559 Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Syste1ns Research_, 1995, Volu1ne l, Number 10 http: //jwsr. ucr. edu/ ISSN 1076 -l56X Three Logics of "l1ajor Power Rivalry" in the World Syste1n - A Footnote to a Pentagon study [Page l] Tieting Su Depart1nent of Sociology l1cGill University 855 Sherbrooke West l1ontreal, Canada, H3A 2T7 Fax: (514) 398 -7476 e -1nail: intt@1nusicb .1ncgill. ca Copyright (c) 1995 Tieting Su Abstract A vast body of social science literature on long waves and 1najor power wars has greatly enriched our knowledge about the rhyth1ns and violent transitions of the 1nodern world -syste1n. The correlation between long waves and 1najor power clashes in the past has been established. What are the structural causal 1nechanis1ns between these two historical and c yclical 1nove1nents? Using trade network patterns as an indicator of a deep structure, this article su1mnarizes a longitudinal study atte1npting to construct one of the missing links between the two historical cycles. Based on a structural analysis of wor ld trade networks in 1938, 1960, and 1990, and a quantitative study of the U.S.-Japanese co1mnercial rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region, this study considers three logics of 11 1najor power rivalry" in the past and its i1nplication for the future: (l) the 1 ogic of rivalry over "life spaces"; (2) the logic of rivalry for global do1nination; and (3) the logic of i1nperial intervention. I contend that these three logics are related, and that changes in one logic result in changes in others. [Page 2] I. Introduction During the North Korean nuclear crisis in the su1mner of 1994, for1ner U.S. govern1nent officials, advisers and business analysts expressed concern that this could trigger a Japanese nuclear ar1na1nent. [2] Why should Japanese nuclear ar1na1nent concern the U.S.? This concern is not too difficult to understand, in light of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years 1994-1999 and its studies which consider Japan and Ger1nany as potential rivals in the post cold war era (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1994; Dupuy 1994; Hadar 1994; Layne 1993; Layne and Schwartz 1993). The initial draft of the Defense Planning Guidance, which was first leaked to the 1nedia in t.1arch, 1992, stated: "We 1nust account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage the1n fro1n challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or econo1nic order," and "we 1nust 1naintain the 1nechanis1ns for deterring potential co1npeti tors fro1n even as pi ring to a larger regional or global role." [3] Al though in a later draft such state1nents about U.S. global do1ninance were deleted, other evidence, according to Layne, suggests that the initial draft of DPG correctly reflects 561 Journal of World-Systems Research official views of the New VJorld Order. Before the initial draft of the DPG was published, a 1991 Pentagon Su1mner Study expressed serious concerns that the 1nain risk to Alnerican security is that [Page 3] of "Ger1nany and/or Japan disconnecting fro1n 1nultilateral security and econo1nic arrange1nents and pursuing an independent course" (Layne 1993: 6). Another Pentagon docu1nent which was intended to establish a fra1nework for the Alnerican post -Cold VJar grand strategy, and which was published after the DPG, argues that "a 1nultipolar world is ... dangerously unstable" (Layne 1993:6). VJhat are so1ne factors that 1nay potentially contribute to possible clashes between 11 1najor powers" in the future? VJhy this "grave" concern about Japan and Ger1nany in Pentagon studies? VJhat structural factors 1nay explain this concern? All these questions have to be addressed in a large fra1nework and fro1n a historical perspective. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold VJar, analysts fro1n various perspectives have e1nbarked on a new enterprise of inquiry into possible future global power struggles and clashes. Huntington speculates that future clashes will be between "civilizations." This interpretation is based on a belief that racial and cultural differences are per1nanent forces for conflict and clashes of the past, the present, and the future. Further1nore, he calls on the \"Jest to foster a "unity within its own civilization," to 11 1naintain 1nilitary superiority in East and Southwest Asia," and to "exploit differences and conflicts a1nong" [Page 4] other civilizations so that their "expansion" can be li1nited (Huntington 1993:49). However, Huntington is not the first to call for a racial and "cultural" unity within "the VJestern Civilization," and a war between "civilizations" and "cultures". This historical echo can be traced back to the periods before both the VJorld VJar I and II. For exa1nple, before the VJorld VJar I, in a speech given at Leicester in 1899, Joseph Chamberlain appealed to Ger1nany and called for "a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo -Saxon race" (Re1nak 1967:33) Active 1neasures were adopted to pro1note this "unity" and peace between the "races" within the sa1ne civilization. For exa1nple, when Rhodes scholarships were initially established they were granted exclusively to citizens of Great Britain, the United States, and Ger1nany. [4] Despite all those efforts, the First VJorld VJar broke out with Great Britain fighting on one side and Ger1nany the other. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, one of the designers of the blueprint for a "Great East Asia Co -prosperity Sphere," predicted a final war in hu1nan history between "the Eastern Civilization" led by Japan and "the VJestern Civilization" led by the U.S. (l1odern History Research Institute 1992: 307). And yet Japanese i1nperial troops encountered fierce resistance in China and other East Asian countries in "the 563 Journal of World-Systems Research [Page 5] Eastern Civilization" during the Second V'Jorld V'Jar. If such social darwinist, racial ideologies, which were 1nuch 1nore influential during the periods of both world wars than at the present, did not lead to those wars, it is doubtful that they can beco1ne funda1nental causes for future clashes al though they could beco1ne propaganda tools to rally popular support. Although, as the 1nass 1nedia reflects, there are localized ethnic conflicts in various parts of the world, it is doubtful that the parties involved in these conflict s have the 1naterial 1neans to bring the whole world into conflict. Further1nore, syste1natic e1npirical studies suggest that there has been no dra1natic increase in ethnic conflict in recent years (Gurr 1994). At present, only the rival powers within the core of the world syste1n have the 1naterial 1neans to bring the whole world into clashes and catastrophe. V'Jhat about "geopolitical and national security concerns?" Can these factors lead to clashes? According to Friedinan and Lebard (1992), the cause for the clash between the U.S. and Japan in the past was and in the future will be Japan's "economic necessity" and U.S. "geopolitical necessity". "Japan I s search for autarky, for co1nplete econo1nic self - sufficiency, was understood by Aineri ca to be a geopolitical [Page 6] challenge. This collision course, first undertaken in the 1920s, is one of the per1nanent and unavoidable forces driving U.S. Japanese relations" (Friecbnan and Lebard 1992: 59). "Thus, the U.S., out of geopolitical necessity, had to destroy Japan's e1npire, created out of econo1nic necessity." (Friedman and Lebard 1992: 85) The puzzle about this perspective that e1nphasizes the "U.S. geopolitical necessity" is: VJhy does the U.S. have to extend its forces thousands and thousands of 1niles away fro1n its border to guard its "security"? This would only 1nake sense if it was an e1npire. But it is not, in the strict definition of the ter1n. During a speech at l1cGill University in l1ontreal, Canada, a political scientist, who also gives pri1nacy to geopolitics, na1ned border disputes as one of the 1nost i1nportant reasons that gave rise to 1najor wars (world wars). VJhat was the border dispute that gave rise to the Pacific VJar between the U.S. and Japan? The answer: the Philippines. According to General l1acArther, the Philippines were i1nportant because the islands, "together with Singapore, for1n a barricade protecting the oil, rubber, quinine, teak, and tin in the Dutch East Indies to the south" (quoted in l1anchester 1978: 186) Let us follow the "l1acArtherian logic" further, and exa1nine what role econo1nic factors played in the past and 1nay play in possible future clashes. [Page 7] II. Long Econo1nic VJaves and l1ajor \"Jars 565 Journal of World-Systems Research The role of econo1nic factors in 1najor power clashes, since the dawn of 1nodern capi tali sin and up through the twentieth century, features pro1ninently in the Hobson -Lenin thesis on i1nperialis1n (Hobson 1902/1965; Lenin 1933), in lateral pressure theory (Choucri and North 1975; North and Lagerstro1n 1971), in world-syste1ns research on the connections between long econo1nic waves and 1najor core wars, and in other non -theoretical works on the topic (see for exa1nple, Friecbnan and Lebard 1992; Kennedy 1987). VJorld-syste1n and "leadership cycle" theorists have carried out a great deal of research in this area (Bergesen 1983 and 1985; Bosquet 1980; Boswell 1994; Boswell and Sweat 1991; Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1994; Goldstein 1985; Goldfrank 1987; Modelski 1994 and 1987; Thompson and Zuk 1982; Hopkins and VJallerstein 1979; VJallerstein 1984). These theorists distinguish two types of long waves: the 40 -60 year Kondratieff econo1nic cycle (K-wave), and the 100 year hege1nonic wave or sequence. In a co1nprehensive e1npirical study of the relationship between K-waves and wars, Goldstein (1985) indicates that 1najor power wars synchronize with the 50 year K -wave cycles, 1neasured by price 1nove1nents. VJhile relying on a high correlation between these two sets of cyclical 1nove1nents, he atte1npts to construct a [Page 8] reciprocal relationship between econo1nic processes and 1najor power wars. Other e1npirical analyses confir1n this correlation between 1najor power wars and the K -wave cycle (Tho1npson and Zuk 1982; Boswell and Sweat 1991), although the causal direction in the Tho1npson and Zuk study 1noves fro1n war to price levels. A hege1nonic wave or sequence is a longer process than the K - wave. While 1nost world-syste1n and other analysts regard this process as a sequence (see for exa1nple, Chase -Dunn and Podobnik 1994; Kennedy 1987), Modelski portrays this process as one with a 100 year cycle (Modelski 1994). Although Goldstein's research failed to find a synchronization between this long cycle and the K-wave, Modelski I s "leadership cycle" is linked to pairs of K-waves (Modelski 1981). In Modelski I s paradig1n, every long cycle of hege1nonic contention as ended with a 1najor war between leading powers. In Model ski I s evolutionary 1nodel, this phase is called the period of "execution" (1994). While 1nost world -syste1n theorists regard this process as a political -economic process, (see for exa1nple, Bosquet 1980; Wallerstein 1984) early "leadership cycle" works tend to e1nphasize political aspec ts of the process, which also include econo1nic factors (Modelski and Thompson 1988: 3). Although these studies have greatly enriched our knowledge about the historical rhyth1ns of the 1nodern capitalist econo1nic and interstate syste1n, the causal rel ation between econo1nic cycles [Page 9] and 1najor power wars re1nains unclear and speculative, as pointed out by Chase-Dunn (1989:133), Gilpin (1987:101), and Schaeffer (1989:3-4). They seem to suggest that there are missing links between the two historical processes, which call for 1nore 567 Journal of World-Systems Research elaborate and syste1natic analyses of the causal 1nechanis1ns in between. III. Recent Research on t.1issing Links So1ne recent analyses of long waves tend to decipher the 500 - year long waves in ti1ne and di saggregate co1nponents. For exa1nple, a recent e1npirical study by Tho1npson atte1npts to focus on the growth of innovation and leading econo1nic sectors in different seg1nents of the long waves (1992). This study identifies thirteen leading econo1nic sector s fro1n the 1500' s to the l 790' s. VJarfare is one of the processes that is associated with the boo1n and bust of these leading sectors. Innovations lead to ascendence of the new hege1nonic power. As innovation 1natures and diffuses to econo1nic co1npetitors, rivalries beco1ne intensified. This analysis suggests a structural pattern of transition from unipolarity to 1nultipolarity of the core of the world -syste1n, as old innovations beco1ne diffused and new innovations e1nerge. Recent world-syste1n and other analysts indicate that the [Page 10] world capitalist syste1n is 1noving fro1n a hege1nonic to a 1nultipolar core (Bergesen 1992; Bergner 1992; Chase -Dunn and O'Reilly 1989; Smith and White 1992; Wallerstein 1991 and 1993) VJhat is the structure of this 1nul tipolar core? How si1nilar is this structure to past structures? VJhat is the e1npirical basis of this structure? Detailed and syste1natic analyses of the 1nul ti polar structure characteristic of the conte1nporary period can provide the explanation of 1nissing links between long econo1nic waves and 1najor power wars. Network analysis proves to be a useful tool in exploring this structure. Recent e1npirical network analyses of the structure of the 1nultipolar core have been conducted at two levels: 1) at the level of corporations (Bergesen and Fernandez 1994), and 2) at the country level (Su and Clawson 1994; Su 1994; Su forthcoming). In this section of 1ny paper, I will concentrate on 1ny own e1npirical analyses at the country level. Following the exa1nple of earlier research carried out by econo1nists and econo1nic historians on the link between trade blocs and major clashes in the past (Arndt 1944/1972; Condliffe 1950; Hirsch1nan 1969; Kindleberger 1973), the project I have undertaken exa1nines patterns of trade flows in the world at three points in ti1ne: 1938, 1960, and 1990. For this particular paper, 1ny focus will be on trade patterns in the 1990s and their [Page 11] i1nplications for future relations between 1najor power s. I have presented different aspects of 1ny preli1ninary findings in several social science journals (Su and Clawson 1994; Su 1994; Su forthco1ning), which I intend to highlight in the following pages. Before discussing these findings, though, I sh ould point out that I do not clai1n changes in trade structure are the only structural dyna1nics that 1nay constitute the 1nissing links between the long K-waves and 1najor power wars. I consider trade to be 569 Journal of World-Systems Research only one i1nportant indicator of a deep structure which 1nay constitute 1nissing links in the long cycle paradig1n. Unlike so1ne analysts, however, I do not regard trade as a singular process; I instead argue that it is related to other economic, political and military processes. For exa1nple, previous studies have recorded the i1nportance of naval power in the hege1nonic sequence, and its additional link with the overseas trading capabilities of hege1nonic powers (see for exa1nple t.1odelski and Tho1npson 1988; Hirch1nan 1969). As the pri1nary focus of this project is to reveal the conte1nporary world trade structure, and analyze its change over ti1ne, I 1nainly rely on two research techniques: clique and structural equivalence, as shown in Figure 1. A clique is defined as group in which every 1ne1nber is tied to every other 1ne1nber of the group by whatever criterion is selected [5]. t.1ore technically, a clique is a 1naxi1nal co1nplete sub -graph (Alba 1973) The trade flows a1nong the U.K., South Africa and Egypt in 1938 FIGURE 1: CLIQUE AND STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE 571 Journal of World-Systems Research ( ... ... , FIGURE 2: EXCLUSIVE HEGEMONIC BLOCS ('>' _, c:~c,y~3 o;,~r c;o;,303,, o~ ;,o;,-,-,~JOK-pOT.~K '°'"'"''""~3 , oK c~ '1'~3~ c:~c,y~3 ~K~ 3c,~~cc;c~;,,,~y ~~K'J~ 30 ,1,p, ,1,~ 0-4JOK POT.~K C1'~~c,~;,c;~ c3 ~KOd~d ~,·~;, 'LX"JL ,,L~ C:~c,:c,~3 ,-,~r o,·~,~~p '•<'ll ~ 0-,iCJOK PO'•~K b~x. 573 Journal ofWorld-Systems Research FIGURE 4: COEXISTENCE OF HECEMONIC ANO RECIONAL BLOCS U.S. business group concerned with foreign policy, working in conjunction with the U.S. State Depart1nent, began pla nning a U.S. "life space" or bloc. It had beco1ne obvious to U.S. policy 1nakers that a "Ger1nan Bloc" was e1nerging, and as a result these advisers decided that the resources under the control of the U.S. in the VJestern He1nisphere were insufficient to counter this Ger1nan Bloc. In order to 1natch the Ger1nan Bloc, therefore, U.S. policy 1nakers decided that the U.S. should extend its control into the Asia-Pacific region. This "life space", also na1ned "the Grand Area," initially included the VJestern He1nisp here and the Asia-Pacific area, but later ca1ne to incorporate the United Kingdo1n as well. U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region inevitably clashed with the "life space" of the e1nerging Japanese i1nperial power. The Japanese -designed "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" overlapped with that of the U.S. -led "Grand Area," and their interests inevitably clashed. The conflict eventually escalated into a full-scale Pacific VJar, after the U.S. i1nposed an econo1nic blockade to check Japanese expansion in the region. VJhile the 1990 trade network does not rese1nble the "open" trade structure characteristic of the 1960s, it does rese1nble that of 1938 in the sense that 1najor power blocs overlap in geographically-concentrated areas (Su forth coining). In 1938, [Page 15] the overlapping areas between 1najor power blocs were the U.K. and Ger1nany in Europe and Africa, the U.S. and Japan in Asia, and the U.S. and the U. K. in the VJestern He1nisphere. VJar broke out in 575 Journal of World-Systems Research three out of four of these overlapping areas, with the only exception being that of the overlap between the U.S. and the U.K. (Su 1994). If one is insistent on applying the Hobson/Lenin thesis and lateral pressure theory here, this case see1ns to be a puzzle. VJhile the Hobson/Lenin thesis argues that co1npeti tion between 1najor i1nperial powers for 1narkets, resources and invest1nents leads to conflict and clashes, lateral pressure theory contends instead that clashes are generated by expansion dyna1nics of nations whose interests 1nay eventually collide (Choucri and North 1975; North and Lagerstrom 1971). These theories will be discussed in greater detail in section V. VJhy did an open clash between the U.S. and the U.K. not occur? An exa1nination of past hege1noni c transitions suggest that it is often the case that "a rising challenger state (A)" (e.g. Ger1nany) initiates "war against the declining hege1non (B) (e.g. the U.K.). B 1nakes an alliance with another rising state (C) (e.g. the U.S.) to combat the 1nili ta ry challenge by A. B and C win the war and C e1nerges as the new hege1non." (Chase -Dunn and O'Reilly 1989:51) Relations between the U.S. and the U.K. during VJorld VJar II [Page 16] are particularly co1nplicated. VJhile 1nost analyses of these relations e1nphasize their cooperative nature, efforts undertaken by the U.S. (the rising hege1nonic power) to erode the power base of a U.K. in decline are often neglected. So1ne of these efforts were political-military, while others were political -economic. An exa1nple in which the U.S. under1nined British political - 1nili tary power can be found in the U.S. -engineered swap of fifty old U.S. destroyers, left over fro1n V'Jorld V'Jar I, for all British naval bases in the V'Jestern he1nisphere, an exchange which o utraged the British parlia1nent (Nicholas 1975). Meanwhile, efforts by the U.S. State Depart1nent to dis1nantle the Sterling Bloc, the econo1nic basis of the British colonial e1npire, provide an exa1nple of political -econo1nic atte1npts by the U.S. to under1ni ne British hege1nony. The U.S. 1nade repeated de1nands to the British to end its "discri1nination" against Ainerican interests in the Sterling area as a condition for Lend-Lease Aid during the V'Jar. In the early 1940's the U.K did not yield to such de1nands. After 1944, however, given that U.K. power had been greatly eroded as a result of its 1nili tary struggle against Ger1nany, Britain was not powerful enough to resist Ainerican de1nands (Block 1977; V'Joods 1990). These econo1nic structures, as indicated by trade patterns, i1nply so1ne interesting logics of "1najor power rivalry". But before I discuss these i1nplied logics, I have one 1nore i1nportant [Page 17] problem to solve, which I will discuss in the next section. rv-. Does the u. S. Co1npete with Japan in the Asia -Pacific Region? One crucial question, in exa1nining the structure in 1990, is whether the U.S. and Japan co1npete or cooperate in the 577 Journal of World-Systems Research overlapping area of the trade network. The overlap between the U.S. and Japan blocs in the Asia- Pacific area in 1990 suggests co1npetition between these two core powers. This is buttressed by so1ne analysts (see for exa1nple, Baldwin et al. 1988). Others (see for exa1nple, Gordon 1990), however, have challenged this clai1n. They argue t hat the U.S. - Japanese econo1nic relations are largely co1nple1nentary in the Asia-Pacific region. The issue has to be exa1nined syste1natically at the industry level. To co1nprehensi vely and syste1natically study co1npeti tion in the area at the industry level, three di1nensions of co1npeti tion have to be considered: 1) structural rivalry, 2) intensity of rivalry, and 3) consistency of rivalry. Technically, these three factors can be 1neasured by the three co1nponents imbedded in the Euclidean Distance 1neasure: si1nilari ty, distance, and variability (Cronbach and Glester 1953; Lorr 1983; Penrose 1952). E1npirically, structural rivalry is 1neasured as correlation [Page 18] between the U.S. and Japan in different industries. A high positive correlation suggests a co1npetitive structure, whereas a high negative correlation i1nplies a co1nple1nentary structure. For exa1nple, a high positive correlation occurs when the U.S. share in different industries changes in the sa1ne direction as the Japanese share. The correlation 1neasure, however, 1nay neglect the fact that two powers can show a structural si1nilari ty, even though they 1night not engage in intense co1npetition. In such cases, the co1npeti tion is only "potential" as the presence of the po wers is found in all industries but the volu1ne is far apart. If the powers are not only found in different industries, but their shares are also similar, a head -to-head rivalry can be seen to e1nerge. This intensity of co1npeti tion can be 1neasured by the second co1nponent in the Euclidean Distance: distance 1neasure. The third di1nension, consistency of co1npeti tion, 1neasures the extent to which co1npetition fluctuates wildly fro1n one industry to another. This 1neasure 1nay be used to detect the ex tent to which co1npetition is concentrated in only a few industries, or spreads across 1nany industries. Careful 1neasures on these three di1nensions can enable us to pin down the real nature of rivalry. Syste1natic data was collected fro1n the OECD For eign Trade by Co1mnodities (1992) in order to carry out such 1neasure1nents. The [Page 19] respective U.S., Japanese and Ger1nan co1mnodi ty trade in thirty-six industries in the Far East (as defined by OECD) in 1992 was analyzed on the three di1nensio ns described above. Ger1nany was selected as a reference, because it consistently ranks as one of the top five participants in Far Eastern trade. Specifically, the analysis is perfor1ned on U.S., Japanese and Ger1nan i1nports fro1n the Far East of crude 1naterials, 1nineral fuels, and resource -based 1nanufactured goods (Ricardian goods), as listed in the following 2 -digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) categories: 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68. The analysis also 579 Journal of World-Systems Research analyzes their exports to the Far East in capital intensive industries such as che1nicals and related products, 1nachinery and transport equip1nent, professional, scientific, and controlling instru1nents and apparatus as found in the following 2 -digit SITC categories: 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 7 7, 7 8, and 8 7 . So1ne exceptional cases are not included in this analysis. These include: agribusiness (roughly 00 to 09 categories in SITC), beverages and tobacco (categories ll and 12) and aircraft (largely in the category 79). In all these industries the U.S. 1naintains a do1ninant position. The last category in each section, such as 29, 59, and 69, [Page 20] are not included in the study, as they lu1np together 1niscellaneous goods not classified in other categories. Sections 8 (1niscellaneous 1nanufactured articles) and 9 (co1mnodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in SITC) are also not included. Section 8 is not included, except for category 87, because this section largely contains labor -intensive goods largely 1nanufactured in non -core countries. Section 9 is not included because again it lu1nps together very different industries in the sa1ne category. As shown in Figure 5 and Table Bl (in Appendix B of this docu1nent), the preli1ninary results fro1n the analysis of the U.S. -Japanese rivalry in thirty -six industries in the Far East in 1992 tend to confir1n that the U.S. and Japan do co1npete in this ~laior c:ower