JWSR - v6n3 - Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein Part II


564

The Civilizational Orientation in the 
Making of the New World

Anouar Abdel-Malek

journal of world-systems research, vi, 3, fall/winter 2000, 564-579
Special Issue: Festchrift for Immanuel Wallerstein – Part II
http://jwsr.ucr.edu
issn 1076-156x 
© 2000 Anouar Abdel-Malek

To the living memory of Joseph Needham,
maître en l’art de civilisation

Great intelligence embraces,
Small intelligence discriminates.
Great talk is sparkling,
Small talk is verbose.

–Tchuang-Tseu

(1) The historical moment of the position of the problem, from the onset,
leads to the heart of the sudden perplexity about the nature, rôle and
prospect of “the civilizational question” in our times.

While the very category of “civilization” was avoided until recently,
a fl urry of amazement-cum-disquiet has been pervading the public
mind, more specifi cally the intellectual circles used to the long-prevail-
ing dichotomies of social thought (“left” and “right”; “developed” and
“under-developed”; “center” and “periphery”; “conservative” and “radical”; 
“reactionary” and “progressive”; “religious” and “secular”).

All of a sudden, as it were, on the morrow of the implosion of the
former U.S.S.R., the end of the bi-polar system, the advent of unipolar
world hegemonism in 1989-1991, a resounding essay in 1993 came as a
shock. “Civilizations,” fi nally in the limelight, were deemed to “clash.”

(2) History indicates that “civilizations” were recognized as distinct con-
stellations of socio-cultural formations since early times—much before
“the making of international society” as we came to know of it, from the
end of the 15th century to our time.

http://jwsr.ucr.edu


Anouar Abdel-Malek565 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 566

sical imperialism and hegemonic imperialism, from the 17th 
century to our times. Hence, these economic-military-political 
processes, accompanied by the spread of cultural hegemonism, 
were described as instances of “civilizational” wars. This also 
leads to the emergence of the ethos of “clash” side by side with 
the categories of “cultures” and “civilizations” in recent times.

(3) Yet, the question remains: why now? why this sudden acuity, amidst 
gloom verging on despair, in the world of plenty?

(a) The cultural-civilizational factor has always accompanied times 
of tension, change and transformation: the decline of Pharaonic 
Egypt, facing the northern invasions; of the Roman empire, at the 
time of the Christian challenge; of Islam after the demise of the 
rising power of Europe; the waning of Indian cultures in Cen-
tral, South then North America crushed by Western invasions; 
the crises of the Ottoman and Mongol empires. The more recent 
feature of the Western world as of the October 1917 revolution, 
when the battle raged between Slavophiles and Westernizers—
till the 1991 implosion of the USSR. China remained immune 
to confrontations until the 19th century, accompanied by Japan, 
while Southeast and South Asia clashed with Western invasions 
some two centuries earlier.

(b) This factor was recognized as the struggle for maintenance against 
intrusions—the defi nition of actors as “nations,” “cultures,” “civili-
zations” being the latter day descriptive terminology of history at 
the center of the human and social sciences.

Maintenance thus became synonymous with normality. The nor-
mality of a world defi ned by the centrality of the West, mainly 
Europe then, more recently, North America, is surrounded by 
the “other,” fringes of societal formations marginalized by real-
concrete history to the periphery. The “other,” past civilizational 
empires and geo-cultural areas, as well as the continuity of distant 
China, is seen as antique, exotic regions where strange processes 
unfolded, and as the realm of exceptionalism.

In a word: normality was synonymous with the maintenance of 
the centrality, or hegemony, of the West—from the end of the 15th 

(2.1) Ancient history is made of the parallel existence of such major 
constellations, mainly the civilizational empires of Egypt, Persia, 
China in the heartland, while the Western hemisphere witnessed 
the Aztec, Maya and Incas, to mention but the major recognized 
macro-formations.

(2.2) At a much later date, socio-cultural formations in Europe were 
united under Rome, till the beginnings of its weakening in what 
became known as the dark Middle Age (of Europe). Simultane-
ously, four major constellations could be recognized, outside the 
limited European-Roman sphere:

(a) China, maintaining its continuity since its formation, twenty-
fi ve centuries B.C. to this day.

(b) The central area of Islam, in South-West Asia and North 
Africa, around the Arab caliphates and shi’âh Iran.

(c) The Indian sub-continent with a predominant Hindu culture 
while power was mainly the domain of Muslim rulers.

(d) The Mongol Asian and Eurasian world, which came under 
Muslim rule during recent times.

In Europe proper, Rome was gradually succeeded by the rise 
of catholic Christendom, albeit at a much slower pace than the 
four circles of the Orient.

These constellations, recognized as so many “civilizations” 
by latter day historians, remained unconnected, except for 
short periods, or by chance, till the Silk Road provided the 
major instrument for intercivilizational, mainly commercial, 
exchanges.

From the 11th century onwards, the rising power of Europe 
unleashed its protracted warfare against Islam in the Arab 
world (“b” above). The Crusades were launched under a pur-
ported religious-civilizational banner, while being, in essence, 
a classical sequence of military waves of plunder and subjuga-
tion—directly leading to the concentration of “historical sur-
plus value” in the hands of the rising bourgeoisies.

These centuries led to the successive waves of colonialism, clas-



Anouar Abdel-Malek567 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 568

century till mid-20th century.

To the central interrogation: “Why now?” the answer must be 
sought in the realm of world transformation, in the changes of the 
West enjoying prevalent centrality and hegemony since the 15th 
century.

(4) At this juncture, it seems relevant to consider the impact of fi ve centu-
ries of Western centrality and hegemony on the movement of ideas, as 
well as Weltanschauungen (visions of the world), the general mold of the 
human and social sciences.

(a) From its very beginning in the 18th century, international society—
i.e., Europe at the center of the constellation of dependent coun-
tries, cultures, nations, social formations—viewed the whole as 
one entity: the “universality” of the constellation—excluding, at 
that time, most of the Asian continent—led to the emergence 
of “universalism.” Hence the defi nition of this ensemble as the 
all-encompassing “civilization,” bringing together all component 
parts and factors—what obtained in the center being deemed 
“normal,” representing “universal” modes of being and values, to 
be accepted by the peripheries. From the onset, this postulated 
one and unique “civilization” was seen as the eternal mold and 
norm of human societies, past, present and future. Alterity was 
not accepted, except as the “other” to be negated or normalized via 
reductionism. Monstesquieu’s “Comment peut-on être Persan?” can-
didly expressed this vision, forgetting that Persia, Egypt, China 
antedated the new limited world of the European bourgeoisies by 
tens of centuries.

(b) This overall vision of the world pervaded the very structuration 
of the tools of investigation and interpretation of human societ-
ies. What obtained was deemed to be normal. The central group 
of societal formations was seen as being able to provide the raw 
materials, as it were, for interpreting the whole range of societies 
in terms of universality: the sectoral character of the whole net-
work of concepts and notions was ignored, in the sure thought 
that the purported universality of the world as it obtained for 
fi ve centuries could serve as the valid basis for asserting the uni-

versal character of emerging theories. The sectoral, European, 
then Western-centered, nature of the whole range of valuable 
knowledge about human societies was deemed to interpret the 
whole, to be “universally” valid as many concepts, laws, the sub-
stance, the theoretical work led to the elaboration of distinct fi elds 
and approaches that become universally valid human and social 
sciences.

The “rest” of the world could only be understood in terms of this 
set of ideas. Thus, if the concept, say, of “nation” was deemed to 
be a recent rendering of processes of societal coalescence in major 
European societies, it followed that there could be no nations 
prior to the beginnings of European modern times, let alone in 
human societies of the peripheries. Reductionism thus became 
the core-philosophy of human and social sciences: what was good 
for the center could not fail to be good for the peripheries.

(5) Then, as of the early 19th century, the earth trembled. The negation of 
the “other(s)” via the iron claws of reductionism led to the rise of the 
hitherto negated societies, deemed dormant, or not able to take action. 
Already, the fi rst tremors during the 16th to 18th centuries, had signaled 
that deep layers were on the move, beneath the serene patterns of West-
ern hegemony as universalism.

(a) The response of the hitherto marginalized societies (the “periph-
eries,” the Three Continents of Asia, Africa, Latin America), while 
directly motivated by the ruthless economic exploitation of impe-
rialism, took the path, and adopted the categories and terminol-
ogy, of the “nation”: national movement, party; national libera-
tion movement or war; national sovereignty, independence; united 
national front ranging to national renaissance.

The liberation of oppressed societies, viewed in this national con-
text and ethos, implied the cultural dimension, often seen as the 
national-cultural heartland of mounting historical waves of lib-
eration and reassertion of oppressed societies, within a wider, per-
ceived mold of more ancient origins—religions, continents and 
civilizations. The last term is used as a descriptive tool rather than 
in essentialist terms. It is used only when continuity, maintenance 



Anouar Abdel-Malek569 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 570

through time, was perceived to a meaningful degree, the living tra-
dition of “the present as history.”

(b) On “the other side of the river,” the rising challenges had to be 
identifi ed. Thus came the notion of “the Orient.” This notion  
found ever widening resonance in the domains of the philosophy 
of history, romantic poetry, exploration and travel literature, 
echoed in political and diplomatic documents. Differences were 
deemed to belong to the very essence of dependent, subjugated 
societies, but rarely accepted as the result of historical dialectics, 
of real-concrete political, economic, cultural-spiritual struggles 
between real-concrete forces through recent times.

As of the 11th century, and more so, since the 17th century, the 
“other(s),” the “savages,” “primitives” or “infi dèles” were gradually 
fused into “the Orient,” which was seen as mysterious, abnormal, 
dangerous—at best “exotic” for lighter minds. In each and every 
case, in all instances, it constituted the world of exceptionalism.

Hence came the general tonality of “Orientalism,” which gradually 
became a fi eld of studies, more so of cultural imperialism. It led to 
the imperative of fi rmly keeping the sciences of man and societ-
ies, as well as social thought, immune to the formative processes 
at work in “the Orient,” so as to preserve their integrity as the one 
and only body of normality, of accepted knowledge. Hence reduc-
tionism as method.

Reductionism is the intellectual expression of hegemonism. It 
pervades the very texture of dominant cultures, and prepares the 
minds and feelings for an adversary, hostile attitude towards the 
temporarily weaker societies.

(c) Real concrete struggles and creativity changed the world from 
Mohammed Ali’s surge in Egypt (1805), via the Meiji Ishin in 
Japan (1868), to the liberation of China after the Long March 
(1949), followed by Vietnam (1973). In less than 150 years, the 
“Orient,” in fact the whole range of societies in the Three Con-
tinents, achieved independence and sovereignty, albeit on vastly 
different terms. While large sectors of the formally independent 
countries are compelled to be marginalized, other major sectors 

are going through momentous processes of development, mainly 
so in East Asia with corresponding degrees of political impact on 
processes of world transformation.

(6) World transformation, around the momentous 1949-1973 period, was 
and remains perceived from several simultaneous approaches.

(a) The gradual displacement of the center of gravity of economic 
growth from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacifi c area, centered around 
East Asia, a process all the more disconcerting as advanced tech-
nologies remain mostly in leading Western centers.

(b) Although tempered by “social capitalism,” notably in Germany, 
France and most Western European counties, the cynical trium-
phalism of the shareholder, as against the stakeholder, transna-
tional fi nancial hegemony gave rise to mounting unemployment, 
frustration, erosion of belief and value systems. “Crisis” became 
the pervading feeling in advanced industrial societies of the West-
ern world. In East Asia, principally the historically unparalleled 
economic growth of Japan, and now, more strikingly so, China, 
hand in hand with the circle of “Asian tigers” and NICs in East 
and Southeast Asia, and the Pacifi c façade in all parts of the 
American hemisphere, showed that Asian societies are able to 
cope with the inevitable contradictions of social dialectics, thanks 
to deeper, non-economic, formative factors. The group-centered, 
communitarian approach, social cohesiveness and consensus, the 
resilience of family, nation, state, cultural specifi cities, accompa-
nied by the inevitable “aggiornamenti” marks a historical epoch of 
the rise of the major centers of the Orient.

(c) Thus, the stage is reached for maximal contradiction at the world 
level: while strategic power and advanced technologies still remain 
in the hegemonic Western world, the major interrogations and 
alternative models for human and social development are being 
presented by the Orient—in its widest circles—centering around 
the East Asian hinterland.

“Historical initiative,” clearly changing course, is seen by leading 
circles of the Western world as a direct challenge to its future 
course. And this challenge is more often than not perceived in 



Anouar Abdel-Malek571 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 572

circles wider than the economic-military-political matrix. Hence 
the re-emergence of “culture” and “civilization,” religion and visions 
of the world.

Processes of world transformation are perceived as world crisis, 
the crisis of the West leading to its decline.

Thus, the stage is set for confrontation, as the inevitable line of 
defense.

Of whom? Against whom?

(7) At this stage, the introduction of the difference between “units of 
analysis” and “units of analysis and action” helps clarify the fi eld.

(7.1) “Units of analysis,” in the domain of macro-societal formations—
beyond the tribe, ethnic group, social class—can be seen to com-
prise four main components:

(a) “Nations” as the optimal mold ensuring the continued coexis-
tence of recognizable cohesive, stable demographic concentra-
tions.

(b) “Nation,” in the broadly accepted defi nition of modern social 
sciences, around its center of social power, the State.

(c) “Geocultural area,” bringing together a group of nations, usu-
ally via the media of one, or a limited number, of language(s) as 
unifying instrument(s) of culture. Usually, though not always, 
such groups of nations are located in distinct proximate geo-
graphical space.

(d) “Civilizations” (or civilizational molds, or circles): the wider 
circle, as a post-fact description of the major circles which co-
existed, mainly without organic links and interaction, until the 
making of international society as from the 15th century. These 
circles were distinguished, came to be recognized by a specifi c 
network of beliefs, visions of time and the world. They some-
times revolve around different structurations of key concepts, 
which are the net result of the “depth of the historical fi eld.”

(7.2) “Units of analysis and action” attempt to identify the major actors 
and the subjects of historical dialectics.

This is the domain of “nations”: they, alone, enjoy the “depth of the 

historical fi eld” which renders feasible the optimal actualization of 
potentials, thus giving voice to the hidden part of the iceberg. It is 
a matter of decisive importance for meaningful action.

Nation is the major variable, around its national state. State can 
also be obtained in non-national societal formations, but in a 
much weaker mode, of secondary or marginal effi cacy.

And yet, major confrontations in history invoked wider frames of 
reference: religion, during the Crusades, as well as during the Ibe-
rian conquests of Central and South America; civilization during 
the heyday of colonialism and imperialism, the “civilizational mis-
sion of Europe” facing the barbarians; as well as the more recent 
“new international order” proclaimed by the uni-polar hegemonic 
center, where the normative approach (“order”) acts as the ideol-
ogy of hegemonism.

To be sure, major identifi cation labels were and still are chosen to 
cover action programs in such terms, which help to mobilize the 
deeper layers of identity and cumulative achievements. The “Asian 
peril,” followed by the dangers of “Islamic fundamentalism,” is in 
lieu and place of the shifting pattern of historical initiative, and 
the control of the world’s oil resources menaced by radical nation-
alism.

Yet, when all is said and done, civilizations and cultures do not 
launch wars, nor conclude peace. The nations of the world, around 
their respective states, are the major recognizable actors, bringing 
together the two circles of social dialectics: the inner (ethnic, 
social class); and the outer (international, world politics).

Nations, yet, are always infl uenced by outer molds of their respec-
tive cultures and civilizations.

(8) How could the mounting tensions of the times of world transforma-
tion develop? Is there a space for meaningful action in a domain where 
the winds of change are blowing, impetuously, more than at any previ-
ous time in the history of mankind?

Tensions lead to confrontations, that is, the clash approach in interna-
tional relations. A glance at the panoply put forth by the epigones of 
this approach, which claims the non-strategic-political character of the 



Anouar Abdel-Malek573 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 574

new confl icts after the end of the Cold War, reveals the intention to 
maximize tensions and contradictions to the level of direct confronta-
tion.

(a) The fi rst range of problems is of the classical economic-cum-
political sort, yet in novel terms. Water, instead of oil, reserves; 
ecology that sets the limits to the menacing growth of the periph-
eries; new technologies, mainly in the fi eld of informatics; the 
spread of new dangerous diseases, often leading to mass epidem-
ics, side by side with the resurgence of old pathologies deemed 
extinct, and the growing ineffi cacy of existing therapies; the 
spread of hard drugs; the mounting menace of massive migrations 
towards the industrial societies, etc.

Little, if anything, is put forth to search for meaningful solutions 
and limit the damage. In fact, the above listing comes as there are 
many menaces in addition to the panoply of traditional strategic-
military and economic confl icts, such as the persistent nuclear 
menace.

(b) “Human rights” occupy the center stage. This is, precisely, where 
the theses of the center—projecting itself to encompass the world, 
via the successive waves of reductionism—can only but differ 
from, and collide with, the visions of other civilizations, cultures 
and national specifi cities. The tacit acceptance of the centrality of 
the individual in Western societies, as of the development of the 
European bourgeoisies owing to the range of possibilities offered 
by cumulative “historical surplus value,” leads theoreticians and 
policy makers of the hitherto prevailing central area to refuse the 
legitimacy of the parallel set of processes unfolding in Oriental 
societies in their different geocultural areas, which give primacy to 
the group, community and togetherness. They are placed before 
the individuation of social life.

A non-confrontational approach would stress the rights of peo-
ples side by side with the rights of man. The confrontation 
approach chooses to denounce Oriental “despotism,” seldom rec-
ognizing the visions and life patterns of the “other(s).” A stage 
has been reached where human rights are invoked to justify mili-

tary intervention, economic blockade against nation states, popu-
lar movements and schools of thought which choose to keep their 
own course.

(c) Democracy, rather “liberal market democracy,” is deemed to be 
the socio-political and ethical norm for all societies. The crisis of 
socialist state formations in Europe leads to the negation of the 
very possibility of socialism, let alone its powerful assertion in a 
large part of the world.

(d) In the name of the above, military-political institutional alliances 
are brought to ever more advanced levels of strategic power. 
N.A.T.O. is now extending towards the frontiers of Russia, 
towards Asia, via the oil reserve area in Central Asia.

In the name of “civilization,” the one and only one.

(9) It is our opinion that another path can be charted: the non-antagonistic 
treatment of contradictions, leading to complementarity.

(9.1) “Contradiction” is of the essence. The European (Western) con-
cept, from Aristotle to Hegel and Marx, of contradiction has been 
conceived in antagonistic terms: thesis facing antithesis leading 
to the supersession of both sides in the resulting synthesis. From 
the onset, confl ict and warfare are postulated as the path to deal 
with contradiction. This vision has enabled the West to open, 
conquer, discover and innovate. It has also led to the resolution of 
contradictions by the launching of the atomic bombs in 1945, and 
genetic manipulations in our times.

The Chinese philosophical tradition, from Taoism to Mao Tse-
tung thought, puts forth that “contradiction is the essence of 
being.” As such, it cannot be “overcome,” eliminated via the removal 
of one side, and/or its forcible taming by the other. Real-con-
crete life, in nature and human societies alike, shows the persistent 
structuration of reality in terms of contradiction. While remodel-
ing the pattern of the interrelations between different component 
elements of the contradiction, the readjustment of their respec-
tive role and impact opens the path for the combination between 
continuity and change, maintenance and transformation. This is 
the hallmark of the rising Orient in Asia in our times.



Anouar Abdel-Malek575 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 576

(9.2) Since the early European Middle Ages, facing the diffi culties of 
propagating the Christian faith in the Islamic-Arab world, Cen-
tral and South America, later Africa and Asia, the Jesuits pro-
posed the concept of “inculturation”: the message of the new, 
Christian faith could only be understood if it followed the specifi c 
nature of other cultures, faiths and peoples.

This major step in European thought remains inadequately 
understood, and its effi cacy from Ricci’s mission to Ming China 
in the 16th century to “liberation theology” in our times remains 
marginalized.

(9.3) One more step was needed to further develop the call for recog-
nizing identities. Such was the purpose of our work to develop 
the concept of “specifi city” (1962-70) as the key tool to understand 
differences, thus helping the bridge-building efforts towards con-
vergence.

The analysis of the concept of specifi city can be attempted at 
three levels/moments:

1. The level/moment of general defi nition, from the origins. In 
order to reach for the specifi city of a given society, one should 
seek what has been the pattern of societal maintenance obtained 
in a given socio-economic national formation through a critical 
study of its historical development. The particular pattern of this 
societal maintenance is simply the pattern of structuration of 
and interaction between the four key factors in every form of 
societal maintenance: the production of material life in the geo-
graphic and ecological framework (the mode of production stricto 
sensu); the reproduction of life (sexuality); social order (power and 
the state); the relation to the time-dimension (the limitedness of 
human life, religions and philosophies). In that group, the pro-
duction of material life occupies the decisive place in the struc-
turation of the whole pattern of maintenance, but only in the last 
instance. By applying this model to different societies, we would 
be in a better position to clarify the general picture, to qualify and 
to give colour, adding tone and nuance to the fi rst analysis under-
taken on the basis of socio-economic criteria.

2. The level/moment of the emergence of spatio-temporal factors 
to conscious awareness. The study of specifi city is not undertaken 
in the outer world of pure epistemology—but within the frame-
work of the concrete evolution of given societies. This evolution 
puts the time factor in the forefront; hence the central importance 
of the notion of the ‘depth of historical fi eld.’ There is no speci-
fi city in a temporary society—a jamboree, student movement, a 
state artifi cially established for show purposes. To talk of societal 
maintenance is to address oneself to the long historical duration 
that molds events—not to contingency. So one can validly speak 
of specifi city in the old social-national formations—the ideal ter-
rain for specifi city—and in those formations which have not yet 
reached the level of national evolution stricto sensu—in the ‘new 
nations,’ to use the term coined by Thomas Jefferson in speaking 
of the United States of America. One can thus see how vast the 
fi eld is—the immense majority of nations and peoples in our 
times. The social sciences will feel less at ease with the ‘space’ fac-
tor—because one form of geo-politics has fallen out of favour. 
However, the historical evolution of societies does not take place 
in the abstract space of the dialectics of the mind—‘History’ in 
place of ‘history’—nor does it unfold in the secluded fi eld of epis-
temology.

Societies—but only within the framework of their geographical 
conditions, should be considered under two aspects: (i) the aspect 
of location, which enables one to assess the importance of loca-
tion to each society and its state as compared with others, that 
is, geo-politics; (ii) the aspect of internal conditioning, that is, 
ecology, which indicates and quantifi es resources and potentials, 
which then had to be tempered by taking the demographic factor 
into consideration.

3. The moment-dimension of the dialectics of the factors of main-
tenance and the factors of transformation, on the basis of the ulti-
mately decisive action of the mode of production and in extreme 
cases of the progress of techniques of production. It is to disen-
tangle the factors which maintained from those which maintain 
(which is very different from speaking of ‘invariables’—of much 



Anouar Abdel-Malek577 The Civilizational Orientation in the Making of the New World 578

later origin), to distinguish each according to their pattern from 
that which was not, but is becoming, and that which is, but shall 
be no more. To distinguish the four linking factors, whatever their 
relative weight at any given stage of historical evolution.

The concept of specifi city will apply to both the hegemonic and 
the dependent areas, where several factors can be isolated that 
merit consideration, as they constitute the structuring framework 
of specifi city at the nodal point of meaningful social theory. These 
problems can be divided into two groups: (i) the uses of the con-
cept of specifi city, that is its relevance in different types of society; 
(ii) the defi nition of priority areas for comparativism, using the 
concept of specifi city as the main conceptual tool.”

(10) Is it now possible to chart the path from “confrontation” and “clash” 
towards “complementarity”—let alone “convergence”?

(a) Major confl icts in our time and the foreseeable future are, essen-
tially, political-economic in the wider sense. The changing emerg-
ing patterns, centering in the displacement of historical initiative, 
are leading to the crisis of modern hegemony, located in Europe 
and then North America (the “West”), as the crisis of the “civiliza-
tional project” of the West itself. The Promethean-Faustian vision 
of “man as demiurge,” master, let alone creator, of the world, lead-
ing to protracted, boundless productivism, consumerism, hedo-
nism. They lead to mounting confrontations and a rising tide of 
unsustainable scenarios in a fi nite world, which is the home of a 
many-splendored panoply of nations, cultures and civilizations.

The crisis of the power system is seen as the crisis of (Western) 
civilization.

(b) Hence, there is the advent (some would say resurgence) of the 
cultural-civilizational dimension as the wider frame within which 
power struggles are unfolding (e.g., the call for a “new Chinese 
spiritual civilization.”).

This realistic recognition of the emerging patterns is brought to 
its maximal systematic acuity by Huntington’s 1996 presentation 
as of his 1993 theses, thus: “Western belief in the universality 
of Western culture suffers from three problems: it is false; it is 

immoral; and it is dangerous…. Imperialism is the necessary logi-
cal consequence of universalism.… It could lead to a major inter-
civilizational war.”

(c) To avoid major confrontations, it is of importance to avoid impos-
ing the center’s vision, let alone will, upon other cultures and civi-
lizations.

More specifi cally, we should avoid the theoretical and essentialist 
approach, while simultaneously reaching for areas of convergence. 
These areas can be seen to obtain in the domain of the exigen-
cies of the very survival of humankind on our planet Earth: hence 
the primacy of the normative approach, the attempt to locate 
common problems, parallel preoccupations, joint efforts to seek 
viable, concrete solutions to real concrete problems and situa-
tions. In a word: it is essential to give priority to the real concrete 
approach to real concrete problems faced by real concrete societ-
ies, albeit in vastly different terms.

(d) This approach can best be implemented by the will of the differ-
ent formative schools of thought and action at work in the dif-
ferent national, cultural and civilizational areas to confront these 
obligations, thus fulfi lling their duty as organic intellectuals—at 
work in the domains of knowledge-cum-policy formulation and 
implementation.

Once more, once again, there is a rising role for the socio-cul-
tural factors, as compared to the traditional political-strategic-
economic approach, advocated since 1973 and mainly so, by our 
concerted joint work at The United Nations University during its 
seminal formative stage (1975-1985). An approach now echoed 
by Huntington (“Peoples of all civilizations should search for and 
expand the values, institutions and practices they have in common 
with peoples of other civilizations.”)

(e)  If all subjects/factors of history are invited to take their full part 
in these processes towards survival, complementarity leading to 
convergence, the two cultural-civilizational circles comprising the 
higher density of the oldest societies and nations—the Orient, 
and Europe; both in their wider connotations—can be seen to be 



Anouar Abdel-Malek579

called upon to take joint action, based upon their exceptionally 
rich experience in the changing patterns and fortunes of historical 
dialectics.

“Civilizational strategy” should welcome different scenarios and 
initiatives, different levels and tempi.

Our contention, throughout, has been and remains that differ-
ences, if recognized, can open the path towards convergence.

Our plea throughout, has been and remains that it is now impera-
tive and urgent to take meaningful action.

Our hope, our decision, throughout, have been and must fi rmly 
remain to trust that the combined lucidity and realism of our 
humankind will prevail over the negative mind and nihilism. Con-
frontation and clash, if understood, can open the path towards 
complementarity, convergence—our joint, richer, futures.

The civilizational dimension and approach facilitate the transi-
tion from the crises of world transformation towards the chal-
lenges and promise of the making of a new world.


	Abdel-Malek