1. Introduction By the time of the dissolution of the USSR about 25 millions of Russians were inhabitants of the Union Republics. About a half of this demographic group accrued to the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, ethno-demo- graphic and sociocultural perspectives of Russians in the post-Soviet Ukraine have nearly central sig- nificance in the problem of keeping of the modern Russian ethnocultural expatriate community. Journal of Geography, Politics and Society 2018, 8(2), 26–32 DOI 10.4467/24512249JG.18.012.8218 RuSSIanS In ukRaIne – GeodemoGRaPhIc dynamIcS of the PoSt-SovIet PeRIod (ReSultS and PeRSPectIveS) Sergey Sushchiy Institute of Social, Economic and Humanitarian Research, Southern Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences, Chekhov 41, 344006 Rostov-on-Don, Russia, e-mail: SS7707@mail.ru citation Sushchiy S., 2018, Russians in Ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-Soviet period (results and perspectives), Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, 8(2), 26–32. abstract The article studies quantitative and spatial dynamics of the Russian speaking population of the post soviet Ukraine. The factors accelerating the demographic shrinkage of the Russians of the country by 3 million people during 1989–2001 are analyzed. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the results of the 2001 Ukrainian census and the data of the ethnic and linguistic surveys of the Ukrainian population the conclusion is drawn that the core role in a prompt reduction of the number of the Russians belong to the assimilation. The analysis of the dynamic trends of the last several years allows affirming that within the borders of the modern Ukraine without the Crimea and the Donbas which is politically independent from Kyiv there may live about 4.1–4.5 million Russians. The study of eventual middle term prospects prove that by 2030 the given number may reduce to 3.3–3.7 million people. The important role in this process will play all three factors of the number dynamics: natural decline, outward migration flow, assimilation. But the core role in the demographic shrinkage of the Russian community belongs to the assimilation or the transition from the Russian to the Ukrainian self identity of a part of the biological and ethnic community of Ukraine. However the number of the Russians in the country recorded by all ensuing censuses of the population was lower than the real ethnic and cultural presence of the “Russian world” in Ukraine as the above mentioned identity transfer was not accom- panied by an acculturation. The Russian language and culture not only dominate in the Russian environment but also keep a weighty role within the dominant country group. Only by prolongation of several decades of tough of a severe anti Russian course Ukraine is capable of undermining the social and cultural potential of the Russian world. key words Russian population of Ukraine, demographical dynamics, biological and ethnic community, middle term forecast, outward migration flow, assimilation. Received: 06 October 2017 accepted: 21 November 2017 Published: 31 May 2018 Russians in Ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-Soviet period (results and perspectives) 27 Russian population in Ukraine was growing dur- ing the postwar decades, rising from 7.1 million people in 1959 to 11.4 million people in 1989 (more than 1/5 of its inhabitants). The most significant part of Russians focuses in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. Mostly there were citizens. Only in Crimea and Voroshilovgrad (Luhansk) regions Russian population was fairly wide settled in the ru- ral areas (Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года…). The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave birth to the new trend connected with the reduction in numbers of Russians in Ukraine and extensive reduc- tion of their geography. This tendency was strength- ened by the linguistic culture and language policy of the Ukrainian authorities, since the early 1990s successively oriented on ethnical and sociocultural «Ukrainization» of the Russian inhabitants. This poli- cy issued from a variety of premises (Фролов, 2000): – closeness of Russian and Ukrainian people, es- sentially relieving ethnical mutual transitions, – active interethnic Russian-Ukrainian marriage rate, – presence of a wide biethnic group of inhabitants (bi-ethnophores), that should have been moti- vated to the “right” national identity. 2. the end of the ХХ century The results of the Ukrainian population census of 2001 demonstrated the apparent success of the state policy of Ukrainization of Russians (Всеукраинская перепись населения, 2001). The census recorded a rapid demographic squeeze of the Russian popu- lation of the country. In 1989–2001, it declined from 11.4 to 8.3 million people. Decrease of it was all-round. In absolute terms, the maximum declines were suffered by the Rus- sian communities of the southeast (only within the Donetsk region declines of Russians were more than half a million people, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts lost 300 thousands of Russians each). But in terms of specific weight decline of the western re- gions proved to be more significant. Two of them (Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk) lost more than half of their Russian population. The scale of the reduction was much greater than the natural decline or possible migration of Russians outside Ukraine. Calculations show that of 3 million recorded demographic decline of the order of 2/3 should be attributed to the identification transition from the Russians to the Ukrainians. The central role in this process was played not by Ukrainization of «pure» Russians, but by the transformation of identification of bi-ethnophores. According to opinion polls, in the middle of 1990s, 20% of Russian Ukrainians had a Ukrainian mother, 10% a Ukrainian father (Савоскул, 2001), that is about 30% of the «Russian» population of the coun- try were ethnic «semi-Ukrainians». Taking into ac- count those who had a third/quarter of the Ukrai- nian «blood», the share of bi-ethnophores was even higher. Nevertheless, the biethnic variety of the country also had a second component – «Ukrainian-Russian». About 6% of Ukrainians had a Russian father, 8% had a Russian mother. In fact, ethnically «semi-Russian» in Ukraine was 14% of Ukrainians, not counting those who had a smaller share of Russian «blood» (Савоскул, 2001). The displacement of a certain number of repre- sentatives of this wide bi-ethnic set from its Russian part to the Ukrainian (and in the opposite direction) was extensively the type of determination of the whole demographic dynamics of the Russian popu- lation of post-Soviet Ukraine. Calculations show that even in the first half of the 1990s, this biethnic group was divided between the Russian and Ukrainian identification parts with a no- ticeable preponderance of the second one (40 and 60%). By the beginning of the 21st century, according to the studies of the specialists of the Kiev Interna- tional Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the mixed Rus- sian-Ukrainian population had grown to 23% of the total population of the country (Хмелько, 2004) and amounted to more than 11 million people (contrary to 8.6 million in the early 1990s). At the same time, the «Ukraine-identical» part of this variety increased to 70% (correspondingly, the Russian one was re- duced to 30%). 3. the beginning of the XXI century: 2001–2013 Due to the fact that after 2001 there were no census- es in Ukraine, ethno-demographic dynamics of its population in recent 15–16 years can be showed only in the form of expert evidence. According to the cal- culations of the Ukrainian demographer A. Poznyak, in 2014 the share of Russians in the population of the country was about 16.0–16.5% (Миколюк, 2014). If this figure corresponds to reality, the number of the Russian population of Ukraine could decrease during 2001–2013 by 1.0–1.2 million people (up to 7.1–7.3 million). Such a result could be considered almost the most optimistic of the real ones. However there were certain grounds for it since the migration 28 Sergey Sushchiy outflow of Russians throughout the 2000s remained very insignificant (about 10–15 thousand people in the average annual calculation), and after the socio- economic stabilization of the country, the natural decline began to reducing. It is worth taking into account the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych’s political team, which policy of cultural and linguistic Ukrainization of the Russian population was essen- tially softened. According to S. Savoscul (Савоскул, 2001), in the mid-1990s, 45% of Russian families in Ukraine already had a Ukrainian wife or husband. The dis- tribution of this variety by age group is unknown, but it is obvious that this indicator correlated with the age of married couples. Modern children’s and young generation of Russian Ukrainians (natives of the 1990–2010-ies) by approximately 50% (or even more) should consist of bi-ethnophores. And taking into account all those having the Ukrainian ethnic component, we can talk about 60–70% of all Russian youth in the country. As mentioned above, the share of bi-ethnophores in the structure of the entire Russian population of Ukraine grew in the 1990s – early 2000s from 30% to 41%. According to our estimates, by 2014 it had to rise to 44–45%. In addition, in parallel in the bieth- nic set of Ukraine the further growth of the share of the Ukrainian-identical population continued. From 70% at the beginning of the 21st century it increased to 76.5–77.0% by 2014 (Table 1). If this expert evidence is correct, then the to- tal demographic decline of Russians in Ukraine for the period 2001–2013 really could be limited to 1.0–1.2  million people: a natural decline of the or- der of 0.45–0.50 million people. (with an average annual rate of natural decline within the range of 4.5–5.5 ‰), migration in the range of 150–200 thou- sand people, assimilation – 0.4–0.5 million people. 4. Period 2014−2016 The events of spring-summer of 2014 most signifi- cantly affected the ethno-demographic structure of the population of Ukraine. Inclusion in the Russian Federation of Crimea and Sevastopol “withdrew” from Ukraine 2.3 million people, including 1.5 million Russians. No less significant demographic declines led to the emergence of two pro-Russian republics of Donbas, whose total demographic potential is about 2.5–3.0 million people (with the possibility of growth of up to 3.5 million) (Сущий, 2013). Thus, the population of Ukraine decreased by 5.0–5.5 million people, and by mid-2016 there were about 39.5–40.0 million people. In this case, the de- cline of Russians (including bi-ethnophores with Russian identity), according to our calculations, amounted to about 2.6–2.9 million people, Ukraini- ans (also taking into account “their” bi-ethnophores) – 2.4–2.6 million This means that the number of Rus- sian Ukrainians in 2015–2016 could be in the range of 4.2–4.6 million people. In other words, their share in the population of the country actually decreased to 10.6–11.5% (Table 2). Tab. 1. Structural dynamics of the Ukrainian bi-ethnophores, 1989–2015 (%) Year Distribution of bi-ethnophores Share of bi-ethnophores wishin self-identified as Ukrainians self-identified as Russians Ukrainians of Ukraine Russians of Ukraine 1989 60.5 39.5 14.0 30.0 2001 69.4 30.6 20.5 41.0 2013 76.6–76.9 23.1–23.4 29.2–29.7 45–45.2 2015 81.2–81.8 18.2–18.8 26.9–27.5 47.6–47.8 Source: Own studies based on: Савоскул, 2001; Хмелько, 2011. Tab. 2. Dynamics of the relative share of the largest ethnic varieties in the population of Ukraine, 1989–2015 (%) Year Share in the population of Ukraine Share in the population of Ukraine taking into account bi-ethnophores «pure» Ukrainians bi-ethnophores «pure» Russians other Ukrainians Russians 1989 62.7 16.7 15.6 5.0 72.8 22.2 2001 62.0 23.0 10.2 5.0 78.0 17.1 2013 56.7–57.8 30.4–31.8 8.7–8.9 2.9–3.8 80–82.2 14.9–16.2 2015 62.0–62.5 27.8–29.0 5.6–6.2 3.0–3.8 84.8–86.3 10.6–11.5 Source: Own studies based on: Савоскул, 2001; Хмелько, 2011. Russians in Ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-Soviet period (results and perspectives) 29 The geography of Russian resettlement in Ukraine has not undergone internal changes in re- cent years, but has been significantly transformed as a result of changes in the territorial contours of the country. After the loss of Crimea and the eastern Donbas, a number of other areas of the southeast – Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and also Zaporizhia and Odessa – moved to the position of the main centers of the Russians. But Donetsk region remained in this row too, in the Ukrainian part of which still lives up to 550–600 thousand of Russian population (Table 3). In the five areas listed, at present, there are about 65–70% of all Russian Ukrainians. If we add to them the Ukrainian part of the Luhansk region and Kiev, then seven regions that make up a third of the terri- tory of the country concentrate about 80–85% of its Russian array. The share of Russians in the popula- tion of these regions also remains quite high: in the Ukrainian part of the Donetsk region they account for 30–33% of inhabitants, in Kharkiv and Zaporizhia – about 1/4, in Odessa – up to 20%, in Dnepropetro- vsk – in the range of 16.5–17.0%. In the rest of the country the proportion of Russians as a rule, does not reach 10%, and in 11 regions of the center and west of Ukraine it is only a few percent. Thus, in most of Western Ukraine, the process of de-Russification of the local population has entered its final stages (local Russian communities are most- ly made up of elderly people and can almost com- pletely cease to exist in the coming decades). Tab. 3. Dynamics of the Russian population by regions of Ukraine, 1959–2016 (thousand people) Territory 1959 1970 1979 1989 2001 2013 2015-2016 Crime 858.3 1385.0 1461.0 1629.5 1180.4 1350–1380 *** Luhansk 950.0 1148.3 1222.0 1279.0 991.8 840–865 240–270 Donetsk 1601.3 1987.2 2225.4 2316.1 1844.4 1630–1680 550–600 Kharkiv 665.5 829.4 966.4 1054.2 742.0 660–680 640–660 Zaporizhzhya 379.1 534.0 606.3 664.1 476.8 420–435 410–420 Odesa 440.4 578.2 656.3 719.0 508.5 460–480 440–470 Dnipropetrovsk 466.0 697.2 834.6 935.7 627.5 540–570 520–550 Mikolayiv 139.2 184.9 223.9 258.0 177.5 155–165 150–160 Kherson 128.2 186.6 228.5 249.5 165.2 145–150 140–145 Kyiv 254.3 373.6 474.4 536.7 337.3 300–310 290–300 Sumy 167.6 176.6 182.3 190.1 121.7 100–105 95–100 Kirovohrad 102.2 115.8 129.4 144.1 83.9 70–72 67–70 Poltava 83.3 123.2 157.2 179.0 117.1 100–105 95–100 Kyiv region 82.4 111.5 146.7 167.9 109.3 95–105 95–100 Cherkasy 66.9 87.7 105.6 122.3 75.6 65–67 60–64 Zhytomyr 87.0 100.6 112.2 121.4 68.9 60–62 58–60 Chernihiv 61.1 73.5 87.6 96.6 62.2 50–52 48–50 Chernivtsi 51.3 53.4 59.3 63.1 37.9 33–36 30–33 Vinnytsya 93.5 102.8 109.4 112.5 67.5 55–60 55–57 Khmelnytskiy 61.6 69.1 76.3 88.0 50.7 45–47 40–43 Lviv 181.1 199.8 194.3 195.1 92.6 80–87 75–80 Rivne 39.1 44.6 51.8 53.6 30.1 25–27 23–25 Zakarpattya 29.6 35.2 41.7 49.5 31.0 27–29 26–28 Volyn 37.1 39.8 43.8 46.9 25.1 22–24 20–22 Ivano-Frankivsk 37.9 46.5 49.8 57.0 24.9 20–23 19–22 Ternopil 26.9 26.3 25.7 26.6 14.2 11–12 9–11 Ukraine 7090.8 9126.3 10471.6 11355.6 8334.1 7358–7628 4195–4440 Source: Figures for the years 1959–2001 obtained from the population censuses of the Soviet Union and the 1959–1989 census of Ukraine in 2001 (Всесоюзные переписи населения 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 гг.; Всеукраинская перепись населения 2001); for 2013–2016 – own studies. 30 Sergey Sushchiy 5. medium-term geodemographic perspectives of the Russian population of ukraine The sharp deterioration in the relations between Ukraine and Russia (2014–2017) greatly exacerbated the question of the possible quantitative dynamics of the Russian population of the country. There is no doubt that the next Ukrainian census will inevitably record the ubiquitous and most significant reduc- tion in the Russian ethnic presence. And in the com- position of this very “wrinkled” demographic array, the share of bi-ethnophores. If we confine ourselves only to the analysis of ethnic dynamics, the current situation of Russians in Ukraine almost mirrors the situation that existed in the south of Russia in the 1920s, when the local Ukrainian array, externally preserving the most im- pressive quantitative scales, is in fact already largely consisted of a mixed, semi-assimilated population. Another 10–15 years passed, and it in its majority self-determined as Russian. In addition, the South Russian Ukrainian community collapsed quantita- tively, declining for 1926–1939 almost by an order of magnitude (from 3.3 million to 422 thousand peo- ple) (Сущий, 2013). However, it seems to us that the dynamics of Russians in post-Soviet Ukraine will be different: not a rapid contraction, but a progressive demographic reduction for many decades. Does this stable trend have a certain quantitative threshold that the Rus- sian community of Ukraine will stabilize or at least significantly slow down its further reduction? At what level (in what quantitative range) can such a zone of stability be located? It is hardly possible to give exact answers to these questions. In our medium-term forecast, we proceeded from the calculations already carried out, suggesting that in 2015 there were about 4.2–4.6 million Russians liv- ing in Ukraine without the Crimea and the eastern part of the Donbas. Under the current conditions, all three factors of demographic dynamics will simulta- neously work to reduce this number: natural decline, outflow and assimilation. Natural decline in the early 2010s of local Rus- sians (3.5–4.0‰ per year) was slightly higher than the same rate for Ukrainians (3.1–3.5‰). The crisis affected the natural dynamics of the entire popula- tion of the country – in 2014, the decline increased to 3.9‰, in 2015–2016 – up to 4.4–4.6‰. Obviously, with the overall socio-psychological depression of the Russians in Ukraine, they could have a decline rate of 5.5–6.0‰. In addition, for 2015–2020 years the number of Russians in the country can be re- duced by 3–4% (by 130–180 thousand people). The degree of the migration of Russians has also grown. The net outflow, which amounted to 5–10 thousand people a year before the crisis, most like- ly increased by several times in 2014 (up to 30–40 thousand people). These figures are, most likely, the lowest bar of possible migration. The outflow could be much higher, given that many activists of the Russian protest movement of the spring of 2014, crushed by the Ukrainian special services, had to leave for Russia. In 2015, migration could be reduced to 20–25 thousand. If in the second half of this dec- ade it falls to the level of the 2000s (10–15 thousand per year), the total outflow for 2015–2020 will figure up 70–100 thousand people. Assimilation losses will also be significant. Part of bi-ethnophores as early as 2014 self-identified as Russians, later changed (or will change to 2020) their identity for Ukrainian. Moreover, in recent years this process has most likely intensified. The rise of Ukrainian civil patriotism undoubtedly played a role, but the growth of systemic pressure on the Russian population of Ukraine was no less important. Moreo- ver, not only the state, but also from the side of civil society, which has substantially increased the de- gree of its nationalism. Russians who are not ready to put up with an in- creasingly tangible “Ukrainization” of social life, are more likely to prefer to leave for Russia, and among those who remain, masking strategies will necessar- ily dominate. If about 10–20% of modern Russian bi-ethnophores changed and change their identity to Ukrainian by 2020 (quite probable value), this will result in the loss of another 200–400/440 thousand people. As a result, for the period 2015–2020 the total number of Russian Ukrainians may decrease by 400–700 thousand and by the beginning of the third decade will amount to 3.7–4.1 million people, of which about 1.8–2.0 million may be accounted for by biethnofores. If for the forecast of the demographic dynamics of the Russian population of Ukraine in the 2020s as the basic parameters take an annual natural decline of 3–4‰ (pre-crisis level of the 2000s), an annual net outflow of 8-10 thousand people and assimilation into amounting to 10–15% of the total number of biethnic Russians, the total demographic loss of the Russian array in this decade will be about 350–550 thousand people, and its total population will de- cline by 2030, to 3.3–3.7 million people. And in this variety, bi-ethnophores will already dominate quan- titatively (Table 4). The post-Soviet demographic dynamics of Rus- sian Ukraine, it would seem, fully confirms the con- clusion that the proximity of the two East Slavic peo- ples significantly facilitates the process of mutual Russians in Ukraine – geodemographic dynamics of the post-Soviet period (results and perspectives) 31 assimilation, allowing gradually to “dissolve” even powerful ethnic arrays, whether they are Ukrainians in the south of Russia or Russians of southeast of Ukraine. Yet, the processes of assimilation of Soviet Ukrainians in the 1930s and Russians in post-Soviet Ukraine have very significant differences. Complex assimilation implies a certain graduality. The first is the period of acculturation (change of language and culture), after which the stage of assimilation (change of national self-identification). This is how, in particular, the “transformation” of the Kuban Ukrainians into Russians took place in the 1920s–1930s. The 1926 census recorded a very sig- nificant scale of Russian-speaking local Ukrainians (1/2–3/4 of their total number in various districts of Kuban). Thus, the massive change in ethnic identity was preceded by a large-scale cultural and linguistic Russification. The Ukrainianization of the Russian population of modern Ukraine proceeds in a different way. The number of Russians in the country is steadily declin- ing, but this process is practically not accompanied by linguistic Ukrainization of the population. More- over, data from sociological polls indicate that the Russian language in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s was not only not lost by local Russians, but even strengthened its position in the titular nation- ality of Ukraine (Хмелько, 2004). “Former” Russians, self-determined themselves as Ukrainians, remained faithful to their native lan- guage and culture, “assimilated” without preliminary acculturation. However, the reliability of such an eth- nic metamorphosis is not large enough and overall is a conjuncture, since a stable Russian-speaking and “Russian culture” preserves for its bearer the possibil- ity of returning to its former identity. Therefore, the number of Russians registered by all future Ukrain- ian censuses will be less than the real ethno-cultural presence of the “Russian world” in Ukraine. Hypothetically, in case of change in the socio-po- litical situation in the country and the normalization of relations with Russia, the flow of bi-ethnophores can go in the opposite direction, and some of the “new” Ukrainians will become Russian again decades later. The modern Ukrainian government understands this perfectly and will do everything in its power to maximize the cultural and linguistic distancing of Ukrainian society from Russia. It is almost impossi- ble to hope for an early change of this course. Ob- viously, the “Russian world” of Ukraine is doomed to a prolonged existence in the conditions of strict targeted pressure. If not for years, then over a num- ber of decades this pressure can significantly reduce the sociocultural potential of the Russian (Russian- speaking) set. Moreover, the loss of this potential will further accelerate the demographic contraction of the Russian massif of the country will make this pro- cess completely irreversible. Although the issue in this case should be a very remote perspective, which goes far beyond the first half of the 21st century. acknowledgements The paper is written in the laboratory of social and economic researches of the FIS Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the framework of a grant of the Russian scientific fund, the project No. 17-19-01411. “Wars and population in the South of Russia in the 18th – the early 21st centuries: history, demography, and anthropol- ogy”. It is based on the materials of the publication Tab. 4. The demographic dynamics of the Russian population of Ukraine and the structure of growth / decline in 1959– 2030 (million people, %) period Growth/decline of Russians (million people) Structure of growth / decline (%) Assimilation Migration Natural dynamics 1959–1970 2.04 20–30 35-42 33-35 1970–1979 1.34 15–20 40–55 30–35 1979–1989 0.89 5–12 25–35 60–65 1989–2001 –3.0 63–70 17–20 13–17 2001–2013 –1.0–1.2 35–45 15–20 35–45 2013–2015 –2.7–2.9 Reduction in connection with the loss of the Crimea and the eastern Donbass 2015–2020 –0.4–0.7 50–60 14–17 26–33 2020–2030 –0.35–0.55 47–53 18–22 29–31 Source: Own studies based on: Всесоюзные переписи населения 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 гг.; Всеукраинская перепись населения 2001; for 2013–2030 – own studies. 32 Sergey Sushchiy in the journal “Sociological Research” (No. 8, 2017, pp.  45–58): I.V. Mitrofanova, S.Y. 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