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Lentera Hukum, Volume 9 Issue 3 (2022), pp. 397-434 
ISSN 2355-4673 (Print) 2621-3710 (Online) 
https://doi.org/10.19184/ejlh.v9i3.28418 
Published by the University of Jember, Indonesia 
Available online 30 December 2022 
 
 

__________________________ 
 
* Corresponding author’s e-mail: babayosule@gmail.com 

Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing 
Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 
 
Babayo Sule* 
Federal University Kashere, Nigeria 
 
Usman Sambo 
Yobe State University, Nigeria 
 
ABSTRACT: Nigeria is composed of plural and multi-complex societies with multiple ethnic 
groups of up to 500 cultural diversities. This country surmounts the obstacles of managing 
diversity through an informal setting popularly identified as a zoning formula and power sharing 
among the federating units. The pattern and trend in which the practice maintains Nigeria's 
diversity is a good lesson for a study of plural societies and consociationalism. The study aimed 
to examine the nature and dimension of zoning formula and power sharing in Nigeria and 
analyze how the strategies of zoning formula and power sharing helped manage diversity in 
Nigeria. The study was identified as a descriptive qualitative method that sought to describe 
Nigeria's strategy for managing diversity. The study uncovered that power sharing and zoning 
consist of constitutional and unconstitutional ones, with the former supported by legal 
provisions. Simultaneously, the latter is designed based on principles and gentleman 
agreements. The study recommended that constitutional provisions should never be sacrificed 
on the altar of the personal elite agreement. Instead, sharing power through zoning should be 
retained to prevent suicide for credibility and competency. It is a plausible shock absorber that 
will continue to sustain Nigerian federalism, and other plural societies can borrow this model as 
a political means of resolving diversities. 

KEYWORDS: Consociationalism, Constitution, Nigeria. 
 

Copyright © 2022 by Author(s) 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International 
License. All writings published in this journal are personal views of the authors and do not 

represent the views of this journal and the author's affiliated institutions. 
 

 
 

 
Submitted: 28/12/2021  Reviewed: 31/08/2022  Revised: 24/12/2022  Accepted: 29/12/2022 

HOW TO CITE: 
Sule, Babayo & Usman Sambo, “Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's 
Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic” (2022) 9:3 Lentera Hukum 397-434. DOI: <https:// 
doi.org/10.19184/ejlh.v9i3.28418>. 



398 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Politics is about a convenient arrangement of power sharing and resource 
allocation in the way of giving and taking will satisfy the basic desires of 
societal members.1 In this regard, no matter how one portrays it, no society 
in the contemporary world can claim total homogeneity. Differences in 
ethnic composition, religious beliefs, geographical settlement, and other 
personal desires led to conflict over power control.2 Plurality is an attribute 
of all modern societies, especially in the African states.3  

Nigeria is composed of plural and multi-complex societies with multiple 
ethnic groups of up to 500 cultural diversities.4 Management of diversities 
in a society like Nigeria takes beyond formal or legal constitutional backing. 
Agreements and tacit arrangements are necessary for containing the 
competing aspirations and pressures of the component groups. The country 
currently surmounts the obstacles of managing diversity through an 
informal setting popularly identified as a zoning formula and power sharing 
among the federating units. The pattern and trend in which the practice 
maintains Nigeria’s diversity is a good lesson for studying plural societies. 
With a democratic system of ruling and a federal structure of the political 
arrangement, the multiplicity of ethnic groups, religious beliefs, and 
cultural diversities made the contest for power intense and chaotic.  

Many scholars emphasized that Nigeria is in a crisis of governance and 
development because of the extreme struggle for power control at the 

 
1  Brendan O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies: An Advocate’s 

Introduction” in Joanne McEvoy, ed, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) at 1.   

2  Bernard Grofman, “Electoral Rules and Ethnic Representation and 
Accommodation: Combining Social Choice and Electoral Systems Perspectives” in 
Joanne McEvoy, ed, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) at 67.   

3  Allison McCulloch, “The Track Records of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided 
Societies” in Joanne McEvoy, ed, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) at 67.    

4  Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (Onitsha: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 
1987). 



399 | LENTERA HUKUM 

center.5 Many studies argued that Nigerian politics is bedeviled with 
ethnicity, religious manipulation, and regional sentiments, which made 
power competition, particularly at the center, a difficult task since political 
independence sometimes leads to the threat of secession.6 Thus, if diversity 
is not managed appropriately, it will threaten the co-existence and 
governance of the country.  

This study aims to identify that despite numerous studies as presented 
above, none had paid adequate attention to the strategies of survival and 
management of Nigeria’s diversity, which ushered in the longest 
democratic experiment in the Fourth Republic. It aims to contribute to 
knowledge by filling the research gap. In addition, the work has other 
specific objectives to examine the nature and dimension of zoning formula 
and power sharing in Nigeria and analyze how the strategies of zoning 
formula and power sharing helped manage Nigeria’s diversity.  

The discussion is structured into the following parts. First, the examination 
of politics in divided societies in the Nigerian context. Second, a revisit to 
the so-called "consociational democracy" or "democracy in plural societies." 
Third, an exploration of power sharing in Nigeria and the analysis of the 
constitutional division of power in the Fourth Republic. Fourth, examining 

 
5  JNC Hill, Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile? (New York: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2012); Okwudiba Nnoli, supra note 4; Rotimi T Suberu, “The Struggles 
for New States in Nigeria: 1976-1990” (1991) 90:361 African Affairs 499–522 issue: 
361volume: 90; Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (New 
York: Cambridge, 1997); Larry Diamond, Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: 
The Failure of the First Republic (London: Macmillan Press, 1995). 

6  Larry Diamond, supra note 5; Staffan I Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006); Sa’id Adejumobi, “Introduction” 
in Sa’id Adejumobi, ed, Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: Changes and 
Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 1; Micheal Peel, A Swamp Full of 
Dollars: Pipelines and Paramilitaries at Nigeria’s Oil Frontier (USA: Lawrence Hill 
Books); Wale Adebanwi & Ebenezer Obadare, Democracy and Prebendelism in 
Nigeria: Critical Interpretations, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Carl 
A Le Van, Dictators and Democracy in Nigeria: The Political Economy of Good 
Governance in Nigeria (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Uyilawa 
Usuanlele & Bonny Ibhawoh, Minority Rights and the National Question in Nigeria, 
1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 



400 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

the politics of zoning in the Fourth Republic. Fifth, a discussion of power 
sharing and zoning formula linked to the future of Nigeria’s democracy.  

 

II. METHODS 

The research adopted the research design of a qualitative approach to data 
collection and data analysis. The study was identified as a descriptive 
qualitative method that sought to describe Nigeria's strategy for managing 
diversity. A qualitative approach was involved in gathering large assembled 
data from primary or secondary sources to generate ideas and themes that 
can be grouped into several arrangements for analysis.7 Thus, the research 
used secondary sources of data collection because the topic is wide, making 
data gathering through primary sources difficult. The sources consulted for 
this research included books, journals, newspapers, internet sources, 
reports, and other related documents.8 The data collected were analyzed 
and interpreted using content analysis, where the data obtained were 
presented in themes and sub-themes identified based on the discussion of 
the subject matter.9 The study paid much attention to theoretical building 
and application in explaining Nigeria's power sharing and zoning 
phenomenon. Consociationalism is adopted and applied throughout the 
contents and context of the study to justify the need to identify the subject 
matter as a model and as a practical policy implication with positive results 
for future reference.  

 

 
 

7  Merriam B Sharan, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation (San 
Francisco: Wiley & Sons, 2009); Uma Sekaran & Roger Bougie, Research Methods for 
Business: A Skill Building Approach, 1st ed (India: John Wiley & Sons, 2013); John W 
Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches 
(California: Sage Publication, 2014). 

8  Robert Bogden & Biklen Sari Knopp, Qualitative Research for Education: An 
Introduction to Theories and Methods, 1st ed (Boston: Pearson Education, 2007).  

9  Virginia Braun & Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research: Practical Guide for 
Beginners, 1st ed (New Delhi: Pearson Education Inc, 2013); Howard Lune & Bruce 
L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 4th ed (New Delhi: 
Pearson Education Inc, 2017). 



401 | LENTERA HUKUM 

III. DIVIDED SOCIETIES IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT 

A. Politics in Divided Societies 

Politics in divided societies, the deeply divided ones, takes the form of 
power sharing, which is not mysterious to perceive but easily front to 
misperception. Politics is the struggle to access power to influence policy 
and decision-making and determine a favorable resource allocation—those 
who succeed in acquiring power influence the societal direction, while the 
powerless lack such privilege. Politics, therefore, is the competition to 
access power for that purpose.10 Politics in divided societies entails any 
effort at blocking the monopolization of power by one group, be it a 
descriptive such as ethnic, religious, or regional or a social such as elite or 
any other category. Politics in divided societies or power sharing is a 
deliberative democratic arrangement of managing diversities, avoiding 
conflicts, and devolution of power to avoid the dilemma of exclusion of one 
category.11 Politics in divided societies, it was observed, created global 
conflicts at alarming rates. For instance, The Heidelberg Institute on 
International Conflict reported that there are 230 political conflicts 
worldwide, with 164 being internal conflicts, and 36 out of the 164 are 
extremely violent, with 51 having a low-level intensity of conflicts.12 This 
has been observed as the repercussions of politics in divided societies where 
power sharing and competition ended in violence by warring factions. The 
pursuit of peace in many divided societies today takes the form of power 
sharing with contending groups to avoid an escalation of crisis because of a 
power scramble that will throw societies into avoidable conflicts.13  

Democracy can achieve peace and a truly democratic structure in plural 
societies only if consociation is adopted. This means sharing power or 
involvement of all members of societies from various levels and groups in 

 
10  Brendan O’Leary, supra note 1.   
11  Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies (Edinburg: Edinburg 

University Press, 2006). 
12  Ibid. 
13  Chandra Lekha Sriram, Peace as Governance, Power Sharing, Armed Groups and 

Contemporary Peace Negotiations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 



402 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

consensus on power sharing and political representation.14 Lijphart 
hypothesizes that plural societies, by a definition that he identified with 
some elements such as ethnic composition and religious differences as well 
as cultural variations, can achieve harmony, stability, good governance, and 
democratic progress if an opportunity is given to all members alike to 
participate in the process of decision making.15 However, as beautiful as the 
above propositions are, and as this study, to its much satisfaction, adopted 
this theory in explaining the juxtaposition of the discussions, there are 
limits to how power sharing based on consensus is sometimes 
undemocratic. Some countries like Nigeria, which relied on such a 
philosophy, often sacrificed merit for that purpose, leading to 
misgovernance. A good example is how President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, a 
sick-ridden former Governor of Katsina State, was imposed vehemently on 
Nigerian Presidency despite his health challenges during the tenure of his 
Governorship. The consequences were the eventual death of the President 
just two years into his tenure, which opened up a wide vacuum for 
succession in the 2011 Presidential Election between the North and the 
South of the country.16 However, Kelly stresses that despite the loopholes 
in Lijphart's theoretical postulation; there is no plausible explanation or 
model for managing power or politics in plural or divided societies better 
than in consociation.17 It has to revolve around the question of legality and 
constitutional provision. Some countries made such an arrangement 
constitutionally.  

There are challenges to power sharing or politics in divided societies. 
While many analysts and Political Scientists settled on the submission that 
it is the best alternative to managing conflicts and diversities in deeply 
divided societies, some challenges of the modalities for the sharing are 
arising. Many structures are used for power sharing. One of them is a 

 
14  Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
15  Ibid. 
16  Olusegun Adeniyi, Power, Politics, and Death: A Front-Row Account of Nigeria Under 

President Yar’adua (London: Prestige Publishers, 2010). 
17  Brighid Brooks Kelly, Power sharing and Consociational Theory (New York: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2019). 



403 | LENTERA HUKUM 

coalition government. Guaranteed representation in the constitution, like a 
fixed number of ministerial slots and parliaments, territorial devolution, 
federalism, autonomy, and a strong delegation of responsibility are other 
measures of sharing power in plural societies.18 The challenges are likely 
imminent and can manifest in changes that may catch up with the societies. 
For instance, one group can try to dominate or violate the agreement, or 
the pattern designed may be obsolete in some groups' perception, which 
may cause conflict and dissatisfaction. This has already been witnessed in 
many states, including the highly stable ones like USA, Britain, and Russia, 
and other new states such as Nigeria, India, and Indonesia.19  

Nigeria's pattern of pluralism in the Fourth Republic involves the politics 
of ethnicity, regionalism, and religion. Power sharing is centered on the 
division of responsibilities based on the above three elements. The division 
is further configured into sub-division where the North, for instance, is 
divided into what unofficially is termed core north, referring to Northeast 
and Northwest. In contrast, in the Southeast and Southsouth, a taxonomy 
of division is purposely created for the Delta-Igbo and the Southeast Ijaw 
or Ibibio. These elements are difficult to reconcile and are only managed by 
power sharing in principle. As discussed in the preceding sections, some 
arrangements are constitutional, while others are only organized based on a 
gentleman's agreement. Therefore, politics in divided societies must be 
arranged and conducted in a manner of consensus, give and take, 
satisfactory power sharing, and recognition of majority and minority 
interests. Failure to do this may result in violence and conflicts that create 
instability and political crisis. This is an interesting subject matter of study, 
mainly because it needs to be addressed by global scholarship, except in a 
few cases. This is the motivation behind identifying Nigeria as an 
outstanding area that will make genuine ideas and models for global 
entertainment and policy practice.  

 

 
18  Ian O’Flynn & David Russell, “Introduction: New Challenges for Power Sharing” in 

Ian O’Flynn, ed, Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005) at 1.  

19  Ibid. 



404 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

B. Pattern of Power Sharing in Plural Societies 

There are various patterns and structures of power sharing across plural 
societies around the globe. In some instances, it is constitutionally arranged 
to avoid conflict of interest and legal issues. In other states, it is hurriedly 
arranged after a deep disagreement in power contests. In others, it is carried 
out using an informal agreement. Many diverse and plural societies adopted 
a political structure as a means of power sharing.20 Federalism is one of 
them. About 30 countries worldwide operate a federal system of 
government contemporarily. These 30 countries are significant in terms of 
demographic strength as they constitute 40% of the total global population. 
They are politically and economically influential because they involve states 
like the USA, Canada, France, Germany, Nigeria, India, South Africa, 
Brazil, Malaysia, Australia, Mexico, and many other globally strong 
states.21 In these states, power is shared using a governmental structure that 
brings the government closer to all components and elements of the society 
with autonomy and self-governance for self-belonging. For instance, in 
these states, it is legally provided in the constitution that each component 
unit of government, mainly structured into federal or central government, 
state governments, and local governments or provinces or counties, have 
their specified powers in the constitution. The formula for revenue 
generation and sharing, electoral powers and processes, and limits are all 
illustrated unequivocally in the respective constitutions of these federal 
states. In this perspective, power is shared constitutionally among the 
various interest groups in each state. Most diversities are anchored around 
ethnic differences, religious beliefs, regional locations, and economic 
interests. Federalism is the most practical model for managing diversities 
and power sharing in complex plural societies.22 However, despite the 

 
20  Scott Gates & Kaare Strom, Power Sharing and Civil Conflict (Centre for the Study of 

Civil War PRIC, CSCW Policy Brief (Centre for the Study of Civil War PRIC, 
2008). 

21  Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “What is Federalism?”, Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2021), online: <https://www.idea.int/news-
media/what-federalism>. Accessed on April 7, 2021, at 10:25 pm.  

22  Daniel Bochsler & Andreas Juon, “Power sharing and the quality of democracy” 
(2021) 13:4 European Political Science Review 411–430 at 20. 



405 | LENTERA HUKUM 

above eloquent presentation of a model of federal power sharing processes, 
most federal states have contending conflicts and agitations for an 
alternative federal restructuring. One of the most intensified situations is 
the Nigerian situation, where some section of the country is agitating for a 
total overhaul of the current system for a new one that is, according to 
them, satiable to them.23  

Another pattern for power sharing is an institutional arrangement that 
guarantees a joint role in the control of the executive, where a president and 
a prime minister are carved out for joint power control. In some instances, 
like France, it was initially designed in this way. In other places like Kenya 
and South Sudan, it was adopted to assuage either temporarily or interim 
rival conflicting groups.24 Other power sharing logics are designed towards 
minority veto power, group autonomy, and a special form of legislative 
representation for a particular group. The most prominent model of power 
sharing is the one presented by Lijphart as consociational democracy. Four 
main patterns were identified as follows: (1) a grand coalition, (2) a system 
of mutual veto power, (3) proportional representation, and (4) segmental 
autonomy, such as federalism.25 

The fundamental question on power sharing is whether it is democratic or 
not. The major arguments presented by the champions of power sharing 
like Lijphart, O'Flynn, and O'Leary. Because it enables a consensus that 
will satisfy all power competitors, is it promoting peace, democracy, and 
peacebuilding, especially in plural societies? 26 However, power sharing is an 
albatross on genuine democratic ideal values. In the first place, it 
contradicts democratic tenets of a free and fair election because where 
power is agreed to be shared on consensus, it does not matter whether an 
authentic election holds. In the Nigerian context in 1999, the elites 

 
23  Harriet Seun Dapo-Asaju & Oludayo John Bamgbose, “The Quest for Restructuring 

the Nigerian Nation: Myth or Reality? The Role of Libraries in Amplifying the 
Debate” (2019) 47:1 International Journal of Legal Information at 21. 

24  Scott Gates & Kaare Strom, supra note 20 at 2. 
25  Siri Aas Rustad, Power sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes (Oslo: 

Center for the Study of Civil War, 2008) Oslo. 
26  Arend Lijphart, supra note 14 at 6; Ian O’Flynn, supra note 11 at 2; Brendan 

O’Leary, supra note 1 at 3.   



406 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

unanimously agreed that power must go to the South. In particular, 
Southwest, to appease the aggrieved Yoruba, whom the Military President 
scuttled an opportunity to control the presidency in 1992, Ibrahim 
Badamasi Babangida, after an election in which a Yoruba, MKO Abiola 
was led was annulled. Another area for improvement with power sharing is 
that it impedes the accountability of leaders. Once they have realized that 
they have an automatic chance to rule even if they are not performing, they 
can display their personal desires ahead of public interest.27 Additionally, 
power sharing runs contrary to the spirit of democracy which is 
competition. Credible and competent leaders are sidelined in favor of the 
give-and-take purpose. An example is a Nigerian context where in 2007, it 
was agreed by a mutual consensus that power must rotate to the North. 
Thus, regardless of how qualified, all the candidates were, the ruling PDP 
stepped down those from the South.  

This was made because of a seriously sick anointed Yar'adua, single-
handedly evil machinations of former President Obasanjo, who eventually 
led to the shoddy and controversial election that gave Yar'adua victory. 
However, the presidency was short-lived for only two years due to terminal 
illness.28 It was speculated that Obasanjo deliberately orchestrated this plot, 
having failed to actualize his illegal ambition of a third term that may 
probably see him becoming a life President, as obtainable in many African 
countries. This study, however, attributed the antecedents of the Yar'adua 
Presidency saga to the laxity and lukewarm attitude of the Northerners who 
failed to resist such a deliberate plot. They should have secured the 
guaranteed Northern zoning of the presidency and resisted Obasanjo's 
effort at a foiled pre-coup for the North. Otherwise, if such failure 
materializes, it prevailed upon Yar'adua to decline for a healthy ground and 
replace him with a stronger and healthy candidate.  

 

 

 
 

27  Scott Gates & Kaare Strom, supra note 20 at 3.  
28  Siri Aas Rustad, supra note 25 at 2.  



407 | LENTERA HUKUM 

C. Nigerian Federalism and Political Structure 

Nigerian federalism traced its root from the vicissitudes of the historical 
antecedents of the interplay of the forces of colonialism. Nigeria 
experienced three major historical epochs which are significant in shaping 
the evolution and destiny of the current entity territorially. The pre-
colonial era presented a plethora of kingdoms, chiefdoms, societies, and 
organizations enmeshed in mutual rivalry, cooperation, and 
interdependence with distinguishing features of different cultures, 
languages, religious faith, and geography.29 In the colonial epoch, the 
mega-ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba were merged 
artificially and compulsorily by the arbitrary handiwork of the British 
colonial exploiters.30 Nigeria sailed through the murky and muddy waters 
of struggles and controversies of consensus and disagreement before 
settling for peaceful decolonization in 1960, leading to political 
independence on October 1, 1960. The third historical epoch in Nigeria is 
the post-colonial era from 1960, which continues to manifest the effects 
and impacts of colonial imposition and arbitrary artificial territorial creation 
where the rivalry between the Northern and Southern regions in terms of 
power control and economic control continue to escalate. The root of the 
federal system was sown during the colonial era.31  

As examined above, Nigerian Federalism started its journey during 
colonialism. In 1914, the colonial Governor General Frederick Lord 
Lugard amalgamated the separated Northern and Southern Protectorates 
and declared a colony of Nigeria.32 The frontiers of federalism were laid 
down in 1944 when Governor Arthur Richard introduced regionalism 
1944. He made the Nigerian territory a conglomerate of the East, North, 
West, and the colony of Lagos, with each independent in revenue 

 
29  James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (London: Longman, 1960). 
30  HE Alapiki, “States Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration 

and Local Autonomy” (2005) 48:3 African Studies at 65.  
31  Dele Adetoye, “The Nigerian Elite and State Creation: The Creation of False 

Ethnic Dichotomies for Self Aggrandisement” (2016) 16:1 Global Journal of Human 
Social Science: Political Science at 4. 

32  Adiele E Afigbo, “Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the 
Colonial State” (1991) 21:4 Publius at 29. 



408 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

generation and remittance and a premier in each region supported by a 
regional assembly except Lagos, where the Governor General resided.33 
Federalism was consolidated in the Nigerian colony in 1951 when Sir 
Macpherson expanded the independence of the regions and their 
autonomy. It was further strengthened constitutionally after the 
intervention of the British colonial secretary Sir Oliver Lytetton in 1954.34 
Nigeria fought and secured political independence under an already pre-
determined political structure of federalism as designed purposely by the 
British colonizers.35  

The Nigerian pathway toward independence and federalism could have 
been smoother. There were several incidences of an attempt to either break 
or delay the process in some regions based on political interest.36 The first 
military coup attempted to dismantle Nigerian federalism and replaced it 
with a unitary system with the motive of forging a united nation, according 
to the bloody coup plotters.37 There were internal efforts to design genuine 
federalism and render autonomy for the minority agitations to sustain 
national unity, eventually leading to state creation in the 1970s.38 Nigerian 
federalism is one of the strongest in Africa, owing to the level of autonomy 
and inclusion efforts made by various governments. It spans from state 
creation to local government autonomy and forming a federal character 
system that accommodates all interests in allocating developmental 
projects, political appointments, and public service employment.39  

The Nigerian political structure has been undergoing several changes and 
amendments. The first political system experimented with was the 

 
33  Isawa J Elaigwu, “Federalism: The Nigerian Experience” (1996) 4:1 Federalism 

Theory and Application at 56. 
34  Isawa JElaigwu, “Federalism in Nigeria’s New Democratic Polity” 32:2 The Global 

Review of Federalism at 95. 
35  Ladipo Adamolekun L, “Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria” (1991) 21:4 Publius: 

The Journal of Federalism at 11. 
36  John P Mackintosh, “Federalism in Nigeria” (1962) 10:3 Politics at 103. 
37  Rotimi T Suberu, “The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Problems, and 

Prospects” (2010) 28:4 Journal of Contemporary African Studies at 477. 
38  Rotimi T Suberu, supra note 5. 
39 Rotimi T Suberu, “Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative 

Perspective” (2009) 8:1 Ethnopolitics 67–86. 



409 | LENTERA HUKUM 

parliamentary system of British style, where a President and a Prime 
Minister governed for six years from 1960 to 1966 before the bloody coup 
that targeted Hausa/Fulani ethnic group leaders for assassination.40 The 
parliamentary structure was disrupted significantly by the bloody coup in 
1966, leading to a prolonged exacerbated military rule from 1966 to 1979. 
The First Republic (1960-1966) ended with a parliamentary structure, but 
the Second Republic (1979-1983) introduced an American style of a 
presidential system of government.41 In the First Republic, regional 
Premiers and Legislatures were maintained, but in the Second Republic, 
regions were abolished, having been replaced with states. A President and a 
Vice President with a National Legislature replaced the old structure, while 
at the state level, state Governors, their Deputies, and State Houses of 
Assemblies emerged. The national legislative representation was based on 
the population of each state accordingly.42 The presidential system was 
maintained similarly in the Aborted Third Republic (1991-1992) and the 
Fourth Republic (1999-2021). However, in the Fourth Republic, two 
lawmaking bodies were introduced with a Senate where each state, 
irrespective of population or size, is allocated three Senators, including the 
Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Simultaneously, in the House of 
Representatives, the membership is constituted based on the population 
and size of the states.43 For instance, Kano, the most populated state, has 
24 Members in the House, while Bayelsa, the least populated, has five 
Members. Similarly, the 36 states in the federation have executives, 
Governors and their Deputies, State Houses of Assemblies with 
membership based on the population and the size of each state, and the 

 
40 Babayo Sule, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, & Bakri Mat, “Political Behaviour and 

Voting Pattern in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: The Case of 2015 Presidential 
Election” (2017) 4:4 Journal of Education, Arts and Sciences 1–13.  

41  Agbude Godwyns Adeniyi, “Political Culture and the Future of Democracy in 
Nigeria” (2010) 2:34 Sustainable Human Development Review 47–65. 

42  Jake Dan Azumi, Attahiru Jega, & Sam Egwu, “The Challenges of Re-Federalising 
Nigeria: Revisiting Recent Debates on Political Restructuring” (2019) 7:1 Journal of 
Political Sciences and Public Affairs 1–8. 

43  Nsembe Edward Lenshie, “Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide: Exploring 
the Resurgence of Ethno-Cultural Identity in Nigeria” (2014) 13:2 Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Council for the Development of 
Social Science Research in Africa) 153–212. 



410 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

774 local governments also have executive Chairmen and their Deputies 
and Councillors for each ward across them. The judiciary is also configured 
to follow federal courts, state courts, magistrates, and area courts for local 
governments.44  

 

IV. REVISITING CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 

The theory of consociational democracy is also well known as democracy in 
plural societies. It is a comprehensive and rigorous study of its kind formed 
by Arend Lijphart in his effort to present a workable model that will 
permanently resolve power sharing and politics in heterogeneous and 
complex societies. In such a way, a satisfactory formula is designed to 
accommodate all conflicting interests harmoniously. Although the theory 
was later expanded by many researchers, either broadened to include larger 
areas than the original case studies espoused by Lijphart or to narrow them 
by picking a singular or smaller case, all the assumptions and modeling still 
revolve around Liphart's earlier conception. 

Lijphart argues that achieving and maintaining a stable democracy and 
governance in plural societies is extremely difficult.45 He further 
emphasizes that consociational democracy moderated and modified the 
above submission of the difficulty of achieving a sustainable democracy in 
plural societies as a possibility.46 Stable democracy and governance are 
achievable in plural societies when the centrifugal tendencies are subsided 
in an accommodative cooperative manner based on the consensus of leaders 
of various segments that constitute the plurality. Elite cooperation is the 
primary concern or idea of consociational democracy.47 Lijphart confidently 
assumes that consociational democracy is both empirical and normative in 
its approach.48 It is empirical as presenting practical case studies of smaller 

 
44  Victor E Ita, Ebong Itoro E, & Tonye Inimo-Etele, “Restructuring Nigerian 

Federalism: A Prognosis Nation-Building and Socio-Political Stability” (2019) 5:1 
Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research 1–18.. 

45  Arend Lijphart, supra note 14. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid at 7. 
48  Ibid at 11.  



411 | LENTERA HUKUM 

European states of Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland. Also, 
it analyzes how they can constitutionally and practically forge a 
consociation that will guide the larger understanding of the theoretical 
postulation. These smaller European countries reached the peak of their 
consociation in the 1950s. Then they were gradually vanishing in 
consensus, not because consociationalism is irrelevant anymore but 
superfluous. Lijphart identifies plural societies,49 as those with tendencies 
for a sharp division in religion, ideology, race, ethnicity, language, cultural 
and regional or geographical differences.  

Consociational democracy can be designed in various ways; according to 
Lijphart, one of them is a 'Grand Coalition' where some competing groups 
may ally to secure power which ordinarily, by their disposition, they may 
only get the leverage to secure victory if they strengthen each other.50 
Another method of forging consociation is 'Mutual Veto,' where the 
majority can have its way into power in a society with multiple interest 
groups. However, the other smaller groups can be given the privilege of 
veto power to protect their interest. 'Proportionality' is another strategy of 
consociation where representation, either at the parliament, executive, or 
other vital decision-making bodies, is designed based on a proportion of 
the population of each group in that society. Another and the most 
obtainable worldwide is 'Segmental Autonomy and Federalism', whereby 
law and powers are designed and shared among the structures and 
component units of governments with autonomy and self-governance in 
many cases. Finally, 'Secession and Partition' is the following form of 
consociation where societies that could not withstand their diversities opted 
for a final division of territories with independent and autonomous settings. 
Federalism is considered the most feasible means of achieving this theory's 
empirical and theoretical application. Most consociational states operate 
federalism since it has readily available alternatives for power sharing and 
alternatives for the autonomy of competing interest groups.51  

 
49  Ibid at 21.  
50  Ibid at 61. 
51  Daniel J Elazar, “Federalism and Consociational Regimes” (1985) 15:2 Publius: The 

Journal of Federalism 17–34. 



412 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

Lijphart further presented some conditions favorable for Consociational 
Democracy.52 They include a balance of power, a multi-party system, 
federalism, constitutional proportional representation, and the structure of 
cleavages. Apart from the four smaller European countries studied by 
Lijphart,53 he also divided consociationalism into the First World and the 
Third World practices. Some, according to him, are success stories while 
others are a failure, but overall, consociationalism is a model for plural 
societies, concluded Lijphart. Canada and Israel are good examples of 
semi-consociational societies, while Lebanon and Malaysia are examples of 
consociations in developing countries. At the same time, Cyprus is a 
practical example of a failure of consociation.54 To support Lijphart, Kelly 
agreed that consociation could be studied and presented quantitatively with 
valid results even in modern times.55 Kelly identified Austria, Netherlands, 
and Switzerland as the much-celebrated success of consociation, while 
Nigeria, Northern Ireland, and South Africa are newer political systems 
yielding positive consociational results.56 In modern discourse, two groups 
dominate the debates on democracy in plural societies; consociationalism 
and centripetalism. The first advocates' group representation and power 
sharing, while the second recommends institutions that promote multi-
ethnic parties.57 The study by Bogaards adopted Lijphart's empirical and 
normative mixture model where, drawing from examples of some states 
including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, and 
Northern Ireland, an empirical and a theoretical relationship was 
established between Consociationalism and Centripetalism.58 

Lijphart initially built consociational democracy to explain democratic 
stability in some smaller European democracies. However, as other states 
emerged that were plural, the theory was expanded and extended beyond 

 
52  Arend Lijphart, supra note 14 at 92.  
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid at 71.  
55  Brighid Brooks Kelly, supra note 17. 
56  Ibid at 61. 
57  Matthijs Bogaards, “Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes?” (2019) 

25:4 Swiss Political Science Review 519–537.  
58  Ibid. 



413 | LENTERA HUKUM 

the earlier case studies. Lijphart used Almond's classification of Western 
democracy to design a comparative study of Consociationalism in Europe 
and other parts of the world.59 Almond classified Western democracy into 
Anglo-American political systems (exemplified by Britain and the United 
States), Continental European political systems (France, Germany, and 
Italy), and the Scandinavian and Low Countries. Thus, using 
consociationalism, Lijphart refined Almond's classification for a more 
consolidated theoretical and empirical study of democracy in the modern 
world.60 Consociationalism met resistance and criticisms from many 
scholars through debates on its feasibility and undemocratic features. The 
concepts, causes, manifestations, and consequences associated with 
consociationalism are being debated contemporarily.61 One of the problems 
linked to consociation is its failure to apply in some instances instead of the 
assumed peacebuilding and consensus-driven motive. Lebanon is a typical 
case here, where a consociation was built by confessional elites of various 
segments. However, the elites turned corrupt and lacked accountability and 
national patriotism. They led to misgovernance, patriotism, and clientelism 
that profoundly defeated the consociational arrangement.62 In another 
view, Stojanovic argues that consociational democracy is not ideal for 
practice because, at best.63 It falls back into ethnocracy, where ethnic 
politics will dominate governance, or at worse, it may turn into a liberal 
democracy where consociationalism will naturally and automatically vanish 
as against the anticipation of power sharing.  

Consociationalism is relevant in understanding the democratic operation 
and Nigerian politics, particularly in the Fourth Republic. The foundation 
of the Fourth Republic in 1999 was entirely built on consociationalism 
from its inception. The elites agreed on power rotation and zoning of 

 
59  Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy” (2011) 21:2 World Politics: A 

Quarterly Journal of International Relations 205–207. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ruby B Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy” (2000) 3:1 Annual Review of 

Political Science 509–536. 
62  Imad Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Approach” 

(2009) 14:2 International Journal of Peace Studies. 
63  Nenad Stojanovic, “Democracy, Ethnocracy and Consociational Democracy” (2019) 

41:1 International Political Science Review. 



414 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

strategic political offices without the prior consent of the electorates. Any 
President that emerges from the North, the Vice will automatically come 
from the South and vice versa. And this is also applicable in other 
important top offices such as the Senate, President, and Speaker House of 
Representatives. Despite the practical adoption of consociationalism, only 
some studies pay deserved attention to the nature and operation of 
consociationalism either with Nigeria as a case study or in comparison with 
other similar areas of study. Njoku attempted to explain how relevant 
consociationalism is to Nigeria.64 However, he needs to receive more 
academic support in debates and further work on the subject matter to 
draw attention. This study is an effort and is considered a theoretical 
contribution to the debates on consociational democracy. This study 
believed that consociational democracy is theoretically suitable for Nigeria 
and has been practically applied for over 20 years in the Fourth Republic, as 
established in the discussion section. Nevertheless, for consociational 
democracy, where power sharing and zoning of strategic offices are 
adopted, Nigerian democracy might have collapsed.  

 

V. POWER SHARING IN NIGERIA AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIVISION OF POWER IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC 

Power sharing in Nigeria or consociationalism, is practically divided into 
two. The first is the constitutional or legal provision from the constitution, 
while the second is the elite segmental arrangement, as rightly observed by 
Lijphart in his consociational democracy. The first category is adopting a 
federal structure with three tiers of government as provided by the Nigerian 
1999 Constitution Federal, State, and Local Governments.65 The pathway 
toward federalism is a challenging one or an easy one. The process began in 
1914 when British colonial exploiters amalgamated Northern and Southern 
protectorates. The engendering of the federal was completed in 1954 by Sir 

 
64  Raphael Chijioke Njoku, “Consociationalism: its Relevance for Nigeria” (2007) 5:2 

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1–35. 
65  Yahaya T Baba, “Power Sharing and the Implications for Democratic Governance in 

Nigeria: The Case of National Assembly (1999-2011” (2017) 8:4 Mediterranean 
Journal of Social Sciences 111–121. 



415 | LENTERA HUKUM 

Oliver Lytetton, the British colonial secretary, six years before the formal 
political independence. The first tier of government to exist was local 
government under the Native Authority system introduced by Lugard's 
Ordinance.66 Later as observed above, the British colonizers systematically 
introduced the federal system in 1944 and consolidated it in the 1951 and 
1954 Constitutions. States emerged in the 1970s after a bitter and bloody 
Civil War was fought between the Biafran secessionist separatist group and 
the Nigerian government. Nine states were introduced, and an additional 
12 by General Yakubu Gowon, the military President, between 1966 and 
1976. Successive military regimes created additional states making a total 
number of 36 by 1996. Local Government Reforms were initiated in 1984 
to give more autonomy to local people for self-governance.67  

The creation of states and local governments was to placate the bitter elite 
regional rivalry and incessant agitations from various ethnic, religious, and 
regional groups in the country.68 By 1999, when the Fourth Republic 
began, there were constitutionally three tiers of government in Nigeria; the 
Federal with headquarters in FCT Abuja, 36 states across the six 
geopolitical zones of Northeast, Northcentral, Northwest, Southeast, 
Southsouth, and Southwest. Also, 774 local governments were in existence 
as of 1999.69 Again, consociationalism is adopted in Nigeria because states 
and local governments gave regional and local elites the opportunity for 
autonomy and power control. Centrifugal powers were devolved into 
centripetalism, another exhibition of consociationalism. The Second 
Schedules of the 1999 Constitution provide three clear-cut divisions of 
powers among the three tiers of government in which the Exclusive List is 

 
66  Okonkwo C Eze, Alexander Elimian, & Uchenna G Chinwuba, “The Politics of 

State Creation and National Integration in Nigeria” (2015) 8:1 Journal of Politics 
and Law 113–121. 

67  Bassey A Okon et al., "States and Local Government Areas Creation as a Strategy of 
National Integration or Disintegration in Nigeria" (2013) 3:1 Journal of Educational 
and Social Research 237–245. 

68  Okpu Ugbana, “Nigeria’s Dilemma: Development or New States” (1988) 38:2 Italian 
Institute for African Orientation 183–203 issue: 2. 

69  David D Yongo, “States creation since 1967: An Imperative of the Military 
Contribution to Nation-Building in Nigeria” (2015) 7:3 African Journal of History 
and Culture 71–78. 



416 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

exceptionally for the Federal Government, such as mining, currency, 
security, and foreign policy. The Concurrent List is shared between the 
Federal and State Governments, including education, health matters, and 
agriculture. The Residual List is shared by the state and local governments, 
including tax collection, market affairs, abattoirs, agriculture, primary 
health care, and basic education services.70 Additionally, fiscal federalism or 
revenue sharing formula is constitutionally designed as: 52.68% for the 
Federal Government, 26.72% for the 36 states, and 20.60 for the 774 local 
governments. Attached with the formula in distribution or allocation is the 
13% derivation formula for the oil-producing states since Nigeria depends 
on oil as the major source of foreign exchange and export. A result of 
agitation by the Niger-Delta people on resource control. The population is 
another yardstick in addition to internally generated revenue. Again, it 
displayed the practice of consociationalism in Nigeria, where powers and 
resources are allocated to agitations and contributions to foster peace.71  

In the legislative arm of government, the constitution provides a convincing 
and satisfactory proportional representation, as suggested by Lijphart in the 
assumptions of consociationalism. Each state is represented in the National 
Assembly in the Upper Chamber of the Senate with 3 Senators irrespective 
of the population, size, or economic strength. In this regard, there are 109 
Senators from the 36 states and FCT Abuja.72 It assures a consensus where 
all majority and minority groups are given equal representation in the 
biggest lawmaking decision-making body. For instance, Kano State is 
populous while Bayelsa is the smallest, but they all have an equal number of 
three Senators in the Senate. Each state is now proportionally represented 
in the Federal House of Representatives based on population. Kano has 25 
representatives, Lagos has 24 representatives, some other highly populated 

 
70  Uwomano Benjamin Okpevra, “A Critique for Nigerian Federalism and Need for 

Restructuring Towards Achieving Vision 2030” (2021) 1:1 Fudan Journal of 
Humanities and Social Sciences 265–284. 

71  Usman Sambo & Babayo Sule, “Local Government Autonomy and Inter-
Governmental Relations in Contemporary Nigeria" in IO Aransi et al., eds, 
Contemporary Issues in Nigerian Public Administration: A Festschrift in Honor of 
Professor Barrister Ishaq Isola Omoleke (Ile Ife: Department of Public Administration 
Obafemi Awolowo University, 2020) 617-640. 

72  Rotimi T Suberu, supra note 38. 



417 | LENTERA HUKUM 

states of Kaduna have 15 and Rivers 13 representatives, while lesser 
populated states such as Gombe have six members and Bayelsa 5. It is to 
enable all segments of the Nigerian groups to have their voice represented. 
It is a power sharing in a plural society.  

In the Executive arm of Government in Nigeria, the constitution provides 
for a compulsory representation from each state, at least a Minister. Some 
fortunate states sometimes end up getting two. Additionally, each state has 
a Federal Permanent Secretary for equal representation. Furthermore, an 
Agency, Federal Character Commission, was established. The objective of 
the Agency is to monitor employees in the national civil service to ensure 
that all states and local governments are represented based on equality and 
equity. It is to protect the minority groups from being dominated by the 
larger ethnic groups or bigger states from dominating the smaller states or, 
in some instances, to protect the educationally less advantageous states 
from being dominated by the highly educational states. This process 
enabled some minor groups to have their societies represented in national 
decision-making. For instance, the Kanuri ethnic group, dispersed across 
the Northern states, is predominantly located in Borno and Yobe. Giving 
them a state with a monthly federation allocation and other interventions 
provides them with an opportunity for autonomy and independence. The 
same with several other ethnic groups such as Tiv, Jukun, and Idoma in 
Benue, Ijaw in Bayelsa, and Igala and Ebira in Kogi State. In this regard, 
the country, unconscious of consociational democracy, practices 
consociationalism in advance more than many case studies. However, there 
is no adequate literature to refer to Nigeria as a case study except that of 
Njoku.73  

Although consociationalism is depicted and exhibited practically in the 
above legal provisions of power sharing, there is a problem that 
consociational democracy encounters. Earlier, from 1999, the consensus 
was perfected in a mutual agreement, but as the journey into the Fourth 
Republic went more intense, issues that were a setback to consociationalism 
emerged. Agitations for resource control by the oil-producing states in 

 
73  Raphael Chijioke Njoku, supra note 65. 
 



418 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

Niger-Delta intensified, leading to militancy in the region and sabotage of 
the Nigerian economic mainstay. Calls for true federalism manifested 
where the constitutional fiscal arrangement of revenue generation and 
allocation is challenged, particularly by the oil-producing states. 
Additionally, calls intensified for restructuring Nigeria by different regions, 
specifically the Southern part of the country. The Southeast continues with 
the agitation for additional state creation. The politics of state creation 
continues across the country and local government creation. Some sections 
of the country agitated for the abolition of the House of Representatives, 
which the other populous states perceived as an attempt at manipulating a 
proportional representation based on the population component. The 
hitherto workable consociationalism in the Fourth Republic is reversed 
gradually, weakening the theory's applicability in Nigeria. The expressed 
dissatisfaction from all angles of the country continues to manifest daily, so 
there is a need to revisit Nigerian consociationalism immediately. However, 
the pattern of power sharing is one of the best in representing all warring 
factions and interest groups across the country. 

 

VI. THE POLITICS OF ZONING IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC 

The issue of zoning is not a legal matter in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. In 
essence, it is unconstitutional. The elite used a scintillating arrangement 
from 1999, with the masses or electorates unaware. When the military 
decided to restore Nigeria to the path of democratic rule, a Constitution 
was designed, which is tagged 'Nigerian 1999 Constitution'. The 
constitution is unequivocal on zoning. No section provides a zoning 
formula. All the elective offices in the country were presented with the 
minimum requirements that contestants must fulfill before they are eligible 
for the contest.74 Surprisingly, neither the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP), which ruled Nigeria for 16 years (1999-2015), nor the All 
Progressives Congress (APC), which has been ruling from 2015 to date, 

 
74  TA Olaiya et al., "Rethinking Zoning Formula as Political Panacea for Ethnic 

Conflict and Governance Crisis in Nigeria” (2014) 4:26 Research on Humanities 
and Social Sciences 1–14. 



419 | LENTERA HUKUM 

provided a section in their constitution or even manifesto on zoning. The 
elite, in their wisdom, designed such a clandestine agreement based on 
what was later called a 'gentleman agreement. The elite unanimously 
agreed that power should first go to the South. To appease the aggrieved 
Yoruba ethnic group who has been nursing an old wound of the annulment 
of June 12, 1992, Presidential Election was anointed by the Northern elite 
for the plum position. It set their son on the path of an indisputable 
victory, a Yoruba man, former military General Olusegun Obasanjo.75  

However, the consociational agreement was nearly bastardized and 
betrayed by President Obasanjo in 2007 when he orchestrated evil 
machinations of a 'Third Term Agenda' to perpetuate himself into power 
for life. The Nigerian Senate rescued the situation after they rejected an 
alleged N50 million bribe offer for each. Obasanjo, not satisfied and 
agonized by the decision and pressure from the Northerners who blocked 
his attempted life Presidency, did not give up but plotted a grand political 
strategy where he anointed a sick Northerner with a terminal disease, 
President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, for the presidency in 2007.76 Late 
President Yar'adua could not hide the full manifestation of his chronic 
illness when he collapsed twice during the campaign. By the time the 
controversial 2007 Presidential Election was concluded, the Human Rights 
Watch reported it as one of the most violent and scandalous elections in 
the world.77 President Yar'adua was already worn out with fatigue and 
sickness that kept deteriorating his health until his eventual death in 2010 
when his Deputy, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, succeeded him. The 
Northerners struggled hard to convince the South that the North must 
complete the eight years of the supposed Yar'adua Presidency, but Jonathan 
persuaded them to allow him to serve one term.78 It has displayed 

 
75  Yahaya Yakubu, “Consociational Power Sharing and Political Equality in Nigeria: 

What Role for Federal Character Principle?” (2018) 2:10 International Journal of 
Research and Innovation in Social Science 1–5. 

76  Musa Abdullahi Sakanko & Joseph David, “The Effect of Democratic Zoning 
System on Nigeria Economy: Evidence of Niger State” (2018) 17:1 Etikonomi 25–
36. 

77  Reports on Violence in Nigeria’s 2007 General Election, by Human Rights Watch 
(Abuja: Human Rights Watch, 2007). 

78  Olusegun Adeniyi, supra note 16. 



420 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

consociationalism as negotiations for power and zoned remain the elite's 
focal point. They are all in their efforts to neutralize conflict, as suggested 
by Lijphart, since the complex Nigerian nature will not allow any region, 
religious group, or ethnic segment to control power permanently as 
obtainable in smaller African countries. Many African leaders, such as Paul 
Biya in Cameroon, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Omar El Bashir in 
Sudan, and late Idris Deby in Chad, and other smaller African countries, 
succeeded in establishing a political dynasty that sustained them in power 
permanently. In Nigeria, such a phenomenon will not be possible because 
of the existence of two imbalanced but closely competing regions of North 
and South.79  

President Jonathan secured victory in the 2011 Presidential Election after 
convincing the North to accept that he was serving just one term, as the 
Northern elite later narrated when the intensity of the clash between the 
North and South on the presidency heated.80 By 2015, the North made it 
emphatic that it would not settle on anything but the presidency, no matter 
the repercussions. President Jonathan remained recalcitrant and continued 
with his pursuit of the second term. This contradiction existed on the verge 
of the establishment of a strong coalition opposition party of APC in 2013, 
which threatened to wrestle power from the PDP, which it did.81 To 
augment the dilemma of Jonathan's candidature and PDP's chances of 
winning, Muhammadu Buhari, the lone standing strong opposition leader 
with a cult-like followership in Northern Nigeria, emerged as the party 
flagbearer of APC.82 The 2015 General Election was a battle between 
President Jonathan and APC's Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari won the 

 
79  Wouter Veenendaal & Leila Demarest, “How Population Size Affects Power 

sharing: a Comparison of Nigeria and Suriname” (2021) 27:3 Contemporary Politics 
271–291. 

80  Emmanuel  Remi Aiyede, “Federalism, Power Sharing and The 2011 Presidential 
Election in Nigeria” (2011) 11:1 Journal of African Elections 31–53. 

81  Siri Aas Rustad, “Between War and Peace: 50 years of Power sharing in Nigeria” 
(2008) 6:1 Centre for the Study of Civil War 1–5. 

82  Babayo Sule, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, & Bakri Mat, “Opposition Political 
Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Examining All Progressives 
Congress (APC) in the 2015 General Elections” (2018) 21:4 Tamkang Journal of 
International Affairs 81–112. 



421 | LENTERA HUKUM 

presidency, setting an unprecedented record of an incumbent President 
unseated by an opposition party in Nigeria's political history since 
independence.83 This scenario exhibited how the Nigerian elite takes the 
consociational democracy with utmost faith that zoning must be 
accentuated irrespective of the opposing powers to avoid conflict. Obasanjo 
was blocked in 2007, and so also Jonathan in 2015. It simply sent a 
message that no zone, either North or South, will allow itself to be 
manipulated or shortchanged in the game of power in the future.  

Apart from the seat of the President, other top political seats too were 
zoned. For instance, whenever the President emerged from the North, a 
Muslim-dominated region, he must be a Muslim. At the same time, his 
Vice must be a Christian from the South with Christian dominance in the 
Southeast and Southsouth and a significant Muslim population in the 
Southwest. In the same vein, a Southern President usually should be a 
Christian and his Vice a Muslim from the North.84 In the National 
Assembly, whenever the Senate President is from the North, his Deputy 
emerges from the South and vice versa. The same applies to the House of 
Representatives. All these seemingly calculated arrangements are never 
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution nor the parties' constitutions. The 
elites automated their grand strategy as they felt it desirable to maintain a 
peaceful power sharing using a zoning formula. This phenomenon 
succeeded in at least keeping the fragile national unity in a wheel of 
continuity. The aggressive and volatile ethnic, religious, and regional 
components also calm themselves with the arrangement. However, for this 
structural arrangement, Nigeria may have drifted into chaos that may cost 
the national existence. Even with the current zoning, some groups, such as 
the Igbo, are contemplating why they should remain in the union when 
they have been deliberately deprived of the presidency since 1966. The 
Igbo question is becoming a headache for the country as the Indigenous 

 
83  Akindiyo Oladiran Opeyemi, Mohammed Siyaka, & Adanri Opeyemi, “Power 

Sharing Conundrum and the Challenges of 2015 General Elections in Nigeria” 
(2014) 2:3 International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability 9–21. 

84  Ayo Awopeju, Olufemi Adelusi, & Ajinde Oluwashakin, “Zoning Formula and the 
Party Politics in Nigerian Democracy: A Crossroad for PDP in 2015 Presidential 
Election” (2012) 2:4 Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 11–19. 



422 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) secessionists are now threatening to separate 
from federalism using violence. In the same way, once the Southwest 
started sensing an attempted plot by the North to continue with the 
presidency in 2023, the Sunday Igboho-led Oduduwa separatist movement 
was initiated. Responding through violence is one strategy adopted to 
prevent any section of the country from perpetuating itself into power.85  

 

VII. THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY 

Power sharing is a shock absorber of Nigerian volatile and turmoil politics. 
It should be regarded as the stabilizer which successfully keeps the embers 
of nationhood in the country rolling. However, recent unfolding 
development is threatening the success of consociationalism or plural 
democratic success in Nigeria. It was earlier noted that President Obasanjo 
attempted to violate this arrangement, but the Senate thwarted his plot. 
President Jonathan also attempted but failed.86 Recently, such rumors on 
the possibility or intention of President Buhari to continue after his eight 
years in 2023 were vehemently debunked by himself as unfounded and 
uncalled for. The battle on where the presidency should go in 2023 is 
threatening to tear the country apart and retrogress the consociational 
practice in the country. The Southern Governors threatened that power 
must go back to the South, while some Northern elite dismissed such 
threats as empty and unconstitutional. Zoning is a political term that 
gained currency in the Oxford Dictionary of African Politics. It is defined 
as "A political practice in Nigeria under which political parties agree to split 
their presidential and vice-presidential candidates between the North and 
South of the country and also to alternate the home area of the President 
between the North and South. The principle of zoning is designed to 
ensure that neither the North nor the South of the country is ever 
permanently excluded from power and that no one party is seen to only 

 
85  Lateef Oluwafemi Buhari, “Separatist Agitation and Quest for State Police in 

Nigeria” (2018) 3:3 European Journal of Social Sciences Studies (European Journal 
of Social Sciences Studies) 249–262. 

86  J Bayo Adekanye, Power Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Political System (Geneva: UN 
Research Institute for Social Development, 1997). 



423 | LENTERA HUKUM 

represent one part of the country."87 This global recognition of Nigeria's 
consociational practice suffix portrays it as a model worthy of emulation by 
countries with a similar plurality.  

After the defeat of President Jonathan by President Buhari in 2015, the 
North has been controlling centrifugal power for six years now. It is 
expected that the ruling APC will, based on the consociational 
arrangement, zone the Presidential ticket back to the South. The stumbling 
block to that is the opposition PDP, which is poking nosing to destabilize 
this arrangement because the last time they held power, it was at the 
Southern hand. The elites in PDP are confidently arguing and justifying 
that PDP must, as a matter of principle and gentleman agreement, as they 
termed it, zone the Presidential seat back to the North. If the PDP zones 
the ticket to the North, the North may continue to rule at the center. This 
will not augur well for the consociational settings that have been enjoying 
continuity but with instability. Of all these, the pundits and commentators 
are busy arguing that zoning and power sharing are unconstitutional and 
are taking the country backward.88 For instance, a scenario where of all the 
healthy and strong contestants, only President Yar'adua was anointed by 
the PDP in 2007. Many better candidates might have emerged if the ticket 
had been left open. Today, the PDP, in a strategic move, is saying that it 
will leave the ticket open for all interested candidates, but all pointers are 
pointing towards a Northern candidate. In contrast, the APC clearly will 
zone the ticket to the South.89  

The consequences of zoning and power sharing are that it promotes ethnic 
voting, regional politics, religious sentiments, mediocrity, and sacrifice of 
credibility and competency in favor of power sharing.90 Some Ministers are 

 
87  Nic Cheeseman, Eloise Bertrand, & Sa’eed Hussaini, A Dictionary of African Politics 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
88  Remond Alexandra, “Power sharing in Africa: Does It Still Have a Role to Play?” 

(2015) 1:1 E-International Relations 1–8. 
89  Leo Sobechi, "Power Sharing Schemes Worsen APC's Zoning Confusion," The 

Guardian Newspaper (18 April 2021), online: <https://guardian.ng/politics/power 
sharing-schemes-worsen-apcs-zoning-confusion/>. Accessed on 26 December 2022. 

90  Scott Gates et al., "Power Sharing, Protection and Peace" (2016) 78:2 The Journal of 
Politics 1119–1215. 



424 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

appointed based on the federal character who are non-performing and 
could not be replaced even if there are capable hands from other states just 
because of federal character. The same applies to public services. Besides, 
the zoning of major political offices in Nigeria sometimes heralded 
electoral violence and rigging of elections, and leaders defied accountability 
and transparency while the citizens were rendered choiceless. It is perceived 
as undemocratic and unconstitutional also. For instance, in 1999, the 
significant contestants in Alliance for Democracy, Olufalae, and PDP, 
President Obasanjo, were all from the Southwest as against the six 
geopolitical zones in the country and FCT Abuja. Also, in 2003, 2007, and 
2011 Presidential Elections, violence characterized by rigging and 
manipulation accompanied the outcome of the results because, in the case 
of 2003, the ruling PDP decided to continue at all costs. In 2007, despite 
the two major contenders, President Yar'adua and President Buhari coming 
from the same geopolitical zones with the same ethnic, religious and 
regional identity and emerging from the same state, the ruling PDP could 
not give any chance to an opposition party. In the 2011 Presidential 
Election, the country was polarized into the North versus South, and the 
same was replicated in 2015. In 2023, the same scenario may re-emerge. 
Some of the inter-religious violence in Nigeria is attributed to the local 
power sharing and zoning of political offices.91 Contrarily, Le Van believed 
that power sharing and zoning is a model working in Africa to curtail 
violence and conflict in plural societies.92 It has succeeded in working peace 
out of the civil war in states like Kenya and Zimbabwe. At the same time, 
it deterred another outbreak in Nigeria. 

Thus, the Nigerian political trajectory in the Fourth Republic is at a 
crossroads. A Rubicon has been attained, believed that democracy has 
come to stay in the country has spent the longest experiment of 21 years, 
which surpassed the total accumulated years of the First, Second, and 
Aborted Third Republic. Therefore, power sharing and zoning are those of 

 
91  Jonas B Bunte & Laura Thaut Vinson, “Local power sharing institutions and 

interreligious violence in Nigeria” (2016) 53:1 Journal of Peace Research 49–65. 
92  Carl A Le Van, “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain 

Democracies” (2010) 24:1 Governance 31–53. 
 



425 | LENTERA HUKUM 

the elixirs sustaining this democracy. Power sharing was not spelled out in 
the First and Second Republics, prompting the politicians to sail the 
country and rock the boat in power struggles. However, in as much as 
power sharing and zoning are tranquilizers in peacebuilding in Nigeria and 
conflict prevention mechanism. The future of Nigerian democracy is at 
stake because of the tendency to betray the agreement as experienced 
during Obasanjo and Jonathan, just as the body language of some Northern 
stalwarts is pointing toward retaining power in the North beyond 2023. 
Whatever may unfold in 2023 and beyond, Nigeria owing to its mega size, 
population, complex nature, and ability to surmount an existential threat 
severally, including Civil War and post-2015 CIA prediction of 
disintegration.  

 

VI. CONCLUSION 

The study concludes that power sharing and zoning in Nigeria consist of 
constitutional and unconstitutional trends. Adopting a federal structure 
enabled a constitutional sharing of power in the legislative and executive 
arms of government. Nigeria’s complex nature made it convenient for the 
elite to design a power sharing arrangement, although out of the context of 
legality, but suitable for attaining a satisfactory political system that will 
guarantee peace and stability. Most states operating Lijphart's 
consociational democracy received adequate attention as case studies, but 
Nigeria did not. Consociationalism is at work in Nigeria, yet, few studies 
paid any attention to that. This work presented the Nigerian version of 
consociational democracy, where an empirical and a normative approach 
explored how the Nigerian version operates, including its successes and 
challenges. The Nigerian model is a role model for similar plural societies 
operating in newer democracies in developing states. Nigeria may not 
secure a stable peace and a strong democratic building without power 
sharing and zoning principles. It is here to suggest that while power sharing 
and zoning will continue to be relevant in Nigerian political sustainability, 
the phenomenon should not be a sacrifice on the altar of mediocrity and 
undemocratic practices. Any zoning should ensure that credibility and 



426 | Power Sharing and Zoning Formula for Managing Nigeria's Diversity: A Case of the Fourth Republic 

 

competency are considered in addition to the popular will of the 
electorates. Violence, manipulation or rigging, disenfranchising the voters, 
and other inimical undemocratic practices should be eschewed. It suggests 
that the elite may try to imbibe the protégé of patriotism in their approach 
to national politics, which will gradually wither away this process for an 
integrated national politics that will no longer require the zoning for peace 
to prevail. In order words, consociationalism should be gradually eschewed 
by the elite not because it is not good but because it will prolong genuine 
national integration and political development in the long run. 

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

None. 

 

COMPETING INTEREST 

The author declared that they have no competing interests. 

 

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