

Religious Identity Politics on Social Media in Indonesia: A Discursive Analysis on Islamic Civil Societies

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ABSTRACT

Since 2014, religious sentiment in Indonesian social media has been increasingly overwhelming. The strong religiosity of society leads to religious packaging to help convey any political articulation in social media mainly conducted by the Islamic civil societies. This article examines the political articulation uttered by *Muhammadiyah*, NU, and Muslim Cyber Army (MCA) as a representation of the democratization of Islamic civil society in responding to the contemporary political situation. Using the sentiment analysis and discursive analysis, this paper attempts to explain how Islamic organizations and groups build discourse and maintain its influence in social media as an alternative tone of political articulation. The results of this study indicate that social media has become a contested space of Islamic organizations and group to show their political position upon the government. The more an organization is close to the power the more it tends to reveal articulations that are in line with the government interest. Meanwhile, the opposing and incapable groups are securing the social media as a tool to delegitimize the authorities. The use of social media as a tool for political articulation is popular in the democratization among Islamic civil society but within the limits of democratic values applied. Social media can also be used to strengthen the discourse of religious politicization that has the potential to contradict democratization itself.

Keywords: Social media, identity politics, civil society, democracy

ABSTRAK

Sejak 2014, sentimen keagamaan di media sosial Indonesia semakin luar biasa. Religiusitas masyarakat yang kuat mengarah pada pengemasan agama untuk membantu menyampaikan artikulasi politik di media sosial yang terutama dilakukan oleh masyarakat sipil Islam. Artikel ini membahas artikulasi politik yang diucapkan oleh Muhammadiyah, NU, dan Muslim Cyber Army (MCA) sebagai representasi demokratisasi masyarakat sipil Islam dalam menanggapi situasi politik kontemporer. Dengan menggunakan analisis sentimen dan analisis diskursif, makalah ini mencoba menjelaskan bagaimana organisasi dan kelompok Islam membangun wacana dan mempertahankan pengaruhnya di media sosial sebagai nada alternatif artikulasi politik. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa media sosial telah menjadi ruang yang diperebutkan organisasi dan kelompok Islam untuk menunjukkan posisi politik mereka pada pemerintah. Semakin organisasi dekat dengan kekuatan semakin cenderung untuk mengungkapkan artikulasi yang sejalan dengan kepentingan pemerintah. Sementara itu, kelompok yang menentang dan tidak mampu mengamankan media sosial sebagai alat untuk mendelegitimasi pihak berwenang. Penggunaan media sosial sebagai alat untuk artikulasi politik sangat popu-

ler dalam demokratisasi di kalangan masyarakat sipil Islam tetapi dalam batas-batas nilai demokrasi diterapkan. Media sosial juga dapat digunakan untuk memperkuat wacana politisasi agama yang berpotensi bertentangan dengan demokratisasi itu sendiri.

Kata Kunci: media sosial, politik identitas, masyarakat sipil, demokrasi

INTRODUCTION

The internet and social media have been a part of Indonesian political campaign for more than a decade. Recently, most parties and candidates especially those who run for offices at the national level and urban regions use the internet and social media as part of their political marketing. Since the victory of Joko Widodo (Jokowi)-*Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok)* in 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election and *Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla* in 2014 Presidential election, the campaign excellence through social media expertise had become increasingly seen important ([Ahmad & Popa, 2014](#); [Tyson & Purnomo, 2017](#)). Simultaneously, the usage of Internet and social media in political contestations was also prevailing among civil societies to engage in discursive power and left pressure to the government. Consequently, such complexity made the electoral interests, and public discourse overlapping.

Meanwhile, since Indonesian democracy landscape has changed by the intricacy of social media and social movements, little attention draws on how the Islamic civil societies also shape political articulation by the internet and social media. In the 2014 presidential election, for instance, religious sentiments were increasingly overwhelmed in which Jokowi was often imaged as an anti-Islam figure in various websites and social media accounts ([Utomo 2013: 67](#)). The cynicism of some Islamic groups, especially among conservatives against Jokowi in social media continues even to the presidential election was over.

The power of using religious impression in social media took a decisive momentum in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. When the incumbent and Jokowi's close ally, *Ahok*, was accused of blaspheming Quran, the message in social media

had rapidly widespread and prompted a wave of mass action from Islamic groups during September-December 2016 ([Herdiansah et al., 2017](#)). The *Ahok's* depleted electability has helped his contender, *Anies-Sandi* who backed by national opposition parties and hard-line Islamist groups, won the race. The rivalry in 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial has extended the fracture of the pro Jokowi's government and the hard-line Islamic groups and communities. Political vengeance prevailed after that. The at-torney then prosecuted *Buni Yani*, the one who allegedly had broadcasting *Ahok's* speech in social media. The government also enacted Government Regulation for Substituting Law about Civil Organisation (*Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan or Perppu of Civil Organisation*) that automatically dissolved *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI), an Islamic organization that is actively mobilizing their mass in pro-testing *Ahok's* blasphemy. Jokowi, however, sought to convince that he was not ideologically hostile toward Islamic elements. In showing that intent, he conducted a tour to Islamic board-ing school (*pesantren*) as well as hold meetings with prominent Islamic organizations such as *Muhammadiyah*, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), and *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI).

When Jokowi exposed confidence to the main Islamic organizations, other 'marginal' Islamic communities tend to strengthen their critical voice in social media. The Muslim Cyber Army (MCA) is a virtual community which emerged in the middle of political disrupt and loudly promotes particular framing on socio-political issues as a resistance praxis against the government in Twitter. However, both *Muhammadiyah* and NU were not necessarily submissive to the will of the government. Through their own Twitter account, the two organizations also show distinct position on some social-political issues. For ex-ample, in the case of *Perppu* of Civil Organization enactment and full day school policy, *Muhammadiyah* and NU perform their definite viewpoint. In assessing the dynamics of religious political life in the contemporary Indonesian democracy, this

article tries to explain how Islamic civil societies, represented by *Muhammadiyah*, NU, and MCA articulate thoughts in the social media especially in the context of the political constellation after 2014.

The struggle of Islamic organizations or groups by involving themselves in political discourse in social media need to be elaborated in explaining the development of religious and political relations in Indonesian democracy. This article highlighted that the existence of the social media has made political articulation is no longer a privilege of organization and group elites that loaded with vested interests. Everyone can express their own opinion and share their views with others until it is strong enough to form traditional collective action. Online articulation regarding social-political issue by Islamic organizations and groups not only show how social media encourage digitally net-work collective action but also empower the marginalised group to engage their collective voice. Social media provides an inter-mediary function for Islamic civil societies to express opinions openly that could attract media attention, thus fuelling public debate. The capability of transforming digital civic engagement into actual collective action without mediation by political parties or other diverse social organizations is the inevitable consequence of the social media employment ([Barisione & Ceron, 2017: 78](#)).

This article seeks to analyze the findings and discussion according to the following questions: how do the *Muhammadiyah*, NU, and MCA articulate their meaning construct on social media regarding social-political issues, and how do they perceived Jokowi's government policy that would affect their interest? To scrutinise the political articulation of Muhammadiyah, NU, and MCA in social media, we use Laclau's discursive analysis that focuses on what Derrida calls 'difference.' The theoretical assumption is that every political discourse is always partially constructed and never entirely signifies all meaning structure ([Laclau and Mouffe, 1985](#)). As [Andersen \(2003: 50\)](#) argues,

Laclau's concept of discourse has two characteristics. First, discourse ought to be distinguished from just a political articulation because it is the result of a practice that 'is capable of differentiating itself from its surroundings.' Second, discourse ought to be also seen as an attempt to construct a fixed relationship between the signifier and signified within any discursivity, such as identity, norm, symbol, subjectivity, and object. Therefore, it can be said that discourse 'is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre ([Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 112](#)).

To observe the discourse's attempt in constructing a centre, Laclau uses Lacan's psychoanalysis by observing *point de capiton* (nodal points, in Laclau's term) or the centre of discourse, in which he differentiates moment (discursive articulation) and element (non-discursive articulation) ([Laclau and Mouffe, 1985](#)). The moment here can be seen as a set of discursive structure that signifies, for instance, the truth and believe that the conservatives claim, the symbol and language they use, and the antagonism and 'evil' they counter. This limited meaning structure, however, results 'surplus of meaning' and also 'dislocation' as it cannot entirely signify all of the element into a fixed relationship ([Andersen, 2003](#)). As the element is always undecidable and contingent, every discursive structure will inevitably collapse and re-articulated. For instance, the discursive structure that is constructed in Joko Widodo's administration invites some reactions in Islamic conservatives, such as the support of Widodo's party to Ahok, a Christian and of a Chinese-decent candidate, in the last Jakarta gubernatorial election. The candidacy was indeed criticised and problematized by some Islamic conservative, especially after the controversial religion blasphemy committed by Ahok. In this regard, the moment can be found in various articulation, especially in social media.

As for the research context, the two largest Muslim organisations, NU and *Muhammadiyah*, that their influence on state power has been acknowledged ([Mietzner, 2013](#); [Singh, 2003](#)),

become the main spotlight. They have already formed an online vigour to organise better and mobilise the spread of ideas and their struggles in cyberspace. Beside those reputable organisations, there is an independent and growing online force, called Muslim Cyber Army (MCA) that emerged as distinct voice message than the mainstream organisations. They are thought as fighting for Islamic interests which they say are often marginalised. Consistently attacking the government, the MCA seems to have a secure connection the 212 movement diehards and its Islamist counterparts. Most of their tweets are contain about global Islamic issues such as the Palestine and Rohingya. The internet and social media have open up articulations with less dependent on the formal organisation or authorised knowledge ([Milner, 2013](#)), and it will likely bring a new meaning in democratizing Islamic civil societies.

The discussion will be directed to the comparison of each organisation and the community in response to several issues. The observed period is during 2016-2017 and focuses only on particular issues of concern to the public. The first issue is the case of the blasphemy by Ahok that extend to the 212 commemorations by the conservative wings of Islamic groups. The issue had drawn the attention of almost all Muslim organisations and groups, and the awareness to support Muslim leaders in election continually preserved by the hardliners as represented by the MCA. The second issue is the imposition of Full Day School by the government, which in the early period the discourse has been divide NU and *Muhammadiyah* on the diametric position. As a vessel of the traditional Islamic school, NU showed a firm rejection of the policy allegedly could threaten madrasah existence. On the other side, *Muhammadiyah* supports the policy as the minister of culture and education, Muhajir Effendi, come from their rank and hold a responsibility to execute the policy. The last issue being discussed here is the enactment of *Perppu* of Civil Organisation that on the first effect was the dissolution of *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) by the government. Responding

the issue, NU support the policy to uphold national unity, while *Muhammadiyah* gave critical view because they thought it could harm democracy. The MCA thought the policy is an intense depiction that the government has abused Muslim communities. The response to those socio-political issues reflects the ideological principles of each organisation or group while struggling to pursue their aims amid the ongoing political constellation.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH FOCUS

Islamic Civil Societies in Indonesia Political Spectrum

The concept of civil society in Indonesia has a character that cannot be equated with the sense rooted in modern Western culture. When civil society is characterized as an aggregate of interest of non-governmental institutions and organizations that uphold democratic values, only few civil societies in the country tend to be exclusive and intolerant towards minorities. [Beittinger-lee \(2009\)](#) explains that the political contest and state intervention also form the nature of civil society in Indonesia, so it is necessary to distinguish between real civil society and uncivil society. In the latter case, civilian organizations and groups are grown with semi-military characters and tend to use violence, while the earlier case is defined as always actively promoting 'civility' culture and reject radicalism.

Referring to the categorization developed by [Latif \(2005\)](#), the prominent Islamic civil society in Indonesia can be historically divided into two groups: reformist-modernist and traditionalist. The reformist-modernists accept and adopt the progress of western thought, but still preserve its Islamic identity. The traditionalists, meanwhile, rejected western view and maintained the traditional religious values. Accordingly, the reformist-modernist Islamist movement was brought in by *Muhammadiyah* thinkers since 1912 who tried to reform the way to understand and practice Islam, while the traditionalist movement was more conserved by the NU movement established in 1926. In its development, the relationship between reformist-

modernist Islam and traditionalist Islam became very fluid, and both tended to accept many western conceptions and thought. For example, some contemporary NU-based thinkers founded the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) such as *Ulil Abshar Abdalla* and *Luthfi as-Syaukanie*. In *Muhammadiyah*, there were also emerging liberal thinkers such as *Syafii Maarif*, *Dawam Rahardjo*, and Muslim Abdurrahman who found *Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah* (JIMM). However, those liberal wings had never got significant support from the conservative proponents ([Bruinessen, 2013](#)).

The pivotal stance of *Muhammadiyah* and NU lies in their moderate character that builds democratization and pluralism in the country. However, when almost all scholars agree that both organizations have an ideological view that sustains democracy, tolerance, and national unity, not all members embrace the authentic moderation. [Hilmy \(2013\)](#) divided the tendency of monetarism of *Muhammadiyah* and NU members into three typologies: monetarism-radical, moderates-middle ground, and moderates-soft. The radicals tend to be more interested in puritanical Islamic ideas, as in the Salafist ideology. On the other hand, the moderate-middle ground is inconsistent in applying the methodology. Sometimes they feel comfortable using a literal approach to religious doctrine. In other words, even though the two organizations are known for their tolerance and democratic support, there are varieties within the bodies and a degree of inconsistency stances regarding particular social-political issues, which made them uneasy to resemble the western modes of civil society.

Known for its autonomous, Muhammadiyah and NU play an important role in national political praxis. In *Muhammadiyah*, Amien Rais who was the Chairman in 1995-2000, established the National Mandate Party (PAN) in 1998 that intended as a political vehicle for Muhammadiyah member. Nonetheless, PAN declared itself as an open and nationalist party because they realized the majority of votes were in the middle.

Consequently, the member of *Muhammadiyah* in regions should compete with others to get positions in the party and raised grievance that weakened the proximity to PAN ([Asyari, Sulthan, & Saifuddin-Jambi, 2007](#)). On the NU side, some prominent elites led by Abdurrahman Wahid founded the National Awakening Party (PKB) in 1998 as a political channel for the NU. They hold nationalist ideology alongside with *ahlussunah wal-jamaah*, the fundamental religious principle of the NU (Baswedan, 2004). Despite having the closeness of political party, the political power of *Muhammadiyah* and NU remain pervasive in national politics. Their cadres, especially the NU's, continually hold government positions since the 1950s to the present day ([Bush & Fealy, 2014](#)).

Besides the two prominent Muslim organizations, the categorization seemingly needs to be supplemented by the rising of the new Islamic movement in the 80s. The movements, which were inspired by the Pan-Islamist transnationalism, developed in several public campuses and commenced to dominate campus politics ([Tomsa, 2012](#)). Among them are tarbiyah movements, mainly carried out by HTI and the *Harakah Tarbiyah* (the origin of PKS), who used multilevel cell system as its regeneration method. What is interesting about the movements is its substantial involvement in politics. After the fall of Soeharto regime, the *Harakah Tarbiyah* have established an Islamist party called the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, or PK) and transformed into PKS. They signed the moderation on the surface to catch up electoral votes and played more pragmatist to secure political incentives. However, they are still running a semi-clandestine Islamist movement and conduct extra-parliamentary measures at the same time that cause them appear less moderate ([Tomsa, 2012](#); [Buehler, 2013](#)). Whereas the HTI, who is a part of major Asian chapter in the global caliphate movement, eventually showing their existence as a formal social organization. They insist on rejecting democracy while consistently criticize every government for allegedly its liberalist economy tendency

([Osman, 2010](#)).

The characteristics of each Islamic civil organization affect the political approach that they use. *Muhammadiyah* and NU took advantage of organizational and cultural strength, in which its cadres spread to various political parties, especially PAN and PKB, respectively. The diaspora of *Muhammadiyah* and NU cadres in diverse political organizations could be seen as a factor that brings closer accesses to the government. Also, with a large number of followers, *Muhammadiyah* and NU can manage mass mobilization that makes the government respects them. Theoretically, it is not difficult for both organizations to influence government policies. On the other side, for Islamic organizations or communities outside the mainstream, share difficulties in participating in the political process. They often utilized extra-parliamentary methods such as demonstrations and protests in expressing their voice. They also rely on the utilization of religious symbols as an effort to reach the Muslim majority's public sympathy.

Social Media and Identity Politics in Indonesia

There are various social media definitions, where some-times one has different categorization than another. For exam-ple, [Murthy \(2012: 1061\)](#) defines social media is another form of media that designed to facilitate social interaction, digital media sharing, and collaboration among users. The best example of social media is Twitter, where users can have public profiles and broadcast public messages, these messages become aggregated across users, and users can choose whose words to follow but cannot receive their messages. The character of social media is uni-directional, in contrast to social media that is automatically bi-directional. However, [Sfetcu \(2017\)](#) depicts social media as an all-encompassing media technology comprises of blogs, profes-sional social networks, corporate social networks, social gaming, video sharing and virtual tools. He specifies social network sites as a subset of social media, which is a web-based communica-

tion platform that allows individuals to expose their relationship publicly and sharing user-generated contents, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. In this article's context, social media refers to digital technology that used to transmit various forms of media or information to other people and let everyone share content that other user can share. Therefore, Facebook and Twitter, which mostly used by prominent Indonesian Islamic organizations and hardliner group to share their materials rather than building networks are treated as social media.

Media is an instrument to articulate identity-based political interests. In the modern era, mass media provides spaces for the public discourse that enables communities or groups to voice their aspirations or political views in influencing the political process. However, since business and political forces co-opted the mass media, the public discourse purity was being questioned. The internet and social media that were growing in the early 21st century get a remarkable welcome from the public. In Indonesia, in 2017 its internet users are one of the largest in the world with 132.7 million or about 50.4 percent of its total population. From various types of social media, Facebook and Twitter are the most abundant users of 88 million users, or 33.4 percent of the people in Indonesia (Internetworldstats. com, 2017). The rapid development of social media is in line with the ongoing open democracy. In a pluralist political system that benefit civil societies, social media becomes a means for every marginalized group (or by who feel being marginalized) in narrating their existence and pursuing aims.

Social media allows micro participation that facilitates individuals who are interested in particular issues. She or he can click the share button on news or other content media and add some opinion if they like to be responded by others. The social or political information that they share in social media are real-time, so the information made visible to others could cultivate digital collectively. The chain reactions are affecting individual lives for whole groups of people who are energizing the poten-

cy of collective action ([Margetts, John, Hale, & Yasseri, 2016](#)). When the discourse centre on the political issue, social media renders a way for users who share their ideology or opinions to conduct virtual meetings, and sometimes they continue with face-to-face interactions. As [Akhavan \(2013\)](#) observes Iran in the post-2009 presidential election, the combination of face-to-face and social media interaction provides a safe space to cross borders and exchange ideas. The successful movement that driven in virtual space could enlarge political mobilization. In a political contestation realm, political mobilization could benefit one party and wound the other one or at least give some dynamics to the political constellation. In this circumstance, social media resembles a discursive ‘battlefield’ for political actors or institutions who are struggling for their aims. Each side tries to bent public opinions, gather board supports, and get the mass media attention that according to their interests.

However, the political effort that mediated through an internet-based form of communication, such as via Facebook and Twitter, are considered marginal and have not significantly affected representative democracy. Its lack of boundaries and diffuseness limits political struggle based on social media. The vague situation could lead to the volatility of its goals with no clear and consistent perspective on the method to accomplished the mission ([Milner, 2013](#)). In the case of social media usage by NU, *Muhammadiyah*, and MCA, particular groups that have existed before in the non-virtual world. It is not the collectively or movement that build up inductively from micro participation, but organisations are imposing their stance in the political realm. To some extent, the ability of those Islamic organisations or group to produce collective organisation is tied up to the political power of numbers. According to [Duverger \(1972\)](#), It is highly developed techniques of the social organisation a large number of people, educated them politically, mobilise their energies, and channel and direct their actions to create effective political action. Nevertheless, the use of social media

in such way by religious organisations and groups could also be strengthening political identity. According to the narrative identity theory, conveying stories about them or showing themselves to others in the public is the same with how the identity of a person or groups is performed ([Whitebrook, 2014: 23](#)). Even though in democratic system identity politics is indulged, there are risks because it could lead to the practice that undermines democratic values and social capital, such as advancing their group above the society and celebrating group distinction that determined by religion, ethnicity or race ([Gutmann, 2003](#); [Eisenberg & Kymlicka, 2011](#)). Political mobilisation based on identity is vulnerable of being utilised as an instrumental vehicle by political elites to pursue their aims ([Weinstock, 2006](#)).

The effectiveness of social media in shaping identity is quite influential in the political constellation. Although the statement is debatable, at least the 2014 presidential election indicates that symptom. Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's victory, which is perceived as a liberal group, is driven by the mass media oligarchy and the expertise of the unbeaten teams and supporters in utilizing social media facilities ([Taspell, 2015](#)). Their successful cyber teams, such as Jokowi Ahok Social Media Voluntary (Jasmev), could manage to dominate discourse and strengthen Jokowi's electability. The mass media welcome opinions about Jokowi's uniqueness as content that is interesting to be published so that it gives a broader impact beyond the internet users. The fact that Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's victory is parallel with their popularity in social media reinforces the impression that social media is a powerful instrument in shaping public perceptions that influence political power. In turn, political power will determine the state's alignment in open spaces and shake up the configuration of discourses mastery which is previously dominated by conservative Muslims. Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's partisanship to minority groups leads to a more challenging condition for conservative domination ([Hamayotsu, 2015](#)).

RESEARCH METHOD

In gathering the data, we observed the social media accounts especially the Twitter from every subject which are NU, *Muham-madiyah*, and MCA. The observed Facebook account are NU Online, *Persyarikatan Muhammdiyah*, and Muslim Cyber Army, and the followed Twitter accounts are @nu_online with more than 300,000 followers and twits more than 100,000 posts, @ muhammdiyah with more than 120,000 followers and 52,000 posts, and @MCAOps with more than 14,000 followers and 91,000 posts. For the blasphemy issue of Ahok, we observed the online activities between September 2016 and April 2017. For the case of Full Day School policy, we watched the online events of the three accounts between June and September 2017. As for the issue of *Perppu* of Civil Organisation, we observed between Septembers to November 2017. There are two points that we analysed in the social media according to the research questions: 1) the political articulation; and 2) the perception of the government constructed by the analysed Islamic organisations. These two analytical tools were used especially in the chosen of three issues.

The data analysis in this paper was done in two stages. First, to comprehend the inclination of NU, *Muhammadiyah*, and MCA regarding the case of defamation by Ahok, full-day school policies, and the enactment of *Perppu* of civil organizations, we conducted a sentiment analysis by searching relevant contents from @Nu_online, @Muhammadiyah, and @MCAOps. Sentiment analysis is used to examine information available on the Internet, especially concerning opinions about a particular issue or product. This technique emphasizes the text mining on social media account that available on Twitter and Facebook that generated by the account owner and other users who put comments on it. The text-content carried on Twitter or Facebook that is showing opinions, attitudes, or sentiments then analysed categorically (Liu, 2015). In the analysis process, the classification of sentiment was divided into three classes, namely negative,

neutral, and positive. After collecting the posts according to each issue, we see the tendency of @Nu_online, @Muhammadiyah, and @MCAOps, whether they support or opposed to the issues. We also added the word cloud analysis using the word cloud generator to see the big picture of each discourse from the three accounts. Second, we discursively analyzed the gathered data by observing the whole structure of meaning constructed by the analyzed Islamic organisations' accounts through social media. This was important in understanding the raw data into the discursive categories developed by Laclau, which are the nodal point, the moment, and the element. The nodal point was seen by looking at the efforts of the Islamic organisations to construct the centre of meaning. Based on the chosen three issues in this research, every Islamic organisation constructed a very distinct meaning construction according to its political ideology. Then, we grouped the structure of meaning by differentiating the moment from the element. The moment is seen by identifying the symbols, statements, and the fixity of signification, which were discursively constructed to support the nodal point. This stage was useful to analyse the extent to which the meaning structure was articulated and its 'surplus of meaning.'

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Reactions on Ahok's Case

The national political situation, especially in the capital city of Jakarta, heated up with the emergence of religion blasphemy assumption by Ahok against Muslims. It was started with a video of Ahok's speech insulting Islam during a working visit in Seribu Archipelago uploaded by Buni Yani's account on Facebook. In the video, Ahok stated that in facing Pilgub DKI many people were using Quranic verses to fool the voters with religious sentiments (Tribunnews.com, 2017). The footage then becomes viral mainly due to Ahok's ethnic background and religious minorities. As a result, there were a variety of reactions from Islamists, such as the Islamic defamation act of November

4, 2017, which was followed by a second Islamic defamation act on December 2, 2017.

The case of allegedly blasphemy was increasingly heated up with Ahok's candidacy in Governor Election of DKI 2017. As an incumbent, Ahok was often positioned as an antagonist figure by the Islamists. It is exacerbated by the political support of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle as the ruling party in Ahok's candidacy in Jakarta. The political contestation between the majority of Islamists and the nationalist majority at the national level is now pervasive to the regional level, in particular with political support for candidates considered to have blasphemed Islam. With the exclusion of Islamist forces from national power in post-2014, the expression of extra-parliamentary conflicts through demonstrations by Islamic social organisations became the hallmark of powerful political articulation in compensating the political manoeuvring of nationalist forces in formal political institutions. The mass mobilisation carried out by Islamic social organisations in Jakarta back then was not only religious but also closely related to the political dimension.

Based on Twitter examination using sentiment analysis, there are quite striking differences between @Nu_online with @Muhammadiyah and @MCAOps. On the @Nu_online side, about 47 posts were collected regarding blasphemy case by Ahok where about 46.8 percent of it is within a positive category, 31.9 percent are neutral, and 21.23 percent are negative. If we look closely to the statements, the attitude of @Nu_online tends to show sympathy towards Ahok for toleration reasons and con-demning Ahok's actions that insult Muslims. Within postings, there are many negative comments on contents sympathizing with Ahok, both from those who claim as NU members and sympathizers as well as those outside of them. The considerable pressure from the NU grassroots seems to affect the attitudes of their elites regarding Ahok, especially when the chairman of the MUI who is also Rais Am PBNU, KH. Ma'ruf Amin, cornered by Ahok in the Ahok's trial. On the @Muhammadiyah

side, there were only about six posts about Islam blasphemy by Ahok. All the contents disclosed by @Muhammadiyah were put in the negative category, which means they did not show joy about Ahok's actions. Meanwhile, the most assertive stance on the case was indicated by @MCAOps, where all of their posts have negative tones.

TABLE 1. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @NU_ONLINE ABOUT AHOK

No.	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1	Ahok Sentenced for Two Years, PBNU: Honor the Legal Process!	1		
2	The joke of the secretary general of Nahdlatul Ulama when asking Ahok to oath the Syahadat			1
3	Visited by Ahok-Djarot, Kiai Said: We Must Accept Guests Well			1
4	Ahok-Djarot visit PBNU Discuss Masjid Raya in Daan Mogot			1
5	Ahok and Djarot tonight, Monday (10/4) visit PBNU			1
6	Mbah Moen Considered as Ahok Supporters for These Three Things			1
7	Kiai Said Denies Attending Istigotsah of Ahok's side Tonight		1	
8	Ahok case, GP Ansor Jatim Following Kiai Ma'ruf Amin Attitude		1	
9	'Nahdlatul Ulama supports KH Ma'ruf Amin in dispute with Ahok'		1	
10	Rais Aam NU forgives Ahok, calls on Nahdliyin to do the same			1
11	Muslims urged to restrain from rallying against Ahok's latest statements			1
12	The First Trial, Ahok Cried before the Panel of Judges			1
13	Ahok Case and Our Law Awareness		1	
14	Ahok Case and Our Law Awareness		1	
15	Police Chief Asks Mass Supports Ahok's Legal Process	1		
16	Ahok Case: Leave it to the Law, Watch the Process!	1		
17	Ahok Case: Leave it to the Law, Watch the Process!	1		
18	Ahok is Suspect, PBNU Urges Public Honoring Legal Process		1	
19	Ahok Case, Political Maturity Process		1	
20	Ahok Officially a Suspect of Blasphemy Case	1		
21	Ahok Case Will Be Accelerated		1	
22	PBNU Expect Ahok Case Completed Soon	1		
23	Kang Said: There are other Bigger Matters than Taking Care of Ahok		1	
24	Kabareskrim Perform More Detail Checks on Ahok	1		
25	Formula Facing Ahok ala Gus Mus		1	
26	Formula Facing Ahok ala Gus Mus		1	
27	Avoid Bad Prejudice, President Commits Open Case ...		1	
28	Kiai Said: Ahok's Statement Insult Muslims	1		
29	Bareskrim Still Sharpen Some Points Related to Ahok Statement		1	
30	FKDMI Asks Police to Involve Experts in Ahok Case		1	
31	Is Ahok Blaspheming Religion? This Explanation Ketum PBNU			1
32	Vice President: Ahok Will Be Processed Resolutely and Quickly	1		
33	Pagar Nusa NU Attitude Related Pilkada Jakarta, Ahok and Demo November 4th			1
34	PBNU ask Peaceful demonstration and Immediate Legal Process Ahok	1		
35	Intolerance in the Region Because of Anti-Ahok protest in Jakarta?			1
36	Bareskrim asked Information 10 Related Witnesses Ahok Case		1	

No. Statements	negative	neutral	positive
37 A Newspaper in Tasik Incorrectly put IPNU and Ansor Involved Action about Ahok			1
38 About Personal Threats, PBNU Chairman: Better Ahok Processed Law			1
39 Demonstration Location Near NU Office Tasikmalaya, Banser Be Ready			1
40 Ahok case's protest, PCNU Guarantees No NU members down action			1
41 Kiai Ma'ruf: MUI Not Supporting Related Protesting Ahok			1
42 Come to Bareskrim, Ahok Clarification Al-Maidah 51			1
43 The Hype of Ahok's Statement, Is This "Test The Water"?			1
44 Responding to Ahok's Statement, PBNU Chairman: Don't be Emotional!			1
45 Related Statement of Ahok, PBNU Chairman: MUI's fatwa is Less Wise			1
46 Ahok Apologizes To Muslims			1
47 Ahok and SARA Campaign in local elections in Jakarta			1
Amount	10	15	22
Percentage	21.23%	31.9%	46.8%

TABLE 2. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @MUHAMMADIYAH ABOUT AHOK

No Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1 Jokowi While Visiting PP #Muhammadiyah: I Emphasize Will Not Protect Ahok	1		
2 Goodwil Zubir : President Must Wise in Addressing Ahok Case	1		
3 The Meeting of President and Islamic Organization's leaders: Peaceful Demonstration and no Intervention of Ahok Case	1		
4 AMM Sue Ahok to Polda Metro Jaya Related to Diversity Threats Not Jakarta Gubernurial	1		
5 The #Muhammadiyah youth will Report Ahok to Polda Metro Jaya	1		
6 Muhammadiyah Expects Ahok Not Disband FPI	1		
7 RT @Republika Ahok Ever been educated at Muhammadiyah School			1
Amount	6	0	1
Percentage	85.7%	0	14%

TABLE 3. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @MCAOPS ABOUT AHOK

No Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1 Alhamdulillah, the Supreme Court (MA) rejected the judicial review (PK) of the Islamic blasphemy	1		
2 Asma Nadia: " When Islam is abused (by Ahok), people may be angry, but Muslims choose SUPER PEACE to express their attitude. "	1		
3 Turns out Secretly #Ahok Examined by Police Related Reclamation Corruption Case.	1		
4 Prosecutor: PK prosecution to Ahok is Different from Buni Yani's	1		
5 PK of Ahok can trigger a new commotion!	1		
6 Only 10 minutes, the Ummah still guard the trial of Ahok's PK	1		
7 Ask PK, Ahok Violate Applicable Law	1		
8 Public Relations PA 212: Habib Rizieq is concerned about the situation in Indonesia today. Many of the terror against clerics, corruption is increasingly rampant. He also highlighted the request of Ahok PK!	1		
9 Anies-Sandi Build 107 Shelters in Aquarium Village for Victims of Ahok	1		
10 Vice President JK: " The elections of Jakarta elections triggered by Ahok "	1		
11 Make Framing Problem Closure Alexis, Trash Media @CNNIndonesia scoffed by Ahok and Netizen	1		

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
12	Related to Reclamation, KPK Will Check Ahok-Djarot	1		
13	The Ahok's Heaven in Earth Closed by Anies!	1		
14	Ahok's men have checked into Alexis, and in fact Alexis became a place of prostitution!	1		
15	Governor Ahok: Not Easy to Close Alexis	1		
16	Kemang Utara Flood, Water Height Reaches 70cm http://detik.id/6HFkV5 So far Ahok-Djarot what are you doing?	1		
17	Polda Has Not Found HTI Involvement in BEM SI demonstration http://rol.co.id/roy9rfy354 Ahok & JKW's pet clutch is dirty.	1		
18	According to Indicator Survey, Prisoners of Ahok Most Favored as Vice President Jokowi.	1		
19	Bambang Widjojanto: Who Says #Ahok Not Corruptive? Here's a Row of Proof!	1		
20	2 Years' Claim for Buni Yani, Attorney General: To Be Balanced with Ahok's Vonis	1		
Amount		20		
Percentage		100		

From the appearance of the word cloud, some prominent words include 'Kasus' (case), 'Hukum' (Law), 'PBNU,' 'demo' (Demonstration), and 'Islam.' This means that most of the statements contained by @Nu_online, @Muhammadiyah, and @MCAOps are related to legal issues in the context of blasphemy. The striking word of 'PBNU' reflects that the statement embraces the organization's representation in many of its statements. The word 'Muhammadiyah' is less prominent as the account was not too aggressive at least regarding the number of posts related to the Ahok case. Meanwhile, the @MCAOps does not render representations of any organization nor community names, it tends to attack Ahok using other person statements and seems to aggressively cornering Ahok out of the context of a blasphemy case.

Twitter account, @Muhammadiyah tends to bring and position Ahok's case in the legal corridor. Although for @Muhammadiyah Ahok has done blasphemy of Islam and must be reported to police, the nodal point which is constructed still emphasised that the prevailing legal process must be done professionally and independent from the palace's political intervention. Interestingly, although Muhammadiyah appears to be less vocal in social media, some of its young activists through Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth Forces, AMM) are more confrontational on the practical level. Also, the meaning of Islam's defensive action for @Muhammadiyah is a reasonable form of reaction from Muslims because Ahok has conveyed hate speech and even threatened the nation's plurality. From this construction, it can be seen that Muhammadiyah makes national unity and pluralism issues as a basis in advocating the Muslims interests and not being trapped in the practical political issue in Jakarta gubernatorial election. On a somewhat different side, @Nu_online with its social media movements tend not to construct discourse and counter-productive acts, although it was agreed that Ahok had blasphemed religion. In fact, despite Ahok's allegedly abuse KH. Ma'ruf Amin, its scholars, and followers, tend not to be confrontational or to directly associate Ahok's case with Islamist political conflict vs. Islam nationalist. The @Nu_online maintains that Ahok's legal process must proceed reasonably and neutral regardless the political pressures of the mass action.

The Protest of NU on Full Day School (FDS) Policy

Full day school (FDS) policy is an all-day school program plan for Basic Education (Primary and Secondary) by the Ministries of Education and Culture. The program is included in the Regulation of the Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia No. 23 the Year 2017 About School Day. After the issuance of the regulation of the Ministries of Education and Culture (*Permendikbud*), the students will be given ad-

ditional learning hours at school until afternoon for character building activities. The duration of study hours is also included in article 2 paragraph 1 *Permendikbud* No. 23 of 2017 that school day is held 8 hours in 1 day or 40 hours in 5 days in 1 week.

After the plan on FDS was disclosed by Muhadjir Effendy as the Minister of Education and Culture, many refused and demanded the revocation of the minister's regulation, namely NU. Compared to the previous case of Ahok, NU tend to make a confrontational criticism of the government. The refusal is mentioned because FDS will potentially increase radicalism and intolerance in public schools. With the FDS, it is also feared that there is no time for Islamic students to learn reciting the holy book and the reduced level of religious education. Not only that, FDS is considered to threaten the traditional educational institutions as the place to develop religious values in the society. Hard protests by NU are rife in social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Through social media, the demonstrations eventually continued not only by the central NU accounts but also by the regional NU accounts. Social media protests are responded by many people with proof of comments and reposts that reach thousands or even tens of thousands, so the issue of FDS rejection once became the top search in some social media.

The protests conducted by NU did not only occur in social media, but there were also mass movements in some areas such as Solo, Semarang, Batang, Purbolingo and many others. In Solo, about 25,000 people were participating in the strike demanding the removal of FDS policy (Liputan 6, August 28, 2017). Thousands of people strike in Semarang from NU mass organisations, and various autonomous bodies under NU carry the coffin in the strike (Kompas.com, August 18, 2017). The masses that participated in the strike consisted of community leaders, prominent scholars, and students, especially from Islamic schools such as *madrrasah*. Even the head of Batang also supported them by refusing the application of FDS (Liputan 6, August 25, 2017). The NU demands on FDS continued to heat

up so that there was a plan that if the *Permendikbud* about FDS were not revoked, then NU would mobilise a more significant strike than the 212 Action at the end of 2016 (Kompas.com, August 9, 2017). The threats then reminisced the turbulence caused by the Islamic defensive strike of the 212 Action. There will be more protests against the government by the Islamic organisation, although the movement process tends to be longer than the issuance of the ministry regulation, until August or about four months. It was unlike the case of Islamic defensive strike that only took about three months to conduct three massive action strikes.

NU also plan other attempts aside from the massive demonstrations. Syamsul Huda, Head of the *Zakat Amil* Institution of NU, expressed that if the policy of FDS is not revoked, then NU will no longer support Jokowi in the presidential election in 2019 (Tempo.co, 2017). In this case, it appears that NU is very serious in this FDS rejection. The FDS issue then involves other political matters. Not until one year from the incident of Islamic defamation which is also influenced by the suspicion of Islamic mass organisation to Jokowi, the problem of Islamic mass organisation appeared again which eventually affected Jokowi. To examine further and analyse various sources, the upheaval on FDS will be enlarged, and mass mobilisation will seriously be done by NU and other Islamic organisations. It also heated up the political constellations and political dynamics in Indonesia because Islamic organisations have strong influences in government. However, there was a discourse on the *Permendikbud* substitute on the FDS in early September 2017.

TABLE 4. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @NU_ONLINE ABOUT FDS POLICY

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1	Persistence of Kiai Said Reject Full Day School	1		
2	PWNU Jakarta: Full Day School Policy Clearly Turn Off Madrasah Diniyah	1		
3	Independence from Full Day School Policy	1		
4	Reported Support Full Day School, PBNU: That's Misleading	1		
5	Ki Hajar Dewantara Looked Full Day School	1		
6	Reject Full Day School, Regent Tegal Ready to Kiss Jokowi's Foot	1		
7	Full Day Sarungan, the Resistance symbol of the Pesantren	1		
8	20 Thousand Tegal Residents Will Reject Full Day School	1		
9	Santri Gus Mus Reject Full Day School with Full Day Sarungan	1		
10	Central Lampung Regent Spread the Circle Reject Full Day School	1		
11	Devil Thought about Full Day School	1		
12	Disband ... Disband Full Day School ...	1		
13	Tasikmalaya Residents Reject Full Day School	1		
14	Full Day School in Children's Perspective	1		
15	NU Kota Bekasi Initiation for Peaceful Action Reject Full Day School	1		
16	Pro and Contra about Full Day School	1		
17	Full Day School's Institutionalism	1		
18	Open Letter to Kaesang Related Full Day School	1		
19	School Based Pesantren Difficult to Apply Full Day School	1		
20	NU Jatim Supports PBNU Reject Full Day School	1		
21	NU Kota Bekasi Initiation for Peaceful Action Reject Full Day School	1		
22	Pro and Contra about Full Day School	1		
23	Reject Full Day School, NU Ready Held Demonstration and Judicial Review	1		
24	Five Recommendations Reject Full Day School	1		
25	Related PBNU instructions "Rejection Against Full Day School" Please direct tweet / share / share ...	1		
26	Santri Ready for Action to Jakarta If Full Day School Demands Ignored	1		
27	Full Day School Leave a Multicultural Spirit	1		
28	Education Ministry Claims No Full Day School Program		1	
29	Rais Aam PBNU KH Ma'rif Amin's stance about Full Day School ...		1	
Amount		28	1	0
Percentage		96.5%	3.4%	0

TABLE 5. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @MUHAMMADIYAH ABOUT FDS POLICY

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1	Full Day School Does Not Mean Full Learning in School			1
2	#KabarPersyarikatan Full Day School Approach in Character Building Education			1
3	#KabarPersyarikatan Full Day School Approach in Character Building			1
4	Full Day School Does Not Mean Full Learning in School			1
Amount		0	0	4
Percentage				100%

account, four posts are highlighting the full day school policy. All these postings are positive tone and attempt to clarify misunderstandings of information about FDS policy. The disclosed content expresses the expert opinion of the meaning behind the FDS policy. The lack of postings and its soft tone could be seen as their step to avoid confrontational situations with NU, as Muhammadiyah cadres held the ministry that issuing the policy. Moreover, the rumour saying that the FDS policy was initiated by *Muhammadiyah* which intended to limit the development of madrasah was growing. Perhaps, the refusal of @Muhammadiyah to defend the FDS policy is a stance determined by situational considerations. Interestingly, a close Twitter account of @Muhammadiyah, @Pppemudamuh, the *Muhammadiyah* youth organisation, posted news from Kumparan.com that explained public misunderstanding of the program. The Chair-man of *Pemuda Muhammadiyah*, Daniel Anzhar Simanjuntak, in the report, defended Muhadjir Effendy and called that the policy was not separated from the actualisation of mission and vision of Jokowi. It seemed that when @Muhammadiyah was less free to express their opinion, @Pppemudamuh as their wing organization, gave little reinforcement. Meanwhile, the MCA account did not issue any posts related to FDS. The Islamist characteristics of the MCA could probably be the reason why they are uninterested in issues that do not intersect directly with the focus of their cause, namely global Islam, the plainness of the government, and Islamises interests themselves.

The Controversy of Perppu Civil Organisation

After the government issued *Perppu* No. 2 of 2017, the tension between the government and the Islamist groups heated up again. After going through considerable political pressure, the Government finally exercised its authority by issuing the *Perppu* of Civil Organisation which could legally crack down on a civil organisation that did not comply with Pancasila and threatened the integrity of NKRI (Kominfo.go.id, 2017). As a

result, HTI, a branch of a transnational political organisation with Pan-Islamic ideology and has existed in Indonesia since the decade of the 80s, has been disbanded. According to the government, the ideology of extremism, as well as Islamic radicalism that existed at the mass organisation, could trigger nation's dis-integration and separation amid the pluralism of the nation. The polemic about the Perppu of Civil Organisation continued to occur until October 2017 and finally passed into law by the House of Representatives.

Regarding the issuance of the Perppu of civil organizations by Jokowi, @Nu_online appears to be giving full support based on the 19 related posts that are all positive. The pattern of @ Nu_online posts leverages the importance of the new law for the sake of national integrity and state security. Interestingly, in almost all the content, @Nu_online makes HTI as the source of illness. On the @Muhammadiyah side, they only display two posts related to the issue of the enforcement of the civil organization's Perppu in which both belong to the negative category despite the efforts of providing a neutral tone. The @Muhammadiyah disagreement over the enactment of the law is not directed to defend HTI, but to safeguard democratic values. Meanwhile, the @MCAOps shows a negative attitude on its 12 posts which attacked the policy. On average, the @MCAOps perceives that the enactment of the law is a clear sign that Jokowi's government is anti-Islamic, resembling the PKI and authoritarian.

TABEL 6. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @NU_ONLINE ABOUT PERPPU OF CIVIL ORGANIZATION

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1	Perppu of Civil Organization now become law, PBNU: The Lawsuit in MK is Dissolved			1
2	Fadli Zon Tap the Hammer, Perppu of Civil Organization is Officially a Law			1
3	Reflection on the Meanings of Al-Quran Verses at the Discussion of the Perppu of Civil Organization			1
4	Public Discussion, GP Ansor Astanajapura Discuss HTI Post-Perppu of Civil Organization			1
5	Action Rejects Perppu of Civil Organization and HTI Paradoxes			1
6	Tangerang Residents Alliance Declaration Support Perppu of Civil Organization			1
7	Unnecessary Dispute and Perppu of Civil Organization			1
8	Islamic Organizations in Semarang City Full Support to Perppu No. 2/2017			1
9	PCNU Chairman Surabaya: The Government Is Too Late Perppu of Civil Organization			1

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
10	Through Perppu of Civil Organization, NU Consistent Defend NKRI			1
11	Support the Government, MUI Pringsewu Agrees Perppu of Civil Organization			1
12	NTB Muslim Community Expresses Support for Perppu of Civil Organization			1
13	Perppu of Civil Organization to Prevent Damage			1
14	Chairman of MUI Lampung Appreciate Government Publish Perppu of Civil Organization			1
15	GP Ansor West Java Appreciation of Perppu of Civil Organization			1
16	Again, Mosques in Jakarta Support Perppu of Civil Organization and Dissolution of Anti-Pancasila Organization			1
17	PBNU: Perpu of Civil Organization is Smart and Constitutional Steps			1
18	GP Ansor Surabaya Ready Kawal Perppu of Civil Organization to Lower Level			1
19	PBNU: Perppu of Civil Organization Smart and Constitutional Steps			1
Amount				19
Percentage				100%

TABEL 7. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @MUHAMMADIYAH ABOUT PERPPU OF CIVIL ORGANIZATION

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1	Perppu Ormas Agreed, Here Feedback from Busyro Muqoddas	1		
2	Concerning the dissolution of HTI by the Government, this words from Muhammadiyah Chairman	1		
Amount				2
Percentage				100%

TABEL 8. TWITTER POSTINGS FROM @MCAOPS ABOUT PERPPU OF CIVIL ORGANIZATION

No	Statements	negative	neutral	positive
1	When the Jokowi regime ends, and the JKW opposition comes to power the Cebongs turn to be dissolved by the Perppu (UU) Ormas!	1		
2	Democrats Turned to Support Perppu of Civil Organization, Muslim Ummah: Partai. Pabhyanat, Do not Be Vote in Elections!	1		
3	Amien: Perppu of Civil Organization to Abolish the Power of Islam	1		
4	Perppu of Civil Organization becomes Law, LBH: Declining Indonesian Democracy	1		
5	Perppu of Civil Organization is passed into Law! The struggle is not over, there is still the MK mechanism!	1		
6	Perppu of Civil Organization: Repressive, Dictators, and Anti-Islam!	1		
7	Yusril: Perppu of Civil Organization Exceeded the Dutch and New Order Colonies despotic rules	1		
8	Experts Criticism the Nature of Crucial Forces in : Perppu of Civil Organization	1		
9	PP Muhammadiyah: Perppu of Civil Organization Do not Have a Strong Legal Basis	1		
10	Belief in the Almighty, Religious Beliefs and Perppu of Civil Organization	1		
11	Perppu of Civil Organization, How to Suppress Islam from NKRI!	1		
12	Similar to #PKI, Perppu of Civil Organization is only used to silence the Critical Muslim!	1		
Amount		12	0	0
Percentage		100		

maintain the integrity of the state was a lie, in fact, it is understood as a political instrument to eliminate the government's political opponents. More specifically, for the @MCAOps, the Perppu of Civil Organisation are specifically aimed at legally eliminating Islamist forces in Indonesia. It is unsurprising that @MCAOps responded to the issue of extremism and radicalism, which became the background of the emergence of the Perppu of Civil Organisation, by conspiring the government as authoritarian and anti-democratic. The Perppu which has legalised to be Civil Organisation Law can be arbitrarily misused by the Government to eliminate their political enemies subjectively. According to @MCAOps, this is due to the absence of standard norms and the objectification process of the judgment that an organisation has been against the Pancasila or not. Moreover, HTI that has long existed in Indonesia, in the end, should be the 'victim' of the government's bargaining price against the political pressure of Islamist groups during this time.

Meanwhile, @Muhammadiyah tends to question more the procedure of publication of Perppu of Civil Organisation. Based on juridical studies, @Muhammadiyah constructed that the re-release of Perppu of Civil Organisation contradicts the Constitution concerning human rights, the right to assemble and unite, as well as the sovereignty of the people. Consequently, Perppu of Civil Organisation must be legally tested in the Constitutional Court before being passed into law by the Parliament. The Government's fear of an ideological threat to national integration does not necessarily make it authoritarian which threatens freedom. Moreover, although the Perppu of Civil Organisation has been passed into law, @Muhammadiyah still insists on a fair and transparent trial process on the discourse of HTI disband in Indonesia. Discursively, @Muhammadiyah plays safely with a fixed focus on legal procedures about the Islamic movement.

In contrast to previous reactions, @Nu_online openly supported the enactment of the Perppu of Civil Organisation to maintain and preserve national integration. Although in the case

of Ahok @Nu_online also counters to Ahok's alleged blasphemy, @Nu_online was not quick to consider the political conflict between the Islamist camps. Likewise, in the matter of Perppu of Civil Organisation, @Nu_online sees that this action is necessary to eliminate Islamist radicalism and extremism which is discursively constructed in non-Pancasila Islamic organisations such as HTI. For @Nu_online, HTI is an Islamic movement that has a different meaning construction with NKRI where their campaign issues are more of political Islamism, such as khilafah, anti-democracy, and only adhere to Islamic law. Therefore, @Nu_online strongly supports the government's discourse through Perppu of Civil Organisation to disband HTI because it has the potential to create chaos in the nation.

In this issue, it appears that @MCAOps becomes the foremost cyber community that opposes the Perppu of Civil Organisation. When viewing their Twitter content, it can be observed that it is dominated by global Islamic problems and Pan-Islamist passions, which is understandable because their views represent the Islamists outlook. The content raised by the @MCAOps in repudiating the policy tends to frame it as tools to banish the Islamic organisations who are critical to the Jokowi government. Furthermore, the @MCAOps is dragging the issue as an anti-Islamic policy and portraying Jokowi as a repressive dictator. There is a correlation between the discourse form that brought by the @MCAOps with the object of the policy, namely the dis-solution of HTI, so it is suspected the supporters of the Islamist organisations formed this community. From the inception of the @MCAOps, they never posted a content related to the PKS which means they may not have any relationship to the party. However, they posted 15 positive contents about HTI from September to December 2017 that indicating proximity to HTI supporters. Moreover, the anonymous character of @MCAOps has bolstered the notion that their real identity is not safe both for the government and the public.

DISCUSSION

The use of social media in articulating public issues has been in line with democratisation among Indonesian Muslim civil society. Social media provides the freedom for organisations or groups to articulate their ideas, ideological attitudes, and political position so they could get equal opportunity in garnering public support related to their interests. Assessing the dynamics of the @Nu_online tendency in the FDS case, it can be said that social media provides an arena that influences the political process. The mobilisation of NU in social media succeeded in increasing the escalation of FDS refusal to obtain pledges from Jokowi's that the policy sustains the traditional Islamic schools. In the case of the enactment of the Perppu of Civil Organisation, the MCA emerges as an anonymous force that continues to attack the policy and further suppresses Jokowi's government by using negative issues. But at the same time, @ Nu_online took a position to support the policy and counter Islamist groups that attacks the government. @Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, tend to be critical of the government but supports an institutionally appropriate measure. The @MCAOps efforts to mobilise opposition support in social media seem to be an alternative for a depressed group to continue fighting the political-dominant regime. The presence of an @MCAOps is an expression from people whose opinions or complaints do not get a channel to an organisation. As an open and *pseudogroups*, @MCAOps are vulnerable to be infiltrated and misused.

The social media contents of Muhammadiyah and NU, show a pattern which suggests how each of them observes and perceive the Jokowi's government. In general, NU regards that the Jokowi government can also be seen as a representation of Indonesian Islam which differs from the Middle East Islam. Therefore, the NU official and cyber team tend to construct the issues positively in terms supporting the government as long as it did not hit directly to their main constituent's interest. NU re-articulation of the FDS's policy indicates a strong reaction from

a party who feels inappropriate to be treated by the government. When looking at the composition of Jokowi's cabinet, NU cadres who occupy ministerial positions amounted to about six seats, not to mention those in non-ministerial positions ([Detik.com, 2014](#)). The number is in contrast to Muhammadiyah's representatives in Jokowi's cabinet which is only one seat. Muhammadiyah's stance toward the neutral government is inseparable from their principle not to get involved deeply in politics.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah seems to be critical to the Jokowi's government while in some ways keeps holding the core value of Islam. The Muhammadiyah official and cyber team tend to give a critical view of the issues and set different stance with the government for several times. The most interesting nodal point of Muhammadiyah's articulation is that Muhammadiyah can contextualise and moderate the spirit and the issue of Islamism with the nationalist power. This article notes that the establishment of the cyber team within the NU and Muhammadiyah circles implies their attitude to the socio-political situation in which the organisation cannot officially disclose these attitudes. A more open, liquid, and egalitarian social media space allows cadres and sympathisers to articulate their views on issues without being awkward towards the structural administrators. The MCA has the most extreme political discourse on the social media, as its activists often disarticulate and re-articulate all the policies and political significance of the Jokowi government. Based on the findings, MCA was always consistent in every political case: Ahok's case and Perppu of Civil Organisation. The credo of Islamism which is profoundly influenced by the transnational Islamist movement becomes the crux of MCA's nodal point.

CONCLUSION

By analysing the contents of the three Islamic groups in social media, we understand that the characteristics that determine the quality of political access have influenced their po-

litical articulation. The position of Islamic organizations and group corresponding the Jokowi government can be monitored through their official statements in the mass media. In reality, their voices are often shackled by formalities and rigidity of the political situation. Social media, therefore, seems to be a means of articulating their views on specific issues which directed political messages to the government. Muhammadiyah, for example, acts more securely by not involving in the practical politics although at the grassroots level there is a strong negative political sentiment against the government. On the other hand, NU tend to be more anti-Islamism and support the nationalist government, although they also show pragmatic signs in political matter. Meanwhile, the MCA as a representative of marginalized Islamist groups in terms of political access shows its strong criticisms against the government with a vulgar style.

Social media has brought about a climate of democracy in both organisations that are increasingly bureaucratic and constrained by political interests. However, interventions of the elite members of the organisations in raising political issues in social media is inevitable. On the other hand, openness and fluid rules in social media contribute in refining contradictory views. In this paper, the use of social media in democracy also leaves a contradictory excess. Political groups can exploit free-dom of speech to use limited public space in social media with exclusive and intolerant purposes. The liberty of speech without a healthy democratic norm concedes intolerant discourse flourishing in social media. Religious issues, for example, could perpetually append a political contest, especially when entering into the virtual arena. Also, social media can be used as a means to lead public opinion tailored to the organisational attitudes influenced by its political relations with the ruling government. Therefore, building the essential values of democracy is more important for the development of Muslim civil society in Indonesia.

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