legal restrictions and restrictions of the right to exercise the powers of the owner of the land is consistent with the legal nature of the constitutional guarantee of inviolability of the right to ownership of land. this is due to the permissibility and the possibility of limiting the right of private property provided for in articles 13, 41 of the constitution of ukraine, according to which the ownership of land obliges, and therefore the use of ownership of land cannot harm the rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens, the interests of society, worsen the ecological situation and natural qualities of land (konstytucìâ…, 1996). in addition, for the users of land plots, ukrainian civil law provides general requirements for the conclusion of lease agreements, and the land legislation provides special requirements for the parties of such agreements regarding the special nature of land and necessity of its protection (fedchyshyn et al., 2018). 2. restrictions of land rights the concept of restriction of subjective land right has a special scientific and practical significance and is the basis for the study of restrictions in the exercise of land rights. general theoretical studies of the restrictions of rights, the discovery and analysis of their essential features and types allows it to consider with greater depth, consistency and justification the problems of restrictions of ownership rights. modern scholars (kot, 2016; kuznetsova, 2014; stefanchuk, 2008), in their writings pay a lot of attention to the restriction of subjective civil and other rights, defining the general theoretical foundations of such restrictions. at the same time, some authors (kharytonova, 2016; nosik, 2006; rozgon, 2006) emphasize the connection between restrictions of freedoms of the subject in exercising rights to land with public interests. the law, combining permissions and prohibitions, fulfills two objectives: on the one hand, it defines the limits of the freedom of the participants in the legal relationship, and, on the other, ensures the freedom of man by means of effective mechanisms that make it possible to make human freedom a reality. in turn, the task of legal regulation is the harmonization of relations between man and society, since, objectively, the interests of an individual subject may not coincide with the interests of the state, society or part of it. for example, in the republic of serbia, the right of ownership of agricultural land can be deprived or limited only in public interest determined by the law or by a governmental decision (trgovčević-prokić, počuča, 2016). based on the contents of article 1 of the first protocol of the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the deprivation of property rights may be exercised solely on terms laid down by law or the general principles of international law (konvenciâ…, 1950). unlike the subjective right, as a measure of possible behavior of an authorized person, limitation of the right constitutes a certain difficulty, deterrence in the exercise of a particular subjective right. restriction of land rights is a system of legal norms established by regulatory acts in order to protect the morals, rights and legitimate interests of the population and others, ensuring the defense of the country and the security of the state. in the scientific literature d. meyer (1864) opposed the restriction of ownership to the rights of others to the thing and noted that the restrictions do not constitute the right to another’s thing, because such a right is allocated from the right of ownership, and the restrictions are its limit. the owner due to restrictions of ownership was deprived of the possibility to perform one or another act in relation to a thing, whereas without such restriction, according to his right, he could have acted. in addition, the owner, as a result of restricting ownership, about restrictions of land rights in ukraine 25 undertook to admit one or another action against the thing from another person, while he could and would not have been allowed without restriction. however, the scientist comes to the conclusion that the owner was not obliged to make a certain active action as a result of his ownership rights restrictions. today, on this issue, there are quite a lot of diverse opinions of scientists. for example, m. stefanchuk (2008) rightly observes in his study that the restrictions have a negative nature. they prohibit (narrow or exclude) certain possibilities for realization by subject of his right and thus they differ from the limits of realization of the right, which reflect the positive aspect in realization by the subject of his right. thus, they establish possible (permitted or not prohibited) variants of the behavior of the subject. o.  rozgon (2006), considering the limits and restrictions of ownership, gives some of their differences. in particular, in her opinion, the limits characterize the ownership in the objective sense and restrictions are established on the subjective right of ownership. limits have a general nature and apply to all owners, but restrictions are established in relation to the rights of a particular subject. also, the scholar points out that the limits are too broad, since they include such criteria for their establishment as “moral principles of society”, “the impossibility of using the owner of his rights to the detriment of the rights of others” etc. restrictions, however, determine the requirements for certain actions or refrain from certain actions. in addition, it should be emphasized that the restrictions are characterized by dynamism, since they can both be installed and removed, affecting the possibility of exercising the land right. for example, according to article 111 of the land code of ukraine and adopted in accordance to it other normative legal acts, contracts and court decisions there may be established such restrictions in the use of land plots: (a) condition to begin or complete construction on, or to bring into cultivation, the land plot during the established period of time; (b) forbidding the conduct of certain kinds of activities; (c) forbidding a change in the purpose of use/designation of the land plot, landscape; (d) condition to build, repair or maintain a road or a section of a road; (e) condition of observing nature conservation requirements or carrying out indicated work; (f ) requirement to allow hunting, fishing, gathering wild plants on one’s land plot during established periods and according to the established procedure (zemel’nij…, 2001). in turn, limits have a static nature. they are an integral part of the relevant right, which defines it. 3. types of restrictions considering the types of restrictions, it is possible to distinguish them according to various criteria. in particular, by types of activities carried out: (a) nature protection activity – due to the use of natural complexes, resources and landscapes that are located on or near the land and form a viable environment; (b) property activity – associated with the exploitation of various property located on the land; (c) other activity – established by features of the implementation of social, economic, commercial demand in accordance with the statutory power of entities. depending on the nature of the occurrence of restrictions, they can be divided into several groups: (a) due to the setting of easements; (b) due to the influence of norms of “neighbor” law; (c) constitute an institution designed to provide social needs and which have a legislative basis in the interests of not individuals, but of all society with the domination of public principles over private. in addition, a. tretyak (2001) proposes to divide all restrictions on the content of the legal relationship to those: (a) which provide the right to use someone else’s land; (b) which prohibit the implementation of certain actions on their own land; (c) which is a combination of the first and second types of restrictions. the author also proposes to classify restrictions on the use of land according to the functional feature – the degree of suitability of land for various types of economic use through the establishment of criteria for restrictions on land use. for the purpose of practical consideration of restrictions, there is a classification of them on such subspecies as: legal, ecological, agrotechnical and special. 4. restriction of rights as a factor of balance of public and private interests as it is known, the system of legal regulation of social relations includes in its composition permissions, prohibitions and positive obligations. this triad of legal regulation arose in roman law. in the xx century there were theories that justify the use of three varieties of regulatory norms – prohibiting, authorizing and binding. however, some scholars have identified a fourth set of legal instruments – legal restrictions. s. alekseev (1989) noted that the restriction of subjective right is achieved through a well-known triad of methods, by limiting permissions, new prohibitions and additional obligations. restriction of rights is expressed in the pinching of the subject in the exercise of subjective right. however, we cannot accept without objection the further argument 26 dmytro fedchyshyn, iryna ignatenko of this author that the “restriction” in the exercise of subjective rights due to the transfer of its possible implementation to a third party. it seems that the restriction of subjective law (for example, ownership of land) is connected, above all, with ensuring the interests of society as a whole. in this case, as an example, we can consider zones of sanitary protection created around objects with underground and open sources of water supply, water collection and water purification facilities, water pipelines, sanitary facilities and others for their sanitary and epidemiological protection (article 113 of the land code of ukraine) (zemel’nij…, 2001). activities within these zones are prohibited, which may result in damage to the above-mentioned objects. since such restrictions are diverse and rather rigid, the tasks of regulation should be weighty and important, as well as the result of legal regulation, which should be significant for society and the state (fedchyshyn, ignatenko, 2018). at present, the coordination of conflicting private and public interests by eliminating legal, economic, socio-ecological problems by satisfying the public and individual claims of the population of the country is an important link in the reformation of land ownership relations and formation of principles of market economic. v. nosik (2006) believes that the absence of land market and abstract (when ownership is not associated with physical occupation) land rights potentially lead to corruption in state bodies of power and local governments. in turn, restrictions and burdens do not encourage enterprises and citizens to finance measures to improve land and carry out their production intentions, inducing the need to alienate land property. the complication of social (including social-land) relations in ukraine is caused by contradictory economic and social processes, which causes a clear imbalance of private and public interests, characterized by the fact that one set of interests does not objectively dominate the other. m. kuntsevych (2014) points out that the achievement of the balance of public and private interests always constitutes the greatest problem of society, and therefore the ways of harmonization of these interests should be defined in the mechanism of the regulatory control of any social relations. consequently, on the one hand, private interests should be carefully balanced with the aspirations and claims of the entire nation, on the other hand – the state as a representative of the interests of the people through power institutions should promote the reconciliation of public interests with the interests of individuals. taking into account the above, we can determine that the process of constructive combination (balance) and the mutual reconciliation of public and private interests should be regarded as a philosophical and integrative model. in land relations, the achievement of a balance between private and public interests occurs through the development of acceptable mechanisms for the harmonization of requirements, both from the state to owners and users of land, and from landowners and land users in relation to state systems. at the same time, representatives of the private sector of land relations are trying to get around the burdensome issues of restoring productive qualities of land. instead, institutions of state power are pursuing strategies for introducing systemic burdens on the rights of land owners and users, and applying restrictions to the use of land and land plots of all forms of ownership. currently, the practice of applying encumbrances to the urban land is more in demand within the settlements, while requirements and norms of an ecological nature in the form of restrictions on the use of land and land shares are applied to agricultural land. n. ilkiv (2008) notes that the realization of public interest by subjects of land law acts as an objective need of society in ensuring the priority of the requirements of environmental safety in the use of land over economic results, which is of particular importance for agricultural land plots. planning civilized land relations that would balance the interests of landowners, land users, society and the state, in agriculture has its own specifics. it provides an integrated approach that identifies the reconciliation (combination) of private interests associated with the use of productive properties of agricultural land and the public interest due to the preservation of natural properties of land as a natural resource. such an interdependent balance of economic and socio-environmental interests in the regulation of economic activity should be based on the prerogative of the interests of the state and society (public interests) under their profitability for each carrier of private interest. only in this situation, the strengthening of state control and supervision in the field of environmental land use will be inappropriate. 5. conclusion it should be emphasized that the legal mechanism of restrictions of rights, including rights to land plots, is one of the ways to ensure an optimal combination of public and private interests. for the legislation of ukraine, as well as for the legislation of a number of the most developed countries of europe and latin america, there are certain restrictions on the land about restrictions of land rights in ukraine 27 rights. moreover, in recent years there has been a tendency in the legislative consolidation of restrictions, as a result of which it can be argued that the restrictions on the powers of use and disposal of land plots are steadily increasing. all of this is the result of the desire of the human community to preserve the land as a limited and unforgiving natural object for future generations. references alekseev s.s., 1989, obŝie dozvoleniâ i obŝie zaprety v sovetskom prave (eng. general permissions and general prohibitions in soviet law), ûridičeskaâ literatura, moskva. andreytsev v.i., 2005, zemelni pravovidnosyny za čynnym zemelnym kodeksom ukraїni: mify ta realnist (eng. land legal relations under the current land code of ukraine: myths and reality), visnyk kyїvskogo nacionalnogo universytetu imeni tarasa ŝevčenko, 68, 47–51. bondar o., 2018, public administration in the field of land use and protection and state land policy in ukraine: problems of correlation, baltic journal of economic studies, 4(3), 22–27, doi: 10.30525/2256-0742/2018-4-3-22-27 fedchyshyn d., ignatenko i., 2018, protection of land ownership of foreigners in ukraine, juridical tribune, 8(special issue), 27–38. fedchyshyn d., ignatenko i., shulga m., 2018, legal principles of organic production in ukraine: realities and prospects, economics of agriculture, 65(4), 1513–1528. doi: 10.5937/ ekopolj1804513f ilkiv n., 2008, deržavne regulûvannâ zemelnyh orendnyh vidnosyn (eng. state regulation of land lease relations), socialno-ekonomični problem sučasnogo periody ukraїny, 6(74), 260–269. kharytonova t.ê., 2016, zdijsnennâ prav na čuži zemelni dilânku v ukraїni: problemy teoriї ta praktyky (eng. exercising of rights on other people’s land plots in ukraine: problems of theory and practice), ûrydyčna literatura, odesa. konstytucìâ ukraїni vid 28.06.1996 roku № 254k/96-vr (eng constitution of ukraine from 28.06.1996 no 254k/96-vr), 1996, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/254%d0%ba/96-%d0%b2%d1%80 (accessed 22 september 2018). konvenciâ pro zahyst prav lûdyny ta osnovopoložnyh svobod vid 04.11.1950 (eng. convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms from 04.11.1950) 1950, https://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_cont ent&view=article&id=276%253a1&lang=uk (accessed 22 september 2018). kot o.o., 2016, meži zdijsnennâ subjektyvnyh cyvilnyh prav (eng. limits of exercising of subjective civil rights), visnyk nacionalnoї akademiї pravovyh nauk ukraїnu, 4, 127–137. kulynyč p.f., 2011, pravovi problem ohorony i vykorustannâ zemel silskogospodarskogo pryznačennâ (eng. legal issues of protection and use of agricultural land in ukraine), logos, kyiv. kuncevyč m., 2014, publični i pryvatni interesy (eng. public and private interests), pravovyj visnyk ukraїnskoї akademiї bankivskoї spravy, 2(11), 11–14. kuznecova n.s., 2014, razvitie graždanskogo obšestva i sovremennoe častnoe pravo ukraїny (eng. development of civil society and modern private law of ukraine), vybrani praci (eng. selected works), ûrydyčna praktyka, kyiv, 233–256. meyer d.i., 1864, russkoe graždanskoe pravo (eng. russian civil law), tipografiâ tiplena i ko, sankt-peterburg. nosik v.v., 2006, pravo vlasnosti na zemlû ukraїnskogo narodu (eng. ownership on land of the ukrainian people), ûrinkom-inter, kyiv. rozgon o.v., 2006, meži ta obmežennâ prava vlasnosti (eng. limits and restrictions of ownership right), fop lysâk, kharkiv. shulga m.v., 1998, aktuanye pravovye problem zemelnyh otnošenij v sovremennyh usloviâh (eng. actual legal problems of land relations in modern conditions), konsum, kharkov. stefančuk m.o., 2008, meži zdijsnennâ subjektyvnyh cyvilnyh prav (eng. limits of exercising of subjective civil rights), knt, kyiv. tretâk a. m., 2001, klasyfikator obmežen prav pry vykorystanni zemelnyh dilânok (eng. classification of restrictions while using land plots), czru, kyiv. trgovčević-prokić m., počuča m., 2016, acquisition of agricultural land, economics of agriculture, 63(4), 1281–1295, doi: 10.5937/ekopolj1604281t. zemel’nij kodeks ukraїni vid 25.10.2001 roku № 2768-14 (eng. land code of ukraine from 25.10.2001, no 2768-14), 2001, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2768-14 (accessed 22 september 2018). 1. introduction addressing speech of the un secretary general on the occasion of the fifth independence anniversary of ukraine was noted that after the “cold war” there had happened unprecedented outbreak of military conflicts, most of which had internal nature, especially within the territories of former soviet union (національна безпека…, 1997). conducting the anti-terrorist operation (ato) on the territories of luhansk and donetsk oblasts, situation with crimea annexation, conservation of long-term social and political tensions in certain regions of ukraine and repeated tension of anti-state political forces – all these prove the necessity of formation and implementation of the system of anti-crisis public management in order to make the effective decisions in proper time. in order accept dynamic decisions under conditions of the hybrid warfare, on the january 25, 2015 the national security council of ukraine (nsc) has proposed to create military-civil administrations (mca) in the settlements of donetsk and luhansk oblasts (про рішення…, 2014). this approach has provided the opportunities to resolve the issues of absence of governments at the liberated territories, when all elected deputies of local councils left journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 49–55 doi: 10.4467/24512249jg.18.006.8158 military-civil administrations as the mechanism of specific decision making process under conditions of anti-terrorist operation oleksandr voronov state management department, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, ezhena pottier 20, 03057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: vorrronn9@mail.ru citation voronov o., 2018, military-civil administrations as the mechanism of specific decision making process under conditions of antiterrorist operation, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 49–55. abstract in the article the author has examined the specific conditions of public administration functioning in the zone of anti-terrorist operation. also it was mentioned that the condition of hybrid military conflict in which ukraine appeared, requires extraordinary decision making. in order to form specific decisions on the basis of technologies of civil-military collaboration, this work studies the process of building and improving the network of military-civil administrations. key words military-civil administrations of ukraine, anti-terrorist operation in ukraine, civil-military collaboration, administrative decisions, military conflict in ukraine. received: 08 june 2017 accepted: 02 august 2017 published: 30 march 2018 50 oleksandr voronov their positions because of proclaiming separatism. thus, it is planned to maintain the system of public administration in the capable functioning conditions until holding local elections. based on this we can state that the purpose of this article is to analyse prospective tendencies for development of mca administration system, especially in decision-making process by taking into consideration civil and military technologies. 2. research results analysis in 2015 the president of ukraine signed the law № 141-viii, where it was written that within donetsk and luhansk oblasts, being a part of the antiterrorist center at the security service of ukraine, there have been formed the mcas – temporary state agencies created: to ensure the compliance of the constitutional regulations and laws of ukraine; to maintain security and to support normal conditions of life for population; to guarantee the rule of law and to combat the sabotage and terrorist operations, as well as to prevent humanitarian disaster in the area of anti-terrorist operation (про військово-цивільні…, 2015). this law came into effect on february 28, 2015. the mcas have authorized to solve issues in tax and business activities, unless a local council does not able to solve these problems. in order to optimize special decision-making process, the law on military-civil administrations (law on mca) brought certain changes into the law of ukraine “on fighting terrorism” (про боротьбу з тероризмом…, 2003). the law on mca was prolonged in february, 2016 based on the decree of the president of ukraine which was approved by the verkhovna rada of ukraine (parliament of ukraine). this law may lose its validity in the case when ukraine implements legal military situation at particular territories, or in the case of war declaration. the law “on military-civil administrations” adopted by the parliament of ukraine became a response to those ones who tried to force the president of ukraine to announce military situation the state and to provoke global military confrontation (про військово-цивільні…, 2015). another reason to create an optimal system of administrative decision-making under specific conditions of public administration was the “military-administrative division of the territory of ukraine”, approved by decree of the president of ukraine № 498/2013 on september 2, 2013 (про затвердження…, 2013; про затвердження…, 2016) according to this regulation there were defined the areas of responsibilities and the settings for special decision-making for the armed forces of ukraine and other enforcement agencies and armed units. in 2015, the president of ukraine signed the decrees on creating mca (the decree №123 on march 5 (про утворення…, 2015), the decree №286 on may 26 (про утворення…, 2015), the decree №469 on august 7 (про утворення…, 2015) and the decree №472 on august 1 (про утворення…, 2015)) where have been specified the particular division of administrative areas. also, the responsibilities, main directions of activities were designed and the heads of mcas were appointed on their positions. finally, there were created 30 mcas, and thus, have formed the optimal conditions for efficient cooperation between civil and military structures under the crisis situation. in the field of activities between civil and military authorities there were introduced the concept of civil-military collaboration (cmc) and the experience of armed forces of ukraine related to the military conflicts in other states was applied. by enacting these regulations, many problems began to resolve in the donetsk and luhansk oblasts. as a result, some local self-government bodies were eliminated from executing of their responsibilities. in the cities and settlements where public bodies were paralyzed, their functions had been taken by the structures that formed in case of necessity with the goal to prepare and to adopt topical administrative decisions. these structures and their creation were assumed the by the decree of the president of ukraine. those structures are equipped by militaries such as military servants, officers and soldiers – assigned representatives of law enforcement authority (police), and the employees who signed a contract with the anti-terrorist center under the security service of ukraine. authorities given to the mcas are much wider than the ones given to local state administrations. state administrations have usual range of authorities provided by laws, but the powers given to military representatives and civilian administrations could be divided into three types. first type – are the authorities (powers) belonged to the local public administrations, second type – are the ones given to the local self-government bodies, third type – special powers, like curfews, restricts in the trading activities, construction of the checkpoints within settlements and beyond them. this decision-making system is grounded on the practical experience gained during collaboration between ukrainian and foreign military and civilian structures (цивільновійськове…, 2015). representative of the general staff of armed forces of ukraine mr. m. ordynovych has emphasized that in the us army there is a strict rule: it must be established a strong centralization in military-civil administrations as the mechanism of specific decision making… 51 decision-making process and full decentralization in the process of their implementation – this could ensue the effectiveness in decisions and used in the mca activities. today ukrainian militaries have a good experience and can share it with the representatives of mcas, they can teach cma members certain tactical elements of conducting ato, as well as how to operate under conditions of hybrid warfare, including experience of specific decisionmaking system cmc (ординович, 2015). following yu. lutsenko’s words, in this way it will be settled the right of oblast state administrations (osa) to establish checkpoints, to assign issues of controlling and passing them, to implement tax goods trade regime at the front-line area, to adopt the budget of the local self-government council. and, in the case of absence of local deputies’, the village head could be replaced by civilian or military person according to decree of osa. positive changes for problematic territories would be visible while executing the effective mechanism of mca law implementation. at the same time, the law contains some problematic issues concerning the interaction of local administrations with anti-terrorist center, but these issues can be settled down. the rate of problem areas development has been declined by 30%. every day business facilities are destroyed, the coal shafts are flooded, and production has stopped. unless combat actions do not stop, this trend will rise and quite negatively impact to the economy development of donetsk and luhansk oblasts as well as to ukraine, in general (kовальов, 2015). according to the preliminary calculations in the donetsk region there were more than twenty villages and towns where people had to overcome many problems on their own and to survive somehow. status of temporary state agencies in the donetsk region has received donetsk oblast mca, mariyska and volnovakha raions mcas, krasnogorivka, vugledar, avdeevka towns mcas. they obtained all powers and functions given to temporary state agencies, they are responsible for civil order and public safety. concerning real situation, the donetsk oblast administration works under conditions of emergency. special committee and headquarters took the responsibility to solve the contemporary issues. the mca work at the territory under control of ukraine could strengthens discipline and turns on the mechanism of operative and effective decisionmaking process. among critical problems we can mention about the following ones: the bypass issue, which caused numbers of complaints had already adjusted; the costs needed to carry out the tasks of life support at the region are involved from the state budget of ukraine. similar processes are deployed in the luhansk oblast. there was created the luhansk oblast mca, the stanycno-luhansky, popasny and novoaydarsky raions mcas (active combat operations had been conducted within mentioned territories, and those territories mostly affected by the military attacks). mcas have been organized in such settlements as triokhizbenka, novotoshivka and troitske. it is still under discussion the issues of creating military-civil administrations in other towns and settlements. in the case of military operations state administrations usually do not carry out their duties. newly created mcas fulfil all functions related to the life support for civilian population – from birth to death. administration can limit traffic on certain streets and territories, it can barred the entrance to the city, to prohibit sale of alcohol, weapons, to withdraw armour even the one, which was purchased legally, to make decisions about curfew and disallow public events if there is a risk for life. yu. lutsenko thinks that the law on military-civil administrations should be extended to the territories of kharkiv and odessa oblasts (луценко, 2015). today the mechanism of humanitarian aid delivering has adjusted within ukraine’s temporarily not controlled territories. this field is under the interest of common population, public administrations staff, international humanitarian missions, including “red cross”. the law provides for the item where it is stated that regional mca creates favourable conditions for carriage of goods to the civilian population living on territory which is not controlled by ukrainian authorities (kонарева et al, 2015). in some parts of the ato zone the process of establishing peaceful life has been set up. there were eight mcas which stopped their work in april, 2016 based on the decree №125 / 2016 signed by the president of ukrain (питання припинення…, 2016). the decision was made on the opening day of the first session of newly elected local councils and mcas have lost their authorities in these raions. thus, there were liquidated such mcas at: artemivsk, volnovaha, volodarsky, constantynivsk, maryinsky and pershotravnevy raions (within donetsk oblast), and, novoaydarsky and stanichno-luhansky raions (within luhansk oblast). at the same time the mechanism of mca functioning is quite complex and not always promotes the adoption of best possible solutions. the legal peculiarity of the mca’s is that it is considered as a state body with cross-subordination to: the president of ukraine – because the president is responsible for mca’s creation and he appoints mca’s heads; the anti-terrorist center under the security service of ukraine (ssu) – from the point of legislative statement and specific functions performed within the 52 oleksandr voronov ato; the cabinet of ministers of ukraine – under vertical subordination while executing functions of state administration of relevant area or oblast; verkhovna rada of ukraine (parliament of ukraine) – by implementing military-civil collaboration (шевченко, 2016). this subordination significantly complicates the decision making process, but it has an objective reason because of tasks associated to providing mission of the armed forces and participating in ato (fig. 1). today the problem of decision-making process in the system of mca is considered wider than just the strengthening of public administration within a particular region by the military organization. m. sungurovskyi, military programs director at the razumkov’s center thinks that creating such mca’s typical for military or paramilitary situation or, for conditions when the country is getting out of the conflict, when at some areas it is necessary to recover economy as well as legal conditions and to fight against the rest of destructive forces. the problem is that creating mca is only one component for establishing stability in the eastern ukraine. full complex of reconstructive work includes not only creation of mcas, but mainly, formation of content of their activities. razumkov’s center reviously proposed to deploy special reconstructive projects by involving foreign partners at the ato zone (сунгуровський, 2014). temporary administration must mostly deal with: preparation to the new government elections, development different events needed for restoration of infrastructure and industrial facilities. it is necessary to launch new business projects in order to create regional product, and to provide with jobs. only combining these activities, people who live on these territories could feel confidence to the government. the law draft on mca issues has lack a systematic approach and has no detailed analysis of the whole complex of problems within the areas which appeared under the military conflict. there are still a lot of issues concerning organization and conducting of military mobilization. the issue of confidence to the government also becomes a topical one. on this case m. sungurovskiy says that the law on mca determines the right direction for stabilization the situation and puts the legal basis for the rest of further steps. but, the head of the center for political and legal reforms i. koliushko thinks that it was not necessary to adopt a new legislative regulation. at this stage it was enough to adopt the amendments into the already existing laws e.g. law on local selfgovernmental bodies or law on combating against terrorism, and to add the positions (norms) that allow to engage military representatives into public executive bodies in the ato zone. he points out to inconsistencies among some legislative regulations that, without fail, will cause some conflicts (aндрусенко, 2015). continuing formation of the system of militarycivil administration there was developed and implemented the law of ukraine “on legal regime of martial situation” in 2015 (про правовий режим…, 2015). s. pashynsky noted that the draft of the law received 88 amendments (верховная рада…, 2015). according to him, ukraine should not exclude the option when the conflict in the ato zone could be escalating any time. the document determines the content of legal bases of martial situation, the procedure of its beginning and withdrawal, legal basis for decision-making by public administration bodies, military command staff and military administrations as well as by local self-government bodies, enterprises, establishments and organizations under the martial situation. it is important to pay attention to the rest of issues related to the organization of military-civil administration while acting under the martial situation. under the process of preparation of the law of ukraine “on legal regime of martial situation”, main scientific and expert department of the verkhovna rada stated that the system of military administrations, the procedure of their creation and subordination, that was offered in the law might be complicated and ineffective under the warfare conditions (про правовий режим…, 2015). in the case of implementation of martial situation, the efforts of the governmental bodies should be fig. 1. the system of influences on decision-making process of military and civil administrations source: developed by the author. military-civil administrations as the mechanism of specific decision making… 53 aimed to organize the defence of the country as soon as possible, and the system of public administration should be based on the principles of hierarchical subordination and clear delegation of powers. governmental bodies should reorganize their work in short terms, and the procedure of such reorganization must be minimal bureaucratic. the analysis of the law draft shows that creation of the system of military administrations does not meet that goal. administrations should include military representatives, but not consist of only militaries, noted the experts of the council. specialists from the main scientific and expert department believe that it is possible to increase powers of oblast and raion administrations and to include military personnel as their staff thus, to subordinate the militaries to the general staff without bringing changes into the title (name) of organization. the law draft provides that the oblasts and raions state administrations in times of crisis “acquire the status of ” military administrations, that is why the experts are warning that changes in the name of organization would require re-registration as a legal entity, to solve staff and organizational issues, while under the martial situation the efforts should be directed not at the reorganization of public administrations, but to the improvement of their effectiveness and strengthen of the defence. experts believe that the phrase “acquired status” has no legal grounds but could create a situation of legal uncertainty when many issues related to the functioning of the newly established bodies could show up. experts also point out that the establishment of military administrations can be justified only in terms of actual inaction of local self-governmental bodies in villages, towns and cities, where there are no public executive bodies. at the same time, experts mention that at the level of oblasts and raions where public executive bodies are functioning, it is enough to bring changes into the competence, order of formation and to subordination system of these bodies. the law of ukraine “on legal regime of martial situation” implies that the military administrations created by the decision of the president of ukraine based on proposal of oblast state administrations or military commanders (про правовий режим…, 2015). it is planned to create military administrations with different competency and at different territorial levels (in the towns, raions, oblasts). in the scientific and expert fields, people are concerned that finally we can receive rather complicated system of administrative bodies. except military administration, the system of public administration includes local selfgovernment bodies (their executive departments), local state administrations, military administrations of the settlements, raions and oblasts (according to the project, they will have different authorities (powers) depend on reasons of their creation), civilmilitary administrations. in such circumstances it is unclear what is the way of functioning of this complex system of administration, and, which part of mentioned bodies are subordinated to the general staff, or, to the cabinet of ministers of ukraine. the effectiveness of administrative system as well as the decision-making process in the ato zone are under the active influences of social and psychological aspects. in the framework of program “overcoming social consequences of the conflict in donbas and illegal annexation of crimea under support of state bodies in ukraine and civil society”, which was implemented by canadian ngo “stabilization support services” with support of the british embassy, there was conducted a survey and investigated the level of conflict in communication process among militaries and civilians, including those categories in the ato zone. it was figured out that military professionals and civilians give their preferences to the peaceful strategies of conflicts resolving. but these strategies are the strategies of avoidance, which means the lack of active dialogue and common approaches to mutual understanding. up to 84% of respondents believe that violence is not acceptable, but 38% considered that the psychological pressure effects are acceptable, though. the analysis of behavior in a conflict situation between civil and military representatives testifies (up to respondents’ opinion) that civilians should demonstrate respect for the militaries (30% civilian and 34% militaries) do not argue (67% civilian and 59% militaries), sometimes be silent (28% civilian and 39% militaries), to reduce contact with unknown persons (33% civilian and 31% militaries). for military personnel within the military units, mca, expert groups it is necessary to find peaceful conflict resolution (70% of civilian and 69% militaries) (85% украинцев ..., 2017). we also conducted researches according to which we can state that 93% of population in the ato zone has psychological damage of different genesis and levels. among civilian population there are 71% of people who have post-traumatic stress and 53% from the military representatives. it is identified that the soldiers (militaries) who were in the ato zone, the ones who had to work directly with civil population, have more higher level of aggressiveness (up to 22 points by the method l. pochebut) and lower level of anxiety (up to 32 points for the methodology of ch. spilberg and y. hanin). a key role belongs to volunteers and social workers who adjust communication links at the ato zone. however, 41% of them are now feeling fatigue and loss 54 oleksandr voronov of motivation. up to 14% of volunteers and 8% of social workers, 6% of psychologists note that they are at the first stage of professional burnout. up to 80% of respondents complained about media bias and lack of objective information for public (у 25% переселенцев…, 2014). parliament experts emphasize that cooperation of military administrations with other administrative bodies in ukraine cannot be implemented situationally, because such a system cannot be effective under martial situation. the law draft provides that the mechanism of collaboration between the military command and military administrations with administrative executive bodies is determined by the supreme commander of the armed forces of ukraine. the scientific and expert department representatives are recommended (as a general framework) to identify the appropriate mechanisms of interaction. based on mentioned above it is necessary to consider the possibility to establish the unified system of administration that starts operating simultaneously with the putting into work the martial situation and does not require any special decision-making for creation of relevant bodies for every single territorial unit. 3. summary how effective legal regulations will work in practice, only time could demonstrate. situation which has happened nowadays leaves no doubts about the need for such drastic steps in some regions of ukraine. the problem is not only in implementing of effective democratic civil control under security sector, but in the radical reforming of relations between civilian and militaries, that is a key part of the issue of ensuring the effectiveness of public administration by the security and defence sectors. in the post ideology society the concept of military-civil relationships should be the cornerstone of a successful process of democratization in the state as well as implementation of its transformations. further research of this issue is to analyze the experience of advanced european countries of consolidated democracy in the field of decision-making process in the system of civil-military relations. new trends in civil-military relations could initiate studies for prospective technologies of decision-making process by taking into account the high level of uncertainty and risks in situations of military confrontation. coordination of mca activity and its functioning structure becomes a complex element of civil-military cooperation, which requires a high level of flexibility in decisionmaking process conducted by the supreme military and political leaders of the state. the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative decisions which were taken by the corresponding officials in order to 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адміністративно-правовий статус військово-цивільних адміністрацій, науковий часопис національної академії прокуратури, 4(12), 196–206. 1. introduction the language problem in ukraine is still up-to-date, the argues according to the ways of solving the language issues continue during the whole period of the independence of the country swinging the society either to the side of the priority of ukrainian language as the state one or to the side of the bilingualism codified by law. unfortunately, the factors like the dalliance with different political actors, unconsequency in the implementation of the language policy, “pushing” the law of ukraine “about the fundamentals of the state language policy” (про засади…, 03.07.2012, № 5029-vi) in verkhovna rada played a dramatic part in the events of 2014 in ukraine. it is understandable that it was not the language that became a reason for a military conflict, but the language was used as a tool of manipulations and the deconstruction of ukrainian nation and ukrainian state (kовальова, 2010; савойська, 2008; сквірська, 2008). as it is known, to see well you should not approach the subject but, vice versa, step aside. the background of the nearest past of the language policy of ukraine answers a lot of questions of the present time. problems of implementation of the european charter for regional and minority languages by ukraine tatiana kovalova law and european integration department, kharkiv regional institute of public administration of the national academy of public administration under the office of the president of ukraine, moskovsky prospect 75, 61001 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: nojanojushka@gmail.com citation kovalova t., 2018, problems of implementation of the european charter for regional and minority languages by ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 38–44. abstract in the article the problems of implementation of the european charter for regional or minority languages are let on. in particular, it admits that during the years of its independence ukraine didn’t provide any system language policy and became a hostage of the signing of the charter, as it undertook the responsibility to support and develop regional languages without any enactment of the law about the state language. as a result of political manipulations the provision of the functioning of ukrainian language by the state was not made on a proper level. the latent language conflicts became a formal reason for the events in the crimea and on the east of ukraine and were used to invade the ukrainian territories. key words the european charter for regional or minority languages, language policy, status of languages, language relations, language situation, ukraine. received: 15 december 2017 accepted: 06 february 2018 published: 31 august 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 38–44 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.021.8790 problems of implementation of the european charter for regional and minority languages by ukraine 39 in september, 2000 the program of the integration of ukraine to the european union was approved by the edict of the president of ukraine, in particular, the program admits the following: creating the conditions for ukraine to get the membership in eu means, first of all, the necessity of conducting the corresponding reforms on the basis of execution of the cooperation agreement with the consequent reaching the fulfillment of copenhagen criteria (програма…, 2000; copenhagen criteria…, 1993). in p. 2 chapter 1 of the program one of the main directions of reaching the fulfillment of copenhagen criteria is defined as “human rights and protection of the national minorities. first of all it includes the laws about citizenship, status of the state language and its teaching, migration policy and the corresponding institutions, the candidate country joining the fundamental international conventions in the defined area” (програма…, 2000). in this way the program confirms both the directions of the integration to the european legal and political space and the consequence of the steps in this directions. but the analysis of the chronology of the establishing of the language legislation in ukraine witness about the breach of the logic of the lawmaking. in 1999 ukraine ratifies the european charter for regional and minority languages (hereinafter – charter) (європейська хартія…, 1992). without making any lows of its own and without building the own model of the language regulation, ukraine implements the european legislation aimed to protect regional and minority languages (in ukrainian context they are the languages of the national minorities, as in this way the charter was translated). let us make a note that ukraine and armenia were the only postsoviet countries which signed the charter. in 2003 ukraine ratifies the charter for the second time (because of the violation of the procedures during the first ratifications) but none of the lawmakers remembers the responsibility to enact the law about the state language which was undertaken by ukraine. so, as the researchers indicate fairly, the charter signing was accompanied with political retarding, confrontation of the political wings, violation of the valid legislation, besides that the title of the charter was translated incorrectly, so “this powerful international document made more harm to the language area in ukraine then it made any good” (кресіна, явір, 2008, p. 190). as it is indicated in the legal conclusion of the ministry of justice of ukraine, the ratification of this charter by ukraine in a way it was done on the 15th of may of 2003 has objectively caused appearing a range of pressing issues of legal, political and economic nature in ukraine (юридичний висновок…, 2006). the main reasons for this are both the incorrect official translation of the text of the document in ukrainian, which was added to the law about the ratification of the charter, and the wrong understanding of the object and the purpose of the charter. the authentic texts of the charter written in the official languages of the european council appoint that this act of the international law tells not about “the regional languages or the languages of minorities” but about the single conceptual unit of “the regional and minority languages”. and in paragraph 11 of the explanatory report to the charter the following is indicated: “the purpose of the charter is to protect and support the regional or minority languages, not the language minorities” (європейська хартія…, 1992). 2. research discussions the european charter for regional and minority languages was approved by the european council in 1992, when the language status as the state (official) languages was defined in many european countries long time ago, and for that moment the task for the european society was to maintain the right to use the regional and minority languages in private and public life considering the point that it was “an alienable right according to the principles declared in the international pact of united nations organization about the civil and political rights and according to the spirit of the convention of the european council about the human rights and fundamental freedoms“ (європейська хартія…, 1992, p. 1). to be fair we must indicate that not all of the european countries willingly recognized the language rights of their minorities because of fears of the threats to the state unity, for example, france, the united kingdom, greece, turkey. “the fact that the charter does not admire the countries-members of the european council is obvious because of the fact it was ratified and valid in 24 countries of 47 only” (бестерс-дільгер, 2013, p. 13–14). the language situation in sweden, norway, france, germany, ireland, finland, belgium and other countries show that the charter is not a panacea in language relations regulation and, in particular, y. besters-dilger (бестерс-дільгер, 2010), i. bolman (больман, 2007), y. shushliebina (шушлєбіна, 2011) and others indicate. in the ukrainian language space when the charter was approved the russian language dominated, conditioned with the heritage of the soviet past, the geographic close location of russia and economic 40 tatiana kovalova connections with it. without creating the real conditions to confirm and protect ukrainian language as the state one, ukraine gives the legal support to 13 languages of the national minorities including russian. and it happened, as y. besters_dilger fairly indicates, because “verkhovna rada during the first and the second ratification was influenced by russian and russian-speaking deputies who aimed to compensate the failure of the attempt to implement russian language as the second state language in the constitution of 1996 via the acceptance of the russian language to the charter” (бестерс-дільгер, 2012, p. 13). so, “the charter became the strongest political instrument to assist russian language... the new de-ukrainization is legitimized under the slogan of the said to be fulfillment of the european demands” (бестерс-дільгер, 2012, p. 14). it is clear that the european authors of the charter did not take into their consideration the language situation in the post-soviet countries. b. bowring, who has been researching the language policy in ukraine for more than 10 years, points to the special features of it. he indicates that “the language policy in ukraine consisted of the exclusively complicated political and historical conditions, even comparing to the post-colonial problems of other countries, for example, ireland, spain or turkey (баурінг, 2008, p. 55). the wide potential of the charter had been started to use fully in ukraine, especially by russophones. during several months after its ratification the range of the regions of ukraine declared that, on the basis of the charter, they want to give a regional status to russian language. one of the examples is kharkiv region, where the population census of 2001 showed that 44,3% of the population of the region consider russian language as the native one (про кількість…, 2001). on the 6th of march of 2006 kharkiv city council was the first in ukraine which approved the resolution about giving the status of the regional language to the russian language in the city of kharkiv (про російську мову…, 2006). on the 3rd of june of 2006 kharkiv regional council approved the resolution to give the status of the regional language to russian language in kharkiv region, referring to the results of the ukrainian population census of 2001, in accordance with which 83.1% of the inhabitants of kharkiv region have fluent russian (про реалізацію…, 2006). the lead of kharkiv was followed by donetsk, luhansk, mykolayiv, zaporizhzhia, dnipropetrovsk, kryvy rih regions and thecity of sevastopol. those resolutions were approved with the violation of the legislation of ukraine, as neither the constitution of ukraine (конституція…, 1996) nor the law of ukraine “about local governing in ukraine” (про місцеве…, 1998), or other ukrainian laws contain any provisions according to which solving the issues about the legal status of the languages which are in use in the work of the bodies of local authorities or within the territories of the corresponding territory communities do not belong to the incumbency of these bodies. after enacting the law of ukraine “about the fundamentals of the state language policy” (про засади…, 2012) of 2012 the situation with giving the status of the regional languages repeated. in the third periodical report of ukraine about the execution of the european charter for regional and minority languages this situation was reflected (third periodical…, 2016, р. 6). russian language was recognized as the regional one in 9 regions of ukraine: donetsk, zaporizhzhia, luhansk, mykolayiv, odessa, kharkiv, kherson regions, the autonomous republic of crimea and the city of sevastopol. hungarian language was recognized as the regional one in the cities of chop and berehiv and also in uzhhorod, vynohradiv and berehiv districts of zakarpattia region. separate territories of zakarpattia region recognized the romanian language as the regional one (tiachivsky district and 2 village councils of rakhiv district). also romanian language was recognized as the regional one by the local councils in 4 districts of chernivtsy region. polish language was recognized as the regional one by just one village council of storozhynetsky district of chernivtsy region. bulgarian language was recognized as the regional one in kyrovohrad region by znamianska village council and in vilshansky district by 1 village council, and by bolhrad district council of odessa region, which also recognized gagauz language as the regional one. crimea tatar language was recognized as the regional one in novooleksiyivka settlement of kherson region. so, ukraine unwillingly became a hostage of the charter responsibilities undertaken by it which didn’t meet the language and political situation of the post-soviet countries. actually, after signing the charter, ukraine faced the problem of solving two mutually exclusive tasks: to consolidate ukrainian nation around the state language and execute european liabilities according to the regional and minority languages. using the letter but not the intent of the charter, the authors of the valid law of ukraine “про засади державної мовної політики” (про засади…, 2012), violating the balance of the languages protection, give a special status to the russian language. it seems that if “the supremacy” of the language of one language minority over other languages. the problems of implementation of the european charter for regional and minority languages by ukraine 41 european commission for democracy through law (venice commission) in its conclusions about the project of the law “about the fundamentals of the state language policy” indicated this fact and noticed that besides the article 10 of the constitution of ukraine separates the protection of the russian language, the approach to the protection of this language must be implemented in the context of protection of other regional languages (висновок…, 2011, art. 38). considering the special features of ukrainian language situation, the commission stresses the additional guarantees to keep the state language as the instrument of the integration of the whole society (висновок…, 2011, art. 41). but the law was enacted without amending any considerable changes. the irony of fate is in the fact that, though russian language was given a wide protection and legal and actual priority above the languages of other minorities, it and the russian-speaking citizens appeared to be unprotected facing the “ukrainian nationalism”. and, unfortunately, the language war turned to be a weaponed war: the slogan “protection of russianspeaking population” was used by russia to justify its actions on the east of ukraine and the occupation of crimea. though, while we were watching the east, the problems appeared in the west. on the 5th of 2017 the deputies of verkhovna rada enacted the law “про освіту” which, in particular, confirms that education in all the ukrainian schools (including those in places of the compact habitation of national minorities within bordering territories) must be provided in ukrainian exclusively since the fifth grade (про освіту, 2017, №3491-d, art. 7). in short time after that the ministers of external affairs of hungary, bulgaria, romania and greece in their letter to their ukrainian colleague pavlo klimkin declared their disturbance according to the new ukrainian law about education. hungary asked the united nations organization to investigate the law about education enacted by ukraine with the following argumentation of this request; the law violates the right of the national minorities to use their language. after the law was signed by the president of ukraine, the hungarian side delivered the ultimatum to ukraine that hungary would not support any initiative of ukraine in the international area until the language article of the law “about education” is canceled (новий закон…, 2017)1. 1 according to the data of the ministry of education of ukraine there are 71 hungarian schools are working in ukraine, where the teaching is made in hungarian since the first till the eleventh form. the situation in hungary is differnow hungary escalates the conflict with ukraine via the law about education and is intended to block the euro integrative initiatives of ukraine and also the cooperation with nato (угорщина заблокувала…, 2017). but ukraine has own arguments according to the obligatory demand to obtain the education in the state language. the ministry of education of ukraine l. hrynevych stressed that now in ukraine together with the stable tendency of increasing the number of pupils studying in the schools with the ukrainian language of education, there is a threatening tendency – some schools with the education in the languages of the national minorities do not give the enough level of possessing the state language. “the situation of this kind means that the children after graduating the school do not have equal access to the higher education in ukraine. according to the official statistics of the ukrainian center of the education quality evaluation, in 2016 more than 36% of graduates of zakarpattia passed the external independent testing on ukrainian language with a result from 1 to 3 scores according to the 12 scores scale. these results mean that the third part of the graduates of zakarpattia do not have any possibility to go to the higher educational institutions as the successful passing of eit on ukrainian is the obligatory demand when entering the higher educational institution”, – liliya hrynevych admitted. the minister added that children should leave schools being multilingual (діти…, 2017). let us indicate that the main purpose to create the charter was the aim to keep the language diversity of europe, its destination is, first of all, to protect languages which have a small number of native speakers and which are threatened to vanish from the language map of the world. the main object of the support of the national states were, first of all, the state languages as the means of the national consolidation. considering the point that the language issue causes the lack of stability in the ukrainian society, it is fit to consider the experience of european countries to use the charter. let us observe the experience of france, poland and italy. choosing these countries for observation is conditioned with the different establishing of the status ent. the ukrainian diaspora is small when comparing it to the hungarian minority in ukraine – about 8 thousand people. nevertheless, as deutsche welle writes referring to the data of the european council, there are neither elementary nor secondary schools with the ukrainian language of teaching in hungary (нуль…, 2017). 42 tatiana kovalova of the languages of the title nation. in france there was a threat of displacement of french language by english. in the history of poland there was a period (in the end of xviii), when the polish-lithuanian commonwealth stopped its existence as a state and its territory was divided between austria, prussia and russia, which influenced the status and functioning of polish language. the situation in these countries is similar to the situation in ukraine: the long domination of the language of the non-title nation, displacement of the language of the title nation from the communication space, language bordering of the separate regions of the state and neighboring countries conditioned with its geographical position. so in all three countries there were periods when the languages of the title nations didn’t have any proper development and the state support. in italy there was a different situation: italian language was confirmed as the state one and today the support of the regional languages became actual. the french revolution started the beginning of the world national movement when the concept of the desirable identity of the state, nation and language developed (бестерс-дільгер, 2010). after the revolution french language was confirmed on the whole territory of the country. but after the second world war english started to displace french from different areas, first of all from the science and economic activity, it was connected to the entrance to french economy of non-french transnational companies which used mainly english. those circumstances conditioned french-english bilingualism in management, in the business, trade and advertisement area which caused increasing of the english language prestige. in article 2 of the valid constitution of france the following is written the language of the republic is french (la constitution…, 1958). the constitutional council of france in spite of the fact that the profile minister on the 7th of may of 1999 signed the charter on behalf of france prohibited to ratify it referring to the point that the charter violates the principles of the republic non-divisibility, equality before the law and unity of the french people and does not meet article 2 of the constitution. before accepting this change to the constitution during the discussion it was said that it had to be aimed against english language exclusively and didn’t have to interrupt the development of any regional languages (agresti, 2008). the status of polish language was defined in the constitution of poland of 1997. in article 27 the following is indicated: the official language is polish language and it doesn’t violate the rights of the national minorities (konstytucja…, 1997). now the main legislation act regulating the functioning of polish language is the law about polish language from the 7th of october of 1999. the preamble of the law underlines the meaning of polish language for the national identity and culture: polish language is the main element of the national self-identification and the richness of the national culture. the preamble also indicates that the law is enacted considering the historical experience “when the struggle of the enemies and occupants with the polish language was the instrument of destroying of the national identity” and recognition of the necessity to protect the national uniqueness in a process of globalisation” (ustawa…, 1999). in article 3 of this law it is said that protection of the polish language is in the correct usage of polish language and opposing to its vulgarization, spreading the knowledge of polish language and respect to the dialects, spreading polish language in the world and support studying polish abroad. in spite of 15 languages are recognized to be the languages of the national minorities in poland, just one of them has the status of the regional one – the cashubian (reservations…, 2017). together with this the language policy of poland is aimed to make polish language more popular not in the republic of poland only but in the countries of european union too with the means of establishing the range of events, including studying of polish language in the european countries where the poles live (pawłowski, 2006). the analysis of the language situation in italy shows that except the official standard (literature) italian language which is used by a small part of native speakers and some mass media there are different forms of so called italiano regionale, the regional italian language, a great number of dialects an a certain number of minority languages of other origin (дель гаудіо, 2014, p. 111). but italy managed to consolidate the nation around the single “national” state. it happened, first of all, as a result of the following factors: (1) the above mentioned processes happened in time and in a corresponding historical context; (2) italian literature language during its long history had an important cultural influence on the intellectual development not only the peninsula but the europe in whole (дель гаудіо, 2014, p. 113). the important part was also played by the activity of italian cultural and political activists which were oriented on a “sample” language of dante, petrarka and boccaccio; (3) the knowledge of the national over regional literature language was one of the factors of the national unity. the ideal for the national patriots is “the language, common (catholic) religion and the common greek and roman heritage” which, problems of implementation of the european charter for regional and minority languages by ukraine 43 on its turn, served the aim of uniting the representatives of the intellectual elite of different italian states of which the peninsula consisted before 1861 року (дель гаудио, 2014, p. 114). but, representing the thought of a modern italian, del gaudio fairly admits, that the axiom “one language – one nation” is not up to date any longer which is connected to the processes of globalisation which caused changes in the ideology and in attitude to the concept of “the national language”. today the contradictory ideological models are spreading aimed against the over domination of the national languages and on support of the languages of the national minorities. 3. conclusions as we can see, the experience of the language policy of the countries chosen for the research shows that the priority status in the model of language relations has the language of the title nation. and this situation is defining for most of european countries. in spite of ratification of the european charter for regional and minority languages by the countries the protection of the title language is an affair of the country itself and is beyond the area of responsibility of european institutions. during 25 years ukraine didn’t manage to form a reasonable state language policy. the law which became one of the instruments for manipulations with the consciousness of the ukrainians and was used to justify the military conflict in ukraine, remains the achilles’ heel of ukrainian safety (про засади…, 2012). until the law about the state language is enacted and the measures to execute it are implemented, the language confrontation in ukraine will exist. the permanent refusals to solve the language question in ukraine as they are not up to date demonstrated the lack of their basis: the reaction of people in social networks, the number of watching the videos on language problems on youtube witness about the opposite. the director of the institute of ukrainian language of the nas of ukraine p. grytsenko fairly admits: “the confrontation about the language will remain until the role and place of each language in the life of our society – ukrainian, russian as the language of the national minority, other languages is clearly defined and underlined by the new law” (глуховський, груздєв, 2017). so today the up to date issue for ukraine is working out the project of the law about the state language and its enactment (проект закону…, 2017). at the same time it is necessary to make amendments to the law of ukraine “about the ratification of the european charter for regional or minority languages” (про ратифікацію…, 2003), particularly to its part 2, in which, against the aims of the charter, it is indicated that the charter in ukraine is applied not to the regional or minority languages but to the languages of the national minorities. the law does not fix the languages on which the action of the charter in ukraine is spread, but just names the national minorities (not all of them) which live on the territory of ukraine, and it cannot be executed in such an edition. references agresti g., 2008, the european charter for regional or minority languages and france: stocktaking and prospects for a ratification in abeyance. discourse analysis and the configuration of the, [in]: 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should be sustainable to ensure a high level of functioning and quality needs of territorial communities. such development can guarantee high quality of life of communities over time. the development of such a complex socio-economic system as a settlement can not be chaotic. to decide some form of territory the authorities should promptly interfere in development processes through various methods and tools and direct it in the desired direction. therefore, the study of existing in the world of forms of territorial development, methods and management tools and their application experience in foreign countries and possibilities of its implementation in ukrainian reality do not lose their relevance at any time. such famous ukrainian and foreign scientists as v. babayev, v. vakulenko, y. glinska, v. mamonova, o. olshanskiy, j. terstriep, m. florek, g. hamilton and others devoted his scientific works to studying the problems of managment of territorial development and settlements. the use of innovative forms of the territorial community development and their management tools has their own peculiarities for each case of the choice. innovations that affect the quality of life of territorial communities are related to the risk of their use and imperfect legislative, organizational and injournal of geography, politics and society 2015, 5(1), 43-52 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.15.006.5162 management peculiarities of innovative development areas in ukraine olena serdiukova department of regional development and local self-government, kharkiv regional institute of public administration of the national academy of public administration under the office of the president of ukraine, moskovsky prospect 75, 61001, kharkiv, ukraine e-mail: o_serdiukova@ukr.net citation serdiukova o., 2015, management peculiarities of innovative development areas in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 5(1), 43-52. abstract the purpose of this article is to explore innovative forms of territorial development, methods and tools of management, and identify the problems of their application in ukraine. the processes of introducing innovative forms of territorial communities in ukraine and other countries of the world are analyzed, their main problems are defined. the methods and the tools of innovative development areas management and peculiarities of their use in ukraine are studied. key words development, management, territorial community, innovative form of public-private partnerships, clusters. 44 olena serdiukova formation support. the analysis of the application of innovation both in ukraine and in foreign countries allows avoiding certain risks and negative impacts on the level of community development. the process of innovation development always has some gaps of knowledge for its implementation, as the innovative process in fact can not be completely investigated. only practice can prove innovation efficiency and provide some knowledge of it, identify gaps and ways to avoid them. but then it ceases to be innovation. today in ukraine the state defined the course on the introduction of innovative forms of territorial development. however, the questions of their implementation, methods and tools of management, international experience of their application are still remained insufficiently studied. 2. introduction of forms of innovation development areas in ukraine: the main problems sustainable development is a development focused on the present needs and the creation of economic, demographic, environmental and other conditions for a decent life for future generations (семёнов, 2004). the experience of advanced countries confirms that it is possible to ensure sustainable development of territories only effectively using of innovative forms, methods and technologies in different sectors of the territorial communities. a well-known american economist, a developer of a cluster model m. porter (портер, 2006) noted that clusters are present both in largeand in small economy, urban or rural area, as well as at several levels of the geographical separation. clusters may be observed in conditions of the developed economy and of the developing one. cluster programs served as an important condition for the economic development of the european union countries. among them there are both national (germany, austria, the netherlands, finland, italy) and regional (poland, great britain, france, spain). cluster formations are created under the influence and with the help of state and local communities. an important factor is that a state or a local government cannot force a cluster in a certain territory. they can only create favorable conditions for their formation and development, investment, and skilled personnel, development and introduction of innovation. the initiative of a cluster creating should come from the private sector, which is located in the territory. as the world practice, clusters are formed of entities that operate in a particular area. the cluster is not created again. existing businesses join together in a cluster to obtain some synergy from its activities. the main factor that ensures obtaining this effect is innovations. they provide a new level of quality of cluster formation, the territory in which they are located, and the state as a whole. clustering improves the competitiveness of the region and the state as a whole. therefore, in ukraine a priority course for region clustering is declared. a study of international experience on the establishment and functioning of clusters is paid so much attention by ukrainian scientists, civil servants and officials of local government. for example, in germany, a cluster form of production organization in a particular area is widely used. in this form scientific potential as a generator of innovative ideas serves a leading role. its feature is that the process of development and innovation carried out in one economic system, the subjects of which are research centers and companies in various areas. all of them are links of one chain. clusters cover almost all areas of germany. new clusters are constantly created and existing ones are developed. the process of clustering in germany goes continually. the use of this production organization form allowed regions of the country to achieve a high living standard. it is confirmed by the socio-economic indicators of their development. application of the cluster approach to ensure effective innovation development of areas is successfully carried out in other european countries, and also in the usa and japan. on average, one of the four companies in europe with over 20 employees operates in a cluster field. one of the five from 3500 surveyed companies in germany points that the choice of their geographical location was realized considering the opportunity to become a member of a cluster (terstriep, 2008). a high level of the development of these countries as a whole and their individual areas, the state of life quality of the population and products competitiveness in the global market suggests the success of the use of such forms of a regional development organization as clusters. in its application the issues of local and state budgets, employment, high-level education personnel, rapid innovation and positive perceptions of the communities, the life quality improvement and others are solved. the first regional clusters in ukraine began to function from 1998 in khmelnitsky. then, agricultural, construction, sewing, tourist and industrial clusters were created. after two years of the construction cluster more than 10 residential, domestic and industrial establishments were provided in operation use. the introduction of new technologies achieved management peculiarities of innovative development areas in ukraine 45 reduction in construction time, the complexity of construction works decreased by 15%, the cost of housing 10%. the region attracted additional investment of $750 000 (пятинкин, быкова, 2008). these clusters were supported by khmelnitsky and ivano-frankivsk administrations, district administrations, carpathian scientific analytical center and local universities. new jobs were created, revenues to local budgets were increased, living standards were improved, and competitiveness of the region was increased. for example, clothes produced by these wing cluster gradually replaced the similar turkish and chinese goods. production of this cluster is in high demand in other regions of ukraine. in ukraine there are such clusters as ivanofrankivsk handicrafts, kramatorsk jewelry, sevastopol sea, lviv regional, lifting equipment, woodworking and furniture production, it business services (мамонова et al., 2013). but the lack of legal regulation of the establishment and operation of cluster formations and unfavorable investment climate and severe protracted economic and political crisis in the country do not allow this process to gain widespread. in our opinion, such a form of community development as a public-private partnership (ppp) (in world practice, public-private partnership (ppp)) is worthy to be noted. it is especially important to use this form taking into account considerable depreciation of fixed assets utilities, unreasonable economic rates for their services and the limited financial capacity of local budgets. in general, in the world there are a lot of variants of the definition „public-private partnership.” in our view, the most accurate of them is the definition of the un economic commission in europe (unece). public-private partnership (ppp) is an innovative contractual agreement between the public and the private sectors in the provision of public services and infrastructure. it combines the best with these sectors: private sector resources, its qualifying abilities, technology and public sector capacity for economic regulation and protection of the public sector (hamilton, 2010). in ukraine, such a form as concession is applied most of all forms of ppp. but implementation of concession relations is quite difficult, although the government announced the introduction of a course on ppp, and the government approved the concept of development of ppp in ukraine in 2013–2018 years. ukraine has some experience in private sector involvement in the development of the national economy. according to the world bank data, for the period from 1990 to 2011 with the participation of the private sector in ukraine 40 infrastructure projects were implemented. the total investment in these projects amounted to 12.1 billion of us dollars, of which about 90 percent were aimed at the implementation of projects in the field of telecommunications. in other countries with income per capita below average total investment involved in 1990-2011 for the implementation of infrastructure projects involving the private sector amounted to 588.5 billion of us dollars. mainly africa, the least developed countries in southeast asia and cis countries belong to this category. it indicates that the level of involvement of the private sector in the implementation of infrastructure projects in ukraine is unsatisfactory (про схвалення…, 2013). in european countries the mechanisms of ppp has been used successfully in various spheres of state and local communities for a long time. thus, poland has used the advantages of ppp in preparation for the european football championship in 2012. in 2009 in poland 41 projects of ppp implementation were announced with a total volume of about 1.7 billion euros, in which 46 private investors were interested. in percentage terms the benefits by area as follows: sports 36% municipal infrastructure 17%, health care 14%, water supply and sewerage – 10%, education – 7% (запатріна, 2010). at the end of 2014 in ukraine, 243 projects of ppp are implemented. 210 contracts were concluded with concession (86.42% of all concluded ppp contracts), 33 agreements were on cooperation (13.58%). these projects are implemented in the following areas of economic activity: refuse disposal 116 projects (47.7% of concluded agreements); collection, purification and distribution of water – 79 projects (32.5% of concluded agreements); construction and/ or operation of highways, roads, railways, runways at airfields, bridges, road overpasses, tunnels and subways, sea and river ports and their infrastructure 17 projects (7% of the concluded agreements); production, transportation and supply of heat – 7 projects (3% of concluded agreements); production, distribution and supply of electricity – 5 projects (2.1% of concluded agreements); search, exploration of mineral deposits and their mining – 3 projects (1.2% of concluded agreements); real estate management – two projects (0.8% of concluded agreements); tourism, recreation, culture and sport – 1 project (0.4% of the concluded agreements); the functioning of irrigation and drainage systems – 1 project (0.4% of the concluded agreements); others – 12 projects (4.9% of the concluded agreements). local governments signed 203 concession contracts and 18 cooperation agreements on communal property. the bulk of them are realized in the 46 olena serdiukova provision of housing services such as water provision villagers, manufacture and supply of heat and electricity, providing services for the collection and removal of garbage, providing services in the housing maintenance sector. much of the concluded concession contracts are implemented in the autonomous republic of crimea. as of 01.01.2014 in the autonomous republic of crimea 63 projects on concession of communal property were realized. mostly these projects are in the sphere of housing and communal services such as collection, purification and distribution of water, provision of services for the collection and removal of garbage. today the process of applying ppp is increasingly spreading. so, local authorities identified 321 facilities of the communal ownership, which are planned to implement projects using the ppp mechanism in the following areas of economic activity: accumulation, purification and distribution of water – 103; production, transportation and supply of heat and the distribution and supply of natural gas – 47; tourism, recreation, culture and sports – 32; waste processing – 32; property management – 10; construction and / or operation of highways, roads, railways, runways at airfields, bridges, road overpasses, tunnels and subways, sea and river ports and their infrastructure – 8; search, exploration of mineral deposits and their extraction, except those which carried out under the terms of production sharing agreements – 8; health – 4; production, distribution and supply of electricity – 4; functioning irrigation and drainage systems – 2; others – 71 (інформація щодо стану…, 2015). but compared to the 1990–2011 process of introducing concession relationship can not be called satisfactory. in our view, the reasons for the poor implementation of ppp projects in the field of municipal property in ukraine are: 1. gaps in the regulatory framework of ppp implementation. the provisions of legal acts are sometimes contradictory. some issues still remain unresolved current legislation of ukraine. 2. low investment attractiveness of communal property, a large depreciation of fixed assets utilities (especially communications). 3. significant risks of the private partner to implement their activities and profits, taking into account the long-term relationship. inefficient distribution of risks between the public and the private partner. 4. lack of qualified personnel by the local authorities in preparation of communal property to the conclusion of the ppp and in the support of ppp projects throughout the period of validity of the contract. 5. irrationality mechanism for setting tariffs for utilities, discrepancy actual expenses applicable tariffs. the complex and long-term procedure of changes in tariffs. 6. the negative perception by population of the implementation of ppp projects through his ignorance in this area. 7. the lack of real understanding of the local authorities on joint co-financing of ppp projects. 8. the unstable economic situation, the fighting in eastern ukraine. 9. the impact of political situation on the stability of the private partner. recently, the ukrainian authorities pay more attention to the creation of condominium associations (condominiums). this form of innovative community development in the field of housing and communal services aimed to solve the problem of residents’ life quality. the main activity of the association is to implement features that ensure the realization of coowners rights to own and use common property, proper maintenance of an apartment building and local area, co-owners assistance in obtaining housing and other services of good quality at reasonable prices and the performance of their obligations commitments related to the activities association (про об’єднання…, 2002). although, the practice of introducing such associations in ukraine appeared in the early 2000s, but unfortunately its distribution should be better. moreover, there is a significant slowdown in the creation of such associations. thus, in 2014 only 3.9% of the amount of the planned mergers under the regional programs of reform and development housing associations were created. for comparison, in 2012 this figure was 54.1%. in addition, in 2012 there was a positive dynamics of creating condominiums compared to the previous 2011 (9.6% increase). at the beginning of 2012 the share of condominiums in tenement housing was only 17%. as of 01.04.15 the proportion of such associations in ukraine as a whole was 22.1% of the country’s multi-storey buildings. in this case the main increase was obtained by 2013, when in the country relative political and economic stability was observed (рейтингові показники…, 2015; в україні 17%..., 2012; удосконалення системи…, 2015; про загальнодержавну програму…, 2014). local government has attempted to interest residents of settlements in the creation of condominiums. so, in severodonetsk, luhansk reg. local authorities has priority in insulation of facade building by the city budget for the residents of that building, management peculiarities of innovative development areas in ukraine 47 who decided to create a condominiums at the general meeting. but, unfortunately, residents wanting to create condominiums still leave not much. the reasons for the slow pace of growth in the number of associations are the unwillingness of tenants to actively protect their interests in government, spending additional time and financial resources. these findings were made by the national institute for strategic studies under the president of ukraine on the results of the work done. a series of financial and organizational problems makes disintegrating influence on the creation of condominiums, which the association faces after the completion of registration procedures. negative practice execution of the powers of the administration and use of property condominiums especially disables association organizers. it is mainly caused by inadequate quality of legal support in this area (пеліванова, 2012). local authorities in ukraine actively contribute to the formation of condominiums, providing methodological and practical assistance for them. in addition, qualified assistance in creating of ukrainian condominiums is provided by international organizations. for example, specialists in the social project of the european union and the united nations development „local development cba” conduct seminars and trainings in ukrainian cities. the main objective of such measures is developing the capacity of local communities and local authorities in implementing development community-oriented. often these professionals are involved in local planning, public services, and restoration of basic social and communal infrastructures. the mentioned measures include study on reforming housing and communal services in ukraine, because today the priority of local government in housing is energy planning and efficient use of energy, innovative technologies and campaigns to raise awareness in the field of energy efficiency. also the best practices on the issue of foreign countries, review of current legislation on various issues, including establishment and operation of condominiums are considered. much attention is being generally paid to the creation and operation of condominiums. topical issues are property rights, responsibilities and relationships between the owners of quarters in apartment buildings, peculiarities of the creation of associations procedure, maintenance of buildings and adjacent territory and the corresponding payments, condominium planning of economic activity, estimates of income and expenses, calculation of contributions in overhaul, transfer the ownership of the local area associations, efficiency, participation of condominium in local, national and international programs. for example, mentioned above undp provides for standard micro project 75% of its value in three, sometimes two tranches. city budget and budget of top-level add 20% and cas brings another 5%. thus, we can solve the problems of water supply, insulation, replacement windows and doors, repairing the roof, porch and others. unfortunately, today in ukraine activity of local condominiums is not too high. some condominiums still have not learned to discuss problems of keeping their own house in common and come to a consensus in resolving them, some do not prepare the necessary documents in time. therefore, holding such seminars and training is an important measure to improve skills not only of the condominium members. there members of associations, condominium associations, community groups and local government officials gain knowledge and skills for implementation of the community-oriented methodology. this achieves sustainable local development, improves basic public services and living conditions of the inhabitants of the settlements. participants of the seminars and trainings resolve the problems faced in the course of business. they also share the experience of solving these problems and define the possibilities of a successful economic management. today in ukraine, another innovative development form, a united local community, is being actively promoted. combining of local communities can improve the level of social and economic development of communities and the region. it is especially important in the current economic situation for small local communities rural and village, and communities of small towns who „survive” at the expense of state budget subsidies. the experience of such developed countries as germany, france, the uk, the usa and others shows that a prosperous and independent state consists of capable local communities that have reached a high level of socio-economic development. due to the decentralization of power they have more opportunities to solve local problems using their own material, financial, human and information resources. a larger united community has more opportunities for growth and a high level of satisfaction of their needs, but its needs are more too. the right to associate was given to local communities in the law of ukraine „on local government in ukraine”, adopted in 1997. but this right was determined only for rural communities. in addition, the mechanism of such association was not defined by law. this mechanism was defined by the law „on voluntary association of communities” adopted in 2015. this law gave the right to associate in village 48 olena serdiukova and urban communities. although this law cannot be called perfect. the main purpose of territorial communities association is to enhance their socio-economic development and prosperity in their communities, quality and accessibility of public services that they provide. achieving this goal is possible only if the local budget of the united community is capable to supply all the needs of the residents. as practice shows, such unification is the most appropriate for rural communities. usually several rural communities unite around a city, which becomes an administrative-territorial center. the financial support of the state is to provide local community with combined funds in the form of grants. they are directed to the formation of appropriate infrastructure in accordance with the plan of socio-economic development of this local community. but financial problems arise in local communities at the stage of unification. it depends on the state of local budgets. especially this situation is inherent in village budgets, which are mainly subsidized. processes of territorial communities association in ukraine start soon. but now visible flaws in legislation regulating processes are defined. that is why it is necessary to adjust it according to today’s realities. combining allow local communities to achieve sustainable development of territories and ensure the course on decentralization proclaimed by the president of ukraine. achieving sustainable development of the territory should be the common goal of functioning of all subdivisions, communities, governments, businesses and ngos. any priori community should strive to achieve the level of sustainable development through the use of new forms, methods and technologies. 3. methods and tools pf management of innovative development territorial communities in ukraine innovative development of local communities is the activity of local communities controlled by local governments, which involves the introduction of advanced scientific and technological achievements in complex combination with experience and knowledge that first applied in the respective areas and aimed the communities to obtain qualitatively new and better needs of their members (сердюкова, 2012). as if development is a gradual move forward to achieve a certain goal, so the desired condition should be directed and managed. local authorities use various methods in the management of territorial development, administrative and legal, economic-financial, communication, moral, psychological, specific peculiar to management functions. the range of instruments is also wide enough. in general, they are divided into three groups: institutional, financial, and functional. each group is represented by the set of tools used in the implementation of management functions (мамонова, 2006). all management functions are also inherent in the process of innovative development of communities. each local community chooses its course of development. it uses a variety of forms, methods and tools along the way. the investment component is an important part of any innovation. each step of the innovation process related to the creation, development and dissemination of innovations requires investments. in carrying out the functions of planning the innovative development, local governments in ukraine can develop innovative strategy of the certain regional development, program of innovation activity in the settlement with the definition of mechanisms for financing its activities, model of innovative development of territorial communities, investor roadmap in the certain territory, balance of income and expenses from innovation activity and others. investor roadmap is developed to provide legal and formation of investment policy in the territory. it includes the following sections: introduction, which states the aims and methodology of its creation, general information; characteristic of the region, which provides information on the appropriate region or sub-region, where the settlement is, the direct characterization of the settlement and its leaders in industrial production; information resources, which provides information on the global and national information base, as well as regional and local information resources; investor map motion in the territory, stating the information on legalization for foreign public documents, work permit and registration of temporary residence of the foreigner, the state registration of foreign investments and business activities, licensing of economic activities, permitting procedures, obtaining land, lease of municipal property, real estate acquisition, construction of structures for the investment activity, the connection of object to utilities, subsoil use, etc. (дорожня карта…, 2012). investor roadmap also contains the information necessary for the investor activities directly, namely management peculiarities of innovative development areas in ukraine 49 on the specifics of labor relations, taxation, external relations (imports or exports), state control in appropriate cases and so on. investor roadmap is usually published on the website of local governments. it is an example for a potential investor interested in the establishment of business activity in the certain ukrainian settlement. roadmap presents an analysis of the steps which should be taken by the investor. the image of the settlement is an important factor in attracting investors to the proceedings of its activities in the territory. the authorities should take opportunities of marketing to create the image of the settlement that allows achieving certain results in the settlement management and high socio-economic indicators, and supplying the expectations of the residents. and it also has its own tools for investors (glińska et al., 2009). among the management tools of innovation development organization in ukraine authorities use the evaluation of innovative potential of the territory, normative legal local documents (different techniques, practices, regulations, etc.), organizational structure, parts of which perform certain administrative functions, that serves and ensures the implementation of innovation and investment activity, promoting interaction of scientific-research organizations, universities, financial institutions, businesses and others. the required information is also posted on the official websites of local councils. the innovative potential is a number of economic resources, which society can use for its development at any certain time (жиц, 2008). in carrying out the coordination of the innovation process, public discussions are organized concerning the process of implementation and identification of problems. for example, deciding on the implementation of public-private partnerships, vital to the territorial community of communal property, it is a appropriate to discuss the opportunity and the need for its implementation with the general public and to consider the possible risks. in addition, it is important to report regularly to the community on the results of the use of innovative forms, methods and technologies through the media. an important tool is the involvement of experts coordinating the implementation of innovative development territory. at this stage of management local governments must use such tools as conferences, seminars, webinars, training experience exchange and training of personnel. motivation of innovative development areas involves stimulation of innovation activities individuals and investors, providing various tax breaks, targeted subsidies and financial compensations for individuals of innovation development areas. but on the other hand, various penalties may be imposed. it should be noted that there is no mechanism providing benefits to the private partner at the implementation of ppp projects in ukraine. the current resolution of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine „on approval of determining the concession objects, concessions which may be granted exemptions in concession fees, subsidies, compensation and their conditions” only defines the procedure for appealing of the concessionaire to the concessioner for benefits, subsidies and compensation, and consideration. but the current legislation does not specify which privileges, subsidies and compensation concessionaire can get, in what way deferred further payments will be paid by the concessionaire to the local budget. the current resolution regulates that the exemptions in concession fees, subsidies and compensation may be available only for loss-making and low profitable concession objects that have great social value. the right to determine a list of such objects according to this resolution is the responsibility of the relevant executive authority of local councils (про затвердження…, 2000), which under the current legislation on concessions can act as concessioners. especially problematic is the provision of such benefits, subsidies and compensations for communal property in today’s difficult situation of local budgets. for local authorities, to receive additional revenues to the budget as concession fees, and the restoration and modernization of fixed assets of the concession is the aim to provide integrated property complexes utilities in a concession. also, if this resolution determines the benefits provided in respect of concession fees, but does not defined the objects of subsidies and compensation, as well as cases of provision in general. in carrying out the functions of monitoring the efficiency of the use of various forms, methods and technologies of innovative development of local communities, they can use analysis of indicators that characterize the results of innovation, implementation of innovative strategies and programs of the areas, check the conditions of contracts that ensure the implementation of innovative forms of territorial development, audit of financial and economic activity of individuals of innovation activity and so on. control of the management in the areas of innovative development occupies an important place. at any stage of innovation it reveals difficulties in the operation of innovative forms of community development, to take the appropriate management decisions in time and to prevent negative impacts on the livelihoods of local communities. effective control can reduce the tension in the society through inno50 olena serdiukova vation, which in ukraine is extremely wary community perceive or do not care. in our opinion, today in ukraine the main reasons for such attitude to innovation in the field of territorial development are: • low level of awareness in innovative ways, methods, techniques and results of its implementation in other countries; • low life quality of local communities; • distrust of the government (the last local elections of city, town and village mayors and local deputies in ukraine showed low voter turnout – 46.62% in the first round and 34.08% in the second. it was particularly low in the eastern and southern regions, (вибори депутатів…, 2015). this suggests population fatigue and uncertainty of the fact that the new government will improve the lives of almost indifference to candidates elected. this is confirmed by the social survey in different towns of ukraine); • low inform of the local community during the preparation and implementation of innovative forms, methods and technologies of the essence of innovation and the results of its implementation; • low level of community participation in public life. for example, in severodonetsk, luhansk region during the month of public consultation on initiatives to maintain the association of city, town and rural communities in one capable community, local government did not receive any response from the local community. therefore, for local authorities in its activities in the areas of innovation development it is extremely important to consider all of the above factors and work to eliminate them. everything is made by local authorities, made only for community development reaches a new, more qualitative satisfaction of their own needs. the purpose of the innovation of local government should be a new level of community development, quality of operation. it has been known for a long time, and long experience of mankind proved that only innovation can ensure the development of any system, and the local community is not in this exception. conducting monitoring implementation of innovative forms of development is different. subjects of such control are the local governments, public authorities and public entities if the innovative process takes place with their participation (e.g. ppp, cluster form of organization of territorial development, etc.). control in the innovative development of communities may take place in the following areas: economic, financial, administrative and financial (applies to control the repayment of various kinds of debts), industrial and technical, property, environmental, legislative (control of compliance with existing legislation, such as in the area of utilities), social, labor, mobilization. it should be noted that the powers of local governments and public authorities are defined by the current legislation of ukraine and by agreement on joint innovation (such as the ppp agreement, the agreement on cluster association, etc.). social control has an important place in the system of control in the sphere of innovation development areas: it allows not only to prevent abuses by unscrupulous its duties by officials of local governments and private partners, and promote transparency and efficiency of innovation. the community provides feedback from the end users of services, reveals the positive and negative impacts of innovation at any stage of their implementation. that is why, public opinion is so important for local governments and private partners in decision of making on coordination of operation of innovative development (e.g., ppp – is the integral property complex of communal enterprise transferred to the concession). however, it should be noted that public control has no direct effect on control object. its results can only affect local governments and private partners in decision-making. public control can be carried out separately by citizens and specially created by them, such as community councils. the composition of the public council includes representatives of the territorial community. it operates on a voluntary basis. decisions of public council are advisory to the local council and are obligatory for consideration. these solutions contain suggestions and comments from the public on the urgent local issues. unfortunately, this type of control in the implementation of innovative forms of development is not given sufficient attention from both the public and local governments. this is due to the specificity of innovation, the need for the presence of specific knowledge and experience in this area, and the passivity of the local community. the system of public oversight in ukraine is still only in its infancy. legal framework of the implementation of such controls is determined by law of ukraine „on access to public information”, which was passed in january 2011 but the mechanism of public control in local government, and particularly in the provision of public services is still not clearly defined. the public pursuant to this act can receive information to control it only in certain limits. in accordance with this law, the public oversight of the enforcement of media access to public information is made by members of local councils, ngos, community councils, citizens personally through apmanagement peculiarities of innovative development areas in ukraine 51 propriate public hearings, public examination and so on. in ukraine information on the environment, the quality of food and consumer goods, accidents, disasters, natural hazards and other emergencies is published and submitted for requests that have occurred or may occur and threaten the health and safety of citizens, as well as other information of public interest (public information required). in the field of communal service entities the public can get information on the terms of the supply of goods, services and prices. furthermore, the public has unhindered access to information about the management of budget funds, possession, use or disposal of the state, municipal property, including copies of relevant documents, subject to such funds or property, surname, name and patronymic of individuals and the names of legal people who received the money or property (про доступ до публічної інформації, 2011). for example, ppp public can only express their opinion on the quality of services provided by the private partner in a particular area. therefore, we propose to resolve the issue of the control of the public in the areas of innovation area sat the legislative level. thus, in this case it is necessary to involve real experts that understand the economic, financial, technological, organizational and other issues of innovative development. in our view, this can be achieved through their participation in community councils. such councils are permanent advisory collegial bodies, which are formed at the respective local councils. the purpose of their creation is ensuring of public participation in the formulation and implementation of local importance. 4. summary thus, in the presence of significant number of innovative forms of territorial development, methods and tools for its management in the fulfillment of engagements, local governments execute their own choice, taking into account their advantages and disadvantages, and specifics of a region, based on the experience of introducing these forms in other regions and foreign countries. it is important that their application should ensure achieving the desired level of community development in the territory. further exploration in this area will include the development of mechanisms of their implementation in ukraine. references glińska e., florek m., kowalewska a., 2009, wizerunek miasta. od koncepcji do wdrożenia, wolters kluwer 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яких можуть надаватись пільги щодо концесійних платежів, дотації, компенсації та умов їх надання, 2000, офіційний вісник україни, постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 13 липня 2000 року, № 1114, 28.07.2000, 39. про об’єднання співвласників багатоквартирних будинків, 2001, офіційний вісник україни, закон україни від 29 листопада 2001 року № 2866-iii, 04.01.2002, 52. про схвалення концепції розвитку державно-приватного партнерства в україні на 2013-2018 роки, 2013, офіційний вісник україни, розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 14 серпня 2013 року № 739-р, 11.10.2013, 291. рейтингові показники створення осбб за 2014 рік, 2015, http://www.minregion.gov.ua/zhkh/zhitlovegospodarstvo-reformuvannya-zhitlovo-komunalnogogospodarstva-127749/upravlinnya-vikoristannya-tautrimannya-mayna-bagatokvartirnogo-budinku-47825/ d i n a m i k a u t vo re n ny a o s b b p p s e z z h b k8 6 0 4 0 6 / r e y t i n g o v i p o k a z n i k i s t v o r e n n y a o s b b z a 2 0 1 4 rik-86504/ [23.08.2015] удосконалення системи управління в житловому господарстві, 2015, http://www.minregion.gov. u a / z h k h / z h i t l o v e g o s p o d a r s t v o r e f o r m u v a n n y a z h i t l o v o k o m u n a l n o g o g o s p o d a r s t v a 1 2 7 7 4 9 / u p r a v l i n n y a v i k o r i s t a n n y a t a u t r i m a n n y a m a y n a b a g a t o k v a r t i r n o g o b u d i n k u 4 7 8 2 5 / d i n a m i k a u t vo re n ny a o s b b p p s e z z h b k8 6 0 4 0 6 / udoskonalennya-sistemi-upravlinnya--v-zhitlovomugospodarstvi-726419/ [23.08.2015] 1. introduction in the years to come, environmental problems influenced the whole global society without respect to the parties that initiated environmental problems and they have become sensitive items on agendas of developed, underdeveloped, northern and southern hemisphere nations and capitalist and socialist countries. as the issue has become more and more alarming and understood globally, the environmental agenda has transformed itself to a field in which every relevant global party pursued common remedies and other solutions to the problem. by virtue of its cumulative characteristic, environmental journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 36–40 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.025.7181 environmental problems and environmental politics: an examination of the context of the eu and turkey relations bekir parlak (1), ýsmail enes parlak (2) (1) department of political science and public administration, faculty of economics and administrative sciences, uludag university, görükle campus, 16059 nilüfer, bursa, turkey, e-mail: bparlak21@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) industrial engineering graduate student, uludag university, görükle campus, 16059 nilüfer, bursa, turkey, e-mail: ensparlak@gmail.com citation parlak b., parlak ý. e., 2017, environmental problems and environmental politics: an examination of the context of the eu and turkey relations, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 36–40. abstract information and communication technologies have been one of these main instruments in the implementation of eu environmental policies. in this respect, eu poses a concrete, influential and important model bearing a potential to generate policies, norms, values and standards on the subject of environment as it does in many other issues. depending on this suggestion, in this study, we aim to analyze and assess the turkish and eu policies regarding the role of information and communication technologies in the creation of environmental information, its distribution and public access to environmental information sources. in this regard, eu’s policies and technology-based initiatives have importance to a great extent in this period of serious debates in relation turkey’s membership talks with the union. furthermore, turkey, by virtue of her geopolitics and geostrategic position in the region as well, stands on the center of regional environmental problems due to its industrial development potential and its crossroads location in the intersection of black sea and the mediterranean among the important energy and transportation routes. therefore, potential of access to environmental information renders itself vital to handle the ecological problems of the region. the paper is targeting to forecast and analyze these potential and possible future developments from the perspective of turkish and eu affairs. key words environmental problems, environmental policies, environmental information, national geographic level, turkish case, european union. environmental problems and environmental politics: an examination of the context of the eu and turkey relations 37 problems are related to the parameters of most economic, social, cultural and political and administrative problems. on the other hand, the structures and understandings arising from industrialization and urbanization have brought about a wide spectrum of problems beyond ideological nature. among these, environmental issue has rendered itself to the most important and the most global item on the list. parallel to its global characteristic, the issue in question has been awaiting global responses. the international and supranational characteristics of the problem have also necessitated the cooperation between global parties involved. 2. environmental problems and environmental politics in the national geographic level the events such as growth of the population, fast and unbalanced urbanization, and industrialization and over consumption together with the economical aspects lead towards the expansion of environmental problems. the negative impacts originating in this connection, due to an advantageous position in the production quantity by the pollution creating monopoles have led to environmental problems with a focus of discussion at local, regional and international level. today the environmental topics are bringing different countries to a very complex reciprocal dependence on each other. the danger of extinct species in the environment compels nations to come to a mutual understanding on a global basis. the concept of trans boundary pollution also transforms environment to an international issue rather than being solely national, thus pressing for regional and universal cooperation (ökmen, 2003). for example, climate change is a global environmental problem that needs global cooperation for its solution. several factors have been identified to make international cooperation more likely: greater scientific consensus; increased public concern; burden sharing between nations; short term political benefits; and the existence of previous, related multilateral agreements (grundmann, 2007). 3. environmental problems, environmental politics and environmental information all efforts to protect and solve the environmental problems are a part of environmental politics. however, measures taken by the governments for the future development and protection of natural and created environments can be termed as environmental politics. environmental politics in the sense of searching for solutions of concrete negative exposures beyond the observational trends, reactions and ideological speeches, takes different shapes in each country according to its characteristics but at almost all places understanding on some characteristics of environmental politics are met with. a creation of healthy environments for humans, protection and development of community environmental values, and sharing of the necessary load of environmental politics applications mean an adaptation to the principals of public justice (what is turkey’s…, 1987). environmental performance assessments servea diverse group of users, including scientists, technicians, policymakers, the media, and the general public. this puts different demands on the way the results are prepared and disseminated (srebotnjak, 2007). espacially the media hold an important position in influencing public opinion on these matters. the framing of issues is particularly important. it has been suggested that there is an issue attention cycle but that the media’s influence in the climate case is secondary, ‘reinforcing the perceptions of primary definers in the politics of global warming: scientists, states and corporations (grundmann, 2007). 4. the environmental politics of european union one of the most important components both during the formation as well as enforcement of the eu environmental politics under question has been the ‘environmental information’. a fast development in the information technology for procuring data and analysis techniques has proved of great help to ecology and environmental science (williams et al., 2006). knowledge and information technologies are capable of producing potential positive or negative effects on every step of sustainability (hilty, 2006). because a need for functioning of the environmental politics, parallel to the globalization of environmental problems, is to a great extent dependent on the establishment and management of a good information infrastructure. in this sense, success of the application of environmental politics by the union is closely related to the effective use of scientific technology and diffusion of information webs that will be created within this framework. one of the foundations occupying the frontline in the case of sustainable development in the union, particularly during the period following maastricht, is “european environment agency”. 38 bekir parlak, ýsmail enes parlak in order to provide healthy and comparable information to the union and the member states on the position of environment, the eea; established in 1990 and put into force in 1993; has undertaken the function of providing centrally oriented sustainable development strategy during the periods of developing politics towards environmental protection (bosch, 2002). the aim of the agency was to help eu and member states in the improvement of environment, integration of problems related to the environment into economical politics and decision making on the progress towards sustainable development (who is it?…, 2005). among the working fields of agency are procurement and analysis of environmental information, coordination of eionet and an information system, provide services to the european commission, member countries of eea, international organizations, conventions and agreements, provide suggestions related to the politics, and other topics related to this on a broader scale. the strategy of eea for 2004–2008 is the third perennial working program prepared according to the outline mentioned in the establishment format of the agency. it has been accepted in the meeting held on 25 november, 2003 by the eea governing body and is on the same lines as sixth action program (eea signs…, 2004). 5. environmental policies of the turkey in the perspective european union the interest environmental policies regarding the protection of environment and formation of early environmental policies took a start in the mid-70s and accelerated throughout the 1980s. the idea of environmental protection and need for environmental policies materialized for the very first time in the united nations conference held in 1972 that also played important role in the making and formation of eu environmental policies. eventually, it was stated that the environmental protection be asserted into the seventh-five-year-developmental program for the first time and actions and arrangements that would not curb the economic growth be taken immediately. henceforth, the environmental policy planning studies were initiated with this plan followed by the 1983 environmental legislation prepared in the spirit of 1982 constitution, an important step in the process (what is turkey’s..., 1987). in particular, global and regional developments were emphasized in line with the stress laid upon increasingly important regional cooperation in the seventh-five-year-developmental program. in this framework institutions such as eu, nafta and pacific region cooperation gained importance and a tri-polar structure began to emerge. parallel to these developments, these institutions became influential with their international norms and rules with sanctioning power. in this regard, it became impossible for nations to form effective policies in isolation with these institutions. it will be useful to open up a little more the relations on the environmental politics between eea and turkey as one of the topics in the national programme, because the steps taken in this connection during the eu adaptation period and efforts spent have a special importance. turkey applied for membership to the eea in june, 1999; the discussions were started by the eu commission with a representation from turkey during the meeting held on 27 march, 2000 at brussels. the topic under question has been taken into consideration in the meeting held on 17–18 may, 2000 with the authorities of environmental general directorate of eu commission visiting turkey during the renegotiations on “participation strategy” towards turkey’s participation in the programmers and membership in eea. in this meeting it has been openly stated by the eu commission authorities that eea is the first eu organization opening the doors towards the full membership of turkey in eu. in the meeting of “eu and standing member countries ministers for environment” a participation agreement was signed between “turkey and eu on eea and european information and observation net” on 9 october, 2000 at brussels. a validation of the agreement under question was ratified by turkish parliament on 23/1/2003 with the 4794 number law. within this framework as in other countries, eea requires that the data needed should be collected according to the eu standards, all required information on environment and other fields (industry, agriculture etc.) should be provided by turkey during the period of adaptation to the european legislation, provision of all required information to the decision makers, provision of all information and data during the formation of politics, provision of information and data during the environmental impact assessment for an acceptance of the projects prepared by the standing member countries of the eu as a prerequisite for getting financial support from eu, formation of a standard not attained due to different formats used by the public sectors / organizations, and private organizations related to the data on environment in turkey, for this purpose in order to get support on the “project on structural development and communication on environmental information” was started by the environmental problems and environmental politics: an examination of the context of the eu and turkey relations 39 “ministry of environment and forests” with a participation from other organizations and sectors in this connection under a coordination of the ministry, so as to create a national data bank for observation and reporting on environmental situation in turkey, activation of eionet in turkey in order to reach on time the data of all member countries, and finally provision of data and information on environment to the public (eionet nedir?, 2006,). 6. discussion and conclusion environment and environmental issues are now clear for all the world agenda. the environmental policy and issues in the past thirty and forty years have become more concrete as they stand as serious problems. as stated in the beginning, apart from the primitive times which people dominated the nature, environmental problems really emerged in the context of industrial revolution and the increasing impact of rational-economic thought in the post-industrial revolution posed it as a concrete problem. wherever we stand in the world, whether it be developed or underdeveloped nations, environmental problems have begun to constitute a real threat. today it is vital and a must that we develop common projects and cooperation on a global and international scale for environmental issues, as the magnitude of the threat requires a gestaltian approach and general solutions beyond the ideological predilections. the environment as we borrowed from our children, due to threats faced in a clear and present sense, has become a high priority item at a national, regional and international level (ökmen, 2006). in this regard, the eu policy perspective is essentially important for turkey in a process of accession talks. the environmental jurisdiction of eu stands as an advanced framework among the ones in implementation around the world and among the administration models. as summarized in the eu legislation, arrangements on the way to a full implementation of environmental policy have been realized and developed along the principles. henceforth, turkey’s direction for change in environmental policy-making should be perceived and implemented from the eu perspective. in the meanwhile, compared to her eu counterparts, turkey remains at very early stages in such policy-making and implementation. in fact, such a conclusion requires a long and an arduous process to succeed for turkey to harmonize herself with the union’s environmental policy making. there will indeed be difficulties for the local and national units in the harmonization of policies in environmental administration. the harmonization with the eu environment policy framework becomes an obligation for the member country that initially agrees to the terms of the union in environmental administration. on the other hand, turkey’s adaptation to the eu environmental policy making will be more difficult and painful for the turkish integration into the environmental policy-making (yaşamış, 1995). turkey, besides her comparative studies with eu environmental legislations since 1987, has set its goals to change the environmental jurisdiction as a part of customs union. as a result, most of the turkish jurisdiction has been harmonized with the eu one. the eu also ensures the full implementation of the process. the target is the implementation of turkish environmental jurisdiction with the same approach of the eu (egeli, 1996). according to the progress report in 2004, in terms of the horizontal jurisdiction, regulations have been found to be harmonized with the eu jurisdiction, as well as this, it was pointed out that beyond border impact and public consultation should be more emphasized. as these need to be implemented immediately, this will affect the implementation quality. the horizontal jurisdiction implementation requires a lot of effort. turkey has still not signed the “kyoto protocol”. in terms of the air quality issue, steps should be taken to develop and implement air monitoring schemes and related regulations. while important measures have been taken in regard to the air quality and waste management, it still requires a lot of support to plan a national strategy to deal with waste management. despite the legislations passed, legal harmonization has been at a minimal level. a new regulatory framework for the environmental protection, birds and habitat should also be developed. continual extinction of habitats are also worrying. effective implementation, in this regard, is a must. interrelated policy fields in relation to the environmental policy should also be considered. industrial pollution, risk management, chemical and genetically modified organism are also issues that need to be harmonized and require attention. henceforth turkish obligations in terms of environmental policy making are inclusive of following: measure regarding environmental protection, identification of policies, integration scheme development and sustainable development. integration of environment and forestry ministry is a positive step in terms of administrative capacity. such unification has not been effective though. there are still overlapping responsibilities and clash of interests between ministries and institutions. more emphasis should be laid upon local administrations within the 40 bekir parlak, ýsmail enes parlak local administration reform draft. in general, planning and implementation are fundamental problem. recruitment of expertise personnel and purchase of technical equipment and implementation of framework are important steps. in the medium run, more investments need to be put. along with such a content integration with the eu framework is a must for investment. generally transfer to the national legal jurisdiction has remained at a minimal level coupled with weak implementation practices. horizontal jurisdiction, air quality, waste management, water quality, industrial pollution and risk management are issues that need to be dealt in terms integration to the national jurisdiction. in this regard, institutions’ capacities and coordination mechanisms be strengthened in environmental policy-making, which also requires great financial investments (year 2004 progress…, 2004). european union standards is important in this issue. while essential steps were taken along with harmonization with eu environmental standards, the list to do is not over. this indeed necessitates a mental transformation and the will to put these legal regulations into implementations. as many economic, social, cultural and politico-administrative factors are intertwined with environmental issues, we need total and holistic approaches. the approach taken by the 7th 5 year developmental program and in particular with the 8th one in a national, regional and supranational sense should be transferred into related fields regarding implementation. in this regard, policies balancing between national and other regional and supranational interests should be formed and put into implementation. references bosch p., 2002, the european environment agency focuses on eu-policy in its approach to sustainable development indicators, statistical journal of the united nations, 19, 4–13. eea signs 2004 update on certain issues of the european environment agency, 2004, european environment agency, office of the official publications of the european communities, luxembourg. egeli g., 1996, environmental problems in the european union and turkey, tef publication, ankara. eionet nedir?, 2006, aça http://www.eionet.eu.int/report. net.html_08.01.2006 [10.04.2016]. grundmann r., 2007, climate change and knowledge politics, environmental politics, 16(3), 414–432. hilty l.m., 2006, the relevance of information and communication technologies for environmental sustainability – a prospective simulation study, environmental modelling & software, 21, 1618–1629. ökmen m., 2003, urban, environment and globalization, alfa publishing, istanbul. ökmen m., 2006, ecology-politics of the integration process: environmental policies in the european union and turkey, [in:] m. dikkaya (ed.), turkey on the way to the eu: politics of the negotiation process, alfa publications, istanbul, 350–362. srebotnjak t., 2007, the role of environmental statisticians in environmental policy: the case of environmental performance, environmental science and policy, 10(5), 405–418. what is turkey’s environmental policy? what should it be?, 1987, tef publishing, ankara. who is it? what are we doing? how are we doing?, 2005, european environment agency, environment agency, office of the official publications of the european communities, luxembourg. williams r.j., martinez n.d., goldeck j., 2006, ontologies for ecoinformatics, journal of web semantics, 4(4), 237–242. yaşamış f.d., 1995, the basic tools of environmental management, imge publishing, ankara. year 2004 progress report on turkey’s accession process to the eu, 2004, spo publication, ankara. human and geographical issues of borderland territories (borderlands) are not new. they are derivative: originally, the category of border appeared and in connection with it – the notion of borderlands and borderland issues. at the same time, these issues, in the context of specific international, national and regional challenges, acquire new features and characteristics. they need not only updated research methods, but also unconventional approaches and interpretations. in short, entire conceptual and terminological apparatus of limology theory (science of borders, borderlands, boundary lines and planes, etc.) requires theoretical comprehension as well as similar in subject matter scientific research disciplines regionalistics, country and area studies. in recent decades, a number of terms, notions, concepts and categories related to the notion of border entered scientific circulation and firmly rooted in. it depends primarily on emergence of new geospatial human realia such as globalization, international integration, formation of interand intra-state regions („euroregions”), joint entrepreneurship, cross-border cooperation, etc. these relatively new notions include „borderlands”, „small border traffic”, „frontiers”, „borderzone” and others. particularly important among them is the notion of „borderlands”. at first glance, it seems that everything is very simple. in fact, the question, first of all, needs argumented substantiation. in particular: a) borderlands are not an ordinary piece of territory adjacent to border and characterized by certain features. because the very characteristic of „being borderland” is the first essential feature of territory. the point is that these features must be suitable for typology of borderlands; b) it is important to take into account new factors of human geographical nature, which provide territory with „borderland sounds”. thus, for example, from borders towards the center of a country, covering a certain distance, „borderland infrastructure” is intensively formed, and this should be considered first; c) „borderlands” as a space are becoming a factor in settling in it of non-traditional enterprises and institutions, unprecedented human activities. primarily, it concerns localization of recreational areas along borders, oriented to the needs of foreign tourism. this is often associated with presence on borderlands of certain (often unique) natural, and historical and cultural resources; d) in traditionally interpreted borderlands, „growth poles” are emerging now, once depressive small and medium urban settlements are activating; journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 5–8 introduction oleh shabliy chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: mvlakhr@ ukr.net citation shabliy o., 2017, introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 5–8 6 oleh shabliy e) against the background of depression and recession of almost all regions of ukraine, certain borderlands are showing signs of social and economic activation. population in them is growing due to positive migration balance, emergence of jobs in free and special economic zones, etc. in short, instead of dividing function, borders are increasingly performing the integrational one. an important role here is played by “carpathian” and “buh” euroregions. these and a number of other characteristics of modern borderlands require paying to them more attention not only by state, but also by planning and design bodies, for example, mistoproekt state institute of city design, and scientists. all the more so, as all borderlands together with borders themselves have socio-economic and, above all, state political content. among different kinds and types of borderlands of ukraine, the west ukrainian borderlands are specific. its delimitation requires a separate substantiation. it is primarily about defining of „width” (more precisely – „depth”) of the borderlands in relation to the border itself. and also about „limits” of the borderlands in relation to their neighbors – the south and north ukrainian borderlands. the west ukrainian borderlands include the territory of ukraine, adjacent to the borders of belarus, poland, slovakia, hungary, romania and moldova. that means that, by its definition, the west ukrainian borderlands have six sectors (according to the number of countries to which they come). in addition, each of the sectors is characterized by historical and political, and ethnic specificity. until recently, the western border had been not so much a border of ukraine as a state border of the ussr. the paradox was that ukraine as a pseudostate (republic) had no jurisdiction over this border and its western region represented in the borderlands not ukraine itself, but a „superpower” – the ussr. moreover, this western border, contrary to the economic trend of integration of the so-called socialist countries, was probably the greatest barrier among all borders of the former ussr. it was most closely guarded. deeply echeloned „defense” of various law enforcement agencies throughout the western region of ukraine had the task to carry out psychological pressure on the local population and prevent penetration to the republic of „harmful” (from the viewpoint of totalitarian regime) ideas and thoughts. in fact, the entire western region was an ideological border. although, the west ukrainian borderlands are entirely ukrainian territory, there representatives of neighboring nations had been massively living for a long time – poles, hungarians, slovaks, romanians, moldovans and others. now their culture and religion are in the process of revival. just the same, cultural and religious, social and public life of ukrainians across the border is gradually getting better. in scientific terms, delimitation of the west ukrainian borderlands becomes important. existing research suggests that the notion of the west ukrainian borderlands have several meanings: regional, state political, historical and geographical, and ethnocultural. in regional meaning, the west ukrainian borderlands are a large region of ukraine, which occupies its western part and is adjacent to its west, including the southand north-west, border. it has some specific features, including: a) geographical location – direct border with four countries of the former „socialist camp”, closeness to developed countries of europe, location on international transport corridors and power systems, etc.); b) high socio-economic and ethnic diversity. along with the relatively highly developed lviv oblast, there are subregions with significantly below the nationwide level (the zakarpattia and ternopil oblasts); c) presence of a powerful consolidating territorial core – lviv, which is an important industrial and cultural center not only of the western region, but of ukraine as a whole or even of pan-european scale; d) specifics of mentality of the population, its nationwide „political ambitions” that, due to extermination of elite strata by occupation regimes in the past, do not always correspond to the real possibilities. however, cultural potential of the region against the background of the state in general can be successfully used for national revival of ukrainian people. state and political delimitation of the west ukrainian borderlands is that it is a „borderline” in the western region, which is defined at several administrative and territorial levels: inter-oblast, inter-raion (the lowest raions), inter-community. the first level is inter-oblast. in this meaning, the west ukrainian borderlands are a set of six or even seven oblasts adjacent to the state border (the rivne, volyn, lviv, zakarpattia, ivano-frankivsk and chernivtsi oblasts, and the khmelnytskyi oblast sometimes). so, this „borderline” shares borders with independent countries: southwestern belarus, southeastern poland, eastern slovakia, northeastern hungary, northern romania and moldova. figuratively speaking, there are the six countries per the six oblasts of ukraine. only the zakarpattia oblast in introduction 7 a certain sense is „central” because it comes to the borders of poland, slovakia, hungary and romania. the second level is inter-raion. the west ukrainian borderlands include a „borderline”, composed of a set of the lowest administrative raions, directly adjacent to the state border, starting with rokytnianskyi raion of the rivne oblast and ending with sokyrianskyi raion of the chernivtsi oblast. altogether there are 32 such raions: rokytnianskyi, dubrovytskyi, zarichnianskyi (the rivne oblast), liubeshivskyi, ratnivskyi, shatskyi, liubomylskyi, volodymyr-volynskyi, novovolynskyi (the volyn oblast), sokalskyi, yavorivskyi, mostyskyi, zhovkivskyi, staro-sambirskyi, turkivskyi (the lviv oblast), velyko-bereznianskyi, perechynskyi, uzhhorodskyi, berehivskyi, vynohradivskyi, khustskyi, tiachivskyi, rakhivskyi (the zakarpattia oblast), verkhovynskyi (the ivano-frankivsk oblast), putylskyi, vyzhnytskyi, storozhynetskyi, hlybotskyi, hertsayevskyi, novoselytskyi, kelmentskyi and sokyrianskyi (the chernivtsi oblast). and then, the biggest borderlands in the zakarpattia oblast (together with the chernivtsi oblast), which cover eight raions (see the article by i. hudzelyak and i. vanda in this collection). the third level – the west ukrainian borderlands are formed by a set of territories of communities (in several cases, city councils, such as in uzhhorod), adjacent to the state border. this is a line of about 20 km of width and of somewhat more than 1,200 km of length. it is truly borderland. its „being borderland” is most clearly manifested near transborder crossings (rava-ruska, mostyska, dobromyl and others – in the lviv oblast). borderlands are a complex phenomenon in geospatial organization of a state. therefore, they should be studied on an interdisciplinary basis. except human geography, the following sciences should play a significant role in the study of borderlands: economics, sociology, jurisprudence, international relations, ecology, tourism studies, etc. the most important issues of interdisciplinary scientific research of the west ukrainian borderlands are: 1) problems of sustainable development of the west ukrainian borderlands in the context of policy of the eastern partnership and european integration. in the modern conditions of the hybrid war of russia against ukraine and the revival of the cold war between east and west, the west ukrainian borderlands are the most stable among all regions of ukraine. in this stability, the role of poland and slovakia is especially important. 2) study of security aspects of the west ukrainian borderlands as a representant of all ukraine. above all, there are problems of geodemographical, and ecological and geographical security; problems of geodemographical security are primarily connected with negative change of reproductive potential of the borderlands, particularly, intensive aging of population, increased external migration of local population and transit international migration of population of asian subcontinent countries; ecological and geographical regional problems are based on: a) western transfer of polluted air masses from central and eastern europe; b) presence of a dense network of roads, including automobile transport corridors of international importance. 3) scientific substantiation of a network of protected areas of various types. creation of natural national parks, bilateral and biosphere reserves, landscape reservants and others only partially solves the problem of environmental affairs. protection of environment should be put on a complex landscape basis, especially with taking into account the systemacity in functioning of natural and natural-anthropogenic complexes. 4) substantiation of location of the west ukrainian borderlands in inter-ukrainian, regional-ukrainian and international geospatial division and integration of labor. this is connected to the fact that by this time, the west ukrainian borderlands have been functioning as a system of depressive and recessive territories of ukraine with specific – actually borderland – geographical location. 5) comprehensive substantiation of impact of created trans-european transport corridors on entire geospatial organization of society of the west ukrainian borderlands in the context of such impact on neighboring to the west ukrainian borderlands borderland territories of neighboring countries. 6) research of the socio-economic problem of quality of life of population. regarding this issue, all other issues, including the aim of their solution, are derivative and often act as factors. 7) research of socio-economic, demographic, ecological and geographic, and security problems of development of cross-border cooperation of ukrainian sections of the borderlands with relevant sections of certain countries: ukrainianpolish, ukrainian-belarusian, ukrainian-slovak, ukrainian-hungarian, ukrainian-romanian and ukrainian-moldovan. 8) substantiation of production and non-production cross-border infrastructure, particularly communication problems of creation and development of cross-border logistics points, hubs, ways, including multitransport highways. in particular, 8 oleh shabliy construction of borderland lateral roads deserves attention. 9) in conditions of development of post-industrial and informational society, it is advisable to substantiate „schemes of development and geospatial organization of society” on the both sides of modern inter-state borders with taking into account further borderland integration of territories of neighboring countries. 10) elaboration and implementation of a system of cybersecurity of life activity of territorial socio-, economicand ecological-geographical subregions of west ukrainian oblasts. this system should have all features of rapid response systems, i.e. it should identify the nature of a cyber danger on-line, develop and implement in the same mode corresponding solutions, predict future conditions of respective complexes of borderland subregions, etc. the present collection of scientific articles by scientists-geographers of ukraine covers a wide range of issues and problems of the west ukrainian borderlands, which have been relevant the last two or three decades. here, in particular, an attempt to explore new approaches to the notions of „border” and „borderlands” and related concepts was made; human, cultural and educational, natural and geographical (including recreational) potential of the region in general as well as its individual model subregions (the lviv oblast, bug euroregion, lviv) was considered. an attempt to consider electoral mobility of population of the region as well as reforming of its administrative and territorial structure was made. in the collection, the west ukrainian borderlands are considered in most cases at the inter-oblast level. there are articles, dedicated to socio-geographical problems, the research of and solution to which would positively influence the life activity of population of the region as well as ukraine in general. these problems include economical-, socio-, demo and ethno-, ecologicaland political-geographical. historical and cultural heritage of the largest urban center in the region – the city of lviv – was separately highlighted. the scientists – the authors of texts of this collection – belong to research centers of several countries: poland (one center – słupsk), ukraine (four centers – lviv, chernivtsi, ternopil, lutsk). editor is grateful to all authors and co-authors of articles texts. oleh shabliy 1. introduction since the fall of the communist system in europe, we have been observing increasingly faster processes of depopulation in central and east-central europe. as a result, currently the vast majority of countries of the region are characterised by an unfavourable demographic situation and a decrease in population (cf. berzis, zvidrins, 2011; michalski, 2005; 2010; rybicka, 2014; the impact ..., 2011), which to a large extent results from unfavourable trends in the birth and death rates. another factor worsening the already unfavourable demographic situation in this region is large emigration which in the vast majority of cases goes unnoticed by official statistics (see neguţ et al., 2010, szołtys, 2016). unsurprisingly, then, the demographic forecasts for the countries of the region are pessimistic (cf. matysiak, nowok, 2006; манаков, суворков, 2017; позняк, шевчук, 2014). of course, in the context of particular countries in the region or the types of settlement, the situation looks a little different. thus in the case of large cities, an additional factor strongly influencing changes in the number of their population is the suburbanisation process (cf. dzhaman, 2011; grigorescu et al., 2012; karachurina, mkrtchyan, 2015; kubeš, 2013; śleszyński, 2006). journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 57–63 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.039.7639 changes in the number of population in large cities of central and east-central europe łukasz marszałek institute of geography and regional studies, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76–200 słupsk, poland, e-mail: lukasz.marszalek@apsl.edu.pl citation marszałek ł., 2017, changes in the number of population in large cities of central and east-central europe, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 57–63. abstract the aim of the article is to review the situation in terms of changes in the population of large cities in central and east-central europe. cities with a population above 300,000 inhabitants in 2004 were considered as large. the time frame of the analysis covers the period between 2004 and 2014. in total, the study involved 59 cities, of which in 31 an increase in the official number of inhabitants was recorded, and in 29 a decrease. it was found that the largest increase occurred mainly in the capital cities and in cities attractive to tourists, while the biggest decrease in post-industrial cities. at the regional level, the highest percentage of large cities with a decrease in the official population was recorded in the baltic states, poland and ukraine. key words big cities, shrinking cities, central europe, central and eastern europe. received: 07 august 2017 accepted: 17 september 2017 published: 29 december 2017 58 łukasz marszałek j.j. parysek (2005), basing on polish cities, has identified several factors of their transformations. these factors can be applied to all large post-socialist cities in the analysed region: 1) endogenous factors: a) the systemic transformation; b) demographic and social changes; c) local factors and limitations on growth. 2) exogenous factors: a) changes of the post-industrial (post-modern) period; b) globalisation and metropolitanisation and their effects on cities; c) european integration. this article focuses on the endogenous factor associated with the demographic changes. to this end, changes in the number of the population of large cities of post-socialist countries in europe were analysed. in this type of analysis there are various limits for the notion of a large city1. different ones will be in a small country, and different ones in a large one. for this study we have adopted a limit of 300,000 residents in 2004, and we tried to take into account the population living in the administrative borders 1 for example, m. viturka (2016) adopted a limit of 500,000 inhabitants. fig. 1. analysed cities source: own study. changes in the number of population in large cities of central and east-central europe 59 of the city2. the time frame of the analysis covers the period of 2004–20143, i.e. since the beginning of the expansion of the european union to the east of the continent until the last year for which complete data were obtained. the spatial range covers almost all post-communist european countries, except that for russia only kaliningrad and saint petersburg were taken for analysis. on the other hand, large cities of the former gdr were also included in the analysis. as a result, 60 cities were designated for analysis, of which 18 are capital cities (fig. 1). because of the difficulty in obtaining reliable data, sarajevo was excluded from analysis, hence 59 cities were finally studied. 2. analysis of changes in the number of the population the data presented in fig. 2. seem to contradict the widespread belief that big cities in central and east-central europe are becoming depopulated. it is clear that in the capitals of the countries (with the exception of riga, vilnius and bratislava) a growing number of the population is recorded. one can, therefore, be tempted to declare that this group of cities “won” the impact of exogenous factors defined by j.j. parysek (2005). this is confirmed by individual studies of these cities (keivani et al., 2002; kohlbacher, protasiewicz, 2012; pojani, 2010; stadion, mollov, 2000; zlatar 2014). on the opposite side we have the so-called monocities, or more generally, the former industrial cities, in which there was the greatest fall in the population numbers: ostrava, makiivka, kherson, luhansk, łódź, katowice, poltava, mariupol, dnipro, donetsk, zaporizhzhia, kaunas. in the case of these cities the synergistic effect of a series of negative factors is amplified by their economic problems4 (gołata, kuropka, 2016; krzysztofik, runge, 2010; krzysztofik et al. 2011, 2014; mykhnenko, 2010; ogrodowczyk, marcińczak, 2014; rumpel et al., 2010, 2014; spóra et al., 2016). it is also noticeable that cities which are attractive tourist destinations are characterized by more favourable changes in the population, examples being saint petersburg in russia, gdansk and krakow in poland, lviv, odessa 2 one clear exception was made for novi sad, for which the population was counted together with the city of petrovaradin, situated on the other bank of the danube. 3 although in some cases (due to difficulties in the availability of data) slightly different time ranges were adopted, which was cleared mentioned. 4 this regularity also concerns much smaller post-industrial cities (cf. jaroszewska, 2014; krupa, krul, 2012; szymańska 2007, 2010, 2011; добрейцина, 2013; левинтов, 2014). and sevastopol in ukraine, or varna in bulgaria. their internal vitality and traditions and a greater diversification of the economy meant that these cities more quickly adapted to the new exogenous factors. and the mere fact of their high tourist attractiveness (cf. berbeka et al., 2011; shabliy, 2017; stetsiuk, michalski, 2012; tölle, 2008) is the differentiator of better living conditions they offer as well as greater possibilities to adapt to new socio-economic realities. in turn, looking at the situation in the regional depiction, we can observe three areas where there was a clear reduction in the number of population in large cities. firstly, these are the baltic states5, in which a particularly high population decline was noted not only in big cities, but generally in the urban population. foreign emigration is an important factor in reducing the population number of large cities6 (cf. kosov, mikheeva, 2010; michalski, 2012). large cities with declining population prevail also in poland. in their case, the reason is both a negative migration balance (both internal in the city/village pair, and international), and with the negative birth rate (cf. kaczmarek et al., 2011; zborowski et al., 2012). however, the biggest population losses were recorded in large cities of ukraine. these are mainly caused by a clearly negative birth rate and high emigration abroad, and this results from badly implemented political and economic transformation (cf. kuczabski, michalski, 2014; radchenko et al., 2014; кучабський, 2014). on the other hand, the increasing number of the population of the cities in belarus is puzzling. taking into account the processes of depopulation in that country (ноздрин-плотницкая, 2016) – the main explanation may be significant internal immigration to large cities (cf. красовский, 2012), which of course does not exclude the suburbanisation processes (cf. сулим, 2016). 3. conclusions in view of the above, one should ask a question whether so often presented processes of shrinking cities in the analysed part of europe (cf. friedrich et al., 2014; jaroszewska, stryjakiewicz, 2014; schoenberg, constantin, 2014; stryjakiewicz, 2013; stryjakiewicz, jaroszewska, 2016; zborowski et al., 2012) are actually related to large cities? the results of the 5 although officially the population of tallinn has increased, the number of urban population in estonia is falling. 6 which, by the way, has lasted since regaining independence, although initially this was emigration to russia, and now to the rich eu countries. 60 łukasz marszałek fig. 2. change in the official number of inhabitants 2004–2014 (2004 = 100%) source: own study based on: population on 1 january by age groups and sex – cities and greater cities [urb_cpop1] and dispersed data. changes in the number of population in large cities of central and east-central europe 61 presented analysis are ambiguous, because out of 59 analysed cities an increase in the official population was noted in 31 of them, and a decrease in 28. it is clear that the depopulation processes hardly ever concern cities which are the capitals of countries and which have a high potential as tourist destinations; however, to a very large extent they concern post-industrial cities. we can also notice a very large diversity of the situation in the regional approach. nevertheless, given the adverse demographic forecasts, it can be concluded that the number of major cities in which the population will gradually decrease in the next few years will grow. references banca de date “statbank”, biroul naţional de statistică al. republici moldova, chișinău, http://statbank. s t a t i s t i c a . m d / p x w e b / p x w e b / e n / 6 0 % 2 0 s t a t i s t i c a % 2 0 re gi o 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городов, 2014, федеральная служба государственной статистики, москва, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/ regl/b14_14t/main.htm [19.05.2017]. сулим с.н., 2016, особенности демографического развития малых городов беларуси в зонах влияния региональных центров, [in:] е.а. антипова (ed.), демографические риски xxi века (к международному дню народонаселения), белсэнс, минск, 121–123. 1. introduction the level and pace of socio-economic development in the post-soviet countries has been determined by ongoing transformation processes in terms of internal policy framework, economic goals, desired position on the geopolitical area and preferred direction of a foreign partnership development. the collapse of the soviet union, one of the most powerful political powers of the 20th century, led to legislative chaos, increased unemployment, social impoverishment, widespread corruption and numerous domestic conflicts. however, it is also regarded as a crucial event in the modern history of the post-soviet states that, together with their sovereignty, have also gained an opportunity to reorient their global political and economic relations. the caucasus region is considered a strategic area that has recently became a focus of attention of western observers. its unique geographical location has led it to become a main transit route of energy resources (gas, oil). this, combined with an ongoing conflict of interests between the world’s economic leaders: united states, european union, iran, turkey, and the russian federation (the latter referring to the countries of south caucasus as ‘near abroad’ that should remain in its sphere of influence), has resulted in the region becoming an area of political and economic disputes between countries aspiring to control the region. the experts in the area of geopolitics, internal situation and a position of a given journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 46–52 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.037.7637 foreign direct investment in armenia julia kaczmarek-khubnaia institute of socio-economic geography and spatial management, adam mickiewicz university, krygowskiego 10, 61–680 poznań, poland, e-mail: khubnaia@amu.edu.pl citation kaczmarek-khubnaia j., 2017, foreign direct investment in armenia, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 46–52. abstract after the fall of the soviet union and regaining its independence, armenia has begun a process of systemic transformation. the level and pace of socio-economic development has been influenced by internal situation as well as by country’s geopolitical position and its relations with foreign partners. the purpose of this article is to present general characteristics of foreign direct investment that has been present in armenia since the 1990s. the author describes several key factors shaping the volume, geographical, proprietary and sectoral structure of the fdi inflows. a special attention is given to the influence of the russian federation on the armenian economy. key words foreign direct investment, armenia, post-soviet region. received: 07 may 2017 accepted: 06 june 2017 published: 29 december 2017 foreign direct investment in armenia 47 region on the international stage, refer to this phenomenon as ‘the new great game’ (cohen, 1996; iwańczuk, 2008; gołaś, 2011). just like neighbouring azerbaijan and georgia, armenia, together with its independence, has been given a chance to reinvent itself as a fully democratic state and to gradually eliminate the negative effects of the collapse of the soviet union. however, despite of many opportunities for establishing new economic and political relations, the country has remained in russian sphere of influence, unequivocally recognizing the russian federation as its main political ally and key economic partner. the purpose of this article is to present a general description of illustrate a general trend in foreign direct investment (fdi) in armenia between 1990– 2016. in addition to the analysis of statistical data describing the character of foreign direct investments (size, geographic and sectoral structure), the author discusses significant factors affecting fdi flows, internal situation in the analysed country, its current international position and a degree of economic dependence from the russian federation. the study is based on data published by armenian statistical service of republic of armenia (armstat) and by the united nations conference on trade and development (unctadstat). 2. selected factors affecting the foreign direct investment process in armenia geopolitical position and historical determinants resulting from over 70 years of membership in the soviet union, make it necessary to consider specific fdi characteristics that affect its shape, size and structure. researchers analysing the subject of fdi in transformation countries, identified three main factors influencing the shape and size of these investments (bojar, 2001): 1. international organisations’ membership (especially the possibility of joining the european union). 2. the state of system transformation process (including the level of investment risk). 3. state policy encouraging fdi inflows, and investment incentives. the most important international organisations joined by armenia after regaining its independence are: the commonwealth of independent states (cis) (1991), the united nations (un) (1992), the black sea economic cooperation (bsec) (1992), the council of europe (coe) (2001), the eurasian economic union (eaeu) (2015)1. in spite of initial pro-european aspirations of armenia (starting accession negotiations in 2010 and joining the eastern partnership (eap)), president serzh sargsyan has decided against of signing the association agreement (the eap summit, november 2013), thereby effectively stopping the integration process. the country is currently strengthening its alliance with the russian federation, as demonstrated by its accession to the eaeu, establishment of russian military bases in armenia (e.g. gyumri), or opposing the un resolution condemning the crimea referendum of 2014. in one of the studies concerning the attitudes of armenian citizens toward other countries (caucasus barometer, 2013), 84% of respondents were of an opinion that the russian federation is one of armenia’s closest friends (sadowski, 2013; loda, 2017). another important determinant of the fdi inflow to armenia is the state of system transformation. since the 1990s, the country has carried out a series of reforms concerning among others, economic liberalisation and business environment. the process had undoubtedly been hindered by outbreak of war in nagorno-karabakh, one day before the collapse of the soviet union. a tense situation resulting from economic isolation caused by azerbaijan and turkey closing their borders and putting a trade ban on armenia, has led to an emergence of a so-called ‘conflict economy’. the difficult socio-economic situation persists to this day. the ever more powerful oligarchy based political system makes it impossible to carry out any comprehensive structural reforms. deepening poverty, social polarisation, corruption and increase in food and energy prices have resulted in growing dissatisfaction and, which follows, more armenians taking to the streets to protest2 (odlingsmee, 2011; jaroszewicz, 2017; armenia ..., 2016). the current state of the country’s political and economic transformation is illustrated by the bertelsmann transformation index (bti)3, developed by the bertelsmann foundation (bertelsmann stiftung) (table 1). in december 2015, indicator for armenia was at 5.564, which meant that the country had 1 all the relevant information concerning armenia’s membership in international organisations can be found on website of the armenian ministry of foreign affairs. 2 the internationally most well-known protest is the electro maidan, also known as armenian majdan. the main reason for the protest, was an increase in electricity prices (falkowski, 2015). 3 the bertelsmann stiftung’s transformation index (bti) analyses and evaluates the quality of democracy, a market economy and political management in 129 developing and transition countries. 4 the index value is represented on the scale from 1 to 10. 48 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia placed as 64th in the ranking of developing and transition countries (for comparison: georgia was placed as 45th and russia as 81st). from 13 analysed components, indicators for political stability (8.8) and private property (8.0) reached highest values while indicators for the stability of democratic institutions (3.0) and level of socio-economic development (4.0) were at the lower side of the spectrum. the data published by the bti confirm the earlier mentioned socio-economic problems of armenia. the last factor determining the inflow of foreign direct investment to countries undergoing a transformation processes is the state policy encouraging fdi inflows, and investment incentives. as far as the fdi is concerned, armenia has declared an ‘open door’ investment policy towards the countries with which they are linked by ‘the most favoured nation clause’5. the law is defined is the 1994 “on foreign investment” (հհ օրենքը օտարերկրյա ներդրումների մասին, 1994) and in the investment policy of armenia. support for this type of investment is one of the key objectives of armenian economic policy. some of the main incentives introduced to attract new investors include: 1. establishment of free economic zones. 2. the law allowing a company registered by a foreigner in armenia to buy land. 3. no sector-specific or geographic restrictions on investment. 5 information on armenian investment policies and the country’s investment incentives are available on the websites of the ministry of foreign affairs of armenia and invest in armenia. global spc. 4. a possibility, for a foreign investor, to own a 100% of any given company. 5. in case of any changes in legislation, foreign investors can choose which law to use for up to 20 years. 3. characteristics of foreign direct investment in armenia when analysing statistical data concerning foreign direct investment, the author has referred to primary index of inward flows which indicates the amount of funds flowing into the country in the form of fdi (fig. 1)6. a year after armenia had regained its independence, the value of funds invested by foreign partners in its economy amounted to only 2 million usd. this situation can be seen as a result of market instability (including a high level of investment risk) in the first half of the 1990s, caused by systemic transformation, economic crisis and an ongoing (since 1988) armed conflict in nagorno-karabakh. since 1994, the authorities had introduced a number of important reforms regarding fdi inflow7, which re6 if no other source has been reported, the statistical analysis is based on data found in yearly reports of the armstat. 7 the first notable increase in the fdi value, after regaining the independence, was observed in 1998 (232 million usd). among the most important foreign investments in armenia at the end of the 1990s were: the takeover of the armenian telecommunication market by a greek company gte, the acquisition of the yerevan brandy company (ybc) by pernod ricard, and the procurement of the armenian diamond company by furfono (bartlett, 2000). tab. 1. the state of armenia’s political and economic transformation process as per 2015 (bti) st at u s in d ex political transformation economic transformation st at en es s po lit ic al p ar ti ci p at io n ru le o f l aw st ab ili ty o f d em o cr at ic in st it u tt io n po lit ic al a n d s o ci al in te g ra ti o n le ve l o f s o ci o ec o n o m ic d ev el o p m en t o rg an iz at io n o f t h e m ar ke t an d c o m p et it io n c u rr en cy a n d p ri ce s ta b ili ty pr iv at e p ro p er ty w el fa re re g im e ec o n o m ic p er fo rm an ce su st ai n ab ili ty 5.56 8.8 4.5 4.2 3.0 5.7 4.0 6.2 7.0 8.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 source: own elaboration based on the bertelsmann transformation index, transformation…, 2016. foreign direct investment in armenia 49 sulted in economic growth and subsequent accession to the world trade organization (january 2003). a first significant decline in inward flow investment was not observed till after 19988. a decline in value of foreign investments in armenia at that time, had its roots in the financial crisis in russia (1998), which directly affected the economies of its closest allies. after joining the council of europe, improving its relations with the european union and establishing a cooperation with the international monetary fund, the world bank and several national non-governmental organisations, armenia, for a brief period of time (2002–2008)9 regained its political and economic stability which, in turn, contributed to the annual increase of fdi inflows10. the effects of global financial crisis (2009), difficult internal situation and political decisions of the authorities make defining a clear trend (an unambiguous decrease or increase) in fdi flows from 2010 onwards, impossible. political actions directly influencing changes in the fdi value include: (1) decision of president serzh sargsyan to suspend any association and trade negotiations with the european union, (2) joining the customs 8 a decrease from 232mln usd in 1998 to 122 mln in the following year. 9 in the years 2008-2015, foreign direct investment accounted for an average of 43.6% of all investments carried out in armenia in that period. 10 in 2008, the value of fdi inflow was at 944 million usd which was the highest since armenia had regained its independence in 1991. union of russia, belarus and kazakhstan (2013), and (3) joining the eurasian economic union, an organisation (referred to, by the near-east researchers, as an ‘economic muzzle’) controlled by the russian federation, whose main goal is regeneration of strong ties and dependencies from the times of the soviet union, and which follows, gaining control over its allies (ananicz, 2014; jarosiewicz, fischer, 2015). when analysing a foreign direct investment, it is necessary to consider its geographical structure. directly before the collapse of the ussr and during the first decade after armenia regained independence, main foreign investors in the region were the russian federation, greece, canada and the united states (tab. 2). the situation has changed significantly within the next thirteen years. there has been a significant increase in capital flow from the russian federation (more than 40% of the total fdi) as well as more active participation of other partners (e.g. argentina and lebanon). despite a significant, directional change of fdi flows, the russian federation’s leading position remains unchallenged. the russian federation, has gradually increased its share of the total annual foreign investment in the armenian economy by 100%11. it is worth noting that the geographic structure of foreign direct investment in armenia is affected by the spatial distribution of the armenian diaspora, 11 more on structure of the russian investment in armenia in: аветисян (2014). fig. 1. inflow of foreign direct investment to armenia in 1992-2016 [in millions usd] source: own elaboration based on unctadstat data. 50 julia kaczmarek-khubnaia whose representatives often choose their homeland as a location of their investment. the estimated number of ethnic armenians within the world population is over 10 million. of these, only 2.99 million12 live in the republic of armenia. the countries with the largest percentage of armenians are: the russian federation, the united states, france, syria, lebanon, argentina, canada and iran. this largely 12 estimates calculated by the state authorities based on the results of the last census (2011) data on the population of armenia and main clusters of the armenian diaspora are available on the website of the president of armenia. coincides with the ranking of top 10 armenia’s investment partners. 13 ownership structure in fdi projects in 1998-2002 indicates private sector companies as most active investors (over 95% of total fdi). as far as a sectoral structure of fdi inflow in 1998-2002 is concerned, the largest part of the capital was located in the energy sector (31% of the total), telecommunications (24%) and food industry (production of food and beverages – 10.3%, fig. 2). 13 due to the fragmentation of the fdi data, the1988–2002 information relates to grow flows and the 2015 information to net stock. tab. 2. armenia’s main investment partners in the years 1988–2002 and 201513 1988–2002 2015 foreign partner share of country’s investment in the total volume of fdi inflows (in %) foreign partner share of country’s investment in the total volume of fdi inflows (in %) russian federation 21.0 russian federation 45.2 greece 18.7 argentina 5.7 canada 12.7 lebanon 5.6 usa 10.9 great britain 5.2 france 7.7 usa 5.1 great britain 6.0 france 4.7 luxembourg 3.3 germany 3.9 switzerland 2.5 cyprus 3.7 cyprus 2.4 switzerland 3.0 italy 1.5 netherlands 2.8 other states 13.3 other states 15.1 source: own elaboration based on annual publications of national statistical service of the republic of armenia. fig. 2. sectoral structure of foreign direct investment in armenia in 1998–2002 and 2015 source: own elaboration based on annual reports published by the national statistical service of the republic of armenia. foreign direct investment in armenia 51 looking at the statistical data from 2015, it is clear that the situation had changed significantly since 2002. on the one hand, the investments by private companies decreased by more than 10%. on the other hand, however, in addition to a still high level of investment in energy (24%) and telecommunications (14%), a proportion of investment in financial sector (21% of total investment) and real estate (10%) increased. this significant amount of foreign capital within the country’s key industries indicates a high degree of dependence on foreign partners. this issue is particularly important when considering the country’s energy security as well as economic objectives of the russian federation, in relation to countries in its strict sphere of influence. it is worth mentioning that russia holds a monopoly on gas imports to armenia till 2024. a good example of the influence exercised over armenia’s energy sector by its northern partner is a gradual takeover of armrosgazprom (a joint russian-armenian company) by gazrrom (ananicz, 2014)14. 4. conclusion after regaining its independence in 1991, armenia began a process of system transformation. despite the introduction of numerous reforms related to business liberalisation and privatisation, the country is still struggling with the issue of low level of socioeconomic development, as evidenced by the value of the bertelsmann transformation index. a difficult internal situation is reinforced by the oligarchy based political system, corruption and deepening poverty. from the beginning of the 1990s till today, the volume of fdi inflows to armenia has changed significantly. the situation was mainly influenced by systemic transformation, political activity of state authorities (especially in regards to the membership of international organisations) and several economic crises (russian in 1998 and global in 2009). additionally, the amount of funds flowing into armenia in the form of fdi was negatively affected by the unresolved armed conflict in nagorno-karabakh and subsequent isolation of armenia within the region (closing of borders by turkey and azerbaijan). the russian federation has been armenia’s main investment partner since the 1990s. as far as the in geographic structure of fdi is concerned, the importance of russian investment in armenia since the 1990s, has increased by more than 20%. this, 14 http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/january/article182633/ combined with data on the fdi sectoral structure (foreign investment is mainly focused on the key industries of armenian economy such as energy and telecommunications), indicates a strong dependence on the inflow of russian capital, which by now is controlling the most strategic state enterprises. the results of statistical examination combined with the information gained from the analysis of political decisions of the armenian authorities (resignation from eu membership, accession to the eurasian economic union, establishment of russian military bases on the territory of armenia), suggest the resuscitation of past political and economic ties and dependencies. recent events suggest a progressive integration process. this issue is particularly important when looked at from the perspective of the ‘great game’ in the caucasus, russia’s activity in the region, and maintaining the independence by other post-soviet republics. the 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with greater experience in implementing new public management is important. initially, the support was addressed to all countries in the region (see camyar, public administration reform as main prerequisite for deeper cooperation with eu and nato volodymyr streltsov (1) (2), viktoria shvedun (3), juri klejshmidt (4) (1) academic, scientific and production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, chernyshevska, 94, 61023, kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: kbuapa@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) management department, faculty of management and security, pomeranian university, arciszewskiego 22a, 76200, słupsk, poland, (3) academic, scientific and production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, chernyshevska, 94, 61023, kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: applevikvs@gmail.com (4) academic, scientific and production center, national university of civil protection of ukraine, chernyshevska, 94, 61023, kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: kspimkh@gmail.com citation streltsov v., shvedun v., klejshmidt j. 2019, public administration reform as main prerequisite for deeper cooperation with eu and nato, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 46–54. abstract for ukraine strategic partnership with nato is an integral part of the european integration course as complementary to the process of internal reforms in the context of the implementation of the association agreement between the european union and the european atomic energy community and their member states, of the one part, and ukraine, of the other part. the significant part of the thesis is devoted to classifications of indicators that measure the european integration progress. in addition to the existing classifications, the author suggests using a new one that analyzes all indicators according to two parameters: (1) as markers of how public administration values (legality, integrity/honesty, transparency, accountability, effectiveness) are adjusted and level of trust for public institution was changed over time; (2) as measurements of ability to integrate into different fields (policies, economy, law approximation, social field etc). the analysis of these indicators helped to generate their taxonomy to measure a progress. the author has specified that the lack of deep relations within regional trade agreements with democratic countries results in poor quality of regulation and ineffective governmental performance in ukraine. key words public administration, administrative reform, indicators, eu and nato values, eastern partnership, ukraine. received: 18 september 2018 accepted: 13 february 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 46–54 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.07 public administration reform as main prerequisite for deeper cooperation with eu and nato 47 2010), currently mainly to countries lagging behind in this respect. analyzing this support, one should bear in mind that its positive use depends on many factors. and you can find both examples of effective changes due to this support (ivan, iov, 2010; swianiewicz, mielczarek, 2010), as well as its not efficient use (ioniţa, freyberg-inan, 2008; karini, 2013). unfortunately, ukraine belongs to the second group of cases (leitch, 2017; solonenko, 2009). the good governance block is the main objective of the administrative reform in ukraine, in which the eu and nato see improvement in the efficiency of implementation of legislation, greater ability to effectively use eu and nato assistance with an emphasis on well-functioning public administration and directions for building a better and ethical civil service. however, these declarations are mostly still remain on paper and have not led to major changes in both efficiency and accountability (transparency) in the civil service system. in addition, a little attention is paid to resolving the conflict between individual values and principles of public management. the beginning of the administrative reform in ukraine in 2010 was marked by a drop in the number of ministries from 20 to 16 and a quarter of the number of employees in public administration. however, it was not accompanied by systematic actions aimed at increasing the efficiency and accountability of the government’s activities (kabmin…, 2010). under the pressure of international partners and ngos (publication confirming this emphasis, here and to references), a regulation of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine has been generated since june 24, 2016. № 474-р „some issues of reforming public administration of ukraine” (rozporiadzenia…, 2016), in which the strategy for reforming public administration of ukraine for the years 2016–2020 has been defined, together with the action plan for implementation of the strategy. in fact public administration reform was ongoing in 2017 with introducing the new (old – same changes were in yearly 2000’s) position of state secretary across government ministries. these state secretaries are responsible for administrative work, taking the burden of human resources and administration from ministers. some proper division of labor between ministers, deputy ministers, and state secretaries, and procedural changes were happened (koliushko, 2017). the pilot restructuring of 10 ministries has already begun, with each ultimately containing directorates responsible for separate policy areas (10 pilotnych…, 2017). this is the second attempt since the end of the 90s of the systemic approach to public administration reform. however, the pilot version of the document contains a small number of quantitative indicators and little focus put on convergence with eu public administration values. another attempt to describe the integration dimension of the eastern partnership countries is the publication of the estonian eastern partnership center, where it focuses on the comparison of public management in the eastern partnership countries (public administration ..., 2011). the participants of this project have adopted the point of view which based on the european principles of public administration and proposed indicators that characterize these principles. this approach corresponds to the spirit of scientific knowledge and is more suitable for researching and developing a system of indicators to measure the quality of integration processes at the national level. the fact that improving the quality of management has a direct impact on the quality of life, allows to look at the process of integration from the point of view of the household, which has the advantages of the integration process. but at the same time not least core government result is trust. trust in government is both a driver of government effectiveness and economic development, and an outcome measure for government action (government at a glance 2017, 2017, p. 214). the main goal of this study is examined current authoritative rankings (oecd, world bank group, etc.) approaches for measuring main parameters of public administration and explore their usability for assessing the principles of public administration in the management of integration processes framework. 2. evolution of public administration issues in authoritative rankings the sigma report “european principles for public administration” defines the principles of fairness and predictability (legal certainty), transparency, accountability and effectiveness, which were to serve as a guidepost for public cee governance systems on their course of necessary reform implementation (european principles ..., 1999 , p. 8) .these rules have been taken from administrative law, constitutional and judicial decisions of domestic courts and the eu court. it is worth noting that in the sigma report, the european principles of public administration are called the “non-formalized version of the acquis communautaire” (european principles …, 1999, p. 19). taking into account the contribution of sigma and the achievements of the european commission in the sphere of building assessment framework, it 48 volodymyr streltsov, viktoria shvedun, juri klejshmidt is safe to say that several important things should highlight, when talk concerning measuring the quality of integration processes management (verheijen, 1999): • sectoral capacity to implement the legislation developed, in the case of the eu this is a wellknown acquis; • development of coordination structures of the european integration process; • horizontal reform of administrative bodies, including civil service rules and a comprehensive public management reform strategy based on the basic principles of sigma; • “ability to implement”. the requirement to implement the sectoral acquis directly comes from the conclusions of the madrid summit and the third group of the copenhagen criteria. however, the principles of civil service reform and the coordination of european integration policy were only developed in the commission’s proposals. in turn, the criterion for civil service reform has been divided into a number of specific requirements to develop a common strategy or reform plan, adoption of civil service laws that would guarantee professionalism and political independence of administrative authorities, create a professional system and reform officials’ salaries, training requirements, reforms of local self-government, etc. as confirmed by a. verheijen (1999), eu officials during the interaction with candidate countries have repeatedly stressed the need to develop a professional civil service and set it as a condition of membership even more than in the commission’s proposals. the most difficult element to understand is the latter, namely, the requirement to develop the institutional ability to implement the acquis. unlike the previous eu accession, transposition of the acquis is no longer considered a sufficient measure for a postcommunist candidate (fournier, 1998). in addition to the implementation of horizontal management reforms, the candidate countries were also required to prove that their new institutions are robust and able to implement the acquis (this requirement is becoming more and more important, starting with commission reports on the progress of the european integration process, which were published after 1998). this aspect of the enlargement process, that is the question of ‘verification’ (mayhew, 2000), was not present in any of the previous enlargements, therefore it was not quite clear to the experts how the commission would make sure that eu legislation is correctly implemented after transposition (your own tab. 1. indicators used to measure the quality of public management in accordance with the european values of public administration list of indicators european values – principles of public administration data source rule of law legal certainty world governance indicators (wgi) political stability and absence of violence/ terrorism wgi favoritism in decisions of government officials global competitiveness index (gci) judicial independence gci citizens freedom and political rights freedom house transparency of government policymaking transparency gci corruption perception transparency international press freedom index reporters without borders irregular payments and bribes gci e-governance un database voice and accountability accountability wgi wastefulness of government spending gci polarization of trust in the governmental institutions (informed public vs. general population) edelman trust barometer, razumkov center regulatory quality effectiveness wgi government effectiveness wgi diversion of public funds gci doing business ifc/world bank source: public administration…, 2011; own proposals. public administration reform as main prerequisite for deeper cooperation with eu and nato 49 eu target for implementation is defined with regard to the level of transposition and allows a deficit ratio of no more than 1.5% (dimitrova, 2002) but the importance of the values-principles underlying the functioning of the public management system is undisputed (table 1). the second, more specialized block should contain indicators that will show progress in the relevant areas of integration interactions. therefore, it is necessary to rely on the opinion of the expert community, because other approaches will not fully reflect the full picture of integration. unfortunately, a quite important element can’t be added to this list regarding the fulfillment of valuable guidelines in the public service and the resolving conflict of values (even between transparency and effectiveness). this is due to the lack of a unified approach to the processing of this information, although they have a significant impact on the quality of public administration activities. the oecd member countries have published several reports on this subject, but the issue of introducing indicators assessing the value-based public management has not been successful. in turn, the european commission, monitoring the progress of the candidate or neighboring countries, only emphasizes the presence or absence of strategies aimed at introducing codes of ethics and improving the quality of public administration through vocational training (joint staff ..., 2011). 3. exploring the value-principles of public administration considering the first principle, it can be said with certainty that it mainly focuses on the legal certainty. this means that compliance is mandatory for everyone. in a democratic society, there is no one but the right, including the elected president. the state and its organs cant violate human rights and freedom. a person can do anything that is not prohibited by law, and the state and its organs operate within the limits defined by law. a person is considered innocent in committing a crime and can’t be punished until his guilt has been proved in a lawful manner and determined by an inauspicious court judgment. the rule of law counteracts arbitrariness (prejudice), that is, the use of power in self-interest, conflicts of interest, etc. the rule of law requires a clear hierarchy of legal norms established by independent courts, and stipulates that state authorities are not entitled to act contrary to general principles approved and published by special normative and regulatory decisions. therefore, it is proposed to include in the list of indicators the following elements: the rule of law, privileges in government decisions, independence of the judiciary, personal autonomy and individual rights, political stability and absence of violence. the second principle focuses on the transparency and openness of the authorities. in order for the government to be responsible to society, it should be given the opportunity to be fully aware of what is happening in the country. people should know what, for what purpose and how the authorities work. for example, transparent authorities organize public meetings and rallies with citizens. in a democratic state, the media and citizens have the opportunity to obtain information about the decisions taken. the following indicators were used to measure the extent to which the principle was achieved: transparency during policy development, corruption perception index, press freedom, irregular payments and bribery, e-governance. as noted earlier, the corruption perception index is a cumulative indicator that reflects the political and administrative elements of corruption that have different consequences for state policy. for greater probability, it is better to use one indicator, which is mainly related to administrative corruption. the press freedom index will reflect the possibility conducting independent journalistic investigations against public officials and politicians, because they give impetus to inspections and litigation. the last indicator includes several components: e-services, readiness for e-management based on website evaluation, telecommunications index, e-participation index and human resources potential. accountability principle is considered as one of the core government result like effectiveness. it obliges elected and appointed officials to answer and inform the public about their activities. officials should make decisions in a proper manner (deliberative approach) and perform their official duties, report to parliament and the community. as this principle is supplemented by the principle of transparency, it is based on several indicators: accountability and freedom of expression, management of public funds and gap of trust in the governmental institutions between informed public and general population. another principle is also the cornerstone of the functioning of the public administration system. as mentioned earlier, its implementation often accompanies sacrifices of the previous principle. to measure progress in this area, it is proposed to such indicators as: the quality of the regulatory environment, government effectiveness, diversion of government spending, and the ease of doing business. 50 volodymyr streltsov, viktoria shvedun, juri klejshmidt as can be seen from table 2, each principle corresponds to several indicators based on different information sources with different rating scales and periodic. for greater convenience, measurements are proposed for rankings (doing business) in which the ranking of countries takes place, use a scale from 0 to 10 with the best and worst results, respectively. a look at each of the indicators under the appropriate rule provides rather comforting information. observance of the rule of law is a serious problem of the ukrainian state throughout the entire history of independence (fig. 1). a slight improvement occurs only during the presidential election. this situation with the rule of law reflects the state of total social anomie, where the value of the law is declared but not executed. inappropriate compliance is a common practice. there are several reasons for this phenomenon. conflict of legal norms, legal nihilism, shaped in times of lack of control by the state, lack of financial means for the state to fulfill its obligations. such a situation is perceived in both dislike and inability to comply with a court judgment. according to the report of the commissioner for citizens’ rights in 2017, only 18% of all court decisions were executed properly (shchorichna dopovid..., 2018, p. 42). a negative tendency to enter the area of freedom and justice is the number of complaints to the european court of human rights (echr). ukraine ranks first behind the number of complaints brought to the echr against domestic court decisions, which violating the rights of citizens fair justice. a positive confirmation of the situation is the ranking of civil liberties and political rights (judicial independence, fig. 2; freedom house, fig. 3). the second set of indicators focuses on transparency. in this segment, ukraine constantly maintains its middle position while improving its position (transparency of government policy making, fig. 2). incidentally, eu countries have an average of 5, which once again confirms the intentions of the state bureaucracy as part of network management, tab. 2. information sources with different rating scales sources wgi gci ti freedom house un database reporters without borders doing bussiness eddelman trust barometer rating scale -2.5 – +2,5 1 – 7 1 – 10 1 – 7 0 – 1 179 – 1 183 – 1 1-100 period every year every year every year every year every two year every year every year every year source: wgi, cgi, ti, fh, un, wfpi, doing business, the 2018 edelman…. -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 voice and accountability: estimate regulatory quality: estimate government effectiveness: estimate rule of law: estimate control of corruption: estimate political stability and absence of violence/terrorism: estimate fig. 1. some wg indicators used to measure the quality of public management in ukraine source: wgi 2007–2016. public administration reform as main prerequisite for deeper cooperation with eu and nato 51 which seeks way to sacrifice transparency for a quick and effective solution. in the field of integration, this is manifested both in the unavailability of information on the use by central authorities of budget support funds as part of international assistance, including the european neighborhood and partnership instrument. this also applies to the implementation of agreements on the free trade area and trade with sanctioned countries. the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the eurasian vector of integration ( cooperation within custom union) with neighboring countries is associated with limited public participation. even the parliamentarians themselves have no information about the intentions of top officials. totally different approach within the framework of ukraine-eu relations, where many institutions have been institutionalized in order to involve civil society organizations and activists. in the ukrainian part of the cooperation committee, an expert council is created as an advisory body. the european commission’s communication also proposed to support the further development of civil society organizations, in particular in 2009 the first eastern partnership civil society forum (eap csf) took place to facilitate networking between organizations and their dialogue with the public authorities. civil society organizations are an institutional partner of the eu, its member states and the eastern partnership countries in the questions of planning, implementing, monitoring and developing multilateral cooperation programs. another body involved in the multilateral format of relations is the conference of regional and local authorities of the eastern partnership (corleap), whose first meeting took place in poland on 8 september 2011. according to the organizers, the involvement of local and regional authorities in the implementation of the eastern partnership policy must strengthen foundations of local self-government in partner countries and bring this policy closer to the community. the conference consists of 36 heads of regional or local authorities, equally from the eu committee of the regions and six partner countries. this means that there is a mismatch between the eu representation and the eap countries. therefore, the partner country can be represented by the supporters of one party, as in the case of belarus. ukraine is again not represented proportionally as part of the conference because it has a much bigger population level compared to other eastern partnership countries. the logical continuation of the topic of non-compliance with the principles of the rule of law is the high level of corruption (figures 1, 2), although in the last few years it can be observed positive dynamics. insufficient control of compliance with values at public positions, non-comprehensive introduction of new methods of bureaucratic management, low financial motivation – all this creates favorable conditions for the development of social anomie 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 transparency of government policymaking irregular payments and bribes favoritism in decisions of government officials diversion of public funds judicial independence wastefulness of government spending fig. 2. some indicators of ukraine in the global competitiveness index source: international… (2008–2017). 52 volodymyr streltsov, viktoria shvedun, juri klejshmidt through ukrainian civil service corps members. negative rhetoric of european and american governments towards the anti-corruption policy in ukraine also leads to a decrease in civil society’s confidence in anti-corruption initiatives. an important lever recalled to break the vicious circle of the temptation of officials who, according to polls, for the most part do not orientate themselves to the interests of citizens, are independent journalistic investigations and dissemination of such information in independent media (world press freedom index (reporters without borders), fig. 3). moreover, events related to the beating of journalists or difficulties in running a professional activity have a significant impact on the press freedom index. at the same time, ukraine is in a fairly good position in the ranking of e-government (e-government (un e-government survey, 2018), fig. 3). however, there is unfortunately a disappointing tendency to aggravate the situation. slightly more than one third of citizens, mainly in large cities, have access to the internet. digital inequality and diversity of approaches to creating databases are the main problems for introducing e-governance into the practice of public authorities’ activities. although a synergy can be noted by improving dialogue between the government, technical assistance projects, business and citizens. it also can be observed a slightly, but better, situation in respect one of the basic valuesaccountability (accountability and freedom of speech, fig. 3). it is about the possibility of influencing the government’s actions by dismissing or suspending its acts. ensuring transparency means the openness of the process of making internal decisions, explaining how the government performs its tasks through various policy instruments. transparency requires a clear formulation of the state policy strategy and the timely publication of all statistical data and forecasts. the logical consequence of the limited public participation in the implementation of public policy is a number of budget violations detected by the accounting chamber and the state financial inspection (diversion of public funds, fig. 2). the continuation of the problem chain is the low level of perception by the community of the government’s ability to shape and implement a policy that promotes the development of the private sector, but the disclosure of positive dynamics in this area is mainly the effect of improving the conditions for setting up and running a business (regulatory environment quality and government efficiency, fig. 1; the ease of doing business, fig. 3). the unsatisfactory level of combating the negative effects of the financial crisis, which largely adapted ukrainian exports and worsened the situation with public finances, are the main trends in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 global competitiveness index doing bussiness freedom house transparency international world press freedom index un e-government survey fig. 3. another ukrainian public administration performance indicators changes source: gci, ti, pfi, un e-government survey, world press freedom index , own calculation for unified scale (1 better-10 worse). public administration reform as main prerequisite for deeper cooperation with eu and nato 53 this category. the further development of relations with major trading partners is accompanied by the absence of a strategic vision for the development of trade and economic cooperation between the eu and russia. setting up your own business is still one of the most important things for the initiative (ease of doing business, fig. 3). although it’s observed a significant improvement in the situation (from 140–150 to 70–80), but the ukrainian economy has a distorted structure, where the most profitable areas are monopolized by companies that have different preferences, covered by other farm entities. the high level of corruption (karklis, 2005) is a testimony to the brutal violation of the value of public management and public pay for the lack of effective implementation of the value-based public management, civic passivity and political unwillingness to improve the operation of the state apparatus. despite the adoption of legislation regarding access to public information, the ease of its reception has not changed significantly. a low level of accountability and freedom of speech is a logical sign of the problems of the entire public administration system. unfortunately, there is no statistical data on the number of cases of employment of redundant civil servants in the relevant private sector, which is considered a conflict of interest. the same situation with data evaluating trust in the governmental institutions differences between informed public and general population. a serious drawback is the low public awareness of integration processes. the obstacle on this path is also the low level of autonomy of educational institutions which hinders the process of introducing new courses in the field of european integration. only regularity in the activities of the media, analytical institutions and educational institutions can change this situation. 4. conclusions and proposals summing up, it’s obvious need to put a stress on the approach to the assessment of the ruling bodies to manage the european integration process, which involves the use of a dual indicator system (respecting the basic values of public administration, progress in the political, economic, legal, social and humanitarian integration). the basis of the first subsystem is a set of indicators based on the key values of public administration used by various international and non-governmental organizations. the second subsystem is created on the basis of standards and indicators, compliance with which should be ensured by the public management system in terms of integration. one should agree with the theses of o. kovryga and p. nickel (2006) that after regaining independence, there was not enough necessitarian environment in ukraine to implement reforms in the western european style. in addition, the lack of deep relations as part of regional trade agreements with democratic countries resulted in low quality of the regulatory environment of ukraine and low efficiency of government functioning, as evidenced by the indicators of achieving the value of public administration. the financial crisis has forced the state’s presence in the economy, which together with the incomplete reform of the public management system contributed to the increase in irregular spending in the field of public procurement due to low transparency and accountability. legally unregulated lobbying rules have helped to increase the level of protection in government decisions. you can also talk about the increase in the number of cases of employment of dismissed officials in the relevant private sector seen as a conflict of interest. references 10 pilotnych ministerstv v peredchutti reformy: jak uriad zbyrajetsia vdoskonalyty ich robotu (eng. 10 pilot ministries expecting reform: how government will improve their work), 2017, center for political and legal reform pressconference http://pravo.org.ua/ua/news/20872184-preskonferentsiya-10-pilotnih-ministerstv-v-peredchuttireformi-yak-uryad-zbiraetsya-vdoskonaliti-yih-robotu (accessed 01 february, 2019). camyar i., 2010, 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administrative reform and regional development in the context of eu accension, transylvanian review of administrative sciences, 31e, 93-113. joint staff working paper “implementation of the european neighbourhood policy in 2010”, 2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/en/all/?uri=celex%3a52011sc0645 (accessed 01 february, 2019). kabmin zlytia ta sproshchenia, (eng. cabinet of ministers merges and simplification), 2010, https://news.finance. ua/ua/news/-/220271/kabmin-zlyttya-ta-sproshhennya (accessed 01 february, 2019). karini a., 2013, aid-supported public service reform and capacity development in post-communist albania, international journal of public administration, 36(7), 469-481. doi: 10.1080/01900692.2013.772634 karklis r., 2005, the system made me do it: corruption in postcommunist societies. m.e. sharpe, armonk. koliushko, i., 2017, piat umov dla efektyvnoi roboty derzavnych secretariv (eng. five conditions for effective work of the state secretaries), center for 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10.1080/13510340903083851 swianiewicz p., mielczarek a., 2010, georgian local government reform: state leviathan redraws boundaries?, local government studies, 36(2), 291-311. doi: 10.1080/03003930903560687 the 2018 edelman trust barometer, 2018 https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2018-10/2018_ edelman_trust_barometer_global_report_feb.pdf (accessed 1 february, 2019). transparency international, https://www.transparency.org/ cpi2018 (accessed 30 october, 2018). un e-government survey, https://publicadministration.un.org/ egovkb/en-us/reports/un-e-government-survey-2018 (accessed 25 october, 2018). verheijen a., 1999, civil service systems in eu candidate states: introduction, [in:] t. verheijen (ed.), civil service systems in central and eastern europe, edward elgar, cheltenham, 85-92. wgi: world governance indicators, the world bank, https:// datacatalog.wor ldbank .org/search?sor t_by=field_ wbddh_modified_date&sort_order=desc (accessed 10 october, 2018). world press freedom index, reporters without borders, https:// rsf.org/sites/default/files/import_good_-_index_2018_ pour_import.csv (accessed 25 february, 2019). 1. introduction during the recent years as a result of the events in eastern ukraine two new categories of social service recipients, which are the internally displaced persons and the participants of the antiterrorist operation (ato) has appeared. these categories require special attention of the state, because the social vulnerability of these persons is a phenomenon that arose suddenly and dramatically change the habitual life of citizens, most of whom did not need a state support until 2014 year or needed it much lesser. therefore, in order to avoid the increasing of the social vulnerability of these persons, it is necessary to regularly analyze the implemented by the state measures of social policy aimed at supporting internally displaced persons and ato participants, including the state of the provision of social services journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 24–40 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.002.8154 social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures tetiana kotenko (1), yuliia horemykina (2) (1) department of social infrastructure, ptoukha institute for demography and social studies of the national academy of sciences of ukraine, taras shevchenko boulevard 60, 01032 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: tatyanako@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) department for human development studies, ptoukha institute for demography and social studies of the national academy of sciences of ukraine, taras shevchenko boulevard 60, 01032 kyiv, ukraine e-mail: refer5718@gmail.com citation kotenko t., horemykina yu., 2018, social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 24–40. abstract the current situation in ukraine concerning the guarantee of social protection and providing social services for ato participants by state and non-governmental organizations is analyzed. legislative strengthening of social protection of ato participants is revealed. the current state of the providing of social services for ato participants and their family members, the effectiveness of the use of resources (financing) for 2014–2016 on the basis of a comparative analysis of the costs on social protection in the expenditures of the consolidated budget of ukraine and presented as a share of gdp, in ukraine and the european union countries for 2011–2014, are evaluated. the problems in the field of social protection for ato participants and and promising measures in this field such as the evaluation of the effectiveness of national and regional social programs for ato participants and the evaluation of the public expenditures for the social protection of ato participants and the evaluation of the quality of social services for ato participants are grounded. key words ato participants; social protection; social services; social programs; government expenditures. received: 13 september 2017 accepted: 24 november 2017 published: 30 march 2018 social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 25 for them. it should be noted that social services for the internally displaced persons and ato participants, are also provided by non-governmental organizations that are the social partners of the state. the services of such organizations also require analysis, which will help to find out their potential and to find the most effective ways of cooperation with the state. this research focuses on the second category mentioned above that is the participants of the antiterrorist operation (ato participants). social protection of ato participants is an integral component of a social policy (кравченко, 2015; горбулін et al. (eds.), 2015), a social, economic and political stabilizer of society development (топішко, 2014), a factor of minimizing of social risks (надрага, 2014). ukrainian researchers studied the main theoretical, methodological and practical problems of social protection of ato participants (лаврухін, 2014; маліновська, рудзінська, 2013; марценюк, 2015). in addition, ukrainian researchers have developed the theoretical approaches to the evaluation of the effectiveness of state social programs, government expenditures (макарова, 2015; радіонов, 2013; лібанова et al. (eds.), 2010) which makes possible to propose the algorithms for the evaluation of the effectiveness of national and regional social programs for ato participants, social expenditures protection of ato participants. the scientific and theoretical analysis of the legislation on social protection of the population and of the normative and legal provision of social protection for ato participants and their families indicates the need to systematize the legal acts regulating the issues of social protection of ato participants and their families (длугопольська, 2016; ветлинський, 2016; чижов, 2016). the state institutions have not worked out the integrated approach to improving the financing of the social protection system for ato participants and their families. despite the presence of a large number of scientific works on this topic, currently there is no theoretical model of the financial provision of social protection for ato participants and their families (ковалевич, 2017; кучер, 2016; насібова, 2015; огінська, 2014; товстиженко et al., 2014). 2. research results analysis the main objective of the study is to present an analysis of the current situation in ukraine concerning the guarantee of social protection and provision of social services to the ato participants, by the state and non-governmental organizations. the one of the most important steps in the field of the state social support for ato participants, became the creation of the state service of ukraine for war veterans and ato participants in 2014 year (про утворення…, 2014), which entrusted with the establishing the status of a participant in hostilities to ato participants, providing them with the social guarantees provided by the legislation, ensuring adaptation and psychological rehabilitation, sanatorium and resort treatment, technical and other means of rehabilitation, social and professional adaptation, providing housing for war veterans (каленюк, котенко, 2016). in 2015–2016 years a number of measures were taken in ukraine to increase the level of social and legal safeguards for ato participants, which include: the legislative strengthening of social protection for ato participants, the provision of their housing, the provision of social services for them (the provision of sanatorium and resort treatment for the victims of antiterrorist operation, an employment for ato participants, psychological rehabilitation and social and professional adaptation for ato participants, provision of other social services for the ato participants’ families) (алієв, 2017; пільги…, 2017; про схвалення концепції …, 2017). let’s take a closer look at the steps below. 2.1. ato participants and their legal status today the persons who are recognized as the ato participants, are those people who defended the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of ukraine and took direct part in the antiterrorist operation, ensuring its implementation, and were directly in the areas of such an operation, including: (1) the servicemen (reservists, military persons) of the armed forces ukraine, the national guard of ukraine, the security service of ukraine, the foreign intelligence service of ukraine, the state border guard service of ukraine, (2) the persons of ordinary and commanding staff, military, employees of the ministry of internal affairs of ukraine, the state guard of ukraine, the state service of special communications and information protection of ukraine and other established according to the laws of ukraine’s military formations; (3) the employees of enterprises, institutions, organizations, which were involved and took a direct part in the ato in the areas of its conduction in accordance with the procedure established by law (пам’ятка…, 2016; про статус…, 1993; сьогодні…, 2015). the access to the social protection system for ato participants in ukraine provides the legal status of a participant in combat operations, which have not only ato participants, but also participants in 26 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina other military operations that are not related to the anti-rhetorical operation in certain areas of donetsk and lugansk oblastey (regions). the practice of the granting the status of participant in combat shows the complexity of the legal registration of this status because of the existence of a significant number of bureaucratic procedures. on the one hand, these procedures exist to confirm the presence of a person in combat operations in the area of ato, and on the other hand, they become the causes of delays in the implementation of social protection measures. that is why the problem of the objective analysis of the practice of the procedure for granting the status of participant of a participant in combat operations and its optimization for those who took part in combat operations in the zone of ato is actualized. 2.2. the legislative strengthening of social protection for ato participants and the effiiciency of their social protection at the same time, it is quite predictable that there is a rapid development of legislation aimed at the social protection of ato participants. а number of legislative acts was enacted in ukraine for the purpose of the legislative strengthening of social protection for ato participants. they include: • the foundation of territorial bodies of the state service of ukraine for war veterans and ato participants (деякі питання…, 2015); • the creation of the network of help centers for ato participants. these centers act as auxiliary bodies of the district state administrations or city councils to ensure the interaction between executive authorities, other state bodies, local governments, volunteer organizations and nongovernmental organizations in solving the issues of treatment, rehabilitation, social protection, social adaptation for ato participants. the creation of such centers is provided in connection with the execution of the decree of the president of ukraine (про внесення зміни до указу…, 2015); • the approval of regional and district programs of social support for ato participants and their families financed from regional or district budgets this financing covers such activities as: the provision of ato participants with technical and other means for rehabilitation, the provision of one-time targeted financial aid for the persons accompanying ato participants for treatment in medical institutions and for payment of their temporary residence, the purchase of the houses for the deceased servicemen’s families who took direct part in the antiterrorist operation and for the invalids of the 1st and 2nd group from the number of military personnel, who participated in the specified operation, and need improvement of living conditions, the provision of onetime targeted financial aid to the servicemen who take (took) direct part in the anti-terrorist operation for the compensation of expenses which connected with the development of documents of land tenure for land allocation for individual housing construction, private peasant farming, horticulture, gardening, the compensation for the cost of housing and communal services, solid fuels and liquefied gas to the members of ato participants’ families, the sanatorium and resort treatment for ato participants, the social support for ato participants’ families, the provision of necessary social services for ato participants and their families, the providing free passage in public transport and suburban railways for ato participants, etc; • the provision of free comprehensive food for students of general educational institutions from the number of ato participants’ children, the coverage of the events aimed at supporting the members of ato participants’ families in the mass media, the ensuring the burial of deceased ato participants with payment of appropriate compensation to the deceased ato participants’ families; • the improvement of the mechanism of using budget funds for social and professional adaptation of ato participants, namely, the extension of the function of procuring such services by district social security bodies (про внесення змін до порядку…, 2015); • the improvement of the mechanism of prosthetics of ato participants abroad and the provision of the opportunity for the prosthetics of ato participants by products of increased functionality using the brand new technologies in ukraine (про внесення змін до постанов…, 2014); • the provision of accommodation and food for ato participants during the implementation of measures for their psychological rehabilitation (про затвердження порядку…, 2017); • the development of the mechanism for reimbursement to ato participants of travel expenses to rehabilitation institutions for psychological rehabilitation and back (про затвердження порядку виплати…, 2016); • the payment of compensation to employers of average earnings for workers called to military service during the mobilization (про військовий обов’язок…, 1992; кодекс законів…, 1971); • the payment of financial aid for the servicemen discharged from military service (про затвердження порядку…, 2015); social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 27 • the enrollment of time of military service it to a special period of length of service which gives the right to apply for a retirement pension on preferential terms (про внесення зміни до статті 8…, 2015); • the appointment from january 1, 2015 of pensions in case of loss of breadwinner to family members of servicemen who died as a result of injuries, contusions or mutilation received during the defense of the motherland, fulfillment of other duties of military service (official duties) (про внесення зміни до статті 36…, 2014; про внесення зміни до статті 37…, 2014); • the establishment of the compulsory free psychological, medical and psychological rehabilitation for ato participants at the appropriate centers with the reimbursement of the cost of passage to these centers and back after performing missions in combat conditions (про внесення зміни до статті 11…, 2015). the significant number of state measures on legislative strengthening of social protection for ato participants is evident. at the same time the questions on the effectiveness of the distribution of funds of the state and local budgets allocated by law to strengthen the social protection of ato participants and questions on the receiving by each ato participant the social aid and social services, that they need, have arose. today, there are official reports from the ministry of social policy of ukraine and the ministry of defense of ukraine on these questions. in addition, the regional and national programs of social protection for ato participants contain separate indicators of efficiency, but as a rule they are highly generalized and monitored by central or local authorities mostly only formally. this situation croped up due to the fact that a significant part of the legislation on social protection of ato participants and relevant state programs began to be created at the end of 2014 – early 2015 years, and there is no yet practical tool to fully evaluate the efficiency of the state measures of social protection of ato participants. that is why, in our opinion, for answering this questions the is the certain need to develop and implement such tools as: • the evaluation of the efficiency of national and regional programs of social protection of ato participants; • the evaluation of the efficiency of expenditures from local and state budgets intended to strengthen social protection of ato participants; • the evaluation of the quality of social services provided to ato participants. nowadays, the term “efficiency” as an economic category is a rather complex and multi-faceted concept. it is customary to define it using elements such as a productivity, a resultivity, and an economy. a productivity is the ratio between the results (output of production, providing of services, performance of works) and the used resources (financial, material, labor resources). a resultivity is the degree of correspondence of actual results and planed results. an economy is the achievement of projected goals for the smallest amount of funds or obtaining a much better result for the same amount of money (радіонов, 2013). national and regional programs of social protection of ato participants, governmental expenditures on social protection of ato participants, provision of social services to them are aimed at providing a certain social effect, which can be considered both as a goal and as a result. the evaluation of social programs is a procedure for measuring their direct effects, efficiency, and possible long-term effects (лібанова et al. (eds.), 2010). an overall evaluation of the efficiency of any social program can be determined in the following areas: • the assessment whether there has been an improvement of the situation identified as a the problem situation at the beginning of the development of a program (the state of the target group); • the assessment of the degree of achievement of goals (макарова, 2015). the following algorithm can be used to evaluate the efficiency of state regional programs of social protection of ato participants: 1. the determination of the key indicators that characterize ato participants’ social and economic state in the region at the beginning of the program. such indicators, depending on the purpose of the program, may include: • the assessment of the state of health (physical and psychological) of ato participants which is covered by the program, by doctors and by these ato participants themselves; • the indicators showing the material status of ato participants’ families: the presence of their own housing, the number of working family members, the availability of benefits for payment of utility bills and problems with their payment, the full board, the availability of the clothing in accordance to the season and necessities, the availability of necessary furniture and home appliances for living, the family’s ability to pay for rest and attend cultural events; • the indicators showing the state of ato participants on the labor market: the, provision of the workplaces for the ato participants, who have returned from the ato zone , the ratio of ato 28 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina participants’ wages with average wage in the region, the participation of unemployed ato participants in free and training and advanced training, 2. the finding out ato participants’ needs in measures of social protection in a certain region in accordance with the specified indicators. the content of the measures and their number is determined at this stage. 3. the comparison of the relevant indicators at two points: immediately prior to the start of the program and immediately after its completion, and analysis of the ato participants’ need for social protection measures in a specific region after the finishing of a program. 4. the identification of possible medium and longterm effects from the outcome achieved as a result of the implementation of the program. the other algorithm is appropriate to evaluate the efficiency of the national social protection programs for ato participants: 1. the determination of the main indicators that characterize the state of social protection of ato participants in ukraine. these indicators are: the ratio of the number of ato participants who applied to the relevant authorities in connection with the need of various social protection measures and the number of participants ato for whom these measures are implemented, the degree of solving the ato participants’ problems by applying a certain measure of social protection (for example, the providing free pass to the medical institution in another region of ukraine for ato participants and persons accompanying them for treatment completely solves the problem of ato participants’ inability to obtain the necessary treatment due to the absence of the appropriate institution at the place of ato participants’ residence), the average processing time of the application and the decision making on the implementation of social protection measures for the ato participants in the institution of social protection system. 2. the assessment of changes in the indicators of the state of social protection of ato participants caused by the action of the program as the difference between the values of the main indicators that characterize the state of social protection of ato participants in ukraine and were recorded in the absence of a relevant national program and the values of these indicators in different periods of the program’s operation. 3. the comparison of the values of the indicators in two sets that are the group of the ato participants, which was included in the program and the control group of ato participants. if the score shows the same changes in both sets, this may indicate the effect of not programmatic, but any other factors that require separate study. 4. the identification of possible medium and longterm effects from the outcome achieved as a result of the implementation of the program. the evaluation of the efficiency of governmental expenditures by its economic essence makes it possible to determine how effective and rational are the activities and behavior of spending units in an effort to achieve maximum results from the state, and above all, budget resources (радіонов, 2013). in our opinion, the evaluation of the efficiency of governmental expenditures on social protection for ato participants can be achieved by implementing the following algorithm: 1. the definition of the basic articles of expenditures for social protection of ato participants (for example, the improvement of health, the legal services, the compensation of the cost of solid fuel and liquefied gas, the compensation of the cost of travel in public transport, the procurement and delivery of food products). 2. the definition of the indicators characterizing the structure of necessary resources for the implementation of basic articles (for example, the amount of certain material resources that necessary for the implementation of the article, the number of institutions in which ato participants can receive social services, the number of employees that necessary for the implementation of the article, the necessary equipment and its quantity). 3. the determination of the expected social effects from the implementation of expenditure article (in particular, the improving of most ato participants’ health, the improving of the ato participants’ families’ financial state etc.), the choice of the indicators that must demonstrate identified effects and the setting the target values for these indicators (for example, 85% ato participants’ families are provided with their own housing). 4. the choosing the method for analyzing of the ratio of resource indicators and achieving of a social effect from the implementation of articles expenditure. the methods that can be used in this case are: • the comparative analysis, which means the comparing of the results achieved in prior years with the target values; • the factor analysis, based on the influence of factor changes (in particular, the increase or the decrease in the expenditure of article) on the result; social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 29 • the analysis of the data package, which investigates the ratio of resources and results in terms of the maximum efficiency achieved by the most progressive spending implementers. the evaluation of the quality of social services granted to ato participants is intended to provide the objective results of the activities of state and non-governmental organizations that provide social services to this category of citizens. basing on the results of the evaluation of the quality of social services provided to ato participants, the state will be able to formulate a certain regulatory policy, constantly taking measures to improve the quality of social services. such an evaluation should include three main elements: the assessment of the quality of social services by ato participants themselves, the assessment of the quality of social services by employees of organizations providing social services to ato participants, the assessment of the adequacy of the resource provision necessary for the provision of services by employees of organizations providing social services services to ato participants and by the representatives of the ministry of social policy of ukraine. in this case, particular attention should be paid to the judgments of the ato participants about the quality of social services for them, since these judgments accurately express the degree of satisfaction of this category’s needs. in general, the involvement of social service users into evaluation of social services is generally recognized as a progressive practice. the main criteria for assessing the quality of services by ato participants and by employees of the organizations that provide them with social services are: the timeliness of receiving a service by an ato participant, the territorial and financial availability of the service to him or her, the degree of satisfaction of the ato participant’s needs as a result of receiving the service, professional level of service. the assessment of the adequacy of the resource provision necessary for the provision of services by the employees of the organizations and the representatives of the ministry of social policy of ukraine is expressed in the following criteria: the sufficiency of financial, personnel and material resources to provide services, the quality of equipment. the practical implementation of the evaluation of the quality of social services for ato participants is carried out by means of a questionnaire, where each of the above criteria corresponds to a certain question of the questionnaire. the abundance of judgments expressed by respondents is framed into an integral assessment, which has a hierarchical structure. the lowest element of the structure is one response to a specific aspect of a particular service, and the highest one is the integral assessment of the quality of all social services provided to ato participants by a specific organization. the complexity of data formalization in this case is solved by involving the mathematical apparatus of fuzzy sets. the proposed tools of evaluation are the promising measures in terms of ensuring the effectiveness of social protection of ato participants, since it makes it possible to obtain objective information on the shortcomings and achievement of the state policy on social protection of ato participants. the ministry of social policy of ukraine or a joint commission consisting of representatives of the ministry of social policy of ukraine, local authorities, state and non-governmental organizations providing social services to ato participants may assess the efficiency of state programs of social protection and quality of social services for ato participants. the evaluation of the efficieny of the gorvernmental expenditures on the social protection of ato participants can be made by the ministry of finance of ukraine together with the accounting chamber of ukraine. it should be noted that the accounting chamber of ukraine, having started its work in 1997, today plays an important role in ensuring the financial control of social programs. the accounting chamber of ukraine is a permanent body of external financial control. since it’s establishment this body have been identified many offenses of the regarding of the use of budgetary funds at the level of central and local authorities. the materials about identified regardings are transmitted to the prosecutor’s office to take appropriate measures (макарова, 2015). consequently, the combination of the efforts of the accounting chamber of ukraine and the ministry of finance will have a real positive impact on the efficiency of expenditures on social protection of ato participants. 2.3. the funding of social protection for ato participants in ukraine within the structure of financing of social protection of the population in many countries, there are problems associated with a lack of financial resources that are needed to cover all social programs. there is no exception concerning the questions of financing of the social protection for ato participants. despite the great interest of society, ukrainian science and practice, there is a lack of attention to the question of the role and importance of state funding of social protection for ato participants and their families, the use of budget resources and local budgets for these purposes. the financial provision of social protection for ato participants can be described as extremely high degree of state participation, weak participation in it’s 30 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina functioning of institutes of civil society and especially of the population itself; the abundance and unsystematic existing of legal acts regulating the activities of social protection bodies of the population; lack of funds in budgets of all levels for financing activities in the field of social protection (горбулін et al. (eds.), 2015). today, more than a quarter of expenditures of budgets of different levels (state and local budgets, funds of social insurance funds and employers, funds of non-profit institutions serving households (ngos), donor funds (foreign aid)) is directed to finance social protection of population. it is therefore necessary to evaluate these costs, including their share in the aggregate expenditures of the consolidated budget of ukraine and the gross domestic product (gdp). social protection expenditures over the period from 2014 to 2016 year increased almost twice and play a significant role in the expenditure structure of the consolidated budget of ukraine (26.4%–30.9%) and gdp (22.2–20.5%) (бюджет…, 2017). expenditures on social protection of war and labour veterans, including ato participants, in ukraine in 2016 year compared to 2014 year increased 1.5 times (by 2.3 billion hrn) to 6 976.5 million hrn, but this is a slight increase, since the share of the respective expenditures in the total expenditures on social protection– 3.4–2.7%, in the expenditures of the consolidated budget of ukraine – only 0.9–0.8% (бюджет…, 2017). the limited funds the state allocates to provide benefits to servicemen and the war veterans are pulverized among the persons, who have benefits, which not only prevents from solving the problems of their social protection, but also generates a social dissatisfaction (горбулін et al. (eds.), 2015). at the same time, over the next few years, the need to further increase these expenditures will be maintained, because if the they are insufficient, there is a risk of rising social pressure in the country. the comparative analysis of the costs on social protections, presented as a share of gross domestic product (gdp) in ukraine and the eu member states for 2011–2014 years, indicates a significant differentiation of these indicators (more than twofold). in 2014, the countries with the highest ratio of social protection expenditures to gdp – france (34.3%), denmark (33.5%), finland (31.9%) and the netherlands (30.9%) – spent twice as much on social goals (increase of expenditures by 0.7–3.0 percentage points (pct)) than the four countries with the lowest values of this ratio (reduction of expenditures by 0.7–3.0 pct): latvia (14.5%), lithuania (14.7%), romania (14.8%) and estonia (15.1%). in ukraine, this figure was 22.2% (a significant decrease by 1.0 pct) (in 2015 – 20.5%, which corresponds to a critical reduction of 2.7 pct), in poland – 19.0% (insignificant increase by 0.3 pct) (національні рахунки…, 2017). it should be emphasized that there is a paradoxical situation in field of the financing of social protection ato participants. it looks like this: the expenditures on social protection of ato participants are only a part of the expenditures on social protection of war veterans, labor veterans and ato participants; which in their turn is only a minor part of the total social protection expenditures. this condition exacerbates the issue of sufficiency and efficiency of public expenditures on social protection of ato participants. to solve these issues, firstly, the above-mentioned evaluation of the efficiency of public expenditures on the social protection of ato participants should be introduced and the division of combatants into separate categories together with the provision of an additional financial guarantee for ato participants should be done. 2.4. the providing of housing for ato participants the separate direction for strengthening of the social protection of ato participants should be the creation of an effective mechanism for solving their housing problems (про внесення змін до порядків…, 2017; уряд вирішує…, 2017). ato participants have the right to extraordinary (primary) provision of housing. the accounting of citizens, distribution and provision of housing belonging to communal property belongs to the competence of local selfgovernment bodies. in 2015–2016 years, ato participants and their families could use such budget housing programs as «субвенція з державного бюджету місцевим бюджетам на будівництво (придбання) житла для сімей загиблих військовослужбовців, які брали безпосередню участь в антитерористичній операції, а також для інвалідів i–ii групи з числа військовослужбовців, які брали участь у зазначеній операції, та потребують поліпшення житлових умов» (“state budget subvention for local budgets for the construction (purchase) of housing for the families of the fallen servicemen who took direct part in the anti-terrorist operation, as well as for disabled persons of groups i-ii from military personnel who took part in the specified operation and need improvement of living conditions”), «комплексна програма забезпечення житлом військово-службовців, осіб рядового і начальницького складу, посадових осіб митної служби та членів їхніх сімей» (“comprehensive program for providing housing for servicemen, persons of ordinary and social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 31 commanding personnel, customs officials and their family members”), «забезпечення житлом осіб, які брали безпосередню участь в антитерористичній операції та / або у забезпеченні її проведення і втратили функціональні можливості нижніх кінцівок» (“housing for persons who took direct part in the anti-terrorist operation and/or its implementation and lost functionality of the lower extremities”). along with the existence of these programs in the country, there is a significant need for funds for their implementation and the significant number of people from ato participants who need the improvement of living conditions. the total need for funds for the realization of the right of these individuals to receive housing is 15 billion hrn. by of october 1, 2016 year, there were 31,576 people in the queue for improving of living conditions. among them are: 4,607 war invalids, including those who participated in the antiterrorist operation; 14,693 participants in combat operations, including ato participants; 3,419 participants of the war, including ato participants; 8,857 servicemen discharged from the reserve (про рекомендації …, 2017). it is obvious that the problem of providing ato participants with housing is extremely acute. the authors (горбулін et al. (eds.), 2015, p. 196) note: “for today, there are many cases when servicemen carry out their patriotic duty to the state, while their families do not have proper housing, dwell in dormitories or rent houses on a commercial basis. there is the «comprehensive program for providing housing for servicemen, persons of ordinary and commanding personnel, customs officials and their family members» in ukraine already for a long time. however, its efficiencyу as an instrument for resolving housing problems of military personnel is extremely low as a result of chronic underfunding”. at the same time, there are some positive steps, for example, the allocation of 1 140.5 million of hrn. from the state budget in 2015 year for the construction and purchase of housing for servicemen of the armed forces of ukraine in order to create an opportunity for the ministry of defense of ukraine to build and to receive over 3 thousand apartments (горбулін et al. (eds.), 2015). an other state measures are also taking place to provide housing for ato participants. in 2015–2016 years, at the expense of the budget program «субвенція з державного бюджету місцевим бюджетам на будівництво (придбання) житла для сімей загиблих військовослужбовців, які брали безпосередню участь в антитерористичній операції, а також для інвалідів i–ii групи з числа військовослужбовців, які брали участь у зазначеній операції, та потребують поліпшення житлових умов» (“state budget subvention for local budgets for the construction (purchase) of housing for the families of the fallen servicemen who took direct part in the anti-terrorist operation, as well as for disabled persons of groups i–ii from military personnel who took part in the specified operation and need improvement of living conditions”) in accordance with the norms of the procedure for payment of cash compensation for getting living quarters for family members of the fallen soldiers who took a direct participation in the anti-terrorist operation, as well as the disabled persons of groups i–ii from the number of military personnel participating in the operation, monetary compensation was paid for self-purchase of 1 255 flats (638 and 617 respectively by years) of the aforementioned category in all regions of ukraine for the total amount of 783 million hrn (367 and 416 million hrn respectively) (питання забезпечення житлом…, 2016). the condition for the use of funds from the budget program «забезпечення житлом осіб, які брали безпосередню участь в антитерористичній операції та / або у забезпеченні її проведення і втратили функціональні можливості нижніх кінцівок» (“housing for persons who took direct part in the anti-terrorist operation and/or its implementation and lost functionality of the lower extremities”) is the purchase of housing by executive authorities at the local level. in 2015–2016, 101 dwelling units (48 and 53 units respectively by years) were purchased for the aforementioned category of persons, whose cash expenses amounted to 73.3 million hrn (32.6 and 40.7 million hrn respectively by years) (про рекомендації…, 2017). the available official static data is not enough to conclude on the percentage of those ato participants who really needed the providing of housing or the improving housing conditions, received a new home. there was no scientific research on this issue either. the one thing is clear: taking into account the existence in ukraine of a long-term general problem of providing housing to the population, this percent can be quite significant. however, the given data demonstrate the growing of the state attention to the problem of providing housing for ato participants and the steps taken to solve this problem. we believe that the following promising measures can be realized in the future to find out the solution of the problem of providing ato participants with housing: • the development and the implementation of a special housing program for ato participants, that could be funded not only by the state, but also by non-governmental organizations and private investors; 32 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina • the provision of a privileged right for ato participants’ children to receive a youth loan through the state fund for the promotion of youth housing; • the providing of the servicemen who have signed a contract for service in the area of ato the warrants on official apartments, which become their property upon the termination of the contract and fulfillment of its conditions; • the increase of the amount of benefits for payment of the cost of housing and communal services to combatants in the ato area. 2.5. the providing of social services for ato participants an important issue of social protection of ato participants is to provide them with social services. ato participants receive most of state social services in territorial centers of social services, centers of social services for the family, children and youth, district labour and social protection departments, employment centers of the state employment service of ukraine, social, psychological and medical rehabilitation centers of the ministry of social policy of ukraine. some social services to ato participants can be provided by health resort facilities of the ministry of health of ukraine. in addition, in july 2017, a centre for social, medical and psychological services to participants in hostilities, ato participants and members of their families was opened in sumy, the activities of which are aimed exclusively at this category of social service recipients. the centre has 3 structural units: a department of medical and social support; a department of social psychological and pedagogical services; a physiotherapy department (положення про комунальну установу…, 2017). in total, 100,168 families of ato participants with 80,847 children needed social services in the country in 2016. as a result of providing social services for ato participants in 2016 (соціальний звіт…, 2017): • 47,200 people received psychological support and rehabilitation; • 21,900 people received legal aid; • 18,400 people received humanitarian aid; • almost 26,000 people received a land plot; • 726 families were provided with housing; • 4,000 families, including 387 persons with disabilities are covered with social support. the major areas of providing social services for ato participants are health resort treatment to the victims of the anti-terrorist operation, psychological rehabilitation and social and professional adaptation of the participants in the anti-terrorist operation. at the same time, there is cooperation between the state and non-state sectors. the period of 2015–2016 was characterized by the intensification of the development of each of these areas and increase in the number of ato participants who managed to receive social services. let us consider the state of each of these areas. 2.6. the providing of health resort treatment for the victims of the anti-terrorist operation and their family members participants of ato (combatants and disabled war veteran) have the right to get free health resort treatment. in accordance with the procedure for using funds provided by the state budget for the provision of victims of ato by health resort treatment (дорожня карта щодо забезпечення…, 2017; про внесення змін до порядку…, 2016; про затвердження порядку використання…, 2017), 7,848 ato participants were rehabilitated in accordance with the relevant budget program in 2015–2016, including 275 disabled war veterans (соціальний звіт…, 2016, 2017). since march 2017, the authority to the purchase of vouchers for the ato participants has been transferred at the local level and the opportunity to independently choose a sanatorium for treatment was given to the ato participants. today, the provision of vouchers by the victims of the anti-terrorist operation will be carried out within the allocated funds in proportion to the number of persons taken into account to provide sanatorium treatment, in accordance with the agreements concluded by the structural departments on social protection of the population or social protection bodies with sanatorium and resort facilities, having a license for the conducting economic activity in medical practice and accreditation not lower than the first category, and by ato participants. the bodies of social protection of the population provide ato participants with free vouchers for treatment in sanatorium establishments in accordance with the legal procedure (про затвердження порядку використання коштів…, 2017) according to medical recommendations in order of priority with the receipt of vouchers. the total expenditures from the state budget in 2016 year to provide the victims of the antiterrorist operation with the sanatorium treatment within the budget program «заходи із психологічної реабілітації, соціальної та професійної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції та забезпечення постраждалих учасників антитерористичної операції санаторно-курортним лікуванням» (“measures for the psychological rehabilitation, social and professional adaptation of ato participants and provision of the victims of the antiterrorist operation social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 33 with sanatorium treatment”) amounted to 22.1 million hrn. in 2015 year these expenditures were 22.5 million hrn. besides, in 2015 year 3 646 ato participants received treatment in sanatorium and resort institutions of the ministry of social policy of ukraine and 2 179 ato participants got treatment in sanatorium and resort institutions of the ministry of defense of ukraine (про рекомендації…, 2017). the recreation and rest of ato participants’ children are carried out at the expense of state and local budgets, the funds of enterprises, institutions and organizations, trade unions and funds, voluntary contributions from legal entities and individuals, and other sources. children from 7 to 18 years are sent to children’s health and recreation institutions at the expense of the state budget if the the voucher was not provided to the child this year at the expense of local budgets. the local authorities are involved in the procurement and distribution of children’s vouchers within the administrative-territorial units. the ministry of social policу of ukraine byes the vouchers to the state enterprise «український дитячий центр «молода гвардія» (“ukrainian children’s center “young guard”) for children of preferential categories. the vouchers to the children’s health and recreation establishments may be provided free of charge or with a partial payment, when 20, 30 or 50 percent of the cost of a vouchers are paid at the expense of parents (persons those who replace them) or other sources not prohibited by law (інформація про оздоровлення…, 2016). 131,000 children of combatants and internally displaced persons were provided with health improvement and recreation (more than 4 million children were rehabilitated (3.3% of the total number of children who improved their health). in the child centers, «молода гвардія» (“young guard”) and «артек» (“artek”) in 2016 more than 15,000 children of the groups entitled to special benefits improved their health, including 1,450 children (9.6%) from the localities situated on the line of collision. for 2015–2016 years, 9,840 children were rehabilitated abroad, in particular, in argentina, bulgaria, the united kingdom, greece, georgia, spain, israel, italy, latvia, lithuania, moldova, the netherlands, germany, poland, portugal, romania, serbia, slovakia, slovenia, the usa, turkmenistan, turkey, hungary, finland, france, croatia, switzerland, sweden, scotland, including: 831 children of combatants (8.4% of children who improved their health abroad); 1,553 children of internally displaced persons (15.8% respectively) (соціальний звіт…, 2016, 2017). in the summer of 2017 year, ukrainian children from ato participants’ families rested for 10 days in the recreation camp of the ministry of education and culture of the republic of cyprus, located in the mountain village of prodromos (інформація щодо відпочинку…, 2017), 19 children aged from 10 to 15 years from zhytomyr region rested in town krosno in podkarpackie voivodship of republic of poland (діти із сімей …, 2017). consequently, in order to form and ensure implementation of the state policy in the field of health improvement and rest of ato participants and their family members in ukraine, it is necessary to carry out the following measures: • the creation of an accessible and efficient market of health and recreation services; • the preservation and the development of a network of health and recreation institutions, including the institution for children; • the of providing training of the stuff for the implementation of health and recreation activities, including the activities for children (оздоровлення…, 2017); • the creation of the mechanisms for economic stimulation, lending and targeted financial support for institutions that provide health care and recreation, including the activities for children; • the creation of the state register of health improvement and recreation institutions, including the institution for children, in order to prevent their liquidation, bail transfers, re-profiling, and use for other purposes except treatment and recreation; • the development and approval of state social standards in the field of treatment and recreation activity. 2.7. an employment of participants of the antiterrorist operation the status of the unemployed by the october 1, 2017 year had 11.8 thousand unemployed ato participants. on average, in ukraine, the share of ato participants among all registered unemployed was 4%, the largest share of unemployed ato participants was in khmelnytsky (6%) and vinnytsia (7%) regions (щодо надання послуг…, 2017). in accordance with the law of ukraine (про внесення зміни до статті 14…, 2016), combatants who took a direct part in ato and its implementation were included in the list of categories of citizens with additional guarantees in the promotion of employment, the employment of which is mandatory in the framework of employment places quota (президент підписав закон…, 2016; як допомогти…, 2017). to promote employment and social integration of ato participants, the state employment service provides them with a full range of services through organizing community service, vocational guidance, 34 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina vocational training (vocational training or retraining, further training), provision of a voucher. during 2015 – september 2017, 108,000 unemployed from the number of the demobilized servicemen who participated in the ato took advantage of the services of the state employment service. vacancies were selected and a job was offered to each participant of ato. with the assistance of the state employment service in 2015 – september 2017, 22,400 participants of ato were employed. of the total number of the employed ato participants in 2016, 135 people are recruited for newly created jobs with compensation of a single payment to employers. from beginning of the 2015 year till the september of 2017 year 2,500 ato participants received one-time unemployment aid. the average unemployment aid of such persons by of october 1, 2017 year amounted to 3,861 hrn. and the average amount of aid for all categories of the unemployed was 2,033 hrn. in addition, 8,700 ato participants received additional material support during the search for their main place of employment by engaging in temporary and civic and other work (щодо надання послуг…, 2017). one third of the unemployed ato participants is employed at the place of workers for servicing, operating and controlling the work of equipment and machinery; every fifth of the unemployed ato is employed at the place of skilled workers with a tool; 15% of the unemployed ato participants are employed at the working places that do not require special training; 12% of the unemployed ato participants are employed in the sphere of trade and services, every tenth of the unemployed ato participants is employed in the place of managers. according to the types of economic activity one can see that 29% of the unemployed ato participants are employed in agriculture, forestry and fisheries; every fifth of this category is employed in the processing industry, 13% – in wholesale and retail trade; 8% – in public administration and defense. to increase the competitiveness of the given category of the unemployed on the labour market and accelerate their employment, 6,700 people got vocational training by the referral of the state employment service. each fourth ato participant has only secondary education, and the suitable work for this category of persons is not requiring special training and, as a rule, is paid for the minimum amount (щодо надання послуг…, 2017). to ensure the awareness of the demobilized ato participants and their families about the social services of the state employment service, regional employment services, informational corners with materials have been created, special seminars and trainings on modern methods aimed at their social adaptation to the labor market are held, a road map and instructions are developed, actions with military units and military registration and enlistment offices for timely informing about the conditions of registration at the employment agency, providing unemployment benefits and social services to find employment are coordinated; information on the services of the state employment service for demobilized ato participants in military registration and enlistment offices is presented (дорожня карта…, 2017; пам’ятка…, 2016; про внесення змін до концепції…, 2017). 2.8. the psychological rehabilitation and the social and professional adaptation of ato participants in 2015–2016, services for psychological rehabilitation were provided by 15 rehabilitation institutions (various forms of ownership), with which the state service for war veterans and anti-terrorist operation participants concluded respective service contracts. totally, 11,683 ato participants from different regions of ukraine were provided with services for psychological rehabilitation during this period (про внесення змін до порядку…, 2015; соціальний звіт…, 2016, 2017). at the same time, at the regional and local level, psychological rehabilitation services for ato participants are provided by ordinary medical, health resort facilities, their structural divisions as well as by public organizations (актуальність створення…, 2017; громадський сектор…, 2017; про схвалення концепції…, 2017; роз’яснення служби…, 2015; уряд схвалив …, 2017). the state service for war veterans and antiterrorist operation participants includes 5  centers for social and psychological rehabilitation of the population located in urban settlement ivankiv, towns boiarka, borodianka, slavutych of kyiv oblast and korosten of zhytomyr oblast. in 2015–2016, the specialists of these centers provided social and psychological services to 15,839 ato participants and 13,609 members of their families. in 2015–2016, 8,036 participants of ato received professional adaptation services based on contracts concluded with the population social protection bodies with educational institutions (enterprises, institutions, and organizations, irrespective of the form of ownership). most of them received the qualification of drivers of motor vehicles of various categories, industry and service sector professions and it technologies occupations (соціальний звіт …, 2017). in 2017 year, the cabinet of ministers of ukraine adopted by its resolution the procedure for organizing social and professional adaptation of the ato social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 35 participants (про затвердження порядку організації…, 2017; уряд затвердив…, 2017), which would ensure the following: • the formation of an effective mechanism for organizing of the restoration of professional skills of ato participants as an integral part of their social adaptation to the conditions of a civil life; • the right of ato participants for education throughout their lives; • the increasing of the promptness of solving the problematic issues of ato participants, related to their professional activities and the increasing of their competitiveness on the labor market. therefore, in order to solve such important issues as psychological rehabilitation and the social and professional adaptation of ato participants, it is necessary to apply a unified approach to psychological rehabilitation and to create the appropriate clubs of ato participants and ato veterans which would be aimed at solving, in particular, issues of the psychological assistance and social adaptation of fighters, the improvement of co-ordination of actions of state bodies and institutes, the integration of demobilized ato participants in society (сьогодні…, 2015). 2.9. the non-governmental social services for ato participants non-governmental organizations also provide social services to ato participants. their work improves the efficiency of social protection for ato participants. non-state organizations mainly work at the primary level, and therefore their activities better take into account the ato participants’ needs in assistance and social services. it is possible to distinguish the following areas of work of non-governmental organizations in providing social services to ato participants: • the assistance in the evacuation of wounded ato participants from the ato zone; • the organization and support of treatment of wounded in medical institutions of ukraine; • the organization of sending seriously wounded ato participants for treatment and rehabilitation to foreign clinics in europe and in the world; • the legal advice and legal assistance (in particular, with the determination of the status of ato participant, protection of rights, etc.); • the assistance in providing housing for ato participants and in providing them with a plots of land; • the assistance in liberation from captivity; • the collection for ato participants of humanitarian aid (clothing, food, toiletry, medicines) and its delivery to the zone of ato; • the assistance in arranging of everyday life for ato participants; • the collection of funds for the purchase of body armors and another equipment necessary for the armed forces of ukraine; • a psychological rehabilitation, integration measures, social support; • the assistance in the employment for ato participants; • the organization of leisure for ato participants and their families. it can be noticed that there is a significant diversity in terms of the status of non-governmental organizations that provide social services for ato participants in ukraine. today one can select the following types according to the status of such organization (горемикіна, 2016): • officially registered volunteer organizations; • officially registered public organizations and public associations; • officially registered charitable foundations and charitable organizations; • officially registered associations of volunteer organizations; • officially registered associations of public organizations; • individual activity of a volunteer without participation in organizations; • civic initiatives and civic platforms; • groups of citizens (active group, distributed in social networks) that actually provide assistance to internally displaced persons and ato participants, but they are not officially registered organizations and do not use the name “volunteers”. some of these organizations specialize in providing social services and assistance to ato participants who have returned from the ato zone, while some concentrate on assisting the armed forces of ukraine and ato participants in the ato area. the sources of information about the work of such organizations are their official sites, their official pages in social networks, the media, some “social advertising”. the detailed reports on financial revenues, expenditures and implemented projects are often placed on sites of non-governmental that provide social services for ato participants. in addition, there is the «єдиний реєстр волонтерських організацій» (“unified register of volunteer organizations”) on the official website of the ministry of labor and social policy of ukraine, and there is the «єдиний реєстр громадських організацій» (“unified register of public organizations”) on the website of the ministry of justice of ukraine. however, not all organizations are officially registered and therefore there is no general list of organizations providing social 36 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina services to ato participants. among the most wellknown organizations providing social services to ato participants are «волонтерська сотня», (“volunteer’s hundred”), «донбас sos», (“donbass sos”), «подільска громада» (“the community of podillya”), «психологічна кризова служба» (“psychological crisis service”), «фонд оперативної національної допомоги діани макарової» (“diana makarova’s fund of operational national assistance”) – initiative group of activists, «39 жіноча сотня» (“39th female hundred”), the charitable foundation «єдина родина» (“united family”), «єдиний волонтерський центр. чернігів» (“the unified volunteer center. chernihiv”), the international charitable foundation «шпиталь майдану» (“the hospital of maidan”), «армія sos» (“sos army”), «всеукраїнська асоціація учасників бойових дій» (“all-ukrainian association of hostilities participants”). non-governmental organizations cooperate with the state in the field of providing social services to ato participants through a social order mechanism. an example of such cooperation can be the activity of the all-ukrainian charitable organization «ініціатива заради життя» (“initiative for the sake of life”), which received a social order for social adaptation, crisis and emergency intervention, counseling for demobilized ato participants and members of ato participants’ families. it is important to note that some non-state organizations create opportunities for providing ato participants with social services in ways that are new to the state. in particular, the public union «всеукраїнське об’єднання учасників ато «українці-разом!» (“all-ukrainian association of ato participants “ukrainians are together!”) within the framework of a unified all-ukrainian social and legal program for assistance to hostilities participants called “social card of ato participant” with the support of the state service of ukraine for war veterans and ato participants, the ministry of defense of ukraine, the national guard of ukraine, the security service of ukraine, the state border guard service of ukraine, socially responsible business offer to ato participants to receive a social card of ato participant, which provides the following possibilities to the owner: a free legal support and legal advice, a free medical examination and provision of medical services, a psychological support, some discounts for the purchases in all-ukrainian trading networks, the participation in educational, recreational and entertainment programs (всеукраїнське об’єднання…, 2017). the official data show that social services for ato participants, both governmental and nongovernmental, cover a significant number of recipients and types of social services. at the same time, qualitative aspects of the work of institutions providing social services to ato participants are largely left out of the state attention. however, these aspects greatly influence on the solving of the problems which made ato participant apply in the social protection system. that is why, the use of the above-mentioned tool for evaluating of quality of social services in practice will help to reduce the social vulnerability of ato participants and their families and prevent the aggravation of difficult situations in the lives of ato participants and their families. the extension of the aforementioned practice of social order of social services for ato participants and their families can be also seen as a promising measure to improve the quality of social services granted to ato participants and their families. sometimes this mechanism is called a social contact. the part of the funds allocated for the provision of social services in local budgets after the competition is expedient to transfer for the procurement of these services in non-governmental organizations that have confirmed their ability to provide high-quality service to ato participants. at the same time, tender procedures should be clear and understandable to all the participants of competition, and after the implementation of the contract, it is logical to establish the evaluating of the quality of provided services. some non-state organizations have already been working on this scheme, but the social order of services for ato participants are only beginning to be part of the practice of cooperation between nongovernmental organizations and local authorities. today, most of the concluded social contracts relate to sanatorium care services, rehabilitation and social adaptation. 3. summary the held analytical review leads to the conclusion that today ukraine uses a wide range of social protection measures for ato participants, which are intended to solve problems of this category and considerable budget funds are allocated for these measures. however, a new problem field arises. so, a number of important issues are opened to consider. first, the procedure for obtaining the status of a participant in hostilities, without which ato participant cannot have access to social protection programs, social services, privileges, is a rather complex and time-consuming task. therefore a certain number social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 37 of ato participants who actually protect the sovereignty of ukraine remain not covered by social protection. secondly, there is no objective information on effectiveness of solving the ato participants’ problems by the system of social protection in ukraine and there is no objective information on quality of the social services provided to them by state and non-governmental organizations. some government organizations, such as territorial centers for social services, carry out internal monitoring and evaluation, but ato participants represent only a small proportion of the contingent they serve. thirdly, the practice of social order, which could become a mechanism for effective cooperation between the state and non-governmental organizations in providing social services to ato participants, has not yet been sufficiently spread. non-governmental organizations, which first came to the aid of ato participants in 2014–2015 years, still work mainly for sponsorship and charity, the state support of such organizations is very limited. foruthly, the ato participants’ opinion on the quality and effectiveness of social protection and social services is not systematically studied. we believe that it should be studied separately. consequently, the sphere of social protection of the population, including ato participants and their families, in ukraine requires the solution of the above-mentioned problems, as well as the improvement of the legislative framework regulating its activities, the improving the of the financing of this sphere, the reduction of administrative expenses, settlement of the number of social benefits which guaranteed by the state to socially vulnerable categories of citizens, the 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ua/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/pilhy-ta-harantijid lya u c h a s n y k i v at o s k a c h at yfa j l . p d f. p d f [29.10.2017]. положення про комунальну установу «центр обслуговування учасників бойових дій, учасників антитерористичної операції та членів їх сімей» сумської міської ради (нова редакція), 2017, [in:] сумська міська рада, http://atocentr.sumy.ua/?page_id=578 [23.08.2017]. президент підписав закон щодо додаткових гарантій працевлаштування учасників ато, 2016, [in:] державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv.gov.ua/ aktualni-pytannya/prezydent-pidpysav-zakon-schodododatkovyh-harantij-pratsevlashtuvannya-uchasnykivato.html [08.09.2017]. про військовий обов’язок та військову службу. закон україни від 25.03.1992 № 2233-xii, 1992, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/2232-12 [23.08.2017]. про внесення змін до концепції державної системи професійної орієнтації населення. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 09.08.2017 р. № 561, 2017, кабінет міністрів україни, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/ cardnpd?docid=250189789 [23.08.2017]. про внесення змін до порядків, затверджених постановами кабінету міністрів україни від 11 лютого 2009  р. №  140 і від 29 лютого 2012 р. № 193. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 20.09.2017 р. № 708, 2017, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/708-2017%d0%bf [28.10.2017]. про внесення змін до порядку використання коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті для здійснення заходів із соціальної та професійної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції (крім військовослужбовців, звільнених у запас або відставку). постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 13.10.2015 № 837, 2015, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/837-2015-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про внесення змін до порядку використання коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті на забезпечення постраждалих учасників антитерористичної операції санаторно-курортним лікуванням. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 08.08.2016 № 510, 2016, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/510-2016-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про внесення змін до постанов кабінету міністрів україни від 23 квітня 2014 р. № 117 і від 1 жовтня 2014 р. № 518. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 24.02.2016 social protection of ato participants and their families in ukraine: an analytical review and promising measures 39 № 172, 2016, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/172-2016-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про внесення зміни до статті 11 закону україни «про соціальний і правовий захист військовослужбовців та членів їх сімей». закон україни від 03.11.2015 № 739-viii, 2015, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon3. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/739-19 [23.08.2017]. про внесення зміни до статті 14 закону україни «про зайнятість населення» щодо додаткових гарантій у  сприянні працевлаштуванню учасників бойових дій, які брали безпосередню участь в антитерористичній операції, забезпеченні її проведення. закон україни від 07.07.2016 № 1436-viii, 2016, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1436-19 [23.08.2017]. про внесення зміни до статті 36 закону україни «про пенсійне забезпечення осіб, звільнених з військової служби, та деяких інших осіб». закон україни від 20.05.2014 № 1274-vii, 2014, відомості верховної ради україни, http:// zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1274-18 [23.08.2017]. про внесення зміни до статті 37 закону україни «про пенсійне забезпечення осіб, звільнених з військової служби, та деяких інших осіб». закон україни від 20.06.2014 № 1542-vii, 2014, відомості верховної ради україни, http:// zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1542-18 [23.08.2017]. про внесення зміни до статті 8 закону україни «про соціальний і правовий захист військовослужбовців та членів їх сімей. закон україни від 05.03.2015 № 242-viii, 2015, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon5. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/242-19 [23.08.2017]. про внесення зміни до указу президента україни від 18 березня 2015 року № 150, 2015. про додаткові заходи щодо соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції. указ президента україни від 05.10.2015 року № 570/2015, 2015, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/570/2015 [23.08.2017]. про затвердження порядку використання коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті для здійснення заходів із психологічної реабілітації учасників антитерористичної операції. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 12.07.2017 № 497, 2017, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4972017-%d0%bf/paran8#n8 [23.08.2017]. про затвердження порядку використання коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті для виплати матеріальної допомоги військовослужбовцям, звільненим з військової строкової служби. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 08.04.2015 № 185, 2015, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/185-2015-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про затвердження порядку використання коштів, передбачених у державному бюджеті для забезпечення деяких категорій інвалідів санаторно-курортними путівками, та внесення змін до порядків, затверджених постановами кабінету міністрів україни від 22 лютого 2006 р. № 187 і від 31 березня 2015 р. № 200. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 01.03.2017 № 110, 2017, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon3.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/110-2017-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про затвердження порядку виплати грошової компенсації вартості проїзду учасників антитерористичної операції до реабілітаційних установ для проходження психологічної реабілітації та назад. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 23.08.2016 № 528, 2016, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/528-2016-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про затвердження порядку організації соціальної та професійної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 21.06.2017 р. № 432, 2017, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/432-2017%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. про рекомендації парламентських слухань на тему: «державні гарантії соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції, революції гідності та членів їхніх родин: стан і перспективи». постанова верховної ради україни від 09.02.2017 р. № 1843-viii, 2017, верховна рада україни, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ ru/1843-19 [28.10.2017]. про статус ветеранів війни, гарантії їх соціального захисту. закон україни від 22 жовтня 1993 року № 3551-xii, 1993, відомості верховної ради україни, http://zakon5. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3551-12 [23.08.2017]. про схвалення концепції державної цільової програми з фізичної, медичної, психологічної реабілітації і соціальної та професійної реадаптації учасників антитерористичної операції на період до 2022 року. розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 12.07.2017 р. № 475-р., 2017, кабінет міністрів україни, http://www.kmu.gov. ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=250138251 [29.10.2017]. про утворення державної служби україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 11.08.2014 № 326, 2014, кабінет міністрів україни, http://zakon2. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/326-2014-%d0%bf [23.08.2017]. радіонов ю.д., 2013, оцінка ефективності державних видатків, економіка україни, 12(625), 76–87. роз’яснення служби: соціальна та професійна адаптація учасників ато, 2015, [in:] державна служба україни у  справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv.gov.ua/aktualnipytannya/roz-yasnennya-sluzhby-sotsialna-ta-profesijnaadaptatsiya-uchasnykiv-ato.html [08.09.2017]. соціальний звіт за 2015, 2016, [in:] міністерство соціальної політики україни, київ, http://www.msp.gov.ua/ timeline/socialni-zviti-.html [23.08.2017]. соціальний звіт за 2016, 2017, [in:] міністерство соціальної політики україни, київ, http://www.msp.gov.ua/ timeline/socialni-zviti-.html [23.08.2017]. сьогодні за круглим столом обговорювались актуальні питання допомоги учасникам ато, 2015, [in:] державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv.gov.ua/topnovyny/sohodni-za-kruhlym-stolom-obhovoryuvalysaktualni-pytannya-dopomohy-uchasnykam-ato.html [08.09.2017]. 40 tetiana kotenko, yuliia horemykina товстиженко о.в., марченко н.а., приходько м.м., 2014, соціальний захист населення: сутність та проблеми його фінансування, науковий вісник чернігівського державного інституту економіки і управління, серія 1: економіка, 1, 100–104. топішко н.п., 2014, система соціального захисту населення як соціальний, економічний та політичний стабілізатор розвитку суспільства, наукові записки національного університету «острозька академія», серія: економіка, 27, 108–113. уряд вирішує проблеми забезпечення доступним житлом учасників ато і впо, 2017, [in:] державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv.gov.ua/aktualnipytannya/uryad-vyrishuje-problemy-zabezpechennyad o s t u p n y m z h y t l o m u c h a s n y k i v a t o i v p o . h t m l [28.10.2017]. уряд затвердив порядок організації соціальної та професійної адаптації учасників ато, 2017, [in:] державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv. gov.ua/aktualni-pytannya/uryad-zatverdyv-poryadokorhanizatsiji-sotsialnoji-ta-profesijnoji-adaptatsijiuchasnykiv-ato.html [08.09.2017]. уряд схвалив питання оновлення системи профорієнтації та адаптації військовослужбовців, 2017, [in:] державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv. gov.ua/aktualni-pytannya/ur yad-shvalyv-pytannyaonovlennya-systemy-proforijentatsiji-ta-adaptatsijivijskovosluzhbovtsiv.html [08.09.2017]. чижов д., 2016, нормативно-правове забезпечення права на соціальний захист учасників ато та членів їх сімей, вісник національного університету «львівська політехніка», юридичні науки, 845, 173–182. щодо надання послуг державної служби зайнятості безробітним з числа військовослужбовців, які брали участь в ато. аналітична записка, 2017, [in:] державна служба зайнятості http://www.dcz.gov.ua/statdatacatalog/ document?id=393494 [29.10.2017]. як допомогти учаснику ато працевлаштуватися, 2017, [in:] державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасників антитерористичної операції, http://dsvv.gov.ua/aktualni-pytannya/yak-dopomohtyuchasnyku-ato-pratsevlashtuvatysya.html [29.10.2017]. introduction olena korolchuk (1) (2) (1) department of social and humanitarian policy, the national academy of public administration under to the office of president of ukraine, tsedika 20, 02000 kyiv, ukraine, (2) department of health systems management, ariel university, ariel 40700, israel, e-mail: terrasanitas@gmail.com citation korolchuk o., 2018, introduction, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 5–10. journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 5–10 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.016.8785 this issue of the journal “geography, politics and society” hides a wide range of topical problems related to the socio-humanitarian sphere development in modern ukraine withstanding the hostilities  – conducting of the anti-terrorist operation (ato) on the east of the country. the modern collection of scientific works of the ukrainian researchers-scientists presents information about their researchers and studies of the other countries’ experience. in addition to this, they show the results of their own implementations and the received achievements in the development of new approaches to improve the socio-humanitarian sphere, which needs close attention of scientists, managers, citizens in the modern living conditions of the country. the intensification of the integration processes at the global and regional levels, considerable instability, the dynamism of changes, as well as the growing competition between the world and regional power centers to preserve and strengthen their influence on the development of relations, have affected the development of various forms of military-political conflicts. it is, in fact, one of the greatest threats to the international safety. ukraine has not escaped the tragedy. the military aggression of the russian federation against ukraine, the war in eastern ukraine, especially in the donetsk and luhansk regions, where, along with the separatists, the regular units of the russian armed forces have been fighting against ukraine since 2014, the annexation of the crimea became a serious test for the ukrainians. for the first time in the twenty-first century the country – a permanent member of the united nations security council – was aggressing against neighboring states, despite their commitment to maintaining peace and security. by its actions, russia has destroyed the existing system of the international security. the functional role of the socio-humanitarian sphere and its components in providing the vital functions of the nation and the state has become globalized and complicated in recent years in connection with the military actions in the east of ukraine – ato. this conflict, as the main threat to the statehood and sovereignty of ukraine, is becoming increasingly complex and protracted. the unannounced, hybrid war creates the challenge of statehood, the maturity of the civic consciousness of the ukrainian people, the competence and responsibility of the leadership, the generally recognized democratic values: freedom of speech, pluralism of opinions, free political competition, etc. external aggression has demonstrated inefficiency of an 6 olena korolchuk independent and adequate modern challenges of foreign, military and information policy, strategic approaches in the management of the security sector, and so on. problems require attention: society, preserving livelihoods for the benefit of the state in the modern realities of external aggression and economic crisis (ukraine lost about 1/5 of its economic power), a sharp decline in living standards, bitter losses and considerable material damage, remains dissatisfied with the level and quality of life, the activity of the authorities – distrust in the state institutions. these problems are turning into deep despair, apathy and depression. in order to eliminate this danger, it is necessary to peremptorily and quickly react and act, properly diagnose and rank challenges, treats, and develop, formulate and provide timely adequate responses. a country faced with deep economic crisis, prolonged political uncertainty, extended process of sporadic reforms in all sectors and systems of the state, limitation of budget resources, is trying to continue financing many programs of socio-humanitarian and economic spheres, what negatively affects the implementation of strategic priorities for its development. among other issues, the issue of studying the main tendencies of development and improvement of the mechanisms of state regulation of these spheres has become topical. events in eastern ukraine in 2014 have expanded the scope of work and system of social protection – having formed new needs for the development and implementation of social protection measures for ato members and their families. after all, international experience shows that the inadequate level of social protection of servicemen is negatively reflected on the qualitative composition of the army, reduces motivation, gives rise to dissatisfaction, etc. implementation measures of state policy in this direction are input unsystematically, fragmentarily without taking into account actually existing objective factors and with significant restrictions of tools and resources for making changes, etc. during 2014–2017, about 200 thousand people were mobilized in ukraine. since 2016, a contracted army has been introduced, more than 100 thousand reservists have volunteered to serve in the armed forces of ukraine. the number of ato-participants and their family members is constantly increasing – as of february 2017. almost 284 thousand persons became the “veteran of the battle”, about 7 thousand – members of the families of the dead, more than 4,100 people – became invalids. additional pressure on the social infrastructure of the country and local communities, on state and local budgets creates 1.7 million internally displaced people, that left their homes, lost their property, broke social ties, and, in most cases, became less competitive. thus, there appeared two new categories of affected people due to ato in ukraine – the recipients of social services that require special attention of the state since the social vulnerability of these people is a phenomenon that arose suddenly. it dramatically changed the habitual life of citizens, most of which did not require state support until 2014. the aforementioned separate categories of the population of affected people’s – the participants of the ato and the internally displaced people, and their family members, who need proper state assistance and support, rehabilitation, social and psychological adaptation, etc. today, ukraine uses a wide range of social protection measures for participants of the ato, solves problems of this category, allocates significant budget funds. however, there is a new problem area of unresolved issues: the procedure for obtaining the status of a participant in combat operations, without which the ato member may not have access to social protection programs, social services, and privileges. in fact, it is complex and time-consuming, therefore, a certain number of ato participants, who actually protect the sovereignty of ukraine, do not have social protection. further problems include the lack of objective information of the quality and effectiveness of social services provided by government and non-governmental organizations – social partners of the state for these groups of the population; unsystematic study of needs, problems, satisfaction and attitudes of ato participants and internally displaced people regarding the quality and effectiveness of the social protection system and social services provided; manifestations of funding shortfalls and acute problems of ukrainian practice in the implementation of legal and regulatory guarantees of social security which demonstrate the declarative nature of the state’s obligations, which often leads to poor quality of services provided by budget and program funds, etc. these tendencies will definitely lead to the marginalization and criminalization of that particular category of people in order to increase the level of social tension. therefore, it is necessary to improve the legislative base that regulates the activities of the social system. they also need to improve the system of document circulation for obtaining social status and corresponding privileges, update financing by regulating the number of social benefits guaranteed by introduction 7 the state and form the adequate account of needs. in addition to this, it is necessary to increase the part of the non-governmental sector in financing the costs of social protection, promote the role of social partnership of major groups of the population, business structures and the state; regularly improve the quality and effectiveness of provided social services, including by combining public and private efforts made by internally displaced people, ato participants and their families. in today’s developments of this scientific problem, the attention of researchers to this issue is focused on issues of social, psychological and medical recovery, prevention of post-traumatic mental disorders (ptsd) for internally displaced people, ato participants and their family members, etc. however, there are insufficiently or fragmentarily studied issues of this scientific context. according to the authors of this issue, scientific justification requires the formation of an innovatively integrated mechanism of state management of the system of social protection of ato participants and members of their families, as a component of socio-humanitarian policy. studying the features of social protection of separate groups of the population with the active use of advanced information technologies, automated control systems and integrated personal databases, which will provide a socio-economic effect, will allow more efficient distribution of public funds and better targeting in favor. military events, social tensions and conflicts in the country are also estimated by the number of loss of life and health of its citizens. accordingly, there arises the intensification of the demand for providing timely and adequate medical services. in addition to the deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation, violation of normal living conditions, reduction of budget financing of health care, direct threat to life and health, inevitable maladaptation of the health in the area of fighting, abruptly increased the intensity and variety of new types of necessary medical care (for example, as a result of gunshot wounds, contusions), etc. therefore, there were problems with the lack or delay of necessary medical care, defective medicine, inconsistency with the treatment required, reduced availability of medical services and medicines, especially due to their lack of and catastrophic growth, etc. due to the difficult life circumstances, the number of people who appeal to medical institutions has sharply dropped. this additionally affects the health of the population of ukraine. according to who experts, the humanitarian crisis in ukraine has affected approximately 5 million people and led to the displacement of 1.6 million. the awareness and support of the international community, as well as ongoing funding, are critical to responding to this health emergency. the following are areas of great concern that require immediate mobilization and action: low vaccination coverage; poor communicable diseases surveillance; inadequate access to medications for cancer patients; and lack of access to mental health and rehabilitation care (health response…, 2017). according to the official data of the state statistics service in 2014 3394 deaths were recorded as “loss due to hostilities”. the head of the united nations observer mission on human rights in ukraine a. arrutunyan noted that from april 2014 to february 2015, there were recorded deaths of at least 5,809 people. due to the ministry of defense of ukraine from the beginning of the ato till june 2017, 2696 ukrainian soldiers were killed, 9903 were injured; according to the unofficial statistics of the “book of memory” site from 2014 to may 2017 – more than 3,500 people were lost (сайт проекту “книга пам’яті”, 2017). the processes of population outflow due to internal migration, appropriately, ignorance of the real number of the population living in the territory of combat operations and adjacent to the atо, have led to the fragmentation of information. statistics on deaths or health violations among civilians, especially those originating from uncontrolled territories of ukraine, are untimely and incomplete. they significantly reduce the reliability and quality of data to make managerial decisions at all levels. unfortunately, with each passing day of ato, the number of deaths of military and civilian personnel continues to rise steadily. an important negative consequence of the ato is the deepening of the gender imbalance in connection with death – more than 90% of officially registered deaths happened due to hostilities. losses among men of working age, negatively affect the process of restoring generations. combat events increase the problem of direct and indirect losses and deaths of the population. the necessary steps have already been taken to reorganize the provision of services, work of staff, personnel management and attitude towards people in the health system. emergency warning and assistance system (possible sabotage, terrorist acts, etc.) is being improved. different algorithms for action in specific emergency situations with a clear definition of the orders of the activities of the performers are being developed. coordinated co-operation with a wide range of non-hospital partners  – military, volunteers, international and domestic public organizations, the media, etc – has already been established. 8 olena korolchuk the greatest attention needs to be given to the prospect of negative consequences for the health of the population of ukraine, related to life damage, deterioration of health, the suffering of people in connection with military events, forced displacements, various types of deficiencies, outbreaks of diseases, violation of human rights and dignity. it is believed that long-term damage to people as well as to the development of society may be even greater than a direct loss. the sphere of negative influence will affect future lives of ukrainians, especially the mental and social health of the population of the country: children lose opportunities for education and longterm development, adults – for decent, fruitful work and family prosperity, etc. the conditions of the ato are characterized by the negative influence of environmental factors – climatologic – weather conditions, constant stress, lack of sleep, moral and physical exhaustion for human, that is worsed by inappropriate nutrition in contemporary ukraine. during the last decade, increased stress-relatedness at the mass population level has become an inevitable companion of socio-economic and social changes in the state and, naturally, has caused a change in the level and composition of the class of pathology of the digestive organs – almost half of the number of mobilized servicemen were found with different degrees of restriction, the leading place was occupied by stress disorders, cardiovascular diseases, diseases of the nervous system, diseases of the digestive system and only in the fifth place – wounded and injured (щорічна…, 2017). the organization of high-grade and high-quality nutrition of troops is one of the most important tasks of the medical service that has to be resolved, considering that nutrition is one of the main risk factors for the development of non-infectious diseases. the modern provision of militaries with products, their delivery and preparation systems therefore requires full revision and improvement in connection with changes in production technologies in the food industry. the first steps were made by the decree of the cabinet of ministers dated october 3, 2016, no. 696 «on amendments to the nutrition standards of servicemen of the armed forces and other military forces» (про внесення…, 2016), the standards of nutrition have been improved, provision is made for an occasional (breakfast, lunch, dinner) issue of a new norm taking into account the amount of rations necessary to provide troops a full meal. undoubtedly, the legal regulation and practical mechanisms of provision and delivery of food to the ato zone has to be under attention for further improvement in the context of the state›s defense capability strengthening and the militaries› health maintainance. when developing a nutrition policy, it is necessary to rely on the existing mechanisms for providing food for militaries, taking into account international experience and experience gained during the ato. in order to minimize the negative impact of social conflicts on the life and health of the population today and in the future, it is necessary to move from crisis management to a comprehensive long-term strategy to prevent threats while restoring economic and socio-humanitarian areas and, preferably, the final resolution of the conflict. as you know, the population of ukraine is prolonged in a state of constant stress, which determines the aggravation of existing and the development of new diseases. sociological studies show that over 80% of citizens living in cities not controlled by ukraine have psychological symptoms associated with «military trauma», ptsd, mental health problems, alcoholism, increased anxiety, especially among women, depression, oppression of mood and anxiety among the population, etc. particular attention and development require the problem of adaptation to the peaceful life of the demobilized ato participants, veterans of combat operations, who received significant psychological injuries while taking part in hostilities. the constant increase in the number of combatants in ukraine today is actualizing and increasing the need for rehabilitation (physical, mental) and medical and social assistance. it is necessary to strengthen the national mental health system in the long-term perspective, using the help and experience of the international community, because mental health is a guarantee of the welfare and productivity of people, communities and countries recovering from emergencies. the psycho-traumatic consequences of war events and the difficult economic situation are considered to be the most modern social stress factors that can lead to maladaptation and disorientation due to social stress of the population, deforming the psyche, deepening depressive mood, producing intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts. this disadaptation can lead to mental and personality disorders, accelerated psychosomatic states with alcohol, drug abuse, etc., and, remotely in time, ptsd. traumatic events change the psyche of a person, which requires the formation and creation of new adaptive models of the functioning of the person and positive behavior models with a sense of belonging to the group, the importance of their own life experience, as a valuable asset, skills of using positive adaptive strategies. long-lasting events in the donbass, which will require a lot of time for a final settlement, have radically and irreversibly changed the socio-psychological introduction 9 situation in ukraine, exacerbating the sense of justice like never before. unprecedented processes related to the ato caused human, moral, political, environmental and economic losses, radically changed the relations in society. another crusial up-to-date to ukraine is an issue relies to the language problem, the argues during the whole period of the independence of the country swinging the society to the two sides: of the priority of ukrainian language as the state one or to the bilingualism codified by law. unfortunately, the factors like the dalliance in the implementation of the language policy in verkhovna rada played a dramatic part in the events of 2014 in ukraine – the language was used as a tool of manipulations and the deconstruction of ukrainian. undoubdetly, the language confrontation in ukraine exists. the permanent refusals to solve that problem bringing the opposite reaction of people. the director of the institute of ukrainian language of the nas of ukraine p. grytsenko fairly admits: “the confrontation about the language will remain until the role and place of each language in the life of our society – ukrainian, russian as the language of the national minority, other languages is clearly defined and underlined by the new law” (глуховський, груздєв, 2017). there is an urgent problem rised in contemporary ukraine due to the fact of the irredentism that from a potential has bacome to a certain extent latent problem, connected with the existence of prorussian sentiments in crimea and eastern regions of ukraine, turned into a real threat to the territorial integrity of the state in the context of a nationwide political crisis in early 2014. irredentism, as a political phenomenon, the emergence of which can be explained by a whole set of reasons, both objective and subjective, has the powerful influence on domestic and foreign policies progresses in the modern world, deserves the attention of scholars. ethnopolitical processes largely determine the dynamic picture of the modern world; the nature of interaction between different ethnic groups is critical for these processes. one of the articles in that issue studied distinguish between irredentism as a form of separatism initiated by national minorities and the policy of irredentism as a course of a kin-state. the formation of the information society, interconnection of globalization and regionalization, the development of democracy and more rapid pace, complexity and scale of the political processes in present ukraine produced the tendency of politicization of ethnic groups. quite often, they cause interstate conflicts, which are characterized by duration, irrationality and difficulty in settling (gokcek, 2010; kim, 2016). the centrifugal tendencies allows to interpret irredentism as a type of separatism. also, irredentism can be evaluated quite positively from the point of view of the realization of the right of the ethnic group to self-determination, but it is considered negatively from the standpoint of maintaining the integrity of the borders of the state in which the irredenta resides. the «great idea» is the core of irredentist demands due to ethnic ideology, which justifies the special historical mission – unification of groups of separated people. in fact, the current policy of irredentism has the nature of expansionism and seeks to revive a «great power» – a striking example is russia›s policy regarding the border areas of ukraine. we›re agree with the authour, that he world community should develop a coordinated position so that russian irredentism, guided by the idea of spreading the «russian world», has not become a dangerous precedent. political and diplomatic support from the west, the world community in conjunction with the minsk accords, is an important factor that adds opportunities for ukraine to resist. the creation of an international coalition in support of ukraine, the maintenance of this coalition in an active state, the prolongation, deepening and strengthening of the sanctions regime, which has been taking place for 4 years – are effective means for prompting negotiations to end the ato and military aggression. many aspects of ukrainian life have been transformed during these difficult more then three years of ato on the territory of the state. ensuring the effective functioning of national systems of social protection and health care is an important task of the state as well as military or economic growth as factors of ensuring national security. it is extremely important today to learn how to evaluate qualitatively existing and potential threats and risks to life and health of the population, to anticipate, to avoid, if possible, or to actually influence their formation and consequences. minimization and prevention of real and potential consequences of the social health of citizens is one of the priority directions for the development of modern mechanisms of proper and balanced state administration. its consistent implementation will lobby for the interests of preserving and improving the health, quality reproduction, long-term development and productive life of the ukrainian people. given the foregoing, the future development of the ukrainian nation, carried out in the newly created conditions of economic, ecological, sociopsychological and political realities, another mental reality, requires carrying out prolonged scientific researchers in order to formulate and implement state 10 olena korolchuk policy; directed primarily at reducing the powerful socio-psychological tension, integration of ukrainian society, catalyze the strengthening of national identity and national unity on the backdrop of a significant increase in the level and quality of life of ukrainians. the editor is grateful to all the scientists – the authors and co-authors of the articles-texts of this collection, working in the research centers of various institutions of ukraine. also, a special gratitude is expressed to reviewers and co-editors, polish colleagues, for their work. at the same time, he hopes that the presented topics are interesting. olena korolchuk references gokcek g., 2010, irredentism versus secessionism: the potential for international conflict, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595095 [03.05.2015]. health response to the humanitarian crisis in ukraine, 2017, world health organization regional office for europe, copenhagen, http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/emergencies/health-response-to-the-humanitariancrisis-in-ukraine/health-response-to-the-humanitariancrisis-in-ukraine [01.09.2017]. kim g., 2016, irredentism in disputed territories and its influence on the border conflicts and wars, the journal of territorial and maritime studies, 3(1), 87–101. глуховський м., груздєв с., 2017, доктор філології павло гриценко: мовні квоти – це ляпас усім українцям, http:// glavcom.ua/interviews/direktor-institutu-ukrajinskojimovi-pavlo-gricenko-movni-kvoti-ce-lyapas-usim-ukrajincyam-402601.html [10.03.2017]. про внесення змін до норм харчування військовослужбовців збройних сил та інших військових формувань, 2016, постанова кабінету міністрів україни № 696 від 3 жовтня 2016 р., сьогодні, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/696-2016-п [23.03.2018]. сайт проекту «книга пам’яті», 2017, http://memorybook. org.ua/indexfile/statmonth.htm /memorybook.org.ua/ indexfile/statistic.htm [01.11.2017]. щорічна доповідь про стан здоров’я населення, санітарноепідемічну ситуацію та результати діяльності системи охорони здоров’я україни, 2016 рік, 2017, моз україни, ду «уісд моз україни», київ. 1. introduction modern state of affairs of the russian-ukrainian relations is marked by systemic crisis because of geopolitical and culture-historical contradictions. despite centuries-old experience of united national identity, cultural, language and religious proximity, russian and ukrainian political development pathway focus on mutual confrontation at the present day, and it is estimated by many experts as a hybrid war condition. at the same time ukraine is the closest neighbor of russia, and both political trends, and people social well-being on both sides of frontier depend on a configuration of the russian-ukrainian relations. anti-russian and anti-ukrainian preferences are formed on both sides hit chord with youth public attitudes, as unlike old-timers, russian and ukrainian citizens aged up to 25 years have no experience living within the confines of unified country with the ideologized system of socialization of new generations. within this framework you must consider that from the youth attitude towards the prospects of the russian-ukrainian cooperation, from what image of ukraine was created in consciousness of young russians, the concrete scenario of development of these relations depends. environmental risks of development of the russian-ukrainian relations stipulate nihilistic perception by the ukrainian young people journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(2), 33–43 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.013.8219 the russian-ukrainian relations in the youth estimates of the boundary region (evidence from the rostov region) anton serikov (1), andrey bedrik (2) (1) institute of sociology and regional studies, southern federal university, pushkinskaya 160, 344006 rostov-on-don, russia, e-mail: avserikov@sfedu.ru (corresponding author) (2) institute of sociology and regional studies, southern federal university, pushkinskaya 160, 344006 rostov-on-don, russia, e-mail: abedrik@bk.ru citation serikov a., bedrik a., 2018, the russian-ukrainian relations in the youth estimates of the boundary region (evidence from the rostov region), journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 33–43. abstract the article describes the current stage of the development of russian-ukrainian relations. the authors describe the public opinion of the youth of the rostov region bordering with ukraine. thus the scenario for the development of these relations depends on the image of ukraine formed in the minds of young russians. the article suggests a new methodological concept “transconflict region”. the authors use this concept to analyze the influence of the events occurring on the territory of ukraine on the border regions of russia (the example of the rostov region). key words russian-ukrainian relations, geopolitics, border region, transconflict region, russian youth, public opinion. received: 06 october 2017 accepted: 12 february 2018 published: 31 may 2018 34 anton serikov, andrey bedrik living in russia their ethnicity, that intensifies assimilatory trend of reproduction of the russian regions population ethno cultural structure including border area. in general, the similar situation aggravates a civil and civilizational break between the population of russia and ukraine, and it is an ethnic segregation factor, guaranteed designing of anti-russian model of the ukrainian nation and grading supraethnic consolidation potential inside the russian society. in the current situation, the russian youngsters support an official political discourse concerning ukraine, but at the same time, it is important to find out what trends are traced among young people, what estimates dominate in perception of the processes happening in ukraine, and what young russians seize room for normalization of the russianukrainian relations. 2. methodology and sources of empirical information the modern scientific discourse in regards to russian-ukrainian relations concentrates mainly around the political issues (the conflict in the donbass, the crimean issues, the russian language status in ukraine (kulyk, 2016; wanner, 2014), ukrainian nationalism, anti-ukrainian and pro-ukrainian trends in russian political sphere and at the international arena (veebel, markus, 2015), etc. the works analyzing the evolution of russianukrainian relations in the post-soviet period include the articles by a.g. zdravomyslov (здравомыслов, 1998), w. zimmerman (1998), s.s. zhiltsov (жильцов, 2014a, 2014b), s.s. zhiltsov et al. (жильцов et al., 2010), n.p. sidorova (сидорова, 2000), a.v. lysenkov (лысенков, 2011) etc. there is an attempt to identify the origins of the ‹russian national homeland› outside kyiv rus as the first steps towards a revision of traditional russian perceptions of russian-ukrainian relations. one point of view on this question is that the new trends have become particularly visible following the signing of the russian-ukrainian interstate treaty in may 1997, which is the important landmark in russia›s acceptance of the independence of ukraine (tolz, 2002; moshes, 2000). the current stage of the russian-ukrainian crisis is considered in the works by v.i. pantin, v.v. lapkin, a.v. ryabov (пантин, лапкин, 2013, 2014, 2015; лапкин et al., 2014), in which the construction of ukrainian state-civil identity is analyzed. the authors distance from the soviet past and russian-ukrainian cooperation in favor to the articulating contradictions and conflicts. in this field some authors focus on the coercive and legitimate forms of power in ukraine (wanner, 2014). they describe the crisis of legitimacy in ukraine as a contradiction between a system of capitalism dominated by a few oligarchs, and the remnants of a soviet mentality. according to k.v. korostelina (2013) two strategies are used by the government to stoke the crisis. first, increased identification with ethnic or regional groups are instrumentally used by the government to take attention from economic and class issues. second, the incorporation of a soviet meaning of power into the new national identity and presentation of it as core norms, believes, and values of the people of ukraine competes with alternative ukrainian identity concepts. as a result in ukraine, the society has no identity of «us», no civic accountability, nor even any real interest in such matters. civil society levels are very low, as reflected by limited opportunities for civic responsibility and participation and few demands from the society. other researches reveal that history education in ukraine emphasises the idea of victim hood as the core of national identity and posits russia as an oppressive and aggressive enemy. it provides a basis for an early warning and resolution of identity-based conflicts (korostelina, 2011). the publications by s.v. kozlov and d.v. bereznyakov (березняков, козлов, 2015; козлов, 2012, 2014) examine the impact of ukrainian public discourse, the exploitation of anti-russian images in ukraine›s politics and media on the state of russian-ukrainian relations. the investigations of o.i. vendina, v.a. kolosov, f.a. popov, a.b. sebentsov (вендина et al. 2014; колосов, 2001), d.o. bats (бац, 2017) are made in a similar field. the authors argue that a sustainable transformation of the ukrainian crisis requires an accurate analysis of the context of the conflict, which should include an understanding of moscow’s perception of the threats to its interests. this policy brief develops a theoretical understanding of the ukrainian crisis through the lens of stephen m. walt’s balance of threat theory (bock et al., 2015). there is a point of view that ukrainophobic and anti-western xenophobic propaganda is spewed in russia. the authors show how the growth of russian nationalism, ‘conservative values’ and anti (ukrainian) nationalism has taken place during specific periods of history (kuzio, 2016). recent events have led to a great deal of speculation about russia’s objectives and their implications for european security. the authors examine russian intentions by means of an analysis both of official rhetoric and of russia’s actions in donbass (kuzio, 2015; mitrokhin, 2014, 2015). the point is the russian-ukrainian relations in the youth estimates of the boundary region (evidence from the rostov region) 35 that concludes that far from instigating the rebellion in donbass and using it to destabilise ukraine, revise the international order, or seize additional territory, moscow has largely been reacting to events and trying to gain some control of a process which was originally almost entirely outside of its control (wilson, 2015). its primary aim has been to get the ukrainian government to negotiate directly with the rebels, in order to produce a permanent peace settlement based upon some form of special status for donbass within ukraine. it has also used its influence over the rebels in order to persuade them to cooperate with the peace process set up at minsk. the researchers conclude that russia’s objectives are very limited, and do not pose a serious threat to european security as a whole (robinson, 2016). in the discourse about the ukrainian crisis much attention has focused on the use of military forces without country or unit insignia, a crucial part of this operation involved a complex and multilayered perception management campaign to advance a selfinterested narrative, which defined the contours of debate, justified their actions at home and abroad, and provided those actions with legal and normative legitimacy. the authors define kremlin’s rhetoric in three areas: crimea’s secession from ukraine was a legal act of self-determination; russia possesses justifiable historical, cultural, and legal claims to crimea; and, western criticism of russia’s actions are dishonest and a reflection of their anti-russian, cold war mentality (ambrosio, 2016). russia’s foreign policy decisions towards ukraine in the context of the “ukraine crisis” have been portrayed largely in a negative light which crudely paints russia’s actions as being imperialistic, evil and largely irrational. though on the other hand, russia’s actions in ukraine can be, to some degree, rationalized. first, russia’s eurasian–oriented great power role identity and its perceptions of ukraine as represent a vital national interest. second, the european union and the united states are perceived as embodying a western team of anti-russian imperialists, which led moscow to pursue hazardous foreign policies (smith, 2017). also the interpretation of the donbass conflict is highly controversial – not only in ukraine, but also among external observers. two theses are represented particularly prominent: first, the conflict is characterized as a prime example of a “hybrid war”; secondly, based on the perspective of geopolitics, the war is interpreted as the result of competitive, hegemonic claims of the west and russia. however, both theories operate with a steering and control imperative which reduces the role of local actors and their agendas to dependent variables of great powers (auer, 2015; bezruk, umland, 2015). u. schneckener (2016) claims that the external actors to a much greater extent are driven by local conflict dynamics than both theses would admit. in general, most publications devoted to russianukrainian relations are considered in the context of elitological and institutional approaches. they are determined by the public discourse on this issue in ukraine and to a lesser extent in russia. the analysis reveals a certain vacuum in the sociological diagnosis of the transfer of the interstate relations between russia and ukraine on the public opinion of russians against ukrainians and the neighboring state as a whole. moreover, this kind of research in the youth environment is urgent, since this demographic group lacks the experience of living together with ukrainians in a single state. the youth has a lesser degree of blood-family ties with the population of ukraine and is most susceptible to the manipulative impact of the negative information space about russian-ukrainian relations in the past and present. the authors use the sociological concept of structuralism as the methodological basis of the research. according to this concept, social and cultural phenomena do not have an independent substantial nature, but are determined by their internal structure and system of relations with other phenomena in particular social and cultural systems. the marginal status of the youth as the most surveyed socio-demographic, social and cultural community is the internal structural factor that determines the perception of russian-ukrainian relations by the youth. the modern social and political discourse framing the relations between russia and ukraine act as an external catalyst for the assessments and images. along with the sociological concept of structuralism, the theoretical model of transconflict region is used in the methodology of the study. the authors consider the transconflict region as a non-stationary, unstable regional unit characterized by the destructive internal potential, that is actualized by an external source of conflict (a region with an active conflict). in this case the prefix “trans-“ reflects the immanent feature of such regions: (1) they can dissect the space of regional target units by the formed external conflict area with a significant potential for destruction and disintegration; non-stationary regional entities with increased conflict can appear in this space; and/or (2) they can have the indirect influence on the regional unit, located even beyond the main focus of the conflict (the influence in the form of increased flows of migrants, institutional constraints, barriers, etc.). the transconflict regions have a clear internal structure: a stable core of the conflict (where the main focus of the conflict is 36 anton serikov, andrey bedrik concentrated) and an unstable periphery area that contains the fading conflict impulses (for example, the border region of the southeast of ukraine and the south-west of russia). the concept of the transconflict region determines the geographical boundaries of the study that include the territory of the border subject on the south-western borders of russia – the rostov region. this region is the most close to the zone of armed conflict in the east of donbass. it adopted several tens of thousands of ukrainian refugees in the period of 2014–2016 years. the population of the rostov region traditionally has the extensive family and relative ties with the ukrainian population, the borderline type of language and culture, an ambivalent form of ethno-regional identity, expressed by such endo-and exoethnonym as “khokhol.” the assessments of russian-ukrainian relations by the population of the rostov region is indicativedue to the fact that living in the immediate vicinity of the ukrainian zone of armed conflict, they perceived the events in the donbass not only from the information channels, but also from direct eyewitness account. the empirical basis of the research includes several sources of information: the data of the federal state statistics service of the russian federation, which characterize the national composition of the population of the rostov region according to the results of the 1989, 2002 and 2010 censuses, and the migration dynamics of the population in the region for the period from 2010 till 2016. the data of migration registration and appeals of ukrainian citizens to the migration and social services of the rostov region for the obtaining of the refugee status, material or other assistance from the russian federation. the results of a sociological survey of the youth in the rostov region, conducted in june-august 2017, using a standardized questionnaire interview. the sample size is 950 respondents. only the stationary population of the region aged between 18 and 25 are questioned. the territorial coverage of the sample is rostov-on-don and 8 municipalities of the rostov region. the multistage stratified sample (type of settlement, territory, sex, age, level of education) ensures the representativeness of the research procedures. 3. results in the framework of the study, the respondents were asked about the key issues of russian-ukrainian relations: the causes of the current conflict, the prospects for normalizing the relations, the opportunities for cross-border cultural and economic exchange, the impact of russian-ukrainian relations on the formation of civil-patriotic youth orientations. according to the developed research construct and the results of its approbation, it can be said that the youth evaluations of events that caused a new turn in russian-ukrainian relations are noteworthy. it is significant that 54.9% of the respondents estimate the reunification of crimea with russia as an event that had equally positive and negative consequences. this change in the initial patriotic and pathetic evaluations of reunification of crimea is explained not only and not so much by the consequences of western sanctions policy towards russia, but rather by an awareness of the complexity and scale of the tasks to ensure the transport, food, energy security of the peninsula, and by the changes in the attitudes to the reunification with russia among the residents of crimea. at the same time, 13.4% of the respondents have negative view on the reunification process. it can be explained not only with the decline of the “crimean euphoria” and the pragmatically rational calculation of the crimean reintegration consequences, but also with the influence of the hybrid war that is massively conducted against russia. for most of the respondents, the position of “balanced patriotism” is typical. it means that the respondents understand that the crimean question unites the russian society, that an effective reaction to external pressure is social and economic growth, the solution of structural and institutional problems in the economy, social sphere of life and politics. an important point is that the respondents separate the problems of crimea, as a russian region, from the russian-ukrainian relations. the key aspect here is that the respondents view the crimea as a returned russian territory. this conclusion is consistent with the results of the all-russian study “russian society and challenges of the time”. the youth of the rostov region agree that this event was of great importance for the actualization of patriotic values, the strengthening of faith in the constructive forces of russian society, in the upholding of the right to have independence and sovereignty. in this view, the reunification of the crimea could become a driver of social and socio-cultural modernization, positively influenced the development of the region on the basis of the formation of new directions for economic and cultural cooperation. negative and limiting effect is caused by the skeptical assessment of the situation in the country as a whole (changes for the worse are recognized by 31% of the respondents, and 26.2% note significant changes for the worse). it is obvious that such opinion of young the russian-ukrainian relations in the youth estimates of the boundary region (evidence from the rostov region) 37 people is determined by the grows of the influence of internal challenges related to economic crisis, the fall in living standards and the narrowing of the window of opportunity for young people in the sphere of professional and career facilities (tab. 1). thus, the patriotic impetus given by the reintegration of the crimea, has a certain decline, it is fixed in the idea that “crimea is a russian region and can not be a subject of political bargaining”. in this sense, the youth of the region shares the view on the events of 2014 that prevails in the whole russian society. touching upon the problem of russian-ukrainian relations, which is increasingly being considered in isolation from the problem of the crimea, it can be stated that for the youth of the rostov region, the influence of the ukrainian factor appears only in 2014. it can be explained by the fact that before this period the ukrainian question did not take the priority positions in the sentiments of the younger generation. the increase of the interest in the russian-ukrainian relations was also caused by the information activity, including the internet, real facts of migration from the ukrainian borderland and a sharp reduction in humanitarian (family) contacts. despite the fact that until 2014 the prevailed attitudes in the relations between russians and ukrainians were mainly positive and not leveled by the events of the orange revolution in ukraine in 2004, russia has established a fairly stable assimilation trend in the reproduction of the ukrainian community. thus, in the border rostov region many ukrainians change their ethnic identity in favor of russian identity. it is one of the main sources of demographic increase of russians in the population structure. the number of ukrainians in the post-soviet period decreased, and the results of such cuts were several times higher than the gross regional indicators of negative natural growth and migration outflow. between 1989 and 2002, the number of ukrainians in the population of the rostov region decreased by 33.7% (from 178,803 to 118,486 people), then by another 34.3% and finally in 2010 it reached the amounted of 77,802 people (tab. 2). as a result, ukrainians lost their traditional second position in the ethno-demographic structure of the population of the rostov region, moving to the third place. in general, their demographic reproduction was characterized by the largest negative indicator, both in the rostov region and in other regions in the south of russia. there are several reasons for the intensive assimilation of ukrainians in the rostov region. first is that children born in russian-ukrainian marriage accept russian identity because it is the ethnic majority identity of their region of residence. moreover, the spouses do not perceive such marriages as interethnic due to the fact that the russian language is recognized as the native language of both spouses and also due to the absence of any ethno-cultural distance between them. second reason is thatin soviet times the maintenance of the ukrainian identity, especially in the cross-border, cross-cultural regions, was artificial. it served as an illustration of the soviet ideologeme about the brotherhood and equality of all the peoples of the ussr and the creation of all necessary conditions for preserving and developing their national culture. the deactualization of the ideological factor has become one of the main reasons for the change of the identity. moreover, the very ethnic identity of ukrainians in the south tab. 1. how do you assess the changes occurred in russia over the past three years (2014–2017)? (%) the significant changes for the better have been occurred 2.8 some changes for the better have been occurred 24.6 some changes for the worse have been occurred 31.0 the significant changes for the worse have been occurred 26.2 no changes have been occurred 7.7 notsure 7.7 source: own studies. tab. 2. the dynamics of the number of ukrainians in the population of the south of russia (the results of the 1989, 2002 and 2010 censuses) constituent entity of the russian federation 1989 2002 2010 the krasnodar territory 195,883 131,774 83,746 the stavropol territory 69,189 45,892 30,373 the rostov region 178,803 118,486 77,802 source: official website of the all-russian population census 2010: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/ perepis_itogi1612.htm 38 anton serikov, andrey bedrik of russia was mainly of an assigned type and it was not reproduced by the real ethnocultural practices of everyday level. at the present time, the tendency to reject the ukrainian identity has increased. it is provoked by the modern nature of the international relations development between russia and ukraine and by the retransmission of negative ethnic stereotypes towards ukrainians, ukrainian language and ukrainian national culture in the mass media. according to the results of the monitoring sociological surveys among the population of the rostov region in 2015, 8% of the respondents have negative attitudes to the representatives of ukrainian nationality, while in 2016 the level of ukrainophobia among the population increased to 12%; the results correlate with the all-russian data (11 in 2015 and 14% in 2016). at the same time, the insignificant growth of ukrainophobia allows us to predict the increase of the assimilation trend in the demographic reproduction of ukrainians in the rostov region and in russia as a whole. it is explained by the fact that the level of mass consciousness, ukrainian identity is often associated with the geopolitical orientations of its subjects. the migration factor is one of the factors that strengthen the anti-ukrainian sentiments among the population of the region and in russia as a whole. the wave of stressful migration from ukraine to russia determined the presence of several hundred thousand ukrainian refugees in the russian regions. at the same time, the public opinion trend towards the settlers from the conflict regions of ukraine moved rather quickly from the pole of the need to help the needy former compatriots to a defensive model of the perception of new flows of migrants as the competitors in the labor market, the factor of the deterioration of criminal situation, additional burden for the regional budgets in terms of economic recession. by the end of the active phase of fighting in the donbass (june 2016) in the rostov region more than 25 thousand citizens of ukraine were accommodated, more than 11 thousand of them were employed in the region (tab. 3). the return migration by july 2017 was 32%. the data testifies certain mythologization of the migration factor, which due to the objective parameters is not able to change the situation on the labor market or social sphere in the regionsignificantly. the annual balance of russian-ukrainian migration in the pre-conflict period was about 3.5 thousand people, which did not cause any outbreaks of anti-ukrainian sentiment in the regional society. the modern growth of ukrainian migrant-phobia in the region is caused by a distorted perception of the media’s information tape by the public opinion and occasional experience meeting the ukrainian refugees at the railway stations, social and medical centers. the overwhelming majority of youth respondents (more than 90%) characterize russian-ukrainian relationsas tense and hostile. we can say that the young people do not consider the relations lost, but representing a potential threat to the interests of stability and security of russia (tab. 4). in general, the young russians take a restrained position: they realize that in ukraine the anti-russian government has been established and that the situation in the country is developing according to the tab. 3. the dynamics of the migratory population growth in the south of russia due to the ukrainian citizens in 2012– 2016 years constituent entity of the russian federation 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 the krasnodar territory 1,024 1,003 5,698 8,454 4,167 the stavropol territory 1,069 1,122 4,342 4,465 3,153 the rostov region 1,028 1,443 4,189 6,238 3,874 source: the official statistics of the stavropol territory, the krasnodar territory and the rostov region (2012–2016). tab. 4. how do you assess the current relationship between russia and ukraine? (%) strained relations 50.0 adverserelations 40.8 stand-offrelations 4.9 friendlyrelations 0.0 neighborlyrelations 0.7 goodfellowship 0.0 neutralityrelations 2.9 notsure 0.7 source: own studies. the russian-ukrainian relations in the youth estimates of the boundary region (evidence from the rostov region) 39 negative scenario for the russian-ukrainian relations; young people express sympathy for the donbass inhabitants (45.2%). at the same time, more than 40% do not welcome the violent outcome of the events and would like to reduce the suffering of ordinary people; they believe that russian state structures should pay more attention to the humanitarian aspects (help the refugees from ukraine). at the same time, the level of civic activity, where young people could demonstrate the experience of volunteering, does not exceed 17.6%. the youth, demonstrating support to the state policy of the russian federation in relation to ukraine, is oriented to the sympathetic waiting at the level of humanitarian contacts and in the interpersonal sphere (tab. 5). thus, the respondents are orientedtoward the future normalization of the russian-ukrainian relations; under current conditions they name among the priorities the creating the conditions for the integration of migrants from ukraine into russian society, peaceful outcome of the conflict in the donbass and in general a soft power in influencing the domestic political situation in ukraine (diplomatic, political, economic sanctions). we can state that the youth of the rostov region assesses russian-ukrainian relations within the framework of the consolidated position on the crimean issue. they recognize that the events in ukraine are developing under a negative scenario, express the expectations of the restoring peace and harmony in ukraine, returning to neighborliness relations with russia, preservation and expansion of cooperation with the border donbass region, or as an autonomy within ukraine (15.5%), or as an unrecognized state, (the experience of transnistria). we can say that the state of russian-ukrainian relations is assessed in the context of civil-patriotic feelings, the approval of russian government policy concerning ukraine. at the same time, most of young people are not ready to participate in the implementation of programs for restoring neighborliness and cooperation; they choose the position of symbolic support. according to the research, the young people perceive russian-ukrainian relations through the lens of loyalty as the sphere of responsibility of the state and regional authorities with the approval of the youth. thus, there is a certain gap between civil patriotism, as a public discourse, and the algorithms of everyday activities. noting that the distribution of youth responses demonstrates the absence of significant discrepancies with other age groups, it is possible to identify the accents and meanings typical for young people. first, the negative impact of the conflict in ukraine on certain aspects of life in the rostov region is recognizedin the youth circles (55.6%) (tab. 6). more precisely, it affects the sphere of employment of young people, increasing the competition in the labor market, housing market. this opinion is partly the result of the rumors about the granting of privileges to refugees from ukraine. thus there is a worth noting moment that long-term integration programs for the hosting of compatriots are not being implemented in the region. in addition, for the young residents of the rostov region, there is considerable concern about the growth of crime related to the risks of uncontrolled migration and ammunition trafficking. it is obvious that the conflict in ukraine has a negative impact and in the reduction of ties with european youth structures that under the political pressure began to scrap the programs tab. 5. attitude towards the refugees from ukraine (%) sympathize and ready to help 17.6 sympathize, but the help should be provided by the relevant bodies 35.2 neutral, without sympathy, but without dislike 32.4 with the hostility, it is necessary to restrict their entry to the region 9.2 notsure 5.6 source: own studies. tab. 6. how do you assess the impact of the conflict in ukraine on the development of the rostov region? (%) the rostov region has received a new positive impulse to the development 6.3 these events did not affect the rostov region development 23.3 the conflict in ukraine had a negative impact on certain aspects of life in the rostov region 55.6 the rostov region has been seriously affected by the conflict in ukraine 4.2 notsure 10.6 source: own studies. 40 anton serikov, andrey bedrik of professional and educational cooperation with regional educational structures (table 7). another important factor is the reduction of the opportunities for recreation, for visiting relatives, which is noted by the overwhelming majority of respondents. speaking about the indicators of social tension in the society, the growth of prices for goods and services, we can state the modality of these problems, which little depend on the state of russian-ukrainian relations. granting benefits to graduates of schools in crimea and donbass in the provision of the access to educational resources caused certain tension in 2014–2015. nowadays the source of tension has disappeared and the state of russian-ukrainian relations is perceived as an external systemic challenge that does not have a significant impact on the life strategies of young people. at the same time, young people share the optimistic scenario expectations, if russian-ukrainian relations can not be restored to the full extent, then ukraine will not stay an actor of anti-russian politics. however, the respondents note that the key aspect in solving the ukrainian problem lays in the greater extent outside of ukraine. in this context it is clear that the external forces are interested in maintaining the status of ukraine as an anti-russian state, a constant source of tension on russian borders. 4. discussions in general, the youth of the rostov region assesses the prospects for the normalization of russianukrainian relations very restrainedly. in public perception of russian-ukrainian relations there is a tendency, which can be characterized as the normalization of risks. young people accept the life in a conflict, contradictory world as natural, and that russian society has entered a complicated stage of international development. the future of russianukrainian relations is determined by the extent of solving the internal social and economic problems, leveling the interregional differences, improving the socio-psychological climate in russian society and growing of the institutional trust. we can assume that for young people the prospect of a positive scenario for the development of russian-ukrainian relations is related to the growing prestige and attractiveness of russia as a state with sufficient military and political power, implementing a project of rapid modernization within the framework of integration in the eurasian space. social structures of youth subjectivity in the transboundary conflict region are characterized by the sustainable dispositions, assessing ukraine as the nearest neighbor, but with an independent trajectory of development. in youth social sentiments the stereotypes of a friendly people, “bandera nationalism”, ukrainian “nativism” take an important place. we can state that the schemes for reconciliation of ukraine by the youth are conditioned by the notions of a society, perceived “as a close other”. the fact that russian-ukrainian relations are evaluated by young people in the context of everyday practices forms the condition of static assessments. at the same time, we can say that changes in russian-ukrainian relations have created a new image of ukraine – the state in which an unconstitutional coup took place, anti-russian forces, oriented toward the implementation of the european integration project came to power. from this point of view, the state of russian-ukrainian relations is considered tab. 7. how do you assess the impact of ukrainian conflict on various aspects of life of the population of the rostov region? (%) got better remained unchanged got worse notsure material situation of the rostov region population 2.8 41.5 42.3 13.4 rising of the prices for food products, housing services, etc. 2.1 23.2 62.7 12.0 safety of the population, threats to life and health 8.5 33.8 47.8 9.9 social tension in the society 2.8 23.3 69.0 4.9 labour situation, competition for job positions 5.6 21.1 62.0 11.3 access to regional universities / colleges 4.9 35.9 50.0 9.2 transport and road problems in the region 3.5 57.7 26.1 12.7 crime situation in the region 4.2 42.3 37.3 16.2 property value , possibility for buying / renting a house 4.2 49.4 23.2 23.2 visiting relatives / friends in ukraine 4.9 2.8 76.1 16.2 traveling toukraine 4.2 4.2 81.0 10.6 source: own studies. the russian-ukrainian relations in the youth estimates of the boundary region (evidence from the rostov region) 41 as an external challenge that has negative consequences for the youth. there are several criteria in youth perception of the state and prospects of russian-ukrainian relations. they can be qualified as objective (view on political, socio-political and socio-economic consequences), subjective (influence on personal plans and strategies), symbolic (images of ukraine and ukrainian society). these criteria are important in the occupying of social positions by young people, in their integration into society, in the process of political socialization. the youth of the border region is oriented towards supporting and approving the activity of power structures in the implementation of russian policy in ukraine. we should emphasize that there are differences between the correlation between the socialization process to the russianukrainian problems and the level of youth readiness to become a group of social and civic activity in terms of these events. it is obvious that the events surrounding russian-ukrainian relations have determined the patriotic mobilization of young people, but at the same time, they have not created a field of common interests for coming on board of consolidating the among young people within existing public and political associations. in order to obtain the reliable results, it is necessary to distinguish young people’s evaluations of the changes that have occurred in russia in current terms and the impact of the conflict in ukraine on the development of the border region. it is important for several reasons. first of all, it helps to determine the opinion of young people regarding the development of russian society, which since the mid-1990s has been going in a different scenario in comparison with ukraine. second reason is connected with the understanding that the rostov region, as a border region, is focused to a greater extent on russian-ukrainian relations at the level of local, humanitarian and socio-economic contacts, tightly integrated russian interregional and intra-regional ties. thirdly, the evaluation of russian-ukrainian relations by young people, in comparison with older generations, is not overburden by the memories of soviet heritage and contains actuality and pragmatic meanings. fourth, the attitudes of the youth were affected by the state of “sentimentality” in russian society, which naturally followed the patriotic effect of the reintegration of crimea in 2014. 5. conclusions in light of the foregoing it is possible to make the following conclusions. first, the attitude of the rostov region youth to the russian-ukrainian relations demands studying structural, subjective-pragmatist (motivational and estimated) youth characteristics as sociocultural and socioage group. peculiarity of young people position concerning russian-ukrainian relations fixes lack of influence of the soviet heritage, weak peek into a public discourse of the ukrainian society and shift of ukraine perceptional schemes to the sphere of family related and humanitarian contacts. secondly, status assessment of the russianukrainian relations by youth is characterized as intense or negative that coincides with a position of other age groups and testifies to a position of civil solidarity. the way of youth estimates of a situation in the russian-ukrainian relations is what the emphasis on symbolical loyalty, on approval of the state policy, the regional authorities, but at the same time weak orientation in volunteer initiatives for neutralization of negative consequences of crisis in the russian-ukrainian relations is prolonged. thirdly, the youth of the rostov region is primed in medium-term measurement for normalization of the russian-ukrainian relations; moreover there has been reproduction of the ukraine status as the antirussian state policy from outside the interested external forces. however, it can be said that more opportunities of the russian-ukrainian relations move towards the solution of internal problems, strengthening of political and economic russia sovereignty, possibilities of the effective answer to the policy of economic warfare and 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краснодарстат, краснодар. численность и миграция населения краснодарского края в 2014 году: статистический бюллетень, 2015, краснодарстат, краснодар. численность и миграция населения краснодарского края в 2016 году: статистический бюллетень, 2017, краснодарстат, краснодар. 1. introduction all business enterprises, functions within an environment, called as the business environment (business environment, 2018). the economic environment consists of all external factors in the immediate marketplace and the broader economy. the economic environment of business refers to all economic factors that affect commercial behavior and consumer behavior. these factors can influence a business and define how it operates (what is…, 2018). business environment literature highlights the common aspects of the environment. various studies bring into question internal and external environment and its analysis. l. hamilton and p. webster (2018) consider global business environment in the context of globalization, analyze global industries and common global economy. they also focus on such issues as political, legal, ecological environment and socio-cultural, technological and financial framework. d. campbell and t. craig (2005) mark out external business macroand micro-environment. external business macro-environment includes macro-economic management and political, sociological, technological, ecological, legal and international business environment. i. worthington and changing business environment in belarus olena hrechyshkina (1), maryia samakhavets (2) (1) historical and cultural heritage department, polessky state university, dneprovskoy flotilii, 23, pinsk, 225710, belarus, orcid: 0000-0003-0653-9210 e-mail: l_grechishkina@mail.ru (corresponding author) (2) finance department, polessky state university, dneprovskoy flotilii, 23, pinsk, 225710, belarus, orcid: 0000-0002-4564-2424 e-mail: samkhvec@rambler.ru citation hrechyshkina o., samakhavets m., 2019, changing business environment in belarus, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(1), 1–11. abstract the paper considers the business environment in the context of socio-economic development of the republic of belarus. it is analyzed and evaluated the current state of the belarusian business in terms of various criteria: activity objectives, ownership types, organizational and legal forms, size. in this paper aspects of transformation of property relations and other priorities of macroeconomic environment in the republic of belarus for a long, medium and short term are given. the paper is based on data in the belarusian economy in 2012-2018. the raw data is extracted and processed by authors from the database of the national statistical committee of the republic of belarus. key words business environment, changes, economic development, organizations, enterprises, belarus. received: 14 january 2018 accepted: 12 february 2019 published: 31 march 2019 journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(1), 1–11 doi 10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.01 2 olena hrechyshkina, maryia samakhavets ch. britton (2009) underline that business organization is in constant interaction with its unique and changeable environment. the authors distinguish immediate or operational (suppliers, competitors, financial institutions, etc.) and general or contextual (economic, political, socio-cultural, legal, etc.) environment. m. schiffer and b. weder (2001) come out that smalland medium-scale enterprises are at a disadvantage in comparison with larger firms in economy. so impediments with financing, taxes and regulations, inflation should be prime targets for state policy directed at leveling the playing field. j. paul (2006) demonstrates development of political, investment, social, technological environment on specific examples of indian economy as well as many other countries. the aim of the paper is to analyze changes in the business environment of the republic of belarus in the context of socio-economic development. this paper is based on original analysis of primary data on economic activity in the belarusian economy in the year 2012–2018. the raw data is extracted and processed by the authors from the database of the national statistical committee of the republic of belarus, based on the submitted balance sheets of the belarusian companies. data interpretation is based on a comparative perspective provided by the relevant literature. forecast quantitative indicators and qualitative characteristics are taken from the official documents of national state institutions. international comparisons are based on the world bank data. 2. the economic development priorities of the republic of belarus quantitative indicators and qualitative characteristics of macroeconomic environment, economic and social structure, scientific and technological development, foreign trade, dynamics of production and consumption, level and quality of life, environmental conditions are contained in the national forecast documents of socio-economic development of the republic of belarus, which includes: 1. the concept of the national sustainable development strategy (cnsds) of the republic of belarus for the period until 2035 (long-term perspective) (koncepciâ …, 2018). 2. the national sustainable socio-economic development strategy (nsseds) of the republic of belarus for the period until 2030 (long-term perspective) (nacional’naâ strategiâ…, 2017). 3. the program of socio-economic development of the republic of belarus for 2016–2020 and measures for its implementation (medium-term perspective) (programma…, 2017). 4. the annual forecast (tasks) of socio-economic development of the republic of belarus for 2019 (short-term period). the person as an individual and generator of new ideas (social component), the competitive economy (economic component) and the environment quality (environmental component) are interrelated and complementary components of sustainable development in accordance with the cnsds (koncepciâ…, 2018) and nsseds (nacional’naâ strategiâ…, 2017). the strategic goal of the republic of belarus is to ensure high living standards and conditions for the individual harmonious development based on the transition to a highly efficient economy of knowledge and innovation, while maintaining a favorable environment for future generations. the following tasks will be consistently solved in the economic sphere to achieve this goal: • formation of a highly efficient, socially oriented and competitive knowledge economy; • accelerated development of high-tech industries, industrial innovation clusters and infrastructure sectors of the economy; • creating an effective ownership structure, increasing the efficiency of public administration and growing local initiatives; • expansion of international economic cooperation (with china, the russian federation, the eu); • efficient resource management and reducing of production and consumption waste. the main expected quantitative economic parameters of belarus pursuant to the nsseds are following: gdp growth is 1.5–2.0 times for 2016–2030; gdp per capita based on purchasing power parity is 30–39 thousand usd by 2030; 30th rank in the world bank’s rating «doing business» (nacional’naâ strategiâ…, 2017). the top three economies according to the “doing business-2019” are new zealand, singapore and denmark, which exemplify a business friendly environment. it means that such economies have consistently well designed business regulation or whose regulatory environment has thrived thanks to the comprehensive reform over the years (doing business…, 2019). belarus ranks 37 position of 190 economies according to the “doing business-2019” (tab. 1). the table 1 shows that the republic of belarus has achieved significant success in strengthening its position in the world bank’s «doing business» – from 129 rank in 2006 up to 37 in 2019. such situation was due to the consistent state efforts for improving core changing business environment in belarus 3 areas in doing business according to 10 indicators (tab. 2). in 2015 belarus made paying taxes easier for companies by introducing an electronic system for filing and paying contributions for the obligatory insurance for work accidents and by simplifying the filing requirements for corporate income tax and value added tax (vat). it allowed belarus to improve position in «doing business» from 133 in 2014 up to 60 in 2015. then belarus made starting a business and transferring property simpler. there were great changes in the belarusian business environment in 2017. belarus streamlined the process of obtaining an electricity connection by establishing a one-stop shop at the utility that fulfills all connection-related services, including the design and construction of the distribution line. belarus also made it easier to transfer a property by improving the transparency and reliability of the land administration system. belarus strengthened minority investor protections by introducing remedies in cases where related-party transactions are harmful to the company and requiring greater corporate transparency. as for getting credit in belarus, the credit bureau started to provide credit scores, strengthening the credit reporting system in 2017 and two new decrees that establish a unified collateral registry were adopted in 2018. in 2019 belarus made starting a business easier and made dealing with construction permits easier by streamlining the process at the one-stop shop. belarus still has untapped reserves for further advancement in the rating despite the achieved progress. an important task is to simplify taxation, strengthen access to credit, deal with resolving insolvency, achieving equal competition and ensuring market freedoms for business. strategic priority for the economic development of the republic of belarus becomes a formation of favorable business environment and improvement of institutional environment. it is intended to ensure the stability and transparency of the business environment, to eliminate redundant and to unjustified government intervention in the activities of business entities, improving the quality of public services, financial accessibility, etc. 3. modern business environment in the republic of belarus the belarusian business entities are classified according to various criteria: activity objectives (profit-making and non-profit), ownership types (public, private, foreign), organizational and legal forms (open or closed joint-stock companies, limited liability companies, additional liability companies, unitary enterprises), size (medium, small, micro). tab. 1. ease of doing business ranking of belarus year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 rank 129 110 85 58 68 69 58 63 57 44 37 38 37 source: doing business…, 2019. tab. 2. doing business indicators – ranks of belarus indicator 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 1. starting a business 40 12 31 30 29 2. dealing with construction permits 51 34 28 22 46 3. getting electricity 148 89 24 25 20 4. registering property 3 7 5 5 5 5. getting credit 104 109 101 90 85 6. protecting minority investors 94 57 42 40 51 7. paying taxes 60 63 99 96 99 8. trading across borders 145 29 30 30 25 9. enforcing contracts 7 25 27 24 29 10. resolving insolvency 68 69 69 68 72 source: doing business…, 2019. 4 olena hrechyshkina, maryia samakhavets the authors consider the structure and dynamics of the belarusian organizations in terms of different signs. first of all, it should be noted that total number of business entities increased by 15% from 122,962 units up to 141,418 units accordingly for the period 2012-2018 (tab. 3). in 2013–2014 there was a significant annual growth of 7%, but since 2016 the total number of business entities has been decreasing. in general, these changes are due to the growth of profit-making organizations by 15,428 units (15.45%), although in 2016 and 2018 they decreased in comparison with the previous period. in terms of activity objectives, profit-making organizations dominate in the structure of all organizations and account for 82%. it is logical that profit-making organizations form the basis of the business environment in the republic of belarus, because they create national income by extracting profits as the main goal of their activity. at the same time, non-profit organizations (educational, health care, cultural, and other institutions) determine the human development within the framework of the knowledge economy. in addition they can also carry out business activities within the framework of statutory goals (samohovec, 2017). the study of the dynamics of profit-making organizations (tab. 4) shows that the number of jointstock companies decreased by 7% (by 258 units) in 2018 as compared to 2012 and amounted to 3,782 units, 57.5% of them applied to open joint stock companies. the number of limited liability companies increased significantly (by 67%) and amounted to 57,462 units. the number of additional liability companies and unitary enterprises decreased by 35% and by 9% and amounts to 5,234 units and 45,334 units accordingly. the structure of profit-making organizations has changed significantly during the study period. limited liability companies formed almost half of all profit-making organizations. their share increased by 15.29%. on the contrary, the share of all other organizations decreased: joint-stock companies by 0.79% (3.28% in the structure), additional liability companies – by 3.49% (4.54% in the structure), unitary enterprises – by 10.49% (39.33% in the structure). it is tab. 3. dynamics of the business entities number in the republic of belarus (the data is given on january 1 of the relevant year) indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 total business entities [units] 122,962 131,667 141,897 145,106 141,600 142,610 141,418 basic growth rate [%] – 107.08 115.40 118.01 115.16 115.98 115.01 chain growth rate [%] – 107.08 107.77 102.26 97.58 100.71 99.16 profit-making organizations [units] 99,828 107,761 117,474 119,937 116,190 116,761 115,256 basic growth rate [%] – 107.95 117.68 120.14 116.39 116.96 115.45 chain growth rate [%] – 107.95 109.01 102.10 96.88 100.49 98.71 non-profit organizations [units] 23,134 23,906 24,423 25,169 25,410 25,849 25,162 basic growth rate [%] – 103.34 105.57 108.80 109.84 111.74 108.77 chain growth rate [%] – 103.34 102.16 103.05 100.96 101.73 97.34 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2012–2018. tab. 4. dynamics of profit-making organizations in the republic of belarus (the data is given on january 1 of the relevant year) organizations 2012 2014 2016 2018 units share, % units share, % units share, % units share, % profit-making organizations, total, including 99,828 100.00 117,474 100.00 116,190 100.00 115,256 100.00 joint stock companies 4,067 4.07 4,058 3.45 4,001 3.44 3,782 3.28 open joint stock companies 2,300 2.30 2,272 1.93 2,262 1.95 2,175 1.89 closed joint stock companies 1,767 1.77 1,786 1.52 1,739 1.50 1,607 1.39 limited liability companies 34,507 34.57 45,726 38.92 50,371 43.35 57,462 49.86 additional liability companies 8,021 8.03 6,910 5.88 6,029 5.19 5,234 4.54 unitary enterprises 49,739 49.82 57,242 48.73 52,314 45.02 45,334 39.33 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018. changing business environment in belarus 5 expected a further reduction of unitary enterprises due to their incorporation in the future. the export and major gdp generating enterprises in belarus are mainly represented by open jointstock companies (jsc «belaruskali», jsc «naftan», ojsc «belaz», jsc «minsk automobile plant», etc.). important task for enterprises of this organizational and legal form for the future is to increase their capitalization and to enter into the international capital market through ipo. 4. transformation of ownership relations in the republic of belarus statistics show that the number of public enterprises decreased (from 17,629 units in 2012 to 16,047 units in 2018) while the number of private and foreign enterprises increased, with, as a consequence, of the targeted state actions in transforming ownership relations and expanding private sector activities in the economy. the number of private business entities amounted to 117,742 units in 2018 (16.7% more than in 2012). however, the largest number of private business entities was recorded in 2015 (122,036 units). this number decreased in subsequent years. the number of foreign business entities had a steady upward trend. there were 7,629 units in 2018 (72.5% more than in 2012). this was the highest value for the time period under study. changes in the organization’s structure of various ownership types are clearly presented in fig. 1. the authors consider it is expedient to study the ownership of fixed assets in order to make a conclusion about predominance of private or public capital. according to tab. 5, the share of fixed assets owned by public enterprises decreased by almost 10%, while the share of fixed assets of private business entities increased by 7.93% and foreign ones by 1.63% for the analyzed period. the low share of fixed assets of foreign enterprises testifies to the problems in attracting foreign investment. although the dynamics of this indicator is positive in general, there is the task of formation of transnational corporations on the basis of the belarusian organizations. at the same time, 11.35% of all business entities were public and they hold 44.98% of all fixed assets in 2018. it confirms the concentration and centralization of the public capital in economy. in addition, the public sector has traditionally played a major role in fixed investment and generally has a significant impact to the financial sector development in the country (samohovec, 2016). public enterprises and enterprises with stateowned share provided 76.4% of industrial output (osnovnye pokazateli…, 2018), 36% of exports of goods and 35.8% of exports of services, 60.3% of 14.34% 13.40% 12.09% 11.45% 11.69% 11.48% 11.35% 82.07% 82.64% 83.72% 84.10% 83.75% 83.44% 83.26% 5.39% 5.08% 4.56% 4.45% 4.18% 3.96% 3.60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 public ownership private ownership foreign ownership fig. 1. changes in the organization’s structure of various ownership types in the republic of belarus source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2012–2018. 6 olena hrechyshkina, maryia samakhavets investments in fixed capital at the end of 2017. it indicates the predominance and significant role of public sector in the belarusian economy despite the less public enterprises. at the same time, very important issue is to enhance public sector efficiency and to transform public enterprises into highly profitable assets. key performance indicators are annually determined for public enterprises and joint companies if 50 or more percent of shares belong to the state. but it is not allowed to bring indicators to small and micro-organizations and to organizations with foreign capital. transition to public ownership management based on market principles, formation of systemically linked mechanisms and measures for the privatization of public ownership are becoming priority tasks in the economic environment of the republic of belarus. this is supposed to be carried out through: • realization of a part of liquid enterprises with a state-owned share on the open market when the market conditions are favorable; • privatization of smalland medium-sized public enterprises, focused on investments attraction, production facilities modernization and new working places creation; • transfer (free or at a reduced price) of public enterprises shares to the most active and successful domestic managers. it is planned to increase the transparency of public enterprises, to create a common database of state assets, to publish a comprehensive report with summary performance indicators in public access and to form an integrated monitoring system of public enterprises results. then authors consider the main sectors of the belarusian economy, as well as the number of employees in the context of different ownership types. sectoral structure of enterprises of various ownership types is presented in tab. 6. these data show uneven distribution of private and foreign business entities in the main sectors of the economy. this is due to the interest of business in areas which can provide the tab. 5. ownership of fixed capital (the data is given on january 1 of the relevant year) indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 fixed assets, total [billion rubles] 104.47 143.55 179.05 211.10 242.51 269.80 293.90 including by ownership: public ownership [billion rubles] 56.98 75.47 90.76 99.17 109.69 122.60 132.20 share [%] 54.54 52.57 50.69 46.98 45.23 45.44 44.98 private ownership [billion rubles] 43.68 63.45 82.00 103.80 122.28 134.80 146.20 share [%] 41.81 44.20 45.80 49.17 50.42 49.96 49.74 foreign ownership [billion rubles] 3.81 4.63 6.29 8.13 10.54 12.40 15.50 share [%] 3.65 3.23 3.51 3.85 4.35 4.60 5.27 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2018. tab. 6. sector structure of enterprises of various ownership types in the republic of belarus [%] (the data is given on january 1 of the relevant year) sectors public ownership private ownership foreign ownership total 2012 2015 2018 2012 2015 2018 2012 2015 2018 2012 2015 2018 agriculture, forestry and fisheries 3.59 3.01 3.24 3.96 3.53 3.76 1.27 1.53 1.70 3.81 3.38 3.59 industry 4.14 3.35 2.19 14.30 13.23 12.77 15.31 12.18 12.26 12.88 12.05 11.54 construction 1.83 1.58 1.48 9.04 8.99 8.43 6.53 5.50 4.68 7.91 7.99 7.44 wholesale and retail trade; car and motorcycle repair 0.98 0.81 0.70 38.67 35.60 32.90 45.47 46.17 43.86 33.51 32.09 29.84 others 89.47 91.26 92.40 34.03 38.64 42.14 31.43 34.61 37.50 41.88 44.49 47.59 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2012, 2015, 2018. changing business environment in belarus 7 fast turnover of capital and a high level of income (trade, services). the strategic goal of the belarusian industrial complex development for the period until 2030 is the gradual approximation of the efficiency indicators of industrial production to the average level of the eu countries. as for agriculture, it is the formation of competitive on the world market and environmentally safe agricultural production. let’s analyze allocation of the employed population in the context of public, private and foreign ownership types of enterprises (tab. 7). the number of employees in the public sector decreased by 11.00% in 2017 compared to 2012. at the same time, the share of employees in the private sector remained approximately at the previous level; slight fluctuations were observed (± 1%). absolute and relative quantity of employees of foreign business entities increased. this is associated with an increase of the number of the belarusian enterprises. the belarusian business entities are divided into microorganizations (the average number of employees does not exceed 15 persons), small organizations (from 16 to 100 people), medium-sized organizations (from 101 to 250 people) and large organizations (more than 250 people) in accordance with generally accepted statistical classification which depends on the average number of employees during the calendar year. the following is how small and medium-sized business entities developed in the republic of belarus in 2012–2017 (tab. 8). the number of micro-, small and medium-sized organizations increased to 9,985 units (by 10%) over this period, due to the increase of micro-organizations by 10,172 units (by 11.87%) and reduction of medium-sized organizations by tab. 7. structure of the employed population by ownership types of the belarusian enterprises indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 employed population, total, thousand people 4612.10 4578.40 4550.50 4496.00 4405.70 4353.60 including by ownership public ownership, thousand people 1965.00 1879.40 1771.60 1765.30 1769.70 1744.70 share [%] 42.61 41.05 38.93 39.26 40.17 40.07 private ownership, thousand people 2538.50 2566.10 2631.80 2576.60 2478.60 2437.30 share [%] 55.04 56.05 57.84 57.31 56.26 55.98 mixed ownership without foreign participation, thousand people 880.90 858.70 857.60 833.70 807.10 767.20 share [%] 19.10 18.76 18.85 18.54 18.32 17.62 mixed ownership with foreign participation, thousand people 278.90 308.80 314.00 301.60 281.30 275.70 share [%] 6.05 6.74 6.90 6.71 6.38 6.33 foreign ownership, thousand people 108.6 132.9 147.1 154.1 157.4 171.6 share [%] 2.35 2.90 3.23 3.43 3.57 3.94 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2018. tab. 8. dynamics and structure of small and medium-sized business entities in the republic of belarus indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 number of micro, small and medium organizations, units 99,986 111,112 114,208 107,441 107,382 109,971 medium-sized organizations 2,542 2,423 2,416 2,394 2,315 2,245 share [%] 2.54 2.18 2.12 2.23 2.16 2.04 microand small organizations 97,444 108,689 111,792 105,047 105,067 107,726 share [%] 97.46 97.82 97.88 97.77 97.84 97.96 microorganizations 85,682 96,858 99,368 92,684 93,288 95,854 share [%] 85.69 87.17 87.01 86.27 86.87 87.16 small organizations 11,762 11,831 12,424 12,363 11,779 11,872 share [%] 11.76 10.65 10.88 11.51 10.97 10.80 individual entrepreneurs, people 232,851 248,546 248,952 240,781 235,995 236,138 source: own study based on maloe i srednee…, 2018. 8 olena hrechyshkina, maryia samakhavets 297 units (by 11.68%). the number of small organizations and individual entrepreneurs was maintained at about the same level. there have been no significant changes in the structure of organizations. the contribution of small and medium-sized organizations to gdp of the republic of belarus remained approximately at the same level from 20% to 22% for the analyzed period of time. minor fluctuations were associated with market conditions, both domestically and internationally. the share of small and medium-sized organizations in the country’s gdp accounted for 21.6%, incl. the share of mediumsized organizations was 6.7%, micro-organizations 6.2%, small organizations 8.7% in 2017. the share of individual entrepreneurs in gdp amounted to 3.1% in 2017. small and medium-sized organizations will be turned into a significant development factor of the belarusian business environment. it is provided to increase the share of gross value added (gva) of tab. 9. dynamics and structure of gdp and gva in the republic of belarus indicators 2012 2014 2016 2017 million rubles share in gdp [%] million rubles share in gdp [%] million rubles share in gdp [%] million rubles share in gdp [%] gross domestic product (gdp) 54761.67 100.00 80579.27 100.00 94949.00 100.00 105199.00 100.00 including: gross value added (gva), including: 48029.35 87.71 71179.15 88.33 82013.80 86.38 91357.70 86.84 industrial sector 24321.53 44.41 34392.93 42.68 35941.70 37.85 41974.50 39.90 agriculture, forestry and fisheries 4452.64 8.13 5884.75 7.30 6547.00 6.90 8174.90 7.77 mining industry 536.30 0.98 546.96 0.68 597.60 0.63 728.90 0.69 manufacturing industry 13571.54 24.78 16992.19 21.09 19134.30 20.15 23376.90 22.22 supply of electricity, gas, steam, hot water and air conditioning 1401.05 2.56 2050.48 2.54 3585.70 3.78 3399.60 3.23 water supply; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; pollution abatement 342.49 0.63 580.79 0.72 683.20 0.72 773.70 0.74 construction 4017.51 7.34 8337.76 10.35 5393.90 5.68 5520.50 5.25 service sector 23707.82 43.29 36786.22 45.65 46072.10 48.52 49383.20 46.94 wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 7470.64 13.64 9805.48 12.17 10416.30 10.97 10243.60 9.74 transport, warehousing, postal and courier activities 3242.39 5.92 4589.04 5.70 5410.80 5.70 6066.40 5.77 temporary accommodation and food services 396.64 0.72 734.77 0.91 807.30 0.85 878.60 0.84 information and communication 1333.18 2.43 2564.75 3.18 4606.80 4.85 5309.40 5.05 financial and insurance activities 1849.59 3.38 2602.92 3.23 3872.50 4.08 4088.80 3.89 real estate operations 1744.90 3.19 3887.11 4.82 5373.00 5.66 5939.50 5.65 professional, scientific and technical activities 1002.82 1.83 2049.20 2.54 2598.70 2.74 2894.30 2.75 activities in the field of administrative and support services 516.16 0.94 923.62 1.15 936.80 0.99 1262.40 1.20 public administration 1595.67 2.91 2716.70 3.37 3340.00 3.52 3402.30 3.23 education 2094.17 3.82 3262.29 4.05 3923.20 4.13 4157.10 3.95 health and social services 1569.15 2.87 2482.13 3.08 3318.70 3.50 3463.20 3.29 creativity, sports, entertainment and recreation 606.15 1.11 694.91 0.86 856.90 0.90 986.50 0.94 other services 286.36 0.52 473.30 0.59 611.10 0.64 691.10 0.66 net taxes on products 6732.32 12.29 9400.12 11.67 12935.20 13.62 13841.30 13.16 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …., 2018. changing business environment in belarus 9 micro-organizations, small and medium-sized organizations in the total gdp from 20–22% (without individual entrepreneurs, with individual entrepreneurs – 23%) nowadays to 50% in 2030. it is necessary to improve the institutional environment of entrepreneurship development through constructive dialogue between government and business (kalіnesku et al., 2012) to provide business self-organization and self-regulation, to increase the financial resources availability, to simplify administrative tax procedures, to eliminate excessive and unjustified state interference to business management, to form an integrated educational system in the field of entrepreneurship. 5. forecast of economic development of the republic of belarus in general, economic development of the republic of belarus was rather unstable in 2012–2018 with relatively low rates of annual gdp growth (about 1%) and economic decline in 2015–2016. however, in the last two years, it has reached the trajectory of the average european gdp growth rates (2.4% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018). in the process of assessing and planning socioeconomic development of the country, the structure and location of production should be taken into account. this shows the state of a social division of labor. the management of sectoral and territorial structures should be directed at business entities; there should be interest in the most effective socioeconomic development of personnel. in turn, the development of industries and territories (regions), their competitiveness are based on the capabilities of enterprises, their ability to jointly form and implement a development strategy, drawing to this the best intellectual, technical, financial and other resources; use them rationally (kalіnesku, grečiškina, 2009). assessment of the dynamics and structure of the belarusian gdp (tab. 9) shows that gva provides 86– 88% of gdp during the analyzed period and 86.84% in 2017. industrial sector had a positive development dynamics for 2012–2017 years but its share in gva and gdp was gradually declining, while the share of the service sector was increasing. in the industrial sector the most important types of economic activity were manufacturing, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, construction (35.24% of gdp in total in 2017). there were wholesale and retail trade, car and motorcycle repair, transportation, warehousing, postal and courier activities, information and communications, real estate operations (26.2% of gdp in total in 2017) in the services sector. fig. 2 shows a comparison of the belarusian gdp per capita at purchasing power parity (ppp) with 0 5 000 10 000 15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000 35 000 40 000 45 000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 armenia belarus european union kazakhstan kyrgyz republic poland russian federation czech republic fig. 2. gdp per capita based on purchasing power parity (current international $) source: own study based on gdp per capita …, 2018. 10 olena hrechyshkina, maryia samakhavets some countries. in belarus this indicator increased from 6.5 thousand dollars usa in 2010 up to 18.9 thousand dollars usa in 2018. belarus ranks 4th among the eaeu countries (armenia, belarus, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, the russian federation) in this indicator, but significantly lags behind european countries. for example, gdp per capita at ppp is 29.1 thousand dollars usa in poland, 36.3 thousand dollars usa in the czech republic, 41.2 thousand dollars usa in the eu on the whole. therefore, the main task is to ensure sustainable economic growth in belarus. this one founds a reflection in the state policy documents. it is projected to increase gdp per capita to 28-36 thousand dollars usa at ppp in 2030 and gdp growth by 1.8 times for 2021–2035, including by 1.3 times in 2021–2025 and by 1.4 times in 2026–2035 (koncepciâ …, 2018) in order to implement the goals of sustainable socioeconomic development of the republic of belarus (nacional’naâ strategiâ…, 2017) (tab. 10). 6. conclusion the paper discusses the current state of belarusian business environment within the framework of socio-economic development forecast for short, medium and long term. the main economic goal of sustainable development of the republic of belarus is transition to highly efficient competitive economy of knowledge and innovation. the priority for the belarusian economic development becomes a formation of favorable business environment. belarus ranks 37 position of 190 economies according to the “doing business-2019” but 30th rank in this rating is one of the expected economic parameters of belarus by 2030. it is analyzed and evaluated the current state of the belarusian business in terms of various criteria: activity objectives, ownership types, organizational and legal forms, size. the total number of business entities in belarus is 141,418 units and it increased by 15% for the period 2012-2018. the number of micro-, small and medium-sized business entities increased by 10% and there were no significant changes in the structure of this organizations. profit-making organizations dominated and accounted for 82% in the structure of all organizations in terms of activity objectives. limited liability companies formed 49.86% of profit-making organizations and unitary enterprises – 39.33%. the number of private and foreign enterprises increased but 11.35% public enterprises (according to the organization’s structure of various ownership types) hold 44.98% of all fixed assets in 2018. it indicates the dominant role of public sector in the belarusian economy. sectoral structure of belarusian enterprises shows that almost 30% of them were related to  wholesale and retail trade, car and motorcycle repair. this represents a business interest in service areas with high level of income. structure of the employed population of the belarusian enterprises indicates that 55.98% were employed in the private ownership business. it is planned to ensure the multistructural market relations in the economic sphere, to develop private initiative and entrepreneurship, to accelerate innovation and investment processes, to develop competition. such changes will create stable preconditions for economic growth and efficiency of the belarusian economy. modern business environment should be «barrier-free» for functioning of all business entities regardless of ownership, size, organizational and legal form as a result of the ownership relations reforms. consequently, it is necessary to ensure equal conditions for business functioning. the worthy image of entrepreneurs, the growth of business culture level, the partnerships and cooperation of small, medium-sized and large organizations must be the rule of favorable business environment in belarus. belarusian gdp per capita at ppp increased from 6.5 thousand dollars usa in 2010 up to 18.9 thousand dollars usa in 2018. gva provides more than 80% of belarusian gdp. it is projected to increase belarusian gdp per capita at ppp to 28-36 thousand dollars usa in 2030 and gdp growth by 1.8 times for 2021–2035. the authors emphasize that it is possible tab. 10. key forecast indicators of economic development of the republic of belarus indicators actual values (in % of the previous year) forecast predicted values (for the five years) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2016-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030 2031-2035 gdp growth rate [%] 97.5 102.5 103.0 104.0 112.2 125.6 120.2 117.6 labor productivity growth rate [%] 99.5 103.6 103.6 103.8 115.7 126.6 121.0 121.2 growth rate of investment in fixed assets [%] 82.6 105.1 105.1 111.3 104.1 130.2 126.0 122.4 source: own study based on statističeskij ežegodnik …, 2018; koncepciâ…, 2018; programma social’no-èkonomičeskogo…, 2017. changing 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belarus’, minsk. statističeskij ežegodnik 2018 (eng. statistical yearbook 2018), 2018, nacional’nyj statističeskij komitet respubliki belarus’, minsk. what is the economic environment? definition and examples, 2018, market business news, https:// marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/economicenvironment/ (accessed 10 january 2019). worthington i, britton c., 2009, the business environment, financial times / prentice hall, harlow. 1. introduction ukraine has been going through the process of depopulation for some time; it was caused with significant reduction in fertility and essential migration losses of reproductive cohorts that lasted almost a century. western region that was occupied by ussr three decades later, didn’t suffer such big demographic losses as the other oblasts of ukraine. besides, slower rates and scale of industrialization and high level of religiousness of the population facilitated in preservation of big family traditions. as a result specific characteristics of human potential of the western region were saved. borderland territories due to their geographical positions and closer communication with neighboring countries even during the period of closed border had more social influence from the west, which formed specific model of demographic behavior and reflected in different features of the human potential. the category of human potential was developed in economic science and conceptually was related with categories of human capital, labor potential, human resources, and labor force (prybyszewski, 2007; cтефанишин, 2006). in the wide sociological aspect human potential consists of the several potentials – demo-reproductive, labor, social and educational, intellectual and spiritual potentials. human potential of agrarian, industrial and post-industrial society is distinguished in the economic context; other specific forms of economic system functionally are also distinguished. in the social geography human journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 17–23 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.011.6627 human potential of the western ukrainian borderland iryna hudzelyak (1), iryna vanda (2) (1) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: ihudzelyak@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: iryna.vanda@yahoo.com citation hudzelyak i., vanda i., 2017, human potential of the western ukrainian borderland, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 17–23. abstract this article contains the analysis made with the help of generalized quantative parameters, which shows the tendencies of human potential formation of the western ukrainian borderland during 2001–2016. the changes of number of urban and rural population in eighteen borderland rayons in volyn, lviv and zakarpattia oblasts are evaluated. the tendencies of urbanization processes and resettlement of rural population are described. spatial differences of age structure of urban and rural population are characterized. key words western ukrainian borderland, human potential, population, depopulation, aging of population. 18 iryna hudzelyak, iryna vanda potential is considered as combined characteristic of the resources attached to the place and time. potential represents: firstly, past tendencies, that is totality of features that appear in the system during the process of development; secondly, it is characterized with modern parameters revealing resources that may be used in the future; thirdly, category of the potential is oriented to the features and tendencies that will be revealed in the process of further development. specific quantative and qualitative characteristics of the human potential may contain different list of indicators that depends on the goal of particular scientific research. some aspects of the development of population of bordering territories are studied in works by l.  rudenko, o.  khomra, g.  starostenko (pуденко et al., 1995, 1996), w.  pantylej (2005, 2015), m.  flaga (2006), n.  pryciuk (прицюк, 2007). the aim of our research is clarification of modern general features of human potential of the western ukrainian borderland. 2. spatial and time aspects of the research elaborated by authors maps and conclusions, presented in the article, are based on official data of state statistics service of ukraine dated 5.12.2001 (census of population, всеукраїнський перепис населення україни 2001 року) and 1.01.2016 (estimated data, населення україни). the analysis of demographic development from the middle of the xxth century shows that in 2000–2001 ukraine had gone through the most critical period of extremely high level of depopulation as a result of the lowest level of fertility in its history. that is why, this time interval allows us to make adequate conclusions about modern tendencies of formation of human potential of the western ukrainian borderland, which includes 18 administrative rayons of volyn, lviv and zakarpattia oblasts, which border with poland, slovakia, hungary and romania (fig. 1-b). this territory is 20075 km2, and almost the whole area is occupied with regime of local border traffic. it lies within the plain and mountain massifs of different nature-geographic zones which significantly differentiate conditions of population resettlement. in settlement system of ukraine they are peripheral territories: distance between kiev – the capital of state – and chop is 829 km, distance between kiev and yagodyn is 510 km. 3. the features of population resettlement in general, 1650.6 thousand of people, or 3.9% of the country population live in western ukrainian borderland (tab. 1). it is very densely inhabited territory, which concentrates 34.1% of population of three oblasts. the demographic weight of border rises: in 2001 33.8% of the population of three oblasts lived here. tab. 1. the main indicators of human potential of the western ukrainian borderland, 2016 indicators western ukrainian borderland border areas volyn oblast lviv oblast zakarpattia oblast number of population, inhabitants 1 650 600 211 167 594 815 844 616 rate of changes of population numbers, 2016/2001,% 98.3 94.8 96.8 100.2 urban 99.9 99.4 100.9 99.2 rural 97.1 88.9 93.8 100.9 level of urbanization, % 42.9 59.1 43.1 38.7 rate of change of urbanization level, 2016/2001, % 101.7 104.9 104.4 99.0 density of rural population, inhabitants per km2 46.9 21.8 43.9 61.6 average population of rural settlement, inhabitants 748 371 499 1483 density of rural settlement network, per 1000 km2 63 59 88 42 share of population, in age 65 and over, % 12.5 14.1 13.7 11.3 urban 11.8 12.9 12.0 11.1 rural 13.1 15.9 14.9 11.4 share of population in age 0–15, % 19.9 18.6 18.7 21.0 urban 19.1 17.5 17.9 20.6 rural 20.4 20.2 19.3 21.6 source: own calculation based on всеукраїнський перепис населення україни 2001 року, населення україни. human potential of the western ukrainian borderland 19 most of the population of western ukrainian borderland is rural inhabitants. average density of the rural population is 46.9 inhabitants per km2, which is twice bigger than average ukrainian level. the highest density of rural population is in plain areas of zakarpattia, and the lowest density is in volyn borderland (fig. 1-a). the character of rural settlement is caused with natural geographical peculiarities of the territory. zakarpattia is marked with domination of big villages – average population of the rural settlement is 1483 inhabitants. in lviv borderland the level of concentration of rural population is almost three times lower – 499 inhabitants. volyn borderland is characterized with even less average population of villages – only 371 inhabitants. features of reliefs and landscapes directly define the density of the settlement network. in general there are 42 villages for every 1000 km2 in borderland of zakarpattia oblast. mostly there are no natural barriers between the bordering line and rural territory, the border for inhabitants of these villages is open, and density of resettlement in the neighboring country hungary is high. in the mountain area the border stretches over the forest complexes, the by numbers at fig. 1–в are marked western-ukrainian borderland rayons: 1 – shatskyy, 2 – liubomlskyy, 3 – volodymyrvolynskyy, 4 – ivanychivskyy, 5 – sokalskyy, 6 – zhovkivskyy, 7 – yavorivskyy, 8 – mostyskyy, 9 – starosambirskyy, 10 – turkivskyy, 11 – velykobereznianskyy, 12 – perechynskyy, 13 – uzhhorodskyy, 14 – berehivskyy, 15 – vynohradivskyy, 16 – khustskyy, 17 – tiachivskyy, 18 – rakhivskyy. fig. 1. population of the western ukrainian borderland source: own calculation and mapping based on всеукраїнський перепис населення україни 2001 року, населення україни. 20 iryna hudzelyak, iryna vanda access is very difficult for inhabitants of adjacent villages due to orographic factors. similar conditions had formed in volyn borderland, that is to north from volodymyr-volynskyy, where only 8 villages adjoin the bordering line of almost 100 km long in the forest area. as a result they have mental closeness; orientation on tight social contacts with foreign countries is much higher in plain areas of lviv and zakarpattia borderslands. in general there are 59 villages for every 1000 km2 in four bordering administrative rayons in volyn oblast. density of rural settlement network is the highest in lviv oblast – 88 villages for every 1000 km2 (fig. 2-a). urbanization level in the western ukrainian borderland is 42.9% (fig. 2-b). thanks to migration growth the part of urban population during the period of research had been increasing in volyn and lviv borderland. concentration of the population in urban settlements intensifies in velykobereznianskyy, mostyskyy, yavorivskyy, zhovkivskyy, ivanychivskyy and liubomlskyy rayons (fig. 2-c). at the same time urbanization had declined in perechynskyy, khustskyy and berehivskyy rayons where natural increase in villages turned out to be higher than general increase of urban population. name of rayons are noted at fig. 1-b urban population lives in 58 settlements including 29 towns. among them only uzhhorod belongs to the category of big cities (115.2 thousand people), chervonograd (67.5) and novovolynsk (53.0) belong to average cities. among 26 small towns 14 of them do not reach 10 thousand citizens – legally established criteria of population for the city. most of the urban population (66.7%) live in small towns, which in many ways (ekistic, socio-economic, demographic) are similar to big country settlements, so there are no essential differences in the conditions of recreation of human potential. there are 17% of citizens in the average town, 16.3% of urban population live in uzhhorod. 4. dynamic of population of the western ukrainian borderland there is depopulation in the most of rayons of the western ukrainian borderland. during 2001–2016 the rate of reduction in border areas in average was 98.3%, though depopulation was slower than in general in three bordering oblasts and significantly slower than in general in ukraine, where decline was 92.3%. the most rapid depopulation were in borderland in volyn oblast – 94.8%, when in zakarpattia oblast population increase was 100.2%. the highest temps of reduction were in mostyskyy, liubomlskyy, shatskyy, and mountain fig. 2. main indicators of population settlement of western ukrainian borderland source: own calculation and mapping based on всеукраїнський перепис населення україни 2001 року, населення україни. human potential of the western ukrainian borderland 21 turkivskyy rayons (fig. 1-b). the zakarpattia borderland, except mountain perechynskyy, velykobereznianskyy and berehivskyy rayons, is characterized with insignificant increase of population, that first of all is provided with prevalence of birth over death. most of the border town settlements are declining in population. there is especially rapid decline of population in former industrial centers which gradually are losing their industrial functions without appearance of new economic activity, such cities as chervonograd, yavoriv, sokal, volodymyr-volynskyy, tiachiv, khust, solotvyno. significant decline of the population can be seen in berehove, the percentage of hungarian population is very high (48%), and apparently migration losses are related with emigration to hungary thanks to preserved family bounds. the influence of “hungarian factor” is well recognized in berehivskyy rayon, it is widely spread for ukrainian citizens to get hungarian passports and practically to get double citizenship. depopulation is peculiar to those small urban settlements that lie directly near the border and due to internal regional periferalism is characterized with backwardness of infrastructure (social, transport, industrial): shatsk, uhniv, belz, dobromyl’, khyriv, nyzhankovychi, stara sil’, nemyriv, velykyy bychkiv. most of the cities of this group are located in lviv region. lviv is multifunctional and has almost a million population, for many decades it dragged human resources away from provincial settlements. the third group of urban settlements, which population is declining – are small mountain towns (up to 10 thousand of inhabitants), which due to natural and economic geographical locations are relatively isolated from large economic cores (centers) and international streams and are underdeveloped: turka, perechyn. depopulation is also peculiar to the only oblast center – uzhhorod, which is located 3–4 km from the border. it is the smallest by number of population oblast center in ukraine. its population, like in other administrative centers, is declining due to natural decline, which is the result of a new european model of reproductive behavior, in which it is characteristic to bear less children, get married in more adult age than they do in villages, marriages are less strong, high level of divorces, domination of nuclear families, where the role of grandparents in bringing up the children is minimum. in the villages, especially in zakarpattia and volyn oblasts, there is still higher level of fertility due to preservation of traditional family ways of life. there are certain cities in the western ukrainian borderland, which are marked with increase of population. firstly, they are the cities located near the international border crossing poins; they have new border functions, which are actively developing: rava-rus’ka, mostys’ka, chop, batiovo. the catalyzer of their further increase will be the realization of the projects of creation of international transport corridors. secondly, increase is inherent to the cities and towns that have suitable border geographical location and functionally tend to the region center, that is lviv: novoyavorivsk, zhovkva, dubliany, ivanofrankove, kulykiv, and also urban type settlement serednie, that is located in the zone of influence of uzhhorod. increase is also peculiar for several rayon centers and towns, which infrastructure positively contrasts with neighboring rural territories: liuboml’, velyki mosty, zhvyrka, mageriv, staryi sambir, velykyy bereznyy, dubove, korolevo, vyshkovo, teresva, bushtyno, ust’-chorna, kobylets’ka poliana. nationwide tendencies of rapid depopulation of rural population are peculiar to the bordering areas, comparing with urban population, which is connected first of all with significant migration losses of reproductive cohorts of rural settlements for many decades of xx–xxi centuries. during 2001–2016 the rate of decline of rural population of the western ukrainian borderland was 97.1% (in ukraine – 94.4), of urban population – only 99.9 (in ukraine – 94.6). rural population is declining with the highest speed in the area in volyn oblast – 89.6%, in lviv oblast – 93.8%, and in zakarpattia oblast there is increase of the population – 100.9%. depletion of the demographic potential of rural locality is connected with industrialization processes: lviv and industrial centers of lviv-volyn coal basin were attracting migrants from all western region, especially from provincial and bordering areas. transformation of border functions from closed into open border made positive impulse for development first of all of urban settlements, migration losses of bordering villages had declined, new migration streams had been planning (village → border city, rayon center), which as a result defined increase of the share of border rayons in the population of border oblasts. such tendencies are not peculiar to other borderlands of ukraine. 5. differences of population age structure in the western ukrainian borderland the population in the western ukrainian borderland is characterized with more young age structure – 12.5% of people older than 65 years, against 15.9% in general in ukraine. the share of children population is 19.9% against 15.2% in ukraine. name of rayons are noted at fig. 1-b the oldest population is in ivanychivskyy (without novovolynsk), starosambirskyy and turkivskyy 22 iryna hudzelyak, iryna vanda rayons. these rayons have also the smallest share of the children population, except turkivskyy, which with yavorivskyy rayons have the highest fertility level in lviv oblast (fig. 3-a, 3-b). the rapid aging of the population in these areas is caused with migration losses of the working age population. zakarpattia borderland has the most favorable age structure: there is high share of children population, especially in rakhivskyy, vynohradivskyy and perechynskyy rayons, and also the lowest level of demographic aging. peculiarity of zakarpattia borderland is an older age structure of population in the cities (except uzhhorod), while in lviv and volyn oblasts the situation is contrary, the level of aging is higher in villages. volyn borderland, particularly volodymyr-volynskyy, liubomlskyy and shatskyy rayons due to high fertility are marked with higher level of children population; however lack of sufficient number of workplaces leads to outflow of labor resources potential, which defines quite a high level of population aging. calculated demographic dependency ratio of the people of working age (16–59 years) demonstrates significant spatial differences in the western ukrainian borderland. there is high demographic dependency ratio in urban settlements of zakarpattia oblast and turkivskyy rayon (fig. 3-c). it is caused with more favorable rates of natural reproduction. demographic dependency ratio is lower in urban settlements in ukrainian-polish borderland, it is due to lower share both children and elderly people. demographic dependency ratios of rural population do not differ much in the borderland. 6. conclusions human potential of the western ukrainian borderland is characterized by specific tendencies of its formation which are totally different from those found in the northern and eastern borderland areas of ukraine. however, ukrainian-polish, ukrainian-hungarian and ukrainian-romanian borderland differentiate on a number of key parameters that describe human potential: 1. the processes of natural reproduction of population indicate to better quantitative parameters of human potential in zakarpattia oblast and possibilities for population growth. there is the most concentrating form of rural settlement, which is characterized with favorable demographic tendencies, the lowest level of demographic aging, and the highest share of children and general fig. 3. age structure of the population in the western ukrainian borderland, 2016 source: own calculation and mapping based on населення україни. human potential of the western ukrainian borderland 23 increase of population. depopulation is appearing in the urban settlements in the borderland, though its rates are the lowest. the level of urbanization is declining. 2. despite the fact that there is more favorable demographic situation in volyn oblast on the background of nationwide indicators, borderland rayons are marked with extremely unfavorable tendencies. there are the highest rates of depopulation of rural areas, very high level of aging of rural population with sufficiently big share of children, considerable migration outflow of working age cohorts. at the same time there is the highest level of aging of urban population and the lowest share of children. the highest rates of reallocation of the population between rural and urban areas were defined. 3. in the borderland rayons of lviv oblast there are more favorable conditions of formation of the population age structure and reproduction of human potential in urban settlements, their population is growing and the level of urbanization is increasing. 4. positive tendencies of human potential formation of the western ukrainian borderland on the background of nationwide tendencies can be intensified with the help of involvement of investments in creation of new industrial enterprises in processing of the local raw materials in small and average towns, which will lead to significant activation of agricultural sector in rural area and will hold the outflow of the working age population. references flaga m., 2006, procesy demograficzne oraz ich uwarunkowania w zachodnich obwodach ukrainy w okresie przemian ustrojowych, wyd. umcs, lublin. pantylej w., 2005, pogranicze polsko-ukraińske. środowisko. społeczeństwo. gospodarka, wszia, zamość. pantylej w., 2015, przemiany demograficzne na obszarze euroregionu bug w latach 2003-2013, analizy statystyczne, urząd statystyczny w lublinie, lublin. przybyszewski r., 2007, kapitał ludzki w procesie kształtowania gospodarki opartej na wiedzy, difin, warszawa. всеукраїнський перепис населення україни 2001 року. публікації, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/publications/ [20.01.2017]. населення україни. банк даних, http://database.ukrcensus. gov.ua/mult/dialog/statfile_c.asp [20.01.2017]. прицюк н., 2007, демогеографічна ситуація західноукраїнського пограниччя, видавничий центр лну імені івана франка, львів. руденко л.г., хомра о.у., старостенко г.г., 1995, відтворення населення прикордонних районів україни: територіальний аспект, український географічний журнал, 4, 12–20. руденко л.г., хомра о.у., старостенко г.г., 1996, трудова маятникова міграція населення прикордонних районів україни, український географічний журнал, 4, 42–48. стефанишин о., 2006, людський потенціал економіки україни, видавничий центр лну імені івана франка, львів. 1. introduction logistics has a distinct geographical component, which manifests itself through the concept of flows, junctions and networks within a supply chain (rodrigue (ed.), 2013). analysis of logistic activities in a region and assessment of these activities’ potential is a subject of study of human geography. in recent years, there was a number of research papers that explore the logistic aspect of economic activity in a region, the logistic potential of a region in particular. some authors understand the logistic potential in a region as “the possibility of a regional system to ensure optimal parameters of economic flows in space and time, which are formed as the result of application of logistic management methods” (коблянська et al., 2015, p. 26). also, these authors propose a quantitative assessment of the logistic potential of a region, which is proportional to the mean-square value of the input parameters, but this approach is not justified. logistic inputs are natural, financial and informational resources; logistic outputs are competitive advantage, time and space utility, effective delivery to consumers, etc. (сток, ламберт, 2005). potential as a functional and resource characteristic signifies the ability of a resource to ensure the performance of certain functions. the measure of such potential journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 81–86 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.018.6634 transport and logistic potential of the western ukrainian borderland volodymyr hrytsevych (1), mariana senkiv (2) (1) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail:gvsmg@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: m.senkiv@lnu.edu.ua citation hrytsevych v., senkiv m., 2017, transport and logistic potential of the western ukrainian borderland, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 81–86. abstract arrangement of logistic companies over oblasts of the western ukrainian borderland is studied and characterised. main logistic centers within the oblasts are singled out. availability of subjects of transportation and distributional logistics is studied. railway and automobile networks are comprehensively assessed. capacity and peculiarities of railway and automobile freight traffic flows are studied. customs posts and crossing points at western ukrainian state border are described. methods of numerical evaluation of transport and logistic potential index for borderland oblasts are suggested and index values for the western ukrainian borderland oblasts are calculated. numerical evaluation of transport and logistic index is conducted. key words transport, logistics, western ukrainian borderland, freight traffic flow, index, potential. 82 volodymyr hrytsevych, mariana senkiv has multiplicative nature and includes the capacity of a resource as well as its functional output (грицевич, 1999). the basis of logistic potential is transport infrastructure (ібрагімхалілова, 2011). consequently, transport and logistic potential is a multiplicative characteristic of the transport and logistic infrastructure of a region, carried out with regard to business entities activity. it is therefore advisable to evaluate numerical measure of such potential as the sum of products of resource (factor) attributes and functional (resulting) attributes, wherein significant coefficients of these products are correspondent coefficients of correlation for account of real impact of resource attributes on functional ones. 2. subjects of logistic activity the largest number of logistic companies in the western ukrainian borderland is focused on major international transport routes, particularly in lviv and in the cities of rivne and lutsk. in the volyn oblast, except lutsk, the following logistic centers are singled out: the cities of kovel, novovolynsk, liuboml, ustylug and others. in the zakarpattia oblast the next logistic centers can be identified: uzhhorod (the largest logistic center), mukacheve, khust, irshava, svaliava, berehove and others. the largest logistic centers in ivano-frankivsk oblast are the cities of ivano-frankivsk, kalush, dolyna and others. in the lviv oblast, except lviv, there are such logistic centers as the cities of drohobych, chervonograd, horodok, zhovkva, stryi and others. in the rivne oblast logistic centers are the cities of rivne, zdolbuniv, dubno, kostopil and others. in the chernivtsi oblast logistic centers as the cities of chernivtsi, storozhynets, khotyn and others are singled out (грицевич, сеньків, 2015). the largest number of companies engaged in automobile freight transportation is in the lviv, rivne, zakarpattia and volyn oblasts. the lviv and volyn oblasts are distinguished by the number of companies providing services of the freight transportation. the largest number of companies providing forwarding services is in the lviv, rivne and zakarpattia oblasts. the largest number of companies providing storage services are in the lviv, volyn and zakarpattia oblasts. the lviv and rivne oblasts are distinguished by the number of companies engaged in multimodal transportation, in freight railway transportation – the lviv, rivne and volyn oblasts. the lviv oblast leads in the number of companies providing express mail and courier services (lardi-trans). within the western ukrainian borderland, the lviv, volyn and ivano-frankivsk oblasts are best equipped with the wholesale trade enterprises, the chernivtsi oblast is least equipped. the maximum amount of wholesale trade turnover is typical for the lviv and volyn oblasts, the minimum value of the amount of wholesale trade turnover is characteristic of the chernivtsi and rivne oblasts. per one company, the maximum value of wholesale trade turnover is characteristic of the zakarpattia oblast, the minimum value – of the rivne oblast. in the structure of the wholesale trade turnover of the chernivtsi oblast, food products dominate; in all other oblasts the share of non-food products exceeds the share of food products. in general, in the structure of wholesale trade turnover of the oblasts, non-food products dominate. the lviv and ivano-frankivsk oblasts have the largest warehouse space at the wholesale trade enterprises, warehouse space is significant in the volyn oblast, the smallest space is in the rivne, zakarpattia and chernivtsi oblasts (оптова і біржова торгівля україни…, 2014). 3. railway transportation the length of railway tracks of general use within the western ukrainian borderland oblasts is 3940  km. the greatest length of railways has the lviv oblast, the smallest – the chernivtsi and ivano-frankivsk oblasts. the maximum density of the railway network is characteristic of the lviv and chernivtsi oblasts, the minimum – of the rivne and volyn oblasts (транспорт і зв’язок україни..., 2015). the railway track width in ukraine is 1520  mm, while in western europe – 1435  mm. in the states neighbouring ukraine (poland, slovakia, hungary and romania) there are sections with a width of 1520 mm. in ukraine, sections of railway tracks of european width are also used, particularly in the sections of chop  –  batiovo  –  mukacheve, batiovo  –  korolevo  –  diakove, from the border with poland to kovel, from the border with poland to mostyska, from the border with poland to hyriv. at the stations mostyska  i/mostyska  ii there are modern terminals of railway carriage reloading from one track to another, but now they are loaded on 30%. in order to accelerate the pace of integration of railway transport of ukraine into the global transport system, the “eurokoliya do lvova” (“european railway to lviv”) project was developed, according to which the new railway track is to pass from polish to romanian border through lviv and chernivtsi (євроколія може об’єднати європу…). on the territory of the western ukrainian borderland there are double-, singleand narrow-track railways. almost all sections of double-track railway transport and logistic potential of the western ukrainian borderland 83 lines (except section of kovel – yagodyn – state border with poland) and several sections of single-track railway lines are electrified. in “program of electrification of railways of ukraine for 2015–2020  years”, the need for electrification of kovel  –  izov  –  state border with poland, which is a part of the international transport corridor, is stressed; it is planned to increase by 30% the capacity of the given section (де буде струм?). it should be noted, that transportation with the usage of electricity is twice cheaper than heat haulage. the electrification improves the speed of the railway traffic and the capacity of the railways. therefore, the lack of electrified railways in the ivano-frankivsk and chernivtsi oblasts is a constraining factor for implementation of transport and logistic activities in these oblasts. a challenging obstacle for passage of railways within the western ukrainian borderland is the carpathians. the most complicated section is between lavochne and volovets stations, where trains go up to the highest point along the way. in order to lay a railway track through this area on the border of the lviv and zakarpattia oblasts, the single-track beskydsky tunnel was built. not only for the western ukrainian borderland, but also for the whole ukraine, the beskydsky tunnel is of strategic importance because a half of transit goods towards western and central europe is carried through it. now it is the only singletrack section of the 5th pan-european transport corridor, which runs through italy, slovenia, hungary, slovakia and ukraine. the beskydsky tunnel has long ago exhausted its service life, therefore trains pass through it at low speed. a new double-track tunnel has been already laid parallel to the old singletrack one at a distance of 30 meters from it. the new beskydsky tunnel will increase the capacity of areas from 47 to 100  trains per day (будівництво нового бескидського тунелю). the biggest railway junction station of the western ukrainian borderland is lviv. the large railway junction stations are rivne, uzhhorod, ivanofrankivsk, chernivtsi, stryi, kovel, chop, krasne. zakarpattia and rivne oblasts have the greatest total freight railway traffic, the ivano-frankivsk and lviv oblasts also have significant freight railway traffic. the chernivtsi oblast has the smallest amount of freight railway traffic. in the zakarpattia oblast, the amount of goods arrival by railway significantly prevails over the amount of goods shipment. it can be explained by the fact that zakarpattia serves as the western gate of ukraine to europe on the path of eurasian transit transportation. in the rivne oblast, goods shipment by railway significantly prevails over goods arrival. it is connected with the operation of a cement plant in zdolbuniv, the products of which are exported, and also with the grain export, as evidenced by the presence of elevators (mostly in the southern part of the oblast). prevalence of the amount of goods arrival by railway over the amount of shipments in the ivano-frankivsk oblast is associated with the operation of the burshtyn thermal power station in the oblast, which is a major consumer of coal. however, this prevalence is not as significant as in some other oblasts due to the operation of a cement plant in yamnytsia and cultivation of grains in the oblast, which are exported. in the lviv oblast, the relatively slight predominance of the amount of goods arrivals by railway over the amount of shipments is also observed, which is caused by the operation of the dobrotvir thermal power station, that uses coal produced within the lviv – volyn coal basin (particularly, on the territory of sokal raion). goods shipments by railway in the lviv oblast are also associated with the operation of a cement plant in mykolaiv and grains cultivation. the predominance of goods arrivals amount over shipments by the railways in the volyn and chernivtsi oblasts can be explained by transitivity of the geographical location of these oblasts. 4. automobile transportation the density of roads of general use, their technical condition significantly affect the speed of transportation, the quality of transported products, the ability to service international transportation. the network of hard-surfaced automobile roads of general use within the western ukrainian borderland is 29400 km. the largest length of hardsurfaced automobile roads of general use is in the lviv oblast, the smallest – in the chernivtsi and zakarpattia oblasts. the maximum value of the density of hard-surfaced automobile roads is characteristic of the lviv, chernivtsi oblasts, the minimum – of the rivne and zakarpattia oblasts. automobile roads of the i and ii  categories, technical parameters of which are the most relevant to the modern european and world requirements, constitute just 2860  km within the western ukrainian borderland. the lviv oblast has the greatest length of such roads. the smallest index of availability of roads of the i and ii categories is in the chernivtsi oblast. automobile roads of the iv category prevail almost in all oblasts of the western ukrainian borderland, in zakarpattia and chernivtsi oblasts prevail automobile roads of the v category (транспорт і зв’язок україни …, 2015). due to its geographical position on the way of the main transit flows between europe, on the territory 84 volodymyr hrytsevych, mariana senkiv of the western ukrainian borderland there are two international automobile corridors – krytsky №3 (at the section krakovets – lviv – rivne and further towards kyiv) and krytsky №5 (kosyny – chop – stryi – lviv). the main problem of the latter is overcoming of the carpathian mountains, and crossing of railway tracks and automobile roads on the same level (грицевич, сеньчук, 2010). automobile transport is the most mobile means of passengers and freight transportation. in terms of the amount of passengers and freight transportation of different modes, automobile transport takes the first place in ukraine and within the western ukrainian borderland as well. in the structure of freight transportation by vehicle companies agricultural, forest, food products, etc. prevail. automobile transport has superiority in the freight transportation on average per day, but the average distance of the transportation of one tonne of goods by means of automobile transport is the lowest among all modes of transport. within the western ukrainian borderland, the leader in terms of freight transportation is the lviv oblast, and in terms of cargo turnover by automobile transport, the lviv and zakarpattia oblasts are leading. the chernivtsi and zakarpattia oblasts have the minimum amount of freight transportation, the smallest cargo turnover by automobile transport is in the chernivtsi oblast. significant cargo turnover by automobile transport in the zakarpattia oblast is conditioned by the maximum average distance of transportation of one tonne of goods by automobile transport. in recent years, in the world and in ukraine in particular, automobile container transportation is becoming more common, which is considered one of the fastest ways of transportation, after airshipment. 5. border crossing points volyn, ivano-frankivsk, lviv, rivne, chernivtsi customs function in the western ukrainian borderland. lviv, zakarpattia and volyn customs have the biggest number of customs posts. in general, customs and logistics activities of the western ukrainian borderland are carried out in 59 customs posts. a leading ukrainian 3pl-provider “увк україна” (“uvk ukraine”) offers to customers comprehensive logistics solutions, including customs brokerage services and consulting in the field of customs brokerage legislation. in all administrative centers of the western ukrainian borderland there are offices of logistics provider “uvk ukraine”. it should be mentioned that often customs brokerage services are provided by specialised companies. in general, the biggest number of companies providing customs brokerage services (excluding individual entrepreneurs) is concentrated in the lviv, volyn and rivne oblasts. there are 64  crossing points and seven control points within the western ukrainian borderland. categorisation (перелік пунктів пропуску): crossing points: 56  international, one interstate, seven local; control points: seven international. classification according to the transportation mode: crossing points: 29  automobile, seven automobile and pedestrian, one automobile, pedestrian and for bike riders, one pedestrian and for bike riders, 19 railway, seven air; control points: seven railway. classification according to the format of transportation: crossing points: 18 passenger, three freight, 43 passenger and freight; control points: one passenger, five freight, one passenger and freight. classification according to the mode of functioning: crossing points: 48 permanent, 16 temporary; control points: seven permanent. classification according to the working hours: 57  twenty-four-hour, seven with particular time of working; control points: seven twenty-four-hour. in general, workload of the west ukrainian borderland crossing points is low. high workload is only at the ustylug  –  zosinh, rava-ruska  –  hrebenne, krakovets – korchova, sheheni – medyka crossing points, medium – at the diakove – halmeu crossing point. the absence or small number of crossing points on a significant segment of the border is not always evidence of weak external economic relations between the neighboring territories. and on the contrary, a significant number of crossing points on a relatively significant segment of the border is not always evidence of intensive external economic relations. for example, the zakarpattia oblast has no border crossing points with poland, but the amount of export–import operations between them is very significant. the chernivtsi oblast, instead, has a large density of crossing points with moldova (one checkpoint per 15 km), which suggests irrationality in the opening of some points, as the amount of export– import operations between them is slight. it is obvious that the current density of crossing points between poland and the lviv oblast (one checkpoint per 26 km) is too small, given the intensive external economic relations between these territories. an efficient alternative to creating new and closing existing crossing points can be implementing of logistic approach in all activities of customs authorities, including crossing points. this approach involves, above all, the creation of temporary customs and logistics centers, improving customs legislation, the transport and logistic potential of the western ukrainian borderland 85 use of new information and technical means of customs bodies activities, etc. 6. numerical evaluation of logistic potential let us consider the theoretical and methodological foundations of evaluation of potential index. suppose on m of territorial elements values k a of factor and k b of resulting parameters are known. information about the value of factor parameters is set by the matrix {ui α}, i = 1,…, m; α = 1,…, k a. information about the value of resulting parameters is set by the matrix {ui β}, i = 1,…, m; β = 1,…, k b. first of all, let us carry out the standartisation of factor parameters: , де , , and, similarly, the standartisation of resulting parameters: , де , . calculate the rectangular matrix of correlations {rαβ} of size ka × kb, where rαβ – the correlation coefficient between α-м column of matrix of factor parameters and β-м column of matrix of resulting parameters, α  = 1,…, k a, β = 1,…, k b. the index of potential of territorial element is calculated by the formula (грицевич, 1999): , i = 1,…, m. for computational convenience, on the fig.  1 the values 100 · ii are presented. for indexes calculation, four factor and four resulting parameters are taken, which are available on the basis of statistic materials. the territorial elements are oblasts of western ukrainian borderland. factor parameters: • number of logistic companies; • number of wholesale trade enterprises; fig. 1. transport and logistic potential of the western ukrainian borderland source: own calculation and mapping. 86 volodymyr hrytsevych, mariana senkiv • the length of railway tracks; • the length of automobile roads. resulting parameters: • amount of wholesale turnover; • amount of retail turnover; • amount of freight shipments and arrivals by means of railway transport; • amount of freight transportation by means of automobile transport. 7. summary transport and logistic potential is a multiplicative characteristic of the transport and logistic infrastructure of a region, carried out with regard to business entities activity the western ukrainian borderland has the advantageous geographical position, and developed network of subjects of logistics activities, especially in lviv. the territory of the western ukrainian borderland is well equipped with the railway and automobile transport networks, which have a greater density in the lowland sub-regions and less density in the mountain areas. transport networks are connected with the networks of neighboring countries through multiple border crossing points. in general, the high value of the transport and logistic index has the lviv oblast, the middle – the volyn, rivne, ivano-frankivsk and zakarpattia oblasts, the low – chernivtsi oblast. the highest transport and logistic potential has the lviv oblast, the lowest – the chernivtsi oblast. references lardi–trans, http://uk.lardi-trans.com [30.01.2017]. rodrigue j.-p. (ed.), 2013, the geography of transport systems, routledge, london. будівництво нового бескидського тунелю, http:// igormelika.com.ua [20.02.2017]. грицевич в.с., 1999, математико-географічний підхід до визначення інтегрального потенціалу територіальних систем, наукові записки тернопільського державного педагогічного університету, географія, 1, 1999, 72-75. грицевич в.с., сеньків м.і., 2015, географія логістичної діяльності в західному регіоні україни, часопис соціально-економічної географії, 19(2), 113-119. грицевич в.с., сеньчук х.в., 2010, автотранспортна мережа карпатського регіону україни в контексті євроінтеграції, наукові записки тернопільського національного педагогічного університету, географія, 2, 52-58. де буде струм?, http://www.magistral-uz.com.ua/articles/ de-bude-strum.html [03.06.2015]. євроколія може об’єднати європу від гданська до одеси, http://zaxid.net/news [20.11.2015]. ібрагімхалілова т.в., 2011, потенціал розвитку ринку транспортно-логістичних послуг в україні, ефективна економіка, 5, http://nbuv.gov.ua/ujrn/efek_2011_5_48 [22.02.2017]. коблянська і.і., рибалко н.о., міщенко о.в., 2015, логістичний потенціал регіону: сутність і методичний підхід щодо його оцінювання, вісник сумду, економіка, 2, 23-30. оптова і біржова торгівля україни у 2012-2013 роках, 2014, державна служба статистики україни, київ. перелік пунктів пропуску, державна прикордонна служба україни, http://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/perelik-punktivpropusku [18.11.2016]. сток дж.р., ламберт д.м., 2005, стратегическое управление логистикой, инфра-м, москва. транспорт і зв’язок україни – 2014, 2015, державна служба статистики україни, київ. 1. introduction the renewal of geopolitical guidelines and principles of foreign policy of modern ukraine requires the intensification of the civil resource of state formation, aimed at realizing the ideas of national consciousness and independence, the affirmation of a transparent socially oriented market economy, the fulfillment of obligations in multi-vector european integration aspirations. the motivation of human potential and staffing of these socio-economic processes and relationships is the key to success in implementing the priorities of ukraine’s sovereignty and competitiveness on the world stage. hence, powerful public support and significant human resources of the systemic state and, in general, social modernization constitute participants of ato – primarily the military personnel of the armed forces and voluntary units, public volunteers, as well as members of their families as a part of the population of ukraine, which has already declared its civil favour, consciousness and maturity in the implementation of the ideas of national self-determination and european integration. expansion of social inclusion of this population category (or target group in terms of journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 9–23 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.002.8154 improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems larysa bogush department of social infrastructure, ptoukha institute for demography and social studies of the national academy of sciences of ukraine, taras shevchenko boulevard 60, 01032 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: bogush_lg@ukr.net citation bogush l., 2018, improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 9–23. abstract organizational and economic approaches and problems of improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine under socio-economic instability are studied. methodology of productive involvement of this population group based on its socio-economic status and psychological peculiarities is developed. level of implementation of the developed legal and regulatory framework for rehabilitation and social protection of ato participants and their families as the basis for achieving a decent level of their life and civic activation is evaluated. current priorities of improving the activities of government and public structures, associated sectors of economy on optimizing the principles and forms of social inclusion of this category of population are determined. key words socio-economic consequences of the anti-terrorist operation; social inclusion; target population category; ukraine. received: 13 september 2017 accepted: 31 october 2017 published: 30 march 2018 10 larysa bogush social inclusion strategy) can positively influence the pace and socio-economic performance of the newest stage of state formation in ukraine, among other things – in directions of increasing solidarity, mitigating and preventing manifestations of marginalization and antisocial behaviour, improvement of crime indicators. the theory and practice of social inclusion is covered in numerous studies, among which, in view of the realities of ukraine, it is necessary to mention the works devoted to: • problems in defining and assessing social exclusion and inclusion, particularly in the context of poverty and social inequality in developing countries (абрахамсон, 2001; бабенко, 2007; рєвнівцева, 2008; савельєв, 2012; ярская, 2008); • peculiarities of the deployment of social inclusion processes in ukraine in conditions of transitional economy, among the priorities of which are the achievement of goals of human development and overcoming social tensions in the regions (лібанова et al., 2011; яценко, коломієць, 2015); • development of areas and mechanisms of corporate social responsibility as a factor in social inclusion and implementation of the goals of the strategy of establishing economic development on the basis of european integration (супрун, 2013). the methodological and information base of the recent processes for improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine is made up of relevant legal and regulatory acts, publications in the periodicals, as well as special scientific literature (гриб, 2016; кравченко, 2015; тополь, 2015; чайковський et al. (eds.), 2016). 2. research results analysis 2.1. methodology for developing a strategy of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine the social inclusion is aimed at creating conditions for building up and improving the level of realization of productive – labour, creative (including intellectual, generating knowledge and rents), spiritual, civic – potential of a certain target group of the population, ultimately aimed at a decent representation of this potential in the socio-economic relations in general. consequently, the methodology of social inclusion implies observance of universal human rights and the fulfillment of a number of current legislative obligations of human development as a guarantee of proportional expansion of the target social group participation in natural reproduction, social and economic life of the country. the basis of the concepts and strategies of social inclusion in industrial, neoand postindustrial economies that declare the formation of a welfare state and a socially oriented market economy is the theory of needs, in particular their gradation according to the level of vital and social urgency and significance, as well as individual priority. the patterns of origin and evolution of the needs of the individual and society as a whole, as well as approaches to their classification can be generalized in a hierarchical model including the following types of needs arranged in the order of increase of their significance in the process of historical development of human and society: • physiological and material needs (in food, drinking water, housing, environment of acceptable quality, satisfaction of other physiological and everyday needs, including regarding the continuation of a family and organization of the desired lifestyle); • the need for safety (in sense of protection of the individual and communities by his affiliation, in prediction of significant for the individual spheres and aims of life, in health); • the need for obtaining and confirming the status in community (in personal involvement in society and its certain communities, in adequate perception by others, including in family relationships, career, leadership, etc.); • the need for recognition (in achieving success and competence, approval and respect); • cognitive needs (in knowledge and skills, in research, awareness and understanding, in accumulation and analysis of experience); • moral-religious and aesthetic needs (in harmonization of personality, community and environment, particularly in the aspects of organization of life conditions and lifestyle); • the need for self-realization and self-actualization (in the most complete realization and awareness of incentives for self-development of inner creative, professional and spiritual potential of the individual, in awareness of social responsibility). in turn, according to the parameters of social urgency and significance, which determine the developed mechanisms of satisfaction at the national, collective and individual levels, it is worthwhile to distinguish the following needs: a) public, including: • common public needs, the realization of which ensures the integrity and legality of the functioning of the state and its institutions within certain boundaries; improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems 11 • socially necessary needs, justified by political and economic expediency in view of reproduction of the technological structure, maintenance of the efficiency of the state economic complex and strengthening of its competitiveness factors, including those caused by social stability and solidarity; b) private needs (according to the theory of the welfare state, they diversify the spheres and kinds of living of ordinary individual/community, increase its quality and satisfy above the valid legislative guarantees of social protection, as determined by social status, priorities scale, life and professional experience, etc.). the list of socially necessary goods and services can be determined by existing social guarantees, legislative standards and norms for their implementation, as well as by the ways of state intervention in the market economy to ensure the sustainability of business and non-profit activities, to compensate for the shortcomings and negatives of free market. noting the regularity of actualization of the highest level needs in the process of the most complete satisfaction of their lower types, it should also be emphasized that: • full satisfaction of the lower level needs associated with various aspects of organization of everyday life and its safety is not an exclusive condition for formation and satisfaction of the higher level needs – in intellectual and spiritual development, self-realization; • influence of the lower level needs on value system, life activity and development of the individual increases under objective or subjective social obstacles to meet those of higher level. objective obstacles primarily include those generated by: a social system characterized by the deepening of property stratification and the formation of a caste socium with typical low wages and a number of restrictions in ensuring the vertical social mobility of population and the territorial mobility of legally employed, consequently the workers and members of their families, in particular, can not fully meet the needs of competitive education, vocational guidance and retraining, career growth; technical and technological peculiarities of the country’s development during the periods of socio-economic instability, resource crises, natural disasters, etc. subjective obstacles are related to psychological peculiarities, as well as to moral, ethical inherited and perceived guidelines of individuals and social groups, regardless of the material welfare level, that cause their consumer sentiment, reduction of needs, anti-social marginalization, and, consequently, degradation of the potential of socium sustainable development in the format of current socio-political system. therefore, the ultimate goal of social inclusion is to achieve decent living standards and social integration of a particular target group based on building up and improving the quality of realization of its productive potential. hence, the concept of social inclusion covers the main directions: the formation of decent material and living conditions (in the areas of implementation of legislative guarantees and promotion of appropriate personal initiative); medical and social rehabilitation (in a number of ways: medical care; psychophysiological rehabilitation and adaptation; actualization of skills of non-conflict stay in territorial community and family, that is, in the social environment); professional re-adaptation and activation (vocational guidance, further training, retraining, promotion of self-employment and career development); civic realization. the above regularities of realization of the needs of individuals and functional groups (communities, united in particular by professional characteristics, specific life experiences) are clearly seen in the processes of formation and implementation of the productive potential of the social group, which include ato participants and members of their families, exercising a powerful influence on implementation of their life strategies and social inclusion parameters. 2.2. social and psychological characteristics of ato participants and their families as a key factor in adjusting the methodology of social inclusion the social composition of ato participants (by: region and place of residence in rural areas, small or large cities; level of education; place of work before mobilization) has a powerful influence on personal and collective strategies for their return to peaceful life and social inclusion. a significant part of ato participants (especially those from the western, northwestern, southern and a number of central regions) are residents of rural areas and small cities with numerous problems of resource provision and availability of social infrastructure providing common public and socially necessary services that arise during the process of its organizational and economic modernization. at the same time, without competitive vocational education which allows for claiming a sufficiently high salary, many ato participants have worked in the sectors of services (security business, motor vehicles maintenance, repair of residential premises, household appliances, etc.), trade (mainly in markets, retail, in particular, network facilities, auto parts, fuel and lubricants sale), construction (at work positions), as well as unskilled agricultural 12 larysa bogush work before a conscription into the armed forces, mobilization in voluntary formations or engagement in volunteer activity on the territory of combat operations. the experience of participating in an armed conflict leads to a massive reappraisal of the values and quality of peaceful life, interpersonal relationships, professional orientations, ideas about personal career development and success in society. this reappraisal serves as a powerful psychological factor that mediates the developed organizational and economic approaches of government and public structures to increase social welfare, rehabilitation, and involvement of ato participants in active economic, state and civic activities. in the case of employment, in particular, even the presence of a family with underage children often does not stimulate a person with a military experience to return to the previous place of work. right after a demobilization an ato participant faces numerous economic, domestic and legal problems primarily related to the collection of a large package of documents for obtaining social status and privileges, as well as employment for sufficient and sustainable earnings usually during bureaucratic procedures requiring qualified assistance from lawyers and employment centers. the satisfaction of needs of ato participants and their family members for security, obtaining and asserting social status, recognition, self-fulfillment and self-actualization is substantially mediated by a number of post-traumatic stress disorders experienced by individuals of this population category under the influence of military action, social and individual misunderstandings in the matter of an armed conflict, the motives for participating in it, the realities of peaceful life in the context of social justice. according to the statistics of the ukrainian state medical and social center of war veterans, 54% of the demobilized servicemen required medical care, up to 30% sought physical rehabilitation and more than 80% needed psychological rehabilitation (шклярська, 2016). according to the experts of the military institute of the taras shevchenko kyiv national university, the level of post-traumatic mental stress disorders among former military servicemen of the armed forces and voluntary formations, as well as employees of other law enforcement agencies that participated in the ato now reaches 20–25% which amount to 60–70 thousand people (в украине насчитали …, 2017). also, according to the chairman of the verkhovna rada committee on health care, psychological rehabilitation is required for more than 70% of ato participants; according to specialists of the psychological support unit of the national guard of ukraine, almost 98% of military servicemen may require the same highly qualified assistance (в україні немає державної програми …, 2016; потіха, /no data/). for comparison, this indicator for israeli military servicemen is now 5–8% due to the consistent improvement of the rehabilitation system, while in the united states post-traumatic stress disorder was diagnosed in 30% of veterans of the vietnam war and 25% of combatants in afghanistan and iraq wars including 42% of wounded and disabled persons, which led to a significant spread of suicidal tendencies, alcoholism, drug addiction, social and criminogenic behavior among veterans (в украине насчитали …, 2017; війна за ветерана …, 2016; потіха, /no data/). an additional threat factor is frequent misunderstandings in the families of ex-ato participants accompanied by violence (миськевич, /no data/). families are mostly weakly prepared for increased irritation and conflict of the demobilized due to their hypertrophied personal expectations or confusion in peaceful life against its low level, spreading social inequality and disorder, and total mistrust of corrupt authorities. at the same time, according to a research project on psychological rehabilitation and social adaptation to the peaceful life of military servicemen after the ato, initiated by a public organization funded by the united states agency for international development, only 14% of the respondents turned to the psychologist and 65% of them were compelled to do so; 41% of the target contingent do not want to receive psychological help at all, in particular, within specialized psychotherapeutic courses (миськевич, /no data/). therefore, taking into account the level of public support and the quality of the social environment at the place of residence, personal priorities and motives for participation in the anti-terrorism operation, individual strategies for satisfying the needs for security, obtaining and asserting social status, recognition, self-fulfillment and self-actualization can have clear asocial expression. a powerful psychological factor that mediates the entire spectrum of processes of social inclusion of ato participants and their families substantially actualizes the role of social rehabilitation as a part of its psychological, legal and vocational components. in the practice of state bodies dealing with issues related to the social rehabilitation of servicemen, the psychological component is treated as the mastery of the system of values (norms, settings, patterns of behavior), culture that exist in a social environment in order to fulfill the requirements to personality; legal component is defined as the acquisition of legislative norms regulating the status, the legal position of a person (rights, duties, opportunities), as well as the knowledge of those structures that can help to improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems 13 master these norms and realize personal opportunities; vocational component is treated as specialized refinement of available professional knowledge, skills or mastering new ones with further successful employment (соціальна, професійна …, 2017). given the content of the components and according to the official definition, the state system of social adaptation of ato participants and their families is aimed at: assistance in analyzing the life situation, identification of the main problems and ways of their solution; provision of information on guaranteed social protection; training, formation and development of social skills and abilities; assistance in strengthening / renewal of family and socially useful connections, organization of day-time employment and leisure (порядок організації…, 2017; уряд затвердив…, 2017). 2.3. regulatory principles, guidelines, practice of social protection and security of ato participants and their families since the beginning of anti-terrorist operation in 2014 in the eastern and southeastern regions of ukraine, the government has been consistently forming rather extensive regulatory support for social security, protection and increase of social weight of ato participants and their families. the basic principles of the state policy on social and legal protection of this population category with the provision of a set of appropriate guarantees, aimed to create favorable conditions for implementation of the constitutional duty to protect the fatherland, are defined by the law of ukraine “про соціальний і правовий захист військовослужбовців та членів їх сімей” (eng. “on social and legal protection of military servicemen and their family members”). according to available statistics, more than 280 thousand people were involved in the anti-terrorist operation and 266 thousand of them have received the status of war veteran (миськевич, /no data/). ato participants and their families have a quite wide range of social benefits for improving living conditions, municipal, transport, medical and sanitary services (in particular, a 50–75% discount on housing and municipal services, free travel with all types of city transport, free or privileged travel with public transport in rural areas, as well as round trip by rail, water, air and intercity transport every two years). at the same time the fixed amounts of one-time and periodic monetary aid are paid, including welfare payments to the wounded, disabled persons and the ones who accompany them for treatment and rehabilitation, as well as to the families of ato participants who have died. in mid-2014, the government made a decision on the free provision of land plots to servicemen of the armed forces of ukraine and other military formations, as well as employees of the ministry of internal affairs and security service involved in the ato. all regional state administrations have approved the procedure for using the funds of respective budgets to provide one-time targeted monetary aid to the ato participants and the families of the dead servicemen to compensate the costs associated with the development of documentation for land allocation for individual housing construction, private farming, gardening. the decree of the president of ukraine dated 18.03.2015 “про додаткові заходи щодо соціального захисту учасників антитерористичної операції” (eng. “on additional measures for the social protection of the anti-terrorist operation participants”) obliged the regional state administrations as a part of general government measures and regional programs: • to ensure enforcement of the rights of ato participants in the priority sanatorium and resort treatment and the priority receipt of rehabilitation technical means; • to establish unemployment payments to demobilized military servicemen as soon as possible, to provide them with employment services, vocational training, retraining and advanced training; to strengthen control over the social guarantees provided by employers to the persons mobilized for military service in a special period; • to improve information support of mobilization and demobilization, including telephone counseling assistance to ato participants and their family members, organization of proper service of social protection and internal affairs bodies on the basis of the ‘one-stop-shop’ service, as well as provision of on-site social and medical services to demobilized servicemen; • to stimulate the involvement of volunteer organizations in measures for social rehabilitation and adaptation of this population category. support centers for the ato participants were established in regions to fulfill the priorities highlighted in the decree. among thematic regulatory documents, “план заходів щодо медичної, психологічної, професійної реабілітації та соціальної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції” (eng. the “action plan for medical, psychological, vocational rehabilitation and social adaptation of the anti-terrorist operation participants”), approved by the cabinet of ministers of ukraine on 31.03.2015, should also be noted. the main sections of the plan, regarding each of which are established procedures for using the state 14 larysa bogush budget funds, include the implementation of a set of measures for: • recovery of health of ato participants; creation of system of their psychological rehabilitation with adopting foreign experience, carrying out appropriate courses for demobilized servicemen; • provision of social support and adaptation of ato participants, as well as members of the families of dead (deceased) persons from this contingent; vocational rehabilitation and employment of demobilized servicemen; • organization of the system of management and informing of citizens on social protection, adaptation and psychological rehabilitation of ato participants; involvement of international assistance in establishing this system in ukraine. at the beginning of 2015, a coordinating council for the rehabilitation of ato participants was created consisting of members of the verkhovna rada of ukraine committee on health care, representatives of interested ministries and departments, and the public. its work is aimed at systematic improvement of the relevant legislation. the main activities of the ministries of social policy and defense of ukraine in the implementation of the government plan in recent years are concentrated around (соціальний захист …, 2017; житло для військових …, 2017; полторак одобрил …, 2017; санаторно-курортне лікування учасників ато, 2017; рада у справах осіб з інвалідністю …, 2017; технічні засоби …, 2017; потіха, /no data/): a) implementation of social guarantees in order to ensure an adequate standard of living for ato participants and their families on the principles of: • provision of cash compensation for housing for the families of deceased military servicemen and persons with disabilities (in 2017, the total cost for 600 households should be 328.9 million uah or about 12.7 million usd at the current rate); • tender purchase of apartments for military servicemen who are in the queue for improvement of living conditions; • extension of the list of categories of persons with the right to receive free housing, stimulation of territorial authorities to finance the relevant obligations in full; • construction of a network of shared households for contract servicemen at the expense of state budget (at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2017, the ministry of defense approved a plan to finance the construction of 100 such objects with a total cost of 1  billion uah or about 38.5 million usd); • provision of privileged retirement benefits; • provision of different types of material and physical assistance by social protection bodies; b) organization of sanatorium and resort treatment (in 2017, in particular, according to the relevant budget program, it is planned to spend 50.5 million uah or more than 1.9 million usd; vouchers should be provided to 12.5 thousand ato participants with disabilities, another 28.4 thousand persons will be compensated for self-organized sanatorium treatment). currently, the practice of personal choice of a sanatorium institution is being implemented and ensured by the conclusion of a trilateral agreement between a social security body, a privileged person and an administration of the sanatorium within the limit of 5250 uah per voucher (about 200 usd); c) financing of treatment, medical and social rehabilitation of injured ato participants with disability. the state guarantees free and extraordinary support by technical and other means of rehabilitation including prosthetic and orthopedic products, means of transportation, special and auxiliary means for self-service, care, personal hygiene and mobility, furniture and equipment of the premises of disabled persons (in 2017, technical rehabilitation means will be provided to 556.6 thousand disabled people; 6.6 thousand of this category will receive assistance in primary and complex prosthetics hospitals; 23 ato participants will be provided with prosthetics of increased functionality and high technologies which are unavailable in ukraine); d) provision of social and psychological support and rehabilitation services in the relevant specialized centers (during 2017, 58.9 thousand ato participants will be assisted in 5 centers, about 8.2–8.5 thousand people will complete a psychological rehabilitation course; total expenditures according to budget program of the latter should amount to almost 50.0 million uah or 1.9 million usd); e) carrying out social and vocational adaptation of ato participants (in 2017, this measure should cover 4.8 thousand people). it should be noted that the tendency to decrease the level of coverage of ato participants and their family members by a range of social protection measures – from medical rehabilitation services and prosthetics available in ukraine, as well as psychological assistance to payment of cash compensation for housing and the most high-tech prosthetics – is twofold due both to the prevalence and severity of the problems highlighted, and the lack of public resources to improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems 15 finance the most costly types of benefits in the field of improvement of material and living conditions. in accordance with clarification of the state service of ukraine for war veterans and anti-terrorist operation participants, and the employment specialists, the measures of social and vocational adaptation shall be performed upon the separate programs of budget financing for reservists, bound to military service, employees of the armed forces and other law enforcement agencies, which directly participated in ato and its providing in the area of conducting, as well as for the servicemen transferred to the reserve or retired (роз’яснення служби …, 2015; дорожня карта …, 2017; уряд затвердив …, 2017). the social adaptation of these population categories in the aspect of improvement and implementation of their productive potential stipulates employment of persons who require no retraining in new specialities or their retraining in civil specialities and employment in cooperation with the involved public organizations and funds. in its turn, proper vocational adaptation shall assume specialized improvement of available professional knowledge, skills, abilities or mastering of new ones with further successful employment by virtue of rendering of information, advisory and vocational guidance services in the issues of enhancement of person competitiveness on the labour market. both directions of adaptation measures shall be implemented in the forms of: • target-oriented courses presuming improvement of qualification for the purpose of study of new equipment, items, goods, materials, services, modern technological processes, means of mechanization and automatization applied at the production, rules and requirements for their safe operation, technical documentation, efficient methods of labour organization, issues of economy and finance, legislative and other regulatory legal acts, etc.; • professional education, which represents primary vocational training, retraining, services in providing the other speciality based on previously obtained educational level, improvement of qualification and specialization, aiming at extension or improvement of professional knowledge, skills and abilities. the ground for receiving free-of-charge services of social and vocational adaption is the identification card of a combat operations participant, a disabled person or a war participant and the document, which confirms direct involvement in the execution of ato tasks in the areas of its conducting; financing of such services from the budgetary funds is carried out within the framework of state procurements. the vocational training can be made upon fulltime, evening, intra-extramural, online, and external forms of study, off-the-job and on-the-job training and upon the individual curricula for the term not longer than one year in separate groups for the ato participants, as well as in the groups of trainees formed by educational establishments chosen by the person independently. in its turn, the advanced training on the target-oriented courses shall last for from 20 to 500 hours. based on the experience of territorial bodies of social protection, training for working professions is in the greatest demand among the ato participants (in particular, for drivers of vehicles of various categories in the vocational education institutions) (інформація …, 2017). in some regions, there are offers of free retraining courses on the basis of higher educational establishments (in particular, in the speciality of ‘organization and management of entrepreneurship’) (проводиться набір слухачів…, 2017). the experience of efficient implementation of ato participants’ labour potential is processed in the interests of state formation. therefore, in kyiv the state employee school for the combat operations veterans was organized, participants of which study principles of such professional activity during 4 months, and then they are trained in the departments of kyiv city state administration. in case of successful completion of the curriculum, they may occupy vacant positions (миськевич, /no data/). after passing the selection procedure, in some regions the ato participants are actively involved in the job for the local government bodies, law enforcement and other state security agencies (гоц, 2017). the employment centers and military commissariats of the particular regions cooperate in selection and sending of such citizens to military service under contract, including to the state border guard service (довідка про підтримку…, 2017). by organizing the financing and implementation of the above measures, the government and the state agencies declare observance of the principles of: individual approach to each ato participant; encouragement him to self-support, economic and social independence; social protection of ato participant during rehabilitation and readaptation (соціальний захист …, 2017). beginning from autumn of 2014, the system of medical assistance and rehabilitation of ato participants is actively developed, namely (санаторно-курортне лікування учасників ато, 2017; санаторно-курортне лікування для учасників ато, 2017; барміна, 2015; шклярська, 2016; потіха, /no data/): • the process of formation of the network of profile treatment, rehabilitation and sanatorium-resort 16 larysa bogush facilities is continued. nowadays the clinical basis of medical rehabilitation system, in particular, consists of 11 hospitals of recovery treatment, which contain approximately 1.9 thousand beds, 30 hospitals for war veterans (according to various estimates, for 6.6–8.5 thousand beds), 7 physiotherapeutic hospitals, over 12 thousand beds of the private joint stock company of medical and health institutions of the professional unions of ukraine, the founder of which is the federation of professional unions and social insurance fund for temporary disability, and a range of departmental sanatorium-resort institutions. upon the volunteers initiative, the centers for posttraumatic rehabilitation of ato warriors, which render comprehensive services in improving the physical and mental health, are created in the capital and certain regions; • state service of ukraine for war veterans and anti-terrorist operation participants carries out bids in procurement of the services of sanatorium-resort treatment and distributes trips to the selected institutions. the territorial bodies of population social protection, in accordance with medical recommendations, should annually provide the combat operations participants (in the order of priority) and disabled veterans (out of turn), who are registered by such bodies upon their place of residence, with free-of-charge trips for 18–21 days (in case of traumas and spine diseases – for 35 days); • the methodical support, programs and protocols upon separate directions of tactical medicine (assistance directly at battle positions), as well as upon clinical and social medicine involved in treatment and rehabilitation of ato participants, are worked out and implemented. numerous scientific research institutions and profile departments of higher and postgraduate educational establishments are involved in this task; • generally, the following practice is extended in the regions: advising of the servicemen sent to ato zone in regional and newly created district centers for psychological service and crisis states; psychological work with hospitalized ato participants, including with involvement of the mobile teams of psychologists and psychotherapists. the substantial assistance to ukraine in implementation of the outlined legislative guarantees, improvement of quality of the processes of social rehabilitation and inclusion of ato participants and their families members are provided by the international, foreign and native public organizations and charitable funds, which recruit the specialists for the said programs, take part in formation of their content, finance their development and execution, and control its progress. today the participation of volunteers in provision of medicines and rehabilitation of wounded and disabled, including abroad, purchasing of prostheses for the last mentioned ato category is the most important (потіха, /no data/). 2.4. urgent problems of improvement of the level of life and social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine urgency and acuteness of issues of the optimization of conditions and quality of social inclusion of ato participants shall be evaluated at the: level and trends in satisfaction of their socially necessary needs upon the place of residence; dynamics of factor generators and consequences of social inequality; comparison of national and territorial processes of regulation of starting possibilities and improvement of welfare of the said population category. let us outline the most noticeable among the negative phenomena. upon the estimates of the specialists dealing with the ato participants, approximately 80% of them lose their jobs after returning to the civil life. among the main reasons of this trend – misunderstanding with the employers or reluctance of the person himself to continue the preceding professional activity as a result of own priorities and guidelines reevaluation (війна за ветерана …, 2016). the substantial part of the demobilized lacks the motivation in the job search as the unemployment benefits from the employment centers exceed the minimal salary, which offer up to 90% of vacancies. among other things, the acuity of situation in professional orientation of ato participants is confirmed by the content of the program “сприяння соціалізації, реабілітації та працевлаштуванню учасників антитерористичної операції у м. вінниці на 2017–2020 роки” (eng. “promoting the socialization, rehabilitation and employment of the anti-terrorist operation participants in vinnytsia city for 2017–2020”), according to which the war veterans with the combat experience are offered the job as a security personnel of state institutions and schools with the quantity of working days not more than 10 per month, but with the salary higher than the minimal in ukraine and provision of full social protection (гоц, 2017). the comprehensive implementation of the right of ato participants and families of deceased servicemen for free of charge transfer of land plots into their ownership is prevented by both objective and numerous subjective factors. the first of them are as follows: • the lack of free lands in big cities and their suburbs, as well as western regions of ukraine, where natural conditions and settlement history formed improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems 17 the substantial deficit of the areas suitable for private farming activities; • numerous drawbacks in registration of lands due to that the true information about the available resources is often absent; • rather high price of execution of ownership documents. the array of subjective factors, in its turn, includes: • corrupt and opaque work of regional administrations of the state service of ukraine for geodesy, cartography and cadastre as a result of which the process of allocation of land plots and execution of accompanying documents is substantially delayed without the significant bribes; • necessity of manifestation foremost the individual initiative while searching the available land plot upon the place of residence and execution of ownership documents; demonstrative role of personal relations with the representatives of local government as a success factor in such situation; • practice of shadow sales of lands allocated for ato participants implemented by the regional officials of the said state service and local governments. therefore, in some regions of ukraine (kirovohrad, volyn, lviv and zakarpattia ones), numerous protest actions due to the delay of implementation of guarantees of free land obtaining and beneficial housing construction have already taken place (миськевич, /no data/). the substantial part of system of wounded ato participants medical rehabilitation lies in the prosthetic procedures – preparation to the prosthesis, manufacturing of prostheses and restoring, as much as possible, of organism’ physiological abilities. the main problems in prosthesis of ato participants, as well as other disabled people in ukraine, consist in unsatisfactory quality of the range of domestic prostheses, high price of foreign ones (in average eur 20 thousand) and become deepened by the long waiting in the queue on prosthesis (at least for 2 years), which can be joined only after collection of the whole package of documents confirming the status of ato participant and the disability itself (потіха, /no data/). there are still few experienced military psychologists. at the same time, according to the opinion of experts of the department of special purpose of the national police of ukraine, civil psychologists without any experience in combat operations are not trusted by the servicemen, who were in the armed conflict zone or captivity (миськевич, /no data/). most of all, the real psychological assistance of various quality to ato participants and their families’ members is nowadays provided on the basis of the local veteran unions, native and international public organizations; meanwhile the psychological rehabilitation is not usually provided directly in the military units. shortage of budgetary resources for implementation of the measures standardized by the state in social provision, rehabilitation and adaptation of ato participants and their families substantially restricts the opportunities and desire of government agencies in implementing the initiatives of cooperation with public organizations, financing the joint projects and promoting the charitable activity in this field. the existing forms of cooperation of state authorities and a range of international, foreign and native public organizations in activities of social protection, rehabilitation, adaptation and implementation of other directions of ato participants social inclusion have mostly the unsatisfactory efficiency reflected in delay and self-withdrawal of the officials from required documents’ preparation, their reluctance to bear responsibility for its content and coordination of work. on the opinion of public organizations’ representatives, one of the main reasons for it lies in: imperfectness of the ukrainian legislation on charitable and volunteer activity; complexity of bureaucratic mechanisms of development of the appropriate measures, programs and accompanying documents, their approval and promotion in institutions; low efficiency of the state electronic document circulation system and governance in social provision and capitalization of the productive potential of ato participants. separate blocks of problems in inclusion of the target population category to productive activity in socium are formed by: • social provision and protection, enhancement of competitiveness of families’ members of ato participants, who died or became severely disabled (for example, lost their limbs, ability to move, sight); • quality of living environment in rural and urbantype settlements, as well as small towns, where the substantial part of ato ex-participants and their families has a residence. both in the case of search and allocation of the land plot in a particular settlement, personal attitude of the representatives of local government of rural settlements and small towns significantly influence the social protection quality and level of inclusion to public life of the families of those ato participants, who was killed in action, early died or became severely disabled. the heavy psychological trauma and economic consequences from the loss of breadwinners complicate the perspectives of their children to 18 larysa bogush obtain successful comprehensive and competitive professional education. regarding the quality of living environment upon the place of residence of target population category, the indicators of utility equipment of ukrainian urban and rural housing stock remain unsatisfactory. there is a clear tendency of critical wear (destruction) causing the collapse of water supply and sewage networks in urban settlements; recently, decrease in the level of maintenance of environmentally safe sewage systems in rural settlements has been traced. the pace of decommissioning of the systems of central heating and gas supply in the rural area as a result of need to enhance the ukrainian energy independence is still not compensated by the distribution of energy-efficient and ecofriendly individual heating systems (as compare with the stove heating). in a wide range of regions, the slowdown of growth rates of equipping the housing stock with utility services is observed. there is a discernible trend to increase the share of dilapidated and emergency housing in the total area of rural housing stock. the practice of satisfying the socially necessary needs of local settlement systems population in the basic education under socio-economic instability proves imbalance and ineffectiveness of mechanisms of measures’ implementation to ensure the territorial availability of the infrastructure of preschool education, complete general secondary and extracurricular education due to: • the lack of local budget funds to implement initiatives of usage of the municipal premises reserve to increase a level of satisfaction of the territorial communities’ needs in preschool institutions (including in view of the potential of re-profiling and privatization of such premises as a source of replenishment of local self-government revenues). the low pace of expansion of pre-school educational institutions’ network in most regions does not ensure the necessary increase in their admission capacity, and thus does not allow to meet the existing needs in public preschool education causing overcrowding of kindergartens (at least in one third of the regions – with a tendency to decrease the specified indicator); • initiation of the process of closing down the general secondary education infrastructure in the framework of measures of the ministry of education and science on reforming and increasing the economic efficiency of this system’ functioning towards the establishment of a network of flagship schools of i-iii  accreditation level without taking into account the territorial communities’ and families’ readiness to bear costs of arrival and stay of middle and senior schoolchildren in the settlements where those objects are located. recently, in an increasingly growing circle of regions, there is a tendency towards more number of secondary schools that conduct classes in two shifts; • imperfection of the currently implemented mechanism for formation of educational districts in the context of unsatisfactory consideration of spatial characteristics of settlement systems, financial capacity of local budgets and economic entities (primarily as a factor guaranteeing the targeted use of educational subventions, creation of budgetary and extra-budgetary funds for cultural and educational development of territorial communities – from local to regional); • sharp reduction of the local budget expenditures for financing extracurricular educational institutions under uncertainty of legal guarantees of their network’ formation and maintenance. the significant reasons for deterioration of material and technical conditions of institutions giving basic education are: • ineffectiveness of control mechanisms over the targeted use of state budget educational subvention; • unstable legislative guarantees for the provision of a certain amount of educational subvention, including in relation to the volumes of budgets of different levels and gross domestic product; insufficiency of this transfer’ aggregate volume, other profile expenditures of state and local budgets, at least, for reproduction of the material and technical provision of the complete secondary education in a number of regions. the last mentioned negative factor of current organizational and economic mechanism of social basic education first of all results in: • the limitation of capital expenditures for the repair of institutions (in recent years there have been flashy cases of destruction of premises of secondary schools due to the lack of funds for planned repairs before an academic year) as well as the development of their communal infrastructure (the high level of wear of centralized and autonomous systems of heating and water supply is a weighty factor in the morbidity of students in respiratory and infectious diseases, deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation in territorial community in general). in particular slightly over half of urban and rural day schools have a hot water system at present; • delayed completion of transportation fleet involved in the ‘school bus’ program, a part of which has been transferred to the needs of armed forcimprovement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems 19 es in 2014, as well as in other activities for transportation of schoolchildren to the places of study and back home. as a result, the dissatisfied need for this socially necessary service continues to be recorded, and the situation tends to deteriorate in a number of regions; • unresolved problems of ensuring local budgets expenditures (in particular, on a subsidized basis) for organization of: nutrition of elementary schoolchildren, as well as low-income pupils of middle classes in general secondary schools; privileged travel (including railways) for schoolchildren of all secondary and vocational educational institutions; • the lack of expenditures for inclusive education development (organization of barrier-free access to the educational institutions’ premises, their completeness with special textbooks, manuals, teaching and laboratory equipment); • the gap of native basic educational institutions with the standards of developed countries in the level of computerization and dissemination of information and communication technologies, electronic means for learning and knowledge quality control. connection of native secondary schools to the internet has not yet been completed; a significant part of urban and rural schools’ computer equipment is outdated, this indicator is steadily increasing. nowadays the strategy of increasing efficiency of functioning and availability of the ukrainian health care services as per the models of the primary health care improvement on the basis of family medicine (general medical practice), as well as hospital districts’ formation in practice leads to rapid collapse of the infrastructure (in particular, district and regional hospitals, a number of outpatient facilities, paramedical and obstetric stations), as it is performed ignoring: • a low solvency level of the population (especially in rural areas, small towns of regions of monospecialization, agro-processing and agro-industrial specialization), as well as its physical capacity to spend time for travel to outpatient clinics, central district and regional hospitals; • notable shortage of funds for financing programs to equip outpatient clinics with diagnostic facilities and consumables; • threatening state of the material and technical (first of all, transport) and personnel support of the emergency (first and urgent) medical aid. under conditions of reduction of the network of stations and departments of emergency (first and urgent) medical care the tragic cases as a result of exceeding even current standards of arrival of brigades to a place of event has become much more frequent, especially in rural areas. in settlements outside cities this standard, in particular, is 20 minutes from the moment of appeal to dispatcher of an emergency medical aid and disaster medicine center with 10 minutes of possible overtime delay (про норматив …, 2012). consequently, despite rather wide legal and regulatory guarantees of social protection of ato participants and their families, poor quality and efficiency of the local settlement systems’ social infrastructure substantially limit possibilities and results of their implementation, even if sufficient budget funding is provided. in addition, the specific of community life in a small settlement provokes exacerbation of social tension in case of demonstrative attention of government structures to the needs of any particular population category regardless of its merits to the society. 3. summary along with medical and psychological rehabilitation and improvement of living standards and conditions within the framework of social protection programs, the key to success in increasing the level of social inclusion of ato participants and their families is to stimulate their labour market competitiveness and to promote productive employment. at the same time, the financing gap and the acute problems of ukrainian practice of implementing legal and regulatory guarantees of social provision of ato participants and their families show a declarative nature of a wide range of relevant obligations, often result in poor quality of benefits and services provided for budget and program funds. this situation contributes to marginalization and criminalization of the population category under study, and increases the social tension in society and local communities. the directions of the state activity which will have priority in the nearest future and are aimed at raising the level of social inclusion of ato participants and their families should comprise: a) adequate consideration of needs and implementation of guarantees of this social group, in particular on the principles of: • representative assessment of real situation and problems regarding certain categories of this population within the whole country by profile government structures; • improvement of the documentation system to obtain a social status and appropriate privileges; 20 larysa bogush • launching and implementing sectoral mechanisms for producing innovations in areas of medical care and rehabilitation, retraining, stimulation of business activity; b) implementation of effective organizational and economic mechanism for improving the living environment, increasing quality and accessibility of social infrastructure (primarily communal, educational, medical ones) in the territorial settlement systems. detailing these priorities for certain spheres of formation of conditions and realization of productive potential of targeted population category in socium, it is advisable to emphasize the urgency of: a) in the field of improving organizational principles for the formation and implementation of social provision and protection programs of ato participants and their families: • completion of development (particularly, interdepartmental coordination) and implementation of the state program on physical, medical, psychological rehabilitation and social and professional readaptation of anti-terrorist operation participants for the period up to 2022; • dissemination and generalization of the experience gained by a number of public organizations regarding creation of unified information base of the initiatives offered in ukraine to provide legal, psychological, social and medical assistance to ato combatants at national level; • further regulation of distribution of powers in budget financing of the areas of medical and social rehabilitation of ato participants by transferring appropriate funds from the state budget to the local level which will contribute to improving content and quality of rehabilitation programs for specific individuals; • setting up and working out effective interaction in systemic activities on social provision and raising the level of social inclusion of ato participants and their families among specialized government structures and public organizations (in particular, according to the criterion of reasonable estimation of the expected results of joint measures and forms of assistance); b) in the field of providing decent material and living conditions for ato participants and their families: • improvement of quality and availability of professional legal assistance, in particular, specialized government agencies, in solving problems related to free transfer of land plots or apartments to ato participants and deceased servicemen’s families as well as to the implementation of a range of benefits in the process of personal housing construction; • implementation of effective mechanisms for housing initiatives of ato participants through crediting housing construction or purchasing of affordable housing under state guarantees which are financially advantageous for this population category; • full financing of free housing programs for dead servicemen’ families and certain categories of disabled people (for example, for those who have lost their limbs, eyesight, etc.), registered in the apartment queue; • dissemination of effective mechanisms of share participation of the state and local authorities, non-governmental organizations, employers in housing construction for ato veterans, first of all for the families of those who have perished or died after demobilization; • development of legitimate local initiatives for transfer of apartments in the newly build houses or cash compensation in the amount of a market value of affordable housing in a specific locality to ato participants instead of land plots; • financing hostels construction in regions for contract servicemen as well as ato participants and their families who will not be able to receive or build their own housing (private house, apartment) in the near future from the state and regional budgets; • payment of monetary compensation for unused privileges, for example, from sanatorium-resort treatment or free travel in intercity transport in case of their inexpediency for person; • implementation of mechanism for choosing a provider of guaranteed benefits and services by ato participant or a family of deceased serviceman, volunteer, hired employee, including on the basis of monetization of such privileges, with allocation of the respective target compensation fund which, at the same time, will contribute to the development of the market environment in the implementation of social protection programs, competition for such a right among producers as well as improvement of quality of benefits and services provided within the budget segment of specified programs; c) in the field of improving quality of medical care and rehabilitation of ato participants: • conduction of representative research on posttraumatic mental stress disorders among ato ex-members, including on the basis of generalization of various involved agencies information; improvement of social inclusion of ato participants and their families in ukraine: approaches, problems 21 • further development and standardization of tactical medicine in order to reduce combat losses and level of disability, to optimize procedures for providing medical assistance to victims in areas of active conflict and their evacuation to safe territories; • development of native innovative technologies of prosthetics, mastering of such foreign samples under consultants guidance; • liquidation of prosthetics queue; systematization and intensification of measures for rehabilitation of disabled people; • institutionalization of the mechanism of cofinancing from the state, regional, local budgets of expenditures for rehabilitation centers creation (for example, on the basis of sanatoriums with appropriate medical equipment or psychoneurological hospitals); • improvement and implementation of the methods for overcoming psychological problems of armed conflict participants (according to: objective and subjective characteristics of health, emotional irritability, level of conformism to community; spectrum of aspects of returning a person to a peaceful life – legal, socio-economic and socio-cultural, moral and ethical) in the practice of psychological support units of ukrainian armed forces and related civil services; • intensification and increase of the complex of psychological and rehabilitation measures provided to the militaries directly at the place of service, in particular, as part of measures to overcome alcoholism at combat positions; • implementation of mental examination procedure on the base of military medical psychiatric commissions for persons, who have been mobilized to the armed forces and sent to ato zone, as well as for ex-members of this operation, who have expressed a desire to join the law-enforcement and state bodies; • regional dissemination of practice of training seminars conducted by psychologists and psychotherapists on provision psychological assistance to ato participants and their families; d) in the field of vocational adaptation and increase of productive potential of ato participants: • involvement to service in the armed forces and the state border guard service under the contract; • implementation of career development programs for socially active ato participants and their families members with the expansion of opportunities to hold positions in civil service institutions and law enforcement agencies; • assistance (in particular, financial) for state and public structures in organization of educational courses, trainings, consultations on improvement of professional skills in the already acquired professions, as well as retraining, launching of own business in innovative and high-tech economic activities. references: абрахамсон п., 2001, социальная эксклюзия и бедность, общественные науки и современность, 2, 158–168. бабенко с.с., 2007, социальная включенность и социальная эксклюзия: новое измерение социальных неравенств в современном обществе, [in:] методологія, теорія і практика соціологічного аналізу сучасного суспільства, видавничий центр харківського національного університету ім. в.н. каразіна, харків, 49–55. барміна г., 2015, медико-психологічна та реабілітаційна допомога учасникам ато, аптека, 7(978), http://www. apteka.ua/article/323836 [12.09.2017]. в украине насчитали 70000 бывших бойцов ато с психическими расстройствами, 2017, [in:] страна. ua, https://strana.ua/news/73295-posttravmaticheskoestressovoe-rasstrojstvo-mozhet-byt-u-o-60-70-tysyachibojcov-ato-psiholog.html [12.09.2017]. в україні немає державної програми медичної та психологічної реабілітації учасників ато, 2016, уніан, https:// health.unian.ua/country/1580106-v-ukrajini-neobhidnopriskoriti-zatverdjennya-programi-reabilitatsiji-ta-adaptatsiji-uchasnikiv-ato.html [12.09.2017]. війна за ветерана. як суспільство й держава борються за психологічну адаптацію учасників ато, 2016, новинарня, http://novynarnia.com/2016/12/30/viyna-zaveterana-yak-suspilstvo-y-derzhava-boryutsya-za-psihologichnu-adaptatsiyu-uchasnikiv-ato/ [12.09.2017]. гоц д., 2017, роботу атовцям: у вінниці створюють програму соціальної реабілітації воїнів, «veжа» – вінницький інформаційний портал, http://vezha.vn.ua/ robotu-atovtsyam-u-vinnytsi-stvoryuyut-programu-sotsialnoyi-reabilitatsiyi-voyiniv/ [12.09.2017]. гриб а.є., 2016, соціальна дезадаптація учасників бойових дій та особливості її профілактики та психокорекції, психологія, http://medpsyhology.pp.ua/%d1%81%d0%be%d1%86%d1%96%d0%b0%d0%bb%d1%8c% d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%b4%d0%b5%d0%b7%d0%b 0%d0%b4%d0%b0%d0%bf%d1%82%d0%b0%d1% 86%d1%96%d1%8f-%d1%83%d1%87%d0%b0%d 1%81%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%ba%d1%96%d0%b2%d0%b1%d0%be [12.09.2017]. довідка про підтримку учасників антитерористичної операції станом на 29 березня 2017 року, 2017, департамент соціального захисту населення тернопільської обласної державної адміністрації, http://www.sobes-ter.gov.ua/dovidka-ato.html [12.09.2017]. дорожня карта щодо забезпечення учасників ато соціальною та професійною адаптацією, 2017, державна служба україни у справах ветеранів війни та учасни22 larysa 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реабілітація військових ато в україні, центр досліджень соціальних комунікацій нбув, http://nbuviap.gov.ua/index.php?option=com_conte nt&view=article&id=2572:reabilitatsiya-vijskovikh-atov-ukrajini&catid=8&itemid=350 [12.09.2017]. план заходів щодо медичної, психологічної, професійної реабілітації та соціальної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції. розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 31.03.2015 № 359-р, 2015, http:// zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/359-2015-%d1%80 [12.09.2017]. полторак одобрил выделение 1 млрд грн на строительство 100 общежитий для военных, 2017, гордон, http://gordonua.com/news/money/poltorakodobril-vydelenie-1-mlrd-grn-na-stroitelstvo-100-obshchezhitiy-dlya-voennyh-205773.html [12.09.2017]. порядок організації соціальної та професійної адаптації учасників антитерористичної операції. постанова кабінету міністрів україни від 21.06.2017 № 432, 2017, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/432-2017%d0%bf [12.09.2017]. потіха а., /no data/, 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(eds.), 2016, підтримка та реабілітація учасників ато в україні: досвід та перспективи, хмельницький інститут соціальних технологій, хмельницький, http://dspace.luguniv.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1820/1/9.pdf [12.09.2017]. шклярська o., 2016, реабілітація ветеранів ато: як повернути до мирного життя кожного, ракурс, http:// ua.racurs.ua/1345-gospital-reabilitacija [12.09.2017]. ярская в.н., 2008, инклюзия – новый код социального равенства, [in:] образование для всех: политика и практика инклюзии, научная книга, саратов, 11–16. яценко л.д., коломієць o.o., 2015, регіональний аспект соціальної напруженості в україні: стан, фактори формування та шляхи подолання, національний інститут стратегічних досліджень, київ, http://www.niss.gov.ua/ content/articles/files/socialna_napruzhenist-fc95d.pdf [12.09.2017]. 1. introduction organization of mega events is always associated with a lot of controversy and dispute about the justification of the expenditure. in the literature and the press is a dispute how to demonstrate the actual economic effects of the mass events. increasingly, it is difficult to demonstrate a direct effect of the financial income of a mass event afterwards. very often financial income during the event, in comparison to the expenses incurred, are not so impressive. however, in this case, more important is long-term effect of investment than the direct economic efficiency of the project. the leading argument for the organization of the mega events is the expected economic effect, which involves the construction of transport infrastructure and new tourist facilities, which in turn translate to stimulate the local economy. of course, such effect can be achieved only when the created journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 25–31 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.034.7634 the impact of mega events on the local economic development through the development of social capital grażyna chaberek-karwacka (1), julia ziółkowska (2) (1) department of spatial management, institute of geography, university of gdansk, bażyńskiego 8, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, e-mail: geogk@ug.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) department of tourism and recreation, faculty of tourism and recreation, gdansk university of physical education and sport, górskiego 1, 80–336 gdańsk, poland, e-mail: julia.ziolkowska@awfis.gda.pl citation chaberek-karwacka g., ziółkowska j., 2017, the impact of mega events on the local economic development through the development of social capital, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 25–31. abstract the aim of the paper is to prove the thesis that the organization of mass events actually affect the local economic development but this effect to a large extent is not straightforward. mass events builds the social capital, which guarantees economic development in the future. the paper includes a review of the literature concerning the organization of mega events on the world and above all, a review of the available research about the effects of mass events expected and achieved afterwards. the study primarily includes the biggest sporting events in the world and in europe which took place after 2000. the paper includes also authors’ research based on the organizational effects of european football cup euro 2012 in poland and 2014 football world cup in brazil. key words mega events, tourism infrastructure, social capital, local economic development. received: 12 march 2017 accepted: 22 may 2017 published: 29 december 2017 26 grażyna chaberek-karwacka, julia ziółkowska infrastructure will not only serve the traffic associated with the event, but will be also functional for the daily needs of the residents and tourist services after the event. however, the construction of new infrastructure does not guarantee the direct effect of local economic growth. in fact, the infrastructure is only a tool for achieving this kind of goals. the most important is desire, awareness and ability to use this infrastructure by the citizens, in a way that will contribute to local economic development. important is the ability to exploit the effect of territorial marketing associated with tourism, build social networks and entrepreneurial and citizenship attitudes. the aim of the paper is to prove the thesis that the organization of mass events actually affect the local economic development but this effect to a large extent is not straightforward. mass events builds the social capital, which guarantees economic development in the future. 2. controversy over the organization of mass sport events years ago, mega sport events were reserved solely to be hosted by the first world nations that had the economic vitality to viably stage them. in recent times even developing countries have been given the chance of hosting the mega events. the justification is the statement that the hosting of mega sport event is “a chance for development”. however, observers are asking if the organizing the mega event in fact, have a positive lasting impact for the developing countries, whether this is truly benefit for the citizens and the economy of the host country (conchas, 2014). in fact, in most developing countries, it entrusted with the organization of major sporting events to prepare for the championships always take place in an atmosphere of controversy and social movements expressing opposition and discontent. recently, in south africa and brazil, on the occasion of the organization of the fifa world cup. the reason is that in developing countries it is very difficult to accept the huge public expenditure on sports infrastructure when many residents lacking homes, jobs, health care at the appropriate level and adequate infrastructure in educational institutions (chaberekkarwacka, dolinski, 2016). those who are against the organization of mass sport events such as the olympics and world cup, prove that the event consumes astronomical spending which are not concern for the welfare of citizens at all. the mega events seem to be conceived and produced as privileged events for elite. very often the unbridled investment in sporting infrastructure are opposed to the development of better social and educational programs (conchas, 2014). sport mega events very often result in the clearance of communities away from stadia either forcibly or because of rising house prices. in brazil, for example, the low of housing rights was being ignored at all (levermore, 2011). additionally, the lack of transparency in spending and decision-making showed that the brazilian government was more concerned with having an image as a big emerging country than with the welfare of its citizens. many surveys conducted after an announcement about mundial in brasil in 2014, show that the vast majority of respondents was opposed the organization that event (chaberek-karwacka, dolinski, 2016). the probe, conducted by grazyna chaberek-karwacka and karel dolinski in april 2014 which collected 225 responses, also showed the almost 80% of respondents against the organizing of the event. replies came from 25 different states of the country. the states with the largest number of answers are found in south-east region (são paulo, minas gerais and rio de janeiro) and the southern region (santa catarina, paraná and rio grande do sul). those were states which were chosen to host the world cup games. the question: “why are you in favor or against the organization of world cup in brazil?” was answered differently. the argument the most often repeated was: “government should first be addressed and solved the basic problems of the country’s health, education, security and a high rate of corruption”. the second argument, which often appeard in the responses, refered to the level amount of expenditure for organizing events. the third argument concerned the corruption in the country. on the other hand, among respondents who were in favor of organizing the world cup in the country appeard the arguments: “an increase in the number of tourists visiting the country, creating new jobs and prestige for the brazilians”1. in the government statements, the infrastructure development is the argument the most frequently given as one of the most important reason why countries and cities bid to host mega events (malhado et al., 2013). there were many expectations about the transport infrastructure development in brazilian host cities, too. actually, one of the major expected influences of 2014 fifa world cup was the infrastructure available for transportation to and from the stadiums. practically speaking, the preparedness of brazil or any host country is an undertaking that 1 the result of the probe is publishing only partly in chaberek-karwacka, dolinski, 2016. the impact of mega events on the local economic development… 27 presents complex challenges. the most important investment in the host cities is always the logistics system, which cover: revitalisation or new roads constructions and constructions of strategic crossroads and the extention of the public transport system (chaberek-karwacka, dolinski, 2016). however, in fact, is crucial whether the transport investments occurred during the preparation for mass sport events are aimed only to improving communication and mutual availability between stadiums, airports and city centers (including tourist accommodation). whether they are really useful in satisfying everyday communication needs. it is important to take into consideration the long-term effect of those spending. that is a question about the usability of new constructed infrastructure in everyday life of citizens (chaberek-karwacka, dolinski, 2016). carron has cited the words of rafael lima the bairfo da paz resident and community activist after announcing brazil the host of fifa world cup 2014: “we need jobs. we need education. we need land titles. we need health care. and we need to know where this road they are planning to build is going, and who will be affected” (carrion, 2013, p. 26). certainly there are many arguments for the mega events contribute to the growth of the economic potential and the economic development of the host, however, should look at what really has the biggest impact on this positive economic effect. 3. the real effects of mass sport events 3.1. infrastructural and economic effects organization of mega sport events requires the construction of transport and sport infrastructure. this involves huge financial expenditure, which can not be covered by private capital. the financial benefits should outweigh the involved capital, that is the idea of investing. in the face of such assumptions, huge government spending involved in the organization of mega sport events should be reflected in specific budget income, higher than expenditure. in the public finance case, the result should be a higher gdp and higher tax revenues, both from the vat and income taxes. the expected economic growth is the government’s main justification of the public expenditure for the organization of entertainment events. the economic growth should occured by development of infrastructure, higher employment and overall growth of the welfare of society. usually after the event, public opinion remains in the euphoria and no longer calculates the effects of the expenses. however, it is worth to take a look at how the assumptions of growth and economic development are realized in the economy of the host countries in long term after the event. in this paper were analyzed some examples, comparing the expectation and real effects of hosting the mega sport events. the main preparation was focused on the investments on sport and transport infrastructure (woźniak, napierała 2012). in poland, alike in other countries, main spendings concerned the building stadiums, sustainable transportation, extension of air infrastructure, roads, railways as well as the communication within the host cities and among those cities (karwacka 2010). the cost of building the 1 km of highway amounted to 17.19 million euros, which is more than twice the average cost of 1 km of motorway in europe. modernized airports were to be one of the main pillars of the success of the operation of uefa euro 2012. but, as statistics show, increased air traffic (for example, gdansk and wroclaw) was observed only in the months of games (june, july), when it increased by 14.45%. in 2013, the number of flight operations returned to the state before the championship, and even down to the level of 17 151 to 24 960 gdansk and wroclaw. a railway played a key role in the transport of passengers during the uefa euro 2012. however, in this case, also cannot observe an increased number of passengers carried in the period after the tournament. only in june 2012 the passengers number was increased. in poland, were built 4 new stadiums. the most expensive was the national stadium in warsaw, constructed by more than 1,900 million pln. it is hard to believe in achieving a positive return on investment. the annual cost of maintaining the stadium is 39.4 mln pln and far exceeds the current income of 18.17 mln pln. when athens successfully held the olympic games in 2004, many of the venues are vacant four years later, promised parks have never materialized, and new transportation infrastructure has caused problems like flooding and increased traffic. the whole legacy of the olympic games in athens was summarized as caused more problems for the local economics than the benefits generated in the event time (gong 2012). the investment of improving the communication system is always one of the main expenses due to satisfy the big transportation demand during the event, but if the city already has advanced transition system, there is no need to extend it just because of one temporary boom of visitors. prior to start a new project, the decision-makers should recognize if the communities need a magnificent venue or if there is sufficient market to maintain or make a full utilization (gong, 2012). the g. chaberek-karwacka and 28 grażyna chaberek-karwacka, julia ziółkowska k.  dolinski (2016) research concerning the usability of the brazilian mundial’s investments in everyday life of the citizens in host cities showed that all of these are parts of a basic logistic system in mobility of the surveyed cities. it seems that those investments were the most urgent and the most needed. most of them were like a missing link. moreover, most of presented investments were placed in the very center of the city where the transportation needs are the most frequently. the logistics systems in most of these 12 host cities, became more multimodal and coherent after the 2014. similar infrastructure benefits were observed in polish host cities of uefa euro 2012. especially gdansk gained the speeding up infrastructure investments in and around the city. these include a number of projects related to the modernization of transport infrastructure in the city, such as the expansion of the airport in rębiechowo and the road investment which allowed not only to provide communication facilities at the time of the championship, but also contributed to the improvement of the quality of the citizens’ life (raport:…, 2012). macroeconomic indicators such as gdp showed the highest rate in two years and the year before uefa euro 2012. gdp grew faster by 3.6 and 3.1% than the average for the euro area. a year later after the event, the economy slowed down and grew more slowly than the average for the euro area, which denies the calculations made when poland and ukraine were chosen to the hosting the uefa championships, which assumed long-term dynamic growth of gdp by 2020 (żuryński, 2014). when it comes to economic efficiency of mega sport events, it can be said that public funds involved directly resulted primarily on increased revenues of individual entrepreneurs including mainly large foreign corporations. sh. tayob (2012, p. 736) proved that during the preparation of world cup 2010: „the autonomy of the south african government, its manpower and its resources were subordinated to the demands of fifa and its corporate partners, for whom huge profits were ensured. even where profits accrued inside the south africa, the main beneficiaries were large companies able to capitalize on the huge construction project undertaken and others with privileged access to capital”. even an unemployment in every of host countries fell only seasonally. the objective benefits, both in poland and in brazil was the acceleration the development of many road projects enrolling in daily communication system of host cities (chaberek-karwacka, dolinski, 2016). 3.2. tourism and marketing effects another important argument in favor of the organization of mega sport events underlined by the supporters, is an increase in tourism and associated with it the financial benefits to the local economy. the observed effect of the championship in this aspect is very diversified, however s. du plessis and w. maennig (2011) proved that major sporting events have only a limited impact on tourism during the time of the event. one important reason is the crowding-out of “normal” tourist due to the noise, traffic jams and other disturbances. but from another side there are many expectations in the improving of city or state image. this expectation is supported by so called “barcelona effect”. the olympics represented a significant effort to restructure the city of barcelona before the olympic games in 1992. crucially the games seemed to change the way people thought of barcelona. nowadays this spanish city is perceived as a land of sun, sand and sangria, but it is easy to forget that before the games in 1992, it was a somewhat different place. for one thing, it didn’t really have a beach before. the city created 2 miles of beachfront and a modern marina by demolishing industrial buildings on the waterfront before the games. between 1990 and 2001 the country went from being the 11th “best city” in europe to the 6th, according to one ranking. the ioc says that 20 years after the games barcelona is now the 12th most popular city destination for tourists in the world, and the 5th in europe (taylor, 2012). that is why tourism and marketing effects should be analyzed in two aspects: the tourism just before and during the championships and also in long term after the mega event. the example of positive touristic effect of the organization the mega sport event is germany which has increased its share among the countries receiving the largest number of foreign tourists after the mundial 2006. this development, was similar to the level of global, as in the case of a european country is a very good result, due to the fact that europe as a tourist region steadily losing its share in incoming tourism to other regions of the world (especially for the region of eastern asia pacific). another positive effect on touristic attractiveness has been observed in poland after the uefa euro 2012 although there weren’t so many tourists as polish authorities had expected. importantly, the vast majority of foreign visitors left the country positively surprised by what they saw. they were pleased not only with the level of sports events, but also of organization, infrastructure, hotel and catering offer and entertainment. good assessment issued to poland by foreign visitors have a chance to bring profit in the future. according to the pbs2 survey, as many as 92 percent 2 pbs – the largest polish research company. the impact of mega events on the local economic development… 29 of respondents pbs declared to recommend their friends poland as a country worth visiting and attractive to tourists. 79 percent of respondents stated that they will come to poland again (woźniak, napierała, 2012, p. 453). organizers and economists share the view that after the championship significantly improved the image of poland in the international arena. this was the result of both a large number of information about poland in foreign media as well as the positive feedback about the country’s foreign supporters. this is confirmed by brand finance institute survey conducted in 2013, in which the polish national brand remained in the top twenty of the world’s most valuable brands (woźniak, napierała, 2012). however, in 2008, the uefa european football championship organized two countries, austria and switzerland. in both countries, in the year following the organization of the european championship (2009), was recorded a decrease of the total number of foreign tourists (respectively: austria – 2.6%, switzerland – 3.7%). it is very strange, considering that the two countries are characterized by a recognized and strong brand among potential tourists (especially practicing winter forms of tourism), and regardless of whether they are organizing a big event or not, should expect usually increased arrival of tourists from other countries (marczak, 2014). 3.3. social effects as shown above, the financial results of the organization of sports events and macroeconomic indicators provide a lot of controversy, and thus on this basis is not possible to evidently determine the real impact of the event on the socio-economic development of the host country. in contrast, those who advocate positively with regard to the fifa world cup point to intercultural awareness as one of the benefits. that is mean that these mega-events allow nations and individual contestants to make a social network, by recognizing and cooperating with each other in spite of their differences but also opens up unique dialogical opportunities (conchas, 2014). in fact, even the main initiators and organizers somehow admit that the biggest benefits of the championships are social one. for example, after world cup in 2010 in south africa politicians, organizers and fifa alike proudly proclaimed that the event was resounding success because large number of south africans from all race and class backgrounds united under the national flag (tayob, 2012). cornelissen claim that even protests and demonstrations against the mega sport events built the social networking and social capital. at the example of south africa, “while many of the demonstrations and civic actions were framed an in opposition to the world cup, they were more significant for how they were embedded within a particular power configuration in the postapartheid era, and their linkage to systemic process. the demonstrations placed in sharp focus the political divergences of the country. such divergences are often accompanied by varied and opposing recollections of history that shape societal engagement and counteract national process of unification” (cornelissen, 2012, p. 345). social capital is an essential element of civil society. most social benefits brought the preparation of the fifa world cup 2010 in south africa, uefa euro 2012 in poland and the fifa world cup 2014 in brazil. the organization of such a big event has become a positive impulse and mobilize society to work together. in poland, it seems that additionally managed to break down the barriers between the central authorities, local authorities and residents of host cities, even through extensive public consultation that took place on the occasion of the organization of fan zones and stadiums during the construction. extremely important was the promotion of volunteerism, creating a base of volunteers and the construction of a bank of experience that can be used in the organization of future projects of similar scale and level (woźniak, napierała, 2012; raport:..., 2012). the biggest challenge in the process of preparation for the tournament, in addition to the modernization of infrastructure, was just possibility for the community to face something important. with something that will trigger the need to coordinate efforts around a common purpose. from the beginning it was clear that the championship cannot be organized without the broad collaboration of various public institutions, to which the intended target was reached, had to go beyond the rigid framework of its bureaucratic world (woźniak, napierała, 2012). 4. the importance of human capital in the socio-economic development the main argument justifying massive public spending to prepare for the mega sport events is the socioeconomic development. according to united nation (transforming…, 2015), the sustainable development has been defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. for sustainable development to be achieved, it is crucial to harmonize three core elements: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental 30 grażyna chaberek-karwacka, julia ziółkowska protection. these elements are interconnected and all are crucial for the well-being of individuals and societies. that means, the sustainability contains the collaboration of economic, social and environmental goals. in the economic aspect, sustainable development is the need to promote economic development, which gives a real increase in prosperity while maintaining this growth in the future (chaberekkarwacka, 2012). the economic growth is based on the rational public finance management, entrepreneurship and the economic effectiveness of individual companies. according to annual reports of consumer goods forum and capgemini (the future…, 2012) to be prepare for the future, business have to be more sustainable and increase the collaboration across the industries. networks and collaboration can lead to more innovative solution in the industry and social engineering. according to the research, the base of competitive advantage and efficiency is transparency, sharing the information and networking (chaberek-karwacka, 2012). this kind of management is not possible without the trust. trust is based on the universal norms which should lie on the foundations of the entrepreneurship and business. these economic demands are directly related to the social aspects of sustainable development. the social aspect of development is based on providing equal opportunities for development, thus ensuring all people to have access to education, productive and fairly paid job and to participate actively in the public decisions (chaberek-karwacka, 2012). an environmental aspect of sustainable development is associated with persistent behavior of natural capital and the integrity of the environment necessary for the preservation of life on earth. this means the requirement that the natural goods and services were used so as not to undermine the networks of interdependence ensure the continuation of ecosystems, and on the other hand, not to reduce the contribution of these goods and services in the creation of human well-being. environmental goods and therefore cannot be used in excess (chaberekkarwacka, 2012). those postulates need the awareness of the entrepreneurs and consumers. at the same time, consumers should uphold ecological business through their market choices. taking into account all aspect of sustain development, the key to achieve it is creation of the social capital. the social capital can be consider as a nexus of both direct and indirect relationship between the firms, the environment and the social unity. the intellectual capital refers to the network of relationships between firms, the citizens, the employees and the social agents. in the nowadays economy, social intangibles become essential resources in order to achieve distinctive competencies. they are a set of critical resources that enable the creation of essential competences. moreover, social activities increase the capacities for the creation, sharing and management of knowledge generating sustainable competitive advantage (bueno et al., 2004). the social capital is generally found in the social structures of society, allowing individuals to act effectively within these structures. it is best conceptualized as a cumulative and transferable public good, freely accessible by the community (arcodia, whitford, 2006). to possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is other, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage. it involves civic engagement social norms, networks development (willis et al., 2004), responsibility for the public goods and environment. this way building social capital secures networking and trust in the business as well as the protection of the environment. all of them are necessary for the future economic and social development. 5. conclusion the expectations from the hosting of mega-sporting events are not only limited in the economic impacts such as touristic base development, increasing employment opportunities, infrastructure development and urban growth, but also include the positive social impacts such as international awareness and community pride, which are perceived as or even more important than positive economic benefits. it is worth noting that political purpose very often plays the main role in the decision of hosting a mega-sporting event. it is an opportunity offering host communities an internationally-focused platform to present and promote their national identities and cultures, as well as industry and markets which play the key role in the economic growth and are the most political sensitive. successfully hosting a sport mega event would be viewed as a great achievement in political career, which come with foreign currency. that is why some policymakers choose to be blind about the negative impacts and keep eager to win the hosting rights (gong, 2012). during the preparation for the tournament, not everything goes as the host would like to. there is no the assumed amount of highways and not the entire rail network become modernized. beautiful stadiums, which are built after the tournament not only don’t bring profits, but don’t even earn their keep. however, there are grounds for believing that the organization of the mega sport events creates the impact of mega events on the local economic development… 31 the social foundations, that means social capital, consists of social skills and tools necessary for the achieving the economic growth and development in the future. references arcodia ch., whitford m., 2006, festival attendance and the development of social capital, journal of convention & event tourism, 8(2), 1–18. bueno e., paz salmador m., rodriguez o., 2004, the role of social capital in today’s economy. empirical evidence and proposal of a new model of intellectual capital, journal of intellectual capital, 5(4), 12–17. carrion m., 2013, brazil’s poor pay world cup penalty, progressive, 77(7), 26–29. chaberek-karwacka g., 2012, logistyka w regionalnej polityce lokalizacyjnej. wydawnictwo universytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk. chaberek-karwacka g., dolinski k. 2016, usability of the transport investments constructed during the preparation for mass sports events, after the event, [in:] m. chaberek, l. reszka (eds.), modelowanie procesów i systemów logistycznych, zeszyty naukowe ug ekonomika transportu i logistyka, 58, 309–324. conchas m., 2014, research possibilities for the 2014 fifa world cup in brazil, soccer & society, 15(1), 167–174. cornelissen s., 2012, “our struggles are bigger than the world cup”: civic activism, state-society relations and the sociopolitical legacies of the 2010 fifa world cup, the british journal of sociology, 63(2), 328–348. du plessis s., maennig w., 2011, the 2010 fifa world cup high-frequency data economics: effects on international tourism and awareness for south africa, development southern africa, 28(3), 349–365. gong q., 2012, the positive and negative economic contributions of mega-sporting events to local communities, [in:] unlv theses, dissertations, professional papers, and capstones, paper 1362, http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/ thesesdissertations/1362 [10.10.2015] karwacka g., 2010, the influence of international sport events on development of infrastructure: euro 2012 in poland – case study, romanian review on political geography, 12(2), 375–385. levermore r., 2011, sport-for-development and the 2010 football world, geography compass, 5(12), 886–897. malhado a.c.m., araujo l.m., ladle r.j., 2013, missed opportunities: sustainable mobility and the 2014 fifa world cup in brazil, journal of transport geography, 31, 207–208. marczak m., 2014, wpływ organizacji wielkich eventów piłkarskich na rozwój turystyki na przykładzie wybranych destylacji, turystyka kulturowa, 12, 54-67. raport: podsumowanie kosztów i oszacowanie korzyści z organizacji turnieju uefa euro 2012, 2012, deloitte, warszawa, https://www.um.warszawa.pl/sites/default/files/raport_ euro_pl.pdf [01.03.2016] taylor a., 2012, how the olympic games changed barcelona forever, business insider. (26, jul 2012.), http://www.businessinsider.com/ [15.03.2016] tayob sh., 2012, the 2010 world cup in south africa: a millennial capitalist moment, journal of southern african studies, 38(3), 717–736. the future value chain: building strategies for the new decade, 2012, consumer goods forum, capgemini, http://www. gs1.at/fileadmin/user_upload/broschuere_tcgf_future_value_chain_2020.pdf [30.03.2016] transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, 2015, united nations, a/res/70/1. willis j., killerby p., dollery b., 2004, social economics and social capital, international journal of social economics, 31(3), 239–258. woźniak j., napierała m., 2013, ekonomiczne i społeczne korzyści wynikające z organizacji przez polskę turnieju uefa euro w roku 2012, journal of health sciences, 3(13), 428–465. żuryński r. 2014, ekonomiczno-organizacyjne efekty uefa euro 2012, economics of the 21st century, 3(3), 127–148. 1. introduction detailed studying of dynamics of demographic indicators forms a basis for decision-making in the questions touching current problems of social development. results of the analysis of change of the demographic processes which are formed under the influence of various factors of development of territories are of interest to public and administrative structures. the methodical basis for probabilistic forecasting is balance methods of demographic forecasts (balance of transitions across age cohorts, balance of births and deaths in different age cohorts, balance of migration). demographic balance indicators also act as base for calculation of the standardized coefficients designed to commensurate demographic characteristics. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(4), 5–13 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.032.7632 analysis of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states since the end of the xviii century and forecast up to 2096 andrei manakov (1), pavel suvorkov (2) (1) department of geography, pskov state university, lenina 2, 180000 pskov, russia, e-mail: region-psk@yandex.ru (corresponding author) (2) institute of demography of the higher school of economics, bolshoy trehsvyatitelskiy per. 3, 109028 moscow, russia, e-mail: pavel_suvorkov@mail.ru citation manakov a., suvorkov p., 2017, analysis of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states since the end of xviii century and a forecast up to 2096, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(4), 5–13. abstract negative demographic tendencies are some of the most serious problems of development of post-socialist countries. goal of this research is historical analysis and forecast of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states (estonia, latvia and lithuania). the demographic forecast is prepared on the basis of revision of forecast model of the population division of united nations department of economic and social affairs. scenario approach and simulation multi-factor modeling act as the main methods of this research. one of the key objectives is critical analysis of use of the hypothesis of stabilization of migration components of demographic processes in scenarios of un secretariat. according to the most probable scenario, latvia (-49% of modern population) can become the leader in expected depopulation within the next 80 years among the considered countries, smaller indicators of depopulation are expected in lithuania (-43%), poland (-38%) and estonia (-34%). key words birth rate, mortality, migrations, modeling, demographic forecast, poland, estonia, latvia, lithuania. received: 13 july 2017 accepted: 25 august 2017 published: 29 december 2017 6 andrei manakov, pavel suvorkov the demographic and migration situation in poland and the baltic states (estonia, latvia and lithuania) in post-socialist time is addressed in a rather large number of academic papers (apsite et al., 2012; berzins, zvidrins, 2011; jasilionis et al., 2015; michalski, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; sipavičienė, stankūnienė, 2011; мкртчян, карачурина, 2014; станайтис, станайтис, 2012). what sets this research apart from these works is the analysis of demographic processes in the baltic states and poland for a rather long time interval – since the end of the 18th century to the present day. in addition to the demographic analysis, a long-term forecast (until the end of the 21st century) relying on multiple-factor mathematical modeling is presented in the article. 2. source base and methodology of the research presented in this article are possibilities of use of bifurcation models which underlie the systems attempting to reflect the chaotic nature of empirical phenomena. calculations used for forecasting are based on averaged bayesian probabilistic predictions of the population division of united nations department of economic and social affairs (world population prospects…, 2015a, 2015b). in particular, these include a forecast of total birth rate, average maternal age at the birth of children, probability of death in each age cohort, exceedance of expected life expectancy of women at birth (in relation to men), ratio of the number of births of boys to the number of births of girls. revision of methodology of the year 2015 and retrospective demographic indicators since 1950 is considered. the main difference of the demographic modeling applied within this research is accounting of migration processes according to the government statistics of the aforementioned countries. extrapolation of indicators of dynamics of migration processes in the baltic states and poland is made taking into account the divergence of standard deviations (according to the data from 2004–2015). (baza demografia gus; eesti statistika; latvijas statistica; oficialiosios statistikos portalas). in the process of preparing the demographic forecast, the influence of migration processes on the aggregative age cohorts with account of gender differences is considered. the offered demographic scenario is based on the stabilization forecast of un secretariat and extrapolation of migration processes according to the government statistics. positive, average and negative options of interaction of the migration factors causing transnational migrations in the concerned countries are considered. changes of influence of expelling and attracting factors on migration processes are proved by criteria of standard deviations in aggregative age cohorts distributed according to gender characteristics. as a comparison, the results of stabilization forecasting of un secretariat are presented. the probabilistic forecast of birth rate, mortality and migration is based on the demographic indicators which are result of estimates of possible perspective values of births, death and migrations in each age cohort of the corresponding gender group in the population. the inbound migration flow of women of fertile age is considered in calculating the birth of the corresponding age cohorts, the outbound migration flow of women of fertile age is withdrawn from the corresponding age cohorts acting as base for calculation of births. the outbound external migration flows are withdrawn from structure of the corresponding age cohorts and cease to take part in age transition across territories. the inbound external migration flows are included in the corresponding age cohorts and begin to take part in age transition across territories. similar methods of optimization of demographic forecasts are presented in a significant amount of the scientific research relying on agent-oriented approach (silverman et al., 2013; wu, birkin, 2012; макаров et al., 2014). this technique has been evaluated by us during preparation of the demographic forecast for the central and eastern europe countries (манаков, суворков, 2017). 3. demographic processes within the modern territory of the baltic states in 1795–1950 at the beginning of the 19th century, the baltic region was characterized by a level of a natural increase that could be considered low for the russian empire. one can also note the high migration activity of this region’s population, first of all the external migrations. the population of kurland and estonia even decreased slightly at the beginning of the 19th century. it can be seen that during patriotic war of 1812 the territory of the modern lithuania suffered drastic depopulation where the number of inhabitants decreased in 1795–1815 (кабузан, 2009). growth of the population in the territory of the modern baltic states was registered a bit later, which can be attributed to less significant epidemic losses in the 1830s, lack of serious crop failures, which led to positive migration balance. it is also necessary to note that serfdom had been abolished in baltic provinces by 1820, however, under the condition that the nobility should retain full landed property. since the analysis of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states… 7 1940s the population of the region grew at extremely slow rates which were considerably lower than the average empire level. across the russian empire the increase in population during the first half of the 19th century amounted to more than 70%. the decline in the rates of population growth can be associated with the high level of population density in the baltic provinces, insignificant land allotments of the peasantry, the intensification of agriculture, and decrease in mortality at early age. the population of territories of the modern baltic states amounted to 2 million 622 thousand people in 1795. the highest population was observed in territories of modern lithuania, a slightly smaller population inhabited the territories of modern latvia and estonia. during the first half of the 19th century the population of the territory of the modern baltic states grew rather evenly. the average annual natural increase of the population in 1804–1810 amounted to 0.7% within the territories of esthonian province and 1.2% in kurland province (кабузан, 2009). at the same time the increase in all the baltic provinces has reached more than 1.6% a year (due to livonia). in 1811–1820, the natural increase amounted to 1.0% in esthonian province, 1.2% in kurland province, and 1.2% across the baltics in general. in 1821–1830 the natural increase in esthonian province grew and amounted to more than 1.2% per year, while it remained at the same level in kurland and the baltics in general. in 1831–1840, the rate of the natural increase in the baltic provinces decreases and reaches about 0.9% per year (with a slightly lower level in the territories of estonia). the average annual natural increase in 1841–1850 decreases to 0.4% in esthonian province while the increase in livonian province amounted to more than 1% for that period, and kurland province only grew by 0.7%. during 1795–1858, growth of the population living in the territories of the modern estonia amounted to 251.2 thousand people, or 51.1% of the population in 1795, with total population reaching 743.0 thousand people; in the modern latvia – 368.8 thousand people, or 41.6% of the population in 1795, with total population reaching 1256.0 thousand people; in the modern lithuania – 525.6 thousand people, or 42.3% of the population in 1795, with total population reaching 1768.8 thousand people. during the second half of the 19th century, the population of the territory of the modern baltic states starts growing unevenly. in the 1860s, the situation with allotments somewhat improves for the population living in the territory of the modern lithuania since many land allotments of peasants were expanded in connection with landowners participating in a revolt in poland. it should be noted also that during the second third of the 19th century the increase in population in the territories of the modern estonia, latvia and lithuania was higher than in europe in general, but below that in the russian empire. in the 1880s, the increase in population in the territories of the modern baltic states dropped even lower than that across europe in general. the greatest increase in population during the second half of the 19th century was registered in latvia (кабузан, 2009), while the territories of the modern estonia had the lowest growth. positive migration balance of the population in the territories of the modern baltic states was insignificant in the 19th century, the migratory movement (within the russian empire) wasn’t widespread among the population of the baltic lands. at the same time, international (and transoceanic as well) migration from the territories of the modern lithuania becomes quite widespread. in the 1850–1860s, the annual increase in population in the baltic provinces amounted to 0.7–0.9%. in the 1870s, the natural increase of the population in the provinces increased again and reached more than 1% per year, which was above the all-european level, but lower than the growth level across the russian empire. thus, growth of the population living in the territories of the modern estonia during 1858– 1897 amounted to 215.3 thousand people, or 29.0% of the population of 1858, with total population reaching 958.3 thousand people; in the territories of the modern latvia growth amounted to 673.3 thousand people, or 53.6% of the population of 1858, with total population reaching 1929.3 thousand people; in the modern lithuania growth amounted to 984.9 thousand people, or 55.7% of the population of 1858, with total population reaching 2753.7 thousand people. it can be said that, during this period, the population of the territories of the modern latvia and lithuania had grown more considerably than the population of the territories of the modern estonia. during the first decade of the 20th century, the increase in population in the baltic provinces decreased to 0.7% per year, and during the second decade of the 20th century – to 0.3%, which can be attributed to conducting warfare of world war i in those territories. despite the aforementioned negative factors, the population of the territories of the modern baltic states has experienced certain growth in relation to the level of the first 1897 population census of the russian empire, namely, it grew by 17.5% in estonia, 23.1% in latvia and 19.7% in lithuania by 1915–1917. most likely, the main losses in population of the territories of the modern baltic 8 andrei manakov, pavel suvorkov states connected with world war i, the civil war and the wars of independence were registered in the censuses of 1923-1925. judging by these censuses, one may talk of reduction of population living in the territories of the modern baltic states. the paramount decrease was recorded in the territories of the modern latvia (-22.3% of the population at the end of the 1910s). almost identical population loss was experienced in the territories of the modern lithuania (-21.2%), a little lower one – in the territories of the modern estonia (-11.3%). it can be observed that migrations affected the population considerably influence during this period, while earlier relatively intensive external immigrations were only registered from the territories of the modern lithuania. in the 20–30s of the 20th century, the baltic region was outside the ussr. sovereign republics – estonia, latvia and lithuania originated in the baltic states. the vilna region was a part of poland from 1919 to 1939. during this period, the former esthonian province was joined by estonia in its entirety, as well as a part of livonia (including kreis werro, kreis pernau, kreis fellin, kreis ösel and kreis dorpat). besides, a part of kreis walk of livonia, yamburgsky and gdovsky uezds of the petrograd province, and a northwest part of the pskov province were also within estonia. the kovno province, a part of the suwalki province of poland were within lithuania. in 1923, the klaipeda region of the former east prussia was consigned to lithuania to become a part of germany in 1939, and in 1945 it became a part of lithuania again. the kurland province (with the exception of a small region which was a part of lithuania), the inflyanty part of the vitebsk province, a part of the former province of livonia, and a part of ostrovsky uezd of the pskov province becames a part of latvia all became parts of latvia after 1920. demographic population censuses of the 1920– 1930s in estonia, latvia and lithuania also allow us to explore demographic processes of these countries. by 1939, the population of estonia had grown by 53.2 thousand people, the population of latvia – by 102.2 thousand people, and the population of lithuania – by 353 thousand people. in general, the population of the baltic states amounted to 5951.2 thousand people in 1939. the further demographic situation in the baltic states becomes unstable, which caused decrease of population in the borders of the modern lithuania by 241 thousand people by 1959 (decrease by 8.2% as compared to the population of 1939, including losses in the period of the great patriotic war). on the contrary, the population in estonia and latvia grew by 144.8 thousand people (growth by 13.8% as compared to the population of 1939) and 146.5 thousand people (7.5%), respectively. 4. demographic processes in poland in the 1795–1950s at the beginning of the 19th century, the territory of the modern poland was characterized by high population density and an average level of natural increase (кабузан, 2008). for example, 3151.6 thousand people inhabited the territories of kingdom of poland in 1795, and 4810.9 thousand people – in 1834. thus, the increase in population of kingdom of poland during the 40-year period amounted to 1659.3 thousand people, or 52.6% of the population in 1795, which corresponds to annual increase of 1.1%. however, during the subsequent period of more than twenty years the population of kingdom of poland did not only stop increasing, but even decreased to 4696.9 thousand people in 1856. if we were to estimate an average annual increase for more than fifty years (from 1795 to 1856), then it is possible to come to a conclusion that the population in these territories grows with an average speed of 0.7% per year (while the average annual increase in population in the territories of the modern baltic states amounted to 0.6% per year during this period). it may also be noted that the high migration activity of the population of this region oriented towards outbound migrations (migration activity of the population of these territories remains high within the considered time period and further on). growth of urbanization was a significant demographic factor in the polish territories. the network of cities remains almost the same in comparison with the first half of the 19th century, but the population of polish cities grows quickly. during the second half of the 19th century and the first one and a half decade of the 20th century, the population of the territory of kingdom of poland grew with an average speed of 1.7% per year and exceeded 12 million people by the beginning of world war i (while the average annual increase in population in the territories of the modern baltic states amounted to 1.0% per year during this period) (кабузан, 2008). influenced by military and political shocks of the 20 th century, further demographic situation in the territory of the modern poland is contradictory, but one can note the preservation of the high rate of increase in population until the end of the 1940s, exceeding 1.7% per year. analysis of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states… 9 5. population processes in the territories of the baltic states in 1950–2015 at the present time, the demographic situation in the baltic states is characterized by the low birth rate that is insufficient for each woman to be replaced by daughter who would attain the child-bearing age. during the analyzed period, the birth rate in the baltic states is characterized by decrease in absolute values of births per woman, and change of the age profile of births. if we were to consider an approximate number of births per woman by the end of the analyzed period that is necessary for natural reproduction of the population (about 2.14 births per woman), this coefficient was significantly below this mark by the end of the period. one can also note the minimum values of coefficient of total birth rate across latvia (1.17) and estonia (1.33) in 1995–2000, and in lithuania (1.28) in 2000-2005, which was caused by peculiarities of the demographic paradigm change, socio-economic factors and characteristics of intergenerational connections in age cohorts of women (world population prospects …, 2015a, 2015b). one can note relative growth of number of births per woman at the end of the analyzed period across all baltic states (more than 1.48). compared to the east european values, it is a satisfactory indicator (for instance, in hungary the indicator is 1.34, in poland and slovakia – 1.37, in the czech republic – 1.45). relatively higher coefficient values are observed in lithuania (1.57) and estonia (1.59), the minimum value – in latvia (1.48). thus, the insufficient level of births in the baltic states should not be viewed as a rare phenomenon and corresponds to the general tendencies reflected in the theory of demographic transition. birth rate dynamics in the baltic states reflects changes of age profiles of birth rate which highlight transformation of reproductive behaviour. reduction of the contribution of younger age groups to coefficient of total birth rate and increase in the contribution of more advanced ages of women is manifestation of the second demographic transition. in the baltic states, signs of the second demographic transition appeared in the second half of the 1990s – the first half of the 2000s. for all baltic states, the contribution of age cohorts of women up to 25 years to coefficient of total birth rate was considerably reduced since 1990–1995 (180.2 births per one thousand women not older than 25 years in estonia, 175.5 – in latvia, 192.0 – in lithuania) by 2000–2005 (when it reached 101.8 births per one thousand women not older than 25 years in estonia, 93.2 – in latvia, 99.9 – in lithuania), and it increased for the senior age groups of reproductive age – since 1990–1995 (145.2 births per one thousand women older than 25 years in estonia, 150.9 – in latvia, 171.2 – in lithuania) by 2000–2005 (when it reached 176.4 births per one thousand women older than 25 years in estonia, 163.9 – in latvia, 155.8 – in lithuania). these changes have brought the age profile of birth rate in the baltic states closer to that characteristic of western europe (world population prospects …, 2015a, 2015b). it can be noted that, historically, in the baltic states the distribution of birth rate was such that peak coefficients accounted to the age cohort of 20– 24 year old women in estonia, latvia (1950–2000) and lithuania (1965–2000), and the age cohort of 25–29 year old women in lithuania (1950–1965). by 1965–1970, the activity of child-bearing at the age up to 25 years had increased across all baltic states, which can be attributed to the reduction of total number of births in general and the relative maintaining of the age of the first female child-bearing. in 1990-1995, the average age of mother at the childbearing across all baltic states was minimal (estonia – 25.3 years, latvia – 25.6 years, lithuania – 25.6 years), which was connected to socio-economic factors. after 1995–2000, average age of mothers at the child-bearing increased rapidly, which was caused by the postponement of the first child-bearing until a later fertile age, as well as peculiarities of demographic transition (deformation of the gender and age pyramid graph). during 2010–2015, average age at the child-bearing amounted to 29.4 years in estonia, 29.3 years in latvia, and 29.0 years in lithuania (world population prospects …, 2015a, 2015b). the highest relative weight of births in the age cohort of 20–24 year old women accounts for 1975– 1980 (40.8% of all births); 1990–1995 (43.3% of all births). the highest relative weight of births in the age cohort of 25–29 year old women accounts for 1950–1955 (32.8% of all births); 2010–2015 (31.2% of all births). the greatest indicators of number of births in the senior fertile age cohorts of women (older than 30 years) are observed in 1950–1955 (39.3% of all births); 2010–2015 (33.8% of all births) (world population prospects …, 2015a, 2015b). thus, in the conditions of the general negative dynamics of coefficient of total birth rate in the last 30 years, there was a shift of number of births to a younger age (up to 25 years) in estonia in 1975– 1980, in the 1950s in latvia, and in 1990–1995 in lithuania. at the same time, the return of the majority of births to senior women’s age took place across all baltic states in 1995–2000. gender and age pyramid graphs of the population in the baltic states are substantially deformed. 10 andrei manakov, pavel suvorkov we note a considerable decrease in the age cohorts which have suffered losses during world war ii, and which were descendants of the age cohorts involved in world war i. at the same time, a considerable negative deviation in population of 30–39 year old men and older is observed in 1955, and also in population of women at the age of 35–39 years, which was a consequence of world war ii. decrease in the number of age cohorts born during world war ii and directly after the war is not as evident (fig. 1). deformations of gender and age pyramid graphs of the population in the baltic states by 1985 are not so pronounced, however, deformations of cohorts still are clearly defined at the age of 40–44 years (born during world war ii) in estonia, 35–44 years (born during world war ii and directly after the war) in latvia, 35 years and older in lithuania (fig. 2). in the mid-nineties of the 20th century, gender and age pyramid graphs in the baltic states have received new deformations of structure due to considerable decrease in births. in 2015, one should note a considerable decrease in number of 15-24 year old men and 15–19 year old women in estonia, which, most likely, is caused by blurring of the borders of the periods of alternation of generations in connection with an unstable social and economic situation, the shift of births to older ages, active migrations of young men in the 2000s. the broadening of the direct basis of the pyramid is connected with economic and structural factors which have caused a certain increase in the number of postponed births, and blurring of the borders of alternation of generations. in an age cohort of 20–24 year old people, a non-standard distribution of number of men and women is observed (considerable overweight of women), which does not correspond to the difference in the accelerated men’s mortality and insignificant excess of number of births of girls in comparison with the number of births of boys. this phenomenon testifies to the migration component. it is possible to assume that men are more fig. 1. gender and age pyramid graphs of the population of estonia, latvia and lithuania in 1955 source: world population prospects…, 2015a, 2015b. fig. 2. gender and age pyramid graphs of the population of estonia, latvia and lithuania in 1985 source: world population prospects…, 2015a, 2015b. analysis of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states… 11 active in terms of change of residence during educational and labor activity. in 2015, one can note a considerable decrease in the number of 15-19 year old and younger men and women in latvia and lithuania, which was caused by blurring of the borders of the periods of alternation of generations, an unstable social and economic situation, shift of births to an older age, and migrations. the pyramid basis practically is not broadening. in the age cohort of 20–24 year old people, the phenomenon similar to estonia (fig. 3) is observed. 6. demographic processes in poland in 1950-2015 in poland, birth rate was falling during the entirety of the considered period. values of coefficient of total birth rate in poland decrease from 3.6 at the beginning of the period to 1:37 at the end of the period. the minimum values of coefficient of total birth rate are recorded in 2000–2005 (1.24), which was generally caused by peculiarities of the demographic paradigm change (shift of births towards older age). it should be noted that the number of births per woman at the end of the analyzed period is slightly lower in poland than in the baltic states. compared to the east european figures, number of births per woman in poland is one of the lowest. historically, the birth rate in poland was at a high level, it becomes insufficient for simple reproduction of female generations only in the 1990s. in poland, distribution of birth rate was almost equal in age cohorts of 20–24 year old and 25–29 year old women by 1950s. the activity of child-bearing at the age up to 25 years increased during the 1960s, with simultaneous fast decrease in number of absolute births per woman. at the same time, the relative age of the first female childbearing practically remained the same. average age of mother at the child-bearing was higher in poland than in the baltic states, and during the entire analyzed period it was never lower than 26 years. in the second half of the 1990s, average age of mothers at the child-bearing increased, however, this growth was not as considerable as in the baltic states, which is possibly connected with higher economic soundness of the population of poland during the period of government reforms. the highest relative weight of births in the age cohort of 20-24 year old women accounts for 1980– 1995 (more than 39% of all births). the highest relative weight of births in the age cohort of 25–29 year old women accounts for 1995–2015 (more than 33% of all births). the greatest indicators of number of births in the senior fertile age cohorts of women (older than 30 years) are observed in 1950–1955 (40.0% of all births), as well as in 2010–2015 (41.1% of all births) (world population prospects …, 2015a, 2015b). thus, in the conditions of the general negative dynamics of coefficient of total birth rate in poland, as well as in the baltic states, there was a shift of births towards senior women’s age. due to the increase in life expectancy of the population in poland during the second half of the 20th century and the fast decrease in number of births, there was an increase in median age of the population, which exceeded 30 years by the middle of the 1980s, and by the end of the analyzed period it amounted to 40 years already. accelerated aging of the population is verified by the median age considerably exceeding the average age. deformations of gender and age pyramid graphs in poland are considerable and similar to fig. 3. gender and age pyramid graphs of the population of estonia, latvia and lithuania in 2015 source: world population prospects…, 2015a, 2015b. 12 andrei manakov, pavel suvorkov the deformations which were observed in the baltic states. in 1955, a considerable negative deviation in population of 35–39 year old men and older is observed, as well as women at age of 35–39 years. the decrease in number of the age cohort of the 10–14 year old people born during world war ii is quite significant (fig. 4). decrease in deformation of gender and age pyramid graphs of the population of poland was not as pronounced as in the baltic states. deformations of cohorts are significant at the age of the 40–44 year old people (born during world war ii) and the main age of their descendants – 10-19 year old people. deformations of structure of the gender and age pyramid graphs in poland are close to those across the baltic states in 2015. 7. the forecast of dynamics of the population of the baltic states and poland until 2096 according to fundamental principles of un and eurostat, outbound net migrations across the baltic states have to be minimized by 2035. if the expected minimization of outbound net migrations does not happen, the population of the baltic states will decrease considerably as a result of migration outflow. on the basis of the carried-out analysis of intensity of migrations in the baltic states during 2004–2015, we suggested that the average net migrations of separate ages distributed according to gender should be used. for imitating modeling for 2017–2096 we have used average values of coefficient of net migrations for 2004–2015 for population at the beginning of the year distributed according to gender and age categories. in case of implementation of the extrapolation migration scenario, if stabilization of number of births per woman and growth of life expectancy within the next 80 years takes place, average annual decline in population will amount to 0.5% for estonia (for the age older than 50 years – 0.3%), 1.6% for latvia (for the age older than 50 years – 1.3%), 1.8% for lithuania (for the age older than 50 years – 1.5%), 0.7% for poland (for the age older than 50 years – 0.2%). in case of implementation of the scenario assuming increase in migration attractiveness, stabilization of number of births per woman and growth of life expectancy, a small positive increase in population of 0.1% per year (for the age older than 50 years – 0.3%) will become possible in estonia. in other countries, decline in population is expected even in case of the positive scenario implementation, which will amount to 0.9% for latvia (for the age older than 50 years – 0.7%), 0.7% for lithuania (for the age older than 50 years – 0.6%), 0.6% for poland (for the age older than 50 years – 0.2%). in case of implementation of the scenario assuming decrease in migration attractiveness, stabilization of number of births per woman and growth of life expectancy, average annual decline in population will amount to 1.1% for estonia (for the age older than 50 years – 0.9%), 2.3% for latvia (for the age older than 50 years – 2.0%), 2.8% for lithuania (for the age older than 50 years – 2.4%), 0.7% for poland (for the age older than 50 years – 0.3%). fig. 4. gender and age pyramid graphs of the population of poland in 1955, 1985 and 2015 source: world population prospects…, 2015a, 2015b. analysis of demographic processes in poland and the baltic states… 13 according to the authors, the most probable is the realization of the “high” version of the forecast for lithuania, latvia, poland, and the average version of the forecast for estonia. according to the expected scenario chosen through the use of expert method, the greatest population losses (more than 49%, with population reaching 995 thousand people at the beginning of 2096) are predicted in latvia. less considerable decrease in number (more than 43%) is expected in lithuania (the predicted number for the beginning of 2096 – 1635 thousand people). in poland, population loss is predicted to amount to more than 38% (the predicted number for the beginning of 2096 – 23747 thousand people). the smallest losses of the population (more than 34%), according to the chosen version of the forecast, can be expected in estonia (the predicted number for the beginning of 2096 – 861 thousand people). 8. conclusions thus, the leader in expected depopulation among the countries chosen for the analysis during the 80-year period is latvia (-49%), smaller indicators of depopulation are expected in lithuania (-43%), poland (-38%) and estonia (-34%). the negative demographic factors which aren’t related to migrations are more pronounced in latvia than in lithuania, during the forecast period. one can note quite high importance of migration processes for dynamics of the population of the baltic states in the 21st century, and a considerably lower importance of migrations for the demographic situation in poland. at the same time poland and estonia have bigger demographic stability in relation to latvia and lithuania. in general, it is possible to say that if the attractiveness of latvia and lithuania (as the countries for accommodation) does not increase as is expected by the authors, these countries will have to expect the most drastic demographic crisis in their whole history. references apsite e., krišjāne z., berzins m., 2012, emigration from latvia under economic crisis conditions, international proceedings of economics development and research, 31, 134–138. baza demografia gus, http://demografia.stat.gov.pl/bazademografia/ [18.05.2017]. berzins a., zvidrins p., 2011, depopulation in the baltic states, lithuanian journal of statistics, 50, 1, 39–48. eesti statistika, http://pub.stat.ee/ [19.04.2017]. jasilionis d., stankūnienė v., maslauskaitė a., stumbrys d., 2015, lietuvos demografinių procesų diferenciacija, lstv, vilnius. latvijas statistica, http://www.csb.gov.lv/ [19.05.2017]. michalski t., 2010, sytuacja zdrowotna w europejskich krajach postkomunistycznych w dobie transformacji, wydawnictwo uniwersytetu gdańskiego, gdańsk. michalski t., 2012a, przemiany w umieralności w europie środkowej i środkowo-wschodniej w okresie transformacji, wydawnictwo bernardinum, pelplin. michalski t., 2012b, przemiany w liczbie ludności i ruchu rzeczywistym w europie środkowej i środkowo-wschodniej w okresie transformacji, wydawnictwo bernardinum, pelplin. oficialiosios statistikos portalas, https://www.osp.stat.gov.lt/ [19.05.2017]. silverman e., bijak j., hilton j., cao v.d., noble j., 2013, when demography met social simulation: a tale of two modelling approaches, journal of 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(1795–2000 гг.), ран=ras: институт российской истории, mocква. макаров в.л., бахтизин а.р., сушко е.д., 2014, моделирование демографических процессов с использованием агент-ориентированного подхода, федерализм=federalism: теория. практика. история, 4, 37–46. манаков а.г., суворков п.э., 2017, моделирование демографического развития стран центральной и восточной европы в xxi веке, известия рго, 1, 3–15. мкртчян н.в., карачурина л.б., 2014, центры и периферия в странах балтии и регионах северо-запада россии: динамика населения в 2000-е годы, балтийский регион, 2 (20), 62–80. станайтис а.к., станайтис с.а., 2012, население литвы во второй половине хх – начале xxi вв., псковский регионологический журнал, 14, 74–84. 1. introduction international christian center (ikc) is a structure under a larger christian organization called indre mission and also a part of the danish church known as “folkekirken”. the christian organization ikc located in copenhagen is dedicated to helping foreigners and asylum seekers gain language and cultural skills for danish society. through christian friends, i got introduced ikc, and i have a personal knowledge of the place as i worked there shortly as a volunteer. it seems obvious to make a study about feminine and masculine culture in an organization such as this, due to the vast variety of backgrounds of the employees here. from the mid 1980’s many refugees came to denmark and indre mission started to assist these immigrants. the counseling is free. ikc is an organization with open doors to everybody regardless of their culture or religion offering opportunities for people of different cultures to meet and socialize. bible lessons, meditations, and prayers often take place during this socialization process (indre missions tværkulturelle arbejde). examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees kourosh gharagozlou institute of applied social sciences of the university of warsaw, nowy świat 69, 00-927 warszawa, poland, e-mail: kouroshfri@gmail.com citation gharagozlou k., 2018, examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 42–52. abstract the purpose of this research is to identify if there is conflict between employees of ikc who come from masculine or feminine cultural backgrounds. in order to response this question, i focused mainly on methodology, and for the analysis of the data it used qualitative analyses. there is a benefit to study for this research paper, as it helps to communicate better for some people who work with different cultures in a workplace. i am wandering if there is a common value within the group of employees to increase the productivity of ikc. organizational values overrode cultural background in a religious organization. hofstede’s ranking of countries, on masculine versus feminine traits, had no effect on the level of conflict. key words cultural identity, workplace values, religion in the workplace, workplace conflict, masculinity and femininity, gender in the workplace received: 15 december 2017 accepted: 25 march 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 42–52 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.028.9015 examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees 43 the employees at ikc come from different cultural backgrounds from different parts of europe (scandinavia and southern europe), from the middle east and from the usa. this research paper will examine how the employees with divergent cultural backgrounds come together and develop common cultural values at the ikc workplace, which is informed by christianity. in this study, i have collected information from employees working at the organization “ikc”. i divided the group into two, in order to have elements from both feminine and masculine cultures because of the different values in their different cultural backgrounds. i interviewed six people, three that come from a masculine culture, namely usa, italy, and egypt, while three were from denmark. the employees in “ikc” have to have the same goals and values as the organization in order to achieve the organization’s mission and vision. this can be difficult due to cultural difference. in the book “masculinity and femininity, the taboo dimension of national culture”, g.h. hofstede (1998) theorizes about cross-cultural communication, feminine, and masculine cultures but an empirical study needs to be implemented to prove that these cross-gender cultural values are different. the purpose of my study is to investigate further the values in feminine and masculine cultures in the light of the common organization values. in thiayarticle, i will use the research methodologh that has been defined by k.f. punch as containing four main points: defining the topic of the research, defining the goal, designing a methodology to achieve that goal, and anticipating the value in the findins” (punch, 2006, p. 9). my research question ise are there complications, regarding personal values, within employees froa masculine and feminine cultures as they work together in a christian organization like th “ic?. my hypothesis was that there might be problems between people from masculine and feminine cultures working together. in an organization like ikc you have to ascribe to common values, which can be very difficult for some people. in order to answer the topic of my research i have used individual interviews, which served as an undisturbed source. these individual interviews gave a deep insight into conversations between employees from feminine cultures and masculine cultures. for example, in the use of individual interviews i was able to explore their personal values regarding ikc. through this, i was able to find out about the employees worldviews, opinions, ideas and thoughts on cultural values and the common values of ikc. this method helped me to understand the thoughts of the employees of ikc. furthermore, i wanted to look in to if the employees at ikc despite their feminine or masculine cultural background had some common values, which might come from the organization. the individual interview gave the opportunity for a communicational interaction between the interviewer and interviewee. in this paper i have tried to find out about the values of people from feminine and masculine cultures in ikc and their common values. as there are both masculine and feminine cultures working together in ikc i have found it interesting to investigate and understand how it is possible for them to work together. i have examined their different cultural backgrounds and values to see how they adapt to the values of ikc in their working life. the hope in doing this research is that i can learn how to point out factors that will increase the profit for ikc and help to address key points about increasing productivity of ikc. to do this i have tried to find out how people from masculine and feminine cultures can work together in an organization like ikc and apply the values of ikc in the working life. 2. theoretical framewory in masculinity and femininity: the taboo dimension of national cultures (hofstede, 1998, p. 6–7) has defined the concept of masculinity as the opposite of femininity. g.h. hofstede has analyzed cultures along five dimensions: (1) power distance, (2) individualism vs. collectivism (3) masculinity versus femininity (4) uncertainty avoidance (5) long-term vs. short-term orientation. i have focused on the singular dimension of masculinity/femininity. according to g.h. hofstede there are several differences between a masculine culture and a feminine culture. in a masculine culture men are far more than women expected to be “assertive, tough, and focused on material success” (hofstede, 1991, p. 261–262). women, on the other hand, are expected to represent an ideal that is expressed by being modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of lfe. (reinisch, 1987). in contrast to the masculine culture, we have the feminine culture. in the feminine culture the ideal of men and women is more similar. here, both genders are supposed to be like the women in a masculine culture (hofstede, 1998). in short, there is not the same separation of how men and women are supposed to be in a feminine culture as in a masculine culture. larry samovar also points out that in masculine cultures the biological differences between men and women are used in the definition of men and women’s social roles in the society (bartlett, 44 kourosh gharagozlou 1998). from these ideas, hofstede has outlined the differences between feminine and masculine societies (appendix 1). i will not outline all the differences here but just show some examples. one of the key differences is that in a masculine society “money and things” are much more important than in a feminine society where they in contrast are more focused on the “relationships between people”. in feminine societies it is a general norm that you have a strong sympathy for the weak. in contrast the masculine culture has sympathy for the strong. when you look at the working life one clear difference worth mentioning is that people in a feminine culture “work in order to live” whereas people in a masculine culture “live in order to work” (hofstede, 1998, p. 16). supporting this, c. rodrigues h?. blumberg (2000) state that an increased job challenge will improve the quality-ofwork-life in a masculine society but in feminine societies an improved quality-of-work-life means an opportunity to develop relationships on the 00). g.h. hofsted1? 1998, p.92?) has also categorized the different cultures in a nationalistic way in the feminine/masculine divide. in appendix 2, we can see this, where, for example, denmark features in the fourth position of feminine culture while japan features in the first position of masculine culture. a quick understanding of this can be gotten from the fact that on average, in denmark people leave work at 4pm to take care of their relationships, while in japan they work longer hours. following this division, we can see how the people interviewed at ikc are from masculine cultures when from egypt, italy and usa – cultures that support the gender gap, while the danish people represent another culture where care is more expected from both genders. it seems that ikc community culturally is oriented towards helping people, which according to the above description of masculine and feminine culture tends to be more related to the values of a feminine culture. the christian organization and its employee’s offers free help to people and follow jesus’ teachings. 3. qualitative methods in this paper i chose to use qualitative research because it makes one able to describe an event in its natural setting. it is a subjective way to look at life as it is lived and an attempt to explain the studied “behaviour” (silverman, 2006). the research method is typically in the form of words instead of numbers and this method is often presented as ‘richer’ and ‘more valid’ compare to quantitative data (dey, 1993). it has usually been used in the social sciences by researchers in fields like sociology and an organizational study has also used qualitative research as their way of collecting data (wengraf, 2001). as mentioned qualitative research is usually in the form of words, which makes it “a source of well grounded, rich description and explanation of processes in identifiable local contexts” (miles, 1994, p. 1). this allows one “to study a phenomena which are simply unavailable elsewhere” (silverman, 2006, p. 43). working with qualitative data allows “you the opportunity to identify specifically what kind of meaning people put into a certain phenomena” (silverman, 2006, p. 44). in order to response to problem formulation of this paper, it needs to consider on some following questions about this research. • what kind of phenomenon do you plan to study? • what do you want to know about the phenomenon? • what do you want to know about cultural values of the employees who work at ikc? it seems, conflict, is a phenomenon in an even small society. i would like to find out if there is conflict between employees of the ikc who come from different cultural backgrounds. the strength of qualitative research is its capability to lead to unexpected findings and hereby to “help researchers to get beyond initial conceptions and do generate or revise conceptual frameworks” (miles, 1994, p. 1). this was illustrated in the interview process by focusing on the word” help” to describe the differences in meaning amongst the group working at ikc. through this qualitative method i could better understand the underlying value placed in their individual ideology. 3.1 thematic coding the aim of an analysis of qualitative data is to characterize the data and afterwards create a basis to infer relations, create understanding and to have insight in human meaning and behavior. qualitative data is based on cases, examples that will be analyzed in their context. it involves analyzing and interpreting texts and interviews in order to explore meaningful patterns descriptive of a particular phenomenon (auerbach, 2003). a case can be a person, a place, an event etc. to do so, one needs to create relevant categories and concepts in relation to the researcher’s goal. and creating categories is “the core feature of qualitative analysis” (lundman, 2004, p. 107). a category here is defined as a group of contents that share cohesion. the qualitative analysis looks both at the picture as a whole and it also identifies meaningful units. the coding of the words can be either explicit or examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees 45 implicit. the codes can identify themes allowing for a comparison and generalization (jensen, 2002). the words can either take the form of “a straightforward category label or a more complex one (e.g., a metaphor)” (miles, 1994, p. 56). the analysis takes place through the repeated and continuous dialogue with the sources and thereby you develop definitions and categories that form the basis for the conclusions (jensen, 2002). the aim of thematic coding is to find which main “themes” or “topics” can be found in the data i collected. by reading through the various texts (individual), it was possible to identify which themes were mentioned more often and in relation with each other (seidman, 2015). in the other words, i have created codes, open coding, which codes are suggested by the researcher’s examination (babbie, 2007, p. 385). there are some themes, which are repeated in several places. i realized that the interviewees explicitly state that there are important. i would also consider to categories those themes, in order to realize which are the most relevant and how these codes are connected to each other. the reason i chose to use thematic coding as a method is because of its unique capability to interpret the meaning of the interviewee’s response (chesnay, 2014). in my case where they all come from different kinds of cultural backgrounds and with different kinds of values and worldviews i had to understand their opinions on different subjects. to do this i collected the most used themes. for example in the question; “why everybody who comes to “ikc” deserve help?” one of the interviewees’ replied that “even muhammad gaddafi could deserves help.” in this case i was not sure about the actual meaning behind the statement, and therefore i needed to interpret what the interviewee meant. by interpreting these i was able to point out and understand that the interviewee meant that all people who need help deserve help. 3.2. interview i conducted interviews with relevant people to pursue this research topic, in deference to klaus bruhn jensen’s statement: “it is one of the best ways to find out what people think about the questions you ask them” (jensen, 2002, p. 240). with the use of interview as a method there is an active process where the interviewer and interviewee will produce knowledge. this knowledge is produced “in a conversational relation” (kvale, 2009, p. 19–20). “interview is a professional conversation and is based on conversations of daily life. the knowledge is constructed in the inter-action between the interviewer and the interviewee” (kvale, 2009, p. 2). this means that the knowledge produced in this kind of research method is produced in social interaction between the two parts where there is no “mechanical following of rules and rests upon the interview’s skills and situated personal judgment in the posing of questions” (kvale, 2009, p. 82). the main purpose is to understand the view from the subject’s perspective (willis, 2015). to understand the interviewee’s world the interviewer must address questions in order to achieve knowledge and have argument about the logic and truth (napier, 2010). in an interview-situation the interviewer can throughout conversations with the interviewee (the subject) extend their understanding of the investigated phenomena. the interview is a key in exploring how people experience and understand the world (gillham, 2000, p. 10–51). in interviews they can describe in their own words how they experience the world. “interviews provide a great method of producing knowledge of the human situation” (kvale, 2007, p. 9). it is the purpose of the interview to bring new information and aspects forward regarding the studied phenomena and through an analysis of the transcription of the interviews “new distinctions may be discovered” (kvale, 2009, p. 112). in my opinion, by conducting interview, the interviewer is able to explore great data, describe central themes, and glend the meanintheof the livld of the subjectn tthe main task in interviewing is to understand the meaning of what the interviewees say. interviewing participants could paint a picture of what happened in a specific event, and yield data regarding the interviewees’ perspectives about common values of ikc’s employees. 3.3. data collection the first component of this method was the creation of an interview guide that would be used when interviewing key figures working at ikc (appendix 3). when selecting these individuals i wanted equality in the numbers of participants coming from different cultural values, namely of masculine and feminine cultures, as discussed earlier. in total i have conducted six individual interviews. three of them were with people from masculine culture and the rest three were with people from feminine culture. four of the individual interviews were held face-to-face. the other two, which were supposed to happen face-to-face, were done by email interview to compensate for the fact that they were sick and did not show up at the agreed time. in general, each interview was conducted face-to face and lasted 25 minutes. with such a time, i was able to clarify my questions and they were able to elaborate 46 kourosh gharagozlou their answers if i had problems understanding them. the main purpose of the individual interviews was to obtain their personal values. if i would have used focus groups of feminine and masculine cultures it could have been disadvantageous due to members not feeling comfortable stating their minds in front of the other participants. and since this paper’s topic is quite sensible to many i decided to use individual interviews in hope to get more reliable information because of a more pleasant environment where the conversation will take place face-to-face by two persons. it also provided a unique access to the lived world of the subjects (kvale, 2007) and a “professional conversation between interviewer and interviewee” (kvale, 2009, p. 2). in obtaining their personal values i found an important value in my first question; why everybody who comes to “ikc” deserves help? one interesting outcome of this method was how one respondent answered: “i try to close my eyes to whatever might be repellent in my neighbor’s behaviour.” maybe he would not have answered this way if i asked him the question in a focus group. it is important when asking questions to start from an open and objective position, to which d. silverman refers “beginning with the how questions”. beginning in this place allows the interviewee to come to their own conclusions unbiased by the subjectivity of the interviewer and then you can gain more contextual information by asking what silverman refers to as “the why questions” (silverman, 2006, p. 391). at ikc, there are 6 employees and about 40 volunteers from different cultural backgrounds, while the employees are all from denmark. the volunteers teach danish and english while the employees also teach as well as they counsel immigrants. the people i interviewed were 3 employees and 3 volunteers. both employees & volunteers from ikc have different roles at ikc. in this way, i was able to compare their positions and contributions to ikc. they serve a community of “users”, who are immigrants who come to ikc, in the least, to get free language education. the meetings for the individual interviews were very successful. there was a very friendly environment, during the question-session (face-to-face). i made a verbal agreement with all the interviewees from both feminine & masculine cultures not to write down their names and addresses to preserve anonymity. the entire sets of interviews were recorded with a type-recorder. 3.4. data analysis after the data gathered through the interviews, a table was produced (appendix 4). from this analysis, it is possible to categorize and identify several themes. below, they are presented. as an example to explain my work –method for identifying themes found in my data, i will explain point 1. i identified 3 codes from the data gathered through interviews: obligation, duty, and same opportunity (the purpose of providing, the same opportunity for all). in these three codes i identified the logical common denominator or theme: responsibility. 1) responsibility (obligation; duty; same opportunity): those people who work at ikc have a great responsibility regarding their job. according to ikc vision, they should follow jesus. they have a duty to work for, and to serve jesus. “i feel an obligation to help them” (interviewee 2). 2) christian caring for all (love and help; no distinction by jesus; all created by god, fellow human beings): according to christianity, loving your neighbor is “the way to show that we love god”. “jesus created us as a crown on his creation. thus, we were given the responsibility to take care of the world. we are the ones he saves along with all the creation – not the angels” (interviewee 3). also your enemies (even repellent) to follow jesus, “you are obligated to love and help all people, even your enemies”. (interviewee 1) 3) opinion of users: strength & weakness (motivation and clear goals vs outcasts): the employees at ikc share common values, but seem to have different ways of looking at the users. (quote – strong): “my experience with the people i have met at ikc is that most of them are strong, have clear goals for their future, and a strong motivation for reaching their goals” (interviewee 1). (quote –weak): “in the biblical worldview all people are created by god and are therefore equally valuable. i want to help people in ikc who are usually weak, because they are foreigner & new to denmark. thus, they are usually depended on other” (interviewee 3). 4) private life and work life (they should go together; overlapping): many of the employees at ikc have christian values, even though they come from a feminine culture, their work and private life overlap each other. “there is an overlap between some of my working hours and some of my spare time” (interviewee 2). 5) relationships are central (share life experiences, identical): examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees 47 both people from feminine and masculine cultures who work at ikc want to share their life with other people, in order to know other people. by doing this, they are able to develop their jo. “relationships between people are more valuable than any money or any number of things. it is important to talk to people, get to know them, and be a part of a community of people that you trust and love, and whom love you as well. i believe that an increased job challenge can be beneficial in helping you to grow and learn as a person, but as i said before, i consider relationships to be one of the most important things in life. so for me, the workplace is just another place to get to know peopl”. (iinterviewee 6). 4. discussion i have understood that employees who work at “ikc” have sympathy for the weak. it appears that the employees work in order to live and have a belief that they are doing meaningful work; they work with people and try to make their daily life better so people can become happier and able to communicate more fluently by learning the language. furthermore, it appears that these relationships are very important to ikc. relationships are very important in many countries and if you work with international people then building relationships is very important. in relation to the question regarding “helping people who need help” there was a pretty clear consensus that they worked because they wanted to help people, weak & foreigner, to improve their quality of life. it had nothing to do with doing better to challenge their job. they also mentioned other benefits in their job but they kept returning to the point that they were here to “help others”. they were also very focused on that all people, special weak people, should be able to get help – “all people deserve help”. they also pointed out that one of the best ways to improve their life is through education and the christian gospel. one of the respondents (interviewer 1) from a masculine culture said “most of them are strong, have clear goals for their future, and have a strong motivation for reaching their goals”. this contrasts with the ideas that they are “weak”. according to hofstede’s theory, it is important for masculine culture to show assertiveness, ambition and competition. such an overview looks at the ambition and motivation of the users which in the masculine culture constitutes signs of strength. therefore, some people of masculine cultures relate to the users as strong “sympathy for the strong” (hofstede, 1998, p. 16). on the other hand, employees of ikc who are from feminine culture relate to users as weak “sympathy for the weak” (hofstede, 1998, p. 16). this is another overview that looks at not yet acquired competences and relative dependence on others as signs of need for help (for example in communicating with local authorities) which in the values of a feminine culture constitute weakness. the data explained the part of the theory about “taking care of the weak”, that helping weak people are a value of both christianity & feminine culture (hofstede, 1998, p. 16). in a way the two overviews from above are looking at the same phenomenon, but through different ‘cultural lengths’, either focusing on their strengths or on their weaknesses, the same way that one can focus on the glass being half full or half empty. researching the values and common values of ikc by use of interviews was quite revealing, not only of those values, but also about in which ways the theory explained the data, which ways the data accounted for the possible improvement of the theory, or even adding a new perspective for which new theories would be needed. the responses from the interviewees revealed that hofstede’s theory about feminine & masculine culture did not specifically apply to their way of working at ikc. some of the distinctions were more useful than others, such as the distinction between “money and things” and “relationships between people”. through this question it was clear due to the fact that everyone sided with “relationships between people” (hofstede, 1998, p. 16). the data showed that the distinction “live to work” / “work to live” is an inappropriate distinction as the respondents struggled to make sense of it. it could be in part, because the theory doesn’t account for the much greater complexity of the relationship between life and work “they overlap(iinterviewee 2) or because there may be a degree of political correctness in not assuming “live to work”. moreover, in the case of ikc, i would expect fewer “career peopl” (iinterviewee 2). it seems that hofstede’s theory was too general concerning the life work balance making it too simplistic. it would be better to also consider on different subcultures as well. the new themes in the data that have to be accounted for, are those related to christianity, as most of the common values of this organization rely on what jesus did and taught. it could be understood that ikc has a specific subculture, because they are so focused on helping refugees (often musim) , where indre mission as such focuses more on mission inside of demark. 48 kourosh gharagozlou many people who work at ikc come from different religions but they still follow the christian values from ikc. one can hypothesize that as ikc is an organization, it is the common values that prevail over their personal values. it could be argued that the christian common values work as mediators at ikc, which perhaps help the collaboration process in their job. this being true, ikc can benefit because the lack of conflicts increases the productivity of ikc. when working with the interviews, i came to the conclusion that there were themes occurring in the data that were outside of my theoretical framework. many of the interviewees referred to christian values as the reason behind their responses. through the respondents utterances i have found it necessary to develop an adequate theoretical framework surrounding a “caring in christianity” theology (fig.  1). i have realized that i need to consider also another concept that i had not a plan to study in the beginning. in other words, i have explored from the responses of the interviewees that i have to consider on “caring in christianity “as well, in order to support the research. as for the use of thematic coding, it was useful to ‘understand’ the responses, to make meaning from their attitude and experiences about their values and common values. even though, it has been interesting to use these theories to understand ikc a much broader study would be necessary to grasp the interplay between feminine & masculine values and christianity. 5. conclusion my initial theoretical framework for interpreting the interview data emphasized the notion of masculine and feminine (hofstede, 1998) cultural as means to examine possible conflicts arising in the workplace of ikc. i made the false assumption that people coming from different cultural backgrounds (muslim, buddhist, sikh, and non-religious) would encounter conflicts in the workplace related to the masculine or feminine nature of their culture specifiity. through the process of dialectical exchange and analyzing the responses from the interviewees, i came to the conclusion that there were themes occurring in the data that were outside of my theoretical framework. many of the interviewees referred to christian values as the reason behind their responses. through the respondents utterances i have come to the conclusion that cultural difference between masculine & feminine culture was overridden by ikcs vision and goals. these provided a framework for a system of common values centering on the notion of “caring in christianity”. an example i encountered in the research interview that illustrated this was that two of the respondents’ work life and private life overlapped. this means, that they couldn’t always distinguish between work life and private life. this directly contradicts hofstede’s theory because supposedly in a feminine culture (denmark) people “work in order to live” instead of “live in order to work”. these respondents clearly demonstrated that they exhibited both of these tendencies by overlapping their work lives (going to church & going on campaigns for the church) with their private lives (going to church & going on campaigns for the church). in conclusion, this study shows that the common values of ikc (the christian values) were preponderant over the masculine & feminine distinction of the background values of the respondents. following the rejection of the part of my theory framework mentioned in the discussion, i hereby, in short propose an addition to the framework, that could better account for the data gathered, in order for it to be retested. for the emerged need of accountinfor a christian values, i made the following study. i need to understand, where the values to support people in need comes from. i will start by listing 3 scriptures fromthe bbible (the reason for listing them will appear below). “love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you” (matt. 5,44). “as you wish, that people should do on to you, you do the same onto them” (luke 6.31). “if anybody wants to be first, he should be last of everybody and everybody’s servant” (mark 9, 35b). the above-mentioned scriptures can be said to summarize the christian dogma of loving your neighbor. the employees of ikc referred to scriptures such as these in their responses. fig. 1. in thematic interviews, concepts may be raised by the interviewee that prompt the interviewer to form new questions source: dan pedersen, associate professor, media, cognition & communication, university of copenhagen, lecture empirical methodologies examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees 49 in the following, i will unfold the christian understanding of the second scripture, also known as “the golden rule”, through a theological study by j. topel 1998) . i wish to underline, that i am not here stating whether or not this christian understanding represents the truth, i am just saying, that the employees of ikc based their responses to my interview guide on an understanding such as this. according to the work of j. topel (1998), the golden rule is a “moral maxim” that is “unique to jesus”. the maxim is a maxim of general altruism, where the individual christian looks into his own heart, for what he wants, and treats others accordingly. it becomes clear from the biblical context (luke 6, 2536), that this he or she does not do in order to obtain anything , not even reciprocity in action , but as an “ imitatio dei” (an imitation of god , who is precisely good to the ungrateful the wicked. based on this study you could say, that anybody, who needs help, deserves it, whether it be an enemy, a close friend or relative or a complete stranger. refences: auerbach c., 2003, qualitative studies in psychology: qualitative data: an introduction to coding and analysis, nyu press, new york. babbie e., 2007, tile practice of social research, thomson wadsworth, belmont ca.publisher?, city?. bartlett c., 1998, transcultural health care: a culturally competent approach, aorn journal, 68(3), 479-480. chesnay m., 2014, nursing research using data analysis, qualitative designs and methods in nursing, springer publishing company, new york. dey i., 1993, qualitative data analysis, a user-friendly guide for social scientists, routledge, london. gillham b., 2000, the research interview, cpi antony rowe, london. hofstede g.h., 1991, cultures and organizations, software of the mind, intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival, harpercollins, new york. hofstede g.h., 1998, masculinity and femininity, the taboo dimension of national cultures, sage publishing, londonthousand oaks. hofstede, g.h., 2001, cultural consequences: comparing values, behavior, institutions and organizations across nations, sage publishing, london-thousand oaks. holy bible. new international version, 2011, biblica, nashville. indre missions tværkulturelle arbejde, http://imta.dk/en/ikckbh/interntinal/ [14.12.2017]. jensen k.b., 2002, a handbook of media and communication research, qualitative and quantitative methodologies, routledge, london. kvale s., 2007, doing interviews, sage publishing, londonthousand oaks. kvale s., 2009, interviews: learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing, sage publishing, london-thousand oaks. lundman b., 2004, qualitative content analysis in nursing research: concepts, procedures and measures to achieve trustworthiness, nurse education today, 24(2), 105–112. miles m.b., 1994, qualitative data analysis an expanded sourcebook, sage publishing, new york-thousand oaks. napier m.r., 2010, behavior, truth and deception: applying profiling and analysis to the interview process, crc press, london. punch k.f., 2006, developing effective research proposals, sage publishing, london. reinisch j., 1987, masculinity/femininity: basic perspectives, oxford university press, london. rodrigues c., blumberg h., 2000, do feminine cultures really behave more feminine than masculine cultures? a comparison of 48 countries femininity–masculinity ranking to their un human development rankings, cross cultural management: an international journal, 7(31), 25–34. seidman i., 2015, interviewing as qualitative research: a guide for researchers in education and the social sciences, teachers college press, new york. silverman d., 2006, interpreting qualitative data methods for analyzing talk, text and interaction, sage publishing, london. topel j. 1998, the tarnished golden rule (luke 6:31): the inescapable radicalness of christian ethics, theological studies, 59(3), 475–485. wengraf t., 2001, qualitative research interviewing, biographical narrative and semi-structured methods, sage publishing, london. willis g.b., 2015, analysis of the cognitive interview in questionnaire design: understanding qualitative research, oxford university press, london. 50 kourosh gharagozlou appendix 1. hofstede’s differences between feminine and masculine societies feminine masculine general norms dominant values in society are caring for others and preservation dominant values in society are material success and progress people and warm relationships are important money and things are important everybody is supposed to be modest men are supposed to be assertive, ambitious, and tough both men and women are allowed to be tender and to be concerned with relationships women are supposed to be tender and to take care of relationships sympathy for the weak sympathy for the strong small and slow are beautiful big and fast are beautiful sex and violence in the media are taboo sex in violence in newspapers and on tv in the family both fathers and mothers deal with facts and feelings fathers deal with facts and mothers deal with feelings both boys and girls are allowed to cry, but neither should fight girls cry, boys do not; boys should fight back when attacked, girls should not fight in school average student is the norm best student is the norm failing in school is a minor accident failing in school is a disaster friendliness in teachers appreciated brilliance in teachers appreciated boys and girls study same subjects boys and girls study different subjects at work work in order to live live in order to work managers use intuition and strive for consensus managers expected to be decisive and assertive adapted from: hofstede g.h., 1998, masculinity and femininity, the taboo dimension of national cultures, sage publishing, london-thousand oaks, p. 16. appendix 2. top fifty most masculine countries/regions rank country rank country 1 japan 25/26 malaysia 2/3 austria 27 pakistan 2/3 venezuela 28 brazil 4/5 italy 29 singapore 4/5 switzerland 30/31 israel 6 mexico 30/31 indonesia 7/8 ireland 32/33 turkey 7/8 jamaica 32/33 taiwan 9/10 great britain 34 panama 9/10 germany 35/36 iran 11/12 philippines 35/36 france 11/12 colombia 37/38 spain 13/14 south africa 37/38 peru 13/14 ecuador 39 east africa 15 united states 40 salvador 16 australia 41 south korea 17 new zealand 42 uruguay 18/19 greece 43 guatemala 18/19 hong kong 44 thailand 20/21 argentina 45 portugal 20/21 india 46 chile 22 belgium 47 finland 23 arab countries 48/49 yugoslavia 24 canada 48/49 costa rica 25/26 50 denmark adapted from: hofstede g.h., 2001, cultural consequences: comparing values, behavior, institutions and organizations across nations, sage publishing, london-thousand oaks. examining common values of the international christian center (ikc) and its employees 51 appendix 3. interview guide: 1. how does an employee at ikc feel about looking at the world in terms of “money and things” or “relationships between people”? 2. how does an employee at “ikc” view the concept in preferential terms of “an increased job challenge”, or “an opportunity to develop relationships on the job”? 3. why does an employee at ikc have sympathy for others that exhibit weakness? 4. why is it important as an employee at ikc to “work in order to live” rather than “live in order to work”? 5. why does everybody who comes to “ikc” deserve help? appendix 4. table analysis: 1. responsibility (obligation; duty; same opportunity). 2. christian caring for all (love and help; no distinction by jesus; all created by god, fellow human beings). 2.1) also your enemies (even repellent). 3. opinion of users: strength & weakness (motivation and clear goals vs outcasts). 4. private life and work life (they should go together; overlapping). 5. relationships are central (share life experiences, identical). theme number miss: number 1 mr: number 2 miss: number 3 mr: number 4 mr: number 5 miss: number 6 theme 1 “i feel an obligation to help them” ‘duty’: “we do it with care, energy, determination” “i want to help people that have not had the same opportunities in life as i do” “the church has a responsibility” theme 2 “christian organization, christian values, love and help all people” “jesus gave special attention and help to the outcasts of society” “god tells us to care for the weak” “all people are created by god and are therefore equally valuable” “everybody that needs help deserves help because we are all made in gods picture” “we should all be aware of our fellow human beings” “love your neighbor as yourself” theme 2.1 “love and help, even your enemies” “i try to close my eyes to whatever might be repellent in my neighbour’s behavior and instead serve him/ her with the help and with the word of god” “even muhammad gaddafi could deserves help” theme 3 “most of them are strong, have clear goals for their future, and a strong motivation for reaching their goals” “jesus gave special attention and help to the outcasts of society” theme 4 “my job challenges both my language skills and i develop relationships” “there is an overlap between some of my working hours and some of my spare time” “work is necessary to live” “it’s good for all people to have jobs.” “our work is very close to our personal life because it is faith-based work.” 52 kourosh gharagozlou theme 5 “it is all about relationships” “it gives essential meaning when meeting people that i can share life experiences with” “relationships between people are more valuable than any money or any number of things.” “important to be part of a community of people that you trust and love” appendix 5. a presentation of the most interesting (clarifying) responses to the questions from my interview guide (appendix 3): (for question number 1): “as a christian, i try to make sure money and things are not the main focus of my life. of course we need money to live and we need things to do different tasks, but i believe that everything i have here on earth truly belongs to, and is a gift from god. relationships between people are more valuable than any money or any number of things. it is important to talk to people, get to know them, and be a part of a community of people that you trust and love, and whom love you as well. but, if you ask me, the most important relationship is the relationship one has with god”. (interviewee number 6) (for question number 2): “my job situation is quite special as it is all about relationships so in my situation increased job challenge is identical to an opportunity to develop relationships on the job”. (interviewee number 2) (for question number 3): “jesus calls us to help that in need, so as a follower of jesus, i do what he calls me to. we all have weakness in some area, and deep down desire help in those areas. god says: “love your neighbor as yourself.” this means, do for others what you would want to be done for you”. (interviewee number 6) (for question number 4):” bringing my family to some of my job functions would be inappropriate but to other job functions very appropriate and therefore there is an overlap between (some of ) my working hours and (some of ) my spare time making it impossible to answer this question”. (for question number 5): “everybody that needs help deserves help because we are all made in gods picture. people don’t deserve help because of their education or skills but because they are human beings”. 1. introduction at the end of the war, when the principle of authority and obedience collapsed, jugoslavia entered that grey area in which economic progress was a chimera and the eu was the only possible lifesaver, and in which the common good wavered between the allure of capitalism and the constraint of nationalism. slovenia, croatia, and possibly montenegro succeeded in jumping on the yellow-starred blue boat, but the same cannot be said about serbia. the serbian society was only able to produce few outstanding politicians1, and, along with other balkan countries, 1 among serbia’s most prominent politicians of the late twenty years, the two most distinguished ones are certainly threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo marcoandrea spinelli via bellingera 4, busto arsizio, lombardy, italy, e-mail: marcoandrea.spinelli@hotmail.it citation spinelli m., 2018, threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 13–26. abstract enclaves are like islands in the middle of a sea they do not belong to. seeing that the enclaves i wish to examine are several and all close together, the comparison with an archipelago does seem the most befitting. enclaves represent, in my opinion, the very essence of the balkan peninsula, which, until as recently as twenty years ago, was almost entirely composed of groups of enclaves. the nineties wars contributed to partially eliminate these balkan peculiarities. most of these groups are now utterly harmless; nevertheless, some of them were, admittedly, the trigger for the last conflict. others still pose a threat to peace; among those, i believe the serbian enclaves in kosovo are the best example. my project will focus mainly on inhabitants of serbian villages in kosovo, which are the first victims of a process of integration the country they live in failed to enable. for this reason, i will not pay close attention to villages of northern kosovo, namely those which are north of the river ibar, since they have a serbian majority. my field of research will rather thoroughly analyse southern enclaves in particular, where, through interviews, i will try to find out what it means to be part of a country withouy ethnically identifying with it. among the interviewees there will be politicians, orthodox monks, and especially ordinary people. in conclusion, my article will focus on velika hoča’s village, in orahovac municipality, where i lived for nine months two years ago. key words enclaves, kosovo serbs, velika hoca, srpstvo, artemije‘s schism. received: 25 september 2017 accepted: 21 june 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 13–26 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.024.9011 14 marcoandrea spinelli it is now indulging in corruption, black market and “je-m’en-fichisme”, an attitude first pinpointed by the english explorer archibald lyall at the beginning of the xx century. a hundred years later, the expression is still befitting. yet, it should also be recalled that „the conditions which triggered the tragic combination of factors [...] of the jugoslavian case cannot be considered outside of a broader horizon, which concerns the awakening of local identities in a globalised world“ (sekulić, 2002, p. 21). among other things, my article will try to outline the features of serbia’s national identity in kosovo, which will be considered equal to any other european identity rather than a balkan or eastern peculiarity. as indicated by rogers brubaker, identity is often regarded as something malleable and fluid which “people have, forge, and construct” (brubaker, cooper, 2000, p. 28), since “the habit of speaking without qualifications of ‘albanians’ and ‘serbs’, as they were sharply bounded, internally homogeneous groups, not only weakens social analysis but constricts political possibilities in the region” (brubaker, cooper, 2000, p. 28). what do modern kosovo serbs villages look like? are they ready to revive and reflourish, or are they doomed to remain in the background as a neglected beacon? do they nurse a serbian national sentiment, a shared sense of belonging regardless of the country in which one may live? if so, what is it? how is it built up, how does it interact with and how it is re-created in everyday life? what are its features, what its priorities and weaknesses? first and foremost, how is it articulated at geographical, urban, religious and environmental level? my article intends to delve into srpstvo, or serbdom, and into the serbian inat, terms utilised by serbs to describe themselves, which can be loosely translated as a mix of “stubbornness” and national pride, in order to obtain a better understanding of one of the most debated yet least well-known population of the twentieth century europe. my project will pivot around the analysis of the sense of identity and feeling of belonging to the serbian nation. its peculiarity will be due to the fact that the project will be carried out through interviews to prominent figures of each minority or ethnic community. these interviews will include questions zoran đinđić and boris tadić. the former was first mayor of belgrade, then serbian prime minister. it was murdered in circumstances still unclear on march 12, 20003. the latter was serbian president for eight years, from 2004 to 2012. about personal identity feelings and viewpoints concerning alterity, as well as an account about the village and municipality history, one about the interviewee’s family history during tito era and the nineties’ war, a description of the political associationism in the area in question, a personal opinion about the european union, which religion they profess and to which extent, what do they think about other religions, an opinion on education, schooling, language spoken in everyday life and language of study, daily relationships with different ethnic communities, whether there are mixed marriages in the area, urban and architectonic symbols of their identity, and activities dedicated to its preservation. besides, questions about controversial topics such as serbian nationalism and the legacy of the war will not be left out. furthermore, the choice of specific urban and nonurban contexts, meticulously selected according to their relevance to the questions at issue, should be considered an additional innovative aspect. i will observe how different ethnic groups interact in order to describe their mutual integration and how identity and relationships are constantly negotiated – or rather re-negotiated and re-asserted – in everyday life. i believe that enclaves epitomise the very essence of the balkan peninsula, which, until as recently as twenty years ago, was almost entirely composed of groups of enclaves. the nineties wars contributed to partially eliminate these balkan peculiarities. my article will mainly focus on inhabitants of serbian villages in kosovo, which are the first victims of a process of integration the country they live in failed to enable. for this reason, i will not pay close attention to municipalities and villages of northern kosovo, namely those which are north of the river ibar, since they have a serbian majority. they are the following three: leposavić, zvečan and zubin potok. my field of research will try to thoroughly analyse southern enclaves in particular, where, through interviews, i tried to explore what it means to be part of a country without ethnically identifying with it. as the map shows (fig. 1), there are six serbian municipalities in the southern part of kosovo: klokot, ranilug, novo brdo, parteš, gračanica and štrpce. among the interviewees there were teachers, serbian orthodox priests and monks, draganac’s monastery abbot, dečani’s monastery abbot, schismatics monks and believers (artemije’s followers), municipal employees, school employees, nationalistic associations’ presidents and members, local institutions’ presidents and representatives, journalists, ordinary people, the technical director of ‘gračanica’s threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo 15 house of culture’, a touristic organization’s director, a librarian, a photographer. finally, my article will focus on velika hoča’s village, in orahovac municipality, where i spent ten months over two years ago. 2. a bit of history when i asked about kosovo’ symbols, some people i interviewed answered by mentioning prizren, patriarchate of peć and gračanica. others named gazimestan, where the battle of kosovo polje took place in 1389. however, most of them had no doubt, agreeing on the fact that “every orthodox church or monastery, every serbian village or town is our symbol. we cannot overlook even the least significant place, because albanian are trying to manipulate our history”, “we cannot choose a single place. serbian identity is not a symbol, it is the spirit inside this land”, “every town inhabited by serbs and every town who hosts a serbian grave is serbia, from croatia to greece, from bosnia to macedonia, and obviously here as well”. in order to understand this kind of feeling, it is necessary to travel through the centuries and focus our attention on a few decisive moments. in the past, serbs were probably the largest ethnic group in kosovo and in metochia. geographically, kosovo is currently divided into two areas: metohija (or rrafshi i dukagjinit in albanian) in the north-west and kosovo (kosova), properly named, in the southeast. in metohija, the main cities are prizren (prizren), đakovica (gjakovë) and peć (peja). it is surrounded by montenegro, serbia and albania. the name metohija derives from ‘metoh’, which refers to agricultural fig. 1. percent of serbs in kosovo in 2011 source: zeqiri, 2013. 16 marcoandrea spinelli land belonging to the serbian orthodox church in the middle ages. the albanian name, rrafshi i dukagjinit, has also a medieval origin. kosovo’s main cities are priština (prishtina), gnjilane (gjilan), uroševac (ferizaj) and kosovska mitrovica (mitrovicë). kosovo borders serbia and the republic of macedonia. the name kosovo derives from ‘kos’, blackbird, while the suffix ‘ovo’ means belonging to. the whole area used to be called kosovo polje, which translates to ‘plain belonging to blackbirds’. finally, only the word kosovo remained in the name. conflicts between albanians and serbs broke out in 1687 during the war between the habsburg empire and the ottoman empire. serbian soldiers fought for wien and albanians for istanbul. however, there were many serbs on the other side as well, chosen because of their military skill; it usually happened that ottomans selected young serbians, trained them until they became soldiers and, eventually, these youngsters ended up fighting against their brothers on the other side of the array. after the war, serbs began to migrate towards the northern balkan area2 and the adriatic sea, in krajina. statistics shows that around forty thousand families left kosovo. these migration flows did not stop until very recently. kosovo remained uninhabited and albanian families migrated slowly, but steadily, in the centuries that followed the war. furthermore, they obtained privileges from the ottoman empire. another aspect that brought a reduction of the serbian presence concerns conversions. from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, just a few years before the end of ottoman empire, some serbian families decided to convert to islam. it is quite uncommon for a serb who becomes muslim to remain within the serbian community. since a few decades ago, these families used to be called bosniaks or arnauts. nowadays, arnauts can be considered completely albanian3. there were two major turning points during tito’s era. the first one took place in 1966, when yugoslavia’s vice president, a serbian politician named aleksandar ranković, was discharged by tito. from 2 serbian families moved towards the south of hungary, where arsenije iii crnojević moved in the june of 1690, with seventy or eighty thousand people. there, the serbian community was assigned a territory by leopold i. this region has never been independent in history, but its name is vojvodina, which approximately translates to duchy or voivodeship. 3 according to serbs, arnauts families were extremely violent and held strong nationalist feelings during the nineties war. clearly, the serbs considered arnauts as old serbs and they could not accept that arnauts fought instead for the albanian army against serbia. this moment on, policy towards ethnical groups in kosovo started to change. moreover, the increasing albanian population outnumbered the serbian one precisely in those decades (fifties and sixties)4. as a consequence, in 1968 the albanian community established the first instance of mono-ethnic classes in kosovo’s history. in many villages, children of different communities attended school in the same building, but at different times, “albanians went to school in the morning, we went in the afternoon. i remember when we once entered and we found an eagle drawn on the blackboard, symbol of their flag” (a teacher from velika hoča, december 2017). the second turning point was in 1974, with the ratification of the constitution. tito decided to divide yugoslavia into six countries and two regions (kosovo and vojvodina) and granted to the latter a distinctive autonomy. as a result, whereas modifications to their regional constitution were made relatively simple, any change to the serbian, croatian or slovenian constitutions required previous endorsement by each yugoslav country. among the interviewees, many have different opinions about the socialist period. someone believes tito was the real problem: “yugoslavia was a graveyard for us”, “tito gave albanian a piece of serbia”, “tito encouraged the albanian birth rate, becoming godfather of every ninth child of an albanian couple. in wider terms, the more children you had, the more government incentives you got. having sons and daughters was a business!” someone else thinks that the socialist power has been misunderstood: “yugoslavia was a sort of a european union before the actual birth of the european union. however, serbs relied too much on it and on bratstvo jedinstvo (socialist brotherhood) among yugoslavia’s countries and we were completely destroyed by it”, “it was not tito’s fault. kosovo serbs governed this region according to socialist thoughts and rules, and not following nationalistic goals. nowadays, we found ourselves in this situation because albanians were smarter than us: they were more nationalistic and patriotic than we were”. despite that division, they are in agreement on the attack towards religion: the serbian orthodox church was deprived of their territories, lands and holy buildings. every religion and every church suffered from the same repression, but since the serbian one was the wealthiest, it ended up being the most affected by these laws. after the death of tito, milosevic was able to take advantage of some albanian violations against serbs 4 from the end of sixties, the number of serbian families that decided to run away towards serbia started to increase. threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo 17 that took place in the eighties. albanians staged many demonstrations and demanded a stronger autonomy in several occasions throughout the second part of the last century; the most notable of which occurred under the fascist occupation during the second world war, , in 1968 and in 1981, shortly after tito’s death. milosević purposely fuelled a chauvinistic feeling among kosovo serbs, thus boosting the birth of patriotism, a social phenomenon which was partially absent over the past decades. the albanians faced an extremely harsh period during milosević time. violent repressions against them took place all over the nineties, when they finally reached their independence in 1999. repressions quickly became conflict and later civil war, when albanians set up a military organization which they called uçk (ushtria çlirimtare kosovës, meaning liberation army of kosovo), and began to plan attacks and kidnapping serbs. milosević then ordered his serbian-montenegrin army to intervene in kosovo. the feeling towards milosević that emerged from the interviewees is often remarkably different from his common depiction made by western media: “european countries did not understand him. they said war broke out because of him, but it would break out no matter what. there was no alternative. europe and united states wanted yugoslavia to fall apart into small pieces” (a man from štrpce, december 2016). the reason why many believe so is quite simple, as it is clear stated in this sentence: “throughout this period, we had many advantages. we felt freer, safer, and, eventually, part of our own country. i have to say that there was something like a repression against albanians, but all milosević did was to protect our serbian land. the point is that, nowadays, we are suffering from the same repression” (a man from štrpce, december 2016). kosovo has been under the occupation of international peacekeeping forces since 1999. the common feeling of kosovo serbs towards this occupation can be summarised by this motto, “someone is beating us so violently we cannot even cry”. an interesting detail emerged during my interviews, which could help explaining why some serbian families continued to live in certain areas and why some others moved to central serbia or somewhere else: as i was told, “during the war it occurred something that cannot be a simple coincidence. our families were treated differently according to the nationality of nato’s soldiers operating in the different areas. where italian or greek soldiers were in charge (gračanica’s area), we were supported; where british ones were in charge (for instance, around kosovo polje), we were forced to run away; where there were russians (especially in ranilug’s area), nothing happened, not even a petty conflict” (a monk from ranilug, january 2017). 3. nowadays kosovo according to the last census of 2011 (statistical…, 2017), there are almost 1.8 million of inhabitants in kosovo. 130 thousand are serbs and, among them, 70–80 thousand live in the northern part, next to serbia. the rest live in several serbian enclaves scattered everywhere within kosovo’s territory. most of kosovo serbs lives outside the larger cities; indeed, the most populated cities in kosovo are almost completely albanian, with the exception of prizren5 and mitrovica6. for instance, there are only between ten or fifteen serbian families in priština, lipljan or in prizren, and in uroševac there should only be the orthodox priest’s family. there are only six municipalities in kosovo which have a relevant percentage of serbs (tab. 1); all of which i visited. tab. 1. kosovo villages with a relevant serb presence villages with serb majority (above 60%) villages with relevant serb presence (between 35% and 60%) gračanica novo brdo parteš štrpce ranilug klokot source: own studies. nationalism in kosovo is currently on the rise and can be observed in every aspect of social life. its effects are reshaping and embittering relationships, with people beginning to be more disrespectful to each other than they were before. each nationality now regards the other as a foreign and usurping force. any form of integration is increasingly more difficult. for instance, it is surprisingly that some albanian children do not know that serbian children live in the same country as well. others do not want to have any kind of contact with them because of their parents’ rules. the same is also true for the counterpart. nowadays, for the first time in the recorded history of kosovo, children of different nationalities cannot play together because they do not share the 5 in prizren, approximately ten per cent of its inhabitants are bosniaks and about five per cent are turks. 6 mitrovica is a town that is completely split in half between an albanian south and a serbian north. 18 marcoandrea spinelli same language. this trend is likely to be even more emphasised in the future. everything in kosovo seems to be ambiguous, unclear or contradictory. indeed, some albanian families were considered serbs by interviewees. this is due to several reasons: first of all, many albanian surnames have a serbian origin; secondly, in some cities, such as orahovac, albanians speak among themselves a dialect which is linguistically closer to serbian than it is to albanian; finally, many albanian families have their own slava, a personal saint who is entitled to the protection of the family, in accordance to an old christian orthodox tradition. nevertheless, these families consider themselves as albanian today, and they consider kosovo as their own country. everything is also double. kosovan passports are not as powerful as the serbian ones. therefore, any serb who is eligible for double citizenship tend to apply for it as soon as possible. this situation leads to ludicrous consequences such as people having double passport, double identity card, double residence and double driving licence. schools and universities are separated; health is normally separated as well, with some exceptions regarding serious issues. there are, next to the formal kosovo serbs administrative institutions, some local ones which refer directly to belgrade and are formally illegal, since kosovo regards them as paramilitary. therefore, their scope is limited and his actions often hindered by bureaucracy. 3.1. political situation few years after the end of the war, kosovo serbs decided to establish their own political parties. the main reason behind it was that, according to them, serbia did not care enough about their interests. the government of kosovo promptly took advantage of the situation and implemented a law that forbids kosovo serbs parties to bear the same name of the corresponding serbian parties. in the following years, the opposite phenomenon took place: kosovo serbs realised that they could not organise their own political life without the support of belgrade parties. nowadays, there are few kosovo serbs’ parties (between five and seven) run by belgrade’s politicians. albeit having different names, the connection with the corresponding serbian party is conspicuous. kosovo serbs do not show confidence in these parties. in fact, they seem not to believe in political institutions at all. in fact, they are slowly becoming apolitical. many interviewees held these parties responsible for the current lack of unity and cohesion of serbian identities and regard this generation of politician as the worst in serbian history. their opinion seems to be clearly reported in the following sentences: “they do not fight for our interests, but for bruxelles’ and washington’s ones. they do not represent us, they are the garbage of our country”; “serbian politicians are not able to help us. they are not educated and they are corrupted. i am not talking about albanian politicians, but our ones: kosovo serbs’ ones. however, i believe that in a few years albanian and serbian politicians will find an agreement and will organise a new war. it is the only way to attract new investors”, “nowadays, the number of kosovo serbs’ is at its historical lowest. we live in the greatest humiliation. all of that is happening because our politicians were absolutely incompetent”. the opinion about ‘serbia serbs’’ parties is unsurprisingly similar: “belgrade is betraying us and our patriotic interest. they are selling out our country for trivial economic reasons. what they should understand is that we, kosovo serbs, will always defend our house in belgrade, our family, our church and our holy land. we will defend our rights until we die, for our children and especially for our ancestors”. some interviewees showed to have more trust in putin than in serbian politicians: “his influence should be bigger in the balkans and i expect that trump’s victory will change something in the relationships among balkan countries. if the alliance between trump and putin will fail, then it would definitely be the end for kosovo serbs’ hopes”. the point is that political parties are important for each person who wants to find a job, “because without a recommendation from a political party, it is virtually impossible to get a job in the city hall or in municipal organizations and associations, sometimes even in some shops, because everything is linked and it is in the hands of a few people”. kosovo serbs’ opinion about serbian politicians and institution was explicitly summarised by the words of sava janjić, dečani monastery abbot, when he said, “we do not believe in kosovo’s institutions. sometimes our politicians do not show up in parliament for relatively extended periods of time. we want them to actively participate in our political life, otherwise why should they even be part of it? we do not want them to sit there as they were parliament’s useless ornaments. kosovo serbs need to participate in kosovo’s political life. however, we do not accept kosovo as an independent country, and we will never accept it. we have to face the reality, but we cannot be satisfied with it”. furthermore, national minorities in the balkans gather themselves in an organization, usually named matica. however, i did not come across it during my research. i then asked interviewees why it threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo 19 is so and i received these answers, “matica does not exist here, since this is our country”, “we do not need matica because our church already gives power and unity to our population”, “we do not need matica because we are not victims of a diaspora”, “matica is an organization that protects minorities. we couldn’t be a minority in kosovo, as italians couldn’t be a minority in italy”. 3.2. social situation nowadays, many serbian families encounter huge economic problems due to job scarcity. in order to tackle this problem, they have lately come up with an unusual solution: they have started to sell their homes and lands to wealthy albanians7. they are then using the money to escape from kosovo, most likely with the intention of never coming back. one of the consequences is that albanians are now reaching and settling down in territories which they have never inhabited, such as kosovska kamenica’s and vitina’s area and the northern part of macedonia. many young serbs refuse to work in the agricultural sector. the serbs have survived for centuries by working on agricultural lands; yet today the situation appear to be fairly different. according to older interviewees, the reason behind it is simple: “our children grew learning that they can survive through social help, so they are not encouraged to look for a new job”. nevertheless, the gap between young people’s lifestyle and wealth in europe and in kosovo remains extremely large. an average monthly paycheck in kosovo is around one hundred and fifty euro. kosovo serbs‘ disappointment and bitterness are unconcealed in their words, „serbia should start building factories here: we cannot find a job in albanians’ ones“, „there is no perspective for youngsters. if the current trend will not change, there will be no serbs in kosovo in ten-years’ time. although there are reports of cases of brawls, stabbings and even burnt down houses, our most notable problem is young people’s unemployment“, “in this moment in kosovo there are no factories. there are only a few companies which repackage goods created somewhere else“, „every kosovan institution should reserve 10% of its job’s places to national minority8, such as serbs, turks, roma, croats. this percentage is actually reached in a few cases; nevertheless, minorities are usually just assigned to unskilled and manual labour. 7 the market price for a house of one hundred square meters is sixty thousand euro nearby gračanica, and ninety thousand euro around kosovo polje. 8 yet one of the conditions to get these jobs is the knowledge of albanian language. there are several national and ethnical minorities in kosovo, such as turks, croats, roma, ashkali, but my intention was to focus my attention on gorans and bosniaks since their cases are more interesting for my research. the gorans are a muslim minority which got their name form the area they live in, called gora, in the southern part of kosovo, between albania and macedonia. this land is entirely mountainous, they live in less than thirty villages and in a town, dragaš (dragash or sharri in albanian), where they live with albanian. their language is a mystery, being a mix of serbian, bulgarian and macedonian. they considered themselves slavic and rejected past bulgarian and serbian attempts to incorporate them, as they are now rejecting the same attempt by albanians. despite that, during the last conflict, they decided to take the side of the serbians, and fought against the albanian army; for that reason, their relationship is today rather complicated. yet, the biggest problem they are facing concerns the islamic radicalization they are undergoing in the last years. bosniaks live in a few villages around prizren. many interviewees said that they used to consider themselves serbian muslims until the seventies or the eighties. the constitution of 1974, with the formation of a new identity among bosniaks muslim, especially in bosnia, arguably permitted a new consciousness also for this small group. in the area, they are named torbesh9, both from albanians than from serbs, but they do not like this denomination, considering it pejorative. as far as the economic situation is concerned, serbia tries to help and subsidizes many kosovo serbs’ families with an economic monthly subvention. serbia also provides pensions, health assistance and support in educational fields10. without that economic support, seventy to eighty per cent of kosovo serbs would probably be compelled to leave the country. the result is that ‘serbia serbs’ feel that their country uses up energies and money helping kosovo serbs, without addressing the precarious state of belgrade’s economic system. as result, a new sentiment towards kosovo serbs is rising in serbia: although theoretically ‘kosovo is serbia’, in practice when kosovo serbs decide to move towards central and northern serbia, they are often given pejorative names and they sometimes suffer from discriminations, caused by ‘serbia serbs’’ prejudices. 9 literally, torba means bag. 10 many interviewees told me they received an economic support for the education of their children. this support covers approximately ten to fifteen per cent of the total outgoings of this sector. 20 marcoandrea spinelli it is also relevant to highlight that kosovo releases subventions according to the number of inhabitants of each municipality: a lower number of official inhabitants equals a minor subvention for a municipality. in spite of that, many kosovo serbs decided not to take part in the last 2011 census. interethnic marriage in southern serbia and in some serbian villages in kosovo is an interesting phenomenon, often caused by socioeconomic reasons: since many young girls opt for moving to large cities, such as belgrade, novi sad, niš, to find a job, men are left with little choice in terms of marriage. as a result, some men decide to buy a young girl from an albanian christians family. therefore, christian girls are brought in from albania, mainly from the mountainous area around scutari, in a very precarious economic situation (possibly worse than in some kosovo serbs villages). i came across around thirty instances of interethnic marriages in the villages i visited during my research11. on the contrary, i neither found nor hear about the existence of any mixed couple formed by a serb and an islamic kosovo albanian. moreover, it seems quite unlikely that a serbian girl would decide to marry an albanian man; throughout my research i heard many times sentences like the following, “the worst thing that could happen to a serbian father would be to see his daughter married to an albanian man”, “an albanian woman might be integrated in our community, an albanian man could not. never”. father srdjan is a priest who works at the gračanica monastery, who gave me a very comprehensive opinion about interethnic marriages and the situation as a whole: “in the past, there were many mixed weddings in this area. therefore, i think it is almost impossible to precisely establish what the nationality of your great grandfather was. however, the question is, does it really matter? the only one who benefit from these divisions are criminal groups, and people should avoid mixing with this kind of people. people should ponder, choose a position, but not be dogmatic about it. choosing a position, a side is still important because if you remain without identity, criminal groups (either nationalists or fundamentalists) will choose for you. we must choose, without regret. by the way, we did not choose our nationality because we did not choose our parents. therefore, he who offers you something asking you to change your identity, he is actually exploiting you. it is better to build up your identity on your own. i believe it is possible to create a multi-ethnic and multi-religious 11 most of the interethnic marriages i come across with were in velika hoča and in the municipality of novo brdo. i then discovered a few more in ranilug as well. country, where albanians and serbs welcome each other to their homes. i believe it is possible because albanian islamic girls still follow christian easter’s traditions, continuing their egg-painting traditions; since albanians islamic families still visit serbian monasteries; because many serbs still visit an albanian hodža (islamic preacher), who predicts them the future. everybody should carry out these traditions”. as far as education is concerned, albanian institutions decided to distance themselves from the former yugoslav education system during the eighties, by establishing new schools with albanian as their official language. from that moment on, kosovo serbs schools ceased to teach albanian, and albanian schools did the same with serbian. nowadays, there are no longer mixed classes. as a result, the traditional bilingualism that was a distinctive feature of this area has almost definitely died, since it is no longer a goal to reach. nowadays, youngsters of different nationalities need to speak english in order to communicate effectively; while middle-aged people have studied both languages. however, whereas middle-aged albanians are nearly all bilingual, serbs are not, because they did not study the albanian language, while albanians studied serbian. furthermore, some serbian villages have endless daily issues with wi-fi connections and electricity and warm water supplies, due to restrictions of various nature.  serbian villages faced even harder restrictions in the aftermath of the war, due to what seemed to be ethnic and political choices. nowadays, the situation has not been settled, but it is the same for every village in the area, either albanian or serbian. however, these restrictions account for one of the main reasons that pushes serbs away from kosovo. it also appears that the phone network and the electric and water system are simply not able to satisfy the energy demand. many interviewees do not consider it to be an ethnic issue: “i believe they are not able to solve ordinary problems of both communities”, “sometimes many wells are closed by central government and its water diverted towards priština or other cities, temporarily leaving both communities without water supply. we live in a nonsensical society”. yet, the amount of kosovo serbs complaints towards albanians piles up in a sort of unwritten cahiers des doléances (english: lists of grievances), “they steal our wood during winter, although we need it to warm our houses; they let their cows and sheep pasture in our vineyards, thus ruining them”, “they once destroyed a house to decrease his economic value. threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo 21 then, they were able to buy it at a lower price”, “they are used to entering bars in gračanica and then asking to switch to albanian music or starting to sing albanian songs”, “they pass by serbian villages waving their flag and insulting our girls”, “we do not have appropriate infrastructure, as private sewer and wells and they do not build them for us”, “during quarrels and fights, it is completely useless to call the local albanian police. kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi”, meaning “the one who accuses you, is the one who will judge you”. serbs are split in two when it comes to the accession to the european union. there are many different opinions with respect to joining the european union. the side which advocates the access to the eu, tend to firmly support it: “serbia must accede to the ue. it is the only solution that could improve our life. not acceding would bring serbia, montenegro and kosovo to further isolation and, possibly, it would bring along conflicts and war”, “we need to join some international organizations, to feel part of something larger than our country”, “it would be important especially for our documents’ value”, “eu is a noble idea. war disappeared and peace is reigning in our continent. yet, i do not think our national pride should vanish with the entrance in european union”. the other side is strongly against the accession: “acceding what? we are already europe! i do not think about it. i have more important problems in my life”, “we cannot enter in the ue because they recognized the independence of kosovo”, “the eu will disappear in a few years. their values are extremely noxious. while our founding values are family, church and the army, european union’s ones are drug legalization, gay marriages and prostitution. we cannot stand to live in that kind of society”. 3.3. religion in order to better understand the role of kosovo, and particularly peć’s patriarchate (fig. 2), it is essential to point out that it represents the heart and the essence of serbian identity. the serbian orthodox church plays a primary role in the everyday life of the serbian community, since its importance relies not only on its spiritual guidance, but also and especially on its logistic role: the church provides and arranges daily assistance to the population, by delivering food to the poor and arranging the sale of medicines, wood, clothes, blankets and other commodities moreover, it contributes to preserve the social cohesion of kosovo serbs and keeps srpstvo and inat alive, key-terms to the serbian culture, concepts which encompass nationalism, pride and stubbornness. yet, despite its ostensible unity, the serbian othodox church has recently undergone a schism which separated otac artemije’s followers from traditional believers. i managed to interview some members of the former group and their criticism towards the leaders of serbian orthodox church and its role emerged noticeably, «it can no longer lead our community because it demands us to recognise kosovo’s independence. we will never accept it, as otac artemije made clear when he was bishop of kosovo», «our religious representatives support the albanian occupation. they are in agreement with them». the division seems due to political rather than spirituals reasons, but that comes as no surprise, since religion, politics and nationalities are largely intertwined matters within the serbian society. i personally believe this strong link between religion and nationality could be the most dangerous threat to peace coming from both sides. the following account seems appropriate to explain this strong link. in 2016, many albanians took photos in front of some orthodox monasteries and peć’s patriarchate, in order to reclaim their lands, a behaviour that has been construed as provocative by serbs. interviewees’ almost unanimous opinion about these events was rather unexpected, «if your wish is to demonstrate that those monasteries belong to your community, then you are at the same time admitting that in the past you have been orthodox as well as (and especially) serb, since our religion and our nationality were born together, from the holy nemanjić family». an educated man from the little village of velika hoča expressed me same concept in a few words, “the serbian identity is linked to the orthodox one. technically, non-orthodox people are not serbs. the reason behind it is that our culture was founded on christian orthodox values. whoever leaves our religion, no matter under what circumstances, will become someone else in a few generations, thus changing both religion and, consequently, fig. 2. peć’s patriarchate source: http://srbijatop10.com/pecka-patrijarsija/ 22 marcoandrea spinelli nationality. the point is that the serbian community never accepted non-orthodox serbs as real serbs, which then decide to shift towards a different religion, a process made even easier in our area, due to islamic proselytism. the link between religion and nationality is extremely evident in our community, and in kosovo in particular”. albania is today home to an interesting phenomenon. the greek orthodox church has been improving his number of albanian believers over the last few decades, and otac srdjan, a priest from the gračanica monastery, is sure that “our church got it wrong about albanian people. it should have attracted them to our church via proselytism, as did the greek orthodox by building many churches in albania in the last few decades. this could also constitute a potential issue in the future, if the greek orthodox church will manage to spread among kosovo albanians. nobody knows how the two orthodox churches would interact if put side by side within kosovo”. these issues regarding the orthodox church fit inside a greater phenomenon that is affecting kosovo’s area. there were seventy active mosques until 1999, one hundred twenty islamic religious sites and only one hundred people were employed in these sites. nowadays, the situation has radically changed; the number of mosques has increased tenfold to a total of seven hundred mosques, islamic religious sites have almost doubled and over 2500 people are employed in these sites. many mosques in kosovo have been directly founded by several arabic countries. furthermore, as already mentioned, it seems that wahhabists and islamic fundamentalists are taking advantage of widespread unemployment and general lack of values by paying some female believers to wear burqas or niqabs and some male believers to grow their beards, in order that the islamist ideology can be spread. unfortunately, it is complicated to find accurate information about this radicalisation. nobody feels free to speak about it and direct answers are generally avoided. nevertheless, it seems to be a serious issue to the extent that to some interviewees “islam is becoming a cancer for christian europe”, and “we can accept moderate islam, but we must reject any radical deviation because the european union was founded on christian roots”. in conclusion, according to many interviewees, “we are witnessing the greatest process of islamisation in the history of the balkans”. this sentence might be overstated due to the emphasis serbs put on religion issues; however, it is undoubtedly true that this radicalisation is almost unprecedented in the recent history of kosovo, a land where, as already explained, serbs were the absolute majority until as recent as fifty years ago. 4. enclaves 4.1. gračanica this municipality is easily recognizable on the map thanks to its position in the midst of kosovo, near to the capital priština (called prishtina in albanian). there are sixteen villages in the municipality of gračanica, ten of which have a serbian majority; three have an albanian majority and the remaining villages are mixed. it is actually rather difficult to determine an accurate ratio between the two ethnic groups, since the serbs are consistently selling their houses to albanians, in a process which is bound to reshape the ethnic composition of several villages. the exact number of inhabitants is actually unknown, due to the fact that many serbian families chose not to show up for the last census. this choice had its consequences, since the government of priština decided to subsidise the area according to the number of its inhabitants. however, it is estimated to be around twenty-three thousand. the percentage of serbs should be close to the eighty-five per cent, with an albanian minority (seven to nine per cent) and a quite significant romani presence. early settlements of albanian families in this area are recorded since the end of the middle ages, although at that time, thanks to the historical role played by gračanica monastery, they were mostly christians, with possibly only a few orthodox families. the roma minority is split into three communities, one which completely orthodox, one completely muslim, and a mixed third one. the first mosque around gračanica’s area was built by muslim romani, a detail that stands out as a demonstration of their successful integration within the municipality. gračanica is one of the few municipalities in europe that recognised romani among their languages. an interesting phenomenon has recently been taking place in this municipality: some families belonging to the roma minority are getting closer to the wahhabism movement, which grants them a salary. some interviewees advocated that “they are people with no values who consider their faith as a job; they do not actually believe in wahhabism doctrine, they just convert to it for the economic reward, because they need it”. a croat village, janjevo12, can also be found nearby. despite the fact that it had always been inside 12 there are even some catholic albanian families in lipljan. threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo 23 gračanica’s diocese, its inhabitants decided to leave this municipality after the nineties war and to join lipljan’s municipality. one of the most recurring issues in gračanica is the lack of water, despite the reservoir being just a few kilometres far from the town. unfortunately, it is shared with the nearby capital priština, which is in constant demand of water supplies owing to its overpopulation problems. gračanica is considered by the serbs to be the true capital of kosovo, due to its facilities, namely a cinema, a theatre, a cultural centre, which are hard to find in other serbian kosovan cities. some interviewees told me that its “cultural life is full of events and this is the only place in kosovo where serbs can find it”. inside the dom kulture (cultural centre), located in the city centre, it is possible to admire an interesting art show by a serbian artist called goran stojčetović which represents a way to remember all the serbs that were kidnapped and never returned during the last war. its artwork is a simple word, missing, with photos of kidnapped serbs attached to each letter. this artwork was thought also as an answer to a similar albanian artwork, located in the city centre of priština; it a single word, newborn, which stands for the new birth of kosovo as a country. 4.2. novo brdo this municipality is located east of gračanica municipality, closer to the serbian border. in 2007, the un implemented the ahtisaari plan, changing the composition of kosovo’s municipalities with the intention to better integrate minorities. novo brdo is one of the municipality that was most drastically modified; the plan increased the number of villages to thirty-four, thus enlarging its area. many villages which were previously part of gnjilane or kosovska kamenica’s municipality were included in novo brdo’s. this new partition resulted in the municipalities of gnjilane and kosovska kamenica losing a high percentage of serbian families, whereas serbs’ percentage in novo brdo’s grew to the fiftyfive-sixty per cent in. hovewer, it is again quite difficult to establish an exact number of inhabitants due to the serbs’ choice not to vote in the last census. this area was historically inhabited by albanians, serbs and saxons; it was well known in the middle ages thanks to its gold, silver, zinc and lead mines. these are all run by albanians today, meaning that not many serbs are still employed in the mines. due to the lack of work, kosovo serbs that lives in this municipality are trying to attract tourists by promoting visits to some monasteries and castles and by improving infrastructures. 4.3. ranilug ranilug municipality borders novo brdo’s municipality on the western side, and serbia on the eastern side. it was also established in 2007 by the ahtisaari plan. it was previously included within kosovska kamenica’s muncipality, where kosovo serbs had always been a minority. on accounts of this plan, they managed to be no longer a minority. in fact, serbs now account for the ninety-five per cent of the inhabitants of this municipality. a few albanian muslim families live in this municipality as well. however much their situation might have improved, it is still somehow bizarre: ranilug’s municipality borders serbia, but the correspondent serbian municipality has an albanian majority. 4.4. parteš this municipality is located south-west of ranilug. most of its territory is surrounded by gnjilane’s municipality. according to the last census, there are less than one thousand and eight hundred13 inhabitants, yet almost three thousand people voted in the last elections. that anomaly was addressed by interviewees, many of which believe the actual number of inhabitants to be higher than five thousand, although the last census failed to register many of them. every serbian municipality is provided with elementary schools, although the same is not always true as far as high schools are concerned. nevertheless, the education imparted is rather good and it is still possible to follow several high school’s careers (in serbian language) in the towns of ranilug, parteš and klokot. 4.5. klokot it is an enclave entirely located within the border of vitina’s municipality, which it was part of until ahtisaari plan’s implementation in 2007. klokot is one of the smallest municipality of kosovo, with less than five thousand inhabitants. seventy-five to eighty per cent of them are serbs, while the rest are muslim albanians. there were only a few albanians in this area until 1999, yet their number is now increasing “since serbs are selling their houses. half of the serbs that lived here fled after the war. it was even worse in vitina: only twenty per cent of us is still living there. everybody ran away!” there are three villages inside the municipality, besides klokot itself: vrbovac, mogila (mogillë in albanian) and grnčar (gërnçar). while vrbovac seems 13 the exact number of parteš’ inhabitants is 1787. 24 marcoandrea spinelli to be an entirely serbian village, albanians make up around half of the population of mogila. this small village is home to an interesting intercultural peculiarity: the high school building is used by both communities and it has two different names, serbian and albanian. this area was once very important because of a large presence of mineral salts, essential to the local economy. almost every family had a member who used to work at the factory that bottled mineral water, as it is for the mines in novo brdo’s area. at the end of the war, the government of kosovo decided to privatise it. as a result, today “workers and employees are almost entirely albanians and it is really complicated to get a job in the area for a serb”. 4.6. štrpce the last enclave i wish to write about is also the most isolated, nestled among the mountains near macedonia and gora. it spreads south-west of klokot, towards prizren. as for the other enclaves, many štrpce’s serbs did not take part in the last census of 2011. whereas official statistics says its inhabitants are less than seven thousand, the actual figure is more likely to be above twelve thousand people. indeed, according to this census, albanians are more or less three thousand and five hundred, and they should account for thirty per cent of municipality’s inhabitants. albanians live both in ethnically pure albanian villages and in some mixed ones. legend says štrpce’s inhabitants are luckier than other kosovo serbs, since “the ottomans did not feel the need to fight against serbs in this area because they were not aggressive and they lived in an area too isolated to pose a threat to the ottoman empire”. 4.7. velika hoča before the nineties war, velika hoča (fig. 3) was a serbian village of seven or eight hundred inhabitants. it is an ancient village of archaeological interest: its ruins date as far back as the fourth and sixth century and some churches as far as the twelfth. a legend says that there were forty thousand inhabitants and twenty-four churches during the middle ages. this legend also says the area was so densely populated that a cat could have travelled from velika hoča to prizren14 just by walking on roofs. nevertheless, at the beginning of this century, its inhabitants amounted to only two thousand. velika hoča is located within the municipality of orahovac, which has a large albanian majority, and the small serbian community, inside orahovac’s town, amounts to just four hundred inhabitants. before the outbreak of the 1999 conflict, the serbian population in the area that comprises velika hoča, orahovac, žočište15 and others small villages was five thousand people. nowadays, there are less than one thousand serbs in this area. many serbs who were able to rebuild their houses in the following years still decided to sell them in order to move out, since they felt at risk and unwelcomed. despite that, velika hoča inhabitants did not feel compelled to leave as other serbian groups were, since their village is completely closed and protected by a valley and because the wine produced in their vineyards allows them to make a decent living. nevertheless, they will probably force to leave this land in a few generations, since every factory nearby the village is own by albanians and serbs have serious issues in finding a job. according to them, “serbia should help us by building factories in serbian villages. unemployment is a big issue for albanians as well, but it affects us even more, and we could not cope with it without serbia’s assistance”. many families from orahovac have considered themselves as albanians for generations, despite speaking a serbian dialect at home, having some orthodox icons in their basements and despite they have converted to islam over the last decades. it is not uncommon to overhear albanians speaking serbian among themselves in orahovac, “but if a serb were to walk past, they would promptly switch to albanian”. orahovac’s inhabitants were the closest to the serbian community and identity. nevertheless, the civil war was particularly violent in this area. nowadays, there is still evidence of it. for instance, 14 the distance between velika hoča and prizren is approximately twenty-five to thirty kilometres. 15 there is an ancient monastery in žočište. it was completely destroyed by uҫk attacks twice in the last twenty years. some serbian families used to live in the village which bears the same name, but in the aftermath of the war they decided to sell their houses to albanians and to definitely leave this area. fig. 3. velika hoča, from one of his vineyards source: sanja jovanović, 2016. threatening archipelagos. serbian enclaves and minorities in kosovo 25 municipality’s employees are required to speak serbian as well as albanian and they should accept serbian document, but they do not do it and many road signs in this area have been vandalised, as the picture below shows (fig. 4). political parties are almost completely absent from village, such as velika hoča; therefore, locals are slowly becoming apolitical because they feel that «the situation is such and there is no alternative, besides there has not been any politician that ever helped us. whoever fled from our village and from kosovo in general, did not come back: this is all it is needed to show that in our community politics isn’t working on our behalf». one of the questions i asked was about the reasons that persuaded them to stay in these villages. jovana from orahovac answered me with the wonderful sentence i quoted at the beginning of this paragraph. as a man from velika hoča reminded me, «today we feel as we are the victims of this situation. but maybe, in the future, our sacrifice will acquire a sense, a meaning for our kids and nephews». 5. conclusions when defining nationalism, ernest renan (1993) and max weber (1995) isolated a shared collective memory and a patriotic fervour, meant as a common fate, as its key element. i believe we could easily find it in those villages. benedict anderson (1996) said that nations always loom out of an immemorial past and glide into a limitless future. i have already written about this past, but it appears that the future is limited for serbian youngsters nowadays, as though their future could not take place in the same geographical space as their past. gellner believes that some sort of a ‘selection of traditions’ should lay behind every form of nationalism. as i showed, the so-called “serbdom” has its own history of traditions in kosovo. however, in the last decades a second nationalism, brought forth by the albanians, has created its own selection of traditions in the same territory. the coexistence of two such opposed form of nationalism is a source of constant clash, for which it would be daring to predict a peaceful resolution bearing in mind that any scientific starting point will have to lie on the interaction between theory and fieldwork, i tried to assume a specific outlook and to focus my reasoning on towns and villages, and not necessarily on generic as much as abstract concepts, which usually lack insight the more the situation gets elaborate or shifting. following karl schlögel (2011, p. 57), i find it “more useful to look at a fragmented reality rather than at reality as a whole, which is now only a promise”. karl schlögel again thinks about inhabited places as diagnoses of time and maintains that “nothing is more stimulating than the challenge of deciphering a city’s pattern: several layers superimpose within it, and languages and styles interweave; it fosters not one but many interpretation” (schlögel, 2011, p. 1). as karl schlögel (2011, p. 39) wrote, “at the beginning of this century, we find ourselves in a particular stage of a clash of civilizations. yet, no country is able to withstand the coexistence of such ethnic differences in the long term”. indeed, despite the intentions of european and american policies, a sense of belonging to kosovo is today quite uncommon among serbians. they actually consider it an artificial entity, something less of a country. coexistence failed in kosovo, and people spent their life in a place shaped by this failure, without a clear understanding of the process. kosovo serbs do not seem to have political parties associations or even ideals that allow them to believe in something. my view on the subject is rather pessimistic; i do not foresee any future for them in this land. i actually believe that in a few years more and more families will move to serbia, kosovo serbs will sell their homes to albanians, a process that will lead to a slow but definitively disappearance of those enclaves. technical informations quotations do not show any name since interviewees asked me to avoid doing so; i respectfully obliged. i mentioned every city’s name in both languages. serbian names were written before the albanian ones (even if serbs are the minority in the most part fig. 4. road signs in kosovo source: jansen, 2015. 26 marcoandrea spinelli of these cities) for the sole reason that my project primarily focused on them and on their point of view. acknowledgments thanks to: the secretary and the principal of velika hoča’s elementary school, otac miljenko from velika hoča, a monk from žočište, zvonko, radojko and a photographer from štrpce, otac benedikt from gotovuša, srećko from klokot, sveta and his colleague from novo brdo, the technical director of gračanica dom kulture, boban from gračanica, dragan and his friend from parteš, otac srdjan and the owner of a restaurant in ranilug, otac ilarion from draganac and otac petar from dečani. special thanks are due to milorad, katarina, miloš, their parents and their uncle from velika hoča, jovana from orahovac, otac srdjan from gračanica and iguman sava from dečani. thanks to sanja jovanović for her passion and her ability throughout this research, as well as for her everlasting smile. references anderson b., 1996, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, comunità immaginate. origini e fortuna dei nazionalismi, manifestolibri, rome. brubaker r., frederick c., 2000, beyond identity, kluwer academic publishers, dordrecht. jansen s., 2015, what’s in a name? the politicization of toponyms – part 1, http://www.iaffairscanada.com/2015/ whats-in-a-name-the-politicization-of-toponyms-part-1 [08/06/2017]. pećka patrijaršija, http://srbijatop10.com/pecka-patrijarsija/ [08/06/2017]. renan e., 1993, che cosa è una nazione?, donzelli, rome. schlögel k., 2011, marjampole: oder europas wiederkehr aus dem geist der städte, arcipelago europa. viaggio nello spirito delle città, pearson, milan-turin. sekulić t., 2002, violenza etnica. i balcani tra etnonazionalismo e democrazia, carocci, rome. statistical yearbook of the republic of kosovo, 2017, kosovo agency of statistics, prishtina. weber m., 1995, considerazioni intermedie. il destino dell’occidente, armando editore, milan. zeqiri l., 2013, map: percent of serbs in the republic of kosovo, 2011 (according to settlements). 1. introduction in conditions of the implementation of modern land reform in ukraine, subjective land rights occupy a prominent place in the system of subjective rights of both individuals and legal persons. these subjective land rights are constantly at the center of attention of representatives of domestic and foreign legal science. the problem of the exercising of land rights is one of the most important in both scientific and practical aspects. as we know, any subjective right has its own social value only when it can be exercised, that is, to realize the opportunities that it provides to the authorized person. in its turn, the land code of ukraine consolidates the pluralism of forms of land ownership, defines the types of rights to land, as well as the circle of subjects of ownership and land use. that is, we are talking about objective rights to the land, the characteristic feature of which is their static nature. however, neither the constitution, nor the land code of ukraine and the laws adopted for the development of their provisions, disclose the content and mechanism of exercising of subjective rights to land. the exercising of subjective rights is characterized by the dynamics, which consists in committing by subjects of certain actions to meet the needs and legitimate interests. these actions relate to the use of land in general or individual plots of land. through the exercising of the corresponding rights to land, the subjects realize the objective rights of land provided for by the theoretical problems of exercising of land rights in ukraine dmytro fedchyshyn department of civil law, zaporizhzhia national university, zhukovskoho 66, 69600 zaporizhzhia, ukraine, e-mail: marlynkh@gmail.com citation fedchyshyn d., 2018, theoretical problems of exercising of land rights in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 37–41. abstract the article is devoted to theoretical issues related to the exercising of land rights. the author analyzed the concept, content and limits of the exercising of land rights. also the relation of concepts “exercising of the rights” and “realization of the rights” is carried out. the content of the concept of “the exercise of land rights” is examined. the category “limits of realization of the land rights” is investigated. the views of scientists in the sphere of land law, which contained term of “intended purpose of a land plot”, are analyzed. it is considered as one of the main characteristics of each land plot. key words land rights, subjective right, exercising of land right, limits of rights, land plot, intended purpose of land, land ownership, permanent use of land. received: 28 march 2018 accepted: 25 april 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 37–41 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.027.9014 38 dmytro fedchyshyn constitution of ukraine, the land code of ukraine and other normative-legal acts. 2. “exercising” or “realization” of land rights? legislative acts of ukraine often use such terms, the content and the relationship of which are not precisely defined, as a result of which in lawmaking and law enforcement, there are problems with the definition of the object and subjective composition of land legal relations. for example, the constitution of ukraine (article 13) operates with the term “exercise of the rights of the landowner”, and in article 14 the basic law uses the term “realization of the right of ownership” (конституція…, 1996). it is advisable to consider the essence and content of these terms and determine their correlation. first and foremost, one should touch upon the etymology of the terms «exercising» and «realization». so, in the ukrainian language, the word «realize» is considered in the sense of carrying out, doing something real, embodying something in life. at the same time, the term «exercise» has two meanings, one of which: to introduce, implement, do something real (словник…, 1980, p. 541). as a result of the comparison of the above interpretations of terms, we can come to the conclusion that they are completely identical, since they are determined one by one. however, in legal literature, the approach to the ratio of phrases «realization of right» and «exercising of right» is ambiguous. some scientists identify these concepts as the same ones. thus, representatives of civil law emphasize that under the exercise of civil law it is necessary to understand the realization of those opportunities provided by the content of subjective civil law (науково-практичний…, 2011). according to this, the realization of subjective law is the transformation of the possibility of reality by means of a set of actions of an actual or legal nature in order to satisfy the interest. there are also some other approaches regarding the relation between the terms «realization» and «exercising». some researchers emphasize that the concepts are not identical, but rather includes one else. for example, o.v. grygorenko (григоренко, 2016) asserts that realization is a very broad concept, since it includes exercising and protection. she emphasizes that exercising is one of the stages in the realization of personal non-property rights, during which, for example, an individual, committing legally significant acts (acts or inactivity) directly or through other persons, transforms the objectively existing right into his own subjective right, in the form of rights and obligations created for himself. in his turn, r.o. stefanchuk (стефанчук, 2008), proposing the definition of «exercising of subjective civil right», notes that the latter can be understood as all possible types of behavior of the carrier of the corresponding subjective civil right, aimed at both the realization of individual powers that make up its content, and to exercise rights in general, which may take place in a form prescribed by the law. in this approach, exercising implies the realization of those opportunities provided by the contract or law to the owner of subjective law. so we can reach the conclusion that the concept of «realization» is narrower than «exercising» and concerns only individual powers, and not rights in general. thus, the position of scientists, according to which the term «exercising» is considered broader than the term «realization» and includes the latter, seems most acceptable and accurate. the content of the exercise of subjective rights to land consists of the rights enshrined in the legal norms, according to which an empowered person can commit certain actions aimed at transforming the his legal powers into reality. the exercising of land rights is combined with the active volitional behavior of a person, with his activities aimed at the use of land through the realization of legally secured facilities, that constitute the content of his right to meet the needs and interests protected by the parties to land legal relationships. the exercising of right lies not only in the attachment to a particular person of a subjective right, but above all its materialization, the actual and complete achievement by this person the main and the original goals. these are, in particular, the reception of those goods and values, the satisfaction of interests, which are programmed by this subjective right and form the basis of its content. for example, a citizen, in accordance with the land code of ukraine, has the right to free land privatization (земельний…, 2001). however, an interested person cannot simply come and «privatize» any land, thereby committing a volitional action, which is enshrined by the law. in order to exercise such a right, a citizen must perform a number of procedural actions (to file an application to the relevant body, to form a certain package of documents, etc.). only after this the person can acquire the land plot into ownership, and as a result, to exercise his right to privatize land. theoretical problems of exercising of land rights in ukraine 39 3. limits of exercising of land rights while individuals exercise their subjective rights, the conflicts of their rights are often encountered. in such cases, one person cannot exercise his right to land due to a certain influence on him by another person. so the question of establishing certain limits of exercising of rights to land is actualized. such limits, as a rule, take place where the exercising of the right of the subject encounters with the rights and interests of another person or society as a whole, which are also recognized and protected by law. according to v.v. nosik (носік, 2006), while exercising the property rights, as well as any other right, there is a certain framework – external borders or a certain amount of freedom, the output of which is combined with legal liability. therefore, for example, the land owner or an authorized person, on the one hand, must act within the limits of his powers, on the other – not to infringe upon the legal freedom of other owners, third parties and not to harm the state and people. in order to ensure such behavior of subjects there is a need for state regulation of property relations and control over the actions of the owner, while not allowing illegal interference in the permissible limits of exercising of the right of ownership. failure to comply with the above requirements regarding the exercise of property rights leads to the emergence of such negative legal phenomena as abuse of law and offenses. thus, the establishment of the limits of the exercising of rights to land is the prerogative of the state, which is aimed at ensuring the rights and legitimate interests of individual citizens and society as a whole. first of all, it should be emphasized that the use of land as an important natural resource requires compliance with a number of environmental regulations and standards in view of the importance of land as a condition of existence of future generations (костяшкін, 2016). in particular, in this context, as one of the examples, we should mention article 167 of the land code of ukraine, according to which economic and other activities that cause pollution of land and soils above the maximum permissible concentrations of hazardous substances are prohibited (земельний…, 2001). the norms of the maximum permissible concentrations of dangerous substances in soils, as well as the list of these substances, are approved by the central executive body implementing the state policy in the sphere of environmental protection and by the central executive body, which implements the state policy in the sphere of sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population. in this case, the limits of exercising of the use of the corresponding land plots, which are based on the ecological criterion, are established. while exercising the rights to land, each person must not only do everything possible to prevent the deterioration of the ecological situation, but also to try to improve the conditions of land. subjects of land law relations must also act in good faith, when they exercise land rights. they must fallow the standards of morality adopted in society. for example, the constitutional court of ukraine in one of its decisions drew attention to the fact that one of the manifestations of the rule of law is that the law cannot be limited only by legislation as one of its forms, but also includes other social regulators, in particular, the norms of morality (рішення конституційного…, 2004). of course, the violation of moral norms is not drawn to the participants of land relations adverse legal consequences, since another interpretation of the law would ignore the differences that exist between the norms of law and morality. the sense of the requirements to act reasonably, conscientiously, fairly, humanely is to orient the subjects, as well as law enforcement bodies, on the mandatory consideration of the rules of morality in their work. as a result, the formation of the limits of the exercise of rights to land is affected by the norms of morality, the requirements of reasonableness and integrity of behavior and the purposes of law. the exercising of subjective rights to land is limited by certain time limits. the current legislation establishes, where necessary, certain time limits for the exercising of land rights, including the time limits for exercising of a subjective right. so, for example, part 5 of article 93 of the land code of ukraine stipulates that the right to lease a land plot may be alienated, including sold at land trades, as well as transferred to pledge or inheritance and may be entered into the authorized capital by the owner of the land plot – for a term up to 50 years. the law also allows a temporary occupation of a plot of land for conducting reconnaissance works (article 97 of the land code of ukraine). in turn, superficies and emphyteusis cannot exceed 50 years (part 4 of article 102-1 of the land code of ukraine) (земельний…, 2001). in addition, in our country there is such a kind of land use as a permanent use, which is carried out indefinitely. the absence of a predetermined period of the right of permanent land use, on the one hand, gives this type of land use a sustainable character, and on the other hand, increases the degree of stability of the powers of a permanent land user. the right of permanent use of land is much less extensive than the right of ownership to these lands, since it does not include in its content the disposal of them. this creates a completely unacceptable 40 dmytro fedchyshyn situation in which state and communal enterprises, being subjects of permanent land use, can not normally conduct business without having the opportunity to dispose of their land. 4. intended purpose of a land plot the main characteristic of each land plot is its intended purpose. the issue of the purpose of land is devoted to a significant number of various legal studies (шульга, 2018, федчишин, 2015, ігнатенко, 2014). emphasis is placed primarily on the lack of proper and unambiguous legislative regulation of this issue. in the science of land law, it is noted that the definition of the term «intended purpose of land» enshrined in the legislation does not reflect the peculiarities of the choice the use of a certain land plot and the procedure for its establishment, which leads to abuses in practice (марахін, 2013). that is why scientists provide and substantiate their variants of definition of this concept. in particular, p.f. kulynych (кулинич, 2002) notes that the intended purpose of the land plot is the permissible limits for the use of land by citizens and legal entities established by the legislation and specified by the relevant authorities. it is indicated in the state acts on the right of ownership of the land plot or for the right of a permanent use of the land plot, or in the lease agreement. it should be emphasized that in most definitions both in scientific literature and in legislation, attention is always focused on the fact that the intended purpose is the establishment of an acceptable limit of exploitation of the land plot. according to m.m. misnik (місник, 2005), a land plot cannot exist outside of one or another category of land. it absorbs all the features of the category of land to which it belongs. that is why, while exercising the rights to the relevant land plots, landowners or land users should take into account which category the land plot belongs to. according to article 19 of the land code of ukraine, the division of land in ukraine is carried out in accordance with the main intended purpose (земельний…, 2001). the «a» part of article 96 of the land code of ukraine proclaims that land owners and land users are obliged to ensure the use of land plots in accordance with their intended purpose (земельнний…, 2001). however, o.o. kot (кот, 2016) correctly notes that the imposition of such obligations on owners and land users cannot be considered as a limitation of their rights. in such cases requirements for any activity of any persons on the use of land are established regardless of the type of the right which is exercised. at the same time, the land code of ukraine for landowners (article 90) and land users (article 95) defines the right to self-management on their land (земельний…, 2001). the essence of this right is that a relevant land user or landowner, on his own will, independently determines the directions of his production and other activities, the way of using the land plot within its intended purpose and conditions for the protection of this land plot. 5. conclusions the exercising of land rights should be considered as a set of all possible types of behavior of a person for the purpose of acquiring, realizing and protecting the land rights, aimed at satisfying personal needs for land use, taking into account the intended purpose, rational use and protection of land, as well as the rights of others subjects of land legal relations. while persons exercise their subjective rights there can be a collision between the subjective rights of different persons. so a situation where the right of one person begins to contradict the right of another person is widespread. then there is a problem regarding the limits of the exercising of land rights. such limits are a legal guarantee of equality of rights of all subjects in the sphere of land law relations. establishment of them can be considered as providing equal opportunities for all subjects to exercise their land rights, what, in turn, essentially enshrines the principle of equality of all people in their rights, provided by the constitution of ukraine. references конституція україни, 1996, від 28.06.1996 року № 254к/96-вр, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/254%d0%ba/96-%d0%b2%d1%80 [22.03.2018] земельний кодекс україни, 2001, від 25.10.2001 року № 2768-14, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/276814 [22.03.2018] словник української мови, 1980 ан урср. інститут мовознавства. київ, http://ukrlit.org/slovnyk/%d0%b7%d0%b 4%d1%96%d0%b9%d1%81%d0%bd%d1%8e%d0%b2 %d0%b0%d1%82%d0%b8 [22.03.2018]. рішення конституційного суду україни у справі № 1-33/2004 про призначення судом більш м’якого покарання від 2 листопада 2004 року № 15-рп/2004, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v015p710-04 [22.03.2018] григоренко о., 2016, реалізація та захист прав фізичних осіб, що виникають при застосуванні допоміжних реtheoretical problems of exercising of land rights in ukraine 41 продуктивних технологій, phd typescript, київський національний університет імена т.г. шевченка, київ. ігнатенко і.в., 2014, правове забезпечення зонування земель у межах населених пунктів, фінарт, харків. костяшкін і., 2016, правове забезпечення соціальної функції права власності на землю в україні, хмельницький університет управління та права, хмельницький. кот о.о., 2016, межі здійснення суб’єктивних цивільних прав, вісник національної академії правових наук україни, 4(87), 127-138. кулинич п.ф., 2002, цільове призначення та цільове використання земель за новим земельним кодексом україни, юридичний журнал, 3, 41-46. марахін є., 2013, правове забезпечення використання земельних ділянок за цільовим призначенням, phd typescript: нан україни, інститут економіко-правових досліджень, донецьк. мисник н.н., 2005, к понятию земельного участка, государство и право, 10, 57-66. науково-практичний коментар цивільного кодексу україни, 2011, юрінком інтер, київ. носік в., 2006, проблеми здійснення права власності на землю українського народу, phd typescript, київський національний університет імені т.г. шевченко, київ. стефанчук р.о., 2008, особисті немайнові права фізичних осіб (поняття, зміст, система, особливості здійснення та захисту), кнт, київ. федчишин д.в., 2015 правове забезпечення використання та охорони земель громадської забудови, фінарт, харків. шульга м.в., 2018, науково-теоретичний аналіз правових режимів категорій земель, окрім земель сільськогосподарського призначення [in:] актуальні проблеми правового регулювання аграрних, земельних, екологічних та природо ресурсних відносин в україні, видавничий дім «гельветика», одеса, 106-132. 1. limited access to water – water stress and water footprint more than ever, globalized world and demographic imbalances increase social differences in the world, based on an absolute shortage on the one hand and overabundance on the other. inequalities cause and direct migratory flows and in their extremes, which are increasingly noticeable, they are increasing the potential for destabilization between societies and within themselves as well (dobkowski, wallimann (eds.), 2002). if at the forefront of this kind of scarcity there are goods, such as water, that define life, it is important to pay attention to both the reasons and the possible consequences of its scarcity. water in its original form is almost without color, odor and taste. and yet indispensable for living beings. a person needs it for its biological existence, it provides basic and urgent hygiene, is indispensable in everyday life and is the basis for food production and is needed journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(2), 1–9 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.2.01 water (in) security – modern security paradigm vladimir prebilič defense department, faculty of social sciences, university of ljubljana, kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 ljubljana, slovenia, orcid 0000-0002-0576-4259 e-mail: vladimir.prebilic@fdv.uni-lj.si citation prebilič v., 2019, water (in) security – modern security paradigm, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(2), 1–9. abstract water. in the existence and activities of each individual it is water that (un) consciously essentially defines them. therefore, water is called the source of life, but nowadays we know it under the new concept: blue gold. the reason for such a modern understanding of the role of water lies in the increasing limitations of access to sufficient quantities, which first results in water stress – the situation where needs remain unmet, but water scarcity does not yet interfere with the foundations of the activities of societies. water stress is thus the first form of threat to water security, especially when deficiency destroys all basic social systems that cannot function without water. the question of the role of water between them is increasingly being raised, as the operation of one system in the area of water consumption or management can mean interfering with the water potential of another system. this confronts us with the effect of the definite quantities of water, although countries with ample water resources and quantity (still) often do not understand or perceive it. of course, this does not mean that the debate is not necessary; it is, conversely, necessary, and it is only in this way that it is possible to prevent or at least control the situation in which many countries around the world have found themselves and there is a total lack of water resources in the most existential aspects. under these conditions, water security has become the most essential element of national security of these countries and thus a potential weak link in ensuring security. key words water security, national security, drinking water, water footprint, water stress, water consumption received: 29 march 2019 accepted: 04 may 2019 published: 30 june 2019 2 vladimir prebilič in all industries. because its shortage means great stress, disruption and, in the extreme, disintegration of the functioning of societies and threatens the existence of both the individual and a group of people, the issue of water has become a geopolitical issue and a challenge for many political elites. water is the only substance that occurs naturally in three aggregate states: hard represented by ice, liquid by water and gaseous state – water vapor. otherwise, the water covers more than 70% of the planet earth’s surface, which is about 1,386 million km³. however, out of all the amount of water, 97% is salt water, therefore it is non-potent and is not directly applicable to the biological part of satisfying the needs of man, fauna and flora. of the remaining 3% of fresh water on the planet, about 69% of it is stored in the form of ice on both earth’s poles and in the areas of continental glaciation of mountain peaks and ridges. of the remaining 30%, there are underground reserves of fresh water, but they are not always accessible for the direct exploitation either for humans or even less for the remaining part of the earth’s biosphere. thus, all of the needs are satisfied only by 1% of the water on the planet, which is surface and thus accessible freshwater. however, in this structure, as much as 70% of the water is snow and ice in mountains and permafrost, 21% of the surface freshwater is in lakes and only 0.5% in rivers, which are the most important source of satisfying the water needs of people on the planet (bralower, bice, 2014). since the amount of freshwater available is finite and cannot increase, the question arises of ensuring the needs of the biosphere, especially people whose number is constantly and fairly rapidly increasing. this also increases the needs, which are not only related to a large number of the world’s population, but depend on many other factors, such as economic development, lifestyle, water prices and consequently awareness. unlike other representatives of the planet’s biosphere, man with his (economic) activity has a significant influence on the quality of the water one uses oneself. in other words, due to pollution and other forms of exploiting freshwater, its available quantity and availability for the most biological needs of both humans and the rest of the biosphere is decreasing. although access to fresh and, in most cases, drinking water in the developed world is simple (it is only necessary to open a tap) and is reasonably priced, it is important to point out the fact that fresh water resources are fairly unequally distributed globally. more than half of all global freshwater supplies are concentrated in only nine countries: the united states of america, canada, colombia, brazil, the democratic republic of the congo, the russian federation, india, china and indonesia (freeman, 2015). by far the most water supplies are available to the inhabitants of greenland (30 million liters a day) and alaska (3.8 million liters a day), who do not need so much water because there is no agriculture and industry that are the largest water users. due to specific weight of water and the fact that it cannot easily be transported over longer distances, water is subject to – more than any other commodity – location. however, as there is globally a large disproportion between sufficient quantities of water and the distribution of inhabitants, however, as there is a large disproportion between sufficient quantities of water and the distribution of inhabitants globally, as a rule inversely proportional, various forms of deficiency are already occurring. australia is the most dried continent, but it has a relatively small population, a completely different picture is in asia, where nearly two thirds of the population live; the continent has only one third of the available water globally (pearce, 2006). the utterly remarkable fact is that access to sufficient quantities of fresh water is not interdependent with the global distribution of the population. even more significantly, there is a marked disproportion in the case of regional settlement and access to fresh water. from the antiquity or the roman state, this issue of the state is further solved by means of water distribution systems that enable the transport of water from the source (mostly water catchment) to the user. due to the importance and necessity of providing water to the population centers, today water supply systems already represent a strategically important or critical infrastructure, since any negative impact on its functioning signifies a security challenge, which may also be of national importance. however, urban centers have, besides the necessity of infrastructure support, at least two extremely important direct impacts on water: the first is consumption and other ways of exploiting water, or the discharge of waste water. for the first, water consumption is much more specific, which is significantly higher, and, in many cases, it represents a multiple of consumption in rural areas of the same country1. the growth of agglomerations, which is evident in the hard-to-control rapid urbanization of developing countries, represent a major water consumption catalyst, which often represents an 1 in the case of mexico, the capital of ciudad de mexico (which accounts for around 10% of the total population) consumes as much as 75% of all water in mexico. the reasons are connected with higher level of living in cities (hygiene) and the concentration of certain industries (food processing industry), which use large quantities of water for their production, as well as extremely high water losses on the water supply system (cossi, 1993). water (in) security – modern security paradigm 3 overload of water supply systems, consequent losses and operating outages, thus increasing the possibilities for lowering water quality in the system and then in users. the so-called ‘hot stains’, which even nowadays do not have access to sufficient quantities of drinking water, and include: the northern pr of china, the larger and closed areas in asia and africa, the middle east, australia, the central western part of the united states and mexico, among which there are also mega agglomerations (bralow, 2007). however, the increasing consumption of water is not related only to the rising number of people through the prism of drinking water. this is even more important because of indirect use of water in the form of production of various goods and food. in this case, we are talking about the consumption of virtual water. the amount needed for the unit of a particular good. in defining virtual water and, consequently, calculating the quantities of the latter for the production of a unit of a certain good, two principles have been introduced: (1) first represents the actual and direct amount of water actually needed for production and, in addition to the production characteristics of the goods, will relate to the production characteristics, the rationality of organizing the production (so-called water efficiency) and water prices, which in many ways define water management and consequently its consumption. (2) the second principle is the understanding of water consumption for the production of a good unit through the prism of its user. in this case, this is an evaluation of water consumption considering the specificity of the state of the environment and the perception of water where this good is required. in other words: how much water would be used on the concrete good and how much water would be saved if that particular good were imported. although it seems quite easy to calculate this type of water consumption, this is not the case. at least two factors have a significant impact on the required amount of water in the production of exactly the same good: the first is water efficiency in the process of production itself and is often connected both with the knowledge of organizing production as well as water prices, while the other is represented by the physical and geographical circumstances in the production region (the production of a kilogram of grain in the arid region will also require twice as much water as for the humid environment). a more far-reaching view complements the above-mentioned definition of virtual water from the point of view of the life cycle of the good, which also includes the water necessary not only for its production, but also for destruction. concerning the complexity of modern goods, whose destruction processes are demanding, this complement of the virtual water understanding is essential (hoekstra, 2002). the presented concept of virtual water is supplemented with the concept of trading or replacing real consumption of water in the production of goods and with the indirect water import, always when we are talking about import of goods. of course, this reciprocity also applies to exports. trade in water between countries rich in water resources and countries with limited water resources is difficult to implement because of voluminosity and mass of water, and the associated high transport costs that this good does not transfer. it is, however, realistic in the field of trade in water-intensive goods, i.e. those goods whose production requires large amounts of water. therefore, it is worth considering the solution of water stress by means of trading with virtual water, because in arid regions it will not be possible to improve access to water resources and thus mitigate water stress. the import of virtual water would allow the concentration of the consumption of already limited water resources for vitally important functions of the country (hoekstra, 2002). the import of food would thus reduce the pressure on water consumption, and this amount would be intended to provide drinking water to inhabitants in arid areas. at the same time, with the phenomenon of virtual water, the water footprint is also becoming increasingly important (following the co2 footprint). it expresses the consumption of freshwater at the individual, social and national levels and includes direct and indirect water consumption, including the segment of the production of goods that have been created. the latter argument is particularly important because the water footprint of an individual includes the water that was needed for the production of food one eats, the products one buys and needs (including those that are not vital and define the lifestyle) and the energy one consumes (hoekstra, chapagain, 2008). calculations on this basis explained the extremely large gap in water consumption between individual countries, as well as considering life styles, predicted no bright future in terms of further water consumption and the associated disproportion between the available quantities of water and the aforementioned consumption. according to s. leahy’s estimates (2014), the consumption for 2030 should exceed 40% of the available water resources, which will be further enhanced by climate change and the most likely consequences in the characteristics of the entire water cycle. therefore, the understanding of the water footprint is so important, as it can (although not necessarily) enable both predicting future trends in 4 vladimir prebilič water consumption and indicating the potential for rationalizing consumption2. in the design of data and the definition of water imprint, a modern methodology separates the different categories of used water, from the point of view of the source the following: – blue water = the amount of surface running water and aquifer water required for (directly or indirectly) the production of one unit of a good; – green water = the amount of precipitation required (directly used or through evaporation) for the production of one unit of a good; – gray water = the amount of fresh water needed to remove pollution and, by means of cleaning, the maintenance of the water quality through the prism of defined standards (hoekstra et al., 2011). 2. theoretical definition of the water (in) security concept the uniquely and completely clear definition of the concept of water security is due to complexity extremely difficult. the reason for this is the systemic interconnection of the role of water in all social systems and subsystems and the direct and indirect impact on the security of societies and also individuals. 2 man, taking into account the water footprint, consumes around 3,500 liters of water per day. as an explanation, here are some facts: for the production of one apple, 125 liters of water is needed, for 1 kg of potatoes 100 liters and 1 kg of beef 15,415 liters, 1 kg of bananas requires 790 liters, 1 liter of milk 940 liters of water, while 1 kg of cheese requires about 5,000 liters. one average pizza indirectly contains 1,260 liters, and for 200 kg of boneless beef, as much as 3.1 million liters of water. even considerably higher consumption of water is associated with a way of life. the average hotel room consumes about 760 liters of water per day (of which 56% of water consumption occurs with taking showers), and the average consumption in a double room is around 65 liters per day for flushing only one toilet, which represents about 30% of consumption. an average family in their home needs 20% of the consumed water for washing, 30% for personal hygiene (toilets, showering, bathing, ...), 5% for cleaning and 10% for cooking, that is, the part that ensures the existence of an individual. similarly, in the production of goods: 910 liters of water is needed for one specimen of a smartphone, while for an integrated baseplate of a personal computer 4,165 liters. the production of four car tires requires 7,850 liters of water, 1 ton of concrete 4,633 liters and petrochemical treatment of 1 barrel of crude oil 7,000 liters. personal hygiene compared to goods represents a significantly lower consumption – 10 minutes of showering about 170 liters of water and a five minute shave about 38 liters (flow rate of an average water tap is 7.6 liters / minute (leahy, 2014, p. 24-32). in its essence, which is adequately covered by the following definition:‘… it is the protection of water supplies necessary for food production, the needs of the industry and the provision of housing and other needs of the population, under the assumption of maximum rationalization of water consumption, the search for new water resources and the protection of water supplies in the event of a shortage due to natural, anthropogenic or technological reasons’ (tindall, campbell, 2010, p. 1), the close connection between the already proven complexity of the topic on its own is emphasized on one hand, and the critical infrastructure on the other, which, in a significant part, in fact enables access to water resources. however, since it is indispensable in other areas of security, it can be argued that it directly affects food and energy security as well as economic stability. moreover: precisely water (in)security causes the number of fatalities among the most vulnerable population groups, such as children. scientists have found that more children die from lack of drinking water than from war, malaria, hiv/aids and road accidents combined. in the last decade, only diarrhea has caused more fatalities among children than the deaths of people throughout the world war ii. every 8 seconds a child dies due to the consumption of contaminated water. in addition, the who reports that contaminated water accounts for more than 80% of all diseases in the world (barlow, 2007). water (in)security, however, has another phenomenon, becoming a symbol of increasingly clear global as well as national social stratification. while the poor access the dubious quality drinking water, or not even that, the wealthier are using such water for watering greenery, car washing, ... . it is the social differences that are considerably deepened by the consumption of water, where the differences are remarkable. a north american person consumes daily around 600 liters of drinking water, for drinking, cooking and hygiene, although 50 liters would be sufficient for all of the above. while a resident of the african continent may consume only 6 liters (barlow, 2007). needless to say, this quantity is used merely for the most biological needs – survival. the paradigm of water (in)security often occurs in connection with at least two verbal phrases: the first is water shortage and the other is water stress. water shortage refers to the volumetric water scarcity and water supply. it is calculated as the ratio between water consumption and water stock in a given area. it is an objective and real fact that is used in cases of longitudinal studies in different environments. this criterion is applied in two different areas: the first one represents the physical lack of water and is often referred to as an absolute shortage, as in this case the water (in) security – modern security paradigm 5 existence of an individual is endangered, or it does not allow for life. the second category represents an economic shortage, which refers to poor water resources management and leads to the potential destabilization of the economic aspect of the functioning of societies. although the verbal phrases are semantically different, there is a direct link between them, as water stress represents a negative frustration, which results in the inability to satisfy the needs for sufficient quantities of water. naturally, it is possible to determine what is sufficient quantity of water, which depends on the living environment and water management. however, scientists have concluded that the phenomenon of water stress occurs when the quantities of available water for an individual are limited to less than 1,700 m³ in one year. if the quantity of available water is in the parameter between 1,000 and 1,700 m³, then there are already different limitations in the life of an individual and the water stress is even more evident. in the case of areas or countries where available quantities of water are less than 1,000 m³, there is already a phenomenon of water shortage. unlike water scarcity, the occurrence of water stress is much more subjective (schulte, 2014). there is, however, also the stress of a water source. this is mainly defined by consumption and occurs in case of a 10% excess of the ability to regenerate the utilized water source. at the same time, the concept of sustainability ceases, because further consumption leads first to the quantitative impoverishment of a water source, followed by a qualitative deterioration and, finally, if the dynamics do not change, the end of the existence of a water source (tindall, campbell, 2015). is there any important question about water restrictions or quantities of water accessible to mankind? when looking for an answer to this question, of course, we cannot omit two facts: the first (1) is the movement of water consumption and the factors directly or indirectly affecting it, (2) the restoration of water reserves or the occurrence of water deficit, that we must understand as an imbalance between the actual reserves replenishment capabilities and is characterized by various filtration coefficients and consumption which has a very negative impact and significantly reduces the possibility of regeneration or the latter is simply made impossible – an example of geological aquifers resulting from different orogenases and chain mountains changes and, consequently, divergences between individual basins, which is changing the direction of watercourses and, consequently, precipitation runoff. 3. water and energy the global demand for energy will continue to grow steadily according to most forecasts. given the high dependence on fossil fuels (whose quantities are limited and gradually decreasing) on one hand, and the growing unacceptability of maintaining or even increasing the amount of energy produced by nuclear reactors, more and more discussions and projects are focused on the field of energy production with the help of renewable energy sources, which still account for less than 20% of all energy produced in the world. an important role in this regard is the high degree of integration of electricity generation, the consumption of which will have increased at least by 2030 and currently accounts for around 35% of all global energy needs. the production of the latter also greatly emission-burdens the environment, through the prism of carbon footprint, since despite all the efforts, the vast majority of electricity generation is coal-based (victor, 2008). an important role plays hydro energy, accounting for about 16% of all global electricity production. its share is expected to increase by about 3% every year for the next 25 years (klare, 2012). since the costs are relatively low, given the energy quantity produced through many years and the possibility of regulating production, in accordance with consumption and energy demand, new investments in the construction of hydrocentral are to be expected. in 2013, 3,750 twh was produced globally, with an expected additional output of 40 gwh, mainly due to huge investments in the pr of china (their share in 2014 was estimated at 29 gwh, that is more than half of the global increase) and already has the largest potential for electricity generation through hydrocentrals – currently 17% of the total global production or 140 gw. countries that, in addition to the pr of china, have a significant share of hydropower are: turkey, brazil, vietnam, india and the russian federation. the eu countries also considerably include hydropower in the energy image of energy produced, as it represents about 60% of all energy produced from renewable sources. by far the largest and currently unexploited potential in the field of hydropower has the african continent, nowadays producing only 3% of global production and is significantly behind asia, leading in this respect with a total of 32%. a large increase in small hydropower is expected in the coming years in india, as the federal government launched the rural electrification program (bp statistical review of world energy, 2014). nevertheless, there are still significant reserves or improvements and possibilities, but they encounter many scientific warnings of excessive interference with watercourses, changes 6 vladimir prebilič in water regimes and anthropogenic (poor) management of water resources3. 4. water and food the provision of the necessary quantities of food is closely linked to another important (in)security concept of non-military threats and challenges – food security. it does not make sense to discuss this in the context of this article, but it is not possible beyond the important fact that is closely linked to water consumption and is necessary in the production segment or in the provision of sufficient quantities of food. due to the increase in the global population and the changes in important nutritional habits, an increasing need for food is expected. it is imperative to recall the facts exposed in the case of virtual water. the consumption of water for the production of a unit of nutritional value is very different (cereals or cattle breeding), therefore, dietary habits represent an extremely important role in this regard – higher consumption of meat is one hundred times or even a thousand times the amount of water consumption of for nutritional needs (griffiths, houston, 2008). regardless the dietary habits, however, there is an increase in agricultural areas also through artificial irrigation of fields. the following data reveals plenty: 200 years ago there were between 6 and 7 million ha of artificially irrigated fields in the world. these areas increased 3 the aral sea was once the fourth largest in the world with an area of 67,000 km² and the third largest freshwater reserve in the world – around 1,000 km³. the aral sea was the center of fishing and the commercial hub in central asia. the soviet authorities irreversibly intervened in the lake with a project to irrigate large areas in the semi-arid region of southwestern kazakhstan and northwestern uzbekistan and turkmenistan. in this respect they changed the flow of rivers syr darya and amu darya, which are inflows of the aral sea and together with the mentioned rivers represent the largest endorheic or no water runoff system in the world. due to the establishment of irrigation systems for the production of cotton (otherwise extremely water-demanding plants), the amount of water consumed per capita per year increased to 2,000 tonnes, the highest in the world (in the eu the average consumption is about 200 tonnes). each year, 50 km³ less water flowed into the lake, and the lake's surface was also reduced – 20 cm each year. by the end of the 1980s, the water reserve in the lake decreased by 75%, while the surface area of the lake decreased by 50%. in 2004, the surface of the lake was only 25%, while the area of the former lake bottom turned into a salty desert. due to pollution, water scarcity and the draining of the lake hinterland, the collapse of agriculture in the region followed, and life expectancy of people in the area is around 51 years (caldecott, 2007). significantly at the beginning of the 20th century, to 50 million ha. however, the trend did not change over the course of the century, and in 2000, 230 million hectares of land were irrigated. nevertheless, only 15% of the agricultural area is included in the irrigation system, but it is true that these areas provide 40% of global food. yet another point is noteworthy: despite the increase in artificially irrigated areas, these, given the increase in the global population, are decreasing. in 1978 there were 48 ha of areas per 1000 inhabitants, also the year when the peak was recorded, followed by a 6% reduction and settled on about 45 ha of area per 1000 inhabitants. therefore, it is not surprising that 70% of global water consumption is agriculture, while industry consumes around 23% and domestic (household) water consumption is only around 8% (de villiers, 2001). as irrigated areas are usually in arid areas, water losses to the irrigation point are also very high. even then, its effect is not expected, as due to the effect of evaporation out of 100 m³ »the loss« is as much as 75 m³. at the same time, the dry soil allows for relatively rapid surface run-off as well as vertically deep water infiltration. such a process, however, greatly contributes to the leaching of the soil or its salinization. such soil, as a rule, is changing into a desert, as it is no longer suitable for cultivation, despite all efforts. when irrigating agricultural land, it is mainly the exploitation of underground aquifers as rich water reserves. however, even in this case limitations are in place, as in the case of faster exploitation, such as the aquifer's reproductive capacity, it leads to a decrease in the level of groundwater, a decrease in its quality and the collapse of the earth's layers, which prevents aquifer restoration. as a result of the need for irrigation in india, the quantities of water consumed increased significantly. for irrigation of 40 million hectares of land, 250 km³ of aquifer water is consumed, or 40% more than it is compensated for by precipitation. the proportion of water consumed in this manner is: about 50% of water in the irrigation process is required by evapotranspiration as a result of plant life; the other half returns to the underground or is lost through an »unproductive« evaporation process (caldecott, 2007). the global distribution of population and climate effects in a region dictate the distribution of irrigated agricultural land. 68% are located in asia, 17% in north america, 9% in europe and only 5% in africa. due to the high pressure on these areas, there is a significant decrease projected (33%) of these areas by 2020, which is or will be due to vertical erosion and soil salinization. by 2030, the countries of the middle east and north america will have already used 60% of all water reserves for farming purposes, water (in) security – modern security paradigm 7 which is an increase of 20%, considering the ratio today4 (griffiths, houston, 2008). 5. water secure world – reality or illusion? since the water is an essential and indispensable pillar or even the very beginning of planning for sustainable and long-term development, the un is significantly involved in the design of the dialogue and the search for possible improvements in strategic water management and its resources. a strategy for a global understanding of the role of water in modern societies is outlined in the 2014–2020 strategy, but the countries’ clear commitments and the concrete actions of the latter are lacking (delivering as one…, 2014). it is therefore difficult to expect coordinated action among countries in this area, especially since water scarcity and the restriction of access to water resources are not a universal problem but limited to individual regions or even individual countries. as a water-secure world, one could indicate the state when every individual in a society had completely satisfactory amounts of water for a completely undisturbed and creative life. in this state, water is controlled for consumption in such a way that it can be returned to the natural environment safely and qualitatively unchanged, which ensures the sustainability. in this way, we would not know the diseases caused by water scarcity, related to the field of hygiene and use water for their spreading water as a transmitter. water security also represents the control of all the accompanying phenomena of surface water, such as the erosion of river banks, floods, landslides and droughts, and relate to the area of environmental safety and show all the weaknesses of poor water management in society. a water-secure world means sharing and assuming responsibility 4 perhaps the most transparent disparity between access to water resources and food production is the pr of china, which has the worst conditions between population and water supply. in particular, northern provinces representing 43% of all population and having only 14% of the country's water resources. this finding implies that around 500 million people depend on areas where hectare yields of fields are steadily decreasing and desertification is spreading due to the over-exploitation of underground water resources. they are only 200 kilometers from the capital beijing. due to the process of urbanization, traffic and other procedures of environmental interventions, the pr of china is losing areas vital for agriculture in the period from 2002 to 2007, as much as 18%. at the same time, according to estimates, 400 out of 600 major cities in the pr of china are already facing the shortage (griffiths, houston, 2008). for managing water resources, and this must be followed during systemic regulation. in other words, the water favors of an individual social system as a water user must be avoided, which can be seen nowadays in extremely unparalleled water consumption between sectors. such actions can only be done with a prior strategic approach in the field of water management. the guaranteed water security reduces the likelihood of poverty and social gradient and increases the standard of living. above all, equitable access to water resources allows protection of the most vulnerable groups of a particular society. and yet there is an increase in the frequeny of use of the phrase ‘war for water resources’, with which we identify conflicts in which the core of misunderstandings is the access to water sources or the causing of water insecurity. this, as has already been stated, is not only a vertical destabilization of a particular social system, but a horizontal collapse of the balance of all social systems as well as subsystems. it should be noted that water as a basic human good must not and cannot be claimed as a purely economic good. despite numerous attempts, which are mostly aimed precisely in so-called privatization and indirect monopolization of water. the reasons are hidden in the increasingly dominant concept of neo-liberalism, as well as in the fact of willingness to cooperate with large capital investments in the field of water management and the creation of a publicprivate partnership. determining the market value of water resources undoubtedly leads to more controlled consumption and more rational management of water resources (shiva, 2002). it also means something else: it represents a direct challenge to the concept of human security. we should understand this as a liberation from fear (the absence of violence and wars) and freedom from needs (the absence of threats such as hunger and disease) (udovč, 2014). the question is, if and whether it is even possible, the ownership of water resources can ensure its basic mission – to be a public good accessible to everyone, regardless the financial capacity of either an individual or a community. the latest events are calming us down and most likely, at least for a certain period of time, the desire to privatize water resources will be halted, yet i am convinced that similar concepts cannot be ignored in the future. 6. conclusion in the world, currently 1.8 billion people drink water, contaminated by a varying degree of the presence of faeces. more and more people use water without proper supervision and systematic improvement of 8 vladimir prebilič water quality (un water, 2014). adding to this the growing water shortage also in the provision of sufficient quantities of food – f. pearce (2006) states that food production will have decreased by 2025 due to water scarcity by 385 million tonnes it is essential to pay more attention to this issue. despite the fact that humanity does not manage water resources in accordance with the principles of sustainability, water remains the latest form of a completely renewable source, despite the various forms of exploitation of water and its resources. despite the pollution, exploitation for irrigation, accumulation with dams and use for energy production, the quantities of water do not change. however, it remains essential – the location of water is changing and is inversely proportional to the global distribution of the population. if we agree with the fact that security cannot be ensured without prior sustainability, then we are undergoing a lot of urgent changes in the field of water resources management. we will first need to focus on the consumption of resources and consider the urgency of extremely irrational quantities of water consumed and the differences between developed and underdeveloped areas. there are certain improvements that must follow that will in future reduce water losses both in the economic as well as in the individual use of water resources. such measures can most probably be expected by harmonizing prices and an additional tax burden for the largest and perhaps irrational forms of water consumption. an important aspect of consumption is awareness of users and dietary habits. these, considering the consumption of the so-called virtual water, can in the future have a significant impact on the actual consumption of water. of course, an important aspect in the management of water resources is also the management of already used water. water, which we used for various reasons either in economic processes or in people’s daily lives. there is ample room for improvement right in this field. the speed of the progress depends on understanding the problem of decision makers in important cities. although in many scientific circles there is already a phrase for water warfare, water stress can be mitigated by using at least a regional approach to more rational water resource management. the question is if we are able to do this ... references barlow m., 2007, blue covenant: the global water crisis and the coming battle for the right to water, the new press, new york. bp statistical review of world energy, 2014, hydroelectricity, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energyeconomics/statistical-review-2014/bp-statistical-reviewof-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf (acessed 01 june 2015). bralower t., bice d., 2014, distribution of water on the earth’s surface, college of earth and mineral science, the pennsylvania state university, https://www.e-education-psu. edu/earth103/node/735 (acessed 23 may 2015). caldecott j., 2007, water life in every drop: causes, costs and future of global crisis, virgin books, london. cossi o., 1993, water wars: the fight to control and conserve nature’s precious resource, silver burdett press, boulder. de villiers m., 2001, water: the fate of our most precious resource, a mariner book, houghton mifflin company, boston. delivering as one on water related issues, 2014, strategy 2014–2020, un water, geneve, http://www.unwater.org/ fileadmin/user_upload/unwater_new/docs/un-water_ strategy_2014-2020.pdf (acessed 23 may 2015). dobkowski m., 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(eds.), 2002, on the edge of scarcity: environment, resources, population, sustainability, and conflict, syracuse university press, syracuse – new york. freeman s., 2015, the water supply – how stuff works, http:// science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/earth/geophysics/h2o1.htm (acessed 23 may 2015). griffiths r., houston w., 2008, water: the final resources: how politics of water will impact on the world, harriman house, hampshire. hoekstra a., chapagain a., aldaya m., mekonnen m., 2011, the water footprint assessment manual: setting the global standard, water footprint network, earthscan ltd., london. hoekstra y.a., 2002, vitrual water trade, proceedings of the internationial expert meeting on virtual water trade, value of water, research report series no. 12, unesco-ihe institute for water education, delft. hoekstra y.a., chapagain a., 2008, globalization of water: sharing the planet’s freshwater resources, blackwell publishing, oxford. klare m., 2012, the race for what’s left: the global scramble for the world’s last resources, picador metropolitan book, new york. leahy s., 2014, your water footprint: the shocking facts about how much water we use to make everyday products, firefly books, new york. pearce f., 2006, when the rivers run dry: water – the defining crisis of the twenty-first century, beacon press, boston. schulte p., 2014, defining water scarcity, water stress, and water risk: it’s not just semantics, pacific institute, http:// pacinst.org/water-definitions/ (acessed 23 may 2015). schulte p., 2014, defining water scarcity, water stress, and water risk: it’s not just semantic, pacific institute, oakland, http://pacinst.org/water-definitions/ (acessed 08 june 2015). shiva v., 2002, water wars: privatization, pollution and profit, south end press, cambridge. water (in) security – modern security paradigm 9 tindall j.a., campbell a.a., 2010, water security–national and global issues, national research program government printing office, denver. tindall j.a., campbell a.a., 2015, water security: conflicts, threats, policies, dtp publishing, denver. udovč m., 2014, varnostne implikacije privatizacije vodnih virov (eng. security implications on water sources privatisation), fakulteta za družbene vede, ljubljana. un water, 2014, water quality, the un inter-agency mechanism on all freshwater related issues, including sanitation, www.unwater.org/statistics-detail/en/c/260727 (acessed 23 may 2015). victor d., 2008, sources of alternative energy and energy market innovations, [in:] k. campbell, j. price (eds.) the global politics of energy, the aspen institute, washington, 132-148. 1. introduction swedish migration policy has changed a lot during the 20th century, from assimilation policy after the second world war, which was mainly connected with labour migration, to multicultural approach, which is connected with family reunion and migration of refugees. nowadays, swedish integration policy is based on multiculturalism, therefore the knowledge of swedish language and the society of the hosting country is as important as migrant´s mother tongue, which gives the members of the minorities opportunity to choose their own identity. according to a. baršová & p. barša (2005) the migration policy is divided into two policies that influence each other: immigration policy and integration policy. immigration policy controls entrance of migration into a country and decides who and under what conditions can settle down. integration policy deals with integration of all migrants into the society. the main purpose of the article is to introduce the development of swedish migration policy and to describe the most important reforms which were made. the main methodology consists of secondary analysis of sources dealing with swedish migration policy and participant observation from the author’s one year fieldwork experience at a swedish secondary school in eskilstuna. during this experience, the author was offered a teaching position that enables him to participate in swedish secondary education system and to observe how young migrants were educated under the guideline of the swedish migration policy at a close distance. 2. swedish immigration policy and its changes the period after the second world war in western european and nordic countries was characterized by industry boom and because there was not enough journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 50–56 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.027.7183 history and changes of swedish migration policy adam kupský faculty of science, university of ostrava, 30. dubna 22, 701 03 ostrava, czech republic, e-mail: akupsky@seznam.cz citation kupsky a., 2017, history and changes of swedish migration policy, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 50–56. abstract the article describes migration policy in sweden and changes within immigration and integration policies. sweden uses multicultural model which is based on cherishing both cultures, the culture of majority as well as the migrant´s original culture. very important part of the integrational process is education, especially language and culture learning. adults are offered special free courses, children study swedish language and culture at school as part of the curriculum. key words integration policy, immigration policy, multicultural model, sweden history and changes of swedish migration policy 51 labourhood on the domestic markets, companies started to look for new employees from other european countries. swedish companies focused mainly on the central, southern and northern europe. since 1947 there were migrants coming mainly from austria, hungary and italy (hansen, 2001). during 1950´s and 1960´s the focus was broaden to other south and south east european countries such as turkey, yugoslavia and greece (darvishpour, westin, 2008). a result of “the agreement on the freedom between nordic countries” signed in 1954, was a big migration wave from finland, between 1954 and 1974 around 500 000 fins came to sweden. however, most of them eventually moved back to finland (benito, 2011). according to c. lundh, r. ohlsson (1999) there were three reasons for increasing labour migration: 1. establishment of common labour market between nordic countries in 1954, 2. common and organized recruiting process, 3. liberalisation of migration policy and its practise. the companies chose their new employees very carefully, some of them even sent their human resource workers abroad to select suitable candidates (darvishpour, westin, 2008). since 1967, due to incoming migrants, the labour market started to be saturated and the unemployment rate increased. as a result, the number of people coming as labour migrations from non-nordic countries declined (segal et al., 2010). in 1972 the swedish government stopped the stream of labour migration from non-nordic countries completely. after this the main category which migrated to sweden were asylum seekers and family members coming in order to reunite their families (family reunion). the number of asylum seekers arriving during 1970´s and 1980´s was quite small thus most of them were accepted. however, since mid-1980´s more migrants started to apply for asylum which opened a political debate about asylum politics (tab. 1) (darvishpour, westin, 2008). he first step to stop the boom with asylum applications was to decrease migration from certain countries by using visa policy. the citizens of these countries had to apply for visa before they were allowed into the country. the countries which were impacted were mainly countries whose citizens previously misused the advantages of swedish immigration policy. for example, the visa policy was introduced for citizens of chile, romania and bulgaria in 1989 and former yugoslavia in 1992 (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). the second step was to support return migration. the swedish government financially subsidised migrations who wanted to return to their home countries as well as organizations which dealt with return migration (darvishpour, westin, 2008). from 1997 until now the swedish asylum politics divides asylum seekers into these 4 groups: 1. quota refugee (un refugee): every year sweden accepts asylum seekers who live in poor living conditions and whose life is in danger. they usually do not have enough money either for quality life or for moving to another country. quota refugees receives resident permit as well as accommodation in the host country already before their relocation which differs them from the other groups of asylum seekers. swedish government along with about 25 other developed countries cooperate with “the united nations high commissioner for refugees” on tab. 1. residence permit issued to non-nordic nationals by categories year refugee family labour student adoptees eu/eea total 1981 3 857 7 938 918 391 – – 13 104 1982 6 266 6 440 983 366 – – 14 055 1983 3 668 6 149 632 476 – – 10 925 1984 5 413 6 561 237 509 1141 – 13 861 1985 7 314 6 944 98 478 1 372 – 16 206 1986 11 486 9 670 171 646 1 244 – 23 035 1987 14 042 12 387 222 678 1 319 – 28 648 1988 16 125 15 093 257 855 1 003 – 33 333 1889 24 879 18 029 167 821 776 – 44 672 1990 12 839 22 221 263 1 143 917 – 37 383 1991 18 663 21 230 300 969 1 086 – 42 248 1992 12 791 19 662 215 1 233 916 – 34 817 1993 36 482 19 796 159 1 611 880 – 58 928 1994 44 875 25 975 127 1 086 884 6040 78 987 1995 5 642 19 707 190 1 504 794 4 649 32 486 source: westin, dingu-kyrklund, 1997, p. 13. 52 adam kupský that matter (the swedish refuge quota, migrationsverket, 2015). if there are more quota refuges at the same place they will be offered preparation program prior to the relocation to sweden. this course takes 2 or 3 weeks and focuses on the main issues which are essential for the life in the new country. after the arrival to sweden the migrants will be offered the basic orientation courses which includes 60 hours of social orientation and swedish language course called swedish for immigrants (sfi, in swedish svenska för invandrare). moreover, everyone is offered a financial support for 2 years under a condition that they will follow a plan which was created for them (the swedish refuge quota, migrationsverket, 2015). 2. convention refugees: these refugees are defined by genova convention from 1951. the difference between them and quota refugees is that they don’t have residence permit and accommodation arrangement prior to their arrival, they have to apply for all of these in sweden (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). convention refugees are defined by geneva convention: “it is everyone who is owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside of the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or, who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such event, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (the un refugee agency…, 2017). the geneva convention binds all countries who signed it to accept all refugees defined by the convention (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). 3. asylum seekers in need of protection: this terminology started to be used in 1997. there are three cases when a refugee can be defined as an asylum seeker in need of protection: 1. in case of return to migrant´s home country he or she would be tortured or sentenced to death or would suffer from other physical punishment. 2. a person who cannot return to his or her home country because of a war or a natural disaster. 3. a migrant who feels in danger in his or her home country because of his sex or homosexual orientation (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). 4. humanitarian refugees: this group contains refugees with physical or psychical handicap, it is mainly those who fled from a war or a civil war in their countries (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). in 1997 the dublin regulation was ratified by all european union countries, island, norway, liechtenstein and switzerland. the main objective was to appoint one country for each of the asylum seeker, which is going deal with his asylum application. in case the migrant will not meet the requirement for granting asylum he or she will not be able to apply anymore within the territory of dublin regulation countries (azyl, 2015). the criteria which are used to determine the state responsible for dealing with asylum seekers applications are ordered according the decision process: 1. family procedure: the responsible state is the one where applicant´s family members already applied for asylum or resident permit. 2. issue of residence documents of visas: the state which already issued visas or resident documents for the applicant is responsible. 3. entry and/or stay: the responsible member state is the one where the asylum seeker first crossed the border into the territory. if this cannot be proved the country where the migrant currently lives now will be in charge of the application. 4. visa waived entry: if the migrant enters a state in which a need for him to have visa is waived, that country will be responsible for dealing with his application. 5. the first application for asylum: the country where the asylum seeker first asked for international protection is responsible (azyl, 2015). as mentioned above, along with migration of asylum seekers, family reunion was also very important source of migrants in sweden. the migration of migrants´ family members started already in 1950´s but the first time when it attracted a proper attention by migration department was in 1976. until the mid-1980´s there were between 5 000 and 10 000 migrants who came to sweden as part of family reunion per year. after this the number started to grow and culminated in 1990´s when there were around 20 000 migrants´ family members arriving annually (tab. 1) (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). the migrant´s family member can obtain residence permit in sweden without having working permit. the permit can be given to a husband or a wife and unmarried children under age 20. under special circumstances it could be also migrant´s older parents (for instance parents older than 60 years or because of humanitarian reasons) or the last migrant´s relative in his home country (lundh, 2005). sweden became a member of the european union in 1995 which increased possibility of migration from other member countries (westin, dingukyrklund, 1997). the obligation of possession of residence permit and work permit was abolished for citizens of all member states and liechtenstein. citizens of switzerland, which is part of schengen area, must apply for residence permit, icelandic and norwegian citizens were not obligated to have any permits since the 1954 as part of “the agreement on the history and changes of swedish migration policy 53 freedom between nordic countries”. from this point forward the rights which previously had applied only on nordic countries could have been enjoyed by all the european union´s members (eu-medborgare…, 2015). if european union citizens want to stay in sweden more than 3 moths they have to fulfil at least one of these conditions: 1. the migrant must have a job in sweden or be self-employed. 2. the migrant studies in sweden, is registered in one of the educational institutions and has a valid medical insurance. 3. the migrant has enough financial resources to secure himself of herself and his or her family and has a valid medical insurance. 4. the migrant is looking for a job in sweden and has realistic chance to find it (flytta till sverige, 2015). from 2006 the eu citizens could apply for residence permit in very easy way at migration board, they could even start to look for a job before this. the restrictions applied for labour migrants from other counties outside of the european union until 2008 (benito, 2011). before this the permanent residence permit was granted to the third country citizens only if the manpower couldn’t be satisfied within eu/eea. for example, in year 2000 only 433 these residence permits were granted for labour market reasons. the majority of such migrants came from the usa, russia and china (sweden in…, 2001). “from december 2009 sweden accepts all categories of work migrants. the only condition is that the job seeker has to get an employment offer for more than one year. if they lose the job for any reason they can stay in sweden for three months searching for a new job. at the end of this period they either find a new job or they have to leave the country. this change in the law began to be in force the 15th of december” (tab. 2) (benito, 2011, p. 10). all migrants have one common obligation which is registration at financial department. in order to be successfully registered the applicant must declare proof that he or she is going to live in sweden for at least one year. after this the migrant receives personal number which is very important for life in sweden. moreover it gives right to study in free swedish courses (flytta till sverige, 2015). 3. swedish integration policy and its changes although, sweden doesn’t belong to the group of typical immigration states such as the usa, canada or australia, its integration policy is similar because it is also built on multicultural approach. migrants are involved in political process which helps their integration into the society (castles et al., 2014). immigrant minorities are granted the option of integrating into swedish society without being required to assimilate culturally. they may decide whether they wish to assimilate into swedish ways of life or maintain their distinct native culture (westin, dingukyrklund, 1997, p. 8). the multicultural model started to develop in sweden in the second half of 20th century when the number of migrants increased due to labour migration. after the second world war the swedish integration policy was based mainly on the idea of assimilation (darvishpour, westin, 2008). in 1967, when the labour migration from non-nordic countries was aborted, the discussion about other new ways to integrate migrants started. although, the number of new migrants was not increasing as fast as in 1950´s and mid-1960´s, the integration of migrants remained a very serious issue for swedish government tab. 2. residence permit issued by categories 2005–2015 year refugee family labour student eu/eea total 2005 8 859 22 713 5 985 6 837 18 069 62 463 2006 25 096 27 291 6 257 7 331 19 387 86 436 2007 18 414 29 515 9 859 8 920 19 387 86 095 2008 11 237 33 687 14 513 11 186 19 398 90 021 2009 11 265 38 332 17 954 16 487 17 606 98 644 2010 12 130 30 287 16 373 14 188 14 480 91 458 2011 12 726 32 469 17 877 6 836 23 226 93 134 2012 17 405 41 156 19 936 7 092 25 501 111 090 2013 28 998 40 026 19 292 7 559 20 712 116 587 2014 35 642 42 435 18 872 9 267 7 394 110 610 2015 36 645 43 414 19 975 9 410 2 791 109 235 source: migrationsverket. 54 adam kupský (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). at the end of 1960´s and the beginning of 1970´s following idea was promoted: “the assimilation policy could only increase cultural differences, where else multicultural policy, which is connected with interaction of minority and majority society, can have a positive impact on the whole society” (lundh, ohlsson, 1999, p. 109). the crucial for development of multicultural policy was year 1975, when the swedish government ratified new integration policy whose main idea was to give all migrants the same privileges as swedes as well as let them keep their own culture (vogel et al., 2002). the new integration policy was based on three pillars: equality, free choice and cooperation. the migrants in sweden had the same rights as swedes in health care, education, safety at work and social system. they also gained right to vote in regional elections and the naturalisation process was simplified (darvishpour, westin, 2008). moreover, some other changes were made, for example: the schools started to teach also in mother tongues of the migrants, swedish courses were free of charge and libraries received money for a purchase of literature in migrant´s languages (gropas et al., 2007). this new approach can be considered as breakthrough because it was in contradiction with the previous assimilation policy. this step can be perceived as a beginning of a multicultural society in sweden (darvishpour, westin, 2008). since 1975 until today the integration policy´s main goal is to provide same rights, protection and opportunities for everyone regardless of their ethnic and cultural background (dastserri, ullenhag, 2013). language is an important aspect of integration because without its knowledge a migrant´s orientation in working environment and cultural of the society will be limited. the first swedish course was introduced in 1950´s but only refugees could participate. the need of learning swedish was growing thus swedish for immigrants (sfi) was introduced in 1965. sfi was available for all migrants in sweden. there was no tuition fee and it aimed to equipping all the migrants with basic swedish knowledge so they could integrate into the working process and swedish society easier. at first, the course took place after working hours, in 1970 every migrants was entitled to 200 hours, where for 60 of them the migrant could get salary from his employer (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). two years later the course consisted of 240 hours and all of them took place during the work time (järtelius, 1982; lundh, ohlsson, 1999). apart from language another important obstacle of integration appeared. many migrants lacked knowledge about swedish society, labour market and swedish working environment therefore a new “orientation course” was opened in 1971. the course introduced basic values of the society and rights and duties so migrants could better understand swedish lifestyle and be able to defend themselves when needed (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). new school reform dealing with education of migrants´ mother tongue was introduced in 1976. in 1970´s some of the counties offered these mother tongue courses for children and the reform brought opportunity for all migrants´ children to study their mother tongue at preschool, elementary and secondary level. the main focus was on elementary and lower secondary level (from 1st to 9th grade). statistics show that in 1971 only 3 800 students studied their mother tongues but after the reform the number grew rapidly: in 1978 it was already 42 300, at the beginning of 1980´s it was over 50 000 and in 1990 there were almost 65 000 students signed for the course. in 1989 two thirds of all migrants´ children studied in the course with 118 different languages covered (lundh, ohlsson, 1999). “an important reason for giving immigrant language a place in ordinary school system was that this recognized the value of “immigrant” culture and linguistic background and gave immigrants´ children a freedom of cultural choice. the development of child´s first language is also believed to facilitate the subsequent development of full linguistic competence in swedish” (lundberg litman, 1987, p. 43). education of swedish language also plays a significant role in integration of migrants’ children. the new student is put into an international classroom after his arrival to the school. in the international classroom the main focus is given to swedish language so the students can communicate as soon as possible. the rest of the subjects are usually taught in their mother tongues. the teachers are also migrants who previously came to sweden. every student is allocated to a “swedish” classroom where he or she is going to move after his or her swedish reaches satisfactory level. the students meet their future classmates already when they are in the international classroom, for instance at lunch (where the whole class has to sit together) or at trips. the second step is gradual integration into the “swedish” classes (major society). this process is slow and always depends on every individual student. at this point the student already has a basic knowledge of swedish so he or she is already able to study some easier subjects (usually it is social studies, physical education, art etc.) in “swedish” classes. the student returns to the international classroom to study the rest of the subjects in his or her mother tongue. the last step is full integration into the “swedish” classroom. at this point students´ swedish is on a high level, they don’t history and changes of swedish migration policy 55 need to stay in the international classroom anymore because they can study all subjects in swedish. the education of swedes and migrants differs even after the integration. the migrants´ children need special approach in teaching swedish thus the swedish lessons are divided into two groups: 1. swedes, the native speakers and 2. migrants for whom swedish is second language. both of the teaching approaches and also tasks which the students have to undertake differ in these two groups. the swedish course for migrants focuses on broadening of swedish language and vocabulary boost. the most common task in the lesson is essays or grammatical exercises. the government stressed importance of both, swedish and native language, which proves that sweden tries to develop multicultural society. the immigrant should know language of the major society, so he can better integrate, as well as his native language so he can understand his origin. there are two actors of swedish integration policy, national and municipal authorities. in 1985 the main responsibility for integration practise moved to municipal authorities which were financed by the state. they are supposed to provide service for migrants in different fields: accommodation, social services and education (lundberg litman, 1987). “all national authorities have a legal responsibility to pay particular attention to the needs of immigrants within their respective field of jurisdiction and to propose measures when deemed necessary” (lundberg litman, 1987, p. 22). in 2008 a new reform, which changed the main distribution of the responsibilities, was introduced. the municipal authorities still possessed a significant share of responsibility for integration of migrants but the main responsibility moved to national authorities (fredlund-blomst, 2014). each ministry is responsible for integration issues within respective area and the coordination of integration policy was assigned to the ministry of integration and gender equality. its main areas were: the introduction of new arrivals, swedish citizenship, anti-discrimination and anti-racism, the promotion of democracy and human rights and evaluation of integration policy. the area of education and accommodation remained under municipalities´ competence (swedish integration policy, 2015). the main issue which the reform focused on was migrant´s employment. this was the first time after several decades when migrants from european union could arrive in order to find a job. before it was mainly people searching for asylum or family reunion who were allowed to immigrate to sweden. the first goal of the reform was to let people with certain profile and skills arrive to sweden so they could enrich labour market and fill the working positions which didn’t have enough applications from swedish population. the second goal was to integrate all migrants into the labour market as fast as possible therefore the basic education was needed. these courses were essential to reach the target: swedish course, course orientation in the swedish society and other courses which prepared migrants for their future job (fredlund-blomst, 2014). additionally, a new pilot project was introduced in 2009 and 2010. after arrival the migrant would be interviewed by the authorities in order to find a link between the migrant´s skills and knowledge and the demand on labour market. as a result, a plan was made which included migrant´s future job, residence, courses which he or she should take etc. (swedish integration policy, 2015). each migrant who successfully strive to integrate into the society was eligible for a financial subsidiary. in september 2013 it was around 308 swedish crowns per day (around 50 american dollars), moreover they could get up to 4 500 swedish crowns (700 american dollars) as supplementary benefits for children and up to 3 900 swedish crowns (600 american dollars) as a housing benefit (fredlund-blomst, 2014). swedish government used a financial factor as a motivation for new comers to integrate. 4. conclusion sweden is one of the countries which chose multicultural approach for its integration policy. the main aspect is a support for both cultures, the migrant´s original culture as well as swedish culture. the migrants can decide which aspects of swedish culture they will follow. after the second world war the assimilation model was the core of integration policy, the multicultural model started to be taken into account in the second half of 20th century when the number of migrants increased due to labour migration. after 1972, when the labour migration was completely abolished, the main migration groups were asylum seekers and family members coming in order to reunite their families. year 1975 brought introduction of a new reform which was very important for development of multicultural integration policy. the new integration policy was based on three pillars: equality, free choice and cooperation. migrants received the same rights as swedish in many important areas. language is a very important aspect of integration because without its knowledge the migrant´s options are limited. sweden offers free swedish 56 adam kupský courses for all adults and children. the adults study in sfi courses which were first introduced on 1965. the children study swedish as part of their curriculum at elementary or secondary school. their integration process is divided into three steps: 1. the main focus is on learning swedish, the children spent most of their time in an international classroom. 2. the children study easier subjects in “swedish” classroom and return to the international classroom to study more difficult subjects. 3. when the children´s swedish reaches sufficient level they start to study all subjects in “swedish” classroom. many migrants lacked knowledge about swedish society thus “orientation course” was opened for them in 1971. the course introduced basic values of the society, rights and duties so the migrants could better understand swedish lifestyle and society. the swedish migration policy is based on education of swedish language and swedish cultural values and habits however the migrants´ culture is also taken into account. the migrants can freely decide whether they accept swedish culture or they keep their own culture which in many cases can lead the fusion of both of the identities. references azyl, ministerstvo vnitra české republiky, http://www.mvcr. cz/clanek/dublinsky-system.aspx [20.05.2015]. baršová a., barša p., 2005, přistěhovalectví a liberální stát: imigrační a integrační politiky v usa, západní evropě a česku, masarykova univerzita v brně, brno. benito m., 2011, labour migration and the system of social protection: country report sweden, multikulturní centrum praha, prague. castles s., haas h., miller m.j., 2014, the age of migration: international population movements in the modern world, palgrave macmillan, basingstoke. darvishpour m., westin c., 2008, migration och etnicitet: perspektiv på ett mångkulturellt sverige, reálszisitéma dabas printing house, budapest. dastserri m., ullenag e., 2013, nordisk fickfakta: statistik om integration 2013, regeringskansliet, stockholm. eu medborgare som arbetar, studerar elle bor i sverige, migrationsverket, http://www.migrationsverket.se/privatpersoner/eu-medborgare-och-varaktigt-bosatta/arbeta-studera-eller-bo-i-sverige-for-eu-medborgare.html [24.05.2015]. flytta till sverige, skatteverket, http://www.skatteverket.se/ privat/folkbokforing/flytta/flyttatillsverige.4.76a43be412 206334b89800018617.html [24.05.2015]. fredlund-blomst s., 2014, assessing immigrant integration in sweden after the may 2013 riots, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assessing-immigrant-integrationsweden-after-may-2013-riots [02.06.2015]. gropas r., triandafyllidou a., vogel d., 2007, european immigration: a source book, ashgate publishing limited, hampshire. hansen l.e., 2001, jämlikhet och valfrihet, almqvist and wiksell international, stockholm. järtelius a., 1982, frihet, jämlikhet, främlingskap?: om invandrare i sverige, gummessonns tryckeri, ab, falköping. lundberg litman e., 1987, immigration and immigrant policy in sweden, the swedish institute, stockholm. lundh c., 2005, invandringen till sverige, sns förlag, avesta. lundh c., ohlsson r, 1999, från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring, sns förslag, stockholm. migrationsverket, https://www.migrationsverket.se/english/ about-the-migration-agency/facts-and-statistics-/statistics/overview-and-time-series.html [15.07.2017]. segal u.a., doreen e., mayadaas n.s., 2010, immigration worldwide, policies, practises and trends, oxford university press, new york. sweden in 2000 – a country of migration: past, present and future, 2001, ministry of foreign affairs, halmstad. swedish integration policy, government office of swed e n , h t t p : / / w w w. g o v e r n m e n t . s e / c o n t e n t a s s e t s / b055a941e7a247348f1acf6ade2fd876/swedish-integration-policy-fact-sheet-in-english [02.06.2015]. the swedish refuge quota, migrationsverket, http://www. migrationsverket.se/download/18.5e83388f141c129 ba63133e7/1381926436777/theswedishrefugeequota_111122_digitalversion.pdf [29.01.2015]. the un refugee agency: convention and protocol relating to the status of refugee http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 [01.07.2017]. vogel j., hjerm m., johansson s.e., 2002, integration till svensk välfärd?: om invandrares välfärd på 90-talet, statistiska centralbyrån, örebro. westin c., dingu-kyrklund e., 1997, reducing immigration, reviewing integration: the swedish rimet report 1995, ceifo, edsbruk. 1. introduction. contents of the basic concepts state symbols, primarily, a flag, a coat of arms and a hymn are, as a rule, officially established distinctive signs of the state, personifying its sovereignty. these symbols often reflect the traditions of the country, as well as the main goals and values adopted by the society at a given historical stage which defines the many principles of public administration. at the turning points of history the symbols of the country change dramatically, and the choice of new symbols at such moments largely depends on the specific balance of political forces. the aim of this article is to try to find out how the balance of political forces and political traditions affected the adoption of new state symbols in russia after the collapse of the ussr. literature on the russian state symbols is quite extensive (for example: пчелов, 2005; соболева, 2002; хорошкевич, 1993), but much of the works are a descriptive and historical rather than of analytical. we are interested in the studies where the meaning of state symbols is viewed through the prism of their connection with the identity and the „myths of russia” (аймермах et al. (eds.), 2000; мосейко, 2003; smith, 2002), as well as the image of the country (галумов, 2003; почепцов, 2001; anholt, 2010). the subject of symbols is closely related to the problem of identity. identity (from latin “identitas”) is a property of the human psyche in a concentrated form to express an answer to the question „who am journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 12–18 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.022.7178 the adoption of state symbols in russia: a compromise of traditions yuri chernyshov world history and international relations department, altai state university, lenina 61, 656049 barnaul, russia, e-mail: ashpi@hist.asu.ru citation chernyshov y., 2017, the adoption of state symbols in russia: a compromise of traditions, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 12–18. abstract the author considers the process of adopting of a new state symbols in russia after the collapse of the ussr. this process was influenced by different traditions and by the struggle of different political forces that sought to consolidate their own „own” symbols and values (democratic, national-imperial, communistic, etc.). as a result, the adoption of the new flag, the coat of arms and the anthem was the result of a „compromise imposed from above” which ended the „war of symbols”, but confirmed the uncertainty of the national idea. key words state symbols, identity, image, historical traditions, modern russia. the adoption of state symbols in russia: a compromise of traditions 13 i?”, that is to determine its belonging to different social, national, professional, linguistic, political, religious and other groups or other communities. as j. topolski (1999) rightly notes, a great role is played by historical myths – simplified and emotionally colored narratives that reduce complicated and contradictory historical processes to comprehensive schemes. after the collapse of the soviet union, the search for new identities, new historical myths and „state ideas”, new symbols was actively developed. this was clearly illustrated by a series of colloquia conducted in russia under the leadership of j. billington in 1996-1999: “what has taken place is one of the most wide-ranging and many-voiced discussions about national identity and political legitimacy in modern times. in broad outline russia is struggling between its authoritarian tradition and its new freedoms…” (billington, parthé, 2003, p. 4). the symbols of the country largely determine its image. by the image we mean an emotionally colored image of the country, purposefully formed in the public consciousness by means of advertising, propaganda, etc. the image of the country has in many respects a „virtual” character, it is easily changeable although its „core” is more stable and is formed mainly under the influence of objective factors. when forming the image of a country, politicians often try to use archetypes of public consciousness which are often reflected in the symbols of the state. however, the adoption of symbols is a very complex process where the principles of logic and expediency do not always play a major role. it is often influenced by the traditions formed in earlier epochs, and the struggle of various political groups trying to consolidate their „own” symbols and values. it was such a „war of symbols”, as the author noted in one of his works (чернишов, 2010), that occurred during the period of „perestroika” and the subsequent disintegration of the soviet union. 2. prehistory: war of symbols the former, „soviet” symbols were discredited in the eyes of a large part of the population, along with the communist party which lost its prestige in the society, along with the ideology that was losing its popularity. it was then that previously unavailable information about mass illegal repressions, deportations, and questionable actions of the soviet leadership in the foreign policy (the molotov-ribbentrop pact, the katyn case, etc.) became extremely popular. this immediately reflected on the attitude towards the state symbols. thus, the sickle and hammer that were presented on the flag and coat of arms, for example, were used in the cartoons as a kind of swastika. naturally, there appeared a search for alternative symbols which would have nothing to do with the symbolism of the outgoing socio-political system. the search for these symbols could be conducted in two main directions: either turn to the experience and traditions of the pre-soviet periods in the history of the state, or try to create something new using the experience of other states which proclaimed the similar national goals and values. it would seem that the constitution adopted on december 12, 1993 gave a fairly clear idea of what the russian state should be: a democratic federal state with a republican form of government (article 1.1). thus, one would expect that the new state symbolism will meet the values of democracy, federalism, republicanism and the rule of law (конституция, 2017). in fact, however, everything turned out to be much more complicated. the need to „search for roots”, the need to demonstrate the „rootedness” of the new system in the „age-old” traditions, the desire not to lose touch with the former „power” pushed for resuscitation of the old russian symbols rejected in the soviet era. this was also facilitated by various political and social trends of a nationalistic, clerical and monarchical nature. therefore, some of the old symbols were given a more modern character. these attempts to make them more modern were met with a fierce resistance of adherents of the communist system of values. the society split into groups and the reconciliation between them due to the fundamental differences was almost impossible. that is why the process of adopting the new symbols turned out to be so stretched in time (more than 10 years), so contradictory and dramatic. further we will try to trace how all these processes were reflected in 1990–2001 on the acceptance of official symbols of the state – the flag, the coat of arms, and the anthem. 3. „democratic” flag the modern flag of russia as well as many other post-soviet republics (matjunin, 2000) caused a lot of disputes and ideological battles (fig. 1). a white-blue-red flag is known to have been introduced under peter i, but under alexander ii, a black-yellow-white flag was used in parallel. only the last russian emperor nicholas ii in 1896 finally secured the status of the only state flag of the russian empire for the white-blue-red cloth. as it was subsequently used in the white movement, in emigration, and then in the troops of general vlasov, those who 14 yuri chernyshov shared the communist ideology at the level of the subconscious perceived the flag as clearly an „enemy” one. hence it caused a categorical rejection on their part. this dislike was reinforced by the fact that this flag became the symbol of the victory of democratic forces after the coup in 1991: it was planted in the place of the former red flag. for some time, the opposition of the „democrats and communists” was symbolized by these different flags. three colors of the flag had a certain official interpretation in the russian empire: red meant „nationality”, blue is the color of the mother of god who protects russia, white is the color of freedom and independence. these colors also meant symbolized the commonwealth of the white, minor and great russia. however, some other informal interpretations are currently in use. thus, here again we see an attempt to escape from the old meanings. incidentally, it can be recognized that the flag carries a much less specific meaning than the anthem. the flag is clearly inferior to both the coat of arms and the anthem on such an important criterion to assess the state symbol as “recognition”. the use of similar three color bands in different combinations occurs on the flags of many other states: the netherlands, serbia, slovakia, slovenia, sierra leone, france, croatia, etc. for better identification sometimes, for example, football fans use a combination of three bands and the russian coat of arms characteristic of the presidential standard. perhaps, if such a variant of the national flag were adopted at the official level, it would increase the degree of not only recognition, but also the semantic load of this symbol. 4. “imperial” coat of arms the coat of arms as an identification mark of the russian state has a very complex and rich, more than a 500-year-old history. even before the collapse of the ussr on november 5, 1990, the government of the rsfsr adopted a resolution on the creation of the state emblem and the national flag. the whiteblue-red flag and the coat of arms, the golden double-headed eagle on the red field, were restored on 30 november 1993 by president b. yeltsin decrees, however, only on december 4, 2000, president v.v. putin introduced a draft federal constitutional law „on the state emblem of the russian federation” to the state duma (федеральный конституционный закон, 2000a). in the current version, adopted by the state duma on december 8, 2000 and approved by the federation council on december 20, 2000, the emblem depicts a two-headed eagle with crowns, scepter and power; on the chest of the eagle in a red shield there is a rider on horseback, striking a black dragon with the spear (fig. 2). the ancient archetypal images embedded in the coat of arms are perhaps the most rich and diverse. it originally has the image of the eurasian empire as the monarchical state, uniting after the byzantine empire many peoples of europe and asia, the west and the east. three crowns, according to the variant of interpretation under tsar aleksei mikhailovich, symbolized „the three great kazan, astrakhan, siberian glorious kingdoms.” the scepter and the power emphasized the idea of autocracy. finally, the scene with george the victorious brought another set of ideas orthodoxy, the victory of the forces of light and good over the forces of evil and darkness. as a result, all these images fully corresponded with the famous formulation of count s.s. uvarov, in the spirit of the theory of „official nationality”: „orthodox faith, autocracy, nationality” (вортман, 1999). it should be noted that on modern russian rubles, until march 2016, the official emblem of the bank of russia was the eagle without crowns, as on the coat of arms of the provisional government of russia in 1917, but now the crowns are returned to the eagle (филимонов, 2016). three crowns, according fig. 1. the modern russian national flag source: государственные символы россии. fig. 2. the modern russian national coat of arms source: государственные символы россии. the adoption of state symbols in russia: a compromise of traditions 15 to modern interpretation, personify the sovereignty of the whole of the russian federation, as well as of its parts, subjects of the federation. the scepter with the power, which the two-headed eagle holds in its paws, symbolizes the state power and a single state. thus, the original „monarchical” meaning of the coat of arms is reinterpreted into the idea of state sovereignty. 5. «soviet» anthem and, finally, the fate of the anthem was even more difficult. the former anthem of the russian empire, written in the melody of a.f. lvov in 1833, unlike other symbols, obviously was not subject to modernization: in russian in english „боже, царя храни! сильный, державный, царствуй на славу, на славу нам! царствуй на страх врагам, царь православный! боже, царя храни!” „god save the tsar! strong, sovereign, reign for glory, for glory to us! reign for fear of enemies, the orthodox king! god save the tsar!” however, the soviet anthem (music of alexander alexandrov, text of s.v. mikhalkov and g.a. el-registan, 1944) in the textual part was too closely connected with the ideology of the departed state: in russian in english „славься, отечество наше свободное, дружбы народов надежный оплот! партия ленина – сила народная нас к торжеству коммунизма ведет!” „be glorious, our free fatherland, friendship of peoples is a reliable stronghold! party of lenin the strength of the people we are being led to the triumph of communism!” in 1990, a government commission was formed which approved the „patriotic song” by m.i. glinka. this choice was fixed by the decree of the president of the russian federation on december 11, 1993 (указ, 1993). a contest for the text was announced, more than 6000 variants were received, and 20 were selected. in november of 1997, b.n. yeltsin introduced the federal constitutional law „on the state flag, emblem and national anthem of the russian federation” for consideration by the state duma. however, the state duma rejected the law in the first reading, in janvary of 1998 (законопроект, 1997). at the same time, the alternative project „on the state anthem of the russian federation” submitted by the communist party faction was rejected. it included a return to the anthem to the music of alexandrov. there was a deadlock in the stakeholder talks: it was decided that it would be expedient at the present time to remove the problem of legislating the state symbols from the agenda since there are polar points of view both in society and in parliament. the new president of the russian federation tried to cut this „gordian knot”. on december 4, 2000 v.v. putin submitted to the state duma a draft federal constitutional law „on the state anthem of the russian federation” with a version of the anthem to the music of alexandrov (федеральный конституционный закон, 2000b). the law was adopted with references to the fact that „the russian federation is the continuer of the ussr according to the principle of “continuity” and the melody of the ussr anthem is well known to the russians. on december 30, 2000 v.v. putin signed a decree on the text of the national anthem of the russian federation for new words by sergei mikhalkov (указ…, 2000). this decision caused a lot of protests among the public, but by march 2001, the federal constitutional law on the anthem came into effect. 6. results of compromise so, the anthem was adopted the last, and it resulted from the „imposed compromise” by v.v. putin. the left forces actually agreed to endure the coat of arms and the flag „alien” to them in exchange for restoring the soviet anthem dear to them (though with the words hastily rewritten ). this compromise had both positive and negative consequences. on the one hand, it completed the prolonged uncertainty in the issue of state symbols and somehow met conflicting requests, on the other hand, it fixed the vagueness of political landmarks, eclecticism in the selection of state symbols. in a somewhat simplified form, yevgeny yasin described this eclecticism as follows: „to me, our culture, our value system resembles such a three-layer pie, in accordance with our state symbols. there is a double-headed eagle the traditions of pre-revolutionary russia, including religious ones. then soviet values are soviet culture, our soviet anthem. and there is a new democratic russia, to which the symbol is our tricolor flag” (земляной, 2008). haste during the writing of the anthem text also had negative consequences. many critics note that the new version of the text turned out to be less colorful than before. people who grew up under the soviet rule unwittingly reproduce the old words when they hear such a familiar melody. in the new version of the text, the refrain begins with the same 16 yuri chernyshov line, but the words „the party of lenin” and „communism” are removed. at the same time no definite landmarks appeared in that place. in addition, the line from the second couplet „native land stored by god” caused protests from both atheists and representatives of non-christian faiths (in particular, muslims). according to the opinion poll conducted by the foundation public opinion several years later (january 12, 2002, august 28, 2004), the most problems were revealed with training of the anthem. the overwhelming majority of the russians knew what the russian flag looks like, and could correctly describe it (86%). 79% of people confidently answered what the emblem of the russian federation represents. when it came to the anthem, it turned out that only 17% of people knew its melody and words, most of them only remembered the melody (65%). the share of those who did not know either music or words was quite high: 14%. the attitude to all symbols in 2004 was also different (tab. 1). later polls by russian public opinion research center (vciom) also confirmed that the knowledge of russian symbols is different. so, according to the survey on june 6–7, 2009, the respondents were best informed of the state emblem of russia. the overwhelming majority of the russians correctly answered what is depicted in it (86%). a little worse did the russians know the russian flag: 60% correctly called the colors and their location on the national flag of the country. about a third of russians (34%) correctly called only colors. every twentieth respondent (5%) did everything wrong. the respondents were least aware of the anthem of the country: only 40% of the respondents correctly named the first words. almost as many indicated them incorrectly: 36%. moreover, younger respondents more often correctly reproduced the national anthem (прессвыпуск № 1295, 2009). after another 5 years, however, more positive dynamics can be traced in the level of knowledge (пресс-выпуск № 2653, 2014). in this regard, it must be recognized that the new symbols of the russian state, on the one hand, often appeal to the archetypes of the public consciousness, and on the other, do not yet fully represent the views of various sections of society about themselves and the country. in relation to these symbols, indifference, dislike, and misunderstanding often occur, although the process of „mastering” them is going on. if we understand under the archetypes the images with the traces of ancient experience and elements of the view of the world, the images of the state emblem deserve the most attention. the idea of a strong empire (or, more broadly, „power”), ruled by a just father-ruler, patronized by god himself, for centuries was close to a large part of the population in russia. this idea, in fact, did not disappear and after the death of the russian empire, transformed and „repainted” it was embodied in new ideologies and political myths: „wise leaders”, „world revolution”, „the struggle for socialism in the whole world”, „socialist camp,” an „international duty”, and so on. that is why the modern „keepers” are in no hurry to part with the symbolic legacy of the soviet union. such questions are important enough in the development of the style of public administration: will this management be built according to old „imperial” patterns, or will a different style be created which is more in line with the principles of democracy and federalism laid down in the constitution? the principles laid down in the constitution somewhat „outstrip” the development of public consciousness towards the values of democracy, republicanism and federalism. russian public consciousness has not yet developed a consensus on the question about what kind of state russia should be. at the same time, the former paternalistic image of the „great power” under the „father of the people” continues to be attractive for many and turns into „neo-patrimonialism” (robinson, 2017). „the imperial temptation” is in the formulas: we are a great eurasian power, we are united by a common history and common values, we provided all the nations with the conditions for development; we must all feared of and respected. however, in response to this, accusations of colonialism, of striving to seize foreign territories, of violent russification of other peoples, etc are often expressed. in this regard, a. kappeler’s (2014) conclusion seems quite correct. in the history of russian policy in relation to many peoples there were elements of colonialism, but the russian people themselves were hardly dominant or privileged at the same time. privileged was the administrativecommand system, the „center” which russia along tab. 1. answers to the question: „do you like or dislike the current state russian flag (anthem, coat of arms)?” the current flag the current anthem the current coat of arms like 73 like 67 like 61 not like 12 not like 13 not like 18 difficult to answer 15 difficult to answer 20 difficult to answer 21 source: государственная символика…, 2004. the adoption of state symbols in russia: a compromise of traditions 17 with other republics struggled for sovereignty during the times of perestroika. that is why the collapse of the union was so rapid that almost nobody in fact defended it. 7. conclusion in the context of the identity crisis which has not yet been overcome there are three main options to answer the question: what is russia. the first option: „russia is the state of the russians, russian citizens.” this option is most consistent with the constitution of the russian federation, and the state top officials publicly and unequivocally speak in favor of it (cf., for example, the periodically sounding thesis that „russians are a single nation”). this is the most peaceful, democratic and least conflict variant of development. however, apparently, that is why it seems wide and not radical enough. the second option: „russia is the state of the russians (option orthodox).” it lies on the ethno-religious principles. many countries in the post-soviet space are following this path: local elites create privileges for the „titular nation” and pursue a policy of assimilation or „squeezing out” of national minorities. however, for the russian federation, the implementation of such a variant would mean an upsurge in separatism, serious conflicts on national and religious grounds, isolation on the international scene, and so on. the third option, „russia is the state of the people of eurasia” is based on the new eurasian principle is based. it is becoming increasingly fashionable to talk about the civilizational unity of the eurasian space, the natural axis of which is russia. such reasoning often reveals the abovementioned imperial temptation the desire to depict eurasia (without any clear boundaries) as a territory that god himself intended for russian domination. however, even g.p. fedotov wrote about the danger of attempts at an imperial revenge: „for russia itself, forcible continuation of imperial life would mean a loss of hope for her own freedom. a state that exists by terror in one half of its territory, can not provide freedom for the other” (федотов, 1992, p. 327). however, this does not confuse the ideologues of the empire: for imperial thinking, according to g. simon, welfare is characterized by the criterion of the scale of the territory and the military power of the state, and not by the standard of living and freedom of citizens (simon, 1994). a peculiar „fashion for the empire” is shown everywhere: in films (like the film by n. mikhalkov „the barber of siberia”), and in the near-scientific literature (it is enough to look at the titles of the books that flooded the bookshelves: „forward, to the ussr 2” by m. kalashnikov, „to become a world power” y. krupnov, etc.), and in the pre-election statements of the party leaders. meanwhile, this rhetoric has the most serious influence not only on russia’s image, the nature of its perception in the countries of near and far abroad, but also on the behavior of the administrative elite within the country. this eclecticism, which was the result of a tactical compromise, is still constantly „stumbled” by representatives of state structures. they do not know how to behave in relation to stalinism. on the one hand, v. putin condemned the criminal policy of repression against people, and on the other, a line from the old variant of the anthem praising stalin appears on the moscow metro station, and in some cities some monuments to stalin are restored. officials do not know how to behave with respect to clericalism. on the one hand, the church is legally separated from the state, and on the other hand, the „foundations of orthodox culture” penetrate into public schools, and in the army the representatives of the church „consecrate” ships and rockets. they do not know whether to uphold the honesty of elections, if the leading party demands from them to achieve certain high results. the lack of clear value guidelines, mundane pragmatism and the „doublethink” of many representatives of the management elite in no small way contribute to the spread of corruption. all these protracted diseases are to be overcome by the russian society. references anholt s., 2010, places: identity, image and reputation, palgrave macmillan, london. billington j.h., parthé k., 2003, the search for a new russian national identity: russian perspectives, the library of congress, washington. kappeler a., 2014, the russian empire: a multi-ethnic history, taylor and francis, hoboken. matjunin s., 2000, the new state fags as the iconographic symbols of the post-soviet space, geojournal, 52(4), 311–313. robinson n., 2017, russian neo-patrimonialism and putin’s „cultural turn”, europe-asia studies, 69, 348–366. simon g., 1994, russland: hegemon in eurasien, bundesinst. für ostwiss. und internat. studien, köln. smith k.e., 2002, mythmaking in the new russia. politics and memory in the yeltsin era, cornell university press, ithaca. topolski j., 1999, the role of logic and aesthetic in constructing narrative wholes in historiography, history and theory, 38(2), 198–210. аймермах к., бомсдорф ф., бордюгов г., 2000, мифы и мифология в современной россии, аиро-хх, москва. 18 yuri chernyshov вортман р., 1999, „официальная народность” и национальный миф российской монархии xix века, россия / russia: культурные практики в идеологической перспективе, 3(11), 233–244. галумов э.а., 2003, международный имидж россии: стратегия формирования, известия, москва. государственная символика: гимн, герб, флаг. база данных фом, 2004, http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/power/pow_ symb/dd043650 [02.05.2017]. государственные символы россии, http://flag.kremlin.ru/ [23.05.2017]. законопроект № 97803381-2, о государственном флаге российской федерации, государственном гербе российской федерации и государственном гимне российской федерации, 1997, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/ %28spravkanew%29?openagent&rn=97803381-2&02 [23.05.2017]. земляной с., 2008, гипостазирование ценностей, https:// wciom.ru/index.php?id=241&uid=9583 [03.05.2017] конституция российской федерации, 2017, омега-л, москва. мосейко а.н., 2003, мифы россии. мифологические доминанты в современной российской ментальности, институт африки ран, москва. почепцов г.г., имиджелогия, 2001, рефл-бук ваклер, москва киев. пресс-выпуск № 1295. государственные символы россии: знания и чувства. 20.08.2009, https://wciom.ru/index. php?id=236&uid=12311 [04.05.2017]. пресс-выпуск № 2653. символы россии: знаем и гордимся! 21.08.2014, https://wciom.ru/index. php?id=236&uid=114943 [05.05.2017]. пчелов е.в., 2005, российский государственный герб: композиция, стилистика и семантика в историческом контексте, рггу, москва. соболева н.а., 2002, российская государственная символика: история и современность, владос, москва. указ президента российской федерации от 11.12.1993 г. № 2126 «о государственном флаге российской федерации», 1993. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/5011 [22.05.2017] указ президента российской федерации от 30.12.2000 г. № 2110 «о тексте государственного гимна российской федерации», 2000. http://www.gov.ru/main/symbols/ gsrf4_3.html [23.05.2017] федеральный конституционный закон российской федерации «о государственном гербе российской федерации», 2000a. принят государственной думой 8 декабря 2000 года. одобрен советом федерации 20 декабря 2000 года. http://www.gov.ru/main/symbols/gsrf2_1. html [22.05.2017]. федеральный конституционный закон российской федерации «о государственном гимне российской федерации», 2000b. принят государственной думой 8 декабря 2000 года. одобрен советом федерации 20 декабря 2000 года. http://www.gov.ru/main/symbols/gsrf4_1. html [23.05.2017] федотов г.п., 1992, судьба и грехи россии, софия, санктпетербург. филимонов а., 2016, новый герб на рубле — дизайн, идеология или намек? портал banki.ru 09.08.2016, http://www. banki.ru/news/columnists/?id=9122279 [05.05.2017]. хорошкевич а.л., 1993, символы русской государственности. изд-во моск. ун-та, москва. чернишов ю.г., 2010, державна символіка сучасної росії: архетипи і компроміси, [in:] публічне управління: терія та практика: збірник наукових праць, вид-во «докнаукдержупр», харків, 404–411. 1. the essence of decentralization decentralization of state power is considered by the international community as one of the key elements of a comprehensive reform of the public administration system and is a priority area for the activities of international and national organizations. support of local self-government by the state and creation of conditions for sustainable and independent development of territorial communities in ukraine is one of the most important tasks of the present. the development of local self-government is characterized by the following aspects, for example, the fact that the share of state authority, which previously exceeded 50% in the structure of public tasks performed at the municipality level, continues to increase. concerning the main directions of the development of local self-government, it should be noted that municipal institutions in many ways increase the share of the state nature, since local affairs are closely intertwined with the state. this fact puts elective municipal institutions in a strong dependence on the government and ministers, which are both an administrative and financial nature. at the international level, this position is also reflected. many authoritative experts (r. gravert (germany), s. monti (sweden), s. maheshvary (india)) believe that local territorial units are increasingly drawn decentralization of the powers of local councils in the sphere of land relations iryna ignatenko department of land and agrarian law, yaroslav mudryi national law university, pushkinskaya 77, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: irena.nekosargot@gmail.com citation ignatenko i., 2018, decentralization of the powers of local councils in the sphere of land relations, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 5–12. abstract public authorities practically have no noticeable influence on the development of land relations. this necessitates the transfer of the full power of authorities to local governments for land management. this can be achieved by decentralizing governance, adherence to the principle of universality of local self-government, which should take place throughout the country without any restrictions. this approach will allow the administrative-territorial units to have content resources in their own assets (land outside of settlements), as well as management tools for its effective application. key words land within settlements, land management, land relations, bodies of local self-governments, local communities, communal property, decentralization. received: 03 may 2018 accepted: 13 may 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 5–12 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.023.9010 6 iryna ignatenko into the implementation of the constitutionally legal principles of social statehood, and therefore they are forced to abstract from local characteristics, which is predetermined by the unity for the whole country of the principles of state policy (граверт, 1992). the transfer of power, as a general legal principle proclaimed by the european union, and also enshrined in the european charter of local selfgovernment of 1985, is becoming increasingly widespread in the member states of the european union. the application of the considered practice is actively spreading in such countries as germany, spain, sweden, the netherlands. in france, the transfer of powers to local authorities from state agencies projected a transition from centralization to relative decentralization in the sphere of public administration. in the opinion of d.i. cherkasov (черкасов, 1998), obligatory and entrusted powers are being extended to the detriment of the communal affairs proper. the share of the latter is decreasing, since tasks that are of national importance actively integrate into the level of local authorities. in turn, in germany, compulsory and transferred cases account for 80–90% of the total volume of cases performed by local authorities. in common, ukraine is not far behind from the european union in this issue, because today at least 70% of the powers of local authorities are directly related to the resolution of issues that in turn relate to state functions in various sectors of the economy. at the present time, it is no longer relevant to say that local self-government bodies are actually endowed with separate state powers. although in their legal nature they are actually separate powers. it should also be noted that any decentralization processes have certain risks of disintegration of public administration. but the key to their minimization is the verifiability of state-legal decisions, systematic, gradual and consistent state policy of decentralization of power. and in this case, the use of the institution of delegation of authority has a positive effect, since diversifying the organizational model of public administration allows to ensure the preservation of the state of controllability and control of a certain sphere of social relations. according to a.m. nikonchuk (нікончук, 2011), decentralization is one of the ways of optimizing public administration. on the basis of this principle, the vector of delegation of powers has a centrifugal character, aimed at strengthening the functionally-competent component of the status of municipal structures. in the current conditions of transition from a centralized model of organization of public power to a decentralized, carried out through the delegation of powers, decentralization of power acts, more likely, a way of forming the volume of powers of local self-government, which should belong to it in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity (новак, 2016). delegation of certain powers by authorities of executive state power to local self-government bodies is proposed to be understood as based on the law municipal legal relations that arise, change, or terminate between the state in the person of the authorized bodies of state power and local self-government bodies regarding the empowerment of the latter to exercise certain powers within the constitution and laws of ukraine. delegation of powers can be considered in three main aspects: 1) as a legal way of forming the competence of local self-government bodies; 2) as a special group of municipal-legal relations; 3) as a form of interaction between public authorities and local self-government bodies. all these aspects are interrelated, since, being one of the main ways of legal influence of the state on the content of the functioning of the municipal government. delegation is embodied in legal relations between state authorities and local self-government bodies and is a special administrative link between these bodies in mechanism for the exercise of public powers. consequently, the decentralization of management in the sphere of land relations consists mainly in the transfer of powers vertically from the central structures to the structures of the regional and local levels of government, and also involves a “horizontal” redistribution of roles from the public sector to private and non-governmental organizations. the state, with the help of legal supervision, seeks to implement the statutory powers that are inherent in local self-government. 2. optimization of land legislation in the process of decentralization of power decentralization is supported by the legislative changes. on april 1, 2014 the cabinet of ministers of ukraine has approved the concept of reform of local self-government and territorial organization of power in ukraine (про схвалення…, 2014). on december 28, 2014 amendments were approved to the tax (податковий…, 2010) and budget (бюджетний…, 2010) codes of ukraine, which established a new financial basis of local self-government bodies, a new distribution system of national taxes and introduced new local taxes and also has changed the system of budget equalization. the strategy for sustainable development «ukraine 2020», approved by the decree of the president of ukraine dated january 12, 2015 no. 5, provides for the implementation of the constitutional reform in decentralization of the powers of local councils in the sphere of land relations 7 the part of decentralization of state power. the goal of decentralization policy is to abandon the centralized model of governance in the state, to ensure the capacity of local self-government and to build an effective system of territorial organization of power in ukraine, implementation of the provisions of the european charter of local self-government, the principles of subsidiarity, universality and financial self-sufficiency of local self-government (про стратегію…, 2015). the verkhovna rada of ukraine, august 31, 2015, previously approved amendments to the constitution of ukraine regarding the decentralization of power. in addition, the enactment of the laws of ukraine «on cooperation of territorial communities» dated 17.06.2014 (про співробітництво…, 2014), «on the voluntary association of territorial communities» of 5.02.2015 (про добровільне…, 2015), «on the principles of state regional policy» of 5.02.2015 (про засади…, 2015), has necessitated certain changes and additions to a significant number of current legislative acts. in particular, they provide for the reform of local self-government through the association of territorial communities, which changes their legal personality in land relations. the law of ukraine «on voluntary association of territorial communities» (про добровільне…, 2015) determined that the territory of the united territorial community should be inseparable, the boundaries of the united territorial community are determined on the external borders of the jurisdiction of the councils of territorial communities which have been united. since the territory of the community will not be limited to the boundary of the settlement, but will include the territory of the respective village, town and city councils that functioned prior to the unification, it is obvious that the ownership of the land of newly formed territorial communities should not be limited to the boundaries of the settlement. it should be distributed to all the land within such territorial communities or the territories of the respective councils that remain at present. such an approach fills in the actual content of the proposed proposals on the construction of the administrative-territorial structure of ukraine on the basis of decentralization of power, the widespreadness and capacity of local self-government, sustainable development of administrative and territorial units taking into account historical, economic, ecological, geographical and demographic features, ethnic and cultural traditions. after having communal land ownership, local governments will be able to provide real financial and economic independence and development of the relevant areas. however, it should be noted that local self-government is currently managing land resources only within the administrative-territorial units (settlements). the existing approach does not correspond to the practice of foreign countries. in them, local self-government is implemented within the administrative-territorial units, including at the primary level, which combine both directly with the territory of the settlement and the adjacent territory. there are two approaches of solving such issues which are called in the literature of the land law. the first is connected with the transfer of land plots located outside of settlements into communal ownership of future united territorial communities. thus, the right to dispose of these lands, as objects of ownership, will be received by local governments. they will carry out the disposal of such lands on behalf of local communities. the second approach involves the delegation of authority to dispose of state-owned land plots outside settlements to local self-government bodies. according to this approach, land plots will remain in state ownership, and delegation becomes temporary (шульга..., 2017, р. 64). at present, in the verkhovna rada of ukraine there is a draft law “on some measures to strengthen the role of territorial communities in land administration” (reg. no. 1159) (про деякі..., 2014), which provides for the automatic assignment to territorial communities of villages, settlements, cities of all lands of state property located outside settlements within the territories of rural, settlement, city councils. in turn, the draft law (reg. no. 4355) (про внесення…, 2016), instead of the transfer of stateowned land to the ownership of territorial communities, provides local governments with the right to dispose of such lands. however, it should be borne in mind that today local authorities within the territory subordinated to them are not the landlords. in connection with this, there are problems with the fact that the state executive bodies almost never take into account the interests of territorial communities in the disposal of lands outside of settlements. according to article 84 of the land code of ukraine, land plots that belong to state-owned land within the boundaries of settlements, also serve as the object of administrative actions by state authorities (земельний…, 2001). consequently, the law of ukraine «on local self-government» (про місцеве…, 2017) requires amendments related to giving local authorities the power to manage land resources local community in full accordance with established procedures and regulations, except for those categories of land that have a national strategic significance. this will enable to concentrate financial revenues to the budget 8 iryna ignatenko of the local council for the use of land of the administrative-territorial unit. as we know, the economic mechanism of concentration of finances from the use of land resources in the local budget expands the possibility of forming an additional trust fund, mainly, with regard to the purposeful use and protection of land resources of the administrative-territorial unit. in the future, financial reserves should be used exclusively for improving the ecological and economic condition of land resources of the subordinate territory. in order to continue the implementation of the principles of reform the state service of ukraine for geodesy, cartography and cadastre has drafted a draft law of ukraine “on amendments to certain legislative acts of ukraine regarding the delegation of powers to local self-government bodies with the disposal of state-owned land and strengthening state control for the use and protection of land” (про внесення…, 2015). adoption of such a law will allow the normative consolidation of the provisions on the decentralization of powers in the sphere of land relations. this law also proposes amendments to art. 12 of the land code of ukraine (земельний…, 2001). if it is adopted, then the village, town and city councils will have the following powers: disposal of state and communal land in the territory of the village, settlement, city council in accordance with the laws; the transfer of land plots of state and communal ownership to the ownership of citizens and legal entities in accordance with the land code of ukraine; the provision of land plots for use from the lands of state and communal property again according to the land code of ukraine; seizure of land from state and communal property lands, etc. at the same time, it should be noted that from 01.03.2016 article 12 of the land code of ukraine began to operate in an updated version. changes to it were made by the law of ukraine “on amending certain legislative acts of ukraine on extending the powers of local self-government bodies and optimizing the provision of administrative services” (про внесення…, 2015). the mentioned legislative act has added part 2 to the article 12 of the land code of ukraine, in which the powers of executive bodies of village, settlement, city councils in the sphere of land relations in the territory of villages, settlements and cities were found. these include: providing information from the state land cadastre, and resolving other issues in the sphere of land relations in accordance with the law. also, on the basis of the concept of reform and the plans adopted for the reform of the system of government, their functions and the implementation of decentralization of power, including in the sphere of land relations, a number of laws were adopted on amendments to certain legislative acts of ukraine concerning the extension of the powers of local authorities self-government in the sphere of land relations. at the moment, amendments to the law of ukraine “on state land cadastre” (про державний…, 2011) have been adopted. according to them the powers of local self-government bodies and provide that the provision of information from the state land cadastre may also be carried out by administrators of centers providing administrative services in accordance with the procedure established by the law of ukraine «on administrative services» (про адміністративні…, 2012), or by authorized officials of executive bodies of local self-government, who have successfully undergone internship in the field of land relations and meet the relevant qualification requirements. internship in the sphere of land relations is conducted free of charge by the state cadastral registrar for a period not exceeding one month. on the basis of the results of successful internship, the relevant cadastral registrar shall be issued an appropriate certificate. the local state administration, village, settlement, city council determines the possibility of exercising their powers in the sphere of providing information from the state land cadastre, taking into account the possibilities of organizational and technical support for their implementation. 3. extending the powers of local self-government bodies in order to ensure the realization of the tasks of the reform processes, the principle of universality enshrined in the law becomes of great importance. the universality is usually understood as such a territorial organization of public administration, in which each part of the country is governed by a specific municipal government (marcou, wollman, 2009). ensuring the universality of local self-government in ukraine is also one of the important components of decentralization, building an effective system of territorial organization of power with financially capable local self-government. the principle of universality is inextricably linked with the principle of subsidiarity, according to which managerial decisions in the state are taken at the lowest possible level, and the upper management units resort to any managerial action only if these actions are more effective than the corresponding actions of the lower units. consequently, according decentralization of the powers of local councils in the sphere of land relations 9 to this principle, district and regional councils pass only those administrative powers that cannot be implemented by city, village and settlement councils, and not vice versa, which are currently in force. in addition, the powers of state authorities in the sphere of land relations regulation should be transferred to local self-government bodies not at all levels, and mainly to the bodies of local self-government of the basic level, which are the councils of the combined territorial communities. as you know, optimization of land legislation is one of the areas of improving the effectiveness of the mechanism of realization of land rights, which consists in improving the procedure for the provision of communal land ownership and the transfer of ownership rights and the creation of legal prerequisites for the most effective implementation of land rights. at present, the land code of ukraine and the law of ukraine «on local self-government in ukraine» include the resolution of a number of procedural issues related to the transfer of land plots of communal property into ownership or use, prior to the session of the local council. in accordance with article 12 of the land code of ukraine, the authorities of village, settlement, and city councils in the sphere of land relations in the villages, towns, cities are disposed of by land of territorial communities. councils manage the lands of the respective territorial communities by transferring the land plots to the ownership of citizens and legal entities (clause «b» of article 12 of the land code of ukraine), granting of land plots for use (clause «b» article 12 of the land code of ukraine), seizure land plots of communal ownership for use (article 12 of the land code of ukraine), changes in the purpose of land plots in cases not related to their seizure and transfer to ownership or provision for use. the constitutional court of ukraine on this subject emphasizes that the powers specified in the points «a», «b», «c», «d» of article 12 of the land code of ukraine, are covered by the clauses specified in art. 143 of the constitution of ukraine by the term “other issues of local importance”, and therefore, village, settlement and city councils act as subjects of authority that implement regulatory and other management functions (конституційний…, 2010). thus, when granting a land plot in the order of assignment, which is owned by a citizen or legal entity, the local council must decide on: (a) approval of issues related to the redemption of land for public needs or reasons of public necessity (article 151 of the land code of ukraine), which provides for the further transfer of redeemed plots for use; (b) granting permission for the development of a land management project for the allocation of the relevant land plot (part 3 of article 123 of the land code of ukraine); (c) the provision of land for use, approval of the land management project and seizure of land from land users (part 6, article 10, article 123 of the land code of ukraine). at the same time clause 34 of article 26 of the law of ukraine “on local selfgovernment” actually requires that all these issues be resolved at plenary meetings of the councils (про місцеве…, 2017). at least it would be advisable to refuse (of course, by making appropriate changes to the law) from agreeing on the «issues related to the purchase of land plots», and from granting permission to develop a land management project regarding the land allocation. however, if such a proposal is not adopted, the assignment of part of decisions taken in the procedure for granting land plots for use or transfer into ownership, to the authority of the city (village, settlement) chairman, his deputy or secretary of the council could be a certain compromise variant. this would significantly (and fully justified) reduce the procedure for the provision of land for use or transfer to ownership. local self-government bodies exercise the rights of the owner or the rights of the controller in relation to land and other natural resources, therefore land administration, land management, land regulation, control over rational use and protection of land resources in one or another volume can be solved by local self-government bodies. in order to reduce the duplication of functions of the local self-government bodies and local bodies of executive powers, it probably makes sense to create appropriate structures in the executive bodies of local self-government with the transfer of certain state powers to them. since local self-government is not in the interests of the state, but namely in the interests of citizens living within a particular settlement, it is necessary to broaden the rights of local self-government and grant them the relevant rights to form their own executive bodies, including in the sphere of land relations. provision of various public services should be transferred to territorial communities as much as possible. these communities will be able to increase the efficiency of this sphere of relations. territorial communities should receive sufficient sources of financial revenues. while forming the local budget, these entities should take into account the legal framework for the development of land relations, the creation of a favorable investment climate for the territory. it also seems important to expand the tax base to form local budgets and ensure the sustainable development of territorial communities. 10 iryna ignatenko at the same time, a significant part of the local budget should be formed at the expense of local taxes. the community should have the real capacity and financial basis for solving local issues, be able to use all available resources independently, including all agricultural land in its territory. we consider an appropriate and well-grounded proposal for the transfer of agricultural land outside of the administrative-territorial units from the management of district state administrations under the jurisdiction of local self-government bodies. in this regard, appropriate corrections should be made to the land code of ukraine. this will change the subject of management of agricultural land and provide an opportunity to solve a number of important key issues of different orientation, namely: (1) improvement of the land legislation of ukraine (by changing the legal personality); (2) rational and ecologically safe use of agricultural land (by intensifying the production of agroecological and ecologically safe agricultural production); (3) the inclusion in the circulation of land plots of unclaimed units of citizens and the use of land at their discretion purchased from their owners, with subsequent transfer to a lease; (4) increase in revenues to local budgets (by obtaining funds for providing tenants with land plots outside the rural communities and will be transferred to the ownership of local communities). the issue of the interaction between public authorities and local self-government bodies in the sphere of land relations becomes more and more important n the effective legal regulation of the procedure for the transfer of land plots into ownership and the provision of land plots for use. however, such interaction is not always effective in practice. periodically there are conflicts and disagreements between executive bodies, often pursuing departmental interests, and local self-government bodies that represent the interests of territorial communities. consequently, the negative legal phenomenon, which significantly reduces the effectiveness of land legal regulation in modern conditions, in fact, is a collision of powers of state authorities and local self-government in the sphere of regulation of land relations. this is one of the types of legal conflicts in the land law of ukraine. and the conflict of powers is observed not only at the level of law enforcement, but also at the level of law-making activity. the latter further complicates the enforcement process. the problems of the unclear definition of the powers of state bodies in the field of land resources are indicated by the analysis of the provisions of the content of article 188 of the land code of ukraine (земельний…, 2001), articles 16, 17 of the law of ukraine «on the protection of land» (про охорону…, 2003), articles 5, 6, 7, 9 of the law of ukraine «on state control over the use and protection of land» (про державний…, 2003) and article 4 of the law of ukraine «on the basic principles of state supervision (control) in the sphere of economic activity» (про основні…, 2007), etc. this leads to the need for a clear separation of powers, for example, with regard to exercising state control over the use and protection of land and the authority to exercise state control over compliance with the requirements of environmental protection legislation. meanwhile, there is no clear understanding of the differences in these concepts even in the practice of the higher administrative court of ukraine. all this once again confirms the existence of the problem of imperfect legal regulation of the issue of the relationship between the powers of state bodies and local selfgovernment in the sphere of land resources and the need for its solution. it seems that the identification of the problem clearly indicates the way to solve it – the above functions should be combined. moreover, this should be done at the lowest possible level – at the level of local self-government bodies. such an approach would be in line with the subsidiarity principle, which has been successful in the legislation of the european union and its individual countries. its essence is that the powers should be transferred to a higher level only in the case when the lower level does not have economic, social and other possibilities for their realization. thus, the maximum number of functions in the procedure for the provision of land plots of communal ownership to the use and transfer of ownership is not only an issue of expediency but also a measure that follows from the obligations of ukraine regarding the harmonization of its legislation with the legislation of the european union (article 51 of the agreement on partnership and cooperation between ukraine and the european communities) (про партнерство…, 1994). 4. conclusions consequently, the laws passed on amending certain legislative acts of ukraine regarding the implementation of the concept of reform and plans for extending the powers of local self-government bodies in the sphere of land relations have initiated decentralization of power in the sphere of land relations. currently, powers of local self-government bodies in the field of land relations are considerably expanded at the legislative level. but these changes only initiate the implementation of the concept of reform. it is necessary to continue its implementation through normative consolidation and decentralization of the powers of local councils in the sphere of land relations 11 introduction of amendments to the current legislation. according to the concept of land management reform, local self-government 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сравнительное местное самоуправление: теория и практика, институт государства и права ран, mocква. 12 iryna ignatenko шульга м.в., 2017, децентралізація влади і земельні відносини, [in:] децентралізація влади як чинник розвитку аграрного, екологічного, земельного та інших природоресурсних галузей права: матеріали всеукр. круглого столу (м. київ, 22 вересня 2017 р.), bидавництво «прінт сервіс», київ, 62–66. 1. introduction in the context of globalization and market economy, risks of economic activity, economic vulnerability and interdependence of regions at all levels, what in ukraine is accompanied by long transformation in economy, are increasing. considering this, safety studies in various areas of public life, including economy, are particularly relevant. economic security (es) as an important component of national security is in the focus of scientists at various levels – from global to local. however, in scientific literature, it is usually examined at the state level that makes it impossible to consider the effectiveness of using of local resources of regions and their impact on the es of spatial entities of higher taxonomic ranks. a significant contribution to the study of various aspects of national and regional es has been done by ukrainian scientists (шлемко, бінько, 1997; геєць, 1999; мунтіян, 1999; пастернак-таранушенко, 2002; пономаренко, клебанова, чернова, 2004; герасимчук, 2006; новікова, покотиленко, 2006; сухоруков, 2009; варналій, 2011). the issue of economic security in ukrainian studies was considered in the late twentieth century; it was developed mainly by economic scientists, but the concept of „economic security” is extremely broad, and its definition is yet not fully formed (наконечна, 2010), several approaches to definition of the term can be found: 1. ability of economy to resist or prevent threats. 2. protection condition of interests at all levels. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 98–107 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.018.6634 integral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast) myroslava knysh (1), anna smaliychuk (2) (1) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: m.knysh@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: anakonechna87@gmail.com citation knysh m., smaliychuk a., 2017, integral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast), journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 98–107. abstract in the article, criteria and indicators of economic security assessment of administrative and territorial units of a region are suggested. component and integral spatial-temporal assessment of economic security of the lviv oblast is carried out using principal component analysis. future scenarios of es of the lviv oblast are suggested based on results of swot analysis. key words economic security, lviv oblast, criteria, indicators, components of economic security, integral economic security, scenarios. integral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast) 99 3. level of availability and effective use of resources. 4. economy condition that ensures sovereignty, independence and sustainable development. 5. integral – as integration or a combination of the above four approaches. social and geographical aspects of economic security studies which are largely ignored by scientists are manifested through: 1) factors of internal and external environment that influence formation of es; 2)  geospatial organization of es in general and its individual components in particular; 3) spatial approach in the course of development of measures to guarantee es. considering advantages and disadvantages of these approaches and taking into account social and geographic aspects of our research, it is suggested to treat „economic security of a region” as a geospatial organization of economy of a region as a whole and its individual components in particular, which is formed under the influence of favorable factors and allows keeping sustainable development able to meet the economic needs of a region in the context of national interests (наконечна, 2010). 2. criteria and indicators of economic security of an oblast level level of es is manifested through a system of criteria that are considered as classification attributes of its qualitative and quantitative assessment. the criteria allow analyzing both retrospective and current state of economic security of an administrative-territorial unit, and also making forecasting with the use of mathematical methods. qualitative assessment is detected in es conditions – danger, threat, risk, security, and quantitative – in the setting of threshold of its being in a particular condition (fig. 1). for qualitative assessment, a system of indicators is selected and threshold values of es are set, violation of which causes adverse trends (наконечна, 2011). in the process of research of geospatial organization of an oblast region es (in terms of administrative-territorial units – raions (districts) and cities of oblast importance), arises the problem of adequate replacement of important, or even basic indicators (such as gross regional product), which are independent parameters and are the basis for determining of relative indexes at national and regional levels. in this regard, the following principles of selection of es indicators are proposed: 1. principle of hierarchy – correspondence of statistic data to the level of economic research. 2. principle of universality – presence of indexes at all levels of research. 3. principle of adequacy – replacement of indexes of higher level with indexes of lower level. 4. principle of temporal consistency – values of indexes should be selected during the same time period. fig. 1. qualitative assessment of transition of security-danger condition source: own studies based on наконечна, 2011; герасимчук, 2006. tab. 1. indicators of measurement of economic security of region administrative-territorial units es component indicators es component indicators so ci al expenditures of local budgets for social security, uah. per person d em o g ra p h ic fertility rate, ‰ expenditures of local budgets for education, uah. per person mortality rate, ‰ expenditures of local budgets for healthcare, uah. per person child mortality rate, persons per 1000 of live born availability of hospital beds for population, per 10 thousand of population balance of intra-regional migration availability of doctors for population, per 10 thousand of population balance of external migration the number of patients with first time established diagnosis of alcoholic psychosis, per 100 thousand of population the total fertility rate (average number of children born to a woman over lifetime), persons 100 myroslava knysh, anna smaliychuk the number of patients with first time established diagnosis of drug addiction and toxicomania, per 100 thousand of population demographic load of handicapped population at able-bodied, % ratio of average monthly earnings to the total oblast level, % ratio of population aging (above 65 years), % number of registered crimes, per 100 thousand of population in ve st m en t іndex of investment in fixed capital, % to previous year housing availability for population , m2 per person investment in fixed capital, uah. per person arrears of wages, uah. per employee ratio of net increase of foreign direct investment to grp, % registered unemployment rate, % share of foreign investors in investments in fixed capital, % coverage of children by preschool institutions, % volume of fdi, usd. per one person availability of teachers, per 10 thousand of pupils ratio of investment to the cost of fixed assets, % ec o lo g ic al emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere by stationary pollution sources, ton / km2 degree of wear of fixed assets, % emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere by stationary pollution sources, kg per person share of innovatively active enterprises (iae) in the total number of industrial enterprises, % emissions of pollutants from motor vehicles, kg / person in n o va ti o n al share of financing of innovative activities in the grp, % emissions of pollutants from motor vehicles, ton / km2 share of enterprises that sell their products for export among all innovatively active enterprises, % contaminated wastewater, m3 per km2 share of enterprises that have introduced innovations in the total volume of the iae, % share of normative treated waters of wastewater % share of enterprises that sold innovative products in the total volume of the iae, % use of fresh water for agricultural and potable needs, m3 per person share of innovative products sold for export in total volume of innovative products sold, % production of waste of i-iii classes of hazard, kg per km2 share of innovative products in volume of industrial products sold, % deforestation, % share of innovative products in export of goods, % in d u st ri al volume of products sold, uah. per person coefficient of inventive activity, volume of industrial products sold, uah. per person volume of grp per person share of manufacturing in total volume of industrial products sold, % m es o a n d e xt er n al e co n o m ic ratio of grp to the average in an oblast share of engineering in the volume of manufacturing products sold, % ratio of grp per person to the average value in an oblast volume index of industrial production to previous year, % volume of freight turnover per person number of small enterprises, per 10 thousand of population ratio of export volume to grp share of products sold by small enterprises in the volume of products sold by all enterprises, % ratio of import volume to grp operating activity margin, % coefficient of coverage of import by export share of unprofitable enterprises, % ratio of exported goods to imported freight turnover, million of ton-kilometers ratio of exported services to imported volume of agricultural products sold, uah. per person ratio of capital investment volume to grp, % source: selected by the authors according to the main statistical office in lviv region (oblast) on архів видань 2005, 2010, 2015; база даних. integral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast) 101 5. principle of spatial consistency – values of indexes should be selected in terms of administrative territorial units of the same level. for the research of es at the oblast level, indicators (tab. 1) that most fully characterize current and dynamic condition of es in general and its components. in particular. indicators are selected from regional statistics database, taking into account the principle of correspondence of research scope. each of the defined components of es has approximately the same (8–10) quantitative set of indicators except social. this is because social component describes and covers volume range of indicators and quality of life indexes. overall, we selected 68 indicators, 19 of which are indicators-distimulators, growth of indexes of which is primarily the source of threats to es of a region. 3. spatial-temporal analysis of components of economic security of lviv oblast taking into account the lack of es study at regional level, an approach to its structuring in the case of transition from national level to the level of oblast region is suggested. we offer to distinguish the following components as components of economic security of administrative raions and cities of oblast importance: demographic, social, ecological, industrial, investment, innovational, mesoand external economic. in our study we used principal component analysis (pca) to calculate indexes of each component of es employing statistica software with further spatial-temporal analysis of the results. indicators of each component are combined in the main factors and the extent of their impact on the level of economic security in each administrative-territorial unit of the region is defined. qualitative assessment of the received component indexes of es within the region showed that mesoand external economic is in the condition of danger, three – in the condition of threat, three – demographic, ecological and social – in the condition of risk (fig. 2). components of economic security in the condition of risk are demographic, social, and ecological. demographic security (ds) is characterized by large territorial differentiation of the correspondent index, which ranges from 0.201 in peremyshliany raion to 0.689 in yavoriv raion. the rest of the administrativeterritorial units of the lviv obast are in the condition of risk and threat. we revealed that the indicators of child mortality and coefficient of natural population growth most negatively affect the demographic security of administrative-territorial units of the lviv oblast. during the investigated period, the index of demographic security in the oblast had a slight positive trend. according to the indexes of social security (ss), 22 of administrative-territorial units of the lviv oblast are in the condition of risk, seven – in the condition of threat. the absolute values of the index in the fig. 2. dynamics of components of economic security of lviv oblast source: own calculation. 102 myroslava knysh, anna smaliychuk region vary from 0.326 in the city of chervonohrad to 0.647 in the city of morshyn. influence of different indicators on the formation of the index of ss in different types of administrative-territorial units is different, but generally in the region, low values of the indicators of social problems positively influence it. over the period of 2005–2015 in most administrative-territorial units, the indices of social security had been increasing. the ecological component has the highest index among all the components of economic security. for seventeen raions of the lviv oblast, the condition of security of this component is revealed, for ten more administrative-territorial units – the condition of risk, and chervonohrad, lviv and stryi, taking into account concentration of sources of environmental pollution, are in the condition of threat. industrial, investment, innovational and meso and external economic components are in the tab. 2. componential and integral assessments of economic security of lviv oblast in 2015 n u m b er administrative raions and cities of oblast importance indexes of components of economic security integral index of economic security demographic social ecological industrial investment innovational mesoand external economic 1 lviv 0.591 0.382 0.466 0.503 0.267 0.496 0.613 0.484 2 boryslav 0.482 0.531 0.622 0.302 0.138 0.098 0.115 0.384 3 drohobych 0.592 0.391 0.575 0.274 0.100 0.388 0.262 0.427 4 morshyn 0.555 0.647 0.492 0.551 0.355 0.368 0.420 0.474 5 novyi rozdil 0.650 0.344 0.651 0.250 0.144 0.094 0.135 0.411 6 sambir 0.613 0.475 0.623 0.254 0.160 0.163 0.166 0.421 7 stryi 0.617 0.375 0.483 0.324 0.182 0.521 0.252 0.422 8 truskavets 0.564 0.463 0.597 0.317 0.481 0.222 0.341 0.481 9 chervonohrad 0.543 0.326 0.399 0.261 0.118 0.317 0.280 0.353 10 brodivskyi 0.413 0.415 0.752 0.283 0.125 0.166 0.214 0.426 11 buskyi 0.493 0.428 0.689 0.416 0.498 0.431 0.128 0.482 12 horodotskyi 0.491 0.460 0.655 0.403 0.324 0.361 0.110 0.440 13 drohobytskyi 0.496 0.447 0.720 0.324 0.393 0.033 0.029 0.422 14 zhydachivskyi 0.260 0.420 0.675 0.367 0.181 0.066 0.095 0.350 15 zhovkivskyi 0.601 0.413 0.726 0.418 0.272 0.166 0.104 0.451 16 zolochivskyi 0.495 0.393 0.712 0.393 0.124 0.254 0.102 0.415 17 kamyanka-buzkyi 0.536 0.520 0.665 0.470 0.360 0.297 0.130 0.458 18 mykolaivskyi 0.576 0.417 0.741 0.337 0.235 0.000 0.185 0.444 19 mostyskyi 0.534 0.399 0.710 0.348 0.279 0.000 0.111 0.417 20 peremyshlianskyi 0.201 0.480 0.689 0.367 0.221 0.000 0.073 0.344 21 pustomytivskyi 0.599 0.417 0.595 0.573 0.334 0.489 0.275 0.479 22 radekhivskyi 0.387 0.488 0.676 0.452 0.228 0.357 0.212 0.436 23 sambirskyi 0.518 0.478 0.709 0.396 0.251 0.304 0.045 0.438 24 skolivskyi 0.558 0.539 0.803 0.270 0.190 0.026 0.141 0.461 25 sokalskyi 0.484 0.458 0.686 0.216 0.276 0.000 0.148 0.412 26 starosambirskyi 0.484 0.482 0.772 0.347 0.296 0.000 0.139 0.443 27 stryiskyi 0.508 0.539 0.713 0.432 0.547 0.172 0.164 0.488 28 turkivskyi 0.499 0.545 0.734 0.281 0.157 0.000 0.033 0.403 29 yavorivskyi 0.689 0.446 0.775 0.316 0.243 0.150 0.146 0.488 note. matrix of critical conditions of economic security: 0 – 0.1918 danger 0.1919 – 0.4833 threat 0.4834 – 0.6755 risk 0.6755– 1 security source: own calculation. integral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast) 103 condition of threat. according to the qualitative assessment of industrial security, 26 out of 29 administrative-territorial units are in the condition of threat. the indicators of volume of manufacturing products sold, agriculture and the number of small enterprises affect the level of this component of economic security the most. the index of the component is increasing slightly, despite the decrease of indices in 11 administrative and territorial units. considerable variation of indices in the lviv oblast is characteristic of investment security. high dynamics of its index is found out. invs index ranges from 0.100 in drohobych to 0.547 in stryisky raion. the cities of chervonohrad and drohobych are in the condition of danger, stryiskyi and buskyi raions – in the condition of risk, others – in the condition of threat. overall, in the region, the indicators that characterize the ratio of investments volume to the cost of fixed assets and their depreciation positively affect the forming of the index of investment security. security index declined slightly given the negative trends in 18 raions. the calculated indices of innovational security (is) for 2005, 2010 and 2015 showed its increase. a major threat to the es in general is the presence in the region of administrative-territorial units without indexes of innovational activity, causing a significant differentiation of the index of is in the lviv oblast: from 0 in six administrative and territorial units to 0.521 in stryi (tab. 2). the administrative and territorial units, in which over the monitoring period the index of is dropped to zero require special attention. particularly they are peremyshlianskyi, mykolaivskyi and sokalskyi raions. 11 of administrative-territorial units are in the condition of danger, half – in the condition of threat, three – in the condition of risk. components of economic security in the condition of danger. mesoand external economic security (mss) in the lviv oblast among other components of es has the lowest index value and shows negative dynamics. according to the qualitative assessment of mss values, only lviv is in the condition of risk, in the condition of threat – 18, in the condition of danger – 10 administrative-territorial units (tab. 2). 4. integral assessment of economic security of lviv oblast the level of economic security of administrativeterritorial units is identified as integral index, which reflects its quantitative and qualitative characteristics relative to other administrative-territorial units of a region. calculation of such index primarily is the basis for comparison of es in a region and, therefore, helps to identify its spatial differentiation. this differentiated approach enables to take action to improve, stabilize or maintain the economic situation within safe limits. integrated assessment of economic security and classification of the administrative-territorial units of the lviv oblast over the period of 2005–2010–2015 is conducted with the use of pca. this allowed not only to identify the level of economic security of the region, but also to compare its spatial, structural and temporal features. in order to calculate the integral index of economic security by pca, seven indeces of relevant components were used. as a result, three factors that explain 75% of the total variance were found. the first factor, which explains 32% of the total variance, has the highest factor load which correspond to the indexes of ecological (0.87), mesoand external economic (0.86) and innovational security (0.79). the second factor explains 26% of the output information and integrates the indices of investment (0.83), industrial (0.73) and social security (0.71). the index of demographic security (0.92) forms the third factor alone. the influence of each factor on the economic security of the administrative-territorial units in the lviv oblast was defined. indices of the first factor influence on economic security in most of the cities of oblast. the second factor has a decisive influence on the level of es in morshyn, pustomytivskiy and stryiskyi raions, and the third factor – in novyi rozdil, sambir and yavorivskyi raion. simultaneously in six of administrative-territorial units, all the three factors are very weak, since the factor weights have negative values in them. among the components of economic security, value of integral index is mostly influenced by ecological and demographic components (0.205 and 0.179 respectively), and less – by social (0.087). over the period of 2005–2010, the level of es in the lviv oblast had been growing slightly – by an average of 6%. in spatial respect, only in six of the administrative-territorial units of the lviv oblast, the level of es declined, more than a third of the administrative-territorial units was included in the group with minor, and ten with medium rate of increase of the integral index of economic security. in particular, the highest rates of increase in the region demonstrated horodotskyi (31%) and buskyi (23%) raions. the dynamics of the index in the next period of 2010–2015 is characterized by a decrease of indices from one to 12% in seven administrative-territorial units. the most negative changes occurred in zhydachivskyi raion and the city of morshyn. and in 104 myroslava knysh, anna smaliychuk sambirskyi, starosambirskyi and buskyi raions, the integral index increased from 16 to 20%. the quantitative values of the integral index of es are taken as the basis of selection of two types of administrative-territorial units, which correspond to the conditions of risk and threat (tab. 2). among the administrative-territorial units of the region in the condition of threat, three subtypes are identified, namely: minor, medium and substantial threat. in the most of administrative-territorial units demographic and ecological components have high contribution to the integral economic security index. the first of the selected types unites the raions of yavorivskyi, stryiskyi and the city of lviv, which have rates of the integral index of economic security in the range of 0.484 to 0.488 (fig. 3). this level of es is reached due to relatively higher shares of mesoand external economic (lviv) and investment (stryiskyi raion) components. in this type of administrative-territorial units, the indeces of social and fig. 3. integral indices of economic security in lviv oblast, 2015. on the main map integral indices of respective administrative raions (nuts-3 level) is depicted. in the upper part of the figure integral indices of city of oblast importance is showed (nuts-3 level), which names coincides with raion’s name, but in regional statistics data on them are separated. city of lviv belongs to cities of oblast importance and showed on the main map. source: own studies. integral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast) 105 innovational components negatively affect the economic security. to administrative-territorial units subtype, which is characterized by minor threat of es, belong four administrative-territorial units, including two raions and two cities. the integral index of economic security of these administrative-territorial units ranges from 0.474 in morshyn to 0.482 in buskyi raion. the biggest risks of es in this subtype are relatively low indexes of investment, social and industrial components. the subtype of medium threat of es that unites 18 of administrative-territorial units, is formed by the three cities of oblast importance and north-eastern and southern raions of the lviv oblast (fig. 3). the index of economic security in the administrativeterritorial units of this subtype ranges from 0.403 in turkivskyi raion to 0.461 in skolivskyi raion. innovational, investment and mesoand external economic components have low values, in particular, in six administrative-territorial units there is absolutely no innovational activity. in this subtype ecological and social components have a slightly bigger contribution to forming of the integral index of economic security. four of the administrative-territorial units of the lviv oblast are classified to the subtype with substantial threat to es. rates of the economic security index in it range from 0.344 in peremyshlianskyi raion to 0.384 in boryslav. the values of the integral index of es are formed in this subtype by high rates of ecological, demographic (except peremyshlianskyi and zhydachivskyi raions) and industrial components. along with that, a threatening situation for es of administrative-territorial units is created by rates of innovational (in most of administrativeterritorial units there is none at all), investment and mesoand external economic components (fig. 3). 5. swot analysis the results of the research of economic security in the lviv oblast bear witness to most of administrative-territorial units being in the conditions of threat and risk, which implies the need for urgent measures for its improvement. to do this, first of all, a strategy to guarantee es of the lviv oblast must be developed, which would bring together a set of goals and measures aimed at efficient use of region potential, achievement of which will create tab. 3. matrix of scenarios of economic security change of lviv oblast favorable opportunities potential threats opportunity-strength strategies opportunity-threat strategies st re n g th s achievement of sustainable positive natural population growth. increase of the quality of social services. reduction of anthropogenic impact through the use of resource-saving and low-waste technologies. improvement of food self-sufficiency. increase of the number and range of products of small enterprises. high rates of goods and passenger turnover due to successful use of transit potential and borderland infrastructure. move of innovative activity of enterprises to a new level through local research efforts. increasing of foreign and domestic investment. implementation of export opportunities of a region positive dynamics of natural growth. growth of territorial disproportions in social infrastructure. growing problem of recycling and disposal of industrial and domestic waste. stagnation of agricultural production for the lack of interest and low profitability. reduction of the share of engineering and high-tech production. trade direction of small enterprises. reduction of scientific and technical personnel and research projects. reduction of growth of foreign direct investment weakness-opportunity strategies weakness-threat strategies w ea kn es se s reduction of the level of child mortality and labor migration by conducting of corresponding reforms. improvement of the investment climate contributes to the construction of housing and infrastructure, including social. upgrade of equipment and technologies for recycling and purification of waste will reduce the risk of industrial accidents. attraction of investment and subsidies to farmers and private households will constrain negative trends in agricultural production. diffusion of innovations into peripheral raions and their involvement in innovative activity. estimated economic policies and successful promotion will help attract investors to the region. development of the internal market will contribute to the qualitative and quantitative growth of small enterprises high depopulation and population aging, growing problem of child mortality. reduction of intellectual level of workforce. aggravation of social problems due to poor quality of life and spiritual level of population. absence of access to education and healthcare of high quality for the majority of the population. slight demand for local products due to low competitiveness. dotation of unprofitable enterprises. closing up of small enterprises. economic uncertainty and instability of policy, excessive bureaucracy and corruption will lead to withdrawal of foreign capital. closing up of local research centers, along with technology import source: own studies. 106 myroslava knysh, anna smaliychuk favorable conditions for the increase of economic security generally and its individual components in particular. a preliminary step of the development of es strategy is the conduction of swot analysis. according to the results, four scenarios of changes of es in the lviv oblast are suggested, which take into account favorable opportunities and potential threats of the external environment, the strengths and weaknesses of the internal environment (tab. 3). the most favorable scenario is strength-opportunities, as it is based on the strengths of the region es with maximum implementation of favorable opportunities of the external environment. the strength-threat scenario is to use the strengths to prevent potential threats. according to this scenario, es will be in a certain stagnation or have a slight but positive trend. the weakness-opportunity scenario involves taking into account the maximum action of favorable opportunities of external environment for improvement of weaknesses of the internal environment. the weakness-threat scenario is the most dangerous scenario for the development of the region. it is characterized by a combination of weaknesses of internal environment with potential threats of internal environment. according to this scenario, the region will be in the condition of danger. 6. conclusions the research dealt with the problem of es structuring while transition from national to oblast region level study and defined the components of es of administrative raion and cities of oblast importance: demographic, social, ecological, industrial, innovational, investment, mesoand external economic. for the research of es at the oblast level, indicators that most fully describe current and dynamic condition of es in general and its components in particular are selected from the data list of regional statistics. the authors presented the methods of integral assessment of es, which include the following components: 1) selection of indicators of measurement of es at the level of administrative-territorial units of oblast – raions and cities; 2) quantitative and qualitative spatial-temporal assessment of es components of a region by formalization methods; 3) quantitative and qualitative spatial-temporal integral assessment of es of a region; 4) classification of administrativeterritorial units of a region according to the es level; 5) creation of synthetic map of geospatial organization of region es; 6) development of future scenarios of region es using the technique of swot analysis; 7) according to the results of pca and critical conditions matrix, it is determined that in the lviv oblast, demographic, social, ecological components are in the condition of risk, in the condition of threat – industrial, innovational, investment, in the condition of danger – mesoand external economic. compared with the previous time slices, demographic and social securities are characterized by significantly lower differentiation of inner-oblast indices. at the same time, innovational, investment and mesoand external economic securities are in the three out of four conditions of economic security. spatial-temporal analysis found that in 2015 as compared to 2010, positive changes occurred only in social and industrial security; 7) qualitative interpretation of quantitative values showed that most of the administrative-territorial units of the region are in the condition of threat. in proposed by authors classification, administrativeterritorial units in the condition of substantial, medium and minor threat, and also three administrative and territorial units in the condition of risk, are distinguished .the most substantial threat to the economic security of the region are low rates of investment component and innovative activity, particularly in the third of the administrativeterritorial units, there is no such activity; 8) one of the main conclusions of the research is that low level of es in the lviv oblast is found, therefore in following research, it is necessary to develop a concept of economic security strategy. references архів видань головного управління статистики у львівській області, http://www.lv.ukrstat.gov.ua/ukr/publ/archive_publ.php?ind_page=archive [20.01.2017]. база даних головного управління статистики у львівській області, http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/statbank_ lviv/dialog/statfile.-asp?lang=1, головного управління статистики у львівській області [20.01.2017]. варналій з., 2011, економічна безпека україни: проблеми та пріоритети зміцнення, знання україни, київ. герасимчук з., 2006, економічна безпека регіону: діагностика та механізми забезпечення, настир’я, луцьк. геєць в., 1999, концепція економічної безпеки україни, логос, київ. мунтіян в., 1999, економічна безпека україни, квіц, київ. наконечна г., 2010, економічна безпека: поняття та підходи до трактування, науковий часопис нпу ім. м. п. драгоманова. серія 4. географія і сучасність, 6(23), 17–22. наконечна г., книш м., 2011, критерії виміру економічної безпеки, наукові записки тнпу. серія: географія, 30, 100–105. новікова о.ф., покотиленко р.в., 2006, економічна безпека: концептуальні визначення та механізми забезintegral assessment of economic security of a borderland region (the case of lviv oblast) 107 печення, ін-т економіки промисловості нан україни, донецьк. пастернак-таранушенко г., 1994, економічна безпека держави, інститут державного управління і самоврядування при кабінеті міністрів україни, київ. пономаренко в., клебанова т., чернова н., 2004, экономическая безопасность региона: анализ, оценка, прогнозирование, ид “инжэк”, харьков. сухоруков а., 2009, система економічної безпеки держави, стилос, київ. шлемко в., бінько і., 1997, економічна безпека україни: сутність і напрямки забезпечення, нісд, київ. 1. introduction bilateral relations between russia and ukraine are crucial in the system of the post-soviet space, so they are the subject of ongoing discussions (матишов, 2016; российско-украинское приграничье…, 2011; суший, 2014). the especially important, pivotal role in the russian-ukrainian discourse belongs to its economic component. it contains such aspects as development dynamics and structural proportions of the two countries, the degree, major factors, manifestations and consequences of their economic interdependence, as well as the orientation to other “centers of power”, near-border and cross-border cooperation, the contingency of political-ideological and economic interests in shaping bilateral relations, their consonance to european integration, etc. continuing the discussion of this topic (and taking into account the realities and consequences of the “ukrainian crisis” as well as the visible growth of the political and economic distance between ukraine and the russian federation), this article is to become an attempt not only to highlight the evolution trend of the economic ties between russia and ukraine journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(2), 16–25 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.011.8217 russian-ukrainian relations in the contemporary eurasian context: geo-economic aspect alexander druzhinin (1) north-caucasus research institute of economic and social problems, south federal university, sadovaya 105, 344006, rostov-on-don, russia, (2) immanuel kant baltic federal university, nevsky 14, 236022 kaliningrad, russia, e-mail: alexdru9@gmail.com citation druzhinin a., 2018, russian-ukrainian relations in the contemporary eurasian context: geo-economic aspect, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 16–25. abstract the article analyzes the evolution trend of economic ties between russia and ukraine over the past quarter century. it is shown that bilateral russian-ukrainian relations are experiencing degradation and disaggregation, lose their “exclusivity” due to diminishing “ussr inertia”, globalization and the influence of leading “power centers”. the new round of geopolitical and geo-economic “redistribution” of the eurasian space (initiated by the increasing influence of china and the overall “flow” of the economic and demographic potential to the south-east of eurasia) became the significant challenge for economic cooperation between russia and ukraine. the crisis in russian-ukrainian relations, unfolding in this context, significantly limits the development opportunities for the both countries, leads to the increase of peripheral traits in their economies, and multiplies dependence on global economic and political actors. key words russian-ukrainian relations, foreign economic relations, geo-economics, geopolitics, russia, ukraine, eurasia. received: 06 august 2017 accepted: 04 december 2017 published: 31 may 2018 russian-ukrainian relations in the contemporary eurasian context: geo-economic aspect 17 over the past quarter century, but also to show the influence of changing global context, signifying the prospect of a new reconfiguration of geo-economic (and hence geopolitical) landscape of eurasia. 2. post-soviet evolution dynamics of the economic relations between russia and ukraine: geo-economic and geopolitical determinants both russia (rsfsr) and ukraine (ukrssr) were important and deeply inter-integrated frame elements of a single large-scale territorial-economic system in the soviet union. the ukrssr, thus, concentrated a wide range of extractive industries (by the end of 1980-ies providing 72% of the ussr’s needs in manganese, 48% – in iron ore, 21% – in coal (экономическая и социальная география…, 2004). also it concentrated the enterprises of the first processing (41% of the country’s total production of pig iron, 27% of steel, 25% of the rolled metal, etc.), specialized as a supplier of high-tech production (including almost 700 enterprises of the military-industrial complex, which employs more than 1 million highly qualified specialists). the food production specialization provided up to 25% of total ussr’s gross harvest of grain, 22% of meat in carcass weight, 51% of the sugar production, 25.9% of animal and 32.3% of vegetable oil (ссср и союзные республики…, 1989). the ukrssr was important (for the soviet union) transportation and logistics center (дергачёв, 1989) and also tourist and recreational area (мироненко, твердохлебов, 1981). by the end of the 1980s, its contribution in the country’s agricultural production has reached to 22.1%, and for the industrial production this figure reached 16.8%, for the national income of the ussr – 17.4% (which, incidentally, was slightly inferior to the share of the republic in the population of the union, which was 18,0%). being densely populated and rich in infrastructure (in comparison with the rsfsr), ukraine, at the same time, was initially substantially energy-dependent on intra-supply. its share in 1988 accounted only 4.2% of the country’s total natural gas production and 0.9% of oil production (ссср и союзные республики, 1989). and, simultaneously, it was economically non-equal to the rsfsr. with the collapse of the soviet union, the economic asymmetry in the system “ukraine-russia” has gained even more prominence. while within a single union space the national income generated by the two republics correlated as 3.75 to 1 (in favor of russia), in 1991 the ratio of gdp of the two countries was 6.7 to 1, according to world bank statistics. this fact itself predetermined the inequality of starting opportunities, the subsequent differences in the global positioning of the two countries, as well as the setting of markable periodically increasing center-periphery gradients and the associated interdependencies and contradictions between their economic systems. since 1991 continuing economic linkages have becoming unstable, prone to spontaneous erosion, but nevertheless real “braces” in russian-ukrainian relations. they, however, gave rise to unstable and, at times, negative foreign policy context (growing, particularly, during the so-called “gas conflicts” in 1993, 2005–2006, 2007–2008, 2008–2009, bilateral restrictions on the supply of goods, etc.). also they initiated a gradual mental-psychological alienation of the two brotherly, culturally, historically and genetically close peoples, provoking a conflict between their oligarchic groups, political and economic elites. the inertia of “factor of the soviet economy” (prolonged in decades collapse of economic and technological interdependencies) at the same time corresponded to the effects of globalization and market transformation. as well it corresponded to the parallelism (but non-identity) in the “embedding” of economic complexes of russia and ukraine into the world economic system, their reformatting, “coagulation”, gaining peripheral features on the background of the manifested (and increasing) inter-country competition. in the prevailing context of bilateral russian-ukrainian relations, the growing influence also gained the geo-economic interests of the major “power centers”, transnational companies. the role of geopolitical factors dramatically increased, including a steady (albeit for a short period) unipolarity of the “westernized” world, and simultaneously vividly manifested (including the former soviet union) economic, political and mental “eurocentricity” of post-soviet states, combined with the wavy-consistent expansion of the structures of the “west”. to the beginning of market reforms russia had lost on the “size” its economy to germany of more than 4 times, and ukraine – almost 28 times (gdp at the official exchange rate). even more substantial were the differences with the group of states that is appropriate to designate as “old european west”1 (generating in 1991, almost 50% of the total gdp over the entire eurasian continent). the lost on the “size” of russian and ukraine economy were correspondingly 17 and 115 times. the western, “european” vector of geo-economic orientation of russia, 1 european states — member of nato and the eu up to 1991, as well as austria, andorra, cyprus, malta, monaco, liechtenstein, finland, switzerland, sweden. 18 alexander druzhinin ukraine and other new independent states was almost inevitable in this situation, even without additional account of the economic “weight” and attractiveness of the usa (26% of global gdp) and other non-european closest partners and allies. the subsequent de-industrialization of the both russian and ukrainian economies, as well as the their gaining more severe dependent, comprador features only strengthened the process of geo-economic and geopolitical “westernization”, producing a destruction of the previously established inter-country economic and technological interactions. against this background, however, russian-ukrainian economic interdependence remained in such spheres as energy, aircraft and aerospace, transportation of hydrocarbons, coal, metals, etc.). also social and cultural contacts and cross-border relations remained strong prolonged (российско-украинское приграничье…, 2011). the ethnic-linguistic specificity of ukraine has played significant role as a component of the russian ethnic and culture, especially in its south and southeastern regions (мезенцев, гнатюк, 2014). it has the significant impact on bilateral relations, unstable in its political aspect, accommodating periods of both political trends’ divergence of the two countries and their convergence (ильин, 1998; политические и экономические…, 2003; лапкин, 2009). russian federation, rapidly losing its former geo-economic (and hence geopolitical) position during all the first post-soviet decade (fig. 1), however, fewer was able to influence the situation in ukraine. and ukraine, having acquired the traits of “the two-faced janus” (багров, 2002), focused not only on the eu and the us, but also on the east2, and in this situation, more and more “drifted” to the west. the post-crisis recovery economic growth began in russia since 1999, and a year later in ukraine. by that time ukraine has already manifested its “midterm bipolarity” (дергачёв, 1998), “two-polarity” (багров, 2002) in full scale. from the turn of 2003– 2004, the most important “driver” for the russian federation was the rapid rise of world prices for oil and natural gas (for the period 2001–2007 the price for oil increased 4.8-fold), which had already become the most important item of national exports to that period of time. opportunistic, illusory role of an “energy superpower state” has strengthened the existing political-economic system, increased the reintegration potential of the russian federation in the post-soviet space, including (partially) its economic attractiveness for ukraine. in this regard, 2 in 1994 ukraine and eu signed the “agreement on partnership and cooperation”; also ukraine signed some agreements with russia, they are: “treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership” (1997); “agreement on economic cooperation for 1998–2007” (1998), “agreement on strategic partnership in gas sphere” (2002). fig. 1. the share of russia and ukraine in world gdp (at the official exchange rate), % source: calculated by the author according to the world bank data. russian-ukrainian relations in the contemporary eurasian context: geo-economic aspect 19 it is markable that the degree of “presence” of russia in the ukraine’s foreign trade remained stable even during the presidency by v. yushchenko (fig. 2), and the significance of the russian federation as the most important direction of ukrainian exports in 2005–2007 even increased slightly (tab. 1). according to the state statistics service of ukraine, during the entire period since 2005 to 2013 the ukranian exports to the cis countries has consistently exceeded the same indicator for the european union. it was distinguished, in this case, by the pronounced “non-primary” character allowing to reproduce the industrial component of the economy fig. 2. the share of ukraine in foreign trade of russia and vice versa (in progress) source: calculated by the author according to the international trade centre. tab. 1. the share of russia, germany and poland in the export and import of ukraine (2001–2015, %) year the share in the export of ukraine the share in the import of ukraine russia germany poland russia germany poland 2001 22.4 4.2 3.1 36.6 8.5 2.8 2002 17.6 4.1 2.8 37.1 9.6 3.2 2003 18.7 6.2 3.3 37.6 9.9 3.5 2004 17.8 5.7 3.0 40.2 9.4 3.4 2005 21.9 3.8 3.0 35.6 9.4 3.9 2006 22.5 3.3 3.5 30.6 9.5 4.8 2007 25.7 2.7 2.7 27.8 9.6 4.8 2008 23.5 2.7 3.5 22.7 8.4 5.0 2009 21.4 3.1 3.0 29.1 8.5 4.8 2010 26.1 2.9 3.5 36.5 7.6 4.6 2011 29.0 2.6 4.1 35.3 8.3 3.9 2012 25.7 2.4 3.7 32.4 8.0 4.2 2013 23.8 2.5 4.0 30.2 8.8 5.3 2014 18.2 2.9 4.9 23.3 9.9 5.6 2015 12.7 3.5 5.2 20.0 10.6 6.2 source: calculated by the author according to the international trade centre. 20 alexander druzhinin of ukraine, partially preserved after the 1990s. in particular, in 2008 the share of engineering products in the total structure of exports to russia accounted 31.7%; the same figure for metallurgy was 19.6%, and for services – 19.6% (российско-украинское приграничье…, 2011). as for the ukrainian imports, the cis countries (with an absolute predominance of russia) took the leading positions in it until 2014 (in comparison with the eu). corresponding with the strengthening geo-economic positions of russia (in the 2000s years), the “eastern vector” in ukrainian economy continued to dominate on the background of significant (and markable!) geopolitical “progress” in both ukraine and its neighboring countries of central and eastern europe. in 1999 hungary, poland and the czech republic were included into nato; in 2004 the same happen for bulgaria, estonia, latvia, lithuania, romania, slovenia, slovakia, estonia; in the same year hungary, latvia, lithuania, slovakia, slovenia, czech republic, estonia joined the eu. at the same time the “european neighborhood policy” started. it was addressed also to ukraine, in which so-called “orange revolution” took place, probably, not by chance “in unison” with the relocation of the euro-atlantic borders. in 2007 the eu was enlarged by bulgaria and romania. in 2004 the number of countries participating in the eu increased from 15 to 25, and by 2007 it has increased to 27. the creation of the single internal market of services has finished. since 2002 there took place the transition of the economic turnover to euro currency. rapid and large-scale promotion of the west to the east, causing increasingly expressed frustration (and concern) of the russian federation, and initiating its growing anti-western position, objectively turned ukraine into another significant geopolitical boundary and the areal of confrontation. in this context the position by j. leveque (левек, 2016) seems to be right while considering the nato expansion towards the russian borders to be the major factor in the formation of russian policy toward europe. the attention of the main global and regional actors was focused on the region of confrontation, giving rise for both economic risks and the primacy of geopolitics over economics for ukraine and russian federation. as v. a. kolosov noticed in 2011: “economic factors push ukraine to the east, while political and ideological factors associated with the tasks of state-building push it to the west” (российскоукраинское приграничье…, 2011, p. 14). the period of “balancing” (between the west and russia) presidency by v. yanukovych (2010–2014), indeed, chronologically coincided with the rise in oil prices and, consequently, strengthening the economic position of russia (whose gdp for 2009–2013 has increased 1.8 times). it was 2011 when both the russian exports to ukraine ($29 billion), and ukrainian one to russia ($19.8 billion) have symptomatically fig. 3. the share of eu countries in ukrainian exports (imports) of goods, % source: calculated by the author according to the state statistics service of ukraine. russian-ukrainian relations in the contemporary eurasian context: geo-economic aspect 21 reached the maximum values for the whole postsoviet period. nevertheless, there were these years, outwardly favorable to bilateral cooperation, when the “peak” in russian-ukrainian relations was already passed for many reasons (global, domestic and ones appeared in bilateral relations). there took place investment interaction: the major assets in ukraine were bought by tnc “lukoil”, holding “group the alliance”, the consortium “alfa-group”, the company “basic element”, afk “sistema”, “sberbank”, “vtb”, etc. it was complied by cooperation in several sectors: automotive, aviation and aerospace, agriculture, energy and nuclear engineering, engine and ship building, nonferrous metallurgy, petrochemical and oil industry (кузнецов, 2012). also by 2013 there was achieved the extent of bilateral export-import in the sphere of services for all the post-soviet history (almost $6.5 billion). but against all this background there were growing systemic contradictions between the two countries, and since 2012 their economic interaction was observed to perform sustainable downward trend. first of all there was cooperation in gas sector to be curtailed. this sphere is the most important for the both countries: developing the gas transport infrastructure bypassing ukraine (“blue stream”, “nord stream”, etc.), russia side by side was steadily losing the ukrainian market. while in 2006–2008 the volume of natural gas supplied by russia to ukraine varied in the range of 55–59 billion cubic meters (in comparison with the post-soviet maximum at 60.9 billion in 1998). in 2011 (according to “gazprom”) the corresponding figure amounted to 44.8 billion, in 2012 to 32.9 billion, in 2013 to 25.8 billion cubic meters. however, it covered the 85% of natural gas consumption in ukraine (сущенцов, 2015). in this regard, the bilateral trade “saged”, while the “european” vector of foreign economic orientation of ukraine, on the contrary, was steadily increasing (fig. 3). however, not only russian-ukrainian relations have changed, but also the entire eurasian ones, as well as the global geo-economic and geopolitical context. new global realities were the fundamental cause of the current economic situation in russia and ukraine after the winter-spring 2014. they determined not only quantitative but also qualitative shifts in the interrelations between the two countries (with the major distancing, mistrust and alienation). 3. the main restructuring trends in the modern economic space of eurasia and their projection on the russian-ukrainian relations having emerged with the collapse of the soviet union, the economic dominance of the west (euroatlantic geopolitical system) in the eurasian space proved to be fragile, short-lived, and it was predetermined by a number of significant circumstances. primarily, this is due to the strengthening of the economic positions of the russian federation in the 2000s. having significantly increased the extent of the “presence” in the total grp of the eurasian continent (3.6-fold) and becoming a significant focus of the generating, accumulation and redistribution of natural resource rents, russia was able to begin forming its own geo-economic structures (druzhinin, 2016). against this background, the russian economic and cultural presence in some states of central asia and transcaucasia began to grow and partly restored. since the start of the customs union in 2010, the degree of conjugation between the russian, kazakh and belarusian economies became to increase gradually. integration processes in the economic sphere were reinforced by the “eurasian economic union” (eeu), “started” in 2015. it transformed post-soviet space not only to the area of acute confrontation between russia and the west in spring 2014 (дружинин, 2016), but also to the pole of integration processes, perhaps the most rapidly developing in the modern world according to some expert estimates (головнин et al., 2016). however, it was not russia, india, the persian gulf monarchies, iran, turkey (all of them simultaneously performed the advanced economic growth), but china to appear the leading driver of radical geoeconomic landscape transformation at the continent. it resulted in the fact that already by 2013 the capacities of the sco (along with the states tending to this union) and the aggregate group of countries of the “european west” were almost equal to each other even in such originally “west-centered” indicator as “gdp at the official exchange rate”3 (дружинин, 2017) (tab. 2). i believe, the desire not only to “traditionally constrain russia” (бжезинский, 1998), but also “to deter china” (брюне, гишар, 2012), to prevent unwanted changes in the global balance of power – is one of the fundamental reasons for the expansion of the 3 in the calculation of gdp at purchasing power parity (ppp) the share of “european west” in 2015 is not exceeded 26.8 %, while the sco with the states-partners reached the figure 48.8%. 22 alexander druzhinin euro-atlantic structures into the east and south-east direction during all the last years. in recent years, the west rapidly “stake out territories”, reformatting and readjusting the country’s economies. it aims to transform local identity, but the real geo-economic effect from the post-soviet expansion is small. its new peripheral gains only partially offset the “trend flow” of economic and demographic potential to the east, south and south-east of eurasia, that has been for almost a decade (хесин, 2010). there is also no fullextent solution to internal tasks, such as: to pause stagnation and disintegration processes within the eu, to prove the feasibility of the nato’s presence and to increase its effectiveness, because its expansion is also at an impasse, as analysts acknowledge (левек, 2016). the “revolution of dignity” (aka – “the state coup”), having accomplished in winter 2014 with all the variety and substantialness of internal ukrainian motives, seems to be only a fragment, one of the “whipping grounds” for the global geopolitical interests, triggered by the major economic and demographic changes (the “tectonic shifts” in the terms by v.a. shuper (шупер, 2016)). they are multifaceted, unpredictable in consequences; their symptoms are significantly corrected by global and country economic rhythm and conjuncture. being only partly associated with the “ukrainian crisis”, the major shifts in global energy markets have made a blow not only to the economy of russia, but also to the economies of many neighboring eurasian states. so, since august to december 2014 the world price of oil have felt almost 2.5 times and further stabilized by about 40–45% from the previous level. for 2013–2015, the total gdp of the twelve countries – leading suppliers of oil and natural gas localized in eurasia decreased from $4.9 to $3.6 trillion, i.e. by a third. in this regard, even against a planned british exit from the eu, there seem to retain reasonable the assumptions that “the process of european integration is far from being complete” (шейнис, 2017), and the european union continues to be perceived (and probably actually stay) as “the most developed and successful integration union” (головнин et al., 2016). time, however, does work neither on united europe, nor on the usa. it is more and more difficult for them to control eurasian mainland, acquiring multipolarity and having actually prevailing on a global scale not only demographically, but also economically (in 2015, the total ppp gdp of the eurasian countries amounted to $82.4 bln., equivalent to 69% of the world total, and is just over 47 billion, or 63.4% at the official exchange rate). and the leading actor (the initiator and sponsor) of modern transnational-eurasian integration processes is china with its “creative expansion” (федоровский, 2016), which has been manifesting since 2013–2014, and virtually uncontested “continentalization” of its sphere of influence. while realizing its factually global geo-economic project, the “middle kingdom” (zhongguo – 中 国) already dominates at the markets of pakistan, tajikistan, kyrgyzstan, iran, mongolia and has substantial interests in india and the states of persian gulf. the transcontinental transit is increasing, being supported by the economic growth in china; also there take place major infrastructure projects (дружинин, 2017). russia also gradually reconfigures its economy to the prc (while in the first quarter of 2008 china’s share in foreign trade turnover of the russian federation was 7.8%, in 2014 it was tab. 2. relative weight of individual metaregions, integration associations and states in the total gdp on the eurasian continent (at the official exchange rate), % 1992 2000 2013 2015 states of the eurasian economic union 2.82 1.41 5.18 3.37 inter alia russia 2.57 1.25 4.52 2.83 «old european west» 49.61 44.39 38.33 36.36 «new european west»* 1.66 2.06 2.89 2.74 states-members of the sco 7.30 9.91 28.83 31.84 china 2.58 5.84 19.45 23.41 japan 21.54 22.83 9.94 8.77 india 1.64 2.30 3.77 4.46 turkey 0.88 1.28 1.67 1.52 saudi arabia 0.76 0.91 1.51 1.37 iran 0.48 0.53 1.03 0.93 ukraine 0.40 0.15 0.37 0.19 * – albania, bulgaria, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, romania, slovakia, slovenia, czech republic, croatia, estonia. source: compiled by the author according to the world bank. russian-ukrainian relations in the contemporary eurasian context: geo-economic aspect 23 11.1%, and in 2017 – 14,3%). the same changes occur, for example, in turkey; they are typical as well for ukraine. in this regard the concept of “one belt and one road”, formulated by chinese president xi jinping in the autumn 2013, appears to be markable and, in fact, the common for all the eurasian space (китайский глобальный проект…, 2016). it signifies the prospect of a new reconfiguration of geo-economic (and hence geopolitical) landscape of eurasia. having found the geo-economic vector primarily focused on the west over the past quarter century, both ukraine and russia (as well as a number of adjacent states) appear to be in the area of geo-strategic uncertainty, disengagement, conflicts of interests by obvious and latent “power centers” with the inevitable confrontation and the concomitant crisis processes in the economic sphere. 4. the crisis in russian-ukrainian relations in 2014-20....: some geo-economic results visible, multi-faceted crisis in russian-ukrainian relations has affected the economic sphere in a full-scale. its negativity was multiplied by a conjuncture in the energy markets. the most noticeably and painfully the crisis manifested in ukraine. probably ukrainian society partly “returned to the european vector” (руденко et. al., 2016); however, the actual price for the division of the country, as well as the intensification of geopolitical and geoeconomic “divorce” with russia appeared to be extremely high. outside of ukrainian jurisdiction there remains about 12% (in comparison with the state in 2013) of the population and productive assets, providing up to 11% of the total volume of the gross regional product. for the period of 2014–2015 the gdp of ukraine has dropped twice (from $183 billion in 2013 to $91 billion in 2015), and only in 2016 (according to the ukrainian statistics) the economy has shown some growth (2.3%), while the foreign trade turnover thus fell 1.86 times (and the 40% of this fall is due to the “collapse” of relations with russia). having gained the status of the “state with market economy” (only in 2006) and failed the attempts to restore the gdp level of 1990 during all the post-soviet period (геєць, 2016), ukraine have plunged into new investment “hole”, as it note ukrainian economists (крючкова, 2016). instead of investment progress which is necessary for the implementation of neo-industrialization, the regression prevails in the country. in both 2016 and early 2017 the state statistics record a decline in the industrial sector of ukraine. the precarious financial state of industrial enterprises causes the shortage of own funds and debt bondage, not allowing to maintain the necessary level of gross savings and therefore, gross fixed capital formation. permanent decline in net profits leads to attenuation of investment activity in the industry (шовкун, 2016). both the crisis in bilateral relations and the extension of de-industrialization have contributed to the accelerated fall in the purchases of russian natural gas by ukraine (7.8 billion cubic meters in 2015), which de facto turned the country into the secondary market for “gazprom” and its subsidiaries. in turn, ukraine has lost the russian food market which was traditionally significant for a number of its regions, especially in the south (shelest, 2015). being triggered by sanctions, the policy of import substitution in russia perform the effectiveness in key positions. even in the face of economic crisis of 2013–2016 the meat production of cattle in the russian federation grew by 9%, pork – by 53%, poultry – by 24%, butter – by 10%, cheese – by 38% (росстат, 2017). in comparison the ukraine’s share in the food goods imported by russia account only 0.5% in the 1st quarter 2017 (that is equivalent to $33.9 million). in general, russia’s share in ukrainian exports accounts only 9%, and imports 13.4% to the 1st quarter of 2017. the share of ukraine in foreign trade of the russian federation in the same period reached 2%, that is also the lowest rate over the entire post-soviet history (федеральная таможенная служба, 2017). it is markable that for both exports and imports the russian federation continued to be a prior (leading other countries) foreign trade partner of ukraine. not only the ukrainian economy but also the russian one has substantially suffered over the past three years. the volume of foreign trade of the russian federation “cringed” 1.6 times, and gdp – 1.63 times. a substantial decrease took place in the investment activity (its volume in 2016 amounted to only 88 % of the level in 2013). according to the value of gdp generated by economy (official exchange rate), russia was thrown back to 2007, and ukraine – to 2005 (the world bank, 2017). as a result, both countries performed a very high degree of dependence on global economic rhythm, as well as on the earlier economic partnerships. it is markable that until 2014, russia not only performed the dense geo-economic “bundle” with ukraine, but in 2000–2008 and 2010–2013 was largely a kind of “locomotive” for it. there were these time periods of global economic situation being favorable for russia, when ukraine has increased its share of global gdp. however, during all the postsoviet period ukraine has never broke the starting bar of 1991 (and russia, i should notice, has done it in 2008, as well as during 2010–2014). in 1999 24 alexander druzhinin the ratio of the “mass” of the russian and ukrainian economies was 6 to 1, and in 2013 it became 12.2 to 1. the degree of economic influence of russia to ukraine in this situation has objectively significantly increased. in 2015 the russian and ukrainian economies correlated already at 15 to 1 (by gdp), and the deepening asymmetry projected on the income of the population, its consumption potential and the cost of labor. for the situation in the middle 2017 the average salary in russia was equivalent to $610, and in ukraine it accounted $290. of course, in this context the russian vector of “socio-economic gravity” is essential for ukraine both now and in the future (in the coming “post-crisis” period). but since 2008 the russian economy is, in fact, “marking time”. the restoration of the geo-economic positions of the country to the level of 2008 will require at least 5–7 years even with a favorable scenario. at the same time the post-soviet generations have entered the economic and political life in ukraine. and in this context, it should be noticed the sharp decline in the attractiveness of russia for ukrainian households, which are foreign-oriented for working activity. such trend is typical for the last years, and every fifth family in ukraine has its member temporarily working in another country (прибыткова, 2003). ukrainian society is visibly reorienting to the labour markets of western and central european countries. it is symptomatic that the amount of remittances of physical persons from russia to ukraine amounted only $1.25 billion in 2015, while in 2013 it was $3.42 billion (according to the cb rf). and this is just one of the faces of the structural reformatting of the ukrainian economy, rapidly implemented nowadays with the use of mostly geopolitical (and geo-ideological) methods. this process results for ukraine in the deepening, prevalent orientation to the west and taking the role of a sales market, the “reservoir” of labour, as well as the supplier of agricultural products. the task to destruct the “ukrainian component” in the russian economy is to be solved simultaneously. as v.v. pantin and b.i. lapkin suggest (пантин, лапкин, 2012), the loss of the ukrainian market will limit the possibilities of economic development of russia. all these is to be made in the interests of western corporations (and their russian branches), and is aimed to provide the geo-economic “containment” of the russian federation, as well as “cleansing” some segments of the russian market from ukrainian producers which, by the way, are keeping interest in the russian market (shelest, 2015). of course, the geo-economic and geopolitical struggle takes place not so much “for ukraine”, but “for russia” as the main hub fragment of the eurasian space. 5. conclusion being the trend of all the post-soviet period (and only accentuated by the geopolitical events of the last three years), the degradation and disaggregation of russian-ukrainian relations marks the actual exhaustion of the “soviet union inertia”. also it marks the new eurasian reality, in which neither russia (despite the vastness of its territory and the continuing military-strategic potential), nor, especially, ukraine can longer be able to claim any leadership position in acquiring multi-polar planetary economic center-periphery system. ukraine was caught in the geopolitical millstone between russia and the west (лапкин, пантин, 2014) and appeared to be in the area of depopulation, aside from the dominant transportation and logistics braces and geo-economic axes of interaction. however, the emphasis on internal issues of government construction and national interests, as well as the geopolitical disengagement initiated by global processes – abolish neither significance of the geo-economic neighbourhood for both russia and ukraine, nor the affinity of cultural and behavioral codes, having formatted during the centuries of mutual geohistory. also it does not abolish the ethno-cultural, socio-demographic, environmental, economic and geopolitical challenges which are common to both countries. at the present time the russian-ukrainian economic interdependence is disappearing in many aspects, being “substituted” by the relations with the eu (and already in the medium term the same role can play the relations with china). but in the mentioned context of geohistorical and cultural commonality doubled by the common challenges of nowadays, this interdependence retains its foundations, reasons, and, i hope, positive prospects. acknowledgements the research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the russian science foundation (project № 18-17-00112 «ensuring economic security of russia’s western border regions in the conditions of geopolitical turbulence») references database of international trade center, http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-import-countryproduct/ [14.06.2017]. database of the state statistics service of 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intensified aggression on the part of russia, and military action in the east of the country (2014–2017), the study of the european integration challenges is more relevant than ever. the european integration as a civilizational choice of ukraine is a means to overcome the technological obsolescence of the economy and the creation of new working places by attracting investments and introducing innovational technologies, the possibility of ukrainian goods and services to enter the global market, the prospect of increasing the quality and the standard of living of the population, the elimination of corruption, reducing the crime rate by introducing european legal norms and standards of living. the challenges of european integration have been thoroughly studied by social geographers both journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 32–42 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.013.6629 lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration myroslav biletskyi (1), yaroslav ivakh (2), liubov kotyk (3) (1) faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: biletskiymyroslav@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: ivakh.yaroslav@gmail.com (3) faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: kotykluba@gmail.com citation biletskyi m., ivakh ya., kotyk l., 2017, lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 32–42. abstract the paper summarizes the contribution of the ukrainian and polish scholars into the study of challenges of european integration in ukraine. it proves the importance of researching socio-economic problems of lviv region in the context of european integration. we have described the general characteristics of lviv region and revealed the advantages of economic and geographical position of the region. it has been analyzed the problems of structural changes in the region’s economy, the challenges of reindustrialization, the investment and foreign economic activity of lviv region. the special emphasis has been put on the need to transform the region’s economy in order to overcome the long-lasting socio-economic crisis. key words lviv oblast, european integration, socio-economic problems, economy transformation, reindustrialization, investment activity, foreign economic activity. lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration 33 in ukraine and in the countries that have successfully resolved them and got integrated into the european space (poland, estonia, czech republic etc.). specifically, the challenges of transforming the economic complex of the state have been researched by o. shabliy (шаблій, 2001), l. nemets, y. oliynyk, k. nemets (нємець et al., 2003), h. balabanov, v. nahirna, o. nyzhnyk, (балабанов et al. (eds.), 2003), v. smal (смаль, 2011), h. pidhrushnyi (підгрушний, 2009), k. mezentsev, h. pidhrushnyi, n. mezentseva (мезенцев et al., 2014), i. pylypenko (пилипенко, 2015); the development of modern forms of the combination of enterprises on the territory of ukraine has been studied by d. stechenko (стеченко, 2002); the problems of trans-border cooperation have been investigated by n. mikula (мікула, 2004); the problems of investment and innovational development have been studied by y. kachaiev (качаєв, 2007), v. kravtciv, m. melnyk, v. anonov (кравців et al., 2011); the problems of the standard and quality of living of the population have been researched by i.  hukalova (гукалова, 2009). in poland, the socioeconomic challenges of ukraine in the context of the european integration have been studied by p. bajda (2011); the structural improvements in the ukrainian economy and the development of the investment activity have been investigated by j. fiszer (2015); the effect of the integrational processes on the development of ukrainian-polish relationship has been researched by r. świtala (2014); the challenges of polish-ukrainian trans-border relationship have been studied by b. kawalko (2011). the scholars have pointed out that in the context of the european integration of ukraine, the most urgent socio-economic problems are connected with the structural changes of the economy (шаблій, 2001; мезенцев et al., 2014; fiszer, 2015), the development of the investment activity (смаль, 2011; fiszer, 2015) and small business (балабанов et al. (eds.), 2003), the transformation of the foreign economic activity (мікула, 2004; bajda, 2011; kawalko, 2011), the polarization of the territorial development (пилипенко, 2015) and an increase in the population’s standard and quality of living (гукалова, 2009; fiszer, 2015). since the studies covered the whole territory of ukraine, the scholars left out the distinctive features of the socio-economic development of specific regions of ukraine in the context of european integration, one of which is lviv oblast. 2. an overview of lviv oblast lviv oblast is situated in the west of ukraine, borders poland (the length of the border is 258 km), is included in the carpathian european region and “bug” european region, and is a leader in the socioeconomic development of the western socio-geographical region of ukraine. in the greater context of ukraine the region is characterized by (tab. 1): • the high number of the industrial plants that market innovative products; • above average indicator of the number of the population, the natural decrease of the population, the average age of the population, the level of unemployment, the gross regional product; • below average indicator of the territory, the potential of integral natural resources; the gross regional product per person; the amount the subjects of economic activity with 1,000 people, the volume of exported and imported services, direct investments into the oblast and from the oblast into the global countries’ economies. the oblast stands out by its favorable economic and geographic location due to the immediate neighborhood with the eu state – poland, the proximity to most eu states (fig.  1), the developed transport system (international highways e-5 (kyivlviv-lisbon), e-17 (lviv-lublin-warsaw), e-40 (lvivkrakow-frankfurt), e-471 (lviv-stryi-chop), danylo halytskyi international airport lviv), and customs infrastructure (customs checkpoints: rava-ruska – hrebenne (hrebenne), krakivets – korchova (korczowa), smilnytsia-krostsenko (kroscienko); automobile and pedestrian checkpoints: shehyni – medica (medyka), uhryniv – dolhobychuv (dolhobyczow); the checkpoint: hrushiv – budomezh (budomierz)). 3. the problems of structural changes in the economy the economic complex of lviv oblast is formed by 120.4  thousand economic entities, 15.5% of which are comprised by enterprises and 84.5% are individual entrepreneurs (діяльність суб’єктів ..., 2016). with a stable upward dynamics of growth in the number of business entities (16.3% growth compared to 2010), the major problem is their low economic activity (only 65% of businesses are economically active (державна служба статистики україни)), as well as the growing “shadow” economic activity, which is caused both by the growth of the tax burden created by the state and local governments (especially the payroll tax) and by the low culture of social responsibility of businesses, corruption, the lack of trust in the state, legal nihilism, the lack of active fiscal policy. this results in the downward dynamics in the number of employed workers (tab.  2) and an increase in unemployment, 34 myroslav biletskyi, yaroslav ivakh, liubov kotyk economic migration and social tension in the oblast. the latter is aggravated by the problem of salary payments and setting the minimum wage: since 2017 – 3200  uah (110  eur), in comparison, the minimum wage in neighboring poland constitutes 1460  pln (335 eur). the positive side of the structural improvements in the economic sector of lviv oblast is an increase in the size of the medium and small business entities (51% and 30% of employed workers accordingly; 34% and 37% by the number of marketed products), as well as the fact that this indicator is reaching the european norms (small and medium businesses in poland account for over 90% of employed workers and 50% of gross regional product). this allows the oblast to resist the monopolization of the regional market by big enterprises, improves the standard and the quality of produced goods and delivered services through the competition between medium and small manufacturers, stimulates innovative activity in small and medium business segment. tab. 1. the position of lviv oblast in ukraine according to main macroeconomic indicators, 2015 indicators lviv oblast, the number (position) ukraine average maximum (oblast) minimal (oblast) the total area, km2 21 833 (17) 24 080 33 310 (odeska obl.) 839 (c. kyiv) 8 097 (chernivetska obl.) integral potential of natural resources, ‰ 37.653 (8) 40.000 122.462 (donetska obl.) 12.703 (chernivetska obl.) the current number of population, thousands of people. 2534.2 (5) 1660.6 4265.1 (donetska obl.) 909.9 (chernivetska obl.) natural population growth/decrease, ‰ -2.0 (7) -4.2 1.8 (c. kyiv) 1.2 (rivnenska obl.) -10.3 (chernihivska obl.) the average age of the population, years. 39.6 (6) 40,9 43.7 (luhanska obl.) 36.8 (zakarpatska obl.) the level of unemployment, % 1.5 (6) 1.9 3.7 (kirovohradska obl.) 0.9 (c. kyiv), 1.1 (odeska obl., zakarpatska obl.) gross regional product, millions of uah 72923 (7) 63476 357377 (c. kyiv), 176540 (dnipropetrovska obl.) 21676 (ternopilska obl.) gross regional product per person, uah 28731 (11) 36 904 124163 (c. kyiv) 46058 (kyivska obl.) 14079 (luhanska obl.), 16552 (kyivska obl.) the number of economic entities per 1,000 people 24 (9) 27 83 (c. kyiv), 36 (mykolaivska obl.) 17 (zakarpatska obl.) the number of industrial plants that market innovative products 44 (3) 22.8 66 (kharkivska obl.) 5 (luhanska obl.), 7 (volynska obl.) the number of exported goods, millions usd 1206,3 (10) 1525.1 8742.9 (c. kyiv), 6399.0 (dnipropetrovska obl.) 108.3 (chernivetska obl.) the number of imported goods, millions usd 1447.9 (5) 1500.7 14495.4 (c. kyiv), 3225.3 (dnipropetrovska obl.) 78.4 (chernivetska obl.) the amount of exported services, millions usd 369.7 (4) 389.5 2803.0 (c. kyiv), 896.9 (odeska obl.) 14.0 (luhanska obl.) 17.3 (chernihivska obl.) the amount of imported services, millions usd 50.2 (12) 220.9 2273.2 (c. kyiv), 402.1 (dnipropetrovska obl.) 1.8 (chernivetska obl.) direct foreign investments in the region, mln usd 1248.1 (7) 1734.9 22600.4 (c. kyiv), 7182.9 (dnipropetrovska obl.) 50.1 (ternopilska obl.) direct investments from the region into the world’s economies, mln usd 34.5 (4) 248.4 5391.2 (donetska obl.) 633.5 (c. kyiv) 0.1 (khersonska obl.) source: made by authors on the based державна служба...; україна у цифрах ..., 2016. lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration 35 one of the problems is that the state owns a lot of bankrupt, not competitive, huge enterprises mostly in the mining (se  “sirka”, novyi rozdil; se  “mezhyrichanska mine”, chervonograd, se “stepova mine”, hluhiv) and engineering (se “lviv radio engineering plant”, lviv, se “lviv state aircraft repair plant”, lviv; pjsc  “drogobych machinebuilding plant”, drohobych) industries that require the search for an effective investor. given that these businesses played the city development role in the soviet period, they are now the centers of depressed areas with low investment attractiveness. there have been changes in the sector structure of the region’s economy (2002–2005): the share of the sold products by business entities in manufacturing, transport and storage sector has increased (fig. 2, 3), and these sectors actively take advantage of the economic and geographical location of the region in their development, and, first of all, the proximity to the eu countries. another benefit is the development of the dynamic information and communications sector (2% of the sold products in the region, 2015) and the high competitiveness of these businesses both on ukrainian and the global services markets (“softserve”, “globallogic”, “eleks”, “n-ix”, “epam”, etc.). in terms of the territory, the biggest number of businesses are registered and working in the centers of active transformation of lviv oblast’s economy: the oblast center – the city of lviv (45.6% of businesses fig. 1. the distance from lviv to european capital cities source: made by authors on the based www.della.com.ua/distance; www.d-maps.com. 36 myroslav biletskyi, yaroslav ivakh, liubov kotyk tab. 2. the main indicators of the activity of economic entities in lviv oblast, 2010–2015 indicators 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 the number of economic entities including: 103517 74454 82757 117732 120447 enterprises 20343 17325 18762 18582 18633 individual entrepreneurs 83174 57122 63995 99150 101814 the number of employed workers, thousands of people including 544.6 490.4 478.4 499.9 478.9 enterprises 403.8 377.0 356.3 345.5 331.6 individual entrepreneurs 140.8 113.4 122.1 154.4 147.3 the average salary, uah 1941 2578 2789 2961 3405 the number of marketed products, mln uah including: 109323.6 143510.9 144168.0 166394.0 207671.8 enterprises 98047.1 131984.6 131081.6 149707.9 183102.3 individual entrepreneurs 11276.5 11526.3 13086.4 16686.1 24569.5 source: made by authors on the based діяльність суб’єктів...., 2016; головне управління… . fig. 2. the volume of marketed products by the type of economic activity, 2002 source: головне управління… fig. 3. the volume of marketed products by the type of economic activity, 2015 source: головне управління… lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration 37 of the region; 62.7% of the sold products); the economically attractive pustomuty district (4.8% and 6.4%), stryi district (3.3% and 1.2%), the center of tourism and recreation development in truskavets city (1.6% and 0.8%); the area of oil and gas mining in drohobych district (4.7% and 2.6%). one of the relevant problems is the polarization in the development of lviv oblast, namely the contrast between the center in lviv and the depressed (sokal and zhydachiv) and outdated (skole, turka, staryi sambir, mostyska, kamianka buzka) districts (fig.  4). an example of overcoming the depression and stagnation in the economic development could be yavorivskyi district, which took advantage of the neighborhood with poland, created “yavoriv” free economic zone (1999), and fig. 4. the functioning of business entities in lviv oblast, 2015 source: made by authors on the based діяльність суб’єктів...., 2016. 38 myroslav biletskyi, yaroslav ivakh, liubov kotyk ensured the development of new competitive companies in this district, namely in the chemical (“propet” llc, “sniezka-ukraine” llc), woodwork (“euroshpon” llc), and light (“joha ukraine”  llc) industries. the creation of sez “resort polis tuskavets” has attracted investments to the spa facilities in truskavets (117,1 million usd in 2001–2011). the withdrawal of benefits negatively affected the development of economic zones so now is the time for their reestablishment. in order to promote economic activity and coordinate the operation of existing business entities, three clusters have been created: (an it  cluster (lviv, 2010, based on the resources of “softserve inc.”, “eleks software”, “n-ix”, and “symphony solutions” companies; a cluster of wood work and furniture production (lviv, 2010, the resources of “svitanok”, “buk-holding”, “uniplyt”, “lviv furniture factory”), a tourism cluster (lviv, travel agencies, hotels, businesses in restaurant and hospitality industries). the industrial park “riasne-2” started its operation in 2016 (“fujikura” (the production of electronic wires and connectors for automobiles) with the investments of 75 million usd). 4. reindustrialization challenges for centuries lviv oblast has fallen behind eastern regions of ukraine and industrial polish regions in the level of industrial development because it was either on the periphery of the empires or was included in the newly-formed states as their periphery. the industrialization during the soviet time was at first aimed at receiving the necessary for the empire resources quickly, and later at active exploitation of the cheap and skilled labor resources. this triggered the development of mining, energy, forestry, light industries in lviv oblast in 1940–1950s; and the development of engineering and chemical industries in 1960–1970s (шимонович, 2001; назарук, 2008). however, there were no finished technological chains in these industries. engineering, especially in the military-industrial complex, was targeted at assembly manufacturing or the production of individual units and components (“lviv armored factory”, “lviv radio electronics plant”); while chemical industry mainly produced raw materials and semi-finished goods with low added value. in the 1990s, during the first years of the ukrainian independence, there was a sharp decline in production in many fields, especially in the industries that were deeply integrated into the imperial structures (engineering, chemical industry). the recession of the production deepened because of russia’s direct discriminatory economic policies (for example, “lviv bus plant” (2001) was acquired by the russian capital (70.4% of shares of “seal auto” llc) to eliminate a competitor). wood work and light industry declined (1991–2001) due to the low purchasing power of the population. also, the enterprises were technologically outdated, their products were not competitive, and their energy and material consumption was high compared with the international counterparts thus these factors contributed to the recession. this led to the reduction of the share of the industry in the total gross regional product of lviv oblast: 2000 – 23%, 2015 – 17%, indicating a catastrophic deindustrialization of the region (fig. 5). this gives rise to the social problem, since unemployed workers with higher technical education had to either seek work place abroad, or retrain for other industries such as construction and trade. the leading fields of the oblast’s industry in 2015 were food (32.8% of the industry production) and energy (17.7%) sectors; the share of engineering dropped to 7.2%, which was the oblast’s specialization industry until 1990s. the presented facts indicate that lviv oblast requires an effective policy of reindustrialization, which will enable the balanced use of the natural and labor resources and will help to increase the gross regional product. while developing the policy of reindustrialization, it is important to take into account the factors which had been formed because of the difficult political and socio-economic situation in ukraine after the russian military aggression (2014). the military action in the east of ukraine did not affect the industrial infrastructure of the western region but decreased its investment attractiveness and aggravated the innovative and investment climate (military mobilization of the population, additional military tax, the activity of volunteer movements supporting the army etc.). foreign investors are reluctant to invest money and start big projects in the country at war, and the military expenses limit internal investments. the political instability and frequent changes in the economic legislation, the corrupted judicial system that covers the raiders, keeps ukrainian and foreign entrepreneurs from modernization and expanding their industrial production. the economic crisis and the lack of attractive loans for local businesses make the production more expensive due to the pay of inflationary rent. the advantage is that the low cost of labor attracts the investors of small, low-capital manufacturing projects that require a lot of labor force (the light industry – “vesna” llc, “svitanok” llc): the establishment of the european standards makes these products competitive on the global market. lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration 39 another benefit is that lviv oblast has the densest network of settlements of different size in ukraine, which have enough industrial sites with the engineering infrastructure and a dense network of routes. also, the oblast has a variety of resources for industrial processing, which are created in agriculture and forestry industries. the oblast has a high level of water supply, many deposits of mineral resources, including the recently discovered deposits of shale gas. therefore, the ways of reindustrialization of lviv oblast should both take into account the opportunities of the existing enterprises and attract foreign investment and technologies. in our opinion, the oblast’s reindustrialization should be implemented in the following directions: • partial modernization of the existing industrial enterprises with the radical decrease in their energy and material consumption (this especially concerns food industry enterprises where the soviet era technologies are still in use). thus there are grounds for the rapid renovation of the alcohol, sugar, dairy, and tin enterprises. such modernization may partly cover more modern companies in the wood and construction industries; • the development of the alternative energy sector (wind, solar), shale gas mining, biofuels production, waste recycling, which will require wide attraction of foreign investment and technologies. over time, this will enable production of technological equipment for the alternative energy and waste management in the oblast. this will allow to use the scientific and technical potential of the oblast; • creation of small enterprises of light industry, mechanical engineering, woodworking, focused on cheap labor force potential, local raw materials, international cooperation. in the long term, the transition to production of technologically more complex products may be expected; • re-establishment of big engineering enterprises, which can already be seen by the example of „electron” group. first of all, rebuilding of strategic enterprises, of the military-industrial complex, and the agricultural engineering enterprises, which are in high demand, is required; • creation of industrial clusters that could comprehensively use available local resources based on the principle of sustainable development. special emphasis should be put on establishing the enterprises of deep processing of raw materials (organic synthesis chemistry, wood chemistry, recycling of plastic and glass containers, bioenergy, and the production of high-tech building materials). fig. 5. the structure of gross regional product of lviv oblast, 1995–2014 source: made by authors on based львівська область у цифрах ..., 2016. 40 myroslav biletskyi, yaroslav ivakh, liubov kotyk 5. the challenges of foreign investments and foreign economic activity during 2005–2015, lviv oblast economy received direct foreign investments (equity) in the amount of 1248.1  million  usd. the most attractive sectors for investors are manufacturing (36.7% of invested equity), finance and insurance (35.2%), transportation and warehousing (8.6%), real estate (6.9%). investors were reluctant to invest in the most dynamic sectors of the oblast such as temporary accommodation and catering (0.7% of invested equity), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles (3,2%), construction (1,4%). a significant problem is the decline in the oblast’s investment attractiveness because of the socio-economic crisis in ukraine, the growing corruption and military action in the east of the country, which led to an outflow of foreign investments from lviv oblast (foreign investment fell by 26.6% by the end of 2015 compared to the beginning of 2014). the largest outflow of investments (2015) took place in such sector as art, sports, entertainment (-34.5%), temporary accommodation and catering (-33.1%), construction (-15.2%), real estate (-13.7%) (статистичний щорічник ..., 2016). the positive aspect is that the eu member states prevail among the countries investing in the lviv oblast (2015) such as poland (30.7% of foreign equity), cyprus (17.1%), austria (14.3%), germany (6.5%), switzerland (5.6%), and denmark (4.9%). the oblast’s most attractive sectors for the investors from poland are finance and insurance (81.6% of foreign equity); for cyprus investors these are manufacturing (44.9%), transportation and warehousing (37.6%); german investors are interested in manufacturing (92.2%), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles (4.4%); austria – finance and insurance (69.9%), manufacturing (18.5%) (інвестиції ...., 2015). one of lviv oblast’s challenges is the territorial disparities in attracting direct foreign investments, the lowest investment per 1,000  entities has been the in peripheral districs of the region (turka, skole, zolochiv, brody) and border regions (staryi sambir, mostyska, zhovkva) (статистичний щорічник ...., 2016). this may be explained by the inactivity of the local communities in the cooperation with potential investors, the lack of modern investment projects in the oblast, inconsistency and frequent changes in the legislation in the field of foreign investment, corruption of the local authorities, non-compliance with the requirements of the initiated investment projects by the regional and local authorities, the lack of effective state guarantees of investment protection under unexpected circumstances, the low level of cross-border economic cooperation. one of the problems is the “shadow” activity, the usage of offshore countries (cyprus) to make direct investments from lviv oblast into the world’s countries. at the beginning of 2016 there were direct investments (34.5 million usd) into three countries from the region, namely cyprus (58.3%), poland (13.4%) and russia (28.3%). as for the positive aspects, the investments in russia have dropped (36.7% in 2014), yet there has been a negative trend, namely the growth of offshore cyprus investment (by 12.3% compared to 2014), which illustrates the export of capital from the oblast and non-residents’ evasion from paying taxes. another problem is the lack of direct investment from the oblast to the economies of highly developed countries, where we could adopt new production technologies, new methods of business management, a new range of products and services for their further usage in the oblast’s economy. due to the european integration, there have been changes in the foreign economic activity. the total export of goods in the oblast amounts (2015) 1.2 billion usd, the total of imported goods comprises 14.5 billion usd, the export of services is 0.4 billion usd, the import of services equals 0.05 billion usd (статистичний щорічник ...., 2016). concerning the benefits, there was an increase in the number of the eu states in the foreign economic activity of lviv oblast (tab. 3). one of the challenges of the oblast’s economy is a negative balance of foreign trade in goods and services, which leads to the dependency of the region’s economic development on the fluctuations of the national currency and economic policies of the partner states, and it does not stimulate the development of production locally, it does not help to solve social problems, reduce economic security. the tab. 3. the share of the eu states in the foreign economic activity of lviv oblast, 2005–2015 type of business activity 2005 2010 2013 2014 2015 export of goods 71.8 64.2 67.2 72.2 71.9 import of goods 41.3 31.6 63.9 79.2 81.5 export of services 75.8 71.0 71.3 65.7 68.5 import of services 84.8 88.1 81.4 76.9 66.6 source: зовнішня торгівля ..., 2016. lviv oblast: urgent socio-economic problems in the context of european integration 41 reforms in the state taxation legislation, especially in area of the production tax will help to changes this tendency, which will drive the creation of industrial enterprises in lviv oblast and reduce the volume of imported goods (home appliances, products of the light industry, etc.). there are high hopes for the functioning of the industrial park and the industrial cluster. 6. conclusions the european integration for ukraine overall and lviv oblast in particular is a way to enter the global economic landscape and solve many urgent socioeconomic problems, the most important of which are the national security, technological obsolescence, unemployment, corruption etc. lviv oblast has a favorable economic and geographic location and borders with poland – the eu state, it is also characterized by the medium indicators of demographic development and below average indicators of socio-economic development across ukraine. one of the oblast’s common problems is the growing “shadow” economy, which is caused by the increased taxation pressure by the state, corruption, legal nihilism, the low culture of social responsibility of businesses. the positive side of structural development of the economic sector of lviv oblast is an increase in the size of small and medium businesses, the formation of the dynamic information and communication sector, the establishment of three clusters and one industrial park. the remaining problem is the large bankrupt, not competitive enterprises owned by the state and significant polarization in the economic development of the oblast. the implementation of the reindustrialization policy will enable lviv oblast to modernize active industrial enterprises; foster the development of alternative energy sector; create small businesses in the light, woodwork, and engineering sectors; create industrial clusters, the functioning of which will be based on the principles of sustainable development. this will significantly increase the investment attractiveness of the oblast, improve its investment and innovational climate, facilitate the development of foreign economic activity and strengthen regional and national security. at the same time, “the shadow” economy, slow and ineffective implementation of economic reforms, their inconsistency and contradiction, negatively affect the modern economic development of lviv oblast, preventing it from using the benefits of favorable location close to the border, the oblast’s demographical and natural resources. in order to stop further stagnation in the oblast’s economic development and implement the principles of the european integration, it is important to introduce effective and fast reforms of the political and economic system of the state, which will guarantee the country’s choice of the european integration. references bajda p., 2011, stosunki ue-ukraina – stan obecny i perspektywy na przyszłość, ośrodek myśli politycznej, kraków, http:// www.omp.org.pl/artykul.php?artykul=254 [29.12.2016]. fiszer j., 2015, kryzys integracji europejskiej czy kryzys unii europejskiej? przesłanki i skutki, przegląd europejski, 3(37), 82–108. http://della.com.ua/distance [11.01.2017]. http://www.d-maps.com [04.01.2017]. kawałko b., 2011, wybrane problemy polsko-ukraińskiej współpracy transgranicznej, barometr regionalny, 2(24), 35–60. świtała r., 2014, integracja ukrainy z ue. zagrożenia utrudniające poprawne ułożenie stosunków 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the organizational product of modern religious life. in particular, the study of spatial aspects and distribution of major religions, faiths, denominations and religious organizations as well as the functions of higher and secondary religious educational institutions including sunday schools (see стецький, 2015). the western ukrainian borderland includes the following six administrative oblasts: rivne, volyn, lviv, transcarpathian, ivano-frankivsk and chernivtsi. their share is 18.4% of the territory and 16.0% of the population. the national education system of ukraine is organized into three levels, each of them performs its inherent educational objectives. the first level is comprehensive. it comprises children of 1–17 years old who attend pre-school, regular schooling and after-school education. they get a basic understanding of key subjects, physical education and aesthetic journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 64–72 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.016.6632 geo-cultural research of religious education in western ukrainian borderland ivan rovenchak (1), vasyl stetskyi (2), oryslava tymchuk (3) (1) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: ir_pavuk@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: stetskyigeo@gmail.com (3) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: oryslava.tymchuk@gmail.com citation rovenchak i., stetskyi v., tymchuk o., 2017, geo-cultural research of religious education in western ukrainian borderland, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2) 64–72. abstract it has become apparent that there’s a need to conduct a study on religious education. i’ve conducted just such a study of the historical aspects of religious education of the western region of ukraine. as a result i’ve done an analysis of the spatial distribution of religious educational institutions in the western ukrainian borderland. i’ve investigated the locations of higher religious educational institutions and various denominations and movements in the region. after much considerations, facts were made available regarding the distribution of religious schools in the western region, in terms of denominations within their areas. key words western ukrainian borderland, religious organization, religious community, church, confession, movement, religious educational institutions, religious education, religious school, sunday school, secondary school. geo-cultural research of religious education in western ukrainian borderland 65 development. the second level involves training. it comprises young people from 17 to 25–28 years old. this is made up of three groups of institutions: a) vocational schools that train professionals; b) universities of the i–ii level of accreditation (technical schools, colleges) that train specialists in general and special education; c) higher educational institutions, the iii–iv level of accreditation (universities, institutes, academies) where students carry a full course of education and receive a bachelor’s degrees (basic higher education) and masters (complete higher education). the third level is a post-graduate education and it depends on the requirements of professional training and retraining as labor conditions require, which in turn provides further training for the need of the community as the labor markets require in whatever particular sectors of economic activity. in 2015/2016 academic year, ukraine had 659 higher education institutions, including 371 institutions of i–ii level of accreditation, 288 institutions of iii–iv level of accreditation and 16900 secondary schools. in the western ukrainian borderland, the situation is as follows: 118 higher education institutions (17.9% of the nationwide index, ni), these include 74 institutions of i–ii level of accreditation (19.9% ni), 44 institutions of iii–iv level of accreditation (15.3% ni) and 16900 secondary schools (27.6% ni) (державна служба…). religious education in the western ukrainian borderland is a subsystem of religious infrastructure that includes 84 missions, 59 academic institutions and seminaries (33 high and 26 medium) and 5601 religious schools (four secondary and 5597 sunday schools). religious organizations produce 133 periodicals, including 76 articles, 21 audio-visual (radio and television) and 37 various electronic methods (звіт про мережу церков…, 2016). there are also other religious publishing houses as well as various church enterprises. the subject of our geo-cultural analysis is the religious education of the western ukrainian borderland. religious organizations in this region, remains the goal of higher and secondary religious educational institutions including sunday school. human-geographic research of religion, particularly religious education in ukraine was conducted by such scientists as i.i. rovenchak, (ровенчак, 2008), j. sutton (1994), o.i. shabliy (шаблій, 2000), l.t. shevchuk (шевчук, 1999) and others. they established the basic foundational principles of spreading religious beliefs and establishing their respective institutions; they also identified geospatial-core centers of religious life, reasonable flows of pilgrims and tourists; identified the territorial aspects of sacred infrastructure; expressed the territorial differentiation of religious life within their historical and geographical backgrounds. such scholar as o.g. kuchabskiy (кучабський, 2000), v.o. patiychuk (патійчук, 1998) and others, addressed the organization and functioning of religious education in ukraine’s various regions. the results of their study confirms the differences within regional education and functional levels of religious schools, seminaries, academies, as well as their territorial location according to the distribution of various denominations. in 2016, the total number of religious organizations within the religious network of the western ukrainian borderland are 30.7% of the national figure, nf; 23.4% are missions (nf); 43.4% are monasteries (nf); 29.8% are religious educational institutions (nf), 25.6% of which are higher (nf) and 37.7% tab. 1. religious organizations and their species, number, 2016 № species of religious organizations ukraine western ukrainian borderland 1 religious organizations 35709 10977 2 missions 359 84 3 monasteries 516 224 4 religious educational institutions 198 59 higher 129 33 secondary 69 26 5 religious schools 12179 5601 general 8 4 sunday 12171 5597 6 periodical 484 133 printed 329 76 audio-visual 29 21 electronic 133 37 source: calculated by the authors. 66 ivan rovenchak, vasyl stetskyi, oryslava tymchuk are secondary (nf); 46.0% are religious schools (nf), 50.0% of which are general (nf) and 46.0% are sunday schools (nf). religious organizations issued periodicals 27.5% of the (nf), 23.1% of which were printed (nf), 72.4% are audio-visual (nf) and 27.8% are electronic (nf) (tab.  1.) (звіт про мережу церков…, 2016). the first public schools which exist in ukraine now, were in the care of the church and priests being the teachers. in the second half of the ninth century, almost every cathedral had a school that produced new educators for the government. when the sixteenth century began, church ‘brethren’ began to create communal schools and ‘fraternal’ organizations. in 1592, lviv dormition brotherhood, which is also called stavropigiyska was established. similarly other ‘fraternal’ organizations began to emerge throughout the western ukrainian borderland, in rohatyn, tysmenytsi, lutsk, volodymyr-grand, komarno, galicia, stryi, nikolaev, dubna and elsewhere. in 1580 ostroh academy was founded in the rivne oblast. in 1783 the lviv theological seminary was founded and in 1804–1918 studiyum ruthenium were established. at lviv university theological faculty existed, for both denominations greek catholic and latin. also, seminaries began to develop in przemyśl in modern poland (1912), stanisław in ivano-frankivsk (1907) and prešov, in modern slovakia (федорів, 2007). in 1928–1929, metropolitan sheptytsky founded the lviv greek catholic theological academy, which consisted of two faculties, philosophy and theology, and yosyp slipyy became rector. after the closure of the academy in 1944 its mission and functions were taken over by the ukrainian catholic university, pope clement of rome, and was reorganized and headed in 1963 by metropolitan yosyp slipyy. in 1994 activity of the academy was resumed under the name “lviv theological academy”, and in 1998 received international accreditation. in 2002 it became the ukrainian catholic university. in lviv, seminary of the holy spirit, which is the successor to general seminary, was founded by austrian emperor joseph  ii in 1783. at that time it was the only seminary of the catholic church, which provided theological education and spiritual education to young people from galicia, transcarpathia, presov region, kryzhevskiy diocese, transylvania and croatia. after the arrival of the bolsheviks it was closed. but the seminary was restored in 1990 and construction of the new seminary of the holy spirit began in march 2002. it was completed in august of 2005. yuriy fedkovych chernivtsi national university, established a theological department in studies of philosophy and theology, which is the historical successor of the greek orthodox theological faculty. it was the basis for the founding of the university of chernovtsy in 1875. for the faithful of the roman catholic church in bryukhovychi, lviv oboist, there exists the higher seminary of the lviv archdiocese. it was originally founded in 1703, when the cathedral seminary was created. in 1783 an austrian order in lviv created the so-called general seminary for all galician dioceses, and in 1814 lviv, the seminary separated from the general seminary. in 1945 the lviv seminary was moved to kalwaria zebrzydowska, poland, and in 1950 the seminary was eliminated. seminary resumed its operations december 12, 1996. 2. the description of religious educational sphere in the western ukrainian borderland geospatial analysis of the western ukrainian borderland, will be conducted by such indicators as high and medium religious schools, the number of attendees daily and forms of publications; religious schools, which include sunday schools. also taken into account performance of religious schools, missions, monasteries and clergy periodicals. the territorial distribution of religious educational institutions were primarily associated with the historical context of religion in ukraine and particularly in the western ukrainian borderland, and the necessity to meet the needs of the faithful. in total there are 58 religious educational institutions of which 33 senior and 25 middle). most of them in lviv (32.8% of the western ukrainian borderland indicator, wubi) and ivano-frankivsk oblasts (19.0% wubi). lowest is in the transcarpathian (10.3% wubi) and rivne oblasts (10.3% wubi). higher amounts of religious educational institutions are in lviv (39.4% wubi), ivano-frankivsk oblasts (33.3% wubi). the smallest are in the volyn oblast (3.0% wubi). the average level of accredited religious educational institutions are larger in volyn (28.0% wubi), lviv (24.0% wubi), ivano-frankivsk (20.0% wubi), transcarpathian oblasts (16.0% wubi) and the lowest in chernivtsi oblast (4.0% wubi) (fig.  1). higher levels of religious educational institutions are not uniform in distribution, both in regions and in confessions. the density of religious educational institutions to community, has a number of interconnectedness of religious schools and religious communities. the average ratio of religious schools to the region is 5.5 institutions/communities. the highest density is in ivano-frankivsk oblast, 8.3 institutions/communities, which is associated with one of the highest geo-cultural research of religious education in western ukrainian borderland 67 concentrations of religious schools to a small number of communities in the region. the lowest density is in transcarpathian oblast. 3.3 institutions/communities which explains the large number of religious communities, a small area and a small number of religious educational institutions. christianity is the leading religion of the population in ukraine. in the western area, the orthodox church is dominant. the most common religious organization is the ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate). it is estimated to have 2560 religious organizations (23.3% of the region), nine departments, 2468 communities (23.5%), 68 monasteries (30.4%), one mission (1.2%), seven religious schools (11.9%), one higher level education (volyn theological seminary (lutsk)) and six secondary schools, where 713 students are enrolled. the employees of the church consist of 2438 clergy, including three abroad. religious organizations: 22 printed periodicals, 12 other printed material, four electronic and six audio-visual. in ukraine, the past 90 years of the last century, popular nationalist ideology, caused a national restructuring and regaining control of the government. we believe it was necessary. during this period, ukrainian orthodox church (kyiv patriarchate) and the ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church united under one name, the ukrainian national orthodox (ровенчак, 2008). the composition of the ukrainian orthodox church (kyiv patriarchate) in this region include 1786 religious organizations (16.3%), 9 administrations, 1,740 communities (16.6 %), 23 monasteries (10.3%), 4 missions (4.8%), 8 religious schools (13.6  %), five higher level (volyn orthodox theological academy (lutsk), lviv orthodox theological academy (lviv), rivne seminary (rivne), ivano-frankivsk theological institute (ivano-frankivsk), school of philosophy and theology of the yuriy fedkovych chernivtsi national university (chernovtsy) and three secondary schools, where 536 students are enrolled. there are about 1423 caretakers of the church which includes clerics, of which one serves abroad. the religious organizations produce 16 periodicals, five print material, four electronic and seven audio-visual. lviv orthodox theological academy (lota), is a higher education institution of the ukrainian orthodox church (kyiv patriarchate), which prepares fig. 1. religious educational institutions of the western ukrainian borderland, 2016 source: own elaboration. 68 ivan rovenchak, vasyl stetskyi, oryslava tymchuk priests, clergy and other church workers for all regions of ukraine (львівська православна…). historical decision was made by ukrainian council of ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church on june  5, 1990 on the creation of lviv theological seminary. since 2003, administrative departments were created, which trains the choir, cantor and clerks with the right christian ethics teaching in the secondary school. the academy has the following departments, scripture, theology, church history, social sciences and humanities. ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church has 612 religious organizations (5.6%), four administrations, 596 communities (5.7%), 7 monasteries (3.1%), one mission (1.2%) and 3 religious educational institutions (5.1%), one of which is higher (ivanofrankivsk seminary (ivano-frankivsk)) and two middle level with 75 enrolled students. church has, 452 priests, publish 8 periodicals, including 5 printed and 3 electronic. in the western ukrainian borderland, it is part of traditional custom, to work and serve the greek catholic. as a religious organizations it has 10 senior kindergartens. in volyn, ivano-frankivsk, lviv, rivne and chernivtsi oblasts ukrainian greek catholic church has 2375 religious organizations (21.6%), one center, 13 offices, 2260 communities (21.5%), 66 monasteries (29.5%), 22 missions (26.2%), 12 religious educational institutions (20.3%), of which 9 are senior level (ukrainian catholic university in lviv), ivano-frankivsk theological seminary named josaphat (ivano-frankivsk), ivano-frankivsk theological academy of greek-catholic church (ivano-frankivsk), ivano-frankivsk theological university, st.  john chrysostom (ivano-frankivsk), lviv holy spirit seminary (lviv), basilian institute of philosophical and theological studies named joseph velyamyn ruts’kyj (lviv-bryukhovychi), drohobych seminary of blessed martyrs severin, vitali and yakima (lviv oblast, drohobych), the institute of spiritual, philosophical and theological studies named bishop nicholas charnetsky lviv province (lviv), diocesan catechetical institute of the holy trinity (lviv oblast, drohobych ) and 3 middle level schools with 1742 students enrolled. those that serve the church, 2001 clergy, 15 abroad. religious organizations produce 32 periodicals, 20 of which are printed, 6 audiovisual and 6 electronic. ukrainian catholic university consists of two faculties, humanities (department: classical, byzantine and medieval studies, world history, modern and contemporary, modern and contemporary history of ukraine, (culture and languages), philosophy and theology; four institutions, catechetical-pedagogical, economic studies, leadership and management, mental health; lectures of the protection of national minorities, christian camp for children, “my journey with jesus and friends” and language schools, english, german, italian, french and english for high school students (український католицький…). the university has an enrolment of about a thousand students as of 2016, of whom 274 are undergraduates and 260 are working towards masters degrees (fig. 2). fig. 2. ukrainian catholic university source: photo v. stetskyi. geo-cultural research of religious education in western ukrainian borderland 69 in the transcarpathian oblast, mukachevo diocese of the greek catholic church, includes 457 religious organizations (4.2%), 2 administrative offices, 433 communities (4.1%), 20 monasteries (8.9%), religious educational institutions (1.7%), uzhgorod theological academy theodore romzha (uzhgorod)), which receive 82 ordained trainees and 137 sunday schools (2.4%). church has about 328 clergy, including 12 abroad. it publishes two journals, one is a print and the other in electronic form. the roman catholic church in ukraine, is represented by 390 religious organizations (3.6%), one center, 8 offices, 331 communities (3.1%), 38 monasteries (17.0%), 9 missions (10.7%), three religious educational institutions (5.1%), two of which are higher level (lviv-bryukhovychi), major seminary st. joseph and the archdiocese of lviv theological institute named archbishop of st.  joseph bilczewski (lviv archdiocese of the latin rite) and one middle level with 125 students are enrolled. church employs 209 priests, including 109 abroad. religious organizations print 7 periodicals, including 3 electronic and 4 printed. the higher level seminary of st.  joseph, lviv archdiocesis, operates the theological institute of st.  joseph bilczewski archbishop of the latin rite branch of the catholic university of lublin (вища духовна…, 2017; теологічний інститут…,2017). training at the institute conducted in two courses – a and b, the course a – 0 to 6 years of practice, and the b course – 1 to 5 year seminars, electives and practical (fig. 3). protestants religious organizations are distributed across all regions of the western region. their first group are the baptists, which include evangelical baptist union of ukraine, international council of evangelical christians-baptists (chernivtsi oblast) and other baptists (volyn, lviv, rivne and chernivtsi oblasts) there are a total of 663 religious organizations (6.0%), 6 offices, 628 communities (6.0%), 15 missions (17.9%), 13 religious educational institutions (22.0%) of which 7 are universities and 6 secondary schools, with a total of 3881 students. affairs of the church cared by 927 priests, including 9 abroad. periodicals produced are 6, of which 4 electronic and two printed. the evangelical baptist union of ukraine has seven senior kindergartens, ukrainian baptist theological seminary (lviv), rivne biblical institute (rivne) rivne regional bible college (rivne), 4 in the chernivtsi oblast. the second group are the evangelical christians represented by the association of missionary churches of evangelical christians of ukraine (rivne oblast), council of independent evangelical churches of ukraine (rivne, ternopil oblasts), evangelical christians (volyn, transcarpathian, ivano-frankivsk, rivne, chernovtsy oblasts). they have a total of 46 religious organizations (0.4%), 1 center and 2 boards 38 communities (0.4%), 3 missions (3.6%), 2 middle schools (3.4%), with 40 students. church affairs are cared by 44 priests. they publish one of printed periodical. the third group of evangelical christians includes all-ukrainian union of christians of evangelical faith-pentecostals and other evangelical christians, union church of god of ukraine (transcarpathian, chernivtsi oblasts), center of god evangelical christian church of ukraine prophecy (transcarpathian, ivano-frankivsk, lviv, rivne oblasts), cathedral church of ukraine, evangelical christians “open bible” (volyn oblast), union of free churches of christians of evangelical faith of ukraine (transcarpathian, ivano-frankivsk oblasts.). total of these religious organizations is 924 (8.4%), 2 centers and 12 offices, 879 communities (8.4%), 23 mission (27.4%), 6 religious educational institutions (10.2%) 5 universities and one middle school with an enrollment of 795 fig. 3. theological institute of st. joseph, archbishop bilczewski source: photos from the site – http://www.itlviv.org.ua/ 70 ivan rovenchak, vasyl stetskyi, oryslava tymchuk students. affairs of the church cared by about 1273 clergy, including 4 abroad. they publish 11 magazines, 5 of which are printed, 4 audio-visual and two electronic. ukrainian union of christians of evangelical-pentecostal has 5 senior kindergartens, lviv theological seminary, rivne theological seminary and another 2 in lviv and chernivtsi oblasts. the fourth group are the adventists, represented by the ukrainian union conference of seventhday adventists and seventh day, adventist church reform movement of ukraine (transcarpathian, chernivtsi oblasts), other adventist (lviv, chernivtsi oblasts). they comprise a total of 307 religious organizations (2.8%), 1 center, 2 governing bodies, 299 communities (2.8%), 2 missions (2.4%), 2 senior religious educational institutions (3.9%), with 106 enrollment. affairs of the church cared by 289 priests, including one abroad. they produce 11 periodicals, of which 8 are print, 2 audio-visual and 1 electronic. the fifth group are the lutherans which include the german evangelical lutheran church in ukraine (volyn, lviv oblasts), ukrainian lutheran church (ivano-frankivsk, lviv, chernivtsi oblasts) and other lutheran religious organizations (ivano-frankivsk, lviv oblasts.). there are 7 religious organizations (0.1%), 7 communities (0.1%). affairs of the church are cared by 7 priests, including one abroad. the sixth group are the transcarpathian reformed church (transcarpathian oblast), ukrainian evangelical reformed church (rivne oblast) and other reformed religious organizations (transcarpathian, lviv, rivne oblasts). they composed 125 religious organizations (1.1%), 1 center and 3 offices, 121 communities (1.2%). church affairs cared by 85 priests, including 7 abroad and they publish one printed periodical. another group are the charismatics which include association of independent charismatic christian churches of ukraine, full gospel (volyn, transcarpathian, lviv, rivne oblasts), ukrainian christian evangelical church (lviv oblast), church of the living god (transcarpathian, ivano frankivsk, lviv, rivne oblasts), spiritual center “new generation” of christian churches in ukraine (lviv, rivne oblasts), spiritual center “renaissance” (ivano-frankivsk, lviv oblasts). the total religious organizations is 184 (1.7%), 4 centers, 2 governing boards, 166 communities (1.6%), 2 missions (2.4%), 2 middle religious schools (3.4%) attending 40 students. church affairs fig. 4. religious schools in the western ukrainian borderland, 2016 source: own elaboration. geo-cultural research of religious education in western ukrainian borderland 71 are cared by 235 priests, including 11 abroad. they produce 12 periodicals, including 9 print, 1 audiovisual and 2 electronic. judaism includes united jewish organization of ukraine (transcarpathian, ivano-frankivsk, lviv and chernivtsi oblasts), progressive judaism (volyn, transcarpathian, lviv and chernivtsi oblasts), the association of chabad hasidim lubavitch jewish organization of ukraine (volyn, rivne and chernivtsi oblasts), other jewish religious organizations (transcarpathian, lviv and chernivtsi oblasts). total religious organizations is 44 (0.4%), 44 communities (0.4%). affairs of the congregation cared by 28 rabbis, including 9 abroad. one print material and one electronic periodical. besides the above mentioned religions and faiths represented in the territory they are few in the area, and their number is not very large and does not affect the overall situation in the region. these are the religious organizations: protestants, islamic, buddhists, ukrainian diocese of the armenian apostolic church, among the new ones are the pagans, oriental, and all others. the density of religious schools/priests, depends on the number of schools, clergy, and community and religious schools. medium density indicator within the western ukrainian borderland is 5.02. the highest density in the volyn oblast – 8.3, the lowest is in the ivano-frankivsk oblast – 1 (fig. 4). the next and equally important figures of religious schools, are the ones in general and the sunday schools. their number in the region is 56017, most of them are in lviv oblast (2054, 27.4% regional) and the lowest in ivano-frankivsk oblast (285; 3.8%). in the western ukrainian borderland are four general religious organizations, namely the ukrainian greek catholic church in ivano-frankivsk (1. “spiritual school” the metropolitan sheptytsky), lviv (2. uc school gymnasium, st. sophia) and one, the ukrainian union conference adventist church in lviv. religious schools in the western ukrainian borderland structure consists of ukrainian national orthodox – 794 (55.0% of the np of 1443), ukrainian greek catholic church – 1734 (85.3%; 2033), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 1185 (32.0%; 3707), protestants religious organizations – 1723 (39.1%; 4401) and other – 165 (27.7%; 595). historically the church influenced the western ukrainian borderland, and it is because of this, it is most numerous. ukrainian national orthodox is very traditional ukrainian, so it takes the lion’s share (tab. 2.) in distributing religious schools there is a pattern, where there is a greater number of specific religious denomination, there is a higher number religious schools of the same confessions. in the volyn oblast structure is as follows: ukrainian national orthodox – 197 (24.8% of the region), ukrainian greek catholic church – 14 (0.8%), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 402 (33.9%), protestants religious organizations – 375 (21.8%) and other – 28 (17.0%). in the transcarpathian oblast structure is as follows: ukrainian national orthodox – 8 (1.0%), ukrainian greek catholic church – 137 (7.9%), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 520 (43.9%), protestants religious organizations – 310 (18.0% ) and others – 80 (48.5%). ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) and protestant religious organizations prevails in this area, we can explain it this way, first – they are remnants of former forced imposition of the “right” religion; second, the rapid spread and influence of something new in the nation. in ivano-frankivsk oblast structure is as follows: ukrainian national orthodox – 66 (8.3%), ukrainian greek catholic church – 141 (8.1%), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 2 (0.2%), protestants religious organizations – 34 (2.0%) and таb. 2. religious schools for confessions in the western ukrainian borderland, number, 2016 № regions religious organizations ukrainian national orthodox ukrainian greek catholic church ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) protestants other together 1 volyn 197 14 402 380 28 1021 2 transcarpathian 8 137 520 310 80 1055 3 ivano-frankivsk 66 141 2 35 4 248 4 lviv 385 1436 25 103 1 1950 5 rivne 121 4 196 432 22 775 6 chernivtsi 17 2 40 468 30 557 total 794 1734 1185 1728 165 5606 source: calculated by the authors. 72 ivan rovenchak, vasyl stetskyi, oryslava tymchuk other – 4 (2.4%). in the lviv oblast the structure is as follows: ukrainian national orthodox – 385 (48.5%), ukrainian greek catholic church – 1436 (82.8%), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 25 (2.1%), protestants religious organizations – 103 (6.0%) and other – 1 (0.6%). art historically formed an important feature among highly religious population. in the rivne oblast structure is as follows: ukrainian national orthodox – 121 (15.2%), ukrainian greek catholic church – 4 (0.28%), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 196 (16.5%), protestants religious organizations – 432 (25.1% ) and others – 22 (13.3%). in chernivtsi oblast structure is as follows: ukrainian national orthodox – 17 (2.1%), ukrainian greek catholic church – 2 (0.1%), ukrainian orthodox church (moscow patriarchate) – 40 (3.4%), protestants religious organizations – 468  (27.2%) and other – 30 (18.2%). this situation is the result of the impact of new trends in society and influence of protestant religious organizations from neighbouring oblasts to the east. 3. summary geographical study of religious education is now at the primary level in ukraine, it requires deeper study. the historical aspect of the development of religious education in the western ukrainian borderland existed a very long time and has been a significant part of the development – from communal schools to famous universities – ukrainian catholic university. we have analyzed territorial extension of religious educational institutions and religious school in the western ukrainian borderland enables organizations and it enabled us to make the following conclusions: 1) the density of religious educational institutions are linked to the number of priests and religious communities; 2) the higher religious educational institutions and secondary religious schools search their place in the system of education; 3) the location of religious educational institutions is due to historical development of religious confessions; 4) the location of religious school has its own pattern – where is the greater number of specific religious denominations, there is a higher number of religious school of the same denomination; 5) the density religious schools depends on the number of schools, priests, and community and religious educational institutions. references sutton j., 1994, religious education in contemporary ukraine: some courses of study analysed, religion, state and society, 22(2), 209–235. вища духовна семінарія святого йосифа львівської архідієцезії, http://rks.lviv.ua/ [22.01.2017]. державна служба статистики україни, www.ukrstat.gov. ua/ [22.01.2017]. звіт про мережу церков і релігійних організацій в україні станом на 1 січня 2016 року, http://data.gov.ua/dataset/ resource/ [22.01.2017]. кучабський о.г., 2000, релігійна сфера обласного регіону: трансформація і територіальна організація (на матеріалах львівської області), phd typescript: лну ім. івана франка, львів. львівська православна богословська академія, http://lpba. org.ua/ [22.01.2017]. патійчук в.о., 1998, територіальна організація релігійної сфери адміністративної області (на прикладі волинської області): phd typescript: волинський держ. ун-т ім. лесі українки, луцьк. ровенчак і.і., 2008, географія культури: проблеми теорії, методології та методики дослідження, видавничий центр лну ім. івана франка, львів. стецький в.в., 2015, освітній простір, географія освіти, суспільно-географічні дослідження обласних освітніх систем україни, [in:] о.і. шаблій (eds), львівська суспільно-географічна школа: історія, теорія, українознавчі студії: матеріали всеукраїнської наукової конференції з участю закордонних учених, присвяченої 70-річчю кафедри економічної і соціальної географії львівського національного університету імені івана франка, лну ім. іван франка, львів, 270–281. теологічний інститут імені святого архієпископа йосипа більчевського львівської архідієцезії латинського обряду, http://www.itlviv.org.ua/ [22.01.2017]. український католицький університет, http://ucu.edu.ua/ [22.01.2017]. федорів ю., 2007, історія церкви в україні, вид-во “свічадо”, львів. шаблій о.і. 2000, географія релігії, [in:] соціально-економічна географія україни, світ, львів, 457–474. шевчук л.т., 1999, сакральна географія, світ, львів. journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(2), 54–65 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.015.8221 self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories (political, ethno-demographic and socio-economic aspects) sergey sushchiy (1), taras medvedkin (2) (3) (1) institute of social, economic and humanitarian research, southern scientific center, russian academy of sciences, chekhov 41, 344006 rostov-on-don, russia, e-mail: ss7707@mail.ru (corresponding author part 1-2, 4) (2) institute of social, economic and humanitarian research, southern scientific center, russian academy of sciences, chekhov 41, 344006 rostov-on-don, russia, e-mail: taras.medvedkin@gmail.com (corresponding author part 3–4) (3) world economy, politics and globalization department, rostov state university of economics, sadovaya 69, 344002 rostov-on-don, russia, citation sushchiy s., medvedkin t., 2018, self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories (political, ethno-demographic and socio-economic aspects), journal of geography, politics and society, 8(2), 54–65. abstract this article examines the political, ethno-demographic and socio-economic aspects of the self-proclaimed republics of eastern donbass. it is concluded that the most likely scenario is to preserve them as politically independent from kiev, the prorussian societies with an uncertain international political status. the process of state bodies’ system formation in eastern donbass (donetsk and lugansk people’s republic – d(l)pr), further legitimizing of the vertical power of the republics through activation of local party life and finalizing the system of elections for leaders and deputy corps of various levels are expected to be completed in the coming years. the socio-political fate of donbass will also largely determine the further ethnic evolution of its population, both in the western (ukrainian) and the eastern (“republican”) parts. the consolidation of the republics as stable political and administrative and territorial entities in the medium term (by 2025-2030) may lead to a quantitative predominance of the russian population within their borders (taking into account bi-ethnophors with russian ethnic self-identification). at present the only realistic scenario of socio-economic development of the republics remains their progressive “shadow” integration into the life cycles of the russian economy. in the next few years a serious spatial transformation of the entire infrastructure complex of the d(l)pr, including a network of transport communications and the basic systems of social life support, is expected. the transformation is caused by a radical turn of trade and economic ties of the region to russia and the need to move the central infrastructural hubs of the republics away from the front line. key words the self-proclaimed republic, eastern donbass, the socio-political dynamics, ethnic and demographic prospects, economic potential received: 06 october 2017 accepted: 16 february 2018 published: 31 may 2018 self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories… 55 1. socio-political dynamics of eastern donbass the process of institutionalization of new societies in different aspects of their activity was quite uneven in its pace. in summer 2014, a “force” component of the republics had been undergoing its formation at a higher rate. in the context of a violent escalation of an armed confrontation in eastern ukraine insurgents’ military inconsistency would merely cancel the project of new pro-russian communities. as a result, during the first six months of the foundation the landmark of people’s republics, hardly their only social fact, was a militia which went from disparate, poorly armed groups to a large semi-professional army (сущий, 2015). the rest of the spheres of the social life of donbass regions controlled by the militia continued to keep their established forms. local industries used to function as a part of the economic system of ukraine. financial flows were still directed to kiev. the administrative and managerial apparatus also remained the same. left “in limbo”, the major massive of officials took a wait-and-see approach, trying to keep their position in the management line of ukraine if possible and avoiding an open conflict with militia leaders at the same time. since summer 2014 a socio-political and administrative and managerial formation of the selfproclaimed republics is accelerated. in the next two years a system of state bodies is established, which allows claiming on socio-political legitimacy and managerial stability of new state entities. nevertheless, their political future was under the question almost all this time, as the minsk negotiating process launched in september 2014 envisaged, at least in writing, a certain road map for returning the republics to the full political and administrative control of kiev. another issue is that each party interpreted this way individually, what initially facilitated the impasse over the negotiating process. there had been a recurrent opinion in expert literature in 2015–2016 that moscow being seriously interested in eastern donbass itself keeps this region as a bargaining chip in a big geostrategic game – a “commodity” for an international political bargaining with its global opponents, first of all, with the usa (украинский кризис…, 2015; матишов, 2016). and as soon as corresponding mutual concessions are negotiated (for example, on syria or on the sanctions list), the kremlin will cede power over the selfproclaimed republics to the ukrainian authorities. this point of view came from an assumption on the entirely artificial genesis of the d(l)pr being the kremlin’s project per se, which obviously contradicted the reality. if moscow had really started targeted construction of novorossiya, the spatial format of pro-russian societies of eastern ukraine would have included at least all territory of donbass, but probably considerably gone beyond its borders. however, it is impossible to deny the most significant assistance provided to the insurgent movement in donbass since its emergence from powerful groups of the russian political, administrative and military elite and nationally-oriented groups of russian society. another point is no less substantial – after everything what happened in the east of ukraine in 2014–2015, even if the russian authorities made decisions on the future of eastern donbass, they would already fail to “return” the rebelled region of the ukrainian authorities in their contemporary militant anti-russian format without the most serious reputational losses in their own russian society. even a propaganda machine of central russian tvchannels working at full power would not be able to justify such a step. it is explained by the fact that such gear would automatically presuppose an extremely rigid “clean-up” operation of all pro-russian elements of two republics, which a large patriotically-oriented part of the russian society would not forgive the higher authorities of the country. finally, there was an influential class of the d(l)pr supporters among representatives of the russian elite (in its political, administrative and managerial and “force” segments). thus, “ceding” the republics to ukraine would, in fact, trigger a serious split in the ruling class of russia. but what was said does not mean that initially moscow deliberately torpedoed the minsk process. the motives of the russian authorities appear to have been entirely transparent. russia was ready to facilitate returning the separatist region to ukraine, but only in case of recognition of all socio-legal and socio-cultural peculiarities of eastern donbass by ukraine. in fact, moscow proposed kiev to make the same with the self-proclaimed republics what it made a decade ago with the chechen republic – to give the separatist region a high level of autonomy (сущий, 2015; матишов, 2016). to change methods of rigid unification to the system of measures of financial and economic and socio-cultural stimulation of integration processes – comprehensive activities planned for realization for decades. so in moscow’s opinion, the political return of rebelled donbass to ukraine could happen only on condition that kiev refused to make forced “ukrainization” of the region, agreed to give it its famous administrative and managerial and socio-cultural autonomy including saving multiple elements of “russian identity” and russian centricity which 56 sergey sushchiy, taras medvedkin were intrinsic to the life of the local population and its social practices (проблемы полиэтничного макрорегиона…, 2015; украинский кризис…, 2015). the acceptance of such variant of returning control over separatist territories in fact by kiev and all the political class of the country would mean (and presupposed) dismantling of the supporting construction of contemporary ukraine as a unitary state. apart from this, delegating special administrative duties and socio-cultural opportunities to eastern donbass, refusal of complex lustration of professional communities and strict persecution of all prorussian “collaborators” presupposed a cardinal value transformation of the anti-russian strategic course of kiev, a deep revision of the state socio-cultural program which the current authorities of ukraine and its extremely active nationalist avant-garde could not undergo under any circumstances (пихорович, 2015; матишов, 2016). taking into account how firmly this avant-garde controls the power and holds the central positions in the ukrainian society, it is obvious that this scenario was absolutely unrealizable from the first steps of the negotiation process. thus, russia was ready to “trade” with eastern donbass. but only with ukraine itself and not with the usa or the european union. however, initially the “price” offered by the parties in this diplomatic bargaining differed most significantly. any negotiation is a search for a mutually satisfactory compromise (a “favorable price”). but even taking into account the maximum concessions each of the parties could admit, a common space for a dialogue/a compromise did not arise. in essence, it was already evident from the first steps of the negotiation process (that is, since autumn 2014). however, better realizing the impossibility of a “deal”, the parties could not refuse to participate in negotiations for a number of reasons and therefore quickly enough turned them into a formal procedure well-recognized by all participants, a diplomatic ritual. in such situation the maintenance of the existing status quo was the most likely – eastern donbass was to remain in the intermediate socio-political status for an indefinitely long time, that is to remain as a potential “commodity”. since only the return of the republics to ukraine or their annexation to the russian federation or, finally, their recognition by russia as independent states would mean their loss of commodity objectivity and their transformation either into an internal element of the ukrainian (or russian) state or into an independent (even formally) subject of international political life. however, none of these options could be considered real. and the uncertainty persisted. meanwhile, the “frozen” status did not mean absolute socio-political static of eastern donbass. while the parties of the negotiation process were bickering with no result, two republics with their population of almost three million people lived their lives testing new forms of social organization and economic survival, gradually adapting to the conditions of long-term system uncertainty. and the pro-russian focus of this new life led it further from the rest of ukraine, therefore increasing its potential transaction costs on potential reintegration of eastern donbass in its cycles. as a result the initially phantom probability of a positive compromise approximately failed completely by mid – the end of 2016. and although the negotiation process continued to take its course, the understanding that the point of no return by the self-proclaimed republics had passed activated the ukrainian nationalists who decided to stop the diplomatic games that had become absolutely meaningless from their point of view. the trade and economic blockade of eastern donbass they organized and which is supported by the official kiev, accelerated the process of socio-political and economic self-determination of the republics. the subsequent recognition of passports of the people’s republic by russia was another step on their way to their own, unrecognized but stable statehood. a comparison of the self-proclaimed republics with transnistria is spread in the expert community (рожин, 2014). meanwhile, there is much more typological similarity of eastern donbass with nagornokarabakh. of course, a comparative analysis of all the unrecognized post-soviet states reveals much in common. but, recalling the dynamics of the armenian-azerbaijani confrontation, we find that the situation in the east of ukraine repeats the same conflict track in its main trends. let us recall that armenia having not officially recognized the independence of the nagorno-karabakh republic (nkr) during the escalation of the armed confrontation between the nkr and azerbaijan provided various kinds of assistance to the insurgents, which, however, was of a “private” nature − armenia did not enter the open war with the neighboring state. correspondingly, the units of the armenian army were not officially on the line of confrontation either. but it did not prevent the development of a broad voluntary movement in armenia resulting in the reinforcement of insurgent groups (including the military personnel). and according to its size and qualitative characteristics, the formed militia appeared to resist the professional army of azerbaijan, its demographic and economic potential self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories… 57 of being 50–100 times greater than the nkr’s capacity (корнел, 2000). in spring 1994, after a period of active hostilities which exhausted both opponents, the parties of the conflict reach the “clinch” stage. in other words, they are on the line of an approximate territorial balance which minimizes the possible mobility of the front in one direction or another. on 12 may, 1994 a ceasefire agreement was signed. the war is replaced by a “non-peaceful” truce, which has been going on for almost a quarter of a century. since then, the nkr remaining a state-like entity has developed sufficiently stable forms of its political and administrative and managerial organization, socio-economic and cultural life. a ramified system of relations between the nkr and armenia has developed, which makes it possible to solve basic problems of the social life support of the unrecognized republic; as well as bypass the difficulties that their population faced in connection with the international “non-subjectivity” of their society (for example, an opportunity to obtain schengen visas, etc.). so, the history of the nkr represents a road map already implemented in practice, which eastern donbass will largely follow (and already follows) in the course of its development. this scenario, as we see, does not presuppose the republics’ inclusion of in russia even in the long term of two or three decades. by the example of the combination “armeniankr” it is obvious that the main strategic goals and guidelines of the unrecognized community can be achieved without its full reunification with the “parent” state. thus, the process of state bodies’ system formation in eastern donbass, further legitimizing of the vertical power of the republics through activation of local party life and finalizing the system of elections for leaders and deputy corps of various levels are expected to be completed in the coming years. taking into account the fact that the population of the self-proclaimed republics became the most injured party of the conflict in the east of ukraine which is currently deprived of a significant part of the opportunities open to both residents of russia and ukraine, the only thing which remains is to hope for the gradual creation of a ramified system of informal procedures performed by means of correspondent russian agencies and institutions, which would let at least partially compensate the inhabitants of eastern donbass for its illegitimate status. 2. ethno-demographic prospects for donbass by the beginning of 2017 direct and indirect (as a result of mortality growth and fertility reduction) irrevocable losses of the population living in donbass were about 70–90 thousand people (about 1.5% of its population). at least 300–400 thousand people permanently left the region (migration to russia and other regions of ukraine for permanent residence) with a view of this figure increase by several hundred thousand people in the coming years. it is explained by the fact that a definite part of population having left the region in the course of active military actions is still uncertain about its place of living (сущий, 2016). and if before the beginning of the crisis in the d(l)pr there were over 4 million residents, now this number is about 3 million with an opportunity of certain growth of this figure in case of military and socio-economic stabilization. the national structure of region’s population also underwent changes. a certain ethno-cultural “separation” of local territorial communities began since the inception of the military conflict connected with extensive migration beyond the region. ukrainiancentered (the majority being ethnical ukrainians) residents of donbass moved to other regions of ukraine, russian-centered population (with high percentage of russians) moved to russia. by the time the frontier line reached stabilization and active military actions ended, the ethno-cultural disengagement of newly formed regional societies had already happened, although a detailed analysis of territorial boundaries of pro-russian and ukrainian donbass discloses an obvious discrepancy of ethnical borders and the line of military confrontation. a number of ukrainian residents remained to live on the territory of the self-proclaimed republics and a large number of russians continued to live on territories under control of the armed forces of ukraine. but the following fact is beyond dispute − a tangible majority of regional russian population took side of militia and a big part of local ukrainians would like donbass not to be separated from ukraine. in this case, it is necessary to take into account the fact that this region was the territory with the highest share of mixed russian-ukrainian population (савоскул, 2001). if there is now more than a quarter of a bi-ethnic majority of population (the offspring of russian-ukrainian married couples) within the rest of ukraine, up to half of the local residents could belong to it in donetsk and lugansk regions. the choice of the party in the conflict by such a population was determined not only by internal 58 sergey sushchiy, taras medvedkin convictions, but also by the sum of concrete life circumstances of every individual. it can also be assumed that the socio-political and economic dynamics of the republics of eastern donbass will determine the further ethnic dynamics of its population to a significant extent. the most numerous part of the outflow from the ukrainian part of the region to the territory of the dpr and lpr will be russians (including a mixed population that ethnically identifies itself as the russian one). and, consequently, the quantitative and fractional preponderance of ukrainians among the population of territories belonging to donbass controlled by kiev will begin to grow rapidly (especially since the remaining russian and bi-ethnic population there will be the object of an integrated, purposeful program of “title conferring”). accordingly, the evolution of the ethnic structure of the population of the republics will be reverse in its central vector, a part of the ukrainian-centric population of these republics leaving the territories and awaiting the return of eastern donbass to the control of kiev. with the loss of this hope the territory of the dpr and the lpr can be left by minimum hundred thousand of their ukrainian inhabitants. moreover, socio-economic problems will contribute to it. thus, the consolidation of the republics as stable political and administrative and territorial entities in the medium term (by 2025–2030) may lead to a quantitative predominance of the russian population within their borders (taking into account biethnophors with russian ethnic self-identification). meanwhile, until recently ukrainians dominated quantitatively on the territory of the future republics of eastern donbass. according to the 2001 census, they accounted for 50–55% of local residents, russians accounted for 40% of the population (всеукраинская перепись населения 2001). by 2014 these shares slightly changed, and the number of ukrainians still exceeded the number of russians by 30–40%. but during the military confrontation about 1.0–1.5 million people rescued to russia and other regions of ukraine. a significant number of migrants forced to move subsequently returned to the self-proclaimed republics. and, nevertheless, many hundreds of thousands of people remain outside the borders of the republics. dozens of thousands have already received russian citizenship, begun to take roots in various regions of russia maintaining the status of refugees. ethnically, this population could generally correspond to the national structure of the entire population of donbass (or differ somewhat in slightly higher proportion of russians). on the other hand, hundreds of thousands who moved to other regions of ukraine and did not want to return to the jurisdiction of the people’s republics were in the majority represented by the ukrainians. and in the share ratio these “ukrainian” losses of the general demographic potential of eastern donbass are highly likely to dominate. in other words, as early as in 2015–1016, the ratio of russians and ukrainians in the population of the self-proclaimed republics could be significantly “balanced”, especially after a massive return of refugees to the dpr and the lpr from russian regions. finally, it is necessary to take into account the obviously reversed identity dynamics of the local mixed russian-ukrainian population. if up to 80% of the representatives of the bi-ethnic population living on all the territories belonging to ukraine already identified themselves as ukrainians by 2014, this ratio was not so unbalanced within the donbass region, in which russia’s influence remained very noticeable. however, after two decades of state independence of ukraine about two thirds of local bi-ethnopfors could also choose a titular nationality under their national self-determination. the appearance of the d(l)pr was to stop the process of bi-ethnic population bias towards ukrainian self-identification, and the political stabilization of the republics was to inevitably include a reverse trend (there is every reason to consider it already included). an outside observer can ironize on such “weathercock” behaviour of the local population concerning their identification. but in the context of donbass’ status of an ethnocultural limitrophe, this mimicry under the social and ethno-cultural trend that dominates the society is an inevitable behavior strategy for a significant part of local residents being far from politics and engaged in the organization of their own lives. given that up to a half of population can belong to bi-ethnophors within the republics, the transition of even 10–15% of representatives of this group from the group of ukrainian identification to the russian one can make the number of the two leading national communities of eastern donbass quantitatively comparable. so, the socio-political fate of donbass will also largely determine the further ethnic evolution of its population, both in the western (ukrainian) and the eastern (“republican”) parts. at the same time, however, it is necessary to state that any of the possible scenarios of the region’s demographic dynamics in the current situation will be associated with a large-scale loss of its population, although, its demographic losses are estimated to date at hundreds of thousands of people (сущий, 2016). but demographic problems connected with self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories… 59 systemic “burdens”, especially sensitive for the selfproclaimed republics, can be huge as well. these burdens are an uncertain socio-political status, the front-line situation of the largest centers (including two capitals – donetsk and lugansk), and the low material level of the population and serious socioeconomic problems. these circumstances will determine the steady outflow of young people and qualified specialists outside the republics. this migration trend has been clearly recorded in the last two or three years. but in the medium term it is able to become an independent factor in the socio-economic stagnation of the republics, a catalyst for the already increased natural loss of their population and its accelerated aging. 3. economy of eastern donbass – realities and prospects until early 2014 donetsk and lugansk regions had significant economic potential and were a part of the group of the most industrially developed regions of ukraine. the main branches of the industrial complex of donbass include metallurgy, chemical industry, production of coke and refined products, coal industry and machine building. the total grp of two regions in 2013 exceeded 29 bln. usd, what was 16.2% of the total gdp of ukraine (tab. 1). the largest industrial centers of donetsk region apart from the regional capital were mariupol, avdeevka, artemovsk, kramatorsk, slavyansk. metallurgical, machine-building enterprises and also serious coke-making capacities were concentrated in the region. the leading centers of industry in lugansk region were severodonetsk, lisichansk, rubezhnoye, where manufacturing of chemical products was concentrated (донбасс: экономика и промышленность, /no data/). thus, the central segment of the economy of donetsk and lugansk regions forming grp was heavy industry. the volume of industrial products sold in donetsk and lugansk regions in 2013 amounted to 27.6% of the total volume of industrial products sold in ukraine (with a 14.5% share of donbass in the population of the country). due to the activities of enterprises of these two regions almost half of the country’s foreign currency earnings used to be formed, a significant part of the entire export potential of ukraine was concentrated in donbass. thus, donetsk and lugansk regions were budget-forming for the country, having a significant impact on the economic dynamics of all ukraine. and despite the well-known structural conservatism of the region’s economic system, at the beginning of the 21st century (until 2014) it demonstrated a sufficiently high production and trading activity, remaining attractive to foreign investment. the ukrainian socio-political crisis of 2014 and the war that followed had the most negative impact on the scale of industrial production in the region, both parts of the regions separated with a front line. fig. 1. volume of sold industrial products in ukraine, mln. usd, % source: calculated by authors on the basis of: государственная служба статистики украины. 60 sergey sushchiy, taras medvedkin the volume of industrial products sold on the territory of donbass since the beginning of the crisis became 3.5 times smaller in dollar terms. if in 2013 sold industrial products amounted to 34.2 bln. usd in two regions, then after three years (2016) they amounted only to 9.6 bln. usd (fig. 1). the decrease in general price indicators is confirmed by a general fall in the index of industrial production (quantitative indicators). even the growth of indices of industrial production in 2016 (donetsk region – 106.4%, lugansk region – 139%) (fig. 2) is a relatively positive result, because as seen from the graphs there was significantly less rapid decline in the production scale fixed during the period of 2014-2015. in its turn, the cumulative (the base year is 2012) index of industrial production as of the end of 2016 decreased to the following indicators: donetsk region – 44.6% (a fall of 55.4%), lugansk region – 24.9% (a decline of 75.1%). but the real scale of the decline in economic activity in 2014–2016 can be even greater, since there is no detailed industrial production statistics for the d(l)pr, and the data presented on the official websites of the state statistical services of ukraine are corrected “retroactively”, which can seriously affect their validity. however, despite the lack of accurate information, it is obvious that at present the powerful economic and commercial potential of the region is being implemented to the smallest extent due to the hostilities and the absolutely uncertain legal status of eastern donbass. at the same time, despite the deep structural crisis both parts of the previously unified regional production complex faced, the problems the economy of the self-proclaimed republics has are more serious, as the industrial enterprises of the ukrainian part of donbass have survived in the economic system of their country. the total number of enterprises on the territories of the donetsk and lugansk people’s republics, according to approximate calculations, is about 23 thousand, about 60 of them being large enterprises of mining and metallurgical and machine-building complexes; about a thousand of them are production associations of medium-sized businesses. 65 thousand of people work at the enterprises under external management, and taking into account the structures cooperating with them, the number of workers in this economic segment of eastern donbass reaches 200 thousand: • “metinvest” (ojsc “khartsyzsk tube plant”, cjsc “enakievo metallurgical plant”, makeyevka branch of ojsc “enakievo steel plant”, cjsc “komsomolskoye rudoupravlenie”); fig. 2. index of industrial production of donbass (% to the previous year) source: calculated by authors on the basis of: государственная служба статистики украины. tab. 1. the share of donetsk and lugansk regions in gdp of ukraine before the military conflict regions grp (bln. usd) region’s share in the country’s ipp (%) place among country’s regions kiev, city 33.9 18.51 1 donetsk region 22.0 12.02 2 dnepropetrovsk region 18.8 10.24 3 lugansk region 7.7 4.19 7 source: calculated by authors on the basis of: государственная служба статистики украины. self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories… 61 • united minerals group (cjsc “dokuchaevsk flux and dolomite plant”); • dtek (ojsc “dtek rovenkyantratsyt”, “dtek sverdlovantratsyt”, jsc “dtek mine “komsomolets donbassa”, llc “dtek service”, dtek “donetskoblenergo”); • isd (ojsc “alchevskkoks”, ojsc “alchevsk metallurgical plant”, cjsc “ecoenergy”), “donetsksteel” (cjsc “donetsksteel – metallurgical plant donetsk”; cjsc “makeevcoke”, ojsc “yasinovsky coke-chemical plant”); • ostchem (ojsc “concern stirol”). donbass accounted for 56–64 million (about 75– 78% of all coal mining) out of 74–83 mln. tons of coal produced in ukraine in 2001–2013. at the same time, 25–30 mln. tons (34–36%) were mined directly on the territories of the modern d(l)pr. but significant positions in the national economy were also occupied by metallurgy, as well as machine building and chemical industry of donbass. however, recognizing the powerful industrial potential of the d(l)pr, it is necessary to take into account the fundamental fragmentation of its available sectoral structure (fig. 3), due to the fact that the single industrial complex that was formed in the region for a century has now been divided by the front line. six of the ten leading industrial hubs in donbass are located within the d(l)pr, four – on the territories controlled by kiev. the majority of production chains that connected not only entire industries and segments of the regional economy, but also specific enterprises were disrupted. similar gaps have passed through the donbass transport system and its central life support systems (electricity, gas and water supply). people’s republics do not have their own port facilities. but there is no full-fledged alternative for mariupol as a maritime transshipment centre of manufactured products. the capacities of taganrog are inferior to mariupol (1.3–1.5 mln. of cargo turnover versus 14–15 mln. tons) and are fully loaded with products of russian manufacturers. it is a complete utopia to build a large trading port in novoazovsk from scratch with the modern financial and economic capabilities of the self-proclaimed republics. it also concerns an attempt to “retake” mariupol from ukraine. but the analysis of the socio-economic system of the self-proclaimed republics makes it possible to single out a number of other serious structural limitations on their dynamic economic development: • a reduction of electricity required for economic and public needs (starobeshevskaya tps, luganskaya tps, zuevskaya tps operate on anthracite coals extracted in the d(l)pr (the cost of production is high), their capacity being about 3000 mwt, and cannot fully meet the needs of metallurgical, chemical and machine-building enterprises (deficit is about 500–800 mwt)); fig. 3. leading industrial hubs of the early twenty-first century industrial complex of donbass source: compiled by authors according to the materials: донбасс. экономика_и_промышленность /no data/. 62 sergey sushchiy, taras medvedkin • a lack of the required amount of coking coal (the coal types produced on the territory of the d(l) pr do not belong to coking coal (this is energy anthracite) and accordingly this leads to the inability to produce coke, one of the key resources in the production of pig iron and steel (a deficit of about 3.0–3.5 mln. tons). it is a serious blow to the entire steel industry of the d(l)pr); • a lack of a sales market for metallurgical enterprises of the d(l)pr (the lack of international recognition of the republics makes it absolutely impossible to export metal products (pipes, sheet metal, square billets) to traditional markets (poland, italy, the usa, some countries of the persian gulf )); • a lack of a sales market for machine-building enterprises of the d(l)pr (a significant part of enterprises of the d(l)pr (jsc “donetskgormash”, gorlovka machine-building plant, etc.) was “imprisoned” for export of mining equipment to kazakhstan and russia (the eaec). in addition to these countries, in the framework of vertically integrated companies (r. akhmetov, v. novinsky, d. firtash, i. kolomoisky), this equipment was delivered to dnepropetrovsk, zaporozhian and odessa regions); • potential threats to food security of the d(l)pr (based on the economy structure of the d(l)pr as an industrial economic system, agriculture occupies an insignificant place in the gross regional product, and consequently, the food blockade of the republics implemented by ukraine since 2017 determines their extremely high dependence on the supply of agricultural products from the russian federation). analysis of the socio-economic dynamics of eastern donbass in 2014–2017 allows us to conclude that initially the line of scenarios for the strategic development of the economy of the self-proclaimed republics included the widest range of opportunities which could be reduced to the maximum of three options, each of which included a number of sub-variants: • preservation of eastern donbass in the financial and economic space of ukraine; • transformation of the d(l)pr into the territory of intersection and dense mutuality of the ukrainian and russian financial and economic systems; • transition of the republics to the life cycles of the russian economy. however, by the beginning of the minsk negotiations (autumn 2014), the obvious refusal of moscow to repeat the crimean scenario with respect to eastern donbass excluded the possibility of the third designated scenario – the transition of the republics to the russian federation as its regions with their subsequent “legal” and complex integration in the russian economy. and since the beginning of 2017, since the establishment of a comprehensive blockade of the republics by nationalists, in fact, supported by the ukrainian political leadership, the first option finally left in a history − the possibility of any tangible preservation of eastern donbass in the financial and economic space of ukraine. moreover, if the complete utopism of this scenario in its politically legalized version became clear already by the spring-summer 2015, then the shadow version (the formation of a significant number of “gray” trade schemes between the republics and ukraine) was widely present in the economic life of the region until the end of 2016. suffice it to say that about 9 mln. tons out of 12 mln. tons of coal extracted in the dpr this year were transferred to ukrainian consumers and only one million was sold to russia. (горняки днр…, 2017; украина ежегодно покупает…, 2016). the obvious orientation of local producers to traditional ukrainian markets and the scale of this grassroots trade itself, taking into account its mutually beneficial nature, allowed us to hope for the longterm preservation of this palliative variant of the earlier existing system of production cooperation. but the beginning of 2017 clearly demonstrated that implementing the strategy of an integrated (financial, socio-economic, food) blockade of the republics, kiev is ready to abandon any forms of mutually beneficial economic interaction. not to let the d(l)pr take place as an economically successful, socially prosperous society is one of the priorities of the modern ukrainian government, which it will realize consistently, rejecting any of its own pragmatic interests, if necessary (матишов, 2016). 4. possible scenarios of socio-economic development thus, at present the only realistic scenario of socioeconomic development of the republics remains their progressive “shadow” integration into the life cycles of the russian economy. however, a wide range of sub-variants differing in the level of systematics and the scale of support for the production segment and the social sphere of the d(l)pr from moscow has emerged within this basic scenario in its turn. this set of more or less realistic trajectories of economic development of the republics fits two extreme self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories… 63 variants which can be conditionally designated as positive (optimistic) and negative (pessimistic). the positive scenario assumes a sharp (multiple) increase in the financial support for the social sphere and economy of the republics from the russian budget, a significant acceleration and expansion of administrative and managerial, legal, transport and logistics, investment activities to form a single territorial and economic complex linking the economy and the basic systems of social life support of eastern donbass with rostov region (the only russian region with which the republics have a common land border) and broader – with all the russian socio-economic system. of course, this complex work can significantly complicate the fact that actual integration should remain not formal, taking into account the indefinite socio-political status of the republics. but in case there is a clearly defined political will, this problem can be completely solved, as well as the issues of legalization through the russian commodity flows of industrial products of the republics. remember that their volume even in coal mining does not exceed 3–4% of the total scale of russian production, and it is one tenth or hundredth of a percent in other industry segments. thus, the purposeful work of moscow is able to significantly accelerate the economic incorporation of eastern donbass, considerably increasing the financial self-sufficiency of the pro-russian region in a matter of years. moreover, given the already existing infrastructure, the centuries-old industrial traditions of the region and its population, the integrated industrial complex of rostov region and the d(l) pr could become one of the leading in the russian heavy industry in the medium term (by 2030–2035). the negative scenario of development will be associated with the persistence of the current socioeconomic situation for a long period of time, which, in the context of total disruption of trade and economic ties between eastern donbass and ukraine, and limited, slowly growing trade with russia, will evolve into systemic stagnation of the republics, large-scale degradation of their infrastructure and human capacity. it will probably happen, especially if the financial support from the federal centre will remain as minimalistic and focused not on the development of eastern donbass, but solely on subsidizing the basic social needs of its population (which is obviously necessary but absolutely inadequate for the withdrawal of the republics to the path of sustainable growth). in the demographic aspect, the negative scenario will be associated with a sustained and accelerated decline in population, related both to its natural decline and the growing outflow from the region. it is obvious that the two scenarios set the general direction of the oppotunities of socio-economic dynamics of the d(l)pr, their actual development being likely to represent a certain intermediate variant. however, the economic dynamics of the republics in 2017 points to an increased danger of the implementation of the scenario approximating the pessimistic forecast. at least six months after the beginning of ukraine’s trade blockade of the republics, russia has practically not increased the procurement of donbass coal, despite the fact that it is an important (if not a central) budget item replenishing the republican budgets. many other facts of the modern economic life of the region testify to the domination of extensive forms of interaction between russia and eastern donbass. the reasons for such sluggishness can be multiple and the time for broad conclusions has not yet come. but a number of factors directly or indirectly work to preserve the current situation. one of the factors is obvious reluctance of moscow to proceed with the implementation of a new large-scale integration project. but you can find other reasons. as you know, the task to financially “outweigh” eastern donbass against russia was one of kiev’s goals. at the same time, a certain part of the domestic expert community was also convinced that in this case the self-proclaimed republics would become a black hole for the russian budget, having a very negative impact on the socio-economic development of russia, already burdened by international sanctions, the economic crisis and the decline in the living standards of the population (украинский кризис…, 2015; матишов, 2016). the amount of current financial support for the d(l)pr from russia refers to closed statistics. but this does not impede the identification of the most general of its quantitative order. the population of eastern donbass is about 2% of the number of russians. and the general price level in the republics is 2.0–2.5 times lower than the average for the russian federation. thus, subsidies from the federal budget for the social needs of the population of the d(l)pr are likely to be less than 1% of the total amount of these expenditures across russia and are comparable to the scale of “supporting” transfers in one rather small region of the country, what is absolutely uncritical for the federal budget. and this circumstance, perhaps, is the main danger for the d(l)pr, since it can cause moscow’s desire to maintain the existing system of interactions with eastern donbass as long as possible and which does 64 sergey sushchiy, taras medvedkin not require the russian leadership to do extensive and focused work, to move from a “reactive” policy to the implementation of a large-scale long-term project on the inclusion of the self-proclaimed republics in the socio-economic system of the russian federation. moreover, such a project will require not only really serious investments/ subsidies to eastern donbass (at least a few bln. usd), but also quality management support. and modern russia has big problems with these two resources. therefore, despite obvious strategic benefits of complex integration of the d(l)pr into the life cycles of russia, the bureaucratic tactics of minimizing financial and economic costs and managerial efforts in this direction can prevail in the policy of the russian leadership, which can turn out to be more serious (including directly financial) losses in the more distant future. but it should be repeated that the situation in the social and economic sphere remains open by mid-2017, not allowing broad generalizations to be made. and the only obvious fact is that the economy of the d(l)pr practically in any scenario of its further evolution will maintain a certain continuity with its historically established structure in which the sectors connected with the extraction and processing of coal, as well as metallurgy, various types of engineering and chemistry, that is a complex of industrial specializations that distinguished the economy of donbass throughout the region’s existence, play the important role. however, the relationship between them can significantly change depending on the specific forms of adaptation of the region’s economy to the new conditions of its functioning. and in general, in the next few years a serious spatial transformation of the entire infrastructure complex of the d(l)pr, including a network of transport communications and the basic systems of social life support, is expected. the transformation is caused by a radical turn of trade and economic ties of the region to russia and the need to move the central infrastructural hubs of the republics away from the front line. in addition, there are serious reasons to believe that main features of the future socio-economic development model of eastern donbass will be determined in the coming years − by the beginning of the 2020s, maximum by the middle of this decade. *** so in the three years of their existence self-proclaimed republics of donbass have followed a considerable path of development. their establishment as independent states/state-like entities in mid-2017 was not finally completed. but they managed to make the most significant part of their way. the next few years will represent an extremely complex and responsible period in all the main spheres of the life of eastern donbass capable to definitely define and formalize new forms of sociopolitical, managerial, financial and economic, sociocultural life of this pro-russian society. acknowledgements the paper is written in the laboratory of social and economic researches of the fis southern scientific center of the russian academy of sciences in the framework of research work 00-18-20, 0256-20180014, № аааа – а 16-116012610047-9 “problems of demographic and socio-economic development of the southern macro-region”. references всеукраинская перепись населения 2001, державний комітет статистики україни, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov. ua/ [25.11.2017]. горняки днр в 2016 году добыли более 12 млн тонн угля, 2017, http://rusvesna.su/news/1483976642 09.01.2017 [27.07.2017]. государственная служба статистики украины, http:// www.ukrstat.gov.ua/. [23.07.2017]. донбасс. экономика и промышленность, википедия, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/донбасс#экономика_и_ промышленность [29.07.2017]. корнелл с., 2000, конфликт в нагорном карабахе: динамика и перспективы решения, http://old.sakharovcenter.ru/publications/azrus/az_015.htm [25.11.2017]. матишов г.г., 2016, опасные тенденции и риски на южном фланге россии, ростов-на-дону, юнц ран, ростов-надону. пихорович в.д., 2015, украина между западом и востоком. война на донбассе, urss, москва. проблемы полиэтничного макрорегиона в условиях дестабилизации каспийско-черноморского зарубежья, 2015, юнц ран, ростов-на-дону. рожин б., 2014, контуры большого приднестровья, livejournal, http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1814701. html [16.07.2017]. савоскул с.с., 2001, русские нового зарубежья: выбор судьбы, наука, москва. сущий с.я., 2015, украина – россия – мир: до и после 2014 года (некоторые аспекты взаимодействия, ленанд, москва. сущий с.я., 2016, военный конфликт на востоке украины: демографические потери и сдвиги в национальной структуре населения донбасса, наука юга россии (вестник юнц), 2, 82−91. self-proclaimed republics of eastern ukraine – corridor of development trajectories… 65 украина ежегодно покупает до 9 млн. тонн угля с  оккупированных территорий, 2016, страна.ua, https://strana.ua/news/45571 [02.08.2017]. украинский кризис: истоки, тенденции и уроки, 2015, юнц ран, ростов-на-дону. 1. introduction in the transition from administrative to marketoriented economy there is a question of creating a land administration system, and other real estate, adequate to situation that is folded in the new economic conditions. therefore, the study of the experience of countries with market economies in land management and other real estate may be useful for countries that do not have a tradition of a market economy or have lost it. as indicated in the „land administration principles” published by the un in 1996, „the ownership of the land, its value and use, although theoretically are independent, in practice, are closely interrelated. each land component requires rational management, which demands an appropriate system of registration information, such as: 1) the ownership – to ensure reliable protection of ownership rights; 2) the cost – to provide an objective assessment of property and justice in the seizure of land for public needs; 3) the land use regime to ensure effective land management” (руководящие…, 1996, p. 24). the land management system can provide order and stability in society through the establishment of guarantees, not only for landowners and their partners but also for national and international investment and credit companies, enterprises, as well as for the government. despite the fact that the land registration system is often directed to protecting the interests of individual property owners, they are journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(3), 75–81 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.030.7186 the urban cadastre today: comparative analysis iryna ihnatenko department of land and agrarian law, yaroslav mudryi national law university, pushkinskaya 77, 61024 kharkiv, ukraine, e-mail: nekosargot.ira@mail.ru citation ihnatenko i., 2017, the urban cadastre today: comparative analysis, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(3), 75–81. abstract the experience of creation and functioning of the urban cadastre as a structural element of modern highly developed state abroad is analyzed. it is found out that in the european union virtually absent analogues of the urban cadastre in our understanding. however, there are widespread cadastral systems, that solve problems of registration and storage of information on real property, as well as planning restrictions and easements. in the states of the former soviet union (especially the russian federation, kazakhstan, belarus) town-planning cadastre is developed in forms that are close to the ukrainian model. since the formation of the urban cadastre system in ukraine is in its infancy, so there is a possibility of using the experience of foreign countries with their achievements and mistakes that can be avoided. key words urban planning, building, construction, urban planning documentation, planning, cadastral system, the cadastral registration, urban cadastre, town planning code, protection of land, urban development, land within settlements. 76 iryna ihnatenko a reliable tool for the national land policy and economic development. each country creates its own property management system that meets the level of its economic development, public relations, historical traditions, with respect to the property, etc. implementation of the land reform and the transition to the real estate market are integral components of the development of market relations and the establishment of a legal state. this implies the need for registration and protection of land rights, the development of fiscal instruments (taxes, rent), based on the physical, economic and legal characteristics of the land, as well as legal and economic mechanisms for the protection and rational use of lands. for conducting of such accounting around the world, as a rule, there is a state cadastre. currently, there is a concept of cadastre in the foreign practice, approved by the united nations together with the international federation of surveyors (the fig) in bogor (indonesia, 18–22 march 1996), and then in bafert (australia, 22 october 1999) declarations: „cadastre – it is usually based on the land (parcels) modern land information system containing a record of property rights (eg, rights, restrictions and obligations). it usually includes a geometric description of a land plot connected with other records describing the nature of the rights, property or control in respect of these rights and often the cost of land and its improvements. cadastre can be used for fiscal purposes (eg valuation and equitable taxation), legal purposes (for example, registration of transfer of ownership rights on the property), to assist in the management and use of land (eg, planning and other administrative purposes), and creates an opportunity for sustainable development and environmental protection” (сидоренко, 2003, p. 12). the report of the economic commission for europe (unece), „land management in europe. tendencies of development and main principles” (2005) notes, that the present cadastre should serve the needs of the person and society in general, benefiting from its application to asset management, drafting of documents for registration of transfer of rights on real estate, secured loans, demographic analysis, regulation of building, planning, emergency response and management of them, impact assessment the environment, analysis of deals with housing and land market, property rights to land and real estate, taxation of land and real estate, land reform, the statistical data for monitoring purposes, spatial planning, control and territories (управление…, 2005). it should also be noted that the original interpretation of the term „cadastre” was not associated with a particular territory. it reflected only the essence of the concept, such as: inventory, record, registry and so on. all actions were connected with the land, a particular location, so the name „the land cadastre” has appeared. over time, in some countries of the west from separate subsystems began to stand out the land registry: engineering structures, transport communications cadastre, cadastre of built-up areas, and so on. this separation caused by explicit informative congestion of land cadastre. however, this does not mean the independence of the emerging systems from its original concept. on the contrary, it is clear that the information makes no sense unless it is „tied” to a particular territory. thus, any subsystem reflects specific information tied to a specific area and includes a specific topic. in this article we are talking about the cadastre, which is prepared in built up areas, that is, the urban cadastre. urban cadastre is a state information system of data, required for the implementation of urban development activities, including the implementation of changes in real estate. a brief excursion into history allows to recall that the emergence of cadastral systems in the former soviet space – land, urban planning and real estate – correlates with the beginning of the 90’s and carried out at the time of market reforms, contributing to providing payment for land and property privatization. by the way of organization there were separate regional systems (often – urban planning of building), under the jurisdiction of local executive bodies. the transformation of urban planning policy into element of strategic planning required changes in the organization of cadastral registration, namely: • the consolidation of its centralized regional systems into a single nation-wide; • emergence as one of the main objectives of the cadastre to ensure compliance with all town planning activities and recommendations of the design decisions of the main town planning document of the country – general scheme and its main provisions. 2. analysis – the republic of kazakhstan we will consider implementation of this policy in the example of the republic of kazakhstan. regarding the first point – in kazakhstan, according to the latest changes in legislation the adoption of the urban cadastre is related to a state monopoly, and entrusted to a specialized state-owned enterprise, which means the transfer of this function from the level of the urban cadastre today: comparative analysis 77 local government to the central. the unified automated information system of the state urban cadastre is defined as an instrument of executing such functions. its development is currently ongoing. as to the second point, the development and implementation of the general scheme of kazakhstan means that urban planning is involved in the processes of strategic planning, indicates the beginning of the implementation of state targeted, systematic, rigorous scientific approach to the organization of territories as the distribution and spatial development of the most important national resource and makes using of cadastre necessary. it requires its centralization and consolidation, converts into the instrument of monitoring of realization and actualization of the basic regulations of the general scheme and the state urban planning policy, a prerequisite for building a paradigm change through a combination of compulsory and country planning with their monitoring in order to create optimal management decisions. it should be noted that from the receipt of kazakhstan’s independence in 1991 until today the development of the state urban cadastre was slow or even has stopped several times. development of information systems in the sphere of urban development in some cities in kazakhstan began to be implemented only in 1995 after the adoption of the first decrees of the cabinet of ministers of the republic of kazakhstan „on the state urban cadastre” of july 6, 1995 № 931 (о государственном…, 1995). however, as of today from 14  provinces and 2 cities of republican value (astana, almaty) only in 9 cities the public urban cadastre has been created: astana, almaty, aktau, atyrau, aktobe, karaganda, kyzylorda, taldykorgan and uralsk. at the same time the database of state urban cadastre automated information system in the cities mentioned above are created by different methods and in different programs that are not comply with the resolution of the government of the republic of kazakhstan „about approval of rules of maintaining the state of the urban cadastre in the republic of kazakhstan” dated december  11, 2009 №  2082 (об утверждении…, 2009). until 2014, in accordance with the law of the republic of kazakhstan „on architectural, urban planning and construction activities in the republic of kazakhstan” of july 16, 2001 № 242 the system of urban cadastre included three levels: national, oblast and basic. creation and maintenance of regional and basic levels was n the competence of the local executive bodies (об архитектурной…, 2001). for example, in 2011–2012 years by the state urban cadastre of the republican level was created, under which a new specialized software for public urban cadastre was developed. also, in cooperation with the central executive authorities thematic database of basic sectors of the economy were created. the pilot project on the interaction of state urban cadastre of the republican level have been created and filled with the lower levels on the example of karaganda and kyzylorda regions was carried out. however, the urban cadastre of the republican level will not function fully without creating regional and basic levels and automated delivery of state urban cadastre information system in commercial operation will be possible only after the establishment of urban cadastre of oblast and basic levels. the analysis of the current situation and studying the experience of foreign countries has shown that the maintenance of the urban cadastre in the country has to be changed and organized on the principles of centralization and unification. so the system of urban cadastre should be concentrated in the competence of the central state body. as the result, the authorized body has drafted a bill on the improvement of the current legislation of the republic of kazakhstan in the field of architecture, urban planning and construction activities. this bill was aimed at restructuring of the existing system through the establishment of specialized stateowned enterprise to a single reference of the urban cadastre of all territorial levels. on the 21 january, 2014, the law of the republic of kazakhstan „on amendments and additions to some legislative acts of the republic of kazakhstan on issues of architecture, urban planning and construction activities” was adopted. it provides the creation of a unified system of state town planning cadastre of the republic of kazakhstan (о внесении…, 2014). unified system of the state urban cadastre will provide users with a complete and efficient information database on the status of administrative-territorial units and settlements, using of which will be implemented in real time. besides it is expected that it will be possible to add to the information database and also display in it any data about the state of facilities, funding of which is realized at the expense of budget funds in any given period of time. this will allow monitoring of information about the possibility of connecting to engineering networks of heat supply, power supply and other utility networks, which will provide the projected object with the necessary resources and capacities, which, respectively, eliminate errors and additional costs for further planning and construction. the availability of relevant information database of the state urban cadastre will also allow to 78 iryna ihnatenko automate the process of provision of public services in the sphere of architecture, urban planning and construction, which in turn will reduce the financial and time costs to users at all territorial levels, eliminate administrative barriers and corruption. it is also necessary to note that activity of maintaining the state urban cadastre belongs to the state monopoly and implemented by a republican state enterprise on right of economic management established by the decision of the government of the republic of kazakhstan. in connection with this, the government of the republic of kazakhstan has adopted the decree „on establishment of the republican center of state urban planning and cadastre” dated june 30, 2014 № 736. this center will ensure the efficiency of decision in public administration, the effective interaction of state bodies with relevant and reliable information (о создании…, 2014). in summary, it can be stated that the legislative acts of kazakhstan are aimed also at preventing the increase of the cost of construction projects, improving the quality of project documentation and construction projects, as well as the reduction of corruption in the construction of facilities financed by the state budget. 3. analysis – the republic of belarus review of the experience of the republic of belarus is also appropriate in this regard. in accordance with the law of the republic of belarus „on the basis of architectural and urban development activities in the republic of belarus” dated 26.11.1993, №  2613xii (об основах…, 1993) „regulations on the procedure of the state urban cadastre” from 13.11.1998, № 1743 (положение…, 1998) have been developed. conducting of the state urban cadastre is carried out by the ministry of architecture and construction and its authorized regional and local architectural and urban management authorities. urban cadastre intended to keep the necessary information and legal base for investment in all spheres of housing, civil and industrial construction and protect long-term interests of investors, thereby ensuring the stability of the economic base of the territory development. the town planning regulations are recorded and made available to all businesses and individuals for the territories they are interested in. the town-planning regulations are requirements for building and use of territories of certain functional areas of settlements, which were set for the long term. if an investor has such information, he would be able to plan his activities and invest considering the current and expected urban situation on this territory. according to law of the republic of belarus „on architectural, urban planning and construction activities in the republic of belarus” dated july 5, 2004 №  300-w2/1049 urban cadastre carries registration functions related to the elements that are not included in other state cadastre and registration systems (designed and constructed objects, rules of urban development and land use, and other objects) (об архитектурной…, 2004). therefore urban cadastre should be formed with partial use of data from other existing cadastres, registers and other information systems, including land registry, technical registration system of residential and non-residential buildings. as a result a comprehensive and complete analysis of occurring on the territory of the socio-economic processes becomes possible. creation of the state urban cadastre of urban settlements is especially important. it should be noted that the ministry of architecture and construction of belarus has approved the „regulation on registers and registers”, functioning under the state urban cadastre dated 30.11.1998, № 398 (положение…, 1998). the centre of cadastre territories has developed software system for management of all registers provided for by this regulation. the use of this complex will take into account and monitor the construction process at all its stages from the receipt of a permit for the design to commissioning. taking into account economic situation of foreseeable future formation and functioning of the urban cadastre at regional and especially municipal level, can only occur as part of the process of creating the relevant territorial information system. the adoption of the government decree on the introduction of the state urban cadastre provides the necessary legal basis for the concentration under the auspices of the municipal executive committees of interested users of funds to create a city-wide information systems of wide application. also it is planned to create a state urban cadastre in each administrative-territorial unit of the republic as an interdepartmental territorial information system. today it is also planned to create a unified cadastre service in the form of municipal unitary enterprise, which would be founded by the city council. it will carry out the whole complex of works on creation and introduction of urban territorial information system, and as part of it – of all state cadastres, the creation of which is carried out with the help of geoinformation technologies. the urban cadastre today: comparative analysis 79 thus, the urban cadastre of the republic of belarus – is primarily used as a registration system, and the second – information. 4. analysis – the russian federation considering the experience of creation of the urban cadastre in the russian federation we can note that the „urban development code of the russian federation” of may 7, 1998 № 73-fz provided for the establishment and maintenance of state urban cadastre as the state information system data required for the implementation urban development activities (градостроительный…, 1998). at the same time it was planned to conduct the state urban cadastre at the federal level, the level of the subjects of russian federation, as well as local authorities in the event of transfer of the relevant government authority. the purpose of the state urban cadastre was established by the decree of the government of the russian federation „on approving the regulations on the conduct of the state urban cadastre and monitoring of objects of town-planning activity in the russian federation” dated march 11, 1999 №  271. the purpose of conducting urban cadastre and monitoring was to provide the interested public authorities, local governments, individuals and legal entities with reliable information about the built environment, its proposed changes, including the limitations of land use and real estate in urban planning, and the other information necessary for urban development, investment, land use and other economic activities, evaluation and taxation of real estate (об утверждении…, 1999). thus, the urban cadastre had to allow implementation of the strategy of development of city, mortgaged for a certain period, for example, the strategy of „green city” or the strategy of removing industrial giants from the city, etc. accurate cadastral information would help to make better decisions at the city level, more accurately predict and model the level of market prices of land. it is important for the replenishment of budget, as well as the impact on the land market and real estate, to ensure the reliability of operations with land and real estate primarily in the area of mortgage lending. however, for the time that has elapsed since 1998, almost nothing has been done to build such a system. there are a lot of reasons for this both objective and subjective. firstly, the system was assumed to be built downwards, while the main production and consumption of information is on the lower municipal level. secondly, neither regulatory conditions for the formation of the information nor for their use were created. third, the rational model of the financing of the system has not been proposed. the new urban planning code of the russian federation of 22  december 2004 eliminates the use of the word „cadastre” in relation to information systems for urban development and makes them municipal (градостроительный…, 2004). however, since 1998 the urban cadastre systems have been created in some cities, for example, in moscow, ufa, rostov-on-don, krasnodar, voronezh, moscow region and some other regions of russia. such urban cadastre systems are successfully operating today. the funds of local budgets and the budgets of the subjects of russian federation were invested in the creation and development of these systems. however, from july 1, 2006, these systems are out of law. for example, the moscow city legislature, in order to get out of this situation with minimal losses, decided to establish the identity of the concepts of „urban information system for urban development” and „urban cadastre of moscow”, securing it in the law of city of moscow „on the moscow urban cadastre” from december 15, 2004 № 88 (о градостроительном…, 2004). moreover, in accordance with the federal law „on general principles of local government in the russian federation” dated 06.10.2003 №  131-fz management of systems is assigned to the powers of local governments of city districts and municipal areas (об общих…, 2003). in any case, even if it will be decided to create a single tier system, it has to be built from the bottom, from the foundation, not from the roof. the unified procedure of its conducting, provided by urban planning code, will eventually lead to pass into a usable form of the necessary information as to the level of the federation and the federal level. the legislator did not have to indicate that the management of systems is carried out by local governments. in some regions, there is a practice, which has successfully established itself, when a municipal information system is operated by entities, subordinated to bodies of architecture and urban planning. along with other benefits it allows to attract for conducting municipal systems funds regional budgets. while taking into account problems with financing systems, it would seem logical to provide compensation for the cost of the free provision of information to public authorities of the russian federation and the subjects of the russian federation from the appropriate budgets. thus, a new system of relations in the sphere of architecture, urban planning and building activities will contribute to the development of civil society, public activity of local executive bodies. it is also focused on the informatization and openness of the 80 iryna ihnatenko processes of providing of land plots for the purposes of the design and construction. 5. analysis – ukraine nowadays ukraine has all the necessary preconditions for legislative basis for providing of the urban cadastre. the legal basis for adoption of the urban cadastre is a number of legal acts, in particular, regulations of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine „on the urban cadastre” (про містобудівний…, 2011), „on the procedure for the exchange of information between urban development and the state land cadastre” (про порядок…, 2011), state building codes b.1.1-16:2013 „composition and the content of the urban cadastre” (склад…, 2013) and others. the urban cadastre in ukraine as a legal category has been the theoretically developed. now it has a legislative basis, which requires further development. however, the practical use of data at all levels of the urban cadastre remains relevant. development of cadastral systems in ukraine is carried out mainly by extrabudgetary resources of state administrations. such works are carried out on the basis of existing state building codes. at present cities began to fill cadastres with the primary database. the most successful examples of creation of the automated systems of the urban cadastre can be regarded to zaporozhye, vinnitsa and lutsk. but the disadvantages of these systems are their isolation and lack of unified methodological, methodical and technological studies. this is the result of the lack of appropriate legislative and regulatory basis of the urban cadastre. 6. conclusions the analysis of the experience of creating of cadastres abroad shows that there are practically no analogues of the urban cadastre in our understanding in the eu. however, cadastre systems, which solve problems of registration and storage of information on real property, as well as planning restrictions and easements, are widespread there. in the countries of the former soviet union (especially the russian federation, kazakhstan, belarus) urban cadastre is developed in forms that are close to the ukrainian model. since the formation of the urban cadastre system in ukraine is in its infancy, so there is a possibility of using of the experience of foreign countries with their achievements and mistakes that can be avoided. references градостроительный кодекс российской федерации, 1998, от 7.05.1998 года № 73-фз, http://www.consultant.ru/ document/cons_doc_law_18685/ [20.02.2017] градостроительный 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[20.02.2017] 1. introduction the level of environmental and natural and technogenic safety of the territory determines the state of protection of the individual, society, and state from the adverse effects of the environment caused by natural, technogenic and anthropogenic factors. the current ecological situation in ukraine as a whole can be characterized as extremely tense. manifestations of ecological danger for the health and life of people in different regions of the state, due to the negative influence of technogenic and dangerous natural processes have recently increased. the depreciation of many industries is approaching a critical point. at the same time it seems important that the enterprises in question already dispose of a certain sense for innovation requirements (steiner et al., 2006). that does not necessarily mean that these enterprises already show a high investment share in r&d, but it is imperative that they are at least open and sensitive journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(1), 41–43 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.004.8156 donbas as an ecological disaster area: technogenic challenges and threats ann obikhod (1), alla omelchenko (2) (1) public institution “institute of environmental economics and sustainable development national academy of sciences of ukraine”, blvd. taras shevchenko 60, 01032 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: anna.obikhod82@gmail.com (corresponding author) (2) public institution “institute of environmental economics and sustainable development national academy of sciences of ukraine”, blvd. taras shevchenko 60, 01032 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: omalla@ukr.net citation obikhod a., omelchenko a., 2018, donbas as an ecological disaster area: technogenic challenges and threats, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(1), 41–43. abstract in recent years the territory of ukraine and its regions has been under the negative influence of a number of technogenically dangerous factors. among the latter, to determine the level of safety it is common practice to analyze the number of potentially dangerous objects, their spatial location, distribution by types of activity and hazards, etc. the article presents the latest challenges and threats in the system of anthropogenic safety of ukraine, including: non-compliance of the regulatory system, lack of adequate risk assessment methods, sharp extension of causal relationships and strengthening of the role of synergistic risks, etc. attention is focused on new risks and threats caused by political instability in the territory of separate regions of ukraine, including the ato zone, and a structure for their further analysis and assessment is suggested. key words technogenic threats and risks, potentially dangerous objects, ato zone, donbass. received: 13 september 2017 accepted: 03 november 2017 published: 30 march 2018 42 ann obikhod , alla omelchenko for innovation necessities. these enterprises can be seen at the threshold of own innovation activities, needing a final external incentive to start specific innovation projects. to that effect these enterprises show a high potential for mobilization with regard to the pre-competitive level of activities. at the same time, at the beginning of the ххіst century long-term system challenges (from rio to rio…, 2012), which reflected both world trends and internal institutional barriers of development, arose in the area of guaranteeing the environmental safety of ukraine and its regions . the major ones include (bryzhan, hryhoryeva, 2014; hannigan, 2006; dunlap, jones, 2002;): the non-compliance of the regulatory system of safety management with the pace of development of the technosphere; the need to develop risk assessment methods; the increase in traffic flows and their complications; global climate changes; complication of causal relationships; the strengthening of the role of synergistic risks; the transformation of information space; the rise of new threats and risks. 2. research results analysis threats associated with the hostilities in the territory of ukraine since the beginning of 2014 (ato zone) have been added to the traditional challenges in the field of environmental safety, which affected the state of natural and anthropogenic and environmental safety. it is rather difficult to quantify the losses in luhansk and donetsk oblasts in hostilities. as a result of bombardment almost every day there is a new destruction of residential, infrastructure and industrial objects. accordingly, a preliminary estimate of losses will be relative, and these are only the direct economic losses as a result of: • destruction of the housing and communal fund; • deterioration of the transport infrastructure (roads, railways, airports, power lines, pipelines and product pipelines); • destruction of the industrial objects (some of which are physically destroyed or not recoverable due to the peculiarities of technological processes); • flooding of the mines because of direct actions or economic inactivity. according to the state register of the potentially dangerous objects (pdo), in the territories of the ato zone there were over 3 thousand pdo in donetsk and about 1.5 thousand in luhansk oblasts (державний реєстр…, /no data/). their number in recent years has dramatically increased, mainly due to fire and explosive objects, having reached the index of 114 objects/1000 km2 of territory in donetsk and 46 objects/1000 km2 of territory in luhansk oblasts. since 2010 the data on the distribution of pdo by the type of activity (gas stations, industrial enterprises, railway stations, bridges, overpasses, tunnels, mines) and types of hazards (fire and explosion hazard, chemical, radiation, biological hazards) in the official publications of the state emergency service of ukraine have not been fixed. as of the end of 2016, 5 thousand residential houses, 4.7 thousand energy supply systems, 220 educational institutions, 132 industrial facilities, 45 health facilities were completely destroyed (аналітичний огляд стану …, 2016). the ministry of temporarily occupied territories  and internally displaced persons has estimated the direct losses as a result of the destruction of social and communal infrastructure at 20 billion hryvnias (without losses from the destruction of private property); of economic potential – at 80; job losses – at 50 for large enterprises and up to 80–90% for small and medium enterprises (подолання наслідків конфлікту, /no data/). the deterioration of many industries in the territory of the ato zone is 60–80% (статистичний щорічник україни, 2015; основні засоби україни, 2015). the local enterprises produced low-competitive products for a relatively narrow segment of the market, a significant part of which was exported to russia. most of the production facilities are low-tech, medium-low-tech and medium-high-tech. a significant proportion of fixed assets fell to the archaic ones: 12.2% in donetsk and 13.5% in luhansk region. the critically low cost of high-tech equipment confirms the technical and technological underdevelopment of the analyzed territories. the production capacities of the enterprises in the ato zone were characterized by high power intensity which increases the cost of production and reduces its qualitative characteristics. it should be noted that for a long time investments in donbas region were distributed unequally: 2/3 was directed at low-tech and medium-low-tech industries (хвесик et al., 2013). state economic losses due to the cessation of business in the ato zone can be estimated by the loss of grp, industrial production, export share, etc. for instance, donetsk and luhansk regions occupied 9% of the territory of ukraine, amounted to 16% of ukrainian gdp, 25% of industrial production, and 25% of domestic exports (статистичний щорічник україни, 2015). the amount of subsidies of the state mines is about 1% of gdp. in turn, the area covered by the military conflict occupies about 3% of the territory of ukraine and constitutes 8–10% of gdp and donbas as an ecological disaster area: technogenic challenges and threats 43 about 15% of industrial production. the most important industrial resources that combine the ato zone with the rest of ukraine’s industry are coal (stone and coke) and iron ore. the rapid drop in industrial production in these areas in comparison with other regions negatively affected the indices of industrial production in ukraine as a whole. the estimation of indirect losses is rather relative, as it can be expressed only by calculating the lost profit. thus, in the area of hostilities due to the termination of economic activity, losses will be generated through such channels (обиход, 2016): • losses of agricultural lands and forest plantations due to changes in the relief, the destruction of the fertile soil layer, pollution of land with infrastructure debris and chemical substances as a result of bombardment; • losses due to the termination of any economic and financial activity in the suffered areas; • losses caused by violation of production chains and export vectors; • losses because of the loss of investment attractiveness of the territory. 3. summary with a view to identifying technogenic risks, threats and losses for ukraine, taking into consideration international experience, in the latest political, economic, social and environmental realities it is proposed to structure work directions by three institutions – human resources, socio-economic infrastructure, natural environment (обиход, 2016): • indicators of human resources losses – increase in unemployment and the number of offenses as a result of emergencies; • indicators of infrastructure losses – losses from the loss or decommissioning of social infrastructure objects, damage to the housing stock, and its physical deterioration, increase in demand and prices for individual goods and services, loss of additional taxes, losses from non-production of products, total losses as a result of destruction and damage to fixed assets of production and non-production purposes; • losses from environmental pollution, which are determined by major recipients – the coefficient of territorial socio-economic features, which depends on the number of inhabitants in emergency zone, the economic, recreational and environmental significance of the territory, a general assessment of the socio-economic consequences of emergencies taking into account the necessary changes and additions to the existing order in value terms, etc. finally, it should be noted that the environmental problems in donbass have accumulated for a long period, and the negative changes in its environment during the last two years have approached irreversible ones. references bryzhan i., hryhoryeva о., 2014, the ways of securing crisisfree ecologically focused development of ukrainian industry, economics & sociology, 7(1), 193–203. dunlap r., jones r., 2002, environmental concern: conceptual and measurement issues, [in:] handbook of environmental sociology, st: greenwood press, westport, 482–524. from rio to rio: a 20-year journey to green the world’s economies, 2012, united nations, http://www.thegef.org/ [28.06.2014]. hannigan j., 2006, environmental sociology, routledge, london. steiner m., gruber m., zumbusch k., 2006, technologiepolitisches konzept ii steiermark. schriftenreihe des instituts für technologieund regional politik der joanneum research forschungsgesellschaftmbh, graz. аналітичний огляд стану техногенної та природної безпеки в україні за 2016 рік, /no data/, державна служба україни із надзвичайних ситуацій, http://www.dsns. gov.ua/ua/analitichniy-oglyad-stanu-tehnogennoyita-prirodnoyi-bezpek i-v--uk rayini-za-2015-rik .html [01.09.2017]. державний реєстр потенційно небезпечних об’єктів, /no data/, http://sfd.archives.gov.ua/page4.html [01.03.2017]. обиход г., 2016, інституціоналізація екологічної безпеки україни, державна установа «інститут економіки природокористування та сталого розвитку національної академії наук україни», логос, київ. основні засоби україни, 2015, державна служба статистики україни, київ. подолання наслідків конфлікту, /no data/ міністерство з питань тимчасово окупованих територій та внутрішньо переміщених осіб, http://mtot.gov.ua/ category/napryamki-diyalnosti/podolannya_naslidkiv_ konfliktu [15.01.2017]. статистичний щорічник україни, 2015, державна служба статистики україни, київ. хвесик м., степаненко а., обиход г., ляшенко о., дацій н., сундук а., ілляшенко і., 2013, інноваційно-інвестиційна і технологічна безпека трансформації регіональних економічних систем, «видавництво «наукова думка», київ. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 9–16 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.010.6626 geospatial concepts of “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands”: modernization of the meaning myroslava vlakh (1), olha mamchur (2) (1) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: mvlakhr@ ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: olyammail@gmail.com citation vlakh m., mamchur o., 2017, geospatial concepts of “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands”: modernization of the meaning, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 9–16. abstract in this article, a terminological analysis of the ambivalent geospatial concepts of “border”, “border zone”, which are characterized by a long synonymic row and simultaneously have the semantic load of lines, strips of separation as well as interaction; with account of historical and genetic, natural and geographical, morphological and functional approaches, conceptual and terminological systems of “state border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands” are analyzed; semantic shifts of the notions of “border”, “border zone”, “frontier” according to the world order tendencies are defined. key words concept, border, frontier, borderlands, region, transborderlands. 1. introduction geospatial concepts “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands” belong to fundamental notions, scientific usage of which has increased under the conditions of regional, global development in the twentieth century. the division of whole into parts, the allocation of interconnected structures in view of relativism of the whole and separate, center-peripheral approaches are general theoretical basis for specifically concrete research. the complexity of research of the concepts “border” and “borderzone” caused by their ambivalent nature (the content is disclosed simultaneously by polar features, such as separation and interaction). philosophical multiplicity of meanings of concept “border” in the specific areas of natural, formal and social sciences has been transformed. the problem of “border” and “borderzone” is relevant in the geographical science, the general subject of research of which is continual-discrete geographical space (geospace) in whole plurality of natural, social, socionatual dimensions. reality and virtuality, absoluteness and relativity, clarity and diffuseness of borders, typology of natural, social, socionatural borders, delimitation criteria and territorial gravitation zones (borderzone) are not enough analyzed in the geographical research. within the context of postmodern scientific discourses, the problem of perception of borders, borderlands and formation 10 myroslava vlakh, olha mamchur their mental geographical images respectively, is also topical. the aforementioned actualizes the necessity of the development of geographical border studies as an research area of theoretical geography. research methodology: methodical possibilities of terminological analysis, essence of which is in creation of the conceptual and terminological systems, determination of content, semantic connections, establishment of semantic transformations of concepts are used for realization of research. the terminological analysis carried out in compliance with scientific methods of comparative, systemic and structural, synergistic, relativism approaches, geographical conceptions of regionalism and regional development. 2. geospatial conception of border: modern interpretation the problem of the origin and function of geospatial borders and border zones is the most highlighted in publications of historical, historical and geographical, ethnogeographical, political-geographical, milita ry geographical and geopolitical areas. in this context should be mentioned the scientific achievements of h. bliy and p. muller (блій, муллер, 2014), m. dnistriansky (дністрянський, 2014), yu. kyseliov (кисельов, 2012), n. mikula (мікула, засадко, 2014), m. malsky and m. matsiakh (мальський, мацях, 2011), t. michalski (2008, 2010), i. chornovol (чорновол, 2015), o. shabliy (шаблій, 1997), b. yatsenko (яценко et al., 2007). the impact of historical factors on the establishment and functioning of strips of cultural, social, economic, mental delimitation in the research of ya. dashkevych (дашкевич, 1991), n. zamiatina (замятина, 1998), f. turner (тернер, 2009) and others is relevant. the most general, comprehensive approach of research refers to the border studies, well known from the end of xx century (каппелер et al., 2011). ukrainian and english, as modern scientific languages, have many correspondences for the definition of geospatial concepts “border” – the line of separation of a territory, and “borderzone” – a zone which functionally gravitates to the border. for example, in ukrainian, correspondences are rubizh (boundary), hranytsia (bound), kordon (border), kray (verge), kinets (end), mezhnyk (side land), hran (facet), and porubizhzhia (boundary zone), pohranychchia (zone of bound), pokordonnia (zone of border), prykordonnia (borderlands), prykordonna smuha (border strip), prykordonnyi region (border region), prykordonnyi prostir (border space), okrayina (outskirts), okolytsia (surroundings), perypheria (periphery), transkordonnia (transborderlands) respectively. the dominant of the synonymic row is the common word border. it is a carrier of the main meaning common to the entire row, stylistically neutral, often used, and it unites around itself the closely semantics words. synonymic rows to the words border and borderlands are not closed. they are replenished with new words, lose outdated, and the most importantly – there are semantic shifts of some correspondences for the definition of the new geospatial context. in english terminology, to denote geospatial boundaries the notions of limit, barrier, frontier (dynamic border), boundary (stable, often the state border), border (a common term that unites frontier and boundary), borderlands, border region, cross-border region, cross-borderlands, transborderlands, are used. there are the term “granitsa” (rus., bulg.), “granica” (pl., croat., serb.) in slavic languages. the term “grenze” in german language is a result of the germanicslavic interaction, according to some researchers (каппелер et al., 2011). in the recent geopolitical publications the latin concepts of limes (border), limitrophe (from limitrophus – borderand, adj); outlying appendage of the great powers; states, formed after the collapse of the russian empire; an intermediate space between the empires or civilizations); great limitrophe (the strip that separates russia from the main centers of power) are reviwed (цымбурский, 1999). according to m. dnistrianskyi (дністрянський, 2014), these terms do not have cognitive values that reflect the bias of the authors in different great power projects and can be used mainly in the historical and geopolitical discourses. as the political and geographical component of geographical border studies is the most developed, the conceptual and terminological system of “state border” is chosen as the object of analysis. the notions of “state border” and “national territory” are key in international law, classical political geography, as the main criteria that must be met by a state as a subject of international law. the correlative universal categories of “border” and “border zone” reflect the polar sides of the spatial political and geographical organization of society (without borders can be the countries deprived of sovereignty; without territory – nations located primarily in the border space of other states). if the historical and geographical discourse allows synonymic interpretation of lines and strips of ethnic, cultural, civilizational delimitation, there is a requirement of holding clear international legal norms in relation to the creation of terms and their geospatial concepts of “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands”: modernization of the meaning 11 definitions in political and geographical studies. for example, the state border is a line and a vertical surface passing along this line, which define the territory of state, its land, water, natural resources and air space. the review of scientific literature of research topic allowed organizing a large array of terminology on state borders. in order to systematize are used the traditional historical and genetic, natural and geographical, morphological, functional approaches. in particular, according to: • the type of formation there are „natural” (orographic, hydrographic, etc.) and “artificial” borders; • genesis – antecedational (pioneer, primary), subsequent (next); • morphology – geometrical, astronomical, wavy, straight, combined; • the nature of the earth’s surface – upland and marine; • the historical features – prewar, postwar; colonial, post-colonial; contentious; • dynamics – stable, volatile, „creeping”; • the nature of the processes – strict, non strict; “soft”, “hard”; controlled, uncontrolled; permeable (diffuse), impervious; militarized, “critical”; • the dominance of certain functions – barrier, filtering, contact (with preservation of the main one – achievement of national security) (влах, котик, 2017; яценко et al., 2007). the state borders, formed as the results of the second world war, the inviolability of which fixed in the final act of the conference on security and cooperation in europe in 1975 (conference…, 1975), are mostly artificial, subsequent that often leads to problems in interstate communication. w. szymańska (2016) used notions of disintegrative borders (closed for contacts), fragmentize borders (have different levels of openness), integrative (have higher level of openness and intensively contacts) for defining borders according to its functions in international relationships. while the lexemes denoting the state border according to the type of formation, morphology, genesis, natural features, the nature of the surface, not change semantic meaning. also polarization of the semantic load of state border from collision to cooperation, from stability to volatility, from barrier to the line of contact, etc. is observed. 3. the concept “frontier”: dynamics of the senses at the early historical stages of the political structure of the world, distinction of territory was variable, unstable. the notion of boundaries of the state was interpreted as a pulsating boundary space, not demarcated and delimitated clearly. the unstable nature of ethno-cultural, civilizational geospatial distinction reflects the relatively new concept of “frontier”. the author of the term american historian f. turner regarded the frontier as a moving area of the settlements of expansive clash of “civilization” with barbarism, according to the theory of geographical determinism, has been formed distinctive traits of the american character. the great frontier was a border of european colonization of north america that was moving from east to west (тернер, 2009). the frontier as a zone of development, the zone of unstable equilibrium is also considered by a modern russian researcher n. zamiatina (замятина, 1998). the frontier issues are raised in the ukrainian scientific thought for concerning the formation of the national territory, detection of the ukrainian national identity. actually, polytonim ukraine means land on the edges. ukrainian historian ya. dashkevych territory (дашкевич, 1991), to characterize the location of ukraine between east and west, used the concept of the great border as a steppe frontier, a strip of delimitation of the political, military influence, and later economic uses of the. the great border of medieval ukraine ceased to exist in the xviii century because of the russian conquest, but for a long time was stored in the material and spiritual culture of ethnic groups of the over northern black sea region. in the modern scientific reflection of the concept “frontier”, there has been a semantic shift from the space of separation, instability (“bloody land” according to t. snyder (снайдер, 2011)) to the space of intensive interaction of different cultures. in particular, lviv historian i. chornovol under a frontier understands “the space of variable values in the contact zone of different identities and adaptation to the natural environment when, through intensive communication, economic, social, cultural and political interaction, the borrowing, adaptation or domestication of one culture by another occurs” (чорновол, 2015, p. 266). the researcher raises questions of comparative aspect of frontier studies for analysis the different eras and societies; the feasibility of introducing the thesis on frontiers in the history of ukraine; the influence of frontiers on creation of ukrainian identity; the dangers of frontier phenomenon at times when ukraine became border zone in the 12 myroslava vlakh, olha mamchur conditions of russian aggression (hybrid or frontier war). in the context of changing geopolitical situation in the modern world – a world of increasing barriers – there is semantic shift of the terms “state border”, “frontier” in the direction of their primary values as lines of demarcation, strips of clashes, confrontation. the new military frontier in the east of ukraine is donbas – local in terms of spatial coverage, but global in terms of the influence on geopolitical situation. for the definition of donbass frontier, the concept of “critical border” can be used as a special kind of borders when great power is seeking to protect their interests outside its legally delineated territory. this concept connected with the concepts of “sphere of influence”, “sphere of vital interests”. the problems of the ukrainian-russian borderzone have deep historical roots. american historian h. kuromiya (куромія, 2002), analyzing issues of freedom and terror in donbas for the period of 1870–1990, argues that modernity has reviwed here the features of the steppe borderlands (pugnacity, cruelty, inclination to terror, independence, love of freedom). the main features of modern militaristic frontier is permanent instability, destruction of social institutions, customary morality, ideology, intensive migration, ambivalent identity of the population. the terminology for definition of the present geospatial differences of frontier acquired militaristic traits: buffer zone, “grey” zone, “red” zone, “green” zone, controlled area, uncontrolled area, safety zone, danger zone. to characterize such frontiers, transterminazed military concepts are used (“red” zone – the zone of fire). describing the geosophical differences of the east and southeast of ukraine, yu. kyseliov uses the concept of ukrainian frontier, which coincides with the basin of the don river (herodotus drew the line between europe and asia along tanais). the researcher emphasizes partially eurasian nature of the ukrainian geospace in connection with its significant spread in steppes (кисельов, 2012). with account of the features of geospatial differences of strip of delimitation, and also the main directions of movement of ethnic groups, the author provides a typology of frontiers, highlighting limitating and unlimitating, linear and planar frontiers respectively (in our opinion, term elements for the definition of the singled out types should be modernized, because by its nature frontiers are always limitating). under unlimitating frontier yu. kyseliov understands “boundary that outlines populated by a certain ethnic group territory with almost undeveloped geographical space”. the limitating frontier “separates the territory developed by two resident ethnic groups with a negative to each other complementarity” (кисельов, 2012, р. 37). linear frontiers arise on condition that an ethnic group moves only in one direction; planar frontiers (sometimes called planar spaces) formed if an ethnic community spreads in several ways. in the modern scientific, scientific and publicistic texts, avoidance of the concept of frontier is observed as a result of its determization, i.e. use of it to describe the different phenomena of the borderlands – location, interaction and etc. ukrainian historian v. kravchenko (кравченко, 2010) in the monograph devoted to kharkiv, calls it the capital of borderlands (not the first capital of ukraine). the researcher emphasizes the importance of mythologemes for the formation of mental images of border areas. in perceptional and dimensional interdisciplinary discourses the concept of mental border is actively used (as opposed to physical border in the traditional approaches). 4. content and semantic connections of concept “borderlands” as to the concepts of “border zone” (“borderlands”), the scientific semantic load it acquired in the context of state border with term elements of “borderland” and “transborderland”. the borderlands is a geographical space directly close to a border, characterized by special social factors, conditions (naturaland human-geographical location), a particular demographic, settlement, cultural, social and economical processes etc., functions (safety, socioand ethno-cultural, economic, etc.), dynamics of development, distinct from neighboring spaces. during the last century, the concept of “borderlands” has significantly evolved and enriched with new components, which is associated with various aspects of the functioning of borders. this is due to historical conditions, dynamics of various processes of the borderland, especially the military, political, cultural and ethno-cultural), social, economic (in particular the formation of border infrastructure, the existence of properties such as transitivity of border), the nature and intensity of cross-border cooperation (michalski, 2010). along with the notion of “borderland” (“border zone”) other terms are often used – „borderland territory”, “marchlands” that are smaller in volume. the category of “territory” actually indicates a portion of land (as a two-dimensional space object) with typical natural geographical and human-geographical features, and the term „borderland” is used to describe not only the territory, but geospatial concepts of “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands”: modernization of the meaning 13 also space (as an object in three-dimensional system of coordinates) that covers the territory, airspace, water space. however, the notions of borderlands and borderland territory are frequently used as synonymous. one of the most important aspects in the definition of borderlands is its delimitation. approaches to delimitation of borderlands are determined by such indicators: • natural geographical; socio-economic (limits are variable, depending on the intensity of crossborder relations); • psychological (depend on the mental perception of the borderland limits by residents, on their selfidentity as citizens of the state, representatives of the ethnic group, or of another religion, etc.); • administrative and institutional (at various levels of administrative and territorial structure – raions (districts in ukraine), oblasts, regions; depending on the role of borderlands for certain formal institutions; depending on the system of legal regulation of border status); • security (availability of borderland and military infrastructure). these indicators identify two aspects of borderland delimitation: informal (no clear limits; or limits, which are not reflected in the documents – laws, international agreements, etc.) and formal (formalized by an agreement; with the establishment of limits). the informal aspect of borderland delimitation also applies to the territorial identity of the inhabitants of borderlands. scientific analysis of regional sentiments, the feeling of kinship with neighbors, willingness to cooperate with them, provides an opportunity to identify features of regional consciousness, the mental limits of borderland. in particular, the feature of borderland socio-dynamics is that on its territory, formation of a specific cultural archetype takes place and, overall, borderlands is a marker of national culture. this approach is typical of social and cultural studies. the formal approach is most common in scientific research of economics, human geography, international relations, military science, law, etc. according to the administrative and institutional and security principles, “border strip” and “controlled border regions”, which have special border regime and protected the state border guard service, are delimitated. also the limits of borderlands in the form of zone of local (small) border traffic (this is a strip with a width of about 30–50 km from the border) are clearly documented, which regulates the peculiarities of crossing the state border by the residents of this zone. however, there is no detailed definition of “borderland zone” in the legislative acts of ukraine. for formal delimitation of borderlands, the system of administrative and territorial structure of a country is often used. for ukraine, unfortunately, there are barriers in the development of borderland areas, precisely because of the lack of implementation of administrative reform, especially a reform of local government (kuczabski, 2010). the most general concept which characterizes the space of borderland is the notion of “border region” – an area (space) adjacent to the state border, which is characterized by stable borderland connections with a neighbouring country and related development features. the limits of this region are formal. they are determined by the units of the territorial structure (local settlements, raions, oblasts, regions). according to the developed in the second half of the twentieth century center-periphery theory, borderland space belongs to the periphery of state, which is characterized by special security functions and minor economic value. all over the time, borderland “periphery” has changed its role in regional development of a country: from agricultural, non urban regions with level of economic development below the averedge to regions with sustainable interstate connections, developed borderland, economical, ecological infrastructure. due to the change of senses “borderlands” chain of meanings next components borderlands – borderland connections – cross-borderland cooperation – border region – cross-border connections – cross-border cooperation – cross-border region – euroregion, cross-border cluster, cross-border partnership, etc is formed. such chain (a system of concepts in which each subsequent term is formed based on the previous) successfully reflects the changing of functions of borderlands from the time, when the dominant function was barrier, to modern times, when contact and filtering functions are important. 5. the place of the concept “transborderlands” in terminological system of border in contrast to “borderlands”, the primary concept of which is “border”, the term “transborderlands” derived from the concept of “cross-border cooperation”. the concept of “transborderlands” or more formally “cross-border region” is used to indicate the space of distribution of cross-border (transborder) cooperation, which is, in turn, a higher level of development of borderland cooperation. in the process of growth of the role of cross-border cooperation, the formation of a cross-border region on the basis of two or more borderland regions takes place. 14 myroslava vlakh, olha mamchur in cross-border cooperation, the main condition is relatively stable relations across the state border. therefore, a common to the two states cross-border region, adjacent to the common section of state border, is formed in contrast to borderlands – on one side of border mainly. the most common definition of cross-border cooperation is no action aimed at strengthening and deepening of neighborly relations between territorial communities or authorities under the jurisdiction of two or more contractual parties, and signing for this purpose no necessary agreements or arrangements. cross-border cooperation carried out within the competence of territorial communities or authorities, determined by domestic legislation (мікула, засадко, 2014). after the disintegration of the system of socialist countries and ussr, this part of europe experienced a vacuum in terms of international relations. however, initiatives quickly appeared aimed at establishing new economic, political and social relations (michalski, 2008). in accordance with the theory of international relations, borderland and cross-border cooperation belongs to bilateral or multilateral forms of international relations (мальський, мацях, 2011). the geospatial meaning the concept “transborderlands” includes components: • border geographical location; • spatial relationships in border regions of neighboring states, including infrastructure, ethnocultural, economic, etc.; • natural geographical factors of functioning of cross-border cooperation’s stable forms, namely the presence of common natural and territorial complex based on a river basin, mountain systems, coastal complex, etc. for example, the vast majority of euroregions is established on the basis of certain natural geographical complexes, which is reflected in their names, for example, the carpathian euroregion, the bug euroregion, the upper prut and lower danube euroregion, euroregion dniester, the dnipro euroregion in ukraine (мамчур, 2013). sociologist u. beck explains modern changes in the economic meanings of borderlands by the processes of weakening of the role of national economies: “global economy operates translegal, that is, neither illegal nor legal. translegal domination means a long, more or less institutionalized possibility of influence over all national systems and functional boundaries on the results of government decisions and reforms so that their priorities match the priorities of distribution of world economic power. (...) the forms of sovereignty divided between states and global economic actors appear” (бек, 2011, p. 120). the modern meaning of “transbordelands” should also be considered in the context of theories of regional development, in particular regional policy. in the applied aspect, borderland and crossborder cooperation is the manifestation of a coherent regional policy of states on both sides of the common border. scientific analysis of the concept “transborderlands” makes clear that its use is associated with the spread of the idea of europe of regions, a concept that is opposed to the centralist concept of creation of common european institutions and includes active participation of the regions of european countries in the power functions of the european union. it was reinforced by the well-known centerperiphery theory (mамчур, 2015). in parallel, by the early 1990s, the fundamental principles of european regional policy had been formulated: subsidiarity; decentralization; partnerships; programming, resource concentration (козак, 2008). these principles reinforce the process of regions’ devolution. it should be noted that the concept of europe of regions has specific political and geographical aspects, because it can trigger the growth of regional consciousness that promotes autonomization of individual regions. also people’s perception of space varies depending on its presentation in mass media. now borderlands, an area of interactions of different geopolitical and geo-economical interests of neighboring states and another, should be considered as a special cyberspace, requiring information security. transborderland space in europe is characterized by the presence of such spatial forms of cross-border cooperation: euroregion, cross-border cluster, cross-border partnership, the european grouping of cross-border cooperation, the organization for european cooperation, cross-border regions of knowledge, cross-border innovations zones and industrial zones, etc. they developed due to unique historical, natureand human-geographical features of appropriate cross-border regions. an example of modernization of the concept of borderlands mostly with security functions on the territory of borderland cooperation is the ukrainianpolish borderlands (шаблій, 1997). this geographical space is characterized by a number of barrier functions: border between states, border of international organizations – eu, nato; ethnic border, religious border (including the limit of use of the various systems of chronology, calendar); time zones border. despite the increase of the barrier function, contact function was also developed that is conditioned by development of border and customs infrastructure (checkpoints, crossing points, customs posts, etc.), transport infrastructure (international transport corridors), increasing of social and economical geospatial concepts of “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands”: modernization of the meaning 15 connects. due to strengthening of these functions, a number of new forms of borderland cooperation appear, and cooperation developed into ukrainepoland cross-border region. 6. conclusions as the result of the research, the synonymic row was determined semantically close archaic and modern terms to denote geospatial concepts of “border” and “borderlands”; was characterized ambivalent semantic load of the concepts of “border” and “borderlands”, which, depending on the context, can be considered as lines and strips of separation as well as communication was substantiated; the expand of conceptual and terminological system of “state border” based on the correspondences that define processes, dynamics, function, determinization of the term “frontier” is found, the feasibility of its preferred use for the of civilizational distinction and historical discourses was defined. in the research, terminological analysis of the concept of “borderlands” was carried out; formal and informal principles of its delimitation were established; modernization of the meanings of the concepts of “border” and “borderlands” was elucidated; the increasing role of the concept of “transborderlands” in respect of the transformation of functions of state border, the development of various forms of intergovernmental cooperation, was noted. the semantic chain of concepts of border – borderlands – borderland connections – borderland cooperation –border region – cross-border connections – cross-border cooperation – transborderlands – cross-border region was constructed. dynamic radial branching of the semantic chain of the concepts “border”, “borderlands”, “transborderlands” that conditioned by the transformation of their meanings, were identified. references conference on security and cooperation final act, helsinki, 1975, http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true [06.03.2017]. kuczabski a., 2010, the support for administrative-territorrial reform in ukraine: key role of self-government, [in:] t. 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криваві землі, грані-т, київ. тернер ф., 2009, фронтир в американской истории, весь мир, москва. цымбурский в.л., 1999, россия – земля за великим лимитрофом: цивилизация и ее геополитика, урсс, москва. чорновол і.о., 2015, компаративні фронтири: світовий і вітчизняний вимір, критика, київ. 16 myroslava vlakh, olha mamchur шаблій о.і., 1997, західноукраїнське прикордоння: делімітація і суспільно-географічні проблеми, [in:] економіко-, соціальноі еколого-географічні проблеми західноукраїнського прикордоння, видавничий відділ львівського університету, львів, 5–14. яценко б.п., стафійчук в.і., брайчевський ю.с., бородієнко о. в., подольський а. о., ткачук л. м., 2007, політична географія і геополітика, либідь, київ. 1. introduction cooperation between societies has a historical character. the practice of social organization shows societies can not only compete, but also join forces. in general, any cooperation between different socioterritorial entities can be formalized and classified according to different parameters. the forms of such cooperation are extremely diverse, as they were made by the coincidence of specific interests over time. only part of such cooperation has institutionalized forms characterized by clear legal regulation. it should be noted that the legal framework regulates only a part of cooperation which, due to its diversity, may not be generalizable at all. z. niewiadomski (1992) points out that cooperation between communities is universal and journal of geography, politics and society 2019, 9(2), 20–31 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.2.03 implementation and development of the european model of neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine aleksander kuczabski (1), maksym maksymchuk (2), solomiya kloba (3) (1) department of regional development geography, university of gdańsk, bażyńskiego 4, 80–309 gdańsk, poland, orcid: 0000-0003-1271-0782 e-mail: aleksander.kuczabski@ug.edu.pl (corresponding autor) (2) department of regional economic policy, state institution “institute of regional research named after m.i. dolishniy of the nas of ukraine, kozelnitska 4, 79026 lviv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0001-5177-539x e-mail: regionmak@i.ua (3) department of regional economic policy, state institution “institute of regional research named after m.i. dolishniy of the nas of ukraine, kozelnitska 4, 79026 lviv, ukraine, orcid: 0000-0003-4697-4866 e-mail: solya007@gmail.com citation kuczabski a., maksymchuk m., kloba s., 2019, implementation and development of european model of neighborhood intermunicipal cooperation in ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 9(2), 20–31. abstract the article was tried to solve the dilemma of whether neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine is part of the european model of inter-municipal cooperation, or just another attempt to imitate it? the basis of the study is the work on the general theory of governance, territorial governance, inter-municipal cooperation, which provide a basis for understanding what the european model of neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation is. the research is based on an analysis of the legal framework governing inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine, as well as official statistics on the practical implementation of the right to inter-municipal cooperation of neighboring territorial communities. key words inter-municipal cooperation, territorial governance, multi-level governance, administrative-territorial structure, european model of inter-municipal cooperation, ukraine. received: 15 january 2019 accepted: 17 july 2019 published: 30 july 2019 implementation and development of the european model… 21 cannot be limited substantially, subjectively or formally. also, inter-municipal cooperation should not be restricted to administratively defined forms, but it may have another dimension, such as based on private law. there are several terms in the scientific literature that directly relate to cooperation between societies: cooperation, collaboration, inter-municipal cooperation. according to t. kaczmarek (2005), cooperation, collaboration, integration characterize the common work of elements of a system that aim at its effective functioning. each of these definitions has got its own special content. the narrowest and, at the same time, the most clearly defined is the concept of intermunicipal cooperation. in order for community cooperation to be classified as inter-municipal cooperation, in addition to a common interest, a number of other important elements are also needed. first, the community must have its own authorized representative – a municipality that has the right on behalf of the entire community to establish cooperation with other equal partners. secondly, the municipality must have sufficient autonomy to initiate and implement cooperation with partners. thirdly, the municipality must have the resources that can be used to solve issues relating to cooperation. in general, the prerequisite for the development of inter-municipal cooperation, in its current sense, is the existence of a decentralized system of public administration. the post-communist states of central and eastern europe, which started decentralization reforms much later than the world’s leading democracies, were forced to implement new organizational and management mechanisms in the shortest possible time. on the one hand, they had access to worldclass best practices in the field, but on the other they lacked their own experience, and they had a very limited time to coordinate advanced models with local characteristics. within the management experience of the european union countries, standards have been formed that have become a model for subsequent implementation in countries with a totalitarian past. one of the post-communist european countries where decentralization is extremely inconsistent, and problematic is ukraine. although the first steps towards decentralization dating back to the time of its entry in the ussr (1990), until recently the local government in ukraine was mainly just an imitation of european standards. however, the last phase of decentralization reform, which began in 2014, gives hope that european standards will be implemented in ukraine’s territorial governance system. evidence of this is the emergence in recent years of such phenomena as inter-municipal cooperation, which is developing dynamically and today can be regarded as an object for comprehensive analysis. the purpose of this article is to answer the question of whether neighborhood municipal cooperation in ukraine is part of the european model of inter-municipal cooperation, or just another attempt to imitate it? in order to achieve this aim, based on the analysis of the theory of inter-municipal cooperation in the modern sciences of administration, we will try to find out what the european model of inter-municipal cooperation. the next step will be to analyze the system of legal regulation of inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine, and finally to examine its implementation in the subject, evolutionary and spatial planes. the basis of the study is the work on the general theory of governance, territorial governance, intermunicipal cooperation, which provide a basis for understanding what the european model of neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation is. the study is based on an analysis of the legal framework governing inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine, as well as official statistics on the practical implementation of the right to inter-municipal cooperation of neighboring territorial communities. 2. the theory of inter-municipal cooperation in the modern sciences of administration the modern theory of inter-municipal cooperation is developing thanks to the spontaneous and dynamic growth of interest of local authorities in the interaction that takes place in the countries of the european union, the usa and other developed democratic states of the world with increasing power since the postwar years. the theory of inter-municipal cooperation implements a rational combination of the principles of local democracy and praxeology, which reflects the nature of decision-making and implementation of administrative decisions. the principle of local democracy ensures maximum involvement of community residents in managerial decision-making, and the principle of praxeology aims to implement these decisions in the most effective way. typically, successful combination of local democracy with effective management implemented within the administrative and territorial system. if the necessary administrative efficiency within the existing administrative-territorial structure is impossible to achieve, then there is a need to reform it. the post-war dynamic socio-economic development, the emergence of new ones and the 22 aleksander kuczabski, maksym maksymchuk, solomiya kloba complication of existing administrative tasks, pose new challenges to the system of territorial governance of developed democracies. traditionally, such problems have been solved through lengthy and costly administrative and territorial reforms, but in the current context, there is a need to find other forms of management effectiveness. in order to avoid permanent reformation of the administrativeterritorial system, the central government needs to move away from traditional historical ideas about the administrative-territorial structure of society as a stable conservative hierarchical system. however, given the stability and inertia of the units of the administrative-territorial structure on the one hand, and on the other hand, the diversity and atypicality of the administrative problems, an acceptable alternative may be the release of the territorial selforganization resource in the form of cooperation. the popularity of inter-municipal cooperation in advanced democracies is a kind of response to the transformation of governing philosophy. this is especially true for the development and complication of management units, and the gradual departure from the traditional hierarchical management system towards network management. the first trend was manifested in the implementation of multi-level governance. analyzing the establishment and operation of supranational institutions, l. gruber (2000) came to the conclusion that multilevel governance enhances its effectiveness by creating a harmonized standard for implementation and enforcement of policies. in fact, this conclusion is also confirmed at local and regional levels of government. f. teles (2016) points out that in today’s context, multi-level governance is complicated and needs new tools to ensure efficiency and avoid redundancy. the second trend does not mean a complete replacement, but only a complement to the management hierarchy of network forms. according to k. hanf and f.w. scharpf (1978), a major change in this respect can be summed up by a transformation in social governance from hierarchical control to horizontal coordination. networking in government means engaging more and more new players in policy making: on the one hand, public and selfgoverning, and on the other, public or private. according to p. kenis and v. schneider (1991), the concept of policy networks is a complex combination of stable, decentralized, non-hierarchical relationships between actors, by their social nature, that share resources in order to achieve a common goal. such networks emerge at different territorial levels. b. marin and r. mayntz (1991) note that there are international (eg european), nationwide, regional and even local networks. f. teles (2016) emphasizes the link between emerging network governance and inter-municipal collaboration. according to him, in such conditions political and administrative hierarchical structures become more open to horizontal networks both an interbranch and intra-industry. the complication and development of the territorial governance system in the context of multileveled and networking leads to the increased interaction of all participants involved. h. baldersheim (2002) draws attention to the growing interest in the phenomenon of multi-level governance from a scientific and practical point of view. f. teles (2016) emphasizes the importance of multi-level interaction and develops the concepts of horizontal partnerships and vertical partnerships. in most european countries a new multi-level space has emerged with a complex interweaving of different functional territories and levels of government, with local and regional institutions operating in both horizontal partnerships and vertical networks. in general, this complication of forms of territorial governance f. teles (2016) describes as “territorial mess”. thus, inter-municipal cooperation is a flexible form of territorial governance that allows it to be more effective and efficient without costly administrative-territorial changes, based on the principles of local democracy. emphasis on the effectiveness and performance of inter-municipal cooperation can be seen as key to implementing this form of local government interaction (see: bel, warner, 2015). inter-municipal cooperation is not universal and cannot be an alternative to a system of established administrative and territorial structure. its flexible nature makes it possible to increase the efficiency of management on the one hand, but on the other it can become a problem for municipality. f. teles (2016) calls inter-municipal cooperation only “one of the alternative strategies”. inter-municipal cooperation does not deny the administrative-territorial structure but is formed on its basis. according to k. nowacki (1996), various unions, agreements and associations are secondary territorial groups that arise on the basis of units of administrative and territorial structure. often, intermunicipal cooperation is seen as an alternative to amalgamation of local-level administrative-territorial units (tranin, 1984; kaczmarek, 2005; hertzog, 2015). f. teles (2016) identifies three key elements of inter-municipal cooperation: efficiency, democracy and stability. the positive effect of municipal cooperation is only possible under certain conditions. implementation and development of the european model… 23 first, the political governance system must be democratic, namely aimed at attracting the maximum number of participants to the decision-making process. secondly, there must be a climate of mutual trust and strategic vision between the participants in the cooperation, that is, a willingness to yield to narrow, short-term interests in order to achieve a common goal. thirdly, the subjects of cooperation must have a sufficient level of managerial autonomy to delegate some of their powers and resources to the operational level. fourth, the legal system must be sufficiently flexible, ready to adapt quickly to the changing expectations of participants in the cooperation. in the absence of these conditions, inter-municipal cooperation becomes limited and sporadic acts of interaction, or it is merely artificial, formal or fictitious. there is a risk of contradiction between ensuring efficiency and democracy in the context of intermunicipal cooperation. in general, the efficiency of public administration is ensured by the delegation of powers in the form of delegation of certain administrative functions to specific bodies, and the phenomenon of delegation is manifested in the chain of power authority (kuczabski, 2010). at the same time, the formation of additional links in the chain of delegation (which is actually inter-municipal bodies) can be a threat to democratic foundations. f. teles (2016) draws attention to the fact that inter-municipal organizations may face serious problems of democratic deficit or duplication of costs. inter-municipal cooperation is the most common definition for the various forms of cooperation of local communities or their representative or executive bodies. it can be classified into a number of aspects: economic, geographical, organizational, managerial. on the basis of spatial coverage, t. kaczmarek (2005) notes that cooperation may be local, supra-local, regional, national and foreign. in our study, the object of the analysis is only neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation of the local level, which arises between the municipalities, which are bordering on each other and on the basis of legally established forms and procedures, solve joint management tasks. as mentioned, the economic aspect of neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation is to address the problem of managerial effectiveness. the configuration of new organizational forms of management, which are inter-municipal associations, is subordinated to the idea of maximizing efficiency. in this context, there is a problem of finding the best point of view of service for the size of structures. this problem has composed an important part of local government literature (hirsch, 1959; oates, 1972; dixit, 1973). j.l. gomez-reino and j. martinezvazquez (2013) draw attention to the problem of suboptimal jurisdiction for a range of management services. the geographical aspect of neighborhood intermunicipal co-operation is also aimed at improving governance but is broader in nature and integrates problems of geographical scope and structure. according to s.c. deller (1992), the optimal geographical scale depends on three main parameters: volume of services, population and population displacement. reconciling these parameters with each other is key to maximizing the effectiveness of governance, including providing services to the general public. clearly, for each individual service, the optimal configuration of service volume, population, and resettlement can vary significantly. as a result, inter-municipal cooperation is able to offer options that bring territorial systems closer to optimal scale. the problem of geographical structure is to classify forms of cooperation according to the resource proportionality of its subjects. r.c. feiock (2007) drew attention to the problem of partner heterogeneity in inter-municipal cooperation. there are inter-municipal structures that represent different in nature and scope of subjects – central municipalities and satellite municipalities, etc. in this context, it is advisable to pay attention to cooperation from the point of view of its place in the center-periphery system. on the one hand, a good ground for interoperability emerges within powerful urban agglomerations, and on the other hand, peripheral rural communities are often forced to cooperate to address current issues. for rural municipalities, inter-municipal cooperation can be an important alternative to contracting with the private sector, since in rural areas private competition in services can be limited by consumer fragmentation and high costs (warner, 2006). at the same time, g. bel and a. miralles (2003) note that in rural areas there is a certain reluctance to cooperate, because on a small scale, potential efficiency gains are not always commensurate with the additional costs of organizing and maintaining new inter-municipal structures. the administrative aspect is manifested in the assessment of the place and role of inter-municipal structures in the system of territorial governance. inter-municipal cooperation requires at least the presence of stakeholders. lack of specific procedures, lack of institutional staff or incentives make the situation where spontaneous field projects do not occur (hertzog, 2015). an important characteristic is the level of autonomy of the inter-municipal bodies and 24 aleksander kuczabski, maksym maksymchuk, solomiya kloba the nature of their relations not only with the municipalities themselves, but also with other administrative entities. in this context, the role of state agencies that indirectly participate in inter-municipal cooperation should not be underestimated. as noted by p. swianiewicz and m. herbst (2002), the cooperation of local governments should be not only spontaneous but also stimulated by the state. one of the key characteristics in this respect is the competence problem that determines the substantive basis of cooperation. it is about what managerial powers can be delegated to inter-municipal bodies. delegations are traditionally considered to be jointly pursuing public tasks, but in practice, cooperation can cover a broader range of issues. the managerial aspect of inter-municipal cooperation is also hierarchical. from the point of view of the place of the subjects of cooperation in the system of administrative and territorial structure t. kaczmarek (2005) proposes to classify inter-municipal cooperation into horizontal (occurs at the same level of management) and vertical (covers different administrative levels). equally important in terms of improving the effectiveness of territorial governance is the organizational aspect of inter-municipal cooperation. inter-municipal cooperation is characterized by varying levels of integration, depending on its organizational forms, the amount of delegated powers and financial resources, and the timeframe. such cooperation may be one-off, sporadic, periodic, or permanent. in general, inter-municipal cooperative agreements differ in form, scope and integration (teles, 2016). this opens the possibility for practically unlimited number of organizational forms of cooperation, which depend only on the legal framework, dominant organizational culture, local management traditions, etc. the simplest classification of forms of inter-municipal cooperation from an organizational point of view can be done by the number of delegated functions. according to g. bel and m.e. warner (2015), inter-municipal contracts can be single-purpose or multi-purpose. an additional criterion may be the depth (scale) of inter-municipal cooperation, which is measured by the amount of resources delegated to implement community-level cooperation at the inter-municipal level. an important problem of organizational nature is the mechanism of formation of inter-municipal bodies and the cessation of their activities. g. bel and m.e. warner (2015) point out that an important feature of cooperation itself is the ability and ease of withdrawal from the cooperation agreement. to sum up, the european model of inter-municipal cooperation is not simple and straightforward. in this regard, f. teles (2016) argues that inter-municipal governance is not unified, stable and has no agreed functions and boundaries. the european model is likely to be a general framework that covers issues of organizing inter-municipal cooperation based on democracy, self-government, efficiency, involvement and more. 3. legal regulation of neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine the legal basis of inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine is similar with the countries of the european union and is based on democratic principles of the organization of government. in 1997, the verkhovna rada of ukraine fully ratified the european charter of local self-government. the charter’s provisions, in particular, entitle local governments to cooperate and create consortiums to carry out tasks of common interest (european charter of local self-government, 1985, article 10, paragraph 1). in the national legal system, the right to intermunicipal cooperation has been reflected both at the constitutional level and in separate legislative acts. the constitution of ukraine clearly specifies that the condition of such an association should be the implementation of joint projects, the form – is an appropriate contract, and the objects may be communal property, as well as budgetary funds. at the same time, the ukrainian constitution entitles the territorial communities (community) to create appropriate bodies and services for this purpose (konstitucìá ukraïni, 1996, art. 142). some examples of inter-municipal cooperation have taken place in ukraine since the time of joining the ussr (proshko, 2015). for the first time, the mention of the right of local self-government bodies of ukraine to voluntary association appeared in 1990 in the relevant law (pro mìscеvì…, 1990). article 34, paragraph 12 of this law gave the executive bodies of local self-government the right to “merge on a contractual basis the funds of the budgets of other local self-government bodies to resolve common issues.” however, at the initial stage of decentralization, inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine was mostly carried out directly, but with the help of representative bodies of local self-government at higher levels of government. until 2014, the function of solving community cooperation tasks was actually performed by representative bodies of local self-government of other administrative levels – district and regional councils, which by constitution are intended to represent the common interests of implementation and development of the european model… 25 territorial communities of villages, towns and cities (kоnstitucіâ ukraїni, 1996, art. 140). ukrainian law in the field of local government does not operate on the concept of public tasks of municipalities, but instead develops the concept of “common interests of territorial communities” (prо mìscеvе…, 1997, art. 2, paragraph 2 and so on). the common interests and goals of the territorial communities, as well as the effective implementation by local self-government bodies of the authorities defined by law, determine the basis for the implementation of inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine. the main tasks of such cooperation are: ensuring the socio-economic, cultural development of the territories, improving the quality of service provided to the population, etc. (prо spìvrоbìtnictvо…, 2014, art. 1, paragraph 1, 2). however, it can be argued that both in poland and in ukraine it is actually about ensuring the effective implementation of the authorities of municipalities for the benefit of representatives of the relevant territorial communities. the current ukrainian legislation distinguishes between “voluntary association of local self-government bodies” and “cooperation of territorial communities”. the first case involves the right of local self-government bodies to form associations or other voluntary associations in order to effectively exercise their authority, protect the rights and interests of territorial communities (prо mìscеvе …, 1997, art. 15). since 2014, the process of establishing active and efficient local self-government bodies has begun in ukraine. the creation of new, much more self-sufficient, administrative units at the local level, known as ‘capable municipalities’, is considered to be a crucial element of this reform (kuczabski et al., 2017). at the same time, the issue of territorial management of communities, which did not decide to go into administrative association, intensified. in general, the emphasis on improving the effectiveness of territorial governance has been reflected in a special law (pro spìvrоbìtnictvо…, 2014). this law created legal grounds for cooperation of local self-government units. critics of the law note that the law has not been properly audited. by some estimates, instead of expanding the legal forms of cooperation, it has been over-regulated. v. proshko (2015) criticizes the absence of any mention of private-public partnership in the context of inter-municipal cooperation in the text. at the same time, previous ukrainian legislation provided only for a general framework of inter-municipal cooperation. the new law classifies the cooperation of territorial communities as relationships based on appropriate agreements between two or more communities for the purpose of socio-economic, cultural development, improving the quality of public services and the efficient execution of local tasks by local governments (kuczabski, 2017). the law provided for the creation of supra-municipal superstructures by delegating certain tasks to them. the text of the law clearly outlines the forms in which cooperation can be implemented, namely: – delegation to one of the subjects of cooperation by other subjects of cooperation the accomplishment of one or more tasks with the transfer of relevant resources to it; – implementation of joint projects, which envisages coordination of activities of the subjects of cooperation and their accumulation for a certain period of resources with the purpose of joint implementation of the corresponding measures; – joint financing (maintenance) by the subjects of cooperation of enterprises, institutions and organizations of communal ownership infrastructure objects; – the creation of joint utilities, institutions and organizations by the subjects of cooperation joint infrastructure objects; – the formation of joint bodies of cooperation by the subjects of cooperation for the joint fulfillment of the authorities defined by law. public authorities monitor the implementation of projects on cooperation of territorial communities. thus, within the framework of the national decentralization project, the monitoring of the process of decentralization of government and reform of local self-government in which the cooperation of territorial communities (state of concluding inter-municipal cooperation agreements) appears as an indicator 5 (spіvrоbіtnictvо grоmad, nd.). however, the total number of cooperation projects is presented not in the context of the five forms of cooperation defined by the relevant law of ukraine, but by economic orientation. 4. development and geography of neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine neighborhood inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine has lagged for a long time far behind the relevant indicators in the countries of the european union. back in 2015, v. proshko (2015) explained this phenomenon with too short list of responsibilities of ukrainian municipalities for their joint fulfillment and no real need for cooperation. 26 aleksander kuczabski, maksym maksymchuk, solomiya kloba instead, in recent years, inter-municipal cooperation in ukraine has been gaining popularity. in general, by june 2019, 1031 territorial communities have been using the tools of inter-municipal co-operation, having concluded 433 agreements in this area (mоnіtоring prоcеsu dеcеntralіzacії…, nd.). the undisputed leader in the development of intermunicipal cooperation is poltava. for more than three years, the region has shown an increase in the number of territorial community cooperation projects increasing (as of may each year): 2015 – 5 projects, 2016 – 17, 2017 – 34. as of the end of 2018, the number of projects it has also more than doubled. since 2010, the poltava regional council has been holding a regional competition for the development of territorial communities, to which after 2015 the cooperation of territorial communities has been submitted. the terms of the competition for projects related to the development of inter-municipal cooperation have been doubled (dzûpin et al., 2017). overall in ukraine in 2018, vinnytsia and sumy regions with 55 and 24 agreements respectively take the leading positions in the conclusion of agreements on the total number of cooperation projects, except for poltava region. instead, poltava, vinnytsia, and ivano-frankivsk regions are leading the number of communities that have used inter-municipal cooperation. kherson (1), lugansk (0) and mykolayiv (0) regions occupy the last positions in terms of the total number of cooperation projects, while in the last two ones no agreement was reached on the number of communities that benefited from inter-municipal cooperation. (mіžmunіcipal’nе spіvrоbіtnictvо…, nd.; mоnіtоring prоcеsu dеcеntralіzacії…, nd.). due to the significant detachment from the rest of the poltava region and the formation of a significant number of outsider regions, a considerable level of differentiation and asymmetry in the development of inter-municipal cooperation can be established (fig. 1). as can be seen from fig. 1., on average 12 agreements have been concluded in the regions of ukraine, but 18 regions are below this indicator and only 6 regions – poltava, vinnytsia, sumy, kharkiv, zhytomyr and cherkasy exceed the average of ukraine, with the first two one – several times. in the regions of ukraine, on average, 47 communities have benefited from inter-municipal cooperation, but in 17 regions this figure is lower. and only less than one third of the country’s regions is above average. these are poltava, vinnytsia, ivano-frankivsk, kharkiv, cherkasy, sumy and zhytomyr regions. if we consider in the regional context the dynamics of concluding agreements on inter-municipal cooperation, we will see that in two regions they have increased tenfold (vinnytsia in 55, sumy in 24) because in the previous period these regions had only one concluded agreement (fig. 2). the third and fourth places are occupied by zaporizhzhya and rivne regions, where the number of transactions increased 6 and 5 times respectively. in the leading region for the development of inter-municipal cooperation – poltava region, the number of projects has almost doubled. overall, in december 2018, the number of inter-municipal cooperation projects in ukraine increased by 2.7 times compared to the same period last year. in 2018, the number of areas in which inter-municipal cooperation was not introduced in 2017 decreased by 3.5 times. instead, in 2018, the lugansk and mykolaiv regions did not have any registered agreements on inter-municipal cooperation in 2018. as of june 2019, no agreement was concluded only by the mykolaiv region (fig. 2). the development of imc is mainly in the housing sector, although there are opportunities in other areas as well. thus, according to official statistics, the largest number of projects of inter-municipal cooperation in the regions of ukraine is implemented in the field of housing and communal services (24%), education, health care, social security (19%), as well as fire safety (12%) (mіžmunìcipal’nе spìvrоbìtnictvо…, nd.; mоnìtоring prоcеsu dеcеntralìzacìї…, nd.). according to experts on average in ukraine, the top 5 topics of the agreements on inter-municipal cooperation include (spìvrоbìtnictvо tеritоrìal’nih…, 2017): – solid waste management (purchase of containers, cars for garbage collection and creation of waste sorting lines); – repair of local roads; – repair works in educational establishments (schools, pre-schools); – creation, joint maintenance of communal enterprises, organizations (local fire protection, enterprise providing housing and communal services, preschool educational institution, work archive, social service institution); – administrative services (co-financing of the cnap, provision of administrative services). the regional section on the forms of development of inter-municipal cooperation for the regions of the carpathian region was obtained as a result of a sociological study conducted by the staff of the state institution of regional studies named after m. i. dolishny nas of ukraine. the most common form of cooperation for the carpathian region communities is the implementation of joint projects (table 1). the use of a problem-oriented approach to the research of imcs in the regions of ukraine allows us to highlight the problems of cooperation development implementation and development of the european model… 27 and to see the possibilities of their solution. yes, the problems that slow down the development of imc in the regions of the state are: firstly, there is a lack of consistent and clear regional policy to encourage the development of imcs. thus, regional programs of support of the development of cooperation between territorial communities were adopted in only eight regions of ukraine (table 2). secondly, the low efficiency of implementation of the imc financial mechanisms by local selfgovernment bodies in the regions of the state due to their imperfection, which is related to the limited financial resources for the implementation of cooperation projects, limited capacities of the utc to carry out obligatory co-financing and underdevelopment of credit instruments inter-municipal projects and the limited access of utc budgets to the fig. 1. inter-regional asymmetry in concluding community cooperation agreements by number of projects (a) and number of communities (b) in 2018, units source: own studies based on „ mоnіtоring prоcеsu dеcеntralіzacії…”. 28 aleksander kuczabski, maksym maksymchuk, solomiya kloba 1 8 3 0 5 2 1 10 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 7 0 2 6 0 6 9 6 1 2 6 6 3 0 2 0 2 5 5 1 3 3 8 82 12 10 2 25 3 8 7 10 1 11 0 2 102 10 36 7 24 4 3 24 5 47 12 88 24 20 1115 55 13 11 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 v in n y ts y a v o ly n d n ip ro p e tr o v s k d o n e ts k z h y to m y r z a k a rp a tt y a z a p o ri z h z h y a iv a n o -f ra n k iv s k k y iv k ir o v o h ra d l u h a n s k l v iv m y k o la iv o d e s a p o lt a v a r iv n e s u m y t e rn o p il k h a rk iv k h e rs o n k h m e ln y ts k iy c h e rk a s y c h e rn iv ts i c h e rn ih iv december, 2017 december, 2018 june, 2019 n u m b e r o f p ro je c ts , u n it s fig. 2. dynamics of conclusion of agreements of inter-municipal cooperation in the regions of ukraine in 2017–2019, units source: own studies based on „mоnіtоring prоcеsu dеcеntralіzacії…”. tab. 1. answers to the question: «in what form is your utc collaborative with other utcs?» frequency of selection % implementation of joint projects 26 38% joint venture maintenance 3 4% delegation of authority and resources to another community 10 15% establishment of new joint communal enterprises, institutions and organizations 1 2% establishment of a joint management body for joint exercise of authority 3 4% we do not cooperate with other utcs 25 37% total 68 100% * two communities added the following comments to the collaboration: learning from other communities’ experience, membership in the pjsc carpathian association, sharing experiences, and providing advisory services. source: stоrоnâns’ka, maksimеnkо, 2018. tab. 2. regional support for cooperation between territorial communities no. the name of the region the maximum amount of grant of the ińě category, ths. uah. applicant’s co-financing rate 1 kharkiv 1 500 no less 50% 2 dnipropetrovsk 1 500 no less 10% 3 lviv 1 500 no less 50% 4 kherson 1 000 no less 50% 5 poltava 800 no less 50% 6 ivano-frankivsk 600 no less 25% 7 vinnytsia 400 no less 50% 8 sumy 200 no less 60% source: mіžmunìcipal’nе spìvrоbìtnictvо…, nd.; prоgrama pìdtrimki..., nd. implementation and development of the european model… 29 borrowing market as a potential financial source for imc projects. thus, one of the areas of activity of the state support fund for regional development (sfrd) is the development of cooperation of territorial communities, but it receives a small number of applications (out of 17,059 of all projects, only 235 projects in the field of imc). the total amount of funding for cooperation between territorial communities and the sfrd during 2015–2018 was only 0.6% of the total project financing, which cannot be considered satisfactory either. in addition, during 2015–2017 no projects were implemented in the area “cooperation of territorial communities”, and in 2018 out of 60 implemented projects for a total amount of 298 744,5 thousand uah only one project was implemented with the volume of financing of 1 330.7 thousand uah. also, not all project proposals submitted by communities are backed by co-operation agreements, and the existence of such agreements is a mandatory requirement of the law for communities applying for funding from the srdf. thirdly, there is a lack of awareness among leaders and employees of local self-government bodies about the possibilities of developing imcs in improving territorial governance and improving the quality of municipal services. in particular, an expert survey conducted by public organizations working in the field of selforganization support revealed a relatively low level of awareness among community leaders about the opportunities and mechanisms of cooperation. only 40% of the respondents demonstrated real knowledge of the content of the forms and mechanisms of the imc in accordance with the legislation (dzûpin et al., 2017). fourthly, there is a low level of activity in implementation of information opportunities for the development of imcs on the basis of the formation of municipal cooperation networks, inter-municipal associations and associative structures that are already formed in the regions. thus, according to experts, about half of the local councils that have concluded the agreement on cooperation of territorial communities do not have an official site, and half of the local councils that have a site do not publish information on intermunicipal cooperation on it. reports on the implementation of the agreement on cooperation of territorial communities are published by about 15–20% of the sites of local councils (dzûpinet al., 2017). existence of problems in the development of imc in the regions of ukraine is confirmed by the data of a sociological survey conducted in four regions of the carpathian region. overall, 39.7% of local government representatives do not consider lack of cooperation with other utcs a problem. the reasons for the formation of problems in the field of mmc development are: – unfavorable social climate in the communities and in society in general, due to the low level of solidarity and involvement in the socio-economic development of the territories; – low level of cooperation and culture of cooperation at the basic level of the ukrainian communities, lack of mutual trust when everyone wants to be “his own master”; – lack of transparency of the activities of local selfgovernment bodies, which are potential participants of the imc; – lack of skills and competences due to insufficient staffing, familiar with the legal, organizational and financial capacity to implement imc projects; – the absence of clearly defined strategic objectives for the development of utcs, which can be solved through imc; – little use of opportunities for participation of voluntary non-governmental organizations in stimulating the resolution of issues of local importance and control over the activity of local self-government bodies. 5. conclusion neighborhood municipal cooperation in ukraine is developing in line with european trends in decentralization of power, multi-level governance, diversification of governance structures through a number of network forms. increasing the effectiveness of territorial governance is a major driver of deepening inter-municipal cooperation. this creates grounds for arguing that in ukraine, at least since 2014, the european model of inter-municipal cooperation has been deliberately approved. at the same time, ukraine has significantly lagged behind the countries of the european union in the implementation of networked territorial governance. the reasons for this gap are different: from lack of trust to potential partners up to miscalculations of public policy in the field of promoting intermunicipal cooperation. the implementation of a coherent state policy in the field of inter-municipal cooperation should aim at addressing the following key objectives: – development and adoption by the regional authorities of all regions of ukraine of programs of financial support and encouragement of cooperation of territorial communities, as well as 30 aleksander kuczabski, maksym maksymchuk, solomiya kloba identification of potential territories in the regions where cooperation could be developed; – inclusion of mechanisms of inter-municipal cooperation in regional programs of socio-economic and cultural development of regions and introduction at the regional level of monitoring of its use; – awareness-raising work among representatives of local self-government bodies on the practical application of the provisions of the law on cooperation of territorial communities through the organization of trainings, seminars, roundtables and study visits of the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the ugf, other events, the dissemination of scientific literature, invitations of leading ukrainian and foreign students , experts, and analysts; – dissemination of positive experience of cooperation, public support and promotion of best practices of cooperation, holding public contests of projects to mark the winners and supporting the implementation of their experience in other communities, as well as the formation of networks of exchange of experience on the development of inter-municipal cooperation between local selfgovernment bodies of ukraine; – organization of informal effective control by the public on the promotion of projects, implementation of measures and obtaining the results of imc. as a result, it should be noted that the cooperation of territorial communities not only creates problems but creates opportunities for solving them by stimulating entrepreneurial activity, expanding self-government and civic creativity at a basic level. in view of this inter-municipal cooperation must become an effective instrument to complete the reform of decentralization of power in ukraine. references baldersheim h., 2002, subsidiarity at work: modes of multilevel governance in european countries, [in:] local government at the millenium, vs verlag für sozialwissenschaften, wiesbaden, 203–211. bel g., miralles a., 2003, factors influencing the privatisation of urban solid waste collection in spain, urban studies, 40(7), 1323–1334. doi: 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and the politics of the time, aiming to transform romania into an economically efficient agricultural-state. by government decision no. 1296 of 13 december 1991, art. 1. it was decided that state-owned companies are transformed into joint stock companies (monitorul…, 1991). the major concern of these companies was that they could not adapt to the rigors imposed by the market economy because of the giant dimensions at which the plants were designed and more because of the system in which they operated during the planned economy when they did not have to they identify themselves, neither the market where they would sell their products nor buy the raw material. this has led, over time, to an acute shortage of culture in relation to the consumer as well as to the relationship with suppliers that are vital in the conditions in which the market operates according to the harsh rules of demand and supply of goods and services. as a result, many of these companies have gone bankrupt, others have reconfigured their activity profile, or have used different asset-leasing methods as a form of subsistence for economically unviable businesses. in present day romania, there is a shortage of industry, but the former industrial factories left behind big pieces of land, a lot of unused buildings that ̀ suffocate` the areas where they are placed. urban regeneration and gentrification in romania miruna cristina boca department of geography, tourism and territorial planning, university of oradea, universității 1, 410087 oradea, romania, e-mail: mirunaboca@yahoo.com citation boca m.c., 2018, urban regeneration and gentrification in romania, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 27–31. abstract before 1990, romania went through a forced industrialized policy, but after this time, most of the industrial bussiness went bankrupt, and their sites and buildings were abandoned. nowadays, most of the cities in romania encounter the problem of abandoned industrial sites. this has become an interesting problem for the local authorities to overcomein the future. the aim of this paper is to study the process of deindustrialization of the country and suggest methods of regenerating the areas. key words industrial, deindustrialization, gentrification, urban, romania received: 23 may 2018 accepted: 13 june 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 27–31 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.025.9012 28 miruna cristina boca 2. romania before and after 1990 the imposed industrialization policy also involved a significant movement of the labor force towards the new industrial centers implicitly an increase of the urban population. between 1948–1989 the percentage of the urban population increases by more than seven million people, is from 23.4% to 54.3%. the growth is not only due to migration in the old urban centers, but also by granting the status of city to some localities, especially mono-industrial ones. between 1948 and 1989, the number of cities increased from 153 to 260 (raport final, 2006). the strategic decision that the process of industrialization is based on heavy hardcore materialized in an investment effort to the detriment of the consumption of the population and at the cost of profound sectoral and social imbalances. a first negative aspect was that the allocation of huge sums for the provision of fixed assets of the industry took place concurrently with the extension of their working life and, implicitly, with the maintenance in operation and after their expiration. a second negative aspect of the romanian industrialization policy was its specialization in the machine building, electrical and thermal energy, fuel, chemistry and metallurgy industries. under the conditions of the explosion of prices on the global market since the early 1970s, extensive development has resulted in increased production costs and decreased profitability in some situations, with losses incurred by the state budget. at the same time, the direction of investments in the preferred branches of communist politics was at the expense of the neglect of other branches of industry, including the food industry, which, in 1980–1989, was allocated less than 5% of the total industrial investments. the result was not delayed: low food supply led to a decrease in population consumption and living standards (gyöngyi, 2015). romania is economically declining right after 1990, when the deindustrialization of romania begins, which is a process of loss especially for the heavy industry. it is well known that he communist period was marked by a forced industrialization of the romanian economy, and after the fall of the communist regime, in the context of the transition from a centralized socialist economy to a market economy, economic development has entered a natural course. it begins the transition from a centralized economy to a market-based one, while western societies are trying to globalize, attacking national economies unable to withstand technology, fact which has led to the gradual loss of outlets. since 1992, production has stabilized, romanian and state-run enterprises have produced in stock and inevitably most of them went bankrupt. according to the national institute of statistics, in 1990 in romania there were 8.1 million employees, of which 47.1% were in industry, their number drops to 4.4 million in 2014, out of which 31.1% work in industry (gyöngyi, 2015). deindustrialization is also manifesting at present, leaving behind vast areas of abandoned or ruined land. the cities in romania, from the smallest to the capital city of bucharest, face problems related to (ghid informativ…, 2007): • degradation of the built space; • quality of life does not always meet the standards or expectations of most citizens, issues related to the quality of the environment; • housing blocks that have not undergone substantial renovations since commissioning; • historical centers often on the brink; • industrial areas abandoned in recent years due to cessation of activities; • unmanaged public spaces; • venture or non-existing infrastructure sometimes; • unsatisfactory urban services; • inefficient public transport; • insufficient or endangered green spaces. the return of urban areas to the cooperative effort of municipalities, owners and other actors involved in improving living conditions, enhancing the quality of the environment, the social climate and strengthening the local economy. the municipality is of importance in the process of urban regeneration, the municipality being the one that owns the public spaces. it also manages services and safety in the area. it is the one that makes urban, sectoral and neighborhood plans. it can attract funds from other parts. usually the municipality also has land that can be offered for development by entrepreneurs. another role of the municipality would be that it is the main financier of the social measures and the initiator (together with the real estate owners) of the renewal of the neighborhood. major problems now arise in the achievement of integrated urban regeneration projects due to the fact that the ownership of land, premises, buildings that were part of former state enterprises, now bankrupt /ruined, belong to groups of persons or legal entities with foreign capital, uninterested in the realization of integrated projects, in favor of some real estate developments, of small scale, but which bring a quick and minimal effort. privatization of former state-owned enterprises, has resulted in the gradual splitting of properties, depending on the interests of the various owners who generally “have understood” that it is easier to sell than to invest in urban regeneration and gentrification in romania 29 the future. the effects were devastating both on the living standard of the population in the area, but especially on the quality of life, the city map being full of pollution sources, contaminated sites of heaps of rubble and scrap (fig. 1, fig. 2). few buildings (houses, office buildings) located in central areas have been purchased, usually in modest amounts due to debts, by various real estate developers, subjected to a gentrification process, transformed into residential areas and returned to third parties, who choose to demolish the buildings and build other functions thought to be more beneficial to the area (fig. 3). 3. urban regeneration of industrial sities gentrification means turning an aging urban area into a more financially and socially-populated neighborhood by renovating buildings, the consequences being, on the one hand, to increase the value of those properties (land and buildings in the area) and the relocation of old poor residents. adaptation of an industrial site to a new use for the purpose of its conservation is usually accepted except for sites of particular historical significance. new uses must comply with the original material and maintain original traffic and activity structures and must be compatible as far as possible with original or primary use. the setting up of an area of evocation of old industrial activity is recommended. fig. 1. oil factory, city oradea, bihor county, abandoned source: personal archive. fig. 2. metallica factory, city oradea, bihor county abandoned source: personal archive. 30 miruna cristina boca the most important sites should be fully protected and no intervention likely to compromise their historical integrity or the authenticity of the materials should be allowed. adaptation and reuse can be an appropriate and effective way to ensure the survival of industrial buildings and should be encouraged through proper legal controls, technical advice and tax incentives (pada, 2015). industrial communities threatened by rapid structural change should be supported by central and local authorities. the potential threats generated by these changes that can influence the industrial heritage must be anticipated, and plans must also be developed to avoid emergencies. establishing a balance between the various interests of urban actors, supported by an integrated urban development policy, is a viable basis for consensus between the state, regions, cities, citizens and economic actors. putting together knowledge and financial resources, public funds that are always insufficient can be used with much efficiency. public and private investment will be better coordinated. integrated urban development policy involves actors outside the administration and allows citizens to play an active role in shaping their life framework. at the same time, these measures can provide more certainty in terms of planning and investment. european cities must draw up integrated urban development programs and need action to the extent necessary to respond to local requirements in a responsible manner and with a sound financial base that will bring long-term stability. for this reason, it is important that member states have the opportunity to use the european structural funds for important integrated urban development programs. the use of these funds should be focused on the specific and potential difficulties of each city and the opportunities, difficulties and elements specific to each member state need to be taken into account. local authorities will need to develop skills and efficiency to implement integrated urban development policies, to meet the quality standards and sustainability of the built environment (carta patrimoniului industrial, 2003). the revaluation of damaged public spaces and the creation of new open spaces together with the protection or re-qualification of architectural forms will not only improve the urban landscape, the quality of many urban tissues, but also increase the attractiveness for specialized businesses and workforce, their attractiveness and the identification of locals with the urban environment and the community they are part of. consequently, this will not only contribute to their cultural enrichment but also to the creation or recreation of citizenship dignity, since the values of democracy, coexistence, exchanges, civic progress, diversity, cohabitation and freedom are key factors in the european city culture that are expressed best in the public realm. in a context where urban challenges are increasingly complex and where both public and private resources are declining, where it is necessary to realize more and more with little resources, it is desirable that the fig. 3. demolition of înfrățirea factory, city oradea, bihor county source: personal archive. urban regeneration and gentrification in romania 31 effort should concentrate in the direction obtaining or capitalizing on each revenue input from public or private actors (chaline, 1999). integrated urban regeneration is conceived as a planned process that has to transcend the boundaries and approaches used previously to address the city as a functional one and its parts as components of a unitary urban body with the objective of developing and balancing the complexity and diversity of social, economic and urban structures, while stimulating greater eco-efficiency of the environment. this concept of „integrated urban regeneration” aims at optimizing, preserving and revalorising all existing urban capital (social, built environment, patrimony, etc.) over other forms of intervention in which, in all this urban capital, only the value of the land is prioritized and preserved by traumatic demolition and by the replacement of the rest of the entire urban display. disadvantaged urban areas should not be seen as a problem, but as a source of physical capital and human talent, the potential of which must be unlocked, so that it can contribute to the overall civic progress and economic growth of the city (leary, mccarthy, 2013). this strategic commitment to „integrated urban regeneration” must not be incompatible with urban growth. obviously, where necessary, territorial and urban planning should allow sufficient land development to respond to justified needs, applying the terms of „strong control of land supply and speculative development” in the leipzig charter (carta..., 2007). but it is also advisable to shape unlimited city growth or urban expansion because – in societies with a stable or recessive demography, like many european cities – new suburban growth is largely fueled – along with a rise in house prices and the decentralization of employment, services and facilities – the feeling of decline of citizens and the lack of quality of life in certain parts of the city (reuniunea…, 2010). 4. conclusion we must not think inflexible, we need to find new ways to think and work so that we can deliver better, more efficient and sustainable services. the integrated approach offers all these possibilities, allowing for additional, synergistic and multiplier effects to be achieved, diminishing conflict interference and encouraging collaboration. although, during the communist era, romania discovered an economical succes, after 1990, the once famous industrial sites were abanoned and most of them they are known by the citizens to not go in those areas. these areas need to go through the process of urban regeneration, so they can be financially and socially-populated neighborhood. references carta de la leipzig pentru oraşe europene durabile, 2007, http://www.rur.ro/download/1183 [05.02.2018]. carta patrimoniului industrial, 2003, charter-international congress of ticcih moscow 2003, http://ticcih.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/ticcih_charter_romanian. doc [25.03.2018]. chaline c., 1999, la regeneration urbaine, presses universitaires de france, paris. ghid informativ privind regenerarea urbană. principii şi practici europene, 2007, ministerul dezvoltarii, lucrarilor publice si locuintelor, bucurești. gyöngyi p., 2015, industralizarea comunistă şi dezindustrializarea capitalistă, transilvania reporter, http://transilvaniareporter.ro/opinii/industralizarea-comunista-si-dezindustrializarea-capitalista [09.12.2017]. leary m.e., mccarthy j., 2013, the routledge companion to urban regeneration, routledge, london and new york. monitorul oficial nr. 13 bis din 21 ianuarie 1991, http://www. monitoruljuridic.ro/monitorul-oficial/13-bis/1991-01-21/ [15.12.2017]. pada o., 2015, the impact of gentrification on faith-based organizations, 2015, justice, spirituality, & education journal, 3(1), 44–59. raport final, 2006, comisia prezidenţală pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din româna, bucureşti, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/raport%20final_%20 cadcr.pdf [09.12.2017]. reuniunea informală ministerială privid dezvoltarea urbană declaraţie, 2010, http://www.mdrap.ro/userfiles/declaratie_toledo_ro.pdf [05.02.2018]. 1. background within the current conditions of ukrainian social and political life as well as social-oriented state governance, study of state governance mechanisms remains of high relevance in both theoretical and practical spheres. particularly, that reflects in state governance mechanisms in the sphere of social protection for specific population groups. this issue is of highest importance across the state during the so called “hybrid war” (gorbulyn, 2016) determined on the legal level as the “antiterrorist operation” (hereinafter referred to as “ato”) (про рішення ради…, 2014). the ar crimea annexation and antiterrorist operation in the east of the country have made a sufficient impact on the national social and economic situation with “each single day of ato amounting to approximately usd 5 million” (statement by the pre sident…, 2015). as a result, ukraine has already lost approximately 1/5 of its economic capacity. moreover, as of today, the state has 1.7 million of analysis of the state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection for participants of the antiterrorist operation in the east of ukraine maryna bilynska (1), oleksii kondratenko (2) (1) public health administration chair, national academy for public administration under the president of ukraine, ezhena pot’ye 20, 03057 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: bilynska@ukr.net (2) social and humanitarian policy department, national academy of public administration under the president of ukraine, berehova 5, 02089 kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: kondratenko_alex@ukr.net (corresponding author) citation bilynska m., kondratenko o., 2018, analysis of the state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection for participants of the antiterrorist operation in the east of ukraine, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(3), 11–17. abstract this article contains a piece of scientific and theoretical analysis of social and legal relations in state governance in the sphere of social protection for participants of the antiterrorist operation (ato) in the east of ukraine. in considers specific elements of social protection for ato participants and their family members as well as the structure of the state governance mechanism hereof. the paper also overviews and characterizes specific types of state governance mechanisms in the sphere of social protection for ato participants. at the same time, the text demonstrates a scientific investigation into a comprehensive state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection for participants of the antiterrorist operation (ato) in the east of ukraine and their family members. key words social protection, state governance, comprehensive state governance mechanism, ato participant. received: 01 march 2017 accepted: 18 december 2017 published: 31 august 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(3), 11–17 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.017.8786 12 maryna bilynska, oleksii kondratenko internally displaced persons with their inflow to territorial communities all over the country causing additional pressure on both state and local budgets as well as social infrastructure (сrisis response…, 2016). in the current situation, the issue of social protection for ato participants and their family members takes the critical place in the system of social and humanitarian policy. the same relates to the study of organizational basics and relevant state governance mechanisms; the latter specifically considers those focused on establishing an efficient comprehensive state governance mechanism in the sphere of social security for ato participants and their family members. in accordance with the data presented by the state service for veterans and participants of the antiterrorist operation, for today over 300 thousand people ever participated in ato have acquired the “combat veteran” status, and their number keeps increasing progressively. moreover, due to ato participation, there are more 7,000 family members of those killed in action who acquired their related certificates, and approximately 5,000 being people suffering from various disabilities due to their participation in the military action (звітність державної служби україни…, 2017). the aforementioned categories of ato participants and their family members are in dire need of appropriate care, rehabilitation activities, social and psychological adaptation and support provided by the state. 2. analysis of basic studies and publications ukraine has been facing a drastic rise in theoretical surveys in the sphere of social policy and state governance issues, particularly, social protection for the public since its transition to competitive environment and market economy. various aspects of social protection in relevance to the current market situation have been investigated by such scientists as v. bidak (бідак, 2013), v. novikov (новіков, 2016), а. grynenko and v. kyrylyuk (2016) etc. sufficient efforts to contribute to development of the scientific idea of social protection and management in the aforementioned sphere for the current settings have been also made by the following leading scientists: v. troshchynsky, v. skurativs’ky, м. kravchenko (трощинський et al., 2016), о. petroie (петроє, 2012) and others engaged in studying the essence, structure, status and issues in development of the social protection system and social security for population while disclosing theoretical and practical aspects of social protection as a component of social policy and investigating into specifics of social protection for specific population groups. in their own part, scientists also dedicate specific studies to state governance mechanisms. these elaborations are well reflected in the works of researches such as v. averyanov (авер’янов et al., 1998), v.  knyazev, v. bakumenko (князев, бакуменко, 2002), n. nyzhnyk, о. mashkov (нижник, машков, 1998). they specifically described the issues and components of the state governance mechanism structure, their types and various approaches to the definition of the “mechanisms” category. among those engaged in the topic, including the younger scientists considering various aspects of social protection for war veterans, issues and perspectives social security for serviceman/women, armed forces personnel and their family members, it`s worth mentioning the works of і. datsyuk (дацюк, 2009), l. sinyova (сіньова, 2013), v. pashynsky, і. svystilnyk (пашинський, свистільник, 2013), y. dmytrenko (дмитренко, 2014), і. avtushenko (автушенко, 2016) and к. zhydchenko (жидченко, 2016). regardless of the fact that scientific literature has a compiled and valuable experience in the social protection sphere, specifically that relating to veterans, servicemen/women and their family members, the area of social protection for ato participants in the east of ukraine and their family members still lacks proper attention. researchers in their works are keen to focus on the issues of social, psychological and medical recovery, further surveillance to prevent posttraumatic psychical disorders for ato participants and servicemen/women spouses. these scientific ideas are demonstrated in the works of о. topol’ (тополь, 2015), а. malyuha (малюга, 2015), n. storozhuk (сторожук et al., 2016), y. shpyl’ovy (шпильовий, 2016). the authors of this article assumed that combination of scientific and theoretical experience while researching state governance mechanisms and current state of affairs in the social protection sphere for ato participants might be of high use for systematizing the vision and disclosure of the concept for the state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection for ato participants and their families, which, in its turn, boosts governance efficiency in the aforementioned field. 3. body of the paper general purpose of the paper is to disclose the specifics of the state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection for ato participants and analysis of the state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection… 13 their families as well as to propose the ways for its improvement. the constitution of ukraine, article 46 (конституція україни, 1996) states that the citizens of ukraine have the right to social protection, which includes the right to their security in case of partial or total loss of labor capacity, survivorship, unemployment due to non-controlled settings, retirement and other cases stated by the valid law. this right is guaranteed by the mandatory state social insurance at the cost of insurance fees of citizens, businesses, facilities and organizations as well as budgetary and other sources of social security; establishment of a network of state, community and private facilities for care over those incapable of working. retirement pensions and other types of social payments, being the major source of subsistence, are to secure a specific life level no lower than the minimum subsistence level set by the valid law (конституція україни, 1996). citizens’ social protection is one of the major public functions as society always contains specific layers and social groups incapable of self-subsistence. this public function is of highest relevance for instable societies with constant complicated social, economic and political processes ongoing, political systems and forms of economic activities being changed (трощинський et al., 2016). practical essence of the public social protection function is implemented via state governance mechanisms. the glossary on state governance edited by v. knyazev and v. bakumenko defined the term “state governance mechanisms” as “practical means, measures, leverages and incentives used by state authorities for influencing society, production and any social system to reach the set goals”. the comprehensive state governance mechanism is defined as “a system of political, economic, social, organizational and legal means of focused influence executed by state authorities” (князев, бакуменко, 2002, p. 116–117). according to r. rudnytska, o. sydorchuk, o. stelmakh (рудніцька, сидорчук, 2005), the mechanism of state governance is an artificially developed comprehensive system aimed at reaching the set goals and regulated by specific legal norms; it has a certain structure, methods, means and tools of public impact. scientific literature also provides the definitions such as “organizational”, “organizational and legal”, “organizational and economic”, “organizational and institutional” governance mechanisms. using the comprehensive approach, we may state that the state governance mechanism combines institutional, organizational, administrative and legal as well as financial and economic mechanisms hence being comprehensive in its core (fig.1). we are focusing our attention on a comprehensive mechanism worth defining and considering from the point of interrelations between state governance institutions. this is the mechanism where each and every institution has its own functional load and plays an important role in the sphere of fig. 1. components of the “comprehensive state governance mechanism” source: own studies. 14 maryna bilynska, oleksii kondratenko social protection for ato participants and their family members, both separately and within the legal, institutional, organizational and economic relations with other bodies of the integrated “state governance” system. firstly, we should specify the legal mechanism, being one of the components of the comprehensive state governance mechanism of social protection for ato participants, which is in need of studying and improvement. it showcases a list of laws and bylaws, presidential acts, cabinet decrees and orders, regulation documents of local executive bodies, etc. among the major statutory acts valid in ukraine, it is worth mentioning the constitution of ukraine (конституція україни, 1998), the laws of ukraine “on status of war veterans and guarantees for their social protection” (про статус ветеранів війни…, 1993), “on social and legal protection for servicemen/women and their family members” (про соціальний і правовий захист…, 1991), “on improvement of welfare for participants of military actions and disabled war veterans” (про поліпшення матеріального становища…, 2004); act of the president of ukraine “on the decision made by the national security and defense council of ukraine as of 18 february 2015 “on measures related to development of an appropriate material and technical facilities for treatment, recovery and rehabilitation of servicemen/women and other persons who took a direct part in the antiterrorist operation and its support as well as military action participants and disabled veterans of war” (про рішення ради національної безпеки…, 2015); decrees of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine “on approval of the procedure for rewarding the status of disabled war veterans for persons with a disability caused by a combat injury, contusion or trauma caused by direct participation in the antiterrorist operation or support to its implementation” (про затвердження порядку надання статусу…, 2015) and as well as the cabinet order “on approval of the action plan related to medical, psychological and professional recovery as well as social rehabilitation of antiterrorist operation participants” (про затвердження плану заходів…, 2015), regulations of local executive bodies and local self-governing bodies. while basing on scientific approaches, we may consider state bodies with their functions and authorities an institutional mechanism in policy-making for social protection and support to ato veterans and their families, with a specific role of the president as a guarantor of the constitution. in december 2016, the president signed the act “on the presidential commissioner on recovery issues for antiterrorist operation participants suffering from a combat injury, contusion, trauma or any other disorder afflicted during his/her participation in the antiterrorist operation” (про уповноваженого президента україни…, 2016) hence setting a milestone for another important institution on social protection issues for the specified category of citizens. the role of the parliament and its related committees, specifically, the committee on the issues of veterans, combat action participants, antiterrorist operation participants and people with disabilities as well as the committee on social issues, employment and retirement pension benefits is of paramount importance for legal and legislative activities as well as development of a social protection policy and related monetary, retirement, employment, rehabilitation, treatment and recovery, social and psychological adaptation, education and retraining for ato participants. the role of the cabinet of ministers of ukraine and its subordinate central executive bodies (i.e., profiled ministries and agencies) should be specified separately. particularly, the ministry of social policy with the department on ato veterans and participants in its structure implements the policy of social protection for the aforementioned categories of citizens as well as their family members through its regional networks of centers for social and psychological recovery (cspr), recovery centers for the disabled, sanatorium and resort facilities and centers for family, children and youth issues. through the minister of social policy, the activities of the state service for veterans and participants of the antiterrorist operation, state service of labor and state employment service of ukraine are also coordinated. the latter services ensure protection of ato participants’ and their family members’ rights within the frames of their authority. the role of the ministry of health are also of highest importance since it organizes related activities on ensuring treatment and recovery for wounded ato participants at medical facilities within the frames of the valid law and in cooperation with its appropriated territorial units. soldiers, servicemen/women of the armed forces of ukraine and ato participants are in direct or indirect dependence on activities of law enforcement agencies they had their service at, specifically: the ministry of defense of ukraine, ministry of internal affairs, national guard of ukraine, security service of ukraine, foreign intelligence service of ukraine, state border guard service of ukraine, prosecutor general’s and military prosecutor’s office of ukraine, department of state guard of ukraine, state service of special communication and information analysis of the state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection… 15 protection of ukraine, state emergency service of ukraine and state penitentiary service of ukraine. the elements of the institutional state governance mechanism, in our opinion, should also include the institution of the gamily, scientific and research facilities, territorial communities, local self-governing bodies, community associations and unions, political parties, religious organizations, representatives of economically active and socially responsible enterprises as well as international nongovernmental organizations. another special part is played by non-governmental organizations of veterans and peer support groups working in accordance with the “peer-topeer” principle and in coordination with state authorities to form an efficient interaction model (fig. 2). the organizational state governance mechanism in scholarly literature n. nyzhnyk, о. mashkov (нижник, машков, 1998) are integrated and linked with the legal and institutional ones by a number of authors since they have similar historically formed traits. in our opinion, the organizational state governance mechanism is introduced by implementing state governance functions, specifically: planning, organization, motivation, control, and it is closely related to the legal and institutional state governance mechanisms, which, in its turn, proves the necessity for a comprehensive approach to determination of a state governance mechanism. regarding the economic state governance mechanism, according to its definition provided by the encyclopedic dictionary of state governance, “economic mechanisms are a set of financial and economic management methods, tools and incentives through which a state regulates economic processes and ensures implementation of social and economic functions. economic mechanisms are based on basic functions and principles of economic policy and focused on achieving a set goal as well as solutions for development contradictions” (савостенко, попруга, 2010, p. 421–422). j. zavadsky (завадський, 1992) defined the economic mechanism as an element of the business one including economic incentives (state economic incentives for production, tax exemptions, subsidized production and financial incentives for labor) and leverages (planning, coast accounting, financing, settings for product sales, production and technical maintenance, economic conditions, various limitations, product cost, production profitability. in practice, the economic state governance mechanism in the sphere of social protection for ato participants is closely linked to the general macroeconomic situation across the country, gdp values, inflation processes and state budget revenues, and it is implemented through the approval of the law on the state budget of ukraine for the current year as well as implementation of related budgetary programs are directed on the care and psychological recovery for affected participants of the antiterrorist operation, on social and professional adaptation for participants of the antiterrorist operation and others. 4. conclusions and proposals during the study, the concept and contents of the “social protection” and “state governance mechanism” terms have been determined, and the specifics of the comprehensive state governance mechanism fig. 2. efficient interaction scheme source: own studies. 16 maryna bilynska, oleksii kondratenko in the sphere of social protection for ato participants and their families have been researched. basing on the scientific and research literature research, we can conclude that the issues of social protection for participants of the antiterrorist operation in the east of ukraine remain under-studied or fragmentarily researched. social protection for population is a public function implemented through the use of state governance mechanism – a multi-aspect phenomenon of complicated structure and contents, and in the process of its impact on a governance subject, it is implemented through the use of norms, methods, standards and leverages. this way or another, the practice of use and implementation of specific mechanisms requires constant development and improvement of the latter. as of now, there is a dire need in advanced and innovative approaches to state governance in the sphere of social protection for ato participants and their family members. this can be achieved through the study of best world practice in the sphere of social protection for war veterans from the countries with specific experience in internal armed conflicts that have related elaborations. having analyzed the state governance mechanism for social protection of ato participants, we may conclude that while taking into account various approaches to the term of the “state governance mechanism”, in practice, this mechanism combines all the aforementioned types with their links and functions being comprehensive in its core. it is worth mentioning that the issue of capacity building for officials from state institutions engaged in development and implementation of the related policy as well as influencing the state governance mechanisms in the sphere of social protection for ato participants and their family members keeps its high relevance. public involvement in the process of implementation of various initiatives in this sphere of work, holding consulting sessions, discussions, inclusion of public representatives into consulting and advisory boards of related ministries and departments in order to ensure feedback are 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реабілітація учасників антитерористичної операції, вісник чернігівського національного педагогічного університету. серія: педагогічні науки, 124, 230–233. трощинський в.п., скуратівський в.м., кравченко м.в., 2016, соціальна і гуманітарна політика: підручник, наду, київ. шпильовий я.в., 2016, особливості соціальної підтримки у жінок з невротичними тривожно-депресивними розладами різного психоґенезу (вимушених переселенців та дружин військовослужбовців – учасників антитерористичної операції, український вісник психоневрології, 24(4), 102–104. 1. introduction oblasts of western ukrainian borderland are characterized by a vast variety of natural resources, especially renewable ones. for centuries, land and biological resources have been the basis of economic development here. the maximum level of tillage was observed in the first half of the 20th century, which was associated with extreme agrarian overpopulation in the borderland. in medieval times, the only mineral resources mined included salt, building materials and bog ore in limited quantities. in the second half of the 19th century, active development of oil, ozokerite, building materials began. one hundred years ago, boryslav used to be one of the leading oil regions of the world. construction of railways including narrow-gauge railroads enabled active exploitation of forest resources in the previously inaccessible areas. after inclusion of western ukraine into the ussr (1939–1945), special attention was paid to the minerals needed for the region industrialization and electrification. in the 1950s, extensive works on the inventory of natural resources of the western journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 24–31 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.012.6628 topical issues of sustainable use of natural resources of the western ukrainian borderland valeriy rudenko (1), yaroslav ivakh (2), oleh veklyn (3) (1) chair of economic geography and ecological management, faculty of geography, yuriy fedkovych national university of chernivtsi, kotsiubynsky 2, 58012 chernivtsi, ukraine, e-mail: rudenko_valery@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: ivakh.yaroslav@gmail.com (3) chair of economic and social geography, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: oleg19v@gmail.com citation rudenko v., ivakh ya., veklyn o., 2017, topical issues of sustainable use of natural resources of the western ukrainian borderland, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 24–31. abstract the article analyzes the natural resource potential of the western ukrainian borderland: history, development, current state and conditions. land resources and land fund of the borderland as well as the main trends in its use as the basis of agriculture and the operational base of society have been characterized. the role of water, biological and recreational resources in the structure of the natural resources of the region has been described. current trends in the use of western ukrainian borderland mineral resources have been analyzed. key words western ukrainian borderland, natural resources, land resources, land fund, biological resources, forest resources, mineral resources, recreational resources, territorial combination of natural resources. topical issues of sustainable use of natural resources of the western ukrainian borderland 25 ukrainian borderland were carried out. they resulted in a monograph published by the then head of the chair of economic geography of lviv state university o. vashchenko “natural resources of the western regions of the ussr” (ващенко, 1959). modern political, economic, technological and environmental challenges have a significant impact on natural resource potential of the borderland: • collapse of the soviet union, the fact that ukraine became independent stopped the practice of large-scale pillage of natural resources at low prices in the interests of the empire. the fall of the “iron curtain” led to the slow, but steady, integration of the region into the european area; • new trends in mineral raw materials mining and processing result in another approach to the estimation of mineral resources. for example, “shale revolution” enables the search for oil and gas in the areas that used to be believed unpromising; • since ukraine became independent, the number of protected areas has significantly increased. western ukrainian borderland has the highest protection indicator in the country, which affects the total natural resource potential. with a view to a comprehensive study of natural resources in modern conditions, o. shabliy (шаблій, 2001) proposed a combined classification of natural resources which combined geosphere and humangeographical approaches. resources are estimated considering diverse material but also spiritual needs of the society. since in the last few years, there were fundamental changes in the political and economic situation in ukraine, this requires new approaches to the characterization of natural resources of western ukrainian borderland. 2. assessment of natural resources potential structure of western ukrainian borderland v. rudenko (руденко, 2010) conducted an economic assessment of natural resource potential of ukraine based on the use value of mineral, water, land, forest fauna and natural-recreational resources. share of the western ukrainian borderland amounts to around 179.86‰ of the total potential of ukraine (tab. 1). its structure in all the western oblasts of ukraine, except zakarpattia and ivano-frankivsk oblasts, is dominated by land resources. water and recreational resources are the most important ones in these two oblasts also characterized by high proportion of forest resources. the most balanced natural resource potential is typical to lviv oblast where the share of land resources accounts for about onethird of the potential, and the remaining share is evenly distributed among other types of resources. 3. land resources land resources of the western ukrainian borderland constitute 45% of the total cost. in the volyn oblast, this share exceeds 50%, and in khmelnytskyi and ternopil oblasts it exceeds 75%. high assessment of the lands of khmelnytskyi and ternopil oblasts is explained not only by high natural fertility, but the largest share of arable land, which constitutes more than 60% of the area (fig. 1). the area of agricultural land in mountainous zakarpattia, ivano-frankivsk and chernivtsi oblasts is limited, however some areas of the northeastern prykarpattia and bukovyna have a very high potential of land resources. tab. 1. natural resources potential of western ukrainian borderland administrative units resources potential, in ‰ of the value m in er al w at er la n d fo re st fa u n a n at u ra l r ec re at io n al in te g ra l lviv oblast 8.491 8.539 11.011 4.169 0.066 5.377 37.653 zakarpattia oblast 0.753 7.751 4.767 4.294 0.020 7.036 24.621 ivano-frankivsk oblast 1.676 7.529 5.453 3.983 0.030 3.929 22.600 chernivtsi oblast 0.658 2.324 6.354 1.596 0.027 1.744 12.703 volyn oblast 0.160 3.051 9.340 2.749 0.069 1.557 16.926 rivne oblast 0.088 2.895 9.685 2.842 0.132 1.171 17.605 ternopil oblast 0.261 2.862 15.792 0.982 0.032 1.136 21.085 khmelnytskyi oblast 0.929 3.675 19.385 1.014 0.096 1.600 26.699 western ukrainian borderland 13.016 38.626 81.787 21.629 0.472 23.550 179.862 ukraine 282.558 130.759 443.839 41.699 4.739 96.406 1000.000 source: руденко, 2010. 26 valeriy rudenko, yaroslav ivakh, oleh veklyn in recent decades, the share of arable land, especially in polissia and prykarpattia is gradually decreasing, some of the land plots turned into abandoned fields. this is due to several reasons. first of all, land with low natural fertility is not tilled. in addition, there are significant socio-economic factors. in early 1990s, most rural residents were trying to get maximum plots for farming (sometimes more than 1 ha). subsequently, many farmers became migrant workers and abandoned farming. therefore, there is a correlation between the percentage of migrant workers and abandoned land plots. in general, soil and agro-climatic resources of western ukrainian borderland, though inferior to other regions of ukraine, have great potential due to better moisture conditions. in europe, better natural properties are typical to hungarian land resources and those of some regions of france only. in the western ukrainian borderland, a trend of decrease in the arable land is observed (fig.  2). in 1990–2015, area of arable lands possessed and used by all enterprises decreased by 459 500 ha and in 2015 amounted to 4  882  000    ha. in zakarpattia oblast only, during this period, arable land area increased by 4 200 ha. instead, the most significant decrease in the arable land area was observed in lviv (145  600 ha), khmelnytskyi (95  000 ha) and volyn (75 400 ha) oblasts. there are many issues with the real valuation of agricultural land due to a lack of land market. the average normative monetary evaluation of 1 ha of arable land as of january 1, 2017 is 30 927.8 uah (1 137 usd) (державна служба геодезії…, 2017). however, in some remote areas of polissia, little polissia, prykarpattia, it will amount to less than 10 000 uah. however, the land plots in suburban areas with good natural fertility and high differential rent might cost hundreds of thousands uah per hectare. price of arable land in khmelnytskyi, ternopil oblasts, in southern rivne and volyn oblasts, where the chernozem and dark gray forest soils predominate, is higher than average. in case of lifting the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land, experts predict a threefold rise in the cost of 1  ha – up to 2  990  usd. this price range will vary from 1  480 to 6  030  usd per 1 hectare (нізалов et al., 2016). fig. 1. land use of western ukrainian borderland, 2015 source: own calculation and mapping based on довкілля україни…, 2016. topical issues of sustainable use of natural resources of the western ukrainian borderland 27 ukraine has already formed a market for nonagricultural land, especially for the land for residential development. due to higher population density, lower urbanization level, presence of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in each area, land for development in the western ukrainian borderland is in high demand. the highest price is observed in cities and suburban areas. in ukraine, it ranges from 1  000 to 4  000 usd per are. a similar price of land was formed in the resort towns and villages of truskavets, morshyn, yaremche, vorokhta, slavske, skhidnytsia, yasynia, mizhhiria, shatsk, etc. 4. water resources the role of water resources of western ukrainian borderland of national and international significance is increasing. the region accounts for over 40 percent of local runoff of ukraine (50% of the surface and almost 60% of the groundwater runoff ) (tab. 2.). more than 90% of the total runoff of the dnister, 50% of the prut, 25% of the tysa, more than 10% of the dnipro, the southern bug, and the vistula are formed here. unfortunately, more than half of local runoff gets outside of the borders of ukraine through the basins of different rivers: the tysa which irrigates the entire eastern part of hungary, the dnister and the prut which limit the territory of moldova and are critical for the water supply in the country; the western bug and the san which ensure, though to a lesser extent, water balance of poland; the siret river and smaller rivers of bukovyna flowing through romania. the dnister and the southern bug largely supply water to the south-western part of ukraine. tab. 2. average long-term value of the water balance components of the western ukrainian borderland oblasts administrative units runoff, km3 surface groundwater lviv oblast 3.27 1.65 zakarpattia oblast 6.39 1.53 ivano-frankivsk oblast 3.33 1.26 chernivtsi oblast 0.93 0.30 volyn oblast 1.58 0.60 rivne oblast 1.56 0.77 ternopil oblast 1.01 0.80 khmelnytskyi oblast 1.58 0.56 western ukrainian borderland 19.65 (49.9%) 7.47 (57.5%) ukraine 39.4 (100.0%) 13.0 (100.0%) source: щербак, 1989. for most western ukrainian borderland, water resources are redundant and can be used for the development of aqueous production. in polissia and little polissia, there are small tracts of protected wetlands regulating surface runoff of the rivers and being biodiversity hotspots. in the region, there are no large lakes and reservoirs (except a group of shatsky lakes fig. 2. area of arable lands possessed and used by all enterprises of western ukrainian borderland, 1990–2015 source: made by authors, based on регіони україни…, 2016; регіони україни…, 2004. 28 valeriy rudenko, yaroslav ivakh, oleh veklyn and dnister reservoir). all this poses certain threats to borderland water balance in dry years as was the case in the summer and autumn 2015 (july–november) and summer 2016 (june–september). since most of the settlements of the borderland take water from the underground sources, recent years have seen a dramatic groundwater lowering. the reasons for this are not only shortage of water in the recent years, but first of all significant increase in the individual water supply in the rural areas. with the current trends of global climate change, western ukrainian borderland may be the key to water security of ukraine and neighboring moldova. 5. biological resources biological resources of the region are primarily represented by forests. western ukrainian borderland has the highest forest coverage in ukraine while carpathian forests have the highest stand of timber per unit area (fig.  3). official statistics shows an increase in forest area, but there is no reliable data on forested areas. the real situation is much worse as illegal logging is performed in large areas. in most cases, public attention and that of the academia is focused on the destruction of the carpathian forests. the problem is really crucial there because of a number of related adverse natural processes. barbaric deforestation without saving young growth and undergrowth causes almost complete washout of soil, increase in erosion, landslides, and catastrophic floods. forest self-restoration without anti-erosion and forestry measures is virtually impossible. however, a much larger area of deforestation is typical to polissia. this is explained by easy forest exploitation on the plains and species composition of the forest. it is dominated by pines and oaks which are highly liquid commodity in the european and ukrainian markets. loggings are mainly conducted in the middle of vast forests massifs, which given the flat terrain allows visually hiding the real area of fig. 3. wooded forest land and stand of timber of the western ukrainian borderland, 2015 source: own calculation and mapping based on довкілля україни…, 2016; лісовий ресурс…; загальна характеристика лісів…; лісівництво…; паспорт області…; ліси івано-франківщини…; лісове господарство…; загальна характеристика області…; лісове господарство львівської області… . topical issues of sustainable use of natural resources of the western ukrainian borderland 29 forest destruction. it can be seen on a satellite image only. lack of erosion, rapid decomposition of logging residues promotes the process of forests selfrestoration, which in several years are presented as the areas where afforestation was conducted. roztochia and podilia forests are much better preserved because of the high share of protected areas and the predominance of hornbeam and beech stands which are of limited use in woodworking and pulp and paper industries. however, gradual transition of the woodwork industry to the production of pressed beam and a sharp rise in gas prices, which leads to decrease in firewood production, may threaten these forests. climate change has a significant impact on the biological productivity of forest resources. warmer and wetter years promote maximum timber growth. however, prolonged drought of the last two years threatens conifers plantations in the carpathians mountains (picea abies) and in podilia where the mixed pine stands are gradually shrinking. in general, the potential of biological resources of the western ukrainian borderland in the last decades has significantly increased due to increase in the area of land covered with natural vegetation and protected areas, decrease in the use of pesticides in agriculture. therefore, the herbs, berries, mushrooms biomass growth increased in spite of the fact that the actual reserves of these types of resources require detailed study. 6. recreational resources recreational resources that range from 5–7% in ternopil, khmelnytskyi, rivne oblasts, to 17–28% in ivano-frankivsk and zakarpattia oblasts are of increasing importance for the socio-economic complex of the western ukrainian borderland. in terms of the structure, they are very close to those of the neighboring states – poland, slovakia, hungary and other middle european countries. truskavets and skhidnytsia are characterized by unique hydrogen sulfide springs. resources of the western ukrainian borderland are especially important for the ukrainian recreational services market (skiing, hiking, educational tourism). in dry and hot summer weather it is only in the carpathians and polissia that pleasant coolness for a rest can be found by the residents of industrial regions of ukraine. combination of historical and cultural resources gives a dramatic increase in the potential of natural recreational resources. the presence of many architectural monuments, operating sacred sites, preserved traditions and scenic landscapes create synergistic effect that promotes the efficient use of natural resources. western ukrainian borderland is a combination of the middle european-type resources with lower infrastructure development level and a wide range of prices. the cheapest is independent tourism and recreation which cost is actually the cost of transfer and food. access to most protected areas and museum is significantly lower than the prices of the services in neighboring countries. therefore, these trips through western ukraine, which unlike in the neighboring regions of unorganized tourism, attract residents of the european countries. in future, the opportunity to see “europe at reduced prices” will be used by the tourists from asia, particularly china. 7. mineral resources mineral resources of the borderland are in need of substantial revaluation. the fuel-energy and chemical raw materials deposits, which used to be of national and international importance, are still heavily depleted and cannot so much as meet regional needs. however, building materials resources are extremely diverse. rivne granite, sandstone of prydnisteria and the carpathians, limestone of podilia are the best known resources. there are huge deposits of cement and brick raw material, gypsum, construction and glass sand, gravel and gravel-pebble mixtures. the cost of one ton of materials is low, but their recoverable reserves alone are estimated at billions of tons making their deposits the most valuable ones among the mineral resources. materials are ubiquitous which makes them an important economic basis for local communities. unfortunately, a large amount of building materials is mined illegally or semi-legally, which causes a lot of environmental problems. a similar situation is observed with the production of unique amber deposits in polissia, especially in the rivne oblast. salt mining, mostly from brines, has been an important mainstay of the peredkarpattia economy for centuries. because of high energy consumption in salt evaporation and complex hydrogeological conditions in solotvyn field (zakarpattia), salt mining in the western ukrainian borderland was almost terminated (except drohobych), though the deposits are quite large. potassium salts in kalush are being developed now and production in stebnyk has been suspended. these deposits could meet the needs of ukraine, but mining requires modern technology and investment to solve numerous environmental problems. instead, still quite large deposits of sulfur 30 valeriy rudenko, yaroslav ivakh, oleh veklyn in the districts of yavoriv and novyi rozdil should be suspended for the coming decades as overproduction is observed in the world. considerable oil deposits in peredkarpattia were exhausted back in the first half of the 20th century, and those of gas – in the second half. now, significant oil and gas deposits have been developed in zakarpattia and volyn, and those of the shale gas – in podilia (olesko deposit). however, low prices for hydrocarbons in recent years, the lack of investors and technology move real estimation of the oil and gas deposits and their development to longer term. the small lviv-volyn coal basin is just southeastern outskirts of much larger lublin basin, which is almost not developed in poland. most mines of chervonohrad and novovolynsk have already depleted productive strata and are in need of closure. promising areas (tiahliv and lubela areas) have difficult conditions of production and too small deposits for profitable production under modern conditions. the peat deposits in polissia and locally in peredkarpattia should be used as valuable organic fertilizer. 8. territorial combination of natural resources natural resources are often located geographically close which is positive for their use. these territorial combinations of resources can be formed of resources of various earth sectors. for example, let us consider the unique mineral water of truskavets, resources of chemical industry (potassium salt) of stebnyk and oil and gas deposits of drohobych region. we get a kind of local combination of natural resources – boryslav-truskavets region. in the mountainous part of western ukrainian borderland, mineral water resources of different material and gas composition are distinctly combined. ten local combinations are identified: svaliava, mizhhiria, tiachiv, yasinia-rakhiv, novoselytsia, putyla, kosiv, morshyn-bolekhiv, truskavets-skhidnytsia, kalush-solotvyn. almost all of them contain fuel and energy and chemical resources: 1. boryslav-truskavets (mineral water, potassium salt, oil, gas). 2. dolyna-morshyn (oil, gas, potassium salt, mineral ozokerite). 3. rakhiv-solotvyn (rock salt, natural gas). 4. kalush-solotvyn (potassium salt, mud, fuel gas, etc.). 5. putyla (oil, natural gas, ozokerite, etc.). in these territorial combinations, problem of priority use of a natural resource arises, i.e. the problem of determining the region specialization as the use of a resource creates problems for the use of the other one. for example, mining creates significant problems for the use of recreational resources and development of recreational infrastructure. environmental component should be the main criterion in determining the priority of the development and use of natural resource combination. the next criteria should include social and economic benefits from natural resources. 9. conclusions thus, the raw material focus of the economy of the western ukrainian borderland is in the past. a sharp increase in the price of fossil fuels (especially after the implementation of the paris agreement), which would let us consider the proven deposits of the tens of millions of tons of oil and hundreds of millions of tons of coal as an important resource for development, is unlikely. however, almost half of not yet used hydropower resources of ukraine and good conditions for the development of wind, solar, geothermal energy are concentrated here. it is the alternative energy sources that could become a new economic growth point of the western ukrainian borderland. in addition to solar and wind energy, there are great prospects for biogas production, tens of millions of tons of organic waste and the development of geothermal energy in zakarpattia oblast can become raw materials base. the share of recreational resources of the borderland, which have already become a strong basis for the development of tourism and health-resort complex, will increase. however, the recreational resources potential of the region is not used enough, especially in podilia, oppilia and in many regions of polissia. land resources will not lose their importance. the introduction of modern technologies has already made medium and low fertile land that hasn’t been in use in the early 2000s attractive for agribusiness. in addition, convenient economic and geographical location, dense transportation network result in a constant growth in prices of land as a territorial resource. the role of water resources in the region on the national and international level will be undoubtedly growing. generally in the region, there is a pan-european trend to mining shutdown, more efficient use of renewable resources and successful launch of alternative energy. topical issues of sustainable use of natural resources of the western ukrainian borderland 31 references ващенко п., 1959, природні ресурси західних районів урср, книжково-журнальне видавництво, львів. державна служба геодезії, картографії та кадастру. огляд стану земельних відносин в україні, 1 березня 2017 р., http://land.gov.ua/opublikovano-cherhovyi-vypuskshchomisiachnoho-land-review/ [07.03.2017] довкілля україни, статистичний збірник за 2015 рік, 2016, державна служба статистики україни, київ. загальна характеристика лісів рівненщини, рівненське обласне управління лісового та мисливського господарства, http://rivnelis.gov.ua/material/119 [12.03.2010]. загальна характеристика області, чернівецьке обласне управління лісового та мисливського господарства, http://www.cvoulg.cv.ukrtel.net/harakter.html [12.03.2010]. ліси івано-франківщини, івано-франківське обласне управління 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homogeneous. in more than 40% of states there could be found five or more national minorities. in general there are about 8 thousands peoples and each of them pretend for independence. in contemporary political discourse there is an opinion that such issues as separatism, nationalism, minorities’ groups problems are not actual any more that is why there is no necessity to analyze them thoroughly. but as we can see on the example of some separatism movements the issues of national minorities are getting harsh. after the end of wwii the world has been divided by the states-winners. in some cases the new borders were set up by those countries without taking into consideration the peculiarities of the areas where national minorities lived. besides inside some states (the ussr, yugoslavia) the areas were taken from one republic and given to the other. as a result a huge part of a particular people had to live in one republic with another people that sometimes even was hostile to this one. during the cold war, that existed in terms of bipolar system on international relations, the national minorities didn’t have an opportunity to protect their rights in a military way or at least aggressively. so after the collapse of the ussr and when the cold war was over we started to observe cruel ethnical fights for the independence. according to the opinion of the experts the world has gone through three waves of ethnical conflicts during the xx century. the first wave took place after the wwi and collapse of colonial states, collapse of austria and hungary empire, russian empire, journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(1), 5–9 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.001.6200 the basic causes of the contemporary separatism yevgeny ryabinin international affairs and foreign policy chair, mariupol state university, stroiteley 129, 87500 mariupol, ukraine, e-mail: ryabinin25@ukr.net citation ryabinin y., 2017, the basic causes of the temporary separatism, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(1), 5–9. abstract the article is devoted to such a pressing problem as separatism. it is revealed that separatism is a problem of the past, but the author emphasizes that the xxi st century will be the century of identification factor increasing that will influence the nationalistic issues. it is underlined that nationalism is the basis of the separatism movements that can lead to military conflicts and genocide. it is emphasized that the separatism could be catalyzed not only by inner factors but also by outside ones, especially nowadays, when the structure of the world is being changed by the influential actors of the foreign affairs. key words separatism, nationalism, conflict, national minority, donbass, genocide, state. 6 yevgeny ryabinin ottoman empire on the territory of which new states were formed. the second wave was initiated by the wwii and collapse of colonial states. the third wave started after the collapse of the ussr and is still going on (соин, 1998). in the end of the cold war when the global architecture of international security started to ruin, the ussr was not as powerful as it used to be and its authorities cared only about internal problems cause they were not interested in controlling the countries that were in the sphere of soviet interest and control, so the national minorities saw an opportunity to get the independence sometimes even using weaponry. s.  huntington (хантингтон, 2007) emphasizes that in the world after the cold war culture and realizing that you belong to different identity determines the model of uniting, disintegration and conflict. 2. contemporary separatism some experts believe that the contemporary world is in the state of the end of the third wave that gives them right to say that ethnical conflict will take place very seldom (gurr, 1993). in the author’s opinion the world is in the state of the final stage of international security architecture construction due to which not only each state but also each people must decide which role it wants to play in the future international affairs. it can influence the stability of any country cause ethnical minorities can have different opinion as for the priorities of the foreign policy course of the country. such a bright example is ukraine in which the society has been divided for 25 years into two groups, the first believes that ukraine should integrate into eu and nato and the second part considers close cooperation with russia as the most profitable policy. catalonia also announced about the process of disintegration from spain as it prevents this region from developing. taking into account these facts we can say that the world can be absorbed by the fourth wave of ethnic conflicts that would be caused by the final stage of political, economic, ideological and civilizational structuring of the world. as it was already mentioned the issue of identity is going to become the integral part of the process of formation of borders in the xxi century. today we already observe how some countries try to leave the unions and organizations (great britain) or states (catalonia, donbass). so today a great number of countries can face a problem of separatism movement due to activization of ethnic minorities. 3. nationalism as a catalyst for separatism there is no doubt that separatism is based on nationalism that is driving force of such processes and events. there is such an opinion that in the epoch of globalization when the borders disappear there wouldn’t be such a problem as nationalism and it will be a part of the past. but as we can see nationalism is becoming again the determining element of the political processes that take place in this or that region. especially it could be seen in europe and post-soviet space countries where right-wing radical politicians or parties win the elections to the national parliaments or succeed during the elections to the european parliament. the radicalization of the european political system is connected with the immigration crises that eu fails to solve. it influenced such events as brexit, the hungarian referendum, the desire of france, the netherlands, hungary, greece to leave eu. besides the population of the western europe has negative attitude not only to the immigrants for the middle east countries but also from the central and eastern europe states such as poland, bulgaria, romania. in ukraine it is getting harder for the russians to protect their rights because the radical political parties demand total ukrainization of the whole country that presupposes the demand to speak only ukrainian, recognize upa as the fighters for freedom of ukraine during the wwii, restriction of freedom of speech. in russia we can observe negative attitude of the russians towards the people from the north caucuses. so we can make a conclusion that the separatism movements are fed by the identity factor that in its turn is based on the nationalism. in my opinion nationalism could be only negative and aggressive as it can be the reason for conflict between different groups of people. as e.  smith (cміт, 2009) says nationalism appears on the ruins of the states and those who can’t develop anymore. it could be popular because it can provide alternative for unstable status-quo and it will be more viable because it corresponds to the people’s hopes. the example could be the ussr that collapsed and we could/can observe severe conflicts on the nationalism ground – chechen republic, abkhazia, s. ossetia, pridnestrovie, donbass, nagorny karabakh. the radicalization of conflicts in former ussr republics is connected with collapse of totalitarian system that controlled all the processes in the country. nationalism contains such a point as imposing identity. it is done in my opinion in order to avoid problems in future that can occur from the side of ethnic minority that doesn’t consider itself to be a part of the people that is a titular nation. so catalonians don’t consider themselves to be spaniards, the the basic causes of the contemporary separatism 7 rusins or hungarians don’t consider themselves to be ukrainians, the same situation with the russians in donbass region. imposing new holidays, traditions, language, history on the russians has the adverse reaction – the more severe ukrainian radicals impose their politics and values the more the russians don’t want to accept it. so nationalism is the basic ground for separatism. let’s consider this phenomenon more thoroughly. according to the definition that is given by “politological encyclopedic dictionary” (політологічний енциклопедичний словник, 1997) separatism is the movement for territorial secession of this or that part of the country with the purpose of formation of a new state or receiving a certain degree of autonomy as for language, religion and national issues. as i have already mentioned the majority of states are polyethnic that can cause social and ethnic conflicts. separatism also can be considered to be a certain form of political opposition the subject of which is ethnic unit that is a minority of population and object is the states government that at the same time represents the dominating majority. the beginning of separatism movement can start under two conditions: firstly, the discrimination of ethnic minority, secondly active national political elite. one of the forms of discrimination is cultural imperialism the essence of which is that culture of so-called great nation is represented as progressive, modern and culture of the ethnic minority is considered to be primitive. there are several opinions as for the basic reasons that cause separatism – economical disbalance, cultural contradictions or different political preferences. it is necessary to emphasize that there is no just one reason of separatism movement. there are some cases when more economically developed regions don’t want to donate less developed regions. and on the contrary less developed regions say that if they leave the country they could develop their economy because the current government doesn’t finance them as it should be. k.  boyle and p.  englebert in their book “the primacy of politics in separatist dynamics” (boyle, englebert 2006) think that separatism today is the reaction as for political conditions than the manifestation of cultural differences or exploitation of economic opportunities. we can agree with this opinion because dissatisfaction with economic situation is the first reason why regions especially those which have ethnic minorities start to rebel. the political activity is the only sphere in terms of which it is possible to draw attention to the problems of the ethnic minority. conducting some cultural events it is impossible to prove its originality but if to politicize the identity emphasizing that the central authorities press on this region it is possible not just to attract attention but also to head antigovernmental movement on ethnic ground. the authors also say that the younger the country is the more active the separatism movements could be. it can be seen on the example of postsoviet countries where we could observe a lot of separatism movements due to the weakness of the central government, its impossibility to provide efficient economic policy, its orientation on nationalism as tool of uniting the country. also it is necessary to emphasize that the bigger the country is geographically the more separatism movements it can have (boyle, englebert 2006). besides the authors also single out such reasons as political regime, process of democratization and economic transformation and international atmosphere or the geopolitical situation in the region (boyle, englebert 2006). taking into account all above-mentioned facts it is necessary to say that it is impossible to say uniquely whether separatism is positive or negative phenomenon. we must say that on the one hand it leads to destruction of the country, but on the other hand it leads to the creation of another country that can be more successful and developed. if separatism movement is not accompanied with bloodshed of civil war but only in a democratic way (e.g. czechoslovakia) it is a right way of solution to the problem. 4. classification of separatism separatism according to the author’s opinion could base on different integral parts, i.e. cultural, religious, economic, ideological, ethnic, civilizational. as for the degree of activity it could be active when the ethnic group actively supports the idea of secession; moderate – when ethnic group demands only autonomy status; passive – when ethnic group is dissatisfied with its position in the country but doesn’t proclaim any demands. it could also be open, when the ethnic group openly says about its desire to leave the country; and closed – it can be only under conditions when the government strictly forbids to discuss and speak about the possibility of secession. each case of separatism could go through several stages of its development such as (1)  imposing of identity; (2) prohibition of language, culture, history; (3) criminal prosecution; (4) absorption of ethnic group by the titular group; (5) genocide. 8 yevgeny ryabinin there is an opinion that separatism is a phenomenon that could develop from within. there are several domestic factors that work as a catalyst for the strengthening of ethno/separatist processes in this or that region. but besides domestic factors it is necessary to single out external factors too. due to it an important role is played by the neighboring states or “great powers” (state-subjects) which are interested in weakening or even collapse of the country in order to improve their position in the region or to increase its territory if it has borders with the state-object. external processes have an important influence on the domestic development of the country. that is the reason and character of conflicts are connected with the peculiarities of the geopolitical and geosocial system and its dynamics. ethno/separatist conflicts occur within one state no matter what kind of territorial structure it has. in some cases they develop without intrusion of the third party, in another cases – with the support of the state that is interested in the development of this conflict. during the cold war the relations of the main actors of foreign affairs, i.e. ussr and usa, had ideological basis. especially ideological background was imposed by the ussr. if the disintegration of the country was profitable for the ussr such a conflict was considered to be a nationally liberation movement. and vise versa ideologically adverse processes were called separatist with negative meaning. today politologists say that globalization makes the notion of sovereignty quite conditional and insist on the fact that it is necessary to support politically and legally the right of the peoples for self-determination including the secession of the regions from countries that are called failed-states (баранов, 2006). the same policy is supported by mainly russia and usa. if the separatist conflict is profitable for them they support the rebellious region if not – they say that it violates the sovereignty principle of the country (kosovo, s. ossetia, abkhazia). v.a.  tishkov (тишков, 2005) states that separatism would not have become a global problem, if it hadn’t been an instrument of rivalry between states and a means of geopolitical engineering. if separatist movement in europe is developing due to the internal factors (catalonia), in the third world or on the post-soviet space we could observe the influence of the external factors. the brightest examples are observed in former yugoslavia (kosovo) and ukraine (donbass). the external factor could be seen by different methods – soft and hard. the hard one has one expression – military invasion and could be fulfilled in the following way: • region is supplied with military support; • interference of peacekeeping forces with the purpose of the further solution to the conflict but taking into account the interest either of rebellious region or the government of the state; • conducting humanitarian intervention that presupposes the participation in hostilities on the side of the rebellious region. the soft support could be divided into soft active and soft passive. soft passive is showed just in existence of the neighboring country with ethnically close population and that wants the uniting of the peoples. soft active support is showed in the following way: economical (financing the fight, financing ngos), technical (supply of lethal weaponry), humanitarian (making the ties with ethically close people in the sphere of culture, education and science, financing the educational programs, scientific projects, internships), the support of the rebellious region or the authorities in international organizations such as un, osce, the construction of religious objects, informational (demonization of the rebellious region or the authorities of the state). 5. separatism in donbass so let’s analyze how all above-mentioned factors and principles work on the example of the donbass conflict. some experts say that this conflict couldn’t be considered to be ethnical because this region has a mixed population that consists mainly from the russian and the ukrainians. but the author of this article insists that this conflict has all features of the enthnoseparatist conflict, taking into account that this region during the whole period of ukraine independence supported pro-russian political parties and candidates for presidency and supported the idea of introduction of russian language as the second state one. some may not agree and provide the example of war in yugoslavia but even there were some cases when serbs fought on the side of croatia and croatians who fought for serbia. as for this conflict we can see that two main geopolitical rivals supported different fighting sides: the usa support the government of ukraine and russia supports rebellious region diplomatically and military, providing the rebels with military equipment. besides russia provides the population of rebellious territories with humanitarian aid and textbooks for the school pupils. on the one hand both sides support the idea that the rebellious region must be within territory of ukraine but russia insists on providing this region with autonomous status and usa doesn’t the basic causes of the contemporary separatism 9 officially participate in the negotiation process but its allies germany and france do. today the rhetoric has changed and european states make kiev fulfill the minsk agreement though some months ago such a pressure wasn’t so harsh. the contrary behavior of the usa and russia could be seen in the syrian conflict. the civil war started in syria in 2011 after the wave of arabic autumn and transformed into the ethical and confessional conflict that involved the main geopolitical actor of the world. russia supports the government of syria not only diplomatically but also military, having sent troops to fight the terrorists organization islamic state. usa provides so-called moderate opposition with lethal weaponry and conducting special operation to help them leave the area that is totally bombed by the russian military planes. taking into account that russia and usa have different geopolitical interests in syria, we could observe the different attitude towards the essence of this conflict. how can we explain the geopolitical clash between russia and usa taking into account that there is no ideological conflict between them? in my opinion the explanation is very simple. according to the theory of geopolitics there are two types of states – thellurocratical (ground state – russia) and thalasocratical (sea state – usa) and due to their nature they will always have conflict with each other for the influence on the zones of their interest. usa wants to control the rim-land or the territory that has common borders with russia that is why they support the central government in ukraine. russia has the same direction in exposing its influence on the postsoviet space and exactly on ukraine to prevent it from having anti-russian politicians at power. as for syrian conflict here we have a mixture of geopolitical, military and economic factors that put usa and russia into two different political camps. 6. conclusion so the processes of separatism can develop for a long period of time and can transform into civil wars that can cause genocide or humanitarian intervention from the side of main actors of international affairs. in the majority of cases separatism is the ethnic phenomenon that could be considered to be very complex and multiaspect phenomenon. and taking into account that each case has its own peculiarities there is no just one solution to all cases of separatism. it is necessary to emphasize that influential actors of international affairs for the solution to their geopolitical tasks use ethnic and/or confessional contradictions for stimulating separatist conflicts the basic objective of which setting the direct of control over the country or region. under conditions of the transmission of the contemporary world from bipolar to multipolar system of international relations, above mentioned types of conflict will occur more often and the degree of such conflicts more severe. references boyle k., englebert p., the primacy of politics in separatist dynamics, http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_ files/wgape/10_englebert.pdf. [10.09.2016] gurr t., 1993, minorities at risk, united states institute of peace press, washington. баранов а., 2006, сепаратизм у сучасному світі: політикотериторіальний аспект, человек. сообщество. управление., 3, 107–123. політологічний енциклопедичний словник, 1997, изд-во генеза, київ. сміт е., 2009, нації та націоналізм у глобальну епоху, нікацентр, київ. соин д.ю., 1998, этнополитические конфликты: аналитический обзор, http://www.nationalism.org/library/ digest/soin-sj-1998.htm [05.08.2016] тишков в., 2005, сепаратизм как новая геополитика, http://www.valerytishkov.ru/cntnt/publikacii3/lekcii2/ lekcii/n66_separat.html [15.03.2015] хантингтон с., 2007, столкновение цивилизаций, аст москва, москва. 1. introduction the state border executes main functions, such as barrier, contact, filter; and secondary functions, such as the separation, control, comparison. depending on the geopolitical situation in international relations one of these functions is dominated or all of the functions are performed simultaneously. through the implementation of the state border of the main and secondary functions interconnection the state economy with international economy is established. in modern times intensification of the contact function of the state border is seen, what reflects objective processes of internationalization of economic reality, development of relations among states and development of interstate and crossborder cooperation. cross-border cooperation is realized in various forms, new ones of them are clusters, triangles of growth, and traditional and nowadays the most effective euroregions are. at present times in the ukrainian-polish border there are two euroregions, they are “carpathian” and “buh”, what is a prime example of border contact function strengthening in terms of the intensification of the process of european integration. journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 43–47 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.014.6630 the functioning of the polish-ukrainian border within conditions of european integration process intensification (on the example of euroregion “buh”) natalia kotsan (1), halyna kopachynska (2) (1) country-studies and foreign relations department, lesya ukrainka eastern european national university, vynnuchenka 28, 43000 lutsk, ukraine, e-mail: intrel-region.dep@eenu.edu.ua (corresponding author) (2) country-studies and foreign relations department, lesya ukrainka eastern european national university, vynnuchenka 28, 43000 lutsk, ukraine, e-mail: kopachinskaja@gmail.com citation kotsan n., kopachynska h., 2017, the functioning of the polish-ukrainian border within conditions of european integration process intensification (on the example of euroregion “buh”), journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 43–47. abstract the main functions of the state border, such as barrier, filter, contact are studied. it is proved that currently there is activation of contact function of the state border. it is underlined that the ukrainian-polish border is characterized by processes of contact function strengthening. origins and political aspects of the formation and development of the euroregion “buh” in the ukrainian-polish border; the positive impact of cross-border cooperation within these structures on the socio-economic development of border areas; the prospects and ways of further intensification of ukrainian-polish border cooperation and positive effects from increased contact functions of the ukrainian-polish border are studied. key words border, state, european integration, cross-border cooperation, the euro region, ukraine, poland. 44 natalia kotsan, halyna kopachynska ukrainian-polish cross-border cooperation, its characteristics and trends (economic, humanitarian, environmental and other), legal support, history of development and formation of the euroregion “buh” is presented by sufficient quantity of publications, which include monographs, dissertation researches, scientific articles, etc. among researchers of ukrainian-polish border cooperation including cross-border, such scientists as a. bordun (бордун, 2003), a. vavrynyuk (вавринюк, 2008), t. komornicki, a.  miszczuk (2011), n. kotsan (коцан et al., 2008), a. malinowska (малиновська, 2002), a.  miszczuk (2013), a. mrinska (мрінська, 2005), j.m.  smutek, p.  łonyszyn (2016), g. strilchuk (стрільчук, 2005) and many others can be named. however, the impact of cross-border cooperation on the transformation of the functions of state borders and socioeconomic development of border areas are poorly studied areas. the aim of the article is to identify the process of contact function strengthening of the ukrainianpolish border by euroregion “buh” creation. the goal was achieved by solving of such tasks as research of creation of euroregion in ukrainian-polish border; evaluation of its functioning and its impact on the social and economic development of border areas. 2. euroregion “buh”: new form of international cooperation cross-border association euroregion “buh” was created on september 29, 1995 in lutsk (ukraine) (стрільчук, 2005). the structure of the euroregion was formed by border areas of the two states – poland and ukraine. treaty establishing the european region from poland was signed by such provinces as: chelm (marian tsihosh), lublin (edward hunek) tarnobrzeski (paul stavovy) zamistskyy (stanislav rapa), and from the part of ukraine the head of volyn regional state administration b.p. klimchuk signed the treaty. on may 15, 1998 in the belarusian city of brest to the euroregion “buh” new members podlasie and brest regions were accepted. two years later, on may 2000 to the euroregion “buh” sokal and zhovkva districtsof lviv region were accepted. by the end of 1998 ccross-border alliance included the border areas of the three states of belarus, poland and ukraine and its territory was one of the largest of european euroregions. the total area of the euroregion amounted 82 thousand km2, of which the polish part was 35.6%, belarussian was 39.9% and ukrainian was 24.5% (перепелиця, 2009). due to administrative changes of 1998–1999 in euroregion former tarnobrzeski province was excluded and thereby the total area of the euroregion decreased, which became about 64 thousand km2 with a population of 6.9 million people. on june 3, 1996 euroregion “buh” became a member of the association of european border regions, from 1998 has a representative in the administration of the mentioned above association. another important institution that operates actively in terms of european integration, is established in 2001 and associated with cbc the european centre of integration and cross-border partnership “house of europe”. the main purpose of cross-border association of euroregion “buh” is the development of border areas and cooperation in the following areas: territorial planning; transport and communications; education, health, culture, sports and tourism; protection and enhancement of the environment; liquidation of emergencies and natural disasters; promoting contacts among inhabitants of border areas, cooperation among organizations and institutions and business entities. the governing bodies of the euroregion “buh” are: council of the european region; the bureau of the european region; euroregion secretariat; audit commission. to address common challenges in euroregion “buh” working groups were formed. 3. contact functions of euroregion “buh” during the existence of the euroregion “buh” in its territory a number of programs and projects with eu structures participation were implemented. polish accession to the eu provided more opportunities to attract financial support from the european commission. borderland volyn region participates in such programs and projects as interreg, phare cbc, tacis cbc, which were implemented with the participation of the eu since the late 90s, what is one of the manifestations of contact function of ukrainian-polish border functioning in the intensification of the process of european integration (мрінська, 2005). one of the manifestation of the realization of contact function of ukrainian-polish border within the euroregion “buh” is intensification of cooperation in issues related to environmental protection in the border areas. an example of this is the implementation of the environmental program “clean buh”, which aims to solve the current problems of the protection and restoration of the river, which flows through the territories of three neighboring the functioning of the polish-ukrainian border within conditions of european integration process intensification… 45 states, which are poland, ukraine and belarus. also from 2002, a project “joint river basin management. basin management of river pripyat” is realized, its aim is to harmonize the coordinated management of international river basins (river pripyat) through the introduction of european regulations. within this project the training of specialists of analytical department of ministry of environmental resources of several regions of ukraine was carried out. another manifestation of the realization of border contact function within the researched euroregion is functioning of cross-border strategies and creation of project which aim is to prevent floods in the basin of western buh. the implementation of them started in the volyn region from 2004, when a working group was founded, which included experts from border regions of ukraine, poland and belarus. contact function of ukrainian-polish border within euroregion “buh” is realized also in economic cooperation. so, from july 2002 with the assistance of the regulatory reform program in the region project “bizpro” is realized, the essence of which is to provide long-term support to small and medium enterprises in order to rise the economic development of ukraine. the “bizpro” realizes number of programs to stimulate private enterprises. in volyn region the program is implemented by center of municipal reforms “lutsk-1432” in three cities of regional importance (lutsk, kovel, novovolynsk) and gorokhiv district (коцан et al., 2008). from 2002 by the eu assistance volyn region participates in the project “establishment of network business internet centers in ukraine cities, where insufficiently developed telecommunications are” in order to promote economic growth and providing regions of ukraine with underdeveloped telecommunications and business infrastructure services for business development and access to modern information and communication technologies the project aims to develop in the small towns of ukraine services of business consulting for implementation business specialized – training programs, implementation of marketing strategies for small and medium businesses, the use of information technologies. appropriation of 2.75 million euros for the reconstruction and expansion of international road exit of checkpoint “yagodyn–dorohusk” is planed by the project “improving of border management” which is implemented in the region from 2003 (бордун, 2003). european commission held a tender to determine the regulatory authority for the practical implementation of work provided by technical objectives of the project. in february 2004 its winner company “louis berger” (france) became (вавринюк, 2008). another example of the implementation of the contact function of ukrainian-polish border in the economic sphere is the operation of the project “improving the environment for small and medium enterprises development”, implemented from 2003 in volyn and ivano-frankivsk regions of ukraine. its purpose is to promote economic growth and poverty reduction through private sector development and the development of small and medium businesses. during the period of implementation of the project a number of international events were carried out. from october 2004 until today within the framework of cross-border cooperation program of phare, which is spread on the territories of the members of the euroregion “buh”, namely the border regions of poland, ukraine and belarus, in the region the project “development of institutional cooperation in promoting entrepreneurship in border regions of poland, ukraine and belarus” is realized. the purpose of the project is strengthening the institutional cooperation in the sector of entrepreneurship and innovation in the aforementioned areas. also from january 2004 the project “ukrainianpolish cross-border agency – together in the future” continues to be implemented. the main objective of the project is to create a ukrainian-polish cross-border agencies on the basis of four regions of the two countries (volyn and lviv region of ukraine, lublin and podkarpackie provinces of poland), which aims to occupy a central place in the work on the ukrainian-polish border and to engage in their activities other existing structures, including the euroregion “buh”. other components of the project is to develop a common and shared cross-border regional development strategy and the creation of cross-border projects. manifestation of contact function of ukrainianpolish border within euroregion “buh” is also cooperation aimed at promoting local democracy. thus, the program “increasing opportunities to use european funds by the authorities of the border regions of poland and ukraine” was realized in the first half of 2004. in its framework training for representatives of local executive and self-governing bodies, as well as non-profit organizations was conducted on february 26–27, 2004. on may 2003 in the frame of program “city of lublin as a place of cooperation of local authorities of east and west” the representatives of the region took part in the polish-belarusian-ukrainian roundtable dedicated to the activities of self-government, and also became participants of training in the organs of self-government communes and counties of lublin province. on the results of the project 46 natalia kotsan, halyna kopachynska implementation index of proposals on the questions of establishment of cross-border cooperation among the authorities and the local communities of the border regions of the three members of the euroregion “buh” was prepared and issued in printed version. another manifestation of the activation of contact function of ukrainian-polish border is the awakening of tourism activity within the euroregion “buh”, implementation of which is influenced by small tourism projects with the financial support of phare. one of them is the project of 2003 “implementation of training seminars on the questions of green tourism in volyn region initiation”. the project intends to disseminate information about rural tourism among residents of the region and reviewing desirous with the experience of this type of business in poland (стрільчук, 2005). thanks to the dissemination of information, organization of trainings and round tables interest of local people to this type of business has increased significantly. already at the end of 2003 in several districts private, mostly family firms that provide complex of tourist services started their activity. results of these small project were used for further expansion of cross-border tourism cooperation. in particular, based on it the joint project “development of agro-tourism in the euroregion “buh”, which was financially supported by the phare program and implemented by the polish side, in partnership with the public association “volyn perspectives” was prepared. also, in public association “volyn prospects” the information center for support and development of green tourism in volyn region functions. today 22  ourist agricultural dwelling are well equipped. for the development of cross-border cooperation in the tourism industry contributes the ukrainian-polish-belarusian project “track” eu triangle of friendship: lublin-lutsk-brest”, which is funded by phare program from the funds of small eu projects, implementation of which in volyn region started from january 2004. main objective of the project is the study of general concept of tourism development in the euroregion “buh” (коцан et al., 2008). in the process of another tourist project of phare program realization from the funds of small eu projects “creation of office service of tourist traffic in cultural and entertainment center of the city zvyezhynets” the ceremonial opening of the newly created point of tourist information in the city zvyezhynets (poland) happened, the concept of its arrangement by participation of ukrainian and polish specialists was worked out. as the result of implementation of ukrainian-polish border contact function within the euroregion “buh” participating countries worked out a number of other interesting and promising ideas that can be used as a basis for the development of joint projects in such areas as environmental protection, tourism, software, local economic development, democracy and local government, as well as social and cultural spheres. several small cross-border projects can be realized with the financial support of phare “the eastern border of poland”. 4. local programs and projects intensification of international cooperation within the euroregion “buh” on the project level creates favorable conditions for the implementation of the new european neighbourhood and partnership instrument (enpi), which aim is to facilitate the development of an area of prosperity and good neighborliness between the eu and partner countries covered by the european neighbourhood policy (enp). the specific objectives and issues, which are developed in each program will be formed on local perspectives of enpi cbc program partners reflecting local priorities. management of programs will be the joint responsibility of local program partners. programs will be able to support a range of projects, from small local initiatives with local administrations and non-governmental civil society organizations to large-scale projects involving a large number of partners at the regional and sub-national levels. program of trans border cooperation enpi will also provide investments in cross-border context. with the introduction of enpi nature of the eu assistance was further reinforced by increasing resources, including total funding, which is available for ukraine and will count 100.5 million euros (перепелиця, 2009). the purpose of border cooperation program “poland-belarus-ukraine” is social and economic development of border areas and their integration. this program provides cooperation in several areas of priorities. they include: increasing the competitiveness of the border area; improving quality of life; development of cross-border cooperation and interpersonal contacts and networking initiatives by local communities. implementation of the enpi through border cooperation program “poland-belarus-ukraine” will promote: economic and social development in border areas; cooperation in addressing of common challenges in such fields as environment, health, the fight against organized crime; ensuring of efficient the functioning of the polish-ukrainian border within conditions of european integration process intensification… 47 and secure borders; help in advancing human contacts in the ukrainian-polish border. 5. summary it is proved that territories that became parts of the euroregion “buh” share a common history. it was studied that during functioning of the euroregion “buh” a number of interesting and promising ideas that can be used as a basis for the development of joint projects in areas such as local development, democracy and local government as well as social, cultural and other fields were worked out. several small cross-border projects can be realized within the financial support of phare program “the eastern border of poland”. with the introduction of european neighbourhood policy by the eu, and through it – the european neighbourhood and partnership instrument (enpi) overall funding available for ukraine was increased. implementation of the program “poland-belarus-ukraine” will promote economic and social development in border areas; cooperation in addressing of common challenges in fields such as environment, public health and the prevention and fight against organized crime; ensuring efficient and secure borders; help to advance human contacts in the ukrainian-polish border. all these processes are manifestation of contact functions of ukrainian-polish border strengthening that in future will have a positive impact on the deepening of the integration process between ukraine and poland in particular, and the whole european union. references komornicki t., miszczuk a., 2011, transgraniczne powiqzania wojewόdztw polski wschodniej, ekspertyza wykonana na potrzeby nowej strategii rozwoju polski wschodniej, ministerstwo rozwoju regionalnego, warszawa. miszczuk a., 2013, uwarunkowania peryferyjności regionu przygranicznego, norbertinum, lublin. smutek j.m., łonyszyn p., 2016, cross-border issues in polish supraregional strategies on example of strategies of western and eastern poland, journal of geography, politics and society, 6(2), 32–44. бордун о.ю., 2003, транспортна інфраструктура західноукраїнського прикордоння: економіко-географічне дослідження, phd typescript: лну ім. і. франка, львів. вавринюк а.а., 2008, сучасна діяльність польської частини єврорегіону “буг” (суспільно-географічний аналіз), рвв “вежа” волин. нац. ун-ту ім. лесі українки, луцьк. коцан н.н., вавринюк а.а., коцан р.і., 2008, сучасні проблеми розвитку польсько-українського транскордонного співробітництва в єврорегіоні “буг”, науковий вісник волинського національного університету імені лесі українки. географічні науки, 1, 99–105. малиновська о.ю., 2002, політико-географічні аспекти формування та функціонування західного державного кордону україни, phd typescript: київ.  нац.  ун-т ім. т. шевченка, київ. мрінська о.в., 2005, регіональна політика в країнах європейського союзу і можливості використання її досвіду в україні (суспільно-географічне дослідження, phd typescript: київ. нац. ун-т ім. т. шевченка, київ. перепелиця г.м., 2009, нові інструменти “східного партнерства” і можливості для україни, [in:] транскордонне співробітництво на нових східних кордонах єс : матеріали круглого столу, поліграфцентр “ліра”, ужгород, 152–158. стрільчук р.с., 2005, хроніка найважливіших подій становлення українсько-польського транскордонного регіону, [in:] європейські інтеграційні процеси і транскордонне співробітництво  : міжнародні відносини, економіка, політика, географія, історія, право: тези доп. ii міжнар. наук.-практ. конф. студ., асп. і молодих науковців, рвв “вежа” волин. держ. ун-ту ім. лесі українки, луцьк, 67–69. 1. introduction the topicality of this article lies in the lack of research of the highlighted topic. here in ukraine the topic of sanctuaries are not researched enough in comparison with other countries, where the information about them can be found easily. moreover, the pathway of saint jacob ‘via regia’ (бордун, шуманська, 2014), which goes through ukraine as well, has been recently explored. this topic needs more attention, because it is necessary to make pilgrimage more popular, and the sacred legacy must be saved as it is in a bad condition now. the object of this article is sanctuaries of lviv archdiocese. in 1375 the ukrainian roman catholic metropolia was founded in halych (later it was moved to lviv) together with lviv archdiocese and dioceses of przemysl (with its center in the city of przemysl), volodymyr (in the city of volodymyr, later – lutsk) and chelm (in the city of chelm, later – hrubeszow and krasnostaw). the modern lviv archdiocese includes four oblasts of ukraine: lviv, ternopil, sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese: current state and development prospects oresta bordun (1), andrij kovalchuk (2) (1) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: obordun@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) tourism department, faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenko 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: kovalchukas@i.ua citation bordun o., kovalchuk a., 2018, sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese: current state and development prospects, journal of geography, politics and society, 8(4), 53–60. abstract this article provides a geographical and functional analysis of the biggest roman catholic sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese. it also explains the definition of the word “sanctuary”, its connection with catholic canons. based on the survey, the amount of pilgrims of 15 sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese is calculated. some of them are more than three hundred years in action, and some are quite new. the part of the sanctuaries is located in little villages with poorly developed infrastructure, and this is a problematic issue. the image of spatial layout the sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese and differentiation amount of pilgrims in 2017 are show. it is interesting to dwell on some of the most popular sanctuaries in more details. characteristics of sanctuary of st anthony in lviv and others sacred place are exposed. problems and perspectives of sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese are identified. key words sanctuary, amount of pilgrims; canon; location of the sanctuaries received: 05 march 2018 accepted: 28 may 2018 published: 30 november 2018 journal of geography, politics and society 2018, 8(4), 53–60 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.18.029.9016 54 oresta bordun, andrij kovalchuk ivano-frankivsk and chernivtsi oblasts. but the sanctuaries function only in two of them (lviv and ternopil oblasts) (kopij, 2011). in order to gain this luck of scientific research, such objectives must be fulfilled in the article: • to research the notion of ‘sanctuaries’; • to learn what place sanctuaries hold in the world of pilgrimage; • to analyze the current condition of sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese; • to identify problems and offer different ways of development of sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese. 2. analysis lviv archdiocese is one of those regions, characterized by a high percentage of religious people. here, during many centuries almost all christianity denominations have been coexisting and developing side by side (the eastern rite church, latin and armenian churches), as well as protestantism and judaism. religious life of lviv region is a complex system of relations, which are developing under the influence of many economical, cultural and demographic processes. while analyzing popular works (table 1), it becomes obvious that the notion of sanctuaries is not researched enough. by summing up all data it is possible to create one more definition of this term. sanctuary is a place where it is possible to meet with god through miraculous icons or relics. also, it is a devoted to god place where his power is displayed in a special way via miracles and divine grace. the sanctuary must be accompanied with the organization which will deal with pilgrims and their trips to the sacred place. trips to sanctuaries have become popular in the roman catholic church. the very word “sanctuary” (latin sanctuarium) means “a sacred place”. in english language this word can also mean “a shelter” (for people and animals), a place of safety. usually sanctuaries are divided into separate types, depending on the level of authorities that founded them: • diocesan (eparchial) (founded by an eparchial bishop); • national (the conference of catholic bishops of a specific country); • international (apostolic capital). the roman catholic code of canon law devotes the whole third chapter called “sanctuary” to the issue of legal regulation of sanctuaries’ activities. according tab. 1. definitions of “sanctuary” in christian theology definitions author shrine is understood a church or other sacred place to which numerous members of the faithful make pilgrimage for a special reason of piety, with the approval of the local ordinary. acc. to canon 1230 of the 1983 catholic code of canon law sanctuary is a place of invocation, which constantly attracts more and more pilgrims and religious tourists, who often find themselves in the complicated human and spiritualrelated condition, and those who are far from church and understanding what faith is. so, sanctuary is a symbol of the living christ among us, and the christians have always been finding the initiative of the living god towards humans in it. benedykt xvi sanctuary is a church or a sacral building for public practicing of the cult of god which (caused by reverence for holy icons and saved relics, the miracle of god and a possibility to acquire special remission on the patronal festival)is considered to be the place of pilgrimage where one can pray for mercy and express their gratitude for it. pius xii a special place, identified by a local bishop, which can be visited by pilgrims and religious people and where they can ask for god’s grace through the intercession of mother of god. kyiv-zhytomyr diocese of the roman catholic church in ukraine a rich religious, spiritual, cultural and material heritage of the catholic church the roman catholic church in belorussia a special space, where god’s grace is displayed in a supernatural way; these are the places, which are blessed by god, and are visited by numerous pilgrims and religious people. compendium of the catechism of the catholic church a place of worship or storing of cult objects or relics; a place which holds something precious, or a place which is very special to someone doroszewski’s dictionary of polish language a place, which is invested with axiological characteristics of sacral significance and is presented in a specific church or monastery ya.m.popovych source: compiled by the authors based on: code of canon law (1983), adamczyk (2014), київсько-житомирська дієцезія (2018), doroszewski (ed., 1958–1969), попович (2014). sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese: current state and development prospects 55 to the canon 1230 of the code of canon law, a sanctuary is a church or other sacred place, which is visited by many pilgrims due to their devoutness with the blessing of a local bishop (code of canon law, 1983). in accordance with the canon 1231 of the code of canon law, in order to acquire a national status a sanctuary needs to get the approval from the conference of bishops of this country. regarding an international status, it is necessary to present its statute to the conference in the apostolic capital (rome). a sanctuary is appointed with a beneficiary or other authorities that are responsible for the management of the sacred place, providing pilgrims with accommodation, services and access to the religious ceremonies and sacraments of confession and forgiveness of sins. according to the canon 1233, in order to provide a good service to pilgrims a beneficiary is able to use local resources, especially when the flow of visitors is significant. those resources are: accommodation places, food etc, which will set positive conditions for praying and well-being of pilgrims. a beneficiary is also responsible for documents, donations and woty (images of different parts of body, made of precious metals, which are left by people as a gratitude for healing, often hung on miraculous icons; they are widespread both in the catholic and the orthodox churches). according to paragraph 1 of the canon 1234, in sanctuaries people receive the remission of their sins by being present at a holy mess, especially by taking holy sacraments, penance and performing other forms of a religious cult. a beneficiary or other authorities may have assistants, who will help to manage and maintain a sanctuary and all of its building (code of canon law, 1983). the authors of this article have researched the general amount of sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese, their location and presence of the object of pilgrimage (table 2). tab. 2. sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese as of year 2017 lviv archdiocese no. city name of the church name of the sanctuary object of pilgrimage decree on establishment of sanctuary – date amount of pilgrims in 2017 1 lviv the archcathedral basilica of the assumption of the blessed virgin mary, the latin cathedral sanctuary of the merciful mother of god and divine mercy icon of the merciful mother of god and divine mercy provision as of 12.05.1776 and 1948 250 000 2 lviv st. antony church sanctuary of saint anthony of padua icon of saint anthony of padua provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 13.06.1995 60 000 3 stryi the church of birth of the blessed virgin mary sanctuary of virgin mary, the guardian of people’s hopes icon of virgin mary, the guardian of people’s hopes provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 8.09.1995 1000 4 kamianka-buz’ka the church of the assumption of the holy virgin mary sanctuary of the dying lord jesus christ of miliatyn icon of the dying lord jesus christ of miliatyn provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 14.09.1996 2 400 5 krysovychi the church of the blessed virgin mary of fatima sanctuary of the blessed virgin mary of fatima statue of the blessed virgin mary of fatima provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 13.10.1997 2 500 6 mostyska the church of st. catharina of alexandria sanctuary of the mother of perpetual hel icon of the mother of perpetual help provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 27.06.2002 7 200 7 rudki the church of the assumption of the holy virgin mary sanctuary of the blessed virgin mary of rudky icon of of the blessed virgin mary of rudky provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 2.07.2003 3 200 56 oresta bordun, andrij kovalchuk so, there are 15 sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese. some of them are more than three hundred years in action, and some are quite new. there are 2 sanctuaries in lviv: sanctuary of the merciful mother of god and divine mercy (the latin cathedral, since 1776) and st. anthony of padua (st. anthony church, since 1995). location and history has already been explored in literature by m. flaga (2014). other sanctuaries are spread all over the region (fig. 1.). they are not concentrated in one single place. some of them (in lviv, krysovychi and mostyska) are situated on the pathway of st. jacob, mutually augmenting their significance for pilgrimage. 8 berezdivtsi the church of the exaltation of the holy cross sanctuary of the holy cross icon of brozovskyi jesus christ provision of the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 14.09.2005 400-500 9 nyzhankovychi the church of the holy trinity sanctuary of the mother of divine providence statue of the mother of divine providence provision as of 1.05.2007 1 800 10 lanovychi st.nicholas church sanctuary of the holy virgin mary of saliatyn statue of the holy virgin mary of saliatyn provision of archbishop mechyslav mokshytskyi as of 3.11.2009 1000 11 susidovychi the carmelite church sanctuary of st.anna bas-relief of st. anna provision of archbishop mechyslav mokshytskyi as of 24.07.2016 500 12 vynnyky the church of the assumption of the holy virgin mary sanctuary of the holy virgin mary of vynnyky icon of the holy virgin mary of vynnyky provision of archbishop mechyslav mokshytskyi as of 27.11.2016 25000 13 yazlovets сhapel of the former general house of the sisters of immaculate the sanctuary of the blessed marcelina darowska relikwie of the blessed marcelina darowska provision of the lviv archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 1.09.1999 r. data are not available 14 chortkiv the sanctuary of the lady of the most holy rosary lady of the most holy rosary lady of the most holy rosary provision of archbishop mechyslav mokshytskyi as of 3.11.2009 r 5 000 15 polupanivka st.jozef the sanctuary of holy scapular of our lady holy scapular of our lady provision of the lviv archbishop marian yavorskyi as of 16.07.2004 r 1 500 source: data gathered by o.bordun based on the survey of abbots. fig. 1. roman catholic sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese source: compiled by the authors. sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese: current state and development prospects 57 3. functional analysis of roman catholic sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese it is interesting to do well of the sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese in more details: sanctuary of the merciful mother of god and divine mercy is held in the roman catholic basilica, the main church of lviv archdiocese of the roman catholic church in ukraine. it is situated in cathedral square of lviv. the church is a piece of a sacral architecture of the 14th-18th centuries, and a listed building of the national significance. its protection number is 316/0 (kozłowska, 2011). the exact date, when the construction works started, is unknown, but nevertheless this church belongs to top 7 oldest churches of lviv. 8 chapels around the church have survived till these days. the tower of the basilica is one of the highest buildings in the central part of the city (66 m). together with four other buildings it creates a logo of lviv. sanctuary of st anthony of padua is situated in lviv at 49a lychakivska st. at request of the provincial curia of franciscans fathers and st anthony church priests the lviv metropolitan archbishop marian yavorskyi established the sanctuary in st anthony church on june, 13, 1995 (the archdiocese of lviv). although the official date is june, 13, 1995, the church has been gathering numerous pilgrims due to their devoutness to st anthony for a long time (kopij, 2014). each tuesday during the mess everyone has a chance to ask god for his grace via the intercession of st anthony of padua. the celebration of st anthony church patron’s day takes place on june, 13, and each person may get the remission of their sins. a solemn mess is held in the park near the church, after which bread and lilies are blessed. the mess ends up in the collective prayer to st anthony and veneration of his relics. the sanctuary is in the peaceful part of lviv, not far from the downtown. pilgrims are received in the administrative building. the advantage of such location lies in the good public transport communications with all parts of the city. one of the most important prominent places of lviv – lychakiv cemetery and the cemetery of lwow eaglets – are situated not far from the church. sanctuary of virgin mary, the guardian of people’s hopes is located in stryi in the church of birth of the blessed virgin mary. on september, 09, 2001 cardinal marian yavorskyi crowned the icon of virgin mary with stryi crown, which was blessed in lviv on june, 26, 2001 by pope john paul ii. the parish is served by diocesan priests, and since october 1994 nuns from the congregation of the sisters of st joseph have been working in this church (the archdiocese of lviv). sanctuary of the dying lord jesus christ of miliatyn is in the church of the assumption of the holy virgin mary in kamianka-buz’ka at john paul ii st. the church was founded in 1471. however, it lost its original form, because it was burnt down by the tatars, but soon it was renovated. the decree on establishment of sanctuary in the church was signed by the metropolitan marian yavorskyi in 1996 (the archdiocese of lviv). in the 17th century an unknown italian artist created an icon of jesus christ on the cross, which he painted with oil paints on the thick 56x73 cm canvas. the background of the painting is brighter than the figure of crucified jesus. his head with the hair hanging over the right shoulder is almost parallel to the horizontal beam of the cross. his face is turned in the way as if he looks at people with a great grief in his eyes. he has a crown of thorns on his head and a deep wound on the left shoulder near the neck, left after carrying the cross. the miraculous icon as well as its copies is often decorated with golden and silver crowns and costly frameworks (kopij, 2014). sanctuary of the blessed virgin mary of fatima is located in krysovychi, not far from the city of mostyska. on october, 13, 1997 the church was proclaimed the sanctuary of the blessed virgin mary of fatima (the archdiocese of lviv). krysovychi belonged to the parish of the sacred heart of jesus and the immaculate heart of mary in striletskyi, but on august, 1, 2009 they created their own parish. it’s served by diocesan priests and nuns from the congregation of the sisters servants of the immaculate conception of the blessed virgin mary (salesian sisters). during the period from may to october the church holds special religious services and many other celebrations under the supervision of virgin mary. a lot of pilgrims come to the sanctuary from different parts of ukraine, poland and the world. sanctuary of the mother of perpetual help is located in the church of st catharina of alexandria in mostyska at 1, ivana franko st. many pilgrims come to visit this church, because it stands on via regia route (бордун, шуманська, 2014). the sanctuary is served by redemptionists (the congregation of the most holy redeemer). sanctuary of the blessed virgin mary of rudky is located in the city of rudky near sambir, in the church of the assumption of the holy virgin mary. a famous polish writer oleksandr fredro is buried in this church (kopij, 2014). there is a big amount of pilgrims coming to this sacred place from ukraine and poland, that’s why all information is available in ukraine and polish. sanctuary of the holy cross is located in the church of the exaltation of the holy cross in berezdivtsi near 58 oresta bordun, andrij kovalchuk stryi. its protection register number is 1370/1. the icon of virgin mary from the main altar was considered miraculous in 1741. but soon the main point of interest in the church was changed to the icon of crucified jesus christ, which started to cry with bloody tears on may, 16, 1741. the church was flourishing until world war ii. after the war and the decline of the soviet union it was returned to the roman catholic community and gradually reconstructed. sanctuary of the mother of divine providence is located in nyzhankovychi in the church of the holy trinity. on october, 7, 2017 there was the celebration of lady of the most holy rosary hold in the church, which was attended by many pilgrims, including 200 people who crossed the ukrainian-polish border for this reason. the church and its additional premises were repaired with the help of pilgrims. each month 150 people come to visit it, mostly in groups by buses, less individually. sanctuary of the holy virgin mary of saliatyn is located in st nicholas church in lanovychi near sambir. on september 19, 2017 the sanctuary celebrated 171 anniversary of a marian apparition (the archdiocese of lviv). sanctuary of st anna at the carmelite monastery in susidovychi. on july 26, 2012 the archbishop mechyslav mokshytskyi blessed a precise copy of st anna’s bas-relief at the main altar, and in 2016 he proclaimed the church as st anna’s sanctuary (the archdiocese of lviv). according to the legend, st anna’s bas-relief was “excavated” from the ground in the second half of the 16th century in the area, which later was called the merciful hill. it was placed in st nicholas church, but the bas-relief “returned” to its previous place until the wooden chapel was built for it there, which was transformed into the stone temple. the miraculous bas-relief of st anna is in krakow right now, but it should be returned to susidovychi. sanctuary of the holy virgin mary of vynnyky is located in vynnyky near lviv. on november 27, 2016 the miraculous icon was crowned and the church was proclaimed a sanctuary of the holy virgin mary of vynnyky (the archdiocese of lviv). it is one of the newest sanctuaries in ukraine. that is why there are not a lot of pilgrims now visiting this holy place, but later its convenient location near lviv will become a huge plus, which will facilitate the amount of visitors. the church of the ascension of the blessed virgin mary and its bell tower are the pieces of architecture of the 18th-19th centuries. three more sanctuaries of lviv archdiocese are located in ternopil oblasts: the sanctuary of the lady of the most holy rosary is located in chortkiv in the church of the lady of the most holy rosary and st stanislav (the decree as of november, 3, 2009) (the archdiocese of lviv). the church impresses the visitors by its neo-gothic style of architecture. it used to be a defensive fortification centuries ago. among other sanctuaries of the modern ukraine the sanctuary in chortkiv is almost unknown: very little amount of pilgrims come to visit this sacred place. however it is only the matter of time, the sanctuary is comparatively new. the sanctuary of holy scapular of our lady in st joseph church in polupanivka (ternopil deanery). on the 16th of july 2004 the church became the sanctuary of holy scapular of our lady. on the 17th of october 2010 archbishop mechyslav mokshytskyi blessed the way of the cross near the church. it was arranged by the local community on their own initiative and money. moreover, there are 15 stations along the way of the cross, from the moment when christ was sentenced till his resurrection. each station is described in sculptures, which are placed on stones and perfectly match the local landscape. the locals tried to make everything as natural as possible; therefore they didn’t destroy anything which had been made by the nature. they even tried not to cover stones, laid naturally, by cobblestones while building the road. this place is taken care of a lot. the beautiful flowers grow near each station, and in order to look after them properly the special water pouring system has been applied. the way of the cross is lit up by many lanterns. unfortunately this place is not very popular both among religious people and tourists, because it is almost unknown as the sanctuary. although it is considered that this way of the cross and st joseph church is the most representative and spectacular in the ternopil oblast. the sanctuary of the blessed marcelina darowska is located in the chapel of the former general house of the sisters of immaculate conception of the blessed virgin mary in yazlovets. during the whole year children and young people come here for religious recollections, where they pray, study, work, go on interesting excursions. also family couples and lone travelers are welcomed here. standing near the grave of the blessed marcelina darowska women pray for their firstborns and healing of their ill children. 4. the problems and perspectives so, the roman catholic sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese are well-managed and well-organized. but some of them need to be repaired to a greater or lesser extent. money for these types of work should come not only from ukrainian sponsors and religious sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese: current state and development prospects 59 people, but also from the roman catholics of poland and the roman catholic church overall. the part of the sanctuaries is located in little villages with poorly developed infrastructure, and this is a problematic issue. that is why it is necessary to repair roads and maintain economical transport means. as for the very sanctuaries, often they are not able to hold a big amount of pilgrims. a lot of them are situated near the national border and cannot provide travelers with all necessary services. most buildings for pilgrims are built with own money of abbots and local citizens. unfortunately, not all people who want to visit these sacred places have a chance to do that. very often those who have a great desire to come to and pray in different holy places belong to the poor layer of society. rich people remember about the state of their souls very seldom and they don’t think it is that necessary to give money and affords to take part in tiring and complicated tours to rome and jerusalem. that’s why it is so important to develop the local pilgrimage and make more and more people from different social layers feel that need to visit the sacred place at least once a year, because the pilgrimage means a craving for transformation, a desire to go beyond worldly pleasures and expand your own horizons as well as the means to push the borders and overcome them. the big obstacle in developing pilgrimage is an unstable political situation in ukraine and the combat actions in the east of the country, which reduces the flow of tourists on this territory, restraining both local citizens and foreign pilgrims from visiting the sanctuaries under discussion. also it is necessary to provide the support of qualified specialists (guides, tour organizers etc) who know history, culture, religion, traditions of ukraine and the peoples that have been living here as well as the foreign languages. it is important to record statistical data about the amount of pilgrims in order to analyze the performed work and the potentialities of sanctuaries. in order to learn perspectives of the international pilgrimage and tourism development in details, to identify possible flows of pilgrims and tourists from specific countries, their interests and requests, it is necessary to establish relations with attaches of these countries in ukraine (usa, canada, israel, vatican, germany, poland, sweden, bulgaria etc.) as well as with societies, communities, national cultural funds and confessional centers of national minorities in our countries. after accomplishing all abovementioned tasks it will be possible to state that the foundation of sanctuaries as objects of pilgrimage has been laid. 5. conclusions a sanctuary is one of the types of christian sacred places, which are visited by roman catholic pilgrims in order to get the remission of their sins. besides the very objects of pilgrimage and significant sacral and spiritual meaning, a sanctuary must have people, responsible for its management, functioning and pilgrimage. there are twelve sanctuaries in lviv archdiocese: two of them (the assumption of the blessed virgin mary and st anthony sanctuaries) are in lviv, the others are located in these cities and villages (one in each): stryi, kamianka-buz`ka, mostyska, rudky, vynnyky, nyzhankovychi, krysovychi, lanovychi, susidovychi, berezdivtsi. most of them have been recently established by provisions of lviv archbishop. the following problems of functioning are characteristic to these sanctuaries: infrastructure and transport accessibility (especially for those in small villages); collection of funds for repair and maintenance of buildings; searching and attraction of skilled personnel for excursions and pilgrimage services; advertising and information support; interaction with the authorities, public organizations and the whole ukrainian society. references adamczyk j., 2014, wokół prawnej definicji sanktuarium, prawo kanoniczne, 57(3), 65–82. code of canon law chapter iii. shrines, http://www.vatican.va [05.03.2018]. doroszewski w., 1958–1969, słownik języka polskiego, pwn, warszawa. flaga m., 2014, sacred places in lviv – their changing significance and functions, prace geograficzne, 137, 91 – 114. kopij g., 2011, sanktuaria archdiecezji lwowskiej. przewodnik, wydawnictwo i drukarnia św. krzyża, lwów-opole. kozłowska a., 2011, wywiad z o. sławomirem zielińskim, dyrektorem wydziału duszpasterstwa ogólnego, pracownikiem kurii lwowskiej „archidiecezja lwowska odradza się z popiołów”, http://www.radomsko.franciszkanie.pl/wywiad_s_zielinski.html [05.03.2018]. the archdiocese of lviv of the latins archdiocesis leopolitana latinorum in ukraine, http://rkc.lviv.ua [05.03.2018] бордун о., шуманська ю., 2014, сучасний стан і  перспективи розвитку в україні європейського паломницького шляху святого якова, географія та туризм, 28, 131–140. 60 oresta bordun, andrij kovalchuk київсько-житомирська дієцезія, https://kzd.org.ua [05.03.2018]. попович я., 2014, паломництво у ранньохристиянський період, вісник житомирського державного університету, 6(78), 68–73. 1. introduction one of the conditions for successful political and economic transformation of a country is rebuilding its public administration both in the functional and in the spatial aspect (izdebski, kulesza, 2004). at the core of any reform of the administrative division there is always a fundamental reconstruction of the system of public administration. also important is the fact that the administrative division does not only mean a spatial form of the functioning of public administration institutions. a. miszczuk (2003) draws attention to a trend changing the essence of the administrative division, which ceases to be merely “administrative power” and takes on the characteristics of “infrastructural power”. the territorial division is a structure by means of which specific spatial governance in the implementation of public tasks is obtained. it is not only the administration that uses such a division. it has the organizational and journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 87–97 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.019.6635 the reform of administrative division in ukraine: problems of territorial communities’ formation in the polish-ukrainian borderland aleksander kuczabski (1), lesia zastavetska (2), taras zastavetskyy (3) (1) institute of geography and regional research, pomeranian university in słupsk, partyzantów 27, 76-200 słupsk, poland, e-mail: aleksander.kuczabski@apsl.edu.pl (corresponding author) (2) faculty of geography, ternopil v. hnatyuk national pedagogical university, kryvonosa 2, 46027 ternopil, ukraine, e-mail: zast@ukr.net (3) faculty of geography, ternopil v. hnatyuk national pedagogical university, kryvonosa 2, 46027 ternopil, ukraine, e-mail: e-mail: zast@ukr.net citation kuczabski a., zastavetska l., zastavetskyy t., 2017, the reform of administrative division in ukraine: problems of territorial communities’ formation in the polish-ukrainian borderland, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 87–97. abstract issues of the administrative division in the broader context of political and administrative reforms connected with democratization and decentralization are considered. some historical aspects of the administrative division modeling in ukrainian borderlands are analyzed. goals, mechanisms and the course of the current reform of administrative division at the local level in the volyn and lviv provinces are presented. the specifics of wealthy communities – new administrative units at the local level are outlined. features of budget decentralization based on the example of comparing the structure of local government revenue are characterized. the problems and threats faced by the organizers at the present stage of reform are revealed, and some solutions to problematic situations in implementation of the new administrative division are proposed. key words administrative division, administrative reform, ukrainian borderlands. 88 aleksander kuczabski, lesia zastavetska, taras zastavetskyy ordering significance on a much wider political, economic and social scale (kaczmarek, 2005). since gaining its independence by ukraine in 1991, a rebuilding of the system of the organization of public authority has been taking place there. similarly to other post-communist countries of central and eastern europe, ukraine pursues a strategy to transform old, heavily centralized public administration structures towards democratization and decentralization. unlike poland and other countries in the region, ukraine’s transition from totalitarianism to democracy is a much longer process. in addition, this process has not yet been completed. the process of democratization of ukraine is not linear either, and it is characterized by a frequent change in the transformation phases (michalski, kuczabski, 2014). reconstruction of the administrative division in border areas has a particular specificity, due to its impact on the social and economic development of the respective territories. socio-economic development of the ukrainian-polish borderland is determined by many factors. the border, cutting through a certain area and dividing it into parts different in terms of law, nature and shape of the administration or the intensity of economic activities, is a key element of this development. the current course of the polish-ukrainian border was formed in 1945–1951 as a result of geopolitical aspirations of the totalitarian regime of the ussr. the historical factor in the case of the ukrainian-polish borderland is extremely conducive to both individual contacts and institutional forms of cross-border cooperation. disintegration of the ussr and the emergence of independent ukraine in 1991 did not affect the course of the border, but it changed its nature. since that time reactivation of the pre-war social, economic and cultural ties has begun. the issue of the administrative division of the ukrainian-polish borderland should be viewed from different perspectives. firstly, the administrative division creates a territorial basis for the functioning of bodies and institutions of the public administration. secondly, it determines the emergence and development of territorial social systems with a specific territorial identity. thirdly, it is the spatial form of distribution of funds and designates the territorial nature of public investment. all these aspects more or less significantly influence the nature and the intensity of cross-border cooperation. one must also realize that in the case of borderlands one of the key factors shaping cross-border cooperation is the compatibility of the administrative division. the compatibility of the administrative division is based on two fundamental elements. the first one reflects the correlation of competence of respective territorial structures of public administration. maintaining a certain level of such competence correlation is an important condition for entering into, maintaining and developing direct cross-border cooperation. the second element characterizes the parity of the size of territorial units on both sides of the border, which is extremely important in ensuring adequate resources necessary for cooperation. this element can be quite widely presented: from the number of the population and the size of the area of the respective administrative units to the amount of their budgets or the costs of the investment made (kuczabski, 2017). the question of the compatibility of administrative divisions in the ukrainian-polish borderland was analyzed by in detail a. kuczabski and a. miszczuk (2005). the analysis showed a relatively high degree of compatibility of these divisions, especially at the regional level (voivodeships and oblasts) and the sub-regional one (poviats and regions). on the ukrainian side there have been more or less significant changes in this regard. so far they have mainly concerned the shape of the administrative units at the lowest level. a reform of regional units in ukraine (oblasts and regions) was announced, but for various reasons, suspended. it aims to lead to a further increase in the compatibility of division units in both countries, especially at the local level (municipalities). 2. historical premises of the reform still in the period of being part of the ussr, the administrative division of ukraine at the local level was critically evaluated in scientific circles. while in most european countries after world war ii, a trend to reduce the number of municipalities dominated, in the soviet union, after quite an unsuccessful attempt to conduct similar reforms in the late 1950s and 1960s, preservation of the existing administrative division at the local level took place. b. choriew (хорев, 1981) was a supporter of a broad reduction in local administrative units in the ussr and propagated the necessity to consolidate rural councils and give them some of the administrative functions from the level of regions. the characteristic of ukraine excessive number of administrative units at the local level significantly weakens the local government, which in small towns is unable to fulfil its basic tasks due to a lack of adequate financial resources and sufficient assets. furthermore, the maintenance of the old administrative division only resulted in the escalation of imbalance between units of this division (kuchabsky, 2006). the reform of administrative division in ukraine: problems of territorial communities’ formation… 89 for a long time, fierce political debate on the necessity and principles of reconstruction of the system of public administration in ukraine did not allow moving on to the relevant changes of the territorial structure of the country. until 2014, all the changes mainly regarded maintaining a certain balance between the central and the local governments, achieved during the constitutional agreement in the mid-1990s. the basic principles and key elements of the administrative regime based on the ideas of self-government of territorial units of ukraine were included in the constitution (конституція україни, 1996) and laws (про місцеве самоврядування..., 1997; про органи самоорганізації..., 2001). after an unsuccessful attempt to reform the administrative division in 1997, the question of reorganization of the administration several times has become a reason for heated political debates. only after taking over power in ukraine by proeuropean political elites in 2014, did the process of implementation of reforms of the administrative division began, with a view to creating active and effective local governments. 3. principles of the reform the change of social relations in ukraine and its transition to market economy requires changes in the administrative-territorial system, which now has become an obstacle for the effective regional policy, and it needs to be reformed. in connection with that, in 2014 the first stage of such a reform began. it ensures decentralization of power and optimization of powers between the state authorities and the local self-government. decentralization of power is an important objective, included in the decrees of the president and the cabinet of ministers of ukraine (про стратегію сталого розвитку „україна 2020”, 2015; про затвердження державної стратегії…, 2014; про схвалення концепції…, 2014). its aim is determined by the laws of ukraine (про співробітництво територіальних громад, 2014; про добровільне об’єднання територіальних громад, 2015) as well as other regulations regarding amendments to the tax and budget codes, strengthening the role of local authorities and self-government. the main objectives of the decentralization policy include moving away from the centralized model of management in the country, ensuring the ability of the local government to build a system of effective territorial organization of the society. creating viable territorial communities that would provide favorable conditions for living and ensure comprehensive economic and social development on their territory is the first stage of the decentralization process in the country. due to the absence of law on the administrative-territorial system of ukraine, there is no single approach to the definition of the concept of “territorial community”. the amendment to the law (про місцеве самоврядування…, 1997) contains the following definition: territorial community – residents, united by permanent residence within the limits of a village, settlement, city as independent administrative-territorial units, or a voluntary association of residents of several villages with a single administrative center. according to the present-day regulations, the powers of the territorial community should be expanded, and amendments to the constitution of ukraine are necessary, because it does not take into account the needs of a modern society. such powers are determined by article 143 of the constitution of ukraine and involve “management of municipal property; approval of programs of socio-economic and cultural development and control of their implementation; approval of the budgets of the respective administrative-territorial units and control of their implementation; carrying out local referendums and implementation of their results; establishment, reorganization and liquidation of municipal enterprises, organizations and institutions, as well as control over their activities; resolving other problems of local importance, assigned to their jurisdiction by law” (конституція україни, 1996). formation of new territorial communities should be based on the transfer of a wide range of powers to the grassroots level of system management, which is based on the principle of subsidiarity. according to scientists, formation of such communities should be aimed at providing citizens with the maximum number of quality services. preschool and children’s education, basic health care, culture and leisure of the citizens, domestic services (water, electricity, heating and sanitation), land use and environmental protection, transport and communications, etc. will be carried out within the community. scientists consider common interest to be one of the attributes of the community. the term “territorial interests” means “the dependence between the necessity and the importance of meeting the needs of local community through its direct or indirect activities aimed at ensuring the conditions for the existence and development of this society and a specific region” (кучабський, 2010, p. 45). in order to implement this interest, it is necessary to ensure a certain resource provision (natural, financial, economic resources). the socio-economic potential of the community is one of the preconditions of its partial managerial autonomy. such interest is part of the public 90 aleksander kuczabski, lesia zastavetska, taras zastavetskyy interest but takes into account the local properties of the so-called territorial conscience, similarity of belonging to the territory, the unity of traditions and culture, etc. the local self-government authorities are created on the basis of the territorial community, which together with the government and other entities of the society establish the necessary balance of its interests. the justification for geospatial organization of territorial communities is considered to be an important issue. it is necessary to proceed from the following principles (заставецька, 2013): 1) settlement-related, i.e. the community area should be based on already existing settlement systems with simultaneous expansion of functions; communication between settlements must be taken into account in establishing the boundaries of the communities. 2) territorial, i.e. the community must cover a compact territory, whose all elements have a high level of transport accessibility. 3) demographic, i.e. taking into account the tendencies of population reproduction, the change in its age structure, migration flows. 4) socio-economic, i.e. the community must engage in economic activities with an effective use of local resources; it should sustain people’s daily needs. 5) self-governing, i.e. representing the community’s interests to ensure their right to self-government. these principles also form the basis of the spatial organization of the local settlement systems, which will be established in the process of the administrative-territorial reform. the voluntary principle should also be added to them; observing this principle is mandatory in the process of merging settlements into a society. in this case the settlements in the community will develop in close relationship with each other. unlike modern village councils that have low economic potential, insufficiently developed production and social infrastructure, having in their structure several settlements, large territory and population, such communities must ensure the integrated development of the territory. optimization of the geospatial organization of the region’s population resettlement will be carried out; new systems of the so-called network organization with the extensive development of horizontal braces will be established on their basis. settlements which will be included in the community will develop according to their place and role in the community. of course, the greatest socio-economic development should be provided for the community centers, i.e. large villages and urban settlements. they should have important industrial and social facilities that will provide the population with jobs and various services. these centers should have good transport links with all the villages of the community and the regional center. they will be kind of „growth poles”, which will become new centers of settlement systems and the sphere of territorial administration. other settlements of the community must also get the social and economic impulse, as they should not become literally „peripheral”. in case of lack of development in non-agricultural activities and low transport accessibility, such villages can become uninhabited and gradually liquidated. therefore, villages in each community should be developed according to the established functions and socio-economic potential. introduction of the cluster model of the territorial community will become an additional mechanism for improving the system of management in the effective use of investments from the state and local budgets, provided for the demographic development, financial and social development of rural areas, poverty reduction, education and health of the peasants, living conditions, cultural and public services. the cluster approach to the new geospatial organization of production and resettlement will become an important condition for the optimization of the geospatial organization of society, improvement of the efficiency of its management. thus, the cluster model of territorial communities will be formed due to the increased production, information, social relations between individual settlements, and establishment of close managerial contacts. collaborative work of people to strengthen local economy, attracting resources of the territory to production, and infrastructure development – these are the advantages of the cluster organization of the population life in the designated area. because the cluster members do not depend on each other, it gives them an opportunity to use their potential and attract investments according to the designated purpose. based on voluntary cooperation of cluster members and their cooperation with authorities, the effective use of investments from the state and local budgets for the revival of rural areas can be achieved. transformation of territorial communities into clusters has many advantages, in particular, the ability to provide a certain territory with integrated socio-economic development, the ability to ensure social comfort of the population throughout the same level and quality of life in all the settlements of the territorial community, and the ability to reduce the reform of administrative division in ukraine: problems of territorial communities’ formation… 91 disparities between the development of the central and peripheral settlements of the community. this will facilitate the transformation of territorial communities into unique clusters and implementation of the cluster model of economic development – such a combination of business organizations that work closely with other institutions and bodies of self-government in a certain area with the purpose of organizing competitiveness and investment attractiveness of the economy ensures a high level of the quality of life of the population. the cluster model in terms of innovation-oriented economy will provide the same standards of living in hierarchically different territorial entities. the vast majority of legislative initiatives on public administration reform came from the government of ukraine, especially the ministry for regional development, building and housing of ukraine structures. the set of projects prepared by the ministry for regional development, building and housing of ukraine played a key role in the issue of territorial management and the reform of the administrative division (про співробітництво..., 2014; про добровільне об’єднання..., 2015). previously, contrary to the constitutional arrangements, in ukraine there had been no mechanism for creating local government units by grassroots consolidation. the bill of 2015 aims, among others, to create legal conditions and strengthen the guarantees of the local government functioning, to support the development of functional rural territorial clusters as well as to support a sustainable development and a rational use of budgetary resources (про добровільне об’єднання..., 2015). the bill gives cluster residents the right to initiate voluntary mergers of the existing clusters, and the very procedure of merging does not preclude holding a local referendum. in turn, the bill of 2014 creates a legal foundation for cooperation of local government units (про співробітництво..., 2014). the existing ukrainian law provided only a general framework for inter-municipal cooperation. the new law classifies cooperation of territorial clusters as a relationship based on relevant agreements between two or more clusters to foster socioeconomic and cultural development, to improve the quality of public services, and to effectively perform their tasks by the local government authorities. 4. the course of the reform in ukraine the process of territorial communities’ formation is already taking place in ukraine. it is carried out according to a specific procedure, according to which high-income territorial communities are the communities of villages (towns and cities), which, as a result of voluntary consolidation, are able independently or through local governments to provide an adequate level of services, in particular in the field of education, culture, medical care, welfare, housing and public services, taking into account human resources, financial support and infrastructural development of the respective administrative-territorial units (про затвердження методики…, 2015). as of the end of december 2016, there were 366 territorial communities in ukraine (tab. 1). however, the process of territorial communities’ formation occurs uniformly in all the regions. in separate regions (vinnytsia, lviv, khmelnytskyi, etc.) it has almost finished, while in such regions as kyiv, luhansk, kharkiv only 2–4 communities have been established. there are significant differences in the area and population size of such communities in the various regions, and also in the number of their member-settlements. in particular, the largest community by the population size has more than 33,000 inhabitants (odesa region). there are several communities with the area of over 1,200 km2 (donetsk, zhytomyr, zaporizhia region), while in certain regions the area of new territorial communities does not exceed 200  km2 (kirovohrad, cherkasy, chernivtsi region). generally, on average, from 5 to 18 settlements in ukraine are united into communities. the communities, established in zhytomyr (65), poltava (63), chernihiv (57), and khmelnytskyi (53) regions have the largest number of settlements. usually, the union of a large number of settlements into community increases the distance between the community settlements and the center. thus, the longest distance is recorded in zhytomyr (53 km), rivne (46 km), donetsk, and dnipropetrovsk (40-41 km) regions (децентралізація влади). creation of new, much more self-sufficient administrative units at the local level, known as “capable municipalities” is considered to be the most important element of this reform. the mechanism for the emergence of new clusters was based on decentralization of budgets through changes in the financial and tax codes of ukraine. changes in the budget code mainly regarded simplification of the relationship of the new clusters with the central budget. if the new units adhere to government’s recommendations on merging the municipalities, they are given competence and resources which until now only cities at the level of oblasts had (практичний посібник, 2016). the need for budgetary decentralization arises from the dynamics of their revenue in the consolidated budget of ukraine which has cemented in recent years and which is disadvantageous for the empowerment of local government 92 aleksander kuczabski, lesia zastavetska, taras zastavetskyy units (fig. 1). a decline in the share of own revenues with a simultaneously increasing role of transfers from the central budget indicates inconsistencies in the central authorities’ actions to continue the declared policy of decentralization. 5. implementation of the reform in municipalities of the ukrainian-polish borderland a very important role of the central administration in the decision-making process is a characteristic feature of the ukrainian administrative reform, which can be explained by a strong tradition of authoritative political and administrative decision-making, without broad public consultations. “the prospective plan of combining territorial clusters” was considered in the bill (про добровільне об’єднання..., 2015) as the basic document setting out the shape of the future territorial administrative units. drawing up such a plan has been foreseen at the level of each region, and it is a task for public administration in particular oblasts. each prospective plan is then approved by the oblast’s council and, finally, by the cabinet of ministers of ukraine. according to the latest plan, in the area of the lviv region there should be 85 new clusters. 40 urban clusters (around almost all the cities of the region, apart from dublana, sosnivka, stebnyk and uhniv), 21 town clusters and 24 village clusters are expected to be created. it is assumed that the discussed project is not final, as some of the clusters approved in the project do not meet the required parameters. in the volyn region, as a result of the reform, 52 new clusters should be created. already in 2015, 5 new clusters were created in the volyn region and 15 in the lviv region. statistics tab. 1. united territorial communities in the regions of ukraine (1.01.2017) name of the region before the reform after the reform total number of councils municipal settlement rural number of united communities prospective plans cherkasy 556 16 15 524 6 39 chernihiv 569 16 28 525 16 34 chernivtsi 271 11 8 252 16 12 dnipropetrovsk 348 20 40 288 34 48 donetsk ** 386 52 81 253 6 33 ivano-frankivsk 516 15 24 477 11 45 kharkiv 458 17 60 381 4 51 kherson 298 9 30 259 12 35 khmelnytskyi 605 13 24 568 26 23 kirovohrad 415 12 27 376 5 16 kyiv 661 26 30 605 2 27 luhansk ** 194 10 25 159 3 22 lviv 711 44 34 633 22 71 mykolaiv 314 10 17 287 19 19 odesa 490 19 32 439 11 14 poltava 503 15 21 467 18 28 rivne 365 11 16 338 18 27 sumy 411 15 20 376 14 41 ternopil 615 18 17 580 26 10 vinnytsia 707 18 28 661 21 20 volyn 412 11 22 379 15 40 zakarpattia 337 11 19 307 3 * zaporizhia 299 14 22 263 16 42 zhytomyr 631 12 40 579 32 19 * information is not available ** in areas controlled by ukraine source: own study according to the information from “decentralization of power”. the reform of administrative division in ukraine: problems of territorial communities’ formation… 93 fig. 1. the share of revenues of the local governments budgets in the consolidated budget of ukraine source: kuczabski, 2017. tab. 2. new clusters, created in the volyn and lviv regions in 2015. centre of the cluster region area [km2] population [thousands] number of municipalities babyna lviv 77.9 4.9 10 biskovychi lviv 55.0 6.1 8 chukva lviv 76.8 3.6 36 dublany lviv 66.5 3.1 7 hnizdychiv lviv 57.6 6.5 6 holoby  volyn 224.0 8.0 19 hrabovets’ lviv 65.9 4.1 6 luky lviv 54.7 3.9 7 mizhenets’ lviv 8.8 2.4 6 nove misto lviv 18.4 6.3 14 novi strilyshcha lviv 71.9 2.8 11 novyi kalyniv lviv 108.3 7.3 8 smolyhiv  volyn 693.2 1.8 6 trostyanets’ lviv 190.0 8.1 17 ustyluh volyn 43.7 7.6 26 velyts’k volyn 211.5 4.1 12 vil’shanyk lviv 79.1 3.1 9 volya-baranets’ka lviv 69.4 5.2 15 zabolottsi lviv 105.7 2.6 10 zymne volyn 175.0 6.2 17 source: own study based on data: від прагнень до звершень..., 2016. 94 aleksander kuczabski, lesia zastavetska, taras zastavetskyy of the new clusters revealed a problem with rational selection criteria for their creation. contrary to the initial intent of the reform propagators, the new clusters very often are little different in terms of territory, population or city from most old clusters. examples of such far too small clusters include: smolyhiv (1.8 thousand inhabitants), mizhenets’ (2.4 thousand inhabitants), zabolottsi (2.6 thousand inhabitants). in turn, the new collective clusters in some cases combine only 6 towns (smolyhiv, hnizdychiv, mizhenets’, hrabovets’) (tab. 2). in the following year new clusters were created. in the volyn region clusters were created with seats of the authorities in: lytovezh, poromiv, povors’k, mayaky, pavlivka, prylisne, shats’k, lyublynets’, dubove, zabolottya, and in the lviv region, as a result of consolidation, new clusters were created with seats of the authorities in: khodoriv, zhovtantsi, mostyska, sudova vyshnya, shehyni, davydiv, nyzhankovychi (fig.  2). it is worth noting that the dynamics of changes in the administrative division is insufficient, as at this rate of transformations, even in the current, very conducive to the reform conditions, the process of consolidation will stretch on for years. this, in turn, will postpone the next stage of the reform at the subregional (regions) and regional level (oblasts). fig. 2. clusters created in lviv and volyn regions in the 2015-2016 source: own study. the reform of administrative division in ukraine: problems of territorial communities’ formation… 95 as the government expectations assumed, the decisive incentive to consolidation was based on financial benefits. adapting to the recommendations of the reform projects on cluster mergers opens access to substantial in the ukrainian conditions resources from the central budget provided for building the local infrastructure. already in the first 9 months of 2016, such resources in the whole of ukraine amounted to 667 million uah. also new clusters of the borderland have benefited from these resources – in the volyn region (18 million hryvnia) and in the lviv region (31 million hryvnia) (децентралізація..., 2016). unfortunately, dispersion of this subsidy to particular cluster, and even more so to municipalities, does not allow, however, for initiating more serious investments of strategic importance. perhaps improvement in the economic situation of the country will affect more favorably the collection and spending of these funds. as a result of the reforms there have also been considerable changes in the revenue structure of some budgets of the local government units. the share of own revenue increased to 10% in one year, which confirms the trend to empower the local government and gives basis to conclude about the steps taken towards decentralization. however, one may notice significantly lower revenue share of own budgets of new municipalities (29.7% in the volyn region and 31.4% in the lviv region) in comparison to the corresponding indicator for all clusters (44.8% in the volyn region and 56% in the lviv region). this proves that at this stage the consolidation actually concerns the weakest units in terms of financial selfsufficiency, since even after the consolidation procedures, they are on average poorer than most of the old municipalities. 6. conclusions the reform of administrative division in ukraine is currently in progress. implementation of the reform in practice allows reactivating self-government as a basic element of territorial management. this is only the initial stage of a broad political and administrative reform, which should implement the basics of local democracy and duly turn into a decentralization reform at the regional level. in general, the idea of creating new, strong clusters at the local level in place of the existing small units is conducive to local development, and hence the development of the whole region of the ukrainian-polish border area and activating the cross-border cooperation. what is meant by that is the emergence of a more compatible administrative division on both sides of the border, both in the sense of competence of local authorities and in relation to the size of the territorial units. an additional factor supporting and stimulating such cooperation in the ukrainian-polish borderland is the pro-european orientation of the currently ruling political elite in ukraine. however, the hitherto implementation of the reform of administrative division in ukraine, especially the situation in the polish-ukrainian borderland revealed a number of serious problems, both with organization of the new system of local authority and with the development of local economy, including the prospects for cross-border cooperation. the most important issues include, among others: 1) unfavorable general economic situation in the country caused by warfare in the east, and a consistent lack of pro-market reforms. in the long run this may affect the further escalation of disparities in standards of living on both sides of the border and undermine the parity in the character of cross-border cooperation. 2) the cabinet nature of the reform translates into a lack of sufficient social acceptance. the acceleration in the implementation of the reform overlaps with a consistent lack of information policy on the part of the authorities. thus the emerging administrative division units do not appear as a result of broad public debate, but they primarily arise as a result of compromises between groups of interest of the regional and local level importance. 3) focusing on the issues of reorganization of rural areas. the main drawback of the hitherto administrative division of ukraine was a heavy fragmentation of the structure of units at the local level. therefore, the idea of the reform mainly focused on organization of rural areas, which in many cases means reshuffling of smaller villages among the newly selected centers of local development. in this way, problems of managing larger towns and agglomerations remain unresolved. 4) possible intensification in degradation of remote areas. one of the key reasons forcing the central authorities to speed up the reform is an intention to rationalize the cost of maintaining administration and social infrastructure at the local level. undoubtedly, this will result in liquidation of many unprofitable establishments so far maintained from the local budgets. this will aggravate the situation in peripheral municipalities, which may lead to the intensification of degradation of such areas. 5) unfair redistribution of funds from the administrative units lagging behind the reform to new clusters. the mechanism of implementing the 96 aleksander kuczabski, lesia zastavetska, taras zastavetskyy reform was based on a financial instrument. by consolidating into a new structure, units obtain larger subsidies from the state budget. however, such additional resources come from cuts in the consolidated budget for other purposes and establishments. if such cuts will cause a reduction in financial support for units lagging behind the reform, this may lead to a sort of sabotage, and even worse, to consolidating and politicalizing of anti-reform circles. these mentioned problems and a lack of or an inadequate response to their appearance on the part of the central authorities translates into certain concerns about ensuring the implementation of the fundamental objectives or the democratic principles of the reform. special concern regards: • increasing conflicts within clusters consolidated authoritatively as a result of a lack of a sense of sufficient identity among residents of the new administrative units; • moving away public services from the citizens – increasing the size of clusters will cause a drastic reduction in the availability and accessibility of administrative offices, particularly in conditions of poorly developed means of transport; • reducing peripheral social and cultural infrastructure establishments (schools, medical clinics, cultural centers), caused by a natural desire to optimize budgetary costs, but lowering the standards of living in smaller municipalities remote from the new administrative centers; • ignorance of the reform on the part of old clusters which do not express a desire to merge with the neighboring units because of various barriers (from mental to economic ones), which poses a risk of growing marginalization of entire areas and may result in the need to complete the reforms in a decretal way; • continued destabilization of local administration functioning through the necessary adjustments and improvements in actually unjustified and hastily approved projects of the administrative division; • abandoning of the reform as a result of a possible change of the ruling political elite in the next elections, also due to errors related to implementation of the administrative reform. the central government should focus on the key challenges to the current stage of the reform caused by reformers’ previous errors. the most important tasks faced by the central and regional authorities include: • encouraging the economic reform towards promarket economy in order to improve the population’s quality of life and to create a better financial base for the functioning of local administration; • financial decentralization, leading to an increase in the share of own revenue of municipalities in their budgets and a reduction of counting on support from the central budget; • supporting all initiatives related to the development of cross-border cooperation to create new opportunities resulting from the benefits of the near-border geographical location (it is crucial to participate in projects which could be subsidized from the european union funds); • creating a mechanism for flexible adjustments to the boundaries of those new clusters that were formed authoritatively, contrary to the local community’s interests, which should lower the level of distrust among citizens. quick and proper response of central authorities to issues that arise in the course of the implementation of the administrative reform can significantly improve the political situation and increase the level of social acceptance for the initiated 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про співробітництво територіальних громад, 2014, закон україни від 17 червня 2014 р. no 1508-vii, http:// zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1508-18 [30.04.2017]. про стратегію сталого розвитку „україна 2020”, 2015, указ президента україни від 12 січня 2015 року no 5/2015, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5/2015 [30.04.2017]. про схвалення концепції реформування місцевого самоврядування та територіальної організації влади в  україні, 2014, розпорядження кабінету міністрів україни від 1 квітня 2014 р. no 333-р, http://zakon2. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/333-2014-%d1%80 [30.04.2017]. хорев б.с., 1981, территориальная организация общества: актуальные проблемы регионального управления и планирования в ссср, мысль, москва. 1. introduction the development of civil society requires active political position of citizens and their conscious participation in making socially important decisions. electoral activity realized through potential voter participation in the electoral process is a part of the political activity of the population. the issue of participation in the elections actualizes fundamental research, including human geographical one, research into involvement in the electoral process of subjects of electoral activity through the prism of quantitative (primarily through attendance figures) and qualitative (the study of ideological preferences) party of election activities. these studies are interdisciplinary and are subject to study electoral geography, political science and sociology. for the first time the problem of electoral activity began to engage representatives of american science (conway, 2000). m. weber (1919) and others explored the self-identity and ea, have emphasized potential levels of activity in politics. electoral activity phenomenon study in the xx century included more recent forms of activity in the sphere of scientific interest: passive forms of participation (political immobility, voter apathy, ballot strike) and absenteeism (weber, 1919; verba, norman, 1972), non-conventional forms, including the use noninstitutionalised forms and journal of geography, politics and society 2017, 7(2), 73–80 doi 10.4467/24512249jg.17.017.6633 electoral activity of the population of western ukraine border territory oleksandra vistak (1), mariya myrosh (2) (1) faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: olesiavistak@ukr.net (corresponding author) (2) faculty of geography, ivan franko national university of lviv, doroshenka 41, 79000 lviv, ukraine, e-mail: murmarja@gmail.com citation vistak o., myrosh m., 2017, electoral activity of the population of western ukraine border territory, journal of geography, politics and society, 7(2), 73–80. abstract the spatial temporal as well as structural and functional analyses of electoral activity were carried out in the paper. electoral activity of the population was analyzed in terms of indicators of electoral potential, electoral turnout and electoral preferences. the dynamics of the electoral potential and its role in the all-ukrainian scale have been analyzed. the level of electoral turnout was estimated and the main features of temporal and spatial distribution were found. the analyses of multicomponent systems of modern electoral preferences of the population in the region in terms of left and right political forces were carried out. key words western ukrainian borderland, electoral activity, electoral potential, electoral turnout, electoral preferences, right and left political forces. 74 oleksandra vistak, mariya myrosh methods of struggle (milbrath, goel, 1982) and cognitive aspects − tracking policy through the media (milbrath, goel, 1982). ea studied as the phenomenon of emotional and evaluative nature (conway, 2000; scott, 2000). also, scientists cognize that the electoral activity is unequal shapes in a democratic and non-democratic (transition) society. in a democratic society it manifests itself in forms such as voting in elections at various levels, referendums, participation in management in local government in the activities of parliament. during the grassroots campaign a lot of people involved in various forms of practical activity − collecting signatures on petitions, meetings with candidates, rallies, demonstrations, pickets, tents, etc. (scott, 2000). in undemocratic societies where political rights and freedoms have limited, electoral activity is mostly formal and often seen only through participation in elections. other forms of political activity have severely persecuted by power (peltzman, 1998). s. huntington (1976) specify that ea forms adapted to the political situation, noting that today the electoral activity of youth increasingly becomes „network” form, or forms of participation in the electoral process through the internet, blogs, social networks, forums. sociological approaches explained the political activity of the election as a sense of belonging to a particular social group and identity through political choice (crotty, 1991). theoretical, methodological and applied aspects of pa highlighted in the works of ukrainian and foreign scientists: political scientists (milbrath, goel, 1982), sociologists, political psychologists and slightly less – geographers. ukrainian geographers examine the human-geographical and political aspects of different types and forms of pa: general and regional electoral geography; political and geographical processes; regional political behavior, electoral landscape, electoral culture and electoral preferences, political, geographic and electoral zoning and others (дністрянський, 2010, 2014; шаблій, 2000). however, these studies do not always consider a geospatial dimension that allows detecting all patterns of implementation of citizens’ electoral activity. the distinctive features of electoral activity in the vast region have not been researched so far, as well as its dependence on geographical factors. real dynamic changes in the political situation in ukraine in recent years have not been taken into account either. 2. comprehensive analysis of elections in ukraine therefore, electoral activity (hereinafter − ea) is a kind of conscious political activity of an individual/ group which defines an active (passive) participation of potential voters in the electoral process (мирош, 2014). the key players of ea include individuals; social groups; cultural, professional, ethno-national, confessional and politically united communities; all adult citizens of the state-organized structures as well as the international community. regional ea is part of a national ea and is developed within it, adapting national formal and informal electoral standards to specific local communities. to analyze the ea of the population of the region the results of the elections taken place after the establishment of a sovereign state have been used. however, most attention is focused on the study of the last parliamentary (2012 and 2014) and presidential (2010, 2014) elections. this is explained by two facts. firstly, the elections were held under a mixed system that allows you to objectively evaluate the ea of population by comparing the results of the vote in different administrative and territorial units (atu). secondly, in 2010, after v. yanukovych had been elected president of ukraine, political processes boosted resulting in the revolution of dignity in 2013–2014, so it is important to trace the dynamics of ea over this period of time. electoral activity of the population living in western ukraine border territory (hereinafter – wubt) is going to be analysed through the indicators of electoral potential, electoral turnout and electoral preferences. electoral potential of the region is an indicator of the population in the region that can carry out electoral activities under favourable conditions. electoral potential directly depends on the number of people in the region. however, more often than not, less populated regions may partially compensate for low electoral potential by having high electoral turnout (дністрянський, 2010, 2014). the proportion of electoral potential of the wubt to the national one is significant. the region in question accounts for almost 1/5 or 17.8% of ukraine’s electoral potential (cf. центральна виборча комісія україни). the power of potential of the region is significantly decreasing, thus correlating with general demographic tendencies. the lowest indicators of electoral potential (over the last 17 years) were recorded in 2015. this fact is explained by a deep demographic crisis and political developments in 2013–2015 when a considerable number of residents of border territory were called up and involved in solving the military conflict in eastern electoral activity of the population of western ukraine border territory 75 ukraine. however, the level of drop in electoral potential is lower than in the country as a whole, which is why the proportion of this region to the total state potential was steadily increasing (fig. 1). thus the region still traditionally maintains the status of one that balances the east pole of biased for ukraine electoral geographical axis of „west-east” (шаблій, 2000). the greatest potential is observed in lviv oblast (≈ 2 mln. people or 30.96%), thus occupying the fifth place in ukraine (5.43%). in fact, the region represents the interests of the whole western macroregion. the oblast indicators are almost twice as high as the indicators of each of the oblasts within wubt (cf. банк даних державної служби статистики; мирош, 2014, центральна виборча комісія україни). ivano-frankivsk oblast also has a great electoral potential, approaching a million, which makes up 3% in all-ukrainian and 17% in regional terms. nearly half of the voters of the region, which is 3 million or 46% of the voters live in lviv and ivano-frankivsk oblasts. electoral potential of other oblasts of the border territory does not exceed 1 million people, which is less than 15% of the electoral potential of the whole region. electoral potential of chernivtsi oblast is the lowest one not only in the region but in the country as a whole (cf. політичні карти областей 2014). thus, the electoral potential of wubt is powerful and characterized by a noticeable disparities. this is explained by deep democratic tradition established by austro-hungarian, czech-slovak and polish parliamentary systems, society structuring according to political orientations, its highly organized nature and focus on hot-button issues (возняк, 2010). residents of ukraine border territory have been known by traditionally high voter turnout and trust in public institutions, sustained support of the forces of the national democratic orientation and choice of the european vector of ukraine’s development. this is confirmed by the results of the elections. the indicators of electoral turnout in border territories in general and separately in specific atu are traditionally higher than on average in ukraine (центральна виборча комісія україни). disparities in electoral turnout of voters of ukraine and of the region in question range from 0 to 15%. for example, the turnout in parliamentary elections of 26.10.2014 in wubt reached 69,2% against 60,3% of the national turnout, which is almost 10% more. the research into the dynamic and spatial characteristics of electoral turnout in the wubt shows the following: (1) since 2004 voter turnout has been steadily declining; (2) quantitative difference in turnout in the presidential and parliamentary elections is traced; (3) presidential elections are more interesting to the public, where electoral turnout is traditionally higher, with a run-off election being especially popular. this situation is typical of the other oblasts of the region; turnout dynamic of atu is similar to the region as a whole. 3. the analysis of electoral activity at western ukrainian borderland spatial distribution of electoral turnout is not uniform. the analysis of nationwide parliamentary and presidential elections of 2010–2014 singles out three groups of atu in western border territories in terms of voter turnout. the first group includes lviv oblast as a leader in the region and the state. its electoral turnout in the elections to the parliament of ukraine fig. 1. the proportion of electoral potential of the wubt to the regions of ukraine, 2010−2014, %. source: own studies based on центральна виборча комісія. 76 oleksandra vistak, mariya myrosh of october 26, 2014 was the highest in the country (центральна виборча комісія україни). other areas of wubt, such as volyn, ivano-frankivsk and rivne oblasts, occupy the third to fifth places in terms of the national turnout. only rivne’s turnout is lower than the average regional figures. the turnout in two areas of the region – transcarpathia and chernivtsi – is lower than the national one – 44.7% and 48.5% respectively. current electoral preferences of the population of wubt were shaped after ukraine gained its state independence and maintained state position. the region is a traditional electoral base of right-wing national-democratic forces. however, political preferences in the region are not limited to classical coordinates „left-right”, since the significant role is played by the peculiarities of the region and its focus on the east or west, and behind it there are vectors to europe and russia (шведа, 2010). thus, having analyzed the system of political preferences of the population of the region, the following features are considered important: 1. western ukraine is internally heterogeneous, with each region having its mental differences. the process of patriotic awareness formation in halychyna gets sometimes perverse forms, due to long periods of struggle for national independence, relatively liberal habsburg rule and the activities of the greek catholic church. instead, hungarian, romanian and russian rule did not provide such an opportunity to other regions, and national potential there was significantly lower (львів, 1998). 2. essential feature of wubt ukrainians is their selfawareness as europeans, within the context of their geographic surroundings − states that are moving to the eu and nato. this clearly distinguishes them from other eastern ukrainians whose ideological guidelines are different. thus, in terms of foreign policy, wubt could become a model of european ukraine, a bridge to the west. sovereign ukraine as a member of the european union and nato is a definite priority of voters (березинський, 2004). 3. in terms of the domestic policy, the region in question is characterized by prevailing religious, cultural and linguistic preferences to economic and pragmatic ones. thus, the border territory voter votes by listening to his heart (львів, 1998). electoral preferences of the residents of the region will be researched with the help of a traditional scheme of political opposition: right (right, far-right, center-right and centrist national-democratic keeping to pro-european foreign policy) and left (prorussian) forces (березинський, 2004). western ukrainian border territory without any exaggeration can be considered a bulwark of national and state right-wing political forces. the results of a referendum on the act of independence of ukraine and the first presidential elections of december 1, 1991 are the first manifestations of patriotic positions. further regular and snap parliamentary and presidential elections confirmed the traditional electoral orientation of the region. in the 2010 presidential election in ukraine, 18 candidates were registered, of whom six represented right and center-right political forces. in total, they won by an overwhelming majority – 71,2%. y.v.  tymoshenko received the largest number of votes (37.98%), which is 15% more than in the country as a whole . and in the run-off, voting for this candidate was almost unanimous (81.16%). tymoshenko’s support is localized in the northern region (in volyn oblast the highest level of electoral preferences was recorded). halychyna region was distinguished by a moderate support for a candidate and only the run-off of february 7, 2010 demonstrated unanimity and trust. transcarpathia turned out to be the only area where the candidate lost the vote and the representative of the „left” political parties got the upper hand, and only in the run-off she won an edge in the election. other right-wing candidates are v. yushchenko (16.8% of the vote in wubt) and a. yatseniuk (10.9%). while the former secured the support in lviv and ivano-frankivsk oblasts, the latter received a large proportion of votes in his native chernivtsi oblast as well as in transcarpathia, where yushchenko failed. a low level of support of both candidates was observed in polissia area where tymoshenko was leading. a characteristic feature of the election was the emergence and growth of support for extreme right candidate o. tiahnybok, which indicates the radicalization and nationalization of electoral preferences of the inhabitants of the region. the results of 2012 parliamentary elections confirmed the high level of right national-democratic electoral preferences. the total amount of votes cast for right-wing parties was 79,9%. however, in transcarpathian oblast left-wing parties took an upper hand. the segment of voters who supported the „yulia tymoshenko coalition” (ytc) was clearly distinguished, constituting more than 35% of the population. electoral support for ytc was concentrated in chernivtsi (the second result in the country), volyn and lviv oblasts. yatsenyuk team won in six out of eight oblasts of the region. however, in two oblasts byt failed to keep leading positions: in lviv oblast, an all-ukrainian alliance „svoboda”, which positioned electoral activity of the population of western ukraine border territory 77 itself as extreme right, nationalist-radical party, came first, whereas in transcarpathia public preferences shifted toward the left-wing political forces. the result of „svoboda” is a victory in lviv oblast, the second place in ivano-frankivsk and volyn, and the third one in rivne oblast. more than 40% of the votes the party won in drohobych and two urban districts of the lviv city. this result was 1% lower than their previous result in districts with centers in ivano-frankivsk and stryi (lviv oblast). in bukovyna and transcarpathia, „svoboda” received less than 10% votes. thus, local concentration of the electorate of „svoboda” is quite evident. the party „udar” also entered the parliament by receiving more than 16% of the votes in the region, with the second result in rivne oblast and the third place in other atu. the best results of „udar” were shown in rivne, transcarpathia and bukovina – more than 19% of the population. the party managed to become a winner only in hust (over 30% of votes). the position of „our ukraine” and the radical party by o. liashko were rather weak, but while „our ukraine” was at the final stage of its great public policy, the radical party was just beginning to work and a certain level of commitment to the party’s messages indicates that west voters were looking out for the new political face alternative to „traditional” forces. early presidential elections in ukraine of may 25, 2014 took place in a permanent emergency situation. the achievements of the revolution of dignity of 2013–2014 led to the destruction of the presidential vertical and transformed the party system, while the annexation of the crimea, military events in donbass, the constant threat of open russian invasion resulted in high mobilization of patriotic voters and peculiar political preferences. in this election, the traditional right as well as center-right and far-right forces were represented by at least 6 candidates that received a record amount of electoral support, i.e. 93.1% of the vote (fig. 2). it is in this region that the current president p. poroshenko became the overall winner with 61.63% support and the first place (more than 50%) in all oblasts and districts of the region. the best results were achieved in lviv region (69.92%), where the candidate received the support from more than 1 million voters (fig. 2). in pustomyty district, more than three quarters of voters cast their votes for poroshenko. y. tymoshenko received the second national result within wubt (chernivtsi oblast), while the fig. 2. electoral activity of wubt population at the presidential election of may 25, 2014 source: own studies based on центральна виборча комісія. 78 oleksandra vistak, mariya myrosh regional average support ranged from 15% (in ukraine – 12.8%). the largest support of the candidate was observed in volyn oblast. however, the symbolic threshold of 20% was not crossed by yulia tymoshenko in either any atu or district of the region (neither was in ukraine) (fig. 2). high rates were received by o. liashko (>10%), especially in volyn and rivne oblasts. the candidate got more than 10% of support in bukovyna. a. hrytsenko was the «fourth» in all atu of the region, gaining almost 5.3%. the best results of the candidate were obtained in lviv oblast: the third result in three districts of the region (in lviv). transcarpathia and bukovyna were the most unfortunate for the politician (for example, in novoselytsia at bukovyna his result was less than 2%). o. tiahnybok’s results were also higher in the region than on the all-national level (over 1.5%). the best result of the leader of «svoboda» was not in his native lviv, but in volyn oblast followed by ivanofrankivsk oblast (fig. 2). electoral population choice in parliamentary elections of october 2014 was formed under the influence of military operations in the anti-terrorist operation (ato) area, lustration period, tough economic and political situation. the first elections to the parliament held after euromaidan−2014 differed from all the elections by a key moment – it was for the first time when there was no question whether «pro-russian» or «pro-ukrainian» forces will win. artificial ethnic confrontation that was escalated for years lost any sense. it was clear that the «proukrainian» candidates will win because radical «pro-russian» ones were now running for quasi-parliaments of the dpr and the lpr. and even the «opposition alliance» which was based on the remnants of the party of regions, represented the interests of the old bureaucracy and associated business, rather than the interests of russia (cf. вибори вр 2014: особливості і сюрпризи; парламентські вибори-2014: аналіз білбордів). therefore, the right-wing political forces represented by eight parties received a substantial support within the western region − 91.75% (fig. 3). the segment of voters who supported the «popular front» stand out with its 32.6% in the region, which is 10% more than the party’s general result. the party won six first places in the wubt oblasts. over 30% of voters supported yatseniuk’s party in ivanofrankivsk (the largest result in ukraine − almost 38%), volyn, lviv and bukovyna. in halychyna they received more support from peripheral districts, while oblasts centres demonstrated lower support fig. 3. electoral activity of wubt population at the parliamentary election of october 26, 2014 source: own studies based on центральна виборча комісія. electoral activity of the population of western ukraine border territory 79 of the party. the worst result of “popular front” were observed in transcarpathia and rivne oblast − less than 30% (fig. 3). petro poroshenko alliance (ppa) polled 21% of the vote and came second in all atu and in all districts of the region. as fig. 3 indicates, the second best result (28%) the presidential party secured in transcarpathia, where in some districts more than 30% of voters cast their votes in its favour. on the other hand, the worst result was observed in volyn oblast where only 17% of the votes supported the alliance. the party «samopomich» was supported by 13% of residents of western ukraine. the success of the party in these elections can be explained by the voters’ wish to see new faces in the parliament, who would be able to carry out the reforms in the country. the role of a. sadovyi’s image as an effective mayor as well as beneficial use of lviv’s image as a successful european city to support this political party were decisive. however, the activity of «samopomich» and sadovyi is assessed positively in ukraine, whereas in lviv they are often accused of corruption and kickbacks. in all atu of the region the party won more votes in regional centres than at the periphery. less than 10% of electoral support was received in bukovyna and transcarpathia, where the party gave leadership to the radical party (fig. 3). the radical party by oleh liashko, the alliance «fatherland» and «svoboda» are among those who secured more than 6% of electoral votes in the region. permanent leftist electoral preferences are not typical of the region at all. these ideas are supported by a relatively negligible but clearly distinctive segment of population. in the first round of 2010 presidential election, leftist candidates were supported by 20.7% of the voters of the region. this result is quite impressive, particularly in view of region’s political hostility towards leftist candidates. v. yanukovych won the highest share of the vote with almost 12%, which was twice as many votes as s. tihipko got, while p. symonenko barely had 1% of the votes cast for him. in 2012 parliamentary elections leftist parties (the party of regions, the communist party of ukraine and the party of natalia korolevskaya «ukraine – forward!») obtained together 18% of the vote, which slightly improved their result in the previous presidential election. the largest voter support – 12.38% – was given to the party of regions. transcarpathian region is traditionally the only one where the party of regions won with 30% of the vote. halychyna cast only less than 7% of the votes for the party of regions (lviv oblast result was still lower with 4.7%). the communist party of ukraine received 4% of the population votes of wubt, which is three times less than their all-national result. the same low support of the leftist representatives was observed in 2014 presidential election on may 25 barely reaching 2.3% (fig. 2). at the parliamentary elections held on october 26, 2014, left-wing political forces managed with the utmost stretch of their powers to get the fourth result in the country, but the share of their supporters in wubt only grew by 3% (fig. 3). the results of «opposition bloc» in western ukraine can be considered a failure. there was no region where the opposition gained more than 3% of the votes, and the three halychyna oblasts did not even cast 1% of the votes. 4. summary the discrete nature of ea suggests such forms of its geospatial organization as the core of political activity of different ranks. the city of lviv clearly stands out in wubt, with its electoral activity having a general impact on the national level and representing the interests and characteristics of electoral activity of entire macro-region. the powerful electoral potential (far exceeding those of each subsequent settlement), underpinned by a high voter turnout and historically determined electoral preferences single out lviv as a macro core of ea in western region of ukraine. spatio-temporal analysis of ea allows also to regard oblast centres, which accumulate powerful in terms of atu electoral potentials (more than 100,000) and shape the general picture of electoral situation in the area, as regional cores. large cities as well as towns of regional subordination function as sub-region cores of ea, whereas small cities where polling stations were operating are viewed as cores of local electoral activity. references conway m.m., 2000, political participation in the united 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