Opinion Section          70 
 

 

 

 

Revisiting Sun Tzu in the Information Overload Age  

for Applied Intelligence Education:  

Stop Answering, Find Good Questions 
 

Jean-Maurice Bruneau
 1

, Pascal Frion 
2
 

 
1 

Telecom Business School, France,  
2 
Jules Verne Institute for Prospective 

& Innovative Projects, France 

 

 

Email: jean-maurice.bruneau@telecom-em.eu   

pascal.frion@acrie.fr 

 

 

 

Received February 9, accepted May 20 2015 

 

ABSTRACT: Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' is an illustration of the Chinese Strategic Mode of 

thinking. Today, faced with Information Overload it is unclear if the model of 

''Foreknowledge'' is as relevant as it once was. The method we used in this paper is Action 

Research to compare an Occidental approach and an Asian approach. The results obtained are 

applied suggestions to Intelligence Education. The contribution is to show how to step away 

from the epistemic of the information-centric approach to shift to a more multi-centric 

approach. We identified anchors such as strategic and critical questioning, identifying source 

people we do not yet know, and uncertainty-acceptance and bounded rationality. The 

implications are numerous. We are not so much dependent on the information available as 

associated with Big Data and software. Our suggestions can be used in Small and Medium-

Sized Organizations and do not necessitate resources associated with Large Organizations.  

KEYWORDS: Applied Intelligence Education, Sun Tzu, Competitive Intelligence, strategic 

questioning, information.

Available for free online at https://ojs.hh.se/ 

 

Journal of Intelligence Studies in Business Vol 5, No 1 (2015) 70-89 

mailto:jean-maurice.bruneau@telecom-em.eu
mailto:pascal.frion@acrie.fr
https://ojs.hh.se/


 
Opinion Section          71 
 

 

Introduction 

The 'Art of War'
i
 was written by the Chinese general 

Sun Tzu centuries ago and continues to be a standard 

text for the study of Intelligence Education. The 

concept of 'Foreknowledge' in particular - 'observe 

your environment and you will win your battles' - has 

been used as a cornerstone for discourses and 

practices in Intelligence for Business, Law 

Enforcement and National Security. 

In this context, we are faced with a gap between our 

capacity and our intention. Baumard (2012) noticed 

that 'the art of being right overtook that of reflection' 

(p. 175). We want to notice, we want to observe the 

environment to win 'battles' but the representation of 

the environment is much richer today in terms of 

information
ii
 and the battles are more diverse than 

ever before. 'Noticing noticing' (Neugarten, 2008) in 

small organizations allows the identification of 

postures and beliefs, different from the traditional 

discourse that is usually associated with large 

organizations. 

Our resources to observe the environment have 

improved over time, but our increasing information 

needs in today's complex environments continue to 

push capabilities to the limit. Until in the past, our 

challenge is not lack of information, but an 

information explosion. So the question is: In the 

Information Overload Age, how can we adjust our 

thinking to better inform ourselves
iii

 and our leaders? 

How can Sun Tzu's Art of War enlighten us today? 

Considering Information Overload, can we use Sun 

Tzu's Art of War today in the same manner we have 

done in the past? 

The focus of this article is 'how to think and how to 

inform oneself' differently', in a position of 

information asymmetry
iv
, for intelligence matters in 

small organizations
v
 during other periods than in 

'peace'
vi
.  

How shall we think and inform ourselves 

professionally when we suffer from Information 

Overload and from Missing Information? In France, 

since the 90's, Occidental Competitive Intelligence 

discourses have not succeeded in influencing small 

companies. There were epistemological misleadings 

(Frion, 2012). 

How can we use the Chinese Strategic thinking mode 

derived from SunTzu's work
vii

, to produce an 

operational system when we want to think or to 

inform ourselves, in an Occidental environment, 

when a company experiences Information 

Asymmetry? 

Sun Tzu's work has been considered an Art and has 

not been modelized with clear success. Should we try 

and modelize it?  

Our aim is to help occidental leaders to question 

themselves and to choose between two approaches,  

 

and by doing so, offer a modern contribution to 

Applied Intelligence Education. Our challenge is 

determining when should we use the Occidental 

approach based on modelization and when should we 

use the Asian approach based on the potential of the 

situation? 

The authors are also trying to understand similarities 

and differences in order to identify the transferable 

skills across the Intelligence Fields. Sun Tzu was an 

Army general and his book was written with direct 

military purposes. We try and use Sun Tzu's legacy 

for Competitive Intelligence in particular for small 

organizations experiencing information asymmetry. 

This article is directly dedicated to Intelligence 

Education for Business, but can be adapted for the 

Police and for the Military.  

Our research method is mainly Action Research with 

these two approaches, each being put forward by one 

of the two authors. 

We will present the major criteria to select the 

Modeling Approach and the Potential of Situation 

Approach, as well as a combination of methods 

along the continuum between the two. 

It is difficult to understand the world today; simple 

situations are rare. It cannot be taken in simple parts: 

It is complex (Morin, 1986). There is a need for a 

global approach to think and to inform ourselves, as 

well as a necessity for ad hoc techniques and 

methods, when established processes are determined 

to be inappropriate or ineffective. 

Background related work 

The Art of War has been studied, translated and 

adapted since before the Information Age. In today's 

environment, it is important that many major and 

implicit considerations be identified and made 

explicit. 

Foreknowledge 

The scene: Sun Tzu is leading an army on behalf of a 

Sovereign. He is using a variety of people within and 

outside his army to collect data. Military training 

teaches to fight, as well as how to observe the 

environment in order to secure and cease 

opportunities. He is using simple soldiers, civilians, 

scouts and spies to maintain situational awareness. 

Many Intelligence Education works are based on the 

input-output model. Information is sought, gathered 

and processed. Objectivity is key; no preconceived 

idea can be accepted. In today's environment, 

technology is a cornerstone in the process. Many 

works deal with Information Searching on a system, 

sometimes as a substitute to Human Intelligence. The 

human dimension is often ignored, except in a few 

contributions, such as illustrated by Baumard (2012), 

Boutin (2006 & 2007) or Bulinge (2009). Still, there 

is an epistemic opacity on how we think and how we 



 
Opinion Section          72 
 

 

inform ourselves. Even in Intelligence matters, some 

people consider that every single bit of information 

should be considered, gathered, checked and used. 

Consequently, Intelligence organizations or team 

function like a data gathering and data crunching 

fusion center, rather than as the analysis center they 

were often intended to be. They target and filter 

data/information/intelligence. As Sun Tzu 

demonstrated, his information requirements were 

already defined in his orders from his Sovereign, 

therefore, it is not information that comes first but 

issues-driven orders from a political leader. The way 

we read Sun Tzu in the Occident is very information-

centered. Focusing on information is misinterpreting 

or over interpreting (Eco, 1992) Sun Tzu's text. 

Spies 

In Chapter XIII of the Art of War, Sun Tzu describes 

the use of spies. Today, conducting competitive 

intelligence activities for business purposes is legal; 

however, we always exercise caution not to stray into 

illegal activities. The value of studying the Art of 

War in this context, is to understand the different 

aspects of the use of spies, legal and illegal, in order 

to recognize and prevent these techniques from being 

used against us.  

Information Overload (IO)  

The detrimental impact of Information Overload on 

an organization has been neglected or ignored. 

Information Overload is defined here as a feeling of 

too much information during too short a period of 

time for a project that is too important to be ignored 

or to do a quick review of the information available. 

Not many works refer to Information Overload in 

Corporate Intelligence, Police and National Security 

as an Intelligence Education literature. IO is one 

symptom of the Information Asymmetry. 

Size of the organizations 

The suggestions from The Art of War have mainly 

been prepared for large organizations. Sun Tzu refers 

to an army of a hundred thousand men. 

Oriental and Occidental modes 

There has been a lack of knowledge, misreading or 

disregard for the fact that this text was written in an 

oriental style and is one illustration of a different 

strategic thinking mode that was generally unfamiliar 

to the West. It should not be read as an occidental 

book, with a beginning and an end. It is more a list of 

thoughts and experiences, presented in a poetic style. 

Reading mode 

We agree with other authors who contend that Sun 

Tzu' Art of War should not be read literally. Lévi 

points out the challenge of translation (2011). For 

him, one cannot modelize the Chinese Strategic 

Mode from the Art of War with an Occidental point 

of view. How can we take advantage of a book we 

cannot apply as a model? How can we use speech 

forms such as metaphors, oxymorons and 

paradoxes
viii

 in an operational way?  

Jullien (2002) shows that the Art of War is the 

expression of the Chinese mode of thinking that is 

different from the Occidental one (with the limit of 

not suggesting an operating mode to learn to think 

differently).  

As for Couderc, he provides a deep Text Analysis 

(2012). He mentions that the ancient Chinese 

language does not clearly allow us to express an idea. 

The plasticity of the text, obscurity and ambiguity, 

made it possible for Sun Tzu'Art of War to live on 

through centuries. 

Modelling or not modelling
ix
 

Shall we try and modelize a text that is using so 

many poetic representations? This text is considered 

here as not modelizable. So how are we going to 

suggest operational hints if we can't modelize it? 

Thinking Modes 

Major postures in Intelligence such as the Chinese 

Strategic Mode primarily observe the potential of the 

situation whereas the Occidental Strategic Mode is 

based on modelizing. In addition to these two modes, 

we identified other factors that are sometimes taken 

into account, such as behaviors, beliefs, 

organizations, methods, theories, tools and 

techniques based on a variety of modes and 

conditions such as luck, serendipity, exposition, 

provocation, totality of information, repeating what 

has been done before, looking for homogeneous 

solutions, making waves or no scandal to name a 

few. A combination of - some of - them can be useful 

during a long project whereas during a short activity, 

beliefs and actions that are not aligned, may create 

pitfalls. Table 1 presents a brief comparison between 

the Occidental and the Chinese Strategic Mode. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 
Opinion Section          73 
 

 

Table 1: The Chinese and Occidental Strategic Modes to apply Sun Tsu's Art of War 

 'Means-end' logic 

Occidental Strategic Mode 

'Condition-consequences' logic 

Chinese Strategic Mode 

Purpose Destruction of the enemy 

(Check game) 

Accomplishment and liberty of individuals 

(realization of 'I') 

Destructuration of the enemy 

(Go game) 

Success of the group / family: harmony 

between the places of individuals and society 

(achievement of 'my role') 

Strategy 'Confrontation with the opponent' 

The environment is transformed by the actions of 

the actors 

Objective: convince 

Encirclement by the reduction of the room for 

manoeuver of the opponent' 

Actors are transformed by the environment 

Objective: suggest 

Relation to the 

model 

 

General 

representations of 

things and time 

 

Values and beliefs 

 Modelize reality 

 Distinction (separation and 
complementarity) between theory and 

practice 

 Impose a shape to the reality 
 

Materialism, a 'objectivated' world 

Conscience of the subject, of the individual 

Linear time 

Rationality and technological progress 

 Adapt the shape to the real 

 Use of reality prevails over 
theorization of reality 

 

 

Interdependent world, mysticism. 

Conscience of the group, community spirit. 

Immutable circular time 

Pragmatism, moral and spiritual progress 

Opportunities 

detection 

The detection of opportunities based on the 

reference to a model set by force to reality by the 

will of the actors 

Actors submit to reality. 

No opportunity outside the process 

Approach 

 

 

 

 

Description of the 

World 

1. First, definition of the goal, 

2. Gather the means, 

3. Look for opportunities and ways. 

 

 

Principle of non-contradiction 

Operating mode: reductionism and logical 

argumentation 

1. Identification of the potentiality of the 

situation, 

2. Anticipation of the consequences 

by the detection of opportunities 

3. Outline the actions depending on the 

conditions of the environment. 

Third included logic 

Operating Mode: aphorisms and 

metaphors, adjustments, in perspective 

Source: Jean-Maurice Bruneau, based on Jullien (1996, 2002) 

 

 

 



 
Opinion Section          74 
 

 

Conceptual framework model design   

Sun Tzu's Art of War is considered valuable and 

insights are believed to be transferable to Business. 

The models we use 

We used the works of Jullien (2002) and Herrigel 

(1953/2004) in particular to address epistemology in 

intercultural approaches, in particular between the 

Chinese Strategic Mode of Sun Tzu to create 

knowledge, and a more Occidental way with 

modelization.  

The main theories we use 

User-oriented. Dervin & Nilan (1986) are regularly 

cited as a change in paradigm from system-oriented 

research to user-oriented research. Frion & Frion 

(2008) mention that the person who is looking for 

information is an actor or even a Director with the 

intellectual building of the 'Staging of Information'. 

We also use Small groups sociology rather than 

focusing on large groups, and the lack of fulfilment 

theory from Gödel. 

The frameworks we use 

Informational Asymmetry: Information is not purely 

and perfectly distributed among the actors. Small 

companies generally have less information and fewer 

resources than larger ones. 

Systemism: The Chinese thinking mode is interested 

in processes. 

Complexity: We opt out from the epistemological 

point of view of objectivity and adopt a more 

complex position, assuming our subjectivity. In 

particular, we use the work done by Morin (1986). 

We consider 'How to think and how to inform 

ourselves' and not 'data/information/knowledge 

management', 'mastering information' or any 

information-centric approach. 

Indetermination postulate: There is no predefined 

information and predefined goal. 

Tier-included logic: The person who is watching the 

environment is part of the environment and 

influences it. 

Economic warfare: The authors distinguish periods 

of 'war' and periods of 'peace' for companies. 

The hypothesis we make 

Information is not always a given. The authors would 

like to stress that this article refers to Intelligence for 

Business, Police and National Security and not to 

data/information/knowledge management. 

Intelligence is taken here as a rare occasion. We 

often don't know what to expect. Is it very different 

from monitoring the web with deterministic key-

words and the 'matching process' among large 

quantities of information available. 

The company does not know the topic very well to 

start with. It simply cannot start analyzing the first 

information available. On the contrary, we need to 

start by asking questions. By doing so, we try and 

push away the limits that a neophyte can have. 

Impossible validation. Frion & Frion (2008) say we 

cannot validate information, because we would need 

to validate the validation of the validation in a 

vicious circle attaining no more than a point of 

reference. We can just believe in references. The 

validating process misleads us. They suggest Staging 

or Directing the information scene with a list of 

criteria to select the information subject to 

acceptance. We decrease some analysis after the 

information and we increase the questioning prior to 

the information. 

Responsibility Principle 

Authors use the Responsibility Principle from Hans 

Jonas (1979/1985) to question our future. How shall 

we inform ourselves today and tomorrow? Looking 

at any data available on the web would not be 

responsible today when we face Information 

Overload. Not looking would not be responsible 

either. Looking responsibly, ethically, is what we try 

to achieve. 

Operational versus true  

Authors are researcher-practitioners. They study to 

practice in a more operational way and are not so 

interested in a theoretical truth. 

Small companies are not just large ones on a small 

scale. They have unique ways of thinking and 

informing themselves due to their limited access to 

information and resources. 

We reject the progress paradigm in relation to 

information gathering: For the authors, the progress 

paradigm that says 'more information is better' is 

simplistic and misleading. The authors take into 

account the human dimension and the operational 

constraints and consequently consider that more 

information is not necessarily better. 

The authors summarized in Table 2, the general Pros 

& Cons of classical views on modelization and 

opportunity seizing. 

 

 

 

 

 



 
Opinion Section          75 
 

 

 

Table 2: Pros & Cons Classical views on modelization and opportunity seizing 

 Pros Cons or To Be Addressed 

 

 

 

Opportunity  

seizing 

Thinking rather than Informing Oneself 

because thinking is synonymous with analyzing 

the information available (mainly with or after 

the information). 

Allow opportunities to be seized. 

Contextual. 

Difficult to teach. 

Adapted for small projects and topics that can 

be handled by one person or a small group. 

Weak signals. 

Does not need hierarchy to be run as long as 

the leader welcomes weak signals. 

 

'If one does not know to which port one is sailing 

no wind is favorable' Seneca 

 

Not so well adapted for large projects when there 

is a lot of information or a lot of constraints to 

review. 

 

No beginning and no end. 

Risk of over-interpretation of the information 

available. 

Some negligible information is taken into 

account. 

Time consuming to process 'all' the 

data/environment. 

Feeling of not leading the process. 

Work Interruptions. 

Incitation to stay in the Known Known and the 

Known Unknown. 

 

 

 

Modelization 

Informing Oneself rather than Thinking 

because Informing Oneself is synonymous with 

working before or without the information 

available to start with. 

Not many questions asked, we follow the plan. 

Avoid/limit Work Interruptions. 

Easy to teach. 

There is a beginning, there is an end. 

No need to process 'all' the data/environment, 

just the one we need. 

Feeling of leading the process. 

Strong signals. 

Fragility of the Check List effect. 

Risk of forgetfulness and blindspots. 

Does not allow opportunities out of the model. 

Not contextual. 

Lack of spontaneity. 

Lack of use of luck. 

Incitation to go to the Known Unknown. 

 

 

The Research Method 

Our Research Method was built in a succession of 

steps.  

We started by regularly discussing our observations 

on Intelligence Education, allowing us to use the 

appropriate method. 

Our main observations are as follows. 

What is the Art of War? 

Sun Tzu's Art of War is regularly quoted in a 

centuries-old context. There has been no real new 

examination or point of view expressed despite the 

recent changes of the Information Age.  

The Chinese Strategic Mode aims at observing the 

potential of a situation, by observing the internal and 

external environment.  



 
Opinion Section          76 
 

 

Sun Tzu's Art of War cannot be modelized. We 

should try other ways to make the most of it in the 

Occidental world rather than to make models out of 

it. 

Information Overload and Lack of Information 

Many people suffer from Information Overload. At 

the same time, they also suffer from a lack of 

information, in particular on strategic issues. Today, 

it is frequent to have a feeling of too much 

information. How can we apply some precepts from 

a period prior to the Information Overload to aid us 

with the challenges we face today in Small 

Organizations? 

Small organizations 

Small businesses generally represent a larger 

proportion of the actors compared to a much smaller 

proportion of larger organizations. Still, small 

organizations are often given the same suggestions 

than larger ones. They are relatively ignored in 

Scientific Research compared to large organizations.  

For instance, students who are leaving their school or 

their university to join start-ups or to launch new 

businesses, have been mainly trained to join a large 

firm. These start-up have less information than the 

large companies and still they can be very 

innovative, before many of them are bought by a 

large firm. Some small organizations take advantage 

of this situation and favorably benefit from 

Information Asymmetry. 

Information Asymmetry 

Small organizations have developed ways and means 

to think and to inform themselves differently from 

larger ones. Small companies are used to thinking 

and informing themselves without or before 

information. Large companies are more used to 

thinking and informing themselves with and after 

information. For instance, data bases and Big Data, 

are really topics keep large organizations awake at 

night rather than small ones. Small companies are 

less likely to use consultants than are larger 

companies. Generally, small companies possess less 

investigative methods and means than larger ones, 

and have less time to spare for activities outside 

producing, selling and administrating the company. 

Small organizations experience an Information 

Asymmetry that influences the types of intelligence 

to which they have access and are able to use. 

Types of intelligence 

When confronted with large amounts of data, like on 

the web, one can develop one's intelligence by 

analyzing and connecting it. People consider that you 

just need to dig into it, targeting and filtering the 

information, and nuggets will surely be found 

eventually. Connect the dots. When confronted with 

smaller and even small quantities of data, one can 

develop a different form of intelligence, specifically 

by making assumptions, without being sure of 

receiving the information they think they need. Two 

major types of intelligence should be studied in 

particular: Intelligence with or after information and 

intelligence without or before information. Different 

types of intelligence will need a specific validation of 

information. 

Validation of information  

Strictly speaking, information cannot be validated. 

We cannot validate information, we can just believe 

in references. The validating process misleads us. 

We suggest Staging or Directing the information 

scene with a list of criteria to identify the 

information subject to acceptance. By doing so, we 

increase the questioning prior to information and 

decrease some analyses after the information. This 

becomes an intellectual building of the ''Staging of 

Information'' (Frion & Frion, 2008.) Of course this 

can be a risky process. However, if we do not 

participate in the validation process, we face 

cognitive biases we could otherwise limit or avoid. 

Cognitive Bias toward the 'Strategic Void' 

Members of large companies can easily suffer from 

information Overload in general and from cognitive 

biases such as the Confirmation Bias in particular.  

According to Baumard (2012), the beliefs of larger 

organizations are no more robust as those of smaller 

organizations. By the nature of their organization, 

large companies tend to work with more established 

norms, standards and guidelines so that they tend to 

reject high value incongruous information. The 

nature of large organizations produces some 

'strategic void'. Large companies do not work with 

physical perceptions as much as small ones do. 

Physical perception 

Members of Small companies are usually more 

directly impacted by customers and other physical 

elements from the realities of their markets. They 

tend to experience more physical perceptions such as 

a lack of comfort, uncertainty and solitude while 

doing their job. Physical perception seems to be very 

useful in different ways in the Industrial and 

Information Age. 

Industrial and Information Age states of mind 

The mastering of information is often taken as a 

reference to achieve or to get close to. Mastering 



 
Opinion Section          77 
 

 

includes various assumptions such as art, control, 

virtuosity and superiority. The Mastering of 

Information is often understood by its control 

subjacent meaning. The denial of surprises, of 

incongruous information and of the unknown are 

relevant signs that the current state of mind is a 

heritage from the Industrial Age. 

What is the Information Age state of mind? We 

observe that people try to adapt from the Industrial 

Age state of mind to the Information Age. 

Awkwardly and out of pique, many people seek 

more data to solve problems. Indeed, Big Data will 

certainly address some of our current endemic 

problems as well as amplifying some others that have 

not been addressed properly. As an example, web 

searching skills have been rather poor for the last 

twenty years, creating poor habits and weak beliefs 

and the authors do not see why they would 

spontaneously be corrected with Big Data. 

The authors have observed the way many members 

of companies in Occident-mainly in France- usually 

think and inform themselves. After having 

acknowledged and presented a short list of the salient 

elements the authors took into consideration, it is 

time to turn to the method chosen. 

The method chosen 

The authors wanted to go over a contemplative 

approach of observing gaps between a discourse and 

its effects and to be in a position to propose new 

ways of improvement. They introduced the Chinese 

Strategic Mode in their missions and lectures and 

made empirical observations in Small companies 

when they think and inform themselves.  

The authors also introduced Sun Tzu's Art of War in 

missions and training sessions with small companies. 

The authors used the Action Research method.  

Bruneau started from the Chinese Strategic Mode 

and relied heavily on Sun Tzu's precepts, sometimes 

with the use of physically feeling the effect of 

information and situations. He started from the Asian 

side with Sun Tzu and walked along towards 

Occidental companies.  

Frion started from the old Occidental Mindset and 

started to include the Asian influence of Sun Tzu and 

also walked along towards Occidental companies. He 

worked with more than two hundred very small and 

small enterprises on commercial aspects, using 

Competitive Intelligence, over the period 2009-2014 

in a regional program called 'Dinamic Entreprises' in 

France. 

The two approaches used the 'Participant Observer' 

method separately and with different populations. 

Sometimes a group was divided in two subgroups, 

one using the traditional and Occidental approach 

whereas the other group was introduced to some 

precepts from Sun Tzu, in order to compare the 

results. 

The authors often compared their results over a 

period between 2010 and 2014. They also worked 

together in 2014 with a group of students with 

Bruneau as a teacher and Frion as a customer over a 

few months. The authors observed the participants 

and also themselves. They had distinct approaches 

and compatible goals. 

These two approaches are not quantitative 

approaches. They are described in detailed below. 

Since our work is due to be used in Applied 

Intelligence Education, the authors are presenting 

two practical hints to revisit Sun Tzu's Art of War. 

At the beginning, they seem to be in opposition; still 

they share some of Sun Tzu's heritage, objectives, 

beliefs and results. 

We will present Bruneau's approach first and then 

Frion's, and we will compare them in a table in order 

to produce a working document and help to assist in 

applying the appropriate approach to a specific 

situation. 

Bruneau's approach 

Success Story 

A five-person firm is specialized in soil biological 

analysis. Its clients are mainly farmers. This very 

small company is competing with multinational firms 

and international institutes in agronomic research. 

Despite its world class recognized expertise this 

company does not receive any public or private 

funding and still, strives to grow. This company is 

clearly in a situation of Information Asymmetry. 

In this context, Sun Tzu's precepts such as aphorisms 

and metaphors were used to facilitate the 

questioning. As an example, ʺThis knowledge cannot 

be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained 

inductively from experience, nor by any deductive 

calculationʺ (Chapter XIII on the use of Spies) 

suggests raising an incongruous question like 'has my 

competitor already done the investigation I intend to 

launch?' The questioning that follows will lead to 

factual hypotheses such as: is there a PowerPoint file 

on the web that would present the marketing efforts 

of Company X on soil quality control? While 

hypothesis check is carried out, surprises often 

emerge. In our case, we found that a competitor had 

prepared a document presenting the typology of the 

various tailored offers on the market, prepared. 

This approach is based on the idea that actors submit 

to the reality of the environment. The culture of 

Resource Management to reach a goal is neglected in 

favor of reality exploitation. In the absence of many 

investigation resources, such as consulting, 



 
Opinion Section          78 
 

 

expensive databases, large sophisticated personal 

network, this little company only adapts to the shape 

of reality without being able to make it or to change 

it. 

Questioning works in a cascade, based on Sun Tzu's 

precepts selected at random. This channeling of Sun 

Tzu's precepts produces creativity in the questioning. 

It favors the generation of pertinent questions for 

which the absence of answer becomes an issue. 

Priority is given to these questions, which are 

disturbing, paradoxical or incongruous. Based on 

these types of questioning, more possible factual 

hypotheses are produced. Then an invalidation 

process is organized and provides additional 

outcomes that could not be imagined with a more 

classical needs assessment. As an example: A file 

from a real estate office that is specialized in 

vineyards from which winegrowers shall soon retire 

and need a soil analysis before they can sell their 

property.  

The goal of this approach is contrary to the one that 

starts by defining the information needs. Indeed, it 

consists of eliminating the search for answers and 

avoids some cognitive biases such as the 

confirmation bias. 

Exploitation of the competitive reality prevails over 

theorizing. It is more a logic of 'condition-

consequence'. This leads the small firm to canvass 

for new customers conditioned by the results of the 

investigation. 

Based on this Success Story and on collaborative 

explication process in working together, the two 

authors have structured some guidelines and a list of 

insights. 

Action Items / Steps 

 

Step 1: Explicitly identify the unknown elements of 

the environment by developing a list of 

questions - for which the absence of an 

answer becomes an issue. 

Step 2: Use Sun Tzu's precepts as stimuli to improve 

the questions. For each 'inspired' question, 

produce four or five factual hypothesis. 

Step 3: Sun Tzu's precepts are left to chance, with no 

specific order. Questions chain themselves 

in a series, matching them to factual 

hypothesis. Verification gives some 

answers and allows more precision to the 

subsequent questions and hypothesis. 

Step 4: Divide questions in two types. One for 

players and sources possessing knowledge 

of the field investigated. The other one for 

the topic of the investigation. 

Step 5: A first exploration is prepared and a dead line 

is given. Identify the players with 

experience in the field who are available 

and who could possibly answer the critical 

questions for this step. 

Step 6: Prepare the meetings and get in touch with 

these players. Turn the critical questions 

into precise hypothesis so that implicit 

knowledge can emerge from the players. 

Step 7: Interview the people from the field and 

consolidate their answers. This last step 

makes the potential of the situation emerge 

without pre-conceived ideas. The 

specificity of the answers helps to bring out 

operational elements. Lasting questions that 

remain with no answer can also be very 

enlightening. 

Example from Frion 

A small company was curious to know if its main 

competitor would be to for sale in the next couple of 

years. Two people gathered around the president of 

this company to work on this topic of special interest. 

Frion suggested his Methodological Information 

Resistance (temporarily) method or Mir(t): For a 

short period of time, the team started by 

Methodologically Resisting the compulsion of 

acquiring Information on the potential target.  

Instead, the team identified a strategic question 

symbolizing the precise goal. This question was 

prepared during a one hour discussion made of a 

succession of attempts. Originally, the question was: 

'Is our competitor going to be for sale soon?' The 

second attempt became:  'What are the three main 

options for our competitor in the next couple of 

years?' The third attempt turned to: 'How can our 

company increase its production capacity and secure 

its current margins within the next five years with 

internal or external growth?' The team was glad to 

have moved from the first question to the second and 

third question. The first question seemed useless by 

this time. 

Then the team started strategic questioning and 

identified a list of ten significant questions in order 

to approach and to encircle the topic to be addressed. 

Two hours were necessary to identify the items to be 

considered, to give them precision, and to turn them 

into questions. The President did not take part in this 

second step until the list of questions was presented 

to him. Two questions were disregarded: One 

seemed useless for the president and one was already 

answered. The president had some information he 

forgot to give to his team and the Strategic 

Questioning step gave him the opportunity to discuss 

this extra information. One question was added. Four 

questions were discussed and slightly modified to 

reach a more incisive question. The initial question 

of the goal was reviewed and modified slightly to 

include adjustments that emerged during the strategic 

questioning. 



 
Opinion Section          79 
 

 

Then, for each question, a prototype was elaborated. 

The first one needed one hour. The following ones 

took approximately fifteen minutes each on average. 

A list of Missing Information was identified, profiles 

of sources people - Human sources - were 

modelized. Accesses - ways, means and tools - to 

contact these people were prepared as scenarios. 

When the First Best approaches were identified - the 

most promising ones - the team experienced a 

moment of excitement with laughter and little shouts 

that Frion calls the 'Success syndrome.' After a quick 

estimation of time and effort that would be necessary 

for this operation, the team realized that resources 

and time would be too limited. The initial command 

was reviewed and modified one more time, with an 

agreement that this final adaptation of the strategy 

was still very good and was worth doing. The 

seeking started and sources people were contacted. 

Good surprises emerged from some interviews and 

some questions from the strategic questioning list 

were considered unnecessary at this time. Finally, the 

company decided to launch an internal growth plan 

over the next few years instead of waiting for the 

competitor to be potentially for sale. 

Frion's approach 

Since information is not necessarily a good thing in 

general and in a situation of general Information 

Overload in particular, a temporary Methodological 

Information Refusal -or resistance- is used first 

(Frion, 2012). Frion's method suggests a temporary 

actionable strategic questioning or an agile 

questioning before information (Frion, 2009a). 

The method is made of three subsequent steps. 

Step 1: The Command. The command is discussed 

and reformulated to reach a second then a third 

version and not taking the first version for granted. 

The command is a question, as it is action-oriented 

rather than a list of Intelligence requirements that is 

more knowledge-oriented. With a question, it is 

usually easier to understand the point of what we are 

looking for and when we reach this point. One 

working principle is that 'a leader doesn't clearly 

know what he wants to start with.' The reformulation 

is compulsory. 

Step 2: The Strategic Questioning. Instead of 

analyzing the existing data, one person or a small 

group of persons tries to find approximately ten right 

ways to go about the 'problem'. The leader does not 

take part in the process at the beginning. It starts with 

brainstorming to identify concerns, refines and adds 

precision to these concerns, and ends in finalizing 

precise questions regarding these concerns. We try 

and ask questions and identify what we would like to 

learn-what is missing in order to move on. Going 

from step 1 to step 2 can involve a confirmation bias, 

however the questions in step two are useful to 

identify what has not been said so far and what has 

been believed either consciously or unconsciously. 

The leader is given this list of ten questions. He 

usually already knows the answer for one of them, is 

not interested in two of them, may add another 

question and modifies three or four or them. If the 

leader only says the questions are ok, the exercise is 

doomed to fail: He needs to get involved in the 

questioning process. The question from step 1 is 

usually modified with a longer description and more 

precise wording. After a general picture is 

developed, we dive into a more analytical approach 

taking the context into consideration. 

Step 3: The Information Seeking Prototype. For each 

question of step 2, there is an information seeking 

prototype. It starts with the identification of the most 

suitable format to give as an answer to address this 

question. This format can be a short memo, a table, a 

pie chart, a picture, a conversation with an expert, a 

verbatim explanation, among others. In this 

document we intend to produce to fit our leader's 

cognitive style, we identify three best missing 

information that would fill this content. For each 

piece of missing information, we modelize the 

profile of a source person. We want source persons 

and not access. Source persons are in the best 

position to help us reformulating a poorly developed 

question. For each source person, we produce a 

scenario or a script to approach this person. How is 

he or is she going to react to my questions? He or she 

must not tell me a secret and it must be the person in 

charge for this matter. Sometimes we need to ask a 

portion of the command to figure out the big 

question without asking for it directly. It is a 

framework rather than a strict procedure. The idea is 

to keep it simple and to develop relations between 

the leader and the task force. Through a succession 

of three main tasks, we produce loops and reviews at 

different levels. The command evolves throughout 

the process and it is 'easy' to adjust to the 'new' 

formulation of the command because we do not 

invest a lot of time in processing data. 

At step A1, A2, A3, the scenario goes to the point of 

two indicators to be met: 

 Subcontracting: A seeking prototype can be 
subcontracted to someone from our team 

without major difficulty. Thus, it has to be 

well presented and explained with details. 

 Success syndrome. A physical syndrome of 
success must be experienced before the 

interviews start. No Success Syndrome, no 

seeking. 

 

In fact this approach provides so much preparation 

that the participant must feel an easiness to act with 

or without surprise, a bit like the Art of Archery 

(Herrigel, 1953) with a Zen approach.  

 

 

      



 
Opinion Section          80 
 

 

Figure 1: Acrie method 

 

Various constraints are identified or explicitly asked 

and this situation will provoke ideas to reach the 

predefined goal. At each step, there is an ambition to 

formulate or to identify the best question, the best 

Source Person, the best access. This First Best 

technique mobilizes the energy of the game of the 

'treasure hunt'. 

This method is particularly adapted to on-the-spot 

questions and rather not for monitoring purposes. 

We try and avoid or limit different mistakes and 

cognitive biases:  

 the sticky information to start with; 

 the confirmation bias when a popular 
information is repeated; 

 we avoid the validation fallacy, among 
others. 

 

Comparison between Bruneau and Frion 

There is a long list of similarities, shared beliefs and 

similar results and another one with differences. 

Major noticeable similarities 

Both approaches aim at improving, skills, business 

behaviors, and a sustainable activity. Both rely 

heavily on Human Behaviors. Therefore, they need 

to be taught during an action-training period over a 

few weeks: 3 days minimum between 3 to 9 weeks 

for Bruneau, and 5 days between 5 and 8 weeks for 

Frion.  

The maximum impact of the two approaches is at the 

beginning, whereas in the classical CI approach a 

major impact can be seen later. 

The two approaches can be used with a new topic, 

with people who do not particularly Fear Of Missing 

Out (FOMO). Missions like canvassing on export or 

on unknown markets, economic war, innovation, 

R&D, start-up launching are particularly adapted. 

Small companies or small team inside of larger ones, 

will benefit from these two approaches, in particular 

when they face Information Asymmetry. 

Both approaches can provoke serendipity. With 

Bruneau's methods it can spring at the beginning and 

with Frion, it usually appears at the end, during 

interviews. In both cases, the main idea is not to find 

answers, it is rather to have our fist questions 

contradicted and improved. Answers will eventually 

join. 

Both approaches save the time that is usually spend 

with the classical Competitive intelligence approach 

to gather a lot of information prior to analysis and 

distribution. There is no ongoing and tedious 

monitoring. No software is necessary; the Internet is 

not necessarily used as a cornerstone. Electricity is 

an option: These two approaches can be realized with 

a place to gather physically in a quiet environment, 

with a small team. 

A combat or a game energy will be expected with 

both approaches. 

Figure 2 shows that both approaches aimed at 

improving Occidental companies. Bruneau starts 

from the Oriental prospective and Frion from the 

Occidental one. 

 

 



 
Opinion Section          81 
 

 

Figure 2:  the Oriental and Occidental prospective 

 

 

Major noticeable differences  

With Bruneau's approach, the profile of the 

participants is key. Some people will subscribe to 

this approach, in particular if they already have a 

liking for non-deterministic activities such as: Art, 

horse riding or hunting. 

With Frion's approach, there can be a clear time for 

ending the task because constraints are helping to 

design the work to be done. Different profiles of 

persons can jump into this approach. 

When shall we use these two approaches to think and 

to inform ourselves of Intelligence matters? 

We identify 4 main situations: 

1. We ought to observe the potential of 
the situation 

2. We ought to modelize 
3. We ought to use both 
4. Undetermined 

 

To keep it simple, we have written a few words for 

each choice. This synthesis needs to be read as a 

comparison and not as an eternal truth. 

How to choose between the two approaches 

One and only one of these two approaches can be 

launched at the same time. They are based on very 

different assumptions and would inevitably clash if 

used together without great care. 

People who are visionary, innovators, pioneers and 

users leaders with naturally enjoy more Bruneau's 

approach. In particular if they come from complex 

activities where uncertainty is accepted and when 

structuring is needed. 

Obligation is more based on Means with Bruneau's 

approach and more on Result with Frion's one. 

As far as the environment is concerned, with 

Bruneau's approach, people consider that the 

environment is taken as it is whereas with Frion's 

approach, it can be changed. 

Long term issues will probably benefit more from 

Bruneau's approach. In order to use extensively the 

potential of Frion's approach, the leader must be 

actively participating three times during the process. 

People who consider that Information Overload is so 

present and so annoying that they believe 

information is not so much a good thing today as it 

used to be when we didn't have so much of it, these 

persons might be happy to try the Methodological 

and Temporary Information Resistance Mir(t) from 

Frion, as a starting point. People who want to 

identify and reformulate theirs needs rather than 

waiting for the best from the environment, will also 

probably enjoy Frion's approach. 

Objectivists and positivists will happily turn to 

Bruneau, and subjectivists and constructivists will 

turn to Frion. 

Surfers will turn to Bruneau, planners will turn to 

Frion. 

None of these two approaches is rejecting the other 

point of view, still both of them stress differently on 

as it can be shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Trial and error vs. Modelling 

 Trial and error Modelling 

Bruneau 80% 20% 

Frion 20% 80% 

 

Each author possesses his own justifications to prefer 

his own approach and none of them tried and 

convince the other one. Both respect and admire the 

other's approach and enriched their own in the 

process of this comparison. 

When one of these two approaches has been 

experienced with no great success, the other one is 

probably a good alternative to revamp the motivation 

as well as a mean to keep on working on the initial 

mission with a second chance. 

Some situations are more undetermined and do not 

particularly call for any of these two approaches. 

When people want to know 'everything', when a very 

strict administrative process is running, when 

Internet searching is the only possible way to think 

or to inform oneself, when there is necessity to use 

many resources from various places in a large 

organization, when people are not ready to lose one's 

grip for a short period of time, then the authors 

recommend not to put much hope in their 

approaches. 



 
Opinion Section          82 
 

 

After having described our method, we will turn to 

the results of this research. 

Results  

Both authors received various level of enthusiastic 

welcome from many companies. Some members of 

these companies expressed their disagreement with 

these new approaches but they represent a small 

chunk of the population studied. Although the 

appreciation was positive, the authors verified that 

trained people tend to go back to their good old ways 

if the 'coach' or their leader does not make sure the 

new approach carries on as shown. 

Possessed by the information 

Both authors of this article observed that the word 

'information' was present in many sentences when 

discussions were going on the topics of thinking and 

informing oneself. People think first and foremost 

with or after 'information'. 

Outside information, there seemed to be no way out. 

Therefore, the authors concluded that many people 

were possessed by information, that is they cannot 

imagine thinking or informing themselves without or 

before information. Authors regret that information 

is only considered as a raw material. 

Sun Tzu is putting forward the model of 

'Foreknowledge' in Chapter XIII on Spies - 

foreknowledge and not information. Sun Tzu's 

approach is more postured-centered and knowledge-

centered than information-centered. 

Nowadays, there should not only be information to 

be taken into account. Information should not be the 

center of our professional universe. With Information 

Overload in particular, a complex situation is 

emerging. There is no unique center, there are 

several ones: We are facing a Hubble revolution. 

Information is an important dimension but thinking 

and informing ourselves cannot be reduced to the 

single dimension of information. 

Incongruous strategic information 

This research confirms the results of Jones (1989) 

and Baumard (2012) relative to incongruous strategic 

information. Indeed, in the Art of War, speech forms 

such as oxymorons and metaphors provoke 

unexpected combinations of words and ideas that 

proved to be useful to stimulate the thinking process. 

They can be used as starting points for strategic 

questioning as well as critical questioning. 

It is the opposite with the use of databases, Big Data, 

and Internet web 'key-word matching' techniques, 

that is looking for similarities. 

Various possibilities can be used to monitor the 

environment, in particular three of them: 

 The classical one in Competitive 

Intelligence is looking around for 

information, as much as possible, targeting 

and filtering it; 

 Looking for the unknown through a 
strategic questioning; 

 Making assumptions and hypothesis; 
modelizing the environment. 

 

Before monitoring the environment, one could 

consider these alternatives and select the most 

appropriate one with regards to his situation. 

Distancing 

Both authors influenced their audience to dismiss 

information available to provoke more strategic 

questioning, at least for a short period of time. 

Bruneau used physical exercises, feelings, poetry or 

loosening one's grip. Frion used weaning or his 

(Temporary) Methodological Information 

Resistance. These techniques allowed people to 

focus on to questions rather than the answers. It 

seemed to reduce the number and the intensity of 

cognitive biases such as confirmation bias. As 

Baumard states 'dominant logic channels the 

observation on signals that reinforce our expectations 

and remove strategic attention from contradictory 

signals' (Baumard, p. 140). 

The use of Sun Tzu's Art of War appeared to be a 

good opportunity to encourage people to think 

differently, and to get out of the closed and simple 

system of targeting and filtering data. 

There is a unique and short period of time during 

which we can think 'before' and 'without' information 

on a new topic. Once we have the first pieces of 

information on a new topic one cannot pretend to 

think without being under the influence of what he 

has just learned. 

Our current Information Management is usually 

more concerned with answers than with questions.  

Good surprise 

The authors have experienced with success the value 

of being surprised, feeling insecure during a 

cognitive process, and to commute between one's 

comfort zone and a lack of comfort. Different 

frameworks, sometimes opposite ones, are the 

cornerstones of the reform of the strategic thinking as 

Baumard describes it, as well as putting forward 

atypical behaviors and impertinence (p. 152). 

'What defines the strategic dimension is the capacity 

to reveal what is surprising, what is disturbing, what 

does not fit to the existing beliefs' (Baumard, p. 153). 

Toxicity of information 

The authors confirm the potential toxicity of 

information available (Taleb, 2005), based on a 

relatively poor information-centered approach, with 

not much prior questioning. Thinking differently, 



 
Opinion Section          83 
 

 

questioning ourselves individually and collectively, 

and questioning the environment, have the potential 

to enrich our approaches. Recently with the 

information explosion, information has proved to be 

potentially useful but the amount of information 

available makes us shift from the interest of 

accumulating information towards questioning a 

situation. When small companies face too much 

information, it is toxic. When they face deceptive 

information in tiny quantities it can also be toxic. So, 

small companies very often were inclined to be 

intoxicated by information or 'infoxicated'. 

Responsibility and accountability 

Theoretically, information can be a good thing and it 

has often been stated that we need to inform 

ourselves. But today this theoretical dimension is 

overtaken by the applied dimension: Small 

companies destroy more value with information than 

they produce value with it. This has been witnessed 

most frequently with the proliferation of emails. 

Only a small number of emails are considered useful 

and creating value whereas the largest proportion of 

emails are said to be counter-productive, destroying 

more value than they may create. It is therefore our 

responsibility to reconsider some weak messages 

such as 'we need information to think.' 

Both our approaches showed we need to flee from 

the 'nice to know approach' with large quantities of 

information to the 'vital to know' based on what is 

usually missing and really needed. In the future, we 

could become accountable for the information we 

lack and for the information we unnecessarily 

accumulate with no applied outcomes. 

Profitability 

Is it more profitable to possess large amounts of 

data? The authors interviewed many people and they 

did not find any convincing direct or indirect link 

between information possession and profitability. On 

the other hand, companies mentioned ever growing 

costs in acquiring, handling, processing, sharing, 

memorizing, and cleaning data, with and without 

Information Technology. 

Structuring uncertainty 

The authors revealed the known uncertainty and the 

unknown one. Uncertainty was presented as a 

valuable period of time to explore the potential of a 

situation (Bruneau) or our needs (Frion). With 

different approaches the authors reached the same 

conclusion: They helped and structured uncertainty 

for a beneficial effect. 

How can small companies benefit from Sun Tzu's 

Art of War precepts? 

For whom is it vital? Companies that do not have 

many resource nor competences to access a lot of 

information, can use some precepts from Sun Tzu's 

Art of War. Here is a short list of these situations: 

during the strategic move of a competitor on a 

market, when the company is striving to survive, to 

make an urgent and important decision, to choose a 

supplier for a key element, to identify a threat, when 

a local authority is locked up on its territory for a 

larger scope issue, when a small organization cannot 

afford to work with a consultant or with an expert. 

Explication of a list of beliefs: 

When a simple situation happens, when there is no 

doubt it is a simple situation, then a simple response 

can be operated. When a situation is not simple, 

when no automatic procedure can face the situation, 

we can have recourse to a principle or to a motto, in 

order to draw a line of conduct without a long period 

of potentially useless discussions. 

Here is a short list of them that the authors 

experience with good results.  

 'I am not certain and it's ok' (Bruneau); 

 'Less data is better than more' (Frion); 

 'Information is toxic' (Taleb); 

 A large proportion of the success in 
Intelligence is in identifying what and 

where to look at (Bruneau); 

 Processing large amounts of 
data/information is frequently tiresome and 

counterproductive (Frion); 

 'Don't use the word 'all' and denounce the 
spirit of 'totality' as not strategic' (Frion); 

 'Stop answering, find good questions' 
(Bruneau). 

 

These short sentences do not represent the truth but 

rather illustrate working principles. When in doubt, 

they can help getting started. If people do not adopt 

their own motto, when they face complicated 

situations, they will revamp some motto from their 

memory, their education, their habits, and these 

spontaneous mottos could be inappropriate. 

Working on these mottos is useful introspection, 

although it is easy to stay in the dark for particularly 

complex situations. 

Sun Tzu's Art of War is not compulsory. 

The authors do not pretend their approach can be 

used unconditionally. The actual information-

centered approach can still be used. The authors 

identify the following conditions that call for the 

traditional target-filter input-output approach: 

 When information exists as a raw material; 

 When information is available; 

 When resources are available; 

 When key-word standardization is 
acceptable on mature topics; 

 When context is not very important (there is 
almost no context on a query on a system); 

 When continuity of work is preferred to 



 
Opinion Section          84 
 

 

'made on the spot' thinking; 

 When there is a logic of result rather than a 
more philosophical questioning approach; 

 When the human dimension is negligible; 

 When a decision is taken in cold blood with 
facts and only facts; 

 When rationality is not bounded, without 
cognitive biases, without errors of 

judgment; 

 When we want to know everything; 

 When information can be simply 
transformed into knowledge; 

 When information is unconditionally a good 
thing and when the Progress Paradigm 

applies. 

 When we can/should work in silos and 
mutilate the thinking process, such as in 

particularly secret discussions. 

 

As a shortcut, we could say we can use the 

traditional Competitive Intelligence discourse when 

'more information is better'. 

Totality of information 

Do we need the totality of information to think or to 

inform ourselves? Does Sun Tzu observe everything? 

He definitely observes the global environment and he 

does not reduce his environment to some specific 

indicators, avoiding the rest in the meantime. 

Since an interview isn't an option, we can only refer 

to his text. Sun Tzu used the word 'all' 28 times in his 

Art of War (Giles, 1910). Apparently, he is in a state 

of mind as if he wanted to know everything. How 

does it compare to other intelligence reports?  

In France, with the five first official report on 

Competitive Intelligence, the number of times we 

can read the word 'all', that is, 'tous, tout, toute, 

toutes', is 74% per page. With the Art of War 

translated by Lionel Giles, the percentage to take is 

'per word' and not 'per page' because the case of the 

words is much larger in The Art of War. The 

percentage of 'all' per word, in Sun Tzu's Art of War 

is 0,255%. It is very similar to 0,264% per word in 

the first five French CI official reports. 

 

 

 

 

Table 3: The use of the word 'all' in the Art of War vs. other references in Intelligence 

Field Competitive 

Intelligence 

Police Military Sun Tzu 

Reports / Books / 

Manuals 

5 French official 

Reports (Harbulot 

1990, Martre 1994, 

Carayon 2004, 

Mongereau 2006, 

Buquen 2012) 

Practice Advice on 

Analysis (Asso. of 

Chief Police Officers 

and Nat. Policing 

Improvement Agency, 

UK (2008). 

Field Manuel 2-22-3, 

Land Force (Human 

Intelligence Collector 

Operations) 

The Art of War 

% per page 

(occurrences over p.) 

74% per page  

(543 over 728p.) 

52% per page  

(76 over 145p.) 

119% per page  

(452 over 384p.) 

55% per page  

(28 over 51p.) 

% per word 0,26% per word  

(287 543) 

0,19% per word  

(38 564) 

0,29 per word  

(157 123) 

0,25 per word  

(10 968) 

 

It seems obvious that the reference to 'all' doesn't 

bother the different authors in Intelligence reports, 

books or manuals. Working in Intelligence would 

therefore consider gathering all the information. It is 

sometimes clearly written as such, but not in the Art 

of War. Still, we identified that the myth of totality is 

present in the intelligence documents we studied 

here. 

The mean for the different documents in Table 3, 

shows that the word 'all' is 0,24% of the words. With 

0,25%, Sun Tzu is just a little bit above the mean. 

The authors are aware that the idea of totality in 

Occident is different than the one in Asia. In 

particular, the Taoist and Buddhist philosophies have 

not much in common with the Occidental mode. In  

 

Asia, the idea of 'all' could be seen as to lose one's 

grip, whereas the Occidental view would rather mean 

the control. 

A last result has been obtained, in the shape of a 

working document presenting and comparing 

Bruneau's approach and Frion's, in order to discover 

Sun Tzu's work from two different perspectives, to 

apply a specific approach according to various 

situations, for a very similar effect. 

Discussion and implications  

Three levels of discussion and implications will be 

presented, for Science, for Companies, and for 

Applied Intelligence Education. 



 
Opinion Section          85 
 

 

Discussion and implications for science 

Scientifically speaking, this article is adding some 

knowledge to the intercultural study of Occidental 

and Oriental business cultures, to the study of Small 

Organizations and to Intelligence Studies. The two 

authors have humbly expressed their approaches, 

their methods, their practices and their beliefs. Two 

authors, two very different ways of thinking and still, 

one common suggestion to use Sun Tzu's Art of War 

with strategic questioning. 

What is most noticeable is their suggestions to use 

Sun Tzu's Art of War by an Occidental audience 

despite the impossible modelling of the masterpiece 

studied. 

In particular, when they release the constraint of the 

information-centric approach of Normal Sciencex, 

other disciplines like psychology, sociology, 

information science and communication, can be 

enriched by this research. The two authors humbly 

contribute to a complex approach, by including as 

fundamental two dimensions in particular: 

Information Overload and a more human oriented 

approach. 

Research would benefit from more frequent and 

more robust 'points of view' exposed, explained, and 

discussed. Indeed some fundamental beliefs such as 

'is information a good thing' is usually not addressed 

and it can be difficult to follow a scientific article 

and its operational suggestions when some 

fundamental issues are kept in an epistemic opacity. 

There is a tendency to stick to 'information', working 

on acquiring it and analyzing it. There are rather new 

approaches that stress communication and not only 

'information' (Libaert & Moinet, 2013) or Data 

Science (Big Data for instance). We subscribe to a 

more communicational approach and we also reckon 

the potential for technical and informational 

approaches for large organizations. Still, our main 

concern in this article is to work on Information 

Asymmetry in small organizations. 

Both authors are willing to consider some 

conventional and unconventional topics. Still they 

include a temporality in their approach so that these 

topics are brought to the table within a methodology: 

Bruneau will address this concern with an 

uncomfortable Strategic Questioning to start with, 

whereas Frion will start by a Methodological 

Information Resistance (Temporarily.) Both authors 

are crediting innovation and the discontinuity of the 

Information Age after the Industrial Age. When 

topics are inextricable or orthogonal, the authors 

suggest the use of another Thinking Mode, a new 

angle of vision, a new posture, a paradoxical 

questioning, to stimulate reflection and to create an 

appropriate new frame of reference. 

 

Besides the public good that science can represent, 

discussions and implications for small companies 

need to be carried on. 

Discussion and implications for small companies 

Sun Tzu was in the Military and his books are 

directly dedicated to prepare, to avoid or to direct a 

war. He did not write a book on peace keeping. The 

topic of 'war' can be sensitive in some civilian 

companies and it can be tricky to use war metaphors 

to convince civilians, in particular antimilitarists. 

And yet, some lessons can be adapted and drawn 

from the Military. As an example, during Special 

Forces trainings, the idea of 'one bullet to kill' is used 

rather than the image of  a 'hail of bullets' with a 

machine gun. The image of 'one bullet to kill' in a 

Military context could be adapted by 'one vital 

question to ask'. The figure 'one' should be 

understood here as a small number, between one and 

ten approximately.  

Comfort and lack of comfort 

There is general trend that emphasizes comfort and 

that tries to eradicate lack of comfort in companies. 

However in chaining up questions and hypothesis, 

one can clarify the nature of uncertainty. Along the 

way, with a learning process, uncertainty can vanish 

or diminish at least. 

According to Bruneau, looking for a physical lack of 

comfort is a simple and often useful way to explain 

the gap between the known and the unknown. From a 

uncomfortable situation, we don't know what will be 

learned: We don't know what we don't know. It is 

radically different than starting from a comfortable 

situation when we know what we know. 

According to Frion, starting from the comfort of a 

model also necessitates a level discomfort, in 

particular during the interviews of Source People: 

Indeed there is an additional advantage to just 

receiving an answer during an interview, and that is 

when the Source Person calls our question into 

question. We learn more from a call into question 

than from an answer! The value is greater, the 

advance is more significant, the focus defocuses, and 

the way of thinking is improved. 

During targeted interviews we are specifically 

monitoring indicators of physical reaction with the 

Source Persons, because these physical reactions are 

usually spontaneous and reveal indicators before a 

sentence is said in reply to the question asked. 

Discussion and implications for Applied 

Intelligence Education 

A list of concerns and beliefs has been developed 

that should be taken into consideration in 

Intelligence for Business, Police and Military. Still 

this article is dedicated to Business applications. 



 
Opinion Section          86 
 

 

The discourse on Competitive Intelligence over the 

last twenty years was evaluated as a failure for Small 

companies (Frion, 2012). Many assumptions in this 

discourse were evaluated as weak or wrong. 

Therefore the discourse did not reach the 'applied' 

level and remained at the 'theoretical' level. In 

particular, the discourse ignored Information 

Overload and usually emphasized the need for more 

information without setting any limit apart from 

focusing and targeting. The authors condemn the 

conventional discourse based on these false 

collective beliefs. 

The use of Sun Tzu's Art of War precepts can be a 

good opportunity to refresh our view on Competitive 

Intelligence in explicit beliefs and assumptions. 

The two authors consider that Intelligence Education 

needs to give more room to the following 

fundamental topics in particular: the human and 

cultural dimensions (individually and collectively), 

the feeling of Information Overload, the value of 

questioning over information in some cases.  

Reviewing the Chinese Strategic Mode in the light of 

these two topics will also contribute to opening up 

the barriers that have been excluding topics so far. 

Using Sun Tzu's precepts in a creative process is a 

way to access the incongruous nature of strategy. 

In particular, accepting the third-included approach 

will improve the vision of contradiction that is 

excessively considered as a bad thing.  

Looking for contradictions could actually improve 

our understanding of others' needs and we can better 

understand the information available as well as the 

missing information. Also we contribute to building 

and fostering a collaborative and interdependent 

conscience and way to work with different cultures, 

accepting that someone can think and inform himself 

differently without being wrong.  

Limits  

The main limits to this article are presented in the 

following list of questioning: 

 Ancient Chinese language is elliptical and 
may be hard to understand; 

 Moving from Chinese ideograms to an 
alphabetical system can be puzzling; 

 Military and business share some common 
topics and also retain specificities; 

 Ancient thinking mode is used for a modern 
thinking mode: How can we adapt an old 

discourse to the evolutions in business, in 

technology and in sociology for instance; 

 Use of poetic style to contribute to a 
business style; 

 Diversity of translations; 

 Two languages used: The authors of this 
article are French and the writing is in 

English. 

 

Inevitably, some questions remain unanswered when 

we try and use Sun Tzu's Art of War in today's 

business live. The two authors humbly recognize 

this. 

This research was realized by two French researcher-

practitioners and might need to be tested and 

evaluated by researchers from other countries to see 

if the results can be replicated. 

On initial examinations, the two approaches 

presented by the two authors seem to be in 

opposition. With a closer look, Bruneau's approach is 

not only observing the potential of the situation and 

Frion's approach is not only about modelling. 

Each of these two approaches needs some conditions 

to be used. If these conditions are not met, then, 

these approaches might not be relevant and even 

worse they could be misleading and out of the 

Responsibility Principle for the future. 

Both of the approaches are counter-intuitive. 

Therefore, they can attract the attention of atypical 

persons like explorers and early adopters of 

innovation. People who have an artistic sensibility 

will tend to join in quicker. Followers will have more 

difficulties in adopting them. Clearly there is a 

barrier of entry related to culture, psychology and 

competences in particular. 

Agreement and disagreement 

Although the two authors reach a common ground 

and declare together that questioning is better than 

information, they diverge on the intensity in the way 

they include some constraints. 

In particular, Bruneau considers that the 'evaluation 

of needs' will most certainly start with the evaluation 

of what we know and that will induce cognitive 

biases such as the confirmation bias. Indeed, Frion 

reckons that when identifying needs, the tendency 

can be seen to keep the investigation within the 

scope of what is already known. On the contrary, 

Bruneau argues that the incongruous question can 

make the reflection start from a new point of view, 

with no obvious preconceived idea, and new 

assumptions can emerge. However Frion also argues 

that with the Mir(t) approach it is possible to limit or 

to eradicate this concern. 

Both authors shared a real commitment to their 

different approaches and neither changed his mind. 

Still both authors learned a great deal on the best 

conditions in which to apply their own approaches, 

and their limits, and they gained a better 

methodology for explaining their own point of view.  

Both authors are willing to present the two 

approaches to use Sun Tzu's Art of War, including 

information Overload, on top of the classical way to 

use it, ignoring the information explosion. 



 
Opinion Section          87 
 

 

There is no such thing as a universal method. There 

are different methods to apply to different situations, 

and some are more appropriate to small companies 

that suffer from information asymmetry. 

The effectiveness of Sun Tzu's legacy is inversely 

proportional to the size of the company. The Art of 

War is less relevant to large companies that rely on 

the action of planning. Interestingly enough, small 

companies are potentially better suited to use Sun 

Tzu's work despite their lack of resources and 

competences. 

Conclusion and Research agenda 

Sun Tzu is still a valuable source of inspiration today 

for Applied Intelligence Education. However, we 

should not apply the Occidental representation of his 

''Foreknowledge'' model in a straightforward manner, 

before considering the implications of Information 

Overload. 

Sun Tzu's approach is more postured-centered and 

knowledge-centered than information-centered. 

This article presented two accomplished approaches 

to Applied Intelligence Education including terms, 

practical details and returns on the experience 

required to operate them. These two approaches can 

contribute to Intelligence Education, with the 

following main concerns: ease of use, adding value, 

inexpensive to run, profitability, responsibility and 

durability. Therefore it can become vital for some 

small organizations to apply it. 

This article shows that Sun Tzu's Art of War can be 

used from different points of view for a common 

apprenticeship - more human oriented - to think and 

to inform oneself differently, with alternation of 

control and loosening one 's grip. 

Small organizations, experiencing uncertainty, lack 

of time to practice classical Competitive Intelligence, 

and facing Information Asymmetry, will benefit 

from either of the two approaches presented above.  

It is often more operational to raise questions than to 

look for answers. Doing so is also more profitable in 

terms of time and money. It usually brings more 

value than crawling the web. 

The two approaches remain very different. Bruneau 

starts from Orient and goes to Occident whereas 

Frion start from Occident and also goes to Occident. 

Still the two approaches are very similar regarding 

fundamentals. Both Bruneau and Frion are dedicated 

to applied actions for strategic questioning. In 

companies experiencing information asymmetry, 

stop answering questions and find good questions: A 

big question is often better than big data. 

Both of these two approaches can be beneficial and 

the authors don't believe one is better than the other, 

nor that only one is good for any given situation. 

How shall we choose?  

There are some objective conditions and there is also 

the idea of a bet. These two approaches are a bet and 

this bet is usually subconscious. We would be better 

off if we could consider these two approaches and 

see if the one we usually choose is aligned to our 

usual conditions. When it is not, we know that we 

can have another approach to try. 

A bit of both approaches can be a good combination 

in a time line.  

In the very short term, a Temporarily Methodological 

Information Resistance should be applied first, even 

during a short period of time, in order to have once 

and only once the possibility to think 'before' and 

'without' information. 

In a longer term, observing the potential of the 

situation should be applied, 'with' and 'after 

information' in order to avoid blind spots. 

Various situations give us different options in using 

Sun Tzu's Art of War. 

We need to consider not only information but also 

other key intelligence influences such as: time, crisis, 

aim, and information availability, among other 

things. 

We need to consider how we inform ourselves and 

not only how we manage information. 

We need to inform ourselves more on how we 

inform ourselves. 

Whatever the method we use, we need to think more 

about the way we think. 

The contribution of the authors is more appropriate 

for small companies in a position of Information 

asymmetry. Still they believe that large companies 

can also adapt these findings to their benefit. 

It is not a Copernican revolution. A more complex 

revolution is emerging: a Hubble revolution. We 

tested different approaches with Companies. We 

believe many assumptions also hold for Police forces 

and National Security. 



 
Opinion Section          88 
 

 

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Opinion Section          89 
 

 

                                                           
Endnotes 
 
i Sun Tzu's Art of War is an illustration of the Chinese Strategic Mode. 
ii In this article we consider the word information as a convenient and generic term for sign, signals, data, 
information, knowledge and intelligence. They share at least one attribute that is the progress paradigm. It has 
been commonly believed so far that more 'information' is better. 
iii In this article we distinguish 'thinking' from 'informing oneself'. For the time being, 'thinking' rather 
means analyzing information available and 'informing oneself' rather means looking for missing information. 
iv Information Asymmetry is mainly used here as a situation when a small company has much less 
information and resources than a large firm. 
v By Small Organizations, the authors refer to (Very) Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, local 
administration, professionals like plumbers or lawyers, with no team dedicated to Business Intelligence or 
Competitive Intelligence.  
vi War and peace. This article presents and suggests behaviors, topics and methods for war times. By war 
times, the authors mean periods with surprises, crises, battles, treachery, spies and enemies such as competitive  
moves, lures, innovation, illegal practices from a competitor, anti and counter intelligence from a competitor, 
rumors and e-reputation. This article is not primarily dedicated to 'peace times' for companies idealized as in a 
few example like administrative behavior, knowledge management, production efficiency, norms and regulation, 
in pure and perfect information situation when markets are showing no significant sign of change. 
vii Sun Tzu's name can vary in time and space. For convenience, we are using the most used name. Other 
writings exist, such as Sun Tze, Sun Tzu (Amiot, Chung, Fayard, Giles, Griffith, Levi, Phélizon), Sun Zu, Sun Zi (Lavis), 
Sun Wu (Lavis, Chung), Souen tse(u) (Levi), Sun Wou (Levi) and sometimes Sun Pin (Levi) or Master Sun (Phélizon). 
Indeed, it is difficult to adapt a Chinese sound in French or in English. Sun Zi was not selected here for 
convenience in this article, despite an official orthography in Pinyin. 
viii Example of an oxymoron: 'The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the 
earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven' (chapter 4.) Antithetical terms 
are put together. 
 Example of a metaphor: 'Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away 
from high places and hasten downwards. Si on war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is 
weak. Water shapes is course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his 
victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare 
there are no constant conditions (Chapter 6.) Two realities are put together. 
 Example of a chiasmus: 'That general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; 
and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack' (chapter 6.)  The use of two 
consecutive phrases in which the second is an inverted version of the first. 
 Example of a comparison: 'A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in 
the scale against a single grain' (chapter 4.) 
ix Modelling is defined here as an attempt to list variables, relations and considerations suitable for 
imitation 
x Kuhn, p. 5 ''normal science, the activity in which most scientists inevitably spend almost all their time, is 
predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like.''