521 Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Syste1ns Research_ v-01u1ne 1, Nu1nber 13, 1995 http: //jwsr.ucr.edu/ ISSN 1076 -156X Ger1nany, The United States and Future Core Conflict [Page 1] I. Introduction Brigitte Schulz Political Science Trinity College Hartford, CT. 06106 USA brigette. schulz@1nail. trincoll. edu Copyright (c) 1995 Brigitte Schulz With the end of the Cold War, 1nuch attention has been paid to the nature of the e1nerging new world order. By what criteria will power and influence be 1neasured in this new era? Who will be the winners and losers? What types of alliances will develop? Or is Francis Fukuya1na' s argu1nent correct that, with the collapse of co1mnunis1n, we have reached the " ... end point of 1nankind' s ideological evolution" and thus "the end of history" [1]. Unlike t.1arx, who saw socialis1n as the end of hu1nanity' s arduous journey, Fukuya1na tells us that the search is off because we have already arrived at our evolutionary destination: liberal capitalis1n. Other analysts envision less optimistic scenarios. Co1mnon to these views is an understanding of capi tali sin that stresses its 1nore co1npetitive nature, and thus its inherent tendency towards conflict. This inherent antagonis1n between the 1najor industrial powers, which in the old t.1arxist literature used to be referred to as "inter-i1nperialist rivalry," appears to have been rena1ned "geo-econo1nics" by 1nany conte1nporary observers [2]. There see1ns to be broad agree1nent that econo1nic [Page 2] rivalry is the driving force of future conflict, rather than the "high politics" of security. In fact, now that t.1arxis1n has been declared dead, econo1nic questions have entered center stage in scholarly works on the global co1npetition for power and wealth. One of the 1nost popular scenarios to have e1nerged over the past few years has been to anticipate growing tensions between the three 1nain core powers: the US, Ger1nany, and Japan [3]. In this conception, the world is about to fall into three co1npeting (neo -Orwellian?) econo1nic blocs, with each of the three 1nain powers using their i1mnediate geographic areas to build its own regional e1npire. While a scenario which anticipates growing tensions within the core is entirely plausible, there is little doubt that the US will continue to be the do1ninant power in the new world order, especially in the 1nili tary/ strategic areas. This do1ninance will not translate into a position of hege1nony, however, and we will argue below that inter -core tensions will lead to a strategic alliance between the two 1nain Western core powers, the United States and Germany [4]. As has been often noted, Ger1nany at the turn of [Page 3] the 1nillenniu1n is destined to play a pivotal role in the new world order. After unification, it boasts one of the largest populations of any of the world's nation states, in addition to being one of the econo1nic powerhouses within the victorious world of liberal capitalis1n. Yet, tugging at the tails of Ger1nan ambitions are 1ne1nories of a past which is unsuitable for great power ambitions, at least in the foreseeable future [5]. The first task of this paper, then, is to look at Ger1nany within the context of the radically altered post-Cold War world. What precisely is happening in Europe's 1nost powerful state? Has one of the consequences of unification been a resurgence in Ger1nan nationalis1n and expansionist ambitions? Is there a chance, in fact, that Ger1nany will seek to beco1ne a new global hege1non? Is this even a possibility? We argue that Ger1nany, based on a 1nultitude of factors which will be outlined below, is not now, nor will it beco1ne at any ti1ne in the foreseeable future, a global hege1non. This is not to argue, however, that Ger1nany does not have an increasingly ambitious foreign policy agenda, nor that it will not beco1ne a key player in global politics. Indeed, as will be asserted in the [Page 4] second part of this pap er, Ger1nany will enter into a close alliance with the United States to form a reinvigorated trans -Atlantic 1narriage in which the co1mnon bonds of "culture and civilization" will replace a virulent anti -co1mnunis1n as the co1mnon vow. A key question which this second part of the paper will address is the extent to which contours of this new alliance and the ene1ny i1nages used to ce1nent it are already visible. As will be argued, 1nany of its features are not new but were half forgotten during the conflict with co1mnunis1n. In the decades to co1ne, the "East" will again define the "others," the ene1nies against who1n Western states 1nust be on guard and protect themselves. In this coming conflict, however, 523 Journal of World-Systems Research the "red 1nenace" will be replaced by the "yellow peril," itself a notion which is not new in the historiography of the West [6]. As stated in The Economist, the success of East Asia seems to present "a challenge to the West that is in so1ne way stronger (if less antagonistic) than that of conununis1n" [7]. Before addressing these issues in detail, however, we will turn to a brief discussion of the do1nestic and international context in which to place unified Ger1nany. [Page 5] II. Ger1nany since Unification a) Problems with Unification On October 3rd, 1990 the for1ner Ger1nan De1nocratic Republic was for1nally incorporated into the Federal Republic of Ger1nany (FRG) under Article 23 of the latter's constitution. On that day the GDR si1nply ceased to exist, and the entire West Ger1nan political, econo1nic, legal, and social apparatus was i1nposed on the Eastern part of the country as though it were a tabula rasa. This had been preceded on July 1 by the introduction of the West Ger1nan deutsche 1nark in the East, at a rate which was politically deter1nined by Chancellor Kohl' s govern1nent but which had disastrous consequences for the East Ger1nan econo1ny. Between 1989 and 1992, east Ger1nan exports to for1ner Co1necon countries fell by 1nore than 75 '.:, fro1n al1nost Dl1 29bn to Dl1 7 bn. During sa1ne period, West Ger1nan fir1ns were ab le to increase their exports by 23 '.:, (DM 24. 4 bn to DM 30 .1 bn) [8]. Economic developments after 1990 led to an unprecedented level of deindustrialization in the for1ner GDR. For exa1nple, in the Halle/Leipzig/Bitterfeld region, in which over [Page 6] 100, 000 workers were e1nployed by the che1nical industry during GDR days, 1nore than two -thirds have lost their jobs [9]. By spring 1994, counting une1nploy1nent (1. 26 inn), govern1nent job creation (238, 000) or retraining (249, 000) progra1ns, as well as early retire1ne nt sche1nes (205, 000), 37 '.:, of the entire East Ger1nan working population was without regular e1nploy1nent [10]. Two Harvard econo1nists, Robert Barro and Xavier Sala -i- l1artin, have esti1nated that it will take fifty years before the econo1nic gap between East an d West Ger1nany is closed [11]. Lothar Sp,,t, general 1nanager of Jenoptik GmbH and for1ner 1ninister president of the West Ger1nan state of Baden-W]rttemberg, thinks it will take 10-15 years before self-sustaining growth in the East will take place [12]. Industrial production in the for1ner GDR a1nounts to only 4 '.:, of total Ger1nan production, while 20 '.:, of the Ger1nan population lives there. Export levels provide a good indicator for the precipitous fall of production in eastern Ger1nany: Overall exports fell fro in Dl1 41. l billion in 1989 (the last year the GDR existed) to DM 17.5 billion in 1991 and roughly 12 billion in 1993 [ 13] . For east Ger1nans, another aspect of unification [Page 7] has been that everything learned in the past has been rendered obsolete, and indeed the negation of how properly to do anything. Civil servants fro1n the old FRG were dispatched to teach east Ger1nans the "proper" way [14]. Just about all supervisory and 1nanagerial positions in the govern1nent bureaucracy in the east were held by people fro1n the western part of the country, totalling 35,000 high level civil servant "1nigrants" by 1993 [15]. The sa1ne was true for 1nost top positions in research and acade1nic institutions. Since leading positions had previously belonged to loyal 1ne1nbers of the SED, a 1nassi ve purge took place after unification to "purify" the country of ideological undesirables. Their replace1nents were generally chosen in the V'Jest. The GDR' s print and electronic 1nedia were likewise either si1nply taken over by V'Jest Ge r1nan enterprises or closed down. Even "privatization," that alleged 1nagical solution to postco1mnunist woes, has created a1nong East Ger1nans the sense of being deprived of the just fruits of their past labor. V'Jhile in 1nost other Eastern (Central?) European countries individual citizens have at least gotten the legal right to purchase or to receive on a grant basis stock in for1ner "people's [Page 8] owned enterprises," the east Ger1nan econo1ny was sold to the highest bidders through a special institution, the Treuhandanstalt in Berlin. Although founded under the l1odrow Co1mnunist caretaker govern1nent on l1arch l, 1990, and assigned the task of overseeing the transition from a centrally planned to a 1narket econo1ny, to East Ger1nans the Treuhandanstal t has bee 01ne the symbol of V'Jestern do1nination over the old GDR. Charged with selling off 32, 400 enterprises in the for1ner GDR, fro1n restaurants to corner grocery stores to gargantuan che1nical plants, Treuhand auto1natically beca1ne an institution of the Bonn govern1ne nt after unification. Obviously V'Jestern investors bought the 1nost profitable east Ger1nan plants first, leaving Treuhand with all those fir1ns unable to co1npete in a free 1narket environ1nent. Treuhand AG still owned 850 enterprises by the spring of 1994 [16]. Treuhand's first president, Detlef Karsten Rohwedder (assassinated in 1991) confidently predicted that Treuhand would 1nake "around Dl1 600 billion" selling off East Ger1nany 1 s "people's 525 Journal of World-Systems Research enterprises"; instead, it accu1nulated about Dl1 275 in debt. East Ger1nan cri ticis1ns of Treuhand abound, including that it brought about deindustrialization in the east, it engaged in 1nany sleazy deals [l 7], and it [Page 9] caused the layoff of millions [18]. In April 1994, the polling institute Infratest/Burke found that 65-'.: of all east Ger1nans think the overall econo1nic situation is bad, and another l4c that it is very bad. Only 55c look to the future with opti1nis1n (1991 = 70-'.::), while pessi1nists now 1nake up 35-'.::. Only one in four thinks that develop1nents in the East are heading "in the right direction", 28-'.:: are no longer sure, and 47-'.:: think post -unification econo1nic develop1nent gone in the wrong direction [19]. According to Forsa, another polling institute, an overwhel1ning number of Ger1nans in both the East and the VJest now feel that privatization has gone too quickly, and over two thirds think that the Treuhand did not do a good job. [20] The agency officially closed its doors on December 31, 1994. At one of his regular 1neetings with representatives fro1n industry and trade unions in July 1994, Chancellor Kohl pointed out that 1nore than Dl1 500 billion will have been invested in the eastern part of the country by the end of the year. On a per capita basis, the Chancellor argued, this a1nounts to three ti1nes the a1nount invested in the FRG after the establish1nent of the Dl1 in 1948 and before the [Page 10] "econo1nic 1niracle" began a decade later [21]. The Bonn govern1nent has transferred a net a1nount of Dl1 130 billion annually to the East in order to facilitate econo1nic deve lop1nent. VJhat the Chancellor did not point out, however, is that East Ger1nany i1nports Dl1 255 billion worth of goods annually fro1n the VJest, 1nainly fro1n VJest Ger1nany. VJhat this a1nounts to, then, is a 1nassi ve transfer of public funds fro1n the Bonn govern1nent to VJest Ger1nan industry via a for1nal transfer to the eastern part of the country, where people use this 1noney to purchase consu1ner goods 1nade in the western part of the country [22]. In addition, 1nany private invest1nents in the East are in highly capital intensive sectors such as chemicals or auto1nobiles, using state -of-the-art technology. This does not bode well for an i1nprove1nent in the e1nploy1nent situation in any foreseeable future [23]. b. The Standort Deutschland Debate Ger1nan unification coincided with the largest crisis in the world capitalist econo1ny since the Great Depression of the 1930s. This crisis had both a structural and a cyclical di1nension, as adjust1nents in [Page 11] production and exchange brought about by the third industrial revolution and one of capitalis1n 1 s periodic downturns coincided. In Ger1nany, the cyclical downturn was 1nitigated by the artificial rise in de1nand brought about by unification with the East in 1990. Just as in other advanced capitalist societies, however, the effects of accelerating technological advance1nents and intensifying globalization of production have led to a "co1npetitiveness" debate in Ger1nany over the past few years. The conservative govern1nent coalition I s explanation of the structural crisis of the Ger1nan econo1ny is si1nple enough: Ger1nans have beco1ne spoiled by high wages, long vacations, and cradle -to-grave social security. The answer? iVIore 1narket, 1nore individual initiative, 1nore flexibility in hiring and firing, and liberalization of job protection laws. On the other hand, lower wages, fewer benefits, less govern1nent, lower public debts, social security only for the needy; i.e., lean production and lean govern1nent [24]. These senti1nents are largely echoed by Ger1nan industry, which insists that Ger1nany I s international co1npeti ti veness is being threatened by the country's high wage and benefit structure [25]. [Page 12] The country's trade unions disagree, pointing to the fact that Ger1nany I s une1nploy1nent rate is low by international standards and that the country alternates with the United States as the world's largest exporting nation, al though its econo1ny is only one third that of the US [26]. The unions argue that the statistics used by both govern1nent and industry are skewed by dra1natic changes in exchange rates. Between 1985 and 1992, for exa1nple, the US dollar appreciated by 72. 3 '.:, vis - ... -vis the DiVI, and 24. 5 '.:, vis - ... -vis all OECD countries. Thus any presu1ned losses in global co1npeti ti veness are due to factors to be found in the global econ 01ny, not in Ger1nany as a location of production [27]. Both govern1nent and industry point out that the end of the Cold War has per1nanently affected the e1nploy1nent and invest1nent situation in Ger1nany by re1noving the Iron Curtain. This has 1neant a large number of highly skilled workers in the for1ner co1mnunist countries stand ready to work for considerably lower wages. The effect of radically different wage structures in Central and Eastern Europe and within Ger1nany is two -fold: It will encourage Ger1nan foreign direct invest1nents in the East, while also serving as a 1nagnet for 1nigrant laborers to the [Page 13] 527 Journal of World-Systems Research VJest. According to a Ger1nan econo1nics think tank, the DIVJ, even if post -co1mnunist econo1nic transfor1nations work s1noothly, roughly 2. 7 1nillion will 1nigrate VJest by the year 2,000, with another 1.9 1nillion by 2,010. Should pro1nises of rapid econo1nic develop1nent fail to 1naterialize, the DIVJ esti1nates that the number of East - VJest 1nigrants will increase to 3. 9 1nillion by 2, 000 and another 2.6 1nillion by 2,010 [28]. A survey conducted by Eurobaro1neter in 18 post -co1mnunist societies in the for1ner Soviet bloc essentially confir1ns the DIVJ assertion: A.bout 2. 7 1nillion (1. 2 '.:, of the total population) say that they are definite about 1nigrating VJest, while 16. 7 1ni llion (7. 3 '.':) say that they will "definitely" or "probably" do so [29]. Conversely, according to a survey conducted by the Ger1nan Cha1nber of Co1mnerce in the Fall of 1993, 30 '.': of all Ger1nan co1npanies planned a relocate production abroad, co1npared to 24 '.': in the preceding years. This nor1nally does not 1nean closing entire plants in Ger1nany but instead a1nounts to a "creeping" relocation, initially involving only parts of the production process. In recent years about 70,000 jobs a year have been created abroad through Ger1nan FD Is. In the next three years, planned foreign invest1nents will lead to [Page 14] the creation of roughly 250,000 jobs abroad. The 1noti ves 1nentioned 1nost often are disadvantages in producing in Ger1nany, especially in ter1ns of costs (high wages, benefit pay1nents, taxes) plus environ1nental legislation. Central and Eastern European locations have advantages in low wages and close proxi1ni ty to Ger1nany (especially the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), as well as highly trained and 1noti vated workforces. Co1npanies are also aware that one of their advantages is the "l1ade in Ger1nany" label, however, which leads to a certain reluctance to relocate production entirely abroad. The countries of Central Europe are in first place as the destination of choice within next three years, followed by Asian countries, which in the past enjoyed advantages based on low wages. Now Southeast Asian countries are 1nainly of interest for realizing future 1narket shares of the little tigers plus China and Japan. Of little surprise is the fact that co1npanies in labor-intensive industries, such as textiles plants, plan to relocate 1nost often [30]. The prestigious Insti tut f]r VJel twirtschaft in Kiel has suggested that Ger1nany' s borders with low -wage Central European countries will create a "European version of the [Page 15] l1aquiladoras;" i.e., a border econo1ny like the one on the Mexican-US border [31]. Even Japan, long considered i1mnune to these types of adjust1nent pressures, now finds itself in the twin throes of its worst recession since the Second World War and the co1npeti ti ve pressure of low -wage neighboring countries [32]. A study of l, 615 do1nestic Japanese co1npanies showed that the 1nanufacturing industry will dra1natically increase foreign invest1nents over the coining year, 1nainly to low wage Asian countries [33]. The Japanese govern1nent, like its Ger1nan counterpart, appears to be following an approach of urging its workforce to 1nake concessions while si1nul taneously facilitating the 1nove1nent of capital to neighboring regions [34]. Ger1nan industry and govern1nent are thus obviously not alone in telling its populations that they need to work 1nore for less. What has beco1ne a "co1npetitiveness debate" of sorts in the United States [35] also very 1nuch infor1ns discourse in Ger1nany, as its political and economic elite look for ways to keep the country firmly within the core of the core [36]. The 1nain proble1ns which are bla1ned for Ger1nany' s supposed lack of international co1npeti ti veness are the country's [Page 16] structure of high wages and social security benefits, 1naking overall co1npensation packages the highest in the world [37]. The end of co1mnunis1n has 1nade this process of labor cost reduction easier, as there is no co1npeting syste1n clai1ning to rep resent an alternative to the exploitation and econo1nic insecurity which capi tali sin holds for the average worker. The 1nere "existence" of co1mnunis1n had always 1nade necessary at least so1ne concessions by capital to labor. While over the past seven decades workers in the West were told that they could enjoy political freedo1n and econo1nic and social security si1nultaneously, with the end of co1mnunis1n they are now told to be "realistic," not si1nultaneously to expect political freedo1n and a high standard of li vin g ! c. The Search for Identity Unified Ger1nany continues to be badly divided, not only economically but also psychologically [38]. People in the post -co1mnunist East feel let down by the 1nany pro1nises not kept over the past five years and the co1mnunist successor party, the PDS (Party of De1nocratic Socialism), is now the third strongest political party [Page 17] there [39]. In the west, on the other hand, there is a strong feeling that eastern Ger1nans are unthankful for all of the help they have gotten and that the years of living under co1mnunis1n have 1nade the1n look to the state for too 1nany handouts [40]. 529 Journal of World-Systems Research The situation is further co1nplicated by the fact that Ger1nans on both sides of the for1ner Iron Curtain have no clear sense of what it 1neans to be Ger1nan. Unified Ger1nany has no fixed vision of itself as a nation, no sy1nbol or historical event, no 1natter how distorted or 1nystified, that can unite the population behind it [41]. It has beco1ne clear in the years since reunification that the "Ger1nan Question" is 1nuch 1nore co1nplex than it see1ned during the ti1ne of the country's di vision, where the sole e1nphasis was placed on the fact that the Ger1nan people had been separated against their will [42]. After the bitter experiences of the Hitler era, VJest Ger1nans found pride in their econo1nic achieve1nents ("Dl1 nationalis1n") while East Ger1nans kept the1nselves going by yearning to be united with the western part of the country again. Now that unification is here and the country is caught in a deep structural econo1nic crisis, Ger1nans on both sides have no clear guideposts on how [Page 18] to proceed, what to believe in, or what precisely it is that binds them together [43]. The Kohl govern1nent has sought to provide part of a solution by beco1ning 1nore explicitly nationalistic in its rhetoric. For exa1nple, the Chancellor ended his 1994 New Year's speech with the state1nent, "God bless our Ger1nan fatherland," so1nething that would have been quite unthinkable only a few years ago. In fact, it is the significant shift to the right of the ruling CDU/CSU which contributed greatly to the poor showing of the country's extre1ne right parties in the October 1994 federal election. These parties' s 1nain political appeal has been their attack on the huge influx of foreigners, their insistence on a return to "fa1nily values," as well as their insistence that Ger1nan interests should beco1ne the pri1nary focus of Ger1nany' s foreign policy objectives [44]. The fact that the 1nainstrea1n conservative parties have picked up these the1nes to a significant extent has taken 1nuch of the wind out of the electoral sails of these far right parties. [Page 19] d. Xenophobia and Asylu1n Seekers As Ger1nans are searching for a new identity, the country is re1ninded of its rather unsavory pa st a lino st daily as 1nainly young 1nen assault foreigners on streets and set fires to the ho1nes of asylu1n seekers and so - called "guest workers." VJhat is perhaps 1nost depressing about these attacks is that 1nost of these perpetrators either work or are in school and co1ne fro1n rather "nor1nal" Ger1nan fa1nilies. According to Ainnesty International, there is a growing cli1nate of intolerance toward foreigners, particularly dark - skinned peoples, with the police often failing to protect the victi1ns of racist attacks an d so1neti1nes even 1nistreating foreigners and asylu1n seekers the1nselves [45]. While 1nost of the foreigners arriving in Ger1nany in search of a better life co1ne fro1n Central and Eastern Europe, it is interesting that the 1nedia usually show pictures of non -Europeans when presenting the issue of 1nigration into Ger1nany [46]. The backlash against people of color in Ger1nany has been dra1natic, and 1nany cities have begun to assign police to provide protection on trains, busses and subways [47]. Europe in the post -co1mnunist era has beco1ne the [Page 20] site of 1nassi ve 1nigrations to avoid civil wars such as in for1ner Yugoslavia, or to escape grinding poverty and despair [48]. Ger1nany, as the continent's richest country and sharing contiguous borders with 1nore countries than any other European nation, has been the 1nain destination for hundreds of thousands of political and econo1nic refugees and 1nigrants. The response of the Bonn govern1nent to this influx has been to close the borders as tightly as possible by changing its asylum law effective July 1, 1993. This law 1nakes it i1npossible for so1neone seeking asylu1n to do so in Ger1nany if he/she has co1ne fro1n a "safe third country;" i.e., fro1n any of Ger1nany' s neighboring states. What this 1neans, in effect, is that it is now virtually i1npossible for a refugee to reach Ger1nany legally. This has led to a huge decline in the number of asylum seekers, from 322,599 in 1993 to 127,210 in 1994. Only 7. 3 percent of the asylu1n requests were approved during 1994 [49]. This closing of the borders has beco1ne a particularly grave proble1n for Central and Eastern European countries, which are the1nselves rapidly beco1ning a transit zone for 1nigrants heading to Western Europe and beyond. According to the I0l1, transit routes [Page 21] fro1n the l1iddle East, Asia and Africa are developing as the transition of the for1ner socialist bloc countries creates conditions which increase possibilities for international travel and 1nigration. Soine actually reach the West but, having encountered stricter i1mnigration controls, hundreds of thousands are in a holding pattern in the region [50]. According to a Russian govern1nent official, Yuri Archipov, his country is also experiencing growing 1nigration fro1n Africa, Asia and the Near East. A.bout 20 0 people arrive daily, and there are now roughly a half 1nillion illegal i1mnigrants in Russia [51]. According to the Polish govern1nent, an 531 Journal of World-Systems Research esti1nated 150, 000 to 200, 000 people fro1n neighboring eastern countries willing to work for "starvation wages" now work illegally in Poland, principally in the construction sector [52]. The dra1natic wage differentials between various Central and Eastern European countries, coupled with the drea1n of so1nehow getting into Ger1nany, obviously serve as a big 1nagnet for 1nuch of this East-VJest 1nigration [53]. One of the Ger1nan govern1nent' s central tasks has been to prevent further 1nigration into the country by 1naking the western part of Europe a fortress. In fact, this has been the 1nost successfully adhered to aspect [Page 22] of the ter1ns worked out in the EU' s t.1aastricht Treaty, and cooperation a1nong EU 1nembers in seeking to keep others out is generally excellent. It is only behind this new wall, argues an editorial in the Ger1nan 1nanage1nent 1nagazine Capital, that ideals such as freedo1n and equality, as well as the present high standard of living, can be 1naintained. Leaving the borders open, which would result in an eventual equalization between East and VJest, "would lead to the co1nplete collapse of our social syste1n with di sastrous consequences for political stability" [54]. III. Post-Unification Ger1nany: The International Context The search for identity a1nong Ger1nans is not li1nited to the construction of a useable past at ho1ne, but also extends to searching for a new role abroad. After VJorld VJar II, the Federal Republic of Ger1nany beca1ne a classical trading state in the typology established by Richard Rosecrance [55]. Hanns t.1aull, a Ger1nan scholar, has 1nade a si1nilar argu1nent about both Ger1nany and Japan, referring to the1n as "civilian powers" [56]. Daniel Ha1nilton and others have referred to the type of foreign policy pursued by Bonn as [Page 23] "checkbook diplo1nacy," an option which the new Ger1nany can no longer exercise as it did in the past. Ha1nil ton, who is now special advisor to the Alnerican ambassador in Bonn, argues that being a purely "civilian" power is a "luxury" which Ger1nany can no longer afford [57]. President Clinton confir1ned that this is indeed the view of his acbninistration in an extensi v e interview with the S]ddeutsche Zeitung in early July 1994, in which he called on Ger1nany to abandon its past foreign policy. "The Ger1nans have no choice but to play a leading role in global affairs," given their size and econo1nic power, stated Clinton in advance of his trip to Germany [58]. There are 1nany in Ger1nany who totally agree. One of the 1nost outspoken proponents of a stronger Ger1nan role in global affairs has been defense 1ninister Volker R]he. During a speech he delivered at the CDU's Adenauer Foundation in Bonn in early July 1994, for exa1nple, he reiterated one of his constant the1nes; i.e., that Ger1nany wants to beco1ne a "global partner" with the United States. He envisions the gradual establish1nent of a "northern zone of stability, which would include the Ainericas, the European Union and Russia" [59] [Page 24] This will require, in the view of both Ger1nans and Alnericans, that Ger1nany play a leading role within the EU and that the two countries for1n a "strategic partnership" with Central and Eastern Europe. a) Ger1nany and the European Union Since unification Ger1nany 1 s position vis - .. -vis the EU has changed considerably, as the country now feels vindicated in its efforts to gain acceptance as a "nor1nal country with an abnor1nal history" as Richard von V'Jeizs"cker once called it. Ger1nany used its six - 1nonth turn at the EU presidency in the second half of 1994, for exa1nple, to push its vision for Europe based on the aggressive pursuit of a larger EU, as well as on 1naking the Brussels bureaucracy 1nore fiscally responsible. The Ger1nan political elite is showing quite clearly it is no longer willing to be the EU "pay1naster" [60]. A constant barrage of negative conunents about the country's disproportionate financial conunit1nent to the EU has undoubtedly contributed to the dra1natic decline of support for European integration a1nong Ger1nans. For exa1nple, in 1982 50 '.:, of V'Jest Ger1nans thought that [Page 25] integration should proceed 1nore quickly, while in 1984 an even higher number (62 '.:,) believed that. By 1992, however, only 13 '.:, of V'Jest Ger1nans and 8 '.:, of East Ger1nans endorsed that view [61]. At the rhetorical level Ger1nany is clearly still pursuing European integration, but it is equally clear that its political leaders are no longer ti1nid in pushing their own agenda now that unification has been achieved. As the Econo1nist phrased it: "European integration is at the heart of Ger1nany' s view of Europe. But is that on Ger1nany's ter1ns? Or on Europe's?" [62] And for1ner Chancellor Hel1nut Sch1nidt has warned his fellow Ger1nans to be sensitive to the feelings of neighbors as the country has embarked on a 1nuch 1nore aggressively self - centered foreign policy [63]. Enthusiasm for a united Europe has also waned in other EU countries, a1nid an enviro n1nent of growing 533 Journal of World-Systems Research nationalis1n and xenophobia. Arguing that "Euro -fatigue" is a growing senti1nent a1nong EU 1ne1nbers, President Francois t.1i tterand warned about the cooling of support for European unity in his final address to the European Parlia1nent in January 1995. t.1itterand warned that [Page 26] VJe 1nust overco1ne our prejudices, our history. If we don't, one i1nperative will overtake us --nationalis1n and war. For war isn I t just so1nething of the past [in VJestern Europe]; it can also be so1nething of the future [64]. Thus the whole project of European unity, already shaken by the divisive experience of the war in for1ner Yugoslavia, and lacking the cohesive conviction of a co1mnon ene1ny which had for1nerly been provided by the co1mnunist bloc, is in jeopardy. VJhile ever closer integration is taking place at the econo1nic level, the political will to further this process appears to be waning. In any case, Ger1nany 1 s ability to beco1ne a hege1non even within the European Union (i.e, a power which can enforce its national interest at will) is far from certain. This is undoubtedly a 1nain reason for the co1mni t1nent of Ger1nany I s political class to 1naintain very close relations with the United States in the years to co1ne. b) The Re-Styled Berlin-VJashington Axis [Page 27] As indicated above, Ger1nany 1 s new assertiveness vis- ... -vis its neighbors has the full blessing of the United States. VJashington has been one of the pri1nary catalysts for pushing Ger1nany into a 1nore aggressive foreign policy role, with the view of 1naking it a junior partner. As Ha1nil ton phrased this endorse1nent: "Neither Ger1nany nor A..1nerica can afford to stay ho1ne alone. Do1nestic renewal in each country depends on active engage1nent abroad" [65]. He refers to the United States and Europe as a "co1mnunity of shared values," and points to the "deep and extensive ties" which have developed between Ger1nany and the US since VJorld VJar II [66]. In his 1nost telling state1nent about the purpose of the Ger1nan-A..1nerican "strategic alliance," Ha1nilton argues: For the first ti1ne in sixty years the transatlantic relationship is being defined and tested as severely by economic as by security challenges. Global economic forces now i1npinge 1nore directly and powerfull y on the well-being of the average American or European than do 1nili tary security issues. Unless 1nore effective 1nechanis1ns can be developed to pree1npt and resolve econo1nic and 1nonetary conflicts between the advanced industrialized nations, the frontlines of the post-Cold V'Jar era 1nay be drawn between the victors of the Cold V'Jar the1nselves. (italics added) [67] [Page 28] These senti1nents are expressed by others as well. For exa1nple, V'J.R. S1nyser, in a stunningly eurocentric world view, argues that the "global concert" used to be led by Great Britain, was then taken over by the United States, and now has the US and Ger1nany as "the 1nost pro1ninent 1nembers" [68]. And the for1ner A..1nerican A..1nbassador to Ger1nany, Undersecretary of State for Europe Richard Holbrook, is quoted as saying: "In Asia we have co1mnon hu1nan-rights and political views, but we are destined to be political and econo1nic rivals ... Ger1nany is the key player in 1noving the Cold V'Jar alliance into a new post-Cold V'Jar phase and Clinton and Kohl are at the heart of it" [69]. V'Jolfgang Sch,,uble, in a 1najor speech at the Brookings Institute in V'Jashington, D.C., echoed the sa1ne senti1nents, stating that in a world characterized by new risks and dangers of global di1nension "proble1ns have beco1ne indivisible" and the "global redistributive struggle is getting ever harder." According to Sch,,uble "the V'Jest 1nore than ever before depends on a co1mnuni ty of shared values of the free de1nocracies;" a "Schicksalsge1neinschaft" (a co1mnunity fated to be) of the V'Jest which for1ns the basis for co1mnon global responsibilities. Ger1nany is part of the EU but also a [Page 29] partner in the Atlantic alliance, and Sch,,uble called for collective security to get a handle on the new world order [70]. So who is the new ene1ny against who1n this Schicksalsge1neinschaft is directed? The new fronts appear to be drawn between Europe and A..1nerica on the one hand, and Japan and its Asian neighbors on the other. As Richard Rosecrance has phrased it with disar1ning honestly: " ... it is i1nperative that the econo1nies of Europe and North A..1nerica follow a co1mnon approach toward their Asian co1npetitors" [7 l]. As usual, however, econo1nic conflict and threats to core interests will be couched in 1noral ter1ns. During the ti1nes in which the threat ca1ne fro1n "real socialis1n," with its lack of freedo1n and 1nobility, the operative ter1n was "de1nocracy." In the new post -Cold V'Jar era, this new East-V'Jest struggle will be couched in ter1ns of "culture." As Fareed Zakaria put it recently: "Culture is in" [72]. 535 Journal of World-Systems Research As John Dower has pointed out in his classic study of World War Two in the Pacific, igniting racial and cultural hatreds is not hard to do. He shows "just how enduring and universal the old i1nages that had been attached to nonwhite peoples since the sixteenth [Page 30] century really (are)" [73]. His extensive study shows how Asians have responded to allegations of being polar opposites to their conquerors (e.g., savages, children, 1nacbnen, and beasts, and, "of course, as pagan and evil opposed to Christian and good" with their own notions of racial and cultural superiority [74]. We need not go far back in history, however, to find confir1nation of these anti -Japanese feelings in the West. In 1991, for exa1nple, the French Pri1ne l1inister, Edi th Cresson, was quoted as referring to the Japanese as "little yellow 1nen" who "stay up all night thinking abut ways to screw the Alnericans and the Europeans. They are our co1mnon ene1ny" [ 7 5] . One 1nonth earlier she had brought "Nippophobia" in France to new heights by calling the Japanese "a nation of ants" [76]. In an era in which populations in the core have lost the ideological certainties of the Cold War, while si1nultaneously being subjected to social and econ 01nic changes unparalleled in their own lifeti1nes, the soil is fertile for do1nestic 1nanifestations of racis1n and xenophobia to turn to ene1nies abroad. Given the extre1nely uneven distribution of wealth globally [77], pressures on the rich core will only incr ease in the [Page 31] years and decades to co1ne. Bla1ning the boo1ning Asia - Pacific region for so1ne, if not all (yet~), of these pressures is an entirely predictable scenario. Iv-. The Asian Challenge As Paul Krug1nan re1ninded his readers in a recent article, in the early phase of the Cold War the econo1nic progress 1nade by the Soviet Union was quite pheno1nenal. This led 1nany to speculate about the superiority of central planning and, indeed, of socialis1n itself [78]. He cites the warning voice of Newsweek in 1959 that the Soviet Union 1nay well be "on the high road to econo1nic do1nination of the world," as well as a si1nilar assess1nent by then CIA Director Allen Dulles 1nade in hearings held by the Joint Econo1nic Co1mnittee [79]. What is interesting, of course, is that these econo1nic considerations were largely lost in 1nainstrea1n scholarly works, which treated the conflict between these two co1npeting social and econo1nic syste1ns 1nainly fro1n the "high politics" perspective of 1nilitary and strategic 1natters. In the post-Cold War era, we will likewise witness an ideological struggle between the Eurocentric core and [Page 32] its challengers in East Asia, where pheno1nenal growth rates have 1nade the region the 1nost econo1nically dyna1nic in the world. Japan, the only non-European 1nember of the core, is at the heart of this Asian challenge, with a number of e1nerging econo1nies (the "little tigers" plus the ASEAN countries) increasingly tied into its econo1nic nexus. Conflict is progra1mned into this situation: The growth 1nechanis1n in the southern tier is critically dependent on Japan as the supplier of capital goods, high -value-added co1nponents, technology, and aid, and on the United States as the de1nander of first resort. Virtually a 11 the high-perfor1ning East Asian countries run large trade deficits with Japan and large surpluses with the United States ... These imbalances are driving the well -known trade tensions in the region [80]. Leonard Silk and To1n Kono argue that [Page 33] Central to the trade issue are differences between Japanese -style capi tali sin and the Western 1nodel. Alnerican "revisionists" have long argued that Japanese capi tali sin is not only different from but essentially inco1npatible with Western capi tali sin - a view that key 1ne1nbers of the Clinton acbninistration, including President Bill Clinton himself, appear to share [81]. The pheno1nenal rise of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in Asia, as well as the 1nore recent successes of ASEAN, is well docu1nented [82]. The region has beco1ne a 1najor co1npetitor for the traditional export sectors of the old Euro -Alnerican core states, and its low wage and social security structures have 1nade it a serious threat to the co1npeti ti veness of core countries. Al though there is so1ne debate about the long-ter1n strength of these econo1nies [83], what interests us here is that, for the first ti1ne in centuries, Western econo1nic hege1nony is increasingly being challenged. Japan has beco1ne the center around which this enor1nous econo1nic growth has taken place. Between 1965 [Page 34] 537 Journal of World-Systems Research and 1985, for exa1nple, over half of all develop1nent assistance and foreign direct invest1nents received by the ASEAN countries ca1ne fro1n Japan. Since the Plaza Accord was signed on September 22, 1985 Japanese invest1nents in neighboring countries have exploded, while Japan itself has served as a 1nodel for effective industrial develop1nent, particularly for the NIEs. Ja1nes Fallows refers to the date of the signing of the Plaza Accord, which set off this chain of events, as being of as 1nuch historical i1nportance as November 9th, 1989, the day the Berlin VJall was opened. According to hi1n, this is the day the Asian econo1nic era began [84]. After the Plaza Accord a period of unprecedented growth, which the Japanese refer to as endaka, enabled Japan to beco1ne the do1ninant econo1nic power in Asia. Japan I s national currency was worth 1nore than ever before abroad, 1naking Japanese foreign invest 1nents enor1nously attractive and helping Japanese co1npanies to set up basic assembly plants throughout East Asia [85]. This will have a negative effect on the tradition of offering per1nanent e1nploy1nent to workers in Japan, who are increasingly finding the1ns elves co1npeting with low wage countries in the region. t.1eanwhile, the Japanese govern1nent, as a result of [Page 35] the end of the Cold VJar and 1nounting econo1nic tensions with the United States [has] encouraged greater Japanese diplo1natic activity in East Asia in order to cultivate a 1nore hospitable regional environ1nent ... Japanese also feel an affinity in terms of basic values and social custo1ns toward their Asian neighbors - especially those si1nilarly influenced by the Confucian cultural tradition [86]. The general e1nphasis of scholars in discussing the Asian exception to the "VJestern 1nodel" e1nphasize its econo1nic di1nension [87]. Our own analysis goes beyond this purely econo1nic di1nension, however, and argues that the reason why the "Asian 1niracle" is so threatening is because it squarely challenges five centuries of European hege1nony and clai1ns of superiority in all aspects of life - political, social, cultural, as well as racial. As Ja1nes Blaut has pointed out, [Page 36] European writers over the past half - 1nillenniu1n have tended to view Asia as a place where people are inherently unfree and society is inherently unchanging ... It was accepted as an axio1natic truth, rarely questioned, but efforts were 1nade to explain this inherent "Oriental despotis1n" (as it ca1ne to be called) in ter1ns of everything fro1n theology to race to environ1nent [88]. To Blaut, the notion of European superiority in all aspects of hu1nan existence (what he and others refer to as Eurocentris1n) has beco1ne so deeply ingrained in European 1ninds that it has beco1ne "a unique set of beliefs, and uniquely powerful, because it is the intellectual and scholarly rationale for one of the 1nost powerful social interests of the European elite" [89]. He insists that this belief syste1n is entirely linked to the experience of European colonialis1n and neocolonialis1n, both of which rest on the exploitation of the wealth and resources of the colonized. And Sa1nir Ainin, in his work on Eurocentris1n, explains how this pheno1nenon differs fro1n traditional ethnocentris1n: [Page 37] Eurocentris1n is not the su1n of Westerners' preconceptions, 1nistakes, and blunders with respect to other peoples. After all, these errors are no 1nore serious than the corresponding presu1nptions that non -European peoples hold with respect to Westerners. Eurocentris1n is thus not a banal ethnocentris1n testifying si1nply to the li1ni ted horizons beyond which no people on this planet has yet truly been able to go. Eurocentris1n is a specifically 1nodern pheno1nenon ... it constitutes one di1nension of the culture and ideology of the 1nodern capitalist world [90]. Our argu1nent here is that the har1nony of cul tu res presented by both Ger1nans and Ainericans in explaining the future of their countries' relations with one another is in recognition that their co1mnon "Eurocentrist" project is under attack [91]. Thus, while the Cold War alliance was based on an ideology of virulent anti-co1mnunis1n, the ideological/ superstructural justification for this new alliance within the core will be presented in for1n of a "clash of civilizations." [Page 38] The idea that politics in the future will be shaped by such clashes was advanced by Sa1nuel Huntington, not coincidentally Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. He argued in the Su1mner of 1993 that a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of wha t global politics is likely to be in the 539 Journal of World-Systems Research coming years .. will be the clash of civilizations ... VJi th the end of the Cold VJar, international politics 1noves out of its VJestern phase, and its center piece beco1nes the interaction between the VJest and non - VJestern civilizations and a1nong non -VJestern civilizations [92]. Huntington, reflecting his own ideological bias, clai1ns that this clash has nothing to do with the respective political and econo1nic syste1ns found inside these countries, but rather with "their culture and civilization" [93]. He also does not explain why this clash is going to take place now, except to point to the pressures of globalization and 1nodernization which create kind of a cultural backlash. [Page 39] A Ger1nan observer, Eberhard Rondholz, has referred to Huntington's approach as a new policy of contain1nent, this ti1ne against e1nerging co1npeting cultures. Rondholz finds a growing number of supporters in Ger1nany for this idea of cultural spheres, which in the European context 1neans drawing lines between the Latin/Ro1nan Occident and Eastern Christianity, between enlighten1nent and orthodoxy, between de1nocracy and absolutis1n [94]. To us this see1ns to be the crucial point, however: It is precisely at the 1no1nent in which the European core countries are facing a new round of challenges to their hege1nony that new justifications for this conflict are being sought at the ideological level. lfJe argue that the coming "clash of civilizations" will be brought about because, for the first ti1ne in centuries, European notions of racial and cultural superiority are being challenged in the econo1nic sphere. Indeed, issues of culture and race will draw the new fault lines that deter1nine the fatal categories of f riend and ene1ny in the coining century. Our argu1nent thus is that the pheno1nenal rise of East and Southeast Asia over the past decade has threatened not only the econo1nic interests of the lfJestern core nations, but it has also [Page 40] seriously under1nine d European notions of racial and cultural superiority, a deeply internalized sense of cultural-racial self-identity. "Race," "culture," and "civilization" will thus beco1ne the new fighting words in the future world of "geo-economics," just as "de1nocracy" and "freedo1n" were the guise under which the struggle for the 1naintenance of core interests was carried out in the Cold VJar era. v-. The Asian Response: New Cultural Assertiveness The fault line of culture and race is not new. In core-periphery relations the issue of race and ethnicity has always played a do1ninant role, although one which a self-centered and culturally arrogant Europe has not focussed on as 1nuch as its victi1ns in the periphery. Frantz Fanon once described this aspect of the core-periphery relationship by stating that in the periphery it was not pri1narily class which assigned your station in life, but: ... the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the econo1nic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich [95]. [Page 41] This racial fault line, a byproduct of European colonialis1n which was te1nporarily overshadowed by the ideological divisions of the Cold War, will show seis1nic activity for the first ti1ne in decades. It should thus 1nore properly be called a return to the status quo ante earlier in the century, at which ti1ne the African-Alnerican scholar and activist W. E. B. Du Bois predicted that the "proble1n of the twentieth century" would be "the proble1n of the color line." Though undoubtedly correct about his prediction that "the relation of the darker to the lighter races of 1nen in Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea" [96] would be the source of future global conflict, Du Bois's prediction did not foresee the way in which the co1mnunist challenge would te1nporarily freeze the "problem of the color line." Eleanor Roosevelt, chair of the United Nations Co1mnission on Hu1nan Rights in the i1mnediate post -war years, said of her experiences: "An age -old sore had co1ne to light and I felt the weight of history for which the nations of the Western world are now to be called to account" [97]. The weight of history to which she was referring was that "we, because our skins are white, necessarily look down upon all peoples whose [Page 42] skins are yellow or black or brown. This thought is never out of their minds" [98]. The only non-European core nation is Japan, whose history over the past century has been one of trying to find acceptance in the white world by adapting as 1nuch as necessary while retaining as 1nuch of its own culture and identity as possible. The response of Europe to Japan's ascendance to core status was 1narred fro1n the beginning by the fact that 1nembership in the core had always been the privilege of white Europe [99]. For exa1nple, an atte1npt on the part of Japan to get an 541 Journal of World-Systems Research a1nencbnent calling for racial equality included in the prea1nble of the Le ague of Nations covenant failed, largely over the objection of US President V'Jilson who argued that "The trouble is that if this Co1mnission should pass it, it would surely raise the race issue throughout the world" [100]. The issue was raised a1nong the non-European peoples anyway, and the hypocrisy of the colonizing nations did not go unnoticed. Nor did it go unnoticed that Japan, a fellow Asian nation, had succeeded at the white 1nan I s ga1ne. Karl Kautsky wrote long ago: [Page 43] The people of the East have been defeated by the Europeans so often that they thought it hopeless to resist. Europeans had the sa1ne opinion. Their colonial policy, which deceived and disposed of foreign peoples as if they were cattle, was based on this. But as soon as the Japanese had broken the ice, this had an i1mnediate effect on the whole of the East. Both the whole of the Far East and the whole of the t.1oha1mnedan world rose up with independent policies, to resist all foreign do1nination [ 101]. As John Dower has pointed out, it was Japan that further shattered the 1nystique of V'Jestern superiority during V'Jorld V'Jar II [102]. Japan was also the only core power to attend the founding conference of the non - aligned 1nove1nent in Bandung in 1955, expressing its solidarity with the peoples of Africa and Asia in their struggle against European colonialis1n. The argu1nent here it not that Japan did this unselfishly or that suspicions of Japanese intentions do not exist a1nong fellow Asians, but that the 1nere fact of not being Caucasian or Christian provides an ele1nent of cohesion [ 103] . [Page 44] V'Ji th the growing econo1nic links between Japan and its neighbors brought about since endaka began, Japanese television progra1ns have begun to e1nphasize the need for Asian unity (kyosei). Elsewhere in Asia, pride in these econo1nic achieve1nents has also begun the process of creating an Asian consciousness which reflects a new level of self -confidence vis- ... -vis the for1ner colonial 1nas ters. "Asia will no longer put up with being treated si1nply as a card; it will de1nand respect as a player," argues Yoichi Funabashi, the V'Jashington bureau chief of Asahi Shi1nbun [104]. An adviser to t.1alaysia I s Pri1ne t.1inister, t.1ahathir bin t.1oha1nad, quoted his boss to Ja1nes Fallows in 1991, "V'Je 1nust cease to be brown Sahibs, brown English1nen. V'Je 1nust find our own roots in Asia" [105]. Kishore l1ahbubani, a senior official in Singapore's l1inistry of Foreign Affairs, expressed these senti1nents the 1nost bluntly: It is difficult for a European or North Alnerican to understand the 1no1nentousness of the psychological revolution in East Asia because they cannot step into East Asian 1ninds. Their 1ninds have never been wrapped in colonialism. They have never struggled with the subconscious assu1nption that perhaps they were second -rate hu1nan beings, never good enough to be number one. The growing realization of East Asians that they can do anything as well as, if not be tter than, other cultures has led to an explosion of confidence [106]. [Page 45] This new Asian assertiveness and insistence on defining its own values and societal nor1ns is occurring at precisely the 1no1nent in which 1natters of race, culture and civilization have also begun to play a 1nuch larger role in public and political discourse in the VJest. Thus, as econo1nic conditions inside the core countries continue to deteriorate and govern1nents grope for ways to create new for1ns of allegiance fr 01n increasingly cynical publics, the stage is set for a "clash of civilizations" between Japan and its Asian neighbors on the one hand, and the United States and Ger1nany as the key 1nembers of the VJestern core. v-I. Conclusion l1aking Japan and its people into a new ene1ny is a process which has already begun, particularly in the United States [107], although the process itself is obscured by a general popular threat perception about people of color. In Europe this has found expression in a 1nore diffused for1n of general xenophobia and attacks against outsiders. The underlying senti1nent on both continents appears to be the sa1ne, however: a sense that non-Europeans (non-whites) are threatening the [Page 46] position of econo1nic and cultural superiority en joyed by Europeans for centuries. Several factors account for this e1nbryonic but growing change. l) The end of the Cold VJar has created an ideological vacuu1n. The i1nplosion of the "red threat" has left populations and leaders alike searching for a new sense of identity. Paradoxically, this has infused a new 1nood of cynicis1n about VJestern de1nocracy and a 1nore openly critical stance toward established 543 Journal of World-Systems Research politics. Events in Italy have been 1nost dra1natic in this regard, but in the absence of a strong e xternal ene1ny, politics as usual has co1ne under severe scrutiny in all other core countries as well. The notion that VJestern-style de1nocracy is experiencing its own crisis of legi ti1nation has begun to accu1nulate a substantial body of scholarly evidence [10 8]. 2) Threats to VJestern security are no longer clearly defined in the for1n of the VJarsaw Pact powers. VJhile the collapse of co1mnunis1n has also led to the dis1nantling of large sections of those countries' 1nilitary-industrial co1nplexes, no corresponding process has taken place in the VJest. Thus, finding new ene1nies is seen by the 1nilitary, the ar1ns industry, as well as [Page 47] politicians whose entire careers have been devoted to an anti-co1mnunist agenda, as preferable to losing decades of power and privilege. As deploy1nents of the l'unerican 1nili tary in the post -Cold VJar era have shown, Third VJorld crises so far have been used to fill 1nuch of the gap [109]. 3) The average core citizen is experiencing growing econo1nic hardships resulting fro1n the twin processes of rising globalization and accelerating technological changes. These have led to a syste1natic destruction of 1nanufacturing jobs in the core, with a resultant drop in real wages and structural une1nploy1nent [110]. By 1994, thirty -six 1nillion people in the OECD countries were out of work. VJithin the core G-7 countries, only the US and Japan had below -double- digit une1nploy1nent levels in 1994. The figures for the US, although they look good on paper, hide the fact that "today 6 1nillion A..1nerican s are working part -ti1ne who would like to work full -ti1ne, and al1nost 9 1nillion are une1nployed" [lll]. Paul Kennedy posed the difficulties ahead with the following question: " ... where will we find jobs for young, a1nbitious Europeans coining out of school? ... Political instability is often rooted in widespread social despair" [112]. [Page 48] 4) Populations in both VJestern Europe and the United States have begun to react angrily to the growing tide of people seeking entry into their countries, either as i1mnigrants, refugees, or asylu1n seekers. As discussed above, one of the anchors of post-l1aastricht cooperation within the EU has been designing structures designed to keep foreigners out. In the United States, concern about growing co1npetition fro1n i1n1nigrants (legal as well as illegal) has 1nanifested itself in a variety of ways. One 1nuch discussed aspect of this has been a backlash of "white 1nales" in the Nove1nber 1994 elections, in which conservative Republicans were able to 1nake an unprecedented sweep [113]. This will have repercussions on Alnerican foreign policy as well, since 1nany of the senior Republican politicians in V'Jashington are known for their extre1nely conservative and nationalistic views [114]. Just like in Europe, however, broad consensus exists on the need to curb the influx of i1mnigrants a1nong the 1nost powerful political groupings. Thus President Clinton has pro1nised the Republican -led Congress his full cooperation on the issue [115]. l1ario Cuo1no, in his final speech before turning over his job as Governor of New York to his Republican [Page 49] successor, voiced his concern about this agenda in the following words: "You're turning those white factory workers all over the country against people of color. You' re turning the1n against i1mnigrants. You have turned the 1niddle class to look downward instead of up. And they're now pitted against the poorest" [116]. These xenophobic i1npulses are not only generated in V'Jashington, however. In California, for exa1nple, a radically anti-i1mnigrant "Proposition 187" (called "Save our State") won in the sa1ne election, calling for a cut in public services, including education and health care, to illegal i1mnigrants and requiring educators, police and public health officials to report anyone suspected of being an illegal i1mnigrant [ll 7]. The l1exican govern1nent has strongly conde1nned the 1neasure and expressed concern that it 1nay under1nine the spirit in which the country joined the NAFTA bloc [118]. Another interesting 1nanifestation of this rise in anti-foreign senti1nents in the United States is the rekindled debate about differences in native intelligence a1nong various racial groups. According to Herrnstein and l1urray, authors of a controversial book on the relationship of race and class [119], the 1nean IQ [Page 50] of African Alnericans is 85, co1npared to 100 for white Alnericans and lll-115 for East Asians. As Alan Ryan has pointed out in a lengthy review article, in the United States this debate has always been driven by "fear of new i1mnigrants ... fears of the 'dilution' of the 'pure bred' white stock by Jewish or Negro blood were the co1mnon coin of acade1nic discussion throughout the first forty years of this century" [120]. It is interesting, of course, that the debate has resurfaced with a vengeance at this point in ti1ne. 5) V'Jithin this increasingly bellicose cli1nate govern1nents are hard pressed to use their power and influence to 1naintain current standards of living for the 1najori ty. Unfortunately, govern1nents have begun to lose 1nuch of their co1npetence in regulating 1narkets, which the1nselves are globalizing ever 1nore rapidly. As 545 Journal of World-Systems Research Her1nan Schwartz has pointed out, as a proportion of total econo1nic activity, global trade did not regain its 1914 levels until roughly 1980. He argues that the era of postwar stability, in which states do1ninated 1narkets, has thus co1ne to an end and that our present era 1nuch 1nore closely resembles conditions at the end of the 19th century [121]. The i1nplications of this develop1nent for world peace are 01ninous, espec ially if [Page 51] one co1npares events leading up to V'Jorld V'Jar I with those discussed in this paper. Then, like now, the power of established core powers, Great Britain as the first a1nong the1n, was challenged by the United States and Ger1nany. Even then, cultural affinities rather than econo1nic realities alone deter1nined the pattern of future alliances. As Ja1nes Joll has pointed out, "Fro1n the purely econo1nic point of view the United States was at least as dangerous a rival [to Britain] as Ger1nany; yet the re was no talk of a growing antagonis1n between the two countries" [122]. Joll shows that anti -Ger1nan senti1nents rose over several decades prior to the actual outbreak of the First V'Jorld V'Jar and acquired an inexorable logic of their own on both sides. In the present era, in which foreign trade issues are once again beco1ning para1nount for govern1nents [123], the rise of Asia as a challenger to European core hege1nony 1nay well have a si1nilarly destabilizing effect. Thus, as the world is heading into an era of disorder, a cli1nate of opinion is e1nerging within the core in which new lines of friends and enemies are being drawn. As this paper has sought to show, Ger1nany is 1nuch too preoccupied with its significant do1nestic [Page 52] proble1ns and too burdened with ghosts of the past to beco1ne a hege1nonic power on its own. The United States, on the other hand, is seeking to 1naintain its continuing preponderance in the 1nili tary/ strategic sector while recognizing its loss of hege1nonic power in the econo1nic sphere. Enlisting Ger1nany as a junior partner in its ambitious global agenda 1nakes sense. Ger1nany, ta1ned by the experiences of the first half of this century, is an easier and 1nore co1npliant partner in Europe than Great Britain or France, for exa1nple. It is also well versed in the art of 1nul tilateral diplo1nacy and already a key 1ne1nber of the world econo1ny [124]. Thus, as the economic balance of power is beginning to tilt in the direction of East Asia, Ger1nany and the United States will beco1ne the wardens to protect the Eurocentric project. As this paper has tried to show, the stage has thus been set for the "coming clash of civilizations." [Page 53] EHDHOTES l. Francis Fukuya1na, The End of History and the Last l1an, New York: The Free Press, 1992, p. xi. 2. See, for exa1nple, Edward N. Luttwak, "The Coining Global V'Jar for Econo1nic Power: There are no nice guys on the battlefield of geo -econo1nics," The National Ti1nes, l1arch 1994, pp. 48 -54. Luttwak argues that "today ... the e1nerging geo-econo1nic struggle for high -technology industrial supre1nacy a1nong Alnericans, Europeans, and Japanese is rapidly eroding their old alliance solidarity, and the ill feelings now released between the1n are beginning to affect all other trading countries of any i1nportance." (p.53) 3. Interestingly enough, these types of argu1nents have e1nerged in all three countries. See, for exa1nple, Jeffrey E. Garten, A Cold Peace: Alnerica, Japan, Ger1nany and the Struggle for Supre1nacy, New York: Ti1nes Books, 1992; Lester C. Thurow, Head to Head: The coining Econo1nic Battle a1nong Japan, Europe, and Alnerica, New York: V'Jillia1n l1orrow and Co1npany, 1992; Shintaro Ishihara, The [Page 54] Japan That Can Say No: V'Jhy Japan V'Jill be First Alnong Equals, New York: Si1non and Schuster, 1991; Konrad Seitz, Die japanisch-a1nerikanische Herausforderung, 6th ed., Bonn: Verlag Aktuell, 1994. 4. Alliance here is used in ter1ns of for1nal as well as infor1nal networks established between govern1nents, not so-called "strategic alliances" between transnational corporations. 5. See Steven l1uller, "Ger1nan Dile1mnas," Proble1ns of Post-Co1mnunis1n, Pre1nier Issue, Fall 1994, pp. 37 -44. 6. See Karl Taro Greenfield, "Return of the Yellow Peril," The Nation, l1ay ll, 1992. 7. Sebastian l1allaby, "Death of a role 1nodel," in: "Oriental renaissance," The Economist: A Survey of Japan, July 9th, 1994, p. 4. 8. Quentin Peel, "East Ger1nany sees for1ner Co1necon trade fall," Financial Ti1nes, 19 August 1993. 9. "Die Beat1nung eines schrottreifen l1onsters," SJddeutsche Zei tung, 22 l1arch 1994. [Page 55] 547 Journal of World-Systems Research 10. Judy De1npsey, "The high price of Ger1nan unity," Financial Ti1nes Survey: Restructuring of Eastern Ger1nany, Financial Ti1nes, May 4, 1994. ll. "V-erpaii.te Chancen i1n Osten," S]ddeutsche Zeitung, 2 January 1994. 12. "Ostdeutschland," Handelsblatt, 9/ 10 October 1993. 13. "Kau1n Export aus Ostdeutschland," Die V'Jelt, 22 June 1994. 14. See V'Jolfgang Seibelt, "Zur Situation der "ffentlichen v-erwaltung in den neuen Bundesl"ndern. Ein vorl"ufiges Res]1nee," in: V'Jolfgang Seibelt/Art hur Benz/Heinrich M"ding, eds., v-erwaltungsrefor1n und v-erwaltungspolitik i1n Prozea der deutschen Einigung, Baden-Baden: No1nos v-erlagsgesellschaft 1993, pp. 477 -498. 15. SJddeutsche Zeitung, 28 April 1993. 16. "Treuhand katapul tie rt Schuldenstand auf zwei Billionen Mark," Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 April 1994. [Page 56] 17. For exa1nple, a for1ner director of a regional Treuhand office in Halle on the run fro1n Ger1nan law was arrested in the su1mner of 1994 in Texas for speeding in his Rolls Royce. 18. Quentin Peel, "Sale of the Century ends," Financial Ti1nes Survey: Restructuring of Eastern Ger1nany, Financial Ti1nes, May 4, 1994. For a scathing critique of the way in which this "privatization" has taken place, see Otto K"hler, Die groii.e Enteignung: V'Jie die Tr euhand eine v-olkswirtschaft liquidierte, Munich: Droe1nersche v-erlagsanstalt, June 1994. K"hler points out, inter alia, that the Treuhand board of directors reads like a V'Jho' s V'Jho of V'Jest Ger1nan top 1nanagers, whose interests 1nore clearly lay in protecting their own organizations' interests rather than 1naking sure that the East Ger1nan "people's property" get divided fairly a1nong those who initially worked for it. 19. "Ostdeutsche Jber V'Jirtschaftslage skeptisch," Frankfurter Allge1neine Zeitung, 21 April 1994. 20. Die V'Joche, 29 Dece1nber 1993. [Page 57] 21. "Bl]hende Landschaften: Aufschwung Ost treibt erste Knospen," Die V'Jelt, 7 July 1994. 22. This argu1nent was 1nade by Dr. Norbert Bub in his talk "Ger1nan Econo1ny on the Up," at the No1nura Research Institute Frankfurt, 7 July 1994. In the written (unpublished) text of his talk he wrote: "The extre1ne flow of goods and services towards the eastern part has beco1ne a 1nost interesting and profitable additional business for western Ger1nan suppliers ... in a net view, western Ger1nan "exports" to the eastern part of the country are still having an enor1nous trigger i1npact on the western Ger1nan econo1ny. Therefore the co1mnon view that building up eastern Ger1nany' s econo1ny constitutes an excessive pressure on the V'Jest has to be reconsidered." 23. According to an Ifo survey of V'Jest Ger1nan industry in su1mner 1994, the e1nploy1nent situation will not i1nprove before 1998, as co1npanies do not plan to 1nake significant new invest1nents in either the eastern or western part of the country. Indeed, plans are to let 1nore e1nployees go. "Industrie streicht auch 1995 Jobs," Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 July 1994. [Page 58] 24. Federal Econo1nics t.1inistry, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Zukunftssicherung des Standorts Deutschland, Bonn, 2 Sept ember 1993. 25. Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie, Sicherung des Produktionsstandortes Deutschland, Cologne, Nove1nber 1993. 26. A worldwide Gallop poll of consu1ners co1mnissioned by the US advertising agency Bozell to deter1nine preferences for products of the twelve biggest exporting nations found that Japan scored highest with a lino st 39 '.:, in very good or excellent category, followed by Ger1nany (36'.:o), and the USA (34. 3 '.:,) . "Consu1ner patriotis1n" was highest in Japan, where 76 '.:, of those polled rated their own products as either very good or excellent. Ger1nany' s rating as the second 1nost popular exporter of goods clearly gives a boost to the trade unions' argu1nents about the country's international co1npeti ti veness. Richard To1nkins, "Japan, Ger1nany and US 1nake best quality goods, say consu1ners," Financial Ti1nes, 11 February 1994. 27. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), "Standort Deutschland: Solide Basis - Kein Grund zu1n Schwarzsehen; Geschweige denn zur Panik," Infor1nationen zur [Page 59] V'Jirtschafts- und Strukturpolitik, Nr. 12/93, D]sseldorf: 2 November 1993. 28. "Der Anteil der Ausl"nder a1n Arbeits1narkt w"chst," Handelsblatt, 21 October 1993. 29. Co1mnission of the European Co1mnuni ties, Central and 549 Journal of World-Systems Research Eastern Eurobaro1neter, Brussels, February 1993. 30. Deutscher Industrie - und Handel stag, Produktionsverlagerung ins Ausland: Ergebnisse einer Unterneh1nensbefragung, Bonn, Nove1nber 1993. 31. Klaus-Dieter Sch1nidt and Petra Naujoks, V'Jestern Enterprises in Eastern t.1arkets The Ger1nan Perspective, Kiel V'Jorking Paper No. 607, December 1993, p. 1. 32. See Yoshikazu Takao, Chi Hung Kwan and t.1asayuki Kichikawa, "Long-Ter1n Outlook: Japan in an Era of Global Structural Adjust1nents," NRI Quarterly, Tokyo, Spring 1994, pp. 2-35. 33. V'Jillia1n Dawkins, "Japan looks to low -cost areas," Financial Ti1nes, 3 June 1994. [Page 60] 34. Barbara Odrich, "Japans Unterneh1nen wandern aus," Frankfurter Allge1neine Zeitung, 28 September 1993. 35. See, for exa1nple, Paul Krug1nan, "Co1npeti ti veness: A Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, t.1arch/April 1994, as well as the responses by 1nany distinguished econo1nists entitled "The Fight Over Co1npeti ti veness: A Zero -Su1n Debate?" in Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 186 - 203. 36. See, for exa1nple, Erhard Kantzenbach, "Ger1nany as a Business Location," Interecono1nics, January/February 1994, pp. 3-10; t.1ichael Frenkel, "Ger1nany's International Co1npetitive Position under Siege," Ibid, pp. 10 -17. 37. This factor is picked up in a cartoon -type graph in the July 20, 1994 issue of The Straits Ti1nes, published in Singapore, depicting a very fat Ger1nan worker whose average hourly co1npensation in 1992, including benefits, a1nounted to $39. 62, co1npared to Singapore, $8. 34 and t.1exico, $ 4 .10. 38. For the difficult process of "1nental unification" of the two Ger1nanies, see, for exa1nple, t.1ichael Lukas [Page 61] t.1oeller and Hans-Joachi1n t.1aaz, Die Einheit beginnt zu zwei t. Ein deutsch -deutsches Zwiegespr"ch, Berlin: Rowohlt v-erlag 1991; Reinhard Bobach, "t.1entale Konversion? Kulturelle Aspekte der deutschen v-ereinigung," Deutschland Archiv, v-01. 26, No. 1, January 1993, pp. 7-20. 39. The PDS scored an i1npressi ve victory in last year's local, state, and federal elections a1nong East Ger1nans, showing a consistent level of voter support of around 20 percent. 40. Fritz Stern, "Ger1nany' s Divisive Unity," Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993, pp. 108 -125. 41. Wolfgang Scha]ble, 1nost likely successor to Hel1nut Kohl in the CDU and one of the country's 1nost pro1ninent conservative politicians, outlines his strongly nationalistic views in his book Und der Zukunft zugewandt, Siedler Verlag, 1994. He acbnonishes Ger1nans to believe 1nore strongly in fa1nily values and their nation. 42. For the painful efforts at reconstructing Ger1nan history, see, for exa1nple, Uwe Uffel1nan n, [Page 62] "Identit"tsbilding und Geschichtsdidaktik," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen, B/41/94, 14 October 1994, pp. 12 -20. In the sa1ne edition of the journal, see also Horst Kuss, "Historisches Lernen i1n Wandel," pp. 21 -30. 43. For a collection of very thoughtful essays written by so1ne of Ger1nany' s 1najor conte1nporary thinkers and public figures on the ambiguities which haunt reunified Ger1nany, see U1ndenken: Deutschland, seine Rolle, seine inneren UmbrJche, Hamburg: ZEIT -Punkte, lJr. 3/1994. 44. See, for example, Wir machen uns stark --- FsR DEUTSCHE IlJTERESSElJ, Party Progra1n of the Republikaner Partei, passed at the party's congress in Augsburg on 26/27 June 1993. 45. "Sorge Sber Brutalit"t in Europa," Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 July 1994. See also a detailed study conducted by Hu1nan Rights Watch/Helsinki entitled "Foreigners Out" Xenophobia and Right Wing Violence in Ger1nany, October 1992. 46. For a critical analysis of the role of the 1nedia in creating xenophobic senti1nents, see Georgios Tsapanos, [Page 63] "I1mner in AnfJhrungszeichen - Ausl"nder und Fre1ndenfeindlichkei t als The1na der t.1edien," in: Entstehung von Fre1ndenfeindlichkei t: Die Verantwortung von Poli tik und t.1edien, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1993, pp. 93-101. 47. "Schutz der Fahrg"st e verst"rkt," S]ddeutsche Zeitung, 17 October 1994, p. 6; "U-Bahn, S-Bahn, Bus: Die Angst f"hrt 1nit," Berliner t.1orgenpost, 9 October 1994, p. 9; "Zeichen der Gewalt: Gesichter unserer Stadt," Berliner t.1orgenpost, 23 October 1994, p. 9. 48. According to the World Bank, five years of post- 551 Journal of World-Systems Research co1mnunist transition in Central and Eastern Europe have created huge une1nploy1nent and social dislocations. Of the region's 320 1nillion people, 58 1nillion live below the poverty line ($120 1nonthly inco1ne per capita), of whi ch 50 million are "new poor." See Branco Milanovic, "The Cost of Transition: 50 t.1illion New Poor and Growing Inequality," Transition, Vol. 5, Number 8, The V'Jorld Bank, 8 October 1994. 49. "Number of Asylu1n-Seekers Dropped Sharply in 1994," The V'Jeek in Ger1nany, New YorK; Ger1nan Infor1nation Center, January 13, 1995, pp. l-2. [Page 64] 50. IOt.1 (International Organization for t.1igration) Press Release, "Transit t.1igration Soars in Poland, Bulgaria and Czech Republic," Budapest, 13 t.1ay 1994. 51. "Ru2llands Beh" rden lber Zuwanderung besorgt," Slddeutsche Zeitung, 7 July 1994. 52. "Die Schattensei te des Aufschwungs", Slddeutsche Zeitung, 7 July 1994. 53. Average 1nonthly wages at current exchange rates in eastern Europe varied from $58 (Bulgaria) to $240 (Hungary) in 1991; fro1n $66 -70 (Ro1nania and Bulgaria, respectively) to $280 (Hungary) in 1992; and from $85 (Ro1nania) to $320 (Hungary) in inid-1993. UN Econo1nic Co1mnission for Europe, Econo1nic Survey of Europe in 1993 - 1994, New York and Geneva, 1994, p. 100. 54. Johannes Gross, "Neue Bl"cke: Die V'Jelt gliedert sich erneut in Bl"cke," Capital, 7/94, p. 3. 55. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Co1mnerce and Conquest in the t.1odern V'Jorld, New York: Basic Books, 1986; -- A..1nerica I s Econo1nic Resurgence: A Bold New Strategy, New York: HarperCollins, 1990. [Page 65] 56. Hanns V'J. t.1aull, "Ger1nany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1990, pp. 91 - 106. 57. These argu1nents were raised in an enor1nously influential study conducted under the auspices of the Carnegie Endow1nent for Peace. See Daniel S. Ha1nil ton, Beyond Bonn: A..1nerica and the Berlin Republic, V'Jashington, 1994, p. 17. 58. "Deutschland 1nua eine Flhrungsrolle lberneh1nen," Slddeutsche Zeitung, 4 July 1994. 59. "Rlhe: Europa will A..1nerikas globale Poli tik 1nitgestalten," Frankfurter Allge1neine Zeitung, 5 July 1994. 60. Interestingly, it is Ger1nany' s industry which is 1nost ada1nantly opposed to this rhetoric and has published a study showing that the country not only pays the 1nost into the EU coffers but also benefits the 1nost econo1nically. See Deutscher Industrie - und Handel stag, Deutschland - Zahl1neister in Europa? Ein Beitrag zur v-ersachlichung der "Nettozahler -Diskussion", Brussels, May 1994. [Page 66] 61. Renate K"cher, "Pl"doyer f]r ein europ"isches Pathos," Kas Auslandsinfor1nationen: Europa, v-01. 10, l/1994, Bonn: Adenauer Foundation, pp. 121. 62. "Ger1nany's Europe," The Econo1nist, June ll, 1994, p. 25. See also l1ark N. Nelson, "Forward l1arch. Ger1nany is Ready to Lead, but is Europe Prepared to Follow? Even Ger1nans are Nervous About New Global Role; First Job: EU Presidency," Wall Street Journal Europe, v-01. XII, No. 106, July l-2, 1994. 63. Hel1nut Sch1nidt, "Einf]hlen, nicht auftru1npfen," Die Zeit, Nr. 18, 29 April 1994, p. 9. On the growing worries of other Europeans about Ger1nany' s growing assertiveness, see also Peter Glotz, "Der gr"ii.te Brocken auf de1n Kontinent. Wir Deutschen soll ten uns klar1nachen: Die Nachbarn 1niii.trauen uns weiterhin," Die Zeit, Nr. 26, 24 June 1994; Pierre Pflimlin, "Zur europ"ischen Einigung gibt es keine Alternative," Das Parla1nent, v-01. 44, Nr. 14, 8 April 1994. 64. "l1itterand urges unity in Europe," The Hartford Courant, January 18, 1995, p. A9. 65. Hamilton, op.cit., p. 24. [Page 67] 66. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 67. Ibid, p. 53. 68. W.R. Sinyser, Ger1nany and Alnerica: New Identities, Fateful Rifts? Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p. 14. 69. Craig R. Whitney, "'Unvarnished Truth' l1akes Clinton's Envoy to Bonn 'Right l1an at the Right Ti1ne," International Herald Tribune, 26 January 94. 70. "Deutschland an der Seite Alnerikas," Frankfurter Allge1neine Zeitung, 24 l1arch 94. 71. Richard N. Rosecrance, "Trading States in a New 553 Journal of World-Systems Research Concert of Europe," in: Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change, Boulder: V'Jestview Press, 1993, p. 137. 72. Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 125. 73. John V'J. Dower, V'Jar V'Jithout l1ercy: Rae e & Power in the Pacific V'Jar, New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, p. 148. [Page 68] 74. Ibid, p. 149. 75. Sunday Times, 23 June 1991, p. 17, cited in: Dunbabin, op.cit, p. 181. The author also quotes from the first draft of the 1988 American Trade Act, which stated " ... V'Jhen trading with adversaries, like Japan." According to Dunbabin, the phrase was dropped from the final text, for obvious diplomatic reasons. 76. Guy F, aux de la Croix, "Die Japan Poli tik Frankreichts," in: Hanns V'J. l1aull, ed., Japan und Europa: Getrennte V'Jelten? Frankfurt/l1ain: Campus Verlag, 1993, p. 312. 77. Of the 5.4 billion people on the planet, 828.1 million are in "high-income economies" with an average GNP per capita of $22,160. In contrast, 3.2 billion people live in "low-income economies" with per capita GNPs of $390. V'Jorld Bank, V'Jorld Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, Table 1. "Basic Indicators," pp.162-163. 78. Paul Krugman, "The l1yth of Asia's l1iracle," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, pp . 63-66. [Page 69] 79. Ibid, p. 65. 80. Albert Fishlow et al., l1iracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian Experience, V'Jashington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1994, p. 68. 81. Leonard Silk & Tom Kono, "Sayonara, Japan Inc.," Foreign Policy, Number 93, V'Jinter 1993-94, p. 116. 82. See, for example, the V'Jorld Bank's The East Asian Miracle - Economic Growth and Public Policy, 1993; Brigitte H. Schulz, ed., European Corporate Strategy Toward the Asia-Pacific Region, Frankfurt: Nomura Research Institute, 1993. 83. Paul Krugman, in a recent dissenting opinion, refers to the NICs as "paper tigers" whose past performance will not lead to a duplication of core econo1nic strength. See Krug1nan, op. cit., pp. 62-78. 84. Ja1nes Fallows, Looking at the Sun, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, p. 225. [Page 70] 85. Willia1n Dawkins points out that Asia has overtaken the US as Japan's largest export destination in trade, and invest1nents to the area have also skyrocketed. "Japan I s econo1nic influence in the rest of Asia has grown so strong that its neighbours are now under pressure to peg their currencies to the yen, rather than the dollar the first step towards the for1nation of a yen bloc ... " "Rising value of yen encouraging Japanese fir1ns to shift to Asia," The Straits Ti1nes, July 20, 1994, p. 29. 86. 11ike 11. 11ochizuki, "Japan and the Strategic Quadrangle," in: 11ichael 11andelbau1n, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 19 94, p. 115. 87. See, for exa1nple, Albert Fishlow et al., 11iracle or Design? Lessons fro1n the East Asian Experience, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Develop1nent Council, 1994. 88. J. 11. Blaut, The Colonizer I s 11odel of the World: Geographical Diffusionis1n and Eurocentric History, p. 81. 89. Ibid, p. 10. [Page 71] 90. Sa1nir Alnin, Eurocentris1n, New York: 11onthly Review Press, 1989, p. vii. Variations on Ainin's the1ne ;have been nu1nerous. Ainong the 1nost co1npelling are Frantz, Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New Yorl: Grove Press, 1968; Edward W. Said, Orientalis1n, New York: Vintage Books, 1979, and Culture and I1nperialis1n, New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 91. It is this heritage of Eurocentris1n which 1nakes the United States quintessentially a 1nember of this proje ct, despite the fact that it has significant numbers of citizens of non -European descent. 92. Sa1nuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Nr. 3, Su1mner 1993, pp. 22 -23. 93. Ibid, p. 23. 94. Eberhard Rondholz, "Abendl"nd liche Visionen: Al te europ"ische Ordnungsvorstellungen, neu aufgelegt," Bl"tter f]r deutsche und internationale Politik, 7/94, pp. 863-872. 555 Journal of World-Systems Research 95. Fanon, op. cit. p. 40. [Page 72] 96. W.E.B.DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, Greenwich, CT.: Fawcett Publications, 1961, p. 23. 97. Quoted in Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Poli tics and Diplo1nacy of Racial Discri1nination, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 226. 98. Eleanor Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953, quoted in Lauren, Ibid, p. 227. 99. It should be pointed out that the issue of race, just like that of gender, is largely ignored in traditional scholarly works on international relations; i.e., the leading paradig1ns are silent on this subject. Finding specific e1npirical data is thus difficult, although the i1nportance of differences in the way in which people relate to each other in cross -cultural negotiations, for exa1nple, is now generally recognized. 100. Conference docu1nent No. 767, cited in Lauren, op. cit. p. 92. For a 1nore detailed discussed, see Chapter 3, "Racial Equality Requested - and Rejected." Alnerican hypocracy about the issue of race generally did not go [Page 7 3] unnoticed in the colonized world. For exa1nple, Afro -Asian nations circulated a story about independence celebrations in Ghana in 1957, when then -US Vice President Richard Nixon turned to his black neighbor at the dinner table and asked: How does it feel to be free?" The reply: "I wouldn't know. I a1n fro1n Alaba1na." Recounted in Laur en, p. 228. 101. Karl Kautsky, "Der Weg zur t.1acht," in Patrick Goode, ed., Karl Kautsky: Selected Political Writings, New York: St. t.1artin's Press, 1983, p. 76. 102. John W. Dower, War Without t.1ercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, passi1n. 103. For a lengthy discussion of the ani1nosi ties between Japan and its Asian neighbors, see Dower, op.cit., passi1n. 104. Yoichi Funabashia, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, Nove1nber/Dece1nber 1993, p. 85. 105. Fallows, Looking ... , op. cit., p. 250. [Page 7 4] 106. Kinshore t.1ahbubani, "The Pacific V'Jay," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995, p. 103. 107. "Japan-bashing" is a vote-getter for Ainerican politicians and US public opinion has long had a strong anti-Japan bent. Recently, however, scholarly works have added new fuel to this old fire. See, for exa1nple, George Friecbnan and t.1eredi th Le Bard The Coining V'Jar with Japan, which forecasts war with Japan at the beginning of the next century; Edward N. Luttwa k, "The Coining Global V'Jar for Econo1nic Power: There are no nice guys on the battlefield of geo-econo1nics," The National Ti1nes, t.1arch 1994, pp. 48-54; Karel Van V'Jolferen, The Enig1na of Japanese Power, London: t.1ac1nillan, 1989. t.1ichael Crichton I s hugely successful novel Rising Sun, and the resulting fil1n of the sa1ne na1ne, certainly added to the i1nage of Japan as a perilous ene1ny. 108. For an insightful critique of the global crisis of liberalis1n, see Henrik Bischof, Die Krise der poli tischen Philosophie des V'Jestens und die internationale Sicherheit, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1994 (unpublished 1nanuscript). See also John Gray's review article entitled "Does De1nocracy Have a Future?" The New York Ti1nes Book Review, January 22, 1995, p. l. [Page 7 5] 109. This beca1ne clear with the Pentagon I s "Operation Desert Storm," whose ostensible reason was to oust the Iraqi dictator, who was presented as a threat to de1nocracy. For a discussion of the i1nportance of the Third V'Jorld in creating new ene1ny i1nages, see Vol ker t.1atthies, "Neues Feindbild Dri tte V'Jel t: Versch,,rft sich der Nord-SJd-Konflikt?" in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 25 -26/91, 14 June 1991, pp. 3 -ll. 110. According to the Econo1nic Policy Institute I s The State of V'Jorking Ainerica, real hourly wages for U.S. 1nale high school graduates declined 20.2 percent between 1973 and 1993. Doug Henwood, "A Decent t.1ini1nu1n," The Nation, January 30, 1995, p. 113. lll. Lester C. Thurow, "The Fight over Co1npetitiveness: A Zero-Su1n Debate?" Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 189. 112. Frederick Ke1npe, "Global Econo1nic Integration Holds Perils as V'Jell as Opportunities, Historian Says," The V'Jall Street Journal Europe, July l -2, 1994. p. 8. 113. See the lengthy analysis of the November 1994 election by Susan Estrich, "The Last Victim," The New [Page 7 6] 557 Journal of World-Systems Research York Ti1nes t.1agazine, Dece1nber 18, 1994, pp. 54 -74. "The new 1nen I s 1nove1nent isn I t about hating blacks or wo1nen or wanting to reverse our national co1mni t1nent to equality. But it is about scapegoating, with 1nen as the new victi1ns." (p. 55) Estrich describes these senti1nents: " ... with blacks and wo1nen getting jobs they don't deserve, and illegal i1mnigrants taking jobs and collecting welfare, it I s a wonder a white 1nan can ever 1nake ends 1neet." (p. 54) 114. Jesse Hel1ns, for exa1nple, is one of the 1nost powerful senators and, as a result of his party's sweep in the elections, has just beco1ne chair1nan of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Co1mni ttee. Hel1ns, a funda1nentalist Christian with very li1ni ted for1nal education, is a right-wing ideologue who 1nakes no secret of his racist and xenophobic views. As reported by Ti1n VJeiner, "All his life, he has passionately opposed the civil rights 1nove1nent, Federal aid to education, environ1nental projects ..... Over ti1ne, his list of pet hates has grown to include foreign treaties, foreign aid, 1nany foreign countries and 1nost of the striped -pants experts at the State Depart1nent." "t.1an VJi th His Own Foreign Policy," The New York Ti1nes, December 7, 1994, p. AlO. [Page 77] 115. "Clinton VJill Seek Spending To Curb Aliens, Aides Say," The New York Ti1nes, January 22, 1995, p. 1. 116. "Cuo1no speaks critically of GOP agenda," The Hartford Courant, Dece1nber 17, 1994, p. A4. 117. Ashley Dunn, "In California, the Numbers Add Up to Anxiety," The New York Ti1nes, October 30, 1994, p. 5: "The econo1ny is down and resent1nent of the i1mnigrant influx is up." See also "I1mnigration issue defines California race," USA Today, 30 Septe1nber 1994, p. 4A. As pointed out in this article, although non -Hispanic whites 1nake up only 54 '.:, of California I s population, they have a tre1nendous edge in the polls, since nearly 80 '.:, of the1n have voted in past elections, co1npared to less than 10 '.:, for all other ethnic groups in the state. Thus, while California is a 1nulti -ethnic state, its politics can be described as largely reflecting the will of the 1najority of the white seg1nent of the population. 118. Ti1n Golden, "t.1exican Chief Urges Talks on Freer Flow of t.1igrants," The New York Ti1nes, November 14, 1994, p. All. [Page 78] 119. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles t.1urray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in Alnerican Life, New York: Free Press, 1994. The book has proven to be a financial bonanza for its publisher, the Free Press, which is now "rolling in 1noney." This brand of ultra- conservatis1n has clearly beco1ne big business in Alnerica. See "Ada1n Bellow Seizes The Day," The Talk of the Town, The New Yorker, January 16, 1995, p. 28. 120. Alan Ryan, "Apocalypse Now?" The New York Review of Books, Vol. XLI, Number 19, November 17, 1994, pp. 7-11. See also Charles Lane, "The Tainted Sources of 'The Bell Curve'," The New York Review of Books, Vol. XLI, Nu1nber 20, Dece1nber 1, 1994, pp. 14-19. Lane traces the sources used in The Bell Curve to an international network of scholars co1mnitted to proving and protecting the superiority of the VJhite race, ranging fro1n Great Britain to the US to Canada to South Africa. 121. Her1nan t.1. Schwartz, States Versus t.1arkets: History, Geography, and the Develop1nent of the International Political Econo1ny, New York: St. t.1artin's Press, 1994, p. 4. [Page 79] 122. Ja1nes Joll, The Origins of The First VJorld VJar, 2nd ed., London and New York: Long1nan, 1992, p. 164. 123. See, for exa1nple, David E. Sanger, "VJar. Peace. Aid. All Issues are Trade Issues," The New York Ti1nes VJeek in Review, January 15, 1995, p. 1. Sanger reports for1ner Treasury Lloyd Bentsen as saying: "Everyone's been saying for a long ti1ne that foreign policy is beco1ning econo1nic, but like everything it's taken a while for the 1nessage to sink in around here." The article outlines the increasingly aggressive Alnerican policy in pursuit of foreign 1narkets. Argues Sanger: "The risk, of course, is that relentless pressure to buy, buy, buy Alnerican undercuts alliances and breeds resent1nents." 124. Karl Kaiser, "Das vereinigte Deutschland in der internationalen Politik," in: Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. t.1aull, eds., Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, t.1unich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994, p. 12. 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