item: #1 of 59
          id: phimisci-10020
      author: Tabatabaeian, Shadab; Jennings, Carolyn
       title: Dynamic attentional mechanisms of creative cognition
        date: 2023-07-21
       words: 12545
      flesch: 39
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10020 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Dynamic attentional mechanisms of creative cognition 5 they relate to creative cognition: top-down versus bottom-up and internal versus external attention. Nonetheless, mounting evidence points to possible contributions to creative cognition from external attention.
    keywords: attention; brain; cognition; control; creativity; et al; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10020; https://philosophymindscience.org; jennings; mechanisms; mind; sciences; task
       cache: phimisci-10020.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10020.txt

        item: #2 of 59
          id: phimisci-10226
      author: Mole, Christopher
       title: Stokes’s malleability thesis and the normative grounding of propositional attitudes
        date: 2023-07-05
       words: 3794
      flesch: 45
     summary: If facts about belief are grounded in normative facts (such as facts about one’s entitlement to make moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons) then Stokes’s malleability claim will require such normative facts to exert a causal influence on the facts about representation that ground perception. Stokes's malleability thesis and the normative grounding of propositional attitudes.
    keywords: attitudes; facts; perception; picture; stokes
       cache: phimisci-10226.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10226.txt

        item: #3 of 59
          id: phimisci-10247
      author: Mroczko-Wasowicz, Aleksandra
       title: Perceptual expertise and object recognition: An explanatory task for modularists and antimodularists
        date: 2023-07-05
       words: 2709
      flesch: 35
     summary: By classifying visual object recognition as a late vision phenomenon, they do not mean that object recognition enhanced by perceptual expertise is an additional indicator of the malleability of the mind. Modularists interpret it as the capacity for visual object recognition – a post- perceptual cognitive process of late vision.
    keywords: expertise; mind; mroczko; object; recognition; stokes; wąsowicz
       cache: phimisci-10247.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10247.txt

        item: #4 of 59
          id: phimisci-10250
      author: Drayson, Zoe
       title: Truth, success, and epistemology: A response to Stokes's Thinking and Perceiving
        date: 2023-07-05
       words: 2409
      flesch: 40
     summary: None of these virtue epistemologists frame epistemic improvement in terms of (non-truth-governed) success, and so they cannot help Stokes to make the case that improvements in the speed or practicality of perceptual performance are epistemic improvements. Stokes’ adoption of virtue epistemology, however, does not seem to be suffi- cient to justify his characterization of epistemic constraints in terms of success rather than truth.
    keywords: epistemology; perceiving; stokes; truth
       cache: phimisci-10250.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10250.txt

        item: #5 of 59
          id: phimisci-10264
      author: Adams, Zed
       title: Varieties of perceptual improvement
        date: 2023-07-05
       words: 1858
      flesch: 48
     summary: Varieties of perceptual improvement. Varieties of perceptual improvement Zed Adamsa(zedadams@gmail.com)
    keywords: fms; improvement; learning; stokes
       cache: phimisci-10264.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10264.txt

        item: #6 of 59
          id: phimisci-10398
      author: Kästner, Lena; Walter, Henrik
       title: Models and mechanisms in philosophy of psychiatry: Editorial introduction
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 1436
      flesch: 43
     summary: The next two papers focus on a recently very influential approach in scientific psychiatry, namely the use of computational approaches based on machine learn- ing and modern developments in the field of artificial intelligence. In the results presented here, the authors focused on the questions (i) whether computational approaches will be able to contribute to an improved nosology and (ii) whether this would be desirable.
    keywords: mind; philosophy; psychiatry; sciences
       cache: phimisci-10398.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10398.txt

        item: #7 of 59
          id: phimisci-10953
      author: Stokes, Dustin R.
       title: Précis of Thinking and Perceiving
        date: 2023-07-05
       words: 4240
      flesch: 45
     summary: Perceptual experts perform in a specific domain of training, their performance success is above a threshold set by the standards of that domain, and their performance non-trivially involves sensory perception. Perceptual experts are, genuinely, perceptual experts.
    keywords: cases; expertise; experts; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10250; https://philosophymindscience.org; perceiving; perception; thinking
       cache: phimisci-10953.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10953.txt

        item: #8 of 59
          id: phimisci-10954
      author: Stokes, Dustin R.
       title:  How radical is perceptual malleability? A reply to commentators
        date: 2023-07-05
       words: 6333
      flesch: 47
     summary: Perceptual experts understood as virtuous agents better find truth, and accurately perceive the world, but which truths (which objective features of the world) they find may be partly determined by their aims and tasks within an epistemic context. Drayson worries that my “analysis cannot be understood merely as a supplement to existing epistemological models” (p. 2) and, in particular that if “Stokes were to take this pragmatist approach to rationality, he could retain his claim that ‘experiences of perceptual experts con- tribute in a positive way to their rational standing as epistemic agents’ (178), but he would no longer be engaging with Siegel’s concept of theoretical rationality” (p. 4-5).
    keywords: expert; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10954; https://philosophymindscience.org; learning; malleability; perception; reply; stokes
       cache: phimisci-10954.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-10954.txt

        item: #9 of 59
          id: phimisci-8941
      author: Mallett, Remington; Carr, Michelle; Freegard, Martin; Konkoly, Karen; Bradshaw, Ceri; Schredl, Michael
       title: Exploring the range of reported dream lucidity
        date: 2021-04-15
       words: 12161
      flesch: 51
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.63 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org R. Mallett, M. Carr, M. Freegard, K. Konkoly, C. Bradshaw, and M. Schredl 4 Only a few questionnaires designed to quantify dream lucidity ask the explicit question about how aware of the dream the participant was. We were also interested in how dream lucidity was related to affect upon awakening.
    keywords: consciousness; control; dream; dream lucidity; dreaming; et al; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.63; https://philosophymindscience.org; induction; lucidity; mallett; participants; range; sleep
       cache: phimisci-8941.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8941.txt

        item: #10 of 59
          id: phimisci-8945
      author: Fink, Sascha Benjamin
       title: A double anniversary for the neural correlates of consciousness: Editorial introduction
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 3683
      flesch: 49
     summary: At the heart of the contemporary science of consciousness is the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://philosophymindscience.org https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7535-1882 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.85 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Sascha Benjamin Fink 2 This indicated that the idea that conscious processes have neural correlates was not uncommon in 19th century psychology, e.g. when Edmund Gurney (1881, p. 156) writes that “the movements of mind are correlated with nervous processes” or when Mary Whiton Calkins (1892, p. 399) speaks of “cerebral correlates of […] intellectual processes”.
    keywords: consciousness; correlates; mind; neural; philosophy; sciences; theory
       cache: phimisci-8945.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8945.txt

        item: #11 of 59
          id: phimisci-8946
      author: Bachmann, Talis; Suzuki, Mototaka; Aru, Jaan
       title: Dendritic integration theory: A thalamo-cortical theory of state and content of consciousness
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 12123
      flesch: 42
     summary: The NSP-thalamus is an evolutionary supplement to the midbrain reticular for- mation and its role has been seen as the modulator of the state of cortical neural circuits, which allows transition between non-conscious states and alert states of consciousness (Brazier, 1960; Brooks & Jung, 1973; Magoun, 1958; Mesulam, 2000; Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949; Newman, 1995). ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade.
    keywords: aru; bachmann; consciousness; content; cortical; et al; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.52; https://philosophymindscience.org; integration; l5p; larkum; neurons; state; suzuki; thalamic; thalamus; theory
       cache: phimisci-8946.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8946.txt

        item: #12 of 59
          id: phimisci-8947
      author: Hohwy, Jakob; Seth, Anil
       title: Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 19219
      flesch: 42
     summary: Core consciousness theory (Damasio, 2000) Orchestrated objective reduction (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014) Electromagnetic theory (McFadden, 2020, 2002) Some of these labels and groupings ignore substantial differences. For now, an analogy might be useful, that the systematicity requirement is not specific to consciousness science.
    keywords: action; basis; brain; consciousness; correlates; et al; framework; friston; hohwy; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64; https://philosophymindscience.org; inference; ncc; neural; predictive; processing; sciences; seth; systematic; theories; theory
       cache: phimisci-8947.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8947.txt

        item: #13 of 59
          id: phimisci-8948
      author: Klein, Colin; Hohwy, Jakob; Bayne, Tim
       title: Explanation in the science of consciousness: From the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) to the difference makers of consciousness (DMCs)
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 10602
      flesch: 52
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://philosophymindscience.org https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7406-4010 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3906-3060 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8591-7907 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.60 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Colin Klein, Jakob Hohwy, and Tim Bayne 2 1 Introduction Since the revival of neuroscientific interest in consciousness in the early 1990s, consciousness science has focused on the search for the neural correlates of con- sciousness (NCCs) (Koch et al., 2016; Metzinger, 2000). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.60 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Explanation in the Science of Consciousness 5 differentiating/non-differentiating distinction is certainly useful – not least because it maps on to the practice of consciousness science – but arguably it undermines the official definition of content-specific NCCs.
    keywords: consciousness; consciousness science; correlates; difference; dmcs; explanation; framework; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.60; https://philosophymindscience.org; lite; makers; nccs; neural; science
       cache: phimisci-8948.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8948.txt

        item: #14 of 59
          id: phimisci-8949
      author: Marvan, Tomáš; Polák, Michal
       title: Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 8895
      flesch: 45
     summary: The second one is that at least on some versions of IIT, perceptual content mechanisms are inex- tricably interwoven with consciousness-conferring processes. If the level of information integra- tion during perception is too low to change the contents into conscious contents (clustered in a mental state), perception remains subliminal.
    keywords: consciousness; content; correlates; gncc; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.61; https://philosophymindscience.org; ncc; neural; perceptual; processing; theory
       cache: phimisci-8949.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8949.txt

        item: #15 of 59
          id: phimisci-8950
      author: Mazor, Matan; Fleming, Stephen M.
       title: Distinguishing absence of awareness from awareness of absence
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 7571
      flesch: 41
     summary: For instance, changes in neural excitability, atten- tion, or beliefs about attention can affect reports of stimulus awareness, even if such factors are independent of how a stimulus is represented or encoded. Theoretically, in Section 2 we describe first- and higher- order approaches to the modeling of awareness reports, and explain how these approaches handle the difference between awareness of absence and absence of awareness.
    keywords: absence; awareness; consciousness; content; fleming; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.69; https://philosophymindscience.org; neural; stimulus
       cache: phimisci-8950.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8950.txt

        item: #16 of 59
          id: phimisci-8951
      author: Mckilliam, Andy Kenneth
       title: What is a global state of consciousness?
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 11855
      flesch: 54
     summary: In what sense are global states states of consciousness? 3 Are global states phenomenal states?
    keywords: account; capacities; capacity; consciousness; contents; creature; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.58; https://philosophymindscience.org; level; range; sciences; states
       cache: phimisci-8951.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8951.txt

        item: #17 of 59
          id: phimisci-8952
      author: Michel, Matthias; Lau, Hakwan
       title: On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
        date: 2020-12-30
       words: 7372
      flesch: 47
     summary: Using category theory to assess the relationship between consciousness and integrated information theory. Keywords Consciousness ∙ Integrated information theory ∙ Neural correlates of consciousness This article is part of a special issue on “The Neural Correlates of Consciousness”, edited by Sascha Benjamin Fink. 1 NCCs, markers, and constituents
    keywords: consciousness; fundamental; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.54; https://philosophymindscience.org; iit; information; ncc; theory
       cache: phimisci-8952.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8952.txt

        item: #18 of 59
          id: phimisci-8953
      author: Barkasi, Michael; Rosen, Melanie G.
       title: Is mental time travel real time travel?
        date: 2020-05-26
       words: 14722
      flesch: 51
     summary: We argue that episodic memory experiences depend on a causal-informational link with the past events being remembered, and that, assuming direct realism about episodic memory experiences, this link suffices for genuine awareness. Specially, we shall argue that episodic memory experiences (recall experiences, for short) involve genuine awareness of the past-perceived events being remembered, while prospection experiences present imagined future events as mere intentional contents.
    keywords: awareness; episodic; events; experience; future; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.1.28; https://philosophymindscience.org; memory; mtt; past; perception; recall; time travel
       cache: phimisci-8953.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8953.txt

        item: #19 of 59
          id: phimisci-8954
      author: Milliere, Raphael; Metzinger, Thomas
       title: Radical disruptions of self-consciousness: Editorial introduction
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 6608
      flesch: 47
     summary: Self, belonging, and conscious experience: A critique of subjectivity theories of consciousness. In his article “Being for no-one: psychedelic experience and minimal subjec- tivity”, Chris Letheby (2020) asks whether reports of drug-induced ego dissolu- tion provide us with solid evidence against so-called “subjectivity theories of con- sciousness”, according to which phenomenal consciousness constitutively involves a minimal form of self-awareness or “subjectivity”.
    keywords: consciousness; disruptions; experience; https://philosophymindscience.org; metzinger; millière; mind; self; states
       cache: phimisci-8954.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8954.txt

        item: #20 of 59
          id: phimisci-8955
      author: Deane, George
       title: Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 14568
      flesch: 40
     summary: This prospective form of control relies on the contextu- alization provided by higher levels in the inferential hierarchy, which anticipate the downstream consequences of actions and select policies accordingly (Friston, 2010; Pezzulo et al., 2015). The result is an inferential framework of hierarchically nested contextual complexity, in which lower levels track basic (and sometimes evolutionarily hard-wired) motivations or affordances, while higher levels track motivations and plans over deeper timescales.
    keywords: action; bayesian; dissolution; ego; friston; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.39; https://philosophymindscience.org; inference; learning; model; precision; predictive; psychedelics; sciences; self
       cache: phimisci-8955.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8955.txt

        item: #21 of 59
          id: phimisci-8956
      author: Fink, Sascha Benjamin
       title: Look who's talking! Varieties of ego-dissolution without paradox
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 20040
      flesch: 59
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.40 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Sascha Benjamin Fink 24 by Saks is not just loose talk, we should search for alternative explanations that do not rely on a multiplicity of selves or feelings of self. But because sensations always have to be mine (I don’t feel anybody else’s), I can reasonably infer that these sensory impressions with a lack of felt self must have been mine.
    keywords: consciousness; dissolution; ego; egoic; episodes; experiences; feeling; fink; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.40; https://philosophymindscience.org; look; non; paradox; reports; sane; sciences; self; varieties
       cache: phimisci-8956.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8956.txt

        item: #22 of 59
          id: phimisci-8957
      author: Gennaro, Rocco Joseph
       title: Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 10863
      flesch: 58
     summary: It will also be crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” (that is, “I-concepts”) and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced ex- planation of the relationship between conscious mental states and self-awareness. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are mental states that I am “aware of” in some sense.
    keywords: awareness; consciousness; cotard; hot; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.41; order; self; state; syndrome; theory; thought
       cache: phimisci-8957.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8957.txt

        item: #23 of 59
          id: phimisci-8958
      author: Letheby, Chris
       title: Being for no-one: Psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 14292
      flesch: 48
     summary: For-me-ness is sometimes characterised as the “first personal givenness” of conscious mental states, or as the “special inner awareness” that each subject has of her own conscious states – or, as Zahavi and Kriegel (henceforth Z&K) put it: Letheby, C. (2020). In different ways, they each unpack the intuition that conscious mental states are ones that the self or subject is aware of, that are some- how present to or for the subject (Levine, 2001, pp.
    keywords: b&k; cases; consciousness; experience; experiential; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.47; https://philosophymindscience.org; lack; letheby; self; sense; states; subjectivity
       cache: phimisci-8958.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8958.txt

        item: #24 of 59
          id: phimisci-8959
      author: Limanowski, Jakub; Friston, Karl
       title: Attenuating oneself: An active inference perspective on “selfless” experiences
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 8629
      flesch: 41
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.35 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Jakub Limanowski and Karl Friston 12 5 Conclusion and outlook We have argued that the experience of having “lost” one’s self (constituting a fun- damental change to the phenomenal self-model) could arise from a combination of “self-flattening” via a loss of deep active inference and “self-attenuation” via aberrant precision expectations about sensory self-evidence (i.e., within the com- putational self-model realizing active inference). Self models.
    keywords: action; experiences; friston; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.35; https://philosophymindscience.org; inference; limanowski; metzinger; perspective; precision; self; sensory
       cache: phimisci-8959.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8959.txt

        item: #25 of 59
          id: phimisci-8960
      author: Metzinger, Thomas
       title: Minimal phenomenal experience: Meditation, tonic alertness, and the phenomenology of “pure” consciousness
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 23433
      flesch: 43
     summary: Accounting for pure consciousness: An examination of the ability of the representationalist approach to phenomenal consciousness to account for pure consciousness experiences. But I also believe that in order to really solve the problem of consciousness we will ultimately need a theory of MPE – because only a minimal model can give us a deep scientific understanding of the essence of phenomenal experience.
    keywords: alertness; attention; author(s; awareness; character; consciousness; content; experience; form; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.46; https://philosophymindscience.org; issn; meditation; metzinger; mind; model; mpe; phenomenology; sciences; self; space; state; tonic; tonic alertness; wakefulness
       cache: phimisci-8960.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8960.txt

        item: #26 of 59
          id: phimisci-8961
      author: Milliere, Raphael
       title: The varieties of selflessness
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 21695
      flesch: 52
     summary: The varieties of selflessness The varieties of selflessness Raphaël Millièrea (raphael.milliere@philosophy.ox.ac.uk) Abstract Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. 1 Introduction Many authors in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience are sympathetic to the claim that conscious experience involves a sense of self.
    keywords: author(s; awareness; bodily; body; consciousness; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.48; https://philosophymindscience.org; issn; lack; millière; ownership; oxford; phenomenology; reports; sciences; self; selflessness; sense; states; subject; varieties
       cache: phimisci-8961.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8961.txt

        item: #27 of 59
          id: phimisci-8962
      author: Sebastian, Miguel Angel
       title: Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution: An analysis of (some) altered states of consciousness
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 15745
      flesch: 55
     summary: 3.2 Meditation It has been claimed that one of the mechanisms of action in meditation is related to an altered sense of self (Hoelzel et al., 2011). The feel- ing of union with the universe might entail a disruption of the distinction between self and other, but this distinction is not something revealed in any sense in PFP- Sebastián, M. Á. (2020).
    keywords: awareness; consciousness; dissolution; ego; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.44; https://philosophymindscience.org; perspectival; perspectival self; pfp; sebastián; self; sense; states; subject; 𝑆𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁; 𝑆𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁−𝑂𝑅𝐷
       cache: phimisci-8962.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8962.txt

        item: #28 of 59
          id: phimisci-8963
      author: Wiese, Wanja
       title: Breaking the self: Radical disruptions of self-consciousness and impossible conscious experiences
        date: 2020-03-24
       words: 14095
      flesch: 47
     summary: Breaking the self: Radical disruptions of self-consciousness and impossible conscious experiences Breaking the self Radical disruptions of self-consciousness and impossible conscious experiences Wanja Wiesea (wawiese@uni-mainz.de) Keywords Consciousness ∙ Impossible conscious experiences · Self-consciousness · Sense of agency ·
    keywords: consciousness; disruptions; experience; features; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.32; https://philosophymindscience.org; neural; properties; sciences; self; sense; time; types; wiese
       cache: phimisci-8963.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-8963.txt

        item: #29 of 59
          id: phimisci-9150
      author: None
       title: Progress and paradigms in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness
        date: None
       words: 2943
      flesch: 51
     summary: The search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) therefore plays a fundamental role for a pre-paradigmatic science like the empirical science of consciousness: It is one of the few sets of largely uncontested data that would-be theory- and paradigm-builders have to take into account. Sascha Benjamin Fink, Lukas Kob, and Holger Lyre (2021) also argue for the view that structures are important in the search for neural correlates of consciousness – so much so that they constrain what can count as a proper neural correlate of an experience (in contrast to a mere statistical correlate).
    keywords: consciousness; correlates; field; neural; philosophy; science
       cache: phimisci-9150.htm
  plain text: phimisci-9150.txt

        item: #30 of 59
          id: phimisci-9152
      author: Wiese, Wanja; Friston, Karl J.
       title: The neural correlates of consciousness under the free energy principle: From computational correlates to computational explanation
        date: 2021-07-19
       words: 17233
      flesch: 43
     summary: The second is to allow for the possibility of systems that implement computations associated with consciousness, without being conscious, which re- quires differentiating between computational systems that merely simulate conscious beings and computational systems that are conscious in and of themselves. However, if one believes that implementing the right kind of computational system is insufficient for instantiating consciousness, then there will be non-conscious systems that still display all the computational properties instantiated by conscious beings.
    keywords: blanket; complexity; computational; consciousness; correlates; energy; explanation; fep; friston; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.81; https://philosophymindscience.org; neural; principle; sciences; states; system; wiese
       cache: phimisci-9152.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9152.txt

        item: #31 of 59
          id: phimisci-9153
      author: Schlicht, Tobias; Dolega, Krzysztof
       title: You can't always get what you want: Predictive processing and consciousness
        date: 2021-07-19
       words: 14097
      flesch: 48
     summary: We think that this worry presents a particular problem for those who would like to avoid 6The problem of post-hoc fitting of PP models to causal analyses has recently resulted in a con- troversy regarding which kinds of neurodynamic models support PP descriptions of cognitive functions (Litwin & Miłkowski, 2020). To drive home this point we now want to look at a different assumption brought in by proponents of PP accounts of consciousness.
    keywords: brain; cognitive; consciousness; dołęga; framework; hohwy; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.80; https://philosophymindscience.org; neural; predictive; problem; processing; schlicht; sciences; seth
       cache: phimisci-9153.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9153.txt

        item: #32 of 59
          id: phimisci-9154
      author: Fink, Sascha Benjamin; Kob, Lukas; Lyre, Holger
       title: A structural constraint on neural correlates of consciousness
        date: 2021-07-19
       words: 12085
      flesch: 45
     summary: Our position is rather that color experiences are relationally individuated among themselves, even if the colors are hallucinated or dreamt of. The core idea is that if we knew the particular structure of experienced color dissimilarities, we would be able to use that structure to home in on the NCC proper of color experience because, according to the SSC, the NCC proper of any phenomenal domain must share the structure of the relevant phe- nomenal space.
    keywords: color; consciousness; constraint; correlates; experience; fink; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.79; https://philosophymindscience.org; kob; lyre; ncc; neural; phenomenal; similarity; space; structural
       cache: phimisci-9154.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9154.txt

        item: #33 of 59
          id: phimisci-9155
      author: Overgaard, Morten S.; Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger
       title: Finding the neural correlates of consciousness will not solve all our problems
        date: 2021-07-19
       words: 8492
      flesch: 44
     summary: Based on the rea- soning above, consciousness theories should be able to propose specific outcomes of behavioural experiments to be empirically compared directly. Instead, what we highlight is that 1Throughout, we use ‘conceptual theories’ and ‘the conceptual domain’ broadly to refer to the various conceptual frameworks aiming to explain consciousness, such as higher-order thought theories, reflexive theories, panpsychic theories, workspace theories, to name a few.
    keywords: brain; consciousness; correlates; data; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.37; https://philosophymindscience.org; nccs; neural; overgaard; theories
       cache: phimisci-9155.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9155.txt

        item: #34 of 59
          id: phimisci-9183
      author: Brown, Derek
       title: Colour variation without objective colour
        date: 2022-12-22
       words: 16578
      flesch: 42
     summary: On my view, the Relationalist account of veridical colour experience reduces to the assertion that objects have colour simply because they cause perceivers to have colour experiences of them. To capture this colours are defined by the highly specific relations that are sensitive to all the parameters in perceptual systems and perceptual conditions that impact veridical colour experience.
    keywords: brown; colour; colour experiences; colour variation; conditions; ecumenical; eliminativist; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9183; https://philosophymindscience.org; non; objects; perceptual; relationalism; veridical
       cache: phimisci-9183.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9183.txt

        item: #35 of 59
          id: phimisci-9187
      author: Di Paolo, Ezequiel; Thompson, Evan; Beer, Randall
       title: Laying down a forking path: Tensions between enaction and the free energy principle
        date: 2022-01-25
       words: 22768
      flesch: 46
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9187 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Evan Thompson, and Randall D. Beer 20 arrived at in FEP systems is definitionally time invariant. In contrast, Markov blankets in FEP systems are there by assump- tion.12 In other words, Markov Blankets are not produced by the system the same way that self-distinction processes and structures are.
    keywords: autopoiesis; beer; di paolo; e. a.; enaction; enactive; energy; et al; fep; friston; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9187; https://philosophymindscience.org; markov; paolo; path; principle; processes; sciences; system; thompson
       cache: phimisci-9187.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9187.txt

        item: #36 of 59
          id: phimisci-9188
      author: Pauen, Michael
       title: NCC research and the problem of consciousness
        date: 2021-12-30
       words: 12954
      flesch: 44
     summary: The dependence of theories and data in consciousness research How theoretical presuppositions guide consciousness research: The debate between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness Chalmers's pre-experimental bridging principles How empirical results may affect theoretical presuppositions No-report paradigms Pain research Neural correlates of experienced and empathic pain Conclusion Another reason against this move is that it would not contribute to the obvious goal of the NCC program: to allow researchers with a broad spectrum of diverging theoretical commitments to contribute to consciousness research.
    keywords: chalmers; consciousness; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.9188; https://philosophymindscience.org; ncc; ncc research; neural; pain; presuppositions; research; sciences; theories; theory
       cache: phimisci-9188.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9188.txt

        item: #37 of 59
          id: phimisci-9190
      author: Bruineberg, Jelle; Fabry, Regina
       title: Extended mind-wandering
        date: 2022-10-05
       words: 16010
      flesch: 45
     summary: According to the decoupling hypothesis, “[a]ttention is directed inwards during mind wandering; thus, representations of the external environment should be superficial” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 947). In K. C. R. Fox & K. Christoff (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of spontaneous thought: Mind wandering, creativity, and dreaming (pp. 181–191).
    keywords: attention; cases; cognition; et al; fabry; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9190; https://philosophymindscience.org; mind; mind sciences; mind wandering; research; smallwood; smartphone; task; use; wandering
       cache: phimisci-9190.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9190.txt

        item: #38 of 59
          id: phimisci-9193
      author: Buckwalter, Wesley
       title: The replication crisis and philosophy
        date: 2022-10-27
       words: 16379
      flesch: 46
     summary: For example, researchers have shown well-replicated effects of culture or heritable personality traits on philosophical case judgments in philos- ophy of language and action theory (Beebe & Undercoffer, 2016; Feltz & Cokely, 2012; Machery et al., 2004). According to one possibility, philosophy inherits a crisis similar to the one in science because philosophers rely on unreplicated or unreplicable findings from science when conducting philosophical research.
    keywords: buckwalter; cases; crisis; evidence; experiments; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9193; https://philosophymindscience.org; judgments; method; philosophers; philosophy; psychology; replication; replication crisis; research; researchers; science; thought
       cache: phimisci-9193.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9193.txt

        item: #39 of 59
          id: phimisci-9194
      author: Lopez, Azenet
       title: Vicarious attention, degrees of enhancement, and the contents of consciousness
        date: 2022-01-25
       words: 23065
      flesch: 43
     summary: I then propose that this kind of processing must also be considered when mapping attention targets into contents of consciousness. Borrowing Montemayor and Haladjian’s terms, this project amounts to tracing the boundaries of conscious attention.
    keywords: attention; author(s; consciousness; contents; degrees; enhancement; et al; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9194; https://philosophymindscience.org; information; issn; journal; lopez; neuroscience; perception; processing; sciences; section; stimuli; stimulus; target; task
       cache: phimisci-9194.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9194.txt

        item: #40 of 59
          id: phimisci-9264
      author: Fink, Sascha Benjamin
       title: Psychedelics Favour Understanding Rather Than Knowledge
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 5667
      flesch: 50
     summary: Psychedelics may cause new mental states, some of which can be states of knowledge. Psychedelics Favour Understanding Rather Than Knowledge.
    keywords: justification; knowledge; letheby; processes; psychedelics; understanding
       cache: phimisci-9264.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9264.txt

        item: #41 of 59
          id: phimisci-9283
      author: Bortolotti, Lisa; Murphy-Hollies, Kathleen
       title: The Agency-First Epistemology of Psychedelics
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 2372
      flesch: 47
     summary: an enhanced realisation of what is possible (e.g., Mary now realises that her mind has a vast unrealised potential and that her sense of self is not set in stone and can be changed); 4. When agents live up to the good traits which they like to regard themselves as having, this may be incentivised by imperfect cognitions, such as post-hoc rationalisation, confabulation, and self-deception.
    keywords: agency; letheby; psychedelics; self
       cache: phimisci-9283.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9283.txt

        item: #42 of 59
          id: phimisci-9285
      author: Hoffman, Sarah
       title: Positive Affect and Letheby's Naturalization of Psychedelic Therapy
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 4100
      flesch: 36
     summary: The general shape of this project is persuasive; it is hard to see how the claim that successful therapy must involve changes to the self could be objected to, and Letheby sketches a consistent, if speculative, picture of psychedelic experience. Moreover, as long as evidence continues to support the induction of a mystical-type experi- ence as the best predictor of therapeutic effects, it makes sense that the profound changes to the sense of self that occur in psychedelic experience are part of the story of how this happens.1 Understanding these experiences, uncovering which aspects of them are responsible for their benefits, and explaining just how they are responsible requires handling both neuroscientific evidence and some fairly speculative hypotheses about normal and psychedelic consciousness.
    keywords: affect; experiences; letheby; mdma; psychedelics; self; therapy
       cache: phimisci-9285.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9285.txt

        item: #43 of 59
          id: phimisci-9310
      author: Caporuscio, Chiara
       title: Belief Now, True Belief Later: The Epistemic Advantage of Self-Related Insights in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 4149
      flesch: 45
     summary: During the trip itself, self-related beliefs are relaxed, allowing patients to momentarily escape the self-fulfilling effects of damaging self models, explore new and healthier ways of thinking and acting, and consequently acquire new insights about themselves. More precisely, I argue that one element is underexplored in Letheby’s otherwise compelling picture: namely, that unlike new beliefs about the external world, beliefs about oneself have the capacity to turn into self-fulfilling prophecies.
    keywords: belief; insights; knowledge; letheby; psychedelic; self; therapy
       cache: phimisci-9310.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9310.txt

        item: #44 of 59
          id: phimisci-9320
      author: Colombo, Matteo
       title: Serotonin, Predictive Processing and Psychedelics
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 2926
      flesch: 33
     summary: Compared to PP models, RL models have been submitted to experimental testing more frequently and more stringently, and they have proved themselves to en- joy a substantial degree of genuinely explanatory unifying power in the sciences of mind and brain (Colombo, 2014). In this commentary, I motivate this worry and sketch an alternative interpretation of psychedelic therapy within the Reinforcement Learning framework.
    keywords: colombo; letheby; precision; processing; psychedelics; serotonin
       cache: phimisci-9320.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9320.txt

        item: #45 of 59
          id: phimisci-9323
      author: Lyon, Aidan; Farennikova, Anya
       title: Through the Psychedelic Looking-Glass: The Importance of Phenomenal Transparency in Psychedelic Transformation
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 6126
      flesch: 51
     summary: Is it the induction of psychedelic experience, with its distinct patterns of hallucinations and insights, or is it the neural ‘shakeup’ that moves the brain out of its regular mode of functioning and into a more disordered state? We outline the common kinds of phenom- enal transparency shifts typical of psychedelic experiences, and argue that in many cases, such shifts are responsible for the psychotherapeutic benefits.
    keywords: experience; glass; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9323; https://philosophymindscience.org; increases; opacity; psychedelics; transformation; transparency
       cache: phimisci-9323.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9323.txt

        item: #46 of 59
          id: phimisci-9326
      author: Martin, Joshua M.; Sterzer, Philipp
       title: How Level is the 'Cognitive Playing Field'? Context Shapes Alterations in Self-Conception During the Psychedelic Experience
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 5956
      flesch: 41
     summary: As Carhart-Harris and Friston (2019) describe in their paper, “A corollary of relaxing high-level priors or beliefs under psychedelics is that ascending prediction errors from lower levels of the system (that are ordinarily unable to update beliefs due to the top-down sup- pressive influence of heavily-weighted priors) can find freer register in conscious experience, by reaching and impressing on higher levels of the hierarchy” (p. 319). Quality of acute psychedelic experience predicts therapeutic efficacy of psilocybin for treatment-resistant depression.
    keywords: context; experience; letheby; level; psychedelics; self
       cache: phimisci-9326.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9326.txt

        item: #47 of 59
          id: phimisci-9391
      author: Kind, Adrian
       title: How does the psychiatrist know?
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 21186
      flesch: 42
     summary: A theory that explains psychiatric diagnostic reasoning consequently should not be constrained by the empirical findings of researchers who investigated diagnostic reasoning across different branches of medicine. In the past, work on the Methodological Question concerning medical diagnostic reasoning in general has been done by cognitive psychologists and medical education scientists, with only few notable exceptions among philoso- phers (e.g., Sober, 1979).3 Only more recently has the Methodological Question as put in this paper – with focus on diagnostic reasoning in clinical psychiatry – came to greater attention.
    keywords: account; author(s; case; cognitive; diagnostic; disorder; formulation; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9391; https://philosophymindscience.org; information; issn; kind; medical; model; modelling; patient; process; psychiatrist; psychiatry; question; reasoning; sciences; symptoms; system
       cache: phimisci-9391.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9391.txt

        item: #48 of 59
          id: phimisci-9435
      author: Starke, Georg; Elger, Bernice Simone; De Clercq, Eva
       title: Machine learning and its impact on psychiatric nosology: Findings from a qualitative study among German and Swiss experts
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 8933
      flesch: 44
     summary: • As you know, some authors argue that machine learning, and Deep Learning in particular, promise a way to divide psychiatric disorders objectively into natural types and thus solve the old problems of psychiatric nosology. (P2) Also others considered ML as particularly useful for psychiatric nosology since it could contribute to mapping different features of psychiatric disorders in a higher dimensional space, taking into account the complex and contingent forms of men- tal disorders, shaped by history, culture, and language.
    keywords: data; disorders; experts; findings; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9435; https://philosophymindscience.org; impact; learning; machine; nosology; psychiatric; research; study
       cache: phimisci-9435.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9435.txt

        item: #49 of 59
          id: phimisci-9438
      author: Singhal, Ishan; Mudumba, Ramya; Srinivasan, Narayanan
       title: In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology
        date: 2022-06-03
       words: 9854
      flesch: 46
     summary: Hence, we contend that IIT needs an axiom for time, through which its causal structure can be refined to account for temporal experiences. The puzzle of temporal experience.
    keywords: consciousness; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9438; https://philosophymindscience.org; iit; information; phenomenology; sciences; search; singhal; srinivasan; structure; theory; time
       cache: phimisci-9438.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9438.txt

        item: #50 of 59
          id: phimisci-9627
      author: Letheby, Chris
       title: Naturalistic Entheogenics: Précis of Philosophy of Psychedelics
        date: 2022-04-19
       words: 13002
      flesch: 38
     summary: https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369 https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9627 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://philosophymindscience.org Chris Letheby 12 and the concepts of phenomenal transparency and opacity are indispensable for a naturalistic understanding of psychedelic experience and its transformative ef- fects. Carhart-Harris and Friston (2019) have proposed a PP-based explanation of psychedelic experience known as the REBUS model (“RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics”).
    keywords: benefits; book; chapter; effects; entheogenics; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9627; https://philosophymindscience.org; letheby; naturalistic; philosophy; précis; psychedelics; sciences; self; therapy
       cache: phimisci-9627.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9627.txt

        item: #51 of 59
          id: phimisci-9630
      author: Dembić, Sanja
       title: Mental disorder: An ability-based view
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 15341
      flesch: 57
     summary: ∙ Defining mental disorder ∙ Reasons ∙ Mental disorder This article is part of a special issue on “Models and mechanisms in philosophy of psychiatry,” edited by Lena Kästner and Henrik Walter. Nevertheless, even an explication of “mental disorder” aims to capture as many phenomena which are deemed mental disorders within the scientific community as possible (otherwise it wouldn’t be an explication of “our” technical concept associated with the term “mental disorder”).
    keywords: ability; biological; concept; dembić; disorder; dysfunction; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9630; https://philosophymindscience.org; individual; reasons; rha; sense; view
       cache: phimisci-9630.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9630.txt

        item: #52 of 59
          id: phimisci-9632
      author: Löhr, Guido
       title: Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism
        date: 2023-07-19
       words: 9368
      flesch: 48
     summary: On concept eliminativism. Are concepts a natural kind? I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information.
    keywords: bodies; concept; content; eliminativism; exemplars; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci..9632; https://philosophymindscience.org; information; kind; machery
       cache: phimisci-9632.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9632.txt

        item: #53 of 59
          id: phimisci-9642
      author: Letheby, Chris
       title: Self and Knowledge in Psychedelic Therapy: Reply to Commentaries on Philosophy of Psychedelics
        date: 2022-04-22
       words: 12164
      flesch: 46
     summary: A and B may both believe that their sense of self is continually constructed by a mental modelling process, and is therefore malleable. It is true that psychedelics strengthen some priors, as well as weakening others (Safron, 2020); that this is important to understanding their experiential and therapeutic effects; and that they can be “gen- erally characterised as weakening the constraining influence of priors encoding rigid highly-abstract beliefs of the world and self, and (relatively) strengthening prior beliefs associated with contextual sources, leading to an amplified influence of ‘set’ and ‘setting’ on the mental state of the user” (Martin & Sterzer, 2022).
    keywords: account; commentaries; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9642; https://philosophymindscience.org; justification; knowledge; letheby; philosophy; psychedelic; sciences; self; therapy
       cache: phimisci-9642.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9642.txt

        item: #54 of 59
          id: phimisci-9658
      author: Crook, Barnaby
       title: Understanding as a bottleneck for the data-driven approach to psychiatric science
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 16430
      flesch: 43
     summary: Conceptualized this way, a patient possessing understanding becomes a pre-requisite for lasting recovery from mental disorder. In section 4 I assess the potential of the data-driven approach to address the challenge of the bottleneck of understanding, 1To be clear then, radically improved scientific understanding of mental disorders, if unaccompa- nied by improved outcomes, would not be considered transformative by this criterion.
    keywords: approach; author(s; bottleneck; crook; data; et al; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9658; https://philosophymindscience.org; illness; learning; machine; model; outcomes; patient; psychiatry; science; understanding
       cache: phimisci-9658.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9658.txt

        item: #55 of 59
          id: phimisci-9664
      author: Facchin, Marco
       title: Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being)
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 15250
      flesch: 54
     summary: First, the regularities and generalization about cognition that cognitive science will discover depend largely on which individual disciplines constitute it. Of course providing a MOC capturing our com- monsensical notion of cognition would do little to aid cognitive science - but it does not need to.
    keywords: author(s; cognition; cognitive; desiderata; facchin; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9664; https://philosophymindscience.org; issn; moc; press; reasons; research; science; systems; time; traditions
       cache: phimisci-9664.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9664.txt

        item: #56 of 59
          id: phimisci-9684
      author: Leder, Garson; Zawidzki, Tadeusz 
       title: The skill of mental health: Towards a new theory of mental health and disorder
        date: 2023-04-11
       words: 14491
      flesch: 47
     summary: Mental disorder is the failure or breakdown of this skill. This paper argues that, when we start with a focus on how and why individuals heal from mental disorders, we gain a better understanding of what mental health is: the exercise of self-regulatory metacognitive skill.
    keywords: disorder; function; health; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9684; https://philosophymindscience.org; leder; naturalist; regulate; regulation; self; skill; skill view; views; zawidzki
       cache: phimisci-9684.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9684.txt

        item: #57 of 59
          id: phimisci-9758
      author: Lee, Jonny; Calder, Daniel
       title: The many problems with S-representation (and how to solve them)
        date: 2023-05-22
       words: 16289
      flesch: 38
     summary: For now, without downplaying the genuine tension between cognitive representation and certain quarters of 4E (e.g., see Varela et al., 1991), we contend that one’s predilection for 4E approaches does not exclude the possibility of S-representations playing a constructive role within cognitive science (for sample pushback, see Hutto, 2013). The S-representation account characterises cognitive representation as a class of state, structure or mechanism component that guides the behaviour of a cognitive system by structurally resembling features of its task environment, thus playing a map- or model-like role.1 Proponents argue this approach iden- aUniversity of Murcia.
    keywords: calder; cognition; content; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9758; https://philosophymindscience.org; lee; objections; problems; representation; representation account; sciences; structural; system; theory
       cache: phimisci-9758.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9758.txt

        item: #58 of 59
          id: phimisci-9878
      author: Dung, Leonard
       title: Dimensions of animal wellbeing
        date: 2023-05-22
       words: 17432
      flesch: 42
     summary: In these cases, the relation between wellbeing and indicator response probably differs widely between species.29 Second, it seems very likely that the traction convergent evidence provides on animal wellbeing capacity is rather limited. Dimensions of animal wellbeing.
    keywords: animal consciousness; animal welfare; animal wellbeing; animals; browning; consciousness; differences; dimensions; dung; experience; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9878; https://philosophymindscience.org; richness; species; time; welfare; wellbeing; wellbeing capacity; wellbeing dimensions
       cache: phimisci-9878.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9878.txt

        item: #59 of 59
          id: phimisci-9965
      author: Walsh, Elena
       title: Emotions as emergent properties
        date: 2023-07-18
       words: 11363
      flesch: 48
     summary: The boundary problem So far, I have described emergent emotions as patterns produced by a system at t2 that are unpredictable when armed only with knowledge of the system set-up and any relevant environmental triggers at t1. For instance, in the component process model (CPM) of Scherer (1984, 2009b, 2009a), emotion is a process of coordination or synchronisation of emotion components, driven by appraisal from a relatively uncoordinated or loosely coupled state.
    keywords: anger; appraisal; approach; arousal; emergence; emergent; emotion; episodes; feedback; https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9965; https://philosophymindscience.org; pattern; properties; sciences; system; time; walsh
       cache: phimisci-9965.pdf
  plain text: phimisci-9965.txt