1. Tropology of the heroic myth The heroic-and-centric vision of the world (to form the world of meaning in politics) is quite persis- tent in those post-Soviet republics that preserved an authoritarian or half-authoritarian political re- gime. Thus, the problem concerning the represen- tation of political power is solved through heroic symbolic representation. Heroic-and-centric mean- ing of the political reality constitution is fixed with special “visible” placement of image of the “ruler” with regard to other symbolic elements of political communication. Today, the myths have transformed into an im- portant element in designing political leaders’ im- ages (Bradford, 2021). The figurative language of the heroic myth serves as a symbolic form of political re- ality comprehension (Bellquist, 1987), i.e. a semiotic model of political communication. The heroic figu- rative language of political communication designs Journal of Geography, Politics and Society 2022, 12(S1), 16–22 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.S1.03 The imPacT of myTh conSciouSneSS on The formaTion of The naTional PoliTical and culTural SPace: “ukraine iS noT ruSSia” Inna Semenets-Orlova Educational and Scientific Institute of Management, Economics and Business, Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, Frometivska 2, 03039 Kyiv, Ukraine, ORCID: 0000-0001-9227-7426 e-mail: innaorlova@ukr.net citation Semenets-Orlova I., 2022, The Impact of Myth Consciousness on the Formation of the National Political and Cultural Space: “Ukraine is not Russia”, Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, 12(S1), 16–22. abstract The articles researches the concept of political culture as a system of inherited political notions expressed in symbolic forms and generalizes the differences between the political culture of Ukrainians and Russians. It stresses that the cultural identity of Ukraine is established on one of its basic tendencies – penchant for archaization of all symbolic forms; it researches the place of the heroic political myth in this process; it analyzes sacral projections of the political in the myth through which the subject-and-object order of the Ukrainian politics world is explained. Thus, the pattern of the heroic monomyth (a structured ontological range of symbols) serves as a program of political reality (as a structured order of political objects). The symbols of the heroic monomyth have sacral significance because they present an idea of political order, stability, forecastability of politics (the latter is lacking in the crisis context of development) when there is unwillingness of a part of citizens to bear responsibility for prospects of future development of events in the country in the conditions of long-term uncertainty. The article researches peculiarities of the how the structure-image of the hero builds the constitution of political reality in Ukraine and Russia. key words heroic myth, political consciousness, archetype, political culture, political myth, Ukraine, Russia. received: 07 May 2022 accepted: 21 September 2022 Published: 25 November 2022 mailto:innaorlova@ukr.net The Impact of Myth Consciousness on the Formation of the National Political and Cultural Space: “Ukraine is not Russia” 17 a sacral political reality by modelling awareness of it construed as important factors-constructs, a rel- evant to the Ukrainian political culture “mythotext” being read by the collective individual. Political pow- er in authoritarian states is perceived as legitimate only in the symbolic context of the worldview, when the events of the present and the past are symboli- cally connected with a manipulative purpose. Pro- vided the use of the heroic political myth, political leadership is carried out through manipulation with symbols. An idea that the only factor that can save the European culture from perishing is active mythmak- ing and the recognition of the advantages the myth has in comparison with morality, science and intel- lect has prevailed in a scientific tradition for a long time (Kostiukevych et al., 2020). Researcher G.M. Nikson (2010) stresses that the formal structure of a human language is always a key to understand- ing the unique nature of human consciousness. In the researcher’s opinion, at a certain time, the so- ciety experiences an existential crisis i.e. awareness of own mortality. That can be transmitted only ow- ing to a wider area of symbolic awareness (Nixon, 2015). Thus, our symbolically activated (culturally constructed) self-awareness – the fortress of cultural identity that provides possibilities of cognition but also creates particular frameworks to the processes of realization – is a human quality. In general, the heroic symbolic representation of political power is a model of one-way political communication. The symbolic authoritarian word of a hero-ruler can either be accepted completely or denied completely. It has merged with author- ity – political power. The heroic myth is a postmod- ern political strategy in the context of an actualized problem of virtual political reality construction in the information society (Ŝerbinina, 1998). 2. The unitary state positive myth of russia A good definition of a heroic political myth can be as follows: this is a phenomenal reality and a closed world of meaning as a construct of constructs. The main metaphors of this myth are “canonic”: for those who use them, they embody the world and set a pri- ory to the components of its description. Certainly, virtual mythoreality is not notable for durability of a special totalitarian heroic political myth, but it is included into the structure of a political being as a legitimizer of phenomena of senses when other legitimations of power are ineffective. To estimate Russia’s experience on operating the unitary state positive myth and to see the threats resulting from this experience for Ukraine, an at- tempt will be made to analyze individual problem- atic aspects of the Russian myths. For the Russian social consciousness, a mediated figure of the Rus- sian “soldier” representing the Russian state, will, power and honor is a particular form of the union between the authority and the population. In the Russian mythology, a short connection between the State and the People is postulated: without the sys- tem of complicated representative and legal mecha- nisms typical of western democracies; therefore, the united “people” can only be possible on condition of availability of the state structure providing them an identity mandate for a right to be called “a people”, and the power grounds its legitimacy referring to symbolic representativeness on behalf of the whole “people”. Analyzing the current propagandistic policy of Russia, N. Ŝerbinina (1998) emphasizes that design- ing virtual politics as a world of artificial and imagi- nary propagandistic images was typical as early as the modernist society of Russia. Certainly, the world of propaganda became extremely formalistic, ready- made, conventional. That was, as they would say to- day, a virtual world of official myths, rituals, solidar- ity, organized collective hatred, fight and expulsion of demons. M. McLuhan admits this typical of Russia practice of designing iconic propagandistic images technologically successful and relevant to further in- formation phantom explosion: For the Russians to be aggressively efficient in the current world of information it is enough to adapt their traditions of the eastern icon and image building to new electronic means of communication. The Russians did not show any creativity or work of imagination in their propaganda. They simply did what their religious and cultural tradi- tions had taught them, particularly – built images (McLu- han, 2003, p. 43). Certainly, in this context the main image was a figure of a political hero. The political propaganda in Russia, in our opin- ion, cannot do without a heroic political myth, which plays a prominent technological and content role in it. This proved that the technology of power legiti- mation should be considered as an efficient method of manipulating through modelling the world im- age. The influence of the political power is carried out as open direct “engineering” propaganda, totali- tarian by its matter. An obvious constructivist poten- tial of propaganda is also used in the post-modern communication context. For example, E. Aronson & A.R. Pratkanis (2003) believe that the information age characterized by dominance of different im- ages still remains an age of “propaganda”. Moreover, 18 Inna Semenets-Orlova the main designers of the world image are political leaders and means of mass communication that dis- cursively form a political reality. The phenomenon of propaganda also characterizes a postindustrial society, and the interpretation of propagandistic in- fluence cannot be reduced to politics of lie, which is attributed to totalitarian regimes only. Despite the fact that people have created the virtual worlds since long ago, it is accepted to think that it is postmodernity that is distinguished by vir- tual information technologies and virtualized mass media. That means that the way of transmission or reception of information becomes virtual, and phan- tom hyperreality is encoded and modelled using the means of mass communication. According to J.  Baudrillard (2007), postmodern one-way commu- nication is not, in fact, an “exchange” since it simu- lates “a response” and imposes the models of signifi- cance. J. Baudrillard thinks that the symbolic way of communication is intrinsic to the phenomenon of mass: “Mass is those who are comprehended with the play of symbols and enslaved with stereotypes, they are the ones who will perceive whatever as long as it is a spectacle” (Baudrillard, 2007, p. 192). According to J. Baudrillard (2007), the area of the political is subordinate to the increasing symbolism; this is the area of simulation where the people ap- peared to be audience. In the field of post-modern political spectacle, a symbol has a special magic meaning: it unconsciously states a sacral political reality. Thus, the “virtual reality” will mean hereinaf- ter an artificially created world of simulacra that find virtual existence and that adds a special ontological status to this reality. In other words, we believe that political being does not only include an objective reality but also a virtual reality where the political component of the space dissolves. With this regard, one can agree with one of the main theses of post- modern philosophy – the loss of authenticity of the political, caused, in our opinion, by artificial design of reality. As a result, specific hyperreality is consti- tuted where the symbols themselves create their own existence. In this self-absorbed virtual reality, the signs-simulacra having their own phenomenal being are the examples and review their own world. Virtualization of political reality is some kind a vir- tual analogue of political interactions, for example, relationship between the power and the people or a leader and his/her followers. Moreover, the roles of a political leader and a citizen are simulated. Hence, the objective reality is substituted, and simulacra (political images) enter the relations with each other. A symbolic exchange in the current virtualized po- litical space is based on a symbolic reference and encoding of social and political integrity. Thus, a per- son deals with a figurative expression of the world. The mass media, especially television, build the virtual reality through “telepresence”, increasing the “optical density of its copies” of information. This is where the danger for practices of modern democ- racy lies, because democracy, as a behavior reflex in the virtual world, does not require public discussion when imposed thoughts win the pre-election cam- paign and the “demonstration” of a party program gives space to “predictability” of the political behav- ior model offered to the voters. Hence, a political leader does not review a social (normative) group but serves as a symbolic isolated model of lifestyle which is to be chosen by an individual from the stars’ “menu” designed by the mass media. 3. The elements of ukrainians’ political consciousness mythologization The problem of heroization or demonization of con- crete people becomes actual, first of all, because the creation of heroes/enemies (political, in particular) is one of the main mythmaking assignments now. The images of the Enemy and the Hero, going through archetypical peculiarities of national conscious- ness, universal binary oppositions of the good and the evil obtain specific coloration. For Ukraine, this coloration resulted in a fight of the Truth and the Falsehood. The myth about the Hero (archetype of Ukrain- ian Kotyhoroshko) remains important in election campaigns. The image of the hero is built on under- standing basic people’s problems. The Hero has to beat the enemy fast, cardinally change the situation, quickly solve all the problems. That is why, the image of the hero is “eternal” in a society’s consciousness. As J. Blondel (1992) stated, regardless of the fact if our vision of the “golden age” of leaders-heroes was right or wrong, for the contemporaries it is hard to overcome a feeling that they are being managed by people who do not meet the requirements of the “real” leadership. Therefore, along with some general disappointment with the state elite’s activ- ity, ideal images of the power and leaders that are passed down through generations remain almost unchanged. That specifies the fact that the images of real and ideal politicians significantly contradict each other more and more often. However, nowa- days, the archetype of the hero can be taken as a particular collective positive image of a messiah, a rescuer, a creator or a reformer. For increased and stable efficiency of the artificial myth, the archetype actualization requires for the candidate to have such The Impact of Myth Consciousness on the Formation of the National Political and Cultural Space: “Ukraine is not Russia” 19 personal features which would allow identifying him/her with a certain archetype. L. Kočubej & K. Merkotan (2004) assure that in 99 cases out of 100, the leader’s life journey and positive features formed will be transmitted at the current state through the archetype of the hero. The parliamentary election of 1998 in Ukraine was the first during which an indirect negative ad- vertisement started to be used – through present- ing negative information, i.e. very favorable from the point of view of political psychology. Accord- ing to Û. Šajgorods’kij (2009), the voters themselves can “add” the required volume of the negative data from their own experience, which sensibly enforces the influence of this advertising. The specifics of the presidential campaign in 1999 is a clear-cut artifi- cial exaggeration of the confrontation between the communist myth (P. Symonenko) and a democratic myth, a strong voice of the “Russian theme” along with the veiled European one. A myth about the man of the people, the politi- cian of the people was a novation among the my- thologemes of the presidential campaign in 2004 in Ukraine. A politician’s identification with a grass-root voter occurred. For example, a mythoimage of V. Ya- nukovych was based on the archetype of a “mythol- ogized criminal” with an accent on a complicated life route of the politician “of the commons”. Parliamentary election campaigns in 2006 and 2007, as well as the presidential one in 2010 were built on the myths about the hero and Europe. Tak- ing into account that the Ukrainians have always be- longed to the central-eastern wing of the European civilization, the European way is not a choice of poli- ticians. The Ukrainians have always been and remain Europeans. However, with the use of myths, the Eu- ropean future dreamt about as “golden century” for Ukraine slowed down from time to time, taking into account the tendencies in the situation of personal intentions among oligarchic elites that held state power at a specific stage. In О. Kolinič’s opinion (2012), while designing the politicians’ images, myth-producers have to appeal to the collective subconsciousness, universal archaic ideas to activate the mythological thinking of peo- ple. K.G. Jung (2004) distinguished such main arche- types: the archetype of a mother, a divine child, the self, a spirit, animus (anima), a mask (person), a shad- ow. The archetype of the self (archetype of a hero), according to К.G. Jung, is implemented in the po- litical culture in the image of a hero, knight, winner. In О. Kolinič’s opinion (2012), the archetype of the hero could clearly be traced in the image of V. Yush- chenko during the events of the Orange Revolution. V. Yushchenko’s image as a messiah (according to the self-archetype) appeared not to have worked due to the non-compliance of the mythologized image- building features and his natural weak character. An apt example of especially negative use of political symbols was an election myth of the Op- position Bloc party: “Kyiv does not hear industrial re- gions”. This is a disconnective myth to the confronta- tional content of which the citizens react alarmingly. This myth can leave traumatic effects in the citizens’ consciousness. The main problem of the pre-election programs of the parties was the weak constructive rational component – the content of the programs appeared to be unspecific, and the solution of the issue con- cerning long-term development of Ukraine was not offered. In Ukraine, a tendency to archaization of myths is notable. The model of a strong modern state is quite viable and can be easily opposed to the models of “hetman” (who was embodied by V. Yushchenko in 2004 and by P. Poroshenko in 2014) and the “mother” (in 2010 – Yu. Tymoshenko) that bring after them- selves the arrival of the messiah. Although their model is closer to the Ukrainian traditions, it is not less dangerous, taking into account that Ukraine is an area of confrontation between Russia and the West. That is why, the Ukrainian society needs univo- cal consistent idea-backbone of the resilient modern state. A political myth of a “strong state” is in the mem- ory of generations of the post-totalitarian society, which in terms of the mythologized social conscious- ness tends to perceive all the economic problems as the consequences of democracy. Residual evidence of the “Soviet thinking” in the mentality of the society under transformation (the majority of theoreticians agree that the residual phe- nomena of the Soviet consciousness were cancelled in the Ukrainian society after the protest events in 2013–2014). The results of early parliamentary elec- tions in 2014 proved that, when representatives of the communist ideology did not pass to the Parlia- ment for the first time. In 2014, the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko offered to become united around the strategic vi- sion of the national idea through the slogans of Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 – dignity, freedom, the future. Two needs correspond to this strategic vision of the President of Ukraine, which, in our opinion, have to be taken into account by the subjects of mythmaking: 1. Uniting the political elite carrying out strategic reforms. 2. Uniting the elite and the nation in the fight against the aggressor. 20 Inna Semenets-Orlova The discussion within the framework of these co- ordinates is important to specify the vectors the pro- cess of determining the unitary state positive myth will be running. The Ukrainian society requires a clear under- standing of its position in the military conflict in the east of Ukraine. That can be successfully incorporat- ed into the unitary state myth. At the time of quick changes, the social request is formed significantly faster than the ability of political forces to meet it. That is why, the unitary state myth would perform a stabilizing role in similar situations, preventing cri- sis phenomena. 4. resistance to a ruining effect of myths At the end of 2013, Ukraine made a civilization choice – high citizen activism, the uniting of the Ukrainian political nation which puts the statehood and success of a national project before all else, re- sulted in a wider and more modern understanding by the Ukrainian society of the national identity (not only through embroidery, language or other ethnic elements). In our opinion, one of the priorities in the state politics must be the designing of a system for com- plex resistance to the ruining myths and the active formation of state-building political myths aimed at consolidation of the nation around democratic val- ues, rights and freedoms of the person. Analyzing the nature of historical myths, it can be stated that these structures lead both to improve- ment and deterioration of the human life. Negative myths justifying racism, xenophobia, religious and other types of intolerance are well known. However, there have been myths used for lofty aims – to wid- en the freedom, equality, national liberation, state- building based on democratic principles, etc. In Ukraine, it can be stated that the keystone of the culture of memory is the absent boundary be- tween scientific (research) and scientific-popular his- tory, although myth-makers intensively use history for national mythology. Nationologists stress that the nation is an everlasting and the most valuable parameter; therefore, the rightness of history must be determined by the rate of devotion to this abso- lute value. The myth about the split of the nation is an ele- ment of the crisis mythology in Ukraine. In 2004, af- ter a conflict of personalities (V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovych) transformed into a conflict of identities (the western pro-European region against the east- ern pro-Russian one), it was given a timeless form due to the convenience of civilization rhetoric. The myth about a split of the Ukrainian nation was cre- ated by Moscow political strategists after the presi- dential election in Ukraine in 2004 (Ševčenko, 2006) and successfully implemented into the social (every- day and even theoretical) consciousness. In a technological way, in the conditions of absent counterstand and countermyths from the Ukrainian society and inability of the Ukrainian mythmaking subjects to decode negative symbols, stereotypi- cal structures about the split of Ukraine obtained a character of norm and began to be perceived as obvious. Political and public leaders began using “split” mythologeme in public discussions easily, not understanding the negative results it can cause. For example, are the differences between Bavaria and Saxonia (which are quite significant) or a fact of dif- ferences between Germany and its former People’s Democratic Republic, in our opinion, a real basis for a German public official to start speaking about the “split of the German nation”? Certainly, not. Howev- er, as it appeared to be, not for Ukraine which bor- ders with a half-authoritarian state which, moreover, wants to position itself as a strong “stem” country of an individual civilization space. Another artificial myth analyzed by О. Ševčenko (2006) within the framework of the crisis mythology in Ukraine is also exported from Russia (and, by the way, is very wide-spread in Russia) – about the crisis of management. Within the framework of such myth perception, the main ideologist of “United Russia” V. Surkov specified that the Ukrainians are not a “state- building nation”, do not have “skills of state exist- ence”, they demonstrate principal inability to build a state and autonomous geopolitical choice that foredooms them for a status of eternal province. In fact, some features of the political process in Ukraine – indecisiveness, manipulativeness of power elites, their complete dependence on the elites non- voted for by the citizens (i.e. oligarchic groups) fa- vors “exporters of myths from Russia to Ukraine” in presentation of new arguments promoting the myth of management crisis in Ukraine. For some time, the myth about the management crisis (more mytholo- gized than real) continued psychological pumping of apathy and negativism in society’s consciousness due to another spreading of the propagandistic for- mula of “national rescue”, although, sometimes in fact, the nation must be rescued, first of all, from the makers and distributors of this myth. One more component of the crisis mythology is a myth about inevitable disintegration of Ukraine, used not only by Russian politicians. For example, O. Ševčenko (2006) provides a statement of a Slovak journalist S. Khelemendyk about “civilization incom- patibility” of numerous “Ukraines” (which include The Impact of Myth Consciousness on the Formation of the National Political and Cultural Space: “Ukraine is not Russia” 21 Kyiv, pro-Russian north-east, Crimea, agrarian areas of central and southern Ukraine, Halychyna and for- mer Austria-Hungary). This situation bears a forecast about “Yugoslavia’s scenario”, probable separation of a part of Ukraine, which О. Ševčenko (2006), render- ing S. Khelemendyk’s words, calls “Russian” (Crimea, south-east). Perhaps, they are biased materials of the journalist, but another fact troubles – the distribu- tion of this analytics out of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The most dangerous is a situation of a large- scale manipulation by the “crisis mythology” which leads to perceiving by the society’s consciousness of a myth about Ukraine’s disintegration as fatal inevi- tability. This is an ideal hidden rationale for political strategies popularizing a “crisis” image of the state. Positive myth-making allows reaching relevant balance in the society for some time. The myth makes penetration of both rational and irrational politics possible; it penetrates into constitutions and laws in active and passive forms. Patriotic protests in Ukraine refed themselves with memorial markers of identity and retrospective understanding of the national in 2013–2014. The fol- lowing ones worked well: • Cossack myth (Cossack sotnias (“hundreds”); • honoring the heroes of the past; • ruining monuments to V. Lenin; • cultivation of the Ukrainian language, songs, em- broidered shirts, other cultural product. According to O. Mykhailova, this certifies that the national is tightly connected with memorial markers (Malahov, 1999). The protests in Ukraine started from the events of Euromaidan, i.e. borrowed identity markers appeared to be not less important than me- morial – the protesters considered themselves natu- ral Europeans. It was a demonstration of tolerance in the respected meaning and perception of “Other”. The other part of Ukraine’s people did not borrow the European but Russian identification markers – paternalism and hostility concerning other identi- ties (thugs for hire, so-called “titushky”). In general, a successful end of the protests was determined in many aspects by the fact whether the leaders were able to specify new markers (Koval et al., 2021) that depicted a new identity of the Ukrainian society. To identify the nature of the current myth in transitional societies, one can use the concepts of “threshold”, “society’s structure” and “ideal commu- nity” offered by the rituals researchers. According to B. Gal’ (2008), the society includes two inseparable models of human relationship: • social structure as a structured system of politi- cal-and-legal and economic statuses of people; • ideal communion as a non-structured and rela- tively non-differentiated community of individu- als, arising where there is a lack of social structure. 5. conclusions The society cannot develop in a balanced way with- out consideration of national indicators. In post-So- viet states, the opposition between the ideal com- munion and a social structure is permanent. It is important how much the groups in these societies aspiring for a status of nation-building ones were in- tegrated into the existing state. The existence of Russia’s aggressive information propagandistic policy against Ukraine and relevant dangers resulting from it are put into the basis of he- roic mythology of Russia. In the Russian mythology, they postulate a short connection between the State and the People, which denies the system of compli- cated representative and legal mechanisms. That is why, in Russia one “people” is only possible if the state structure giving them an identity’s mandate for a right to be called “people” is available, and the power justifies its legitimacy referring to symbolic representativeness on behalf of the whole “people”. Political and social discourse of Ukraine and almost all post-Soviet area is the imposition of in- dividual symbols from the previous epochs taken out from political “naphthalene” onto the common Soviet symbolic basis: for Russia these symbols are dynasty’s, for Ukraine – Cossacks’. By contrast, in Ukraine, like in other western de- mocracies, the principles of democracy are interwo- ven into the heroic myth. However, the state struc- ture components are not an immanent component of heroic mythology. Heroic-and-sacral symbolism in the consciousness of the Ukrainian society can become actualized in a plural way: with embodi- ment in an individual person (President in the image of the “father of nation”), group (young ambitious politicians in the image of Cossack’s otamans), com- munity (army, volunteers as forces of the good that beats the absolute evil) or ideas (Eurointegration, victory in the conflict with Russia, which will lead to “the golden age”). The Ukrainians have always been and remain Europeans. However, due to myths, dreamed Euro- pean future for Ukraine in the image of the “golden age” sometimes slows down, taking into account the tendency in the situation of personal intentions of particular circles of the elite. The positions of the myth about the hero remain dominant in Ukrainians’ political consciousness but not so strong as in other 22 Inna Semenets-Orlova countries of the post-Soviet space, for example, in Russia. Topical dangers for national security which start- ed with the annexation of Crimea by Russia require counterstand beyond the borders of humanitarian aspects. The aggressive information policy hostile to the Ukrainian interests certifies not only about the lack of tolerance, culture of political dialogue among particular layers of the Russian political elite but is a demonstration of infringement upon the na- tional narratives of Ukrainians, leads to a permanent increase in mutual non-understanding. In the con- ditions of the transformation stage in the develop- ment, the process of permanent updating of stand- ard-and-symbolic components of the consciousness is natural. 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