perspective decembrie2011.pdf


decem6tie 2011 (Pwspectbe po6ti 37

The French-American Relationship,
its Impact on the UN and the Reshaping
of International Intervention 1990-2011i

Abstract The relationship between the us and France has profoundly a#ected the process afinternationat
intervention. use ofjorce and humanitarian actions in the conflicts across the world since i99o Military
interventions and decision making in international a#uirs has been the result qthe balance ojpowers inside
the UN SecurityCouncitlnm the end ojthe Cold War inwards. From the peak ofg/ta to the tow of the Imq
war the French-American relations have constanttykept the international agenda alive. With the changes
in both the US and French administrations in the past 4 years, with the overall EU dynamic, as welt as with
the dwetopments in MENA(Middle East-North Afrka) in recent months. the interaction between those two
main acton of the trans-Atlantic partnership, has gained new dimensions. The present paper attempts to
analyze the consequences of the Finch-American relations of the past 2 decades on the UN system and on
the legitimacy ofinternationat intewentions.

Key words: intemational intervention. France. US, UNSC (United Nations
Security Council), international conflict. decision-making, trans-Atlantic relations

"Ta understand Europe you have to be a genius - or French
Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State(1996-2000)

"I don't think about the reaction of the Americans before } say
things. ljust speak my mind -- which is trained in the world's best
schools, and refined by a thousand years of French cultural superi-
ority". Jacques Chirac, President of France {1995-2007)

Introduction

dana- Cristina
Professor at Babel
oanapopa@hotmail

Rona The question herein discussed is that
Botyai University of the relationship between the US and
com France within the broader trans-Atlantic

partnership, its impact on the UN decision
making process and on international inter-

vention in general. over the past 20 years.
The evolution of the French-American relationship after the

Cold War, the foreign policy approach of the two countries and
their involvement in international conflict managements being loo-
ked at through a comparative analysis of a number of conflicts
from the Balkan ethnic wars (1991-1999) to Afghanistan (2001)
and Iraq (2003). ending with the Arab Spring movements (2010-
2011 )



It remains to be seen if in the 21't century we will witness a more balanced approach
in the trans-Atlantic partnership, possibly with France as a European leader ,and if this
relationship can redefine international interventionism and adapt it to the conditions of the
current internationalenvironment.

Historical Background

Relationships between the US and France have always been an indicator for interna-
tional relations as a whole and for contemporary interventionism in particular. Interaction
between the two goes back 200 years to the Declaration of Independence of the United
States of America and throughout history moved back and forth from harmony and sym-
pathy to rivalry and competition, being oftentimes spiced up with touches of irony2.

The two are strongly connected by historical facts. To Americans, Lafayette3 always
sounds a War of Independence bell. while Pierre L'Enfant is ever-present in the architec-
ture of the US capital, Washington DC4.

The French, in turn will never forget the Normandy landings or the triumphant entry of
the American troops in Paris in 1944. It is as if none of the two countries could have exis-
ted without the other from the birth of the US inwards.

But beyond those solid ties that run over centuries, the post Cold War era has brou-
ght a new (r)evolution in their relationship. This (r)evolution was clearly visible within the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the international decision making process.
This (r)evolution has influenced the UN in the 21'' century in a dramatic manner and con-
sequently, the interventions in international conflicts.

After France's unconditional support towards the US immediately after 9/1 I and during
the war on terror that was launched in Afghanistan, the Iraq invasion distanced the two
countries, which placed themselves on apparently clashing positions.

But. with the change of administrations in both countries in 2007 and 2008. with presi-
dents Sarkozy and Obama in ofHlce, we have been witnessing an unprecedented "transfer
of power' on the international arena and the start of the 'Americanization ' of French forei-
gn policy (France's Defence Review).

This culminated nowadays with France taking over leadership in Libya, at a time when
the US took a step back on the international front and the UN revived as the supreme
institution to legitimize international intervention.

From Bosnia to Iraq. A Timeline ofevents
The Cold War created a very good balance of powers inside the UNSC when the world

was divided between the US and the USSR and the only security threats were the conven-
tional ones, nuclear arms and the rival forces on the two sides of the Berlin Wall.But once
the Iron Curtain fell and the USSR disintegrated, new unconventional threats to security
mounted, Alongside, the UN also went through an identity crisis (M.J. Anstee)

In Europe and inside the then European Community (EC), France and Germany repre-
sented the core members of the future European Union (EU), having the ambition to cre-
ate the 'United States of Europe ' on the old continent. The historic reconciliation between
France and Germany and the French-German partnership were given as examples all
over tho newly liberated Eastern Europe. But the future had other unexpected plans.



decem6tie 2011 (Perspecthe poGxtice 39

The ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans (1991-1999) and the genocide in
Rwanda (1994) were already leaving a mark on the decade that had just begun. The
international community was faced with new challenges it did not have the experience
to manage. But, as in other crucial moments in history, the balance of powers and their
interests were primarily important (Glenny, 2001 )

United Europe's frailty was soon to be tested and the non-involvement of the US on the
old continent along with the UN's lack of power to act under the new climate had serious
consequences on European stability and security (W. Wagner).

As soon as the USSR disappeared, France developed the ambition to become the
new European power pole of the trans-Atlantic bridge. The absence of Germany from
the "big 5' in the UNSC and the privileged relationship between Washington and London,
described oftentimes in the years to come by the French as submissive on London's part,
brought about the need for an actor to represent the European point of view worldwide.
Paris wanted to be it. Although not a member in the military structures of NATO, France
tried to influence the Alliance's enlargement to the East, oRentimes forwarding opposing
views with those of the US, but wishing at the same time to be an equal dialogue partner
In the trans-Atlantic relationship5.

At home, France influenced the transformation and the expansion of the EU and stron-
gly supported a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). France was also known to
be a great supporter of the UN and insisted that all international intewentions be legitima-
te and carried out with UN resolutions.

On the other side of the 'pond". the US was the only remaining superpower, the "hero '
that ended the Cold War and soon to be the "world's policeman '. lts economy and the
military were rapidly expanding. Nevertheless, the US needed Europe and its allies. Fran-
ce included. The US was encouraging EU enlargement. as well as a common European
defense structure. But things were being complicated by the fact that the majority of EU
members were also NATO members and there was no consensus among EU member
states. At the same time, the US gained influence in the UNSC and oftentimes pushed
decision through power politics rather than partnerships.

The massacres in Rwanda (1 994. with over 800.000 deaths) and Bosnia (Srebrenica.
1995. with over 8000 deaths) proved the UN's incapacity and ridiculed its function, so-
metimes unrightfully. The UN Charter. chapters 6 and 7 were not sufficient to use force
in order to stop the killings6. The mandates under which the UN peacekeepers, known
as the "blue helmets', were deployed. did not allow them to use force in order to settle
disputes. In fact they could only use force if fired upon7

Thus, the UN and the states participating in these operations were becoming silent
witnesses to genocide. Their only weapon was rhetoric and verbal condemnation. thus
hiding their incapacity to act (M.J. Anstee).

Another problem the UN faced in the 90s in mandating peace-keeping operations was
the (un)balance of powers in the UNSC. Therefore, almost inevitably, Russia would veto.
China abstain, the US and Great Britain stand together. and France too weak to determi-
ne any of them to do otherwise.

Also, things started heating up inside the EU. This became very clear in the attempts
to mandate military interventions in the Balkans. The difficulty of the decision making
process in trying to stop violence in Bosnia (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999) led to
belated actions and loss of human lives.



40

That is why it is almost unanimously accepted that the involvement of the US in Bosnia,
by taking over leadership in the military campaign against the Bosnian Serb targets and in
negotiation the Dayton Peace Accords (1 995), although criticized by many. was the only
viable option to end the war. The US managed to give an impulse to the UN that mandated
the first ground operation in the Balkans after the Second World War, IFOR (International
Force, which later became SFOR, Stabilization Force). The Americans also managed to
convince the world through the voice of its chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke that using
tactical force was necessary to stop the violence (Holbrooke, 1 999). Although a shocker
at first, the strategy worked and under US leadership the darkest chapter in postwar Euro-
pe ended (A.M. Slaughter). The US was the champion, the "world's gendarme" and once
again the savior of Europe.France and Germany, together with their European colleagues
admitted they were not ready to act as one in defense and security matters. Europe had
a long way to go picking up the pieces after Bosnia

The rest of the decade was marked by American leadership. Only 4 years after Dayton,
another intervention required US assistance, the one in Kosovo (1999). Again, the ab-
sence of European cohesion, the incapacity of Europeans to reach an agreement, diffe-
rences between France, Germany and Great Britain deepened by conflicting positions of
Italy, Greece or Spain, that voiced their own opinions on the Balkans, made it impossible
to reach a decision on how to establish peace in the region. The bombings of March 1 999
on Yugoslavia which were aimed at Serb targets in both Kosovo and Serbia were coor-
dinated by NAT'O under US leadership and represented the first illegitimate international
intervention as it did not have green light from the UNSC. Nevertheless, 3 months later,
after 1 0 weeks of militaW air raids, as a result of defeating the Yugoslav Federation, a new
UN resolution was obtained following the Military Accord of Kumanovo (FYROM). The
resolution endorsed a new peacekeeping ground force under NA:l'O command (KFOR),
which thus blessed post factum the previous military air campaign8.

The success in Bosnia represented for the Clinton administration an opportunity to
highlight American power worldwide and served as an excellent asset in the 1 996 presi-
dential campaign, which placed Clinton for another 4 years in the White House. Clinton
remained in high esteem in the European capitals. The Europeans saw in him a true
dialogue partner who contributed significantly to the strengthening of the trans-Atlantic
partnership, a leader who shared and consulted with the allies regardless of their capacity
to intervene militarily. To France, the Clinton administration remains the most "European '
of the past 20 years.

Once George W. Bush became president in 2000, the American foreign policy swiftly
changed. The French-American relation would also change and the first fault lines were
to appear in the trans-Atlantic relation (Franco-American Relations).

The idea of pre-emptive war became the foreign policy guideline of the first Bush admi-
nistration. After the success in the Balkans it was time for new interventions and to export
democracy to new territories. The topics of the hour were at the time the strengthening
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan -- a reason of anxiety for Washington, an increase in
terrorist alert worldwide and the controversial relations of the Bush family with the Saudis.
This was the moment when the most dramatic and shocking event of all took place: the
terrorist attacks of 9/1 1 .

All of Europe, y compris France, sided with the Americans in a show-of:f of solidarity ne-
ver before seen. It was Europe's time to stand by its ally. The Bush administration had the



decem6de 201] 9!;pe!®!.gg$$1 4]

sympathy and support of the entire democratic world. Punishing the guilty was everyone's
task. When the war on terror was launched, France was the first European country to
offer sharing its own experience in counterterrorism.Inside ISAF, which was mandated
by unanimity in the UNSC. France was present alongside Germany and the UK. the lat-
ter taking over leadership under NATO command9. But the ' honeymoon ' would not last
(Franco-American Relations).

President Bush was already talking about Iraq and the problems caused by Saddam
Hussein. when 9/11 took place. But the attacks delayed his plans for a while. The fight
against terrorism and al-Qaida was a good opportunity to ro-launch the topic in mid 2002
when the American intent to get involved in Iraq became reality. George W. Bush had his
father's example. George Bush won the first Gulf War in 1 991 and his son wanted to follow
In his footsteps and somehow finish what his father had started (Haass, 2009). But his
plan clashed into a wall of resistance on behalf of the European allies, especially France
and Germany. As opposed to Afghanistan, they considered the situation to be completely
different and an intervention in Iraq in their view was unfounded, unnecessary, unjustified
and above all illegitimate. They were detemiined to stop it at all costs in the UNSC. They
succeeded, but the US ignored the opposition in the UN and along with the UK and a few
others launched a 'coalition of the willing ' and marched into Iraq (A.M. Slaughter).

The trans-Atlantic relation suffered its most serious divide in 50 years. the UN became
again a blocked institution and the relations between the US and France narrowed down
to a war of words. In the end. the Iraq war proved to be useless. unnecessary and with
huge human and material costs (Haass, 2009).

Meanwhile, the growing disapproval of the Bush administration among the American
public over the Iraq war and the slow progress in Afghanistan eroded the image of the
Republicans as a whole. America had stretched militarily more than it could afford and
without the support of the Europeans the weak links were becoming more obvious. The
readiness of the European allies in front of the US diminished and France became tho
Ideological enemy in the trans-Atlantic relation.

Although America was clearly a victim at 9/1 1 . it did not play its cards well in the years
that followed. The war on terror lasted far too long. with modest results. The serious loss
of lives in Afghanistan and Iraq, both civilian and military. the controversy over the Gu-
antanamo prison and the torture scandals the US army in Iraq was involved in, brought
about heavy criticism from both inside and outside the US and seriously eroded the Bush
administration. But change was on the way again.

In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy wins the presidential elections in France. His foreign policy
campaign topics were to revive the trans-Atlantic relation and to reposition France among
the leaders of the democratic world. One of Sarkozy's first decisions was to reintegrate
France in the military structures of NATO O'he Economist. June 1 9th 2008).

Some French analysts consider that all this would have worked better for Sarkozy if
Bush would have stayed on (M.H. Van Herpen).But having in view that in Washington big
changes were about to happen and worldwide new challenges appeared, the French-
Amorican relation was slowly taking a new turn.

Obama was aware that ho had inherited huge problems in the foreign policy area and
that he could not handle them alone, without European support. That was one of the rea-
sons that already in tho campaign, as well as immediately after tho inauguration, he went
to Berlin and Paris to repair damages.



42

The US was involved in two complicated wars abroad. The majority of the Europeans
had either pulled out, or had plans to do so. As far as the UN was concerned. Bush igno-
red the institution, which often displeased the Europeans. More so, he was accused that
he totally disregarded it after he appointed John Bolton as his ambassador to the UN,
following some allegedly aggressive remarks about the UN on hls behalfl 0. But no good
or bad came out of it. as the institution continued to remain blocked in the UNSC from the
Iraq war inwards by the constant veto threat of one or the other of its members.

A new dialogue and revised partnership were about to emerge between France and
the US with Obama and Sarkozy. These were going to redefine once more the trans-
atlantic partnership and the dynamics inside the UN.

For Europe it was clear from the very beginning that Sarkozy wanted to emulate ele-
ments from American politics (S. Meunier). The French president was known to be a great
admirer of the US and that he wished to raise his internal approval rate through external
actions which could show France's might and leadership on the world stage.

The financial crisis which exploded in the second half of 2008 kept the public opinion
busy for most of 2009 with its eyes on the US. Although the crisis was sober in Europe,
the business and political circles here remained much more preoccupied with its effects
than with foreign policy.

But, the end of 2010 was going to bring unexpected surprises in intemational politics
through the events triggered in Tunisia, which then swept through the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) and took the EU. France and the US by surprise.

Rede$ninglnterventionism

By comparison with what was about to follow in Libya and Syria. Tunisia and Egypt
had a relatively smoother transition after the fall of dictators12. The internal violence
that escalated in Libya in the spring of 2011 has brought into light the need to take firm
and quick decisions inside the UN regarding the use of force for humanitarian purposes.
With the US overstretched in 2 military campaigns (Afghanistan and Iraq) and unable
to lead another international action. with a very short window of opportunity and huge
humanitarian stakes (as Ghadaf$ was attacking unarmed civilians) France stepped in
and took over the negotiations in the UNCS for a resolution to authorize the use of
force13. Although the Americans were as involved as always in the planning and the
development of the resolution and the campaign itself, they strongly wanted to avoid
a "new Rwanda" in North Africa (A.M. Slaughter). They were grateful to France for
taking over leadership and for their success in negotiating the resolution. Even Italy,
extremely reserved at first vis-i-vis a military intervention due to its traditional relations
with Ghadaffi's Libya, and Germany likewise reserved for reasons of domestic politics
(regional pre-election). ended up denouncing the Libyan dictator or declaring that they
were ready to join the operation through non-military means. Thus, in the initial absence
of a European consensus, under French leadership, the void was filled and no delays or
further compromise were needed. A prompt response from the international community
came rapidly in Libya (S. Patrick)

Another conflict that tested international intervention, the power of the UN, but most
of all France's global influence in the spring of 2011 was the one in Ivory Coast.Beyond
the intervention itself to topple president Laurent Gbagbo who refused to concede power



decem6rie 2Qll (Perspective posit ce 43

following elections, the novelty consisted in the direct involvement of the peacekeeping
forces in airstrikes launched due to the violation of the UNSC resolution in place on the
ground. More so, the UN, through the voice of its Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. requ-
ested France to intervene in the resolution of the conflict in the Ivory Coast, relying on the
French troops already positioned on the ground (P. Rater).

Analysts believe that by taking over leadership in Libya and the Ivory Coast. France
managed to come to life from its inertia and absence which described its attitudes over
Tunisia and Egypt. It also fundamentally changed its image after the firm opposition of
president Chirac to the American intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003 (P. Rater)

Tunisia and Egypt inspired the entire region and a great part of the Arab world to break
the barriers of fear and unleashed a pragmatic optimism that change was indeed possible
(K. Almond).

What Libya in turn inspired was the strengthening of the UN in managing internatio-
nal conflicts. Even if the setting up of a new doctrine for intemational intervention is still
awaited, a new type of international intervention is gaining ground (R.E. Hunter); a type
of intervention in which the US is no absolute leader anymore and France appears as a
new point of influence.

The idea of a new doctrine regarding interventionism is not entirely new.Robert E. Hun-
ter makes reference to it by reminding us that in the fall of 2005 at the UN headquarters
in New York, on the occasion of the annual General Assembly. a call to support a new
doctrine called Responsibility to Protect took place. The idea behind it was the protection
of civilian population in front of atrocities committed by their own leaders and was initially
promoted by Bernard Kouchner, until recently French foreign minister. Then, in January
2009, the UN Secretary General released a document referring to the implementation of
the doctrine R2P14. Although not yet finalized, R2P could for sure be considered to have
been applied to Libya and its civilian population (R.E. Hunter).

Today, some of its elements take shape along with the interventions in Libya and the
Ivory Coast. The idea according to which civil wars are just an "intemal affair ' and that sta-
tes are entirely responsible for what is taking place inside their bordersl 5 is starting to be-
come passe. Although intervention in internal civil conflicts has been rare and late (Rwan-
da and Bosnia remain "dazzling" examples in this regard), it seems that there is a model
taking shape those days in what "protective interventionism" is concerned. According to
Hunter this model has a few features which both the US and its European allies seem to
be taking into account. Among those, the presence of civilian casualties, danger of war
crimes against civilians, danger of genocide, desirably the existence of a UN resolution
to legitimize intervention, the existence of at least one state to take over leadership, the
conflict must take place in EU's and NATO's vital space. The involvement of other states
or regional organizations in the area (The Arab League, The Union of African States) may
offer a larger support and a greater justification for the intervention (S. Patrick). It would
also be desirable that the conflict does not create interference between the humanitarian
purpose of the intervention and other vital interests (political. economic or strategic).

Far from being perfect, those principles may, in time, lay the foundation for future inter-
ventions similar to those in Bosnia, Kosovo, or more recently Libya. The problem may be
that sometimes the need for stability is greater than the achievement of justice. In Bahra-
in, for example, the US and its allies chose stability and non-involvement. as opposed to
Libya, where they chose military protective action.



44 .rule/?mfionzarg@fatzo?n

Another missing element of the doctrine is that of an exit strategy. In Libya, for instan-
ce, there seems to be no such thing as there is no medium term plan to end the air cam-
paign or start the post-conflict peace building process. facts which may overshadow the
good intentions of the intervention (R.E. Hunter).

Along with those discussions. comes the one of separating the US and the EU in
carrying out the interventions. the so called "labor division '. The US through its Vice Pre-
sident , Joseph Biden. said that NAT'O can 'manage Libya" without the US (AFP, April 19.
2011 ). more so that Washington has already handed over the command of the operation
to the Alliance a few days after the commencing of the alr strikes.

On the other hand, Libya could have been a vey good test for ESDP16, but despite
France's leading role in the front line and the promotion of independent European inter-
ventions, the EU continues to be divided. That is why UN resolutions remain essential in
mandating international operations.

Interventionislti whereto?

The difference between the UN in the 90s and today are huge. In the past the organi-
zation played oftentimes a symbolic role in managing intemational crisis. Today, it seems
the UN is being restored to being the supreme body to authorize international interven-
tion.The main difference is that it has moved from passive to active and it seems that
International legislation is finally applied.

But behind those changes there is also the work of the trans-Atlantic partnership and of
a much improved French-American relationship which has evolved spectacularly. Today,
we see a significant shift from the "freedom fries" 17 moment to a mature collaboration
and bilateral dialogue. We are also witnessing the beginning of a new labor division inside
NATO between the Americans and the Europeans in what interventions are concerned.
American leadership has not disappeared, but responsibilities are shared much clearly
(as with France in Libya). More so, due to the bad image the US has in the Middle East
and the Arab world in general, France offers a great "make-up '. The EU remains divided
and still unable to speak with one voice. as well as with a relatively modest profile in forei-
gn and defense policy despite some obvious progress at the legislative level (such as the
European External Action Service).Germany remains the economic engine of the EU, but
still hesitant when it comes to world affairs, where it is still struggling to define a role for
itself after many years of caution18.In light of the newly strengthened French-American
relation. on the European side of the trans-Atlantic relation one can notice a slow shift
from the Franco-German traditional nucleus to a Franco-British one.

As far as Sarkozy's is concerned, he has been accused of "Americanizing" French
foreign policy (M.H. Van Herpes). His intemational standpoint looks extremely similar to
that of Bill Clinton in 1995. or George W. Bush's in 2003. In those cases, both American
presidents were in the last year of their first mandate and speculated on successes in
foreign policy (especially through military interventions) to help them make a go for a
second term in the White House. on the background of a drop in polls at home. At the
end of the day, Bosnia proved a success for Clinton, while Iraq took a heavy toll on the
Republicans, despite Bush's victory in 2004. But regardless of the calculations, the idea
that foreign policy can help in the internal election process remains. Sarkozy. who accor-
ding to French analysts, delivered much less than he promised in the elections (M.H. Van



&cem6de 2011 Qerspectbe pofitice

Herpen). and who is nowadays witnessing a dramatic drop in the polls, is trying to use
France's leading role abroad to boost his numbers. The interventions in Libya and the Ivo-
ry Coast may have served him as means for domestic political ends (The French White
Paper on Defense and National Security) . One thing is for sure though. it is the first time
in 20 years when France is taking over the management of 2 major international crises in
front of the US, although they are being seconded closely by the Americans.

Across the Atlantic. Obama finds himself in an exactly opposite situation. As well in a
pro-election year. he must on the other hand play foreign intervention as low as possi-
ble (C. Gventner Ward). The American public is tired of exhausting military interventions
abroad in conflicts they feel they have nothing to do with. Even being second in Libya,
Obama was heavily criticized by the Republican majority in Congress, the same majority
that approved the Iraq intervention in 2003. That is why. Obama does not need to try to
obtain a new 'success stole ' externally. Actually, the total absence of one may serve him

The question that arises though is 'what do all those things mean for the UN in this
new decade of the 21't century'? A drop in the pressure the US puts on the UNSC may
be an opportunity for the institution to revive, work consistently for the implementation of
international legislation and manage successfully international crises (S. Patrick).

An increase in France's role worldwide may in turn offer a trans-Atlantic balance and a
true feeling that the US is not going it alone in NATO, the UN and other intemational fore.

In addition, France's bilateral relations with Russia and China may have a benefit
effect on the decision making process at the international level. as it was seen with the
intervention in Libya when France secured the adoption of the UN resolution.

The UN may thus re-establish itself as the credible player to legitimize the functioning
of intemational justice wherever and whenever needed.

bestS

References

zThis work was possible with the f\nancial support of the SectoralOperationalProgramme for Human
Resources Development 2007-zoa3. co-financed by the European Social Fund. under the project
number POSDRU/8g/t.5/S/6uo4 with the title .Social sciences and humanities in the context of global
development - development and implementation of postdoctoral research '.
2 For example:The verbalexchanges between Dominique deVillepin. French foreign minister in zoo3.
and Colin Powell, US Secretary of State. on the eve of the Iraq war in the UNSC, when Powell was sent by
the Bush administration to present evidence for the existence ofWMD and the link between the Saddam
regime and al-Qaida as means forjustifying an American intervention; the comment of Jacques Chirac,
French president, in early 2003 when he said as an indirect reply to Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of
Defense. regarding the laudable support of the states of "new Europe '. that those countries missed a
good opportunity to keep quiet. "Old Europe" at the time (mainly France) was considered hostile by the
US for its opposition and refusal to act. In February zoo3. French President Chirac warned in particular
Romania and Bulgaria, wha were negotiating membership to the EU. that they behaved irresponsibly
when they signed the support letter for the US to go to war in Iraq, having in view that their position
regarding membership was delicate as h was. .If they wish to reduce their chances tojoin Europe.
they couldn't have chosen a better way" said the French President, Carle / Nat;anal, Anal 8, nr. 36SZ,

3 Marquis de Lafayette (t757-i834), French aristocrat and military off\cer who fought in the American War
i9.oz.zoom



46 /}ztemat a?zafiRffzt£ons

oflndependence. His name is linked to numerous towns and monuments in the US
4Pierre Charles L'Enfant (i7S4-i8z5). French born American architect and civil engineer best known
for designing the street layout in Washington DC, but also for his Involvement in the American War of
Independence where he served under the command of General Lafayette.
S in t997 at the NATO Summit in Madrid. France fought until the last minute for Romania and Slovenia to
be accepted by the Alliance, despite the already made decision of Washington not to accept more than 3
members in the first wave. Finally the enlargement took place on America's temps.
6The International CriminaITribunalin The Hague for formerYugoslavia and Rwanda(ICTY and ICTR)
ruled that genocide took place in both cases.
7The UN Charter, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
8 Resolution UNSC i244 of June ao, t999 mandated the entrance of KFOR in the province of Kosovo,
thus legitimizing the air campaign of March earlier the same year. http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/
u99o6toa.htm
g Resolution UNSC a386 of December 200a mandated ISAF to enterAfghanistan https/www.un.arg/
News/Press/docs/zooUsc7z48.doc.htm
io John Bolton. the US permanent representative tithe UN appointed in aoo5. declared once, before
holding this position. that "There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only the international
community, which can only be led by the only remaining superpowers which is the United States." He also
said: "If the UN Secretariat building in Newyork lost ten storeys, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.'.
Xhe SundayTfmes, March 8. zoos, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us.andamericas/
article4zz888.ece
n Middle East and North Africa, geographicalabbreviation in relation to the ,,Arab spring '
x2The popular protests that started in Tunisia at the end of 20io and in Egypt at the beginning of
zouhave been followed by transitional regime changes and modest steps towards free elections.
i3Resolutian UNSC t973 of March t7. 20uP regarding a military intervention in Libya, contains in the title
the following wording: .taking all necessary measures for protecting civilians'. It was one of the quickest
resolutions adapted and implemented in the history of the UN. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/load
sci0200.doc.htm
a4 RzP is short for Responsibility to Protect.
i5 Reference to the Westphalia doctrine according to which civil wars are entirely managed by the state,
with no basis for extemalintervention. nationalsovereignty being absolute
z6 European Security and Defense Policy
t7 «French fries" were temporarily banned in the US in zoo3, following France's opposition to the Iraq war
and replaced with "freedom fries'.
i8 Germany's abstention in the UNSC on the Libya air intervention show a cautious attitude on the
international arena on the country's behalf

Bibtiography

Almond. Kyle, "5 voices:What's next for the 'Arab Spring'?". CNN.com
Anstee. Margare\ Joan, Dame, "The UN in Crisis". The 4th fnkine Childers Memorial Lecture. Action for
UN Renewal, June 27. zoom
Franco-American Relations. After D Day". The Economist, June zo, 2004, Paris

The French White Paper on Defense and National Security. June zoo8
Glenny, Misha, Nat/ona/ism, War and the Great Powell, 1804-i999r Penguin Books 2001
Gventneri Ward. Celeste. "Interventionism Run Amok". Foreign Po//qy, August io, zou



decem6tie 2Ql! (Perspectwe poCitice 47

Haass, Richard. N., Waraf NecessfDq War ofChofce, Newyork. Simon & Schuster. 200g
Holbrooke. Richard, To End a War. Newyork. The Modem Library, t999
Hunted E. Robert, 'The.4/lies /n Libya:A New Paras m For late entfon?". The European Institute, April.

Let's get real: Seeking smaller. sharper defences". France's defence review, The fconomi$t, June toth
zoo8. Paris
Meunieri Sophie. "Globalization. Americanization and Sarkozy's France '. Et/mpean Po/ftfca/Science gP

'NATO does not need US for Libya: Biden", Washington. April ig. zou, AFP
Patrick. Stewart, "Libya and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention ', FOreJyn JWaln# August z6. 20u
Rater. Philippe. "France stakes reputation on conflicts in Libya, I.Coast", Paris, April 5, zou, AFP
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "Why Libya Sceptics were Proved Badly Wrong". The Flnancia/77mes /tdi August

Van Herpes. t\farce\ H.." The Foreign Potiqaf Nicolas Sarkozy: not principled. oppoRunistic and
amateurish". Cicero Foundation Great Debate Papers No. ao/oi, February zola
Wagneri W., "Why the EU's common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: a
rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis management policy",Journa/ ofEuropean Public
Po/iq, Volume xo, Number +, August 2003

2011

z4. 20zi

Web links:
www.nato.int

www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u99o6loa.htm
www.cnn.com
www.timesonline.co.uk

www.princeton.edu
www.europeanlnstitute.org
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us.andamericas/article42t888.ece
www.un.org
www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.dhtml
vwvw.un.org/News/Press/docs/zoaVscx0200.doc.htm
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/200Vsq248.doc.htm
www.whhehouse.gov/the-press-of6ce/zotVo8/o4/presidential-study-directive-suspension-entry
immigrants-and-nonimmigran
www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre.blanc.Press.kit.english.version.pdf
http://www.reformwatch.net/fitxers/6o.pdf