Journal of World-Syste1ns Research_, 1995, Volu1ne l, Number l http: //jwsr.ucr.edu/ ISSN 1076 -l56X Fro1n t.1esopota1nia through Carroll Quigley to Bill Clinton: World Historical Syste1ns, the Civilizationis t, and the President David Wilkinson University of California, Los Angeles Depart1nent of Political Science Los Angeles, CA 90024 Fax (310) 206 -6030 e-1nail wilkinso@polisci. sscnet. ucla. edu Copyright (c) 1995 David Wilkinson ABSTRACT The noted co1nparative civilizationist and world -historical syste1ns analyst Carroll Quigley, whose theorizing reste d on the whole historical span fro1n t.1esopota1nia to the 1960' s, was a teacher well-re1nembered by his student Bill Clinton. Quigley, by an intensive process of reduction, or rather idealization, of 1nasses of historical data, derived a procedure for the diag nos is and therapy of ailing civilizations/world systems, especially the one which he inhabited. The coherent, persistent and personal 1notifs of the policy discourse and variant initiatives of his student, the President, bear 1nore than a passing rese1nblan ce to the hopeful, idealistic, voluntaristic, intellectual, scientistic, econo1nistic, de1ni-1naterialistic propensities of the civilizationist and teacher. "Practical 1nen, who believe the1n selves to be quite exe1npt fro1n any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of so1ne defunct econo1nist. t.1acbnen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy fro1n so1ne acade1nic scribbler of a few years back." --Keynes And (on the other hand?) teachers so1neti1nes influence students. "As a teenager I heard John Kennedy's su1mnons to citizenship. And then, as a student at Georgetown, I heard that call clarified by a professor I had na1ned Carroll Quigley, who said Alnerica was the greatest country in the history of the world because our people have always believed in two great ideas: first, that to1norrow can be better than today, and second, that each of us has a personal, 1noral responsibility to 1nake it so." --Bill Clinton, "A New Covenant" (Clinton and Gore, 1992: 231) If Carroll Quigley said that 1nuch, he said considerably 1nore. [Page l] The question of whether world syste1n theory has anything to do with the practical perfor1nance of politicians and Presidents arises as an e1npirical one si1nply because one of the pioneer world system theorists of the l960's, who hoped to influence his practitioner students, had one student who obtained a position of 5 Journal of World-Systems Research un1natched, if also quite circu1nscribed, political power: Quigley was the theorist, Clinton the student. Clinton 1nay have been the first world-syste1n leader to have been directly stricken by the educational influence of a ranking social theorist since Alexander decided to ignore Aristotle and conquer the world instead of his own hubris. Has Quigley fared any better than his re1note predecessor? V'Jhat difference --if any--did Quigley' s syste1ns - theorizing 1nake to Clinton's praxis: his dispositions, intentions, vocabulary, policies, achieve1nents? V'Jhat difference could it have 1nade? QUIGLEY AHD CLIHTOH. Carroll Quigley (1911 -1977) was professor of history at Georgetown University for 35 years, from 1941 to 1976. Quigley, a historian by training, identified hi1nself as a co1nparative-civilizationist; I have labeled hi in an analyst of world syste1ns, for the one i1nplies the other. [I have both long and recently argued that civilizations are world systems (large -scale and urbanized), and have accordingly treated Quigley's civilizational theory as properly co1nparable to, fo r exa1nple, V'Jallerstein's world-syste1n teachings: V'Jilkinson 1980 -1982, 1988, [Page 2] 1994.] Quigley's course, "Develop1nent of Civilization," was judged by Georgetown's Foreign Service alu1nni fro1n 1941 to 1969 to have been the 1nost influential course in their undergraduate studies (V'Jashington Post, 1977). Clinton was a senior at Georgetown University from fall 1967 through spring 1968, in the School of Foreign Service. His house1nate Ji1n t.1oore recollected that, of the Georgetown professors, two ha d 1nost i1npact "shaping the wor ldview" of those who shared the house. One of the two was Carroll Quigley. (t.1araniss, 1992) Quigley had just co1npleted a 1nassive history of the V'Jestern "civilization" (i.e. tradition) in its world context (i.e. the world syste1n), with 1nost focus on the crisis epoch, as he saw it, since 1914. (Quigley, 1966.) Clinton was a student in Quigley' s world civilization class. V'Jhat did Clinton think of Quigley? "Half the people at Georgetown thought he was a bit crazy and the other half thought he was a genius. They were both right." (Maraniss, 1992) Clinton was favorably i1npressed by Quigley' s inclination toward hopefulness, which pointed toward social engineering, even toward what one 1night call 1noral engineering -- the rational and deliberate choice of 1noral nor1ns with a view to producing social consequences. "The hope of the twentieth century rests on its recognition that war and depression are 1nan -1nade and needless. [Page 3] They can be avoided in the future by turning fro1n" the current cultural tradition of laissez faire, 1naterialis1n, selfishness, false values, hypocrisy, and secret vices "and going back to other characteristics of our V'Jestern society always regarded as virtues: generosity, co1npassion, cooperation, rationality and foresight." (Quigley, 1966: 1310 -1311; cited by t.1araniss, 1992, and in a context which suggests that Clinton had cited it to him.) Clinton naturally recalled his teacher's views as of the ti1ne of their connection. Later Quigley beca1ne less opti1nistic about VJestern civilization I s retrievabili ty. "In 1961 [Quigley] still thought that the future of the VJest was open. But by the 1970 1 s he believed that all signs pointed to our violent, irreversible, devastating destruction." (l1elko, 1977: 6 -7). In his last public state1nent Quigley spoke favorably of political localis1n and of "opting out of the syste1n," the "bureaucratic structure": the "process of copping out will take a long ti1ne, but notice: we are already copping out of 1nilitary service on a wholesale basis; we are already copping out of voting on a large scale basis .... People are also copping out by refusing to pay attention to newspapers or to what's going on in the world .... the final result will be that the Ainerican people will ul ti1nately prefer co1mnunities"; "Do not be pessi1nistic. Life goes on; life is fun. And if a civilization crashes, it deserves to. VJhen Ro1ne fell, [Page 4] the Christian answer was, 'Create our own co1mnunities. 1 " ( [1977]: 40) VJithout checking the course syllabus, or interviewing its ex - students, one cannot tell whether Quigley used his theoretical treatise (1961) in addition to his historical treatise, which was required reading for Clinton (l1araniss, 1992), and in whi ch his theory is highly condensed (1966:3 -7), though embedded descriptively at great length. There are aspects of Quigley's 1najor theoretical work, _The Evolution of Civilizations_, and of the theory it embodies and to which Quigley habitually referred (e.g. 1972b: 2-3; [1975?]: 7; 1977: 29-30), which make it particularly apt to be not only effective but 1ne1norable. As the leading conte1nporary analyst of the co1nparati ve study of civilizations, l1atthew l1elko, puts it: "his theory has a clarity that no other co1nparati ve study has. . . . Because of its brevity and clarity, its 1narvelous exa1nples ... , striking charts and 1neaningful 1naps, it is the best of all books ... for undergraduate students, and an excellent way for any lay1nan to begin studying civilizations" (1977: 7). Quigley's economics is itself economical, entailing a short and particular vocabulary (expansion, growth, rate of growth, production, surplus, savings, invest1nent, invention, instru1nent, institution) which he considered necessary and suf ficient to for1n [ Page 5] a theory intended to account for those pheno1nena co1mnon to all "civilizations" (citified literate societies). Of these ter1ns, the 1nost significant is "expansion." QUIGLEY' S CIVILIZATIOHAL THEORY: EXPAHSIOH, AHD THE ALTERNATIV-ES. Quigley asserted that civilizational syste1ns displayed a periodic alternation between stages with and without "expansion," a fourfold increase: in population, in per capita production, in geographic area, and in knowledge. Quigley perceived the alternative to expansion in several ways. In one for1nulation, a stage of expansion gave way to one of "conflict" or "crisis": decreasing rate of expansion, increasing class conflict, i1nperialist war, and irrationality (1961: 82). In another for1nulation, Quigley argued that "the process of evolution of a civilization has its 1nain thrust along the econo1nic level, beginning as expansion but gradually changing to growth and ulti1nately to gross growth." The central econo1nic feature of 7 Journal of World-Systems Research "expansion" is per capita production increase; that of "growth" is increase in production without per capita increase; that of "gross growth" is increase in state area. "Expansion" Quigley conceives as intensive, with 1neans subordinated to ends, taking place by innovations in a society's artifactual syste1n for transfor1ning resources of nature to satisfy hu1nan needs. "Growth" is extensive, taking place by increased 1nobilization and [Page 6] consu1nption of resources, and involving the subordination of ends to 1neans, the frustration of needs, and their replace1nent by desires 1nanufactured by external controls, "based on political and 1nili tary 1neans supple1nented by ideological propaganda." (Quigley, 1972a: 73, 69.) "Gross growth" is si1nply growth at the expense of others, violent redistribution by spoliation, conquest and empire. ( [1975?]: 11) In October 1976, Quigley, having retired the previous spring, delivered, to an audience of his for1ner colleagues and students, his final refor1nulation, in his Oscar Iden lectures. He provided a third sequence, now e1nphasizing the degenerative succession econo1nics--poli tics--force, with particular reference to the V'Jest. The V'Jest began to expand in 976. By that I 1nean they began to produce 1nore goods per person per day or per year. You know what I 1nean by expansion if you took 1ny fresh1nan course: increased output per capita, increased knowledge, increased geographic area for the civilization itself, and increased population .... The economic expansion was achieved chiefly by specialization and exchange .... conunercialization. V'Jhen the expansion reaches a crisis, you get increasing politicization. . . . Politicization 1neans that [Page 7] the expansion is slowing up, and you are no longer atte1npting to achieve increased output per capita, or increased wealth, or increased satisfactions, or whatever is 1noti vating you, by econo1nic expansion, but you are going to do it by 1nobilizing power. V'Je have seen this going on in our society for al1nost a century. And then, as the society continues and does not reform, you get increased militarization .... [;] 1nisplace1nent of satisfactions, [which are obtained increasingly fro1n] power ... weal th ... org anized force ... sadism ... just war.... ( [1977]: 29 -30) CAUSES OF EXPAHSIOH: THE IHSTRUMEHT OF EXPAHSIOH. All three versions center on expansion and its breakdown. V'Jhat explains the occurrence of expansion? Quigley's causal analysis crosscut the nineteenth-and-twentieth-century debate between advocates of capitalis1n and socialis1n, or statis1n and free 1narkets, which characteristically had each party contrasting its idealized utopia to the opposing, deplorable reality --Ada1n S1nith vs. Joseph Stalin, l1arx and Engels vs. the Lancashire 1nills. His approach was e1npirical, co1nparative and historical rather than critical and idealistic: he looked for real periods of expansion, and the actual sociocultural structures that accounted for them, periods of crisis and the for1nations in which they occurred. He concluded that a [Page 8] wide variety of social organizations and cultural structures had at one ti1ne produced expansion, but that each had then stopped expanding and fallen into crisis. He observed th at these diverse structures shared co1mnon features in their expansive success, and shared a different set of co1mnon features in their crisis. Priesthoods, socialist states, slavery, feudalis1n, co1mnercial capi tali sin, and industrial capi tali sin have each an d all functioned at ti1nes as "instru1nents of expansion," and later broken down in crisis. When functional, all provided three things: an incentive to innovate, an accu1nulation of surplus, and an invest1nent of that surplus in innovation. That was what the y had in co1mnon, and that was all they had in co1mnon. (1961: 69 -71) Stages or periods of expansion were unifor1nly preceded by the establish1nent of organizational patterns 1narked by three characteristics .... : (a) an increased tendency to invention or innovation, both in artifacts and in organization; (b) the accu1nulation of econo1nic surplus through inequitable distribution of the social product; and (c) the application of such surplus to utilize the innovations. These three could, of course, be called "invention", "capital accu1nulation", and "invest1nent", except that these briefer terms have a narrow economic sense which is 1nisleading, since the civilizational process is far 1nore than si1nply a 1naterialist econo1nic process. (l972b: 2 -3) [Page 9] Quigley concluded that these three characteristics could be treated as a causal trinity, "the triplice organization of expansion." (l972b :9) INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CRISIS. Expansions in due course broke down. The usual for1n of breakdown is a decrease of the rate of invest1nent in invention, and an application of the surplus to the consu1nption of its elite controllers instead. (1961: 69 -78) "The absence of ... invest1nent ... is the 1nost frequent cause of a failure of econo1nic progress. It 1nay be absent when both of the other factors [saving and innovation] are working well. In such a case, the savings accu1nulated are not applied to inventions but are spent on consu1nption, on ostentatious social prestige, on war, on religion, on other nonproductive purposes, or even left unspent." (1966: 498) In this connection, Quigley drew attention to a particularly potent syste1nic process which has been studied by others before and since under various labels; he styled it "the institutionalization of social instru1nents." Hu1nan needs are satisfied by processing resources through an organizational structure or culture. The organization's effectiveness is nor1nally subopti1nal, and tends to decline, because its parts develop their own ends, and atte1npt to preserve established routines despite changing circu1nstances. When [Page 10] a structure or culture has beco1ne a collection of vested interests, we say that it is no longer an I instru1nent I f or satisfying needs but has beco1ne an 'institution, 1 leaving the original needs substantially 9 Journal of World-Systems Research unsatisfied. ( [1975?]: 6) The general economic crisis of a civilization is for Quigley strongly connected to the "institutionalization" of its organization for expansion, a process which occurs in the face of a rising population, hence of insistent de1nands for an increased output of goods. An early sign of crisis is precisely the shift fro1n "expansion" to "growth." If a society seeks to increase its supply of goods in spite of an increasingly ineffective productive organization, it 1nay do so either by increasing the inputs processed by the organization, using 1nore resources less effectively ("growth") , or by refor1ning the organization so that it produces 1nore goods fro1n the sa1ne or even fewer resources ("expansion"). Of these, "expansion" is preferable to "growth" for the society as a whole, because resources are always limited in supply, but expansion is not preferred by v ested interests which 1nust be refor1ned in order to obtain [Page ll] expansion rather than growth; vested interests usually prefer growth, or even gross growth, to expansion. The changes which are required to satisfy hu1nan needs or the society as a whole (in order for it to survive) are different fro1n the changes which are wanted by institutions within the society. What is good for the country is not necessarily good for General 11otors. Indeed, it can be taken as a general rule that long run i1nprove1nents for a society often require short -run sacrifices and disadvantages for so1ne of its parts. By definition, refor1n in any society is any increase in the satisfaction of the real needs of its 1nembers even when so1ne of those 1nembers regard the necessary changes as totally destructive of their own interests. Such 1nembers will resist these changes, so that the changes will co1ne about only if the powers supporting refor1n prevail over the powers of the vested interests resisting these changes. ( [1975?]: 7) The society atte1npts to increase its production of goods, while each vested interest seeks to prevent its own refor1n but willingly increases the rate at which resources are processed (and diverted) through its institutionalized structure. This results both in enor1nous waste of li1nited resources, and in increased co1npetition for the1n between groups, classes and states. [Page 12] "These struggles gradually 1nove downward [in a psychological hierarchy] fro1n the econo1nic level to the political level and finally to the level of applied force." ([1975?]: ll) SYSTE11S AND ETHICS. As with 1nost ci vilizationists, and 1nost historical econo1nists, a 1noral vision underlies Quigley's analysis. His is expansive and organicist: expansion is preferable to growth and gross growth (and to stagnation/stability or decline); the interests of the social whole are preferable to those of its various parts; the privileged elite ought to act as trustees for the general good. Quigley's civilizational theory, intended to be explicitly scientific (1961: l -2) was "not deter1ninistic, has no independent variables, is a syste1n of interaction." (The quote is fro1n 1ny notes on his 1972 presentation to the first annual 1neeting of the International Society for the Co1nparati ve Study of Civilizations, on "The Civilizational Process: A General Systems Approach.") The evolutionary social process "is not relentlessly deter1ninistic at all points but 1nerely at so1ne points, in the sense that 1nen have power and free will but their actions have consequences nonetheless." (1961: 89) Accordingly, Quigley treats the activities of vested interests as fully explicable in ter1ns of rational self-interest, freely chosen, dystrophic, highly undesirable, and wrong; and he is concerned with how they can be [Page 13] got round. VESTED IHTERESTS AHD PUBLIC ACTIOH. Quigley had Crane Brinton as his honors tutor at Harvard. They discussed Sorokin, Pareto and Lyford Edwards. Quigley judged that Brinton had not derived his 1nodel of revolutionary process fro1n a 1nodel of social and psychological structure ([1975?]: l -3). Quigley tried to fill the gap. Atte1npts to replace or preserve vested interests necessaril y arise both continuously and increasingly in a crisis of expansion. A continuous process of reform by persuasion --intellectual, religious, e1notional, social and 1naterial -econo1nic appeals, going down level by level in a hierarchy of psychological needs --is conceivable; when it fails, external controls (political power, 1nilitary force) are resorted to, either to co1npel refor1n or to foreclose reform ( [1975?]: 8 -15). In Quigley' s view, 1nost civilizations failed to refor1n; successful foreclosure of reform by vested interests, and increasing resort to external controls, 1narked their next stage of develop1nent. Orthodox/Russian civilization refor1ned once, the Russian Revolution providing it with a new instru1nent of expansion (1966:93). V'Jestern civilization refor1ned its instru1nent of expansion twice: the feudal instru1nent of the 10th -century [Page 14] expansion (1961: 227) was replaced by the co1mnercial - capitalist instru1nent of the 15th-century expansion (1961:233), and that by a 1nore co1nplex agro-industrial-finance-1nonopoly capitalist instru1nent of the 18th-century expansion (1961:249-258), in crisis by the late 20th century (1961:265). Despite its past record of refor1n, Quigley regarded the conte1nporary V'Jest as deeply sunk in a "crisis of expansion. " He pointed to a variety of current practices as exe1nplifying the obsolescence, the vesting and the hidebound institutionalization of such a crisis: the stubborn persistence of "the internal combustion engine using gasoline" ([1975?]: 7); the extensive, resource- wasting econo1nics of destruction of "natural capital," soils, forests, fossil fuels ([1977]: 35 -36); the destruction of human co1mnuni ties by co1mnercialization, corporate and statist bureaucracies ( [1977]: 36 -37); autono1nous, i1mnortal, 1nonopolisti c corporate structures ([1977]: 36, 39 -40); "a capital intensive 1nedical syste1n devoted to keeping people who are a lino st dead alive a few 1nore days" ( [1977]: 37); the Ainerican I1nperial Presidency, 11 Journal of World-Systems Research with particular reference to the institutionalization and consequent paralysis of the syste1n for i1npeach1nent, so that there is no easy way of re1noving a nonperfor1ning or 1nalperfor1ning incumbent ( [1977]: 38 -39). VJi thout predicting that the VJest would refor1n, Quigley [Page 15] believed it refor1nable, and strongly favored its refor1na- tion. "[VJ]ar and depression are 1nan -1nade, and needless. They can be avoided in the future.... VJe now know fairly well how to control the increase in population, how to produce wealth and to reduce poverty and disease; we 1nay, in the near future, know how to postpone senility and death .... " (1966: 1311.) This was what he taught his students; this was what Bill Clinton recollected. QUIGLEY'S INFLUENCE. Quigley taught practitioners, and intended to influence their practice. How 1night we trace his actual influence? Bill Clinton is, I am sure, the first U.S. President to have studied under a theorist of world historical systems -- or, in that theorist's terminology, of the evolution of civilizations. Did it 1nake a differe nee? Does Clinton show the theoretical as well as the 1noral influence of Quigley? "Influence" is difficult to prove; correlation 1nay 1nean coincidence; statistical techniques are hard to apply when N=l. A 1nay teach B, convert B, resonate with B's pr econceptions, or be taken for granted by Bas part of the background noise; real influence 1nay be overlooked or denied by the recipient, likewise its absence. Still, I take it that a practical politician influenced for1natively by, say, Spengler, would have a rhetoric of gloo1ny acquiescence to historically inevitable decline; by Toynbee, of the delights and desirability of free -wheeling artistic, [Page 16] cultural and religious creativity; by Sorokin, one of resolute idealistic altruis1n; by VJallerstein, one of continuing co1mni t1nent to a socialist future despite realistic acceptance of enor1nous difficulties; by Quigley, one of general expansiveness and refor1nativeness, with particular e1nphasis on ongoing econo1nic refor1ns and continuous struggle with veste d interests. If one knew that Bill Clinton had been influenced by so1ne civilizationist' s theory, the choice would seem reasonably clear. Even without that assu1nption, the question of influence can be pursued by way of a 1nore detailed exploration of rheto rics and policies. QUIGLEYAH MOTIFS Ill PRESIDEHTIAL UTTERAHCE. The words of a practitioner 1nay reflect not only his thought but its sources. President Clinton's January 25, 1994 State of the Union 1nessage (Los Angeles Ti1nes, 1994) contained 125 paragraphs. Twenty-eight were devoted to heal th care refor1n (a proposed redistributive increase in forced private spending to subsidize the cost of i1nproving health care delivery to the poor). Twenty -three were e1nployed for an inspirational and congratu latory introduction. Eighteen went to defense and foreign affairs. Fourteen were dedicated to an inspirational peroration. Seventeen went to cri1ne-control. Thirteen were given to welfare and une1nploy1nent -syste1n refor1n. Twelve were left over for 1niscellanea. A..1nong the latter were the following: [Page 17] As we reduce defense spending, I ask Congress to invest 1nore in the technologies of to1norrow. Defense conversion will keep us strong 1nilitarily and create jobs for our people here at home. (Para. 28) VJe 1nust also work with the private sector to connect every classroo1n, every clinic, every library, every hospital in Alnerica into a national infor1nation superhighway by the year 2000. (Para. 30) Alnong the congratulatory re1narks to Congress was praise for "a budget that cut the deficit by half a trillion dollars," for the ratification of the North Ainerican Free Trade Area (para. 7), for "tax cuts to reduce the taxes of nine out of 10 s1nall businesses who use the 1noney to invest 1nore and create 1nore jobs," for "a dra1natic increase in high -tech invest1nents to 1nove us fro1n a defense to a do1nestic high-tech econo1ny" (para. 9), and for the fact that "business invest1nent and equip1nent is growing at seven ti1nes the rate of the previous four years" (para. 22). Also in the congratulations: "Once we reduced the deficit and put the steel back into our co1npetitive edge, the world echoed to the sound of falling trade barriers. In one year, with NAFTA, with GATT, with our efforts in Asia and the national export strategy, we did 1nore to open world 1narkets to Ainerican products [Page 20] than at any ti1ne in the last two generations. That 1neans 1nore jobs and rising living standards for the Alnerican people, low deficits, low inflation, low interest rates, low trade barriers and high invest1nents" (para. 26 -27). Buried in a paragraph on cri1ne control through co1mnuni ty e1npower1nent is a reference to "challenging businesses to provide 1nore invest1nent through e1npower 1nent zones" (para. 110). There 1nay be 1nore to this than its depth of burial would suggest. One strand in welfare theory proposes that even this stubbornly consu1nption - directed subsidy can be redirected to invest1nent; e.g. the E1npower1nent Network Foundation I s president, David Caprara, states that its Center for Econo1nic Enterprise I s business incubator progra1n has "incubated" a fa1nily -based child-care business for an ex-welfare client. (Caprara, 1994) Al though they are certainly not do1ninant, Quigle yan 1notif s of saving (exclusively state -based, via deficit reduction), invest1nent (in both state and private sectors, neutrally as to sector) and invention (again bisectoral and neutral), are definitely present, and 1nore than 1nere undertones. An ele1nent in Quigley' s 1noral policy of which Clinton especially approved was his espousal of "future preference," the practice of sacrificing today for the benefit not of others now [Page 19] living but for future generations yet unborn. (l1araniss, 1992) To the extent that current U.S. federal and state budgeting inclines very strongly in the opposite direction, i.e. to present consu1nption subsidies and to "elder preference," via l1edicare, l1edicaid and Social Security, Clinton I s address is slightly Quigleyan, i.e. in its extensive attention to children (paras. 32 - 34, 38-39, 45-47, 113-118) and its skepticis1n about doles in 13 Journal of World-Systems Research une1nploy1nent (paras. 35 -36) and welfare proper (para. 37), but about as a1nbi valent as possible concerning elder preference (e.g. paras. 67 -68 on t.1edicare, proposing to cut, protect and incre1nent it, rather than for instance providing tax incentives for effective and substantial personal retire1nent savings). CLIHTOH AHD HAFTA. The evidence so far 1nakes a Quigleyan connection plausible, but re1nains inconclusive. One way to pursue the question would be to ask what 1nental picture a person influenced by a Quigleyan analysis would be expected to have of so1ne current political issue. Take, for instance, the argu1nent over free trade in general, and NAFTA in particular. The protectionist argu1nent both in general and in this instance is noticeably do1ninated by the sense that free-trading hurts the inco1nes of existing high -cost protected producers--far1ners, industrialists and trade unionists. Populist protectionis1n leaves the protected industrialists out of the discussion, focuses on the lost jobs of workers (e.g. US auto and [Page 20] apparel workers) and s1nall far1ners (in e.g. Chiapas), and plays up the benefits of free trade to the prof its of large fir1ns exporting capital, jobs, goods and services. The free -trade argu1nent tends to be couched in ter1ns of consu1ner interests, lower prices, and the survival of the 1nost efficient producers. It see1ns reasonable to expect that the very way in which the argu1nent is habitually couched would incline a student of Quigley's to equate "protection" with "vested interest," and to be alienated by precisely those argu1nents considered 1nost poignantly persuasive by anti -NAFTANS: "vested interests resist refor1n, fro1n nor1nal hu1nan inertia and because the established ways of operating [within the institutionalized structure or culture] bring inco1nes to those who are part of it." ( [1975?]: 6) Clinton, hi1nself involved in pro1noting the i1nport of invest1nent capital to Arkansas as its governor, expressed support for NAFTA in principle (" I believe in open 1narkets and free trade") fro1n the outset of his ca1npaign in 1991, but did not co1mni t hi1nself to a position on the text --negotiated by the Bush Acbninistration in August 1992 --until October 4, 1992, when the position was "Yes, if t.1exico and Canada would negotiate side agree1nents with further labor and environ1nental concessions." Clinton's argu1nent was that, if "done right, it will create jobs in the United States and in t.1exico." (Behr, 1993) When those [Page 21] agree1nents were concluded, he enlisted three for1ner Presidents to join hi1n (Septe1nber 14, 1993) in pro1noting NAFTA; in this co1npany, his re1narks proposed to e1nbrace global econo1nic change rather than resist it "hoping we can preserve the econo1nic structures of yesterday." (Devroy, 1993) Clinton's argu1nents for NAFTA contained attacks on isolationis1n as selfish (Broder, 1993) and on the job -loss fears of Ainerican workers as false since NAFTA would "create 200, 000 new high-paying jobs in the next two years." (Jackson, 1993) After its passage, he spoke to seven Central Ainerican Presidents of plans for "the expansion of free trade to other 1narket de1nocracies in the he1nisphere." (Scott, 1993) Buried in a foreign policy paragraph on "de1nocratic renewal" we find in the 1994 State of the Union Address: "VJe will ask Congress to ratify the new GATT accord" (para. 88). A theoretical defense of free trade could certainly have been couched in Quigleyan ter1ns (as pro1noting increased per capita production); so could a pole1nic (against vested interests preferring their own sectoral prosperity to the general interest) Clinton avoided such discourses, preferring a populist rhetoric of "jobs" and an inspirational rhetoric of fearlessness. But these were adventitious, and do not see1n to reflect the reasoning process which led hi1n to favor NAFTA in principle, and free trade in [Page 22] principle. It see1ns unlikely that any reader of Quigley would look at Clinton's discussion of NAFTA and deduce Quigley's theoretical influence therein. CLINTON AND VESTED INTERESTS. NAFTA is of course 1nore than the surrounding rhetoric, which raises a broader issue. The operations of a Quigleyan politician ought surely to da1nage "vested interests," 1nore particularly to those which obstruct invest1nent, innovation, productivity, as co1npared to the 1nore traditional populist conception, which focuses on 1nonopolistic price-raising, 1nonopsonistic wage -squeezing, bureaucratic abuse of indi victuals, and profit -preserving tax-resistance. A VJashington observer expressed surprise at Clinton's 1995 budget, which daringly proposed to eli1ninate a large number of s1nall progra1ns with protective constituencies, and to cut subsidies for energy consu1nption, public housing and 1nass transit. (Risen, 1994b.) A wide variety of "vested interests" have in fact suffered criticis1n or da1nage at Clinton I s hands. Most are predictable targets on a strictly populist basis: insurance co1npanies (in the healthcare refor1n package); high-inco1ne groups (in the 1993 tax increase and the healthcare refor1n); the 1nilitary and the defense industry (in the FY 1994 and 1995 budgets); employers (in the family and 1nedical leave law) . So1ne are predictable fro1n an ideology of nanny-state liberalis1n, i.e. ar1ned citizens and the National Rifle Association (in the Brady bill and law). But so1ne, fewer, are on [Page 23] those bases, surprising: sunset -industry labor unions and their industries (in NAF TA); govern1nent e1nployees (in FY 1995 e1nploy1nent cuts); constituency clientages (in the FY 1995 progra1n cuts). VJithout its being preponderant, there is so1ne inclination in Clinton's praxis to reduce, though not to denounce or confront, interests vested in the Quigleyan but not in the populist sense. So1ne observers see this as deliberate: Clinton I s purpose "is to change the way the De1nocratic party works by curbing the power of special-interest groups. The deficit helps hi1n do that. It forces Congress to 1nake a choice between the de1nands of selfish interest groups and the needs of the whole society." (Schneider, 1992) Still, the evidence re1nains ambiguous. Once again, it is unlikely that an i1npartial observer would find 1nore of Quigley than, say, VJillia1n Jennings Bryan or Franklin D. Roosevelt in this area of Clinton's politics. CLINTON ON SAVINGS: THE ISSUE OF DEFICITS. The deficit as an issue was forced upon Clinton, not hunted out. The proble1n is 15 Journal of World-Systems Research co1nplex; hu1nan and practical-politician ability to grasp and cope in a brief ti1ne co1npels radical si1nplification of perception. There are 1nany stereotypes for a quick -study practitioner to choose fro1n. Alnong the various ways of looking at the chronic fiscal ttcrisis of the state,tt indicated by the growth of federal entitle1nents, budgetary deficits, the gross national debt, [Page 24] interest on the national debt, and taxation to finance debt interest, is to focus on the effect of federal borrowing upon net private savings, net do1nestic savings, net national savings, net world savings, intergenerational wealth transfers, net social welfare, etc. Practitioners who have been trained to be especially alert to the categories of "surplus," "savings" and "invest1nent" are likely to si1nplify their view of the deficit to see it as con1bining (l) by definition, state dis -saving; (2) by its special welfare effect on the elderly, discourage1nent of private retire1nent savings; (3) by its provision of safe, conservative bond "invest1nent" alternatives, discourage1n ent of invest1nent in "invention," e.g. stocks in general, startup co1npanies and venture - capital operations 1nore particularly. Clinton I s key confrontation with the deficit ca1ne in his February 17, 1993 State of the Union Address. Rather than provide a lengthy analysis of the pros and cons of deficits, it assu1ned a (controversial) analysis, and referred to it only parenthetically, e.g. Clinton I s "co1nprehensi ve plan" (para. 6) "has a deficit reduction progra1n that will increase the savings available for the private sector to invest" (para. 24). There is not 1nuch 1neat here. There are re1narks to the effect that "The 1nore 1noney we take out of the pool of available savings, the harder it is for people in the private sector to borrow 1noney at affordable interest rates for a college loan for their children, for a ho1ne [Page 25] 1nortgage, or to start a new business" (Para. 75.); here private spending in general is counterpoised to govern1nent spending in general, a laissez-faire or li1nited-govern1nent rather than Quigleyan argu1nent. "VJe have to cut the deficit because the 1nore we spend paying off the debt, the less tax dollars we have to invest in jobs, in education and the future of this country." (Para. 74) This 1nuddles the concept of public invest1nen t in a populist but also consu1nption -disguising direction. Clinton discussed his proposed tax increases for deficit - reduction (Paras. 88-94) without reference to their effects on private savings, though they were targeted at high -inco1ne groups classically considered to have a relatively high propensity to save. Again the verdict is an1biguous. If we assu1ne a Quigleyan influence, we can find traces of it; if we do not, we are unlikely to notice the1n. CLINTON ON It-rv-ESTl1ENT. The rhetorica 1 tag "invest1nent" proves 1nuch 1nore rewarding when searched for. Quigley I s dyna1nics center on the invest1nent of saved surplus in invention; breakdown is usually a consequence of a failure of invest1nent. VJhere does [Page 26] "invest1nent" figure in Clinton I s speech and thought? Approxi1nately everywhere. A concordance of presidential utterance would, I guess, show that President Clinton has officially uttered the word "invest1nent" 1nore often than the preceding six Presidents combined (since Kennedy was politically co1npetitive with Nelson Rockefeller, the last national politician of rank to ho1ne in on the topic of econo1nic growth, I leave hi1n out of the hypothesis). In a general sense, govern1nents of 1nixed 1narketive -corporate- statist capitalist-corporatist-socialist states such as the 1994 United States can invest in transportation and co1mnunications, research and develop1nent, and education and training with so1ne expectation that those portions of state invest1nent not diverted by corruption and fraud to consu1nption subsidies, wage and salary subsidies, e1nploy1nent subsidies, bureaucratic Parkinsonianis1n, operating subsidies to prevent the collapse of loss -making enterprises public and private, constituency welfare and representative re -election subsidies will result in so1ne lasting incre1nent to private inco1nes and inco1ne -tax driven state revenues. Clinton I s ca1npaign proposed to spend on standard public invest1nent projects (roads) and unheard -of projects (infor1nation superhighway) of parallel character--tending to speed [Page 29] the flow of exchange and to enlarge network penetration of private spheres. "Clintono1nics" beca1ne recognizable, and was recognized, in the 1992 ca1npaign, not in issues of free trade, vested interests, deficits, or savings, but in relation to "invest1nent": Call it "Clintonomics"--a strategy to insure robust econo1nic growth through a one -two punch of govern1nent invest1nent, which Clinton would increase by $220 billion over four years, and private invest1nent, which he hopes to spark through tax credits .... Public invest1nent. Many still call it "govern1nent spending. Clinton prefers invest1nent because it suggests the long-ter1n benefits he seeks through i1nproved education, technology and infrastructure. (Peterson, 1992) At least one observer of the 1992 econo1nic conference ca1ne away persuaded that Clinton had a genuine and peculiar econo1nic doctrine: Clinton distinguishes govern1nent spending for invest1nent and consu1nption. Consu1nption is spending for [Page 28] i1mnediate needs and gratifications, like welfare pay1nents and veterans benefits. This is exactly the kind of spending that interest groups like. The basic rule of Clintonomics, as George Bush might put it, is, "Invest1nent --goood. Consu1nption--baaad. " .... The difference, in the gospel according to Clinton, 17 Journal of World-Systems Research is that invest1nent generates econo1nic growth. Consu1nption does not. Therefore, it is good to spend 1noney on invest1nent, even if it increases the deficit in the short ter1n, because a growing econo1ny will eventually bring in new tax revenues .... Clinton wants to change the way govern1nent works by shifting resources fro1n consu1nption to invest1nent .... Clinton wants govern1nent to get out of the business of endlessly expanding progra1ns and into the business of pro1noting growth. It's really a political strategy to secure 1niddle - class support for the De1nocratic party. (Schneider, 1992) No doubt the cynic's special variety of utopianis1n is the naive faith that so1neone (usually hi1nself) has penetrated to the [Page 29] core of the truth and perceived Reality. Still, there is a connection, though the 1neans and ends are 1nuddled, a1nong the policies, the "gospel," and the strategy; and the "gospel" see1ns really to be present so1newhere in the 1nuddle. The 1993 State of the Union Address was reported on at the ti1ne as a "Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit" (l1arcus and Devroy, 1993), which it certainly was. But Clinton did not view it, nor wish it to be viewed, in these ter1ns, except incidentally. Here is how he introduced it: The plan I offer you has four funda1nental co1nponents: First, it shifts our e1nphasis in public and private spending fro1n consu1nption to invest1nent, initially by ju1np-starting the econo1ny in the short ter1n and investing in our people, their jobs and their inco1nes over the long run. (Paras. 13-14) The ter1n "invest" or "invest1nent" appears in paras. 3, 8, 14, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 36, 40, 73, 78, 90, 91, 100, 102, and 107 (of 110), doubtless rivaling "the," "and" and "a." Nonetheless the reporters for the VJashington Post bu ried their substantive references to "invest1nent" deep in para. 44 of their [Page 30] story (l1arcus and Devroy, 1993), and gave it a spin Clinton can scarcely have enjoyed: New spending. Clinton calls this "invest1nent" and has concentrated it in two places. One is on projects ai1ned at creating jobs quickly and thus sti1nulating the econo1ny, 1nuch of this traditional pork barrel govern1nent spending ... that Congress will divvy up a1nong its various 1nembers. Specific references to invest1nent included "a per1nanent invest1nent tax credit" for the esti1nated 90 '.:, or so of businesses with revenues under $5 1nillion (Para. 27), invest1nent in "our roads, our bridges, our transit syste1ns and high -speed railways and high tech infor1nation syste1ns" (para. 29), in i1mnunizations against preventable childhood diseases (para. 40), and an arcane reference that see1ned to invite taxpayers to view Clinton I s proposed--and ill-fated--"broad-based tax on energy" as "a wise invest1nent for the1n" (paras. 98-100) . The Republican response by House t.1inority Leader Robert H. t.1ichel was predictable but not uninvited: "The Clinton spin -doctors have even given us a new political vocabulary: 1 Invest1nent I now 1neans big govern1nent spending your tax dollars." (t.1ich el, 1993) In denouncing the deficit, Clinton raised the specter that [Page 31] failure to reduce it would 1nean "we 1 11 be terribly dependent on foreign funds for a large portion of our invest1nent" (Para. 78), a specter 1nore dreadful to populists than to Quigleyans, and one unlikely to have been 1nentioned in, say, discussions with t.1exico on lJAFTA. The narrowly victorious 1994 budget was not quite so free - ranging in its "invest1nent" rhetoric, but still contained traditional and non-traditional "invest1nents" (so1neti1nes shrunken) such as s1nall business invest1nent tax credit and capital gains exclusion, research and develop1nent tax credit extension, the Janus-faced "e1npower1nent zones" (Bush -era "enterprise zones" revised) to encourage invest1nent through tax incentives (Republicans I face) targeted at depressed areas (De1nocrats I face), Head Start, roads and bridges, nutrition for pregnant 1nothers, childhood i1mnunizations, the student loan progra1n, worker training, the earned inco1ne tax credit for the working poor. The fiscal 1995 budget planning again involved an "invest1nent" package --technology develop1nent, job training, help for s1nall 1nanufacturers --which was also explained as a 1neans to "produce jobs," which is subsidy -rhetoric. However, casual observation suggests that when in 1994 Clinton uttered "invest1nent" he very closely uttered "jobs," which 1nay 1nean that a ter1n ("jobs") that resonates favorably with his audience has been [Page 32] e1nployed to allay their doubts about a ter1n ("invest1nent") which does not. In this area, Clinton's rhetoric perfectly reflects one aspect of Quigley' s theory, the absolute centrality of invest1nent. The closing link of the circular Quigleyan process, where invest1nent feeds back into surplus production and accu1nulation, is on the other hand never inspected: no esti1nates are given for the rates and dates of return on these "invest1nents," so1ne of which (e.g. 1naternal nutrition) are very long -ter1n. This 01nission no doubt feeds the suspicion that welfare -consu1nption-subsidy progra1ns were being 1nisleadingly relabeled "invest1nent" by vested interests intending quick institutionalization of the new invest1nent budget, which would provide an ironic, but predictable, case of Quigley's rhetoric being co-opted by his targets, to evade Quigleyan refor1ns. In the area of invest1nent, Clinton I s for1n suggests the influence of Quigley; the substance suggests haste. 19 Journal of World-Systems Research CLIHTOH OH IHVEHTIOH. This area, labeled, however, "technology" or "productivity," was early recogni zed as a Clinton special. In April 1992, Alan t.1urray, the reporter for the V'Jall Street Journal quoted Clinton adviser Rob Shapiro of the Progressive Policy Institute: "Clinton foresees a heroic expansion of the govern1nent' s co1mni t1nent to support basic research in the develop1nent of non1nili tary technology." And t.1urray concurred that [Page 33] Clintono1nics indeed entailed "e1nphasizing 1neasures to increase invest1nent in technology" so as to increase productivity, hence wages and living standards" U·1ur ray, 1992a) --pure practical Quigleyanis1n. In their 1992 ca1npaign docu1nent Putting People First, Clinton and Al Gore proposed a variety of redistributive, regulatory, invest1nent and inventive 1neasures. The latter included: creation of a high-speed rail network linking our 1najor cities and co1mnercial hubs (1992: 10) invest1nent in 's1nart' highway technology to expand the capacity, speed and efficiency of our 1najor roadways (1992: 10) develop1nent of high-tech short-haul aircraft (1992: 10) Environ1nental technology to create the world's 1nost advanced syste1ns to recycle, treat toxic waste, and clean our air and water (1992: 10) t.1ak [ing] per1nanent the research and develop1ne nt tax credit to reward co1npanies that invest in groundbreaking technologies. (1992: 12) [Page 34] Creat [ing] a civilian research and develop1nent agency to bring together businesses and universities to develop cutting-edge products and technologies. This agency will increase our co1mnercial research and develop1nent spending, focusing its efforts in crucial new industries such as biotechnology, robotics, high -speed co1nputing, and environ1nental technology. (1992 : 13) Creat [ing] a s1nall business Technical Extension Service through the SBA, based on the successful Agriculture Extension and t.1innesota' s proven Outreach Progra1n, to give s1nall business easy access to technical expertise. (199 2: 79) [D] irect [ing] funds to the develop1nent of new, clean, efficient energy sources. (1992: 144) Reorient [ing] the 1nission of hundreds of national laboratories, 1noving fro1n defense R&D to 1nore work on co1mnercial renewable energy projects. (1992: 91) In this venue, there has been a fairly straightforward follow - through, fro1n the 1993 State of the Union Address ("V'Je propose to give s1nall business access to all the new technologies of our [Page 35] ti1ne ... ," para. 27; "this plan invests in ... high -speed railways and high tech infor1nation syste1ns," para. 29), the FY 1994 budget (which sought to protect net govern1nent R&D expenditure fro1n deficit-cutting and inflationary erosion while reallocating between progra1ns), the 1994 State of the Union Address (praising Congress for "a dra1natic increase in high -tech invest1nents to 1nove us fro1n a defense to a do1nestic high-tech econo1ny," para. 9; "I ask Congress to invest 1nore in the technologies of to1norrow" via defense conversion, which "will create jobs," para. 28; "we 1nust invest in the environ1nental technologies of the future which will create jobs," para. 29; "Instant access to infor1nation will increase productivity .... It will create jobs," para. 30); the planning for the FY 1995 budget: "For the first ti1ne in 1ne1nory, the Co1mnerce Depart1nent has beco1ne a top priority at the V'Jhi te House. The Acbninistration plans a 12 '.:, increase in the depart1nent' s budget for 1995, pri1narily to help fund new technology initiatives. One of the biggest beneficiaries is the Advanced Technology Progra1n ... fostering technological research and develop1nent on the civilian side. It would receive about $451 1nillion in 1995, up fro1n $190 1nillion." (Risen, 1994) Most of the 31.2, proposed 1994-1995 increase (above 3 '.:, for inflation) for Co1mnerce is absorbed by a 77 '.:, increase for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, including $451 1nillion for the Advanced Technology Progra1n for high -risk high- [Page 36] payoff projects, "critical technologies" in which the state sector beco1nes increasingly a venture capitalist jointly with industry. Another 1nassi ve increase is $865 1nillion for technology transfer, up 540 FY 1994-1995. Even though inflation -adjusted federal R&D spending would actually decline slightly for FY 1995 (due to cuts in defense laboratory and academic research facilities spending, fossil energy funding, nuclear fission funding, hu1nan space flight, and the abandoned Superconducting Super Collider), it was relatively protected once again. There would be substantial increases for research on nuclear-waste storage, energy efficiency, renewable energy, global change, earth studies fro1n orbit, and individual NSF awards. (Science News, 1994) It is hard to dis agree with the substance of l1ichael Schrage' s (1994) judg1nent --provided it is considered as far apart as possible fro1n its 1netaphoric expression--that "this is an Acbninistration that is putting taxpayer's 1noney where its 1nouth is in the high -tech arena." Though that 1nouth can increasingly be heard chanting the apparently protective 1nantra "will create jobs .... will create jobs .... will create jobs," the underlying initiative is surely entirely in accord with the Quigleyan acbnoni tion to invest in invention. Again there is no esti1nated rate of return; but for innovation, that 01nission see1ns proper. [Page 37] THE KEY INVENTION: THE HJFOR!1ATION SUPERHIGHWAY. While Clinton allowed one 1na1mnoth scientific -technical project with narrow expected econo1nic return, the Superconducting Super Collider, to suffer supersession, another superproject has beco1ne the 1najor technological endeavor defining the Clinton Acbninistration; identified with v-ice -President Al Gore, but fully supported by the President. It was advanced in the ca1npaign 21 Journal of World-Systems Research docu1nent as "A national infor1nation network to link every ho1ne, business, lab, classroo1n and library by the year 2015. To expand access to infor1nation, we will put public records, databases, libraries and educational 1naterials on line for public use." (Clinton and Gore, 1992: 10) It was accelerated in the 1994 State of the Union Address: "VJe 1nust also work with the private sector to connect every classroo1n, every clinic, every library, every hospital in America into a national infor1nation superhighway by the year 2000. Think of it. Instant access to infor1nation will increase productivity. It will help to educate our children. It will provide better 1nedical care. It will create jobs. And I call on the Congress to pass legislation to establish that infor1nation superhighway this year." (Para. 30) If this superproject is to be an extension rather than a corruption of today's "infor1nation highway," the Internet, it will [Page 38] be a state -subsidized linkup between co1nputers in ho1ne, backpack, workplace, and 1narket at high bandwidth to allow the fast trans1nission of enor1nous volu1nes of infor1nation. So1ne will be "free," i.e. state-subsidized: library-like, 1nuseu1n-like, school-like, govern1nent -docu1nent-like, deliberative, rhetorical. So1ne will be "free," i.e. advertiser -subsidized: radio-like, broadcast-TV- -like, newspaper -like, flyer-like, classifieds. So1ne will be sold for profit, co1npeting with or supple1nenting or supplanting the videotape, CD, book, 1nagazine, telephone, fax So1ne will be as yet unthought -of. The technical bases for the "infor1nation freeway" are the technologies governing rates of infor1nation trans1nission, e.g. speed of electronic circuitry, high -carrier-frequency high- bandwidth cabling (e.g. fiber -optic), infor1nation-co1npression, satellite linkups of co1nputers. VJill the "infor1nation superhighway" i1nprove or disi1nprove the current, spontaneous, accidentally state -subsidized (Internet is a 1nutant fro1n the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 's ARPAnet) "infor1nation freeway"? Internet has 1nanaged a 1983 -1992 growth rate faster than the federal deficit, for its linkups increased over 3000 ti1nes, fro1n under 300 to over l 1nillion co1nputers (with over 4 1nillion users). (Cra1ner, 1994: 131) This is a statistic co1nparable even to the rate of decline of the ruble: [Page 39] "should this trend continue," all anticipated hu1nans will be plugged in--more than once--by the end of Clinton's (possible) second ter1n in office, as whoever changed the target date fro1n 2015 to 2000 must have noted. There are, however, constraints on network growth. Since costs of linkup are still too high for 1nost individuals, businesses and universities underwrite and control 1nost Internet nodes. The extension to in di victuals 1nay co1ne via telephone, cable TV-, or cellular telephone. So1ne of the entities which could acco1nplish the linkup are hidebound; others have corrupt relationships with state 1nonopolis1n and regulationeering. VJhat ought not to be done, in the for1n of state 1neddling, is fairly clear. The state could best obstruct the linkup process by choosing the 1nost hidebound and corrupt clai1nant to access control, granting it a 1nonopoly, and then de1nanding unsound cross - subsidies of the resulting inefficient system via ever-rising tolls upon the users of the current syste1n; this would provide a constant uproar which, no 1natter how it was "resolved," would divert attention 1nore or less per1nanently away fro1n Internet expansion, which could be expected to grind to a halt. At present, the state sector's participation in the infor1nation superhighway has not taken a regulatory, [Page 40] redistributive, institutionalizing for1n, but rather one of invest1nent in invention: e.g. NSF' s high -perfor1nance co1npu ting initiative, with a 23i proposed increase to $328 million (while NIH' s high-perfor1nance co1nputing budget would go up 41 i, to $82 1nillion). (Science, 1994) But the extant expanding network can hardly fail to attract controllers, 1nonopolists, fixers, protectors, and the like. Internet in fact offers a nicely Quigleyan case of an instru1nent of expansion already functioning, with would-be vested interests on the verge of a pounce. Perhaps we can treat Clinton's future response to their predictably dystrophic initiatives as a test of Quigley's teaching effectiveness. THE HEALTH CARE ISSUE. There were initial signs of Quigleyan concepts in Clinton's discussion of health care, the substantive issue which preoccupied hi1n during 1nuch of his first two ye ars in office. Thus in the 1993 State of the Union Address, it was explicitly juxtaposed to "invest1nent": "In 1992 we spent 14 percent of our inco1ne on health care .... [If present trends continue] al1nost 20 percent of our inco1ne will be in health care .... Reducing health care costs can liberate literally hundreds of billions of dollars for new invest1nent and growth .... Refor1ning heal th care over the long run is critically essential to reducing not only our deficit but to expanding invest1nent in Ainerica." (Paras. 35-36) There was however also a redistributive [Page 41] side to the issue: the need to provide "a basic package of health care benefits" to all citizens "so that no one will be denied the coverage they need." (Paras. 35, 37) Even this sidelong invest1nent reference, which sees invest1nent as an alternative to health care, was a deviation fro1n the course laid down in the 1992 ca1npaign docu1nent Putting People First, in which the health care section (1992: 19 -23) is exclusively regulatory and redistributive, with no reference to invest1nent, return, technology or research. By the ti1ne of the 1994 State of the Union Address, the redistributive aspect had taken full control of Clinton's rhetoric. In his extensive discussion (paras. 48 -75) of what was intended to be that year's crucial agendu1n, the word "invest1nent" does not appear; instead the the1ne is to guarantee by legislation to every Ainerican heal th care coverage "that can never be taken away" (para. 75) at the sa1ne high level of quality and low costs as that available to the state bureaucracy (paras. 66, 73) via state - guaranteed e1nployer-based "private insurance for every Ainerican" 23 Journal of World-Systems Research (paras. 64-65). Despite a rousing attack on "special interests" that would oppose these proposals (paras. 71-72), Clinton's analysis of the heal th care issue has beco1ne essentially non -Quigleyan, except [Page 42] in reflecting the redistributive struggles characteristic of Quigleyan breakdowns. The possibility of refor1ning, circu1nventing or reinventing sclerotic 1nedical institutions by, for exa1nple, placing free -access diagnostician progra1ns on the "infor1nation freeway," 1noving 1nore drugs fro1n the phar1nacy to the open shelves, expanding the practices of nurses and phar1nacists and public-health workers, increasing the reach of 1nailout phar1nacies, shifting the entire balance of heal th expenditure fro1n treat1nent toward prevention (especially of s1noking - , alcohol- and diet-related disease), concentrating medical research in areas that could reduce chronic debilitation (e.g. neurology, Alzhei1ner I s and other "agings"), shifting costs of preventable diseases toward i1nprudence by heal th -cost-taxing not only tobacco and alcohol but salt, ani1nal fats, sugar, and currently illegal (necessarily then legalized to allow taxation) substances, is thoroughly 1narginalized ("People who s1noke should pay 1nore for a pack of cigarettes," para. 70) and next to nowhere. CLIHTOHOMICS OR QUIGLOHOMICS? By the time of the Group of Seven industrialized nations Detroit 1nee ting (l1arch 14, 1994), Ja1nes Risen (or his headlineer --l994c) was labeling the President I s econo1nic-policy tendencies not 1nerely as a consistent "Clintono1nics," a label traceable at least to 1992 (l1urray l992a) and one which i1nplies a certain syste1naticity, but as the "cult of Clintono1nics," which i1nplies the sa1ne, plus a judg1nent. Risen I s [Page 43] piece and a co1npanion piece by Ja1nes Gerstenzang did indeed show a certain 1nantric tendency of their own, citing Clinton I s views on "technological advances " four ti1nes (to be taken advantage of), "technological revolution" once, "technological changes" once (to be embraced), "productivity" four ti1nes (connected with gains, growth, i1nprove1nents, increases), and "invest1nents" once (to be sharply increased). At the G-7 1neeting, Clinton sought a "convergence" of U.S., European, and Japanese labor policies upon his own vision: full acceptance of labor -saving technologies; substantial state invest1nent in training and apprenticeships in advanced skills. Indeed, in its focused e1nphasis on the desirability of invest1nent, invention, institutional reforms, and collective convergence toward pattern-unifor1ni ty, the President I s speech could hardly have been 1nore Quigleyan in character. The central the1ne of Quigley' s theory--invest1nent in invention--is equally central to Clinton's rhetoric, and there has been a deter1nined effort, 1narginalized by the deficit crisis, to realize it. "Invest1nent" per se is also central to Clinton I s rhetoric, though here there is 1no re roo1n for doubt as to the relationship between the idea, the label, and the progra1ns. Refor1nist confrontation with vested interests is very i1nportant to 1naking Quigley I s doctrine operational, and Clinton I s rhetoric is [Page 44] frequently confrontation al--but only with respect to traditional populist targets; yet so1ne refor1ns do i1npinge strongly on interests that would be Quigleyan but not populist targets. Deficit-cutting has been acco1nplished while protecting invest1nent and invention, as Clinton conceives the1n. Free -trading, consistent with Quigley's approach, has been pursued, but via a populist, not a Quigleyan rhetoric. The health -care episode, in its funda1nentally redistributive character, appears in this context to be a deviation, a very large one to be sure, but a deviation still, fro1n the 1nain track of Clinton's discourse (represented especially by the 1992 ca1npaign docu1nent and the 1994 State of the Union Address), and of his action (represented by the discretionary parts of the FY 1994 budget and the FY 1995 budget plan), to which he recurs whenever considerations of the 1no1nent do not persuade hi1n otherwise. Either Clinton paid very close attention to Quigley, or they chanced to focus on al1nost precisely the sa1ne set of econo1nic ideas. Though intensely inclined to co1npro1nise, to hedge, to balance, to screen with references to "jobs," to wander (the health care package wanders al1nost antipodally), Clintono1nics can reasonably be judged the practical and conte1nporary incarnation of Quigley' s operative world-syste1ns theory. CRITIQUE: QUIGLEY. Once a theorist becomes politically [Page 45] influential, it is well to take a new look at his theory. I have previously (1988) discussed Quigley's theories, in the context of co1nparison to those of I1mnanuel VJallerstein, at so1ne length. I think now, as I concluded then, that "Carroll Quigley' s econo1nically driven 1nodel of the evolution of a civilization is elegant, lucid, consistent, and tight." (1988: 55) Quigley's concept of an instru1ne nt of expansion, of core -periphery relationships, and of expansion/stagnation cycles, are of great analytical value, and should receive 1nore attention than world - syste1ns analysts have given the1n. I also judged then, and judge now, that there were serious proble1ns in Quigley' s 1nodel' s "deli1nitation of the units of 1nacrosocial analysis, and in its dependence upon a relatively ho1nogeneous structure and process to explain fluctuations in relatively heterogeneous social syste1ns" (1988: 55). The issue of heterogeneity vs. unifor1ni ty is of funda1nental i1nportance in the study of civilizations/world syste1ns, and has i1nplications for practice as well. At the 1nicro as at the 1nacrolevel societies are culturally heterogeneous stewpots. As regards econo1nic culture, it is entirely nor1nal to change econo1nies as one crosses the house threshold, or 1noves fro1n 1narketplace to cathedral, fro1n retail shop to giant corporation. Econo1nic polyculture, with no pervasive "instru1nent of expansion" or "1node of production," is also the nor1n of cities past. In ancient Athens one found [Page 46] household econo1ny, and state slavery, and a welfare state, and a trading oligarchy, and statist i1nperialis1n, and a 1narketplace, and a tributary protection racket, all coexisting dishar1noniously. If such a variety of instru1nents and institutions of expansion could struggle on within so tiny an area, how 1nuch 1nore likely that a polycul tural econo1ny is the nor1n at the 1nacrosocial level~ 25 Journal of World-Systems Research lfJe ought to assu1ne that it is the nor1n for in acrosocieties to have 1nany different instru1nents of expansion, badly orchestrated so as to have different ti1nescales of function and crisis (cf. Iberall and Wilkinson, 1987; 1993). In a diverse polycultural society -- where diversity is not a utopian goal but a natural fact -- this 1neans that what Quigley sees in bilateral relationships as the propensity of those cultures in or nearer to expansion to do1ninate those cul tu res not in expansion or farther fro1n it (1961:91-92) may be extended to the whole world system: where all its 1nain regions are in phase (cf. VJilkinson, 1992a) there 1nay be no pre-e1ninent core, while if they are out of phase one will e1nerge but not last forever (cf. Wilkinson, 1991). The chief weakness of Quigley' s theory see1ns to 1ne to be its tendency to social 1nonoculturalis1n, which causes hi1n to perceive in the conte1nporary world a plurality of 1nonocultural civilizations which have only external relations with each other, rather than the [Page 47] single polycultural civilization, with 1nany co1nplex transactions a1nong its cultural strands, which I would contend now exists (Wilkinson, 1987a) as the sole successor to the plurality of civilizations of the past, which were the1nselves polycultural rather than 1nonocultural (Iberall and VJilkinson, 1993). In particular reference to the econo1nics of civilizations/world systems: in Quigley's theory of stages of civilizational develop1nent, there is found a stage of gestation during which the whole society is pervaded by a single instr u1nent of expansion (1961: 80). If I a1n right, this never happens, or is never all that happens. Rather the new instru1nent propagates at first, looks as if it will be all -pervasive, but then slows down, hits boundaries, takes up a 1nerely diffusive velocity , beco1nes diluted, fails to penetrate this region or that sector, falls into breakdown before it has reached the society's outer boundary, and in short runs into one or another li1ni t on its own expansion. I believe this can be shown to be e1npirically true of priestly, feudal, slave, statist, 1narketive and corporate instru1nents of the past, and that it ought to be treated as generally true. Quigley hi1nself took two significant steps in this direction, with his core-periphery theory, which incorporates a very significant diffusive delay (1961: 81 -82), and with his labeling of the VJest' s econo1nic organization, at least since 1934, [Page 48] as "pluralist" rather than "capitalist." 1966: 37 -39) But 1nore is needed. Quigley acbni ts to his theory a st age of cultural "mixture" (1961: 79-80); but the stage of mixture is always a re1note preli1ninary [or, as a stage of "invasion," postli1ninary (1961: 88 -89)] to the period of expansion, which is one of organizational unifor1nity. I would propose, on the contrary, that expansion is characteristically heterogeneous and involves continuing "1nixture," cultural borrowing, and innovation in response to culture -contrasts. Al though within any expansion it is quite likely that so1ne of the expanding regions and secto rs beco1ne 1nore unifor1n, i.e. pervaded predo1ninantly by one instru1nent of expansion, others will have beco1ne less alike, i.e. pervaded by different instru1nents which serve the sa1ne purpose. VJorld syste1ns as a whole 1nay be 1nore or less ho1nogeneous as t o their orchestra of instru1nents of expansion. The 1nore unifor1n a world syste1n is, the 1nore tightly coupled and synchronized its growths and breakdowns ought to be; the 1nore striking its glorious achieve1nents; the 1nore notable and devastating its catastrophes. The 1nore diverse it is, the 1nore dephased its co1nponents should be; always afloat, like Lincoln's raft, but with the rafters I feet always wet. On the whole, it see1ns wiser to preserve econo1nic diversity, if that can be done. [Page 49] In a heterogeneous orchestra (or festival?) of expansion, the instru1nents will all break down fro1n ti1ne to ti1ne, but out of sync, so that, during each such local crisis, alternative local instru1nents of expansion 1nay be i1nported or created to circu1nvent the old broken-down ones, so that the sa1ne subecono1ny that exports corporate capitalis1n in its ti1ne of success to broken -down state socialists 1nay i1nport 1nonopolistic bureaucratis1n, or welfare social-liberalism, in its time of crisis. Accordingly, the abstract test of actual expansion is a better test of a world - econo1ny 1 s vitality than the for1nal test of econo1nic structure, since all structures function at so1ne ti1nes and fail at others. As far as conte1nporary students of world syste1ns are concerned, this is a vote for Frank and Gills (1993: 46) in their argu1nent over the disutility of the 1nodes -of-production concept in world-syste1n analysis, and a suggestion that Quigleyan theory as well as world-syste1ns theory be worked over fro1n a polycultural perspective. CRITIQUE: CLIHTOH. Despite this partly critical reading of Quigley's theory, I nevertheless believe that Clinton was lucky in his choice of teachers, and that he would on the whole do well to grant Quigley I s econo1nic -refor1n theory even 1nore power, in h is words and his priorities, than it already see1ns to possess; the 1nore of Quigley's ideas that Clinton's praxis reflects, the 1nore [Page 50] effective, coherent and innovative it see1ns. So1ne of the fringe areas adopted by Clintono1nic "invest1nent" rhetoric could profit from further application of Quigleyan principles. Thus "invest1nents" in 1nass transit co1mnonly turn out to 1nean enor1nous and inter1ninable consu1nption subsidies to failed state 1nonopolies (subways, buses) or state -private 1nonopolies (suburban rail). One needs to think of refor1ns that 1night allow the privatization of --and invest1nent in --so1ne ele1nents (despite resistance fro1n such vested interests as riders, e1nployees and bureaucracies); reduced deficits for others (e.g. by extension of subway platfor1ns to serve as walkways, and rentals of business frontage along these "understreets"); circu1nventions of others, as by jitneys (despite resistance fro1n taxi 1nonopolies); even genuine innovations, such as freeway 1nonorail (however abo1ninable to the nimby). Another area needing reinvention, even if in violation of vested interests to the contrary, is low -inco1ne housing, which historically occurred spontaneously in rapidly developing areas 27 Journal of World-Systems Research with low land values and vanished as land values skyrocketed. Why not found new cities, around new industries and universities devoted to govern1nent -and-industry funded technological research, on 1narginal or abandoned far1n- and ranch-land (often sold for 1/1000 of the price of land in the high-rent districts); if you [Page 51] build it, they will co1ne. There will still be a subsidy, but it will subsidize invention, which is legi ti1nate Quigleyan econo1nics; the i1nprove1nent in consu1nption should be allowed to follow. Clintono1nics also needs to take to he art--and to be seen as taking to heart--the following: [Al 1991 Congressional Budget Office study of the $125 billion or 1nore the federal govern1nent already spends on physical and hu1nan capital develop1nent concluded that higher rates of return on public over private invest1nent "can only be expected on carefully selected spending projects." (Allen, 1992) A characteristic of the entire body of Clinton's discourse on "invest1nent" fro1n his ca1npaign blueprint to his FY 1995 budge t is the absence of a discussion of anticipated rates of return. Clinton econo1nic adviser Robert Solow of l1IT has been quoted as saying "Public capital probably has the sa1ne net addition to productivity as private capital" (l1urray, l992b), which 1nay reflect the "Aschauer curve" theory of 1988, showing a net positive relationship between U.S. govern1nent spending on infrastructure and productivity growth, a proposition not endorsed by the 1991 study; but 1nore is needed. Aschauer hi1nself doubts (l1organ and [Page 52] Southerland, 1992) that real pork -barrel highways would provide as good long -ter1n returns as 1nore advanced technologies. Without being too ambitious, one 1night begin by trying to distinguish invest1nents --current as well as proposed, private (especially subsidized) as well as public --with negative rates of return, and turning the1n into disinvest1nents, to finance the 1nore hopeful portion of the invest1nent budget. In the area of foreign policy, however, rather than being 1nore Quigleyan, I judge that Clinton needs to reconsider certain Quigleyan tendencies reflected in his G -7 reference to "convergence." Like 1nost other ci vilizationists of his generations--and others--Quigley was strongly influenced by the 1nonocul turalis1n of the preceding great theorists of civilizations, particularly Toynbee. (See, e.g., Toynbee 1972.) l1onoculturalis1n in co1nparative -civilizational studies draws spatial and te1nporal boundaries of civilizations around areas of cultural coherence (vs. intense social interact ion), treats essential civilizational change as culturally endogenous, and sees intercultural interaction 1nost i1nportantly in ter1ns of threat, clash, or invasion (e.g. Quigley, 1961: 88 -92; or, 1nost recently, Sa1nuel P. Huntington: 1993). This description, although it neglects their vital trading relations within the oiuku1nene (Wilkinson, l992b, l993a), does in fact fit the historic interaction of genuine civilizations, which collided with each [Page 53] other, and in doing so lost their historical autono 1ny and ceased to exist as self -deter1nined entities (Wilkinson, 1984, l987a). But the past is past, and this process is obsolete, because it is co1nplete. Today there is only one global civilization, one surviving world syste1n, no longer 1nany; this already extant, singular, world civilization, like the several root civilizations that fused to for1n it, is polycultural not 1nonocultural; having no civilization external to it, it need fear none. The external policy of a state in a polycultural civilization can, however, possess a very Quigleyan virtue, albeit one that he praised only in respect of the internal politics of VJestern "civilization," na1nely "Inclusive Diversity." [T] he \"Jest believes in diversity rather than unifor1nity, in pluralis1n rather than 1nonis1n or dualis1n, in inclusion rather than exclusion, in liberty rather than authority, in truth rather than in power, in conversion rather than in annihilation, in the individual rather than in the organization, in reconciliation rather than in triu1nph, in heterogeneity rather than in ho1nogeneity, in relativis1ns rather than in absolutes, and in approxi1nations rather than in final answers. The \"Jest believes that 1nan and the uni verse are both co1nplex and that the apparently discordant parts of each can be put [Page 54] into a reasonably workable arrange1nent with a little good will, patience, and experi1nentation. (1966: 1227) [T] he tradition of the \"Jest .... is one of Inclusive Diversity in which one of the chief proble1ns is how ele1nents that see1n discordant, but are and necessary, 1nay be fitted together. recognized as real (1966: 1233) The the1ne of Inclusive Diversity has a direct application at the systemic/civilizational (global) as well as the regional/cultural (VJestern) level. It is probably superior to "convergence" as a slogan for international econo1nic policy. The aspect of "inclusion" in this context beco1nes one of exchange in ideas, persons and patterns, not just trade in goods; the aspect of "diversity" beco1nes the acceptance that no a1nount of converging will produce convergence. Before pressuring Japan to abandon its industrial policy, or India to drop its tariff and invest1nent barriers, or Russia to dissolve its statal/parastatal fir1ns, or \"Jest Europe and the US to ho1nogenize their respective welfare states, one should ask, are these econo1nies in a crisis of expansion? If so, are these the responsible institutions? Or are the econo1nies successfully producing surplus, saving, investing, inventing, [Page 55] investing in invention? If so they need and will tolerate no refor1ning; rather their patterns should be tolerated, studied and learned fro1n. If not they need refor1ning, and will rebuff it. But in that event, there will also be deprived 1najorities and innovative refor1ners critical of the vested interests and willing to try a new way. VJi th such, one can cooperate in discussing reforms which need not be structurally ho1nogenistic, or in creating what Quigley called "circu1nventions," new patterns which perfor1n the functions of expansion while the old 29 Journal of World-Systems Research patterns are left unrefor1ned to wither away. It isn't clear that Clinton has yet accepted that the world econo1ny is a 1nacroecono1ny where "a ris ing tide lifts all the boats," to quote a phrase Kennedy applied to the US "1nacroecono1ny" (i.e. 1nicroecono1ny, or at best 1nesoecono1ny). Clinton I s argu1nents for invest1nent in education and infrastructure are said (Peterson, 1992) to derive fro1n Robert Reich I s contention (1991) that this will provide a co1npeti ti ve edge in the global struggle to attract free-floating capital and technology -- but the argu1nent is valid only in short-range 1nesoecono1nic ter1ns, since other states are active players and can do the sa1ne, ending in a subsidy race whose outco1ne 1nay or 1nay not be 1nacroecono1nically (world -econo1nically) rational, as co1npared to a cooperative division of labor such as increasingly attractive in big -ticket long-ter1n big-science/high- tech 1negaprojects like space stations and high-energy physics [Page 56] installations. Who is to say that the boats will not be lifted best by a U.S. subsidy to education or infrastructure in, say, the Philippines, or India, or China, or if one 1nust show 1nore 1nesoecono1nic co1n1nit1nent, in t.1exico? The co1nparative study of civilizations and world - historical syste1ns 1nay supply would -be refor1ners and circu1nventors with a flow of ideas, once it is recognized that history is not a neat sequence of develop1nental stages each of w hich renders its predecessor obsolete. For instance: in for1ner ti1nes the Phoenician and Greek innovators in Central civilization c. 1500 -500 BC got round the stagnant statist econo1nies of extractive 1nonarchs by setting up e1nporiu1ns (e.g. E1nporiu1n itself), free ports where traders could ship and sell at international 1narket prices. Hong Kong e1nbodies the 1nodern version of that ancient but long -effective pattern. Consu1ners cheated of the chance to shop at international 1narket prices by tariffs, trading 1non opolies, quotas, and the like, and unable to afford international air fares, might well be able to travel do1nestically to a St. Petersburg, a Vladivostok, a Goa, a Detroit, a Nagasaki -- a1nong 1nany other potential e1nporia --to access the international consu 1ner goods 1narket, if only these cities' national customs barriers were shifted to the city limits. An international agree1nent to per1nit a standard 1nini1nu1n duty -free allowance across those shifted barriers (which could also be raised outside rather than in side great international airports, [Page 57] or run-down waterfronts, which would accordingly turn into enor1nous shopping centers) of, say, US $1000 per trip and $10,000 per year might be less offensive as a bargaining target in international econo1nic negotiations than "Be 1nore like us." Before saying that, in any case one should have asked, are we ourselves saving? investing? inventing? investing in invention? If we have realized a sche1ne for doing all of the above, we have so1nething to offer; but if we do we will probably disse1ninate it unwittingly and unintentionally by the creative fascination of the successful exa1nple (cf. Toynbee, 1972: 224). If not, atte1npts to disse1ninate i1nperfect patterns via the power of the jawbone are likely to call forth a1nuse1nent, resent1nent, disillusion or resistance. To institute the free -port innovation at half a dozen U.S. airports in troubled cities might be rewarding politically as well as econo1nically, effective do1nestically as well as internationally, exe1nplar y rather than do1nineering; and, for a student of Quigley' s, in accord with his 1nost expansive teachings. Since it appears that one piece of Clintonomic doctrine, 1nicrobanks to 1nake 1nicroloans to 1nicroenterprises, credited to experience in Chicago and Arkansas (Clinton and Gore, 1992: 149), also involves so1ne learning fro1n the experience of Bangladesh (l1urray, l992a, citing Lewis Solo1non), this Adininistration 1nay in general be inclined to i1nport ideas --and even [Page 58] technology--fro1n less conventional sources than the nor1n. A great deal of research of general use to the world econo1ny could be done (and is being done but not disse1ninated) in the Russian, Indian and Chinese econo1nies, whose labor -intensive research enterprises should not be precluded fro1n co1npeting for grants via NSF, or receiving operating subsidies via AID. And there is no reason on Earth why the "infor1nation superhighway" should be 1nerely national in its reach --Internet is already 1nul ticontinental --and every reason why a national web should be conceived as only one 1najor interchange in a global "infor1nation freeway." (This point has, in principle, perhaps been taken: Reuters 3/22/94 reports that Vice President Al Gore told the International Teleco1mnunications Union confer ence in Buenos Aires that it was ti1ne to build a "global infor1nation infrastructure," a "network of networks," to raise business productivity, bring education everywhere, and pro1note representative de1nocracy. Privatization, co1npeti tion, and interconnection were e1nphasized as governing principles.) Given these reservations and suggestions, in the net it see1ns fair to say that Clinton learned 1nuch fro1n Quigley, gained 1nuch by what he i1nbibed of Quigley' s distillation of world syste1n history. Despite Quigley' s objections to Plato, it see1ns fair to co1npare hi1n to that philosopher in respect of their students who were, or [Page 59] beca1ne, states1nen. In that sense, Clinton as a student to Quigley has proven closer to the 1nodel of the faithful Dion ("as soon as he got a taste of a rational philosophy which led the way to virtue, his soul was ... on fire": Plutarch, 1918: 9) than to that of the hopeless Dionysius (who "was driven to use inaptly what he had i1nperfectly learned fro1n Plato": 1918: 37). Distract ed by the need to respond to daily events and by the struggle for power and survival, driven by an inclination to co1npro1nise, rhetoricize, dilute and seek consensus, constrained by the 1narginali ty of his freedo1n to budget, with neither his own appointees nor the various V'Jashington establish1nents (bureaucratic, Congressional, 1nedia) inherently sy1npathetic to the theory he favors but does not fully co1mnand, Clinton also provides a case study of the li1ni ts that would constrain the application of any of the prevalent theories of the very large scale and the very long ter1n, whether of "world-syste1ns," "world syste1ns," or "civilizations." BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, Jodie T. 1992. "V'Jill Clintono1nics Add Up?" 31 Journal of World-Systems Research VJashington Post, November 15, 1992: CS. Behr, Peter. 1993. "Clinton I s Conversion on NAFTA." VJashington Post, September 19, 1993: Hl. Broder, John. 1993. "J.F.K. would back NAFTA, Clinton says." 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