jwsr-v8n3- 330 An Evolving Triadic World: A Theoretical Framework for Global Communication Research* Shelton A. Gunaratne Shelton A. Gunaratne Mass Communications Department Minnesota State University Moorhead Moorhead, MN 56563 gunarat@mnstate.edu http://www.mnstate.edu/gunarat/ journal of world-systems research, viii, 1ii, fall 2002, 330–365 http://jwsr.ucr.edu issn 1076–156x © 2002 Shelton A. Gunaratne The recognition of the process of globalization has drawn attention to the shortcomings of the theories that scholars have so far used to study global communication—a concept that is distinct from but often confused with inter- national communication. Th e “developmentalism” notion of the Parsonsian structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which presumed that nation- states changed in parallel lines from tradition to modernity, infl uenced the work of many inter-national communication researchers until the mid-1970s. Researchers also have paid attention to other communication phenomena asso- ciated with globalization—transborder data fl ows, cultural imperialism, media events, global network organizations, etc.—though many of those studies have generally failed to take a global perspective. Changes in the global power struc- ture, attributable primarily to the ongoing globalization process fanned by the Digital Revolution, require us to reformulate and refi ne relevant aspects of these approaches. Th e purpose of this essay is to develop a theoretical framework for global communication research based on a reformulation of the world-systems per- spective. Gunaratne (2001a) has broadly explained the potential for testing global-communication hypotheses within the fi ve components of Frank’s inter- * This is a revised version of a paper the author presented to the 2001 annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in Washington, DC. The author is grateful to Kurt Kent (Florida), Carol Lomicky (Nebraska-Kearney), Mark Hansel, Ariyaratne Wijetunge (both of MSU Moorhead), and the several anonymous reviewers for their advice on the draft of this essay. A macro theory that recognizes the world’s three competing center-clusters and their respective hinterlands off ers a realistic framework for global communication research. Th is study has used recent data on world trade, computers, Internet hosts, and high- tech exports to map the triadization of the world in the Information Age. Th e original dependency theory and world-system theory perspectives emphasized the hierarchical link- ing of national societies to the capitalist world- economy in a center-periphery structure. Th e proposed global-triadization formulation looks at the center-periphery structure in terms of a capitalist world-economy dominated by three competing center economic clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland comprising peripheral economic clusters. Th ese clusters may not necessarily be geographically con- tiguous. Strong-weak relationships may exist within each center-cluster, as well as within each periphery-cluster, with one center-cluster occupying a hegemonic role. Th e rudimentary Information-Society Power Index, constructed for this study, can guide the researcher to test an abundance of hypotheses on the pattern of global communication and information fl ow with particular attention to source, message, channel, and receiver. abstract mailto:gunarat@mnstate.edu http://www.mnstate.edu/gunarat/ http://jwsr.ucr.edu/ Shelton A. Gunaratne331 An Evolving Triadic World 332 pretation of the world system1 (Frank & Gills 1993): the world system itself; the process of capital accumulation as the motor force of (world system) history; the core-periphery structure in and of the world system; the alternation between hegemony and rivalry; and the long and short economic cycles of alternating ascending phases and descending phases. Several excellent overviews of the lit- erature spawned by the world-systems perspective already exist (e.g., Shannon 1989; Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995; Sanderson & Hall 1995). Th e current study is an attempt to ascertain the suitability of grafting the putative global triadization concept to the world-system theory to try out hith- erto untried ways of conducting comparative communication research. Th e tria- dization concept itself is not new. What is new is the approach to analyzing each triadized cluster as a single economic unit (rather than as separate political units or nation-states comprising that cluster) for center-cluster comparisons. Th is approach enables the researcher to include smaller political units (e.g., Belgium) and even low-end developed countries (e.g., Portugal) as part of the center thereby making the controversial semiperiphery concept of the original world- system theory virtually redundant. Th is study has also introduced a new variable, the Information Society Power Index, for comparing nation-states within each economic cluster, as well as the triadized center-clusters, and placing them in the appropriate center-periphery structure. Based on the literature review, this study focused on two main research propositions: 1. The pattern of world exports supports the existence of three world center clusters each of which has at least one dependent periphery cluster. (Old controversial hypothesis) 2. The distribution of computing power and exports of high-technology manufactures (constituting the Information Society Power Index) will confirm the triadization structure and help identify the hegemon cluster of the triad. (New hypothesis) Th e fi ndings of this study clearly confi rmed both propositions. Th ese fi nd- ings provide a new theoretical framework for global (holistic) or international (partly holistic) communication researchers to embark on projects to ascertain the inter-and intra-communication patterns/processes of the world’s three com- peting center-clusters: the center-periphery communication patterns/processes related to each of the these center-clusters, the inter-and intra-communication patterns/processes of the periphery clusters, and the signifi cance of the hegemon cluster vis-à-vis all other macro and micro units in the world system. Th e particu- lar contribution of this approach is the potential it off ers to examine global or inter- national communication patterns/processes (source-message-medium-receiver-eff ect) holistically by recognizing the part-whole interrelationships of all theoretical compo- nents of the world system. Th us, the hermeneutics of communication research fi ndings would have to entail the fi ve dimensions of the world system mentioned in the second paragraph. Th is study also fi ts rather well with the continuing tra- dition of concern with cultural ties (e.g., Galtung 1971) or the network blocks of cultural ties (“blockmodel” analysis) of the world system (e.g., Kick 1987). Th e next section of this essay will focus primarily on the more recent lit- erature on the subject and demonstrate how I derived this study’s theoretical framework. Th e third section will elaborate on the concepts and methods I used in the study. Th e fourth section will elaborate on the fi ndings. Th e fi nal section will provide a discussion of the related issues. L I T E R AT U R E R EV I E W Th e structure of the basic argument of the world-systems perspective, according to Goldfrank (2000:178), is that capitalism is a world-economy comprising “core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral productive regions integrated by market mechanisms which are in turn distorted by the stronger of the com- peting states, none of which is strong enough to control the entire economy.” Wallerstein’s (1974) formulation of this perspective borrowed the core-periphery concept from the dependency theory (see Gunaratne & Conteh 1988) and added the concept of the semi-periphery. Th e world-systems theory sees the world “as developed and underdeveloped states, or zones, the interaction of which, through unequal exchange processes, produces a global core-periphery division of labor” (Bergesen 1990:67). It uses totalities as units of analysis to describe social change. It postulates the capitalist world-economy as the basic unit of analysis. Trade and exchange constitute the primary social mechanism that integrates the global system. Bergesen criticizes the world-system theory, as well as the international- relations theory in political science, because “both begin with the individualist assumption that we begin with an aggregate of states and then move toward 1. Diff erences exist between Wallerstein’s world-systems (plural and hyphenated) perspective and Frank’s world system (singular and unhyphenated) perspective. Frank (2000) points out that his formulation is humanocentric and global whereas Wallerstein’s is highly Eurocentric. Wallerstein (1979) has traced two world-systems up to now: world- empires (unifi ed political systems that have existed since the Neolithic Revolution, e.g., Byzantium, China, Egypt, Rome, feudal Europe, feudal Japan), and world-economies (marked by a single division of labor but no overarching political structure). Wallerstein says that the 16th century marked the beginning of the modern world-system centered on Europe; and what distinguished it from previous world-systems was ceaseless capital accumulation. Th is essay retains world-systems, as well as world system, to express distinct intents. Shelton A. Gunaratne333 An Evolving Triadic World 334 the global capitalism approach. He argues that the global capitalism approach is the most productive for theory and research in globalization. Volkmer (1999) has called for the “reformulation or reformatting of existing concepts of international communication” to develop a new theory of global communication that would encompass the “various global movements in shaping the diverse, and…con- tinuously diversifying global communication processes” (p. 2). Gunaratne (2000, 2001b) has asserted that the “New Global Age” requires more refi ned global (or macro-level) theories to dissect the reality of the world as an interconnected unit. Chang, Lau, and Hao (2000) have attempted to incorporate various theoretical approaches in inter-national communication research into the world-systems perspective. As already documented, contemporary scholars have gone well beyond the ideas of Braudel (1967) and Wallerstein (1974) who broached the idea that a world- economy—an economy wherein capital accumulation proceeded throughout the world—prevailed in the West since at least the 16th century.2 Wallerstein (1979) argued that capitalism as “a system oriented to capital accumulation per se” (p. 272) began in the 16th century. Frank and Gills (1993) discarded the Eurocentric approach of the world-systems theory and adopted a humanocentric approach to socio-historical analysis arguing that a world economy has been in existence for 5,000 years. Castells (1996) pointed out a signifi cant distinction between a world economy and a global economy, stating that the latter signifi ed “an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale” (p. 92). Triadization Louch, Hargittai and Centeno (1999) draw our attention to three dominant interpretations of the process of global interdependence: interdependent global- ization (the universal model), civilizations and empires (the clustered model), and hegemonic globalization (the hegemonic model). Th e universal model presumes a generic and system-wide increase in reciprocal ties between countries. Th is has been the largely accepted assumption behind much of the discussion of increas- ing inter-connection. Th e clustered model presumes an increasing concentration of communication within clusters of countries united by a common cultural international order, rather than the collectivist assumption that we begin with an international order and only then derive the presence of states and national economies” (p. 68). Bergesen says that the world-systems approach should “place culture and power at the heart of the analysis and replace the individualism implied in the idea of a division of labor, unequal or not” (p. 80). Bergesen’s sug- gestion confi rms the need for global-communication research to emphasize the global framework rather than the atomistic nation states. Unlike the structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which occupied the center-stage of social science inquiry until the mid-1970s, the new world- system paradigm helped explain not only the historic North-South inequality but also the rise of the newly industrialized countries. It shifted attention from the nation-state to the world-system as the relevant unit of analysis. However, Schramm and Lerner (1976), two of the pre-eminent communication scholars at the time, failed to assess the signifi cance of the world-system perspective’s epistemological and hermeneutical challenge when they edited their book on re- thinking communication and change. Many contemporary developmental-com- munication scholars (e.g. Shah 1996) also continue to exclude the world system perspective, while a few (e.g. Servaes 1999) have attempted to incorporate it. In general, this perspective has not yet received adequate attention in most discus- sions on communication theory as a fi eld. McMichael (2000:669) points out that the world-systems perspective saw development as a systemic process, “where core-periphery relations were the real development dynamic and core states were outcomes, rather than units, of development.” McMichael contends that the accelerated compression of time and space in the current era of “fi nancialization” has helped transform nation states into global states, a phenomenon synonymous with the decomposition of wage-labor as a social institution. Th is interpretation provides a challenge to researchers engaged in the study of communication and development, as well as the global fl ow of information. Teivainen (2000) argues that to face the politi- cal and theoretical challenges of the futures of the world system, scholars must redraw the modernist map of political space (i.e., the territorialist and single- perspectival conception of social space) used by the traditional world-systems approach. Sklair (1999) asserts that the process of globalization has made it diffi cult to study many contemporary problems at the level of nation states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations. Instead, researchers need to con- ceptualize such problems in terms of global processes. However, Sklair points out the clear need to establish a distinction between the inter-national and the global. He categorizes globalization studies into four research clusters: the world- systems approach, the global culture approach, the global society approach, and 2. Hier (2001) claims that the initial architect of the world-system perspective was Oliver Cox, who produced a trilogy of volumes on capitalism in 1959, 1962, and 1964 trac- ing the roots of the capitalist system to medieval Venice. Shelton A. Gunaratne335 An Evolving Triadic World 336 heritage3 or congruent to ex-imperial links, historical fl ows of trade, and contem- porary fi nancial fl ows. Th is perspective recognizes clustering around the three major powers—the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Th e hege- monic model presumes the increasing centrality of a small core of rich countries, perhaps dominated by a single power. Th is view sees globalization as merely an acceleration of the concentration of resources and infl uence in European and North American clusters with some limited East Asian additions. Louch, Hargittai, and Centeno (1999), who tested international telephone traffi c from 1983 to 1995 as a measure of “globalization,” found little evidence to support the universal model. Th ey found a clear hierarchy of telephone contact mostly concentrated in the wealthiest countries with poorer countries being either marginalized or linked asymmetrically to a cluster of the wealthiest. Th ey also found that the United States had consolidated itself as the “center” with the further weakening of Europe’s relative position. In an earlier study, Barnett and Salisbury (1996) traced changes in the international telecommunications net- work from 1978 to 1992 to examine the process of globalization. Th eir fi ndings were similar to those of Smith and White (1992), who also found the underlying core-periphery dimension in the world commodity trade fl ows. At the center were the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; at the periphery were the less-developed countries in Latin America and Africa; and between these two groups were nations generally classifi ed as semiperipheral. Th is global power confi guration, which some scholars identify as “triadization” (Th ussu, 2000, p. 77), off ers a most tempting meta-theoretical basis for global communication analysis. Mattelart (1996/2000) also identifi ed the construction of the large free-trade economic blocs around the triad powers—North America, East Asia, and the European Union (EU)—as “a major change that has contributed to the creation of new divisions in the world” (p. 98). Bergesen and Sonnett (2001), who analyzed the Global 500, found a very clear three-way split between Asia (29 percent of the fi rms), Europe (34 percent), and the United States (33 per- cent), “suggesting a tripartite geopolitical division of the world economy” (p. 1603). Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) also recognized the emergence of three regional international economic blocs—the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the rich Asian economies—to dominate the world economy. Earlier, Galtung and Vincent (1992) had gone to the extent of demar- cating the mainly Buddhist-Confucian countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia as a separate world with Japan at the top, and the Four Tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—in the second tier. Th e triadization concept also ties in with the socio-historical analysis of Frank (1998:328) who points out that “the globe-encompassing world economy/system did not have a single center but at most a hierarchy of centers” even though a single-centered structure of center-periphery relations prevailed “on intraregional and perhaps on some interregional bases.” Frank (1998) also disputes the existence of “semipe- ripheries” in Wallerstein’s sense. However, some network analysts have disputed the presumed triadization. Barnett and colleagues, who have conducted several international studies on selected aspects of communication—monetary, telecommunication, transporta- tion, and trade fl ows (Barnett, Salisbury, Kim, & Langhorne 1999; Salisbury & Barnett 1999; Barnett, Choi, & Sun-Miller 1996; Choi & Ahn 1996; Barnett & Choi 1995), news fl ows (Kim & Barnett 1996), and telephone networks (Sun & Barnett, 1994)—have concluded that overwhelming empirical fi ndings do not support a triadic world system but a tightly connected group centered on the G-7 countries. Straussfogel (1997), a geographer, on the other hand, describes “the modern world-system as a hierarchically organized complex social structure [comprising] multiple layers of nested and overlapping, cooperating and compet- ing subsystems linked through a variety of types of nonlinear relations” (p. 123). She has proposed the merging of Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures (Prigogine & Stengers 1984) with world-system theory to derive a framework that is able to account for a large number of spatial and temporal events through- out the history of capitalism. Castells (1996:145), a sociologist, explained that the new global economy was the outcome of the “interaction between the rise of informationalism and capital- ist restructuring.” Its characteristics, he said, were interdependence, asymmetry, regionalization, increasing diversifi cation within each region, selective inclusive- ness, exclusionary segmentation, and variable geometry (p. 106). Furthermore, he asserted that the architecture of the global economy refl ected “an asymmetrically interdependent world,” a triad area comprising three major economic regions: North America, with Latin America as its hinterland; Western Europe, with Eastern Europe, Russia and South Mediterranean as its hinterland; Japan and the Asian Pacifi c (plus Australia and New Zealand), with the rest of Asia, including the Middle East, as its hinterland. He called Africa the marginalized region even though South Africa could be the magnet for the region’s resurgence. Castells (1996) castigated the world-systems theory as “simplistic” because it 3. Th is model includes Huntington’s (1996) concept of a world system of competing civilizations. Huntington foresees a “clash of civilizations” with the greatest threat coming from Islam and then China. Frank (1998:359) dismisses such concepts as “divisive ideo- logical diatribes…[that] have their intellectual roots in ignorance or denial of a single global history.” Shelton A. Gunaratne337 An Evolving Triadic World 338 made little analytical sense to compartmentalize the deeply asymmetric global economy into a center, a semiperiphery, and a periphery. He argued that the world has several “centers” and several “peripheries” characterizing the “so internally diversifi ed” North and South (p. 108). Despite Castells’ criticism, a triadized confi guration of the global center-periphery structure provides a more realistic framework on which to base communication research. In a recent study of 38 countries, Wu (2000) reported trade volume as the leading predictor in interna- tional news coverage. In the light of this fi nding, the “triadization” model off ers a framework to test hypotheses on the news fl ow within and among the three center-clusters and their respective hinterlands. Hugill (1999) looked at the geopolitics and technologies of the respective communication systems of Britain, imperial Germany and the United States as they struggled for hegemony. He applied the world-systems perspective but confi ned himself to the “capitalist world-system only as it has developed over the past 150 years” (p. 16). Despite his Eurocentric approach, Hugill makes a useful assertion: that “in the period of multipolarity we are now entering” (p. 18), the chosen communication strategy of regional power groupings—e.g., NAFTA, the European Union, and Japan-led Asia—will determine their ability to achieve hegemony. Th is observation further supports the notion of “triadization.” Castells (1996:145) describes the “architecture and geometry of the informational/global economy” as an asymmetrically interdependent phenom- enon organized around three major regions—Europe (EU and the European economies affi liated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), North America (or NAFTA) and the Asian Pacifi c ( Japan and the “China Circle”). He identifi es the G-7 countries as “the core of the system” because they accounted for 90.5 percent of high-technology manufactur- ing in the world (in 1990), and also held 80.4 percent of global computing power. Furthermore, he says that an economic hinterland has sprung up around each of the three major regions with Africa increasingly marginalized in the global economy. Combining these observations of Castells, Hugill, and others, we can use their triadization framework to empirically observe the information and com- munication fl ow among and within the three center-clusters and their respective economic hinterlands. High-technology manufacturing and computing power may serve as the criteria for measuring competitive capital accumulation under informational capitalism. Informational capitalism is what Tehranian (1999) calls “informatic imperialism,” which, in his view, is bifurcating the globe into the “high-tech and high-growth centers” and the “disintegrating peripheries” (p. 26). Gunaratne (2001a) wrote: Where high-technology production and computing power are likely to determine competitive capital accumulation, as well as the concomitant phenomena of hegemony-rivalry and alternating economic cycles, a development approach must recognize the realities of the world/global system. Communication researchers should address this issue to help policy makers stall the proliferation of “disintegrating peripheries.” Triadization Model Th e foregoing review leads us to consider the following essentials for formu- lating a macro-model for researching aspects related to the global information and communication order. • Because totalities should be our units of analysis, we should begin with the “collectivist” world system (the capitalist world-economy—in eff ect, the modern informational economy) as our basic unit of analysis, and only then derive the presence of the “atomistic” states (Bergesen 1990). • Th e world system has three center-clusters (Bergesen & Sonnett 2001; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Castells 1996; Mattelart, 1996/2000; Smith & White 1993) one of which occupies the role of the hegemon (Louch, Hargittai & Centeno 1999) while continuously competing with the other two to maintain its hegemony (Hugill 1999). (Such competition goes hand-in-hand with cooperation in the self-interest of each center- cluster as evident in G-7 summits.) • Each center-cluster has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters (Castells 1996), and our subordinate unit of analysis should be these clusters of global states, which have so transformed from nation states as a result of ongoing transnationalization, as well as “fi nancialization” in the informational economy (Bergesen 1990; McMichael 2000; Teivainen 2000). • Th ese characteristics have made it diffi cult to study many contemporary problems, which are entangled in global processes, at the level of nation states (Sklair 1999). However, within this structure, we should analyze the phenomena of culture and power (Bergesen 1990), political and cultural eff ects (Sklair 1999; Chase-Dunn 1999), transnationalization (Teivainen 2000), fi nancialization (McMichael 2000), etc. Network Model Whereas the triadization model is based on attributes of the units compris- ing the world system, the network model is based on relationships among those units. Hargittai and Centeno (2001:1552) extol the virtues of applying network theory and methods to defi ne “the underlying pattern of the literally millions of sets of ties across the globe.” Th ey say network analysis enables precise and concrete means to map the relationships among regions, states, cities or even smaller units. Th ey argue that the two-dimensional perspective refl ected in the Shelton A. Gunaratne339 An Evolving Triadic World 340 core-periphery structure based on attributes has become irrelevant “in an N- dimensional reality,” where N represents the number of forms of international reactions. Categorization by attributes, they point out, may miss the “critical dynamics of global cliques” (p. 1551). Within this scheme, the core units are those that emerge as central to these global cliques. However, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995:398) say the contention that “network measures are superior to attribute measures has been argued but not demonstrated. Th e question of method of operationalization is always confounded with the question of the substantive content of the measures.” More recently, several researchers (Barnett 2001; Kick & Davis 2001; Sacks Ventresca, & Uzzi 2001; Smith & Timberlake 2001; Townsend 2001, and Van Rossem 1996) have improved on the earlier work of pioneer “blockmodel” network analysts (Boorman & White 1976; Breiger 1976; Kick 1987; Knoke & Kuklinski 1982; Mullins, Hargens, Hecht, & Kick 1977; Snyder & Kick 1979) to explore the dynamics of the world-system. Th eir analyses, accomplished through advanced statistical techniques, have yielded varying core-periphery structures depending on the variables measured. However, the United States and the top G-7 countries in Europe consistently appear as the core though Japan’s appear- ance is inconsistent. Smith and Timberlake (2001), who studied the hierarchy of world cities based on the international fl ow of population by air travel, placed Hong Kong and Singapore ahead of Tokyo in 1997 while asserting that the “key cities in Western Europe and North America have continuously maintained their posi- tion as central nodes” (p. 1675) even though six or seven East Asian cities had achieved a remarkable rise in importance. Townsend (2001), on the other hand, found in the global structure of the Internet “a shift in the geography of telecom- munications networks and the emergence of a network of network cities” (p. 1697). Kick and Davis (2001), who conducted a multiple-network analysis of eight types of transnational transactions (trade fl ows, bilateral economic aid and assistance treaties, bilateral transportation and communication treaties, bilateral sociocultural treaties, bilateral administrative and diplomatic treaties, political confl icts, armament transfers, and military confl icts) for 130 countries during 1970–1975, derived a modifi ed world-system structure: core, semicore (capitalist/ socialist), semiperiphery, and periphery. Kick and Davis concluded that the “core of Western industrial nations,” including Japan, dominated the world-system across all the networks (p. 1566). No Asian-Pacifi c country fi tted the capitalist semicore although China fi tted the socialist semicore. Th ey, however, fi tted 12 Asian-Pacifi c countries, including the East Asian Tigers, in the semiperiphery. Van Rossem (1996), in his role-equivalence model of the world system based on the density of fi ve networks—imports, exports, diplomatic ties, arms trade, and troops, placed highly developed small economies like Iceland, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in the second-tier periphery, concluding that “the best proxy for world system role is absolute size of the economy” (p. 524). An integrated model? Th e network model’s power to analyze relationships among units constitut- ing the world-system is a clear advantage over linear models based on attributes of those units. However, one must also be aware of its potential pitfalls, which I shall take up in the discussion section of this essay. I take the view that research based on attributes, as well as relations, would serve to validate or discard the fi ndings derived from each method. CONC EP TS A N D M ET HOD Th is study postulates the transition of the world system into the infor- mational era by grafting the two variables computing power and high-technology manufactures into the trade and exchange mechanism, which determined the center-periphery structure of global states/clusters, according to world-system theory. Castells (1996) identifi ed these two as the crucial variables associated with the dominance of the center-clusters in the modern informational economy. Computing power is a prerequisite for high-technology manufacturing. Th e abil- ity to compete in high-technology exports, then, determines the center-clusters, as well as the hegemon within them. Th is study constructed an Informational Society Power Index by combining the two variables, i.e., computing power and high-technology exports, to ascertain the relative dominance of each of the three center-clusters that “triadization” proponents deem to exist. Computing power Glaeser (1997) defi ned the computing power of a country in terms of mil- lion instructions per second (mips) per 1,000 people. However, data on mips do not exist for most countries. Th erefore, this study settled on two indicators that could generate a reasonable estimate of computing power: the number of personal computers and the number of Internet hosts. Because global states/ clusters can enhance their competitive edge in trade and exchange (e.g., e-com- merce) through the global web of computer networks (Gereffi 2001), the number of Internet hosts refl ects an important facet of computing power. By combin- ing these two sets of data through an allocation of weights, this study derived a reasonably valid Computing Power Index. International Telecommunication Union (1999) data show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) own 74.3 percent of the world’s total number of personal computers. To derive the number of Internet hosts, this study combined two sets of data: the October Shelton A. Gunaratne341 An Evolving Triadic World 342 2000 Netsizer estimates for 60 countries and the July 2000 Internet domain survey of the Internet Software Consortium . It used the ISC data only for the countries not included in the Netsizer list because the latter allocates the three-letter generic Top Level Domains or gTLDs (e.g., com, net, org, edu, gov, mil) to countries on the basis of estimated registrations whereas the ISC does not. Th ese data also show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) account for 87.8 percent of the world’s Internet hosts.4 Th us this study allocated a weight of 46 percent [(74.3 ÷162.1) × 100] to personal computers and a weight of 54 percent [(87.8 ÷ 162.1) × 100] to Internet hosts and added the two results to derive the Computing Power Index. Th e denominator of these two equations is the sum of the percentages of the top 10 in each variable (74.3 + 87.8 = 162.1). (Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, and Minitab were used for the calculations.) High Technology Exports Th is study used the 1998 high-technology exports data from the World Bank (1999:317), which defi nes such exports as “goods produced by industries (based on U.S. industry classifi cations) that rank among a country’s Top 10 in terms of R&D expenditures.” In simpler terms, high technology exports are products with high R&D intensity. Th ey include aerospace products, computers, pharmaceuticals, scien- tifi c instruments, and electrical machinery (World Bank 2000:307).5 National Science Board (2000) says that high-technology industries are important to nations because such industries are associated with (a) innovation, (b) high value-added production and success in foreign markets, and (c) spillover eff ects that benefi t other commercial sectors by generating new products and processes. Data for the 1990s show an increased emphasis on high-technology manufac- tures among the major industrial countries. In 1997, production by U.S. high- technology industry accounted for nearly 32 percent of world high-technology production, and exports by U.S. high-technology industries accounted for 18.1 percent of world high-technology exports. Japan was second, accounting for 9.1 percent of exports, followed by the United Kingdom with 8.3 percent (NSB 2000). Because the World Bank excluded the data for Taiwan, an important high-tech product exporter, this study estimated the data by deriving the average for the East Asia region. Th e data show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) accounted for 71.1 percent of the world’s high-tech exports in 1998. Informational Society Power Index Th is study constructed the ISPI by allocating appropriate weights to the Computing Power Index and the High-Tech Exports Index and, then, combin- ing the two results. It allocated a weight of 53 percent to the CPI [(78.1 ÷149.2) × 100] because the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) accounted for 78.1 percent of this index; and it allocated a weight of 47 percent to the HTEI [(71.1 ÷149.2) × 100] based on the same reasoning. Th us the ISPI, just like its two derivate indexes, gives each global state/cluster a score out of 100 that refl ects its power position in the triadized center-periphery structure. Reliability and Validity Considering the conclusion of Van Rossem (1996) that the absolute size of the economy was the best proxy for world system role, I conducted a regression analysis of the component variables of the ISPI vis-à-vis the Gross National Income of each economy for which relevant data were available. My analysis yielded the following equations: R2= 82 for GNI v high technology exports (using 1999 data for 92 economies); R2=82 for GNI v number of Internet hosts (using 2001 data for 136 economies); and R2=96 for GNI v number of PCs (using 2000 data for 116 economies). Th us, we can surmise that all three variables have high reliability, as well as construct validity, because they are signifi cantly anchored to the GNI. Th e weights allocated to each of these variables—the per- centage share of the top 10 economies—to construct the ISPI are quite justifi - able, though somewhat arbitrary, because of the remarkable dominance of these few economies over each of the three attributes. 6 4. Th e top 10 countries shared 82.7 percent of the 1999 total of Internet domains, with Japan occupying the ninth rank (Zook 2001). However, Japan occupied the second rank in the share of Internet hosts . 5. World Bank (1999:317) identifi es high-tech exports, in technical terms, as “com- modities in the SITS Revision 2, Sections 5–9 (chemicals and related products, … manufactures, manufactured articles, machinery and transport equipment, and other manufactured articles and goods not elsewhere classifi ed), excluding Division 68 (non- ferrous metals).” OECD identifi es four industries as high technology, based on their high R&D intensities: (a) aerospace, (b) computers and offi ce machinery, (c) electronics-commu- nications, and (d) pharmaceuticals. 6. DeVellis (1991:317) says, “Scale reliability is the proportion of variance attribut- able to the true score of the latent variable.” He clarifi es that construct validity is “directly concerned with the theoretical relationship of a variable … to other variables” (p. 46). As for weights, one could argue that no empirical way exists to determine weights although structural equation (or path) modeling could generate an infi nity of statistically accept- http://www.netsizer.com http://www.isc.org http://www.netsizer.com Shelton A. Gunaratne343 An Evolving Triadic World 344 Asia, and almost one-half of the Middle East exports go to Asia.) Th e Central- Eastern Europe/NIS region appears to be the hinterland of the Western-Europe center. Because of Africa’s heavy dependence on Europe for its meager world trade, Africa also belongs to Europe’s hinterland. (More than one-half of the exports from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, as well as more than one-half of the exports of Africa, go to Western Europe.) Finally, Latin America, including the Caribbean, appears to be the hinterland of the North-America center. (More than one-half of the exports from Latin America go to North America.). The Triad Th is study defi ned the North-America center as the NAFTA cluster of global states, the Western-Europe center as the EU cluster of global states, and the Asian-Pacifi c center as the cluster of eight global states that topped the region’s Information Society Power Index (i.e., Japan, Singapore, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Australia). Th ese three center-clus- ters scored 91.2 out of the maximum possible 100 on the ISPI, thereby showing their remarkable dominance over their hinterlands (Table 2). NAFTA was the hegemon of the center-clusters with a score of 42. Th e EU, with a score of 26.6, was slightly ahead of the Asian-Pacifi c center with 22.6. Figure 1 illustrates the F I N DI NG S Th e exports-data attribute supported the “triadization” concept. (Statistical advice I received confi rmed that tests of signifi cance would make little sense because the data covered the universe.) Th e 1996–1999 world merchandise trade data (Table 1) provided evidence to back the notion of three center-clusters and four dependent periphery-clusters, which Castells (1996) refers to as hinterlands. Th e process of capital accumulation in the global material economy has gener- ated a scenario where world trade is predominantly concentrated in the three centers: Western Europe (42 percent), Asia (22 percent) and North America (20 percent) in that order. In general, most of the Asian continent, including the Middle East, appears to be the hinterland of the Asian-Pacifi c center—Japan and a half-dozen rising economies.7 (Almost one-half of Asia’s export trade is within able weights. Wainer and Th issen (1976:9) say “increased robustness can be obtained through the use of equal regression weights without severe loss in accuracy.” Th e weights I have allocated are very close to equal weights. 7. A reader of this manuscript, however, disputed this confi guration on the basis of the frequency of telephone calls from the one region to the other. He wrote: “For 1997, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE do not have an East Asian country among the top 20 nations that they call. But the United States and United Kingdom are among the top 10.” Considering that 46 percent of Middle East’s trade is with Asia (World Trade Organization 1999), this may mean that the trading partners are not using telephone communication alone for trade transactions because of language problems. Th e Middle East also has considerable trade connections with Western Europe (21 per- cent) and North America (13 percent). Trade data for 1997 clearly show that Japan was the No. 1 market for exports from Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (International Monetary Fund 1998). Telephone communication data may well be a refl ection of the international language order that has elevated English as the global language, and also of the Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU and the NAFTA center-clusters. Table 1 – Regional Pattern of World Merchandise Exports (based on annual average for 1996–1999) Origin Percentage of exports (shown along the rows) Destination World Western Europe Asia North America Latin America C/E Europe/Baltic/CIS Middle East Africa World 1996-1999 Average of Exports ($ Billions) 5331.75 2322.69 1344.57 890.44 278.20 216.74 163.62 115.96 Western Europe 42.1% 68.5% 17.5% 19.1% 14.3% 50.7% 20.9% 52.5% Asia 22.2% 8.4% 48.5% 23.4% 7.4% 7.4% 45.6% 13.9% North America 20.0% 8.7% 24.8% 37.4% 54.9% 4.1% 12.8% 15.4% Latin America 5.4% 2.4% 2.6% 15.2% 19.3% 1.7% 1.6% 2.7% C/E Europe/ Baltic/CIS 4.1% 5.3% 1.1% 0.9% 1.1% 31.8% 0.8% 1.2% Middle East 2.7% 2.6% 2.7% 2.6% 1.1% 2.1% 7.8% 1.5% Africa 2.2% 2.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 4.1% 9.1% Rows show origin; columns show destination. Boldface indicates exports within each region. Boldface Oblique indicates exports from periphery clusters to center-clusters. Source: WTO Annual Report 1999 and 2000 (based on Table A7) Computing Power Index High-Tech Exports Index Information Society Power IndexGlobal Centers NAFTA Center EU Center Asian-Pacific Center 57.4769 18.3091 13.3023 89.0883 24.5170 35.9777 33.1271 93.6218 41.9858 26.6134 22.6200 91.2191 Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999 Table 2 – The Three Global Centers Shelton A. Gunaratne345 An Evolving Triadic World 346 relative size of the three center-clusters in relation to the ISPI, as well as their relative positions on the two derivate indexes—the CPI and the HTEI. NAFTA Center Within the hegemon cluster, the United States stands out as the super global state with an ISPI score of 38. Canada and Mexico have relatively little power within the cluster (Table 3 and Figure 2). Because the United States beats the ISPI score of each of the other center-clusters, its infl uence on the entire world system becomes crystal clear. As a macro-unit, the NAFTA Center has a popula- tion of 410.3 million, a gross “national” income of $10.7 trillion, and a per capita income of $26,188 (World Bank 2000). EU Center Th ree global states stand out in the EU cluster: Germany and the United Kingdom hold the lead, with France closely behind. Th e Netherlands and Italy occupy the middle between the Big Th ree and the other 10 global states of the cluster (Table 4 and Figure 3). As a macro-unit, the EU Center has a population of 376.4 million, a gross “national” income of $8.5 trillion, and a per capita income of $22,654 (World Bank 2000). Asian-Pacific Center Compared with the other two, the Asian-Pacifi c center-cluster is geo- graphically not contiguous. Japan leads it with an ISPI score of 8.6 followed by Singapore (Table 5 and Figure 4). Except for Japan, South Korea and Australia, the other global states of this center-cluster do not belong to the OECD—the NAFTA Hinterland: The Caribbean Central America South America EU Hinterland: Africa East Europe/NIS A-P Hinterland: Middle East Other Asian-Pacific Communication Flow Between Center Clusters Communication Flow Between Each Center and its Hinterland Communication Flow Between Each Center and Other Hinterlands 15 25 35 45 55 655 20 25 30 35 40 EU 26.6134 NAFTA 41.9858 Asian-Pacific 22.6200 Computing-Power Index H ig h- Te ch E xp or ts I nd ex Figure 1 – Center Clusters and Hinterlands Note: Size of Bubble = Information Society Power Index NAFTA-Center 53.6910 3.0831 0.7028 United States Canada Mexico Sub-total 57.4769 19.7682 2.5175 2.2314 24.5170 37.7473 2.8172 1.4212 41.9858 Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999 Table 3 – Components of NAFTA–Center Computing Power Index High-Tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index Canada 2.8172 Mexico 1.4212 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 United States 37.7473 Computing-Power Index H ig h- Te ch E xp or ts I nd ex Note: Size of Bubble = Information Society Power Index Figure 2 – Center Cluster: NAFTA Shelton A. Gunaratne347 An Evolving Triadic World 348 world’s club of the rich. New Zealand, an OECD member, is not included in this cluster. Hong Kong also is not included although one could justify its inclusion as part of China. Unlike the other two center-clusters, the Asia-Pacifi c center- cluster is neither an economic union nor a free-trade association. As a macro- Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999 Table 4 – Components of EU–Center EU–Center Computing Power Index High-Tech Exports Index 4.1885 7.3775 5.6873 3.6339 7.4658 5.4349 2.1544 6.2754 4.0913 1.3734 4.0973 2.6537 2.3314 1.9766 2.1646 0.1997 2.7732 1.4092 0.9500 1.5896 1.2506 0.6005 1.2873 0.9233 0.9080 0.6526 0.7880 0.6479 0.9409 0.7856 0.4852 0.6807 0.5771 0.4768 0.6346 0.5510 0.1796 0.0940 0.1394 0.1516 0.0489 0.1033 0.0280 0.0832* 0.0540* Germany United Kingdom France Netherlands Italy Ireland Sweden Belgium Spain Finland Austria Denmark Portugal Greece Luxembourg Sub-total 18.3091 35.9777 26.6134 Information Society Power Index * Estimated -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Spain 0.7880 Sweden 1.2506 Finland 0.7856 Italy 2.1646 Netherlands 2.6537 France 4.0913 United Kingdom 5.4349 Germany 5.6873 Ireland 1.4092 Belgium 09.233 Denmark 0.5510 Austria 0.5771 Portugal 0.1394 Greece 0.1033 Luxembourg 0.0540 Computing-Power Index Hi gh -T ec h Ex po rt s In de x Note: Size of Bubble = Information Society Power Index Figure 3 – Center Cluster: European Union Japan 6.5504 10.9770 8.6309 Singapore 0.3179 6.3449 3.1506 Korea, South 1.2767 3.5420 2.3414 China 1.8865 2.6995 2.2686 Taiwan 1.0570 3.5538* 2.2305* Malaysia 0.2158 3.6389 1.8247 Philippines 0.1630 2.1898 1.1156 Australia 1.8349 0.1811 1.0576 Sub-Total 13.3023 33.1270 22.6200 Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999 Table 5 – Components of Asian-Pacific Center Asian-Pacific Center Computing Power Index High-Tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index * Estimated -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Computing-Power Index Hi gh -T ec h Ex po rt s In de x Note: Size of Bubble = Information Society Power Index Figure 4 – Center Cluster: Asian-Pacific Japan 8.6309 Singapore 3.1506 South Korea 2.3414 China 2.2686 Australia 1.0576 Philippines 1.1156 Taiwan 2.2305 Malaysia 1.8247 Shelton A. Gunaratne349 An Evolving Triadic World 350 (OECD) as the units comprising the world’s center and the semiperiphery. Th e Group of Seven (G-7), the world’s super-rich countries, would be the center, and the remainder the semiperiphery. My analysis shows that the OECD cluster accounts for 83.3 percent of the ISPI (Table 6). Geographical Breakdowns Table 7 shows the power rankings, in descending order, of each of the traditionally recognized main geographical regions. Th e Americas head the list followed by Western Europe, Asia-Pacifi c, East/Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, Middle East, and Africa. It also shows the power rankings of the sub-regions comprising each major region. Nested within each sub-region are the power rankings of each of its principal global states. Th e data in this table can assist the researchers who may want to redefi ne center-clusters and periph- ery-clusters. DISC US SION Although the world merchandise trade data help us identify the clusters comprising the global triad, they do not help us to correctly identify the hegemon of these three center-clusters. With 42 percent of the world trade concentrated in Western Europe, one could mistakenly identify the EU center-cluster as the hegemon. (IMF data for 1997 show that 60.6 percent of EU exports went to other EU countries, 8.7 percent to NAFTA, and 7.5 percent to Asian-Pacifi c core. See Table 1 for the three-year average for Western Europe.) However, the Information Society Power Index, which highlights the two main resources that presumably engender power inequalities among states, enables one to identify the actual hegemon.8 In Wallerstein’s parlance, a new world-economy, which Castells calls an informational economy, has replaced the old world-economy. In my formulation of the world system, the three center-clusters would include many, though not all, of the global states that Wallerstein placed in the semipe- riphery. Th us, prosperous small global states too have become part of the center. Th is perspective diff ers from that of Van Rossem (1996), who placed highly developed small economies in the second-tier periphery in his role-equivalence model of the world system. However, he allowed that global states could “gain unit, the Asian-Pacifi c Center has a population of 1.6 billion, a gross “national” income of $6.8 trillion, and a per capita income of $4,200 (World Bank 2000). OECD Th e traditional world-system perspective would most likely see the 30 member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 8. If one were to add up the exports and imports within the 50 states comprising the United States, just as in the case of the 15 components of the European Union, the result would also pinpoint the actual hegemon by smoothening the “infl ated” share of world merchandise trade credited to the latter. 53.6910 19.7682 37.7473 6.5504 10.9770 8.6309 4.1885 7.3775 5.6873 3.6339 7.4658 5.4349 2.1544 6.2754 4.0913 3.0831 2.5175 2.8172 1.3734 4.0973 2.6537 1.2767 3.5420 2.3414 2.3314 1.9766 2.1646 0.7028 2.2314 1.4212 0.1997 2.7732 1.4092 0.3595 0.0515 0.2148 0.3342 0.0546 0.2028 0.1796 0.0940 0.1394 0.1516 0.0489 0.1033 0.0280 0.0832* 0.0539* 0.0659 0.0335 0.0507 0.0325 0.0425* 0.0372* United States Japan Germany United Kingdom France Canada Netherlands Korea, South Italy Mexico Ireland 0.9500 1.5896 1.2506Sweden 1.8349 0.1811 1.0576Australia 0.6388 1.3933 0.9934Switzerland 0.6005 1.2873 0.9233Belgium 0.9080 0.6526 0.7880Spain 0.6479 0.9409 0.7856Finland 0.4852 0.6807 0.5771Austria 0.4768 0.6346 0.5510Denmark 0.5251 0.2188 0.3811Norway 0.1679 0.4507 0.3008Hungary 0.4589 0.0792 0.2805Poland 0.2037 0.2294 0.2158Czech Republic Turkey New Zealand Portugal Greece Luxembourg Slovak Republic Iceland Grand Total 88.2347 77.7483 83.3061 Table 6 – OECD–Member Countries OECD Countries Computing Power Index High-Tech Exports Index Information Society Power Index Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999 * Estimated Shelton A. Gunaratne351 An Evolving Triadic World 352 Table 7 – Relative Standing of Countries within Subregions of Major World Regions Americas North United States Canada Mexico South Brazil Argentina Colombia Chile Venezuela Peru Uruguay Ecuador Bolivia Paraguay Central Costa Rica Guatemala El Salvador Panama Honduras Nicaragua Caribbean Jamaica Cuba Dominican Republic Puerto Rico Haiti Western Europe Big Five Germany United Kingdom France Italy Spain Smaller Countries Netherlands Ireland Switzerland Belgium Co m pu tin g Po w er In de x 59.5676 57.4769 53.6910 3.0831 0.7028 1.9876 1.0081 0.3241 0.1915 0.1531 0.1362 0.0637 0.0593 0.0308 0.0126 0.0081 0.0754 0.0235 0.0147 0.0124 0.0123 0.0072 0.0053 0.0276 0.0134 0.0097 0.0039 0.0006 0.0000 19.4450 13.2162 4.1885 3.6339 2.1544 2.3314 0.9080 3.6290 1.3734 0.1997 0.6388 0.6005 Hi gh -T ec h Ex po rt s In de x 24.9745 24.5170 19.7682 2.5175 2.2314 0.4187 0.2958 0.0569 0.0351 0.0107 0.0091 0.0041 0.0025 0.0023 0.0017 0.0005 0.0382 0.0256 0.0069 0.0052 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 37.5066 23.7480 7.3775 7.4658 6.2754 1.9766 0.6526 10.3748 4.0973 2.7732 1.3933 1.2873 In fo rm at io n So ci et y Po w er In de x 43.3088 41.9858 37.7473 2.8172 1.4212 1.2502 0.6733 0.1985 0.1180 0.0861 0.0765 0.0357 0.0326 0.0174 0.0075 0.0045 0.0579 0.0245 0.0110 0.0090 0.0065 0.0039 0.0029 0.0149 0.0072 0.0052 0.0022 0.0003 0.0001 27.9339 18.1661 5.6873 5.4349 4.0913 2.1646 0.7880 6.7995 2.6537 1.4092 0.9934 0.9233 Austria Portugal Greece Nordic Sweden Finland Denmark Norway Asia-Pacific East Asia Japan Korea, South China Taiwan Hong Kong Mongolia South East Asia Singapore Malaysia Philippines Thailand Indonesia Vietnam Myanmar Cambodia Laos Oceania Australia New Zealand Papua New Guinea South Asia India Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal East-Central Europe/NIS East Central Hungary Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic 0.4852 0.1796 0.1516 2.5998 0.9500 0.6479 0.4768 0.5251 15.1259 11.2112 6.5504 1.2767 1.8865 1.0570 0.4384 0.0021 1.2206 0.3179 0.2158 0.1630 0.1982 0.2335 0.0832 0.0059 0.0017 0.0014 2.1693 1.8349 0.3342 0.0002 0.5247 0.4162 0.0719 0.0154 0.0136 0.0076 2.2061 0.8964 0.1679 0.4589 0.2037 0.0659 Co m pu tin g Po w er In de x 0.6807 0.0940 0.0489 3.3839 1.5896 0.9409 0.6346 0.2188 35.5903 21.3226 10.9770 3.5420 2.6995 3.5538 0.5503 0.0000 13.8784 6.3449 3.6389 2.1898 1.4592 0.2455 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2357 0.1811 0.0546 0.0000 0.1536 0.1522 0.0010 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 1.2506 0.7928 0.4507 0.0792 0.2294 0.0335 Hi gh -T ec h Ex po rt s In de x 0.5771 0.1394 0.1033 2.9683 1.2506 0.7856 0.5510 0.3811 24.7441 15.9636 8.6309 2.3414 2.2686 2.2305 0.4910 0.0011 7.1698 3.1506 1.8247 1.1156 0.7909 0.2391 0.0441 0.0032 0.0009 0.0008 1.2605 1.0576 0.2028 0.0001 0.3503 0.2921 0.0386 0.0084 0.0072 0.0040 1.7570 0.8477 0.3008 0.2805 0.2158 0.0507 In fo rm at io n So ci et y Po w er In de x Shelton A. Gunaratne353 An Evolving Triadic World 354 NIS 1.0310 0.3579 0.7147 Russia 0.7959 0.2836 0.5552 Ukraine 0.1129 0.0000 0.0598 Estonia 0.0456 0.0200 0.0336 Lithuania 0.0330 0.0082 0.0213 Latvia 0.0295 0.0049 0.0179 Belarus 0.0006 0.0236 0.0114 Kazakhstan 0.0023 0.0119 0.0068 Moldova 0.0053 0.0013 0.0034 Kyrgyzstan 0.0016 0.0036 0.0025 Armenia 0.0031 0.0007 0.0020 Georgia 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 Turkmenistan 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 Azerbaijan 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 Uzbekistan 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 Tajikistan 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 Southeast 0.2786 0.1000 0.1946 Slovenia 0.0732 0.0413 0.0582 Romania 0.0866 0.0136 0.0522 Croatia 0.0459 0.0308 0.0388 Bulgaria 0.0353 0.0129 0.0248 Yugoslavia 0.0338 0.0000 0.0179 Albania 0.0024 0.0001 0.0013 Macedonia 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 Middle East 1.4990 0.5569 1.0562 West Asia 1.4990 0.5569 1.0562 Israel 0.3014 0.4921 0.3910 Iran 0.4163 0.0000 0.2206 Turkey 0.3595 0.0515 0.2148 United Arab Emirates 0.1769 0.0000 0.0938 Saudi Arabia 0.1444 0.0045 0.0787 Kuwait 0.0298 0.0010 0.0163 Syria 0.0273 0.0000 0.0145 Lebanon 0.0205 0.0000 0.0109 Oman 0.0081 0.0076 0.0079 Jordan 0.0111 0.0000 0.0059 Yemen 0.0036 0.0000 0.0019 Iraq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Africa 0.8109 0.1289 0.4904 Southern Africa 0.4717 0.1105 0.3019 South Africa 0.4017 0.1069 0.2631 Zimbabwe 0.0195 0.0015 0.0111 Mauritius 0.0148 0.0017 0.0087 Zambia 0.0082 0.0000 0.0043 Namibia 0.0078 0.0000 0.0041 Co m pu tin g Po w er In de x Hi gh -T ec h Ex po rt s In de x In fo rm at io n So ci et y Po w er In de x Botswana Mozambique Madagascar Angola Malawi Lesotho North Africa Egypt Morocco Tunisia Algeria Libya West Africa Nigeria Senegal Ghana Cameroon Togo Guinea Gabon Mauritania Mali Chad Benin Gambia Central African Republic Niger Sierra Leone Guinea-Bissau East Africa Kenya Sudan Tanzania Uganda Ethiopia Rwanda Eritrea Burundi Grand Total Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999 0.0072 0.0060 0.0039 0.0014 0.0012 0.0000 0.1668 0.0919 0.0362 0.0173 0.0214 0.0000 0.1275 0.0832 0.0169 0.0060 0.0048 0.0042 0.0036 0.0014 0.0019 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0450 0.0170 0.0083 0.0074 0.0066 0.0054 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 98.65 Co m pu tin g Po w er In de x 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0139 0.0002 0.0010 0.0120 0.0006 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 Hi gh -T ec h Ex po rt s In de x 0.0038 0.0033 0.0021 0.0008 0.0006 0.0000 0.0949 0.0488 0.0197 0.0148 0.0116 0.0000 0.0686 0.0441 0.0090 0.0032 0.0026 0.0022 0.0019 0.0017 0.0010 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0249 0.0101 0.0044 0.0039 0.0035 0.0029 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 99.29 In fo rm at io n So ci et y Po w er In de x Shelton A. Gunaratne355 An Evolving Triadic World 356 prominence in the world system through cooperation and regional alliances that pool their resources” (p. 524). Adhering to Bergesen (1990), I began with the international order and only then derived the presence of states and national economies. My starting point was the global trade fl ow pattern, which enabled me to determine the regional clusters that dominated the world economy/system. (However, my confi gura- tion was based on the pattern of exports, not imports, because exports represent the competition for world capital accumulation. Th e relational data derived from network analysis would refl ect both exports and imports but with inadequate attention to the magnitude of trade.) Th en I hypothesized the factors—comput- ing power and high-technology manufacturing—that enabled these clusters to compete successfully in the global informational economy. Th ereafter, I looked at the pattern of distribution of the world totality of computing power and high-tech exports to construct a power index for each center-cluster and its con- stituent member states. My approach of using attributes for analysis is consistent with that of historical social science that gave birth to the world-systems theory. As pointed out earlier, adherents of network theory, including Barnett et al. (1999), assert that the proper approach to the analysis of structural theory uses relational data such as the frequency of communication among social systems or nation states. However, network analysis also suff ers from major drawbacks. First, the lack of global data sets makes it an impractical method to uncover the historical center-periphery structure of the world economy going back at least to the beginning of the European Age (Wallerstein 1974) or the Asian Age (Frank 1998). Smith and Timberlake (2001) confess “the lack of data on the fl ows between any units of a network means that relational analysis can never adequately capture its multiplex structure in totality” (p. 1662), and the nature of network analysis made “missing data particularly problematic” (p. 1661). Second, in the absence of solid and unbiased data sets encompassing all global units, network analysis based on partial data will raise questions on validity in spite of statistically derived results on connectedness, centrality, and integrativeness. Although some good network data on commodity trade fl ows are available, Smith and Timberlake lament the “absolute dearth of relational data on all social phenomena” (p. 1661), i.e., compilations of networks of interactions or fl ows between global units. In relation to tracing communication networks, Smith and Timberlake point out that although sampling the volume of telephone calls, telex messages, faxes, telegraph, and mail is possible in principle, telephone companies “would probably be reluctant to share such information because of the possible implications for their competitive positions in the industry” (p. 1663). Th ird, the dearth of data available for network analysis forces researchers to operationalize research concepts to suit the availability of data thereby raising further questions on validity.9 For instance, Kim and Barnett (1996) used the country reports of international newspapers and periodicals trade data—a very narrow category based on self-reporting—to defi ne news fl ows. Again, Barnett et al. (1999) used data from a U.S.-based credit card corporation to measure global monetary fl ows that gave an incomplete picture of international transactions related to Japan in particular. Th is study has hypothesized that the power structure of the Information Society, to a large extent, is dependent on computing power and high-technol- ogy manufacturing. However, one should be conscious that these two variables, in turn, are the consequence of a cluster of antecedent variables, such as those included in the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program 2000)—the real per capita income, literacy, education, and life expec- tancy. Th e emphasis placed on research and development is also a supremely important factor. Th e Computing Power Index constructed for this study needs further validation through a comparison with mips (million instructions per second) when such data become available for most global clusters. Furthermore, the reliability of the CPI also depends on the accuracy of the estimates of the number of personal computers and Internet hosts. Th is study’s High Technology Exports Index also needs refi nement based on a “more comprehensive notion of high technology” (Chabot c. 1996). Th is study provides the following world system perspective. Th e modern world-economy comprises three competing center-clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters. Th e relative power of the three center-clusters is unequal. Among them, there is a hegemon cluster led by a global state that has more power in the world system than any other. Th e relative power of the global states within the center-clusters, as well as those within the periphery-clusters, is also unequal. If one were to presume that the global infor- mation and communication fl ow follows the pattern of this triadized center- hinterland structure, this reformulated world system perspective off ers a rich theoretical framework for conducting global communication research. Barnett and colleagues, as noted earlier, say their network analyses do not show a triadic confi guration as postulated by Castells (1996), Mattelart (1996/ 2000), and others. Barnett and Choi (1995), however, say they found three group- ings of a diff erent kind: a Spanish-language based group that included Spain and Latin America; an English-language based group that included East and South 9. Van Rossem (1996:525) says, “Th e development of better measures of world system role is made diffi cult not only by the conceptual confusion, but also by the poor quality and limited availability of international data.” Shelton A. Gunaratne357 An Evolving Triadic World 358 Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada; and a group comprising continental Europe, excluding France and Spain. Th e Barnett team’s Choi and Ahn (1996) confi rmed the centrality of the G-7 countries in Europe but found no evidence (Choi & Ahn 1994) of the cen- trality of Japan in the Pacifi c Basin community. Th ey placed Hong Kong, as the center of information fl ow in East Asia. Although WTO data on world trade (Table 1) clearly indicate the triadic domination of the world economy, Barnett et al. (1999) provide no explanation for this discrepancy. Th ey assert: When comparing the international monetary, telecommunications and trade networks, the overall results suggest these three networks are quite similar. NEGOPY results suggest that these networks share similar core, peripheral, semi-peripheral and marginal countries.…In spite of all the recent ideologi- cal criticisms of the world system theory…, these research findings support the theory.…The consistent regional patterns of organization in the three networks suggest a further anomaly in the world system theory, i.e., factors other than economic ones determine the structure of the world system. These include geographical and cultural factors. (Barnett et al. 1999:43) Barnett and Choi (1995) and Barnett and Salisbury (1996), however, did fi nd regional clusters for telecommunication fl ows, as well as for international telephone use. Barnett et al. (1999:42) admitted that these were “somewhat at odds with world system theory.” Th ey said that one explanation could be that the world system may be divided into regional groupings even though “recent research has failed to confi rm this fi nding for international trade” (p. 42). Th us these researchers concede that the world system theory needs some refi nement as suggested in this essay. Th e present study sees the three center-clusters— NAFTA, EU, and Asia-Pacifi c—as the most evident structure of the contem- porary world-economy. Starting from this totality, network analysis could trace relations within each cluster and among the three clusters and their hinterlands in relation to better-conceptualized research problems. Network analysis could provide new insights if it were to analyze the EU as a single economic unit rather than as 15 separate political units thereby reducing the current Eurocentric bias. Each of the three center-clusters can be analyzed similarly. A crucial need is to answer the following questions: What is international communication; and should there be a distinction between mass communica- tion and other forms of communication such as travel, tourism and migration? Multiple-network analysis encompassing a variety of communication variables would be the most benefi cial though the most diffi cult to do. If the triadization concept were to be incongruent with the pattern of world communication, that may indicate the need to separate the world communication or language order from the world economic order. Th e work of Barnett and colleagues in the communication fi eld need further confi rmation (for validity and reliability) using all pertinent research approaches. Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) say “some excellent work has attempted empiri- cally to measure the placement of states in the core/periphery hierarchy” (p. 397) using a number of research tools. Th e essential requirement is to move the research focus away from the atom (i.e., the nation-state) to the whole (i.e., the world system). Th us the analysis of global communication should move in descending order from the world-economy to the center-clusters and their respective hinterlands, i.e., the periphery-clusters, and only then to the global- states within each of the clusters. Researchers could redefi ne the center-clusters or the periphery-clusters to achieve the desired accuracy. For instance, they could expand the EU cluster (ISPI = 26.613) into a Western Europe cluster (ISPI = 28.025) by adding Western Europe’s OECD states excluded from the European Union: Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Th e arrows in Figure 1 indicate the potential interrelationships between and among the various clusters. Th e bold double-arrow lines show the hypothetical higher information and communication fl ow between and among the three com- peting center-clusters. Th e thin double-arrow lines show the hypothetical higher information and communication fl ow between each center-cluster and its hinter- land. Th e broken double-arrow lines show the hypothetical lower information and communication fl ow between hinterlands and external center-clusters. Th is model presumes a very low fl ow among the hinterlands themselves. Within this framework, researchers can test hypotheses covering all fi ve elements in Lasswell’s (1948) transmission model: Who (Source) says what (Message) to whom (Receiver) through what medium (Channel) with what eff ect (Impact). Here are two examples of plausible hypotheses related to source- message-receiver elements: • Information and communication fl ow within each center-cluster and its respective hinterland would be greater than the fl ow across competing center-hinterland confi gurations.10 10. Th e aforementioned reader also pointed out that Fuentes-Bautista (1999) had examined trade and telecommunication fl ows in the Americas and found that trade blocs did not have an impact on regional communication, although they did eff ect trade. Th e study showed one group centered on the United States. Th is too points out to the need for more research by diff erent researchers. It also suggests a need to diff erentiate between communication and mass communication with more widely acceptable operational defi nitions. Shelton A. Gunaratne359 An Evolving Triadic World 360 • Information and communication fl ow from the hegemon center-cluster to each of the other two center-clusters would be greater than the fl ow from the remaining center-cluster. Th e fl ow to the hegemon center-cluster from the other two center-clusters favors the one that has the higher ISPI score (i.e., EU cluster). An example of a medium-related hypothesis would be: • Mass media density in each of the center-hinterland confi gurations, as well as in its component global-states, generally follows the pattern of its respective ISPI score. Th e proposed model also provides a challenge to researchers who are engaged in mapping press freedom in the world (e.g., Van Belle 2000; Weaver, Buddenbaum & Fair 1985). Th e structural-functionalist modernization para- digm, which presumed that nation-states changed in parallel lines from tradition to modernity, placed media participation, with accompanying press freedom, as another facet of development. Th us it placed press freedom outside the context of the world system. Freedom House, for instance, measures press freedom using four criteria solely internal to a state: laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, economic infl uences, and repressive action (Sussman 2000). My model requires linking the notion of press freedom to global forces, such as the ability of center-clusters to fl ood the periphery-clusters with a barrage of information- communication notwithstanding the domestic restrictions within a state. So conceived, the measurement of press freedom should include the accessibility of information from non-domestic sources.11 Moreover, if we were to presume the libertarian concept—“a free fl ow of information unimpeded by any interven- tion by any nation” (Hachten 1999:21)—as the best expression of press freedom, then, research must also address the issue of global press freedom vis-à-vis the vast volume of government-sponsored global news fl ow (e.g., Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Radio France Internationale, etc.). As noted in the literature review, the world system perspective also provides a challenge to developmental-communication researchers to look into the global links that limit or facilitate a nation’s competitive edge in capital accumulation. Th e concept of developmental communication, as well as that of developmen- tal journalism, which is predicated on the modernization paradigm, requires a thorough re-examination. Elevating the quality of journalism globally, and in the periphery-clusters in particular, may serve a much more useful purpose than a restricted brand of developmental journalism that hardly commands an audi- ence. Although the world system perspective is solidly based on economics, its strength depends on its ability to provide a testing ground of hypotheses asso- ciated with all other social sciences. Wallerstein (1979) maintains that history and the social sciences—anthropology, economics, geography, political science, and sociology—are just “one subject matter” that one may call “historical social science” (p. ix); and that the world-systems theory is a by-product of the applica- tion of historical social science. If economic criteria are implicitly integral to all social sciences, then the present study’s theoretical approach should be eminently suitable for culture-and communication research as well. Frank and Gills (1993) assert that the world system theory accommodates scholarship in a variety of disciplines. Anthropologists (Kearney 1995) and geographers (Straussfogel 1997) are among the social scientists who have attempted to integrate it into their fi elds. Relating the world-systems theory to international communication, anthro- pologist Kearney (1995) points out the three successive dominant paradigms in the fi eld: the communication and development model, the cultural imperialism model, and the cultural pluralism model, “which is still exploring the dynamics of media in a world in which the distinction between centers and peripheries has largely dissolved with respect to media production and consumption” (p. 555). Global communication researchers stand to gain by adopting the world system theory to examine this issue and much more. Tomlinson (1997:174), for instance, sees advantages “in the recuperation of globalization within international or ‘global sociology’…or in Immanuel Wallerstein’s contributions to debates on global culture, framed fi rmly in the perspective of world-system theory,” which may well accommodate the analysis of the postmodern condition of compression of time and space (Harvey 1989), as well as action at distance associated with theo- ries of structuration and the nature of modernity (Giddens 1994). Tomlinson (1991), however, has criticized Schiller (1979) for using the macro-political economy approach of the world-system theory to equate cultural domination or “media imperialism” with economic domination with no attempt to show empiri- cal evidence relating to the cultural eff ects of such domination on the receivers. As stated in the introduction, the particular contribution of the proposed theoretical approach is the potential it off ers to examine global or international communication patterns/processes (source-message-medium-receiver-impact) 11. Th e MacBride Report (1980) attempted to place press freedom in a global con- text. It affi rmed everyone’s right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, as articulated in Article 19 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Note that this right belongs to the individual, not the media institutions.) Th e report also drew attention to the 1952 Convention on the International Right of Correction (Recommendation 48). Shelton A. Gunaratne361 An Evolving Triadic World 362 holistically by recognizing the part-whole interrelationships of all theoretical components of the world system. 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