Meta-Psychology, 2023, vol 7, MP.2021.2762 https://doi.org/10.15626/MP.2021.2762 Article type: Original Article Published under the CC-BY4.0 license Open data: Not Applicable Open materials: Not Applicable Open and reproducible analysis: Not Applicable Open reviews and editorial process: Yes Preregistration: No Edited by: Carlsson, R. & Innes-Ker, Å Reviewed by: Rebecca Willén, Farhan Sarwar Analysis reproduced by: Not Applicable All supplementary files can be accessed at OSF: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/YCS8T A Theory of Ethics to Guide Investigative Interviewing Research David A. Neequaye University of Gothenburg Abstract This article examines ethical considerations relevant to the formulation of psychological investigative interviewing techniques or methods. Psychology researchers are now devoting much attention to improving the efficacy of eliciting information in investigative interviews. Stakeholders agree that interviewing methods must be ethical. However, there is a less concerted effort at systematically delineating ethical considerations to guide the creation of interviewing methods derived from scientific psychological principles. The disclosures interviewees make may put them at considerable risk, and it is not always possible to determine beforehand whether placing interviewees under such risks is warranted. Thus, I argue that research psychologists aiming to contribute ethical methods in this context should ensure that those methods abide by a standard that actively protects interviewees against unjustified risks. Interviewing techniques should provide interviewees, particularly vulnerable ones, with enough agency to freely determine what to disclose. Researchers should explicitly indicate the boundary conditions of a method if it cannot achieve this standard. Journal editors and reviewers should request such discussions. The suggested standard tasks research psychologists to be circumspect about recommending psychological techniques without fully addressing the ethical boundaries of those methods in their publications. I explain the proposed ethical standard’s necessity and discuss how it can be applied. Keywords: disclosure, ethical investigative interviewing, human intelligence source, psychological manipulation, suspect, witness A Theory of Ethics on Investigative Interviewing This article discusses ethical considerations relevant to the formulation of psychological investigative inter- viewing techniques or methods. Such techniques are means of asking people questions in investigative in- terviews. In those interviews, interviewers question in- terviewees to potentially elicit information pertinent to perceived local/national or international security con- cerns or interests a governing entity may have. I use the word, perceived, deliberately in this definition of investigative interviewing. Different governing enti- ties may have different views on whether an investiga- tion is a security issue or whether an interest is legiti- mate. Another term, interrogation, has a similar mean- ing as investigative interviewing (see, e.g., Hartwig et al., 2014). However, some stakeholders associate inter- rogation with questioning methods aimed at confirm- ing a preconceived notion rather than eliciting infor- mation (Rachlew, 2017; Williamson, 1993). Therefore, I adopt the term investigative interviewing. The term is arguably a more intuitive designator of the majority of social interactions wherein the objective is to elicit truthful information in an investigation or interview. Before proceeding, it is critical to preempt any later confusion by noting relevant topics that are not the cur- rent article’s focus. This examination does not discuss the ethics of interviews psychologists conduct, such as psychological evaluations in the health sector, for em- https://doi.org/10.15626/MP.2021.2762 https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/YCS8T 2 ployers, and other organizations. Additionally, the ar- ticle does not delve into how psychologists should per- sonally comport themselves when directly performing consultations in a professional capacity. The APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct addresses these important issues (American Psychological Associ- ation, 2002), which are not the focus of the present dis- cussion. The article centers on investigative interviewing per- taining to national/international security concerns and interests—and research psychologists contributing ethi- cal methods to that enterprise. Research psychologists may serve as consultants, advising directly on actual in- vestigative interviews, and it is generally recommended that such consultations follow the APA ethical guide- lines. It is worth repeating here that this article does not delve into how research psychologists should per- sonally comport themselves during professional consul- tations. Previous examinations have addressed these es- sential issues (see, e.g., American Psychological Associ- ation, 2002; Porter et al., 2016). Moreover, this work does not address how security personnel, for example, the police, should behave when conducting investiga- tive interviews—or the ethical-legal standards thereof (e.g., the recording of suspect and witness interviews). Other research has examined such essential issues (see, e.g., Clarke, 2001; Newton, 1998; Snook et al., 2020). This article focuses on the burgeoning research field where research psychologists contribute somewhat indi- rectly by developing and recommending psychological interviewing techniques to be used by other practition- ers, specifically, law enforcement and intelligence inter- viewers. Many existing scientific publications recom- mend such psychological interviewing techniques (see, Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017; Vrij and Granhag, 2014 for overviews). The ethics of these methods published in scientific journals remain underexamined. Existing ethics codes are either underspecified for investigative interviewing (e.g., American Psychological Association, 2002) or typically speak to how researchers or psycholo- gists should personally comport themselves (e.g., Porter et al., 2016). This article explores and specifies ethical considerations relevant to indirect contributions to in- vestigative interviewing that feature in psychology jour- nal articles. Researchers’ Current Focus on Developing Psycho- logical Interviewing Techniques Various events in recent history have sparked a gen- eral interest in investigative interviewing. For example, (a) the discovery that the Central Intelligence Agency (United States) used undeniably abusive questioning methods at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib (Cohen, 2005); (b) the revelations that law enforcement person- nel routinely employ dubious techniques that elicit false confessions to crimes (Kassin, 2017); (c) the missed op- portunities to obtain information that could have helped prevent security breaches worldwide (Soufan, 2011). Psychology researchers are now devoting much atten- tion to improving the efficacy of eliciting information in investigative interviews (Meissner, 2021; Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017). The majority of research focused on de- veloping interviewing techniques draws on psycholog- ical principles that facilitate disclosure. Researchers and practitioners agree that interviewing methods must be ethical (Alison and Alison, 2017; Hartwig et al., 2014; Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017). However, there is a less concerted effort at systematically delineating ethi- cal considerations relevant to the creation of interview- ing methods derived from scientific psychological prin- ciples. Two seminal works have considered this topic previ- ously. Skerker (2010) extensively discusses the moral- ity of investigative interviewing. Hartwig et al. (2016) reviewed extant psychological interviewing methods, at the time, and analyzed their moral implications. The present work draws on Skerker (2010) and Hartwig et al. (2016), and when necessary, I will describe the rel- evant aspects. However, this work is not a commentary on those publications. The current article takes a differ- ent approach and examines the ethics of investigative interviewing in ways that address existing interviewing methods and those that may be developed in the fu- ture. This work aims to contribute to the discussion by calling on the field to now consider a more forward- looking approach. I will argue that interviewing meth- ods should provide interviewees, particularly vulnerable ones, with enough agency to freely determine what to dis- close. As such, researchers should explicitly indicate the boundary conditions of a technique if it cannot achieve this standard. The proposed ethical standard may as- sist in regulating researchers’ creation and publication of psychological interviewing techniques. The proposed standard purposely focuses on the pub- lications of research psychologists for pragmatic rea- sons. Guidelines aimed directly at practicing investiga- tive interviewers may be ineffective since practitioners are generally under no obligation to abide by an ethi- cal standard the academic literature posits—unless the relevant authorities ratify the standard. Such ratifica- tion may comprise an arduous and lengthy bureaucratic process, decelerating the goals at hand. Nonetheless, practicing interviewers may draw on the recommendations of research publications, and they are encouraged to do so (Fallon, 2014). Suppose a pub- lication indicates that an interviewing technique leads 3 people to disclose information. In that case, a prac- titioner may implement the technique in an actual in- terview. This possibility offers a pragmatic way for the academic literature to proactively contribute to practi- tioners using ethical methods. We must ensure that the methods researchers develop and recommend via their publications are ethical. The editorial process of scien- tific publishing is an opportune avenue to assure that researchers primarily disseminate ethical interviewing methods. Importantly, this approach could preempt possibilities for the scientific literature to sustain or pro- duce ethically problematic techniques that practitioners might adopt. However, there is little specification when it comes to standards by which to determine the ethical nature of interviewing methods researchers publish. Later, I will elaborate on the details of the proposed ethical standard; now, I will explain its pragmatic neces- sity. The APA ethics code (American Psychological Asso- ciation, 2002) offers principles to govern the psychology profession; two are relevant to the publication of inves- tigative interviewing methods in psychology journals. Principle A: the beneficence and nonmaleficence principle charges members of the psychology profession to en- sure that they do no harm. In this view, we must strive to safeguard the welfare of those whom our work may affect. Principle E calls for respecting people’s rights and dignity. The work of psychology should not infringe on individuals’ rights to privacy, confidentiality, and self- determination. It is incumbent upon research psycholo- gists to ensure that their publications align with the rel- evant ethics codes. However, the APA ethics code is de- signed to be applicable across the organization’s many (∼54) divisions; the principles therein are purposely as- pirational. The respective divisions and fields of psy- chology are encouraged to create enforceable standards that put the APA ethics principles into action (Behnke, 2006). The standard this article proposes is an attempt to provide such an enforceable standard applicable to the development and recommendation of investigative interviewing methods via scientific publication. Put sim- ply, the standard is an effort to provide a metric to as- sure that published interviewing techniques align with the beneficence and nonmaleficence plus the respect for rights and dignity principles. To my knowledge, a compendium of generally appli- cable ethics principles does not exist when it comes to psychological interviewing methods. The current state of the literature is not exactly a shortcoming but an in- evitable result of moral and legal entanglements com- monly associated with investigative interviewing (see, e.g., Sukumar et al., 2016). Moreover, there are var- ied legal jurisdictions and cultural contexts worldwide. Broadly examining legal nuances simultaneously with the morality of psychological techniques will be close to unmanageable. Thus, this work will focus on moral issues that generally arise when people are subjected to psychological techniques in investigative interviews. The analysis will not delve into the specific laws of any context. Also, this article does not necessarily provide a complete theory. The goal is to offer a general proposal to commence open discussions on the topic. I have structured the remainder of this article as fol- lows. First, the work discusses the moral challenges and legitimacy of investigative interviewing. Next, I de- scribe the categories of people that typically feature in interviews and the risks interviews pose to them. The article then explores how research psychologists may structure interviewing methods they develop to navi- gate such risks ethically. Finally, I explore the ethical na- ture of the Scharff technique—an interviewing method that features in the published literature. That analysis provides an example of how one may examine the ethics of an interviewing technique. Moral Challenges of Investigative Interviewing Investigative interviews contain a moral conundrum: to what extent is it permissible to (sometimes) compel people to submit to questioning about whatever topic a governing entity deems fit? Surely one is entitled to keep what they know a secret if one wishes? Control- ling the information one wants to be open or secret is the essence of human autonomy—that is, one’s ability to determine their identity, intentions, possessions, and actions (Bok, 1989). Previous works, namely, Hartwig et al. (2016) and Skerker (2010) have addressed this general problem investigative interviewing raises. I will draw on the relevant aspects of those works to reiterate the legitimacy of investigative interviewing because the discussion is a useful reminder, and it sets the stage for the remainder of this work. Bok (1989) argues that one cannot automatically ap- prove or disapprove of secrecy. One must examine the moral arguments for every occasion where the justifia- bility of secrecy is under contention Bok (1989). Let us now address whether investigative interviewing, which often comprises probing others’ secrets, is a justifiable enterprise. Liberal democracy is presently the most popular form of national and international government (e.g., Mukand and Rodrik, 2020). In this system of governance, founded on deontological ethics, a signif- icant aspect of exercising one’s rights is the freedom to enjoy autonomy without interference Hartwig et al. (2016). There is a general understanding that people are morally equal; Skerker (2010) explains this phe- nomenon in detail, and the remainder of this paragraph provides a summary. Mutual respect for one another’s 4 rights upholds moral equality. One can fully enjoy one’s rights if they do not impede another’s rights (Skerker, 2010). For example, a person is free to own a house provided she purchases it using her resources, not steal- ing another’s house. Illegitimate means of exercising one’s rights is a rights violation. The violator conse- quently forfeits the expectation that others will respect her rights. Hence, it is permissible to inhibit such vio- lations but only to the extent that the restraint restores the status quo—moral equality (Skerker, 2010). Typically, in liberal democracies, the state or the legit- imate governing entity is responsible for ensuring moral equality by protecting the interests of the governed. Ac- cordingly, governing entities usually have a monopoly on coercion. They can, therefore, compel the governed to attend investigative interviews if there is cause to be- lieve a deviation in moral equality has occurred. As such, the interview may support efforts to restore the status quo. For instance, a murder suspect may be de- tained and questioned about their whereabouts when the crime happened. Ordinarily, detaining, and asking anyone to share personal details compromises their au- tonomy, which is a rights violation. However, Hartwig et al. (2016) note that a warranted temporary restriction of a person’s rights, as in the example of this murder sus- pect, is not necessarily a violation but a rights infringe- ment. An infringement, in this case probing the secrets of a suspected murderer, is not inherently wrong. Re- member that governing entities in liberal democracies are responsible for safeguarding moral equality, which allows the mandate to compel. Nonetheless, such rights infringements must not ex- ceed the amount of compelling a governing entity needs to restore the status quo (Skerker, 2010). The governed have the right to procedural fairness or natural justice (Bayles, 2012). But investigative interviewing is fraught with epistemic limitations. It is impossible always to know whether subjecting a person to an interview is justified in the first place, a significant part of interview- ing aims to determine if the interview is appropriate (Hartwig et al., 2016). Suspects undergo questioning as part of establishing whether they are culprits—they might well be innocent. An interviewer might have to ask an informant probing questions before fully de- termining whether the probe was necessary for under- standing some investigation of interest. These epistemic limitations make it challenging to establish the extent to which chosen interviewing methods overly infringe on an interviewee’s autonomy—and rise to the level of a rights violation. That is to say, investigative interviews are highly morally risky (Hartwig et al., 2016). How- ever, interviews are a necessary aspect of assuring moral equality. Thus, it is critical to equip stakeholders to bet- ter anticipate such moral risks. That knowledge could be a useful crutch to navigate the formulation of inter- viewing methods ethically. People Subjected to Interviews A central discussion point regarding the moral risks of investigative interviewing is the injuries interview- ing methods pose or could pose to interviewees or peo- ple subjected to interviews. For example, the exam- ination by Hartwig et al. (2016) classified the exist- ing psychological interviewing techniques into themes and analyzed their potential moral hazards; next fol- lows a summary. One theme comprised interviewing techniques that seek to confirm preconceived notions of guilt. Those methods implement coercive and deceptive practices to elicit confessions; examples include decep- tively minimizing or maximizing the consequences of crimes to force suspects to confess at any cost (Inbau et al., 2001). Confession-based techniques have been shown to reliably elicit false confessions (see Kassin, 2017). Moreover, such methods damage the integrity of interviewers and the institutions under which they serve (Hartwig et al., 2016). The other theme consists of interviewing methods that actively avoid confirming preconceived notions. The PEACE model is an example of a framework under the information-gathering approach (see Clarke, 2001 for an overview). PEACE is an abbreviation denot- ing five stages of the interviewing process—Planning and Preparation; Engaging and explaining; asking an interviewees’ Account of events; Closure; and Evalua- tion. The PEACE model offers the interviewee maxi- mum opportunities to provide a thorough account in re- sponse to an interviewer’s inquiries. Other techniques advocate asking questions in a manner that elicits dif- ferences between liars and truth tellers (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Vrij, 2018). Some methods also employ subtle elicitation tactics that lead interviewees to dis- close information without realizing they have provided new information (Oleszkiewicz et al., 2014). In all, the techniques under the information-gathering theme equip interviewers with tactics and strategies to gather information about a topic of interest. Hartwig et al. (2016) note that the information-gathering theme pro- vides a better ethical view of investigative interviewing. It focuses on treating interviewees fairly and respecting their rights—unlike confession-based methods. I have chosen a different way of approaching the topic by first categorizing interviewees to provide a generic classification system. This entry point offers a novel approach different from Hartwig et al. (2016) and is useful because it allows a more tractable and forward- looking discussion than classifying interviewing tech- 5 niques. We cannot anticipate all the methods that might be developed in the future. Hence, a classification of ex- tant interviewing techniques is likely to become limited as the field develops new methods. Classifying inter- viewees affords a forward-looking analysis and offers more longevity. Such a categorization allows one to ex- amine whether any existing or upcoming interviewing method may pose injuries to the class of interviewees from which the technique aims to elicit information. Generically classifying interviewees better situates the field to examine the moral implications of current and future interviewing methods. Additionally, the shift in analysis, highlighting interviewees’ experiences, could spur discussions toward potential modifications existing techniques may need to enhance their ethical standards. Types of Interviewees and the Risks for Worst- Case Outcomes. Surveys of the literature reveal three general functions that can arguably characterize any in- terviewee1; a suspect, a witness, or a human intelli- gence (HUMINT) source (e.g., Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017; Vrij, Meissner, et al., 2017). An individual is likely to fit at least one of these designations when questioned in an investigative interview at any time point. Hence, this classification system sets the stage for a forward- looking ethics analysis that offers more longevity. I will examine each interviewee category and the associated risk for worst-case outcomes in interviews. Suspects. Suspects are individuals whom interview- ers question because of reasonable grounds to believe, at least temporarily, that the person has committed a crime or some aspect of a crime. Typically, interviewers question suspects in a local/national law enforcement jurisdiction (e.g., Meissner et al., 2015). Some suspects can, however, be interviewed in an international law enforcement context (Glasius, 2006). International sus- pects usually feature in investigations sanctioned by in- tergovernmental organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). Any act labeled a crime in a juris- diction is unlawful by default. A governing entity can mete out punishment to anyone found guilty of a crime (Morrison, 2013; Tierney, 2009). If a suspect is con- victed of a crime, penalties can range from a partial to a total loss of civil liberties. For example, those convicted can receive a fine or a prison sentence. What a suspect reveals during questioning could contribute to absolving or implicating them. Risks. In the worst-case scenario, what a person dis- closes when questioned as a suspect could inadvertently cause them to lose some civil liberties or contribute to the loss. Witnesses. Like suspects, witnesses can feature in a local/national or an international law enforcement con- text. These individuals undergo interviews if they report having had some direct sensory experience of a crime under investigation or have been directly harmed. Ordi- narily, these are cases where the person may have seen or heard aspects of a crime as a bystander (Read and Craik, 1995; Wells and Olson, 2003)—or they may have been a victim of the crime (Spalek, 2016). The informa- tion a witness provides sheds light on the crime under investigation in various ways. Three are relevant here: (a) whatever a witness discloses may contribute to ex- culpating or incriminating a suspect; (b) or the informa- tion may lead someone to become a suspect. (c) In the first instance, a witness is not a suspect, and a witness may refuse to answer incriminating questions (Pieck, 1960). Nonetheless, if a witness unwittingly provides self-incriminating information, they may become a sus- pect in the investigation. Risks. In the worst-case scenario, what a witness re- veals may inadvertently cause another person or the witness themselves to become a suspect or ultimately lose some civil liberties (Wells and Olson, 2003). Human Intelligence Sources. HUMINT sources are questioned because they might possess information rel- evant to an investigation. A broad range of HUMINT investigations exist. Those investigations could be pre- vious, ongoing, or possible future local/national or in- ternational crimes (Hartwig et al., 2014). The interest may also be a general security issue that is not exactly a crime (Burkett, 2013). For example, an investigation of known or ostensible threats posed by a local or foreign organization or a foreign government. Alternatively, the investigation could be gathering information to further an entity’s interests (Ransom, 2013). For instance, a government seeking to gain insight into subjects that can inform foreign policy or foreign aid decisions. Un- like suspects, HUMINT sources are questioned primarily because of the information they may possess, not neces- sarily due to a belief that they have committed a crime. There are a few distinctions between the HUMINT source and witness designations worth noting. Some- times, the objective of an intelligence interview is to elicit information about a previous, ongoing, or immi- nent crime. Here, unlike witnesses, intelligence sources are those who may have obtained information indirectly and not necessarily through direct harm or sensory ex- perience. For instance, another person could have pro- vided the information a HUMINT source now holds. In this view, one could consider such indirect sources of 1Possibly, some jurisdictions may call the categories by slightly different names. However, stakeholders are familiar with and frequently use these designators in the manner de- fined by the classification scheme. It is unlikely that the names used here will cause unnecessary ambiguity in the investiga- tive interviewing literature. 6 information in criminal investigations to be intelligence sources, as they possess relevant information (Carter, 1990). Indeed, investigators may question other in- dividuals to better understand aspects of an incident; for instance, cross-checking suspects’ alibis or witness’ statements using third party information. An example of such intelligence gathering could be interviewing var- ious care-givers in a child sexual abuse case to shed light on the alleged abuse. Investigators may also ask inde- pendent experts about different aspects of a crime; for example, requesting an explanation of DNA evidence analysis. The goal could be to better understand, for instance, how the crime occurred. Risks in Criminal Investigations. Despite the func- tional distinctions, the HUMINT source and witness des- ignations have similar risks when an intelligence inter- view relates to a criminal investigation. A HUMINT source may provide information that contributes to im- plicating or absolving a suspect. Under certain circum- stances, an intelligence interviewee could incriminate herself. Thus, the worst-case scenario here is a HUMINT source unwittingly revealing information—and those details implicate someone or her to become a suspect in a criminal investigation or eventually lose some civil liberties. Risks in Non-Criminal Investigations. Other intelli- gence interviews entail eliciting information about gen- eral security issues such as criminal networks and for- eign threats. Alternatively, the questioning can cen- ter on certain interests an entity may have (e.g., for- eign policy decisions). These intelligence investigations are not necessarily alleged crimes, at least not until a governing entity launches a formal criminal investiga- tion. Thus, here, an intelligence source may come by information directly, as a witness would, or the source could obtain it indirectly, as I have described earlier. Un- like witnesses who provide information about a specific (past) crime, intelligence sources here could undergo questioning about known or ostensible events. When the matter is a general security issue or an entity’s inter- ests, the worst-case eventuality for the HUMINT source is revealing details on a subject when one does not in- tend to. Caveats. I must emphasize that the above catego- rizations derive from the immediate purpose or function an interviewee is serving during questioning. Thus, the classification scheme does not preclude an interviewee from switching roles during an ongoing or a subsequent interview. The point is—an interviewee assumes a des- ignation depending on their current function, and those functions are subject to change. Navigating the Moral Risks of Investigative Inter- viewing The current article aims to improve the ethics of in- vestigative interviewing techniques research psycholo- gists publish. If so, why delve into risks to intervie- wees directly caused by practicing interviewers—not re- search psychologists? After all, jurisdictions have laws and guidelines to determine and prevent malpractice, at least in local and national law enforcement (e.g., Col- lege of Policing, 2019). As I noted earlier, research psychologists recommend that practicing interviewers should implement interviewing methods published in the scientific literature. Often the recommendation comes with the claim that those techniques are ethical or elicit information effectively (see, e.g., Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017). Suppose practitioners heed the recommen- dations of the published literature because of the pre- sumed benefits. In that case, research psychologists may contribute indirectly to the risks interviewees face even though practitioners directly cause those risks. There- fore, it behooves research psychologists to be cognizant of the dangers they could inadvertently contribute to and preempt such possibilities. Importantly, research psychologists should strive to prevent possible misuse of techniques they publish. Investigative interviewing is an inevitable aspect of assuring moral equality despite the risks involved. Thus, the critical question to now address is this: how should stakeholders ethically navigate these moral risks when developing interviewing methods? How should re- search psychologists design fail-safe techniques that in- hibit interviewees from being excessively compelled in interviews? The following sections delve into these is- sues. Interviewees Should Decide Their Disclosures. Actions that tend to result in unpleasant outcomes can be permissible if one consents to partaking (Hartwig et al., 2016; Tadros, 2011). For example, pugilists con- sent to the possibility of concussions when they engage in prizefighting. In this view, the risks of investigative interviewing are not immoral by default. Hartwig et al. (2016) note that, sometimes, such outcomes are worthy of consent because, in liberal democracies, the governed expect governing entities to ensure moral equality. Cit- izens presume that governing entities will take action to keep them safe and protect their interests. However, epistemic limitations prevent knowing beforehand if an investigative interview is warranted. By extension, we also cannot know whether the potential worst-case sce- nario an interviewing method presents is worthy of con- sent. Interviewees must first disclose information for the worst-case scenario to arise. As a result, in liberal democracies, interviewees generally have the right to 7 silence, even if they can be compelled to questioning in interviews. The right to silence allows the interviewee control over what information to be open or keep secret. This control assures that interviewees consent to the possible consequences of their disclosures beforehand. I use the phrase—possible consequences—deliberately because it is not always viable to foresee the exact out- comes of disclosures in interviews. The right to determine one’s disclosures may allow bad-faith actors to withhold information or provide mis- leading details to avoid deserved punishment. More im- portantly, however, such autonomy enables good-faith actors to provide all the information a governing entity may need toward ensuring moral equality (Seidmann and Stein, 2000). These features do not necessarily ad- vocate freeing the bad-faith actors. Instead, they uphold a primary aspect of moral equality—the protection of good faith actors (Bandes, 2009; Cassell, 2017). A crit- ical parameter for what can be done to persons without compromising their rights is that no one should harm another without the other’s consent (Nozick, 1974). In this vein, an interviewing method worthy of consent should inhibit the worst-case scenarios for good-faith actors in the class of interviewees from which it aims to elicit information. Interviewing methods purposed to elicit information from suspects should make it near impossible for in- nocent suspects to inadvertently say anything that can cause or contribute to them losing civil liberties. The witness and HUMINT source designations in criminal investigations are similar. Techniques designed to elicit information from such interviewees should make it near impossible for an innocent person to say anything self- incriminating or unwittingly incriminate another inno- cent person. HUMINT interviewing methods aimed at eliciting in- formation about general security threats or an entity’s interest should also protect interviewees’ autonomy in deciding what to disclose. Because these intelligence in- terviews do not concern formal criminal investigations, interviewees here are not necessarily innocent or guilty. Consequently, such interviewees may be propositioned to submit to an interview and not compelled as a matter of course. To be consent-worthy, elicitation techniques purposed for such HUMINT sources should make it near impossible to say anything one has not formed a clear intention to share. The consequences of disclosure in these HUMINT contexts are highly unpredictable, un- like in criminal investigations where some rules (e.g., constitutions) regulate the potential outcomes of disclo- sure. As such, it should remain the source’s prerogative to determine what to disclose; this provides reasonable assurance that the source has consented to the possible consequences of the disclosure. Two Principles for Ethical Interviewing Methods. How should research psychologists formulate interview- ing techniques that are worthy of consent? By what principles should those questioning methods strive to abide? This work offers two principles to set future dis- cussions in motion. The following proposal aims to con- tribute to developing parameters to assess or guide the ethics of current and future psychological interviewing techniques. A psychological interviewing method can achieve consent worthiness by ensuring the following. (a) An interviewee is maximally and instantaneously aware of an interviewer’s inquiry or what the interviewer is ask- ing; call this the inquiry-clarity principle. (b) An in- terviewee is maximally and instantaneously aware of the information they are choosing to disclose; call this the disclosure-awareness principle. These principles ar- guably give interviewees substantial agency to decide their disclosures and safeguard against disclosing infor- mation unwittingly. Suppose an interviewee has agency, that is, maximum and instant awareness of an inter- viewer’s inquiry and forms a clear intention of an ac- ceptable response, which she discloses. It is then con- ceivable that the interviewee has consented to the po- tential consequences of their disclosure. Agency allows the expectation that a person bears responsibility for their actions (Frith, 2014; Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009; Moore, 2016). It is worth reiterating that the two principles are to be applied in serial order, the inquiry-clarity principle and then the disclosure-awareness principle. Both prin- ciples must be satisfied. Suppose that an interviewing technique falls short of making an interviewee aware of what an interviewer is asking. One cannot justify the consent-worthiness of that technique by claiming or demonstrating that the method makes interviewees aware of what they are choosing to disclose. Without inquiry-clarity, it is challenging, if not impossible, to as- certain a reasonably proximate cause of a disclosure. If the inquiry that elicited a disclosure is unknown, one cannot claim the unknown inquiry is consent-worthy, re- gardless of the interviewee’s response. After satisfying the inquiry-clarity principle, the method must also al- low the interviewee to choose their preferred response. Suppose a method elicits a legitimate response from an interviewee, but the interviewee does not realize they have offered such a response. In that case, the method falls short of the disclosure-awareness principle. Here, legitimate response means a response on the record that one can materially ascribe to the interviewee. Proponents of a psychological interviewing technique must offer theoretical arguments or empirical evidence 8 demonstrating the conditions under which the method satisfies the inquiry-clarity and disclosure-awareness principles. Such exposition will reveal the extent to which the method allows interviewees agency over their disclosures. Editors and reviewers of investigative in- terviewing research may draw on the principles of- fered here to request such discussions from authors. This requirement will encourage much-needed reflec- tion about the ethics of interviewing methods. The principles offer much-needed clarity about what constitutes a psychologically manipulative technique. Currently, the term psychological manipulation remains undefined in the investigative interviewing literature. Torture, physical coercion, and deceptive methods do not comport with the principles proposed here. Ana- lysts condemn such practices (Meissner et al., 2015); they compromise interviewees’ agency to freely deter- mine what to disclose and essentially prevent one from providing accurate information. For example, deceptive interviewing techniques are prone to elicit false confes- sions (Kassin, 2017; Kassin and Kiechel, 1996). Hartwig et al. (2016) address the immorality of these dubious methods; they note that such techniques undermine so- ciety’s trust in public institutions and damage interview- ers’ character. That notwithstanding, indubitably immoral tech- niques should not be the standard against which stake- holders determine ethical techniques. This criterion is too low. It does not guarantee interviewees’ protection, given that investigative interviewing is fraught with epistemic limitations, and governing entities can com- pel people to interviews. Accordingly, deriving an inter- viewing method from scientific psychological principles does not necessarily make a technique consent-worthy. The scientific interviewing technique may still obscure an interviewer’s inquiry and lead an interviewee to un- wittingly disclose information—then the method is ar- guably psychologically manipulative. I am not suggest- ing that any interviewing technique that successfully persuades an interviewee to share information is psy- chologically manipulative. That interpretation is erro- neous. The proposal is that methods are psychologically manipulative if they undermine interviewees’ agency when convincing them to share information. An Absolute Standard Based on the Two Principles. In- terviewing methods should be held to an absolute stan- dard that actively protects all interviewees, especially vulnerable ones, such as children and people with in- tellectual disabilities. Broadly speaking, vulnerable in- terviewees, for various reasons, are highly suggestible and prone to providing information unwittingly (see, e.g., Farrugia and Gabbert, 2020; Gudjonsson, 2005; O’Mahony et al., 2012). Hence, I propose that the minimum requirement of consent-worthiness should be one that adheres to the inquiry-clarity and disclosure- awareness principles when a vulnerable person under- goes a technique. This standard calls on research psy- chologists to apply a maximin rule when formulating interviewing methods. The maximin rule is an ethics principle advocating that, typically, the right state of af- fairs is one structured such that the worst outcome is as acceptable as can be (Rawls, 1971). A method should allow the most vulnerable intervie- wee, within a class of interviewees, maximum agency in determining what to disclose. The standard neces- sitates research psychologists to be explicit about the possible boundary conditions where a technique fails to be consent-worthy—if such conditions exist. To my knowledge, there is little ongoing discussion about the ethical boundaries of techniques derived from psycho- logical principles. Let us say, for example, one designs a technique to elicit information from suspects. At a min- imum, I propose that the method give vulnerable sus- pects agency to determine what information they want to share. For example, the technique should give the most suggestible suspect, who is prone to falsely con- fessing, maximum agency to determine what to dis- close—without undermining such ability in any way. This standard is not always attainable. Techniques for vulnerable interviewees may require special considera- tions. However, the proposed standard tasks developers to indicate the target populations of their methods and not leave that to assumption. For instance, does the method provide agency to neurotypical adults but not adults with intellectual disabilities and children? It is worth clarifying that this work does not suggest that consent-worthy methods must provide an equal amount of agency to all interviewees within the rele- vant class. Such a feat will be unproductive and, ul- timately, insurmountable due to individual differences. Instead, I am proposing that an interviewing method should generally give interviewees enough (viz., max- imum) agency to the extent that when vulnerable in- terviewees undergo the method, they too will have the agency to decide what they wish to reveal. An illustration may assist in understanding the pro- posal. Imagine that the agency a technique provides is a pie. I am not suggesting that an interviewing method should ensure that all interviewees get an equal piece. Equal pieces may still be unacceptable if the pie is too small in the first place. For example, by design, a method may offer little agency to any interviewee. The proposed standard calls for a pie big enough so that even when one gets the smallest slice, it will still be ac- ceptable. Put differently, interviewing methods should provide enough agency such that the levels are suffi- 9 cient even when dealing with vulnerable interviewees. Researchers should be explicit about the boundaries of a method if it cannot achieve this standard. Overall, the proposed standard may allow psychological investiga- tive interviewing techniques to achieve beneficence and nonmaleficence; and respect for rights and dignity (viz., American Psychological Association, 2002, Principles A and E). Advancing the Ethics Paradigm: Exploring the Scharff Technique The standard proposed here arguably provides fairly straightforward and actionable guidelines for the de- sign of future interviewing techniques. Nonetheless, when it comes to existing methods, it is useful to ex- plore the conditions under which those techniques im- pact interviewees’ agency to promote or undermine con- sent worthiness. Illustration may help one understand how to engage with the standard when examining a specific technique’s ethics. In that light, I will exam- ine the Scharff technique. Researchers developed the Scharff technique by scientifically conceptualizing the interviewing style of Hanns Scharff; a member of the German Luftwaffe, active during World War II2. See Granhag and Hartwig (2015) for the first of such con- ceptualizations (see, also, Oleszkiewicz, 2016). Choosing the Scharff technique is arbitrary. Every in- terviewing technique in the published literature should be the subject of an ethics analysis; for example, the variants of the cognitive approach to lie detection (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017), the strategic use of evidence frame- work (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015), the tactical disclo- sure of evidence method (Dando and Bull, 2011), the verifiability approach (Nahari et al., 2014), et cetera. Moreover, this analysis of the Scharff technique is pre- liminary and not exhaustive; its goal is to encourage open discussions about the ethical boundaries of exist- ing techniques. The objective is not to impugn or be a snare to label the Scharff technique as unethical. The state of the literature will improve through collective ef- fort, not alienation. The present discussion provides an example of a structure and general recommendations. The goal is to get the ball rolling for future examina- tions of the Scharff technique and all other methods in the published literature. The current conception of the Scharff technique com- prises five components that work in concert to elicit in- formation. These components are best characterized as a way of handling conversations to facilitate the other interlocutor’s disclosure—not a checklist of mandatory behaviors to perform in serial order. An interviewer may enact the Scharffian components in any order that suits the goals at hand. • A friendly interpersonal approach. This component advocates conversing with the interviewee in a non-adversarial manner. The interviewee is to feel relaxed and comfortable, not accused or threat- ened to comply with demands. • Not pressing for information. This component charges the interviewer to refrain from asking di- rect questions or badgering the interviewee with questions. Note that asking direct questions is not synonymous with badgering. • Creating an impression of omniscience on a topic. This component calls on the interviewer to estab- lish an illusion of possessing substantial informa- tion on a topic by presenting truthful information. The presentation could be explicit; for example, the interviewer could talk openly about what they know, like a coherent story. Nevertheless, the goal to create the illusion of omniscience must be sub- tle, leading the interviewee to perceive they are unlikely to reveal anything new. It is worth noting that exponents of the Scharff technique advocate the use of truthful information, not false evidence ploys. • Confirmations and disconfirmations over direct questions. Instead of posing direct questions, the Scharff technique recommends the interviewer to present claims in a manner that invites the in- terviewee to either confirm or disconfirm. Here is an example fashioned after one provided by Oleszkiewicz (2016). Suppose an interviewer wanted to know if an event is likely to happen at location-x or -y. The interviewer could ask a direct question. Will the event happen at location-x or -y? Alternatively, one could embed the ques- tion in a claim. We know the event is likely to happen at location-x, not y. The interviewer is to discern if the interviewee confirms or disconfirms the claim in any way. Drawing on Grice (1975) and Luke (2021) notes that the confirmation- disconfirmation tactic may derive from the archi- tecture of conversational norms; interlocutors typ- ically correct each other’s mistakes if any arise. Oleszkiewicz et al. (2014) mention that confirma- 2As one can infer, Scharff fought for Nazi Germany, which begs an ethics discussion at a different level of analysis. Sup- pose an interviewing method is consent-worthy by the stan- dard this article proposes. In that case, does it matter who or what inspired the method? Are there any conditions that ethically justify or should preempt from developing consent- worthy interviewing methods? I am preparing to address these questions in an upcoming article, but see Luke (2017) 10 tion and disconfirmation alleviate the responsibil- ity on the interviewee to take the initiative of shar- ing new information. Importantly, the tactic min- imizes interviewees’ perception of the magnitude of their contribution to the interviewer’s knowl- edge. • Ignoring new information. This component rec- ommends the interviewer to avoid indicating that an interviewee has disclosed anything significant. The interviewer may achieve this goal in several ways. Examples of those ways include changing topics after the interviewee discloses something significant, downplaying the information, or ig- noring it. Luke (2021) theorizes that not acknowl- edging new information may complement other components like not pressing for information and the confirmation-disconfirmation tactic. This sym- biosis may bolster the illusion that the interviewer is indeed omniscient on the relevant topic. The interested reader may consult Oleszkiewicz (2016) for a more thorough discussion of the Scharff compo- nents. Overall, the Scharff technique’s current conception calls for the interviewer to assure that the intervie- wee experiences a pleasant interview. Interviewers must strive to view interviewees as persons, not just sources of information (Oleszkiewicz, 2016). Hence, the congeniality should be as authentic as possible, without threats, accusations, emotional manipulation, or accusatory minimization (Luke, 2021; Oleszkiewicz, 2016). Generally speaking, the ethos of the technique is laudable and respects interviewees’ dignity. Based on the extant scientific literature on the Scharff technique, one can infer that proponents intend for in- terviewers to use it to elicit information from human intelligence (HUMINT) interviewees (e.g., Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). This specification is a good start, and the Scharff technique literature offers more, in that re- gard, than say the cognitive approach to lie detection (see, e.g., Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017). In fact, this anal- ysis is possible because the Scharff technique literature provides some specifications about the intended target population. Nonetheless, the Scharff body of work is silent regarding which HUMINT interviewees can un- dergo the technique. For example, is the technique applicable when interviewing children, adolescents, or adults with intellectual disabilities; or is the technique designed for interviews with neurotypical adults only? To be fair, as I mentioned earlier, this issue is pervasive across the investigative interviewing literature; it is not specific to the Scharff technique. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the Scharff technique is recommended for eliciting intelligence in criminal investigations, non- criminal investigations, or both. To examine the ethics of any interviewing method, re- searchers must specify its intended applications. It may be worthwhile to approach that task in a manner analo- gous to the safe and balanced prescribing of medication. The idea is that medical professionals should strive to prescribe medicines appropriate to the condition under treatment with a dosage regimen that minimizes harm to the patient (Aronson, 2006). Thinking along those same lines, it is useful for research psychologists to ac- company their recommendations of interviewing tech- niques with dosage regimens that promote judicious us- age and flags plus preempts abuse. Next follows an elaboration of how one can offer an appropriate dosage regimen in the investigative interviewing context. • (i) One must first identify the categories of inter- viewees from which the method aims to elicit in- formation. One must outline why it is permissi- ble to subject that category of interviewees to the recommended technique. There should be empir- ical evidence or a theoretical discussion describ- ing how the method provides agency that allows the relevant interviewees control over their disclo- sures. • (ii) It is also equally vital to identify potential cat- egories of interviewees that should not be subjects of the technique. If possible, authors should also specify with theoretical examination or empirical evidence why it is not permissible to subject a category of interviewees to a proposed technique. These specifications allow clear identification of a technique’s ethical boundaries. Imagine that the technique seriously undermines the agency of some relevant category of interviewees, but this is left unspecified. Suppose the technique pro- vides neurotypical adults agency to decide their disclosures. However, for whatever reason, when adults with intellectual disabilities undergo the technique, they mistake the interview for a ca- sual conversation. Say it is not immediately ap- parent to them that what they are saying are dis- closures on the record. In that case, the technique fails the inquiry-clarity and disclosure-awareness principles. The vulnerable class of interviewees is not aware that the interviewer is asking for in- formation on the record, and they (i.e., intervie- wees) are choosing to disclose information on that record. • (iii) Finally, authors should aim to anticipate pos- sible misapplications and preempt such possibili- ties by describing such situations. For example, 11 exponents of the Scharff technique try to prevent misapplication by noting that interviewers should only use truthful information—not false evidence ploys—to create the omniscience illusion. Proponents of an interviewing method are unlikely to always be available to chaperone practicing interview- ers when they are potentially misusing the proposed method such that it falls short of consent-worthiness. For that reason, leaving the permitted and protected categories of interviewees unspecified or potential mis- applications unaddressed allows dangerous possibilities for abuse. Without specification, one can justify any usage by claiming the technique is recommended in the scientific literature and is therefore ethical. Speci- fying the permitted and protected categories and flag- ging possible misuse will challenge researchers to more thoroughly consider the possible risks a seemingly non- coercive technique could be inviting. Exposing those risks will lead researchers to take preemptive action by discontinuing the technique, outlining the boundary conditions, or redesigning it to be fail-safe if possible. Let us now explore the Scharff technique’s consent- worthiness given what is published concerning (a) the category of interviewees from which the method aims to elicit information; (b) the associated risks of being an interviewee in that relevant category; (c) the effects of the Scharff technique on how interviewees think and behave. Based on the extant research, one can assume that the Scharff technique is purposed to elicit informa- tion from HUMINT interviewees who are neurotypical adults. A recent meta-analysis examined experiments where neurotypical adults underwent the Scharff tech- nique compared to direct questioning (Luke, 2021). All things being equal, direct questions arguably reveal a questioner’s inquiry clearly. A neurotypical adult an- swering those questions is likely to be aware of what they are choosing to disclose. All things being equal, di- rect questions satisfy the inquiry-clarity and disclosure- awareness principles in serial order. By the standard this article proposes, direct questioning is consent-worthy when interviewing neurotypical adults in an intelli- gence interview. The meta-analysis indicated that the Scharff tech- nique generally influences HUMINT interviewees as in- tended (Luke, 2021). The method leads interviewees to disclose more new information. Importantly under Scharffian questioning, interviewees underestimate the amount of new information they disclose relative to what they indeed revealed. The technique also makes interviewees perceive the interviewer as more knowl- edgeable on the topics of discussion. Finally, the Scharff technique leads interviewees to report greater difficulty in deciphering the interviewer’s questioning objectives. Further research needs to elucidate how the various Scharffian components contribute to the effects just de- scribed. However, one can infer that taken together, the components may lead neurotypical adults to un- wittingly disclose some information in a HUMINT in- terview. The use of the word some is not trivial. The meta-analysis (Luke, 2021) suggests that for certain questions, the Scharff technique obscures inquiry-clarity insofar as interviewees report difficulty understanding what information the interviewer is after. Additionally, interviewees disclose more new information and under- estimate the amount they actually disclose. That re- sult suggests that the Scharff technique may obscure disclosure-awareness of some items of information. In the worst-case scenario, during a criminal inves- tigation, for example, when questioning an informant, the technique may reduce the interviewee’s agency in deciding whether to reveal or withhold some informa- tion items. Suppose those items are not bona fide crim- inal secrets but private information outside the scope of the investigation. In that case, the Scharff technique’s influence on neurotypical adults’ agency is a cause for concern. As discussed previously, epistemic limitations prevent knowing beforehand whether one possesses bona fide criminal secrets3. Governing entities have a monopoly on coercion and could compel people to in- terviews, at least in criminal investigations. Intervie- wees’ recourse from being excessively compelled is to decide their disclosures and object to providing infor- mation if they wish (Skerker, 2010). Proponents must address this potential ethical boundary of the Scharff technique when it comes to HUMINT interviewees in criminal investigations. Similar concerns to the one just described arise when considering Scharffian influence on HUMINT intervie- wees in non-criminal investigations. An example of a non-criminal investigation is a clandestine interview to collect information aimed at directing foreign policy. As discussed earlier, the risks in those interviews are highly unpredictable. Typically, there are hardly any codified rules (e.g., constitutions) stipulating the potential out- comes of disclosure for the interviewee. Those out- comes could be innocuous or pernicious, but one can- not be entirely sure before disclosing the information. The Scharff technique reduces agency to decide some disclosures. Hence, the technique may prevent an inter- viewee from withholding what they have not formed a clear intention to share. For those items of information, the Scharff technique falls short of the inquiry-clarity 3In a liberal democracy, withholding a criminal secret is morally inconsistent with the expectation that governing en- tities should ensure moral equality when a deviation occurs (Skerker, 2010). 12 and disclosure-awareness principles. There is a need to examine the flagged potential ethical boundary that could arise in non-criminal investigations. As noted previously, the present analysis is prelimi- nary. The current conception of the Scharff technique may change. There is also the need for more research to examine what precisely the Scharffian components cause interviewees to disclose. The meta-analysis in- dicates that the Scharff technique, compared to di- rect questions, leads interviewees to disclose a higher amount of information (Luke, 2021). Nonetheless, it is unclear what information people share in response to the technique. The underlying mechanisms of the technique remain largely unknown. Thus, it is uncer- tain which components exert the elicitation influences and why interviewees reveal the information they do. Maybe, Scharffian tactics generally elicit information that interviewees must legitimately reveal, for example, criminal secrets. Further research may also indicate that the technique leads interviewees to unwittingly share information irrespective of the information’s character- istics. These questions remain unanswered. Answering the pending research questions will assist in conducting further ethical analysis to comprehensively determine the Scharff technique’s consent-worthiness. Concluding Remarks This article has proposed an ethics standard that may guide the formulation of psychological interviewing methods. That is, interviewing techniques should pro- vide interviewees, particularly vulnerable ones, enough agency to freely determine what to disclose. This standard is feasible in governances, pertinently, liberal democracies, that arguably respect the natural rights of the governed and persons in general. Applying the principles to develop interviewing methods in immoral contexts like totalitarian regimes that do not aim to re- spect the rights of the governed would be unethical by default. In their publications, researchers should explicitly in- dicate the boundary conditions of a technique if it can- not achieve the proposed standard. Journal editors and reviewers should request such discussions. It is worth noting that this proposal does not call for researchers to cease exploring how people think and behave in in- vestigative interviews. As such, I do not intend for this work to stifle the exploration of interviewing methods. It is vital to understand the enterprise of interviewing to facilitate navigating it ethically. The suggested standard tasks research psychologists to be circumspect about recommending psychological techniques without (fully) addressing the ethical boundaries of those methods in their publications. The field must adopt fairly unambiguous metrics to examine the ethics of interviewing methods authors aim to publish. We must relinquish the comforting fiction that techniques devoid of blatant physical or psycholog- ical coercion are automatically ethical without actively investigating those methods. Indubitably immoral tech- niques that take advantage of suggestible interviewees to elicit false confessions or collect information nefari- ously should not be the standard against which research psychologists determine ethical techniques—this crite- rion is too low. Psychology research needs further theo- retical and empirical work that proactively ensures that current and future publications of interviewing methods protect various interviewees against potential manipu- lation. In addition to thinking about how a method may fa- cilitate disclosure, research psychologists must also be cognizant of the potential misuse or misapplication of the techniques they publish. This article’s contribution is that it specifies criteria by which to examine the eth- ical nature of interviewing methods researchers pub- lish, reducing ambiguity about what constitutes psycho- logical manipulation. Investigative interviewing entails considerable moral risks. Stakeholders must take steps to avoid ambiguity about what constitutes consent- worthy methods of eliciting information from intervie- wees. Author Contact David A. Neequaye, 0000-0002-7355-2784 Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Sweden I thank Lorraine Hope and Erik Mac Giolla for pro- viding immensely useful comments on earlier versions of this work. I am fully and solely responsible for any errors in this article. Correspondence to: David A. Neequaye, De- partment of Psychology, University of Gothenburg. Box 500, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Email: david.neequaye@psy.gu.se Conflict of Interest and Funding I have no conflict of interest to declare. I received no specific funding for this research. Author Contributions David A. Neequaye: Original Conceptualization, In- vestigation, Project administration, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing 13 Open Science Practices This article is purely theoretical and as such did not receive any Open Science badges. 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