Journal of World-Syste1ns Research_, 1995, Volu1ne l, Number 7 http: //jwsr. ucr. edu/ [Page l] THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL POLITICS George t.1odelski Depart1nent of Political Science University of Washington SEATTLE WA 98195 USA e -1nail: 1nodelski@u. washington. edu Copyright (c) 1995 George Modelski ABSTRACT The rise and decline of world powers has attracted 1nuch scholarly attention in recent years. The theory of long cycles answers parsi1noniously the question: why, in the past half 1nillenniu1n, have Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Britain (twice), and the United States risen to global leadership while others failed to do so? This accounts for the success, or failure, of individual states, but to explain the entire sequence we need to e1nploy an evolutionary paradig1n that proposes that each of these long cycles is one 1nechanis1n in a spectru1n of global evolutionary processes. The leadership succession is an inter1nediate stage in the evolution of global politics whose next likely 1najor phase, reaching a high point later in the 21st century, will be the gradual absorption of the infor1nal role of global leadership, when e1nbedded in a de1nocratic co1mnunity, into a network of 1nore for1nal positions within an e1nerging global organization of a federalist character. The conditions of that process can now be specified. [Page 2] INTRODUCTION The rise and decline of global powers has in recent years drawn considerable attention a1nong students of world politics and society. Work has focussed on two questions: why do so1ne states rise to a unique position of global leadership while others fail? And why is that those powers that have risen so successfully ul ti1nately also tend to decline? It is argued in this pap er that these two questions can now be answered parsi1noniously within the fra1nework of the theory of long cycles of global politics. The first part of the paper proposes such an answer, and illustrates it with the help of critical exa1nples. But the rise and decline of world powers is not all there is to structural world politics, or to the theory of long cycles. As every student of these subjects is uneasily aware, there is 1nore here than the coining and going of 1nighty states. The global political syste1n today is radically different fro1n what it was a thousand years ago - at which ti1ne it arguably did not exist at all - and it also is probably quite different fro1n what it will beco1ne, 425 Journal of World-Systems Research say, one or two centuries into the future. [Page 3] It is different not only because it is obviously more complex, but it is also different in a patterned way that suggests higher performance and greater efficacy, in other words, cumulative learning, but also greater dangers. That is why an explanation of structural change in world politics, while focussing on the fortunes of global leadership, must set its sights higher, and show not only how and why individual states rise and decline, but also what the entire picture adds up to. A structural analysis of world politics must describe, therefore, a basic process whose principal mechanism in recent centuries has indeed been the rise and fall of world powers, but one that has itself been embedded in a larger movement: the evolution of the global polity. Our work suggests that global leadership succession is an intermediate stage of an evolutionary process that went through several instances of global leadership, but one whose likely next major phase will be the gradual absorption of the informal role of global leadership, embedded in a democratic corrununity, into a wider network of more formal positions with global responsibilities. Thus it is for us to show in this paper how, on a [Page 4] canvass of a thousand years, the trajectory of world politics shines as a thrust away from failed efforts to establish world empire, through increasingly intricate exercises in global leadership, towards more and more democratic forms of global organization that are mostly yet to be invented. I. EXPLAI!HHG RISE AHD DECLIHE The Propositions A premise of this paper is the ttexistencett, in the past half millennium of global politics, of a role of leadership exercised by a succession of nation -states. While the precise characteristics of this phenomenon remain a matter of debate, the basic fact of a series of leading powers is increasingly taken for granted. The list of states constituting this sequence differs in particulars, but as William Thompson has argued at some length (1988:Ch.2, esp.31-34), the similarities of position on this matter are greater than the differences. Scholars of diverse orientations, including Robert Gilpin (1981), Irrunanuel Wallerstein (1984), Paul Kennedy (1987), and Joshua Goldstein (1988) each present such a list, and all lists agree that the United States is the most recent case in point, and Britain the second most recent and relevant. The variant of this approach which we explore in this paper is the theory of long cycles, successive treatments of which include, but are not limited to, Modelski 1978, 1987, l990a, and Modelski & Thompson 1988, and for comparative analysis, in particular Thompson 1988. In our approach, a long cycle of global politics marks the rise or decline of one world power. As shown in Table l, the powers which were successively selected by that process for a global leadership role included Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States, with challengers being Spain, France, and Ger1nany. The challengers shown in Table 1 are those leading the losing coalition in the next global war; that is Spain, shown with Portugal, leads the "opposition" in the "1nacrodecision" phase, shown as starting after 1580. The data arrayed in this table simplify the historical descriptions presented in t.1odelski (1990: 15), yet they have been staples of work in this field for the last decade. [Page 5] Agenda- setting 1430 1540 1640 1740 1850 1973 Table 1: Periodic Table of Long Cycles (learning 1node) Phases Coalition - t.1acro- Execution Leadership building decision Opposition starting in VJest -European era 1460 1494 1516 Portugal Spain 1560 1580 1609 Dutch Rep. France 1660 1688 1714 Britain I France 1763 1792 1815 Britain II Ger1nany Post -VJest-European era 1873 1914 1945 United States 2000 2026 2050 Source: after t.1odelski 1990a: 15 [Page 7] Continuing our discussion of Table 1, we note that each line (or row), co1nprised of four phases, represents the "learning" long cycle attributable to one world power. It details the steps by which that state rose (or achieved selection) to that position. Thus, the first line shows that Portugal reached the global leadership position by 1516, following a process that started in about 1430 and whose other 1najor steps 1nay be dated as 1460 427 Journal of World-Systems Research and 1494. While Portugal features in this account as a world power, Spain is shown e1nerging as the next global challenger that is, as one that will be particularly active throughout the next cycle (shown on the next line). Each line in Table l stands for one cycle and traces the "rise" (or selection) of a world power. This 1nakes the table a representation of the learning 1nodel of the long cycle; the alternative, "leadership" 1nodel also consists of four stages or phases, but this 1nodel starts with global war, and world power, and focuses upon sy1npto1ns of "decline" via "delegiti1nation" and "deconcentration". Such "decline" cycle. Britain is and nothing in this ter1n, or two ter1ns, global leadership. of Table l form one 1nay or 1nay not occur in the next shown to have experienced two learning cycles, presentation allows us to prejudge whether one constitute the "nor1nal" tenure of the office of We can say, however, that the first four rows bloc of four cycles, in as 1nuch as these four lines share at least one i1nportant co1mnonality: each and every one has a West European, oceanic base. With the advent of the United States we observe a shift away fro1n Western Europe. That is why the table labels the earlier bloc the West European era of global politics, as distinct fro1n a "post-West European" era which is shown to have begun in 1850 and beco1ne serious after 1945. The ter1n "post-West European" is a provisional one, intended to [Page 8] highlight an i1nportant shift of e1nphasis in the direction of a globally-oriented "basing 1node", but leaving open the possibility that, in the future, a 1nore extended experience will allow the choosing of a 1nore precise designation. Given the "existence" of such a leadership role, how do we explain the observed facts of "rise," that is the selection of so1ne and the failed challenges of the others? For purposes of this analysis, we prefer the term selection because it brings out the point that global leadership is a position that is sanctioned by a syste1nic, collective process, and is not 1nerely a 1natter of individual effort and national power or superior productive potential. The reference to "learning" also 1nakes it clear that we have here a role whose ele1nents need to be acquired via an extended learning process. [Page 9] The theory therefore proposes that: (l) A nation-state accedes to global leadership by a. successfully undergoing a four -phased process of selection (or learning) consisting of Agenda -setting, Coalition -building, Macrodec is ion, and Execution; and b. acquiring or exhibiting the qualifications needed for selection to that position, na1nely politico -strategic organization for global reach, lead econo1ny, open society, and responsiveness to global proble1ns. It is a corollary of the first proposition that: (2) Challengers do not accede to global leadership because they a. fail to co1nplete the selection process, and lose l1acrodecision phase in particular; or because in the they b. lack the necessary qualifications for that position, as set out under (lb). Propositions (l) and (2) might be thought of as constituting a "recipe" for global leadership: each gives us both the "instructions" and the "ingredients" necessary for producing (or failing to produce) the right "1nenu" of policies for structural change in the global syste1n. We 1night also think of the instructions as furnishing the "progra1n" and the ingredients, or as furnishing the "data" required for i1nple1nenting that progra1n. To extend these analogies, we 1night recall that the geno1ne (one set of chro1noso1nes with the genes they contain) 1night [Page 10] also be thought of as a program: as the instructions for building an organis1n (Wesson 1991: 144). The geno1ne is not a blueprint, a scaled-down 1nodel of an organis1n, but rather a code or a set of instructions (such as those found in a cookery book) for carrying out a sequence of activities. Further1nore, a crucial characteristic of a recipe is its irreversibility (Dawkins 1988:295 ff). That is why the selection process is not a blueprint of world order, but only a specification of steps by which a search for a better order 1night be conducted. An ambiguity inheres in this notion of a p rogra1n for an evolutionary process. It 1night 1nean a set of rules devised and acted upon by participants, and inferred by observers, but it 1night also be a regularity that inheres in that sa1ne process. A si1nilar proble1n attaches to the notion of calendars that, via astrono1ny, were once the principal progra1ns organizing the e1nergence of civilization. A calendar 1night be thought of as a progra1n that orders a te1nporal sequence and tells us how to act in relation to it; or else it 1night also be the elucidati on of a natural order governed by the 1notions of the planets around the sun. That is how the long cycle could also be regarded as a [Page ll] calendar of world politics. We notice, finally, that the theory also allows us to differentiate a1nong the winners and losers in the global leadership stakes of the past half-millennium. Those that "decline" and fail to 1nake it to a second ter1n are those that have "failed" in their second bid, for reasons specified in propositions (l) and (2), that is, for disobeying the instructions and neglecting to bring together the necessary ingredients. In other words, we do not need separate theories of rise and decline; a good theory of "rise" has i1nplicit in it a theory of decline. The proble1n of continuance of global leadership is identical with that of 429 Journal of World-Systems Research re-selection. Let us now exa1nine in so1ne 1nore detail these two propositions. Selection A basic observational datu1n for our study is the long cycle: a century-long strea1n or ti1ne -line of political events at the global level linking the strategies or fortunes of a number of pro1ninent actors, states and others that co1npete for global leadership. The fact of co1npeti tion 1nakes it pla in that [Page 12] these actors engage in ttselection,tt that is, in a process of collective choice. Selection is a 1nechanis1n by which a choice is 1nade a1nong candidates for an office, and the policies they propose. Elections co1npose, of course, one clas s of selection processes, though there are others as well. Suffice it to say that, at the global level and in the experience of 1nodern ti1nes, so1ne nation -states have co1npeted for the largely infor1nal position of global leadership in 1najor ar1ned conflicts that we call global wars, and have acceded to that position by winning those wars and playing a leading role in the winning coalition. V'Je can regard those wars as "1nacrodecisions" because they rendered collective decisions that proved to be, for a ti1ne, binding for the whole of the global syste1n. Just as election ca1npaigns and electoral contests punctuate the politic al life of a nation, so have global wars lent organization to the politics of the global system, and to each long cycle. That is why the long cycle is a political selection process. Analytically, or 1nore generically, it can also be described as a four-phased "learning" process (l1odelski 1987:99 ff, 1990). It is a learning rather than a routine process [Page 13] because it involves coping and adapting to global proble1ns for which there are no routine solutions. Such structural challenges include 1najor threats to global security, general proble1ns of global syste1n organization, and specific political questions arising out of the selection process such as: where is the next global leadership and challenge coining fro1n? That is, global problems might be classified as negative or positive (threats or opportunities), those arising specifically out of the functioning of global politics, and others that concern wider structures (including the econo1ny). V'Jho are the participants in structural global politics? In the political sphere, the principal participants are the global powers and their leaders, including the "incumbent" world power and its actual and potential challengers, and for so1ne purposes, their forces of global reach; as well as global organizations (to the degree that they 1night exist, such as the United Nations). And, at the interface of politics and other global processes: national, regional and global coalitions and parties that exert influence on global issues; agents of the global econo1nic order such as world banks and global corporations; and instru1nents of world opinion such as the 1nedia, or episte1nic conununi t ies. [Page 14] In a si1nplified analysis, and for the earlier cases, we shall not go too far astray if we focus our attention on the strategies of actors 1nost closely linked to the current world power: its leaders, their politico-strategic forces, the coalitions they 1nanage, their econo1nic agents, and their opinion leaders. The 1nore we 1nove forward in ti1ne, however, the 1nore i1nportant it beco1nes to enlarge the range of strategies and to include world organizations. Participants in global politics cope with 1najor structural proble1ns by "learning" new strategies. A useful way to analyze that process is to conceptualize it as regularly passing through four generation -long phases: those of Agenda -setting, Coalition-building, Macrodecision, and Execution (the ACME process). Four such phases constitute one cycle, as shown by Table l. The phases lay bare the procedural structure of the long cycle as a political learning process: they 1nake it explicit that proble1n resolution requires, in the first place, infor1nation, and an exploration of alternative courses of action. That is followed by the coalescence of coalition around [Page 15] pro1ninent leaders, and certain pro1ninent alternatives, so1ne of which are bound to of fend vested interests. The coalitions are then likely to square off in sustained conflict, but one of the1n will prevail through a collective choice process. Once a decision has been reached, all that re1nains is i1nple1nentation. Clai1nants to global leadership all participate in this process, but do so with special intensity in the phase of 1nacrodecision. They activate and lead the coalitions that, via a global trial of strength (in past cases, a global war), validate the set of policies that will be carried to fruition during "execution". Let us now review these four phases in so1ne 1nore detail. Agenda -setting is analytically the 1nost elusive yet practically the 1nost unsettling of the four phases of global political change; it also is quite crucial to understanding of what follows in the cycle. Adding to that interest is the fact that our own 1nost recent experience of world politics (1973 -2000) has been pro1ninently colored by it. Agenda-setting follows upon the close of the phase of execution in the preceding cycle, and is crucially shaped by that [Page 16] circu1nstance: the closing of the old agenda and the ensuing delegi ti1nation of so1ne features of the old order and of its leadership. Thus by 1850 it was beco1ning clear that France was no longer a significant threat to European and global security, and that the Vienna order of 1815 was in need of drastic reconstruction. The Industrial Revolution launched by Britain in the previous century was fir1nly established, and other econo1nies were about to 1nove in to the van. Britain I s position in Europe weakened significantly and the question of succession started to 431 Journal of World-Systems Research arise, at first only in European but then also in global terms. As old agendas fade away, new proble1ns rise to pro1ninence. VJhen long-standing security proble1ns disappear, new ones rise to co1mnand attention, especially those linked to co1npeti tion for global leadership positions that 1night soon be vacated. Such proble1ns in the past tended to be resolved by global wars. However, when i1nportant global proble1ns are resolved that very success generates new proble1ns. Thus the spread of the Industrial Revolution raised issues of econo1nic and social organization centered on capi tali sin; it also created the resources that 1nade possible an incredible spurt in knowledge generation, in the natural and also in the social sciences. Understanding the new [Page 17] world created by the Industrial Revolution beca1ne an urgent global proble1n. VJho 1night be the chief participants in this phase? VJe would look for the1n pri1narily a1nong opinion -1nakers, especially those cultivating an expertise that responds to e1nerging global proble1ns; but it 1night also be political leaders who for1nulate such problems with greatest visibility. After mid-nineteenth century, they 1night be John Stuart l1ill, Herbert Spencer, Karl l1arx, Fernand Lesseps, or Richard Cobden; a1nong political leaders, Abraha1n Lincoln, Napoleon II, or Otto von Bis1narck. For global agenda-setting, issues co1ne alive with particular saliency in 1nedia networks, in episte1nic co1mnunities, during 1neetings and assemblies, and in inter -govern1nental settings. After 1973, the United Nations has increasingly served as a forum for raising and debating such global proble1ns as those of the environ1nent, food, desertification, and others. Agenda -setting is the phase par excellence for airing proble1ns and reviewing policy proposals that ought to find a place on the global agenda, but it is not necessarily one in which co1nplete agendas descend ready -1nade fro1n on high; 1nore likely they re1nain subject to continuous debate [Page 18] and revision. Agendas re1nain crucial to global politics throughout the course of the entire long cycle, but it is our contention that they undergo dra1natic change and experience the first and 1nost thorough of 1nany debates in the phase of agenda -setting. Coalition -building follows upon agenda -setting in a natural progression. The rising awareness of new global proble1ns and the fading of old ones sets in 1notion a reshuffling of e stablished coalitions, and the construction of new alliances around a new set of issues. This coalitioning is the flip side of "deconcentration" that is now in progress. Over ti1ne the high degree of power concentration and the do1ninant position of the world power that characterized the global political system at the close of the last global war has now waned; global concentration is lost as 1nultipolarity rises and as the weight of other powers, especially of challengers on land, increases. The p reviously effortless superiority of the world power gives way to a condition of low global concentrations that favor flexibility of align1nents and the reconstruction of alliance systems [l]. [Page 19] In other words, as 1night be expected, a lower r atio of power concentration (including econo1nic power concentration) in the appropriately titled phase of 'deconcentration' creates conditions pro1noting realign1nent and encouraging coali tioning. l1ost generally such coali tioning takes the for1n of an align 1nent for and against 1naintaining global order, while responding innovatively to global proble1ns. A classic case of the for1nation of such new alliance syste1ns is the case of European and global realign1nents after 1873. That phase began with the coining together of the Triple Alliance of Ger1nany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, that was begun by Bis1narck in 1879, in response to which the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Britain was built between 1890 and 1907. At the sa1ne ti1ne the Anglo-Alnerican "special relationship" crystallized after 1900, during the Spanish-Ainerican war, albeit quite infor1nally. These were linkages that focussed on the rising power of Ger1nany, and the i1npending changes in global leadership, but they also reflected differing approaches to other global problems. [Page 20] The agents of coalition-building are both political leaders and diplo1nats, and it would be a 1nistake to regard the process as exclusively or predo1ninantly confined to the international or diplo1natic level. Lasting political align1nents take root and assu1ne shape in an e1nerging global conununi ty and represent concern for conunon proble1ns that reflect underlying value conunit1nents. V'Jorld parties play an i1nportant role here, at the interface of world politics and conununity. In the earlier cases, cultural and religious factors ca1ne to the fore; in the second British cycle the cul ti vat ion of a trading conununi ty proved to be significant [2]. l1ore recently ideological factors, including adherence to de1nocratic nor1ns and practices, played a significant role. In all such cases global align1nents were closely linked to national party align1nents and regional orientations. l1acrodecision is the cul1nination of coalition -building. Analytically speaking this should be regarded as the ti1ne when actors in the global political system, arrayed in at least two 1najor coalitions, choose a1nong the rival agendas by deciding upon the co1nposition of leadership for the next "ter1n of office". In [Page 21] the past several cycles this has 1neant a generation -long period of global warfare, at the conclusion of which new global leadership e1nerged. But there is no reason why in the future this process could not assu1ne a different for1n, as new procedures (yet to be invented) will be devised for coining to a 1nacrodecision without any resort to large -scale violence; such new for1ns will in effect serve as substitutes for the entirely pri1ni ti ve 1nethod of world-wide warfare of potentially -catastrophic consequences. There are reasons to believe that within a de1nocratic conununity such substitutes can in fact be constructed. A good exa1nple of "1nacrodecision" is the global war 433 Journal of World-Systems Research period bracketed by World Wars I and II (1914 -1945). It co1nprised two instances of 1najor warfare, including sustained hostilities at sea, in which the identities of the 1najor contenders, and of the rival coalitions and their agendas, re1nained virtually unchanged. It also co1nprised related warfare in the so -called "inter-war" period, such as the Sino -Japanese war, the Italian -Ethiopian wars, and the Spanish civil war. And further1nore, it was punctuated by a world-wide "Great Depression" (a structural crisis in the global econo1ny paralleling a structural crisis in global politics) whose ravages only added to an i1npression of pervasive disorder and universal havoc. Out of this tur1noil the United States e1nerged [Page 22] in a clear leadership position by 1945 -47. The principal actors of 11 1nacrodecision" are global leaders of a politico-strategic bent. In World War II, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were key exa1nples. They asse1nbled the global war coalitions, defined war ai1ns, and 1narshalled forces for victory via sustained ca1npaigns of global scope. They have been aided by 1nilitary leaders (naval, ar1ny and airforce), so1ne of who1n (such as l1arshall, or Eisenhower) rose to political pro1ninence in the after1nath of war; the interests of 1nili tary and naval organizations assu1ned para1nount i1nportance in such periods. It is an open question how precisely this politico-strategic role 1night evolve in the coining century, or if substitutes 1night be devised for the "global war" for1n of 1nacrodecision. Execution rounds off 1nacrodecision, and the entire sequence; it is the quintessential "post -war" period. This phase has also been called that of "world power" because that is when the weight and influence of global leadership is at its peak. l1ore precisely, it is a period of "honey1noon", because global leadership continues [Page 23] beyond the phase of execution but at a lesser degree of intensity and effectiveness. Effectiveness is in part a function of power concentration. War victory leaves the world power co1mnanding a lion I s share of 1nili tary and econo1nic power in the global syste1n. A glance back at the data in Note l confir1ns this point, and shows that in every execution phase to date the world power has enjoyed a healthy 1nonopoly of seapower (50 per cent or over seapower concentration ratios). That 1neant unchallenged control over naval co1mnunications, and a powerful assist to installing and "locking -in" the post-war order. However, 1nonopoly also ul ti1nately leads to co1nplacency, to "resting on one's laurels." But the world power is not just powerful; as the "executor" of the agenda that the global war coalition carried in the 1nacrodecision phase, and whose i1nple1nentation is atte1npted in the post-war settle1nent, it also has legi ti1nacy. The essential functions of "execution" reside in the creation of an i1nproved institutional structure for the gradually evolving global syste1n. Additions to for1nal international organizations that have incre1nentally occurred each century after 1609 include the Concert [Page 24] of Europe in 1815 and the United Nations, which incorporated a growing fa1nily of after 1945. In relation to the global econo1ny there is, in each post -war settle1nent, an incre1nent of consolidation and in the direction of freer (though not totally free) trade. In the phase of execution, the activities of large corporat ions and banks have oftenti1nes been crucial; witness the Dutch East Indies Co1npany after 1609, the English East India Co. after 1714, the Rothschild banks after 1815, and US 1nultinationals after 1945. An "executor" conception of global leadership car ries a restrictive rather than an expansive definition of responsibilities. It is not to be conceived as the role of "world police1nan," if seen as conferring an all -round duty of responding to every breach of the peace by an authorized and paid agent of a world organization. Rather it is one of 1nore specialized concern for the safety of the essentials of the global order, and especially that of global co1mnunications that are its infrastructure. Earlier world powers did not act as all -round "keepers of the peace," but rather as the guardians of the sinews of global order: shipping lanes, freedo1n of the seas, suppression [Page 25] of piracy or the slave trade. This essentially voluntary duty, while responsive to allied concerns, was of a selective kind, even in periods of 1naxi1nu1n effectiveness. It is likely to beco1ne 1nore generalized only in response to greater global organization. Production of global order has in recent years been taken as the basic output of global leadership, the clai1n be ing that 'order in world politics is typically created by a single do1ninant power' and that 'the 1naintenance of order requires continued hege1nony. ' Order, in this context, has 1neant peace and a liberal econo1ny. In our perspective this is too expansive a v iew, and the expression "typically" needs qualification, since the proposition generalizes only fro1n the 1nost recent British and Ainerican cases. Global leadership has in fact "traditionally" consisted of carrying out a program of action, executed via a post-war settle1nent. Such a settle1nent could be said to have helped to 1nould "an order", but did not create order as such, and represented only one step in the evolution of the global syste1n. Past the phase of execution a new agenda began to e1nerge, but though the legi ti1nacy of global leadership was coining into [Page 26] question order never co1npletely dissolved, even in ti1nes of global war. The "post-war" period of the twentieth century (1945 -1973) is a good exa1nple of "execution." The security threat presented by Ger1nan-Japanese expansion was thwarted, and the two states found gradual inclusion into an e1nerging de1nocratic co1mnunity. That sa1ne co1mnunity-in-beco1ning defined its 1nembership 1nore sharply by contrasting itself with a Soviet b loc that for four decades offered a non -de1nocratic alternative but which ulti1nately broke up. That sa1ne co1mnunity finally served as the basis for the infor1nation and knowledge revolution that is ever 435 Journal of World-Systems Research 1nore tightly weaving the world together. This co1np letes our account of the four phases of the "selection" process that constitutes, in effect, the program and calendar that aspiring candidates for global leadership would be well advised to follow. What about the "ingredients" that the candidates need to bring to that process? Necessary Conditions We recall that, earlier on, four "ingredients" were declared necessary for the "production" of global leadership: [Page 27] l. politico-strategic organization for global reach; 2. lead econo1ny; 3. open society, and 4. responsiveness to global proble1ns [3]. These are the "necessary and sufficient" properties of a nation-state, whose presence in adequate a1nounts is needed to achieve global leadership. It is, 1noreover, asserted that all four are "necessary" in that all four 1nust be present, and that, further1nore, such a conjunction suffices to achieve it. The present for1nulation is a 1nore generalized, if also a 1nore succinct list of the "factors of leadership" that were outlined in chapter nine of Long cycles of World Politics (l1odelski 1987:220-233). It differs fro1n the earlier state1nent in that it puts "insularity," previously shown as a separate factor, under preconditions favoring an organization of global reach, and treats "responsiveness to global proble1ns" as a distinct condition; in the earlier treat1nent that latter point was discussed under "Pressures from New Problems" (ib.:231-3). Table 2 sets out the necessary conditions of global leadership in a syste1natic for1n. We shall now discuss the1n in greater detail. [Page 28] Table 2: Necessary Conditions for Global Leadership Organization for global reach Lead econo1ny (l) Why a necessary condition Wins global wars, keeps post-war settle1nent Funds global progra1ns, serves as role 1nodel of econo1ny (2) Organizational basis Oceanic Lead navy, industries, Open soci ety Ani1nates coalitions, role 1nodel of society De1nocratic potential; Responsiveness to global proble1ns Global leadership serves global proble1ns, leads world opinion Strong,active 1nedia space fiscal strength party system (3) Predisposing conditions Insularity t1arket econo1ny De1nocratic experience (4) Sources of co1mnit1nent to global action Global interests World trade Alliances (5) t1ost relevant phase of the long cycle Global war Large ar1ny [Page 29] Execution Coalition - building Characteristics of challengers Large econo1ny Closed, controlled society Free spe ech experience State -of-the world knowledge Agenda- setting Weak, ethno - centric 1nedia Politico-strategic organization for global reach is what wins global wars. In all the past five such wars , strong oceanic navies, rather than large armies, were the necessary conditions of victory and of attaining global leadership. Without superiority on the sea, ar1nies alone could not have been deployed where and when needed. At the end of each global war, the "inco1ning" world power could therefore be shown to be co1mnanding the world's greatest navy. In between "1nacrodecisions", global reach forces deterred global war, that is, protected the global status quo. An early, yet insufficiently well known exa1nple of such an organization was the navy of the King of Portugal in the 15th and 16th centuries. A focus on oceanic naval forces 1nakes it possible to sort out states with a serious stake in world affairs. Over the past half 1nillenniu1n, about four states have had, on the average, a significant stake of this sort at any one ti1ne, for a total of nine al together, with another half -dozen in a regional role (t1odelski & Tho1npson 1988). Nor is this situation 1nuch different in th e 1990s, when over one half of the world's nuclear warheads are deployed at sea. Even though the 1nembership of the United [Page 30] Nations has reached 180, only one or two of the 1nember states (the United States, and 1naybe Russia) qualify as having oceanic navies, and 1naybe only another two or three could play the role of aspirants (China, or a future "Europe" including France, and Britain). That is why what 1natters at the global level is not 437 Journal of World-Systems Research 1nilitary power in general, and ar1nies in particular - though the latter do 1natter greatly, especially at the regional level - but the availability of globally -1nobile forces. In the past these have 1neant navies, and today and in the near future they 1nean navies allied to air, space and infor1nation power. Navies are "observables": warships are a for1n of 1nilitary hardware that is 1neasurable and therefore, for our purposes, exceedingly useful as indicators of global purpose. But the use of that indicator is not intended to i1nply that fleets in and of the1nsel ves are all that 1natters to organization for global reach, for they are only one crucial co1nponent. Obviously, they 1nust be combined with other ele1nents of 1nilitary political power, as well as with diplo1nacy and good intelligence, and they 1nust be well-led. For it is political leadership at the highest level (via its decision-1naking processes) that combines these forces with the [Page 31] inputs of resources fro1n econo1ny, society, and culture to create the conditions that lead to the attain1nent of global leadership. VJe 1night add that insularity represents a set of physical conditions which in the past have been conducive to developing a strong navy and a co1mni t1nent to an oceanic role. It has also conferred on aspirants to global leadership an i1nportant 1neasure of "surplus security," hence relative invulnerability, aiding in the effective deploy1nent of forces at the global level. Insularity is still with us (in as 1nuch as the United States 1night be regarded as virtually a continental-sized island), and will continue to be a useful attribute of forces of global reach, even if the technical conditions affecting it 1night change. But there is no need to regard it as one of the four "necessary conditions" of our analysis. In the past five hundred years, global reach as the necessary condition of global reach was given practical embodi1nent in oceanic navies. These were e1nployed to deny the use of the sea for trade and other purposes during ti1nes of 1najor war. [Page 32] In the future global reach 1night increasingly take the for1n of space power, specifically the power to deny the use of near space to one's opponents, that is to their ability to operate co1mnunication, navigation, weather, and intelligence satellites for purposes of conventional and/or nuclear warfare. A 1nonopoly of space power could be technically possible in the 21st century [4] l1aintaining a lead econo1ny is the second basic condition of global leadership. In order that an econo1ny aids in the "production" of leadership it 1nust, of course, be an econo1ny that is fiscally sound, of so1ne weight and substance, and also a growing one at that, for only a substantial and a growing econo1ny can be expected to fund the budgets that 1nake it possible to 1nount force s of global reach. But the size of the national product alone does not suffice as a clai1n to leadership, and 'preponderance of 1naterial resources' is not a defining ele1nent of such an econo1ny. A large but stagnant econo1ny cannot support world -wide enterprises. An econo1ny will only be a reliably growing one if it is an econo1ny that nurtures and brings forth leading industrial sectors. lfJe refer here to globally -significant sectors of the econo1ny, [Page 33] that is, to lead industries. These are the industries that in a given ti1ne span and at certain locations radiate innovative i1npact upon the world econo1ny. That i1npact travels via international trade, and gives new shape and 1neaning to global transactions. It also constitutes by itself an additional clai1n to leadership. Classic instances were the cotton and stea1n industries which launched the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, and gave Britain co1mnercial supre1nacy in the 19th. The location of future lead industries, if it can be reliably deter1nined, is a leading indicator of world power and global leadership to be. "Open society" is a ter1n designed to spotlight de1nocratic experience, and is intended as shorthand for freedo1n, openness, and de1nocracy potential. lfJe know that de1nocrac y, as a pheno1nenon of the 1nodern era, takes off only in 1nid -19th century. That 1neans that the VJest European era of global politics, one on which 1nuch of the substance of this analysis (and 1nuch of the conventional wisdo1n of the study of International Relations) are based, does not really offer us clear exa1nples of de1nocratic co1mnunities serving as the basis for global leadership. It is also the reason why the [Page 34] de1nocratic experience features 1narginally, if at all, in historical accounts of world politics. Even Britain, with a liberal society and a parlia1nentary regi1ne since 1688, did not acquire true de1nocratic credentials until well past the 1nost creative periods of its global invol ve1nent. Yet it is also worth stressing that all those acceding to leadership in that era belong to what in retrospect 1night be called the de1nocratic lineage, that is, the lineage fro1n which a 1nore fully -for1ned t:ype of de1nocracy descended. They exhibited features of society that qualified the1n as belonging to that lineage on account of de1nocratic potential because, relative to their co1npetitors, they offered a superior pro1nise of forwarding develop1nents in the direction of greater freedo1n at ho1ne and openness abroad. As we look forward to the future, 1noreover, fro1n Britain onward, it is not just de1nocratic potential but also past de1nocratic experience that 1nore and 1nore beco1nes a deter1nining condition. Conceived in this way, why is it that a free, open, and de1nocratic society is needed to produce global leader ship? VJe answer this question on two levels: at the e1npirical level we observe that all the cases listed in Table 1 under "leadership" [Page 35] are cases of de1nocratic potential, or of de1nocratic experience, superior to that of the challengers [5]. At the general level we argue that a free and open society provides a superior support fra1nework for the evolution of cooperation, and provides the seedbed for strategies that in turn serve as the foundation for 439 Journal of World-Systems Research global leadership. Robert Axelrod (1984) has shown how cooperation can start in clusters and thrive with rules that are "nice," provocable, forgiving, and clear. Open/de1nocratic societies provide the opti1nu1n conditions for the e1nergence and clustering of such strategies in the for1n of coalitions at national and global levels. By regularizing and stabilizing decision -1naking processes they allow for the differentiated growth of cooperative strategies; by fostering debate and protecting hu1nan rights they offer the context for the e1nergence of variety, hence creativity and innovation; and by civilizing conflict they 1nake 1nore likely the growth of "nice" strategies that are oriented to solving global problems and that, when successful, tend to cluster and enlarge the area of cooperation. That is why de1nocratic alliances have generally been 1nore productive and 1nore enduring. [Page 36] In 1nore concrete ter1ns this 1neans that a society aspiring to global leadership will value pluralis1n and possess a developed syste1n of public organizations, including a well -functioning 1nultiparty syste1n and a rich network of private associations and interest groups. The combination and recombination of these ele1nents produces the coalitions that contend over global proble1ns and that, nationally and globally, are essential ele1nents of the process we are studying, especially so in the phase of coalition-building. In coining decades these will serve as the building blocs of the global de1nocratic co1mnuni ty within which global war will beco1ne an anachronis1n, an d proble1ns will be resolved by de1nocratic procedures. Responsiveness to global proble1ns is a necessary condition because global leadership is precisely the business of attending to urgent global proble1ns. Global leadership is not a 1natter of asserting or flaunting power, nor is it the 1natter of exercising world do1ninion. It is an arrange1nent for 1narrying the interests of one nation-state with proble1ns of the global syste1n that are of pervasive currency and wide concern. Such a nation -state will likely be predisposed to develop such interests, be it on account of previous politico-strategic involve1nent, trading links, [Page 37] established alliances, or because knowledge of world -wide conditions is available. Such a nation -state also will tend to view its own national interests as closely linked with wider, 1nore inclusive concerns that can beco1ne the basis for global action. Analytically, responsiveness to global proble1ns 1night be regarded as a 1node of responding to world opinion. It provides legiti1nacy for international action; that is, it offers a justification in ter1ns of which national action 1nay also be regarded as having been undertaken in the service of broader interests. That is how the King of Portugal, for exa1nple, explained his expeditions to the East as producing "discoveries" that rebounded to the benefit of all. l1ore specifically, such responsiveness provides the basis for coalition-building. Cooperation occurs because certain strategies are seen to serve interests which are wider than those of any one nation; global proble1ns provide the 1nost general of such platforms. In the wars of the Great Alliance against Louis XIV, for instance, the concept of balance of power served as the principle expressing the interest of all Europe in a "balancing" arrange1nent [Page 38] which li1ni ted the power of the Sun King. Our argu1nent therefore also i1nplici tly asserts that global leadership is capable of producing public goods for the global syste1n. These are goods or services that can benefit a public wider than that of the acting nation, including at the li1nit all of hu1nani ty. Peace and a liberal trading order are often cited as exa1nples of such benign goods, but on the negative side there are also those who argue that "h ege1nony" produces such "bads" as war and exploitation. The theory of collective goods (as for1nulated by t1ancur Olson, cf. Abra1ns 1980, Ch. 8) has helped clarify the logic of collective action and elucidate the concept of public goods ("goods which cannot provide benefits to one individual without si1nultaneously providing benefits to others"). It argues that such goods are provided 1nore easily in s1nall ("privileged") groups than in large groups that are likely to be beset by "free riding" proble1ns. But it also points out that 1nost public goods are not "pure," are subject to "crowding" (when their benefits are reduced by the consu1nption of others), and to exclusionary practices. lfJe observe that in past experiences of global leadership, [Page 39] "privileged" groups have been the rule. That is, the direct benefits of the provision of collective goods, such as those resulting fro1n the discoveries, were subject to appropriation by the 1nonopolies of the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, which practiced wholesale exclusion; or at the close of global wars, by the winning coalitions. The broader benefits have only beco1ne apparent over the longer run, so that it is only in the 20th century, as the relevant groups have grown larger (opening up new organizational questions), that the proble1n of free riders has beco1ne 1nore salient. That is why our analysis avoids reference to such broad concepts as peace or the liberal order for characterizing the entire process, and focusses attention instead on circu1nsc ribed global proble1ns that helped define the individual cycles. It i1nplies neither the "benign" nor the "1nalign" version of the selection process, but seeks to 1natch the benefits of particular policies against the costs they might have entailed. Responsiveness is a function of the availability of 1nechanis1ns that translate a potentially inarticulate world opinion into agendas of global proble1ns. Such is the function [Page 40] of actual or potential global political leadership. Effective parlia1nentary bodies, and other assemblies often perfor1n such functions well. For instance, in the 19th century the British Parlia1nent, on so1ne occasions, ca1ne close to serving as a organ 441 Journal of World-Systems Research of world opinion, and in the second half of the 20th century the Congress of the United States on occasion acts in a similar fashion. Such bodies function best when they interface closely with world-wide 1nedia and other cultural -educational networks; political definitions of proble1ns are thereby filtered to the general public world-wide, and world opinion percolates up to the political bodies. Free 1nedia and open scholarly and episte1nic co1mnuni ties perform such services better than weak or ethnocentric ones. Ideologies 1night be regarded as standardized definitions of global proble1ns that are associated with definite action progra1ns. They for1nulate co1npeting solutions to persistent global proble1ns, and they provide a co1mnon orientation to the future across do1nains and regions. Thus, t.1arxis1n 1night be thought of as having articulated one set of responses to proble1ns created by the Industrial Revolution. t.1odern de1nocracy, 1neanwhile, could be seen [Page 41] as having risen in the context of the infor1nation revolution. Ideologies therefore co1ne and go; over long perio ds they reflect fluctuations in world opinion. In earlier ti1nes world opinion, that is, opinion relevant to the definition of global proble1ns, had a rather narrow basis and was confined to so1ne people in a few countries. Over the centuries, however, the social base of that opinion has widened steadily. The infor1nation revolution of the past century has significantly expanded it, 1naking it now technically possible to conduct world public opinion polls. At the li1nit, the base of world opinion is coextensive with the hu1nan race. Non-Selection of Challengers The long cycle has produced global leadership, but it has also si1nul taneously produced a parallel but contrasting result: the pheno1nenon of "challenger." The structural p rocess of global politics effects not only the rise and decline of world powers, but also the opposition, the tension, and the conflicts that attend upon the rise and defeat of challengers. Such circu1nstances, it 1nust be noted, have so far tended to cul1ni nate in global war. The non-selection of challengers is as 1nuch a part of the [Page 42] long cycle as is the selection for global leadership, and is subject to the sa1ne conditions outlined above. The sequence of phases is quite si1nilar, except that it begins one phase earlier than we have observed in respect of world powers and it also ends sooner, with the defeat of the challenge in the phase of 1nacrodecision. The set of necessary conditions is the sa1ne as well, except that they all appear, as it were, under the opposite signs, as when the society that would be expected to be open turns out to be closed or the econo1ny turns out to be 1nerely large but not of the leading kind (cf. Table 2, last line). Phase 1nove1nent of the challengers take s shape in the "E" phase of the long cycle, one in which the inco1ning world power "executes" its 1nandate by i1nple1nenting the agenda of global proble1ns. But the position then established does not confer total control or world do1ninion, and an alternative focus of influence naturally e1nerges. Either the winning coalition, having served its purpose, dissolves or splits (as after 1814 -5), or else the defeated challenger re1nains as a potential center of the opposition (as after 1714) Certainly, as indicated in Table 1, we can see [Page 43] that the ascent into global leadership 1noves in step with the coalescence of political and econo1nic forces that, further down the road, 1night 1nount a challenge. This is a situation that cannot be regarded as unexpected, since power and its exercise do not re1nain unopposed or unanswered for long. But the process takes a while to unfold. It 1noves first into the phase of agenda -setting, in which the legi ti1nacy of global leadership begins to weaken and debate is opened anew about world visions. Again, this is not a debate in which one agenda crystallizes and to which all parties can instantly subscribe. Rather, we see a variety of agendas and issues, variously prioritized; we also see expansionists seeking traditional conquests, funda1nentalists resisting all change, and 1nonopoly interests strenuously defending their prerogatives. Gradually the debate evolves to the phase of coalition -building, during which the issues cluster into two or 1nore opposed alliances. Aspiring challengers 1nove toward the peak of their 1nili tary power on land (cf. data in note 1), and tend to beco1ne the focus of one such alliance. Such alliances also for1n likely rallying points for 1nove1nents of forcible expansion and the opponents of evolutionary [Page 44] change. The strength of that alliance will then be tested in the phase of 1nacrodecision, via global war or so1ne other for1n of collective decision -1naking, in which the challengers have so far been regularly defeated. It is as though the challen gers were working on a set of negative instructions, assuring the defeat of their policies. Characteristics of challengers mirror the process by which the opposition first takes shape and is then resolved in global war. VJe have already noted above, in Table 3 (see also t1odelski 1987:225-7), the set of conditions that 1natch those required for global leadership but in an opposite direction, on all four di1nensions. VJe notice, first of all, that the challengers we have considered were all regionally-based in lfJestern Europe - which is another reason why that particular sequence of long cycles is a VJest European one. At their peak they laid clai1n to regional leadership, cast, however, in an i1nperial 1node. As we look at "necessary conditions," we note that the challengers' economies were above all large, reliant on natural resources (such as agriculture and 1nining), and 1nade up a significant portion of [Page 45] regional or even global output. At their own respective ti1nes Spain, France, Ger1nany, and even the Soviet Union had substantial populations that could be 1nobilized for large 443 Journal of World-Systems Research collective undertakings. But they were not lead econo1nies oriented to world interactions, and in the field of innovation and new industrial sectors they we re regularly outclassed by those who e1nerged successfully fro1n the test of "1nacrodecision." A large econo1ny relies less on foreign trade, offers less to potential coalition partners, and tends to be linked to ethnocentric orientations which lead to t he pursuit of national interests which are narrowly conceived and zealously pursued. Nor is it conducive to the acquisition of knowledge about global conditions. All of these ele1nents, which are exacerbated in closed societies, translate into a slender bas is for building coalitions. For such reasons, despite their wealth and power the Spain of Philip II (1560-1580) and the France of Louis XIV (1660 -1688) each had basically only one regional base, and they each had trouble attracting significant allies worl ct-wide. Si1nilarly, Ger1nany, being relatively less open than either Britain or the United States, beca1ne boxed into a continental syste1n of alliances that turned out to be untenable but i1npossible to break out of after [Page 46] 1914. The Soviet Union was even 1nore isolated within its Iron Curtain. Last but not least is the structure of the military organization, which in the case of challengers tended toward reliance on a powerful ar1ny (rather than navy) and on lightening land ca1npaigns at the regional level. All the challengers were, in their ti1ne, the leading European 1nilitary powers on land, even as they also participated in naval co1npeti tions at the global level. But in global wars they were shut out of the oceans, and the loss of global links fatally under1nined their plans and skewed the contests against them. The overall sy1mnetry of these relationships is quite i1npressi ve. The positive qualities of successful candidates for global leadership contrast 1narkedly with those of the failed challengers. What 1night puzzle those who reflect upon the folly of repeated global wars is the persistence of challenges based on flawed recipes, through at least four cases. Is it not ti1ne for challengers to abandon this false trail and, once and for a 11, to try a new path? [Page 47] Ti1ne and Space Di1nensions The long cycle of global politics, in its learning 1node, has now been shown to be the process by which one state has risen to global leadership. That process is explai ned as the product of (l) a four-phased selection process, and (2) the co -action of four necessary conditions. It 1nust be pointed out, however, that the phased process and the necessary conditions are two ways of looking at the sa1ne pheno1nenon. They re port on the sa1ne condition but fro1n two different vantage points, and they yield two different perspectives. The relationship is, in fact, reciprocal. The four phases represent successive opti1nizations of each of the necessary conditions. Macrodecision (global war) represents that phase in the process in which the forces of global reach exert their 1nost decisive influence and experience their fullest realization. In turn, the four necessary conditions are the factors that explain successful perfor1nanc e in each of the four cycle phases. Sche1natically, the relationship 1night be represented as follows: [Page 48] Phase of Agenda -setting Coalition -building l1acrodecision Execution opti1nizes .. .. .. Responsiveness to global proble1ns Open society Forces of global reach Lead econo1ny . The first of these perspectives, that of the four -phase selection process, is te1nporal (or diachronic), 1neaning that it is oriented to the ti1ne di1nension. The second is spatial, in that it has to do with the distribution of "production resources" in space, and 1nay therefore yield, at different points in ti1ne, different (synchronic) snapshots of such distributions. l1ore precisely, we 1night ask: why conceptualize four phases and four conditions? This is because we conceive the selection process as unfolding in four di1nensions: three spatial (left-right, up-down, forward-backward) and one te1nporal (ti1ne). The processes we are exa1nining can be located and fully described on all relevant scales by reference to these di1nensions. These di1nensions can also be roughly identified with the econo1nic, political, social, and cultural aspects of social ti1ne-space. The long cycle is a 1nodel of long -ter1n political develop1nent [Page 49] that represents a for1n of "symbolic synthesis" that is obviously fact-oriented, because it is governed by observables in social processes. But it is also a high er-level synthesis, as co1npared with historical narratives and in that respect is 1nore econo1nical with facts (Elias 1992:190). Co1nparison with Kennedy Paul Kennedy's (1987) work, while a sustained narrative account of the "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" in the past half-millennium, does not present a full statement of the analytical 1nodel of the process that is being described (see also l1odelski 1990b). But such a 1nodel 1night nevertheless be extracted fro1n it, for purposes of highlighting the key features of this approach as co1npared with the "symbolic synthesis" outlined in the present account. Table 3 effects a co1nparison of these two 1nodels of "rise and fall" under the categories so far e1nphasized in this presentation: those of the te1nporal selection process, and those of spatial, necessary conditions. Kennedy's account (1987:esp. at pp. xxi-xxiv) puts 1najor e1nphasis on the two factors of 1nilitary and econo1nic power, and on their interaction; he presents full 445 Journal of World-Systems Research [Page 50] narratives of 1najor wars, especially those he calls "coalition wars," but he generally neglects "softer" factors such as open society, and global proble1ns. Nor does he, in our opinion, focus sharply enough upon issues of global co1npeti ti veness. Table 3: Two 1nodels of "rise and decline" Long cycles (learning 1nodel) "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 1500 -2000" (Kennedy 1987) Explanation of "selection" to global leadership of Portugal, Dutch Republic,Britain, United States; "non-selection" of Spain, France, Ger1nany. "rise and fall" of Hapsburg Spain, Britain, United States. Selection process consists of four phases of Agenda-setting, Coalition- building, Macrodecision Execution: Ag-> Co-> Ma-> Ex period: 110 years not explicit, but lays stress on coalition wars non -periodic Necessary conditions Global reach potential inc. insularity econo1ny Open society Military power (M) Sustained econo1nic growth Lead (E), inc. fiscal health Responsiveness to global proble1ns Interaction Global politics co-evolves with global econo1ny, conununi ty, and opinion. [Page 51] (co -evolutionary) effects Econo1ny interacts with 1nili tary power: E+ --> M+ --> E- --> M- (adaptation 1nodel) Kennedy does, however, offer a 1nodel of politico -econo1nic interaction that goes so1ne way toward lending a distinctive dyna1nic to the process. He proposes that ttrisett begins with uneven econo1nic growth in one econo1ny (E+), and that this generates 1nilitary capacity (M+). The joint action of these two factor s explains the rise of a great power. But the exertion of 1nili tary power drains resources and drive fro1n the econo1ny (E -) , and dwindling econo1nic strength in turn saps 1nili tary power (11 - ) , inducing decline. This is an "adaptation" type 1nodel that co1nprehensively covers both "rise" and "decline"; it i1nplies four very general phases, but its periodicity is unspecified and there is no discussion of testing (which we would not really expect in a historical narrative anyway) . We observe as well that this 1node 1 focuses 1nost of its attention on an adaptive interplay of econo1nics and politics. Our own 1nodel, on the other hand, focuses on the [Page 52] phasing of the political process, but considers "interactive" (or co-evolutionary) effects in a 1nore co1nplex f or1nulation (cf. Part II of this study) . We have now accounted for the rise of particular powers to global leadership, but neither our account nor that of Kennedy deals with the question of succession or lineage. Why is it that these powers, in both accounts, constitute a 1neaningful sequence and not just a rando1n assort1nent of powerful states? In order to answer this question we 1nust extend the ti1ne horizon of our discussion backward by another half 1nillenniu1n, and consider 1nore fully the context within which the selection process has operated. On both of these counts we broaden our analysis beyond the fra1nework utilized by Kennedy and 1nost other students of this subject to date. [Page 53] II. THE EVOLUTIOH OF GLOBAL POLITIC S The Need for Broader Explanations We have now essayed an explanation as to how and why four global powers, on a total of five occasions, prevailed over their opponents an 1naintained a period of global leadership. While arguably neat and tidy, this explanation is inadequate because it tackles only a part of the proble1n, and does not co1ne to ter1ns with broader questions that need to be asked if the process as a whole is to 1nake sense. These inadequacies 1night be sununarized as follows: A thorough-going inquiry 1nust go beyond individual long cycles that are 1narked by the influence of one single power, and pose questions about the nature of the entire process. Why is it that, since about 1500 but not before, 1nost of these e vents have centered upon Western Europe? Why is it that the long cycle has been punctuated by a series of four 1najor, global wars? Why is it that there see1ns to be a liberal bias inherent in this long cycle, in that the winners of these wars, and those attaining global leadership, 1night all be regarded as 1nembers of a liberal lineage that showed de1nocratic potential? [Page 54] l1ore basically, the piece1neal, one -case-at-a-ti1ne explanation i1nplies "perpetual 1notion", the circulation of powers in an 447 Journal of World-Systems Research endless coining and going of 1najor states struggling to rise on an unending treacbnill. It raises the proble1n of de1narcation: why does that "rise and fall" begin in 1500, and how long into the future 1night it continue? V'Jhile there 1night be good reasons t o think that a larger and 1nore basic process is at work here, it is not entirely obvious that it 1nust always take the for1n of "rise and fall of the great powers." The issue is joined 1nost i1mnediately over the question of when that process 1night be said to have co1mnenced. Conventionally that beginning is set at about the year 1500, a date that, for the past two centuries in European historiography, has been regarded as 1narking the divide between 1nodern and pre -1nodern ti1nes. This is how Kennedy (1987: 3) explains his decision to start his account at that point. Gilpin (1981:Ch.3) gives no precise dates but he, too, adopts about the sa1ne ti1ne fra1ne when he distinguishes between the pre-1nodern pattern of the "cycles of e1npires," and the 1nodern world whose characteristic features are the nation -state and the world 1nar ket. For V'Jallerstein, the onset of the capitalist world [Page 55] econo1ny dates to the "long" sixteenth century, starting about 1450. And Goldstein I s long cycles start ca .1500, though so1ne attention is also paid to Venice. For those who choose to depict the operation of the global syste1n, this is a wholly satisfactory procedure. V'Jorld -wide co1mnunications on a routine basis, regular oceanic exchange and trade, let alone global political structures si1nply did not exist before 1500. An inventory of sea power in global politics would have to start at that ti1ne as well, because before it no navies could be found that 1naintained a global network of fleets and base. On the descriptive level, that was all that could be done. But those who search for causal explanations would find this procedure unsatisfactory. For even if we agreed that a date close to 1500 (and the sailings of Colu1nbus to the Ainericas and of Vasco da Gaina to India) 1narked the birth of the global syste1n, including the global political syste1n, the question re1nained how 1nuch earlier should we go if we wanted to deter1nine the inception (or conception?) of that syste1n. For in order that a global oceanic [Page 56] syste1n be launched, certain necessary technological, social, political and economic preconditions would have to be satisfied. For instance, ocean-going ships and navigational aids such as the co1npass would have to be developed. An excellent answer to these question was in fact given by V'Jillia1n t.1cNeill (1983), whose account of global political and 1nilitary changes in the 1nodern era begins with Sung China ca. 1000. His reasoning is supported by conte1nporary scholarship that has co1ne to view this period of Chinese history, "China I s greatest age," as the start of 1nodernity in the global context. In other words, in order to give an adequate explanation of the process that ca. 1500 gave birth to the global system, we need to start in China so1ne five centuries earlier. lfJe reach the sa1ne conclusion if we reason, deductively, about world syste1n history. lfJe agree with Frank (1991) that the entire process needs to be viewed as a whole, since it has exhibited significant uniformities ever since its inception in the l1iddle East so1ne 5000 years ago. But it would also be wrong to regard that process as wholly unifor1n, for we 1nust recognize within [Page 57] it certain 1najor eras or phases. In that vein, we follow conventional designations fairly closely if we distinguish the ancient (or archaic) age (-3000 - -1000) from the classical one (-1000 - +1000), and view the 1nodern age as starting at about 1000 (l1odelski 1991). It is at that point that the world syste1n 1night be postulated to have begun e1nerging as a global syste1n (at the sa1ne ti1ne as a syste1n of nation -states), in a process whose full unfolding is yet to be co1npleted. Eras of the Global Syste1n Co1nbining such e1npirical and theoretical considerations with the picture presented in Table l, we arrive at a three -part classification of "eras of the global system," each of which is so1ne 450-500 years in length: l. Eurasian transition; starting ca.930; 2. lfJest European, starting ca. 1420, and 3. Post -VJest European, starting ca. 1850. VJe call the first of these eras "Eurasian," because that is where the center of gravity of the world syste1n for the previous one or two 1nillennia had been. During this era, the Eurasian Silk Roads served as the backbone of the world syste1n 1 s co1mnunication network. The subsequent shift away fro1n that syste1n took so1ne [Page 58] doing. The first thrust toward 1nodern organization on a large scale took off in Sung China in the 10th century, and continued with the successive develop1nent of a nu1nber of globally -significant innovations. But in the 13th century, the experience and the resources of, at first North, and then South, China were captured by the l1ongols who used the1n in an atte1npt to construct a world e1npire. For a ti1ne the rule of the l1ongols extended fro1n Eastern Europe, to Syria, to the Sea of Japan, and to the South China Sea, incorporating over 40 per cent of the world population (a proportion higher than that attained by an y e1npire before or since). l1ongol cavalry ar1nies do1ninated the center of the world I s landinass and threatened the continental fringes in Europe, Egypt, India, Southeast Asia, and Japan. It was the first truly Eurasian social and political system, with Renaissance Italy for1ning no 1nore than an outlying part of it. Fro1n a global perspective, the defining feature of the Eurasian transition era was the l1ongol bid for world e1npire. But that was not all there was to it. The 1nost i1nportant feature of that bid was its catastrophic failure, the utter collapse of the 449 Journal of World-Systems Research [Page 59] l1ongolian design into devastation, disruption, and epide1nic disease. The atte1npt to build a global political structure on the basis of i1nperial 1nodels of the classical era failed so c 01npletely that world syste1n develop1nent was pushed in a new direction [6]. But there was 1nore to the Eurasian transition than the failure of the l1ongols. This positive aspect is captured by the ter1n "Renaissance," which has been applied by historians to both the Chinese and the Italian periods of this era. For instance, Jacques Gernet has called the Sung dynasty the ti1ne of "Chinese Renaissance," while the sa1ne ter1n has of course been used in reference to the Italian develop1nents of the later l1iddle Ag es. Both were strikingly innovative periods of high growth, urban vitality, and artistic excellence. But it was, in fact, the e1npire of the l1ongols which served to diffuse the experience of the first to the second; they spawned influences still felt today. This pattern of negative and positive develop1nent 1nay be observed in the two subsequent eras of the global syste1n. A recurring feature of the V'Jest European era has been atte1npts at universal do1ninion, in response to which "balance -of-power" [Page 60] coalitions were organized under global leadership that 1narked entire periods of this era. These ti1nes also gave rise to colonial e1npires, including the large British colonial holdings at the turn of the 20th century. But these were also ti1nes o f vigorous co1npeti tion, 1narked by feats of exploration and technological innovation, great econo1nic expansion, and rapid population growth. In the post -V'Jest European era, whose shape we are only now beginning to discern, these tensions continue, though arguably in a 1nore attenuated for1n. The labels we attached to the eras of the global syste1n refer to locations in space. V'Je are thus arguing that the bulk of innovative activity in those periods was concentrated in one or another zone of the world syst e1n, that is, in the "active zone" of that particular period. But these eras 1night also be understood as phases in the evolution of the global syste1n, which 1nay be sche1natically represented as follows: 930-1420 1420-1850 1850- (2300) (2300) [Page 61] The Evolution of Global Politics Preconditions Global nucleus Global organization Consolidation Defining proble1n Failure of world e1npire 1200 -1400 Balance of power in Europe after l 713 Shape of world organization ca. 2100 Stability of world organiz ation V'Je propose, in other words, that the 1najor project of the for1nation of a global political structure is a learning proble1n that cannot be co1npleted suddenly or without preparation. V'Je also propose that the four 1najor stages of that process can be roughly characterized as cultural (technological), social, political, and econo1nic, and that they together 1night take 1nore than a 1nillenniu1n to evolve. In this larger sche1ne of things, we 1night then see the Eurasian transition as one in which the preconditions of later develop1nents were laid out: both negatively, in that i1nperial designs were ruled out, and positively, because innovations of global significance were diffused world -wide and the building of large-scale political and economic organizations was initiated in several areas. The V'Jest European era was one during which a few nation-states provided a regional nucleus for global organization that 1nay not have e1nerged otherwise; states in this region took advantage of earlier innovations, and undertook their own initiatives, to lay down world-spanning webs of econo1nic, political and social connections which had their center in V'Jestern Europe. In the post -V'Jest European era we 1nove beyond this nucleus, [Page 62] towards an organization of increasing density, and towards and increasingly oceanic global basing 1node. This is a process that took off in the 19th century, gained force after 1945, is now gathering new 1no1nentu1n, but is likely to continue for the next two or three centuries. Beyond that a phase of consolidation, probably reaching out into space, will prospectively give it yet greater definition. Long Cycles as t.1echanis1ns of the Global Polity Process Each (500 -year) era of the global syste1n process 1night also be regarded as one period of global politics. V'Je 1night also say, as we have just seen, that the global syste1n process defines, in broad terms, the program for global politics of its era. t.1ore specifically, each period of the global political process 1night also be shown to co1nprise four long cycles, such as those we have exa1nined in earlier parts of this study. On that account, each 120-year long cycle constitutes one phase of the global political process, that is, the process by which global political organization is constructed. V'Je have already seen, in Table 1, a series of five [Page 63] co1npleted cycles. V'Je can now co1nplete that table with four 1nore cycles in the era of "preconditions," shown in Table 4. V'Je find that this era was launched with a surge of activity centered on the Northern Sung, and was followed by another that was characteristically "Southern Sung". The third cycle was propelled by the t.1ongols, who 1noved the center of global political activity to the t.1editerranean, showing a "Genoan" and a "V-enetian" cycle. In about 1420 the Portuguese initiated the process by which the nucleus of the global syste1n e1nerged, and by 1850, with the take-off of the U.S. cycle, we see the beginnings of global organization. Table 4 sets out the full schedule of ten long 451 Journal of World-Systems Research cycles, viewed as phases of the global political process; it presents a fully theoretical interpretation of this process. Table 4: Global Polity Process (Long Cycles) Agenda- Coalition - setting building (global problems) 11acro- decision (global war) Execution EURASIAH TRAHSITIOH period (preconditions) 930 Infor1nation 1060 960 Sung founded 1090 Global syste1n Refor1ners: base conservatives 1220 990 V'Jar with Liao 1120 V'Jar with Chin 1250 1020 Northern Sung 1160 Southern Sung 1280 Pisa routed Genoa LCl LC2 LC3 1190 V'Jorld e1npire? Mongol confederation Fall of S. Sung 11ongol wld. e1np. 1300 1320 1350 1385 LC4 Organization Galley fleet Genoa routed Venice of 1nari t. trade network 11 ongol collapse Ti1nur+l405 1430 Discovery 1540 Integration 1640 Political fra1nework 1740 Industrial Revolution 1850 Knowledge WEST EUROPEAH period (global nucleus) 1460 Burgundian connection 1560 Calvinist international 1660 Anglo-Dutch alliance 1763 Trading co1mnuni ty 1494 1516 V'Jars of Italy Portugal & Italian Ocean Spain 1580 16 09 LC5 LC6 Dutch -Spanish wars Dutch Republic France 1688 1714 V'Jars of Britain I Grand Alliance France 1792 V'Jars of Napoleon 1815 Britain II Ger1nany L C7 LC8 POST-WEST EUROPEAH period (global organization) 1873 Anglo-Ainerican 1914 V'Jor ld V'Jars 1945 USA LC9 revolution 1973 Co1mnuni ty 2080 sp.relationship I & II 2000 De1nocratic transition 2026 (global war substitute) Political fra1nework [Page 66] 2050 The phase structure of every long cycle is the sa1ne, LClO LCll throughout the table. As in the V'Jest European era, 1najor wars also punctuate the four Eurasian transition cycles. These 1night even be called proto-global wars, on several grounds. The forces engaged in these conflicts were powerful, in fact they were the largest in the world at the ti1ne, and the central ca1npaigns of the l1ongol era shaped the world's 1nilitary history for two centuries and brought about a te1nporary consolidation of the core of the Eurasian continent. V'Jhat is 1no re, just as in the later cases, sea power played an i1nportant part in the1n as well. Table 4 also contains significant infor1nation under the heading of Agenda-Setting, where each entry shows the global proble1ns which were central to the shaping of that particular long cycle. In that sense, the global problems orient a century - long sequence of global politics. For instance, in LC3 the series of events is shaped by a preeminently political problem, that is, by an energetic drive for world e1npire. V'J hile that drive attained considerable success, it never reached the stage of a consolidated world e1npire because it soon dissolved into autono1nous uni ts. The energy quickly dissipated, and the real winners turned out to be the Italian republics. V'Je 1nig ht argue that the result was a negative learning experience, a lesson about the irrelevance, if not the i1npossibility of constructing a world e1npire as a lasting structure of world organization. [Page 67] The proble1ns that appear under "agenda -setting" derive in part fro1n the working of the global polity process. They "progra1n" each long cycle so that it can serve as a 1nechanis1n by which a global political structure 1night e1nerge. Specifically, referring again to Table 4, we would argue that the West European era was one of the for1nation of the global nucleus, that network of linkages around which cooperative structures gradually began to for1n in the world syste1n. V'Je would argue further that, in order for such a nucleus to be constituted, four 1najor learning tasks would need to be acco1nplished in sequence. Fist, an infor1national phase, that of oceanic discoveries wherein the broad outlines and the di1nensions of the proble1n would be 1napped out. In the second phase of integration, in which co1npeting nuclear coalitions first faced off with rival designs, the initial ele1nents of that nucleus would be brought together fro1n one of these coalitions. In the third 453 Journal of World-Systems Research phase, the political fra1nework of that nucleus achieves definition, via a co1npeti tive balance-of-power syste1n of nation-states that rejected world e1npire. In the fourth, the industrial revolution served to create an econo1nic basis for the global syste1n to be. [Page 68] In this way, one thing led to another since the solution to one set of proble1ns opened up opportunities for tackling the next. That is how the long cycle served as the instru1nent for the construction of a nucleus around which global organization is e1nerging in the current era, and that is 1noreover how we can de1nonstrate the existence of global proble1ns. For the 1nodel predicts that global proble1ns acquire saliency in the phase of agenda-setting. Specifically, to return to our exa1nple, we would expect "world opinion" to begin placing "discoveries" on the global agenda between 1430 -1460, and start acting upon that agenda soon after. In other words, the existence of global proble1ns postulated by the 1nodel can also be verified by historical evidence. These argu1nents tend to support the position that long cycles in global politics are 1nore than a 1nere churning of great states, the rise and fall of global powers. If they were, such cycles would be 1neaningless or worse for the world at large, or even for the players the1nselves. According to our argu1nent, though, these processes possess a wider 1neaning and inhabit a 1nore expansive universe, that of the construction of the global polity [Page 69] via the stages of preconditions, nucleus, and organization. That is what gives the1n long-range significance and accounts for the success of so1ne and the failures of others. For it is those whose efforts contribute to the creation of a global order that have a good chance to garner broad support, and hence have better odds for success. Fro1n Leadership to Organization l1ost i1nportantly, Table 5 allows us to de1nonstrate what we 1night 1nean by the the1ne of this study, the transition fro1n global leadership to organization. Strictly speaking, that transition begins with the inception of global organization. That is, before about 1000 hu1nans had not the 1neans and largely no desire to organize the entire planet, and had not evolved specialized organization for those purposes. It is true that so1ne of the great conquerors such as Darius or Alexander, or the 1nore powerful e1nperors of the Han or T'ang dynasties, 1night have had the aspirations to rule over all "four corners" of the 'civilized' world, but their practice always fell short of these aspirations because their 1neans proved [Page 7 0] inadequate the task. The situation started to change when our table begins, about 1000. In Sung China population growth, econo1nic expansion, and urbanization created the conditions under which the basic pre-conditions of global organization first e1ne rged: a national 1narket econo1ny, gunpowder and firear1ns, a "learning society" founded on printing, and oceanic navigation based on the co1npass; all that con1bined with the concept of 11andate of Heaven to rule over the civilized world. The Sung exercised that 1nandate in a rather 1nild 1nanner; it was the 11ongols who, first organized by Genghiz Khan - a na1ne that 1neans Universal Ruler - translated that 1nandate into a drive to conquer Eurasia, and who, under Kublai Khan, the victor over the Southern Sung, ca1ne close to attaining that goal by projecting on an al1nost global scale the 1nethods of organization devised by the e1npires of the classical period. But they failed to innovate and their syste1n of order proved to be surprisingly short-lived. Ti1nur' s atte1npt to reassen1ble the conquests of the 11ongols failed even 1nore decisively (1405). The 11ongols collapsed after about 1350, but it would be unwise to dis1niss theirs, and Ti1nur' s, failed experi1nent in world order [Page 71] as irrelevant to the study of world politics, for the re1nnants of that e1npire have been with us until quite recently. Russia, a dependency of the 11ongol e1npire, established its national identity by defeating the Golden Horde and reaching out to the Pacific coast (1550-1650). The Otto1nans, another earlier dependency of the 11ongols, lasted until the 20th century. The 11ughals, who descended fro1n Ti1nur, ruled India until the British displaced the1n in the 1nid-l9th century. China was slow to recover fro1n the 11ongol conquest and was, until 1911, ruled by the 11anchus (descendants of the Jurchen tribes who founded the Chin E1npire destroyed by the 11ongols in 1234, and whose language belongs to the Altaic group, of which the other sub -groups are Turkic and 11ongolian) . The 11ongol e1npir e failed as an atte1npt at global organization on an inner-continental basis. Its failure brought forth an alternative for1n, one based on oceanic linkages, which we call global leadership. Applying 1nethods first developed on a relatively s1nall scale in the 11edi terranean by the Genoese and the Venetians, a set of newly -e1nerging nations, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British, projected these 1nethods precociously [Page 72] fro1n rather narrow VJest European bases onto a planetary scale. Fro1n these s1nall beginnings, a nucleus of global organization gradually arose around certain 1najor nation -states. Global leadership found its 1nost recent 1nanifestation in the position of the United States in the 20th century. The nucleus of global organization first began to accrete on a regional basis in Renaissance Italy after 1420, as part of the alliances centered on Venice, and fro1n the sixteenth century onward, in Europe, around global leadership and its coalition wars. The focus of diplo1natic constellation s soon beca1ne the Dutch Republic, and then Britain (the two soon known as the 11 1nariti1ne powers"), as well as the states that successively fought them, Spain, France, and Ger1nany, and the counter -coalitions they atte1npted to rally. The high points of diplo1n a tic organization were 455 Journal of World-Systems Research the 1najor peace settle1nents: the Truce of Antwerp (1609), the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Peace of Utrecht (l 713 -4), and the Congress of Vienna (1814-5). It was as part of the post-Napoleonic settle1nent that a conuni ttee of the Gr eat Powers that ca1ne to be known as the Concert of Europe was e1npowered, on British initiative, to deal with crises that 1night arise fro1n that [Page 73] settle1nent. The re1nainder of the world syste1n largely re1nained a British preserve. Since that ti1ne, the nucleus of world organization (nuclear because based principally on global leadership and its European allies) has been subject to slow but steady expansion. After 1850, the Otto1nan E1npire joined the European syste1n, and China and Japan were "opened" to the world; at the turn of the 20th century, the Hague Peace Conferences de1nonstrated the practicality of international conferences of universal scope, and so did the League of Nations in the interval between the two World Wars. The United Nations, established in 1945 on the initiative of the United States and with British cooperation co1nprised, in the Security Council, the pri1nary nuclear ele1nent of a conunittee of the Great Powers. However, in the General Assembly it also acquired a 1nore universal co1nponent, designed to be representative of all the world's national govern1nents. So far the United Nations has not beco1ne the center piece of post -West European global politics. Instead, since 1945 the global political process has revolved pri1narily a round the leadership of the United States, its initiatives (or lack of initiatives), and its coalitions and counter-coalitions. [Page 74] That is why, at the turn of the 21st century, we have advanced only partially toward the goal of i1nproved glo bal organization. Table 4 suggests that such progress, while continuing, will necessarily be slow. For, i1nplied in our 1nodel of the global political process is a ti1ne table for the post -West European era. If we are correct in this analysis, that era should co1nprise four long cycles. Of these the first, now co1nplete, is best characterized as having produced a new knowledge -basis for global politics. Science and technology have taken off since 1850, so that the technical basis for world organization is now in place, both in the positive sense of conununication and infor1nation and also in the possibilities of destruction of previously uni1naginable scope. We are currently in the second cycle of that era, one whose principal global proble1n center s on "integration," that is, on laying the social foundations of global organization. We can now see that any lasting foundation of "civil society" is likely to be provided by an e1nerging global de1nocratic conununi ty. It is fro1n within such a conununity which 1night e1nerge alternatives [Page 75] to global war, those arrange1nents that on previous several occasions functioned as rather primitive selection 1nechanis1ns for global leadership. These are 1najor tasks whose solutions 1night not be arrived at for several 1nore decades. It is only then, perhaps a century from now as a third cycle plays itself out, that global organization 1night acquire a full political fra1nework of a federalist character which will be able to replace the for1ns of global leadership to which we have beco1ne accusto1ned. According to this analysis, therefore, the structure of global politics of the coining century will continue to give a pro1ninent, though not exclusive, place to global leadership. Global organization will be a 1nix ture of leadership that is, or is not, supplied by the world power in the for1n that is by now "traditional", and of ele1nents of universal organization in a federalist 1node that are 1nore recent, 1nore tentative, and subject to evolutionary change. V'Je 1nigh t sur1nise that to the latter would increasingly gravitate the acbninistration of routine tasks, while global leadership, acting through international institutions or ad hoc coalitions, will re1nain indispensable for resolving priority global problems. [Page 7 6] How does this analysis square with Robert Keohane's (1984: 14) question: "How can cooperation take place in world politics in the absence of hege1nony?" Two pre1nises which lie behind this question include l) the definition of hege1nony as "preponderance of 1naterial resources," and 2) the observation that the "post-hege1nonic era" had already begun at his ti1ne of writing. The answer to this question is: "Through i1nproved (that is, non-hege1nonic) international regi1nes." Our initial answer questions the pre1nises of Keohane' s position by noting, first of all, that unlike his use of the ter1n "hege1nony" our concept of leadership does not require a "preponderance of 1naterial resources" but rather an econo1ny with global leading sectors; it also calls for politico-strategic capacity for global reach, co1mnuni ty organization, and responsiveness to global proble1ns. In these broader ter1ns, it is not obvious that the post -1945 ter1n of US leadership has now ended; indeed our analysis argues that it has not. V'Jhat is 1nore, we need to distinguish between routine tasks of global organization and those proble1ns that call for structural change and innovation. Once created, international [Page 77 ] regi1nes acbninister routine proble1ns. V'Je regard routine cooperation even a1nong egoists as non -surprising and as little in need of explanation as is so1ne standard or 1nini1nu1n a1nount of conflict. Leadership, on the other hand, concerns crises and thus requires innovative responses which call for learning capabilities. The global syste1n will continue to experience crises, and new global proble1ns in response to which leadership of a "traditional" kind will continue to be called for. But such leadership is also likely to 1naterialize in the context of an e1nerging de1nocratic co1mnuni ty that will te1nper it, and of an 457 Journal of World-Systems Research increasingly well-infor1ned world opinion that will scrutinize it ever 1nore closely. In short our answer is: Routine cooperation will continue even in periods of waning leadership (that is in phases of delegi ti1nation, and deconcentration), but leadership will be needed for projects that will de1nand structural change in the 21st century. lfJe therefore postulate that the global political process will continue on its ti1ne path, following the sa1ne te 1nporal structure that we outlined in considerable detail in the first part of this study. VJhat we 1night expect to change [Page 7 8] is the specification of the necessary conditions of that process. VJhile re1naining defined by our four basic categories, the content of these conditions changes with the eras of global politics. lfJe have su1mnarized in Table 5 the conditions likely to characterize the era of "global organization," contrasting the1n with conditions appropriate to "world e1npire" (the t.1ongol ver sion), and global leadership. VJe observe that a distinct global political structure corresponds to each period of global politics. Table 5: Politico- strategic Econo1nic Social Global proble1n base [Page 7 9] Necessary Conditions for Global Political Structure lfJorld e1npire Global leadership lfJorld organization Principal unit of organization Tribal Cavalry, for continental reach Tribute Stratified By ruling clan Nation -state Federalist Necessary conditions Navy, for global reach, in global war Lead econo1ny Open society VJorld power public opinion Li1ni ted rapid reaction forces, earth 1noni toring Autono1nous tax base, global corporations De1nocratic co1mnuni ty Interactive 1nedia, world opinion The third colu1nn of Table 5 specifies the conditions necessary for the e1nergence of full -fledged "world organization" of a kind sufficient to dispense with global leadership. These include: federalist -type organs of collective decision-1naking that 1night e1nerge as substitutes for global war, li1ni ted 1nili tary forces (including space capability for 1nonitoring conditions on earth), an autono1nous revenue-raising syste1n, a de1nocratic co1mnunity, and grassroots-level 1nechanis1ns to facilitate responses to global proble1ns. It also follows fro1n our analysis that such conditions 1nust be brought into being through a learning process co1nposed of a number of phases, in which proble1ns such as consolidating substitute 1nechanis1ns for global war will be resolved. Unless and until such conditions are satisfied, real global organization will not be possible and strong doses of global leadership of the traditional kind will still be needed. [Page 80] An Evolutionary t1odel The 1nodel offered here is an evolutionary process 1nodel of global politics. This is, however, not the place to fully elaborate the theoretical ra1nifications of an evolutionary approach [7]. At present, suffice it to say that such a 1nodel wou ld rest upon the following core propositions: l. Evolution, including social evolution, is a pattern of the universe. 2. Evolutionary processes necessarily occur in favorable conditions. 3. Evolutionary processes involve the 1nechanis1ns of variation, cooperation, selection, and reinforce1nent. 4. Evolutionary processes coevolve with other evolutionary processes. All we wish to argue at this point is that evolutionary biology and the theoretical social sciences are "equivalent, albeit different exa1nples of the use of one and the sa1ne general theoretical calculus (or 1nodel), the theoretical structure of which re1nains the sa1ne" (Sch1nid 1987:82; italics in original). There are, of course, i1nportant differences between biologi cal organis1ns and societies, and this suggests the need to keep the two real1ns basically distinct. But the successes of the biological sciences give us an incentive to pursue what has been called the [Page 81] "evolutionary analogy" with respect to socia 1 organization. The for1ns of organization that have been addressed in this paper are persisting populations of global political strategies (or policies). Those strategies persist when they successfully reproduce the1nsel ves. By "persistence" or reproduction we 1nean the trans1nission of a progra1n, code, or set of generating rules to the next generation of strategies. We regard for1ns of global organization, such as e1npire or global leadership, as tight clusters (or populations) of strategies that are subject to evolutionary processes. We then proceed fro1n the fact of global political evolution. By extending the reach of our analysis further into the past, and forward into the future, we have established that global political structures have experienced substantial change. For we cannot fail to have noticed that in the past millennium, (a) global 459 Journal of World-Systems Research organization has changed extensively, fro1n a condition of low connectivity and 1nini1nal structure to one of considerable connectivity and substantial structure today. Moreover, that develop1nent has been not 1nerely one of change but has also shown (b) directionality [Page 82] (rather than rando1nness) in that, as just argued, the change 1night be said to have embodied a search for i1nproved for1ns of organization appropriate to an expanding population. It has also traced an orderly path in space, and exhibited a te1nporal structure. Further1nore, it has been evolutionary in the sense of being (c) a ttnaturaltt process of trial and error, one that could be seen as if the unfolding of a process of evolution which does not require the postulation of a grand design or purposeful intention. To show directionality or "naturalness" we need not e1nbrace deter1ninis1n or assu1ne "progress," as in evolutionis1n. VJe postulate only that the evolutionary process unfolds in accordance with an inner logic and/or sequential structure, in that each phase creates the conditions for the next phase which itself 1nust respond to new conditions in the environ1nent. VJe have no reason to believe that, 1nerely because global politics have 1noved toward 1nore co1nplex for1ns of organization, it has therefore beco1ne "better". To 1nake such an argu1nent other external criteria would have to be invoked. On the other hand, that process requires no special 1notivation other than "search for a better life", or, as [Page 83] Ada1n S1ni th put it in his atte1npt to account for what pro1npts hu1nanity to save, the ever -present "desire for bettering our condition." VJe also assu1ne "sensitive dependence on initial conditions;" the beginning for1ns have an i1nportant effect on the course of develop1nent, in that they help cu1nulate the results of earlier changes. This is a basic reason why it is necessary to carefully exa1nine the te1nporal path of struct ural change that we also describe as path-dependent [8]. Even though we need not invoke the postulate of progress, we do not believe that evolution is a rando1n process, a 1natter of lucky accident, or "1nanna fro1n heaven". Rather we assu1ne that in the presence of certain specifiable conditions, in particular those of infor1nation, openness, variety, and co1nplexity of interaction, political evolution will indeed occur. That is why we have paid such attention to specifying these kinds of conditions with care. Conditions favoring political evolution are those in which evolutionary 1nechanis1ns operate 1nost successfully. The first of these 1nechanis1ns is Darwinian "variation". Over ti1ne, so1ne global political strategies will be reproduced in a routine fashion by [Page 84] copying; but others will undergo change, by 1nutation or co1nbination. Additionally, new ones will be proposed as innovations for policy agendas in response to de1nands for the solution of global proble1ns. Such co1nbinations and rec 01nbinations are 1nore probable in free societies, hence are not as rando1n as 1nutations are thought to be in Darwinian biology. These are the sources of variation in the population of strategies. The political and social environ1nent of this population of strategies, including specific institutions, should then be regarded as co1nprising a selective factor or 1nechanis1n that helps to deter1nine which parts of the progra1n will persist, and which policies shall be susti tuted for by new progra1ns. In global politics this has been 1nost directly the 1nechanis1n of 1nacrodecision, which in the past five centuries assu1ned the for1n of global war but which 1night evolve new for1ns in the future. In global econo1nics, on the other hand, the co1npetititve environ1nent of the world 1narket has served as the basic 1nechanis1n of selection. "V-ariation" and "selection" are the two Darwinian 1nechanis1ns. To these 1nay be added two others: cooperation, and [Page 85] reinforce1nent. Cooperation is distinctly non -Darwinian, but it has been recognized 1nore recently by those who see that evolution is not only about co1npetition, but is also about altruis1n, synergy, and long-ter1n collaboration as sources of advantages for survival. Reinforce1nent is essential to learning because it reward s successful solutions to social proble1ns and it also cu1nulates the bases of evolution. This is the "hard core" (in the Lakatosian sense) of the social evolutionary research program. It is actuated (with respect to global politics) by the conception of the long cycle as a phased and therefore also ti1ned [9] evolutionary process that consists of the sequential activation of the four sets of 1nechanis1ns. To predict which particular cluster of policies will prevail, we need additionally to specify as et of conditions which are particularly favorable to the operation of these 1nechanis1ns. Table 4 serves as a test of this evolutionary 1nodel. But there is 1nore to evolutionary theory. It asserts the co1mnon descent of populations, and their co1mnon ori gin via a branching process, for1ning an evolutionary tree. "Co -evolution" is a ter1n referring to "diachronic changes in two or 1nore inter [Page 86] acting objects or syste1ns," and Lu1nsden and Wilson (1981: 367) have extended it to include the reciprocal effects of genetic and cultural evolution. In populations of policies we 1night speak not only of co-evolution of strategies in global politics and economics, but also of policy lineages. Our earlier analysis has deter1nined a set of conditions (shown in Table 2) that are "necessary" for selection to global leadership, and that will deter1nine the shape of global organization. In the case of the politico -strategic organization, the relevant process is of course endogenous; that organization rises as part of the long cycle. But for the three other conditions we need to have recourse to a set of processes that are basically exogenous to the global political process. In Table 3 we show these as "interaction effects," because Kennedy lays so 1nuch stress on the interaction of politico -1nilitary and econo1nic factors. 461 Journal of World-Systems Research VJith respect to the lead econo1ny, as just 1nentioned, we need to consult develop1nents in the global econo1nic syste1n and inquire into the conditions that are likely to foster new global [Page 87] econo1nic sectors in particular. Such "co -evolution of global politics and econo1nics" is exa1nined in greater detail in t.1odelski & Tho1npson (1995). Table 6 is a sche1natic representation of two processes: long cycles that have been the principals ubject of this study, and K-waves, charting the rise and decline of leading sectors of the global econo1ny. Table 6: The Co -Evolution of Global Poli tics and Econo1nics Long cycles (world powers and antecedents) GLOBAL POLITY PROCESS Preconditions (Eurasian transition) LCl Northern Sung LC2 Southern Sung LC3 Genoa LC4 Venice Global nucleus (VJest European) LC5 Portugal LC6 Dutch Republic LC7 Britain I LCS Britain II Global organization (Post - K-waves (global leading sectors) MARKET ECOHOMY Sung transition (Chinese) Kl K2 K3 Printing and paper National 1narket Fiscal fra1nework K4 t.1ari ti1ne trade Nautical -Co1mnercial Revolution (Italian) KS K6 K7 KS Cha1npagne fairs Black Seat rade Galley fleets Pepper Fra1nework of global trade (Burgundian) K9 KlO Kll Kl2 Guinea gold Indian spices Atlantic, Baltic trade Asian trade (VOC) Industrial take -off (British) Kl3 Kl4 Kl5 Kl6 Ainerasian Ainerasian Cotton, stea1n Rail WORLD MARKET Infor1nation age VJest European) LC9 United States LClO [Page 89] K17 Steel, electrics K18 Autos, electronics K19 Infor1nation industries These sectors have been both industrial and 1nercantile, representing innovative spurts in econo1nic and co1mnercial organization. Just as the long cycle is a 1nechanis1n propelling the global political process, K -waves are the 1noving ele1nents of the global econo1ny. With respect to the effect of free and open societies, we need to look into the rise and decline of social 1nove1n ents and the prospects for the expansion of the global de1nocratic co1mnuni ty. And concerning responsiveness to global proble1ns, we need to review the processes that shape global opinion. So 1nuch for global structural processes. For an even 1nore co1nplete picture, we need to consult develop1nents at both regional and national levels. All in all, a co1nplex task. But it 1night be rendered 1nore tractable because we have taken the "necessary conditions" as initial proxies for these 1nore wide-ranging ra1nifications. Conclusion Since the second half of the 19th century, two conceptions of evolutionary theory have existed side by side: the Co1nte -Spencerian view of social develop1nent, which e1nphasized stages of develop1ne nt [Page 90] that 1night be 1nanifested in the history of hu1nanity, and the Darwinian 1nodel that clarified the causal 1nechanis1ns of evolution to explain continuity and change in populations, but avoided the te1nptation for quick explanations of socio -historical processes. The Spencerian progra1n fell into disuse, but in 1nid -20th century, Darwinian theory experienced a strong revival and reinvigoration through a 11 1nodern synthesis" (Huxley 1942, 3rd ed.1974) that followed the revolution in genetics and the di scovery of DNA. This theory, in turn, has been subject to 1nuch critical analysis (Pollard 1984). Our 1nodel of global political evolution co1nbines these two conceptions. VJhere does our 1nodel stand on so1ne of the 1najor the1nes and debates that have characterized evolutionary thought? Hallpike (1986: 19ff) distinguishes four types of the1nes: whether evolutionary processes are endogenous, or exogenous; whether the theories to explain the1n are or should be structuralist or ato1nist; whether they are 1nateri alist or idealist, and whether the processes are deter1ninistic or rando1n (stochastic). Briefly, we would argue that the global evolutionary process can be studied, in the first instance, as an endogenous process. 463 Journal of World-Systems Research [Page 91] But it is also clear that each of its necessary conditions in turn depends on other evolutionary processes that are exogenous to it (for instance, the lead condition of the econo1ny depends on the develop1nent of global leading sectors within it). These other processes are in turn nested in yet other exogenous processes (that is, to continue the sa1ne exa1nple, in the evolution of the entire world econo1ny). The picture is co1nplex indeed. Our approach also is clearly structuralist, in that it proposes that persisting clusters of strategies for1n e1nergent global political 1nacro-structures whose properties cannot be deduced fro1n the parts co1nposing the1n. It focusses on structural transfor1nations as well. The concept of the long cycle as a selection process propelled by a set of necessary conditions 1nakes it plain that both "ends" and 11 1neans", both idealist (agendas, free societies) and 1naterialist co1nponents (politico-strategic, and econo1nic power) are equally involved. Finally, the 1nodel is neither deter1ninistic, nor does i t assu1ne rando1nness, but it rather favors directionality without projecting a fixed content for it. [page 92] The directionality of evolutionary politics is that of "organized co1nplexity" (Davies 1984:239 -240). The co1nplex organization of living o rganis1ns can be shown to arise spontaneously given the existence of an ense1nble, that is, a large collection of si1nilar syste1ns. Co1nplexi ty has been defined as the ability to 1nake transitions, that is to evolve. In our case, the relevant collection is the population of strategies or policies, past, present, and future. That way experi1nents will occur with alternative strategies until, in favorable conditions, a useful innovation co1nes along that is selected out and then cu1nulates through a1nplification. The accu1nulation of countless innovations, large and s1nall, establishes syste1ns as co1nplex as 1nodern 1narket econo1nies or free de1nocratic co1mnunities [10]. That is why we view this as an open -ended 1nodel that does not posit a final goal or destination for the processes that it is analyzing. All it does is postulate an evolutionary "inner logic," that is, the require1nent that the processes evince a ti1ne-space structure that constrains the1n. Notes Paper read to the XIIIth World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, Ger1nany, July 18 -23, 1994, revised. Earlier versions of this paper were presented, in t.1ay-June 1993, at the Geneva Institute of International Studies, the University of Zurich, and Leyden University. [Page 93] l. This is illustrated below with respect to four previous cycles of data on sea and land power concentrations, which is a good indicator of the degree to which the world power, and the challenger, respectively co1mnand forces of oceanic and continent al i1npact. For each world power the range of that index stretches over the phases of Execution (EX) and Coalition -building (CO). A high ratio, in excess of . 500, 1neans that over one half of the capital warships in the global syste1n were co1mnanded by th at world power. In each case, the range shown for the EX phase is consistently higher than the range for the CO phase. For each challenger, the table shows the peak of an index of ar1ny concentration in V'Jestern Europe, which usually falls close to the end of the CO phase. V'Jorld power Phase Range of seapower concentration ratios ------------------------------------------- ---------------------- Portugal Dutch Republic Britain I Britain II United States Challenger Spain France I France II Ger1nany EX 1516 -1540 co 1150 -1580 EX 1609 -1640 co 1660 -1680 EX 1716-1740 co 1763 -1792 EX 1815 -1850 co 1873 -1914 EX 1945 -1973 End of CO phase 1580 1688 1792 1914 .597 - . 511 .425 - .202 .557 - .476 .335 - .260 .522 - .461 .448 - .332 .660 - .462 . 477 - .436 1. 0 - . 713 Observed peak of V'Jest European power concentration 1560 -64 1690 -94 1800 -04 1910 -14 1940 -44 .649 .484 .537 .366 .486 Sources: t1odelski and Tho1npson 1988: 110 -112, for seapower concentration ratios, and Rasler and Tho1npson (1994: Ch. 2) for V'Jest European ar1ny concentrations. [Page 94] 2. As shown by Daniel V'Jhiteneck's (1993) research on the network of British co1mnercial treaties after 1750. 3. Or else we 1night say that global leadership is brought about or "caused" by a "production function" constituted of these four factors. 4. Depart1nent of Defence spokes1nen now clai1n that "space control" has beco1ne "as i1nportant to the USA as sea control capabilities are to the exercise of 1nariti1ne strategy" (SIPRI YEARBOOK 1991:58 -60). 465 Journal of World-Systems Research 5. None of the other approaches to the rise and fall of world powers include an analysis of the de1nocratic experience. 6. The co1mnunist international syste1n, ca.1950, co1nprised 1nuch the sa1ne land area as the t.1ongol e1npire ca. 1280. 7. Traditionally, the study of evolution is divided into two areas, 1nacroevolution and 1nicroevolution, that is, description (whether evolution has occurred, and the theory of descent), and explanation (the 1nechanis1ns of evolution) (see e.g. Ayala 1982; Pollard 1984). For a full discussion see t.1odelski 1994. [Page 95] 8. David (1988: 18) describes processes whose outcoines are path-dependent as those dyna1nic processes in which the position and 1notion of the syste1n, and its constituent sub -syste1ns, are "sensitive to initial conditions". 9. The fact of regularity of the long cycle, as of other global processes 1nay not, in and of itself, be altogether surprising. According to Paul Davies (1984: 241, 57) "periodic 1notion, or oscillation, is perhaps the 1nost widespread exa1nple o f order in physics"; indeed "physical syste1ns which display exponential behavior are also likely to display periodic 'sinusoidal' behavior". But it does pose the question as to the 1nechanis1n of such regularity, and leads to the intriguing hypothesis of a social-evolutionary clock. Such a clock might be stochastic in character, governed by a constant probability of a certain a1nount of 1nutation (innovation, that also 1night cluster in particular ti1ne periods) (cf. accounts of evolutionary 1nolecular clocks in Dobzhansky et al. 1977: 308 -313, Ayala 1984). It could also be 1netrono1nic, ti1ning such change. Possibly soine evolutionary processes, such as the long cycle of global politics, might serve to ti1ne others. 10. Robert Wesson reaches "beyond natural selection" to chaos theory. He views (1991: 144) the geno1ne, whose essence is self-organization, as an "attractor" : a "set of per1nitted states of a system", that is, linked attractors at all levels of genetic stability", that are latent patterns for 1naki ng a structure. "The geno1ne is a plan (or a combination of 1nany plans) for building an organis1n; it is a pattern or a progra1n". [Page 96] References A.brams, Robert. 1980. 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WAR AHD CHAHGE Ill WORLD POLITICS. Hew York: Cambridge University Press. Goldstein, Joshua. 1988. LONG CYCLES. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hallpike, C.R. 1986. THE PRIHCIPLES OF SOCIAL EVOLUTIOH. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Huxley, Julian. 1942,1974. EVOLUTIOH: THE MODERH SYHTHESIS. 3rd ed. New York: Hafner Press. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. THE RISE AHD FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS, 1500-2000. Hew York: Random. Keohane, Robert. 1984. AFTER HEGEMOHY. University Press. Princeton: Princeton Lu1nsden, Charles J. & Edward 0. VJilson. 1981. GENES, l1IND, AND CULTURE: THE COEVOLUTIOHARY PROCESS. Cambridge: Har vard University Press. [Page 98] l1cNeill, VJillia1n. 1983. THE PURSUIT OF POVJER. Oxford: Blackwell. l1odelski, George. 1978. "The long cycle of global politics and the nation-state." COMPARATIVE STUDIES Ill SOCIETY AHD HISTORY 20,2:214-35. 1987. LOHG CYCLES m WORLD POLITICS. London: Macmillan. 1990a. "Is world politics evolutionary learning?" IHTERHATIOHAL ORGA!HZATIOH, Winter. ----- 1990b. 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