http://www.smallbusinessinstitute.biz A B S T R A C T Keywords: Journal of Small Business Strategy 2019, Vol. 29, No. 02, 22-43 ISSN: 1081-8510 (Print) 2380-1751 (Online) ©Copyright 2019 Small Business Institute® w w w. j s b s . o rg High-tech firms operate in a highly dynamic envi- ronment typified by both frequent changes in industry composition (Wolf & Terrell, 2016) and an increasing concentration of market power among a small group of large firms through aggressive acquisition activity driving consolidation (Andriole, 2017; Deans, Kro- eger, & Zeisel, 2002). Operating as a small- to medi- um-sized enterprise (SME) within this highly dynam- ic and increasingly concentrating environment poses many new and complex challenges, especially when considering the financial resources needed to success- fully start, grow, and exit a venture (e.g., Droege & Marvel, 2009; Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Simpson, Pad- more, & Newman, 2012; Zulu-Chisanga, Boso, Ade- ola, & Oghazi, 2016). One factor entrepreneurs often overlook in their efforts to obtain the necessary finan- cial resources to grow a venture and provide a path- way to successful entrepreneurial exit (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Müller, 2013) is the pattern of invest- ment funding (Ragozzino & Blevins, 2016). For exam- ple, in traditional Founder, Angel, and Venture Capital backed firms, both the number of investors and early investment are associated with increased likelihood of acquisition (Ragozzino & Blevins, 2016). However, a more recent trend of investor diversification which includes incubators, accelerators, and crowdfunding approaches provides new investment options for firms looking for financial resources, which may affect fund- ing decisions and exit outcomes (Drover et al., 2017). High-growth-potential technology firms, also re- ferred to as small- to medium-sized technology en- terprises (SMTEs) (Li, Qian, & Qian, 2012; Qian & Li, 2003), represent more than 10% of all US SMEs (Caruso, 2012), which make up over 99% of all U.S. Introduction Kristin C. Irwin1, Collin M. Gilstrap2, Paul L. Drnevich3, Chance M. Tudor4 1University of Alabama, USA, kirwin1@crimson.ua.edu 2University of Toledo, USA, collin.gilstrap@utoledo.edu 3University of Alabama, USA, dren@ua.edu 4University of Alabama, USA, cmtudor@crimson.ua.edu From start-up to acquisition: Implications of financial investment trends for small- to medium-sized high-tech enterprises Acquisition, Financial investments, SMTEs, High-tech The high-technology (high-tech) industry is a dynamic environment defined by both frequent changes in composition and a concen- tration of market power through consolidation. Operating as a new or small venture within this environment poses many complex challenges, especially when considering the financial resources needed to be successful. In their efforts to obtain financial resources, entrepreneurs often overlook how the choice and pattern of investment funding to maintain a growth path can later affect a successful entrepreneurial exit. Exit via acquisition for small- to medium-sized technology enterprises (SMTEs) is a strong area of interest given firms in the U.S. high-tech industry experience the fastest growth rates and have been the target of over $400 billion in deal volume and 20% of all merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in the last twenty years. Much of this M&A activity is conducted by five prom- inent firms, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, commonly referred to as the Fearsome Five or the “FANGS”. However, as there has been only limited research examining this unique M&A context, in this study we explore the investment funding factors influencing exit via acquisition by the Fearsome Five. We highlight questions and potential concerns for SMTEs given the trends in financial investments and increasing market power. APA Citation Information: Irwin, K. C., Gilstrap, C. M., Drnevich, P. L., & Tudor, C. M. (2019). From start-up to acquisition: Implications of financial investment trends for small- to medium-sized high-tech enterprises. Journal of Small Business Strategy, 29(2), 22-43. http://www.smallbusinessinstitute.biz http://www.jsbs.org 23 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 organizations (Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council, 2016). The U.S. high-tech industry is also recognized as the fastest growth market for the indus- try (Biery, 2017) and U.S. high-tech firms represent over $400 billion and 20% of all merger and acqui- sition (M&A) transactions over the last twenty years (IMAA, 2018). The recent “Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act”, which changed the regulatory environ- ment for investment options to help small businesses (Lander, 2012), and the increase in alternative funding options (Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi‐Lamastra, 2015; Mollick, 2014; Prive, 2012) adds further complexity and change to the financial environment in which SM- TEs operate (Spigel & Harrison, 2018). One development over the last decade is the ex- panded growth and concentration of wealth within the high-tech industry. Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Face- book, and Microsoft, termed the “FANGS” or “Fear- some Five,” are among the largest, most recognizable, and most valuable global brands (Bradshaw, 2017), and the wealthiest technology firms in the world post- ing a collective market cap of $3.3 trillion (La Monica, 2017). Their growth and increase in market power is one added wrinkle to the global complexity in which SMTEs operate. Such industry concentration and the potential for oligopolistic influence (either real or per- ceived) has the potential to greatly influence resource allocations and/or distort markets in many ways (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Dalton, Todor, Spendo- lini, Fieldingg, & Porter, 1980; Love & Roper, 1999). The effect of such factors on SMTE growth both in terms of influencing the financial investment environ- ment and acquisition activity could have profound ef- fects on the industry and is clearly in need of further research attention. To examine the influence and implications of these factors, in this research study we evaluate such factors and their implications for influencing an SMTE’s ac- quisition. In doing so we focus on evaluating two of the potential major influential factors: The availability of financial resources and the increasing power of the Fearsome Five within the high-tech industry. The ob- jectives of this study are as follows: (1) to examine the changing financial investment environment within the high-tech industry; (2) to determine the effects of the different investment trends on SMTE exits to acqui- sition; (3) to understand the role and influence of the Fearsome Five firms on SMTE current exits and future options. In our pursuit of the answers to these ques- tions, we focus on SMTE’s in the U.S. over the last 20 years and develop hypotheses for the implications of several prominent influencing factors on acquisitions. We then examine these hypotheses using sample data consisting of a cross-panel of SMTEs, who obtained one or more type of investment funding and who sub- sequently exited via acquisition or did not, in order to better understand the role and implications of invest- ment funding sources and their associated outcomes. To provide additional insights for both research and practice, we extend our analysis to incorporate the in- dustry composition and assess how the top five firms of the high-tech industry engage in SMTE acquisitions. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for academic research and practice, as well as considerations of limitations and suggestions for fu- ture research. Theoretical Development Entrepreneurs face many challenges and decisions in their efforts to sustain and grow their businesses (e.g., Baron, Franklin, & Hmieleski, 2016; Slevin & Covin, 1998; Spigel & Harrison, 2018). SMTEs are no exception and face additional hurdles operating in a fast-paced high-tech industry (Biery, 2017) and the increasingly varying options of how to pursue their growth. For example, incubator and accelerator pro- grams (Albort-Morant & Oghazi, 2016; Drover et al., 2017) provide SMTEs with additional avenues to acquire resources including financial support (Chen, 2009; Drover et al., 2017). While many types of re- sources are associated with entrepreneurial growth such as networking opportunities (Ebbers, 2014) or training programs (Lyons & Zhang, 2018), one nec- essary requirement for both growth and survival is the ability of a firm to acquire financial resources (DeSan- tola & Gulati, 2017). According to the resource-based view (RBV; e.g., Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) competitive ad- vantage can be obtained through the use of valuable tangible resources such as access to financial capital, which in turn may enable firms to acquire and/or fund the development of rare, inimitable, and non-substi- tutable technological and human capital resources and 24 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 capabilities. For example, financial resources enable SMTEs to hire valuable strategic human capital, build new organizational and technological capabilities (McKelvie & Davidsson, 2009), which are associat- ed with overall new venture performance and growth (Chandler & Hanks, 1994), and are critical to generate a positive cash flow to avoid early failure including bankruptcy (Liao, Welsch, & Moutray, 2008; Thornhill & Amit, 2003). However, the challenges in obtaining financial resources can be daunting to many entrepre- neurs. To obtain financial resources, the entrepreneur needs to identify high-potential funding options, ap- ply for funding, and provide documentation for why investment in their firm will produce returns and lead to an exit opportunity or liquidity event that meets ex- pectations of the investor (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Fairchild, 2011; Mitteness, Sudek, & Cardon, 2012; Winston Smith, 2011). The role of the environment (D’Souza & Kemel- gor, 2008) and industry (e.g., high-tech; Liao et al., 2008; Lumpkin & Dess, 2001) can also affect the fi- nancial resources, strategic path, and exit options for entrepreneurs (Zulu-Chisanga et al., 2016). Environ- mental uncertainty, measured through the levels of mu- nificence, dynamism, and complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984), in the high-tech industry adds another level of complexity and provides an interesting backdrop for understanding the financial decisions SMTEs make. The increase in the number and type of investors re- flect an increase in the complexity of the financial deci- sions as it provides more options to entrepreneur own- ers. Previous literature on entrepreneurs and investors focused on the success of financial and non-financial factors (DeTienne, McKelvie, & Chandler, 2015), dif- ferent motivations (Achtenhagen, Brunninge, & Melin, 2017; DeTienne et al., 2015), and/or conflicts between the two groups (Collewaert, 2012). This challenge of navigating the “right” path in selecting investment opportunities, both in timing and type(s), may not be prioritized over the general challenge of just obtaining the financial resources required. However, as we argue and examine in our study, these decisions matter when looking forward to entrepreneurial exit via acquisition as they may influence the availability and type of exit option. In addition, the complexity of the decision is further enhanced given the changing dynamics of the high-tech industry and its operating environment (e.g., Boso, Story, Cadogan, Micevski, & Kadic-Maglajlic, 2012; Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2016; Wolf & Terrell, 2016). The reduction in the complexity of an industry, outlined by the concentration of the number of top firms over the total number of firms, increases barriers to entry and thus poses challenges to start-ups and SM- TEs (Porter, 1979). One example of this environment is seen with the continued growth in the high-tech in- dustry. The market concentration, control, and power of the Fearsome Five are proposed to have a negative impact on innovation (Curry & George, 1983; Dola- ta, 2017; Turner, Mitchell, & Bettis, 2010) and have brought forth calls for antitrust legislation to manage their growing influence (Manjoo, 2016). In addition, Liao et al. (2008) highlight that new entrepreneurs of high-tech firms have to manage many demands for suc- cess, which include adjusting to market conditions and intellectual property requirements while still working with venture capitalists to acquire funding. One advantage to exit via acquisition is the ability of a quick and handsome repay to investors. VCs in- terested in a planned exit of their investment include options of either through a SMTE’s IPO or acquisition (Drover et al., 2017). SMTEs may entertain the option of acquisition based on the possibility of growth with- out the additional overhead of searching for more fund- ing. As Li et al. (2012) outline, difficulties to expand both products and internationally to remain competi- tive in the high-growth environment of the technology industry may not align with the entrepreneur’s motiva- tions and future interests (Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; Gabrielsson & Politis, 2011; Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003; Wright, Robbie, & Ennew, 1997). Our focus is on the financial motivations for exit (Strese, Gebhard, Feierabend, & Brettel, 2018). We do not include the failure options such as bankruptcy and liquidation, or where the SMTEs remain independent or choose to go public (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1996). While these types of exit options are also important, they are beyond the scope of our in-depth analysis of acquisi- tions through which we seek to provide a better under- standing of the changes in concentration in the high- tech industry. In previous assessments of the likelihood of ven- ture-backed firms to go public or be acquired scholars identify the need for a better understanding of the role 25 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 of different types of funding beyond venture capital (Ragozzino & Blevins, 2016) and of the underlying motives of the entrepreneurs (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007). More specifically as Drover et al. (2017, p. 1845) highlighted, more research is needed into differ- ent earlier-stage funding mechanisms for new ventures and their interactions with other prospective investors and stakeholders. Factors Influencing Exit via Fearsome Five Acqui- sition The firms making up the Fearsome Five are typi- fied by a “high demand for scientific research and in- tensity of R&D expenditure, high level of innovative- ness, fast diffusion of technological innovations, ..., high level of employment of scientific and technical personnel...,” (Zakrzewska-Bielawska, 2009, p. 94). Authers (2017), the senior investment commentator of the Financial Times, summed the year 2017 up in one word: “FANGS,” defined as “the label for the group of evermore powerful internet companies that dominate the online world, which also made their investors very, very rich in 2017”. This elite group of high tech behe- moths uses their size, market power, and vast financial resources to engage in extensive M&A activity. While the motivations for their M&A behavior may be classically presumed to improve firm growth and performance, increasing shareholder value, etc. (e.g., Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014; Hagedoorn & Duys- ters, 2002; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010), research has been unable to clearly link such motivations with per- formance outcomes (King, Bauer, & Schriber, 2018; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Some leading scholars and industry insiders speculate on more ne- farious set of motivations for M&A activity (Carper, 1990; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005), includ- ing eliminating current or preventing future competi- tors, as well as the procurement of proprietary knowl- edge, technology, patents, and/or talent (Christensen, Alton, Rising, & Waldeck, 2011; Kaul & Wu, 2016). The implications of M&A activity from “super predators” such as the Fearsome Five present an inter- esting area in need of further study, specifically from the target’s perspective. The RBV perspective views firms as a “bundle of resources” (Barney, 1991) and thus provides that SMTEs and the Fearsome Five may utilize M&A activity to enhance their resource po- sitions. The application of RBV, originally put forth by Wernerfelt (1984), outlines how to address certain management issues such as the diversification or the acquisition of firms by answering the question, “Why acquire?” given M&As are known to have a high like- lihood of failure (Christensen et al., 2011). The poten- tial for SMTE acquisitions to provide specific resourc- es to larger firms like the Fearsome Five that are more easily acquired than built outlines one motive for the acquisition. This type of motive aligns with Werner- felt’s (1984) argument that a firm wants either to utilize its resource position directly or indirectly to achieve a competitive advantage over competitors. This argu- ment also directly applies to other types of resources such as human resources (talent) or workplace process- es that are highly sought after in high-tech industries. Experience with Investors. Prior research has shown that, in the short-term, both target firms and acquiring firms gain from an M&A announcement (Kashiramka & Rao, 2014; Kohers & Kohers, 2000). Acquiring firms’ shareholders are excited about poten- tial value creation and the premiums that target firms receive from the acquiring firm increase the target’s valuation. However, the difficulty involved in bring- ing on new firms, including cultural fit and the degree or speed of integration, often shows a decrease in val- ue in the long term (Bauer & Matzler, 2014). How- ever, Fearsome Five firms are much better positioned to overcome these difficulties. First, they are what the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) refers to as “Serial Tech Buyers”: firms that completed more than five tech M&As over ten years’ time (Kengelbach, Klem- mer, Schwetzler, & Sperling, 2012). This status allows them to have a deeper understanding of the M&A pro- cess and how to make the deal work out in their favor. Secondly, Fearsome Five firms have more resources to dedicate to M&A activities. In another BCG publica- tion, Hansell, Walker, and Kengelbach (2014) explain that by articulating a set of underlying principles and policies successful serial acquirers are able to add rigor and discipline to the M&A process. Firms that lack established processes and proce- dures offer a greater chance for the acquiring firm to create synergies with the target firm (Ransbotham & Mitra, 2010). In addition to potential synergies, acquir- 26 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 ers are interested in smaller or younger firms that offer innovative power (Graebner, Eisenhardt, & Roundy, 2010) and the intrinsic sources of motivation for inno- vation found in successful SMEs (Schenkel, Farmer, & Maslyn, 2019). As Graebner et al. (2010) note, larg- er acquirer firms will value skill or performance more highly than seniority when assessing SMTEs as tar- gets. In addition, the relationship between acquisitions and R&D is shown to possibly act as a substitute for innovation (Blonigen & Taylor, 2000). Furthermore, acquiring firms looking at smaller and younger target firms benefit from valuation uncertainty, allowing the acquirer to buy low early and potentially reap great- er rewards through acquisition (Ransbotham & Mitra, 2010). Thus, to offset the difficulty and cost of internal R&D or take advantage of information asymmetry, es- tablished firms like the Fearsome Five, will be more likely to acquire less established SMTEs. Established serial acquirers (e.g., Hansell et al., 2014; Kengelbach et al., 2012; Laamanen & Keil, 2008), prominent com- petitors / firms represented in an oligopoly (Nilsen, Sørgard, & Ulsaker, 2016; Salvo, 2010), and those with excess cash (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000; von Beschwitz, 2018), may be more likely to engage in SME acquisitions. Thus, a Fearsome Five firm is more likely to engage in acquisitions of SMTEs in compari- son to other high-tech firms that do not have a history of acquisitions and access to additional resources for M&As. Therefore, stated formally, we propose that: Hypothesis 1. SMTEs with less experience with in- vestors will have a higher likelihood of acquisition by a Fearsome Five firm as compared to SMTEs with more experience with investors. Number and Value of Investments. As SMTEs may be resource-constrained (e.g., Bendickson, Da- vis, Cowden, & Liguori, 2015; Li et al., 2012; Parida, Westerberg, & Frishammar, 2012) and newly formed and developing businesses require influxes of financial capital for continuing operations and growth (Blevins, Ragozzino, & Reuer, 2017), a firm’s success in ob- taining funding, including how much and how often, can serve as a positive signal to the market (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Islam, Fremeth, & Marcus, 2018). Similar to literature on signals surrounding IPO an- nouncements (Mantecon & Thistle, 2011; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007), venture capital funding can provide firms with legitimacy to attract other investors (Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; Mitteness, Baucus, & Nor- ton Jr, 2013; Peake & D’Souza, 2015) and help reduce uncertainty of future investments (Kollmann & Kuck- ertz, 2010; Ragozzino & Blevins, 2016). As such, a firm’s collective history of venture capital investment funding can provide insights into the perceived worth and anticipated growth of a developing business (Ra- gozzino & Blevins, 2016). In contrast, firms with high levels of market power (Galbraith & Stiles, 1984) and extensive financial re- sources (Bruner, 1988) may be in a position to not have the necessity to conduct extra vetting in the acquisition of SMTEs. This situation may be particularly preva- lent in an industry controlled by an oligopoly whose leading firms have enhanced knowledge of the market and industry (M’Chirgui, 2009). This superior market position provides an information advantage that allows for those firms like the Fearsome Five better to assess SMTEs that have limited number of investors or in- vestor dollars. In addition, firms representing an oli- gopoly power can assume greater amount of risk (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990). Thus, a Fearsome Five member may be more likely to take a chance on SM- TEs with less investor commitment. Stated formally, we propose: Hypothesis 2. SMTEs with a lower number of inves- tors will have a higher likelihood of acquisition by a Fearsome Five firm as compared to SMTEs with many investors. Hypothesis 3. SMTEs with a lower value of invest- ment dollars will have a higher likelihood of acquisi- tion by a Fearsome Five firm as compared to SMTEs with high investment dollars. Incubator and Accelerators. SMTEs may utilize different sources of funding to support their growth than other types of firms (Drover et al., 2017; Sudek, 2006). The financing options for SMTEs include ven- ture capital (VC), corporate venture capital (CVC), angel investment, and crowdfunding (Drover et al., 2017). These options are chosen by the entrepreneurs based on numerous selection criteria such as the sim- ilarity between the investor and entrepreneur (Bruns, 27 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 Holland, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2008; Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2006; Murnieks, Haynie, Wilt- bank, & Harting, 2011). In addition, globally, countries have expanded the availability of financial resources through grants for small start-up organizations (Islam et al., 2018). The ability to obtain a grant from insti- tutions is associated with increased legitimacy with a newer start-up (Mitteness et al., 2013; Tracey, Dalpiaz, & Phillips, 2018), which has subsequently resulted in the start-up achieving more success and additional VC funding. One distinguishing factor a Fearsome Five firm may look for in SMTEs is higher legitimacy in com- parison to other SMTEs. Legitimacy gained through having interest from multiple types of funders allows for a SMTE to demonstrate the ability to attract differ- ent types of investors’ interest (Drover et al., 2017). The ability to obtain various sources of capital can also be of competitive advantage to firms and validate their resilience and openness to many opportunities for growth (Sequeira, Weeks, Bell, & Gibbs, 2018). Incubator and accelerator investment opportuni- ties can provide start-ups with additional resources and are associated with an increased likelihood of growth and continuance (e.g., Liao et al., 2008; Roig-Tierno, Alcazar, & Ribeiro-Navarrete, 2015). An incubator or accelerator can be independently owned and operated as a stand-alone business, a sub-unit as part of a larger corporation (Kanbach & Stubner, 2016), or be provid- ed as part of a University program (Berbegal-Mira- bent, Ribeiro-Soriano, & García, 2015; Dada & Fogg, 2014). While there is no consensus on the difference between an incubator and accelerator, incubators are typically more focused on early-stage ventures while accelerators have more predominately focused on or- ganizations looking to increase growth of an already established product or service (Isabelle, 2013; Malek, Maine, & McCarthy, 2014). While different incubators and accelerators may have slightly different require- ments and goals, the result of their investment is di- rected toward the continued success of the business by providing not only financial resources but also pro- grams and curriculum providing an ecosystem of men- tors and training resources (Dempwolf, Auer, & D’Ip- polito, 2014; Kohler, 2016; Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, & Van Hove, 2016). Social capital is one important resource for entre- preneurs (Liao et al., 2008). Social capital, is defined in the literature as the “goodwill derived from relation- ships, both formal and informal, that managers have with others and can use to obtain resources and infor- mation” (Helfat & Martin, 2015, p. 1286). As such, it can provide resources to SMTEs through access to additional financial capital, the ability to gain legiti- macy more quickly, or to facilitate business through the network of relationships of the entrepreneurs (Liao et al., 2008). For example, accelerators like Y-Combi- nator, based in California’s Silicon Valley, provide a unique opportunity for entrepreneurial networking that can aid venture development (Drover et al., 2017; Hal- len, Bingham, & Cohen, 2014). Thus, given the poten- tial or a scarcity or shortage of resources SMTEs may experience (Nouri & Ahmady, 2018), the benefits of both incubators and accelerators include creating links between the organization and individuals to help sup- port and grow the venture (Albort-Morant & Oghazi, 2016). Both the legitimacy of participating in an incu- bator or accelerator program and strategic relationships built within the high-tech community (Albort-Morant & Oghazi, 2016; Liao et al., 2008) would make them a potential target for a Fearsome Five member. Thus, the addition of additional perceived legitimacy of funding through the access and visibility afforded by participa- tion in an incubator or accelerator program provide a positive environment for increasing the likelihood of a Fearsome Five firm acquisition. Thus, stated formally, we propose: Hypothesis 4. SMTEs participation in an incubator or accelerator will increase the likelihood of acquisition by a Fearsome Five member as compared to SMTEs who do not participate in an incubator or accelerator. Geographic Proximity. One additional com- ponent highly associated with the participation in an incubator or accelerator program is the co-location requirements typically required by the start-ups (Pau- wels et al., 2016; Tracey et al., 2018). This co-location is claimed to help increase the opportunities for par- ticipation in events and help expand the social capital of the participants, thus further associated with a suc- cessful exit such as through an acquisition. The type of events including typical demo days hosted by these investment funders also provides an opportunity for 28 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 acquirers a “one-stop” venue to assess many differ- ent ventures for either further investment or acquisi- tion (Cohen, 2013; Kanbach & Stubner, 2016; Kohler, 2016). This opportunity provides cash-rich high-tech firms such as the Fearsome Five an efficient mecha- nism to identify and assess SMTE’s that participate. The opportunity to successfully network with po- tential acquirers is further enhanced if the SMTE is lo- cated in geographically close proximity to the acquirer, increasing the likelihood of awareness of, and interac- tion with, the target, as well as reducing the costs of travel to visit and evaluate the target. All factors that should be positively associated with increasing the opportunity for future engagement and possible likeli- hood of acquisition (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011; Reuer & Lahiri, 2013). Thus, the additional legitimacy from enhanced awareness and interaction through geograph- ic proximity established by locational choice of the SMTE, as well as continued opportunity for increasing social capital through networking of local events, pro- vides a more positive environment for a Fearsome Five firm to become aware of an investment opportunity. Thus, stated formally we propose: Hypothesis 5. An SMTE’s closer geographic proxim- ity to a Fearsome Five member will increase the like- lihood of acquisition by that Fearsome Five member over SMTEs not located in close geographic proximity. Method To examine these hypotheses, we conducted an empirical analysis of high-tech firms who acquired venture funding on their path to an M&A exit with a public firm. We constructed our sample using the Ven- tureXpert dataset from the SDC Platinum database. Our sample included all M&A deals flagged as “High Tech” in the VentureXpert dataset that were completed from 1995 to 2017. We required that the acquirer be public at the time of the acquisition, and that both the target and acquirer be based in the U.S. Additionally, we filtered out deals that did not report the number of rounds, number of private equity firms involved in the deal, or state of operations. This approach yielded a sample of 1044 M&A deals. We then divided our sam- ple by firms acquired and not acquired by a Fearsome Five firm, given that we are interested in the effects of the oligopolistic nature of these firms on acquisition targets in the high-tech industry. Additionally, these target SMTEs acquired by the Fearsome Five were as- sumed to have equal chances for successful post-merg- er integration given the similarity based on industry, potential for organizational fit, and synergy (Bauer, Strobl, Dao, Matzler, & Rudolf, 2018). Dependent Variable. The primary dependent variable for our logit regression model is a binary mea- sure (F5) which takes on a value of one in the event that one of the Fearsome Five acquired the target firm and zero if the target is acquired by a firm outside the Fearsome Five. Independent Variables. Our independent vari- ables of interest are: TIME OF VC which measures the time in years that a target firm is first associated with a venture firm until the final purchase by a public com- pany. NUM FUNDS is the number of venture funds involved with the target. INVESTMENT is the total amount invested by venture firms reported in thou- sands. INCUBATOR is an indicator for targets held by an accelerator, incubator, university, or an angel inves- tor. BANK is an indicator for targets held by invest- ment bank venture fund. CORP is an indicator for tar- gets held by a corporate backed venture fund. SAME STATE is an indicator if the target is in the same state as the acquirer, a proxy for geographic distance. Control Variables. We include controls for PRESTIGE which is an indicator that takes on a value of one if the largest venture holder is in the top 25% of total venture capital deployed by venture funds in our sample (Ragozzino & Blevins, 2016). The lead venture fund in each target is the fund with the largest dollar investment in the target. TIME TO VC is the time in years from a target’s founding to the first venture in- vestment. ROUNDS is the number of venture rounds a target experiences. CALI is an indicator that takes on a value of one if the target is headquartered in California. We also considered additional control variables com- monly used in the finance literature, which we decided to omit due to lack of theoretical scope fit and statisti- cal insignificance to our study. In Table 1, we report the top acquirers in our sample. Microsoft and Google are the second largest 29 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 acquirers in the Fearsome Five with 37 and 20 deals, respectively. Amazon has eleven acquisitions, and Facebook and Apple each have six acquisitions. Table 1 Top acquirers Ticker Count Percent CSCO 54 5.47 MSFT 37 3.75 GOOG 20 2.03 BRCM 16 1.62 ORCL 14 1.42 IBM 13 1.32 SYMC 13 1.32 AABA 12 1.22 AMZN 11 1.11 CRM 11 1.11 MSI 11 1.11 VRSN 7 0.71 AAPL 6 0.61 FB 6 0.61 In Table 2, we report the participation and lead frequency in deals by venture fund type. With respect to deal participation, individual private equity (PE) funds are involved with 3,905 (lead 3) deals, PE ad- visors and private equity funds of funds are involved with 51 (lead 838) deals, corporate backed PE funds have 791 (76), investment banks are involved with 370 (lead 35) deals, and individual investors are involved with 299 (lead 5) deals. In Table 3, we report the summary statistics of all variables in our analysis. Approximately 7% of targets in our sample are acquired by members of the Fear- some Five, prestigious funds account for deal leads on 41% of deals, and the average deal has just under four rounds of financing. The average deal has sev- en venture backers, with $30.6 million in capital in- vested. Firms typically receive venture backing in the first three years of their life, and backers are usually involved with the firm for just under five years. In our sample, nearly half of the firms (48%) are headquar- tered in California and 36% of deals are between an acquirer and target in the same state. In Table 4, we report the correlation matrix of the Table 2 Venture group participation and leads Venture Group Type Participation Count Participation % Lead Count Lead % Angel Group 23 0.37 3 0.29 Bank Affiliated 370 5.89 35 3.35 Corporate PE/Venture 791 12.6 76 7.28 Endowment, Foundation or Pension Fund 43 0.68 2 0.19 Government Affiliated Program 35 0.56 7 0.67 Incubator/Development Program 35 0.56 8 0.77 Individuals 299 4.76 5 0.48 Insurance Firm Affiliate 26 0.41 1 0.1 Investment Management Firm 98 1.56 15 1.44 Non-Private Equity 4 0.06 44 4.21 Other 534 8.51 4 0.38 PE Advisor or Fund of Funds 51 0.81 838 80.27 PE Firm 3905 62.2 3 0.29 SBIC 37 0.59 3 0.29 Service Provider 15 0.24 0 0 University Program 12 0.19 0 0 30 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 Table 3 Summary statistics N MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 F5 1044 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 PRESTIGE 1044 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 TIME TO VC 886 2.76 4.86 0.42 1.25 2.87 ROUNDS 1044 3.85 2.93 2.00 3.00 5.00 CALI 1044 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 TIME OF VC 1042 4.66 3.75 2.24 3.74 6.01 NUM FUNDS 1044 7.12 5.69 3.00 6.00 9.00 INVESTMENT ($000s) 1044 30590.66 43724.46 6999.85 17000.05 38560.05 INCUBATOR 1044 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 BANK 1044 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 CORP 1044 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 SAME STATE 1044 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 Table 4 Correlation matrix 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 F5 1 2 Prestige 0.0625* 1 3 Time To VC -0.0448 -0.0877** 1 4 Rounds -0.0624* -0.0476 -0.150*** 1 5 Cali 0.0563 0.118*** -0.197*** 0.0108 1 6 Time Of VC -0.0877** -0.0324 -0.029 0.490*** -0.0517 1 7 Num Funds -0.0748* 0.0422 -0.225*** 0.658*** 0.0999** 0.360*** 8 Investment -0.0709* 0.194*** 0.0422 0.295*** 0.0251 0.220*** 9 Incubator 0.0929** -0.0496 -0.0562 0.0278 0.00569 -0.00101 10 Bank -0.0752* 0.0389 -0.0978** 0.308*** 0.0143 0.215*** 11 Corp 0.0319 0.0895** -0.142*** 0.240*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 12 Same State -0.0362 0.0660* -0.137*** -0.034 0.537*** -0.0807** 7 8 9 10 11 12 7 Num Funds 1 8 Investment 0.433*** 1 9 Incubator 0.130*** 0.00786 1 10 Bank 0.492*** 0.236*** 0.0318 1 11 Corp 0.429*** 0.225*** 0.0408 0.206*** 1 12 Same State 0.00996 -0.00282 -0.00828 -0.022 0.0231 1 * p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 31 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 variables in our main analysis. Results Preliminary Analysis As part of our preliminary analysis we performed some exploratory background assessments for robust- ness including the trends in the overall types of inves- tors and an industry analysis. As we depict in Figure 1, the different types of investors from 1990-2017 shows while traditional private equity and venture cap- ital firms invests the most in SMTEs, both corporate and incubators show an increasing number of invest- ments starting in 2013. In addition, we also assessed the trends in investment dollars and total deals, which show a negative trend in the number of overall invest- ments. However, the year 2018 shows a dramatic in- crease in investment dollars. See Figure 2 for the full trend analysis. Figure 1. Deal participation Figure 2. Deal frequency and total capital investment 32 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 When analyzing the data from an industry per- spective, we also found some signs that the oligopo- listic nature of the Fearsome Five seems to affect the market. See Figure 3 for the graphical representation of the deals made by the Fearsome Five each year, from 1995-2017. On the left-hand side of the graph is the collective Fearsome Five deal count done in each year; on the right-hand side of the graph is the Her- findahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a measure of market concentration. For reference, an HHI of 1 represents a monopoly, while an HHI of 0 represents a completely free market. The Fearsome Five steadily increase the amount of deals they do in each year up to 2015, when the deals suddenly drop off by a large margin. At the same time, the HHI rapidly increases after steadily de- clining for the past eight years. When looking at the entirety of M&A activity of every firm characterized as a 737 SIC code (Computer Programming, Data Processing, and other Computer Related Services) during the same period as the anal- ysis, the total number of deals remains relatively con- sistent (See Figure 4). For the total number of deals performed by 737 firms in each year we depict the per- centage of each total deal count that was done by only the Fearsome Five. The results show that the Fearsome Five increasingly hold a higher and higher percentage of all 737 M&A activity up until 2015, when it drops and remains lower than previous years. These results support our initial arguments that Fearsome Five ac- quisition activity will decrease as the industry concen- tration grows. Regression Analysis. To formally test our hypoth- eses we use a logit regression model with the following form: Pr(F5) = a + b*Variable of Interesti + X*CONTROL- Si + ei (1) where the dependent variable is the indicator F5 which takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer is in the Fearsome Five and zero otherwise. Our control set includes con- trols for deal lead prestige (PRESTIGE), length of time in years to first venture investment from firm forma- tion (TIME TO VC), number of venture rounds during the deal (ROUNDS), and an indicator if the target is in California (CALI). We report the results of our analysis in Table 5. Figure 3. Fearsome five deals 33 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 The cells report the marginal effects of the logit mod- els and p-values. In Column 1 of Table 5, we report the results of our model with only the control variables included. In Column 2 of Table 5, we depict the test our first hypothesis that the F5 prefer firms earlier in the VC cycle by including the time of venture partic- ipation (TIME OF VC) with the firm in years. This variable loads negative and significant at the 5% lev- el, supporting our first hypothesis. The marginal effect suggest that a one year increase in TIME OF VC leads to 70 basis point decrease in the probability of being acquired. In Column 3 of Table 5 we test our second hypothesis that the F5 prefer firms with fewer venture participants by including the number of venture inves- tors (NUM FUNDS). This variable loads negative and significant at the 5% level, supporting our second hy- pothesis. The marginal effect suggests that increasing the number of investors by one fund reduces the prob- ability of being acquired by 50 basis points. In Column 4 of Table 5 we test our third hypothesis that the F5 prefer firms with lower venture investment by includ- ing the total amount of venture investment (INVEST- MENT). For this model we scale INVESTMENT to millions to adjust the reported coefficient. Thus, the marginal effect implies that each additional $1 million invested reduces the probably of acquisition by 1.7%. This variable loads negative and significant at the 1% level, supporting our third hypothesis. In Column 5 of Table 5 we test our fourth hypoth- esis that the F5 prefer firms from incubator to other types of backing by including INCUBATOR, BANK, and CORP. Each of these variables is an indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the target has backing from an incubator venture fund, investment banking venture fund, or a corporate backed venture fund. INCUBA- TOR loads positive and significant at the 5% level, supporting our fourth hypothesis that Fearsome Five firms prefer targets who participate in Accelerators and Incubators. The marginal effect implies that participa- tion with an incubator increases the probability of ac- quisition by 9.7%. BANK is negative and significant at the 5% level, which provides additional support in comparison the Fearsome Five firms do not acquire targets with investment bank funding. The marginal effect implies that investment bank backing decreases the probably of acquisition by a fearsome five by 3.5%. In Column 6 of Table 5 we test our fifth hypothe- sis that the F5 prefer firms located close in geographic proximity by including SAME STATE, which takes on a value of 1 if the target and acquirer are in the same state. This variable loads negative and significant at the 1% level, not supporting our fifth hypothesis, and the marginal effect implies that the probability of acqui- sition of from an F5 firm is lower by 4.2%. Finally, in Column 7 we include all of our hypothesized vari- ables in the same model. The statistical significance and direction remains consistent in the full model on the majority of our independent variables of interest at 0.0 % % 0.5 1.0 % % 1.5 2.0 % % 2.5 % 3.0 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 737 Deals Pct F5 Figure 4. 737 SIC and F5 M&A activity 34 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 Table 5 Logit models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Prestige 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.026* 0.019 0.016 0.019 (0.296) (0.301) (0.249) (0.086) (0.215) (0.280) (0.134) Time To VC -0.004 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 (0.140) (0.196) (0.070) (0.129) (0.158) (0.105) (0.116) Rounds -0.007** -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007** 0.004 (0.042) (0.697) (0.981) (0.415) (0.119) (0.025) (0.191) Cali 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.030* 0.028* (0.564) (0.624) (0.450) (0.489) (0.614) (0.072) (0.050) Time Of VC -0.007** -0.005* (0.042) (0.052) Num Funds -0.005** -0.004** (0.010) (0.043) Investment -0.017*** -0.000 (0.008) (0.209) Incubator 0.097** 0.099** (0.039) (0.036) Bank -0.035** -0.012 (0.015) (0.440) Corp 0.012 0.020 (0.410) (0.121) Same State -0.042*** - 0.035*** (0.005) (0.005) Observations 886 885 886 886 886 886 885 * p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 the 5% level. The two exceptions are TIME TO VC, which is only significance at the 10% level, and IN- VESTMENT, which is insignificant. Given significant, positive pairwise correlation of INVESTMENT and NUM FUNDS reported in Table 3, it is likely that the multicolinearlity of these two variables explains the loss of significance on INVESTMENT in the results depicted in the full model in Column 7 of Table 5. Discussion One popular question SMTEs are interested in an- swering is “What is their path to riches?” Based on investment trends and the current projected role of consolidation of power and financial resources in the high-tech industry, SMTEs that are involved with in- cubators, have less investment dollars and fewer inves- tors, and less time working with the investors, have a higher likelihood of exiting via acquisition by a Fear- some Five member. Given our analysis, we conclude that the sheer market power of the Fearsome Five has crowded out other high-tech firms, decreasing the in- dustry complexity. There is currently limited room for another high-tech firm to make a splash in the market, leading to fewer ventures, and thus less M&A activity. 35 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 Academic Implications Based on our theoretical integration of RBV and environmental uncertainty, our results offer several ac- ademic implications. First, expanding on the bound- ary conditions of RBV and environmental uncertainty, we show the limitations of SMTEs financial capital competitive advantage when looking for entrepreneur- ial exit via M&A. As industry complexity decreases, while opportunities for funding may still exist, if the top firms within the industry perform all acquisitions, less, not more, venture capital funding is preferred. Less M&A activity with a sudden increase in market concentration is concerning, to say the least. The con- versation amongst industry insiders, financial analysts, and the general populace must now be one centered on the health of the high-tech industry. Do we really want five firms controlling a market that has increasingly greater sway upon everyday life? Historically, such a market situation has led to higher prices and lower quality. The same results may be true for this market situation, with the addition of yet another noxious effect: less privacy. The concentra- tion of firms in control of hundreds of millions of users’ data makes them a target for hacking (Kshetri, 2014), and without a high level of security could be a reci- pe for disaster (Dawson, 2018; Schneier, 2011; Straub & Welke, 1998). One need only look at FaceBook’s various data scandals that have rattled investors, users, and regulators. The ongoing concerns over the intru- sion in to the home of the internet of things (IOT) and AI-based home and office automation platforms from Amazon, Google, Apple, and others leading to discus- sions not only about privacy and data usage but also about the very foundation of modern life (Solon & Laughland, 2018). It is not in the scope of this paper to discuss and attempt to resolve each of these possi- ble implications and how their potentially catastrophic privacy rights and market implications could be rem- edied. It is in the scope of this paper, however, to sug- gest that this discussion be hurried and aided by much additional research and examination in the near future. Practical Implications One consideration for investors and policy makers is the potential impact of the consolidation of the high-tech industry related to the outcomes of ac- quisitions of SMTEs. For example, local community investors look to invest in start-ups and SMEs to en- courage local community growth through employment and productive output (Islam et al., 2018). While this may be the case for SMTEs, after acquisition, the local economy is dependent on the actions of the Fearsome Five or other acquirer choices on whether support the growth SMTE in their current location. If the trend of acquisition of SMTEs shows a lack of giving back to the local community, while larger investors may re- ceive a return, a negative trend may begin with the lack of initial investments in start-up (Decker et al., 2016). This negative cycle, or death spiral, could thus result in a reduction of high-tech start-ups receiving the fi- nancial support they need to grow into SMTEs, which results in a lack of options for VCs and thus for large high-tech firms like the Fearsome Five for acquisition. While such a death spiral is a very pessimistic view- point, both scholars and industry practitioners suggest this potential outcome is likely to occur over the next 30 years (Andriole, 2017). Limitations We encourage some caution in interpreting these results. While they show support that the Fearsome Five acquire SMTEs earlier in the investment funding process, we do not account for the outcome of the ac- quisition. In addition, the changing nature of the M&A activity by the Fearsome Five provides another reason to pause and assess if exit via acquisition by a Fear- some Five member in the future is as likely and prom- ising as it has been. Another limitation to this study is the use of only investment funding provided by those that are listed in the XPERT database, which does not include debt or classify other types of equity funding. SMTEs that also utilize grants, or other terms of accel- erator or crowdfunding resources that may or may not be associated with either debt or equity financing not included in EXPERT could provide additional insights to the financial path from start-up to acquisition (Drov- er et al., 2017). Another avenue not explored in this paper that could provide additional insights into the future role of investment funding in entrepreneur exit is the changes in the investment environment over time. For example, 36 K. C. Irwin, C. M. Gilstrap, P. L. Drnevich, & C. M. Tudor Journal of Small Business Strategy / Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019) / 22-43 as the number and type of financial investors increases, the number of SMTE acquisitions may increase given the observed significant relationship between SMTE’s gaining funding and acquisition exit. However, the trend of different types of investments over time both in terms of growth in the different categories of invest- ment types and the increasing number in volume and dollar needs further analysis. Both scholars and prac- titioners may find this future avenue of research inter- esting as it could foreshadow both the role of growing investment firms and the role the Fearsome Five may play going forward. Future Research Some open questions not addressed in our analy- sis include how the role of acquirer motives and their actions post-acquisition may further affect the indus- try and subsequent future investment opportunities. We identify the increasing trend of investments by the Fearsome Five up until 2015 and then a subsequent de- cline is noted. While some of this decline can likely be explained by the decrease in M&As in general due to the waning of the M&A wave (Park, Morel, & Madha- van, 2010), other reasons for a decline could be a lack of SMTEs to acquire or lack of interest by SMTEs for acquisition. For example, recent negative media may serve as a disincentive to SMTEs to pursue acquisition if culture or customer privacy are as or more import- ant than financial incentives (Strese et al., 2018). SM- TEs may view recent issues the Fearsome Five have had with data privacy (e.g., MacMillian & McMillian, 2018; Solon & Laughland, 2018) or the issues of cul- ture and support for diversity (e.g., Edwards, 2016; Seetharaman, 2018; Waters, 2018) as negative factors and may choose to explore other alternatives for exit. For example, SMTEs may instead decide given these issues to explore utilizing the additional investment funding to pursue their own acquisition opportunities for further growth (e.g., Celikyurt, Sevilir, & Shiv- dasani, 2010; Ng & Al-Shaghroud, 2018). Additional future research directions may include a deeper investigation into HHI: What are the top firms making up the HHI index? Which of the Fearsome Five has the greatest market power? Future research may also be conducted around the choice of Fearsome Five targets. Are Fearsome Five member firms more often targeting public or private firms, and why? Final- ly, researchers may seek to find out whether the rest of the high-tech sector will follow the Fearsome Five’s M&A activity. Will M&A activity plummet like the Five’s has in recent years? Conclusion Through this study, we offered a greater under- standing of the potential impact of how financial in- vestments can influence an entrepreneurs exit via an M&A by that of the Fearsome Five in the high-tech industry. While SMTEs strive to overcome financial challenges by raising capital through one or many in- vestment funding opportunities, we highlight the im- portance of the source and timing of those funds if the SMTE is looking to attract the attention of the top five firms in the high-tech industry. A more thorough un- derstanding will lead to far-reaching implications for the rest of high-tech industry and business and soci- ety in general. For example, another practical impli- cation includes possible governmental oversight and new policy to help encourage the growth and funding of SMTEs or mitigate potential negative impacts of the power held by the Fearsome Five. 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