Journal of World-Syste1ns Research: Volu1ne 1, Number 19, 1995 http: //jwsr. ucr. edu/ ISSN 1076 -156X The t.1odern World-Syste1n and Evolution I1mnanuel Wallerstein Fernand Braudel Center Bingha1nton University iwaller@bingha1nton.edu Copyright 1995 by I1mnanuel Wallerstein v.12/12/95 The concept of "evolution" is ambiguous. So1neti1nes it only 1neans those changes that have historically occurred. In other usages, it has a 1nore teleological aspect, as in the clai1n that acorns evolve into oaks. In that 1neaning the end result is the nor1nal outco1ne of a pattern inscribed in the inner structure of the "entity" under discussion. In the for1ner sense, [Page l] evolution is nothing but an e1npirical _post facto_ description. In the latter sense, it is a 1node of stating lawlike propositions. If one adds "structural" as an adjective to "evolution," it suggests that the second sense is probably what is intended, although still not inevitably. Hence, I suppose one cannot even begin to discuss a concrete "evolution" without enunciating an episte1nological stance. Let 1ne therefore do that. I believe that what social scientists study is the evolution of historical systems. Since these entities are both systemic (lawlike) and historical (aleatory), it follows that neither of the two 1neanings of evolution is satisfactory for 1ny purposes. Rather, I believe that all historical syste1ns do evolve in the second sense, that is, that their historical trajectories are inscribed in their structures - but only up to a point. And this point is in so1ne sense truly a point, or a lino st. That is to say, since all structures have inherent contradictions (or rather are contradictory), it follows that over ti1ne, the *evolution* of the structure reaches a *point* where it is no longer possible to 1nake necessary adjust1nents to the structures and so the paralyzing effects of the 629 Journal of World-Systems Research contradictions will no longer be contained. VJhen such a point is reached, further evolution ceases to be explained by the structure; it beco1nes aleatory. The fluctuations are wild or at least wilder; the i1npact of 1ninor inputs beco1ne 1najor in consequence, and there is a bifurcation, resulting in a new syste1n. But the e1nerging structure of this new syste1n is *not* predictable and is in no way inscribed in the structure of the historical system out of which it is e1nerging and which has beco1ne inviable. It follows that there are no general rules about hu1nan evolution, [Page 2] Journal of VJorld-Syste1ns Research or the evolution of hu1nan social structures, except perhaps at a very abstract and not very 1neaningful level. For exa1nple, it 1night perhaps be argued that there is a 1nul ti1nillenial trend towards 1nore c 01nplex historical syste1ns (though even at this vague level I would be cautious), but this tells us little about the successive structures of historical systems, and nothing at all about future ones. In any case, there is no e1npiric al basis for any suggestion of historical progress as inevitable or even as an adequate descrip - tion of past history. This episte1nological stance having been asserted, but to be sure not argued here, we can proceed to discuss what 1night be 1neant by the evolution of the 1nodern world-syste1n. I consider it i1nportant to distinguish three processes in the historical life of any syste1n: its genesis; its relatively long period of nor1nal functioning; and its d e1nise (the result of bifurcation), which can also be thought of as the period of transition to a new historical system or syste1ns. It is only about the period of nor1nal functioning that it see1ns useful to apply the ter1n evolution, and it is to this period that I shall restrict the discussion.<2> The 1nodern world-syste1n is by no 1neans the only historical syste1n that has existed; it is not even the only *world* -syste1n. But it has been a very particular t:ype of historical syste1n, unlike any other that we have heretofore known. It is a world -econo1ny, to be sure not the first ever, but the only one that survived long enough to institutionalize a capitalist 1node of production, and as a res ult the only world-econo1ny (indeed the only world -syste1n) that has ever succeeded in expanding its outer boundaries to enco1npass the entire globe. It has transfor1ned itself fro1n being 1nuch *a* world to beco1ning the historical [Page 3] syste1n of *the* world. It shares two features with every other historical system. It has an axial division of labor whose effective "stretch" defines its boundaries, boundaries which are flexible and can therefore expand (and contract). That is to say, the boundaries evolve. And it functions by 1neans of a 1nixture of cyclical rhyth1ns (the repetitive fluctuations which allow us to call it a syste1n) and secular trends (the transfor1na - tional vectors which allow us to call it historical). VJhat defines the specificity of the 1nodern world -syste1n, the ele1nent which 1nakes it different fro1n all other historical syste1ns, is the pri1nacy of the drive for the *endless* accu1nulation of capital. Of course, 1nost historical syste1ns accu1nulate capital in so1ne way. But only the capitalist world -econo1ny has 1nade the accu1nulation of capital the pri1ne 1nover. VJe are not talking of a *psychological* drive, although of course *so1ne* individuals 1nay have internalized this objective as such. The system is constructed such that there are structural pressures to accu1nulate capital and to accu1nulate it endlessly. Its panoply of institutions function in ways to significantly reward those who accu1nulate capital and to punish those who do not. Further1nore, the strength of these pressures has constantly increased over ti1ne, which 1nay be ter1ned the steady intensification of the capitalist nature of the 1nodern world-syste1n. However, even in earlier periods, the strength of the pressures was already sufficient to keep the syste1n on track in the face of internal forces which sought to alter its nature or prevent its further develop1nent. The 1nodern world-syste1n consists of an intricately constructed and co1nplex set of institutions that has functioned re1narkably s1noothly and [Page 4] Journal of VJorld-Syste1ns Research efficaciously over the past 5 00 years, given the ab - surdity of the _pri1nu1n 1nobile_ and the enor1nity of the resistance to the syste1n both fro1n the understrata (who have been 1nightily oppressed by it) as well as by powerful seg1nents of the upper strata who have fear ed loss of power and prestige fro1n the further evolution of such a syste1n. A 1najor pre1nise of the structures of knowledge that have flourished within the syste1n is that it functions in three separate arenas: the political, the econ 01nic, and the socio -cultural. Or, otherwise stated, the states, the 1narkets, and the civil societies are said to be ontologically autono1nous, and to utilize different logics. VJhile this is a self -serving description of the syste1n by its clerics, and does not stand up to careful episte1nological or e1npirical analysis, it has a certain surface resemblance to the for1nal structuring 631 Journal of World-Systems Research of the institutional co1nplex. lfJe shall therefore describe these institutional arrange1n ents under three 1nain headings: production networks; the state and interstate structures; and the geoculture insisting on their total i1nbrication one with the other. There are five central 1nechanis1ns by which the network of production structures per1ni t the endless accu1nulation of capital: co1mnodif ication; the 1nultiplicity of 1nodes of labor control; co1mnodity chains; unequal exchange between core and periphery; and the group of 1nonopolizing non -specialized capitalists functioning as the anti -market. Each 1nechanis1n can be briefly su1mnarized. Co1mnodification 1neans that activities that involve production, exchange, saving, or borrowing are 1nonetized and thus beco1ne 1narket ope rat ions. It is probably the case that virtually no historical syste1n for the last 10,000 years has been without [Page 5] co1mnodif ication of so1ne of its activities. However, since engaging in such operations in non -1nonetized for1ns protects the1n so1newhat (though not perfectly) from appropriation for the purposes of capital accu1nulation, it is e1ninently logical that those who operate within the fra1nework of a capitalist syste1n seek to co1mnodify ever 1nore operations. And since it is also true that the spread and routinization of co1mnodified activities tends to di1ninish their profitability, it is logical as well that 1nonopolizing capitalists repeatedly encourage the search for new niches to co1mnodify. The results we know: over ti1ne there has been a thrust towards the co1mnodification of everything, a thrust which by the late twentieth century had reached levels undrea1nt of in for1ner historical syste1ns. To take only a particula rly aberrant exa1nple, we have entered into the era of the co1mnodification of childbirth. The 1nodern world-syste1n 1nakes, as everyone re1narks, 1nore extensive use of wage -labor than did previous historical syste1ns. Even so, it is worth noting that, after 500 years, wage -labor still is not the for1n of re1nuneration of the 1najority of the world's productive activities. There is a good reason for this. A syste1n that 1naintains 1nul tiple 1nodes of labor control ( and therefore of labor re1nuneration) creates inbuilt 1nechanis1ns by which the de1nands of workers for increased co1npensation can be restrained. It even creates 1nechanis1ns by which surpluses created in non-co1mnodified production can be appropriated. That 1nechanis1n is the se1niproletarian household, in which wage-inco1ne represents a 1ninority of the total household inco1ne fro1n all sources. This structure was 1nore or less an invention of the 1nodern world -syste1n, and currently is the do1ninant 1nodel worldwide. In such [Page 6] Journal of World-Syste1ns Research households, the wages paid to those 1nembers engaging in wage -labor activities can be reduced below the level of household reproduction because th e household supple1nents this inco1ne with its other inco1ne -generating activities (1narket -oriented production, so-called subsistence production, rents, and transfers), the totality of which bring in a greater inco1ne per hour of work than does wage -labor. Hence, e1nploying persons located in such se1niproletarian households not only reduces the wage bills of the wage-e1nploying producers but also transfers part of the other surplus accu1nulated by the household to the enterprise via the subsidization of the enterprise's below-par wages. The effort to obtain wage -e1nploy1nent and then ensure that such wage -e1nploy1nent is re1nunerated 1nini1nally at the level of household repro - duction (the slogan was the "fa1nily wage") has been central to the class struggle throughout the history of the 1nodern world-syste1n. To the degree that proletarianization has been achieved, it is in large part the outco1ne of this class struggle. Co1mnodi ty chains have been the integu1nent of capitalist production processes fro1n the outset. Productive activities have always been syste1natically linked across the whole division of labor in insti - tutionalized channels. It is not hard to de1nonstrate that a lino st every i te1n that is 1narketed by enterprises is constructed fro1n co1nponents (which are in turn constructed fro1n co1nponents), utilizing 1nachinery (constructed in turn fro1n co1nponents ... ) and 1nanpower (sustained by food production constructed fro1n co1nponents ... ) , the totality of which are produced in geographically dispersed areas. (The so-called internationalization of capital refers to the existence of such co1mnodity chains, except that the phrase incorrectly suggests that this is a new post -1970 or at 1nost post-1945 pheno1nenon.) The existence of such chains 1nakes it possible for different units of the chain to be structured in different ways one [Page 7] fro1n the other, and differing in the1nselves fro1n one point in ti1ne to another. The possible differences include the degree of geographic dispersion of the producing enterprises in the unit; the degree of overall 1nonopolization of production; the 1nodes of labor control utilized; the degree to which the enterprises in one unit are owned by the sa1ne fir1n that owns enterprises in adjoining units (vertical integration of production), thus allowing so1ne 633 Journal of World-Systems Research operations to escape fro in the constraints of the world 1narket; and the degree of profitability of each unit of the co1mnodi ty chain co1npared to other uni ts. Such a co1nplex structure allows endless 1nanipulation (reorganizing the structures of different units in the chain) with the objective of increasing the overall accu1nulation of capital and centralizing this surplus in fewer hands. The creation of such co1mnodi ty chains is what per1ni ts us to describe the axial di vision of labor as a core/periphery pheno1nenon in which unequal exchange is a 1najor 1nechanis1n of surplus transfer and concentration. Funda1nentally, the core/periphery antino1ny refers to the relation between relatively 1nonopolized units versus relatively co1npetitive units, which is a high profit/low profit, high wage/low wage antino1ny. Largely because of the advantages of reducing transactions costs, and the need to protect the accu1nulated capital politically, the core/periphery antino1ny beca1ne e1npirically a spatial pheno1nenon, core -like activities tending to be con - centrated in a few countries and peripheral activities tending to be concentrated in 1nost of the rest, without ever having excluded the possibility that the full range of activities could and did exist inside the boundaries of any single country that was over a [Page SJ Journal of V'Jorld-Syste1ns Research certain size. Spatial distribution reflected the process; it did not cause it. Unequal exchange has been the result of the political rules of the interstate structures that 1nade the 1nobili ty of capital and 1nerchandise across political frontiers far easier than the 1nobili ty of labor, and thereby guaranteed the transfer of surplus value from one set of owners to another (those located in the 1nonopolized activities in the core zones). Finally, the 1narket is essential to the operations of a co1mnodified production syste1n. But since the 1nore truly free (and not 1nerely no1ninally free) the 1narket, the greater the co1npetition (and therefore the 1nore difficult it is to attain significant profit levels), those who are great accu1nulators of capital represent (in B raudel' s 1nagnificent phrase) the *anti -1narket*, utilizing their political strength to ensure that unrestrained co1npeti tion never beco1nes the nor1n. Since however 1nonopolies are always under political assault and any given quasi-1nonopoly has a rather short half -life (probably circa thirty years), great accu1nulators of capital 1nust re1nain non -specialized, and engage in all kinds of operations si1nultaneously: production, co1mnerce, finance, transport, infor1nation. Thi s enables the1n to ju1np ship (that is, shift the e1nphasis in their invest1nent co1mnit1nents) repeatedly, in search of 1naintaining high overall levels of profit. Ju1nping ship not only has sectoral i1nplications but geographical ones as well. The shift of invest1nents has tended to occur pri1narily within the fra1nework of the Kondratiev cycles, which are the consequence of the exhaustion of the ability to 1nonopolize leading sectors of production, and consequently of decline of worldwide [Page 9] profit levels. The periods of contraction (B -phases) see relocations of industrial production, and thus opportunities for a few (but only ever a very few) se1niperipheral states (those with a fairly even 1nixture of core -like and peripheral activities) to i1nprove their relative position at the expense of other states. They also tend to see shifts of in - vest1nent allocation fro1n industrial to financial sectors. They see the search for innovative sources of 1nonopolized activities. They have often involved, after a while, so1ne reallocation of world inco1ne to sti1nulate overall de1nand, while si1nul taneously expanding the boundaries of the world-syste1n into new zones in search of very low -cost labor to co1npensate for the redistribution. In short, they have tended to juggle the world's econo1nic geography while reproducing the sa1ne basic structure. The possibility of the endless accu1nul at ion of capital has depended upon the ability of the great accu1nulators not 1nerely to concentrate the surplus -value, but to defend its concentration both against predators and against the de1nands of the workers that have produced it. The state and interstate structures are at one and the sa1ne ti1ne a ra1npart for the great accu1nulators and a continuing danger. The state can be the pri1nary predator; no predator was ever as efficacious historically as an e1nperor atop a redistributive structure. Anything that would reproduce such a political structure with the increased technological efficiencies of the 1nodern world would be a ne1nesis to the endless accu1nulation of capital. The great accu1nulat ors are thus notably wary of stateness (the rhetoric about laissez -faire Yet on the other hand, never has workplace bargaining power been greater than in the 1nodern world -syste1n, and never have 1nonopolies been easier to crack than i n [Page 10] Journal of World -Syste1ns Research 1nodern ti1nes, which has 1neant that the great accu1nulators desperately needed political defense not only against the working classes but against their co1npetitors (Frederic Lane's "protection rent"). Balancing such contradictory constraints has been a 635 Journal of World-Systems Research tricky ga1ne fro1n the beginning. The opti1nal 1node has been found to be that for1ned by the creation of a network of so-called sovereign states (in fact sharply graded in political strength) operating within a loose, but 1neaningful, interstate syste1n, in which hege1nonic powers periodically and te1nporarily create regi1nes of interstate order that seek to 1naxi1nize the possibilities of the endless accu1n ulation of capital. Creating strong states in the core offers 1nany advantages to 1nonopolizing capitalists. It establishes a strong refuge for their property. It creates a political structure capable of advancing their interests in the world-system. Its higher level of taxation is si1nply a protection cost, e1ninently reasonable. Eventually, by 1naking the strong state a liberal state as well, a high degree of internal order is ensured at relatively low cost. F urther1nore, strong states in the core can work to ensure that states in the periphery do not beco1ne strong enough to interfere with the process of the worldwide accu1nulation of capital. To be sure, it is not as si1nple as this , for two reasons. On the one hand, there is not a single ho1nogeneous group of 1nonopolizing capitalists, but rather a group caught in the contradiction of having class interests that unite the1n and individual interests that divide the1n profoundly. And on the other hand, the world's working strata are not si1nple objects of 1nanipulation by do1ninant forces, but active agents of resistance. Both these co1nplications account for a considerable part of the political history of the 1nodern world-syste1n. [Page 11] Inter -capitalist co1npeti tion has two i1mnediate i1npacts on the state and interstate structures. First, any kind of political 1nechanis1n that aids the 1naintenance of any particular 1non opoli- zing effort represents for its non -beneficiaries an obstacle that they will seek to overco1ne. They constantly organize to overco1ne such obstacles: for exa1nple, calls for 1nore laissez -faire within states; opposition to protectionism in the strongest states, and calls for it in the others; geographical transfer of production sites, with its consequent i1npact on the financial and social strength of given states. This story is usually recounted under the hea ding of the history of 1nacroecono1nic structures. The second i1npact is even greater. The organization of hege1nonies gives distinct advantages to certain groups of 1nonopolizing capitalists. But hege1nonies are self -destructing because of their necessarily increasing costs. When hege1nonic powers decline, others seek to take their place. This is a long process, and has historically resulted in their long geopolitical struggles, each of which culminated in a "thirty years' world war," and an eventual strengthening of the interstate structures. This story is usually recounted under the heading of international relations. We can discern hege1nonic cycles 1nuch longer than the Kondratiev cycles . The active oppositional agency of oppressed strata is a constant of the 1nodern world -syste1n. Fro1n the outset, the pressure of urban working strata tended to push wage levels slowly upward, which periodically led to the need to seek out working strata ready to work at lower inco1ne levels. This was [Page 12] Journal of World -Syste1ns Research one of the 1nain factors behind the repeated geographic expansion of the 1nodern world -syste1n, as noted previously. Nonetheless, such opposition tended to be scattered, unorganized, and lacking ideological strategy until the nineteenth century. It was the French Revolution that catalyzed an i1nportant cultural transfor1nation of the 1nodern world-syste1n. Although the origins and the trajectory of the French Revolution was in very large part the outgrowth of the Franco-British struggle for hege1nony in the world- syste1n, <3> the 1nost i1nportant consequence was the transfor1nat ion of 1nentali ties throughout the world-syste1n, pointing up the long -existing ano1naly that there existed no adequate geoculture to legi ti1nate the econo1nic and political structures of the capitalist world -econo1ny. The ano1naly was brought to an end by the fact that two the1nes put forward in the French Revolution gained such resonance a1nong such large strata of the world -syste1n that there see1ned no way of "restoring" the antecedent cultural situation. These two the1nes were the nor1nali ty of political change and the belief that sovereignty resides in the "people." The nineteenth century was the 1no1nent of the construction of a coherent geocul ture for the 1nodern world-syste1n. One of the 1na jor factors was the rise of organized antisyste1nic 1nove1nents in two for1ns: the social 1nove1nent and the national 1nove1nent. Al though serious for1nal organization did not occur until the late nineteenth century, the early stirrings of these 1nove1nents pro1npted preparatory responses al1nost i1mnediately. The two the1nes nor1nal change and popular sovereignty -- were of course exceedingly dangerous for the political stability of the world -syste1n, legi ti1nating de1nocracy . In response to these the1nes there e1nerged a trinity of ideologies, which 637 Journal of World-Systems Research were really meta-strategies of political control: [Page 13] conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism/socialism. Each represented fundamentally a different mode of coping with the normality of change and popular sovereignty. By 1848, it became clear that the centrist ideology of liberal reformism (an ostensibly universalizing doctrine, but one whose application was always restricted to ttcteserving, civilizedtt persons) was the dominant one, the two other ideologies slowly turning themselves into modified versions of liberal re - formism. Liberal reformism had an appealing political strategy, which conservatives eventually realized was necessary to contain the dangerous classes in ways that would preserve the processes of the endless accumulation of capital, while radicals/socialists eventually realized that this program was the maximum their real political strength could obtain for them at that stage of the historical development of the modern world-system. The package offered by liberal reformism, and enacted for Europe/North America during the nineteenth century, had three components: the gradual according of universal suffrage; the beginnings of welfare legislation and welfare redistribution; nationalism of the core zone, with its essential component of racism/sexism. Historically, this formula was extraordinarily successful in the core, and in the twentieth century there was an attempt to apply it on a world scale. This latter attempt, initially successfully, eventually foundered on the absence of a group to pay its cost: there was no Third World for the Third World. But the mechanism was clearly in place, and discussing its foundering would bring us into the subject of the crisis of the world-system and its demise, a subject we have excluded from this analysis of evolutionary processes. [Page 14] Journal of World -Systems Research The construction of the geoculture involved legitimating the dominant political ideology in the structures of knowledge. The universalism of liberalism was given an ontological status in the moral dominance of modern science as the only rational form of analytical discourse. This involved the revival of the world university system, the creation of the modern structure of "disciplines," the application of Newtonian linear analysis and its re - jection of the organizing relevance of time/space to all arenas of discourse (and specifically the social sciences), and of course the secular state and the moral neutrality of the scholar. VJhat had been left out of the package was de1nocratization and equalization of reward and resources. Even though the political i1nplications of hypothetical universalis1n were largely nullified by the si1nul taneous enthrone1nent of racis1n/ sexis1n, the logical i1nplications of liberal theory resulted in a steady pressure for de1nocratization, a sort of global equivalent of Oliver Twist asking for "1nore, please" in the orphanage. It has been argued that the 1nodern world -syste1n has a structure that has been elaborated around the pri1nacy of the endless accu1nulation of capital. This structure is coherent, and has operated effectively for so1ne 500 years. It has now reached the li1ni ts of that effectiveness. It is at this point, the point where the various contradictions of the structure are no longer possible to adjust in any easy way, that we end our argu1nent. [Page 15] HOTES I have tried to do this elsewhere in various places, 1nost notably in _Unthinking Social Science: The Li1ni ts of Nineteenth -Century Paradig1ns (Ca1nbridge: Polity Press, 1991). See also "History in Search of Science," forthco1ni ng in Review . <2> On the genesis of the 1nodern world -syste1n, see 1ny "The VJest, Capitalis1n, and the 11odern VJorld-Syste1n," Review , xv-, 4, Fall 1992, 561 -619 On the de1nise/transitiOn, see 1ny "Peace, Stability, and Legi ti1nacy, 1990-2025/2050," in G. Lundestad, ed., The Fall of Great Powers (Oslo: Scandinavian Univ. Press, 1994), 331 -49. <3> I argue this extensively in The 11odern VJorld-Syste1n_, v-01. III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist VJorld-Econo1ny, l 730-l840s (San Diego: Acade1nic Press, 1989), ch. 2. Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_01 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_02 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_03 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_04 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_05 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_06 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_07 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_08 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_09 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_10 Volume1Issue1Wallerstein_Page_11