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  JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH 
 

 

 

The Evolving Arctic in the World-System  

 

Zachary Lavengood 

Charles University 
lavengoodzachary@gmail.com   

 

 

 

  

Abstract 

Global climate change’s continuing effect on the Arctic has brought about a fundamental shift in the region’s 

identity as it becomes an ever more active area in the world-system. Economic opportunities such as new shipping 

routes and a bounty of natural resources that were hitherto ice-locked are becoming accessible as the pace of 

climate change quickens, garnering increasing attention from actors around the world-system. This article 

explores the new geopolitical and economic realities of the Arctic through the lens of world-system analysis by 

examining the region’s budding role in the world-economy and emerging economic opportunities, its unique core-

peripheral nature, and its potential to spark a regional hegemonic rivalry between NATO and a Sino-Russian 

partnership. This article aims introduce the evolving Arctic to world-systems studies and promote further research 

on the region using the theoretical framework. 

 

 

Keywords:  Arctic, Climate Change, Resources, Shipping 

 

ISSN: 1076-156X  |  Vol. 27  Issue 2  |   DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2021.1042   |   jwsr.pitt.edu 

 

Vol. 1 |  DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 

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Global climate change’s continuing effect on the Arctic has brought about a fundamental shift in 

the region’s identity as it becomes an ever more active area in the world-system. The economic 

opportunities which were hitherto ice-locked have now become accessible as the predicted 

warming trend in the region makes itself more apparent. The global actors who are capable of 

pursuing these opportunities and are involved in the Arctic’s regional affairs constitute the 

overwhelming majority of global military and economic power, and despite grandstanding and 

saber rattling in other theaters, the Arctic has been a model for multilateral diplomacy and 

restraint. Below the surface however, serious issues regarding globalization, economic access, 

and environmental stewardship remain unresolved which could sow the seeds for varying 

degrees of conflict in the future. This paper will analyze the Arctic using core ideas and 

terminology from world-systems studies, most especially Arctic core-periphery relations, the 

Arctic within the world-economy, and hegemonic competition in the Arctic. The author’s goal 

for this paper is to encourage further study of the Arctic using the lens of world-systems analysis 

which, with its flexible scope, is well suited to investigate the intricacies of this rapidly evolving 

region.  

Divided into sections, this paper will first define the Arctic within its physical and human 

geographic scopes in the modern world-system. Next, the paper will analyze the remote Arctic’s 

relationship with the rest of the world-system using a core-periphery model, including an 

overview of the Arctic’s growing participation in the world-economy, focusing on the Arctic’s 

two key economic outputs: natural resource extraction and shipping. Finally, the geo-politics of 

the Arctic are introduced using the lens of hegemonic rivalry and competition to analyze actors’ 

motivations and the formation of power blocs in the region. Closing the paper is a conclusion 

which presents open-ended topics for discussion within the world-systems analysis academic 

community.   

 

Defining the Arctic 

The Arctic (also referred to as the High North) straddles the top of the Geosphere and is 

geographically demarcated by the Arctic Circle which rings the planet at 66°33′N. The region 

encompasses the Arctic Ocean and is hallmarked by low year-round temperatures with short 

summers, long winters, and boreal/taiga forests which give way to tundra steppes in higher 

latitudes. Culturally, the Arctic has no set border, and dips further south into areas which 

experience many of the characteristics associated with the region such as ice-floes, midnight 

sun/polar night, and long periods of below-freezing temperatures (Medby 2017). 

Geopolitically the Arctic is defined largely by the Arctic Circle with eight actors having 

territory above 66°33′N: Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United States, 

and Denmark via Greenland. The region is populated by nearly ten million people who are 

largely concentrated in urban and coastal areas with infrastructure linkages to the south; however 

an important, yet shrinking, minority lives in remote settlements which are only accessible by 

plane or dogsled for significant portions of the year (Heleniak 2020).  



 

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The Arctic in the Twenty-First Century World-System 

The Arctic entered the twenty-first century in a state of evolution. The progressive impact of 

global climate change has become more apparent as permanent and seasonal ice cover has 

receded year by year, and what was thought of as permanently frozen land has begun to thaw. 

With this evolution comes a structural change in the Arctic’s identity, from a wasteland to an 

active theater, as the region garners increasing geopolitical and economic attention from the 

actors in the world-system. This section examines key events which highlight this structural 

change in the Arctic and their effect on the wider world-system.  

The reduction and loss of permanent and seasonal sea ice in the Arctic is doubtlessly the 

largest single contributor to the Arctic’s structural change. Summer ice levels have declined by 

over 40 percent since observations began via satellite in 1979, and current projections predict the 

complete loss of summer sea ice by 2030, with a widening ice-free season throughout the 

remainder of the century (Wang and Overland 2012). The loss of sea ice has a compounding 

nature, wherein the solar energy which is normally reflected off of the white sea ice is instead 

absorbed by the ocean which retains the energy as heat and inhibits the formation of new ice 

(Pistone, Eisenman, and Ramanthan 2014). 

This physical change in the Arctic environment is a mixed blessing for the Arctic regional-

system. Foremost, the loss of sea ice facilitates the development of the region economically, as 

access to the littoral Arctic grows with the lengthening of the shipping season along the Northern 

Sea Route (along Russia’s northern coast), the North West Passage (through the Canadian 

archipelago), and eventually along the Trans-polar Route (across the North Pole). These sea 

lanes reduce shipping journeys between East Asia and the Atlantic coasts of North America and 

Europe by thousands of kilometers as well as allow shipping firms to bypass tolls at the Suez and 

Panama Canals. This translates into millions of dollars saved in fuel and overhead costs by 

shipping firms and improved efficiency for just-in-time commerce (Hong 2018). In addition to 

full-length transits across the Arctic, destination shipping—where a vessel has one or multiple 

stops on a route to a port—has shown promising growth as isolated Arctic communities grow 

alongside natural resource projects in remote littoral areas (Lasserre 2019). An increase in 

shipping, however, is likely to exacerbate sea ice melt as black carbon emissions rise in relation 

to the rise in shipping traffic (Messner 2019). 

While the receding sea ice presents a boon for international corporations and state-level 

actors, it represents the end of traditional subsistence economics for tens of thousands of 

indigenous peoples who inhabit the Arctic (Larsen and Petrov 2020). The hunting and gathering 

cycles which developed over millennia in one of the least hospitable regions of the planet relied 

on the predictable patterns of fauna migration and ice pack movement to create a sustainable 

balance with the environment; which in turn, created a unique set of cultures and economies, 

which were highly specialized for the environment within which they existed. For many 

indigenous groups the loss of traditional economic outlets has intensified trends of migration to 

urban centers, especially among the youth who leave remote settlements for education and job 



 

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opportunities further south, creating a brain-drain that further impacts indigenous societies 

(Larsen and Huskey 2015). 

Alongside the melting ice are millions of square kilometers of permafrost which for the first 

time in human history are thawing for significant portions of the year. This new cycle of freeze-

thaw, and in some cases permanent thaw, of the permafrost has had significant impact across the 

affected areas of the Arctic. Until recently, permafrost acted as a firm foundation for 

infrastructure and buildings across the Arctic, providing similar stability to bedrock in temperate 

climates; however when thawed, the support provided by the permafrost is lost as the ground 

becomes saturated with melt water. With their structural support turned into marsh and mud, 

roads, houses, pipelines, docks, and other man-made structures begin to shift under their own 

weight and in many cases collapse or are made unusable due to damage. Similarly to sea ice, the 

thawing permafrost compounds to create runaway scenarios of environmental change. Trapped 

within the permafrost are huge stores of carbon, as much as 1600 gigatons worth, alongside 

methane and other harmful gasses; which, when freed into the atmosphere, trap heat in a 

greenhouse effect perpetuating the Arctic thaw (Welch 2019; McGuire et al. 2018). The gasses 

released during the thaw have the added danger of being extremely volatile, sparking 

unpredictable explosions which can leave craters large enough to swallow a building; the largest 

yet discovered in Siberia is nearly 50 meters wide (Wei-Haas 2020). Coping with the thawing 

permafrost adds significant costs to economic projects in the Arctic as additional building 

supports must be able to weather the freeze-thaw cycle. In addition to this, existing structures 

must either be renovated with new supports or must be abandoned, which can present substantial 

financial burdens to businesses, governments, and residents.  

 

The Arctic in the World-Economy 

Although it is entirely within the borders of non-peripheral states, the Arctic economy shares 

many characteristics with peripheral economies, such as limited infrastructure, wealth and wage 

inequality, and the domination of primary sector industries whose proceeds flow to core areas. 

As the Arctic continues to evolve due to climate change, its interactions with the wider world-

economy evolve as well. The melting ice and thawing permafrost open new opportunities for 

infrastructure, development, and resource exploitation; however, the shifting environment also 

signals the end of many traditional indigenous economic practices and disrupts the fragile 

ecosystem, which is home to the region’s diversity of living resources and wildlife.  

This section will examine the Arctic economy and its place in the wider world-economy, 

first by focusing on the region through a core-periphery lens, where similarities between the 

Arctic and peripheral regions of the world-system are compared and contrasted with each other 

and with the core regions of Arctic states. Next is an outline of two key economic sectors found 

across the region: resource extraction (hydrocarbon, mineral, and living resources), and shipping. 

This section will also consider the impact of these sectors on traditional indigenous economies, 

as well as the future of traditional indigenous economies in a rapidly changing climate.  



 

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Core-Periphery Relations of the Arctic 

The Arctic exhibits a dualistic nature in the world-economy; it is located entirely within the 

territory of core states of the Arctic NATO members and the semi-peripheral world power 

Russia, yet when examined through the lens of a regional-system it shares many characteristics 

with peripheral regions. This is largely due to two key factors which compound with one 

another: the Arctic’s remote location and its small local population. It is important to note that 

the peripheral qualities of the Arctic are not equally shared among Arctic areas; for example, the 

Scandinavian Arctic shares many more commonalities with the core than with the periphery, 

whereas the Russian and Canadian Arctic are comparatively peripheral. Three indicators of the 

Arctic’s peripheral nature are examined in this subsection: primate cities, social infrastructure, 

and the dominance of the primary industry in regional economics.  

Due to its remoteness and its economic structure which is detailed further below, the 

regional subdivisions of the Arctic are home to primate cities, meaning cities which 

disproportionately dominate their political or regional subdivision demographically, 

economically, and culturally. Using the Canadian territory of Yukon as an example, the city of 

Whitehorse, with an estimated 2021 population of  just over 33,000 dwarfs the territories next 

largest urban area, Dawson, which has a population just under 2,300 (Yukon Bureau of Statistics 

2020). Similarly, the Russian oblast of Murmansk which encompasses the Kola Peninsula is 

dominated demographically by the city of Murmansk which during the latest national census 

(2010) had a population of roughly 307,000, five times larger than the next largest city in the 

oblast, Apatity (Federal State Statistic Service 2010).  

The High North primate cities, similarly to those in peripheral areas throughout the world-

system, are not only are disproportionately populated, but are also significantly better equipped 

with social and transportation infrastructure compared to regions outside of their urban areas. As 

the distance between rural areas and these primate cities or other urbanized areas increases, the 

quality of social infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, fire and police protection, and cultural 

outlets exponentially decreases to the point of absence. In the U.S. state of Alaska, one in three 

communities has no local law enforcement, and must rely on state police to respond to 

emergencies and disputes; due to only about 14 percent of Alaskan towns and villages being 

connected to a road network response times can range from hours, to days (Hopkins 2019). 

Medical services in the Canadian Arctic, which are guaranteed by the state, drop significantly in 

quality and rise significantly in cost for the state in peripheral areas, disproportionately affecting 

indigenous communities. A study by Oosterveer and Young (2015) found that access to 

emergency medical services in the Canadian Arctic were particularly difficult due to the lack of 

infrastructure to remote communities, and that during periods of adverse weather (a common 

occurrence during Arctic winters) emergency flights to fly-in only communities might take 

between four hours and six days before conditions could allow a safe landing. While conducting 

the same study, a rural nurse was interviewed about the circumstances of medical emergencies in 

her community, on the topic of medical evacuations she was quoted “I call for a plane, let the 

emergency room in Yellowknife [primate city] know that the patient is coming, and the plane 



 

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comes and picks them up. But if you had a heart attack here, you would never survive” 

(Oosterveer and Young 2015). 

Finally, Arctic economics are a strong indicator of its peripheral nature within the world-

system and the world-economy. The region relies heavily on the primary sector for employment 

and tax revenue, with export infrastructure and related services centered in primate cities, which 

are linked to remote extraction sites with little to no inter-settlement infrastructure. Similarly to 

other peripheral areas in the world-system, the resources produced in the Arctic are exported to 

core areas for processing where they dramatically increase in value, creating a profit which 

benefits core industries while the Arctic only sees comparatively marginal returns, which largely 

remain within the ownership structure of the extraction industry. While these proceeds are 

taxed—at times heavily—the geographical realities of the Arctic, which increase the cost of 

living and doing business, translate into a smaller impact when tax revenues are spent on Arctic 

communities. The Arctic’s indigenous peoples are disproportionately affected by the negative 

consequences of the primary industry; and since large-scale extraction operations began at the 

end of the nineteenth century have seen their traditional economic structures dismantled, as they 

are pushed off of their ancestral lands and find themselves unable to compete within the 

constraints of modern capitalism.  

Below is an in-depth look at the resource extraction industries that drive the economy of the 

High North which fall into three categories: hydrocarbon extraction, mineral extraction, and 

living resources. Following this is a growing industry within the Arctic outside of the primary 

sector, shipping, which holds the potential to further expand the profitability of Arctic resource 

extraction in the future as well as increase the prominence of the Arctic within the world-system 

and the world-economy.   

 

Resource Extraction 

Resource extraction has long been a cornerstone of Arctic economics and is its primary 

contribution to the world-economy. Many of the modern settlements in the Arctic exist solely to 

support the countless oil rigs, gas fields, mining operations, lumber mills, and fisheries, which 

dot the region’s coast and interior. The receding ice and warming temperatures brought about by 

climate change have created new opportunities for extraction enterprises to expand into areas 

previously too inhospitable for profitable ventures, generating an economic boon for Arctic 

states and territories. These new opportunities come at a price however: man-made disasters such 

as oil spills, gas leaks, and mining runoff can cause irreparable damage to the delicate Arctic 

environment that is already under severe strain from climate change; overfishing by an armada of 

factory ships can leave Arctic waters and sea beds barren; and native peoples can be coerced off 

their ancestral lands in order to make way for resource development projects.  

 

Hydrocarbon Extraction. Hydrocarbons are the catalyst for a significant portion of the 

Arctic economy. The rigs and wells which extract the valuable hydrocarbons from the Earth are 

serviced by hundreds and thousands of service workers, who are in turn supported by hundreds 



 

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and thousands of workers who provide housing, consumer outlets, food, and various other 

services at remote settlements. The supplies for these remote settlements are shipped in by an 

army of truck drivers, bush pilots, and boat captains from larger Arctic population centers such 

as Anchorage, Arkhangelsk, and Yellowknife, which are better connected to the larger world-

economy. This economic ecosystem is vulnerable to a number of outside factors such as 

fluctuations in the international oil and gas market, changes to environmental regulations, the 

quality and condition of infrastructure along the supply chain, and the development of alternative 

energy sources (Gosnell 2018). 

Hydrocarbon extraction is the largest industry in the Arctic, making a considerable impact 

not only in regional economics, but it is also the largest commodity from the Arctic into the 

world-economy (Olesen 2017; Keil 2015). A 2008 United States Geological Service study 

assessed that the Arctic contains some 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and roughly 30 

percent of its undiscovered gas, much of which lies offshore and within the exclusive economic 

zone (EEZ) of Arctic littoral states (Stauffer 2008). This does not include the already well-

explored and vast onshore resources that have been worked for decades above the Arctic Circle, 

such as the shale and oil sands of North America and gas fields of Siberia (Stronski and Ng 

2018). Non-littoral states are able to access these hydrocarbon resources only with the 

cooperation of the state which has sovereignty over the territory or EEZ and must negotiate their 

entry, often involving agreements to use local labor, exchange technology, invest in 

infrastructure development, and profit sharing among other concessions, which makes entry into 

Arctic hydrocarbon extraction viable for only a small number of deep-pocketed actors primarily 

from the world-system’s core. An exception is China, which is the most proactive of the non-

littoral actors involved in hydrocarbon extraction, and has a number of high-value investments 

and projects above the Arctic Circle. The most productive and prestigious of these investments 

are in Russia as part of the Polar Silk Road project, such as the multi-billion dollar Yamal LNG 

project; however China also has significant holdings in American and Canadian ventures, such as 

the future Alaska LNG project (via Sinopec Group, Bank of China, and CIC capitol) and Long 

Run Exploration’s Alberta hydrocarbon production (via Sinoenergy) (Passut 2018; Dutta 2016; 

Hong 2018). China views these ventures as a necessary diversification of energy sourcing to 

safeguard the flow of energy to its demanding economy, which could be disrupted in times of 

geopolitical crisis (Lajeunesse 2018; Weidacher Hsiung 2016; Kröger 2019). 

The profitable exploitation of the Arctic’s gas and oil reserves, especially those which lay 

offshore in newly ice-free areas, faces a number of challenges both from the Arctic’s 

characteristic environment, and from economic considerations. For one, the extraction and 

support equipment necessary for hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic is extremely expensive 

compared to the conventional rigs and wells at work in other hydrocarbon producing regions, 

such as the Gulf of Mexico or the Arab Peninsula. This is due to the harsh climate in which they 

must work: persistent sub-zero temperatures for much of the year, impacts from ice flows, and 

poor foundation conditions from the permafrost and the ocean’s freeze-thaw cycle which can 

cripple all but the most specialized machinery. Second, as described earlier, long supply chains 



 

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and limited transportation options require extraction operations to pay extraordinary fees in order 

to keep downtime to a minimum. Third, the international oil and gas market is currently in a 

down-trend due to renewable energy developments and advances in shale and fracking 

technology, causing low market prices; making many Arctic projects, particularly offshore 

drilling, a high-risk investment with the potential of little to no return under current production 

conditions. Finally, political developments, mainly concerning environmental stewardship, have 

caused a backlash against the “drill baby, drill” mindset, prompting politicians in many littoral 

states to limit the development of extraction operations. 

 

Mineral Resources. Similar to hydrocarbons, the mineral resources of the Arctic are located 

exclusively in the territory of Arctic states, decreasing the likelihood of direct conflict over 

extraction rights. Also similar to hydrocarbon extraction are the communities and supply chains 

that exist only to support the mining of mineral resources, creating a delicate economic 

ecosystem which can see the closing of just one mine reverberate throughout a 

disproportionately large area. Currently the global price for minerals remains low, dampening the 

intensity of development; a spike in prices or the discovery of a valuable lode of rare-earth 

minerals, however, could significantly increase activity in the sector (Olesen 2017). 

During this market lull, China has been proactive, buying up the rights to existing mines 

and related real-estate in anticipation of more profitable times and to secure a diverse portfolio of 

available resources. This is most visibly taking place in Greenland, where the global giant’s 

weight is met with both adulation of a forthcoming economic boom, and a fear of straining 

already worn relations between the Greenlandic native government and their benefactors in 

Denmark (Bislev, Gad, and Zeuthen 2018). Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and Chinese 

private enterprises align themselves with the policies and interests of the central government 

when developing their investment strategies in order to obtain financing from state banks and 

support from Beijing, giving them an advantage over competitors and inviting criticism from 

other Arctic actors of secret geostrategic agendas (Jiang 2018). 

The United States has mined its Alaskan territory for well over 100 years, with mineral 

extraction making up an important portion of the Alaskan economy. A study by the McDowell 

Group found that in 2016 mining exports represented 35 percent of the total exports from the 

state, a value of some $1.5 billion (McDowell Group 2018). The same study found that payments 

to the state of Alaska (via taxes, licenses, etc.) totaled $109 million dollars in 2017, not including 

an additional $34 million paid to local governments. This income is vital for the budget of a state 

with a comparatively small population and immense geographic size. As with the state’s oil and 

gas industry, increasing concerns about the environmental impact of mining (especially open-pit 

mining) has created hurdles of red tape which mining enterprises must jump in order to receive a 

license. The Trump administration, as with other Republican administrations, vowed to simplify 

the process to create more growth in the sector as well as open hundreds of thousands of 

protected acres to mining tenders (Rosen J. 2017; DeMarban 2020). Conversely, the Biden 

administration, which came to office in 2021, began efforts to overturn many elements of the 



 

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Trump administration’s resource development agenda within its first 100 days. It remains to be 

seen how committed the Biden administration will be to Arctic stewardship and the effect his 

resource policies will have on the Alaskan economy (Hanlon 2021). 

Alaska’s native peoples have begun to more effectively organize to dispute potential mining 

operations that adversely affect their traditional economics. Tribal governments have brought 

forth a number of lawsuits in which they claim that the environmental impact from current and 

proposed mining operations disrupt their livelihoods by poisoning water supplies and damaging 

fisheries, among other grievances (Kauffman 2019; Rosen Y. 2019). Despite some legal 

victories, it remains a “David and Goliath” struggle, as small tribal communities litigate against 

multi-billion dollar extraction firms who not only command more monetary resources, but often 

have non-tribal public opinion in their favor, as the prospect of new extraction projects promise 

to bring jobs and economic opportunity to remote areas.  

 

Living Resources. The Arctic’s remote location, harsh environment, and historically small 

population allowed its living resources to remain relatively undisturbed outside of subsistence 

harvesting and small-scale export operations until the late nineteenth century, when advances in 

transportation and refrigeration created viable opportunities for profit. Since that time, the 

exploitation of living resources in the Arctic has undergone a series of industrializations leading 

to the present day’s factory fishing vessels, high-output lumber mills, and other hallmarks of 

modern living resource exploitation. This has affected not only the species harvested but also the 

indigenous peoples of the Arctic, whose livelihoods which have centered on the stability and 

availability of various living resources for millennia is now in question. The three primary living 

resources in the Arctic are marine living resources (primarily fish), timber, and reindeer.  

Beginning with marine living resources in the Arctic, fish, seal, whales, and other ocean life 

have been harvested by indigenous communities for millennia and had been, until recently, 

largely protected from industrial fishing above the Arctic Circle by ice cover which made large 

scale operations unprofitable (Fernandez et al. 2016). Now however the changing climate has 

created an ice-free season, which opens new fishing grounds to fleets of factory ships able to 

catch and process more fish in one season than a traditional fishing community might be able to 

in a lifetime. Coupled with a predicted migration of fish stocks to higher latitudes due to 

warming waters further south, this emerging resource has the potential to create conflict between 

proponents of ideological conservation and reality of increasing global food demands (Wegge 

2015).  

For the time being, the voices of conservation have bested the lobbying efforts of the $130 

billion a year fishing industry looking to open new fishing grounds in the High North. A 2018 

agreement between the Arctic littoral states, the European Union, China, Japan, and South 

Korea, banned fishing in the Arctic until 2034 while a battery of studies are carried out to better 

understand the region’s delicate ecology and the impact industrial fishing might have on the 

region (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2018; Sevunts 2018). Whether 

the parties involved will agree on the findings and suggestions from these studies is unclear, as 



 

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each has their own particular idea of conservation and conscientious resource management. As 

the world-system’s population continues to grow exponentially, the demand for seafood will 

increase as well, and increasing pressure will be placed on governments to open the Arctic to 

fishing as stocks elsewhere shrink due to warming sea temperatures and overfishing.  

Similarly to marine living resources in the Arctic, timber harvesting in the High North is 

being shaped by the forces of climate change and concerns over environmental stewardship. The 

boreal forests which form a belt around the Arctic from roughly 50° to 60°N latitude provide the 

raw materials used in wood industries around the world-system and comprise roughly 17 percent 

of the global wood harvest (International Union of Forest Research Organizations 2012). Though 

the timber industry employs considerably fewer people than the hydrocarbon and marine living 

resource extraction industries, it plays an important part of many local economies within the 

Arctic, due to the long supply chains which reach out to and support remote logging camps, 

similar to the supply chains seen in the hydrocarbon and mineral extraction industry (Marcille et 

al. 2015). 

The global timber industry is undergoing a number of changes as demands and supplies 

shift with advances in harvesting, processing, and by-product recycling technology. In the boreal 

forests of the Arctic this takes the form of improved forest management techniques which lower 

the environmental impact of timber harvesting compared to traditional clear-cutting methods, 

and an increasing diversification in the use of by-products from the harvesting and forest 

management processes (International Union of Forest Research Organizations 2012). One such 

use of timber by-products is an increasing interest in the creation of pellet biofuels for heating 

and power generation, especially in Nordic countries which are currently able to use these 

biofuels in combined heat and power (CHP) plants which have a high energy efficiency of 

between 90-95 percent (International Renewable Energy Agency 2019). 

The health of the region’s forests has been heavily affected by factors that can be directly 

attributed to climate change. Perhaps the most obvious of these factors is the shift in growing 

seasons and freeze-thaw cycles to which the regions flora has been unable to adapt. As well, the 

changing climate in the Arctic has produced drier weather patterns; which, in conjunction with 

shorter periods of snow cover, have created ideal conditions for wildfires that are able to clear 

hundreds of thousands of acres of timberland in a season (NOAA 2020). Warmer summer 

temperatures and milder winters have also allowed the population of various wood-pests and 

fungi to explode in and extend their range further north than has historically been possible. One 

such pest found in Alaska, the spruce beetle (Dendroctonus rufipennis), whose populations had 

previously been kept in check by the freeze-thaw cycle has increased its range northward by 63 

miles (101 kilometers) between 2018 and 2020, leaving in its wake an uncountable number of 

dead standing trees (Syrotchen and Stehn 2020).  

Finally, reindeer husbandry remains an important industry in the Eurasian High North, 

where it is practiced by semi-nomadic indigenous groups who migrate with their herds across the 

region with the changing seasons. The right to practice reindeer husbandry is legally exclusive in 

many areas to these indigenous groups, and despite only a fraction of the indigenous populations 



 

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practicing reindeer husbandry it remains an integral part of their culture (Torp 2013). Reindeer 

are raised for their meat, hides, antlers, and other products, as well as used as beasts of burden in 

a number of different tasks in the semi-nomadic life of indigenous peoples. In 2014, the reindeer 

industry, including production, processing, and a budding tourism sector, is estimated to have 

contributed 1.3 billion euros to the economies of Sweden and Finland, and employed some 

15,000 people (Finnish Reindeer Herders' Association 2014).  

Due to the seasonal and nomadic nature of reindeer husbandry, its practitioners face 

growing difficulties in an Arctic evolving from climate change. The traditional routes and 

pastures that have been used for thousands of years in predictable seasonal cycles are now in flux 

as changing weather patterns affect the freeze-thaw cycle of the High North, jeopardizing calving 

success and slaughter income. As herders adjust to the changing environment they face 

additional issues, including encroaching urban and industrial areas which can lead to less 

pastureland and legal challenges to their centuries old right to free migration with their herds 

(Hovelsrud et al. 2012; Sapmi 2018; Torp 2013). 

The living resources in the Arctic have the least potential to spark inter-actor conflict in the 

region out of all of the natural resources that have been mentioned. The fish stocks presently in 

the region and those which are expected to migrate north in the future exist primarily within the 

EEZ of Arctic littoral states. These states have shown that ecological conservation is an 

important factor in their collective stewardship and, along with forging multilateral moratoriums 

on fishing, have also implemented bans on fishing individually within their own EEZs (Nilsson 

2018). Similarly, logging and reindeer husbandry are practiced largely without crossing national 

boundaries; and when boundaries are crossed, such as during reindeer herd migrations, there is 

often legal precedent and ample regulation to avoid contention outside of isolated incidents. 

Points of contention do however have a possibility of rising in the future between the Arctic 

littoral stewards and the non-Arctic states whose food security will be put into jeopardy as 

traditional fishing grounds are depleted from the ongoing exponential growth in the global 

population as well as future fish migration. Illegal fishing activity is likely to, at least in the short 

term of this scenario, increase before littoral states become more adept at policing such activity 

in the region (Gosnell 2018). 

 

Arctic Shipping 

The modern world-economy relies on global maritime shipping to move goods quickly and 

cheaply from manufactory to market, often from one side of the planet to the other. Navigable 

and efficient sea routes linking the North Atlantic and Asia that can bypass the costly Suez and 

Panama canals, and avoid pirate havens such as the Malacca Straits and the Horn of Africa have 

become a long-sought reality due to climate change. Three routes have opened with the receding 

ice: the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which crosses over the Eurasian Arctic; the North West 

Passage (NWP), which passes through the American and Canadian Arctic; and the Transpolar 

Sea Route (TSR), which crosses the North Pole and exits between Greenland and Eurasia. Each 

route has advantages and disadvantages which shipping firms must weigh accordingly, such as 



 

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length of shipping season, development of search-and-rescue (SAR) infrastructure and ice-

breaking capabilities, and the territorial claims of littoral states, among other considerations 

when planning shipping routes in the High North. Below is an outline of the strengths and 

weaknesses of each Arctic sea route, as well as a brief examination of the Bering Strait’s 

importance in Arctic shipping. 

 

Bering Strait. All three routes pass through the Bering Strait, which separates Eurasia and 

North America and links the Pacific Ocean to the Arctic Ocean. This natural choke point is 

roughly 85 kilometers wide and is split territorially between the United States and Russia at the 

Diomede Islands which themselves are separated by less than 5 kilometers. Currently, the strait 

is navigable for over half of the year beginning in mid-June, with accessibility diminishing in the 

late-Autumn months. During the winter months, an ice-pack averaging a meter and a half in 

thickness and severe, unpredictable weather limits accessibility to only the most hardy of vessels, 

making commercial traffic impossible (Chief of Naval Operations 2014). Geo-strategically, the 

strait has the capacity to halt east-west sea traffic passing through the Arctic, though this is 

unlikely to happen outside of a period of significant conflict within the world-system. The 

strait’s status under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows 

vessels “the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded” (United Nations UNCLOS, 

1982 Part III). This freedom of navigation is presently a non-issue as Russia is a party to the 

convention and the United States, though a non-signatory to UNCLOS, has been a long-standing 

proponent of navigation rights. 

 

Northern Sea Route. The NSR is the most navigable and well-developed of the three Arctic 

passages and is the most trafficked by a significant margin, with over 1,000 permissions for 

navigation granted in 2020 by the Russian Northern Sea Route Administration (Olesen 2017; 

Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation 2020). Situated over the top of the Eurasian 

landmass, it offers the shortest route from manufactories in East Asia to markets in Western 

Europe, reducing the traditional journey via the Panama Canal or Suez Canal by thousands of 

kilometers, and saving roughly two weeks’ worth of overhead costs and shipping time (Hong 

2018). Currently, the NSR has the longest shipping season, spanning from late spring/early 

summer to the beginning of October, and the best coverage of support vessels and SAR 

capabilities (Melia, Haines, and Hawkins 2016). The waters of the NSR are overwhelmingly 

controlled by one Arctic actor, Russia, who views the opening sea lanes as paramount to its 

economic future (Schulze 2017). The NSR not only facilitates the shipment of hydrocarbons 

from the oil and gas fields in the far Siberian north, but also stands to provide the Russian 

government with a boon of transit license fees and service charges from shipping firms. However 

due to economic troubles in Russia over the last decade, there has been a shortage of domestic 

capital to develop the region, forcing Moscow to look internationally for investors (Roseth 

2014). 



 

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China has provided much of this international investment, buying stakes in hydrocarbon 

extraction ventures, funding infrastructure projects, and improving the region’s 

telecommunication capabilities (Lukin 2020). These investments are a part of the “Polar Silk 

Road,” a branch of the larger Belt and Road Initiative, which China revealed in their 2018 Arctic 

strategy (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China 2018). The 

Polar Silk Road will be an important link from the resource rich Arctic to the energy demanding 

economies of East Asia, as well as an alternate route for goods to and from European markets 

which is able to avoid traditional choke points such as the Malacca Straits that could be made 

inaccessible in more hostile geo-political climates (Stronski and Ng 2018). COSCO, the largest 

state-owned shipping enterprise in China, increases their usage and interest in the NSR year-

over-year. In a company sponsored study, 14 trips on the NSR had saved a total of 220 days of 

shipping time, 6,948 tons of fuel, and $9.36 million USD worth of costs compared to using 

traditional routes (Sun 2018).  

Russia perceives and treats the NSR as internal waters, while other actors, most vocally the 

United States and the European Union, insist it is an international waterway per UNCLOS, and 

question the legality of fees and regulations imposed by Russia (Congressional Research Service 

2021). China meanwhile has shown itself willing to accept Russia’s claims, keeping in-step with 

assertions it has made on similar issues regarding navigation rights closer to its shores and 

ensuring that its relationship with Moscow and the billions of dollars it has invested in the Arctic 

remain stable (Olesen 2017). 

 

North West Passage. The once mythical NWP, sought after by the likes of Henry Hudson 

and William Baffin, has become a reality with climate change and receding ice. It crosses the 

American Arctic over Alaska before proceeding through a maze of islands in the Canadian 

Archipelago and exiting between Baffin Island and Greenland, making the NWP a more intricate 

route to navigate than the NSR as well as a slightly longer journey to European ports. The route 

is best suited for shipping between North East Asia and the North Western Atlantic coast along 

the upper American and Canadian seaboards; however a study by (Melia et al. 2016) showed that 

savings in time and distance by using the NWP versus the Panama Canal were relatively modest, 

and the volume of shipping was likely to continue using the Panama Canal route, assuming 

efficient passage and short queues through the Canal. The NWP also has a shorter shipping 

season on average than the NSR by roughly one month; though as climate change intensifies, the 

route’s period of open water navigability will extend to longer periods throughout the late 

summer and early autumn months.   

The NWP has not received the same level of development as has the NSR. Environmental 

concerns over resource extraction projects, its distance from major population centers, the rights 

of native peoples over their ancestral lands, and budgetary concerns have all slowed down efforts 

to improve infrastructure along the route by the United States and Canada. Signs however point 

towards a renewed interested in the route by both powers as they see the potential that the NWP 

has as both a subject of national security planning and for their respective economies as climate 



 

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change makes the route, and the North American Arctic as a whole, more accessible. Future 

development projects will focus on SAR capabilities, disaster response (especially related to oil 

spills), and enhancing law enforcement cooperation between the United States and Canada 

(Lajeunesse, 2018; Lackenbauer and Huebert 2015). 

Like the NSR, the NWP’s status as either internal waters or an international strait is 

controversial, and is an area where the United States and Canada, normally close partners on 

Arctic policy, diverge in their approach to the Arctic. The United States, in conjunction with 

states who conduct a large amount of international maritime shipping, assert that the NWP is an 

international strait according to Article 38 of UNCLOS, which would limit Canadian sovereignty 

over the route and open it to international regulation. Canada by contrast claims that the waters 

of the Canadian Archipelago have historically been internal waters and are exempt from the 

enforcement of Article 38 by Article 8(2), which covers pre-existing claims (U.S. Department of 

Defense 2016). Though the dispute over navigation rights between the close partners is not likely 

to spark conflict, it does have the possibility to cause disruptions in the future between the two as 

traffic on the NWP increases (Lajeunesse 2018; Schulze 2017; James and James 2014). 

 

Trans-polar Route. The TSR is currently the least accessible route of the three. The polar 

region at the global axis is still locked in ice for much of the year and is normally only navigable 

by large ice-breakers. Summer ice levels however have declined by over 40 percent since 

observations began via satellite in 1979, and are continuing to recede, allowing for more 

ambitious voyages yearly with “ice-free” summers forecasted to begin as soon as 2030.  The 

route is particularly appealing to shipping enterprises as it is the fastest route from Asia to 

Europe and is able to avoid most territorial waters and regulations (Hong 2018). Although the 

TSR has enormous potential to revolutionize shipping when the waters clear of ice, the route will 

still pose many challenges to shippers, including snap changes in weather, multi-lateral action by 

the Arctic littoral states to turn the region into a protective reserve, and unpredictable shipping 

seasons (Melia et al. 2016). 

 

Hegemonic Rivalry in the Arctic: The Formation of Competing Power Blocs 

The Arctic is exemplary in the modern world-system for its multi-lateral approach to peaceful 

governance and collective stewardship. Dubbed “Arctic exceptionalism,” the region has been 

conflict-free since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s; with Arctic states resolving points 

of contention through diplomatic means rather than through forceful coercion, such as the 2010 

treaty between Norway and Russia that successfully delineated the two states’ respective EEZs 

in the Barents and Arctic Seas (Øystein 2011; Käpylä and Mikkola 2015). This precedence of 

cooperation is best demonstrated by the Arctic Council, the premier body of governance in the 

High North. Since its founding in 1996, it has been the forum for Arctic states to negotiate and 

promote Arctic interests, focusing on issues surrounding environmental stewardship, economic 

development, joint SAR readiness, and scientific cooperation, among other pertinent issues. 



 

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Importantly, however, the Arctic Council does not address security issues as is explicitly 

mentioned in its founding document, the Ottawa Declaration (Arctic Council 1996). This has 

allowed the council to function normally and carry out its stated mission without becoming 

mired in non-Arctic affairs; for example, during periods of Russian aggression in the Caucasus 

and U.S. interventions in the Middle East, which have disrupted the functioning of other 

international bodies. However under the surface is a growing unease, as the Arctic becomes more 

accessible due to climate change (Congressional Research Service 2021). This new accessibility 

has brought other actors from the world-system into the region who seek to stake out their own 

share of the Arctic bounty, most importantly China.  

China’s interest in the Arctic stems from two intertwined existential realities: its reliance on 

inexpensive raw materials and fuel to perpetuate its export-oriented economics, and its 

dependence on just-in-time supply chains that pass through multiple choke-points (Hong 2018). 

This has prompted Beijing to increase its political and economic capital in the Arctic where it 

perceives investments in extraction projects and the NSR as alleviations to vulnerabilities 

elsewhere. Labeling itself a “near-Arctic” state, China asserts that the Arctic should be open to 

international development from actors throughout the world-system, rather than strictly at the 

pleasure of Arctic states; and as a near-Arctic state, it, along with other non-Arctic actors, should 

be included in Arctic governance processes (Grieger 2018). 

Due to tensions triggered by its rapid political and economic growth elsewhere in the world-

system, China has turned to Russia to facilitate its Arctic ambitions, which in turn is largely 

isolated economically due to international sanctions for its military actions against Georgia and 

Ukraine, and is unable to finance many of its own projects in the High North (Pezard 2018). In 

return for Arctic access, China has heavily invested in the build-up of Russia’s Arctic region’s 

infrastructure, and is a significant stakeholder in several high-profile Russian extraction projects, 

most prominent of which is the Yamal LNG project which has 30 percent Chinese ownership 

through the National Petroleum Corporation and the Silk Road Fund, in addition to covering 

two-thirds of the project’s external lending needs (Stronski and Ng 2018). Chinese investments 

in the Arctic have allowed Russia to shift resources into rebuilding and refurbishing several 

Soviet-era military bases in the Arctic and construct new outposts that dualistically serve as 

bases for SAR along the NSR, as well as a projection of military power into the High North 

(Forsythe 2018).  

The establishment and refurbishment of remote Russian outposts in the Arctic, such as the 

air bases at Nagurskoye, Temp, and Sredny Ostrov, point to a revitalization and possible 

expansion of the “bastion concept” defense used by the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. 

This concept was meant to ensure Soviet access to the North Atlantic and protect access to the 

Northern Fleet's headquarters on the Kola Peninsula, and was a balancing strategy to NATO's 

naval superiority (Osthagen 2021). As the Arctic evolves and melting ice increases access to the 

region, these outposts, dubbed an “Arc of Steel” by U.S. Navy Admiral Mark Ferguson, will 

provide A2/AD coverage for Russian forces and interests in the theater; securing not only the 



 

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NSR and hydrocarbon projects, but also provide staging grounds for power projection (Franiok 

2020; Garamone 2015).  

Despite the increase in cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic, potential 

fracture points exist which warrant attention. At the center of these issues is the growing 

disparity in global power between China, a rising power, and Russia, which has seen its power 

fluctuate since the 1990s (Guo and Wilson 2020). Most pressing of these issues is an increasing 

reliance by Russia on Chinese funds for its economic development in the Arctic, and potentially 

losing aspects of its sovereignty to Chinese economic power; this presents itself most vividly 

along the NSR which Russia sees as key for its rejuvenation as a world leader in the twenty-first 

century (Kobzeva 2020). While both powers presently consider continued strategic cooperation 

fruitful, their mutual drive for supremacy on the global stage, a “Chinese Century” and nostalgia 

for Cold War superpower status, are mutually exclusive. 

The synergy of Russian might and Chinese money in the Arctic, and a gradual move 

towards policy alignment in key areas indicate the formation of a power bloc in the High North, 

wherein both powers work in conjunction to fulfill geopolitical goals that would be unattainable 

otherwise. This mimics other developments in the world-system where China and Russia find 

themselves as partners of necessity due to diplomatic and economic isolation. As climate change 

continues to reshape the Arctic, this budding bloc will increasingly find its interests opposed by 

another, well-established power bloc: NATO.  

Originally designed as a deterrent against Soviet aggression and influence during the Cold 

War, NATO has evolved beyond its original purpose into an organization, which, in its own 

words, focuses on “utilizing collective defense, managing crisis situations and encouraging 

cooperative security” (NATO 2018). In the Arctic, all but one of the littoral states are NATO 

members, and five out of the eight votes on the Arctic Council are chaired by NATO members. 

As well, the two non-littoral states Sweden and Finland are closely aligned to NATO, 

strategically and diplomatically both on the Arctic Council and on the global stage. While it 

would appear at face value that a comparison of NATO and the Sino-Russian partnership would 

be asymmetrical in favor of NATO, as outlined below, the two blocs for the time being maintain 

a strategic equilibrium.  

The multiplicity of different policies, strategies, and viewpoints on the Arctic is the largest 

single factor preventing NATO from establishing a collective hegemony over regional affairs. 

While members remain steadfast on collective security as enshrined by Article 5 of the NATO 

treaty, there is disunity on Arctic strategy in respect to individual actors. This is exemplified by 

the individual Arctic policies and regional actions taken by two of NATO’s Arctic members: 

Canada and Norway. Their attitudes exist on a spectrum spanning from Canada’s prioritization 

of sovereignty to Norway’s efforts to promote regional security collaboration (Lackenbauer and 

Huebert 2015; James and James 2014; Coffey and Kochis 2018).  

Canada is NATO’s largest Arctic member with extensive territories in the far north and 

control over the majority of the NWP, which runs through the Canadian Archipelago. Canada is 

concerned that a larger role from NATO in the Arctic would increase the influence of non-Arctic 



 

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states in the region, possibly putting aspects of Canadian sovereignty in jeopardy (James and 

James 2014). Even bi-lateral security arrangements in the Arctic with the United States, 

Canada’s closest ally politically and physically, have proved unpopular with the Canadian 

electorate, especially those in the Far North (Lackenbauer and Huebert 2015). It remains to be 

seen how Ottawa’s position will be affected by the pace of sea ice melt in the Canadian Arctic. It 

is possible that with the predicted increase in traffic along the NWP that Canada will be forced to 

accept outside assistance in policing the route and surrounding areas at the sacrifice of its policy 

of exclusivity in the region, as its own coast guard and navy struggle to compensate for the 

increased area of responsibility. This move would be welcomed by NATO allies, especially the 

United States, who has indicated that it is interested in pursuing holistic security options with 

Canada in the Arctic (Forsythe 2018). When coupled with an increasing trend among Canadians 

to favor social spending over defense spending, the likelihood of a shift in Canada’s dogmatic 

interpretation of sovereignty in the Arctic increases, bringing about a mindset which could be 

more accepting of sharing the burden of securing its vast Arctic territory.  

The largest proponent of increased NATO action in the Arctic is Norway, a country that is 

not only a littoral state, but also shares a land border with Russia (U.S. Department of Defense 

2016). Norway’s Arctic forms a more integral part of its national economy than the Arctic 

territory of any other NATO member. One third of all Norwegian land lies above the Arctic 

circle, and with it 10 percent of the national population (roughly 500,000 inhabitants, more than 

all of the Arctic territory of all other NATO members combined), as well as many of the 

hydrocarbon, mineral, and living resources that have made Norway’s economy one of the most 

prosperous in the world. Concerns have risen in Norway over Russia’s military build-up in the 

Arctic, especially on the Kola Peninsula where the Russian Northern Fleet is based and where 

the two share their land border.  Despite comments from the Norwegian Defense Ministry 

downplaying the threat that Russia poses, Norway has worked to strengthen its position in the 

Arctic militarily. Measures include the stationing of 1,500 British and American troops in the 

North, increasing the national defense budget by 7.3 percent (4 billion NOK, over 450 million 

USD), and reinvesting in defensive infrastructure in Finnmark (Snow 2018; Watts 2019).  

An area where policy unity remains is in adherence to the collective defense spelled out in 

Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty. As the Arctic’s strategic importance grows, so does the 

attention it receives from NATO command. The alliance’s presence in the Arctic waned after the 

end of the Cold War and only began to receive renewed interest after an increase in military 

activity from Russia in the late 2000s. In 2018, this renewed interest culminated in the largest 

NATO exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Named “Trident Juncture,” the two week 

exercise tested the readiness of NATO forces to respond to aggression in the Arctic with mock 

air, naval, and land operations staged in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, the latter two being 

active members of NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” program. Taking part in the exercise, which 

NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg called “ambitious and demanding,” were some 50,000 

personnel, 10,000 land vehicles, 65 naval vessels, and 250 aircraft from 31 participating 

countries (Jozwiak 2018). A resounding success, Trident Juncture served not only to bolster the 



 

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cohesiveness of NATO members in combat scenarios and test new strategies and equipment, but 

it also showed the effectiveness of NATO to outside actors, namely Russia, who have been 

conducting large scale military exercises aimed at the West over the past decade (Garamone 

2019). Despite the grand show of force during Trident Juncture and its successes, an enduring 

problem for NATO in the Arctic is a lack of manpower and specialized equipment permanently 

stationed in the theater compared to Russia (Congressional Research Service 2021).   

In the coming years NATO will be pressured to formulate a common position on the Arctic 

by a rapidly changing physical and political environment. Increases in traffic along Arctic 

maritime routes will put pressure on the alliance’s naval capabilities to police previously 

inaccessible areas, which might be relieved only at the expense of dogmatic sovereignty. Saber 

rattling by a historical rival who is encouraged by its domineering position in the theater will 

need to be answered resolutely by all allies, not just those who are in immediate physical 

uncertainty. These issues can be met head-on through compromise within the organization, 

through risk-sharing, and a through a continued reliance on multi-lateral cooperation overcoming 

common obstacles. 

 

Conclusion 

The Arctic has begun an irreversible evolution from a frozen, inaccessible wasteland to a theater 

of growing geopolitical and economic importance within the world-system. The small number of 

actors with influence over Arctic regional affairs maintain the bulk of global military and 

economic power, and include the previous hegemonic rivals the United States and Russia, as 

well as the rising global power, China. At stake in the Arctic are a wealth of natural resources 

such as hydrocarbons, fish, and minerals, and access to shipping lanes that could present a boon 

to destination shipping and just-in-time international trade. Though multilateralism and 

diplomacy have thus far shaped the geopolitics of the region, largely thanks to the success of the 

Arctic Council, there remain lingering questions regarding governance and access, which, if not 

addressed with care, could form flashpoints in the near future.  

The region shows a dualistic nature within the world-system: a strong geopolitical 

connection to the core and economic characteristics of the periphery. The Arctic maintains a 

visible colonial history that continues to affect the region’s indigenous peoples through the 

demise of traditional economies, destruction of heritage land for the resource extraction industry, 

and marginalization of indigenous culture. The primate cities that dominate the region 

demographically exist in stark contrast to remote settlements, which in addition to being 

inaccessible for much of the year often lack key education and health infrastructure found 

elsewhere within the respective Arctic states. This has prompted a migration to urban areas that 

further exacerbates the degradation of indigenous culture and economies, and compounds the 

financial strains on small municipalities. The resource extraction industries that dominate the 

regional economy maintain much of their refining and processing infrastructure outside of the 

Arctic in the core, where labor and other associated costs are cheaper. The boom in resource 



 

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extraction seen in recent decades has not translated into increased economic opportunities for 

individuals, while governments are only able to tax a raw, and therefore less valuable, product 

for revenue.  

This paper’s goal has been to introduce the Arctic and its evolving nature to world-systems 

scholars in the hope of promoting further study on the region through the lens of world-systems 

analysis. As the Arctic continues to emerge from ice-lock and integrate itself more fully within 

the wider world-system and world-economy, questions regarding its present impact, its future 

trajectory, and its unique characteristics, issues, and realities will become more clear, evident, 

and pressing. The region is a particularly interesting subject of study for: 

- Hegemonic and rivalry studies 

- Core-periphery studies  

- Post-colonial impact studies within core actors  

- Climate change’s impact on the world-system 

These, among other topics of interest related to the Arctic, have yet to be studied by world-

systems scholars. They provide an opportunity to use the flexible scope and multi-disciplinary 

toolbox of world-system analysis to study this emerging region in the world-system that is still 

largely overlooked by social and political sciences. 

 

 

About the Author: Zachary Lavengood is an Area Studies PhD. candidate at Charles 

University’s Department of North American studies where he is completing his dissertation 

Arctic Partnerships: Geopolitics of the Forming Powerblocs in the Far North. His research 

interests include Arctic and outerspace geopolitics, the rise of China, and international 

development.  

 

Disclosure Statement: Any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of 

the article’s text. Otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon 

submission of the article to the journal. 

 

 

 

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