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  JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH 
 

 

 

Power and Politics in the World-System 
A Cross-National Analysis of Environmental Governance  
 
Jamie M. Sommer 

University of South Florida 
jamiesommer@usf.edu  

 

Andrew Hargrove 

Stony Brook University 
andrew.hargrove@stonybrook.edu  

Abstract 

While various researchers and practitioners agree that it will be hard to restructure our current global and local 

systems to adapt to and mitigate climate change, there is unsurprisingly great disagreement in how and if this can 

be accomplished and on what level(s), or if this is even what needs to be accomplished. These conversations have 

continued with the introduction of the “Anthropocene.” The dominant interpretation of the concept poses several 

solutions, one being national government restructuring to support environmental efforts and encouraging 

behavioral change. To join conversations that critically evaluate the conceptualization and implications of the 

Anthropocene with the world-systems perspective, we consider how the effectiveness of national environmental 

governance in reducing CO2 emissions varies by a country’s position in the global hierarchy. Using two-way fixed 

effects regression, this article tests how one aspect of this environmental governance, environmentally related taxes 

as a percentage of total tax revenue impacts CO2 emissions for 75 countries from 2000 to 2011. Given inequities in 

the global division of labor, which reinforce the dominance of higher-income countries and the exploitation of 

lower-income countries, we expect the effectiveness of environmental governance to vary tremendously by global 

position. Our results support the idea that the impact of environmental governance on CO2 emissions varies across 

countries at different income levels in the world-system, and this is due to external constraints. Such external 

influence is unsurprisingly neglected in dominant interpretations of the Anthropocene. In line with previous critical 

research, we argue that these external constraints undermine climate change solutions because they fail to address 

mutually reinforcing global, political, economic, and environmental inequalities. 

 

Keywords:  CO2 emissions, Anthropocene, governance, world-systems, cross-national, climate change 

ISSN: 1076-156X   |   Vol. 26   Issue 2   |   DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2020.998   |   jwsr.pitt.edu 

 

Vol. 1 |  DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 

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The concept of Anthropocene defines the current geological period as an unprecedented era where 

human activity has been the dominant influence on the environment and climate. While being a 

relatively new term, coined in 2000 by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, it has become 

extremely influential for the current understanding of the interaction between humanity and nature 

(Bonneuil 2015; Conty 2016; Moore 2016). While conceptualizing this interaction is not new, it 

has reinvigorated discussions across disciplines about how humans impact the environment and 

how the environment impacts humans. While there are several distinct and overlapping 

perspectives in this ongoing debate, it is clear that the ideologies we are embedded in, academic 

or otherwise, will impact our interpretation of the Anthropocene, how we resolve the problems of 

the Anthropocene, and how we think about the supposed nature/culture divide (Conty 2016).  

For example, some Critical, Marxist, and Metabolic Rift theorists, among other theoretical 

perspectives point out that the concept of Anthropocene helps further mask the power dynamics 

holding up the supposed nature/culture divide (Moore 2014; 2016; Malm 2015; Hornborg 2003). 

These perspectives view the nature/culture divide as an apparatus that allows for the exploitation 

of nature through “othering” and perpetuates an exploitative world-system (Moore 2016). Some 

of these researchers view the Anthropocene as a scapegoat, masking the global political 

inequalities, exploitations, and power that have created the environmental crises we are currently 

experiencing (Moore 2016). While the Anthropocene does not exactly “hide” inequalities, it can 

be viewed as more of a symptom or artifact of dominant paradigms or ideologies, such as the 

culture of capitalism (Foster, Clark, and York 2011). Critical scholars recognize inequalities when 

they see how the Anthropocene has been constructed and redefined as a “human struggle,” which 

implies that we are all to share the burden because we as a species exploited nature (Altvater 2016).  

However, some countries, groups, and individuals have had a heavier hand in this destruction, 

and many more reify and hold up the existing structures they are embedded in (Jorgenson 2016). 

But to pretend like the burden is equal mutes the inequalities in the world-system that, depending 

on what group of scholars you ask, drives the very nature/culture divide (as well as the idea that 

there is a divide) we see today (Moore 2016; Haraway 2016; McBrien 2016). The way the 

Anthropocene is framed, with humanity’s actions as the cause, erases inequality, which is 

convenient for the hegemonic powers and ideologies that are responsible for the majority of the 

environmental damage. Thus, many have argued for the term “Capitalocene,” coined by Andreas 

Malm (2015) instead, to capture what rationalized dogmatic Western science in the current 

geopolitics of knowledge failed to encapsulate in their nomenclature (Moore 2016). 

“Capitalocene” captures the inequality the Anthropocene overlooks and sees capitalism as a 

system that organizes all of nature rather than a Green Arithmetic of “society + nature,” which 

further perpetuates a “nature/culture” divide (Moore 2016).   

This perspective raises the question, how can the Anthropocene as a way of conceptualizing 

the current era resolve the nature/culture divide if it pretends nature is separate from humanity, 

and conveniently leaves out what many of us believe started, or at least furthers the “rift” between 

nature and humans? Expanding upon this idea, it will be hard to restructure our current global 

system to adapt to and mitigate climate change. Within our global configuration as nation-states, 



 

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the country is often held up as the essential force to enforce and enact strategies to overcome 

climate change, generally by focusing on reducing their CO2 emissions, which has been the center 

of international conferences and treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement 

(Sommer 2018; Hargrove et al. 2019). Following these global initiatives, which have their own 

dominant political agendas and narratives, countries were invited to strengthen their own and other 

country’s abilities to limit global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius through better environmental 

governance and capacity building initiatives (Gareau 2012). The general suggestion encourages 

countries to develop and use technological solutions and other management techniques and 

individual behavior changes to limit current emissions such as adopting new policies and raising 

environmental taxes, which is consistent with how much of the academy approaches the 

implications of the Anthropocene (Conty 2016; Duit 2016).  

However, many have questioned the country’s ability to reduce environmental issues when 

not actually addressing the roots of climate change. The “roots” of climate change or “rift” between 

nature and humans has been explored in several ways, including conceptualizing a treadmill of 

production, an ecologically unequal exchange of resources, and how a culture of capitalism locks 

us economically, politically, and socially into an over-producing, consuming, wasting, and unequal 

global society (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Gould 2008; Bunker 1985; Bartley and Bergesen 1997; 

Kick et al. 1996; Jorgenson 2016; Shandra, Shircliff, and London  2011; Foster, Clark, and York 

2011). In fact, previous cross-national research finds little support that national actions, like 

government spending, impact environmental outcomes (Jorgenson and Burns 2007; Shandra 2007; 

ShandraShircliff, and London 2010; Shandra and Shor 2008; Sommer 2018). 

Put differently, there is a complex matrix of inequalities in systemic power within the world-

system that define a country’s autonomy in relation to the “environment” (i.e., material resources) 

and the rest of the world. Building on Evans (1995), we argue that countries have agency to make 

decisions and shape their governance, but only within an intricate web of external and internal 

constraints. Thus, our research aims to understand the impact of national actions while considering 

the broader world-systems hierarchies countries exist in. This intervention is of particular 

importance given the dominant interpretation that the issues the Anthropocene illuminates can be 

mended through increased efficiency, technology, and individual behavioral changes. We argue 

that this interpretation misses the importance of power and ideology in addressing climate change.  

Using the aforementioned perspectives, our arguments are threefold: 1). the impact of 

environmental governance on CO2 emissions varies across countries at different income levels in 

the world-system due to the external constraints (which are masked by the dominant interpretation 

of the Anthropocene); 2). external constraints pose a risk for the ability of the state to overcome 

climate change using its current approach (environmental governance efforts like increased 

environmental taxes); and 3). introducing more environmental related taxes further puts the onus 

of responsibility of the individual rather than acknowledging external and internal historical 

processes of inequality. The conceptualization of the Anthropocene, like the dominant paradigms 

before it, ignores how power dynamics in the world-system lead to different levels of effectiveness 

for the same environmental policy. While some have had a greater hand than others in creating the 



 

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nature/culture divide (if and whenever it began), this idea runs the risk of further diffusing the 

blame on an abstract powerful group, and allows us to distance ourselves from the decisions many 

of us make every day that hold up the existing power and politics in the world-system.  

 Specifically, the arguments above are derived from empirical tests presented in this article, 

which begin to assess how the strength of environmental governance (environmentally related 

taxes as a % of total tax revenue) impacts CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) for 75 countries 

by world-systems position from 2000 to 2011 using two-way fixed effects regression (Verburg et 

al. 2016). The main independent variable in this analysis measures one important aspect of a state’s 

environmental governance, as state taxes for the environment is a representation of how much a 

country values its environment monetarily, while controlling for a county’s internal and external 

constraints. Thus, empirically we ask two main research questions: 1). How does one aspect of 

environmental governance, environmentally related taxes, impact CO2 emissions; and 2). How 

does variation in the strength of environmental governance change across countries at different 

income levels in the world-system impact CO2 emissions? 

 The article is organized as follows: first, we review previous cross-national research on the 

relationship between state factors and environmental outcomes and research analyzing how a 

country’s position in the global hierarchy can have differential effects on environmental outcomes. 

We situate this theoretical perspective in a critical understanding of the Anthropocene. Then, we 

draw on previous theory from the environmental state perspective and world-systems perspectives 

to explain why environmental governance may impact CO2 emissions and how global stratification 

and the global division of labor may lead to differing impacts of environmental governance on 

CO2 emissions. After reporting the findings, we discuss how external constraints may pose a risk 

for overcoming climate change, but we should try to resist others interpreting our focus on 

externalities as an excuse for a lack of transformation at any level.  

Previous Research 

State Spending and the Environment 

Building on developmental state perspectives (i.e., Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), 

researchers have argued that countries with higher levels of state spending should have less 

environmental issues because they generally have a greater capacity to create and enforce 

environmental regulations, the potential to expend resources for environmental protection, and the 

ability to protect their land from excessive domestic and corporate extraction of natural resources 

(Crenshaw and Jenkins 1996). This has often been called the environmental state perspective, 

whereby countries with more resources or activities to incentive environmental protection tend to 

have better environmental outcomes (Duit 2016).  

On the one hand, researchers find support for these ideas. For example, Jorgenson and Burns 

(2007) find that higher levels of state spending are associated with less forest loss. Moreover, 

Shandra et al. (2009) find some evidence that higher levels of government spending are related to 

lower levels of threatened mammal species. However, several researchers find that state spending 

does not predict significant variation in forest loss (Shandra 2007; Shandra et al. 2010; Shandra 

and Shor 2008), unless a country has strong levels of governance (Sommer 2018). Still further 



 

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analyses find that the environmental state does not predict organic water pollution (Shandra, Shor, 

and London 2008; 2009).  

While previous research has not investigated the impact of government spending as a whole 

on CO2 emissions some studies find evidence that other state factors like governance and 

democracy reduce CO2 emissions (Gani et al. 2012; Wang, Zhang, and Wang 2018; Neumayer 

2002; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Page and Redclift 2002), though these results are also mixed 

(Hargrove, Qandeel, and Sommer 2019; Li and Reuveny 2006; Scruggs 1999; 2001; Ergas and 

York 2012; Shandra et al. 2004; Jorgenson 2009; 2012). Others find that military expenditures 

increase CO2 emissions (Bradford and Stoner 2017; Clark, Jorgenson, and Kentor 2010; 

Jorgenson, Clark, and Kentor 2010). Thus, there has been no cross-national empirical test of how 

a country’s environmental governance or spending specifically impact CO2 emissions. Though, 

world-systems theorists have addressed this idea through other avenues. 

Differential Impacts by a Country’s Position in the Global Hierarchy 

World-systems theorists, among others, developed the idea that the world is organized in a single 

interconnected system through a unified division of labor (Wallerstein 1974). This structure is 

inherently unequal, whereby more powerful countries exploit weaker countries, reinforcing the 

dominance of the core (Young et al. 2006). Within this system, activities are mostly valued in 

terms of their labor, or what is materially produced, rather than something more immaterial, like a 

sense of belonging or fulfillment. Researchers have long been committed to analyzing the 

processes and dynamics behind the world-system (Chase-Dunn 1999; Bunker et al. 2007; 

Jorgenson and Rice 2005). Building on research within world-systems perspective, cross-national 

researchers argue that CO2 emissions are unequally distributed across income-levels (Jorgenson 

2003).  

This body of research suggests that CO2 emissions are higher in some countries rather than 

others because of different forms of labor they contribute to the global market, which is linked to 

past historical processes such as colonialism and current inequalities like trade deals. For example, 

some forms of labor are valued more highly than others and thus are more profitable than others. 

The labor involved in collecting natural resources, fitting in with critical research on the 

Anthropocene, is valued very low in the current dominant system as natural resources are 

considered cheaply exploitable and plentiful. The forest loss, polluted air and water, mining deaths, 

and conflicts among other atrocities to human life, well-being, and a sense of belonging are not 

considered in this calculation (Jorgenson 2012; Shandra 2007). Those who have dominance in the 

world-system define what types of labor are valuable, creating or reestablishing pre-existing 

inequities. These inequities, among others, have implications for if and how countries experience 

and reduce environmental damage. However, there is great variation within this simplification of 

the global political economy.   

For example, several researchers have focused on how greenhouse gas emissions vary by 

world-system position and greenhouse gas emission type (Roberts and Grimes 1997), pointing out 

how while there is a hierarchy of emitters from more wealthy countries to poorer countries, the 

core is not alone in its production of greenhouse gas emissions nor is it able to export all its 



 

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emissions to less wealthy countries (Burns, Davis, and Kick 1997). While CO2 emissions are 

exacerbated by global economic stratification (Dietz and Rosa’s 1997), world-system position 

tends to increase per capita consumption of natural resources, whereas more unequal countries 

tend to consume fewer natural resources (Jorgenson 2003). Other researchers have begun to see 

how different factors, like global environmental regime embeddedness (i.e., international 

environmental non-governmental organization memberships and signing onto multilateral 

environmental treaties), impact environmental factors. For example, Shorette (2012) finds that 

there is differential decoupling within the global environmental regime by world-system position 

for pesticide and fertilizer use.  

While variation exists within different categories of the world-system and there are often 

outliers that diverge from these common conceptualizations (Jorgenson 2003), overall, there is 

convergence for the idea that more wealthy countries tend to benefit both environmentally and 

economically than less wealthy countries. Case studies have addressed the mechanisms underlying 

these processes. For example, Gareau (2012) finds that the Montreal Protocol has failed to remove 

all ozone-depleting substances due to the United States’ actions and influence, as industry actions 

used U.S. hegemony to reinforce their dominant positions in the global market.  

There have been several calls for researchers to continue to explore this variation, focusing 

specifically on the ways states and social institutions are embedded in global hierarchies that 

undermine attempts to reduce climate change (Gareau 2012). These calls have also insisted that 

we aim to differentiate by world-system position more broadly to see the complexity of 

exploitation and inequality involving environmental matters beyond an increasingly simplistic and 

antiquated North-South divide (Ciplet and Roberts 2017).  

Following these calls, this article aims to combine both the environmental state perspective 

and world-systems perspectives to understand how the strength of environmental governance in 

each zone in the world-system impacts the natural environment, specifically CO2 emissions. 

Environmental Governance and World-System Positionality 

According to the environmental state perspective, countries that prioritize environmental 

protection activities, policies, and regulations should experience less environmental damage (Duit 

2016; Sommer 2018). Activities to promote the adoption of greener technology (subsidizing), 

corporate regulation (taxation), and establishing environmental rights for citizens (right to clean 

air), among others, incentivize activities that protect the natural environment and penalize 

environmentally damaging behaviors (Shelton 1991; Melo-Escrihuela 2008; Boyd 2012; Lewis 

2018). Environmental states are thought to exist on a continuum, ranging from weak to strong in 

terms of the responsibility they take for environmental protection, including the activities they 

promote, create, and enforce (Duit 2016).  

Theoretically, strong environmental states should make it easy for citizens to adopt 

environmentally friendly practices, such as subsidizing electric cars to make them affordable, 

while also incentivizing its companies to adopt greener practices with tax breaks. Likewise, strong 

environmental states will also penalize citizens for not conforming to environmental laws through 

fines and tax polluting companies (Melo-Escrihuela 2008; Boyd 2012; Lewis 2018). Such states 



 

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will provide these incentives to reduce the barriers for individual and corporate environmental 

compliance and create penalties for those that willfully ignore environmental obligations despite 

such support. For example, Sweden can be considered a strong environmental state because it has 

invested in an affordable and accessible public transportation system to limit emissions as well as 

disincentivize using cars through heavily taxing gasoline.  

Weak environmental states have not yet or have incompletely renegotiated how individuals 

and groups will be protected from environmental harm and in return comply with environmental 

duties (made accessible by the state). The failure of the state to protect its citizens from 

environmental issues, incentivize sustainable livelihoods and businesses, or reduce damaging 

corporate extraction of natural resources and polluting activities are some signs of a weak 

environmental state (Sommer 2018). For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo fails to 

enforce environmental laws and protect its population from mining-induced pollution hotspots, 

among others (UNEP 2017). Following this logic, Sweden tends to have better environmental 

outcomes than the Democratic Republic of the Congo due to its strong environmental state.  

While this perspective is straightforward and simple, it tends to lack nuance as to why there 

are disparities in the environmental strength of states. It fails to recognize the processes that 

enabled countries like Sweden to have the resources to strengthen its environmental state and the 

processes that prevented the Democratic Republic of the Congo from having a strong 

environmental state and that these processes are interrelated (Jorgenson 2016). It also tends to 

reinforce biased representations of rich countries as environmentally friendly and poor countries 

as corrupt polluters instead of incorporating long-standing global inequalities, or a less 

ethnocentric interpretation of the agency of people and countries, as the key explanatory factor. 

Thus, it is important to recognize that in practice it would be impossible to put states on a 

continuum of strong to weak environmental states because countries are complex units that have 

internal conflicts, competing interests, and external constraints that shape a wide variety of 

environmental protections and destructions which leave states in something that looks more like 

organized environmental hypocrisy than a unified green state (Brunsson 1989; Weaver 2008; 

Sommer et al. 2017). Countries have a kind of embedded autonomy when it comes to 

environmental issues—they have agency to make decisions and shape their governance within a 

complex web of external and internal pressures (Evans 1995).  

World-systems perspectives can be coupled with the environmental state perspective to 

enhance its explanatory power in conceptualizing and understanding why the capacity or ability to 

protect the natural environment varies so much from country to country. Environmental 

governance, defined as the strength of the state for environmental protection, should vary by a 

country’s position in the global hierarchy given inequities in the global division of labor, which 

reinforces the dominance of higher-income countries and the exploitation of lower-income 

countries (Wallerstein 2004). Given this division of labor and power, countries within different 

income levels may face similar internal and external constraints that can impact their national 

environmental governance. Thus, breaking down countries into similar income groups is intended 

to conceptualize the different internal and external constraints one country group may have that 



 

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may be different from another country group. Some country groups, given their positionality, have 

different opportunities than other country groups. It is important to note that higher or lower-

income countries do not necessarily have more or less opportunities, but different opportunities. 

This is not an attempt to depoliticize these categorical distinctions, but rather to invoke the agency 

of countries, groups, and individuals, among others (Smith 2018). Table 1 below is an attempt to 

begin to describe how the global division of labor by a country’s position in the global hierarchy 

using the World Bank’s income classifications may impact the effectiveness of environmental 

governance at reducing CO2 emissions given their potentially shared internal and external 

constraints. Using these income group classifications, rather than simpler distinctions between a 

trimodal core, semi-periphery, and periphery, allows for more analytical specificity instead of 

lumping widely divergent countries together. For example, separating high-income OECD 

countries from high-income non-OECD countries could provide more clarity in how environment-

related taxes impact CO2 emissions. However, this conceptualization is still limited by 

homogenous generalizations and may not fit all countries in the group. For example, Jorgenson 

(2003) finds several countries are outliers in his study of ecological footprints, as they do not 

conform to common conceptualizations in world-system positionality.   
 

 
Table 1. Environmental Governance and World-System Positionality 

 

World-System 

Position1 

Description Potential Impact on 

Effectiveness of 

Environmental 

Governance 

Sample 

High-income 

OECD (GNI per 

capita of 

$12,536 or 

more) 

Capital-intensive 

production in 

service and 

design-based 

industry, controls 

global finances 

and viewed as 

dominant 

producer of 

knowledge 

Funds supporting 

activities that only 

appear or are 

misrepresented as 

environmentally 

beneficial 

(greenwashing) 

Australia (2000-2011); Belgium (2000-2011); 

Canada (2007-2010); Chile (2000-2011); Czech 

Republic (2000-2011); Denmark (2000-2011); 

Estonia (2000-2011); Finland (2000-2011); 

France (2000-2011); Germany (2000-2011); 

Greece (2000-2011); Iceland (2000-2011); Italy 

(2000-2011); Japan (2000-2011); South Korea 

(2000-2011); Luxembourg (2000-2011); 

Netherlands (2000-2011); New Zealand (2000-

2011); Norway (2000-2011); Poland (2000-

2011); Portugal (2000-2011); Slovak Republic 

(2000-2011); Slovenia (2000-2011); Spain 

(2000-2011); Sweden (2000-2011); Switzerland 

(2000-2011); United Kingdom (2000-2011); 

United States (2000-2011) 



 

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Table 1. Environmental Governance and World-System Positionality (Continued) 

High-income 
non-OECD 
(GNI per capita 
of $12,536 or 
more) 

Less control on 
global finance 
and less global 
political-
economic power, 
though benefits 
from higher- 
income 

Funds supporting 
environmental 
activities but focused 
on economic growth 
efforts that 
undermine 
environmental 
protection 

The Bahamas (2000-2011); Croatia (2000-
2011); Cyprus (2000-2011); Latvia (2000-2011); 
Lithuania (2000-2011); Malta (2000-2011); 
Singapore (2005-2011); Trinidad and Tobago 
(2000-2011); Uruguay (2000-2011) 

 

Upper-middle-
income (GNI 
per capita 
between $4,046 
and $12,535) 

Highly 
industrialized, 
less sophisticated 
technology, 
manufactured 
goods 

Use environmental 
funds for 
sustainability efforts 
but may focus more 
on economic growth 
narrative perpetuated 
by high-income 
OECD countries 

Argentina (2000-2011); Belize (2000-2011); 
Brazil (2000); China (2000-2011); Colombia 
(2000-2011); Costa Rica (2000-2011); 
Dominican Republic (2000-2011); Ecuador  
(2000-2011); Hungary  (2000-2011); Jamaica  
(2002-2011); Kazakhstan (2000-2011); Malaysia 
(2000-2011); Mauritius (2007-2011); Mexico 
(2000-2011); Panama (2000-2011); Peru (2000-
2011); Romania (2000-2011); South Africa 
(2000-2011); Tunisia (2000-2011); Turkey 
(2000-2011); Venezuela (2000-2011) 

Lower-middle-
income (GNI 
per capita 
between $1,036 
and $4,045) 

Industrialized but 
relies heavily on 
producing 
manufactured 
goods 

Aim for 
environmental 
sustainability and 
cleaner production 
despite less 
technology, but 
perhaps less 
entrenched in 
fetishizing economic 
growth and more 
removed from 
corporate penetration 

Bolivia (2000-2011); Cabo Verde (2000-2006); 
Cameroon (2000-2011); Cote d’Ivoire (2000-
2008); El Salvador (2001-2011); Guatemala 
(2001-2011); Honduras (2000-2011); India 
(2005-2011); Morocco (2000-2011); Nicaragua 
(2000-2011); Paraguay (2005-2011); Philippines 
(2000-2011); Senegal (2002-2011); 

Low-income 
(GNI per capita 
of $1,035 or 
less) 

Lower-skill, 
labor intensive, 
natural resource 
and raw material 
extraction 

Environmental 
efforts may be 
undercut by 
transnational 
corporate 
involvement and 
pressure to export 
natural resources 
(unequal exchange) 

Niger (2000-2011); Rwanda (2000-2011); Togo 
(2000-2011); Uganda (2000-2011) 

1 By World Bank (2019) income classification 

 

The role of higher-income countries in the global production of goods and services tends to 

rely heavily on branding and advertising (Wallerstein 1974; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; 

Walton and Ragin 1990). While such states generally have the resources to incentivize sustainable 

goods, the multiple inequalities throughout their supply chains coupled with a compulsion for 

capital accumulation has the potential to turn well-intentioned, science-based environmental 

protections and activities into a façade of greenwashing while continuing business as usual 

(Roberts and Grimes 1997). However, the relative power of OECD countries may be the 

determining factor in the effectiveness of environmental taxes, as they may pervert 

environmentalism to reinforce their dominance while posturing sustainability (Shorette 2012). 

This leaves the appearance of a unified green state along the lines of what the same hegemonic 

forces constructed the image of the strong environmental state to be. Following this reasoning, 



 

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environmental governance may increase CO2 emissions in higher-income countries, though this 

may vary by whether the country is part of the OECD. 

Though middle-income countries have less resources and power (given the dominant value 

system) than higher-income countries, countries at this income range may exploit the relatively 

cheap prices of raw materials from lower-income countries to sustain their manufactured 

production with the added benefit of (following higher-income countries) exporting their 

environmental issues to lower-income countries. However, this relationship may vary within the 

middle-income category, where upper-middle-income countries may align more closely with 

higher-income countries while lower-middle-income countries may actually aim to protect the 

natural environment (perhaps in itself or for social gain) rather than employ greenwashing 

(Shorette 2012; Frank et al. 2000). 

Finally, efforts of low-income countries to strengthen their environmental state may be 

undercut by external pressures to export natural resources, such as appeasing multi-national 

corporate interests (Gereffi 1989; Hornborg 2009). Additionally, internal pressures such as 

providing health and food resources for its population, repayment of loans, and other constraints 

often linked to colonialism, neoliberalism, and other practices enacted by hegemonic forces to 

destabilize and dominate low-income countries, potentially rendering their environmental efforts 

less successful or less pertinent (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Evans 1979). Here too, just as is true 

within all income categories, accumulating wealth and facilitating corruption will also weaken 

environmental efforts (Sommer 2017). Therefore, a country’s position in the global hierarchy may 

impact their ability to take responsibility for environmental issues through renegotiating the 

environmental rights and duties of citizens and providing incentives and penalties to ensure 

compliance by individuals and various interest groups (citizens, NGOs, small-businesses, 

corporations, local governments, etc.).   

Thus, we suggest the following hypotheses: 

 

1). Environmentally related taxes are associated with lower levels of CO2 emissions. 

2). Environmentally related taxes increase CO2 emissions in higher-income countries, reduce 

CO2 emissions the most in middle-income countries, and increases CO2 emissions in low-

income countries. 

Methods and Data 

Modeling Technique and Sample 

We use two-way fixed effects regression with clustered robust standard errors to analyze the data 

(Hargrove et al. 2019). This is the most appropriate modeling technique for several reasons. First, 

due to the availability of panel data, it would be inappropriate to use ordinary least squares 

regression because it assumes observations are independent. Second, it is common for time 

invariant unmeasured factors that differ across countries to be present in cross-national 

longitudinal data (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). Panel regression techniques consider variables on 

two dimensions: cross-sectional units of observation and a temporal reference (Halaby 2004; Hsiao 

2003). Third, we use two-way fixed effects analysis following previous research as it controls for 



 

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both time and unobserved factors and estimates general trends for comparisons within countries 

over time (Jorgenson et al. 2010; Jorgenson and Clark 2013). Fourth, according to the Sargen-

Hansen test statistic, fixed effects models are more appropriate than generalized least squares 

random effects models. Therefore, only fixed effects estimates are provided here.   

The sample includes 75 countries across all income levels with 842 observations from 2000 

to 2011. The panel is unbalanced with a minimum of 1, an average of 11, and a maximum of 12 

years per country. Data is included for each time point available rather than intervals to include 

more observations instead of averaging across sub-periods to avoid erasing any variation in the 

data. This analysis includes all data available. The sample is limited to 75 countries using listwise 

deletion of missing data. 

We check for regression assumptions including linearity, multicollinearity, 

heteroskedasticity, outliers, influential cases, specification error, and endogeneity (Alderson and 

Nielsen 2002). To ensure linearity, variables are logged when appropriate (indicated in Table 2). 

To see if multicollinearity is problematic in the models, we calculate a bivariate correlation matrix 

for all variables in the analysis (Table 3). We also identify the variation inflation factor (VIF) 

scores for each model by using corresponding pooled OLS regression. There are a few high 

correlations; namely, democracy, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and 

GDP per capita. Each of these variables are removed from the model one at a time to see if their 

inclusion biased the statistical significance of and of the independent variables. The main results 

are substantively the same, so these variables are included in the present models. 

Heteroskedasticity is also minimized with robust standard errors. To test for outliers and influential 

cases, we calculate standardized residuals. There are no country years for which standardized 

residuals exceeded an absolute value of 3, indicating no potential problems with outliers (Frees 

2004). While it is difficult to ensure the models are not in violation of specification error, we have 

aimed to include a similar number of independent variables and specific factors based on recent 

research that uses similar modeling during the time period the data are available for (Hargrove et 

al. 2019). Finally, endogeneity can be problematic when one of the independent variables is jointly 

determined with the dependent variable being explained (Sommer et al. 2020; Wooldridge 2015). 

In this case, endogeneity may be biasing the estimates because environment-related taxes are not 

randomly assigned and may be linked to other factors external or internal to a country. For instance, 

a country might increase its environmental taxes because of its high levels of CO2. If this is the 

case, then the regression equation would be capturing the selection of levels environmental taxes 

as well as the effects of prioritizing environmental taxes in one parameter. To test for this, 

researchers usually find a variable to be an instrument that is correlated with the independent 

variable under question but not the dependent variable. After selecting an instrument, we ran the 

Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity. The results are inconclusive, as it is difficult to find 

relevant instruments that meet all requirements, though the main findings remain consistent to 

those reported. It is also important to note that including 1-5 year lags on the dependent variable 

nor main independent variable does not substantively change the results. From these tests, there 



 

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appears to be no egregious issues with violating regression assumptions. A summary of all 

included variables and descriptive statistics is in Table 2. 
 

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Definitions 

 
 

Variables 
 

 
Description (Source) 

 
Mean (Std. Dev) 

 
Range 

Dependent Variable    
Carbon dioxide emissions 
per capita (ln) 
 

Total CO2 emissions in metric tons per 
capita (World Bank 2019; Jorgenson 
2012) 

.242 (1.786) -7.452-4.604 

 
Independent Variables 

   

 
Environmental Taxes 
 

 
Environmentally related taxes, % total 
tax revenue (OECDStat 2019). 

 
7.639 (4.293) 

 
-11.503 – 

35.361 

Democracy Composition 
Index of Political 
Competition and Political 
Participation 

Political competition measures the 
percentage of votes gained by smaller 
parties in parliamentary and 
presidential elections. The political 
participation variable measures the 
percentage of the population that voted 
in a parliamentary and presidential 
election (Vanhanen 2014). 

16.132 (12.099) 0-46.2 

International Non-
Governmental 
Organizations 

The total number of International Non-
Governmental Organizations (Boli and 
Thomas 1999) 

510.008 (702.335) 0-4339 

GDP per capita constant 
USD (ln) 
 

The sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of 
the products (World Bank 2019; 
Jorgenson 2012; Jorgenson et al. 
2010) 

7.423 (1.691) 3.566-12.175 
 

Total population (ln) 
 

Number of residents in a country 
(World Bank 2019; Jorgenson 2012; 
Jorgenson et al. 2010) 

14.801 (2.372) 8.361-21.344 

Manufacturing as % GDP 
 

Total value added by manufacturing 
industries standardized by GDP 
(World Bank 2019; Jorgenson 2012; 
Jorgenson et al. 2010) 

14.097 (7.803) 0-47.344 

Trade as % GDP 
 

Total value of trade standardized by 
GDP (World Bank 2019; Jorgenson 
2012; Jorgenson et al. 2010) 

77.688 (49.586) .309-562.060 

Foreign Direct Investment 
Stocks as % of GDP 
 

Cumulative total of external private 
investment in a country standardized 
by GDP (Shandra et al. 2004) 

40.353 (165.351) 0-4851.724 

Arable land as a % of land 
area 

Total arable land standardized by land 
area (World Bank 2019; Gani 2012) 

13.508 (13.488) .001-73.389 

 

  



 

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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 

 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 

(1) CO2 emissions 1.000          

(2) Environmental Taxes -.118 1.000         

(3) Democracy Index .621 -.011 1.000        

(4) INGOs .565 -.116 .670 1.000       

(5) GDP per capita .857 -.156 .761 .705 1.000      
(6) Manufacturing as % 

GDP .198 .031 -.023 .175 .037 1.000     

(7) Total Population -.025 -.012 -.156 .408 -.124 .388 1.000    

(8) Trade as % GDP .253 -.117 .067 -.094 .245 .084 -.454 1.000   

(9) FDI as % of GDP .152 -.010 .102 -.038 .189 -.098 -.279 .380 1.000  

(10) Arable land -.059 .215 .153 .274 -.054 .086 .194 .028 -.009 1.000 

 
 
Dependent Variable 
Carbon dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita). CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 
represents the impact on climate change of a country standardized by the size of its population. 
This variable is logged to correct for skewness. We chose this dependent variable for two main 
reasons. First, greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2, are responsible for unprecedented global 
temperature rise and have been steadily increasing since 1970 and have accelerated further in the 
time-period of this analysis. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 
(IPCC) 2018 special report, we are in danger of surpassing a 1.5 C increase in global mean 
temperature compared to pre-industrial levels by 2030. CO2 emissions are thus an important 
measurement under the geological conceptualization of the Anthropocene. Such researchers find 
that temperature increase will lead to catastrophic outcomes for humans and the environment, 
including rising sea levels, more intense and erratic storms, desertification, extreme water stress, 
and more severe weather events (IPCC 2018). Second, given the current global economic system 
of capitalism and culture of waste and pollution it produces through the constant intensifying of 
production, CO2 emissions is an important dependent variable to analyze, especially when 
applying theory concerning world-system positionality. In particular, it is one of few common 
environmentally related dependent variables used in cross-national analyses where generally, 
higher-income countries have more outputs than lower-income countries (compared to forest loss 
which is higher in lower-income, not higher-income countries). Thus, this variable is extremely 
relevant for the time period the environmental governance data are available for and understanding 
how internal and external political-economic factors influence CO2 levels.  
Main Independent Variable  

Environmental Governance. This variable measures environmentally related taxes as a % of total 

tax revenue (OECDStat 2019). These data were collected from OECDStat. As detailed above, this 

measure is intended to capture a state’s environmental governance. While there are several ways 

to characterize environmental governance (i.e., administration, regulation, redistribution, and 

knowledge production, etc.), this article focuses only on environmental related taxes (Duit 2016) 

due to theoretical relevance and data availability. Thus, this analysis can only reveal a partial 

picture of the environmental governance arrangements in countries in the sample.   

World-System Position. We also create a variable using the World Bank income classification as 

a proxy for world-system position (described above). Per the theory section above, we believe that 



 

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interacting environmental governance with world-system position will uncover hidden power 

dynamics in the effectiveness of environmental governance to mitigate carbon emissions.  

Other Independent Variables and Controls. Following previous studies, we control for 

democracy composition (Vanhanen 2014), the total number of INGOs, GDP per capita, total 

population, manufacturing as a % GDP, trade as % GDP (Jorgenson 2012; Jorgenson et al. 2010), 

trade, foreign direct investment stocks as a % of GDP (Shandra et al. 2004), and arable land as a 

% of land area.  

Findings 

Table 4 contains the two-way effects regression estimates of environmental governance on CO2 

emissions in metric tons per capita. The first equation (4.1) contains the base model of the effect 

of environmental governance on CO2 emissions. The remaining five equations include the 

interactions between high-income OECD (4.2), high-income non-OECD (4.3), upper-middle-

income (4.4), lower-middle-income (4.5), and low-income countries (4.6). World-system position 

is classified using the World Bank’s atlas method for income classification (World Bank 2019). 

These breakdowns by USD are included in Table 1 above. This measurement correlates highly 

with other breakdowns (Shorette 2012; Kentor 2015; Van Rossem 1996). The number presented 

is the unstandardized coefficient. We report one-tailed tests corresponding to the directional nature 

of the hypotheses. In every equation, we include an index of democracy composition, INGOs, 

GDP per capita, total population, manufacturing as % GDP, trade as % GDP (Jorgenson 2012; 

Jorgenson et al. 2010), and arable land % of land area.  

 In equation (4.1), we find that the coefficients for environmental governance are negative and 

statistically significant. This suggests that environmental governance is associated with lower 

levels of CO2 emissions. The remaining models interact environmental governance by a country’s 

position in the global hierarchy. In Equation (4.2), the coefficient that represents the interaction 

for high-income OECD countries is positive and statistically significant, while equation (4.5), 
 

Table 4. Effects of Environmental Governance at Different Positions in the Global Hierarchy on CO2 

Emissions as a % of GDP
a
 

 Base 
(4.1) 

 

High-
income 
OECD 
(4.2) 

High-income 
non-OECD 

(4.3) 

Upper-
middle-
income 

(4.4) 

Lower-
middle-
income 

(4.5) 

Low-
income 

(4.6) 

Environmental 
Governance 

-.004* -.005* -.004 -.004 -.003 -.006* 

Environmental 
Governance X 
High-income 

OECD 

 .025*     

Environmental 
Governance X  

High-income non-
OECD 

  -.004 .   

Environmental 
Governance X 
Upper-middle-

income 

   -.001   



 

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aNumbers listed are the unstandardized coefficients. 
* indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001 for a one-tailed test  

 

which includes the coefficient that represents the interaction for lower-middle-income countries, 

is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient that represents the interaction for low-

income countries in equation (4.6) is positive and significant, just like the coefficient that 

represents the interaction for high-income OECD countries. The coefficients that represent the 

interaction terms for high-income non-OECD countries (4.3) and upper-middle-income countries 

(4.4) fail to reach levels of statistical significance. Thus, environmental governance is not related 

to CO2 emissions in high-income non-OECD countries and upper-middle-income countries. These 

results are generally consistent with previous research and theory (Shorette 2012) though they 

reveal additional nuances.  

Additionally, we find a number of other factors are associated with CO2 emissions. First, we 

find that the coefficients that represent GDP per capita are positive and significant. This suggests 

that higher levels of GDP per capita correspond with more CO2 emissions, which is most likely a 

result of wealthier countries consuming more resources. This finding is consistent with past 

research (Grimes and Kentor 2003; Jorgenson 2007; 2009; Roberts and Grimes 2003; Shandra et 

al. 2004). Second, we find that the coefficients that represent manufacturing as % GDP are positive 

and significant, suggesting that factors such as industrialization increase CO2 emissions 

(Longhofer and Jorgenson 2017; Jorgenson and Clark 2012; Jorgenson 2012). Third, we find that 

the coefficients that represent trade are associated with increased CO2 emissions, consistent with 

previous research (Jorgenson 2012; Jorgenson et al. 2010).  

There are also non-significant findings. First, the coefficients that represent democracy fail to 

reach levels of statistical significance, which is mostly consistent with previous research (Shandra 

et al. 2004; Neumayer 2002; Mayer 2017). I find that the coefficients that represent INGOs also 

Environmental 
Governance X 
Lower-middle-

income 

    -.014*  

Environmental 
Governance X 
Low-income 

     .018* 

Democracy Index .002 .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 

INGOs -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 

GDP per capita 
(ln) 

.330*** .323*** .330*** .331*** .330*** .334*** 

Manufacturing as a 
% of GDP 

.014* .013* .014* .014* .013* .014* 

Total Population 
(ln) 

.417 .414 .432 .419 .370 .452 

Trade as a % of 
GDP 

.001** .001* .001** .001** .001** .001* 

FDI as a  of GDP 

 

-.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 

Arable Land as a 
% of land area 

.007 .007 .007 .007 .008 .009* 



 

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fail to reach levels of statistical significance. It is surprising that INGOs fail to reach levels of 

statistical significance as a relationship between these variables has been established in previous 

research (Shandra et al. 2004), however; other research has shown that this effect varies by levels 

of FDI stocks and level of economic development and may not impact CO2 emissions on its own 

(Jorgenson and Dick 2010; Longhofer and Jorgenson 2017). 

Moreover, we find that population is not associated with CO2 emissions, which diverges from 

more recent previous research (Hargrove et al 2019; Jorgenson 2012; Jorgenson et al. 2010; 

Jorgenson and Dick 2010), but converges with older research (Shandra et al. 2004), perhaps due 

to the disaggregation of population into urban and rural population (Jorgenson, Dick, and Shandra 

2011). Also diverging from previous research, we find that agricultural activities are not associated 

with lower levels of CO2 emissions (Gani 2012). 

Discussion and Conclusion 

According to environmental state perspectives, countries that promote and facilitate activities that 

protect the natural environment should have better environmental outcomes than states that do not. 

When including all countries in the analysis, on average, environmental governance decreases CO2 

emissions. However, when interacted by world-system position, the impact of environmental 

governance on CO2 emissions is different for different income groups. Overall, the findings 

generally suggest that environmental governance reduces CO2 emissions the most in lower-

middle-income countries, while environmental governance increases CO2 emissions in high-

income OECD countries and low-income countries and has no effect in high-income non-OECD 

countries and upper-middle-income countries. These divergent patterns across income groups 

begins to suggest that this differentiation is a meaningful explanatory factor for how power 

dynamics in the world-system influence how environmental governance impacts CO2 emissions.  

The patterns of these findings can be explained drawing on historical and current asymmetrical 

distributions of power. Thus, several externalities and internalities linked to level of economic 

development, rooted in the global division of labor, may be able to explain the variation in the 

impact of environmental governance on CO2 emissions. Put differently, since positionality in the 

global economic hierarchy can constrain or enhance the effectiveness of environmental 

governance, we should continue to pay attention to these positions or at least the long-term 

inequalities they aim to represent. These findings support the idea that the capacity for reducing 

environmental harms is unequally distributed across the global hierarchy and is therefore linked to 

historical and current asymmetrical distribution of power. Power thus shapes how different types 

of labor are distributed and how it is valued to support continued dominance of high-income OECD 

countries, specifically. 

Drawing on existing previous research and theory, high-income countries, with their 

generally service, technology, and design based industries may not experience reductions in CO2 

emissions from environmental governance due to the funds supporting activities that only appear 

to be or are misrepresented as environmentally beneficial given existing greenwashing practices 

by companies headquartered in such countries. In the present analysis, high-income OECD 

countries actually see increases in CO2 emissions from environmental governance taxes, which is 



 

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most likely related to the relative power and dominance over global agendas (including trade, 

global governance, and narrative control, among others) these countries have compared to high-

income non-OECD countries.  

Shifting to the other end of the world-system power hierarchy, low-income countries’ 

environmental efforts may be undercut by transnational corporate involvement in addition to 

external pressure to export natural resources to fulfill activities such as paying back loans or being 

able to afford imports. This suggests that the environmental governance efforts made by low-

income countries are stymied by their relatively weak position in the world-system and the history 

of power imbalances that have led to their exploitation. Additionally, their decisions may 

undermine environmental efforts to focus on other internal needs or interests such as health care 

or exploit their environments to profit from natural resource exports. Any interpretation of the 

Anthropocene that overlooks these inequalities will suggest that low-income countries adopt 

similar policies and strategies as the rest of the world. This generalization will lead to ineffective 

solutions since our analysis shows that environmental taxes in low income countries do not reduce 

CO2 emissions. 

Like high-income countries, middle-income countries also have divergent findings. While 

upper-middle-income countries’ focus on producing manufactured goods rather than natural 

resources, their environmental governance efforts are still not improving their CO2 emissions. 

Following economic growth agendas (perhaps in the hopes of shifting their world-system position 

to join higher-income countries) seems to still weaken environmental governance (Shorette 2012). 

The efforts of upper-middle-income countries may be seen as greenwashing or only focusing on 

environmental policies/technologies that will increase economic growth. This focus could be 

undermining the effectiveness of environmental taxes in these countries. On the other hand, lower-

middle-income countries appear to use environmental funds in accordance with activities that 

ultimately create sustainable activities instead of just promoting them. Thus, the global division of 

labor may help explain the differential impacts of environmental governance on CO2 emissions 

and provide more grounding for environmental state perspectives.  

 These findings also suggest that the dominant interpretation of the resolution of the 

Anthropocene as a “human struggle” rather than a power struggle overlooks the responsibility of 

larger polluters and more powerful groups in addressing climate change. The national government-

based solutions for increased environmental funding for environmental activities does not 

effectively reduce CO2 emissions in several world-system positions and tends to increase CO2 

emissions in high-income OECD countries and low-income countries. These findings provide 

additional evidence for the critique that the dominant conceptualization of the Anthropocene 

masks inequality while promoting solutions that do not address the political, economic, and social 

causes of climate change (Moore 2016; Haraway 2016; McBrien 2016). This especially rings true 

given the patterns of effectiveness of environmental governance in this analysis.  

 Moreover, environmental taxes allow the state to offset or push its responsibility onto tax-

paying citizens. In this arrangement, the citizen takes the monetary burden of environmental 

protection. Even worse, in many cases across the world-system these taxes have no effect or do 



 

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not reduce CO2 emissions – with the exception of the lower-middle-income country group. This 

further exemplifies the failure of the state in addressing climate change. While there are other ways 

to measure environmental governance that future research must accomplish, the present findings 

provide evidence that suggests that many world-systems country groups lack the ability or will to 

use its citizenry’s taxes to reduce CO2 emissions. Thus, failing to break down the present analysis 

into income groups would reify the onus of responsibility of reducing CO2 emissions on the 

individual and fail to acknowledge the external and internal historical processes of inequality that 

shape the autonomy and decision-making of countries.  

However, there is a difference between failing to acknowledge pre-existing inequities and 

historical processes that shape current inequalities and putting the blame on an abstract powerful 

group. It is important to make sure our global political economic tradition in studying and 

conceptualizing the Anthropocene does not also become an argument used to give up on solutions 

and transformations or hold up the existing power and politics in the world-system.  Reducing the 

Anthropocene and its conceptualization, dominant or not, to an ethnocentric understanding of the 

relationship between humans and climate change that cannot break away from the power 

imbalances that created it removes agency from individuals and groups, especially less wealthy 

ones, while also diffusing responsibility into further abstraction will not help anyone (Smith 2018). 

Put differently, the aim in identifying external and internal constraints and pressures and how they 

shape or are shaped by external and internal processes is not to reinforce biased representations of 

rich countries as environmentally friendly and poor countries as corrupt polluters, but instead to 

recognize how both long-standing global inequalities and the agency of individuals, countries, and 

other groups interact in complex ways (Smith 2018). We are trying to recognize how global 

inequalities and the agency of individuals, countries, and other groups mutually construct each 

other.  

Although the analysis includes the full extent of data available, care should be taken when 

making claims beyond the time period and sample in the analysis. Future work may use updated 

data to strengthen or expand upon the analysis. In particular, the main independent variable in this 

analysis measures one specific aspect of a state’s environmental governance. Data availability on 

this measure severely reduces the sample and time period for which CO2 emissions are usually 

analyzed, which may impact the results of the study. Future data collection efforts, therefore, must 

expand to include administration with interest in environmental protection, environmental 

regulations, redistribution of government funds toward environmental efforts and away from 

carbon-intensive activities, and environmental education, among others (Duit 2016). While the 

data used in the study only reveals a partial picture of the environmental governance regime in 

countries, it is still an extremely important part of the picture, as state taxes for the environment is 

a representation of some combination of what proportion of funds they can collect from their tax 

payers for the environment and what the state thinks the environment deserves. Put differently, 

this measure captures how much a country values its environment monetarily, which in the current 

capitalist world-system is an important assessment of what a state cares about.  



 

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Moreover, while this research does attempt to differentiate grouping of countries within a 

global hierarchy beyond a trimodal system, it still homogenizes countries that are very different 

from one another, that have divergent external and internal constraints. The classification of 

countries also relies on economic data and decision-making from the World Bank (2019), which 

makes these distinctions particularly biased. Thus, those who interpret this research should be 

cognizant of this generalization and bias and work toward more encompassing conceptualizations.  

Despite these shortcomings, the present research reminds us of the importance of breaking 

down data and analyses by income level to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of how factors 

impact CO2 emissions (Shorette 2012). Given the findings, it is important for future research to 

continue to understand how long-standing global power imbalances, especially within the global 

division of labor, impact a country’s ability to reduce environmental issues. Going forward, we 

must continue to problematize the role of environmental governance in the future of the 

Anthropocene from a critical perspective using world-systems and other global political-economic 

perspectives while also attempting to interrogate the ways in which we are embedded in and 

perpetuate the current geopolitics of knowledge through our research. 

 

 

 

About the Authors: Jamie M. Sommer is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University 

of South Florida. Her research focuses on how internal and external factors interact to impact 

environment and health outcomes at the global level. Andrew Hargrove is a Ph.D. candidate at 

Stony Brook University. His research focuses on the intersections of political economy, 

international development, public health, and the environment 

 

Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the guest editors Michael Murphy and Leslie 

Sklair, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and helpful insights on our article. 

We would also like to thank John Shandra, Andreas Duit, and Kristen Shorette for their help and 

support.  

 

Disclosure Statement: Any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of 

the article’s text. Otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon 

submission of the article to the journal. 

 

 

 

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