JWSR Volume 10, Number 1, Winter 2004 255 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration and Political Mobilization* journal of world-systems research, x, 1, winter 2004, 255–285 Special Issue: Global Social Movements Before and After 9-11 http://jwsr.ucr.edu/ issn 1076–156x © 2004 Jackie Smith The Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization and subsequent resistance to global trade and investment negotiations highlight the growing centralization of economic and political power in entities that transcend nation- states. Th ese protests challenge traditional understandings of social movements as bounded by national or sub-national political arenas. Globalization, or the expansion of social interactions across national borders, leaves few areas of social life untouched, and sociologists are beginning to pay closer attention to how it aff ects our understanding of social and political processes. While globalization is not new, its relatively recent acceleration and expansion to new social domains calls for greater sociological attention. Th is project builds upon existing socio- logical research and brings new data to the investigation of relationships between globalization, social movements, and political change. Jackie Smith With the end of the Cold War, military security issues declined on the international agenda as environmental, economic, and social issues rose. As superpower confl ict faded from the international agenda, space was created for new attempts at multilateral problem-solving. How have these changes aff ected the prospects for transnational organizing? Using data from the Yearbook of International Associations this paper explores changes in the size, issue focus, geographic makeup, and organizational struc- ture of the population of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) in recent decades. While not the only form of transna- tional cooperation, these formal organizations provide important infrastructures for sustained transnational political work. Key fi ndings are that while the transnational social movement sector has continued to grow since the mid- 20th century, its rate of growth has slowed in the 1990s. Also, human rights and environ- ment predominate on TSMO issue-agendas, but during the 1990s more groups emphasized economic issues and adopted multi-issue orga- nizing frames over single-issue focuses. Newer groups were more likely to be organized region- ally, that is within the global North or South, which may refl ect eff orts to develop structures to better connect local settings with global net- works. abstract Jackie Smith Department of Sociology Stony Brook University State University of New York Stony Brook, New York 11794-4356 jackie.smith@sunysb.edu http://www.sunysb.edu/sociology/ * This is a revised version of paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, 18 August 2001. This research has been supported by an American Sociological Association - National Science Foundation Funds for Advancing the Discipline grant and by the World Society Foundation. Numerous colleagues provided helpful comments on various aspects of this research, including my colleagues in the sociology depart- ment at SUNY Stony Brook, members of the Labor and Globalization seminar at Columbia University, the Globalization study group at the University of Pittsburgh, the Globalization and Contentious Politics seminar at Cornell University, and students and faculty at the Sociology/ Anthropology department at Hofstra University. Special thanks to Dawn Wiest for research assistance on the project and to John McCarthy, Timothy Moran, Sidney Tarrow, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, and Andrea Tyree for comments on earlier drafts. http://jwsr.ucr.edu/ http://www.sunysb.edu/sociology/ Jackie Smith256 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 257 While many Americans were surprised by the size and vigor of the recent protests against the global trade regime, these events should be seen as part of a long and growing stream of protest against global fi nancial institutions. Th is resistance has been most visible in the global South, where the eff ects of global fi nancial policies have triggered the most violent responses. Th e protests have broadened geographically and gained momentum since the late 1970s (see, e.g., Keck 1998; Fox and Brown, 1998; Walton and Seddon 1994). Th e most recent protests are especially important in that they demonstrate strong opposition to global trade liberalization from a variety of constituencies within the countries that have benefi tted the most from liberal trade policies. Th ey also build upon a more extensive network of transnational organizational and informational ties among activists in a wide range of countries. Th is organizational infrastructure began to expand in the latter half of the 20t century, and its roots took hold and generated more rapid transnational organizational expansion in the 1970s and 1980s (Sikkink and Smith 2002). GLOBA L I N TEGR ATION A ND SOCIA L MOV EMEN T MOBILIZATION How should we expect global integration to impact social movements? Social movement scholars have recognized various potential transnational impacts on social movement mobilization. First, the relative strength or weakness of a state and its degree of vulnerability to domestic political challengers is aff ected by the state’s geopolitical position. For instance, World Systems theory holds that, because of stratifi cation in the global labor market, core states will tend to be more democratic, while periphery states will tend to be more repressive. Th us, the political opportunities that movements in every country face are shaped by how the target government is integrated into the global political economy (see, e.g., Maney 2002; Anderson-Sherman and McAdam 1982; Skocpol 1979). Second, the ideas around which social movements mobilize have long fl owed freely across political boundaries. Th us, civil rights activists drew inspiration and strategy from Mahatma Gandhi (Kumar 1992; Chabot 2000) and European and U.S. activists of the 1960s learned from each others’ experiences and innovations (McAdam and Rucht 1993). More recently, transnational alliances of environ- mental activists and indigenous groups have generated a “political ecology” frame that relates environmental struggles to concerns for human rights and local empowerment (Rothman and Oliver 2002). Th ird, transformations in global communication and transportation technologies as well as the related develop- ment of global economic and political institutions facilitate the mobilization of transnationally organized social movements (Kriesberg 1997; Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000).¹ Th ey do so in part by fostering the development of shared cultural and ideological frameworks that serve to legitimate certain collective values and goals—such as democracy, human rights, or free trade—that appeal to global or at least transnational constituencies. Not only have social movements been aff ected by changes in the global polit- ical and economic order, but they have also played roles in shaping that order. For instance, Keck and Sikkink show how advocates working to abolish the slave trade, helped to advance transnational human rights norms (1998). In addition, numerous case studies have documented that the formation and strengthening of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) have been assisted by eff orts of non-governmental actors to shape governmental policies and to codify universal standards for, among other issues, human rights (Hovey 1997; Smith 1995; Boli and Th omas 1999) and more humane military and national defense practices (Evangelista 1995; Finnemore 1996; Price 1998). Th e recent mobilizations around global trade institutions have built in part upon eff orts to defend prior achievements in global environmental, human rights and labor law from growing challenges by the global trade regime (Smith 2002a). Rates of change in the quantity and speed of economic, political, and other societal interactions have increased dramatically, particularly in more recent times. Forms of economic globalization can be traced back to the late 17t century or earlier (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Wolf, 1982). Political globalization– fi rst characterized by the diff usion of organizational templates for state structures and political organization, and later evolving towards an increasingly organized inter-state polity—dates back at least as far (Boli and Th omas 1997). Socio-cul- tural globalization developed from the transnational human interactions mani- fested in economic and political integration. Th e technological and organizational innovations, particularly those of the late-20th century, have accelerated capacity for global integration of economic and political activities, and these same innova- tions have also served to advance globalization of the social and cultural realm. Th e changes in all three dimensions of globalization all aff ect the variable political opportunities available to social movement actors (della Porta and Kriesi 1999). Th e economic realm is characterized by increasing income dispari- ¹. Keck and Sikkink (1998) discuss the formation of less formally organized trans- national “issue networks” promoting changes such as the abolition of the slave trade, an end to foot-binding in China, and expansion of women’s suff rage. Th ese issue networks resemble what sociologists call social movements, though there are some important con- ceptual diff erences, such as a distinction between governmental agents and actors pro- moting some form of political change (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfi eld 1997). Jackie Smith258 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 259 GLOBA L I N TEGR ATION A ND SOCIA L MOV EMEN TS : HY POTHESES How are changes in international political and economic interactions likely to aff ect the mobilization of transnational social movements? Boli and Th omas (1997) documented the presence of a “world polity” that is evidenced by isomor- phism in the organizational structures adopted by national states as well as by the global diff usion of ideas such as individualism, scientifi c rationality, bureau- cratization, and citizenship.⁴ Th ey view international non-governmental orga- nizations (INGOs) as important conveyors of world cultural ideas and values, as they seek to promote common international standards for industries or to advance the goals of democracy, human rights, or respect for the environment. Kathryn Sikkink and her colleagues have done important work to demonstrate the ways that certain INGOs advance global norms and shape inter-state poli- tics (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). Th is wealth of research supports the claim that transnational associations serve as key social infrastructures that help link individuals and national or sub-national groups with global-level political processes. Such a view is consistent with predominant perspectives in the sociology of social movements that treat social movement organizations as key actors within a fl uid and loosely organized social movement fi eld (See, e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Drawing from this work and others (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997), we would expect to fi nd that: h1: The size and geographic dispersion of the formally organized transnational social movement sector will expand with increased global institutionalization. Th e second half of the 20t century has brought a dramatic expansion of supranational political institutions. Governments have been cooperating around an increasing number of issues—from the rules of war and humanitarian law to environmental practices to the policing of international narcotics traffi cking. And they have established formal organizations to structure and routinize this cooperation. Th is pattern of increased formalization and bureaucratization of (inter-)state structures parallels that accompanying the rise of the modern state. Social movement analysts trace the rise of organized social movements to the ties and concentrations of wealth in the hands of transnational corporate actors coupled with the strengthening—particularly during the 1990s—of international institutions designed to facilitate and advance free trade. Th ese developments have important consequences both for the formation of new grievances and for the capacities of challengers to mobilize and to aff ect social change (See, e.g., Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997; Sassen 1998). In the political realm, the forma- tion and strengthening of supra-national institutions has transferred important aspects of political decision making outside the nation-state. Th is undermines democratic accountability within states, thereby limiting the abilities of challeng- ers to achieve their goals within national political arenas alone. It has, however, also created new opportunities for social movements and other non-state actors to access decision makers and seek infl uence in both national and transnational policy arenas (see, e.g., Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfi eld 1997).² Finally, in the socio-cultural realm, the global spread of ideas (e.g., universal human rights) and cultural materials (e.g., fi lms, music) may help lay the orga- nizational and ideological foundations for transnational collective action. It also creates new incentives for contention as social movement actors seek to align the framing of local confl icts with those of global-level discourses (cf. Snow et al. 1986). By framing local struggles in global terms, local groups can gain legitimacy as well as new international allies.³ Th ese various aspects of globalization, in short, aff ect the political opportunities open to movements at both the national and international levels, the resources available to movement actors, and the interpretations or framings of confl icts. Nevertheless, eff orts to understand how global economic, institutional, and social transformations aff ect possibilities for social movements remain relatively under-developed (but see Tarrow 2001). ². Kim Reimann (2002) demonstrates how Japanese environmental organizations gained increased access to national politicians as a direct result of the Climate Change Convention negotiations in Kyoto. Th e international conference increased the salience of environmental issues on national political agendas, and it legitimated the claims of national environmental groups. Moreover, the United Nations practice of recognizing non-governmental actors socialized Japanese offi cials to expand the access of Japanese NGOs to national political arenas. ³. Th is does, of course, mean that some of the most urgent struggles are ignored by the international community because they do not resonate with global mobilizing frames (e.g., Bob 2001). ⁴. Th e world polity perspective, however, does not account very well for confl icts among these values and how power and politics might aff ect variation in the reinforce- ment of certain values (e.g., economic rationalization) over others (e.g. equity, human rights, environmental protection). Jackie Smith260 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 261 emergence of national states during the 18t century (see, e.g., Tilly 1984; Markoff 1996; Markoff 1999). We should therefore expect greater formalization within a social movement sector that seeks to infl uence the political contests being waged in emerging supra-national institutions. In other words, just as the rise of states brought with it the emergence of national social movement organiza- tions (SMOs), we should expect an expansion of IGOs to generate new forms of transnational organization, or transnational SMOs. Early states altered political contests between challengers and elites by bring- ing a new actor into what once were more regional and local confl icts. Th at state brought increasing amounts of resources to bear on those confl icts and served as either opponent or ally of local challengers, depending upon the context. Th e same dynamic is true when we think of the struggles in a global political context. International agencies are created and funded by national governments. Th ey are charged with addressing specifi c international problems, and they therefore do not always refl ect the specifi c interests of their government members. Th is cre- ates opportunities for cooperation between international agencies and transna- tional social movement actors around problem-solving goals.⁵ Such cooperation between SMOs and IGOs can contribute to movement mobilization as well as co-optation. Once established, international institutions can stimulate growth in the transnational social movement sector by providing access to information and fi nancial resources, by serving as a focal point or target for social movement energies, and by actively facilitating networking among individuals and groups participating in social movements. Beyond its contribution to the overall growth of the transnational social movement sector, we should expect that the charac- ter of global political interactions will infl uence transnational social movement mobilization: h2: The expansion (or decline) of a particular transnational social movement industry is affected by changes in the broader “world polity.” Specifically, growth in a particular transnational social movement industry such as the environment or trade will be associated with new or renewed transnational institutionalization around issues relevant to that industry. On issues where little international cooperation exists, there will be minimal transnational social movement mobilization. Th e end of the Cold War meant that superpower rivalries no longer stymied negotiations in the United Nations, creating new optimism for multilateralism. It allowed new issues to achieve greater priority on international agendas, and it opened up space for the emergence of new political blocs. At least at fi rst, this produced new levels of agreement within the UN and generated new treaty ini- tiatives in several issue areas outside of the area of military security. By facilitating cross-national dialogue among actors from both within and outside governments, by focusing government attention and resources on problems defi ned through international negotiations, and by conveying legitimacy to some of the claims of social movements, international institutions infl uence transnational mobiliza- tion. We should expect, then, that an increase in the numbers of organizations, conferences, and treaties that help structure international political cooperation will aff ect the shape of the transnational social movement sector. Another crucial trend in the post-Cold War period is the expansion of neolib- eral ideology, including its institutionalization in the World Trade Organization and regional trade associations as well as in the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Th e demise of the Soviet Union was seen as a vic- tory for free market capitalism over socialist economic policies, and proponents of limited government and unrestricted markets enjoyed important infl uence in the global economic arena. Th e opening of the World Trade Organization in 1994 clearly altered the context of all multilateral policies, and as the organi- zation took hold, it became clear that its operation could threaten other areas of international cooperation such as human rights and the environment. Th ese developments should be expected to aff ect the character transnational social movement organizations, probably by attracting greater attention to trade and economic issues. Economic globalization has important consequences for transnational social movement mobilization; and not least among them is the diff usion of inexpen- sive communications and transportation technologies which are essential to transnational corporate operations. Does the social movement sector replicate existing structures of economic dominance and marginalization? Are challengers to existing global inequities subject to the same economic forces that reinforce the gaps between the world’s rich and poor? Th e following hypotheses will help organize analyses that address these questions: h3: On measures of access to IGOs, survival, and legitimacy, TSMOs based in core regions will be more successful than those based in peripheral ones. ⁵. Th us we see that social movement actors promoting limits to greenhouse gas emissions often fi nd ready allies and resources from governments that favor a stronger climate change treaty (including many European governments) and from international agencies (such as the Secretariat for the Climate Change Convention). Th ese allies and resources are part of a broader struggle against other states (e.g., the U.S.) and indus- try (which created its own “NGO”—called the “Global Climate Coalition”—in order to resist stronger environmental accords). Jackie Smith262 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 263 Participation in most transnational political and social change activities demands highly specialized knowledge and skills. At the very least, one is required to speak at least one of the offi cial UN languages. And more ready access to information and offi cials is available if a TSMO is based near a center of interna- tional decision making such as New York, Brussels, or Geneva. Th ose promoting international human rights must have some expertise in law, and many activ- ists in this area hold advanced degrees in that fi eld. Moreover, the domination of many global institutions by the agendas and interests of core industrialized countries would lead us to expect that the core/periphery pattern is replicated in the social movement sector. However, the fact that TSMOs are, by defi nition, challengers to the exist- ing political and economic order, we would expect that they would not simply mirror and reinforce structural inequalities, but rather that they would seek to transform them (Amin et al. 1990). Th us, we expect core/periphery diff erences in the social movement sector to be shrinking over time, particularly as the sector itself becomes more organizationally rich and diverse.⁶ h4: Core/periphery distinctions found in global economic relationships are reproduced in the political realm, making TSMOs more populous in core areas. Over time, however, as access to transportation and communication increases, as the number of TSMOs expands, and as technology becomes more widely disseminated, the location of TSMOs will be less concentrated in the core. An additional area of concern regards the ways that changing technologies— particularly the expansion of electronic communications—aff ect transnational organizing. We should expect that expanding global integration of social, eco- nomic, and political relations both refl ects and contributes to new opportunities for transnational organizing of all kinds. Technologies that facilitate transna- tional communication and routine exchanges of ideas as well as international conferences and exchanges that bring individuals and organizational repre- sentatives together help reduce the costs of building and maintaining transna- tional organizations. Th ey therefore increase the feasibility of individuals’ direct participation in transnational organizations, rather than indirect participation through national sections of a transnational federation. At the same time, global- ization processes are fraught with uncertainties and rapid change. Anticipating the course of complex inter-state negotiations and the applications of interna- tional law poses major challenges for transnational actors, including businesses as well as advocates for social change. In order to avoid unforseen calamities or to take advantage of emerging opportunities, transnational actors must be able to respond quickly. Th ey also must have the capacity to mobilize diff erently in diff erent parts of the world. Just as businesses must tailor their marketing and industrial strategies to local contexts (see, e.g., Sklair 2001), so, too, must trans- national social movement actors cultivate mobilizing strategies that are appropri- ate to local or regional cultural and strategic conditions. Th us, we would expect to fi nd that transnational movement structures will become more decentralized and informal over the recent decades of expanding global integration. h5: The structure of transnational SMOs will become more decentralized and informal as new technologies and increasing global social, economic, and political integration facilitate participation by individual members and reduce organizing start-up costs. METHODS Formal organizations provide important infrastructures that aid activists in their eff orts to mobilize and act collectively to promote social change. Earlier work suggests that social movement organizations that adopt transnational organizational structures play key roles in mobilizing, informing, and coordi- nating collective action on issues crossing national boundaries. Th us, this study examines the characteristics of formal transnational organizations advocating for social change. Indicators of this dependent variable—changes in the trans- national social movement sector—come from the Yearbook of International Associations (1973, 1983, 1993 and 2000/01 editions).⁷ Th e Yearbook is edited by the Union of International Associations (UAI) in Brussels, which is charged by an early UN Resolution with helping maintain a census of international associa- tions of all kinds. Th e UAI defi nes international associations as those with mem- bers in at least three countries, and it identifi es such groups through a number of mechanisms, including referrals from other organizations, website searches, and self-identifi cations. It then sends an annual survey to all identifi ed international organizations to update each entry and to assess whether or not a group remains active. Like any data source, the Yearbook has important limitations, especially when one is interested in tracking groups that may be minimally structured and ⁶. I expect that increased competition for participants and resources among a larger number of TSMOs would encourage their geographic expansion. ⁷. For more details of the Yearbook and coding procedures, see Smith (1997). Jackie Smith264 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 265 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as with IGOs. Groups were also tracked between the two time periods so that we could identify which groups that were present in the earlier time period disbanded or were otherwise inactive by 2000. Th is tracking across time-periods also identifi ed some groups that were missed in the 1993 selection process, leading us to update the previously reported fi gures for 1993.⁹ Additional information about the funding sources of TSMOs was recorded for the 2000 period.¹⁰ Analyses of earlier editions of Yearbook entries showed dramatic increases in the numbers of transnationally organized SMOs, particularly since the early 1970s. Th ey also revealed changes in the broad issues around which people orga- nized transnationally and in the structure of transnational organizations (See Smith 1997; Sikkink and Smith 2002). But the 1990s witnessed some major changes in the global system that should have signifi cant impacts on the ways people organize across political borders. Th e dissolution of the Soviet Union both expanded the number of states formally participating in the international political community and fundamentally transformed the geopolitical context. Th e Cold War confl ict dominated the post-WWII era and severely restricted international cooperation on issues other than security and disarmament. With the end of the Cold War, other issues emerged on the international agenda, and more of the political discourse emphasized the interdependencies of security, environmental, and economic issues. Th e opening of new “emerging markets” in the former Soviet Union also fueled the expansion of neoliberal economic policies and contributed to the period’s rising levels of international trade and investment. At the same time, actors such as NGOs and corporations that had long been in the corridors of international negotiations were seen as growing in importance as global actors, alongside states. And analysts increasingly recog- nized an enhanced role for international institutions and political processes in shaping all levels of politics (see, e.g., Risse 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995; Tarrow 2001). dependent upon volunteer labor. It also under-represents non-state groups that use violence as a political tactic, since these groups are unlikely to seek inclusion in the Yearbook, for obvious reasons. Th e Yearbook staff , nevertheless assembles the most complete census of international organizations, and its methods for continuously identifying new groups are rigorous. Moreover, Yearbook editors update their census annually, and they have incorporated Internet searching into their methods. Th ey indicate both newly formed groups for which they have minimal information as well as indications that a group has ceased activity.⁸ Each edition of the Yearbook was reviewed to identify free-standing non-governmental associations that were specifi cally organized to promote some type of social or political change goal. In earlier years, the selection process excluded labor unions as well as “Institutes” and “Foundations” in order to limit the possibilities of including groups that may have government affi liations or whose work involves primarily research or funding activities outside the realm of social movement activity. In the 2000 collection process, we included all of these organizations in order to allow us to examine labor groups and to determine how the prior exclusion of such groups infl uences our understanding of the sector of organizations advo- cating social change. Of 1064 organizations identifi ed in the 2000/1 Yearbook, 106 or 10 were either labor organizations, foundations or institutes. Most of these (71) were labor organizations. To maintain comparability with earlier years, however, our analysis here is limited to groups that fall under our selec- tion criteria for the earlier periods, thereby excluding these groups. Th e groups that are included, then are all nonviolent organizations with members in at least three countries that pursue any kind of social change goal. So they range from groups like Amnesty International to the Universal Esperanto League to anti- abortion organizations. Development organizations are included in the dataset only if their entry suggests that they advocate for poor empowerment rather than simply provide for the delivery of services. Once the population of TSMOs was identifi ed, each listing was coded to record information such as the location of the organizational headquarters, the countries of membership, issue-focus, membership structure, and ties with other ⁸. Such cases are included in separate sections of the Yearbook, including identi- fi cation numbers to indicate whether a group seems to be an “internationally oriented national group” (e.g., no evidence of transnational decision making or governance), “recently formed” or “apparently inactive.” In our selection process, most of the groups in these categories were excluded, except when the author had additional sources of infor- mation on the group that warranted inclusion in the dataset. ⁹. Similar tracking was done for the earlier periods recorded for 1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, and 1988. Roughly 8-10 of additional cases were identifi ed by tracing each case from the lists generated in searches of the subsequent edition of the Yearbook back to ear- lier time periods. Missed cases appeared to be random errors resulting from the process of reading thousands of entries in the Yearbook’s small print. ¹⁰. Th is information was not recorded from earlier versions of the Yearbook because we believed the reporting on this measure was too inconsistent, and it was not provided for a large number of entries. Th e entries for the later periods are much more consistent and complete. Jackie Smith266 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 267 Th e current paper asks how the transnational social movement sector changed during a period when the international system itself witnessed a dra- matic transformation that included more extensive international and transna- tional engagement. I begin to explore the hypotheses outlined above using data the transnational social movement sector during the 1990s. While additional case study data are needed to fully test the hypotheses, we can begin here to identify patterns and develop lines of future inquiry into the dynamics of transnational organizing. DATA Hypothesis 1 anticipates that increasing global integration will both necessi- tate and create opportunities for transnational mobilization. Given that the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by eff orts to expand the agendas and jurisdictions of global political and economic institutions, we should expect to fi nd growth in the numbers of new transnational organizations formed during this period. Also, we would expect that these trends would help already existing groups to mobilize members from more countries. Th e data in Table 1 do not generally support the expectations in hypothesis 1. Although we expected to fi nd an acceleration in the formation of new TSMOs during the 1990s, in comparison to the growth rates of previous decades, substan- tially fewer new groups were formed during this later period. Further confi rma- tion of this slowing growth trend is that the average numbers of new organizations formed in the fi ve years prior to each data collection point declined from an aver- age of 21.8 in 1993 to 17.4 in 2000. Comparisons of the numbers of countries in which TSMOs report members provide little support for hypothesis 1. Although the average number of countries with members increased slightly between 1983 and 2000, the median number of countries remains unchanged, as does the average number of continents in which groups report members. Moreover, the increase in the numbers of states in the international system during this time would lead us to expect some increase in the numbers of countries represented in TSMO memberships. Th e most plausible explanation for this fi nding is that we have a saturation eff ect in the population of TSMOs (see, e.g., Minkoff 1995; Hannan and Freeman 1977). As the density of organizations increases, the competition for resources and members is expected to inhibit the formation of new groups. Given a limited pool of resources and the high costs of transnational organizing, activists seeking to take advantages of new international political opportunities may seek more cost-eff ective ways of doing this than starting a new international organization. Th us, although the 1990s brought a clear change in the “opportunity structure” defi ned by the international system, these changes could not sustain the high rates of organizational growth that we saw in the 1980s. Nor did they encour- age existing organizations to expand signifi cantly their geographic scopes. If the 1990s and expanding global integration did indeed provided impetus for more activists to engage in transnational activism, this new activism is not refl ected in a growing rate of new international organizational foundings. While the saturation eff ect would encourage organizers to fi nd alterna- tives to starting up new transnational organizations, we could also infer from these data that pre-existing organizational structures were able to respond to the more favorable political conditions of the 1990s by expanding to incorporate new members and program agendas. I explore this interpretation further in the discussion of organizational structures below. I also see an exogenous explanation for the slowed growth of the TSMO pop- ulation during the 1990s. Th e 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) led to an unprecedented move within the UN system to allow national and sub-national groups to perform tasks that were once the domain of transnational associations. Whereas prior to 1992 formal accreditation at the UN required a transnational organizational structure, the UNCED Secretariat allowed national groups to apply for formal accredita- tion to the conference, and this precedent led to the adoption of similar rules in other UN venues.¹¹ Before 1992, national groups seeking to work within the UN Table 1: Size and Geographic Dispersion of Transnational Social Movement Organizations* Year Number of TSMOs Numbers of Countries In Memberships # Orgs. % Change Mean (st.dev.) Median 1973 183 — 33.89 (23.17) 28 1983 348 90% 31.02 (26.03) 23 1993 711 104% 33.13 (29.55) 23 2000 (observed) 959 35% 34.39 (32.46) 23 2003 (estimate)** 1011 42% * Data for 1973 were colleted in collaboration with Kathryn Sikkink (see Sikkink and Smith 2002) ** To allow for more accurate comparisons between these unequal time periods, the bold figures are estimates derived by calculating the average number of new groups formed each year between 1995 and 1999 and adding three times this average to the total observed in 2000/1. ¹¹. Formal accreditation at UN Conferences enables organizations to have access to offi cial proceedings, provides access to offi cial documentation surrounding the meeting, Jackie Smith268 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 269 their own struggles. Table 2 displays the issues around which TSMOs organized during 1993 and 2000. We fi nd here that human rights remains the major issue around which the largest numbers of TSMOs organize, and a consistent quarter of all groups work principally on this issue. Th e environment has attracted growing attention since the early 1970s. And between 1983 and 2000, development issues motivated a larger percentage of TSMOs. Th is parallels a growing international discourse on development and inequality that intensifi ed with the end of the Cold War. Many analysts characterized the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War politics as one from East-West to North-South confl ict, as negotiations on trade liberalization and development displaced attention to arms control. Most UN Conferences refl ected the economic divisions between the global North and South, as many global problems were linked to enduring inequalities and development failures. A growing emphasis among TSMOs on development is consistent with the hypothesis that the sector is shaped by changes in the broader global polity. A robust trend we see in the 1990s is a shift towards more multi-issue organiz- ing by TSMOs. Th e number of groups adopting multi-issue organizing frames doubled between 1993 and 2000. Interestingly, groups organized within the global South were signifi cantly more likely to engage in multi-issue organizing.¹³ Th is would suggest that Southern TSMOs face diff erent mobilizing opportunities and constraints from their Northern and trans-regional counterparts. Such dif- ferences may arise from more repressive political contexts that foster frames that approach highly contentious issues such as equity and human rights from less confrontational angles. One such example would be the Greenbelt Movement in Kenya, which originated as a women’s tree-planting organization and sub- sequently expanded its frame to issues such as empowerment and equitable development (See, e.g., Michaelson 1994). Also, groups in the South often aim to cultivate ties with Northern counterparts in order to bring external fi nancial and symbolic resources for their struggles. Th is may mean that they must adapt their frames to fi t those that resonate with Northern audiences. Most promi- nent among these kinds of cases are indigenous rights groups that extend or bridge their issue-frames to demonstrate connections between human rights and system needed to develop an affi liation with a transnationally organized group that had offi cial accreditation. However, the UNCED process opened the door for national groups to develop direct contacts with UN offi ces. Th is change in the broader political environment certainly contributed to the slower growth of transnational associations by reducing the need for nationally based activists to join in formal international alliances. Th e second hypothesis was that the changed global political context of the 1990s would shape the issues around which people organize transnationally. Specifi cally, as global institutions expand their scopes and as global conferences sponsored by the United Nations encouraged mobilization around particular issues,¹² we expected to fi nd changes in the way social movement actors frame and provides limited speaking rights in offi cial, inter-governmental meetings. Immediately following UNCED, national and sub-national groups were granted the rights to partici- pate formally in the annual Commission on Sustainable Development, whose role was to monitor national governments’ follow-up to UNCED. Other UN agencies followed this precedent as they re-evaluated their NGO accreditation process. ¹². Th e UN sponsored an unprecedented number of such conferences during the 1990s on issues ranging from environment and development (1992) to womens’ rights (1995) to housing (1997) and population (1994). Table 2: Issue Focus of Transnational Social Movement Organizations Number of Organizations (Percentage) 1973 N=183 1983 N=348 1993 N=711 2000 N=959 Human Rights 41 (22%) 89 (26%) 200 (28%) 247 (26%) Environment 17 (9) 43 (12) 126 (18) 167 (17) Peace 21 (12) 37 (11) 82 (11) 98 (10) Women’s Rights 16 (9) 25 (7) 64 (9) 94 (9) Development/empowerment 8 (4) 15 (4) 52 (7) 95 (10) Global Justice/Peace/Envir. 7 (4) 13 (4) 30 (4) 109 (11) Self-determination/Ethnic unity 13 (7) 26 (7) 25 (3) 20 (2) Right-wing** — — 9 (1) 16 (2) Multi-issue organizations* 18 (7%) 43 (12%) 82 (12%) 161 (17%) * This categorization overlaps some of the categories above- especially the global justice category. ** Because many right-wing organizations are secretive otherwise averse to making information about their work widely available, such groups are likely to be under-reported in the Yearbook. The most recent issues of the Yearbook rely in part on searches of organizational websites, and therefore have been able to include more of these types of groups that are unlikely to respond to requests for information. ¹³. Twenty-six percent of groups organized in the South indicated a multi-issue organizing frame, compared to 17 of North- only and trans-regional (e.g., both North and South) organizations (p < .05). Th e North-South diff erences here are mirrored in two surveys of transnational human rights and environmental organizations (see Smith 2000). Jackie Smith270 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 271 environmental degradation (See, e.g., Brysk 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002). Another possible explanation is that populations in the South face experiences that make the connections between global economic divisions and other issues much more obvious. Under such conditions, organizing for peace or human rights without explicitly identifying the underlying economic sources of confl ict would be ineff ective. Another trend towards greater multi-issue frames is refl ected in the grow- ing numbers of groups organizing around a broad global justice/peace/environ- ment frame. Such groups grew from just 4 in the early 1990s to 11 by 2000. Th is pattern may lend credence to my latter interpretation of the causes of more frequent multi-issue organizing in the global South, assuming that the inten- sifi cation of global economic integration during the 1990s would more broadly reproduce the kinds of experiences faced in the global South that clarify connec- tions between economic inequalities and other problems. Th is development also parallels expanding multilateral cooperation on trade issues that characterizes the post-Cold War period. Th e issue of ethnic unity/ liberation drew declining attention as the organiz- ing focus of TSMOs. Th e most recent period again saw a decline in the absolute numbers of such TSMOs from 26 to 20. Th is can signal two very diff erent trends. One is that these types of movements are adopting—probably in response to the elimination of Cold War induced transfers of military aid—more militant, illicit tactics and therefore are less likely to report their activities in the Yearbook. Another possibility is that activists are framing ethnic struggles in new ways in response to changing issue priorities on the international agenda. Rather than advocating separatist goals, for instance, they may seek to create more inclusive, transnational identity categories such as indigenous peoples or refugees. Such identities allow groups to take advantage of opportunities in international insti- tutions that legitimize individual human rights claims and challenge traditional notions of state sovereignty based on self-determination (see Sassen 1998:22). For instance, groups like the Federal Union of European Nationalities or the World Council of Indigenous Peoples may help focus the eff orts of multiple diff erent ethnic groups around the aim of using global institutions to protect minority groups’ rights against infringements by states and other actors. Th e data here support this interpretation. About half of the groups working to promote indig- enous peoples’ rights were formed during the 1980s. Another organizing frame that may be displacing the ethnic unity/liberation one is the anti-racism/ minor- ity rights frame. Half of the groups listing this as a key goal were formed after 1980, and one quarter were formed during the 1990s. Peace issues continued to be the focus of organizing for a consistent percent- age of groups, despite the dramatic changes in the geopolitical situation following the Cold War. And women’s issues are also the focus of a consistent percentage of TSMOs. Finally, I include in the table the groups organizing around right-wing issues, although the fi gures for these groups are much less reliable, given that many of them operate covertly and are unlikely to make information about their associations available to the Yearbook editors. Th e Internet has allowed the UAI to expand their own capabilities for identifying and including information about international associations, and this may be one reason why we identifi ed more right-wing groups in the more recent period than in previous ones. Th e next hypothesis begins to take up questions about how the structure of the international system may be aff ecting transnational organizing patterns. Hypothesis 3 anticipates that TSMOs operating in core countries will have greater access to IGOs and will reap advantages of greater legitimacy as well as higher survival rates. We measure legitimacy here in terms of the extent to which an organization maintains links with other NGOs well as with inter-gov- ernmental agencies. In addition, the number of diff erent nationalities an orga- nization incorporates into its membership also refl ects and contributes to the recognition of the group’s ability and its worthiness of respect. We distinguish between internal and external legitimacy, since recognition by one’s peers may not translate into respect and recognition from outside actors (for a similar use of this concept of legitimacy see Edwards and Marullo 1996). Table three dis- plays measures that will help us test this hypothesis. Th e results in table three are mixed, and they don’t allow us to either accept or reject hypothesis 3. Th e only fi nding that corresponds with the hypothesis’ predictions is that groups whose members were only from periphery countries were less likely to survive between 1993 and 2000 than were groups based in core countries. Organizations that transcend the North-South divide were the most successful at gaining access to IGOs, legitimacy, and consequently at sur- vival. Contrary to hypothesis 3, South-only groups were more likely than their Northern counterparts to maintain formal consultative status with IGOs and to achieve both internal and external legitimacy.¹⁴ Th ey had consistently higher numbers of links with other NGOs and with IGOs than their North-only coun- terparts. ¹⁴. Caution must be used when comparing these fi gures for country memberships, since South-only groups may draw from a much larger number of countries than North- only ones. We are in the process of developing a more comparable measure for this con- cept. Jackie Smith272 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 273 Can this be taken to mean that TSMOs have been able to overcome struc- tural inequalities that are entrenched in the global system? Probably not. Ties with international organizations or other external actors are a way for relatively weak groups to increase their access to resources and otherwise enhance their ability to act in the global political arena (see, e.g. Bob 2001). So, the data in Table 3 may nevertheless be refl ecting weakness as much as strength. First, groups in the North enjoy greater direct access to and infl uence on the major power (e.g., core) governments, thereby aff ecting the course of most major policy decisions even without substantial ties to global institutions. Southern activists are doubly disenfranchised, since their home governments are often less open to democratic infl uences and less able to aff ect the course of international policy. Th ey are therefore more reliant on transnational alliances. Ties with external actors can also be interpreted as a weakness because they can undermine the autonomy of an organization. While no eff ective social move- ment organization can succeed if it seeks complete autonomy, organizational sur- vival and, to some degree, eff ectiveness depends upon an organization’s abilities to decide and pursue a course of action around which its members are united. If a group has to respond to fi nancial incentives or other pressures from external allies or international agencies, its ability to defi ne and pursue its original goals may be compromised. Also, while many international agencies share TSMO goals like environmental protection, equitable economic development, and demilitar- ization, they are still under the control of collections of states. Th ey often aid groups by providing resources and information and by advising organizers about how best to infl uence multilateral negotiations. But they may also deliberately seek to co-opt or at least assuage challengers. At the very least they can serve to channel protesters’ energies towards institutionalized forms of action (e.g. eff orts to monitor and/or shape international treaties), thereby displacing more radical critiques and disruptive forms of protest. Th e speculative nature of my interpre- tation of Table 3 suggests a need for more detailed case study research to uncover the complex relations between intergovernmental and non-governmental orga- nizations (e.g., Friedman et al. Forthcoming; Cullen 2003). Another way to approach questions about how structural power impacts the transnational social movement sector is to ask whether organizations tend to be based in places that favor already privileged, core groups or whether they Table 3: Access, Legitimacy and Survival: Comparisons of Core- and Periphery- based TSMOs Scope of Member Base N Formal Consult. Status w/IGOs Legitimacy Survival 1993–2000 Internal External 1993 South Only 65 40%** 5.4 (6.1)** 2.3 (2.4)** 16.8 (15.5)** North Only 105 19% 3.1 (4.7) 1.0 (1.5) 10.7 (5.6) Both N. & S. 369 41% *** 5.9 (8.3)**** 3.1(5.3)*** 42.0(30.7)*** 2000 South Only 77 49%* 6.3 (6.4) 3.2 (2.9)** 16.3 (11.9)** 69% North Only 182 34% 4.8 (6.8) 2.0 (2.4) 12.1 (7.3) 82% Both N. & S. 491 46% 7.7 (10.0)*** 3.7(6.4)*** 44.9(34.4)*** 87%*** * T-test comparisons of means for North only vs. South only groups significant (p < .05). ** T-test comparisons of means for North only vs. South only groups significant (p < .01). *** T-test comparisons of means for “Both North and South vs. groups in North or South only significant (p < .01). NGO links IGO links # Country members mean (s.d.) T-test comparisons of means for “Both North and South vs. groups in North or South only significant (p < .05). **** Table 4: North-South Comparisons of TSMO Mobilization 1973 1983 1993 2000 Headquarters Located in: (N=135) (N=343) (N=711) (N=946) Global City* 48% 31% 26% 28% Other Western Europe or U.S. 35 48 46 45 Global South 12 17 23 21 Members located in: (N=132) (N=210) (N=539) (N=750) South Only 5% 9% 12% 10% North Only 16 21 20 24 Both N. & S. 79 70 68 65 (N=132) (N=214) (N=534) (N=750) Western Europe 89% 87% 84% 86% N.America (U.S./Canada only) 72 64 66 62 Eastern Europe 53 43 49 56 Any Global South Country 84 79 80 76 * ”Global City” is derived from Sassen’s term (1991) and refers here to Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, and New York. Jackie Smith274 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 275 was 32 (t=7.59). Of groups formed before 1980, 78 were trans-regional, but this fi gure declines to 56 for groups formed after 1980. Th e overall number of trans- regional groups, however, is growing, so we cannot say that regional organiza- tions are completely displacing more universal ones. Rather, it suggests a shift in transnational organizing strategies. Boli and Th omas’s analysis of the more general category of INGOs showed a similar, growing tendency for these groups to organize along regional lines. Th ey argued that regional organizing enjoyed the “practical advantages of shared language, culture, and history as tools for mobilization with respect to the larger world” (1999: 31). In their view, the broader world culture and its institutional artifacts defi ne an overarching framework within which “world culture autho- rizes and compels organization at diverse levels” (1999: 31–2). Th us, the forma- tion of regional groups has been shaped by the UN global conferences, where negotiating contexts encouraged eff orts to build broad consensus among NGO participants. Regional organizing also facilitates consensus-building in global NGO arenas, since activists fi rst work through their diff erences in more local- ized contexts where the interests of participants are likely to converge and where power diff erentials are minimized. In global settings, regional spokespersons can represent the views and interests of their regions as they work with their counterparts to achieve a broader consensus. Th is interpretation would suggest that regional organizations complement rather than compete with the work of broader TSMOs by helping to bridge local- and regional- level concerns with broader international processes. In other words, such groups appear to be mobi- lizing new constituencies into transnational political arenas. Th e vast majority of TSMOs have members in Western Europe and North America. But a comparable percentage of groups have members in the global South, and these percentages have not changed signifi cantly over the past few decades. Citizens from Eastern Europe and the Middle East remain least inte- grated into the transnational social movement sector, with participation in about half (or less in the case of the Middle East) of all TSMOs, whereas Latin American and Asian rates of participation rivaled that of North America in the most recent time periods. I want to explore further the unanticipated fi nding of greater intra-regional organizing among TSMOs in the most recent time period. If this refl ects a trend among transnational organizations, it could substantially infl uence the ways that global interests and confl icts are articulated, particularly if intra-regional groups are not, in turn, serving as bridges that help aggregate and process regionally defi ned interests and positions into trans-regional (e.g., North-South) groups. Table 5 examines the issue focuses and age of organizations according to their geographic scope. are accessible to activists in areas outside the core. Hypothesis 4 anticipates that world system relations will aff ect the locations of TSMOs by encouraging the location of groups in core countries. Table 4 displays comparisons of TSMOs in 1993 and 2000 to determine the extent to which TSMOs are centered in core versus periphery countries. Th e patterns in Table 4 generally support the notion that one’s location within the world system aff ects access to TSMOs as well as other resources. Th e vast majority of TSMOs are headquartered in core countries, and even within those countries, they are concentrated in key cities that serve as headquarters for global political institutions and commerce. Just as Sassen (1991) found global cities emerging from the foundations of communication, transportation, and labor infrastructures that tend to be concentrated in important urban centers, we see a “global city” eff ect in the political realm as well, as transnational advocacy groups fi nd advantages to being near the headquarters of international agencies. However, the tendency of TSMOs to locate their headquarters in one of fi ve major global cities appears to be declining somewhat. In 1973 nearly half of all TSMOs were based in such cities, but this fi gure dropped to around one quarter by 1993. Th e 2000 fi gures show little change from 1993, but if anything they sug- gest a reverse, or at least a leveling-off , of the earlier trends towards more decen- tralization of TSMOs and a greater presence in the global South.¹⁵ Th e patterns of regional North-South organization suggest that there may be some movement towards greater intra-regional organization, and that this tendency is most pronounced in the global North. About a third of all groups were organized within either the global North or the South in 2000, whereas this fi gure was around one-fi fth of all groups in 1973. Th ere has been a paral- lel decline in the percentages of groups that organize across North and South. Comparisons of the mean age of groups that were intra-regional versus trans- regional amplifi ed this pattern. Seventy-one percent of TSMOs formed before 1990, and just 51 of groups formed after 1990, were trans-regional (t=4.92). Th e mean age of intra-regional groups was 18, while the age of trans-regional groups ¹⁵. Th is fi nding might be the result of a longer lag-time between Northern and Southern groups in the reporting of new organizations in the Yearbook. Because the Yearbook editors are based in Brussels and rely heavily on electronic communications and inter-personal networks to identify new groups, organizations in countries with less developed communication infrastructures and less contact with global institutional forums may not appear in the Yearbook until years after they have been founded. Further research must be done to determine the extent to which this is the case. (I am grateful to Gillian Murphy for raising this observation). Jackie Smith276 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 277 Th e results in Table 5 indicate that the tendency of groups to organize within their particular geographic region of North or South is a recent one. Of all groups formed during the 1990s, more than half adopted intra-regional orga- nizational structures. Forty-one percent of groups formed during the 1990s were North-only groups, and an additional 13 were South-only groups. Forty-six percent of all groups formed during this recent decade transcend the North- South divide. Moreover, the shift towards more intra-regional organizing within both the global North and South may be refl ecting more deep-seated cleavages across geographical divides. In areas where the North-South confl ict is most pro- nounced, i.e., where the confl ict centers most directly on resource-use questions, the tendency is that we fi nd more intra-regional groups forming as opposed to trans-regional groups that include members from both North and South. Th us, higher percentages of South-only groups focused on development and economic justice, whereas a higher percentage of North-only groups focused on the envi- ronment, which is often portrayed as an issue that is at odds with economic devel- opment. More North-only groups also focused on peace issues, perhaps because for some Southern groups this may be seen as a lesser priority behind immediate material needs. Th e fact that a larger percentage of South-only groups focused on women’s issues further supports this interpretation, as most women’s groups tend to address the development inequities faced by women as a consequence of their diff erential legal protections. Th e greater tendency of Southern groups to work within multi-issue frame- works suggests that such groups tend to favor a diff erent strategic orientation from their Northern counterparts. Whereas Northern organizations may prefer to organize around single-issues for the purposes of political expediency, Southern activists may see such compartmentalized approaches as avenues that avoid addressing fundamental questions about power and access to resources (see, e.g., Steiner 1989; Smith 2002b). A long-time scholar and activist from the global South, Walden Bello, makes a similar observation about these diff er- ences in how Northern and Southern activists frame their struggles (Bello 2001). Case studies of specifi c campaigns show that the North-South diff erences we observe here may a changing feature of transnational organizations. Northern activists have had to alter the ways that they conceptualize confl icts if they hope to succeed in building ties with Southern activists, which they must do in order to increase their political leverage and legitimacy. Analysts have documented a slow and confl ict-ridden process of dialogue and re-framing of confl icts as activists experience new opportunities for transnational dialogue and exchange. For instance, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and Rainforest Action Network have learned—through their contact with Southern activists—to emphasize the links between environmental degradation and the protection of human rights (e.g., Brysk 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002; Warkentin 2000). And the experiences of organizations working for sustainable development show that interactions between activists in the North and South led to an “unmaking” of Western development framework and a remaking of an alternative (Warkentin 2000:139, see also Macdonald 1997). Annelise Riles’s study of Fijian womens’ activists provides additional evidence of a learning pro- cess within transnational organizations: Where delegates at previous meetings had been acrimoniously divided over whether structural adjustment or the Palestinian liberation were in fact ‘women’s issues,’ …at this meeting Fiji’s participants in the academic women’s networks from ‘the South’ who had led the fight for the expansion of what counted as women’s issues at previous conferences found, to their own sur- prise, that most of the European and North American attendees at their ses- sions were in fact converts to their position (Riles 2001:182). For their part, activists in the global South (as well as in the former Soviet Union) benefit from the transnational transfer of “’the technology to unite us’ [such as…] techniques for speaking in groups, listening to each other, forming networks around a concrete issue, thinking strategically at the grassroots level about specific actions” (Sperling et al. 2001: 1172). Transnational organizations help facilitate this kind of learning. Factors external to TSMOs may also help explain the recent tendency to organize along regional as opposed to cross-regional lines. Specifi cally, the pattern may signal that TSMOs are fi nding more favorable political opportu- nities for aff ecting the issues they hope to address within more limited inter- Table 5: Issue Focus of Sub-Regional vs. Trans-Regional Organizations North-Only N=211 South-Only N=87 Both North & South N=531 Age (Mean, years) 18.6 17.5 32.6 (Median) 12 13 22 Formed during 1990s 45% 36% 20% Human Rights 26% 28% 21% Environment 18 7 16 Peace 8 5 11 Women’s Rights 6 17 8 Development 8 16 9 Global Justice/Peace/Environment 11 17 10 Self Determination/Ethnic Unity 1 1 3 Jackie Smith278 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 279 state arenas that are defi ned by regional identities and interests. It may be that regional international institutions are seen as having more immediate impacts on local conditions than universal institutions like the UN, which is hampered by the diverse interests of its global membership. Or activists may have found through the experience of working at the UN that greater eff orts to resolve intra- regional diff erences (particularly within the global South) are more eff ective at strengthening the capacity to negotiate for regional interests within this global setting. Regional international associations may also prove more responsive and accountable to activists’ demands, particularly within the relatively highly devel- oped setting of the European Union. And factors like greater media attention to regional international negotiations as well as institutional access or geographi- cal proximity may provide incentives for regionally based organizations. Further research is needed to determine the relative eff ects of external political factors and population dynamics on this organizational pattern. Th e fi nal hypothesis addressed the way the changing technologies that have fueled globalization of economic, political, and social relations have aff ected the structures of TSMOs. We anticipated that the comparatively greater access to inexpensive travel and communications would produce more decentralized orga- nizational structures. Table 6 displays analyses used to test this hypothesis. Table 6 shows some support for hypothesis 5, that TSMOs would become more decentralized in structure over time. Th ere has been a consistent decline in the percentage of TSMOs organized as federations, that is organizations with national sections that typically share a common organization name and a more formal and centralized decision making structure. Amnesty International is a prominent example of such a group. Th e coalition form seems to be replacing the federation, probably because it allows more autonomy for members/partici- pants. While they vary quite a bit in how they operate, coalitions typically allow affi liates to maintain their own organizational name and affi liation and allow more diversity in goals and strategies of affi liates. Such groups are better suited to rapid decision making at local or national levels, and they encourage inno- vation by members. Th e decentralized organizational structure allows affi liates greater fl exibility as they seek to address in a local context the organization’s col- lective goals.¹⁶ Th is trend towards more decentralized or network-like structures may help to explain the pattern we found in Table 1 of a declining rate of growth in the TSMO sector. Th e less centralized coalition structure is able to incorporate a larger number of free-standing national and sub-national groups than is the more hierarchical federal structure. Th us, while the absolute numbers of new TSMOs reveal a slowing growth rate, the level of actual participation in transnational organizations could yet be on the rise. Additional evidence about membership size is needed to assess this, and such data are not available from the Yearbook. CONCLUSIONS Th e 1990s witnessed dramatic changes in the global political system as the Cold War bipolar system gave way to greater eff orts at multilateral approaches to a wider range of global problems. Th is study explored whether and how those changes aff ected the patterns of transnational social movement organizing. We also examined whether structural inequalities in the world system are mirrored in the transnational social movement sector and whether this has changed in recent decades. We might expect that the political opening created by the end of the Cold War and the related expansion of multilateral institutions during the 1990s would have encouraged an expansion in the numbers of TSMOs. While the numbers of TSMOs continued to grow between the early 1990s and 2000, the rate of growth has slowed dramatically from that of recent decades. While the size of the sector more than doubled between 1983 and 1993, its growth rate was less than 50 of what it was during the 1990s. Th is fi nding may be the result of greater competition for members and other resources among this growing population, or it might also refl ect changes in the broader political system that served to reduce the strategic advantage of transnational organizations. It may also refl ect a greater ability of transnational coalitions to absorb a larger variety of local and national organizational adherents, thereby streamlining the interest aggregation process at the global level (cf., Murphy 2001). We need more local- ized data to assess the meaning of this macro-level trend. A second expectation was that the end of the Cold War would allow for an expanded international issue agenda and would alter the issue focuses of TSMOs. Th e most dramatic change during the 1990s was that many more Table 6: TSMO Structures Federation 1973 50% 25 1983 38% 31 1993 28% 43 2000 18% 60Coalition ¹⁶. Gamson’s study (1990) found that more formal, bureaucratized and centralized organizations tended to be most eff ective at achieving their goals. Further research is needed to determine whether this fi nding applies in the contemporary global political context. Jackie Smith280 Exploring Connections Between Global Integration 281 groups are organizing around multiple-issues rather than as single-issue groups. Th is may refl ect a greater recognition among activists of global interdependen- cies and of the relationships between issues such as human rights, environment, development, and peace. Certainly the opportunities for transnational commu- nication and dialogue facilitated by transnational associational structures have helped shape these multi-issue frames. Also, the shift towards greater interna- tional trade and towards multilateral trade agreements is paralleled by an expan- sion in the numbers of TSMOs working on issues relating to economic justice. Comparisons of core and periphery regions showed some important diff er- ences. We expected that periphery regions would be less integrated into TSMO memberships and that they would also have less access to intergovernmental agencies, lower levels of legitimacy, and lower survival rates. Th e organizational data we examine bore out some but not all of these expectations. Groups that organized in the global South only were less likely to survive between 1993 and 2000 than were groups in the North. However, groups that were organized across the North-South divide were most likely to survive, and they were also better able to establish ties with IGOs and with other actors in their environ- ments. South-only TSMOs were also more likely than their Northern counter- parts to have formal consultative status with an IGO, and they had consistently larger numbers of ties with both IGOs and NGOs. Whether these connections with external actors serve to amplify the infl uence Southern activists can have in the global political arena or whether they simply reduce the autonomy of such groups without giving them substantial political benefi ts is a question that fur- ther research should address. Examinations of the organizing patterns of TSMOs revealed at least a level- ing-off or possibly a reversal of earlier trends towards greater Southern partici- pation in TSMOs. While earlier decades saw a growing percentage of TSMO headquarters in the global South, between 1993 and 2000 the percentage of groups based in the South declined. Similarly, the percentage of groups with members in any country of the South also declined slightly. One other fi nding that may have important consequences for the future course of transnational organizing is that a larger percentage of groups are organizing within regions rather than across the North-South divide. A larger percentage of new TSMOs are organized within the global North or South than was true in the past. Th is may create more opportunities for people to make connections between their local interests and global processes, but it could also complicate eff orts to resolve the critical diff erences between the interests of people in the global North and South that hinder global cooperation on economic, environmental, and security issues. Further research is needed to determine how regional level organizing aff ects possibilities for broader, trans-regional cooperation. Finally, we examined the ways that changing technologies have aff ected the organizational structures of TSMOs. Th e proliferation of comparatively inex- pensive communication and transportation possibilities was expected to enable TSMOs to adopt more decentralized forms. Th is was indeed the case, and we found a shift from the more centralized federated structure towards more decentralized, coalition structures that allow TSMO affi liates greater autonomy. Future research should explore the implications of this trend for movements’ success. In short, we see some important changes in the growth and geographic makeup of the transnational social movement sector. Th ese are likely to aff ect future possibilities for transnational mobilization, and in particular, the abili- ties of transnational groups to overcome diff erences in interests and culture that inhibit transnational organization, particularly across major structural divisions like core and periphery. While social movement organizations and their trans- national counterparts are not the only actors in social movements, researchers have shown them to be important agenda-setters and mobilizers that provide the foundations for popular mobilizations during movement surges. Th us, eff orts like this one to understand the dynamics of transnational social movement orga- nizing can help us better explain and anticipate the course of social movements. Th ese macro-level data off er some insights into the large-scale patterns of trans- national organizing, but more localized and case study work is needed to test some of the interpretations of the data that I off er here. 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