DIALECTICAL ISLAMIC AND CONFUCIAN TRADITIONSWITHIN ASEAN

TO HINDER THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION

Saefur Rochmat8

Abstract

In the globalization era the clash of civilizations becomes our concern due to culture being the only

aspect of human living not affected by globalization. But all aspects of human living are substantially

related to culture for their meaning as well as the identity of certain groups differing from others. The
clash of civilization discourses was ignited by Samuel P. Huntington who perceives the unification of

Islamic Civilization and Confucian Civilization as the greatest threat to America. Inevitably the US has tried

to attract the Confucian Civilization as its ally, leaving its former allies, the ASEAN countries, with their

strong Islamic influence. However the ASEAN members have strong internal cohesion so they are able to

manage the challenge and increase their bargaining power. Then ASEAN is able to moderate the clash of

civilization.This essay tries to analye ASEAN’s success in protecting its Moslem members from the clash of

civilization, such as interventions and pre-emptive strikes imposed by the US. This is due to the ASEAN’s

model of security community which enabled dialogue amongst civilizations possible, especially Confucian

and Islamic ones. ASEAN provides the opportunity for its Moslem members to have better bargaining

power, such as in the case of Indonesia which has relatively strong power in the ASEAN to direct the

courses of the organization. As result the US’s realist approach in the form of security regime had been

modified to suit the Indonesian case. Indeed the US should develop dialogue with Moslem in formulating

terrorism policies in Indonesia n order to have effective policies that do not endanger human security.

Keywords: Dialectical, Islamic and Confucian traditions, Clash of Civilization

8Faculty of Social Sciences Yogyakarta State University. Email: Saefur_Rochmat@uny.ac.id

IJSS.Vol.12, No.2, September 2016

A. Introduction

Terror is as old a phenomenon as the

history of human beings. Terror as a means to

frighten, threaten, do violence, attack or kill

someone to create great fear is an inherent

tactic for power struggles already known long

before it was identified as terror or terrorism.

This word of terror entered political

vocabularies at the time of the French

Revolution. In the early of 19th century and in

the 20th century terror became a technique for

revolution. For example, Stalin’s regime in

1930s was often categorized as a terror

regime. In the Cold War era, terror was

related to the nuclear weapon threat

(Hardiman, 2003: 10).

Terrorism falls into political violence,

but it is not always political. Terrorism has a

political dimension and consequently it tends

to be defined subjectively. The following

phrases explain the problem that one’s

person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.

That is why it is impossible to formulate an

objective definition based on actor’s identity

or actor’s reason but on the quality of the

action. If it is based on the actor’s identity it

tends to be stigmatization; meanwhile based

on actor’s reason it tends to multi-

interpretation. From the quality of the action

we are able to measure it objectively. By doing

so the connection between the casualty and

the terrorists’ target can be cut because the

casualty whoever it is, is not a matter of

interest for them. The casualty just represents

the symbolical technique for their reasons. All

terrorist actions manifest into violence actions

or violence threats which are quite often

accompanied by explicit demands. The terror

is directed to those who are engaging in

resistance and its aim is political and its

execution is to have optimally public

attention. The actions are carried out

systematically following the principles of

political struggles (Hardiman, 2003: 11).

Based on scale of the action and its

organization we can divide terrorism into

national terrorism and international

terrorism. The national terrorism limits its

organization and its scale of action to certain

territorial states. Meanwhile international

terrorism has certain characteristics such as:

a. It is directed at foreigners and foreign
assets.

b. It is to influence a foreign
government’s policies.

c. It has global networking for preparing
global revolution which will result in
new world order (Hardiman, 2003:
12).

In the Cold War era, international terrorism

was associated with the ideology of

communism which pretends to change the

new world order according to the doctrines of

communism. Terrorists have tried to follow

the revolutionary movement of the state

model of the former USSR. They created the

communist party, besides the Bolshevik model

of the military cell to guard the revolution.

The former USSR and then the People’s

Republic of China (PRC) tried to spread and

support communism movements around the

world. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler

(2000: 307-8) argued that transnational

terrorism has fallen significantly in the post-

cold war era due to reduced state sponsorship

and the demise of many leftist groups.

After the ending of the Cold War, the

Western Blocs, especially the USA tried to

identify other subsequent threats for their

own interest. They mistrust their former

allies, theMoslems, who had fought against the

former USSR in Afghanistan. Indeed both had

reached agreement based on the fragile

foundation of their shared enemy. As a result

Saefur Rochmat: Dialectical Islamic and Confucian Traditions…

they began to fight each other just after the

enemy collapse of the USSR following the

failure of both to develop constructive

dialogues and find common interests for

cooperation. Despite an imbalance of power

the US feel threatened by the possession of

weaponry by their Moslem former allies.

The above kind of alliance based on the

realist approach is not strong enough to stop

another clash of civilizations and it is just a

matter of time. We have witnessed in modern

history the failures of this kind of alliance

between the former USSR and the Western

Bloc, and between the Western Bloc,

especially the US, and Islamic Civilization. We

will witness problems the current US alliance

with Confucian Civilization if both do not

develop dialogue amongst civilizations

considering that civilization is the only aspect

of life not transformed into globalization.

This essay tries to analyse ASEAN’s success in

protecting its Moslem members from the clash

of civilization, such as intervention and pre-

emptive strikes imposed by the US. It is due to

the ASEAN model of security community

which makes dialogue amongst civilizations

possible. ASEAN is very useful for its Moslem

members to have better bargaining power

such as in the case of Indonesia which also has

strong power in the ASEAN to direct the

courses of the organization. As result the US’s

realist approach of security regimes is

modified to suit the Indonesian case.

Indonesia tries to scrutinize the US war

policies on international terrorism in order to

have positive responses from other countries,

especially Moslem countries.

B. US Global Politics and International

Terrorism

As the US believes that the economic

globalization can not be separated from the

political order or the guarantee of security as

explained by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1995: 90), ex-

Assistant Secretary of Defence for

International Security Affairs who argued that

power politics is still relevant in the post-Cold

War era for international economic systems

resting upon international political order.

That is why the US wants to develop both

economy and military powers. Despite the end

of Cold War, it appears that the US wants to

maintain its superpower position and

consequently wants to develop its first class

military technology. Michael Mastanduno

(2003: 144) assesses its superpower status as

a hegemony that is ‘the ability to control

important international outcomes; it is

associated not just with material power but

with social purposes’. He evaluates correctly

that the US is playing a role of partial

hegemony because by the ending of the Cold

War the US, as the only superpower, is

reluctantly involved in all matters of world

affairs which do not suit well with its national

interests.

However the US had difficulties in

materializing its unilateral approach; besides

its member allies do not want to support it,

due to lack of ideological justification.

Politically, the demise of Marxism-Leninism

leaves the US without any powerful

transnational ideological competition to social

mobilization, willingness to bear high costs for

strategic rivalry, and incentives for alliance

between countries. Richard K Betts argues

correctly that ideology is an element of power

rather than just a matter of values and it can

be used to justify US hegemonic roles. The

only candidate to replace Marxism-Leninism

as a competing global ideology is radical Islam

(Betts, 1994: 42-43).

The September 11, 2001 terrorists’

attack on the World Trade Centre in New York

IJSS.Vol.12, No.2, September 2016

and the Pentagon, Washington DC is the

turning point in creating a common threat as

the justification for US unilateralism. For first

time since the dawn of the Cold War, a new

grand strategy is taking shape in Washington.

It was advanced by President Bush Jr., whose

administration most directly as a response to

terrorism, but it is also constitutes broader

views about how the US should wield power

and organize world order. Considering the US

has tried to arrange this new system of

unilateralism soon after the end of the Cold

War, it can be seen the onset of the concept of

human security. Although this concept is

offered to the United Nations, we know that

this concept can not be materialized without

the help of the US. By adopting this concept

the United Nations has justification to make

humanitarian interventions into states which

threaten human security. I agree with this

concept but it should be applied very carefully

for it risks more human security if the

intervention causes intense conflict with the

ruler, which of course has impact on society as

a whole.

Furthermore the US’s materialization

of human security has political bias, using this

concept to arrange a new world system order

which will guarantee the US security or the US

hegemonic role (Lone, 2004). Of course this

one sided interpretation of human security

endangers other parties and consequently

endangers human security which should be

materialized fairly without discriminating

political ideas. This is the case in the US

support for military regimes in Moslem

countries to take over Islamic governments,

such as in Sudan and Algeria. This

discriminating policy costs human security in

the Moslem countries and risks causing

terrorism (Wright, 2004).

The US makes use of the September 11

terrorist attack to arrange a new inter-state

relationship comparable to that of the Cold

War era. However this newly created system

is not a political bloc anymore but one system

of national and global security to counter

terrorist attacks, in which the US places itself

as the head of this new world system.

According to this new paradigm, the US is to

be less bound to its partners and to global

rules and institutions while it steps forward to

play a more unilateral and anticipatory role in

attacking terrorist threats using pre-emptive

strikes and confronting rogue states seeking

WMD. The US will use its unrivalled military

power to manage the global order (Ikkebery,

2002: 324).

September 11 terrorist attack gives

more justification for the US to intervene in

other states, especially in the Moslem

countries perceived to endanger the US’s

hegemonic role. The US makes inappropriate

responses to pursue terrorists into other

national jurisdictions and, further, tries to

overthrow the regimes considered as the

supporters of terrorist actions (Munir, 2003:

5). Afghanistan and Iraq have become

casualties to the US assuming its role of

hegemonic power. Further threats have been

directed to other Islamic countries such as

Syria and Iran, but these threats have not

materialized because the US has been facing

terrible responses from certain Iraqi people

who do not want to deal with Americans.

The political stigma of terrorism is

maintained by the US to create some

instruments for countering political Islam. The

most important instrument is law and its

apparatus to deter subversive cells and to

justify extra action by the governing regimes.

Responses to terrorism have created a new

kind of global political conflict and caused the

Saefur Rochmat: Dialectical Islamic and Confucian Traditions…

restructuring phenomenon of national

political systems in most countries. To pursue

the US ambition to arrange a global security

system has resulted in some wars as well as

authoritarian regimes which all belittle world

peace, besides the establishment of law

regulations to limit civil liberties in most

democratic regimes.

C. The US Clash of Civilization Policies

toward ASEAN

1. The Clash of Civilization

The demise of the USSR makes

globalization develop more rapidly especially

in terms of the economy (that is world

economy) and politics (that is international

nation state system), but it has not influenced

culture or civilization. We have a world

system in politics and economics but it is not a

holistic world civilization. Furthermore

unification of the world by means of

technology has created a global structure

which causes the shrinking of the globe, but it

is not followed automatically by a monolithic

world view within itself. For the above

reasons Bassam Tibi (2000: 9) argues that

globalization as structural achievement is not

followed by the globalization of civilization.

It can be inferred that world peace can

be obtained by accommodation amongst

civilizations based on equality, respect for

each other, and recognizing the existence of

the other. It is better to offer equality amongst

civilizations, as a model which is better than

hegemony by anyone (Tibi, 2000: 5). This

trend of thinking is a kind of postmodernism,

that herewith views the world as a ‘plurality

of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities’

and rejects the hegemony of modernity

(Heller and Feher, 1988: 1).

Huntington replaces Islam as the

enemy of the West, which might be true along

with human history, but we should consider

also the causes of the unrest and conflict

between these civilizations. Both fight each

other to pursue an ultimate claim of truth by

negating each other. This tendency roots in

their personal characteristics of God so that

they often fail to reach compromises

(Amstrong, 202: 264). Both develop personal

religion as opposed to impersonal religion

represented by Eastern Civilization. For them,

God’s personal actions can be manifested into

man’s actions so that man often acts in the

name of the God. On the one hand this

personal God has contributed to the Western

civilization’s formulation of liberal humanism,

but on the other hand it creates big problems

if God manifests into an idol serving our needs

or as the projector of our personal images of

limited needs, fears, and willing; and in the

name of God people often act cruelly.

Moreover, both have big potential conflicts

due to their global mission so that they will

compete with each other to serve their global

mission (religion).

The clash of civilization has become

our concern recently because civilization is

the only aspect of human living not effected by

globalization. Moreover all aspects of human

living are substantially related to culture in

order to have their meaning. Culture also has

the function of being the identity of the group,

which is different from the others (Ross, 1999:

42). It is not surprising that civilization is the

last aspect of human life to be transformed

into globalization because civilization is the

core of all aspects of human being. Indeed it is

difficult to see the domain of culture becoming

the main factor of radical development or

revolution because culture itself is

multifaceted, has no single appearance of it.

Instead, the culture becomes a framework for

such radical development of revolution.

IJSS.Vol.12, No.2, September 2016

It is not appropriate to view Islam as

the enemy because the latter is not ideology in

modern terms, like communism, which has a

means to encourage revolution. Like other

religion, Islam can be seen from multi-

dimensions such as politics and culture. Most

Moslems perceive Islam as civilization which,

within itself, develops some culture

representing an Islamic worldview.

2. The US belittles the ASEAN and favours

China

Samuel P. Huntington (1997: 185) in

his provocative book of The Clash of

Civilization and Remarking the World Order

analyzes the changing of world politics.

Considering the ending of the Cold War,

Huntington evaluates that the greatest danger

for America is the unification of Islamic

Civilization and Confucian Civilization.

Consequently the US should try to attract the

Confucian Civilization into being its ally and

leave its former allies, the ASEAN countries,

with their strong Islamic influence.

Table 1. Population of Moslem in Southeast Asia
(2000-01)

Country Population Pop. Growth Moslem
share Moslem pop.
(mil.) rate (%) of pop. (%)
(mil.)

Brunei 0.3 2.4 67
0.2
Indonesia 210.4 1.6 87
183.0
Malaysia 23.3 2.4 53
12.3
Philippines 75.6 1.9 5
3.8
Singapore 4.0 1.7 16
0.6
Thailand 60.7 0.8 4
2.4

Source: R.W. Hefner Islam and Asian Security, p. 374.

The above table shows that Moslems

constitute the majority of the population in

the original ASEAN members (202.3 of the

total population), and Islam has strong

followers amongst the non-Moslem ASEAN

members, constituting the majority in some of

their provinces. On the other hand, Islamic

countries are pluralistic societies with

relatively strong influence from the Confucian

tradition. Non-Moslems consist of 87%, 67%

and 53% in Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia

respectively, although Malaysia and Brunei

formally apply modern Islamic states, while

Indonesia as the largest Moslem country in

the world, is assumed to be neither an Islamic

nor secular state. The above socio-

geographical figures show that the Islamic and

Confucian traditions live together in peace in

Southeast Asia.

Inevitably the US is developing closer

ties with China and may be recently values as

less important its relationship with the ASEAN

countries, considering a half of the ASEAN

people are Moslems who are a majority in

Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Actually the

US policy towards Islam is not an overarching

goal and its fundamental reason is economical.

As the developed country, the USA wants to

seek the cheapest labor and the USA, of

course, finds this in China (Edgington, 2004b:

3). China becomes more attractive due to its

large market compared with ASEAN which

consists of just only one-third of this.

Moreover China has better educated people

than ASEAN as the driving forces for the

development of modern industries.

Third, it is culturally easier to reach an

agreement with the Confucian Civilization

than the Islamic Civilization. The Western

Civilization based on the Christian tradition

had long histories of fighting the Islamic

civilization in the Crusades, apart from the

fact that both came from the same root of the

Saefur Rochmat: Dialectical Islamic and Confucian Traditions…

Semite tradition. However, the theological

claims to truth fostered them as members of

the the same family fighting each other for

inheritance, instead of cooperating amongst

themselves for the common benefit in the

future. Ironically the shared personal

character of the religion causes them

difficulties in cooperation because this

personal character often does not tolerate

others claiming the truth of religion; on the

contrary, they compete with each other in

serving their global mission. That is why it is

easy for the USA to cooperate with Confucian

Civilization because the latter has, differently,

an impersonal character which tolerates and

absorbs other civilizations (Amstrong, 2002:

264).

The USA has been developing its

relationship with China since the introduction

of Ping Pong Diplomacy in 1971, and then in

1979 the US tied a formal diplomatic

relationship with China. Having experienced a

limited long relationship with China, the US

was able to make a decisive decision after the

ending of the Cold War in 1989. The US

Clinton administration, then, changed its

foreign policy to the region by developing a

closer relationship with China than that of

Japan as its major ally in the region.

However, the US changing policy

toward Japan is a more economical and long

term policy. The US wanted to develop its

economic power in China because the former

was frustrated in having a trade relationship

with Japan because of non-tariff barriers,

besides its insistence on Japan’s need to pay

more of the shared security burden as the

result of Japan’s economic recovery. After

these US short term objectives concluded,

both countries managed to build a strong

alliance because they shared common interest

in global security which will guarantee the

US’s superpower position. Its strong alliance

with Japan is very useful to deter the rising

power of China.

There were three developments which

caused the relationship between the ASEAN

and the USA to worsen. The first was in the

mid-1990s when the US promoted the agenda

of trade liberalization within APEC, but the

U.S.A., then, promoted the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) outside

APEC, which were perceived to create trade

and investment diversions from Asia. The USA

took this policy due to the rise of regionalism

in Europe which established the European

Union (EU). The second was at the time of the

Asian financial crisis: the USA and

International Monetary Fund (IMF), its tool of

international economic policy, exacerbated

the hardship of the countries hit by the crisis,

besides the fact that the US hedge funds

substantially profited from the massive selling

of Asian currencies. Last but not least came in

the wake of the terrorist attacks on September

11, 2001 which caused the US to pay little

attention to the ASEAN economies, besides the

US inclination towards unilateralism –not just

in the field of security but also in such policy

areas as trade or environment (Munakata,

2003: 9-10).

D. ASEAN’s Bargaining Power

1. ASEAN’s Efforts for Bargaining

Power

Although both the US and ASEAN have

changed their attitudes toward communism

since the end of the Cold War, but

substantially both have a different approach

to it. The US bases its foreign policy on the

realist belief that within 50 years China’s

IJSS.Vol.12, No.2, September 2016

military forces will not become a threat to the

US. Based on this stand President Clinton tied

the close relationship with China as one of the

US strategies towards Japan which, in the view

of the US, was not playing fair in their

relationship, both politically and

economically. Recently after Japan revised its

attitudes toward the US, both developed a

close relationship, as far as in security

matters, to develop technology which will

guarantee the US hegemonic power.

The US policy towards ASEAN is based

on the security regimes approach which is

defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit

principles, norms, rules, and decision-making

procedures around which actors’ expectations

converge’(Krahmann, 2003: 7). Security

regimes foster stability because states value

peace and cooperation despite the fact that

their legitimacy becomes disputable

concerning the US tendency to maximize its

hegemonic power unilaterally. Considerably

some call it the US incomplete hegemony for

its lack of concern toward world affairs

outside its national interests and for ignoring

persuasive approaches to solve the problem.

Meanwhile ASEAN attitudes toward

communism are based on the security

community approach, and the ASEAN

countries have experienced living together

peacefully despite their prevailing different

political systems. A pluralistic security

community is defined as a region of states

whose people maintain dependable

expectations of peaceful change. Security

communities are facilitated by three factors

which build upon one another: (1)

precipitating conditions, such as changes in

technology, demography, economics, the new

interpretation of social relations and external

threats; (2) factors conducive to mutual trust

and the development of a collective identity,

such as transactions, organizations and social

learning; and (3) necessary conditions, such

as mutual trust and a collective identity

(Krahmann, 2003: 8).

On other hand ASEAN tries to manage

itself to counter undesired impacts from the

development of the relationship between the

US and China. The ASEAN members have a

strong identity so that they are able to manage

the challenge. ASEAN has functioned well in:

(1) alleviation of regional conflict within

Southeast Asia; (2) economic cooperation by

fostering intra-ASEAN trade; (3) a common

foreign policy with external countries; (4)

cooperative defence arrangements

(Edgington, 2004a: 2).

For mediating the impacts of the US

clash of civilizations, ASEAN has introduced

some strategies as follows. The first was to

enlarge its membership to other Southeast

Asian countries which were previously

subordinated either to former USSR or China

namely Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In the

view of ASEAN, these states may create

instability in the region if their economic

development lags behind by diverting their

internal decline into external power seeking

because it is impossible for them to invade

China (Shambaugh, 1994: 44). From an

economic point of view, having received new

members will enlarge the ASEAN market. On

other hand, these states also want to join with

ASEAN although they have been developing

good ties with China because they just do not

want to be dependent on the regional power

of China; besides some of them have border

conflicts with the regional power.

The second was to introduce the

ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1991

in order to create the ASEAN Economic

Saefur Rochmat: Dialectical Islamic and Confucian Traditions…

Community (AEC) in 2010 as a further step of

ASEAN’s joint production (Edgington, 2004a:

3), although some argue that the introduction

of AFTA was due to the growing threat of

regional arrangements in the rest of the

world, such as NAFTA and the EU (Edgington,

2004c: 7). By doing so the ASEAN will be able

to compete with China and the US and at the

same time it becomes a way to increase its

bargaining power. ASEAN knows well that

amongst major powers in the region are

different, if not conflicting, ideas about the

security issues, so that it tries to materialize

its role in the regional political power by

managing its own power and playing the roles

as mediator amongst the major regional

powers.

Soon after its introduction of AFTA, in

1994 ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF) which has become the principal

forum for security in Asia. It draws together

23 countries which have a bearing on the

security of the Asia Pacific region (Simon,

2002: 9). Another bargaining power was

obtained in 1997 when PM Mahathir

Muhammad held the ASEAN-China meeting

(The ASEAN+1). This meeting encouraged

Japan to join based on its perception that

ASEAN is the most important partner to play

with in regional power because Japan did not

want China to assume the leadership of the

regional power. Consequently, still in the

same year, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South

Korea) was established (Naber, 2003: 120).

2. China is approaching ASEAN

In contrast to the U.S., China

paid more attention towards ASEAN due to its

proximity such that the instability in ASEAN

could influence the stability in China.

Moreover China has also political reasons to

tie agreements with ASEAN for the purpose of

bringing added security as counter strategy to

its relationship with the stronger power of the

US which may cause hazard impacts to its

sovereignty and core national interests

(Naber, 2003: 45-47). China views ASEAN as

geopolitically very important to pursue its

ambition to be regional power, so that China

becomes sensitive to the fact that its economic

development was at the cost of ASEAN which

previously enjoyed the US’s economic support.

China took careful steps to tie

up a closer relationship with ASEAN so that it

was very often that the initiatives were at first

introduced by its counterparts in ASEAN. I

think it is due to its political culture and

national historical experiences which

constitute the larger milieu in which a nation’s

specific security calculations are made. That is

why it is very important to know about these

matters in the case of China for assessing the

nature of the rising power of China as a threat

or not to the security of ASEAN. China’s most

urgent concern is national security because it

is difficult to feed its large population and to

run the country. China is most concerned to

develop its economy because it perceives

strong power as outgrowth of a strong

economy. China’s leaders take first into

account its national security, and its regional

roles develop in parallel with the level of its

economic growth (Banlaoi, 2003: 98).

For that purpose China tries to

develop its bilateral relationship with each

member of the ASEAN. China was very

sceptical of the multilateral approach, such as

ASEAN and ARF (The ASEAN Regional

Forum), because its influence will be less

sound. Just after China is able to build a good

relationship with each separate member of

the ASEAN, the former feels reluctant to join

IJSS.Vol.12, No.2, September 2016

into multilateral institutions such as the

ASEAN and ARF. Both China and the members

of ASEAN have reached agreement of the

Treaty of Conduct to solve the problems.

China has been developing close ties

with previous members of the communist

bloc, namely Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia,

besides Singapore and Malaysia, many of

whose citizens are overseas Chinese people.

The relationship between the ASEAN and

China has developed very fast, especially after

the Asian crisis starting from 1997, following

China’s commitment not to devaluate its

currency.

Furthermore following its economic

growth, China has become more active to

promote economic regionalism through its

proposal to ASEAN in November 2000 to

create ASEAN-China FTA. This trend is

evidence of China’s ability to challenge

dependency theory by developing the concept

of Greater China which develops economic

ties between Taiwan, Hong Kong and

mainland China despite political differences

(Edgington, 2004d: 1). Of course, it is due to

China’s success in opening market policy

which benefits its ASEAN neighbours. In

October 2001, China and ASEAN completed

the joint feasibility study for an FTA, and in

November 2001, both agreed to establish an

ASEAN-China FTA within ten years (Krawitz,

2002: 2). In November 2002, the Framework

Agreement on ASEAN-China Economic

Cooperation (ACEC) was signed that would

establish a free trade area by 2010 for the

older ASEAN members and 2015 for the

newer members. In order for this FTA to

sound more attractive to the ASEAN, in

October 2003, beginning with Thailand, China

started to implement the so-called early

harvest measures to eliminate tariffs on some

fruits and vegetables. Last but not least, PM

Zhu Rongji proposed five tasks for the ASEAN

Plus Three countries to implement and six

points for Sino-ASEAN cooperation (Thayer,

2002: 6-7).

E. Bargaining Power ASEAN Member of

Indonesia

I would like to scrutinize this clash of

civilization in order to measure the scale and

the extent of it. Political Islam might be

viewed by the West as an enemy in spite of its

minority adherents, however it is very

dangerous to overwhelm its threat and

consequently result in unwisely supporting

military regimes, such as the cases in Sudan

and Algeria, just to prevent political Islam

from gaining power in Moslems countries,

although it is done by election as a means of

democratic processes. It, of course, endangers

human security and peace and might be also

the cause of terrorists.

We can undermine political Islam

because it is not monolithic. Furthermore it

does not constitute military forces which

should be faced by arms forces. It is a political

issue which should be deterred by counter

issues. Political Islam also does not have a

model state such as the USSR’s perceived role

at the Cold War era. If we consider Pan-

Islamism as a political agenda, then which

state will support this utopia? ‘Islamic states’

such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait do not want

to give financial aids to this movement

because it might create instability for them.

‘Islamic states’ in the Middle East give

financial aids to other Moslem countries or to

Moslem minorities in a certain state primarily

based on religious purposes. Similarly they

promote fundamentalism, just like Christian

fundamentalism in America in the 19th

Saefur Rochmat: Dialectical Islamic and Confucian Traditions…

century, with its some negative

characteristics. The most clear feature of

Islamic fundamentalism is to apply Shari’a

(Islamic laws). Shari’a does not need an

Islamic government regime such as perceived

by Zachary Abuza (2003: 322) Shari’a can be

applied at different levels namely personal,

social, or in autonomous groups such as in the

case of the Indonesian government’s offer to

the separatist movement in Aceh.

Fundamentalist movements can be divided

into non-political fundamentalists and

political fundamentalists. Political

fundamentalists pretend to apply Shari’a at

different levels up to state level. We tolerate

political fundamentalists as long as they

pursue their goals by means of democratic

ways. We should deter political

fundamentalists manifesting into Pan-Islamic

movements such as done by Al-Qaeda and

Jamaah Islamiyah.

Mostly, Islam in Indonesia is tolerance,

moderation, and pluralism, and most Moslems

support the secular state of the Republic of

Indonesia. This mainstream Islam is

supported by the two biggest Islamic

organizations of Muhammadiyah and

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Both represent

themselves as civil society, although they have

a political interest in making sure that

Indonesia is ruled by regulations which do not

contradict the principles of Islamic doctrines.

They do not want to implement Islamic law

(Shari’a) formally.

Zachary Abuza (2003: 322) argues that

only a small minority advocates the

establishment of Islamic regimes governed by

shariah (Islamic law) and their political

activities are mainly focused on their own

domestic agenda, not as an international

threat. It is misleading to judge Shari’a

(Islamic law) as monolithic. As I have

mentioned above, we are really to focus our

biggest worry on pan-Islamism. This category

is useful for noticing the differences between

religious fundamentalism (Salafism) and

political fundamentalism (pan-Islamism).

Research done by Sidney Jones (2003) of the

International Crisis Group, claimed as the first

comprehensive analysis of Salafism, concludes

that the Salafism movements characterized by

a puritanical form of Islam, often identified

with Saudi funding, do not have any

relationship with terrorism activities.

Furthermore she says that if there is any

tendency toward violence on the part of the

religious activists, it is rooted in the ambition

to dictate, control and correct individual

behaviour, and takes the form of punitive

actions against individuals or groups regarded

as `bad Muslims` (Jones, 2003: 1).

Based on Sidney Jones’s finding, the US

should notice this division of groups to hinder

counter responses from some Moslem groups

in Indonesia. It is not appropriate to stop all

the flow of financial aids from Middle East

because these aids are very useful to develop

human resources. By doing so it will

disseminate the birth of radical Moslems who

are worried about Moslems’ converting into

Christianity as a result of the US allows the

inflow of donations by Christian missionaries.

The US’s efforts to register into United

Nation’s lists of terrorism groups all the

Islamic organizations or foundations which

receive financial aids from Middle East is

objected by most Indonesian. These Islamic

organizations do not have any relationship

with terrorism activities. For example,

Haramain foundation headed by Dr. Hidayat

Nur Wahid, head of MPR (People’s Supreme

Consultative Council). It is also the case of

IJSS.Vol.12, No.2, September 2016

LIPIA, an Indonesian branch of Imam

Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, in

which one of its graduates Ulil Abshar Abdalla

become the founder of the Liberal Islamic

Networks, in some ways the antithesis of the

Salafist movement (Jones, 2003: 8). It is due to

Indonesia culture or situation and condition

contribute to the development of intellectual

life for the Salafists.

Political fundamentalist or Salafist

jihadist are the extreme fringe of the Salafist

movement, determined to attack Western

targets in retaliation for perceived aggression

by the West, or what Indonesians more

frequently term a “Christian-Zionist

conspiracy”, against Muslims around the

world. ICG correctly argues that this radical

wing of the international salafi movement

emerged as a product of the war against the

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and it is no

coincidence that the top JI leaders are Afghan

veterans (Jones, 2003: 1).

Following US war policies on

international terrorism, Indonesia public

debates on the matter develop quite

ambivalent. The devastating bomb blast on

the Sari Nightclub in Bali, in which some 183

people were killed, was a wakeup call to

government in denial and sceptics about

terrorism in the region. The October 12, 2002

attack was Al Qaeda’s second most deadly

after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the

United States. Indonesia’s two largest Moslem

organizations urged the government of

President Megawati Sukarnoputri to crack

down on Islamic militants suspected of violent

activities. Both urged to propose even more

draconian measures. As a result some human

rights groups have warned that the new anti-

terrorist measures could be abused and mark

a return to the autocratic practices of former

President Soeharto. But more moderate

Moslem figures said these fears are overstated

(Sipress, 2002).

The government issued Acts of Lieu No

1 and 2 2002 on Criminal Crimes of

Terrorism. This acts give a great authority to

BIN (Indonesian Intelligent Bureau) to take

some measures to arrest or catch some people

identified as members of terrorist groups.

Another measure makes worried the human

rights groups is to give BIN and TNI

(Indonesian Army Forces) authority to

enforce law. Moreover these both institutions

have rights to apply pre-emptive actions to

detect an early potential threat (Sipress,

2002).

Indeed the acts give both institutions a

great authority and these acts could be used to

suppress civil liberties and could damage to

democratization process. Without effective

control to these both institutions in

materializing their function against terrorism

they might become new terror mechanisms

which create serious threat to civil societies

(Munir, 2003: 7). However up to now both

institutions are very careful to execute their

rights because the military is no more the only

political power.

Conclusion

Strict exclusion of Islamic Civilization is

very dangerous for maintaining world order

because the US can develop cooperation with

moderate Moslem to deter the spreading of

terrorism in the Islamic countries. The US

should be careful for classifying

fundamentalist of terrorist. As argued

correctly by Zachary Abuza (2003: 322) that

only a small minority of Indonesian fall into

fundamentalist which advocates the

establishment of Islamic regimes governed by

Shari’a (Islamic law) and their political

Saefur Rochmat: Dialectical Islamic and Confucian Traditions…

activities mainly focused on their own

domestic agenda, not as international threat.

Sidney Jones (2003) reaffirm that the

fundamentalist movements characterized by

puritanical form of Islam often identified with

Saudi funding do not have any relationship

with terrorism activities. If there is any

tendency toward violence on the part of the

religious activists, it is rooted in the ambition

to dictate, control and correct individual

behaviour, and takes the form of occasional

punitive actions against individuals or groups

regarded as `bad Muslims’. It is misleading to

judge fundamentalism or Shari’a (Islamic law)

as monolithic and we should notice the

differences between religious fundamentalist

(Salafism) and political fundamentalist (pan-

Islamism).

The US should develop dialogue with

Moslem in formulating terrorism policies in

Indonesia n order to have effective policies

and does not endanger human security. The

US is unwisely to enlist some organizations as

terrorist group in the United Nation lists just

because of receiving donation from the Middle

East without developing dialogues with other

countries. By means of ASEAN Indonesia has

stronger bargaining power to the US so that it

moderates the US clash of civilization

approach into Indonesia. The US revises its

policy concerning Indonesian organizations

receiving donation from the Middle East while

the US are not able to guarantee the same

donation of Christian missionaries flow into

Indonesia and become cause of terrorists

which are worried about converters.

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