

# Rationalism and Future Political Islam in Indonesia

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## ABSTRACT

This paper aims to examine the Muslim rationality in legislative and executive election, and also to understand the reason why they choose national party, or Islamic party based on the alkali data of legislative and executive election in West Sumatera from 2004-2009 periods. The paradigm of research is a rational choice theory. This paradigm helps to understand the political behavior of Muslim in West Sumatera in legislative and executive election of 2004-2009 period. Finally, the research finds out that Muslim in West Sumatera always make a political choice rationale, and ignore the primordial consideration to choose the party. This fact is crucial factor why the Islamic party was lost in West Sumatera, and other places in Indonesia.

Keywords: Political Islam, Rationalization, Democracy, the rational choice theory.

## ABSTRAK

Tujuan penulisan paper ini adalah untuk mengetahui rasionalitas umat Muslim dalam pemilihan legislatif dan eksekutif. Dan juga untuk memahami alasan kenapa mereka memilih Partai Nasional, atau Partai Islam. Dengan data yang bersifat alkali dari pemilihan legislatif dan eksekutif di Sumatera Barat; dari periode 2004-2009. Paradigma penelitian ini adalah Teori Pilihan Rasional. Paradigma ini membantu memahami perilaku politik dari Muslim di Sumatera Barat pada saat periode pemilu legislatif dan eksekutif 2004-2009. Pada akhirnya, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa Muslim di Sumatera Barat selalu membuat pilihan politik yang rasional, dan mengabaikan pertimbangan primordial untuk memilih partai. Fakta ini merupakan faktor krusial kenapa Partai Islam mengalami kekalahan

di Sumatera barat dan daerah lain di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci: Islam Politik, Rasionalisasi, demokrasi, Teori Pilihan Rasional

## INTRODUCTION

Constructive interpretation of the influence of Islam can be traced through the historical approach and the dynamics of contemporary Islam with respect to the factors and context of the emergence of Islam (Lijakumpu, 2006:3). The emergence of “Political Islam” is the contemporary face of Islam that developed at this time, and grows in countries or in Muslim-majority countries that are open to the participation of Islamic politics as Turkey and Indonesia. Indonesia as the largest Muslim country can be categorized as a nation which is open to receive and even encourages the growth of Islamic politics. It can be seen in the presence of various Islamic parties with their promordial network system accompanying the development of democracy in Indonesia.

If traced back, the rise of political Islam in Indonesia has started prior to Indonesian independence. The waves were strong more and more, when Indonesia became independent, and make the election as part of the pillar and procedural democracy. In this condition the various Islamic political parties emerged. Presumably, this is part of the political attitudes of Muslims in Indonesia qua a nation (*Indonesia as a nation*) the desire to participate in building democracy and strengthening the nation-state, *nation-state*. It also makes Indonesia complete with a portrait of democracy growing on it be interesting to understand. Fauzan Ali Rashid (2010:1-4) suggests three assumptions made Islam and democracy, with political Islam qua interesting locus to be discussed. *First*, political Islam in Indonesia is different patterns with Islamic movement in different Islamic countries. One difference is the inclusion of local culture in a democracy. *Secondly*, Islam as religious affiliation of the people has the ‘power’ politics is quite large. *Third*, political Islam has a history of struggle and resistance series<sup>1</sup>.

In line with Fauzan Ali Rashid, the study Rizal Sukma (2004:9) explains that long before the Dutch came and change the political structure in Indonesia, Islam has a privileged position. It can be seen from several major kingdoms in the archipelago-from the Sultanate of Aceh in the west to the Sultanate of Ternate and Tidore in the south-Islam has

become a dominant belief system, not just at the elite level but affect the structure of the royal kingdom as a whole. In this context it can be seen later became the pillars of Islam and the material is important for democracy in Indonesia. Interestingly, prior to democracy in Indonesia growing and developing as a political character Indonesia, Islam has indeed become a force not only to 'bulldoze' imperialism-colonialism, but also as forming the face of democracy in Indonesia.

Dynamics and political battle is forces of political Islam in Indonesia, looking at the period of parliamentary democracy (1955-1956). During a parliamentary democracy, political Islam occupies important position in the nation's political dynamics. Political parties like Masyumi, NU and Perti as a representation of the strength of Islam gained a significant voice in the election; Masyumi (20.9), NU (18.4) and Perti (1.4). Due to the failure of parliamentary democracy and representation became a destination majority Indonesia, President Soekarno rated as the base for the political instability in the country, making Soekarno turn around the political policy of parliamentary democracy to a democracy. Although Islam under this new political model faded as a political force, but Islam has become one of the pillars of the forces that determine the fate of empires Soekarno. Exceed dramaturgy Old Order regime, interesting to note how the twisted political Islam in the early days of the Indonesian state.

The data above can be used as an indicator that political Islam is not only a part of a democratic practice Indonesia, but also the pillars that make up the face of politics and the life of the nation and state of Indonesia. Islamic Politics in Indonesia is full of romance, from anomalous to unexpected surprises. According to Assyaukanie (2010:3) although it is still too early to say Indonesia as a model of democracy in the Muslim countries, but taking into account the way of democracy in Indonesia over the past decade and how it practices Islamic values, Muslim countries might turn to Indonesia as a model, or at least as a *benchmark* to see how the issue of Islam and democracy are discussed. However, Indonesia has experienced a process of democratization that is different from all Muslim countries. There are anomalies in the middle of Islamic parties electoral victory in the Middle East, Indonesia actually showed the op-

TABLE1. ACQUISITION OF SOUND DYNAMICS IN ELEC

NO	PARTY	% VOICE	CHAIR	NO	PARTY	% VOICE	CHAIR
1	PNI	22,3	57	16	Partai Murba	0,5	2
2	Masyumi	20,9	44	17	Baperki	0,5	1
3	NU	18,4	45	18	PIR Wongsonegoro	0,5	1
4	PKI	16,4	39	19	Gerinda	0,4	1
5	PSII	2,9	8	20	Permai	0,4	1
6	Parkindo	2,6	8	21	Partai Persatuan Dayak	0,4	1
7	Partai Katolik	2,0	6	22	PIR-Hazairin	0,3	1
8	PSI	2,0	5	23	PPTI	0,2	1
9	IPKI	1,4	4	24	AKUI	0,2	1
10	PERTI	1,3	4	25	PRD	0,2	1
11	PRN	0,6	2	26	Acoma	0,2	1
12	Partai Buruh	0,6	2	27	R. Soejono Prawirosoedarso	0,1	1
13	GPPS	0,6	2	28	Partai Lain, dan individu	2,7	-
14	PRI	0,5	2	29	PRIM	0,2	1
15	PPPRI	0,5	2	Total		100,0	

Sources: Fauzan Ali Rashid, 2010

posite result. Unlike in Egypt, Turkey, and others, the election is not a good event for the Islamic parties in Indonesia to gain power: in three elections since the fall of Seeharto, Islamic parties were always lost. There are important things conveyed by Luthfi Assyaukanie that Indonesian Islam is not really a positive correlation with political choices. Is this true?

Failure of Islamic politics in Indonesia is also traceable to the New Order era. According to Robert W. Hefner (2000:58) the failure of political Islam is due to the strong and effective power control of Suharto regime against the influence of Islam. In this condition, the power of Islam both in the elite and grass roots is not growing, and even, suffering 'temporary paralysis'. In political expression, the power of Islam fused at a party; United Development Party. Consequently, Islamic Politics in the New Order era was not developed. At the grassroots level of Muslims, the presence of the party is only used as a formal structure of politics and subterfuge New Order regime to calm the turmoil of Muslim elites. This condition is then termed as the 'domestication of Islam': a taming of Islam in order to not threaten the power. In different analysis, Greg Fealy (in Akbarzadeh and Saeed, 2003:150) explains that the failure of politi-

cal Islam in Indonesia from the 1950-1980s was mainly caused by the mentality of the political leaders of Islam as well as Muslims which is large in quantity, but a minority mentality. Why Greg Fealy expresses such extreme views? Greg Fealy seems to depart from the reality of politics in Indonesia, where Islamic parties tend to be second class as an option in the community. Islamic parties have no power to grab the attention of Muslims in Indonesia.

Study of Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani on conflict of Islam as a religion and democracy as a form of government in Indonesia found two typical of Islamic politics; 'Islamic parties' and '*Islamists parties*'<sup>2</sup>. This difference seems to depart from the two forms of public response to the Islamic parties in Indonesia. According to this study 'Islamic parties - PKB and PAN - in the 1999 election are more likely to be accepted than' *Islamists parties*'- PKB and the United Nations. Departing from this study, it seems interesting to understand how real reasoning or rationalization of Muslims against their political choices. By understanding the political fate of Islam and Muslim political choices by rational choice perspective, it is hoped that Muslim political choices can be assessed and evaluated based on forms of reasoning underlying political behavior choices.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

An action or an option over a certain form of behavior is underlied by unique and specific reasoning. Amartya Sen (in Elseter, 1986:61) explains that the preference of human behavior is determined by the choice itself. Making a choice is psychological problems, in terms of a choice determination.

A choice is also social problem: it is constructed by social forces surrounding the actor when choosing and deciding a choice. Beyond assumptions built by Amartya Sen, when discussing the options in relation to rationality automatically deliver the theory of "utility" (*maximization paradigm*) which is popular economics.

Fuad Aleskerov, Denis Bouyssou, & Bernard Monjardet (2007:31) asserts that the relationship between rationality and choice is close and inevitable. It can be traced from the model selection based on the para-

digm of maximizing (*maximization paradigm*). If so, what is the underlying assumption that the maximization paradigm can be a powerful and robust for understanding the relationship between choice and rationality? Peter C. Fishburn (1968:335) explains that utility theory is the study of human preferences or values; under the assumption that every human being has its own method of calculation of the actions and behaviors. More and more clear that the paradigm of utility networks, actions, and choices of human behavior are based on the calculation of highly rational and measured.

The study of Nicolaas J. Vried of *Rational Behavior and Economic Theory* (1995:263-264) explains that humans can be assessed as steady as *homo economics*. Terminology of *homo economics* is grounded by empirical reality, and even looks very natural that people will always decide and choose an act of political economy which is also based on the calculation of opportunistic behavior; how lucrative that choice for themselves (*self-interest oriented*). Other terms of utility paradigm is “*cognitive science*”: an approach, methodology questioned the “*reasons*” (reasoning) and decision making (*decision making*). Craig R.M. McKenzie (2003:403) considers that one popular approach used by scientists to question and understand the relationship of “rationality” and “choice” is a methodology cognitivist, where reasoning and its relationship with the option to then be built in modeling. Both paradigms utilities, and cognitivist basically stopped at the same point, which is sure of the relationship between the ‘rationality’ and choice, good choice to act in the world economy and world politics.

Another term that may also explain the relationship between the rationality of choice and then called the ‘rational choice’ is the concept of “*bounded Rationality*” or “limited rational choice theory.” What is the theory? How to do with the ‘rationality’ and ‘choice’? Till Grüne-Yanoff (2007:534) interprets the concept of ‘*bounded Rationality*’ is used in four domains, namely, *first*, to criticize the theory of standard (read: the theory of classical rationalism is too normative), and *second*, to enrich the behavioral models and theories *third*, to provide the appropriate rationale, *fourth*, fully explain the rational concept. In this context, exploration of concept of ‘*bounded Rationality*’ seems to help explain how the real essence of

'rationality' itself, to then be connected to the 'choice' of politics. The concept of 'limited rational choice' is the behavior of individuals who continue implicated (Grüne-Yanoff, 2007:537-538). Can be expressed phenomenon that has become a separate and independent phenomenon in the social structure because real people are always faced with limited choices. In this condition the calculations are accurate and have a higher rationality required by humans before deciding on a choice and social action. If so, how the concept of rationality that was very economical then used as a theoretical concept to explain political behavior?

It is James Buchanan (1998) who territorialized or extend the theory of rationality which is formerly confined in economics then transformed in studies that are concerned about political behavior. James Buchanan in *Politik by Principle, Not Interest* (1998:3) describes the phenomenon of political-interest or 'politics by interest': a reality of elite political behavior driven by opportunistic calculations, the effect of the human tendency constantly, *simultaneously*, to understand themselves as bidders, suppliers, buyers and sellers. Similar reasoning then forms political behavior to plunge-both at the elite and grassroots-utilitarianism into the horizon: a behavior that is based on the calculation of pragmatism-"profit, but do not want to lose." Assumption of James Buchanan's political would clarify the 'red thread' between rational choice economists who grew up in the environment with the use of rational choice James Buchanan to understand political behavior, political behavior both elite and grass roots (*grass root society*). In genealogical thread is visible from the building of the assumptions underlying the analysis of James Buchanan. For her 'reasoning' that affect, behavioral constructs of political choice and political action with 'reasoning' that exist in economic behavior (Buchanan, 1998:3). This means that political behavior can be assessed rationally when politicians choose to act for mode benefit. This assumption is actually derived from the paradigm of utilitarianism which believe that every human being will always be faced with the desire to maximize self-interest. In this context, how the behavior and response of the political Islamic society to be understood? Zuly Qodir in *Political Sociology of Islam: Political Islam and Democracy Constellation Indonesia* (2012:8, 21 & 51) have tried to explore the response and attitude of Muslims toward politi-

cal Islam. There are at least three Indonesian Muslim attitudes toward political Islam developing in Indonesia, *the first*, Islam requires the formalism of Islam in Indonesia.<sup>3</sup> *The Second* is substantial's Islam which emphasizes the importance of ethics (Islam) in the roles of state<sup>4</sup>. *The third*, Islamic secularism needs to see that a strict separation between Islam and the affairs of state. Islam took care about the worship of God, and the care of social issues such as education, poverty reduction, suffering people and so on. S Zuly Qadir has unmasked the Muslim response to the politics of Islam, especially the Islamic parties which is not constant even though Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia. Because of the dynamics of political behavior and political behavior in response to the two sides are to be seen and understood. At the other end, or the reasoning behind the selection process of rationalization of Muslim political choice, is what drives the dynamics of the behavior of political elites and the Muslim response to it. Then what about the fate of political Islam, more specifically Islamic parties in Indonesia?

## METHODS OF RESEARCH

The types of this research is studied as research evaluation of rationalization in development phenomenon at Islamic political in Indonesia. The methods of data collection in this research are interview and literature from types of secondary data, both of the book, journal, and mass media. Analysis method of this research is critical analyzing, i.e: resources of primer data in this analysis by critical toward secondary data and then directing conclusion taking.

## RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

If Kikue Hamayotsu (2011:133) put the question why some political parties based on religion terribly *survive* after adopting a moderate ideology, then similar questions are also worth asking is why Islamist parties in recent elections in Indonesia, tends to decrease electability? Studies on electability Kikue Hamayotsu National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) could be an illustration that even though the two parties (PKB-Islamic party - and PKS Islamic party) together make Islam as a political ideology inspiration but public response to both dif-



ferent, even high-contrast and opposite each other. After the third wave election (read: Election 2009) the fate of the Islamic parties in elections seem bleak fate (Hamayotsu, 2011:136).

Kikue Hamayotsu chooses two parties, because both parties that represent these two categories of political Islam in Indonesia, *Islamists and Islamic party party*. CLA has from polar of *Islamic party* and the *Islamists of PKS party*.

TABLE2. MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1999-2009) ORIGINATING FROM ISLAMIC PARTIES

PARTY	1999		2004		2009	
	VOTE (%)	SEAT	VOTE (%)	SEAT	VOTE (%)	SEAT
PAN	7.12	34	6.44	53	6.01	43
PBB	1.94	13	2.62	11	1.8	0
PKB	12.61	51	10.57	52	4.94	27
PKS	1.36	7	7.34	45	7.8	57
PPP	10.7	58	8.15	58	5.3	39
TOTAL	33.73	163	35.12	219	25.85	166

Sources: Hamayotsu Kikue 2011

The table shows that a significant reduction in electability Islamic parties from one election to another. There is a tendency that more ideologically Islamist parties like PKS outperform the more moderate Islamist parties like PKB. Domination PKS seats in the 2009 election as many as 57 seats, ahead of PKB that only get 27 seats in the same year is a fact. If the dynamics and fluctuations electability Islamic parties take place among Islamic parties, then what if compared with the nationalist parties that do not rely on 'Islam' as a determinant factor to lure voters (*voters*). Shall Islamic parties have good luck or bad luck as even having experienced a moderate Islamic party? Despite the downward trend electability moderate Islamic parties such as PKB and PAN, but durability as a political party is stronger than Islamic parties such as non-moderate MCC and the United Nations. Beyond this fact, both moderate Islamic party and non-moderate, both equally decreased electability rather than nationalist parties. Why is that and how is this proved?


Participation of Muslims and political preferences in West Sumatra, for example, seems to explain how the fate of the Islamic parties in elec-

tions when compared to the nationalist parties. In fact, voter turnout in the elections 2004 and 2009 showed a positive thing, in which the percentage of the voting was relatively higher when compared to abstain; 75.56% voting, and 24.44% were abstain. While the 2009 elections, 70.46% used their voting rights and 29.54% abstain (KPUP province West Sumatra 2005-2009). Legislative Election Data DPR, DPR, in the province of West Sumatra in 2004 and 2009 showed that the political participation of Muslims in West Sumatra can be assessed as a positive thing, because political participation increases every time the election. Is this high level of participation, something where the majority of Muslim voters in West Sumatra? In that sense, whether choosing a religious piety, where Muslims make everything or anything that is attached to a generative in Islam, is seen as a piety? Apparently, choosing is not a devotional, but only part of the responsibility as citizens of Indonesia. Muslims in the West Sumatra believe that selecting or giving voting rights is the responsibility as citizens, not as representing the religious attitude; although MUI or presence of political Islam may color the constellation of local politics, but people interpret their actions or political choice not an expression of religious piety.

Referring to the study Nurus Righteous (2011) on the political choices of Muslims in West Sumatra shows clearly that voting in elections is not the encouragement of religion, but as the fulfillment of one's responsibilities as a citizen. The views Aris and Alfian fairly represent that abstain or voting not represents the attitude of the religious person. Aris a woman home nearly all elections followed properly. For Aris voting at any election saw as a matter of routine and responsibility as a good citizen. Golput is not unlawful, because a lot of people who do not know how the personality of the person who will be selected. Nowadays few people have the decency to be chosen as a leader, let alone the candidates' positions only hunt for their own advantage Yanti added. Alfian a man who works as a small trader, his life was never to vote in the election, due by Alfian, besides his voice was not quite significant in influencing political life, elections also did not bring concrete benefits for life. Instead of anti toward politics, but there are still many who need more serious thought. Although no vote, yet still continue to run elections, and nearly everyone

received the election results' Alfian said that all his life had never used their right to vote in any election.

The following quantitative data strengthen the qualitative data above, where both the data equally show no positive relationship between religion and political choices of Muslims in West Sumatra. There are five factors and reasons why people give partisipasi politiknya in choosing, first, 45.08% of voting rights using the action is driven by the belief that the rights and responsibilities as citizens. Second, holds 16.67% chose was the arena show and get the existence of a good citizen. Third, using a 3.79% voting rights aim to avoid social sanctions. Fourth, using a 14.77% voting rights with determinates in order to get the leaders of Indonesia, and runs fine. Fifth, only 7.95% who believe that choosing is part of the responsibility as Muslims and religious people (Nurus, 2011:128).



Whether this can be considered as symptoms of secularization or rationalization for just the sort of political choice? In general, Muslims believe that commitment to God Almighty must have social implications: an impact of religion on the lives of a better world. This was later termed by Heirich Matthee (2008:39) with a positive correlation between monotheism and social life. Matthee Heirich views this relationship with the Muslim political choice and political participation of Muslims to establish a democracy, sometimes encouraged by Islam. But it is not necessary; steady, and constant but the relationship is a dynamic thing.

Bob Hefner as determined Zuly Qodir (2007:166) thesis progressed

to symptoms ‘whelm’ in Indonesia, a fact that Muslims in Indonesia more and more *fragmented*. It is run over in the absence of political control qua that the potential for violence and conflict more and more enlarged. How can this be connecting with Muslim political choices? For the political elite’s, the fragment condition of the Muslims; fragmented assess profitable. This condition makes it possible to establish more Islamic parties and enliven the party-electoral democracy in Indonesia. Islamic parties does not growth automatically attract attention, not even able to win the hearts of Muslims in Indonesia. Zuly Qodir (2007:167) with reference to data from KPU/15 April 2004 explained that the Islamic parties and candidates that carry the Islamic identity is not the top choice of Muslims in Indonesia. In fact, the PPP is finished fourth, 8:27%, 7:13% MCC in sixth, the Crescent Star Party 2.52%, 2.28% Reform Star Party, Unity Party Nahdatul Umah Indonesia 0.78%. The question arises as fact “wretched” of his electability Islamic parties in Indonesia is why it happened in the middle of the Muslim community is so great, whether it’s a sign that there is a process of rationalization of the political choices made by the Muslims?

On view of political behavior of politicians in Indonesia does not go away, but all of it was recorded and then evaluated by the people, especially Muslims. Robert Grafstein (1999:15) uses a rational approach to understanding the behavior of political elites, how they portray themselves, how they socializing with voters, or *voters*. She gave birth to a theory to explain the desirability of a politician with various combinations of “state” and “quirky behavior” to determine a person’s level of desirability. If the political elites-candidates, and political parties have separate and distinctive way to subdue the Muslims, then Muslims as voters also have a rationality that is also typical to decide to whom they give credence. So what kind of reasoning is?

There are many forms of political choice considerations. Consideration is made of typical reasoning, and determinants of the image surface (*surface of performance*) displayed by politicians and political parties. Associated with this view, today’s face of political Islam in Indonesia is moving in the era termed Pierre Rosanvallon (2008:173) and with “*the age of deselection*”; an era where politicians decay voter confidence or deselection.

ing. Reason etymological (*the etymological sense*) to select candidates or legislative candidates is not flexible to choose all the candidates, but the reason it is faced with choices. In this condition the image and the performance of the candidates of the Islamic parties to determine voters' decision to give voice to their beliefs or political party. Unfortunately, in Indonesia the appearance and *performance* of candidates even Islamic parties are not privileged. It encourages voters to rethink their support for the Islamic party and its candidates, but even it is not uncommon that withdrew their support. It can be traced from the preferences Muslims an increasingly declining against Islamic parties. Why is that, does this signify that Islam is no longer a preference or a reference to Muslims in the political choice, then how is this explained?

The results of the legislative elections in 2004 and 2009 in West Sumatra at least be used as a marker that religion (read: Islam) does not always correlate with political choices. Although the majority of constituencies in West Sumatra are ethnic Minang (88.35%) and Muslim (98.04%), but the large number of Muslim constituents rate able straight with their political choices, even more nationalist party of choice for Muslims than Islam-based parties. The data in 2004 and 2009 legislative elections fairly representative excused for this thesis. Despite the achievements of Islamic-based parties in the 2004 legislative elections to win political contestation to gain 327 seats (54.05%) of the 605 contested seats (550 seats for District / City, and 55 seats for provincial parliament), while the nationalist party gained 249 seats ( 40.82%). However, the difference of 44 seats (8.00%), the victory of the Islamic party is not so significant when compared with the ratio of the number of voters who are predominantly Muslim (98.04%).

The results of the 2004 legislative election may be gauge how true religion (Islam) does not always correlate with the political choices people. Moreover, if the assumption that *the larger Muslim constituency in an area, the greater the chances of winning the party's Islamic-based political contestation*; tested with data 2009 legislative elections, the look is not righteous ratable between Islam and political choices people. If the Islamic parties in the 2004 election were able to win 44 seats (8.00%), is not the case in the 2009 election. Political contestation in the 2009 elections, Islamic

parties suffered a crushing defeat, and only able to gain 241 seats (43.82%) of the 610 seats contested in each district / city and province. Islamic Party is not only able to maintain his voice gained in the 2004 election, they just have to lose 27 seats in the 2009 legislative elections.

Data is increasingly confirming that in practice there distancing between ideology by choice or lack of relationship between Islam as an ideological basis to the Muslim political choices. Because there are other things to be considered in political choices qua *track record*, level of confidence, responsibilities, capability and performance (Nurus, 2011:134). It assumes there is a dynamic logic in mobilizing political choice, and the reason it was set up by the *performance* of political parties. Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan (2003:293) express assumption that political choice (*political voting*) is a rational choice. Told as a rational choice, because each voter always is considers the consequences of their political choices. In this context, Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan (2003:294) progress at least two assumptions of political choice as rational choice, namely: *First*, the decision to choose can be quite rational; *second*, a rational voter will decide to elect a legislative candidate based consideration of the social consequences if he chooses. Assumptions raised by Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan can be found in the legislative elections in West Sumatra. Muslims in the West Sumatra is more dynamic in providing support to political parties. However, Islam is not a decisive determinant of political choice in West Sumatra. It can be seen from the 72.35% of Muslims in West Sumatra first consider the capability of candidates or political parties, rather than ideological basis adopted by the party. Then, at the level of 62.12% Muslims also consider the performance of the candidates and the performance of political parties. Reinforced by the fact ironic, wherein Muslims in West Sumatra (merchants: 58.54%; workers: 50.00%) noted that the behavior of candidates from Islamist parties show no Islamic behavioral (Nurus, 2011:134-135). These facts came to be called the 'rational consideration': *a rational consideration* bases in Muslim political choices. Then, what about the future of Islamic parties in Indonesia?

## CONCLUSION

Political Islam, if it is still trapped in the logic of common opportunistic and not actually renew itself as a defender of the interests of the people and build closeness careful with political constituencies, it will arrive at its nadir. And the twilight of the political Islam is coming over. The question is why political Islam terribly shows grim face, particularly in Indonesia? Presumably the political movement and political force parties must recognize the answer, wherein Islamist parties are not able to perform as well as their arch-rivals, the secular parties. Graham E. Fuller in *The Future of Political Islam in 2004* provides an analysis of the relationship between the failures of political Islam with a growing image of Islam is at the root of fate opaque of Islamic parties. Graham E. Fuller (2004:48) considered that the polarity of the Islamist group has touched the lives of many lines is included in the political life, complete with character literalism inherent in it. Rely too much on symbols primordially-Islam and its doctrines-but not accompanied by a matching behavior with moral teachings and soothing imagery. This makes the image of the Islamic parties' terribly slump.

It was originally (Election 2004) PKS defeated Islamic parties are more moderate as PKB: but the popularity of Islamic parties cannot match the popularity of the secular parties that do not rely on religious symbols in drawing the attention of Muslims. Of this fact there is a paradox in the development of political Islam in Indonesia: one side of Muslims eager for Islamic parties really consistently applied, internalization of moral values and spirituality into political behavior. In contrast, Islamic political parties are stuck with the behavior of pragmatism. This then makes Muslims in Indonesia are pessimistic; to no longer believe in the Islamic parties. Presumably this is the impulse of the expansion of Islam are too wide into political territory that had meaning or perhaps siltation in accordance with what is implied by Mark Sedwick (2006:126) when Islam entered the region of practical politics, it is the opportunistic and pragmatism are more likely to be shown than the best side of Islam itself. In the eyes of Muslims, especially in Indonesia, Islamist parties are no longer believed to carry much less fight for the aspirations of Muslims, and secular parties benefited over the situation. Only with improved *performance*,



they were able to defeat the Islamist parties. If they Popularity terribly uphill, it is not the case with the Islamic parties, which are increasingly experiencing distrust: a condition of declining confidence in Islamic parties. This is caused by distance between “hope” and “reality”; between the desires of Muslims to the political parties with the political realities of Islam itself. Muslims finally concluded, Islamic parties are just tools for power, and it would meet his own destiny.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> A discussion of political Islam movement in Indonesia sees Alfian, *The Political Behavioral of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989. Deliar Noer, *Modern Islamic Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (New York: LP3ES, 1982). Harry J. Objects, and Sunrise Crescent, *Islam in Indonesia on the Japanese Occupation Period*, New York: Library Jaya, 1980. J. Boland, *Wrestling Islam in Indonesia*, Jakarta: Graffiti, 1985. Clifford Geertz, *Abangan, Rasta, Priyayi the Java Community* Ed. III, New York: Library Jaya, 1989. Hiroko Horikoshi, *chaplain and Social Change*, translation Umar Basalim and Andi Muarly Sunrawa, Jakarta: P3M, 1987. Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion, Case Darul Islam in West Java*, Jakarta: Graffiti, 1990. Etc... See also Fauzan Ali Rashid, *Democratic Indonesia: Experiences Largest Muslim Countries as Home Affairs*, (Paper Presented on Annual Conference on Islamic Studies: Banjarmasin, 1-4 November 2010).
- <sup>2</sup> The difference is presumably based on the fact sociological and ideological forms of Islamic parties. In this case, the term ‘Islamic parties’ ask the Islamist parties that have formed the basis of Islamic masses, and cultural-religious ties such as PKB and PAN. While the term ‘Islamists parties’ refers to the Islamic parties formed through political ties-ideological; party’s more radical is the meanings of Islam in relation to the state, such as the MCC and the United Nations. See Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, *Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam*, retrived at [www.lsi.or.id/riset/385/Indonesian% 20Democracy](http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/385/Indonesian%20Democracy), accessed at 28-



11-2012 | At 08: 42 pm.

- <sup>3</sup> According to this view, is merely the Pancasila ideology-Rombak overhauled to suit the tastes of Indonesia, even the majority of Muslims who are residents of the archipelago. In a more explicit meaning, Indonesia should be based on Islam, so that Pancasila in Indonesia is a secular country that is still not clear alias as a Muslim majority country, as Pancasila is clearly not in accordance with the teachings of the absolute truth that comes from God. Therefore, Indonesia must be changed in order to get the blessing and benefit to all mankind (Zuly Qodir, 2012:8).
- <sup>4</sup> Ethical religion can provide a foundation in the management of the country. Formalization of religion in a country will only stunt Islam itself, Islam terribly narrow and limited only understood by the interpreter, whereas Islam away from it all. Got it believes that Islam is the one but it has a variety of colors (Zuly Qadir, 2012:21).

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