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NARRATIVE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY: PATTERNS OF 

THE SPREAD AND ACCEPTANCE OF RADICALISM AND 

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA  

(Case Study on the ROHIS Groups and Youth Organizations in 

DKI Jakarta Province) 
 

Firdaus Syam1 , Fachruddin Majeri Mangunjaya2 , Ajeng Rizqi Rahmanillah3 

1Associate Professor, School of Graduate Studies, Universitas Nasional Jakarta  
2Centre for Islamic Studies, Universitas Nasional Jakarta 

3International Relation Studies, Universitas Nasional Jakarta 

firdaus.syam@civitas.unas.ac.id, * fmangunjaya@civitas.unas.ac.id, 

ajeng.rizqi.rahmanillah@civitas.unas.ac.id 

 

ABSTRACT : This study aims to examine the narrative map, acceptance and spread 
patterns, and factors influencing the spread and acceptance of the narrative associated with 
the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism in DKI Jakarta Province. It was conducted 
with a qualitative approach: the data were collected through in-depth interviews with as 
many as 24 subjects (informants) divided into seven categories, namely, the Rohis (Islamic 
organization in secondary schools), the LDK (Basic Leadership Training)), mosque youth, 
youth organizations, religious leaders, da’i (preacher)/ takmir (mosque board), political 
activists, and cultural leaders. The finding of the study showed that the radicalism narrative 
has spread through a variety of patterns and has more importantly spread through 
interpersonal relationship patterns. However, the spread of the narrative has not been 
accompanied by an acceptance by the respondents of the narrative’s substance. From 96 
radicalism and terrorism narratives posed as questions, a total of 62 responses (64.58%) 
showed an opposition to these narratives that are present in the midst of the people of 
Jakarta. A total of 20% of the respondents expressed an improvement attitude towards the 
narratives, and the rest were receptive and accepted them with considerations. This finding 
proves that Jakarta residents not only are relatively free from the influence of radicalism 
and terrorism narratives but also have an immune system (improvement group) whose 
numbers among the groups of respondents to the narratives are balanced. 
 
Keywords: youth, organization, radicalism, terrorism, Jakarta 
 

 

  

mailto:firdaus.syam@civitas.unas.ac.id
mailto:fmangunjaya2@civitas.unas.ac.id
mailto:ajeng.rizqi.rahmanillah@civitas.unas.ac.id


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INTRODUCTION  

Jakarta, a metropolitan city in the centre of Indonesia, serves as the centre of the 

Indonesian government. It is also an important business centre in Southeast Asia. Because 

of its strategic and complex function, Jakarta has become a melting pot for various groups 

from many regions and countries. Jakarta, portrayed graphically, resembles cobwebs amid 

a haystack. There is a pattern of regularity, which is also evident in the cobwebs. However, 

Jakarta (or the cobwebs) is often biased because it is in a tangled environment. 

As a metropolitan city and the centre of government, Jakarta is inhabited by various tribes, 

ethnicities, and religions. From the aspect of religion and belief, ethnic (tribal), culture, 

economics, and other demographic factors, the people of Jakarta are a miniature 

representation of Indonesia's diversity (heterogeneous). All religions and beliefs that exist 

in Indonesia are in Jakarta. Jakarta includes a variety of different interest groups with 

different perspectives, and Islam is the religion of the majority of the population. These 

differences also underlie their perspective in responding to central government policies 

and in responding to the existence of non-Muslim groups in Jakarta. 

The Jakarta area has become very important for research on radicalism and terrorism, as 

Jakarta has unique characteristics when viewed from the perspective of government, 

business, social and political culture. Jakarta is a melting pot of various interest groups. It is 

the centre of administrative and political activity. Jakarta is also a melting pot of all ethnic 

backgrounds, cultures, and religions. On the other hand, Jakarta is also a stage and a 

strategic objective of radicalism and terrorism behaviours. Based on these conditions, the 

findings of this study on radicalism and terrorism in Jakarta will be distinctive and crucial. 

Radicalism and terrorism are social movements understood as movements that are done in 

an organized manner, of a group of people who refuse or accept new values. According to 

Situmorang (2007: 4), a social movement is a conscious, collective, and organized effort to 

encourage or reject changes in the social order. This description indicates that the main 

criterion of a social movement is a movement that aims to bring about a fundamental 

change in society. Antony Gidens (in Situmorang, 2007: 4) viewed that the social movement 

is a movement to achieve a common interest through collective action outside the scope of 

the established institutions. 

Basically, a religious movement is a social movement based on a particular religion (faith-

based social movement). As part of social movements, in general, religious movements can 

be analysed using the theory of social movements. By using the theory of social 

movements, a religious movement is considered as a social fact, not a collection of religious 

doctrines alone. It is seen as the movement of thought, as a thing-in-itself, with an emphasis 

on the issues of the theological thinking or the religious-political thoughts of its founder, its 

institution profile, and on sometimes merely the doctrines of its movement. Moreover, a 



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religious social movement must be seen as a dynamic movement, which is responsive to 

the challenges outside the movement and which builds networks and social change. 

Some social theories, which can be used to understand religious social movements, are, 

among others, the following: (1) the theory of Structural Political Opportunity (POS), (2) 

the Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), and (3) the Framing theory. (Situmorang, 2007: 

4). In the Structural Political Opportunity (POS) theory, social movements occur because of 

changes, which are seen as opportunities, in the political structure. POS theory is always 

associated with resources that are external. Actors wanting change use these resources 

through open political access and through the networks of political institutions and 

divisions within the political elites, to make changes (Tarrow, 1998: 20). 

To explain the development and the formation of networks of radicalism and terrorism 

movements in Jakarta, we use the theory of Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT). Religious 

social movement is seen as a rational and organized manifestation of collective action. In 

other words, a religious social movement will be able to evolve if it is able to optimize its 

various resources, such as material resources, legitimacy, identity, and institution (Tarrow, 

1998: 15; Sigh, 2001: 102; Situmorang (2007). 

Radicalism is often associated with violence, even terrorism. It is not separated from the 

increasing violence and terrorism committed in the name of religion or by a participant in a 

particular religion. However, conceptually, according to Taher (in Azca, 2013: 24), 

radicalism is not synonymous with terrorism and violence. The term radical that makes up 

the term radicalism is derived from the Latin radix, meaning root. Thus, radical thinking is 

synonymous with thinking up to the roots. In other words, then, why is it associated with 

thinking that is likely to cause anti-establishment attitudes? 

Radicalism is a concept that is both contextual and positional. In this case, its presence is 

the antithesis of the orthodox or the mainstream, whether in a social, secular, scientific, or 

religious aspect. Radicalism is more about position and ideology questioning or challenging 

something (or everything) that is considered an established, accepted, or a common view. 

Radicalism can be understood as a social and political phenomenon born in a state of 

dislocation or a permanent crisis in society. Therefore, it should be seen as a collective 

political phenomenon and not as a mere individual psychological phenomenon.  

This research aim to study  the areas covered by the narratives of radicalism and terrorism 

in Jakarta, it is important to know the patterns of spread and the acceptance in the region. 

This is due to the position of Jakarta as the centre and capital city of Indonesia. Therefore, 

Jakarta serves as a barometer for radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. 

 

 

 



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METHOD 

This study is included in the category of the qualitative research, that is, a study aimed at 

generating data in the form of written or spoken words from people being observed 

(Moloeng, 2000, 4). As a case study, this research is aimed at studying in detail particular 

social units that include an individual, a group, or an institution (Zuriah, 2006: 48). The 

data were collected through interviews, observations, and a study of the documents. 

The interviews were conducted with leaders of rohis in schools, figures of the LDK (Basic 

Leadership Training)), mosque youth, youth organizations, religious leaders, da’i/ takmir, 

political activists, and cultural leaders in Jakarta. 

In this research, a descriptive analysis was used in order to create a systematic, factual, and 

accurate picture of the facts, nature, and the relationship among the phenomenon 

investigated. The data obtained was then presented and analysed using a descriptive 

technique, which included a series of data reduction and data presentation activities, and a 

conclusion was developed. The analysis of this study not only provides explanations 

through descriptive sentences but also attempts to give clarity to the res earch object 

(Moloeng, 2000: 36). 

 

RESULT AND DISCUSSION 

Social, Political, and Religious Setting in DKI Jakarta 

According to data from the DKI Jakarta government in 2005, the composition of religious 

followers in this city was as follows: Islam (84.4%), Protestants (6.2%), Catholics (5.7%), 

Hinduism (1.2%), and Buddhism (3.5%). The number of Buddhists who follow 

Confucianism was also included. This composition was not very different from the religious 

composition in 1980, which was as follows: Muslims (84.4%), Protestants (6.3%), Catholics 

(2.9%), Hinduism and Buddhism (5.7%), and non-religious followers (0.3%). According to 

Cribb, in 1971, the adherents of Confucianism in relative terms were 1.7%. In 1980 and 

2005, the census does not record religious affiliations other than the six religions 

recognized by the government. 

Various places of worship of world religions can be found in Jakarta. Mosques and Mushala, 

as houses of worship for Muslims, are scattered in all corners of Jakarta, even in almost 

every environment. The biggest mosque is the national mosque, i.e., Masjid Istiqlal, located 

in Gambir. Other important mosques are Masjid Agung (the Great Mosque) Al-Azhar in 

Kebayoran Baru, Masjid At-Tin in Taman Mini, and Masjid Sunda Kelapa in Menteng. On the 

other hand, the Christians also have large churches in Jakarta, such as, for Catholics, the 

Jakarta Cathedral Church, the Church of Santa Theresia in Menteng, and, the Church of St. 

Jacobus in Kelapa Gading. In addition, for Protestants, there is the Immanuel Church, 

located across from Gambir Station, the Koinonia Church in Jatinegara, the Jakarta Zion 



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Church in Jakarta Kota, and the Toraja Christian Church in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta. 

For Hindus who live in Jakarta and the surrounding areas, there are places of worship, such 

as the Pura Adhitya Jaya located in Rawamangun, East Jakarta, and the Pura Segara in 

Cilincing, North Jakarta. The houses of worship for the Buddhists are, among others, Vihara 

Dhammacakka Jaya in Sunter, Vihara Theravada Buddha Sasana in Kelapa Gading, and 

Vihara Silaparamitha in Cipinang Jaya. The places of worship for the Confucians in Jakarta 

are the Temple of Jin Yin Tek and a synagogue used by the Jewish foreign workers. 

DKI Jakarta is a melting pot of all social groups fragmented in terms of religion, ethnicity 

(tribes), culture, economics, and other factors. This fragmentation of Jakarta’s people into 

these different social groups has created a dynamic that frequently has given rise to social 

radicalism in the fight over economic resources. In addition, political radicalism has also 

emerged as a way to seize political and economic power. 

 

Narratives On Islam, The State And Politics 

The respondents generally showed a moderate stance against the political system in 

Indonesia. The narratives do not radically criticize or reject the existing system. In general, 

informants opine that the political system is a tool to achieve the goal of providing benefits 

to the citizens. This view implies that whatever the system does is not important: its most 

important function is to provide for the well-being of human beings. However, the 

informants criticize the existing system for not yet being an ideal one. They consider that 

the political influence in the management of the country is too large; therefore, the 

country’s resources and energy are severely drained by political activities. Consequently, 

some crucial issues that would benefit the citizens and the country, i.e., economics, 

education, health, and others, are subject to neglect. An LDK of University of Indonesia (UI) 

committee member stated the following: 

"I saw that there were too many parties in Indonesia, so that our energy is drained for 

political activities. As a result, other aspects, such as economic issues, have become less 

overcome. It is not a problem to follow the existing system, for it is basically a tool to achieve 

the goal, i.e., the realization of benefit. " 

 

In addition, the respondents apparently had moderate attitudes towards the democratic 

system. Most respondents agreed or did not reject the democratic system, and others 

conditionally agreed with it. The respondents do not reject democracy but evaluate that 

there are weaknesses in its implementation. Democracy in Indonesia has not been 

complemented by the level of maturity and the level of education of the citizens. Therefore, 

the majority of respondents rate the democracy in Indonesia as having gone too far. 



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Didi Setiadi, the Chairman of Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonedia (KNPI) Kepulauan Seribu, 

claims that the political system of Indonesia is considerably democratic but that there are 

weaknesses in its implementation. However, he considered that Pancasila was in 

accordance with Islam and supports the concept of Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia 

(NKRI). He says the following: 

"The political system in Indonesia, I think, is quite democratic. Even, it is too democratic to the 

point that it creates a dilemma for government. For now, I disagree that our society should be 

given very broad democratic freedom. This is a boomerang for Islam. Yes, to some extent, 

there are some that are conformable, and some are not so. Pancasila, in Islam, is more 

universal. (Is Pancasila compatible with Islam?) Yes. NKRI, in my opinion, is “a fixed price” for 

us to defend, and we should not let anyone mess it up. " 

 

A similar voice is echoed by Ahmad Zaenudin, Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI) Jakarta Brigade 

Commander. He further states as follows: 

"When it comes to democracy, it does not change that much. If you look at political parties, the 

system is still a monarchy. Thus, the current system does not support it. I would not fix it by 

radical ways. Let us criticize it from the outside through real actions. Fundamentally, 

Pancasila and NKRI do not contradict Islam since the Prophet Muhammad never talked about 

the countries and Islam is indeed rahmatan lil 'alamiin. Mercy for the universe" 

 

Some respondents felt that as a form of a democratic system implementation, the process 

of generally and directly electing leaders is not entirely good. In the democratic system, 

everyone has the right to pick and choose leaders, but a majority of voters may not have a 

sufficient understanding and the wisdom to determine leaders. As a result, regardless of 

the individual’s quality, the elected leaders can be anyone and may possibly be elected 

based on popularity. Moreover, this election process may provide the possibility of misuse 

by certain interest groups.  

Some respondents stated that democracy is not fully in accordance with Islam. However, 

with respect to Indonesia's current condition, they do not reject the system. There are two 

considerations the respondents propose in this regard. First, the system’s implementation 

should be adapted to specific situations and conditions. Second, as long as the system is still 

considered appropriate or closely in accordance with Islamic values, democracy is 

regarded as an acceptable tool or instrument that aims to establish benefits for people. In 

other words, democracy as a tool can be anything and does not have to formally carry out 

the label of Islam. More importantly, its goal is achieved through its benefit to humans. The 

chairman of the cadre teen mosque in northern Jakarta stated the following: 



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"It (democracy) did not exist in the Prophet Muhammad’s era, but if democracy is defined as 

deliberation, it means just talking about methods (of democracy as a method in making 

decisions or choosing a leader). So, it is legitimate (allowed), if beneficial. Depending on the 

conditions (if today the democratic system is possible to be applied, it does not matter, as long 

as it can be beneficial). Implementation of any system is largely determined by its leaders. The 

disadvantage (of the democratic system implementation) is that all people with different 

capacities have the same vote (voting with the same power at the time of the election).The 

ways conducted by the prophet are difficult to apply today, as people’s thoughts are very 

diverse. " 

 

A similar narrative has been received as well from the chairman of the LDK Universitas 

Negeri Jakarta (UNJ). He asserts that democracy basically does not come from Islamic 

teachings. However, for Indonesia’s current situation and the political system existing 

today, democracy is not considered a problem. This is because the democratic system is 

considered to still include positive values that are not contradictory with Islamic values, 

although there are some parts of the implementation that are, he considers, less than ideal. 

Even though it is not fully in accordance with Islam, it is considered the closest to the 

values of Islam.  

The respondents’ narratives on Pancasila and the concept of NKRI are generally very 

positive. All responses declare that Pancasila and NKRI are something good and 

instruments that benefit the lives of society and the nation. The respondents mostly agree 

on this view of these two concepts. Respondents embrace these attitudes because the 

respondents claim that the Pancasila and the concept of NKRI are not inconsistent with 

Islam. A respondent from FPI, for example, says that "Pancasila has been well received and 

is not contrary to Islam.” The same response is also delivered by FKUB. A representative 

from FKUB utters that "the majority people are no longer concerned with Pancasila". 

A number of respondents specifically questioned Pancasila’s implementation. They ponder 

that as a concept or ideology, Pancasila is good but that they are still facing the problem of 

practising the values of Pancasila in their daily lives. This issue was revealed by three 

groups of respondents, i.e., the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) , Bamus Betawi and Partai 

Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) party figures. An MUI respondent stated the following: 

"Pancasila is not an issue, yet its practice is questionable.” Then, PKB figures expressed, 

"the very issue of Pancasila is that it has not yet been put into practice.”  

In line with the above narratives, the LDK leader of UI believes that Pancasila is not an issue 

when applied as a basis or system of values in life as long as Pancasila is not juxtaposed 

with the Qur'an. Pancasila was positioned as an instrument, interpretation, or declaration 

to strengthen the implementation of noble values. He stated the following: 



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“Not a problem (with Pancasila), as long as Pancasila is not aligned with the Qur'an. As such, 

Pancasila should be positioned as a formal declaration to strengthen the values, not as the 

primary basis.” 

 

A similar comment was expressed by the leader of the LDK from UNJ. He viewed that there 

is no problem with Pancasila because Pancasila is not in opposition to Islamic values, 

although it is not labelled as part of Islam. He claims as follows: 

“(Pancasila) as a value system is fine. This country is the achievement of the struggle of our 

predecessors, who were mostly Muslims. See the previous formulation of Pancasila (there were 

some words written “to implement sharia law for Muslims”). (I saw that) it (Pancasila) did not 

contradict Islamic values, although it does not use any Islamic terminology. If its application is 

not in accordance with the values of Islam, it must be denied.” 

 

The respondents’ narratives on NKRI are as positive as their narratives on the concept of 

Pancasila are. All respondents from various categories even agree and accept the concept of 

NKRI. They reasoned that NKRI is an instrument to strengthen the unity and sovereignty of 

the country. The respondents of the LDK said the following: 

 “I accept (agree). Do not let this country become fragmented! There are souls of nationalities 

(which bind a unity as citizens). However, these conditions do not erode the concept of 

harmony of Muslims among nations.” (UI). 

 

A similar narrative was expressed by another LDK respondent, who stated the following: 

“No problem (with NKRI). It is a good thing to unite people in the country. Its 

implementation must be in conformity with Islamic values covering the guarantee in 

exercising rights to practising religious teachings.” 

For the activists of the ethnic and cultural based-organizations in Jakarta, such as Kembang 

Latar, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is “the fixed price” that cannot be negotiable. 

Their proximity to national figures and youth organizations, such as Pemuda Pancasila, is 

evidence of this. In fact, in our conversation, an activist of Latar Kembang stated that his 

mass organization has an emblem bearing a stallion and surrounded with rice and cotton. 

Rice and cotton are symbols of social justice for all people—this is obviously an influence of 

Pancasila. Therefore, when asked about their view of radicalism and terrorism, two 

activists of Kembang Latar stated unequivocally that there was no place for both ideologies 

in their mass organization. While smiling, one of them stated the following: 

"We do not want to interfere, if not disturbed. Our slogan is indeed obvious: a thousand friends 

are still lacking, an enemy is too many ... once upon a time, one of our people successfully 



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managed to capture terrorists in Pamulang, and now he has a position that is quite strategic 

there (Police) and this was enough to prove that our attitude is in line with the most ... " 

  

Similarly, with respect to FBR, although they are frequently reported for their acts of 

violence, their political attitudes towards race and religion do not point out any 

understanding of the narratives of radicalism and terrorism. In FBR’s culture and strategy, 

violence, which can be quite vicious, exists. Nonetheless, their culture and strategy seem far 

from Islamism. When found guilty, the individuals’ motives for their violent acts are more 

prone to be ones other than religion and politics. Moreover, the FBR’s current Chairman, 

Haji Lutfi Hakim, is an alumnus of pesantren and graduated from the Faculty of Da'wa UIN 

Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. Some activists from Ciputat even testified that Lutfi Hakim was 

a campus activist and was active in the Student Forum Ciputat (FORMACI), a study group 

that is widely known for its progressive ideas. After the death of El-Hajj Fudholi Muhir, who 

is his relative, he was inaugurated as the next Chairman of FBR. One of the FBR activists in 

South Jakarta said that he was interested in joining FBR because this mass organization 

would give him the opportunity of mobility that he wanted but still in the realm of 

ethnicity, nationality and Islam. 

 

Narratives on Islamic Sharia 

In the respondents’ narratives, there was a wide diversity of opinion between those who 

agree and those who disagree, on the need for the enforcement of sharia law in Indonesia. 

Some respondents did not actually say that they agreed or not, but they were pessimistic 

about the possibility of sharia law enforcement. This attitude would appear from 

respondents, such as those in the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Ulama Indonesia 

(MUI), Bamus Betawi and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). The FPI figures stated that for 

the moment, it was not easy to impose sharia law in Indonesia. The same statement was 

also expressed by MUI. PKB’s board has even explicitly declared that it is not necessary to 

impose sharia law. Bamus betawi and FKUB have the same view on this issue. They said 

that the imposition of sharia law will cause divisions. While the figures of PKS commented 

that Pancasila has been deemed good and sufficient to serve as a foundational value 

because it has been widely accepted by society, how these values can be implemented in 

life remains unclear. 

The groups that agreed and provided support for the implementation of Sharia emerged 

from the group of Rohis respondents in high school, youth organizations and campus 

da’wah agencies, as well as a number of prominent figures of the mosque youth. Two Rohis 

respondents from senior high school said that sharia law has to be applied. All groups of 

Rohis supported having Indonesia as an Islamic state, while all clusters of OKP stated the 



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opposite. This polarization means many things. Biological lability factors may be important 

variables influencing the different views. Other factors are related to experiences and 

engagements in society and in the country. Regardless of the reasons for their views, the 

Rohis groups seem more prone to accept the spread of radicalization or extreme Islamism.  

Although most of them agree or encourage the application of sharia law, they have different 

views on its application. Information indicates that the respondents who agree with sharia 

law do not reflect radical ideas in their views on the way and the mode of its application. 

Respondents from Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI), for instance, 

stated that the shariah actually has been widely applied in a number of rules of law, 

although it has not been formally labelled as shariah. A similar view was also stated by a 

member of the board of LDK from UI. He felt that the shariah is good and true and that it 

should be applied. However, he argued that the application of sharia law should not use a 

formal label, i.e., shari'ah. The important thing, he said, was that the substantial basis of 

Islamic values is implemented in the legal process. Regardless of the name of the system 

and its origin, if the contents are in accordance with Islamic values, it is actually the 

implementation of Shariah. Therefore, some informants say that shariah implementation 

does not need a formal channel in the political system in Indonesia, such as political parties , 

elections, or parliament. They place more emphasis on propaganda (da’wah)activities 

(movement) as a great media mechanism to build up the rule of shari'ah. One of them 

comments as follows: 

“I am very confident in the shari'ah because it comes from God. It should be applied. (Its 

application) should not always be labelled as shari'ah, but its substance has to be Islamic. 

(This is considerably realistic) for now. That means that it does not need to say ‘this is the 

shariah.’ The importance is its substance (containing Islamic values). 

 

The respondent further stated: 

“The shariah system is the best. The application of the shari'ah system cannot be done 

instantly. The substance is more important. The process of implementing the Shari'ah system 

is done through the missionary (da’wah) movement. Do not put forward the symbols of Islam! 

The importance is its substance (Islamic). The important thing is good content, which includes 

anything that comes from the West or from Christianity, because it is basically Islamic.” 

 

In line with the views on shariah, in different ways of expression, the majority of 

respondents also tended to show a less positive attitude towards the establishment of an 

Islamic State. The respondents stated that the application of shariah is the important thing, 

not the establishment of the Islamic State. The majority of the people already received 

Pancasila. The issue with Pancasila is how to practice it. According to the respondents, the 



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issue of establishing the Islamic State could break up Indonesia, resulting in the 

disintegration of the country. The respondents stated that they just needed to practice 

Pancasila well. One of the PKB figures explicitly stated that they do not need an Islamic 

state. Respondents who viewed that Indonesia must turn into an Islamic State were only 

those from the Rohis of the senior high schools. 

Respondents representing religious activists on campus (LDK) reflected a more realistic, 

rational and flexible view of the Islamic State. Their view is that Shari'ah is a system which 

is regarded as the best and most ideal. Nevertheless, in their view, the concept of the 

Islamic state should not always be mentioned with respect to a formal label. In reference to 

the concept of the Islamic State, they emphasize its substance, which means that although 

the name may not appear as an Islamic state, the concept that is implemented and managed 

by the State should in many respects reflect Islamic values. This concept concerns changes 

in culture, outlook and behaviour. For that reason, it takes time and a long struggle to make 

it happen. Hence, directional changes of these conditions should use the  existing rules or 

tools in order to avoid the resultant collisions and the radicalism that might be 

counterproductive. A respondent of the LDK from UI stated the following: 

“There is no need to formally label an Islamic state, but the substance should be Islamic. The 

substance exceeds the form. The realization of (these expectations) requires a long struggle 

and must follow the process, rules or existing tools.” 

 

The respondents from the UNJ also reflected the same narratives on the Islamic State. A 

respondent claimed the following: 

 “Indonesia has not yet been able to do that at this time, as our society is not conducive to that. 

For now, we cannot formally become an Islamic state. We are not ready. This has to be 

continuously defended. There is something more significant, i.e., the application of Islamic 

values (in various aspects of life)” 

 

Narratives on Violence 

Narratives about violent behaviour are quite diverse. However, there is a relatively 

consistent pattern in the narrative of most of the respondents. Most respondents conveyed 

a critical, realistic and rational narrative with respect to violent behaviour committed by a 

group of people against another group. Not all acts of violence were considered 

blameworthy and not all acts of violence were justified. The respondents tended to 

critically analyse every act of violence. Behaviour involving the raiding of a church was 

judged as something that cannot be justified, as it violates an individual’s rights to practice 

their religion. This attitude was reflected by the majority of respondents and was clearly 

indicative of the moderate attitude of the majority of the respondents towards religious 



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differences. A member of the LDK Board of UI, for example, stated that he did not agree 

with raiding churches because it violates the individuals’ right to practice their religion. He 

stated the following: "I do not agree with raiding places of worship (church) because it 

violates their rights". The same statement was also delivered by LDK of UNJ. He stated the 

following: "(raiding the church) It is not justified. It may be done by a person or in the name 

of Islam. " 

The respondents from Rohis SMA agree with conducting violent raids against places of vice 

and evil cult but not against the church. Adni Adzkia of Rohis SMA 59 and Mohamad Aci, 

Vice Chairman Rohis SMK Negeri 75, stated as follows: 

"(About the raid on immoral places?) It was good. (If it’s a raid on the church?) No. (Cult?) Yes. 

(Why) because of conflicts with the Shari'ah. (Right there is the government?) ... Do not 

understand. "(Adni Adzkiah) 

 

"(on raiding) agree with destruction, as the immoral place is forbidden. (Including cult-like 

Ahmadiyah) .. I do not necessarily agree. (Church?) I do not agree (once looked uncertain, 

red). An immoral place was destroyed for destroying the young generation. ... because it 

was a good move. Good, because it's an immoral place; there is nothing good. Everything is 

bad. "(Mohamad Aci) 

 

Additionally, the respondents from the OKP agreed with conducting raids against immoral 

places but not against cults and the church. This was disclosed by Didi Setiadi, Chairman 

KNPI Thousand Islands, who stated as follows: 

"(Raiding a maksit?) Agrees, but if related to the church, I do not agree. The time of the 

Prophet is also not allowed. If a cult, yes; fighting since the time of the Prophet, too. In 

Indonesia, it should be adjusted in a way so that they can be good. To directly raid the 

Ahmadiyah is good because they do have an understanding that is considered right by 

them. " 

Basically, respondents did not approve of violent behaviour towards the church. According 

to some respondents, violence or raiding church buildings usually occurs when the 

establishment of the church is not in accordance with existing rules, thus giving rise to a 

reaction from the surrounding community. When these reactions are not quickly and 

adequately settled by the government, it eventually leads to violence. This view is 

consistent with the narrative of the Governor of the youth mosque in North Jakarta. He 

stated the following: 

 “We should refer to the rules. We see laws. The Pendirin church sometimes does not follow 

the rules, but it is still standing. As a result, the community reacted. Sometimes the church 

is built on the site (environmental) of a Muslim community. Therefore, you should adjust 



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the legislation. If the establishment of the church is done by the rules, it does not matter. 

They also have the right to worship. 

Similar feelings were expressed by officials of the LDK UNJ. A respondent stated: 

“Cases of violence (destruction) against the church occur because the existing rules / 

obligations are violated or because there is a person who intentionally wants to create a 

chaotic atmosphere. If the (church establishment) has been permitted (by the rules), there 

should be no violence. We must respect each other. If there are any problems, the path of 

deliberation should take precedence.” 

 

The views of the respondents with respect to violence against immoral places seem 

different than their views on violence against the church. A small portion of respondents 

agreed with this type of action without any conditions. This attitude was shown by 

respondents from among the group of Rohis who attended high school. Most respondents 

agreed with this type of action but with a number of conditions. The respondents who have 

this view say that the phenomenon of violence against immoral places occurs as a result of 

the half-heartedness and lack of government enforcement of laws that have established 

order in the society. The respondents considered the raiding of immoral places a reaction 

of a group of people to the government's inability to deal with the rampant immorality in 

society. The respondents seemed to take a middle position on conducting raids on immoral 

places. They did not expressly support such behaviour, but they also did not directly blame 

the perpetrators for the behaviour. A respondent from the LDK UI revealed the following: 

“Most respondents do not agree with raiding places of worship (church) because it violates 

the worshippers’ rights. Raiding immoral places disrupts public order because the 

government is unable to take firm action. This is a form of reaction from the public. We 

cannot directly blame them.” 

The same narrative is also conveyed by the board mosque youth in North Jakarta. He stated 

the following: 

“Raiding against immoral places is a phenomenon that is almost the same as conducting 

violence against the cult. It is a form of forbidding the evil committed by a group of people 

because law enforcement does not function effectively. Finally, its the community itself 

that(takes action to close the immoral place).” 

 

Respondents from the FPI and the MUI have very similar views on violent acts against 

immoral places. Both of these respondents signalled that we cannot blame the people with 

respect to this case because this is a reaction to law enforcement’s ineffectiveness. FPI 

leaders said that violence against immoral places occurs because the law is not enforced, 



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while respondents from the MUI states revealed that they do not blame people if they 

conduct raids against immoral places. 

The respondents’ narratives about violence against cults were similar to those regarding 

the phenomenon of violence against immoral places. The respondents were not directly 

and unequivocally blaming the people who committed the acts of violence against a group 

of people who they considered had gone astray. In the case of a cult, the respondents felt 

that there have been acts of harassment that have caused unrest or that have been 

offensive to the religious community (Islam). Here is the actual root of the problem. The 

respondents highlighted the issue of the government not taking strong actions against 

individuals in these cases, which has led to people having to overcome their own issues. 

Related to this view, the respondents from LDK UI revealed the following: 

“I see people feel disturbed (by the cult). The government does not (cannot) be trusted to 

solve this problem. (A cult phenomenon) menimbilkan causes unrest / interference, 

because of the harassment of things that are considered sacred. 

A board teenager from the North Jakarta mosque stated the following: 

“In general, raids or acts of violence cannot be justified. We must have orderly law. 

Governments are supposed to curb cases of cult since this is already considered as a 

desecration of religion. So, I see law enforcement as ineffective in dealing with this issue. So, 

violence is a form of reaction from the public. Communities do this as part of efforts to prevent 

kemungkaran. 

 

Furthermore, LDK of UNJ also said the following: 

“We should firmly oppose (the cults), such as the Ahmadiyah or Shia. The problem is that they 

claim Islam but have deviated from Islamic principles. So, this (is already categorized) as an 

abuse of Islam. The government should address this issue. If the government effectively 

addresses this issue, it will not happen (violence against the cult committed by a group of 

people).” 

 

In addition to the narrative as exposed above, some respondents argued that any form of 

violence should not happen because it would damage the image of Islam and therefore the 

perpetrators must be dealt with. Such views emerged from respondents in the FKUB, the 

PKS and from PKB party figures. On the other hand, two respondents who agreed with 

raids on immoral place noted that such actions should be done by the government/state, 

not by a person or group of people. This attitude was reflected by respondents from the 

KAMMI and the GPI. The views of the last group of respondents are consistent with the rule 

of law related to the raiding phenomenon and to violence. 



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Perhaps one of the most vicious and violent cultures in Jakarta is contained in the groups 

that have felt or perceived that they have experienced discrimination. When all their 

economic and political mobility is hampered in particular because of the important 

position occupied by "settlers" in Jakarta, then those of certain ethnicities have no place to 

which they can return. Therefore, it is in the case of religion. 

Thus, in Jakarta, various events in which there are clashes, often involve CBOs’ regionalism. 

Although often covered up with impressive preaching, a number of these events have 

attracted news media coverage. For example, there have been conflicts of interest between 

the Betawi and the Madura in Kebayoran Lama Market, the Banten and the Flores in Tanah 

Abang, and others. Even events in the Kebayoran Lama Market reaction have sparked a 

reaction from a large number of citizens and Betawi leaders, which has led to the 

establishment of the Forkabi organizations in Jakarta. 

Despite the fact that current conditions tend to be favourable, the infighting among various 

organizations, such as Latar Kembang and FBR, is still possible because it has been 

traumatic for both groups. After peace between the two groups was initiated by the police 

of Jakarta, the two organizations took a defensive stance. As explained earlier, the events 

did not necessarily eliminate the cultural strategy which asserts that the culture has to 

"defend itself." The dynamics of the rest of the mass organizations are that they are 

growing and sometimes growing violently.  

 

Narrative on Terrorism 

The global terrorism threat has become more decentralised, unpredictable, hard-to-detect 

and resilient with regenerative capacities. The global jihadist movements, principally the 

socalled Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda, have glocalised to exploit indigenous grievances, 

recruit aspiring jihadists and fight for local and global causes. Overall, both IS and Al-Qaeda 

have become underground terror networks which will allow them to sustain themselves 

for longer and perpetrate more violent attacks. With a radical Islamist jihadist ideology, 

multiple wilayat (provinces), sleeper cells, lone -wolves, online radicalisation and skilful 

exploitation of modern technologies, the terrorism threat remains challenging despite the 

successful expulsion of IS from its heartlands in Iraq and Syria in 2017. Moving forward, in 

2018, the terrorist threat will be characterised by attacks mounted by politico-religious, 

ethnic-political and left/right wing groups. The major risk to the West, the Middle East, 

Africa and Asia will come from Islamist extremist groups with radicalised segments of 

migrant and diaspora communities perpetrating attacks in North America, Europe and 

Australia. Notwithstanding the operational and military setbacks IS and Al-Qaeda have 

suffered over the years, their affiliates in the global south will continue to mount attacks 

against military, diplomatic, political and economic targets. Despite security measures, 



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threat groups will seek to hit aviation, maritime and land transportation targets. In 

addition, selfradicalised and directed attacks will focus on populated locations for large-

scale impact, with suicide attacks as the preferred tactic. The favoured modus operandi of 

IS-inspired and directed jihadists in the West will be low-end terrorism relying on vehicle-

ramming and stabbing as witnessed throughout 2017. Broadly, the world has witnessed 

the rise of three generations of global terrorist movements. ‘Global Jihad 1.0’ emerged after 

Al-Qaeda attacked the US in September 2001 and captured the imagination of multiple 

militant groups in Asia, Africa, Middle East and the Caucasus. The second generation, 

‘Global Jihad 2.0’, emerged after al-Baghdadi declared a ‘caliphate’ and announced the 

formation of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) on 29 June 2014. The third generation, ‘Global Jihad 

3.0’, represents the global expansion of IS outside Iraq and Syria. IS now relies on its 

wilayat as its operational bases in the Middle East, Africa, Caucasus and Asia. IS and its 

affiliates control territorial space in varying degrees in countries with active conflict zones, 

and maintain a presence in cyber space. The group’s strength also lies in affiliated and 

linked groups, networks, cells and dedicated jihadists who are willing to fight and die for IS. 

There is an almost a similar narrative from all respondents associated with their views on 

terrorism. Generally, respondents view that terrorism is not consistent with Islamic 

teachings. Terrorism is a form of misunderstanding Islam. It became a counterproductive 

matter for Islam. The respondents provided an ambiguous assessment regarding the 

perpetrators of terrorism. In addition, there was another narrative pattern that emerged 

but that was not reflected by all respondents (only on some of the respondents), i.e., a 

belief that terrorism is a kind of conspiracy coming from outsiders who dislike Islam. 

There are important differences, of course, for the other in the war on terror is not as 

readily knowable (and therefore not as actionable and controllable) as enemies in wars on 

crime, since the terrorist other represents a global rather than local threat. However, as we 

will argue in this paper, the war on terror can be said to have a similar purpose in the 

political struggle for order. If wars on terrorism are to be successfully represented in those 

terms, the terrorist must be ideologically represented as knowable, actionable and 

controllable in a particular form. The construction of ‘terrorism’ as something that the state 

can do something about is central to the justification for the expansion of its juridical and 

military reach. 

 

Terrorism is not in accordance with Islamic teachings 

All respondents have similar views about terrorism. They tend to say that terrorism is not 

consistent with the teachings of Islam. Islam is a rahmatan lilalamin religion, that is, a 

mercy for all creatures. This means that Islam provides noble teaching and aims to create a 

good life in the universe. It is not possible for Islam to teach meanness and cause horrible 



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damage. The beneficence promoted by Islam is not only for human beings but also for all 

natural living things that exist in the universe. All respondents coming from the Rohis 

group in senior high school and youth organizations, such as KAMMI, GPI, and KNPI, agree 

that terrorism is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The same view was also 

expressed by respondents from the MUI and FPI group. When they were asked about the 

relationship between terrorism and Islam, the LDK UI figures stated, "Terrorism is not in 

accordance with the teachings of Islam.” Furthermore, the board of the north Jakarta mosque 

youth association in an interview said that "Islam is a religion rahmatal lilalamin; Islam is a 

peace religion.” This view has been reinforced by a narrative of the other board member of 

the mosque youth association. He states "... Islam is rahmatal lilalamin. It has never been a 

war in peaceful circumstances. Terrorism is not in accordance with Islamic teachings. Making 

terrorism is jihad, but actually it's not ". 

Therefore, it is impossible for Islam to promote terrorism, an activity that causes damage 

and or injustice to others. Actions of terrorism are basically not consistent with the 

teachings and behaviour of Islam. Therefore, even if there are Muslims who commit 

terrorist actions, they are certainly persons who have a misconception of Islam. When 

mosque youth respondents are asked who the perpetrators of terrorism are, they said 

"they could be Muslims, but they have a superficial understanding of Islam. This is a 

deviation from real Islam.” Such conditions have existed for a long time in every religion. A 

narrative stating that terrorism is not in line with Islamic teachings also has been affirmed 

by LDK leaders of UNJ. One respondent stated, "(Terrorism) is not in accordance with the 

teachings of Islam. Islam does not teach terrorism. Islam does not condone terrorism. Islam is 

a doctrine of affection” 

Terrorism cannot be generalized only to Islam. Actually, terrorism exists in any religion. It 

has appeared as a model of misconception in the interpretation of religious teachings. 

According to a number of respondents, terrorism is the result of dissatisfaction with 

conditions or reality, for example, injustices, poverty, slavery, etc. This was conveyed by a 

prominent figure of the LDK UNJ in the following statement: 

"The behaviour of terrorism arises because there is injustice, rampant immorality and some 

people who use illegal ways to fight for justice; it is not related to Islam. I do not agree that 

terrorism is related to Islam." 

 

Terrorism: A Misconception Model in Understanding Islam 

The first narrative emerging from respondents about terrorism is that terrorism is not 

consistent with Islamic teachings. Islam has a mission of virtue for the universe. If it is 

acknowledged that a perpetrator of terrorism was a Muslim and that he fought in the name 

of Islam, then undoubtedly the perpetrator’s understanding of Islam is wrong.  



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Therefore, the terrorists misunderstood the meaning of jihad. This is a summary of the 

views collected from some respondents. For instance, a respondent from PKB clearly stated 

that as the terrorists misunderstood their religion, they went the wrong way, and they 

should be reproached. A young leader of the LDK UI lahiriyah considered that Islam does 

not have a positive impact on terrorism and that if it is proved that a terrorist is a Muslim, 

then it is probable that there is a problem in the person’s understanding of Islam. The UI 

LDK Chairman stated the following: 

“I do not know what he (terrorist) is fighting for. There is no proof that Islam affected him. 

There is a wrong understanding about Islam. There are still other ways. 

 

The same thing is also spoken by a respondent from an association for mosque youth. He 

stated the following: 

Terrorism is a form of simplifying religion. They misinterpret the meaning of jihad ...... .. it 

seems like jihad, but it is not ...... This is a deviation from Islam. Such conditions have existed 

for a long time, and they exist in all religions. 

 

Terrorism is Counterproductive for Islam 

The next narrative about terrorism conveyed by the respondents was an outlook that 

terrorism can create a bad image for Muslims. When the perpetrators (terrorists) think 

that terror is one of the methods that can be used to fight for Islam, their view is precisely 

opposite from the way Muslim people think. The respondents think that terrorism does not 

improve the image of Islam. Most of the respondents from Rohis in the senior high school 

and all the respondents from the youth organizations (KAMMI, GPI, KNPI) agree that 

terrorism does not improve the condition of Muslims. They assert that there is no 

correlation between terrorism and improvements in Islam. One young leader of SMA Rohis 

said that there might be some effects of terrorism that result in the improvement of the 

conditions of Muslims, but he still does not agree with the terrorists’ actions. 

The view that terrorism does not produce a positive impact on Islam was also delivered by 

a respondent of the mosque youth in northern Jakarta. He stated that terrorism could not 

produce good improvements for Muslims and could even worsen the image of Islam. In an 

interview, he said the following: "It (terrorism does not fix the Muslims). It will only worsen 

the image of Muslims in the eyes of the world.” 

The same response was delivered by a young leader of the LDK UI. He said the following: “It 

is an ideological question (it depends on who answers the question). In my opinion, (terrorism 

does not improve the condition of Muslims).” 

 

 



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Ambiguous attitude in Assessing Terrorists  

There are two narrative patterns reflected by the respondents with respect to terrorists, 

such as Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Noordin M. Top. First, from a negative viewpoint, 

there was disapproval for the lack of investigation with respect to the mareka terrorists. 

This view emerged from most of the leaders of the Rohis in the high school and all 

respondents of youth organizations, such as the GPI, the KAMMI AND the KNPI. The 

following comment was given by Mohamad Ali from SMA PKP JIS: 

"(Regarding the bombers, such as Amrozi, Nordin M Top. Do you agree with them?) ... well I 

agree. (what’s the reason?) ... because they are Muslims. (or maybe because the victims are 

infidels?) Not really, because there are Muslim victims. (Then why do you agree?) ... I do not 

know .... (the bombers admitted that they desired martyrdom. do you agree with them?) ... No, 

since their reasons are not based on a fight for Islam. (They said they did it on the name of 

Islam?) ... They did not fight for the sake of Allah. (So where are they?) Ehhh .. (silence, red). 

(do they only look for sensation/attention?) ..yes, they do." 

 

The second view is one of disagreement with the actions of terrorists but of appreciation 

for certain cases, for example, for the fighting spirit with respect to Islamic preaching. 

However, these respondents still considered that the terrorists misunderstood Islam and 

the jihad concept and had taken a wrong direction. The respondents who took this view 

could not say what the fate of the terrorists would be when judged in front of God. A 

respondent from the LDK UI, for example, said that she could not assess how the terrorists’ 

actions would be viewed by God. Let it be the Lord's business. In an interview, he said the 

following: "I do not think about it too much. It’s God's business. I do not take into account 

God's business". 

Similar views were also expressed by the respondents of the OKP. A chairman of the KNPI 

of Thousand Islands states that he does not agree with terrorism but that he also agrees 

with certain issues. Didi stated the following: 

"Actually, terrorism is an attitude of dissatisfaction with a society that tolerates injustice. In 

certain matters, it is in accordance with Islam, but the implementation is not appropriate .... 

(An appropriate thing is like developing the community?) Yes, it is. In the case of shari'ah 

enforcement, it would be better if it had been done using hands. It amounted to a situation 

that was fought at any cost... (is it similar with what Amrozi has done?) I don’t think so. In that 

case, Amrozi had the wrong understanding, because what he did cause a lot of people to 

suffer, even innocent people" 

 

 



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Another respondent coming from the mosque youth gave the same view. He stated the 

following: 

"The assessment of Amrozi and his friends is very dependent on what point of view is used". I 

cannot judge (assess) him as an infidel or martyr. It was the authority of God; even though 

apparently it was wrong, I cannot judge.” 

 

Unlike the mosque youth, respondents from the Rohis in senior high school and all youth 

organizations openly said that they did not agree with the terrorists and that they object to 

labelling terrorists as martyrs. This means that they believe terrorists are wrong and that 

the terrorists are valued negatively before God, the Almighty. 

 

Terrorism is a Conspiracy 

A small portion of respondents believes that terrorism is a conspiracy of certain parties to 

intervene in Indonesia to impose Islam. This view appears only in a minority of 

respondents, i.e., one respondent from LDK and one respondent from the mosque youth. 

They judge that it is not clear who the real perpetrators of terror are, and they think the 

terrorists require a large amount of funds and high technology to carry out their large 

bombing missions, which would not be possible if done by a small group of people. They 

suspect that there is a strong party who has sponsored terrorism. A figure of LDK UNJ 

indicated this allegation. He stated the following: 

“I see that there are (some) irregularities in the arrests of terrorism. Perhaps this is a 

conspiracy to discredit Islam. Terrorism is everywhere and in any groups and religions. 

Terrorism cannot be generalized (to Muslims). Many cases are claimed to be acts of terrorism 

but are not openly and clearly processed at the court (they were killed in an ambush, so we 

cannot know who really they are). Perhaps this is part of a conspiracy (to give a bad image of 

Islam and or to control the development of Islam).” 

 

The same view was also delivered by a prominent mosque youth in North Jakarta. He said 

the following: 

“Who is Amrozi. He is nothing. It was deliberately created by the Americans in order to control 

Indonesia. Indonesia is an easy country to control. There are people who provide funds and the 

amount is very large. The price of bombs is expensive, and an ojek rider may not be able to 

purchase a bomb. It has been financed by the United States. It is the American effort to control 

Indonesia, as it did to Iraq and other countries ". 

 

What can be concluded is that, in general, research on this topic has been conducted, and 

the majority of the respondents’ views are generally moderate. The theme of the 



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respondents’ narratives resembles that of the "polarized radical", covering topics such as, 

who is the enemy of Islam, Western products, the church, and raids. In analysing sample 

responses consistent with this radical narrative, we found that the Rohis cluster exhibited a 

relatively strong correspondence. However, note the emphasis on the vulnerable, not on 

who was born in Jakarta. This could mean that the narrative of radicalism is not one of a 

radical who is a native of Jakarta or of radicalism carried out by residents of Jakarta just 

because the conditions giving rise to radicalism began in Jakarta.  

The research shows that, generally, the narrative map of respondents in Jakarta with 

respect to violence and terrorism incline into certain groups. Most respondents do not 

indicate radical responses in their views about the state, sharia law, political system, 

violence, non-Muslim groups (the other), etc. This map shows that the narrative of 

respondents does not reflect any condition that is worrisome and shows no significant 

potential for radicalism and terrorism. 

 

Patterns of Narrative Deployment 

Theoretically, the narrative deployment of radicalism and terrorism is based on certain 

patterns. A narrative map, displayed in Table 1 (Appendix 1), does not occur in the same 

pattern. In other words, the construction of the narratives is not the same for all the 

characters and all the clusters. The spread of the radicalism and terrorism narratives are 

due to several factors with respect to patterns and mechanisms: 

1. Electronic and printed media, such as TV, radio, movies, newspapers, newsletters, 

flyers, internet, social media and others; 

2. Teaching, meeting (khalaqah), and others; 

3. Demonstration, humanitarian action and others; 

4. Interpersonal relations through family, friendship, organization; and 

5. Teaching through schools curriculum, boarding schools, and others. 

We can see five patterns and means for the deployment of radicalism and terrorism 

narratives; the easiest and most far-reaching deployment is through TV, radio, Internet and 

social media. The most difficult to control is the narrative deployed through social media 

because everyone can spread the narrative at any time and from wherever they are located. 

The deployment of radicalism and terrorism narratives is still done through the old pattern 

of halaqah, that is, through recitals by sitting in a circle and though liqa’, that is, a meeting 

to recite. In addition, the massive deployment has been accomplished through the media 

(TV, newspapers, internet, social media, etc.). The pattern of the spread of the radicalism 

and terrorism narrative which is the most difficult to control is through social media 

because everyone is capable of this type of deployment and can become easy targets of 

social media users around the world, the majority of which are the young generation. 



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In the context of the mosque, the religious narrative and political identity can be spread 

through various mediums also. Because some groups are closely related to the community 

and places of a religious nature, most of the distribution pattern is conducted traditionally. 

Here, routine activities, such as Friday sermons, weekly or monthly lectures, or other 

religious events, are important. 

For example, at Masjid Baitur Rohim, the Friday sermon is given by dozens of different 

preachers. This practice corresponds to the mosque Takmir policy that only provides each 

preacher the opportunity to deliver a sermon once a year (khatib). Khatib is more reliable 

and preferably could afford each preacher the opportunity to give a sermon twice or maybe 

three times a year. Nonetheless, for the mosque, a system in which a sermon is given once a 

week, as in other areas, is not customary.  

Thus, it is somewhat difficult to determine where and how the pattern of the narrative 

spreads. However, as explained by Mr. Sonih, a mosque Takmir, there is an evaluation 

delivered every week by the coordinator for the observance of religious duties. Sometimes, 

the congregation members themselves will contact the mosque committee by phone or 

SMS when there are some less suitable or difficult matters to discuss. Periodically, mosque 

officials gather to discuss different issues, ranging from the condition of the mosque, the 

income from donations and kencleng (charity box), the content of speech and the style of 

the preachers and propagators when delivering a lecture at the mosque. 

Kebon Jeruk Mosque, one of the historic mosques in Jakarta, has long been r ecognized as 

one of the centres reflecting the spread of the Islamic missionary Jama'ah Tabliq movement 

models. According to Ustadz Hanif, one of the activists of Jama’ah Tabliq Pondok Ranji, the 

mosque is open to anyone.  

The communication of teachings and understanding is accomplished by regular meetings in 

this mosque. There are congregants who come once a week, twice a week, or only at certain 

times. They come from all over the Greater Jakarta area (Jabodetabek) and include those 

who come from other regions in Indonesia. In addition, any group that has a strong 

commitment to the Jamaah Tablig movement will be given an opportunity to gather in 

small groups and then to do itinerant preaching—a practice called khuruj—with a well-

planned time schedule, travelling around the village, town or outside the city. When I met 

Ustadz Hanif, he claimed that he was planning a preaching tour to Papua. Several years ago, 

he had been preaching in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 

The spreading of narratives and teachings among Tablig members has been accomplished 

by calling people to worship in the mosque. The more people there are who move back to 

the mosque, the more they can spread their narrative. For that reason, Jamaah Tablig is 

called a non-political Islamic movement. Some people are interested in joining the mosque 

in this way. After joining, they usually meet with other people who are newcomers in 



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Jamaah Tablig and begin their journey in preaching. Ustadz Hanif is very happy with this 

method of spreading his teaching. Moreover, he can meet with some people who he has 

never known before, in a situation that is very friendly, warm and dignified and in a place 

of worship. Ustadz Hanif revealed that this method and pattern of spreading his teaching 

attracted a number of members of the Muslim community to join Jamaah Tablig and stated 

one other fact: former military and police officials, artists and well-known musicians, as 

well as ordinary people, are some of his congregants. Bang Sonih, who is now serving as 

chairman of mosque takmir in Bintaro, admitted that he repeatedly follows itinerant 

missionary activities together with Jamaah Tablig activists who come to his place. 

Therefore, he welcomes the members of the Jamaah Tablig to stay and to preach in his 

mosques and territory. 

At the As-Sakinah mosque, located in a residential complex in the border area of Jakarta 

and Banten, the pattern of the spread of the Islamic narrative has been one of a deployment 

conducted intensively to children and mothers. The reason for this is because gentlemen 

usually were busy serving in the office when Islamic teaching was occurring. Ustadz Anwar, 

who served there, was a young indigenous Betawi man staying in the local village. When he 

was asked from where he received his religious education, he said that he only learned 

from experience because he diligently attended the teachings of the youth in his village. 

Ustadz Anwar is a graduate of a private high school in Tangerang city but was active in 

Islamic activities in that region. 

When asked to name the preachers that regularly delivered sermons, he mentioned several 

names, and one of them was Ustadz Abu Jibril. According to him, he is a very deeply 

religious, so he and his friends like to come to Ustadz Abu Jibri’s sermons in South 

Tangerang, although his sermons are not scheduled. When recently, Ustadz Abu Jibril was 

accused of being involved with extreme Islamic groups, he shrugged. He did not know if 

Ustadz was dealing with police and other authoritative institutions because of his religious 

teachings and understandings. What he knows is that he and his friends liked his speech 

style and feel satisfied with the religious explanations given by him. 

At this point, the pattern of narrative deployment is not simple. Some are regular and 

periodic, while some are not fixed. In terms of the method, the deployment of the narrative 

is done in many ways depending on the giver and the receiver parties. 

 

Pattern of Narrative Reception  

The radicalism and terrorism narrative has not been accepted by the people of Jakarta, but 

it has not been absolutely rejected. The narrative has undergone a process of maximum 

transformation, but the acceptance of this narrative has not substantively succeeded. Based 

on a pick-test sample in Table 2, it can be seen that the pattern of narrative reception can 



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occur in the following ways: by accepting the substance of the narrative (thesis) offered by 

a radical/terrorist group; by opposing the narrative (antithesis) offered by a 

radical/terrorist group; and by improving the narrative (improver / synthesis) offered by a 

radical/terrorist group. 

Based on the findings in Table 2, a total of 62 of 96 respondents reflected attitudes that 

refused to embrace the negative narrative in the theme of radicalism and terrorism, which 

means that 64.58 percent of the respondents would act in a way that would be the 

antithesis to the narrative. The rest of the responses are divided as follows: attitudes 

accepting the narrative, 14 respondents (14.58%); accepting attitude for the narrative but 

with improvements, 5 respondents (5.20%); and taking a neutral position, while improving 

it, 15 respondents (15.62%). Based on the findings data, it can be concluded that the 

majority of the research respondents reject radicalism and terrorism. 

Even though the percentage of respondents accepting the radicalism and terrorism idea is 

14% to 19%, this does not mean that there is a potential threat in Jakarta. Because 

radicalism and terrorism activities generally are not conducted by many people, these 

concepts are not contemplated in the minds of the majority of the public. The terrorists are 

usually more of a militant, controlling minority. 

The balance between the percentage of the group who accepted the narrative and the 

group who would have improved it indicated a balanced view in the society of the activists 

and negative narratives. This means there is a socio-political tendency to stem the tide of 

radicalism and terrorism. In other words, the people of Jakarta are smart enough to see 

what is good and bad relating to life and society, despite the use of the label of religion 

(Islam) linked with terrorism as a provocative issue. 

Some sensitive narratives, for example, narratives concerning "the other" and non-

Muslims, reflect the refusal of the respondents to accept narratives that are diametrically 

opposed to their view of Islamization. This indicates that there is a religious and social 

maturity. A somewhat risky issue concerns raids against immoral places and misleading 

Islamic sects and churches. Although the church is considered a safe place that should not 

be raided, immoral places are considered as objects that deserve to be destroyed by force. 

This can be seen positively as a degree of participation by the religious communities in 

rejecting the existence of a place that is going to demoralize their moral and social order. 

Therefore, the role and presence of the government in quickly responding to the existence 

of these immoral places is important. 

The pattern of the spread and acceptance of narratives is also very closely related to the 

presented content and material. At a mosque in Bintaro, South Jakarta, a terrace board 

member of the mosque said that sometimes there is a Friday preacher or speaker with a 

rather "hard" manner of speaking. Hard here certainly does not refer to volume but rather 



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refers to the content of the speech. According to the board member, there are some 

preachers or speakers talking loudly, indiscriminately and uncompromisingly—especially 

when it is about religious teachings. If something is true, they say that is true; if wrong, they 

say that is wrong. There is no grey area in religion. During the New Order, Betawi people 

often termed such kind of speech as sedep or savory, meaning that it was pleasing, such as 

in a taste on the tongue. This type of speaker received a great deal of attention from the 

people since, in the New Order era, political openness was taboo and partly because of the 

particular communication medium, such as recitation. 

The contents and teaching materials or sermons that are considered to be quite hard are 

approved by the mosque committee because to be religious, it is important to be assertive, 

straightforward and not hypocritical. For example, having a certain attitude in issues, such 

as halal and haram, heaven and hell, is necessary. Nevertheless, the terrace board member 

was not very happy with the content of sermons or lectures that carry a political issue, or, 

moreover, that criticized other persons or parties personally. For such a preacher or 

speaker, he said he would make a note to be delivered in a meeting of the mosque board or 

to be submitted, spoken or written to the person in the section of worship who invited him. 

In this context, the type of religious ideology plays an important role in terms of to what 

extent a narrative is accepted or rejected. 

In addition to showing the pattern of the spread of the radicalism and terrorism narrative, 

we also expose the reception pattern of the radicalism and terrorism narrative. For more 

detailed information, a reception pattern of the radicalism and terrorism narrative is 

shown in Table 3 (appendix). 

The reception pattern of the radicalism and terrorism narrative is similar in all groups and in 

various clusters, as seen in the responses about the enemy of Islam discourse. All groups 

understand narratives relating to enemies of Islam because it has been already stated in the 

Koran that Jews and Christians will never willingly follow Islam unless you follow them (al 

Baqarah (2): 120). 

This is similar to the situation with respect to democracy issues, as religious leaders saw that 

indeed democracy is not compatible with Islam. The religious leaders felt that narratives 

relating to democracy had been “exaggerated”. Some groups firmly reject democracy. While 

others may accept democracy, its acceptance is not considered by people as being morally 

correct. 

 

Factors of Narrative deployment and Reception  

However, if this assumption is accurate, note that some regions or areas in Jakarta often 

become "targeted operation" zones. These areas are the strategic business centre, 

government, police, and diplomatic offices in Jakarta. Several bombings tragedies have 



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occurred in those places, such as the bombings in the Hotel Marriott, the Australian Embassy, 

and so on. 

The interesting point is that the targeting devices used in the operation were apparently 

often prepared in other areas, particularly in the outskirts of Jakarta. The Book Bomb, for 

example, was prepared by former Islamic activists who lived in Aceh Province (outside of 

Java) for years and had also lived in Ciputat. The zone targeted-operation is also spreading, 

from Serpong and Tangerang to Utan Kayu and East Jakarta. In recent years, these terrorist 

groups also have scrutinized the outskirts of Jakarta as if they were looking for a new 

"hideaway". Usually, it has been located or adjacent to the Muslim community in Jakarta and 

its neighbourhood, which is considered an ordinary neighbourhood, such as Bekasi, Bogor, 

Tangerang Selatan. Pamulang and Ciputat—which have become terrorist ambush sites 

several times—are even situated near Islamic higher education institutions. 

In this study, changes in the demographic map made us give special note to the importance of 

the peripheral areas of Jakarta. Although no specific factors have yet been found with respect 

to the strengthening of Islamism, especially radicalism and terrorism, in a suburb of Jakarta, 

or in areas bordering Jakarta, there may be a social impact or a particular psychological effect 

on the citizens who are in this region and surrounding areas. 

Radicalism and terrorism narratives have been deployed in the public curriculum. 

Unfortunately, the substance of the narrative is generally rejected because it is 

counterproductive to the community and not in accordance with Islam. How can the 

narrative spread and be accepted by 14.58% of the respondents' attitude? Several factors can 

be behind this. 

First, consider the success factors of the narrative’s dispersal. As seen in Table 2, there are six 

patterns for the spread of narration, either in a single or a collaborative way. Among the six 

patterns, the patterns of interpersonal relations are dominant. This indicates that the 

successful deployment of the narrative occurs because our society is content to socialize and 

to interact cohesively, both among citizens and within the family relationship. The strong 

public opposition and the attitude of the need for improvement of the community towards 

the radicalism narrative indicate that the people of Jakarta are not producers or constructors 

of such negative narratives that have spread to the people. The pattern of interpersonal 

relationships is the medium used to spread the secondary narrative. Therefore, it is 

important to look at the learning model (curriculum) and the patterns of the social setting as 

the media used to produce the primary narrative of radicalism and terrorism. 

Second, consider the success factors of the narrative’s reception. The spread of the narrative 

is also most often caused by the respondents’ attitudes towards accepting it. Several 

important reasons show success factors are due to not understanding Islam as a rahmatan lil' 

alamiin (peaceful) doctrine. The acceptance attitude in this study was reflected primarily in 



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the Rohis group, which in terms of education, is still on a long learning curve or, in other 

words, they are still unstable or have an incomplete and unfinished understanding of 

religion. Therefore, their attitude can be understood as a natural matter and a necessary 

protective action for them. The social setting factors, such as economic conditions, perceived 

injustices, corruption and despotic leaders, may be factors triggering a successful reception 

of the narratives.Third, consider the factors of the narratives’ rejection. It's interesting that 

the people of Jakarta have "an active antibiotic" when the radicalism and terrorism virus 

presents and infiltrates the Jakarta community. The opposition to the radicalism narrative 

generally comes from the OKP activists who have a counter-narrative based on their 

organization located in the area in which the narrative has spread. In addition, the 

internalization of nationalism spirit and awareness factor of the Indonesian Islam model is 

considered a strong influence. Similar to KAMMI and GPI. Ahmad Zainudin stated the 

following: 

"(is uncle salafi jihadis similar with GPI?) No, actually I am more open after joining the GPI. I 

used to say bid’ah (heresy) to people who had a different belief. While after joining the GPI, I 

became more tolerant in seeing a different paradigm. " 

 

The KAMMI and KNPI members have had similar experiences. Generally, they are activists 

who understand public policy. Therefore, the regulatory factors that apply to safety and law 

enforcement could also be a factor that helps them to refuse the narrative. 

The five factors influencing the deployment and acceptance of the radicalism and terrorism 

narrative are as follows: 

1. The social protests of economic and legal injustice 

2. Ideological encouragement to make changes 

3. The influence of the social environment and social association 

4. The effect of the global environment 

5. A minimal and incorrect understanding of religion 

These five factors could be driving factors in the spread and acceptance of radicalism and 

terrorism narratives. Therefore, religious leaders who are respondents of this study 

emphasize the importance of justice implementation, even justice with respect to the press. 

Fairness in the economic sector becomes a major issue in the deployment and acceptance of 

radicalism and terrorism. Other issues in deployment and acceptance include ideology 

factors, legitimacy, passion, determination and even the spirit of struggle (jihad) to correct 

injustice. Justice factors are contained in the second and fifth principles of Pancasila. 

The deployment and reception of radicalism and terrorism can be imported from areas in the 

Middle East, which continuously fuel the flames of radicalism and terrorism that are 



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responded to by those who misunderstand Islam, have a lack of education and who are poor. 

Through the media, they accept and spread the narrative of radicalism and terrorism. 

 

CONCLUSION 

Research on the narrative and the identity of politics, which we have conducted in Jakarta 

Province, has given us a wide perspective on the pattern of, and what, how and to what 

extent radicalism and terrorism have spread and been accepted in this region. Based on the 

findings in the field, the research concluded the following: 

1. The respondents of Jakarta have a diversity of narratives of radicalism and terrorism, 

but the majority of respondents have negative attitudes towards any violence and 

terrorism acts. Most of the respondents rejected the substance of the narrative offered 

by radicalism and terrorism narrative creators. 

2. This study confirms that respondents of Jakarta are not the perpetrators of radicalism 

and terrorism. There is a diverse pattern in the spread and acceptance of these 

narratives. In general, it can be said that the people have a more moderate 

understanding. There are some views that tend to be militant; their views cannot be 

separated from the context of religious life, which is conservative but not necessarily 

radical, extreme or even terroristic. 

3. Even though there are a small proportion of respondents who tend to accept the 

narrative, there is at least an ambiguous attitude towards the issue of radicalism and 

terrorism; however, the respondents’ attitudes need to be explained further, 

accompanied with a strong reason relating to their attitude of reception. This 

acceptance may be merely a part of individual piety which—according to these 

respondents— must be showed in their religion. However, in general, they exhibit 

social piety in order to realize a peaceful social life. 

4. Note that there is a pattern in the spread of radicalism and terrorism in the history of 

activism, but there are several factors that do not increase radicalism or terrorism in 

activism movements. For example, educational and organizational maturity factors 

existing in the areas in which the activists are located, as well as in the social setting in 

Jakarta, actually result in some of them being opponents of the "attack" narrative. This 

explains why the radicalism and terrorism narrative is an "imported narrative" in 

which the actors are by far the people who are culturally "strangers" or—quoting one 

respondent’s term—"the foreigners" who come from outside Jakarta. 

5. The electronic-printed media and social media have been used to spread the narrative 

of radicalism and terrorism in the midst of the Jakarta community. However, so far, the 

people of Jakarta have resisted all forms of radicalism and terrorism, which is proof 

that the perpetrators of radicalism and terrorism in Jakarta are not citizens of Jakarta. 



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However, the news spreading about the injustice in the life of the nation, including in 

Jakarta, the ambiguous treatment by the authorities of suspected terrorists, as well as 

the amount of radicalism and terrorism imported from the outside (for example, the 

Middle East), can potentially affect and change the mindset and behaviour of people of 

Jakarta from people, who actually tend to support anti-violence, anti-radicalism and 

anti-terrorism, to people who are permissive with respect to all forms of violence and 

may even result in them becoming perpetrators of radicalism and terrorism for 

implementing change. If this is allowed, there will be a rallying point (intersection) 

consistent with the themes of other radical movements, such as DII / TII, in various 

parts of Indonesia, who have their own political agenda. 

To end the acts of radicalism and terrorism, the majority of respondents state that it is 

impossible to resolve the problems of violence with violence. Thus, in this perspective, the 

"violence vis a vis violence" model is considered highly improper. For the majority of the 

respondents, violence hereditarily propagates revenge and it can actually create the seeds 

of a new radicalism and terrorism. 

 

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