Bergesen 's Way Forward For World-System Theory After Gunder Frank 

Sing C. Chew 
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research-UFZ 
Leipzig, Germany 
sing .ch ew@ufz .de 

Gunder Frank's ReOrienting the J 9h Century, published posthumously, was based on a 
long-term project of an evolving five-thousand year old world system undertaken in 
partnership with Barry Gills in the early 1990s (Frank 1990, 1991, 1994; Frank and Gills 
1992, 1993). This endeavor of Frank and Gills also produced a theoretically infused 
world system history of the making of the "modern" world. Frank ' s ReOrient: Global 
Economy in the Asian Age (RGEA) 1 was the first monograph of this theoretically 
informed world system history, and ReOrienting the J 9'h Century (Rl 9C) was the 
continuation volume. The latter, the topic of this symposium, despite being unfinished , 
resumes the argument of ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. 

ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age questioned (theoretically and 
historically) the manner we have interpreted long-term social change , and especially, our 
common understanding of the timing of the rise of the European domination of the world 
economy /system (the 1500 divide), and therefore , the specific region that was the 
dominant power of the world system at the particular historical conjuncture. ReOrienting 
the J 9h Century further buttressed this line of argument that the periodization of 
European dominance, as has been commonly accepted, needed even further revisions. 

With these two volumes, Frank not only challenged the contemporary 
understanding (theoretically and historically) of the making of the "modem" world, but 
as well, the writings of his colleagues (such as Wallerstein, Arrighi, Amin, etc.) in world-
systems analysis, and even his own contributions to world-systems analysis prior to the 
early 1990s. Following Frank's typical critical iconoclastic stance, even Femand Braudel 
was not spared (Frank 1994; Chew and Lauderdale 2010). Despite Gunder's numerous 
pleas, not too many in world-systems analysis pursued his demand for reorientation 
theoretically and historically in the rethinking of world history. In spite of this silence, in 
1995, a core group of scholars from various disciplines, including Frank, convened in 
Lund (Sweden) to discuss the evolution of the world system /world-systems (Denemark et 
al. 2000). The product of the discussions was to engage and write world system history 
along a trans-disciplinary approach. It is best summed up by the title of the first volume 
of the group's collective research: World System History: The Social Science of Long-
Term Change. Following this, numerous other world system history accounts of the 
making of the "modem" world were published (see, for example, Chase-Dunn and Hall 
1997; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Chew 2001, 2007, 2008; Chase-Dunn and 
Anderson 2005; Gills and Thompson 2006 ; Modelski 2003; Modelski, Devezas, and 

1 For a critical review of RGEA, see the contributions of Arrighi , Amin, and Wallerstein in Review vol. 22, 
no.3 , 1999. 

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 United States License. 
Journal of World-Systems Research, Volume 21, Number 1, Pages 162-173, ISSN 1076-156X 



Bergesen' s Way Forward for W arid-System Theory 163 

Thompson 2007). In this regard, Gunder Frank's monographs (RGEA and Rl9C) can be 
viewed as products of the World System History Group, and these two volumes should 
be considered as his last and lasting contributions to world system history. 

Bergesen's Way Forward: Forget History, Long Live Empiricism! 

Bergesen's article for consideration in this symposium, World-System Theory After Andre 
Gunder Frank, proposes to use some of the deliberations of Frank and Gills' 
conceptualization of the five thousand year-old world system as the way forward for 
world-system theory. His starting point, ontologically and epistemologically, is that we 
accept an "objective, non-theoretically constructed, facts-defined world, or global 
economy, to which can then be applied and evaluated the PEWS or any other model. .. 
rather than trying to explain the object (world-economy)" that "is fused with its 
theoretical explanation" (Bergesen 2015). Some might find this dictum welcoming, 
while others might not. I suspect even Gunder Frank might have difficulty making this 
shift, for in Rl9C he wrote: "Not surprisingly, the further back we go through history, the 
scarcer and less reliable become the hard and especially quantitative data. Beyond these 
"natural" or "scientific" limitations, we run into essentially ideological ones. The 
selection of data to research and publish, and especially of those not to examine, is 
largely a function of the interests of the chronicler or researcher" (2014: 75). For those of 
us who are trying to re-think world history, it has always been an exercise of utilizing a 
history infused theory and a theory infused history to explain world development, hence 
the phrase, world system history. Notwithstanding this minor objection, let's proceed to 
consider the other elements ofBergesen's proposals. 

Bergesen's First Proposal 

Bergesen's going forward plan recommends dropping the concept of capitalism as a 
mode of production underlining the world-economy when dealing with the post-1500s 
global changes, and to realize the theoretical utility of his "world-system based globology 
approach." He joins Gunder Frank (1991) in dismissing the utility of the capitalist mode 
of production framework in understanding and explaining long-term change. Bergesen's 
argument, based on an ontological understanding of what is capitalism by definition, is 
rather straightforward. Because world-systems theory's level of analysis is the world-
economy or world economy, and the capitalist mode of production theoretically belongs 
to the national level defined by worker-owner social relations guaranteed by a national 
state, "capitalism, as a mode of production, remains a societal/national entity"; he 
suggests that there is an issue in terms of translation-utilizing a concept that is based at 
the national level and employing it at the global level, though as he has correctly 
suggests, it has not prevented Lenin and Hobson from doing so. This "theoretical error" 
of Lenin and Hobson that starts from national accumulation, and then leads to the export 
of capital for further accumulation ( exemplified by imperialism as the final stage of 
capitalism) on the world scale has to be dropped, according to Bergesen, if we intend to 
undertake a world-system level analysis. What Bergesen has done is accept the position 
taken by Lenin as the only theory on the circuit of capital accumulation. The work of the 



164Journal of World-System Research 

late Rosa Luxemburg (1968), a contemporary of Lenin and Trotsky, offers us a much 
different formulation of the nature of the capitalist mode of production. Her theoretical 
edifice starts from the position that the circuit of capital accumulation involves different 
geographic zones/groups (that are capitalist, non-capitalist, protocapitalist, etc.), which 
capital absorbs/includes in its accumulation process. Hence, for Luxemburg capital 
accumulation has been a world-scale process since its inception, and not necessarily one 
starting from national accumulation and then the export of capital (globally) in the form 
of imperialism for global accumulation. 2 

Whereas Bergesen utilizes ontological and epistemological assertions to dismiss 
the world-system as having a capitalist mode of production in the post-1500 era, Frank's 
( 1991) dismissal of using capitalism as a mode of production to understand the evolution 
of the world system is based mostly on his fervent insistence that the only "correct" route 
to understand long-term change or system transition is a world systemic analysis based on 
history and theory. In Frank's case, his declaration that feudalism, capitalism, and 
socialism are transitional ideological modes that has put blinders on our eyes, and thus 
has prevented us from really understanding and explaining the course of world history, is 
based on an examination of the historical processes of global history, and whether the 
characteristics of capitalism existed prior to 1500-hence, his 'continuity thesis.' 
Frank's rejection was historically based, and not derived from ontological and 
epistemological shifts of the sort Bergesen has proposed for world-system theory after 
Frank. Is Frank successful in convincing us to discount the need to use, in his terms, 
these ideological modes and myths that have imprisoned our world-system/world system 
analyses? RGEA and RI 9C are supposed to provide the historical information-theoretical 
reformulations to substantiate his claims. 

Bergesen's Second Proposal 

Frank's RGEA and RI 9C propose that we consider seriously analyzing the trading 
patterns and networks in terms of volumes of trade flows at the world system level in 
order to understand the course of world development, and to distinguish the economic 
and financial trends according to the different regions of the world economy. Because of 
his demand that everything has to be considered at the world level, bilateral trading flows 
do not capture the socioeconomic historical reality of what really happened in world 
history. A historical multilateral trading pattern analysis would be more precise in 
determining the relative dominance of the world system, and therefore, in socioeconomic 
and political terms, the real hegemonic region of the world system that is not 
ideologically derived and mythically reinforced. Frank's new 'mode of analysis' 
continues to mirror his previous mode of analysis, pre- and post- early 1990s, by focusing 
still on the "exchange" moment of the circulation of capital instead of directing his gaze 
more on the "production" and the "consumption" moments of the capital accumulation 

2 See Wallerstein (1980) for a theoretical-historical twist of Lenin's accumulation thesis within the 
perspective of world-systems analysis. 



Bergesen' s Way Forward for W arid-System Theory 165 

circuit that world-systems analysis a la Wallerstein has done much to explain. 3 This is 
very clear in RGEA and RI 9C, and especially in RGEA. 

Bergesen, following Frank, suggests that world-system theory drop the core-
periphery relational economic form of analysis and shift to a multilateral structural model 
of trade triangles based on positional placements (location) in the matrix. Added to this 
change should be a political economic dimension so that control and power can then be 
brought into the picture. This will better serve us to understand the relationship between 
the dominant region/power and the dominated in terms of economic resources that are 
derived by the dominant. According to Bergesen, this is how Frank in RI 9C has been 
able to explain Britain's position in Frank's revised dating of British hegemony in the late 
19th century. In both RGEA and RI9C, Frank's argument was to deny it was Britain's 
indigenous assets and forces that led to Europe's domination of the world economy-a 
widely-accepted position that Frank sought to dismiss. 4 To do this, it is understandable 
that Frank has to rely on external factors and the world system level model to dismiss 
what he has deemed a Eurocentric explanation for European domination of the world 
economy. A theory-sensitized search for the historical information was mounted, 
collected, and marshaled quite convincingly for this dismissal in RI 9C. I am sure there 
are, and will be, critiques on the periodization, the data, and other historical information 
that have been presented by Frank, besides his lack of sensitivity to the role of indigenous 
ideas and knowledge that precipitated Britain's and Europe's rise to global dominance. 

Notwithstanding these critiques, which one can either treat as minor or even 
dismiss, the important contribution of Frank is that he is trying to offer an alternate 
explanation of past historical moments in world development and the historical processes 
that have produced such a course of world history. Bergesen (2015), however, proposes 
the opposite: that we should just research multilateral trade structures, and that we should 
take a "radical departure from present efforts to map properties of the historical moment, 
or moments past, or speculate upon moments to come"-all of which he considers no 
longer very helpful for our world-systems enterprise. He characterizes current world-
systems practioners' efforts to explain the dynamics of the world economy as similar to a 
dog chasing its tail; "each tum of a dog chasing its tail is somewhat different from the 
previous one, and research effort can either be spent noting the unique properties of each 
tum, or identifying the finite properties of the dog and the tail that generate these endless 
turns." He proposes doing the latter. His proposal, therefore, underscores the "continuity 
thesis" (see Chapter 3 of RI 9C for a historical application of this) that Frank and Gills 
have been arguing for since the early 1990s (see, for example, Gills 1996; Frank 1998): 
there is more continuity in terms of socioeconomic patterns and structures, especially the 
latter, than disruptions or dissipations of structures. In this sense, for example, there has 
been no break starting from 1500 onwards. 

Bergesen's proposal, notwithstanding his disavowal of the need to consider 
historical moments and historically informed theory, presents us with the same concerns I 
have raised in the past with Frank's continuity argument (Chew 2002). Historical 

3 See the critique of Brenner (1977) of early world-systems analysis of Frank and W allerstein. Whereas 
W allerstein's later works looking at production commodity chains, households, and antisystemic 
movements have addressed Brenner's various criticisms, Frank has never fully responded to them, other 
than in his joint work with his late wife, Marta Fuentes on anti-systemic movements. 
4 See for ex., the works of Goldstone (2002), Mann (1986), Jones (1981), etc. 



166 Journal of World-System Research 

moments of ruptures and dissipations no longer are considered important to explain the 
course of world history, or for that matter, world system history. By declaring the 
theoretical irrelevance of the mode of production to explain the development pattern and 
the nature of change, Gunder Frank had diminished any specific contingent factors or 
processes that underline system transformation (and the change that follows) which the 
mode of production form of analysis had been able to furnish and distinguish. In other 
words, for Gunder Frank world development is distinguished by the economic cycles of 
expansion and contraction, center-periphery relations, hegemonic rivalry, etc. There is no 
specificity of a transformation for a particular historical epoch: "the rules of the game are 
not much altered so much as the position of the players" (1996: 44). Frank again repeated 
this in a draft version 5 of ReOrienting the 1 <I' Century, where he stated: 

The argument herein as it was in ReOrient is that only a GLOBAL 
framework of analysis is necessary, not only of course to do a-or a 
political economic-history of the WORLD, but to have any hope of seeing 
where any of its regional, sectoral, or processual PARTS fit into the 
general scheme of things. Secondly IF we do that, we will discover that 
historical CONTINUITY has been far more important than any and all its 
dis-continuities. The perception of a major new departure in 1500, and 
even of one in 1800 which allegedly spell a discontinuous break in world 
history, is substantially [mis] informed by a Eurocentric vantage point. 
Once we abandon this Eurocentrism and adopt a more globally holistic 
world or even pan Eurasian perspective, dis-continuity is replaced by far 
more continuity Or the other way around? Once we look upon the whole 
world more holistically, historical continuity looms much larger, 
especially in Asia. Indeed, the very "Rise of the West" itself appears 
derived from this global historical continuity (2005:59) 

There is therefore a tendency to stress the continuity of the evolution of the world 
system instead of looking for or being aware of break points in world history whereby 
contingent factors and circumstances conduced system transformations. Even though I 
believe that the mode of production form of analysis is analytically fruitless, Gunder's 
proposed solution characterizes world history as an endless cycle of repetitions of 
political, economic, and social processes, and does not distinguish the significance of 
historical epochs and the specificity of the systems transformation that preceded them. In 
other words, world history is devoid of critical ruptures and specificities. His proposed 
theoretical framework has the tendency to lead us down this path. 

Beyond Bergesen: Theoretical Issues with ReOrienting the 19th Century 

By stressing the continuity of the structures and processes of the world system and the 
irrelevance of the mode of production analysis to explain development pattern and the 

5 This citation, derived from the draft manuscript that was unfinished, in my opinion provides us with a 
more virulent defense of the continuity thesis cited above than what was published in the final version. The 
equivalent citation appears in the published volume on page 43. 



Bergesen' s Way Forward for W arid-System Theory 167 

direction of social change, Frank has flattened world history and made it devoid of 
critical ruptures and specificities, as I have stated previously. For Gunder Frank, long-
term social change over world history is depicted by long economic cycles of expansion 
and contraction (that he has not elaborated on why they occur), core-periphery relations, 
and hegemonic rivalry. There is no specificity of a transformation for a particular 
historical epoch as he has put it, just different players at the table (Frank 1996: 44). 

Can additional theoretical scaffolding be erected to overcome this issue (and it is 
not a return to the mode of production form of analysis that I also find analytically 
fruitless as world history has revealed), and additional alterations be added to firm up the 
foundation of his five-thousand-year world system history approach? What should be 
included? More than two decades ago, I had made a remark to Gunder that in spite of his 
attempt to write a world history that is hurnanocentric, which is to be applauded, there 
was a major dimension that was missing in his overall framework. It was ecology, for at 
that time I was writing an ecological world system history (Chew 2001). He had agreed 
then that it was a missing dimension, and one that is extremely important. In ReOrient the 
1 <I' Century, he does try to address this issue of ecology by writing about ecological 
entropy that is created by the core in its ceaseless accumulation, and generating and 
dissipating the entropy to the periphery by its extraction and consumption of global 
natural resources. 

With this entropy dissipation model placed within the multilateral trade system, 
Frank again sticks to his old "dependency" model whereby the core generates the 
problems globally, and it is the periphery that absorbs and suffers, though in this case, he 
shrouds it under the model of energy flows. Rather than seeing global system crisis as a 
result of a set of relations between global culture ( characterized by a degree of 
hierarchical consumption) and Nature leading to critical conditions, Frank wants to place 
all the blame on the core for its excessive consumption with no responsibility placed on 
the rest of the world. In short, it is an anthropocentric form of analysis instead of an 
ecocentric one whereby it is the human community-of course with core and periphery 
having different degrees of responsibility-that generates the crisis. For Frank with his 
call for a hurnanocentric approach towards understanding world development and world 
history, he cannot move towards a position of the sort that I have called for (Chew 1997). 
Egalitarianism is not exclusively for the human species, but has to be for all species 
(Devall 1988; Naess 1984). 

Furthermore, by emphasizing a hurnanocentric approach and utilizing an entropy 
dissipation model (to replace unequal exchange in core-periphery relations), Frank 
continues to account for all system crises as corning from the realm of social, political, 
and economic activities, thus underscoring 'the economy in command' dictum that he 
had so often depicted in his writings. He does not give leeway to the fact that there might 
be other independent/dependent factors such as ecological ruptures, surprising natural 
events, extreme weather shifts etc., that can affect the socio-technical-economic system 
and generate system crises. Perhaps, after all, it is "ecology in command" that has the 
final say in global crises (Dark Ages) and transformation (Chew 1997, 2007, 2008). 



168Journal of World-System Research 

Crisis 

Given the above, for Frank, world development is a perpetual cycle of economic expansion 
and contraction. That is how he explained the final demise of Asia and the rise of Europe in 
the 19th century. A "B-phase" of economic contraction was occurring in the world system 
and the economies of China, India, and Southeast Asia were experiencing economic 
distress, and Europe (like the newly industrialized economies of Asia in the late 20th 
century) maximized economically on this period of economic contraction. Thus Asia's 
demise preceded Europe's rise. 

If we are to understand the trajectory of world development and world history, such 
a flattened view of world history does not illuminate much. Frank, in his attempt to 
overcome certain breakpoints in world history, which he believed have been established as a 
result of the centric-ness (such as the 1500 break, as a result of Eurocentrism) of some 
analyses, does not address the issue of system crisis and transformation. As we know, all 
systems eventually will reach crisis conditions, and the effort is to maintain system 
equilibrium, which we know is especially difficult in systems that are organized on a 
hierarchical order with inequality as one of its basic features. The numerous theoretical and 
empirical works oflmmanuel Wallerstein (1988, 1996, 1998, 2004) on the systemic crisis of 
a historical world system have addressed this issue precisely. Frank's model does not deal 
with system crisis and transformation; it is an endless cycle of system reproduction and 
perpetuation. 

Economic Stagnation and Crisis 

Social (world) system crisis means that the continued evolution of the world system faces 
obstacles, and that necessary structural changes/adjustments have to be made for systems 
reproduction to continue. These crisis phases become the key periods for our 
understanding of the dynamics of world system evolution and transition (long-term social 
change). Over world history, these crisis moments are rare. When they do occur, these 
phases are extremely impactful in terms of geographic coverage, and they extend over a 
long period in terms of socioeconomic and ecological recovery. 

Conceptually, the factors and processes that trigger crises over the last five 
thousand years have not been worked out or well understood. That however has not 
prevented the identification of these economic stagnations or B-phases. With the plethora 
of positions on world system/s development, crises or B-phases have been proposed to 
cover different duration, and have different meanings for those working in this area. In 
addition to the Gills and Frank's model I have outlined in the previous pages, Modelski 
and Thompson (1996) and Wallerstein (1974, 1980) also comes to mind. According to 
each model, the duration of these downturn phases varies. Different durations ranging 
from 50 years to one thousand years in length have been suggested. 

Leaving this difference in duration aside for the moment, there are also different 
views of what a B-phase is in relation to world system/s reproduction. For Gills and 
Frank (1993), B-phases represent the cyclical tendency or rhythms that a world system 
goes through as it expands. In other words, a B-phase is a cyclical downturn of the world 
system within its rhythm of expansion and contraction, a structural process of the world 
system (Gills and Frank 2002: 159-160). They are recurrences of economic downturns. 



Bergesen' s Way Forward for W arid-System Theory 169 

Along this reasoning, there is no notable difference between one B-phase and another. 
They are all economic downturns with no distinguishing characteristics depicting a 
specific era (conjuncture) of the world system, other than sharing similar tendencies such 
as hegemonic rivalries. Therefore, historical contingent circumstances/factors are not 
given much weight nor proffered to explain the genesis or resolution of the crisis. 

Another view of a B-phase is quite different. For Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980) 
for example, a specific B-phase is not only signifying an economic crisis period (price 
fluctuations, etc.), it also demarcates specific characteristics of system reorganization and 
consolidation, depending on the particular B-phase in question. In his explication of the 
origin and evolution of the modern world-system, the B-phase between AD1300-AD1450 
has been analyzed as a reorganization of the social structure ("the crisis of feudalism") in 
order to overcome the crisis conditions (Wallerstein 1980:25); In contrast, the B-phase 
between AD1600-AD1750 is considered not as a "crisis in the system" but as "a period 
of consolidation" of social relations and structures with its respective specificities 
(Wallerstein 1980: 31). Thus, a specific B-phase crisis has certain triggers that trip the 
crisis. In the case of the B-phase between AD1300-AD1450, the particular triggers for 
the "crisis of feudalism" were a conjuncture of secular trends, immediate cyclical crisis, 
and climatological decline. 

The apparent differences in just Frank and Gills' and Wallerstein's positions have 
implications for our understanding of the factors conditioning system crisis. If we 
consider a Wallersteinian B-phase, we need to note that it has some commonalities such 
as cyclical economic contraction trends (price changes, production losses, etc.) with other 
recurrent B-phases. In this case, Wallerstein's interpretation is similar to Gills and 
Frank's understanding of a B-phase. However, for Wallerstein, a specific B-phase might 
also be different from other B-phases, for it also has certain contingent particular 
characteristics ( e.g., breakdown of feudal social relations, climate changes) of the epoch 
in question that condition the system crisis. Hence, the specific conjuncture and its 
contingent socioeconomic and political characteristics are included in an understanding 
of the precipitation and determination of the crisis or contraction. Given this direction, 
for Wallerstein the identification of common elements that condition crises recurring over 
world history needs to be combined with the conjunctural elements in order to understand 
the crisis. The attempt, therefore, is to straddle nomothetic and idiographic methodologies 
for an explanation of system crisis and transition. 

Between these two viewpoints of B-phases, there are those that are closer or 
further away from the above two positions. Modelski and Thompson (1996, 2003) have 
suggested the recurrent nature of crisis and transitions over long cycles in the historical 
evolution of the world system. Agreeing with Gills and Frank on the dynamics of the 
world system since 3000BC, according to them, the recurring crisis phases have been 
characterized by learning (technological, writing, information, etc.) innovations,!olitical 
hegemonic struggles, population, urbanization, migrations, climate, and warfare. Unlike 
Frank (1992), Modelski and Thompson have identified both particular elements 
(technological innovation, information, writing, etc.) that underline a specific crisis 
phase, and common elements such as deurbanization, migration, population decreases, 
which permeate every system crisis phase. Beyond the widely agreed element of negative 

6 The identification of climate as an element in the crisis phase rests on the work of Thompson (2000, 
2001). 



170 Journal of World-System Research 

economic trends defining a B-phase, what we have are additional delineation of elements 
such as those that are specific (information, technological innovations, and writing), and 
other common elements ( deurbanization, migration, climate, and population decreases) 
that all form the matrix circumscribing system crisis and transition. For Modelski and 
Thompson, system crises, therefore, are transition points of system adaptation and 
evolution. 

In view of the state of discourse on long-term change over world history, we 
should also be aware of long-term structural crises-beyond a B-phase of contraction-that 
a historical world system experiences; what Modelski (2006) has called 'ages of 
reorganization' or what I have identified as Dark Ages (Chew 2007). Wallerstein's 
( 1998, 2004; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996) more recent works have also addressed this 
in terms of system maturation and transformation. These crises have also occurred in the 
past, and prior to the modern era have not been fully noted or understood. We do have 
some indications from historical accounts of social, political, and economic long-term 
downturn periods, and preliminary identification of the characteristic processes depicting 
these phases. Besides the above preliminary attempts to decipher recurrent patterns of 
social, economic, and political characteristics underlying the systemic crisis phases, there 
are very few idiographic efforts made to identify and explain the contingent factors, 
agents, and conditions that might have also played a part in engendering each specific 
system crisis phases. 7 The latter task is even more challenging, especially in light of the 
available archaeological evidence for the premodem period. 

Given the above, can we buttress the five-thousand year world system model of 
Frank and Gills further to overcome the lacunae I have identified in the previous section? 
I propose that we first accept the ontological statement that "Theory Is History"-a view 
that Gunder (1978:13) also shares-as we go about filling the lacunae. If this is the case, 
can we find specific periods in world history when there is a world system crisis from 
which we can derive generalized concepts, and at the same time, outline specific 
contingent factors and processes that lead to system transformation from these specific 
occasions? Indeed, these are the periods known as the Dark Ages in world history that I 
have described, though they are quite rare in world system history; in fact, about three 
such periods have occurred in the past five thousand years (Chew 2007). In view of this, 
system transformations whereby structural changes occur come quite infrequently (maybe 
Gunder is right on this; things do not change that often) and, perhaps, they are not 
cyclical in nature. These are the moments of structural ruptures and reconfiguration that 
the current world system may be experiencing (Chew 2008). 

Our task therefore is to sketch out a theoretically generalized history of system 
crisis or Dark Ages, and within the limits of available historical information, identify 
contingent factors and agents that could have engendered each specific system crisis 
phase or Dark Age from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age of world history (Chew 2007, 
2008). The end point would be a social science history of long-term change-i.e., a history 
of the evolution of the world system. 

7 For example, see Drews (1993) for the crisis of the Bronze Age of 1200 B.C. The more recent work of 
Eric Cline (2014) also covers this system crisis. 



Bergesen 's Way Forward for World-System Theory 171 

Conclusion 

Clearly, Andre Gunder Frank's view of world development and world history is quite 
refreshing, especially in light of current global transformations, and especially for those 
outside the core zones who are looking for alternate views of world development and world 
history. In an era of critical cultural and social debates on global issues that are often 
determined knowingly and unknowingly by dominant ideological frameworks such as 
Eurocentrism, nationalism, socialism, etc., Gunder Frank's type of scholarship will be sorely 
missed, in spite of some of the inadequacies that I identified. He was, I believe, a harbinger 
of truth as to what happened in the past and what could very likely occur in the future, not 
only in terms of world development, but as well in the world of academic scholarship. I 
conclude with the following, as he frequently did: A Luta Continual 

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