Perspective_politice_2017_iunie.qxd


Catholic and Nationalist Populism 
in the Current Poland

Abstract: This paper is dedicated to Catholic and nationalist populism that has become a part of po-
litical party called Prawo i SprawiedliwoϾ (Law and Justice), the faction which currently rules in
Poland. This attitude of populism is characteristic also for its leader Jaros³aw Kaczyñski who builds his
political strategy on populist slogans concerning nationalist and Catholic elements. The level of pop-
ulism has permanently been growing since the origin of PiS. The great power that supports these ten-
dencies is the Catholic hierarchy. A folk version of religion is a main face of Polish Catholicism. It is
one of the sources of populism in Polish society. The Catholic Church in Poland has lost its intellectual
image. Author underlines that populist slogans try to mobilize right-wing electorate but consequences
for Polish political system, the place of Poland in Europe and international relations as well as for the
future of the European Union can be dangerous. 
Keywords: Catholic and nationalist populism, Poland, Law and Justice, Jaros³aw Kaczyñski

1. Introduction

Populism is a quite common phenomenon in the contemporary po-
litical history [1]. It has strongly disclosed in the post-communist area
in the resent years, also in the Central-European countries considered
as a model countries of democratization processes [2]. This could be
observed also in post-communist Poland, where it takes various forms

– from an agrarian populism to a neoliberal
one. In this paper, I will concentrate on one
form of populism, i.e. Catholic and nationalist
populism which is getting stronger and
stronger in the Polish political life in the last
two years. Its political significance has been
increasing since 2015, i.e. since the last par-

liamentary and presidential elections were held and won by Prawo i
SprawiedliwoϾ (Law and Justice, hereinafter referred to as the PiS,
i.e. Polish abbreviation of the name). Obviously, not only PiS refers to
the populism in the Polish political discourse. Polish populism has a
pretty long history. British historian Peter Brock, a specialist in histo-
ry of Central and Eastern Europe, points Boles³aw Wys³ouch (1855-
1937) as a pioneer of the Polish populism – naturally, Brock means its
traditional or agrarian form [3]. In the contemporary Poland, as proved
for example by researches Pawe³ Przy³êcki [4], the populist discourse
is a feature of common for majority of Polish political parties – from
the left wing (i.e. from the post-communist left: Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej – Democratic Left Alliance, peasant and nationalists
Samoobrona – Self-Defence as well as left liberals Ruch Palikota – Pa-
likot’s Movement [5]), through the centrist parties (agrarian Polskie

Arkadiusz MODRZEJEWSKI, PhD.
Institute of Political Sciences, 
University Gdansk, Poland,
modrzejewski@ug.edu.pl

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Stronnictwo Ludowe – Polish People’s Party), up to the centre-right (liberal and conservative
Platforma Obywatelska – Civic Platform, Polish abbreviation PO) as well as the right parties
(mentioned conservative and Catholic PiS or Liga Polskich Rodzin – League of Polish Fami-
lies, Polish abbreviation LPR). As obvious from the above, the populism is characteristic also
for mainstream parties and liberals. 

This short essay does not open enough space for any detailed linguistic analysis of the term
“populism”. Thus, it could be assumed that criteria of the populism content both premises: (1)
anti-elitism. i.e. populism is against an elite defined negatively as being usually corrupted and
alienated that treats the state institutions and state-owned companies as sinecures creating op-
portunities for enriching and maintaining the economic position; populists refer to the mythical
people and this position is in opposition to the elite (the PiS which is currently in power in
Poland refers to the sovereign); (2) simplicity of the methods which, in opinion of politicians
using a populist argumentation, could restore a situation in the state; they obviously assume to
side-track demoralized and compromised elite from the power and resources. Of course, this
kind of approach to the issue is an oversimplification but it contains features which could be
definitely assigned to populism [6]. It also shows how often one can meet a refereeing to the
populist argumentations and solutions in the political discourse. As mentioned above, also lib-
erals and centre-left parties have not resisted populism in Poland. Thus, we can recall here an
idea “4 times yes” promoted by PO in 2004 concerning the referendum in the case of the reduc-
ing number of the MPs, liquidating of Polish Senate, aboliting parliamentary immunity as well
as reforming the national electoral law (in order to establish a majoritarian voting system)i. 

Aim of this essay is not even outline history of the Polish populist discourse so it is to focus
on the current Catholic and nationalist form of the Polish populism that is characteristic for the
ruling party – PiS (in fact, it comprises about three formally separate parties that create one
parliamentary faction, i.e. PiS, Solidarna Polska – Solidary Poland built by the former seces-
sionists from PiS, and Polska Razem – Poland Together which groups former politicians of PO
and PiS) as well as parliamentary formally opposition faction – movement Kukiz’15 (name of
the movement originates from the surname of its founder and leader – Pawe³ Kukizm. Such
feature is quite often in the current Polish political practice, especially regarding populist
movements). However, the only faction that is currently in power in Poland falls to the centre
of this essay-, because its politicians, particularly Jaros³aw Kaczyñski, are real political deci-
sion- makers and they are shaping domestic politics in Poland. They are also foreign- policy
outliner shaping the nowadays position of Poland in the contemporary international relations
and thus defining its role worldwide, especially within the European Union. Existence of the
populist parties, populist politicians as well as social attitudes present within the whole nation-
al politics is rather a general tendency present in the Polish society. Even though Western lib-
eral democracies are not free from the populism. Generally said from political science point of
view that the situation is more questionable when populists legally manage to gain a real
power in the state by democratically held electoral process. Then the national politics becomes
unpredictable and political system is threatened by destabilization Therefore, this essay is to
concentrate on populism of – it can sound as an oxymoron but only seemingly [7] – elites cur-
rently ruling Poland. This populism is strongly enhanced in that part of the Polish society
which reveals populist tendencies, i.e. within the PiS electorate [8], and the causes of the pop-
ulism are in the centre of this essay underlining with as well as its eventual consequences, es-
pecially for the process within the EU in the future. 

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Commonly recognised, populism refers to extreme organizations, usually propagating na-
tionalist slogans. As signalized above, it may be an oversimplification because populist atti-
tudes worldwide are common for different groups, either rightist or leftist, as proved also in
the Polish case. Therefore, my considerations here concern Catholic and nationalist populism
in Poland experiencing the current rule of the PiS since 2015 national elections, referring here-
by to general definition of populist movements and saying that the PiS is populist party and a
part of populist world tendencies, its political program, speeches of its top politicians as well
as political decisions and actions already held definitely refer to the Catholic and nationalist
populism, as proved below. However, it should be remarked that Polish Catholicism is chal-
lenged by a specific kind of Catholicism which could be called a “folk Catholicism”, compris-
ing, in fact, an anti-intellectual Catholicism, as analysed in a separate part of the paper. 

2. PiS: from a moderate right-wing to the 
Catholic and nationalist populism

The PiS is a political party which entered the Polish politics more than a decade ago. It was
founded in 2001 after disintegration of the rightist alliance called Akcja Wyborcza Soli-
darnoϾ (Electoral Solidarity Action) and the main group of PiS was formed by the former
political representatives of a party called Porozumienie Centrum (Centre of Agreement) lead
by Jaros³aw Kaczyñski. His brother, Lech Kaczyñski, later became President of the Republic
of Poland, was also one of its faces important for the PiS background. Anti-corruption and
criminality comprised the main postulates of the PiS. In the first years of its activity nothing
proved that the Party´s rhetoric and its program will, in the future, have clearly nationalist and
Catholic character [9]. This role was characteristic for rightist LPR party mobilizing a tradi-
tionalist electorate and enjoying support of important mass media, i.e. of Radio Maryja inter-
connected to important personality, Tadeusz Rydzyk who is its founder and director. From the
very beginning of its history, the LPR bonded nationalist slogans with Folk Catholicism. It was
anti-European faction from its beginning and it rejected the ongoing European integration in
opposition to the Polish Catholic hierarchy as well as of Pope John Paul II who was a promot-
er of Polish accession to the European Union [10] [11]. 

The PiS is defined in Polish political science literature as a right, conservative and Chris-
tian democratic party. Conservatism of the PiS is mainly of national character. Catalogue of
values affirmed by the PiS contents values as tradition, family values (traditional family), re-
ligion represented by mainly the Catholic Church, strong state, etc. In the economic sphere,
the PiS rejected neo-liberalism and promoted solidarism declaring an acceptance for a free
market but also allowing a state intervention to the economy. Generally speaking, the PiS was
characterized as a right multi-stream party[12]. 

Obviously, the above mentioned does not mean that populism was not present in the PiS
from the very beginning. According to research by Pawe³ Przy³êcki, during electoral cam-
paigns in 2001, 2005 and 2007 the average number of populist sentences present in the PiS po-
litical program amounted to 15%, while the non-populist ones almost to 85%. It was mainly
political populism referring to national and Catholic slogansii. Political program of the PiS un-
derlined for example a preservation of Polish sovereignty but simultaneously it supported Pol-
ish accession to the European Union. In this time, the populist discourse concentrated mostly
on the internal enemies as for example the post-communists (2001campaining) and liberals

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(2005 and 2007 campaigns) [4, p. 192]. In my opinion, PiS then was proving features also of
penal populism. Based on analysing the aforementioned electoral campaigns, the program and
politicians of the Party generally emphasized necessary to stiffer penalties for the most serious
crimes as in the PiS´s vision effective prevention would be more that reduces criminality in
Poland. In the literature referring to this simply method is determined as penal populism [13].
But it is not a subject of the paper, although undoubtedly comprising an interesting aspect of
the populism analysed.

It is required here to to underline that for the post-communist standards of concept of na-
tion was used in a moderate form in official narration of the PiS. Danuta Karnowska, the re-
searcher specializing in the contemporary Polish political thought, emphasises links between
program of PiS and a communitarian tradition, however rather on intuitional than rational level
[14]. Karnowska also puts attention to the character of their vision of a nation outlined in the
PiS´s political program as it is their vision of nation through which they gradually evolved to
the present position nationalist populists. Firstly, it is a romantic vision in which the nation,
however understood not in ethnical categories but rather in cultural and political, is to become
a basic principle of state. Responsibility of its leaders lies in an activity for the “Nation”. Sec-
ondly, this romantic vision makes the nation to be an “exclusive” community. However, the
exclusivism does not mean a reduction of the nation to the ethnical category because the PiS
in its program says about two possibilities of being a Pole, i.e. from either “origin” or “choice”.
It was associated with affirmation of “traditional values of the nation” which the Catholic
Church is a depositary of. In opposition to individualism and idea of civic society, the nation
in the PiS´s political conception is seen as an organic community and thus a common good of
the nation takes priority over individual goods. Only with respect to the common good under-
stood as a good of nation, an individual is able to determine one´s own good. So, there is a re-
quirement of an active participation in the national community [14, pp. 81-82]. 

The attitude of PiS to the European Union issues could be seen ambivalent since the ori-
gin of the Party. From the one hand, the PiS declared a will of the Polish accession to the EU,
but from the other hand, its politicians and program underlined an importance of the state
sovereignty as well as called for a “tough” EU accession negotiation. It is obvious that in the
narration of the Party´s representatives, the European Union was gaining more because of
Polish accession than Poland after becoming a member state. However, in the official state-
ments of the PiS representatives its members of the Party were required to vote for the Euro-
pean integration. Nonetheless, they underlined that then Polish government (government led
by Leszek Miller – SLD party) had negotiated unfavourable conditions of the Polish acces-
sion to the European Union, especially in the area of finances, agriculture and structural pol-
itics. The PiS rejected – and still rejects – a federalist conception of the European Union, pro-
moting an idea of “Europe of national states” as the most optimal form of European
integration [9, p. 159-160]. 

Despite some populist elements in the narration of the PiS in its first period of existence on
the Polish political scene , the Party could be not classified as a populist party. Of course, the
representatives of the PiS officially and publicly manifested their maintaining to the national
and Catholic traditions but it was not enough to rank the PiS to populist parties. So, when the
change in the Party value-orientation appeared? In my opinion we can indicate two key events
which caused radicalization of the PiS and its transformation into a populist organization.
Firstly, it was in year 2007 when marginalization of populist allies of the PiS happened and re-

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sulted to governmental coalition with the PiS during 2005-2007, i.e. the Self-Defence Party
representing left agrarian and nationalist populism as well as nationalist and Catholic LPR
party. The second event happened in 2010 with the air crash in Smolensk which brought -out
an attitude called as “religion” or even “Smolensk sect” by a part of the Polish media which is
characteristic for some right-wing groups, was the result of this occurrence [See: Gazeta
Wyborcza 2015-04-10, available at: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,17730529,Katastrofa_smolens
ka__Sekta_zakrzykuje_prawde__Ale.html]. 

Although the percentage of populist statements in the 2007 PiS electoral program as well
as the number of populist statements of politicians of this Party during the parliamentary de-
bates in the same year was lower than in the previous years [4, p. 193], it should be taken into
centre that the “hostile takeover” of voters after extinguishing the Self-Defence and LPR
strengthened populist tendencies in the PiS. In 2007 electoral campaign, the PiS presented it-
self in a position of a ruling power, that is a reason why populism would be completely incom-
prehensible. Moreover, it was a period before financial crisis outbroke, the Polish economy
was in good condition absorbing funds from the European Union and Polish government and
President (Lech Kaczyñski from the PiS) proclaimed the Lisbon Treaty as their success. But
the first two years of the PiS in opposition indicated a substantial increase of the Party´s pop-
ulist expressions during parliamentary debates. In years 2002-2009, as examined by Pawe³
Przy³êcki, the number of populist expressions was the highest exactly in the two last years, i.e.
in 2008 and 2009 containing many references to religion, tradition as well as national virtues
[4, p. 194]. 

Since this period a permanent radicalization of the PiS could be noticed. In my opinion, the
air crash during which brought death to Lech Kaczyñski who was the President of the Repub-
lic of Poland and the first PiS chairman (and the twin brother of Jaros³aw Kaczyñski), con-
tributed to this process stronger than the first cause in 2007. Due to this unquestionable nation-
al tragedy politicians and journalists from the right side as well as some representatives of
Polish Catholic clergy started to create a Catholic and nationalist narration that strengthened
polarization of the Polish society. Epithets which divided Poles in two groups and indicated on
bad intentions of political opponents became a part of newspeak of Polish rightist spectrum.
Here it is possible to identify a division into “real Poles” with reference to followers of “right”
and “false” Poles with reference to the rest as well as invectives, e.g. untranslatable “³¿eelity”
(this neologism means lying elite), “lemmings” with reference to voters of PO and left wing,
“communists”, “thieves” etc. Earlier some of right-wing politicians and journalists said about
the “German option” which was representative one especially for Donald Tusk but also for the
whole social and regional groups like Silesians and Kashubiansiii. 

3. Phenomenon of Jaros³aw Kaczyñski and followers of the PiS

Leaders of political parties having a direct influence to national politics for example by
being a government party thus may through their political statement given publicly influence
also the nation-wide attitudes and views, from positive but also from negative aspects. In this
context, based on the research of the main roots of polarisation in the Polish society, it may be
provided that polarization of the Polish society as well as inserting to the language of political
debates some pejorative terms determining political opponents could be definitely identified
as a contribution of Jaros³aw Kaczyñœki. He is seemed to be the main, maybe even the one

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and only, architect of politics created by the PiS and inside the PiS. His personality effects the
way of conducting political discourse in Poland. Agnieszka Turska – Kawa, the Polish politi-
cal psychologist and scientist, made a psychological description of personality of Jaros³aw
Kaczyñski. In her opinion the leader of PiS is characterized by following features of person-
ality: (1) dogmatism; (2) excessive suspiciousness; (3) authoritarianism; (4) high level of
Machiavellianism; (5) low openness for experience implying a use of extreme categories as
well as (6) uncompromising attitude [15]. These features imply an attitude which is determined
by term populism of politicians in the literature of political science. 

Post-political world, as some scholars see it, is associated with a limitation of the role of
ideology, social classes as well as traditional political structures. Media, also social media, cre-
ate a new political reality opening place for charismatic leaders who referring to their voters
and followers bypasses traditional parties as well as ideological engagement [16]. Jaros³aw
Kaczyñski is a politician declaring anti-communism, affirmation of Christian values and
Catholic Church, however, he treats these attitudes, values and institutions instrumentally. The
power is his main aim. It is a source of his Machiavellianism which is in my opinion a key el-
ement of his political personality. As mentioned above, Agnieszka Turska – Kawa notices that
Machiavellians accept moral norms, respect some values but if the norms and values create an
obstacle on their way to reach their aims – in this case we talk about gaining the power – they
do not hesitate to break the rules and norms and reject the values. Based on Turska – Kawa,
Jaros³aw Kaczyñski could be characterised as an example of Machiavellian because of his low
level of empathy, emotional coldness or resistance to social influence. His Machiavellianism
is revealed also by instrumental treatment of norms and values. Declaring anti-communism, he
included former members of the Communist party as well as officials of the Communist-
regime state to his political faction. Reference to the Christian values is not barrier for him to
stigmatize political opponents and use pejorative terms while offending them [15, p. 164]. 

Jaros³aw Kaczyñski used to change his image for the electoral campaign. He embodies the
role of conciliatory person, regarding his enemies and opponents. In spite of the fact that he
was many times one of the politicians with the lowest level of social trust expressed in opin-
ion polls, among his rigid electorate found him to be a “providential man”. His attitude of
chameleon brings him also new followers however usually temporary ones. Aggressive style
of politics rather discourages the unstable part of the PiS electorate and its leader. But in the
case of rigid and stable the PiS electorate, features which seem to be negative for us are inter-
preted as his power and smartness. So, for instance dogmatism is a constancy of opinion and
Machiavellianism is a political competency. Dichotomy between objective Jaros³aw Kaczyñs-
ki and his positive image among his followers speaks us something about his electorates. Ag-
nieszka Turska – Kawa in her psychological analysis shows us over the dozen key needs and
features of the PiS electorate, among others: need of acceptance, need of respect and commu-
nity deriving from a low self-esteem, need to order and control over their circle, need of sense
of security, need to order the world on the base of simple system of judgements, low suscep-
tibility to changes, fidelity of tradition, need to respect norms and values etc. In the opinion of
the above mentioned political psychologist, the features and needs of the PiS electorate and
personal features of Jaros³aw Kaczyñski are complementary. Followers of the Party and its
leader are conservative and resistant to changes from their nature. It is easy for them to build
a dividing line between “we”, i.e. who continue traditional national values, who remain with
patriotism and religion, and “you” who are searching for the new solutions in the public space.

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The PiS electorate sees positively an uncompromising attitude of the Party leader. It raises be-
lief that Jaros³aw Kaczyñski would never agree with relativisation of traditional values. They
are also united due to their suspiciousness, lack of trust to other persons, imputing them neg-
ative intentions as well as an excessive attention given to the issues of security [15, pp. 172-
174]. It is an origin of suspicious attitude to the European Union (in narration of the PiS, the
European Union represents interests of Germany and France and wants to deprive Poland of
its sovereignty or establish new norms which are in opposition to the traditional values of the
Polish society) as well as to immigrants and refugees (in narration of the PiS, they want to con-
quer Christian Poland and Europe and establish Sharia, they are source of diseases, they do
not respect Polish and European values and they rape women). 

His form of communication is simple without any intellectual fineness, sometime even
primitive. An average man, typical Kowalski is a target group of his statements. However, root-
ed in intelligentsia family surrounding, Jaros³aw Kaczyñski is an anti-intellectualist. He has no
trust to intellectual groups identifying them as “liberals” from the beginning of his political ac-
tivity during the communist period [17]. In his anti-intellectual attitudes, we can find sources
of his later populist inclinations. They give him a characteristic. We can say with reference to
populism of politician but because of authoritarian personality of him and authoritarian man-
agement of the Party, populism became a part of the PiS – populism of organization. 

4. Catholic Church and populism of the PiS

In the Polish political reality, it is hard to overvalue the importance of the Catholic Church.
The Church is an important element of the public order that has exceeded over the sacral
sphere and actively participated in political life from beginning of the Polish statehood. Role
which the Church played in the past, especially during the partition period as well as in the
time of Nazi occupation or communism – Catholic Church was treated as a mainstay of Pol-
ishness – has strengthened stereotypic image of a Pole as a Catholic. That role also currently
legitimizes the Catholic Church position in the Polish political system as its active subject,
being an interest group, privileged participant of public debate as well as centre creating and
forming attitudes and behaviours of citizens. A significant part of Polish clergy, also higher hi-
erarchy being aware of social legitimization as a centre of political activity tries to implement
some principles of non- secular state. We have been witnesses of sacralisation of the Polish pu-
blic sphere since the end of the 80th. Religious symbols are present in the public institutions
on each level of administration (local, regional, state), at schools, bureaus, hospitals and work-
places. Secular state is defensive against claims of the Church concerning symbolic sphere as
well as economic, organizational and legal ones. Participation of clergy in politics is manifest-
ed by an active support for political factions declaring loyalty to the Catholic doctrine and na-
tional traditions. However, political activity is not a common phenomenon among the Polish
priests.. Many of them outdistance from the current politics and giving their clear declaration
of support to a concrete political party. Involvement in the campaigns of concrete politicians
or factions was rather characteristic for a conservative part of episcopate and lower parish cler-
gy which is in its majority traditionalist, in opposition to ethos of Catholic intelligentsia and
Catholic progressivism. Redemptorist Radio Maryja became a symbol of the Polish national-
ist Catholicism. Director of the Radio, father Tadeusz Rydzyk is an active carries – maker in
the Polish politics on the right-wing side. The radio essentially effects political behaviour of

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its auditory not forming the civic attitude but rather loyalty to the concrete political faction that
is treated as a guarantor of catholicity and Polishness of the state. In opposition to this style of
pseudo-religious activity, if priests representing so-called open Church speak about political
topics, they are rather avoiding any direct declarations of political support limiting to civiliz-
ing the public order in the spirit of evangelical ideals of peace and reconciliation according to
the Catholic philosophical and theological tradition [18]. 

The PiS and Jaros³aw Kaczyñski have been treated by significant part of the Polish clergy
as protectors of Polishness and Catholicism since 2010. This political faction got a main role
in neo-Messianic historiosophy revealing ad hoc after the air crash in which the President died.
It is not an academic historiosophy, but rather historiosophia pauperum because pronounced
pictures of fight between good and evil, Catholicism and laicism could be found here as well
as Polishness and liberal cosmopolitanism and other enemies of Poland and Poles. Enthroni-
sation of Jesus Christ of the King of Poland in Krakow on the 19th November 2016 became
the crowning a return to neo-Messianic historical narration. The most prominent officials of
the state, participated also by President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda, among the
others. Despite the fact that the Polish hierarchs underlined that it was only Jubilee Act of Af-
firmation of Christ as the King and Lord avoiding declaration that Poland was the Kingdom of
Christ [Cf. http://episkopat.pl/19-xi-jubileuszowy-akt-przyjecia-jezusa-za-krola-i-pana/], in
common opinion this event was identified as enthronisation of Christ of the King of Poland.
This act, one of many, shows the shape of Polish Catholicism in its majority or rather in its
current mainstream. It is the folk Church, anti-intellectual and dressed in nationalist rhetoric.
Nationalism covered by Messianic illusion is a constitutive element of this Church. Its believ-
ers can be an electorate of the faction referring to the populist (nationalist and religious) slo-
gans. Now, they comprise mainly PiS electorate. The Party can find additional support in the
Church organizations and mass media, especially in Radio Maryja that can guarantee a mobi-
lization of the electorate on the level of tens of percentage [19]. 

5. Populism and Euroscepticism of the PiS

As mentioned above, Eurosceptical tendencies have been representative for the PiS since
beginning of the faction. They are also presented in declarations which could be classified de-
fine as anti-German ones. It is an attitude quite characteristic for Polish nationalist and
Catholic right wing. Euroscepticism and anti-Germanness are present in political program and
speeches of Zjednoczenie Chrzeœcijañsko-Narodowe – Christian and National Union (some
politicians of this faction were co-founders of the PiS in 2001) and LPR. Initial Euroscepti-
cism of the PiS is determined as a soft approaching to the soft Euroenthusiasm on the line an
“extreme Euroenthusiasm and extreme anti-Europeanism” [11, p. 288]. In the Polish literature
of political science, we can find an opinion that relation of the part politicians of the PiS, es-
pecially those who derived from the Centre Agreement (PC) founded by Jaros³aw Kaczyñski,
to the European integration can be determined as Eurorealism [20]. However, also opposite
opinions could be found. For example, Marcin Lasoñ states that also in the first stage of the
PiS existence, its Euroscepticism was a populist one. It was in fact a nationalistic and Catholic
populism. He says that the populism of the PiS was a tool of attracting the Catholic electorate
connected to, the Radio Maryja [21]. In 2005 the PiS published a less known program docu-
ment titled Katolicka Polska w chrzeœcijañskiej Europie (Catholic Poland in Christian Eu-

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rope). It is hard to disagree with Lasoñ that issue of the document was an expression of pop-
ulist tendencies inside the PiS. Not only the contents of the document but also its form and its
language are characteristic for a folk Catholicism, for Catholicism that is dressed in national
and pseudo-intellectual rhetoric. In this document, we can read that the European Union has
bad intentions, its aim is to negate Christian values of Europe and destruction of the moral
order. There is written: 

Rejection of the invocation to God in the Constitutional Treaty is a sign of this civilization-
al orientation. Policy of the EU partly disregards a social order and even partly directly
fights against this order. We can find here the rejection of normative character of Christian
morality. […] Policy of the European Union is prejudiced to faith, national bond and fami-
ly (so, to all values which reveal dignity of human nature) but in the extreme cases this pol-
icy supports degenerations, moral pathologies or even crimes treated as an expression of
human freedom and signature of “open society” [Polska katolicka w chrzeœcijañskiej Eu-
ropie, Warszawa 2005, p. 42].

Catching voters of the LPR and Self-Defence resulted a radicalization of the PiS and
strengthened the Eurosceptical attitudes or even more in some cases generated anti-union
standpoints [4, p. 211]. the PiS redefined also an enemy. Besides internal enemies, i.e. liberal
societies, left wing, Donald Tusk and PO, European institutions – European Commission, Eu-
ropean Parliament, and last but not least also so-called Venice Commission, briefly speaking
all institutions which express doubts about the state of democracy and the rule of law in Poland
under the PiS – became external enemies. It surely gives opportunities to save a populist face
for the people who currently rule in Poland. Populists must be anti-elitists. When decision-
makers from the PiS became a state-ruling elite, they started to fight against international elites
in the name of national sovereignty and dignity of the nation. Polish national interest and Pol-
ish reason of state comprise their key argument in the conflict with external enemy. All uncon-
stitutional decisions and activities done under the PiS rule are explained by democratic legit-
imization that the PiS received during the last election in Poland. The will of Nation as a
sovereign is above the law, Constitution as well as obligations arising from the international
treaties. Generally, it is symptomatic for different kinds of populism. The will of people is
treated as an ultimate reason of all decisions and acts. Therefore, any confrontation between
the Polish authorities and European institutions is unavoidable. This confrontation creates new
opportunities for this faction. It enables mobilization of the followers in the struggle for
sovereignty of Poland. 

Immigrants and refugees sent to Poland by the European Union in the frame of the program
of relocation became also an external enemy. In the PiS narration, they threaten Polish identi-
ty, national and internal security (terrorism and common crimes, e.g. rapes) as well as epidemi-
ological security (refugees as vectors of infectious diseases). It is another sphere which reveals
the populism of the PiS and its leader. Officials of the Party scare Polish people by imaginary
threats. It gives them the next “argument” in the conformation with the European Union as a
promoter of politics of multiculturalism as well as power of relativisation of Christian and na-
tional values. 

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Conclusions

Pawe³ Przy³êcki correctly provides that “The faction of J. Kaczyñski has conducted a dis-
course which is to convince a Polish society that the PiS is only one party truly national,
Catholic and simultaneously supporting a sovereignty of Polish nation for a few years” [4, p.
209]. The populist slogans have become a constant part of political practice of people who are
ruling in Poland since victory of the PiS in both elections, presidential and parliamentary, in
2015. These slogans became a principle of internal (deterioration of liberal democracy) and ex-
ternal (weakening of European unity) politics. What will be its political and social conse-
quences? In case the anti-European populism still wins in the EU member states (presidential
elections in France, parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, Germany and Italy), a black
scenario outlined by political scientist Jan Zielonka can be prophetical [22]. If the European
Union does not survive the time of trial, Polish politicians ruling today in Poland led by
Jaros³aw Kaczyñski will have their contribution also in dismantling the European unity. Bet-
ting on strategic alliance with the United Kingdom, damaging cooperation within Weimer Tri-
angle, broking constitutional rules in internal politics, establishing norms closer to the model
characteristic for authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet countries than for Western-liberal
ones in fact crowds Poland out from the European political and axiological space. Promoting
nationalism and throwing out values of the European Union, i.e. solidarity, they really con-
tribute to split of this European political structure. One of the prominent PiS politicians, Piotr
Naimski reveals the real intentions of his faction noticing in the Party journal saying that “Pas-
sive participation in the process of rescue of the European integration project at any price
leads inevitably step by step to s loss of sovereignty and as its consequence threats an inde-
pendence of the member states, also of Poland [Zeszyty Polityczne, no. 1, p. 14]. In my opin-
ion, in some simplification we can state that the European Union was and still is for the PiS
only an instrumental value. In the PiS vision, the European Union is useful if it gives support
for Poland. But Poland is not obliged to follow the rules of solidarity, democracy, freedom and
justice. Reference to national and religious traditions can be a smokescreen for real acts which
in fact mean a deEuropeanization of political system in Poland as well as a disintegration of
the European community, a value- based community. 

Notes
1 If PO changed then the voting system according to its initiative of referendum, currently PiS would have

had not only majority in the Polish Parliament (Sejm) but also PiS would have had a constitutional majority
what surely could strengthen its authoritarian tendencies. The idea of PO, in its essence populist, shows from
perspective of time that simply methods which intentionally are to remove corrupted elite from power and im-
prove the decision-making system, in fact they can have catastrophic consequences for liberal democracy, es-
pecially young and jeopardized on authoritarian temptations. 

2 Unfortunately, Pawe³ Przy³êcki did not refer to the important program document of PiS entitled Polska
katolicka w chrzeœcijañskiej Europie – Catholic Poland in Christian Europe (2005). If he included it in his
research , probably the number of populist sentences was much higher. 

3 Donald Tusk identifies himself as Kashubian. His grandparents were citizens of the Free City of Gdan-
sk before the World War II. The service of Tusk’s grandfather as a citizen of the Third Reich (after annexation
of Gdansk) in Wehrmacht was used by propaganda of PiS during the presidential campaign in 2005. In this
way PiS wanted to negate his patriotism and impute him pro-German attitude and subordination to Germany.
This unfair argumentation probably helped Lech Kaczyñski to win the election.

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