403 Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Syste1ns Research_, 1995, Volu1ne l, Number 9 http: //jwsr. ucr. edu/ ISSN 1076 -l56X Global Cooperation or Rival Trade Blocs? Gerd Junne University of Alnsterda1n Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237 1012 DL A.Insterda1n, The Netherlands fax 31 20 525 2080 Copyright (c) 1995 Gerd Junne I. Globalization versus regionalization: different scenarios I.l. The CPB Scenarios I.2. The BRIE Scenarios I. 3. The Alnsterda1n Scenarios II. Intra-bloc develop1nents as a deter1ninant of inter-bloc relations II.l. The cohesiveness of Europe II.2. An East Asian Trading Bloc? II. 3. Develop1nents in North Alnerica III. Different Theoretical Approaches III.l. Long Waves Theory III.2. The Network of Strategic Alliances III. 3. Frag1nentation of Co1npanies and a New Role for the State III.4. Different Concepts of Control III.5. Different Cultures IV. Conclusion Introduction This paper exa1nines the question of whether the world will continue to 1nove towards a liberal, 1nultilateral world trade syste1n or whether it will fall apart into rival trade blocs. It starts with a short co1nparison of different scenarios for the develop1nent of the world econo1ny. It then tries to illustrate the i1nportance of develop1nents inside the 1najor trade blocs for the relationship between these blocs, taking as an exa1nple (a) the i1npact of Ger1nan unification, (b) the i1npact of a possible break -up of China, and (c) the i1npact of do1nestic polarization within the United States. It then discusses how different research avenues give rise to different expectations with regard to cooperat ion versus rivalry. For instance, fro1n a long waves perspective increasing rivalry can be expected. However, an analysis of strategic alliances points in the direction of 1nore cooperation and collective 1nanage1nent of international econo1nic relations. And f inally, analyses which give 1nore attention to the internal restructuring of co1npanies lead to the hypothesis that new societal de1nands for a 1nore active state will be articulated, i1nplying 1nore frictions at the international level. An analysis in ter1ns of "concepts of control" points in the sa1ne direction. The tentative conclusion of this paper, 1neanwhile, is that 11 1nanaged rivalry" will characterize future relations between the 1nain trading blocs. [Page 1] I. Globalization Versus Regionalization: Different Scenarios VJe are unable to predict the future of international relations with any certainty (e.g. Van Ginneken 1993). This is not because the discipline is still underdeveloped. It is rather because -the topic of re sear ch does not develop independently fro1n how people think of it, -the future is the outco1ne of social struggle, which is still contingent, and -social forces interact in a dialectic way: the 1nore the pendulu1n sways in one specific direction, the stronger the countervailing forces beco1ne. Instead of trying to forecast the 1nost probable future develop1nent, it 1nakes 1nore sense to elaborate a nu1nber of scenarios which cover a broader range of possible alternative develop1nents, and then analyze the social forces that work in favor or against each of the different scenarios. I.1. The CPB Scenarios The present enquiry into whether the world is heading towards 1nore globalization or 1nore regionalization can build upon earlier work by 1nany others. An interesting effort was 1nade two years ago by the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) in its book "Scanning the Future," in which it describes four scenarios for the [Page 2] develop1nent of the world econo1ny. The four see narios were dubbed (a) "Global Shift", (b) "European Renaissance", (c) "Global Crisis", and (d) "Balanced Growth" (CPB 1992a: 22 -26, 182-207). (a) In "Global Shift", Japan and the "Dyna1nic Asian Econo1nies" (DAE's) get strongly attached to a free -1narket orientation. Under heavy co1npetitive pressure, growth i1npeding factors in the United States (such as the low quality of basic education) are tackled by private enterprise. The resulting recovery of productivity within the United States generates the financial 1neans by which the govern1nent deficit can be reduced. lfJhile the U.S. econo1ny thrives again, econo1nic refor1ns in Europe re1nain half -hearted. The European bias in favor of security, stability, and risk -aversive behavior prevails once again. Econo1nic growth slows, and i1nportant industrial sectors quickly lose ground. Social and political tensions, which have already risen sharply as a result of the 405 Journal of World-Systems Research recession, are further infla1ned by large 1nigratory 1nove1nents to VJestern Europe. (b) In "European Renaissance", global co1npetition increasingly leads to the e1nergence of world -wide oligopolies and strategic alliances, supported by govern1nents. In a cli1nate in which "coordination" rather than the free -1narket plays a do1ninant role in the regulation of the econo1ny, European integration advances quickly, creating favorable conditions for European business. U.S. [Page 3] business, on the contrary, re1nains unable to change the success for1nulas of the past. Increasing U.S. trade deficits s trengthen protectionist 1noods. Japan and the DAE I s reorient their interests towards Europe and each other. (c) In "Global Crisis," neither the U.S. nor European economies prosper. The econo1nic rise of the Far East and the i1npotence of Europe and Ainerica ensure a deepening of tensions on trade issues; the 1najor regions of the world gradually degenerate into antagonistic protectionist blocs. Unable to earn their living by producing for the world 1narket, the de1nographic trap in 1nany developing countries closes, and a worldwide crisis of food supply occurs. (d) For "Balanced Growth," an ever stronger drive towards sustainable econo1nic develop1nent and continuously strong technological dyna1nis1n constitute the do1ninating forces. Refor1ns practically everywhere lead to renewed econo1nic growth, which facilitates an open and cooperative attitude in international trade negotiations. Both the free -1narket and the coordination ele1nent play an i1nportant role at the do1nestic level, as well as in the international econo1ny. In a follow-up study on perspectives for the Dutch econo1ny (CPB 1992b:18), only three scenario's were kept. "Global Crisis" was skipped, because the situation for Europe and the Netherlands [Page 4] in "Global Crisis" was roughly the sa1ne as in "Global Shift". Further1nore, it is generally not advisable to work with 1nore than three scenario I s, because it beco1nes too difficult to co1npare a larger number (Schwartz 1991:29). A number of co1mnents can be 1nade on the scenar ios produced by the CPB. In "Global Shift," the U.S. econo1ny is boo1ning, while the European econo1ny busts. In "European Renaissance," it is the other way round. This i1nplies that the interdependence of the world econo1ny is still li1nited: The econo1ny in one 1najor region can prosper for longer periods, while the econo1ny in other 1najor regions is in a deep recession. Is this plausible? It see1ns to 1ne that the econo1nies of North Ainerica and VJestern Europe have beco1ne 1nere co1mnunicating vessels. Though dif ferences persist, the application of new technologies will not take place at a dra1natically different pace: this will differ 1nore fro1n co1npany to co1npany rather than fro1n country to country. Strong links between co1npanies on both sides of the Atlantic (oft en belonging to the sa1ne concerns) 1nean that de1nand in one region sti1nulates de1nand in the other. Protectionist 1neasures taken by one side would also provoke protectionist 1neasures by the other. It see1ns 1nore appropriate, then, to conceive a scenario in which the 1najor industrial centers prosper 1nore or less together and keep a rather liberal trade syste1n, and another one in which regional rivalry do1ninates. [Page 5] I. 2. The BRIE scenarios This has been done in a recent project of the Berkeley Round Table on the International Econo1ny (BRIE) . The authors put forward three different scenarios, which are described as "1nanaged 1nultilateralis1n," "benign regionalis1n" and "regional rivalry" (Sandholtz et al. 1992). l1anaged 1nultilateralis1n "a1nounts to an extension of the post-war Alnerican syste1n into a new era in which power is 1nore evenly distributed" (Sandholtz et al. 1992: 173). Though trade will not beco1ne totally liberalized, govern1nents will be able to agree on the rules that will govern the international trade syste1n and these rules will be relatively liberal, leaving the 1narket to deter1nine the outco1nes. Regional rivalry describes a kind of "twenty -first century 1nercantilistic regionalis1n" (Sandholtz et al. 199 2: 174-5). Govern1nents will worry 1nore about relative positions, rather than about absolute welfare gains. Relative shifts in positions will beco1ne security concerns for the great powers, thereby greatly di1ninishing the chances for collective coordination and leadership a1nongst these powers. Benign regionalis1n (or "defensive protectionis1n"), finally, depicts a situation in which different world regions live rather independently fro1n each other, "with low levels of sensi ti vi ty to each other's choices and low levels of vulnerability to each other's actions" (Sandholtz et al. 1992: 174). This last scenario see1ns to be the least likely. It does not take into account that [Page 6] international interdependence has reached such an intensity that this scenario can be discarded even in the case that world trade beco1nes concentrated largely on intra -regional trade. Even then, two i1nportant levels of interdependence would re1nain: (a) Interdependence via international financial 1narke ts: International financial and currency 1narkets actually link econo1nic develop1nents in all parts of the world. Any kind of govern1nent policy which i1nplies deficit spending and increases inflationary pressures, will i1mnediately face reactions which w ill put that country's currency under pressure and affect do1nestic interest rates. (b) Interdependence via the international ecological syste1n: Economic policies also affect each other even if no international transactions in the classical sense take place. Al1nost all econo1nic activity, for instance, leads to the e1nission of polluting substances and gases which 1nay destroy the ozone layer or contribute to global war1ning through the greenhouse effect. In this way, societies have beco1ne 1nuch 1nore vuln erable to each others choices (Cf. l1acNeill, V'Jinse1nius, and Yakushiji 1991). 407 Journal of World-Systems Research As a result, the "benign regionalis1n" scenario will be dropped. Instead, we will look for a scenario that takes the increased i1nportance of the environ1nental di1nension into accou nt. [Page 7 ] I. 3. The Ainsterda1n scenarios Schwartz has suggested that scenario writers should avoid depicting an opti1nistic scenario (like "free trade"), a pessi1nistic scenario (like "rivalry") and a "1niddle of the road" scenario, because this last scenario would probably be accepted by 1nost readers as the 1nost probable one, and the whole exercise of scenario writing would be devalued. He suggested that a third scenario, instead, should bring in another i1nportant fac tor (e.g. a funda1nental social change, like a shift in basic values) which the other scenarios do not yet sufficiently take into account. The increasing i1nportance of environ1nental i1nperati ves is a case in point. I1nagine that i1nperati ves of sustainabl e develop1nent get 1nore attention around the world. This could lead to very different trade structures, and certainly to new types of trade conflicts (see Van der VJurff and Kolk 1993). VJe have therefore decided in favor of a third scenario in which priority is given to environ1nentally-friendly production and trade structures. This probably would be done in different ways in North Ainerica, Japan and VJestern Europe, i1nplying new frictions between the trade blocs. In su1n, the three scenarios taken as a point of departure for future analysis are: A) 11anaged 1nultilateralis1n, in which the vision of a "global village" - if only for the northern half of the globe - is approached, the fast introduction of new technologies leads to a another period of worldwide eco no1nic growth, and the leading trading nations are able to agree on increasingly liberal rules for world trade and production; [Page SJ B) Regional rivalry, in which slow econo1nic growth con1bines with highly conflictual relations a1nong the 1najor trading blocs, and C) Greening of business, in which a high priority is given to the i1nperatives of worldwide sustainable develop1nent, and econo1nies are restructured in order to beco1ne less environ1nentally -har1nful. This last scenario will not be extensively explored in the present paper, but will be considered in future research. Before we look at the relations between the blocs, however, it is useful to look at develop1nents within the three blocs, because these develop1nents can have i1nportant consequences for intercontinental relations. II. Intra-bloc Develop1nents as a Deter1ninant of Inter -bloc Relations VJhat happens with regards to relations between the blocs depends to a large extent upon develop1nents within the thre e blocs. The 1nore united and cohesive the blocs beco1ne, the higher the chances are for inter-bloc conflicts. Conversely, the less united the blocs are internally, the less intense conflicts between the blocs tend to be. This hypothesis will be illustrated by discussing one specific aspect of cohesiveness for each of the three blocs. II.l. The Cohesiveness of Europe A great deal has been published on whether the Co1mnon t.1arket project ("1992") will lead to a "Fortress Europe" or not. Seen fro1n within the European Union (EU), the Co1mnuni ty see1ns 1nuch less of a Union than is often envisaged fro1n the outside. Already the Union [Page 9] can hardly agree on anything, not even on the nu1nber of votes necessary for 1najority decisions of the European Council of t.1inisters, its 1nain decision -1naking body. And, with every enlarge1nent, its cohesiveness 1nay decline even further. It is particularly i1nportant to note that, in 1nany instances, the United Kingdo1n still plays an inde pendent role within the EU. The do1ninant value syste1n within Britain often corresponds 1nore to that put into practice in the United States than to that on the European continent (cf. Albert 1991). To so1ne extent, General De Gaulle proved to be right when he expressed the fear that Great Britain would act as a kind of "Trojan Horse" in the European Co1mnuni ty. VJhat are the preconditions for European unity? There are basically three situations which could lead to a united European stance. One is outside pressure, which has been the strongest uni ting force in the past. The second could be internal do1ninance by either one 1ne1nber state (with a united Ger1nany being the 1nost obvious candidate), or a coalition of core states (a Paris/Bonn axis, for instance). The third possibility would result fro1n a co1nplicated bargaining process a1nong the govern1nents of the 1ne1nber countries. VJhere the latter is the case the results tend to be relatively inflexible, which can put so1ne strain on inter -bloc bargaining because it i1npedes the usual process of give and take in international negotiations. I will not discuss the first possibility, that of outside pressure leading to European unity, because I instead want to concentrate on internal develop1nents within this bloc. I t here fore [Page 10] single out the chances of future do1ninance of a united Ger1nany for further discussion. The 1nost i1nportant question thus beco1nes: VJhat has been and will be the i1npact of Ger1nan reunification on European integration? t.1any observers expected (and so1ne still expect) a stronger and even do1ninant role of Ger1nany in the EU as the result of Ger1nan reunification. During the first years since unification, however, this has clearly not been the case. On the cont rary, opti1nistic expectations that the introduction of a 1narket econo1ny would lead to an explosion of productivity in the for1ner GDR, and that its population would quickly reach the inco1ne level of their VJestern co1npatriots, turned out to be wishful thinki ng. Instead, Ger1nany got its own "t.1ezzogiorno:" a large area that depends for its living standards on 1nassi ve state intervention. It is this shift towards 1nassi ve state intervention which 1night be 1nost relevant for future inter-bloc relations. 409 Journal of World-Systems Research The intensity of state intervention is one of the 1nost contentious ele1nents in the relations between the United States, VJestern Europe and Japan. The US govern1nent re1nains the strongest advocate of further deregulation and liberalization, while Japan has adopted a cautious stance regarding these issues. European govern1nents, 1neanwhile, tend to fall so1newhere in between on the question of state intervention in econo1nic 1natters. Before unification the European Conununity 1naintained a delicate balance between go vern1nents that were free -1narket oriented and in favor of far -reaching deregulation (1nainly Great Britain and the Benelux countries), and govern1nents with a 1nuch stronger tradition of state intervention (such as the southern European states and France). Ge r1nany used to hold a position in between, and acted as a kind of balancer. As a result of unification, [Page ll] however, Ger1nany 1nay lean towards 1nore intensive state intervention for two reasons: (a) it suffers fro1n struc tural internal imbalances which cannot be solved by 1narket forces alone, but which de1nand state intervention to prevent these imbalances fro1n beco1ning increasingly extre1ne, and (b) with unification the Ger1nan electoral syste1n has expanded to incorporate 1ni llions of voters who were socialized in the context of a strong state which regularly intervened in all areas of daily life. For 1nany of these people, it is co1npletely self -evident that the state should intervene heavily in the econo1ny; they cannot in fact i1nagine otherwise. VJith a changing balance between the forces in favor of 1nore rather than less state intervention in Ger1nany, the balance of these forces in Europe in general has changed. As a result, the EU itself 1nay beco1ne 1nore inclined towards state intervention, with clear -cut repercussions for its future relationship with the United States. Ger1nan unification had also other, 1nore short -ter1n ra1nif ications with consequences for inter -bloc relations: It delayed European recovery in the early 199 Os and under1nined European co1npeti ti veness. It delayed recovery because of the inunense transfer pay1nents to East Ger1nany (of annually about 100 billion US$) . These pay1nents (1nainly for social security) helped stabilize the social and political situation in the Eastern part of the country, but at the sa1ne ti1ne constituted a large -scale shift fro1n invest1nent to consu1nption. In order to li1ni t the i1npact of the financial transfers on inflation, the Bundesbank had to continue a tough 1nonetary policy, hindering e cono1nic recovery not only in Ger1nany, but in Europe as a whole. This is one of the reasons why Europe is e1nerging fro1n the recession 1nuch 1nore slowly than is the United States. [Page 12] Further1nore, the enor1nous shift fro1n invest1nent to transfer pay1nents can under1nine Ger1nany' s (and Europe's) long ter1n co1npetitiveness on the world 1narket, thus laying the basis for further conflict between Europe on the one hand, and the United States and Japan on the other. This is because, sooner or later, a decline in co1npetitiveness will be translated into protectionist 1neasures against other trading blocs. The i1npact of Ger1nan unification on European integration and the relationship between Europe and the outside world is interesting in itself, but it is even 1nore interesting as it provides so1ne ideas about what the future enlarge1nent of the European Union 1night i1nply, as Central European countries (Hungary, Poland, Chechia and Slovakia) join in the first two decades of the 21st century. II.2. An East Asian Trade Bloc? In any analysis of present international trade conflicts, the role of Japan is crucial. However, if we try to develop scenarios for the develop1nent of trade patterns over the next 25 years, the position of China see1ns at least as relevant. This idea does not i1nply that the role of Japan will di1ninish; it only reflects the assu1nption that changes in Japan I s international position will be 1nuch 1nore incre1nental in the future. Japan I s position in internationa 1 trade will probably nor1nalize so1newhat with increasing do1nestic consu1nption, changes in work ethics, less pronounced productivity advantages, and less disinclination to buy foreign products. [Page 13] Destabilizing effects for the world trade syste1n 1night instead co1ne fro1n China, for it is not the intensity of co1npeti tion nor the volu1ne of trade which leads to trade conflicts, but the rapidness of change and the resulting i1nbalances. Slow changes can nor1nally be easily acco1mnodated. Quick changes, however, leave little ti1ne to adapt and easily cause political clashes. It see1ns that China I s trade will actually increase by large percentages for a while. VJhile Japan has reached a wage level where rises in the value of the yen can easily nullify co1npetitive advantages, the wage gap between China and the highly industrialized countries is such that the co1npetitive advantage will not easily be destroyed. If the assu1nption is correct that China will beco1ne one of the big players in world trade, this would i1nply a new generation of trade conflicts. It is highly probable that China will continue to have strong state intervention in its econo1ny, even if it is no longer ruled by a co1mnunist regi1ne. It will continue to show str ong state intervention because of its relative level of develop1nent (co1npared to the highly -industrialized countries), and because high levels of internal inequalities de1nand a strong state. However, it is not clear whether this i1nportant player in future world trade will be a state with the present borders of the People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan). Indeed, at the present the central state of the PRC no longer has effective control over so1ne of its provinces. During the next 25 years, further1nore, the very success of certain regions within China in expanding industrial production will exacerbate internal tensions. Such increased tensions will e1nerge between the coastal provinces, where 1nost capital accu1nulation takes place, and other provinces which are exposed to the negative consequences of this [Page 14] accu1nulation process (such as higher prices, a drain on qualified personnel, and large scale corruption). The inhabitants of China's less-successful provinces 1nay also suffer fro1n the atte1npts by their own polities to catch up with the coastal provinces (e.g. by i1nposing higher taxes to offer a better infrastructure, and by conferring other advantages to co1npanies which are prepared to shift production there). There have always been tensions between the 1nore urban coastal provinces and the rural provinces of the Chinese "hinterland", where 1nany of the 1nore revolutionary 1nove1nents find their roots. Indeed, peasant revolts have already 411 Journal of World-Systems Research occurred in Eastern China, perhaps foreshadowing 1nore serious conflicts in the future. Additionally, thriving s1nall -scale rural industries in disadvantaged provinces will be increasingly threatened by co1npetition fro1n large -scale industries, which produce pri1nari ly for the world 1narket but are coining to serve the do1nestic 1narket as well. Pressures will therefore build to protect local econo1nies against outside co1npeti tion. If local authorities cannot exert enough influence at the level of the central state, or if the central govern1nent cannot or will not respond to such de1nands, the disadvantaged regions 1nay break away. An ideological umbrella which would justify such a 1nove can always easily be found. One 1nay even say that the break -up of China is a precondi t ion for the integration of large parts of the Far Eastern region into the world 1narket, because neither China nor the world 1narket could withstand the integration of all of China at the sa1ne ti1ne. If the factual, if not for1nal break -up of China is a precondition for the rapid integration of parts of this region into the world econo1ny, 1nuch will depend on the concrete 1nodalities of this break-up. If this is turns out to be a violent process, which draws neighboring states into the conflict, the entire region 1nay be paralyzed for a considerable period of ti1ne. This would slow [Page 15] down the develop1nent of the region itself, and the world econo1ny as a whole, and could perhaps contribute to a worldwide recession and increasing trade conflicts as well. If, on the contrary, the internal changes take place in a co1nparati vely s1nooth way, this could open the door to another period of rapid econo1nic growth in certain parts of China which would 1nean stiffer international co1npetition for foreign producers in the 1nost affected econo1nic sectors. The break-up of China would add to other 1najor recent changes in the international state syste1n, the 1nost i1nportant of which has been the break-up of the Soviet Union. If we are to le arn so1nething fro1n the far-reaching and largely unforeseen changes in the last five years, it is to not take the existing state structure for granted when we speculate on future international develop1nents. Not only 1nay China follow the exa1nple of the Sovie t Union, but other countries show si1nilar tendencies as well. An obvious candidate is India, where the (albeit cautious) opening of the do1nestic 1narket is strengthening tendencies towards unequal develop1nent, which in turn 1nay exacerbate ever -present centrifugal tendencies in this 1nul ti-lingual, 1nul ti -religious, 1nul ti -ethnic society. II. 3. Develop1nents in North Alnerica Co1npared to the other two continents, the situation in North Ainerica see1ns 1nuch less co1nplicated. There are few 1nanifest conflicts between Canada, the United States and 11exico. What could have i1nportant repercussions for intercontinental relations, in this case, are not so 1nuch the international relations between the three countries, but internal develop1nents within the United States, where polarization 1nay beco1ne exacerbated by the Free Trade Agree1nent with 11exico. [Page 16] With about 30 per cent of the U.S. population living below the poverty line, and about as 1nany being illiterate, the North- South divide does not so 1nuch separate 11exico and the United States--it rather goes right through the United States itself. It 1nay periodically lead to social eruptions, as in the case of the recent events in Los Angeles (cf. Davis 199 3). These will re1nain te1nporary eruptions, however, because there is no ideology around which the disadvantaged groups of U.S. society can rally. Nevertheless, these eruptions will force the U.S. govern1nent to pay 1nore attention to social proble1ns at ho1ne. Such a reorientation would not necessarily i1nply a 1nore isolationist policy for the United States. During the last decades, declarations of a "war against poverty" often went hand in hand with an internationalist policy, as shown by the Kennedy, Johnson and Carter acbninistrations. The indirect i1nplications of do1nestic policy, however, 1night lead to new intercontinental conflicts. Increased govern1nent expenditures will, if not acco1npanied by tax increases (1nore and 1nore difficult to acco1nplish in a hi ghly internationalized world), lead to higher budget deficits, 1nore international borrowing, a higher value of the dollar on international currency 1narkets, and a decline in international co1npeti ti veness of the Alnerican econo1ny - with all kinds of protectionist 1neasures that this 1nay entail. VJi th NAFTA, North Alnerica has internalized the periphery even 1nore than before, to the extent that social stability has beco1ne increasingly questionable. Any 1nove to i1nprove this situation 1nay cause additional international conflicts. In addition, the internalization of the periphery has other i1nportant side effects. It aggravates social cleavages within the United States, and it [Page 17] helps to reproduce a specific set of values and attitudes, like strong individualis1n at the expense of solidarity, which lays the basis for different policy orientations in the United States and European countries. * As has been illustrated by the above exa1nples , internal develop1nents in all three trade blocs have tre1nendous consequences for relations between the blocs. They 1nay lead to a stronger position of the state in Europe, and to centrifugal tendencies within China and the United States. Finally, all these develop1nents 1nay increase the intensity of conflicts a1nong the trade blocs, and contribute to 1nore regionalization rather than globalization of the econo1ny. III. Different Theoretical Approaches In the re1nainder of this paper, I shall review a numb er of different approaches in order to see what they lead us to expect with regard to future relations between highly -developed capitalist countries. I shall start with long wave theory. I shall then try to indicate how changes in corporate structures and differences in class structures in various regions can give us so1ne clue as to probable future develop1nents. The 1nain hypothesis of this part is, however, that structural and econo1nic indicators 1nay be of li1ni ted help in such an analysis. Instead, the fol lowing rather "soft" factors see1n to play a pri1nordial role in deter1nining the nature of future relations: different political projects, 413 Journal of World-Systems Research different "concepts of control," different ideologies, and different cultures provide the basis for political conflicts or political cooperation. [Page 18] III .1. Long V'Jave Theory V'Jriters of very different backgrounds (cf. Kennedy 1987; Mandel 1980; Modelski 1987; Wallerstein 1980) have described the history of the last 500 years as a history of the rise and fall of hege1nonic powers. Typically, the rise of a new power would coincide with the spread of new technologies, in which the rising power would have so1ne advantage. This productive advantage would be turned into a favorable position in international trade, which in turn would lead to a central position in the world financial syste1n. The hege1nonic position of this particular state would then be eroded, however, as a new generation of technologies which privilege a different co re state would e1nerge (cf. V'Jallerstein 1980:38-39). The situation of the 1970s and 1980s see1ned to fit this pattern pretty well. The United States enjoyed a hege1nonic position in the capitalist world-syste1n between the Second V'Jorld V'Jar and the early 1970s, due to its co1npetitive strength in the two leading industries in the third quarter of this century: the auto1nobile and the petroche1nical industries. The U.S. position was threatened when Europe and Japan caught up during the 1970s, however, and was further eroded when Japanese co1npanies started to take the lead in so1ne sectors of the electronics and new 1naterials industries. The 1980s were characterized by a kind of "restructuring race" a1nong the OECD countries, each of which wanted to get a str ong foothold in new industries such as 1nicroelectronics and biotechnology. Govern1nents expected that such a position would give the1n a strategic advantage within the world econo1ny, and would [Page 19] not only boost their e cono1nic co1npetitiveness but would also affect the distribution of political power over the long run. This political cli1nate gave rise to neo1nercantilistic policies on technological, industrial and trade 1natters. Ironically, tendencies in this direct ion also sti1nulated co1npanies to internationalize at a rapid pace, in order to beco1ne "local players" in all 1najor OECD 1narkets (cf. Oh1nae 1985). Foreign direct invest1nent (FDI) flows in the few years since the second half of the 1980s have exceeded the total of all FDI flows in history up to that ti1ne, concentrating 1nainly on invest1nent within the TRIAD countries (United Nations 1991; Junne 1994a). The close ties created by FDI and by "strategic alliances" a1nong fir1ns fro1n different continents have in stalled very effective channels for technology transfer. Fast technology transfer has 1nade it i1nprobable that the history of the rise and fall of hege1nonic powers will continue into the future, because no country will be able to 1naintain a durable advantag e in a whole range of new technologies for an extended period of ti1ne (which used to be the basis for a hege1nonic position) . Technology policies in 1nost OECD countries have beco1ne less concentrated on the develop1nent of new technologies, and instead increasingly focus on the s1nooth diffusion of available technologies. Inas1nuch as not technological advantage, but 1nilitary victory is held to be the basis of a hege1nonic position (see l1odelski 1978: 21 7), a si1nilar argu1nent holds true. Given the destructi v eness of 1nodern ar1ns, it is highly i1nprobable that the outco1ne of a struggle for hege1nony will again be decided by war. [Page 20] Periods of undisputed hege1nony in the past have tended to be periods of free trade. Does thi s i1nply that long periods without a hege1non, which we can expect for the future, would take away the basis for free trade? This is not necessarily the case. Long wave theory (and the theory of hege1nonic stability) cannot tell us whether a liberal trade re gi1ne will be 1naintained or not. It only suggests that the chances for liberalized global trade are sli1mner in periods of disputed hege1nony than in periods during which a clear hege1nonic power does exist. III.2. The Network of Strategic Alliances To get a better idea of the societal forces that work in favor or against the 1naintenance of a liberal world trade syste1n, it is necessary to look at changes at the 1nicro -level of individual co1npanies in order to understand the develop1nent of the international "social tissue" which underlies policies of international cooperation or conflict. In this respect, one of the 1nost i1nportant develop1nents during the last twenty years has been the proliferation of "strategic alliances" between co1npanies fro1n different countries. The dyna1nics behind this development have been aptly described by Ohmae (1985): The accelerating pace of technological develop1nent shortens the life cycle of 1nany products. While co1npanies have to spend 1nore on research and develop1nent to keep abreast of technological develop1nents (they actually often spend 1nore on R&D than on new buildings and 1nachinery), the ti1ne period in which they can recover [Page 21] these costs is shrinking. They therefore have to launch new products in all "Triad" 1narkets (North Ainerica, Japan, Western Europe) right fro1n the start, in order to recover their invest1nent before a new product replaces theirs in the 1narket. In order to reduce the risks involved in R&D invest1nent decisions, to spread the costs of R&D, and to cooperate in co1mnercializing the results in all "Triad" 1narkets, co1npanies have joined forces in intercontinental strategic alliances with co1npanies with who1n they 1nay be involved in fierce co1npetition in other fields. Global co1npetition, according to Oh1nae, will 1nore and 1nore often take the for1n of co1npeti tion between international alliances, in which co1npanies with headquarters in different trading blocs participate, rather than co1npetition of Alnerican versus Japanese versus European co1npanies. It is often taken for granted that these networks of strategic alliances create a kind of safety net under the liberal world trade regi1ne. Because it is thought that these alliances create an interest to 1naintain cooperative international relations, and because they provide a fra1nework for intensive interaction between the business elites of the different trading blocs, it is thereby assu1ned that they could contribute to the for1nation of an international elite consensus whi ch, in the absence of a hege1nonic power, could assure the continuation of a liberal world trade syste1n. 415 Journal of World-Systems Research Reality, however, is probably much more complex. There are at least three reasons why strategic alliances may not (at least not always) fulfill this function of "cushioning" the liberal world trade order. [Page 22] l. t1any of the alliances may have been concluded with mixed motives and are not syrrunetrical in nature. They often constitute a continuation of competition by other means. The individual partners often try to get as much as possible out of such coalitions, while making only modest contributions themselves. They can also have the purpose of dominating or neutralizing the partners in other countries, and can thus give rise to conflict rather than reducing international conflict. 2. If companies do succeed in becoming true "insiders" in the different Triad markets, with the help of their alliance partners, they may become less vulnerable to protectionist policies maintained by the different trading blocs. As a result, they may make fewer efforts to counter political forces which demand protection. 3. The increased intensity of contacts does not always le ad to better mutual understanding. Such interaction can also create a fertile breeding ground for misunderstanding and prejudice. t1uch more than in usual trade contacts, alliances bring into confrontation partners with very different management styles, customs, and rigidities. As a result, managers often become more aware of their differences rather than their corrunon interests. t1any of these alliances also have a temporary character, as they are frequently designed to last only until specific technologies have become standardized, until more competitive [Page 23] partners can be found, or until an independent sales network has been built up. In such cases, continuous parallel efforts undertaken outside existing cooperative agreements may give rise to mutual suspicion and tensions between alliance partners. A detailed empirical study is therefore warranted on the political implications of international strategic alliances between companies. The above remarks can only give some plausibility to the idea that the proliferation of strategic alliances does not necessarily underpin the liberal world trade order. In fact, parallel developments at the company level may work in the opposite direction. III.3. Fragmentation of Companies and a New Role for the State The accelerated pace of technological development has not only led to a concentration of capital and closer international cooperation among companies. It has also fostered trends moving in the opposite direction: Companies split up, decentralize and concentrate on core activities, contracting out many of the activities that used to be carried out in -house. There is not only an increasing number of s1nall co1npanies, but the large co1npa nies actually reorganize themselves in such a way that they increasingly resemble a bunch of relatively independent co1npanies (or "business units"), which deal with each other at ar1ns -length. Co1npanies are forced to do so, because the co1npany headquarters is no longer able to follow technological and 1narket develop1nents as closely as is required to continuously adapt activity to changing circu1nstances [Page 24] and new challenges. In the extre1ne, one can state that "we are approaching an econo1ny of one -person organizations" (Fortune, 4 April 1994). An increasing share of s1naller co1npanies in the econo1ny (or of business units that are part of larger organizations, but behave largely as if they were independent co1npanies) will lead to a new de1nand for a 1nore active state (see Figure 1). S1naller co1npanies are 1nuch 1nore dependent than larger co1npanies on the s1nooth functioning of the social syste1n of which they for1n a part. They are also 1nuch 1nore dependent upon the external prov ision of inputs of all sorts (supplies, educated labor, infor1nation, capital). They thus depend 1nore than large co1npanies on the state to guarantee the social conditions of production. VJith 1nore intensive state activity, however, the likelihood increases that the activities of different states will clash, at least insofar as there are no 1nechanis1ns to assure that state activities will re1nain co1npatible and not lead to new trade barriers. VJe therefore have to turn to those ideas and traditions whic h inspire state activities in different world regions. It is 1ny contention that these "soft" factors are at least as i1nportant as the "hard" factors of econo1nic structures, industrial profiles, trade deficits, etc. Structures can be quite unbalanced, but as long as people do not regard the1n as a proble1n they will not give rise to conflicts. On the other hand, structures can be as co1npatible and sy1mnetric as one 1night wish, but conflict could still arise if these structures are interpreted in a way that would urge the actors to take conflictive action. Such "hard" factors as the distribution of econo1nic capabilities define the real1n of the possible, "but the outco1nes re1nain contingent on the beliefs and actions of the 1najor protagonists" (Sandholtz et al. 19 92:198). [Page 25] Figure 1: Proliferation of S1nall Co1npanies and Intensification of State Activity !Increasing share ofl ______ I s1naller co1npanies I _____ _ v- ---- I 1nore need I for I guarantee lof social I conditions lof I production I in the econo1ny I I I ~----_v--~---- I larger business I cycle I fluctuations I ________ _ v- ---- ------ I stiffer I international I co1npeti tion land resulting lneed for I co1npensation lof losers 417 Journal of World-Systems Research I I I I I v I I !intensification I I I-----------> I of state I <-----------1 I activity I I ________ I [Page 26] III.4. Different Concepts of Control International relations have undergone a profound change in the last hundred years. Starting early in this century, a zone of highly-developed capitalist countries has developed in which civil society is not do1ninated by the state, and where a 1nyriad of interactions links different societies to each other. These societies are related to each other in such a way that the chance of warfare a1nong the1n see1ns to be excluded. This area, to so1ne extent 1nodelled after the British Co1mnonweal th (v-an der Pij 1 1992: 58-59), originally included Great Britain and the United States and, fro1n the 1nid-l950s onwards, was slowly extended to incorporate France (with the Briand/Kellog Pact of 1928) and other parts of VJestern Europe. Kees van der Pijl (1989: 19) calls this area the "Lockean heartland", because the role of the state is subordinated to civil society, and politics are oriented 1nore towards welfare 1naxi1nization rather than towards the 1naxi1nization of power. VJi thin this geographical area, the chances of war can be regarded as nil. This under1nines the distinction between international and do1nestic politics, according to which international relations are characterized by the possibility of war, since sovereign states are not disciplined by any overarching authority. VJi thin the "Lockean heartland" (actually roughly the OECD area), it therefore beco1nes 1nore difficult to differentiate between international and national politics. International as well as national relations within this area can be conceptualized 1nore accurately as rivalry between political projects, carried by transnational coalitions, rather than as rivalry a1nong states. v-an der Pijl (1984) has extensively discussed those political projects ("beheersconcepties" or "co1nprehensive concepts of control") which (a) can be traced to specific interests do1ninating specific phases of capital accu1nulation, but (b) are broadened to such an extent that they also acco1mnodate other interests. They can thereby qualify as possible hege1nonic projects at any given point in ti1ne. "International liberalis1n" was such a project, and [Page 27] it was hege1nonic throughout the 19th century until about 1875, when it started to beco1ne challenged by "state 1nonopolis1n". It was only after the Second VJorld VJar that a kind of synthesis developed in the for1n of "corporate liberalis1n", which, fro1n the 1970s onwards, has been challenged by "neo -liberalis1n". The future world order depends to a large extent on the degree to which neo-liberalis1n gets or re1nains accepted as the do1ninant ideology guiding econo1nic policy, and on the alternative concepts which 1night co1ne up. If neo -liberalis1n gets accepted everywhere, then a 1nultilateral free -trade syste1n (not even a 1nanaged one) will be strengthened. The neo-liberal recipe, however, does not lead to a stable situation. Unbridled free 1na rkets lead to backwash effects and unequal develop1nent, which sooner or later provoke protectionist reactions. Refraining fro1n state intervention would also increase environ1nental proble1ns to such a degree that the resulting pollution would enforce a repla ce1nent of the political project. The actual strength and spread of neo -liberalis1n is, therefore, not due to its intrinsic 1nerits, but 1nore to the fact that there is currently no convincing alternative around which critics of neo-liberalism could rally. VJinfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder (1993) have used the ter1n "concept of control" in another way. They have tried to show how the specific ways in which co1npanies can organize their relations with govern1nents, trade unions, financing institutions, suppl iers, distributors and co1npeting co1npanies, coincide with specific strategies of internationalization and specific preferences for international trade policies (Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1993: 195 -204) On the basis of a detailed analysis of fir1n strategies, b ased pri1narily on their e1npirical research on the auto1nobile industry, these authors distinguish five different "concepts of control" (i.e. coherent ways to solve different control proble1ns which a co1npany faces): "flexible specialization", "industrial de1no cracy", "(1nacro) Fordis1n", "(1nicro -) Fordis1n", and "Toyotis1n" (Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1993:110). The links to internationalization strategies and international trade policies are as follows: Firms which follow the "flexible specialization" concept (e.g. networks of s1nall cooperating fir1ns, such as are found in the [Page 28] textile and shoe industries in Italy and in the 1nachine -building industry in Ger1nany) tend to produce pri1narily for the do1nestic 1narket. They do not generally internationalize their production or try to protect their do1nestic 1narkets. VJhere they do internationalize, they do so by direct export and they therefore prefer to have foreign 1narkets as open as possible. They therefore tend to "favor a uni later al trade regi1ne: a con1bination of do1nestic trade barriers ... and foreign expansionist trade policy strategies" (Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1993: 195 -196). A regi1ne of "industrial de1nocracy," which often develops in govern1nent-do1ninated industries such as teleco1mnunications, defense industries, and utilities, i1nplies barriers to the transfer of production abroad and instead relies on exports as the do1ninant for1n of internationalization. "If faced with severe i1nport co1npeti tion, govern1nent will be inclined to establish production cartels, provide subsidies, or take antidu1nping 1neasures" (Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1993: 198). "Fordist" fir1ns, or vertically -integrated, 1nass-production fir1ns, try to establish an international (intra -fir1n) division of labor and are therefore interested in a free trade syste1n regulated by a 1nul tilateral trade regi1ne. Co1npanies adopting a "Toyotist" concept of control, by instituting networks of dependent specialized suppliers, a dependent local govern1nent, etc., try to keep foreign 1narkets open, if necessary via unilateral trade policy preferences. If they internationalize, they follow a pattern of "glocalization" rather than "globalization." That is, they try to insert a co1nplete 419 Journal of World-Systems Research production process (including captive suppliers) into a foreign context (without a co1nplex inter -continental, intra-fir1n division of labor), and they also try to serve entire regions fro1n the facilities in the country where the invest1nent is placed. Once installed in all 1najor regions, the free trade orientation will give way to 1nore prag1natic considerations (Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1993:200). This analysis links develop1nents at the fir1n level to trade policy orientations, though the postulated relationships still need [Page 29] e1npirical verification. If the relationship is strong, changes in co1npany structure and strategy could be used as a kind of "early warning indicator" for changes in international trade policy. It is not certain, however, that the trade poli cy establish1nent will always react to changes in co1npany structures and strategies, in any case not in all sectors. So1ne sectors have 1nuch better access to the policy establish1nent than others, and so1ne changes 1night not be translated into policies because they do not correspond to the overall ideological orientation of the policy 1nakers. III.5. Different Cultures VJi th the end of the Cold VJar, one i1nportant disciplining force has gone which in the past placed limits on the intensity of conflicts occurring a1nong capitalist countries. Since capi tali sin is no longer challenged by socialis1n, however, 1nore attention is being paid to the continuing differences that exist between different types of capi tali sin which lie at the heart of renewed international conflict. This has increased awareness that, in spite of all the possible har1nonizing pressures of international capi tali sin, quite different traditions have developed in the capitalist world. Na1nely, different sets of institutions with different acco1npanyin g ideologies are tending to reproduce the1nsel ves. A good exa1nple of such an analysis is Albert (1991), who draws a distinction between an Anglo -Saxon and a "Rhineland" version of capi tali sin (the latter being so1newhat si1nilar to the Japanese one). The following table su1mnarizes the 1najor differences which he describes: [Page 30] Differences between Anglo -Saxon and Rhineland Capi tali sin according to t.1ichel Albert Anglo -Saxon Capi tali sin Rhineland I Capi tali sin I -~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~-I Inco1ne differentials high salary differences s1nall salary I differences I -~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~-I Social Security little social security well elaborated! syste1n of I socia 1 security I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~I Recrui t1nent hire and fire conservation of I "hu1nan capital" I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~-I I Type of work highly Taylorized 1nore I I !versatile jobs I I~~~~~~~- -~~~~~~~~~-1~~~~~~~-I I Source of stock exchange 1nore I banks 1nore I I capital i1nportant than bank I i1nportant than I I I bank I I I I !Attitude borrowing is I saving is I I toward credit sti1nulated I sti1nulated I I I I I Regulation co1nparati vely little I 1nore intensive I I regulation I networks of I I I regulations I I~~~~~~~- -~~~~~~~~~-1~~~~~~~-I One set of institutions continually fosters indi vidualis1n, while the other is based upon stronger notions of solidarity. The different attitudes have a direct i1npact upon negotiations on international institutions. Where one govern1nent opts for greater state intervention to achieve 1nore egalitarian structures, this can [Page 31] easily be interpreted as 1narket interference by another. Where hire and fire attitudes prevail, co1npanies will be less inclined to invest in their e1nployees. Where the stock exchange plays a 1nore i1nportant role than banks, a short -ter1n perspective on profit 1naking will prevail. Where borrowing is syste1natically sti1nulated rather than saving, it is no wonder that large public deficits occur. Different basic values are not independent fro1n the class structure that they produce, and that in turn reproduces the1n. Large social differences and large -scale social segregation reproduce strong individualis1n, which in turn tends to exacerbate large social differences. These different attitudes thus tend to perpetuate the1nselves, staying with us and shaping the experiences and social values nor1ns of future generations. In concrete ter1ns, they i1nply basic differences with regard to the appropriate role of the state and the 1narket. They create the breeding ground for diverging ideologies which will shape the perception of policy 1nakers, and which will lie at the basis of continuous conflict between the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Iv-. Conclusion On the basis of the considerations presented in this paper, I expect that future relations between the different trade blocs will be characterized by "1nanaged rivalry." That is, state intervention will increase again in the after1nath of neo -liberalis1n. Different traditions will assure that state activities take different forms in the different trade blocs, which will lead to a new generation of trade conflicts. However, rivalry will re1nain contained. International interdependence has reached such a de gree that protectionist 1neasures not only hurt foreign actors, but increasingly also run 421 Journal of World-Systems Research against the interests of so1ne do1nestic constituencies. As a consequence, an uneasy balance between liberalis1n and protectionis1n will continue to exist, with the e1nphas is gradually shifting back and forth within the different trade blocs. [Page 32] REFEREHCES Albert, Michel. 1991. Capi tali sine cont re capi tali sine. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Bornschier, Volker. 1994. "Hege1nonic Decline, V'Jest European Unification and the Future Structure of the Core." Paper prepared for the XII Ith V'Jorld Congress of Sociology, July 18-23, Bielefeld. CPB (Central Planning Bureau), 1992a. Scanning the Future. A Long-Ter1n Scenario Study of the V'Jorld Econo1ny, 1990-2015. The Hague: Sdu Publishers. CPB (Central Planning Bureau), 1992b. Nederland in drievoud. Een scenariostudie van de Nederlandse econo1nie, 1990-2015. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat. Davis, Mike. 1993. "V'Jho Killed Los Angeles ? Part Two: The Verdict is Given," New Left Review, Number 199, May -June, 29-54. Garten, Jeffrey E. 1992. A Cold Peace. America, Japan, Ger1nany, and the Struggle for Supre1nacy. New York: Rando1n House. Junne, Gerd et al. 1993. Structuurverandering in V'Jereldhandels -stro1nen. Final Report on "Changing Patterns of V'Jorld Trade" for the Dutch Ministry of Transport. 1"unsterda1n: University of 1"unsterda1n. Junne, Gerd. 1994a. "Multinational enterprises as actors," in: V'Jalter Carlsnaes and Steve S1nith (eds). European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe. London: Sage. Junne, Gerd. 1994b. "The end of the dinosaurs ? Do new technologies lead to the decline of 1nu ltinationals?" Discussion paper for the workshop on 'Technology, Change and the Global Political Econo1ny 1 , Barnsdale Lodge, Rutland (UK), 4 -6 May 1994. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Econo1nic Change and Mil i tary Conflict fro1n 1500 to 2000. New York: Rando1n House. MacNeill, Ji1n, Pieter V'Jinse1nius, and Taizo Yakushiji. 1991. Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World's Econoiny and the Earth's Ecology, A Trilateral Coimnission Book. New York: Oxford University Press. Mandel, Ernest. 1980. Long Waves of Capitalist Developinent: The Marxist Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Modelski, George. 1978. "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State," Coinparative Studies in Society and History 20: 214-235. Modelski, George (ed). 1987. Exploring Long Cycles. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub. Ohinae, Kenichi. 1985. Triad Power: The Coining Shape of Global Coinpeti tion. London: Collier and Macini llan. Roobeek, Anneinieke. 1990. Beyond the Technology Race: An Analysis of Technology Policy in Seven Industrial Countries. Alnsterdain: Elsevier. Ruigrok, Winfried and Rob van Tulder. 1993. The Ideology of Interdependence: The Link Between Restructuring, Internationalization and International Trade. Ph.D. Dissertation. Alnsterdain: University of Alnsterdain. Sandholtz, Wayne et al. 1992. The Highest Stakes: The Econoinic Foundations of the Next Security Systein. New York: Oxford University Press. Scherrer, Christoph. 1994. "The Coimnitinent to a Liberal World Market Order as a Hegeinonic Practice: The Case of the USA." Paper prepared for the XIII World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, July 18 -23. Schwartz, Peter. 1991. The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World. New York: Doubleday. Thurow, Lester. 1992. Head to Head: The Coining Econoinic Battle Alnong Japan, Europe, and Alnerica. New York: Warner Books. United Nations. 1991. World Investinent Report: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investinent. New York: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, ST/CTC/118. Van der Pijl, Kees. 1984. The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London: Verso. Van der Pijl, Kees. 1989. "Ruling Classes, Hegeinony, and the State System: Theoretical and Historical Considerations," International Journal of Political Econoiny, 19,3:7-35 (Fall). Van der Pijl, Kees. 1992. Wereldorde en Machtspolitiek. Visies op de internationale betrekkingen van Dante tot 423 Journal of World-Systems Research Fukuya1na. A..1nsterda1n: Het Spinhuis. v-an der V'Jurff, Richard and Ans Kolk. 1993. V'Jereldhandel en Milieu: Vier scenario's voor 2018, Deelstudie uitgevoerd in het het kader van het onderzoeksproject "Structuurveranderingen in V'Jereldhandelsstro1nen" in opdracht van het t.1inisterie van v-erkeer en V'Jaterstaat en de Stichting Coordinatie t.1aritie1n Onderzoek. A..1nsterda1n: University of A..1nsterda1n. v-an Ginneken, Jaap. 1993. Rages and Crashes. Over de onvoorspelbaarheid van de econo1nie. Bloe1nendaal: Ara1ni th Uitgevers. V'Jallerstein, I1mnanuel. 1980. The t.1odern V'Jorld -Syste1n II: t.1ercantilis1n and the Consolidation of the European V'Jorld-Econo1ny, 1600-1750. New York: Acade1nic Press. Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_01 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_02 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_03 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_04 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_05 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_06 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_07 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_08 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_09 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_10 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_11 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_12 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_13 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_14 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_15 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_16 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_17 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_18 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_19 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_20 Volume1Issue1Junne_Page_21