1. Introduction In September 2015, a special United Nations (UN) Summit, including 193 member states, adopted Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustain- able Development. The Agenda included a political declaration and 17 sustainable development goals (SDG), embedding economic, social, cultural, po- litical and environmental sustainability (UN General Assembly, 2015). Since 2015, the UN Agenda 2030 has become the blueprint for Europe’s ambition to become sustainable and the European Union (EU) has committed itself to implementing all necessary reforms (European Commission, 2016). In 2016, the EU Commission launched the Communication Next Steps for a Sustainable European Future – European Action for Sustainability (European Commission, 2016) including changes and challenges ahead (Eu- ropean Commission, 2016). The UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 ad- dresses political sustainability; the sustainable de- velopment goal means promoting and protecting peace and inclusive societies based on strong in- stitutions and the rule of law. The political declara- tion of the Agenda highlights the importance of democratic governance. It declares how democratic norms and values are essential to promote and fulfil the remaining sustainable development goals. De- mocracy is a fundamental goal and a means to sus- tainable development (UN General Assembly, 2015). In July 2019, the Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed stressed the importance of expanding Journal of Geography, Politics and Society 2021, 11(4), 18–28 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.02 EU and aGEnda 2030 – PEacE, JUStIcE & StronG InStItUtIonS Daniel Silander Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, SE-35105 Vaxjo, Sweden e-mail: daniel.silander@lnu.se citation Silander D., 2021, EU and Agenda 2030 – Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions, Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, 11(4),  18–28. abstract In 2015, the United Nations (UN) decided on 17 sustainable development goals. Goal 16 focused on peace, justice and strong institutions and on the importance of democracy for global sustainable development. This study explores the status of de- mocracy in Europe and highlights tendencies of authoritarianism in some post-communist states. This happens in a global context of resurgence of autocratization. Although the European Union (EU) continues to be a solid liberal democratic order, challenges in post-communist Europe exist, especially in Hungary as a new authoritarian state within the EU. Key words UN Goal 16, democracy, European Union, post-communism, Hungary. received: 27 April 2021 accepted: 24 September 2021 Published: 24 January 2022 EU and Agenda 2030 – Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions 19 democratic governance around the world and how Goal 16 had to be promoted in all UN activities. She acknowledged that democracies may have different forms of governance, with different historical and cultural legacies, but how democracy, as free and fair elections, transparent institutions, fair and balanced rules for people/state relations and checks and bal- ances are universal freedoms for everyone and eve- rywhere (UN Secretary-General, 2019). This study explores the status of democracy in Europe in the last two decades by using well-es- tablished democracy indexes, namely the Freedom House Index, the Nations in Transit Index and the V-Democracy Index in addition to research on de- mocratization and autocratization. The main ques- tion is: what is the status of democracy in Europe in a context of the Agenda 2030 and Goal 16? It is stated that, although the EU is a global frontrunner on the Agenda 2030 and Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, there are new alarming chal- lenges in the European democratic landscape and especially so in some post-communist states such as Hungary and Poland. These challenges could be- come serious hindrances for the consolidation of democracy in individual states and the implementa- tion of Goal 16 in post-communist societies, but also undermine further EU integration based on a liberal democratic order. 2. the Un agenda 2030 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions Agenda 2030 was a result of a long political pro- cess of debates and negotiations, which started in June 2012 with the Rio-20 Conference on Sustain- able Development, where participating states finally agreed to develop global sustainable development goals based on the previous Millennium Develop- ment Goals and the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The Agenda 2030 of 2015 included 17 goals (see Table 1.). The Agenda 2030 embedded a wide array of sustainable development goals. The UN declared how billions of citizens around the world faced challenges to sustainable development goals. Such challenges were poverty and unsafe drinking water, hunger and diseases, social, economic and gender inequalities, poor education, conflicts and human rights abuses. In addition, the UN also acknowl- edged climate changes consequences with a se- vere impact on people and societies, such as natural Tab. 1. Summary of Agenda 2030 GOALS CONTENT 1. Ending poverty Reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty 2. Food security Ending hunger and promoting sustainable agriculture 3. Health & well-being Health systems, health coverage and countermeasures against diseases 4. Quality education Inclusive and equitable education as well as life-long learning opportunities 5. Gender equality Girls’ and women’s empowerment, plus social and economic participation 6. Clean water & sanitation Sustainable management of water to provide safe water and sanitation 7. Sustainable energy Sustainable energy services, and sure access to affordable, reliable and modern energy 8. Work and growth Promoting decent work and full employment through inclusive and sustainable economic growth 9. Industries and innovation Sustainable industrialization and fostered innovation 10. Reduced inequalities Structural transformation to address income inequalities 11. Sustainable community Sustainable urbanization to enhance effective local development 12. Responsible consumption and production Responsible supply chains and business practices, as well as promotion of green economy 13. Climate action Combating climate change and its impacts 14. Life below water Conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas and marine resources 15. Life on land Protecting and promoting sustainable terrestrial ecosystems on land, and combating unsus- tainable management of forests, desertification and land degradation 16. Peaceful societies & strong institutions Promoting inclusive societies based on strong institutions and the rule of law 17. Global partnerships & implementation Strengthening and monitoring means of implementation of development goals based on global partnerships Source: United Nations, General Assembly 2015. 20 Daniel Silander disasters, desertification, drought, land degradation, rising sea levels and ocean acidification. Although progress has been made in many states and regions, the Agenda called for the implementation of urgent global reforms (UN General Assembly, 2015). The Agenda 2030 in Goal 16 addresses the im- portance of peace, justice and strong institutions in providing for sustainable development. The UN declares how the different goals in the agenda are dependent on peaceful, just and inclusive societies with effective public institutions. Goal 16 is essen- tial to obtain other goals; lack of justice and stable and accountable institutions is a major hindrance to socioeconomic development in quality education, healthcare, fair economic policies, social inclusion and environmental protection. As stated by the UN, “Institutions that do not function according to legiti- mate laws are prone to arbitrariness and abuse of power, and less capable of delivering public services to everyone” (UN, 2019, pp. 1–2). The importance of Goal 16 for sustainable devel- opment is highlighted in the Political Declaration of 2015. Agenda 2030 is to “envisage a world of univer- sal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality” (UN General Assembly, 2015, p. 3). Such a world is “one in which democracy, good governance and the rule of law, as well as an enabling environment at the national and interna- tional levels, are essential for sustainable develop- ment” (UN General Assembly, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, democracy is a fundamental aspect of Agenda 2030 and the overall UN Charter (UN Charter, 1945). How- ever, goal 16 is in great need of global promotion and protection. States and regions around the world are highly divided regarding the level of peace, jus- tice and strong institutions, wherein some states and regions are free from serious challenges, while other states and regions are undermined by conflicts, dys- functional institutions and democratic and human rights abuses. Therefore, the UN provides electoral assistance in about 60 countries every year in addi- tion to partnerships with regional, international and governmental organizations (Freedom House, 2019). Such work focuses on promoting aspects of Goal 16 in the rule of law and equal access to justice, effective, accountable and transparent institutions, responsive, inclusive and representative decision-making and public access to information (UN Goal 16, 2015). 3. Europe – Peaceful Societies and Strong Institutions The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights addresses the importance of dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity and citizen’s rights and justice within the EU. It sets out shared European norms and values and a plat- form for European integration and peace. It declares how the EU “is founded on the indivisible, univer- sal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity: it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law” (Charter, 2000, preamble) as in- stitutionalized in the European Coal and Steel Treaty (1951) and the EC- and EU Treaties thereafter. These treaties acknowledge the founding ideas of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. As stated in the TEU of 1992: “The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for hu- man rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992, article 6:1). The notion of the EU as a peace-prone region of democratically elected governments based on strong institutions and the rule of law have attract- ed great scholarly attention for decades. Studies on European integration have explored how European states have domestically developed democratic in- stitutions and on a European level shared institutions with other EU member-states. Studies on interna- tional relations have analyzed how the EU member- states have developed normative power based on shared democratic norms and values. In consistency with the democratic peace theory, scholars have ac- knowledged how the development of democratic institutions, norms and values, within European states, have consolidated a European democratic peace order among states and favored an EU nor- mative power externally (Manners, 2002; Pace, 2007; Russet, Oneal, 2001; Russett, 1993). The democratic norms and values have also guided European states on how to pursue politics regionally and internation- ally (Pace, 2007) in the areas of trade, development of cooperation, common foreign policy and security and enlargement (see The Maastricht Treaty, 1992; The Treaty of the European Union, 2012). In the fall of 2012, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU. The committee stressed how European integration facilitated peace, stability, democracy and human rights for decades. “The Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes to focus on what it sees as the EU’s most important result: the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights. The stabilizing part played by the EU has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace” (The Nobel Prize organization, 2012). In addition, the transformation and stabilization of a continent of peace has provided for EU exter- nal relations based on shared norms and values. Perhaps the enlargement policy has been the EU’s EU and Agenda 2030 – Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions 21 most efficient tool in external relations, offering EU membership based on absorption of European dem- ocratic norms and values domestically (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Bosse, 2009). Another important part of EU external relations is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), launched at the European Council Meeting in Copenhagen of December, 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2003). The ENP has embedded “a mutual commit- ment to common values” (Commission of the Euro- pean Communities, 2004), such as democracy, rule of law and human rights, towards EU neighboring states. Beyond the regional scope, the European Instru- ment for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has promoted democratic institutions, justice and hu- man rights and human rights defenders at risk as well as favored EU Election Observation Missions and the nexus between democratic governance, peace and conflict management (European Com- mission, International Cooperation and Develop- ment). The EU also constitutes the largest aid donor in the world. Based upon EU treaties, the 2006 Eu- ropean Consensus on Development and the 2017 New European Consensus On Development, the EU declares how “Progress in the protection of human rights, good governance and democratization is fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable development” (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006, p. 13, Council & Representatives of Member-states, 2017 pp. 5–7). Finally, in June 28, 2016, the High Representative launched the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, identifying objectives of EU foreign policy, in- cluding security, conflict prevention, democracy and sustainable development (Mogherini, 2016). 4. Status of democracy – contemporary European challenges It could be argued that Goal 16, on peace, justice and strong institutions, is institutionalized in democrati- cally elected European states, within the EU commu- nity of shared democratic norms and values as well as in many areas of EU external relations. In a global comparison, the European landscape is by far the most democratic one in the world. In the early 2000, however, scholars shed light on a democratic decline in the world. The retreat of democracy included the development of authoritarian activities within re- pressive states, but also increased activities interna- tionally questioning established democratic institu- tions, norms and values (Diamond, 2021; Lührmann, Lindberg, 2019). Studies showed how authoritarian states continued to oppress rights and liberties at home, limiting freedoms in the political system and the civil society, but also how these authoritarian regimes pointed out democracy as a western phe- nomenon jeopardizing security, safety and progress (Brady, 2016; Nathan, 2016). Authoritarian regimes challenged international treaties, norms and values that had founded the global and European order (Merloe, 2016). Studies focused on sharp power, in- cluding authoritarian regimes promoting cultural and education exchange, media enterprises and broadcasting, think-tanks and strategic investments plans in infrastructure and technology, to promote authoritarian norms and values within democracies. Overall, authoritarian sharp power has embedded strategic actions to socialize others into specific nar- ratives, suppress alternative narratives, monopolize ideas and exploit international institutions for the sake of national interests (Walker, Ludwig, 2017a, 2017b). In addition, a weakened democratic leader- ship has also challenged democracies. Studies have shown how stable democracies have faced hindrances in socioeconomic crisis, migration, populism, xenophobia and political fragmenta- tion (Silander, 2020). Some democracies have seen a growing number of dissatisfied democrats de- manding improved democratic performances while other democracies have faced illiberal and anti- democratic movements and leaders. The many and complex challenges have existed on both sides of the Atlantic leaving the world with a weaker demo- cratic leadership (Noury, Roland, 2020). On the U.S. side, the Presidency of Donald Trump has led the U.S. into a path of democratic decline (Carothers, 2019). The government launched institutional pressure on electoral integrity and judicial independence, ques- tioning the role of media and used harsh and hostile political rhetoric against opponents (Ghitis, 2020). In addition, the U.S. foreign policies showed lack of coherence regarding democracy and human rights, at times speaking out against authoritarianism, but at other times excused political misbehavior by eco- nomic and security collaborates (Carothers, 2017). On the European side of the Atlantic, democratic challenges also existed in clash of interests between democracy, security and trade, but more obviously in elected leaders pursuing populist agendas, re- stricting rights and liberties in the name of national interests and allowing human rights abuses against minority groups and immigrants. Some established European democratic leaders have seen an “ethical decay” (Repucci, 2020) where mostly right-winged populist politicians have challenged rights and liber- ties (Freedom House, 2020). In sum, “The unchecked 22 Daniel Silander brutality of autocratic regimes and the ethical decay of democratic powers are combining to make the world increasingly hostile to fresh demands for bet- ter governance” (Repucci, 2020 p. 1 ). Based on the methodology used in the Freedom of the World, the Natins in Transit and V-Democracy, the status of democracy in Europe may be explored. Freedom in the World is published annually on polit- ical rights and civil liberties, and the methodology is to large extent based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assem- bly in 1948. Each country receives 0 to 4 points on 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indica- tors, where 0 represents the most limited degree of freedom and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. While the political rights questions are categorized into Electoral Process, Political Pluralism, Participation and Functioning of Government, the civil liberties questions are categorized into Freedom of Expres- sion and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law and Personal Autonomy and In- dividual Rights. The highest score for a country on political rights is 40 (a score of 4 for each 10  ques- tion) and for civil liberties 60 (a score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). These scores reflect a) political rights and b) civil liberties, where 1 represents the freest conditions and 7 the least free. There are three categories of countries’ freedom – an overall status of 1 = free, 2 = partly free, or 3 = not free (Freedom House Nations in Transit, 2021). Based on the Freedom in the World Index, Eu- rope stands strong as a community of shared demo- cratic norms and values. Over the last decades, the EU has widened and deepened based on the notion of a democracy–justice–security nexus as embed- ded in Goal 16. Table 2 below illustrates the scope of Tab. 2. Status of Political Rights and Civil Liberties among EU Member States Country 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 PR CL Status PR CL Status PR CL Status PR CL Status PR CL Status Austria 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Belgium 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Bulgaria 2 3 Free 1 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free Croatia 2 3 Free 2 2 Free 1 2 Free 1 2 Free 1 2 Free Cyprus 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Czech Republic 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Denmark 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Estonia 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Finland 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free France 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Germany 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 2 Free Greece 1 3 Free 1 2 Free 1 2 Free 2 2 Free 1 2 Free Hungary 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 2 2 Free 3 3 Partly Free Ireland 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Italy 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Latvia 1 1 Free 1 2 Free 2 1 Free 2 2 Free 1 2 Free Lithuania 1 2 Free 2 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Luxembourg 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Malta 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 2 1 Free Netherland 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Poland 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 2 2 Free Portugal 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Romania 2 2 Free 3 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free 2 2 Free Slovakia 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 2 Free Slovenia 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Spain 1 2 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Sweden 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free 1 1 Free Source: based on Freedom House, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020. EU and Agenda 2030 – Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions 23 political rights and civil liberties within the EU mem- ber-states. At the beginning of the 21st century, all EU member-states were consolidated democracies with ensured wide range of rights and liberties for its citizens. The EU with member-states symbolized a pro-democratic community and a peace-prone community. Freedom House’s assessment is very im- portant to understand the EU member states’ stand on Goal 16. Goal 16 refers to the rule of law, account- able and transparent institutions, political pluralism and participation, freedoms of expression, beliefs, association and personal autonomy in protecting fundamental freedoms. The European scores on freedoms regarding rights and liberties shed light on a region of consolidated democratic states that to large extent embeds Goal 16. However, when scrutinizing the last years of de- velopment, the European democratic landscape has worrying tendencies. There are signs of growing il- liberal populism that has attacked the idea of liberal democracy (Freedom House, 2020). Some European states are challenged by a global trend of threats against independent institutions, civil society and media and where elected leaders and parties pursue policies to undermine checks and balances, concen- trate power and limit basic rights and liberties. Hun- gary is the most alarming case, as it dropped from Free to Partly Free between 2000 and 2020. Minor decline on democratic score is identified in Latvia, Malta and Poland, although they still remain as Free states. The Nations in Transit Index explores 29 post-com- munist states in Central Europe and Central Asia fo- cusing on the status of democracy by assessing each country on a scale of 1 to 7 in the following catego- ries: National Democratic Governance, Local Demo- cratic Governance, Electoral Process, Independent Media, Civil Society, Judicial Framework and Inde- pendence and Corruption. Each country receives a democracy score from 1–7 where 1 being the most democratic and 7 the least. The ambition is to explore institutions in place and the impact of such institutions on actions taken. The Nations in Transit then classifies countries into different types of re- gimes using Consolidated Democracies (CD, score 5.01–7.00), Semi-Consolidated Democracies (SCD, scores 4.01–5.00), Transitional or Hybrid Regimes (THR, scores 3.01–4.00), Semi-Consolidated Authori- tarian Regimes (SCA, scores 2.01–3.00) and Consoli- dated Authoritarian Regimes (CA, scores 1.00–2.00) (Freedom House – Nations in Transit, 2021). The Nations in Transit Index identifies an overall antidemocratic tendency in Central European states in patterns of misuse of state authority against judi- cial independence, civil society and the hollowing out of electoral frameworks and the role of the par- liament. A number of political leaders have acted illiberal and antidemocratic by invoking restric- tions of democratic rights and liberties in the name of safeguarding the nation. In 2020, the Nations in Transit stresses how the region of countries covered in the Index have fewer democracies today than ever since the assessments began in 1995. The democrat- ic decline is foremost visible in some EU member- states in Central Europe (Nations in Transits, 2020). The Nations in Transit points out Hungary, but also Poland, as alarming examples of resurgence of au- thoritarianism. As illustrated in Table 3, the Index classifies Hungary as a transitional/hybrid regime that no longer is democratic in nature. Hungary has thereby descended by two regime categories becoming a transitional hybrid regime (Nations in Transits, 2020, pp. 1–2). In addition, Poland has trans- formed from a consolidated democracy to a semi- consolidated democracy. The Nations in Transit also identifies issues over developments in Bulgaria and Slovakia, but not to such an extent that would result in a change of the regime type. 5. the resurgence of authoritarianism in Post- communist Europe: the case of Hungary Hungary is today the worst EU case of authoritarian resurgence as illustrated by the Freedom House In- dex and the Nations in Transit Index. The Freedom House Index illustrates how Hungary has dropped from a free state to a partly free state, and the Na- tions in Transits Index sets out a transformation of Hungary from a consolidated democracy to a tran- sitional/hybrid regime. The resurgence of authori- tarianism in Hungary is also supported by V-Dem Institute, which produces the largest dataset on de- mocracy in the world, including 202 countries from 1978–2021. Based on V-Dem’s Electoral and Liberal Democracy Index, Figure 1 illustrates a decline of democracy (Interval from low to high, 0–1). The Elec- toral Democracy Index measures the de facto exist- ence of the share of population with suffrage, the degree to which government policies are vested in elected politicians, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association and the availability of alternative sources of information. On the other hand, based on the electoral democracy index, the Liberal Democracy Index measures equality before the law and individual liberty, judicial constraints on the executive index and legislative constraints on the executive index (see V-Dem Institute, 2020, pp.  33–34). Overall, V-Dem stresses how “the glob- al decline during the past 10 years is steep and 24 Daniel Silander Tab. 3. Nations in Transit – Post-communist EU-member states Country Year National Democratic Governance Electoral Process Civil Society Independ- ent Media Local Democrat- ic Govern- ance Judicial Framework & Inde- pendence Corrup- tion Democ- racy Score Regime Bulgaria 2005 4.50 6.25 5.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.00 4.82 SCD 2010 4.75 6.25 5.50 4.25 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.96 SCD 2015 4.25 5.75 5.75 4.00 5.00 4.50 3.75 4.71 SCD 2020 4.25 5.50 5.50 3.50 4.75 4.50 3.75 4.54 SCD Croatia 2005 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.25 4.25 3.50 3.25 4.25 SCD 2010 4.50 4.75 5.25 4.00 4.25 3.75 3.50 4.29 SCD 2015 4.50 4.75 5.25 4.00 4.25 3.50 4.00 4.32 SCD 2020 4.25 5.00 5.25 3.75 4.25 3.50 3.75 4.25 SCD Czech Republic 2005 5.50 6.00 6.50 6.00 6.00 5.50 4.50 5.71 CD 2010 5.25 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.25 6.00 4.75 5.79 CD 2015 5.25 6.75 6.25 5.25 6.25 6.25 4.50 5.79 CD 2020 5.00 6.75 6.00 5.00 6.25 6.00 4.50 5.64 CD Estonia 2005 5.75 6.50 6.00 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 6.04 CD 2010 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 6.04 CD 2015 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 6.04 CD 2020 6.00 6.50 6.25 6.25 5.75 6.50 5.25 6.07 CD Hungary 2005 6.00 6.75 6.75 5.50 5.75 6.25 5.25 6.04 CD 2010 5.50 6.25 6.25 5.25 5.50 6.00 4.50 5.61 CD 2015 4.25 5.25 5.50 4.25 5.00 5.25 4.25 4.82 SCD 2020 3.25 4.25 4.50 3.25 4.75 4.75 3.00 3.96 THR Latvia 2005 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 5.50 6.25 4.50 5.86 CD 2010 5.50 6.00 6.25 6.25 5.75 6.25 4.75 5.82 CD 2015 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.00 5.75 6.25 5.00 5.93 CD 2020 6.00 6.25 5.75 6.00 5.75 6.25 4.50 5.79 CD Lithuania 2005 5.50 6.25 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.25 4.25 5.79 CD 2010 5.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 5.50 6.25 4.50 5.75 CD 2015 5.25 6.00 6.25 5.75 5.50 6.25 4.50 5.64 CD 2020 5.25 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 4.50 5.64 CD Poland 2005 5.50 6.25 6.75 6.50 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 CD 2010 4.75 6.25 6.50 5.75 6.25 5.50 4.75 5.68 CD 2015 5.50 6.50 6.50 5.50 6.50 5.50 4.50 5.79 CD 2020 4.00 6.50 5.50 5.00 5.75 3.50 4.25 4.93 SCD Romania 2005 4.50 5.25 5.75 4.00 5.00 4.00 3.75 4.61 SCD 2010 4.00 5.25 5.50 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.54 SCD 2015 4.25 4.75 5.50 3.75 5.00 4.25 4.25 4.54 SCD 2020 4.00 5.00 5.50 3.75 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.43 SCD Slovakia 2005 6.00 6.75 6.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 5.00 6.00 CD 2010 5.00 6.25 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.32 CD 2015 5.00 6.50 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.36 CD 2020 4.75 6.25 6.25 5.00 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.29 CD Slovenia 2005 6.00 6.50 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.00 6.32 CD 2010 6.00 6.50 6.00 5.75 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.07 CD 2015 6.00 6.50 6.00 5.75 6.50 6.25 5.50 6.07 CD 2020 5.75 6.50 6.00 5.50 6.50 6.00 5.25 5.93 CD Source: Freedom House – Nations in Transit, 2021. EU and Agenda 2030 – Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions 25 continues” and how “electoral autocracy remains the most common regime type.” (V-Dem Institute, 2021, p. 4). In particular, V-Dem Institute recognizes how “Hungary is no longer a democracy leaving the EU with its first non-democratic member-state” (V-Dem Institute, 2020, p.  4). V-Dem Institute classifies Hun- gary as an electoral authoritarian regime and the first authoritarian regime ever within the EU (V-Dem Institute, 2020, p.  9). In fact, Hungary is first among the top-10 most regressing countries in the world transforming from a liberal democracy in 2009 to an electoral autocracy one decade later. The resur- gence of authoritarianism in Hungary is substantial over the last decade with systematic government at- tacks on the media, civil society and academic free- dom, disrespect towards and harassment of political opponents, assaults on the judiciary, distribution of false political information to provide social polariza- tion and undermine electoral frameworks and pro- cedures (V-Dem Institute, 2021, pp. 9, 18–19). Based on the three Indexes, the rule of Prime Min- ister Viktor Orbán and the Alliance of Young Demo- crats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) has resulted in limited independence of core institutions through constitutional and legal changes, policies challeng- ing political opposition, journalists, universities and civil society organizations as well as reforms cen- tralizing power and the electoral framework. In ad- dition, the government has initiated populist and illiberal policies against migrants and asylum seek- ers, as its impasse with European institutions over its migrant policy leading the European Commission to launch a legal investigation (Freedom House, 2020). The Hungarian development has led the European Parliament to suspend Fidesz, and the EU has trig- gered the use of Article 7 against Hungary due to the suspicion that Hungary does not fully commit to Article 2 of the EU’s fundamental norms and val- ues. Article 7(1) allows the EU to take action if there is suspicion that a member state does not adhere to the EU’s fundamental norms and values (requires ab- solute majority of four-fifths of the Council), whereas Article 7(2) includes possible sanctions on a member state (requires unanimity) (The Treaty of the Europe- an Union, 2007). Hungary’s democratic decline also comes with other worrying signals in post-communist Europe. Figure 2. by V-Dem. illustrates Hungary’s autocratiza- tion in 2020, although Bulgaria and Poland may also become new challenges within the EU, as in 2020 they moved in a wrong direction compared to in 2000 (V-Dem Institute, 2021, pp. 19, 23; 2020, p. 22). 6. conclusion On September 14, 2016, in the context of the new UN Agenda 2030, Jean-Claude Juncker, the former Pres- ident of the European Commission, delivered the State of the Union Towards a Better Europe – A Europe that Protects, Empowers and Defends. He described numerous challenges to Europe and called upon all European actors to show leadership and strength; one of the challenges identified was the fight for hu- man rights and fundamental values (Juncker, 2016). Goal 16 of the UN Agenda 2030 is institutionalized in most EU member-states. The consolidation of demo- cratic institutions, norms and values has served in- dividual states very well and left Europe as a peace- prone region of like-minded states. Today, the EU symbolizes not only a democratic peace project, but also a global force for rights and liberties. However, Fig. 1. Democratic Decline in Hungary Source: V-Dem Institute Index Hungary, 2021. 26 Daniel Silander while the world faces resurgence of authoritarian- ism, Europe also sees signs of populism and illiberal politics challenging the very founding democratic norms of the EU. This study has highlighted the re- turn of authoritarianism in Hungary, but with worry- ing tendencies in some other post-communist states as well. 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