

## Which EU and what for?

**Abstract:** The EU enlargement is inside the historical tendency of continental Europe to be dominated by a German-Russian axis. The “creation of Europe” has been the German continuation of WW1 and WW2 in other ways. Will the German tradition of State-building by custom unification lead to a simple Great Germany or instead to some kind of new State-formation, an original form of a new feudal State? Will this new space be the pure enlargement of the existing EU or should a greater EU inevitably lose western pieces? No easy institutional solutions exist for what is presently happening, while modernization of the EU States and of the EU as a whole is on the agenda for fully valorizing the chances of the unique market space.

### **EU towards the East and South-east**

The process the EU formally launched in March 1998, and which makes enlargement possible, affects the following thirteen applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey, for a total population of 105 million<sup>59</sup>. From the one side, the EU stretches to the Russian/CIS<sup>60</sup> western and southern borders, while from the other side it inserts directly into the Middle East and Caucasian area by Turkey. There is also an increasing competition with Russia and USA-UK in the whole Balkans as it is testified from the June 27, 2001 *Free Trade Zone* treaty (FTZ) signed in Brussels by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Romania<sup>61</sup>.

The same as in 1939, when different geopolitical spaces removed (or found removed) intermediary “obstacles”, a situation of direct confrontation is created. In 1939, the reciprocal removal of intermediary obstacles led Germany and Soviet Union towards the military clash in 1941. Then, Germany hurriedly preceded the Soviet attack of a couple of weeks<sup>62</sup>, but it is legitimate to suppose that, since irrational triggers are in every historic event, even without the defensive war Germany was obliged to in 1941, it would have attacked Russia the year later. Rationality would have suggested cooperation but, when both sides of an interaction are dominated by irrational factors, conflict is inevitable, overall if the external world<sup>63</sup> operates and pushes for it. That attitude was anyway a reply from both sides to a real problem: the inevitable attraction and complementarity between the German and the Russian spaces. After the long freezing created by the British and US war policies and games, this German and Russian question ineluctably reemerges.

Now the EU, or *Great Germany* as some might call it, will find itself directly bordering with the Russian field (traditionally subordinate, from WW2, even if conflictually, to the Anglophone world) and with the Anglophone interests in the Middle East. If the Russian world would economically integrate with the EU, there would be, from that side, vast access to raw materials and natural resources, and practically unlimited perspectives of colonization and development until the Pacific Ocean and North, Central and South East Asia<sup>64</sup>. This immense space has long borders with rapidly developing China, a further possibility of synergies. Around the political axis Berlin-Moscow, a United Europe may be built, if other factors and rivalries do not finally obstruct that. Today, the dramatic weakening of a Russia obliged to suffer false liberal policies makes it economically colonizable and integrable, if the way of fully respecting and exalting its identity is found. The UK (from 1973) and the French presence inside the EEC/EC/EU is the presence of interests historically opposed to a European Union centered on Germany and developing and consolidating along the axis Berlin-Moscow. If a German EU really wants to expand from the east side, either Germany subordinates the western powers, either it should free itself from them.

These historical determinants and rivalries do not seem to have changed despite two WWs, and some other confrontations and events, created from the usual Anglophone policies of dividing Europe for hampering its development and controlling it. If, until 1989, the French and British presence inside “European” agreements and institutions was indispensable for tutoring Germany and other EEC/EC countries relatively to open obstruction from the Western side, the 1990s evolution seems to have made their presence an obstacle to the EU project development, although the US policies are not reassuring. The 1990’s US vain attempt to build a mono-polar world, and now the *terror line* against all differences (but only when the “enemy” countries are sufficiently small and

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<sup>59</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index_en.htm)

<sup>60</sup> and Ukraine in certain parts.

<sup>61</sup> (Ranchev 2001).

<sup>62</sup> (Suvorov 2000).

<sup>63</sup> Then, the UK and USA.

<sup>64</sup> Russia has land borders with Korea and sea borders with Japan (since the WW2 events, Russia still occupies some islands which are actually Japanese).

without atomic weapons), are a continuation of the usual Anglophone option of neutralizing all adversaries. This *terror line* is a senseless<sup>65</sup> option of world intimidation perhaps for trying arresting the perception of the US decline, although with the possibility that the senselessness of this course produces its degeneration toward greater catastrophes.

Inside, these Anglophone attempts against the consolidation of a pluralist world is rapidly growing, the advantages of the EU continuing to be its apparent weakness. For instance, it is not (apparently) having a military power and it is letting the US free to dissipate energies for reaffirming their impossible world hegemony: this makes the EU difficult to attack from the West. The USA, not perceiving a EU head, perceive just a potential enemy they do not know where to strike. The financial and monetary maneuvering for hampering and sinking the Euro failed. The USA-UK reaffirmed their [ephemeral] military “world” hegemony, while the Euro became real and it is now worldly competing with the dollar. Fortunately, easy enterprises and targets periodically attract the US-British attention. For instance, Iraq attires considerable US and British military energies for striking there some EU countries (Italy, France, Germany) interests and for intimidating the Arab world. But oil resources are abundant also from the Russian side, and thus stimulates the continental EU direct access to them, while the USA and UK involve in vain military options.

Certainly the US and British liberalism is continuing to conserve a systemic superiority over continental European Statehood, although German etatism, and eventually a regeneration of the Russian one, should not be undervalued. They are not abstract models, by themselves necessary and always superior or inferior to other ones<sup>66</sup>. Even if the German custom-way of State-building is exasperatingly slow and likely less efficient than the revolutionary and military way, not only that it worked for State-building in the case of Germany, but it revealed the only possible way towards European unification under German hegemony after Germany failed to conquer its vital space in two WWs. In a too crowded world, with all vital spaces already occupied, perhaps the German way was the only possible one, although the custom and monetary unification is not yet a united Europe under its rule. The USA were more successful in the containment of Japan, from this point of view, the point of view of a large State-building effort objectively antagonist to the US and Anglophone domination. There, they have been favored from Japan being an island. But differently from Russia, China refused the caricatural liberalism of the international agencies and now it is successfully developing at accelerated rates and fully exploiting the synergies offered by its geopolitical space. The containment of Japan has produced Popular China. Now, the PRC is becoming the strongest world antagonist of the USA.

The present EU eastern enlargement is proceeding with exasperating slowness despite the desire of the new States to be rapidly integrated and despite the same incumbents advantage on various markets, starting from the labor force one. Perhaps this slowness depends on the perception that the real question is, with the intermediate areas nearly removed, the integration of the Russian and para-Russian spaces with the EU, and there are diverging orientations on how to deal with the problem.

On the other side there is the consciousness that for fully exploiting the vast economic space represented by the EU, modernization reforms for improving efficiency would be indispensable. However, not only simple, but also effective improvements of the labor and other markets are avoided or introduced with excessive shyness in the continental EU States. The discussion on liberalism and etatism in the EU countries is based on idealizations and caricatures both of liberalism and etatism. Whatever the reasons, it is a way for not discussing of and for not operating for efficiency for the citizens’ common welfare. Stability is evidently preferred to development and to growing welfare. Where a development line is followed, as in Ireland, wealth grows rapidly.

### ***From common market to “super-State”?***

From a technical point of view, the EU building (“Europeanization”<sup>67</sup>), reduced to “a more or less accentuated process of supra-nationalization at the EU level of the decision-making process which manifests itself in the emergence of new institutions of supranational government, in the redefinition of the competencies of national and/or sub-national government institutions”<sup>68</sup>, as in reality this already partially happened, it seems to me a poor and inconvenient thing, decidedly worse than a simple monetary and free trade space and not necessarily having a future. In fact, super- or supra-State<sup>69</sup> governments are generally inefficient as real State entities, differently from well built forms of federalism or, eventually, confederalism. In addition, ruling classes at Union level are not magic consequences of the new space, what makes the States’ ruling classes (where there are ruling classes<sup>70</sup>) inevitably not disposable to cede powers to indeterminate levels and centers of sovereignty. A level of sovereignty is never a pure act of will. Not casually, too many unsolved and perhaps unsolvable problems are obstructing the

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<sup>65</sup> Senseless, because too many antagonist poles are growing, without any possibility the USA can contrast all them.

<sup>66</sup> Generally, discussions are on caricatures of models. As caricatures of Statism have traditionally perpetuated the Italian State inferiority, a caricature of liberalism has destroyed, in the 1990s and over, the economy of a large part of Eastern Europe.

<sup>67</sup> (Graziano, 5-6 April 2002, p. 5).

<sup>68</sup> (Graziano, 5-6 April 2002, p. 5).

<sup>69</sup> In supra there is more of the concept of transcendence, while super is more positional.

<sup>70</sup> In Italy there are no ruling classes at Italian State level, so with visions and projects at the level of the Italian State and for it. Italy is a EU State where in front of all problems the political representatives of monopolistic capitalism, speculative finance and backward bureaucracies limit to invoke metaphysical “European interventions”.

“natural” passage from a common space to a unique State: traditional approaches to reality do not work in front of historical novelties.

It is certainly true that a currency, a partially common currency in this case<sup>71</sup>, should be solidly founded on State-kind entities at the same level of the space it covers, although nothing is so mechanical as it may seem. A currency implies a level of monetary management, consequently of economic policy management in the same way, covering the same space covered by it. This is a level of central or common governance guarantying the common currency. Today, in practice, the meetings of the different governments (represented by the Prime and other Ministers) define this and other common governance frames.

The common management of trade and monetary policies is not the only possible solution for a unique trade and monetary space, although the EU historically was born and lived in this way. Among the possibilities, there are also possible forms of monetary colonization, which *de facto* take shape when certain States or similar spaces adopt a foreign currency. In this case, there is, from the side of the adopter, a form of delegation of the monetary policy without possibility of any formal control on it. In this case, although the adopter has not the control on “its” currency, there are no particular constraints on internal economic policies apart from the subjection to the trust of savers and what happens to the adopted currency. It is what Balkan areas did in the 1990s, adopting the DM, and later the Euro, as accepted currency in contexts of uncertainty and State dissolution.

In the EU case, inside certain very general parameters and rules for guarantying the currency stability (and fair competition, but this is conceptually different from the question of the common currency), each State does what it wants. Taxation and its repartition are generally free. The States’ complaints for the EU budget constraints are frequently internal propaganda, which would be more usefully replaced by pursuing State efficiency instead of complaints. Even without EU constraints the State debt could not infinitely grow, in relative terms, and, even if inflation is the easiest way of social restructuring, it is the most unfair and undemocratic (because it’s outside any formal democratic control) way of realizing it. Governments’ claims discharge frequently on the EU, actually on what they have contributed to decide, their ineptitude. From this point of view, the EU has a useful deception function for governments, which decide unpopular but necessary policies at EU level and later present them as ineluctable EU constraints<sup>72</sup>.

So, in practice, the common currency implies only very general parameters to conform to, and agile institutions managing this super- and supra-State level. Different and well more complicated aspects are [1] the free trade, and [2] the relatively fair-trade and competition. These two aspects are different, as they are different questions relatively to the common currency. If a common currency clearly facilitates mercantile and personal exchanges, and it is generally created for this reason, relatively fair competition is a further aspect that may exist or may not in a frame of common currency. In the EU case, it exists, while it is the common currency that doesn’t exist for the whole EU.

However, a monetary space, with consequent general economic policy frame, and even a fair mercantile space, are not necessarily for a State. If one abandoned the mystification, and sometimes useful equivocation, that the Commission is a kind of EU government instead of a Secretary service at the States’ governments’ orders, it would be evident that this is roughly the present condition of the EU: a non-State guarantying relatively fair trade and competition, and, for part of the associates, a common currency.

The expansion to new areas is not certainly obstructed by this condition, as well as it (the EU enlargement) does not imply the transformation of the EU in a State or super/supra-State. The tendency of the super- or supra-State is to obey to intra- bureaucratic logics of the EU bureaucracy and of those who eventually think to have the possibility to control it or really can or could control it. Perhaps to this kind of logics and intentions [some hetero-direction of the EU] obey attempts, otherwise extravagant, as that of imposing the *European arrest warrant* without any common criminal and criminal procedure law, any Justice and Interior Ministries at EU level, no common guarantees’ and Constitutional frame.

In the literature on this type of questions [super- or supra-State], one prefers to call the present EU condition as *scarce institutionalization*<sup>73</sup>. It is a frame in reality well defined but perceived as inefficient or unsatisfying and with environmental pressures towards something implying devolution of power from States to superior entities. A well centralized State with wide federalism, *alias* with large delegation to the different local levels of all the masses of unessential questions for a well managed central State, is certainly more efficient than a badly assorted kaleidoscope of States. However things are not so easy and there is no magic model, neither any magic solution.

### **Unifying EU markets with subsidies and without adequate surface communications?**

Already in the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), which fostered the integration process of the European Community (EC), there were illusions which unfortunately did not remain simple empty claims, specifically *the Economic and Social Cohesion principle*. For (Faña 2001): “The objective of strengthening *Economic and Social Cohesion* [ESC] implies to promote the overall harmonious development of the EU by reducing regional dispari-

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<sup>71</sup> Part of the EU remains outside the monetary space.

<sup>72</sup> In post-WW2 Italy, this kind of practices (the *foreign constraint*) was adopted from institutional levels already when Italy was still occupied from the opposing powers between 1943 and 1945. The foreign constraints permitted to avoid that economically incompatible policies expressed by Catholic and Stalinist common anti-capitalist visions could express all their devastating pulses and lead to the State’s collapse.

<sup>73</sup> (Graziano, 5-6 April 2002, p. 7).

ties and, in particular, the backwardness of least-favored regions. The ERDF<sup>74</sup> and the other structural funds in a coordination framework are intended to help redress the main regional imbalances in the EU by participating in the development and structural adjustment of less developed regions and in the conversion of declining industrial regions and other areas with structural and/or employment problems.”<sup>75</sup>

This general orientation, here referred by the words of the quoted authors well synthesized this EC/EU orientation, is certainly very sounding. Its intentions are apparently noble. Actually, good intentions are not necessarily, in this case not at all for me, the wished results. An equalizing frame is necessarily opposite to a development frame. Development is disequilibrium.

That the extension of a market union produces adjustments among countries, according to the interactions between the competitiveness of incumbents and newcomers, is not an unexpected event. For instance, the 1986 EC enlargement saw the entry of Spain, Portugal and other countries, produce market share losses overall for France and the UK, while Italy did not and Germany only in lesser degree<sup>76</sup>. The enlargement from the German, Austrian and Italian side will inevitably produce greater shocks for the market shares of the States from this side. Common advantages, even for the temporarily apparent “losers”, are the other face of market shares restructuring from EU enlargement.

“Development” policies, more precisely “equalizing” policies, of the EU, actually subsidies not infrequently intercepted by frauds, are *de facto* revenue distribution. If, from the one side, market and, later, currency unification has inevitably, apart from diffusive effects, some spontaneous equalizing effect, from the other side “investments” in subsidies instead of in great communication works and other infrastructures is a waste against development, privileging illusory forms of equalitarianism against development.

Certainly, infrastructures favoring developments may be also at micro level, from the water management to services for enterprises and entrepreneurship, although “investments” from a distant entity are without possibility of real controls on their destination. However, a macro political and economic policy entity could more usefully manage great works for unifying markets and creating conditions for fair competition.

Competition creates development benefiting everybody<sup>77</sup>, while subsidies to underdevelopment are surely popular for their profiteers, but ineffective and eventually damaging wastes. This kind of logic is more easily observable inside single States, where massive subsidies as in South Italy have not created development but depressed it both in the North and in the South<sup>78</sup>. In case of sudden creation of common markets or their enlargement, there are spontaneous adjustment that may be easily presented as an effect of the EC subsidies policies although it is not so.

Development is generally triggered suddenly, eventually since interaction with the environments, following some mysterious logic more understandable from ex-post historical reconstructions than by the illusion one could find some inexistent sure and ineluctable cause. However, apart from specific situations of colonization, no external intervention triggers development where self-propelling forces are not already acting. Instead, subsidies policies may more probably have the consequence of further depressing entrepreneurial propensities. If pauperism can stimulate reactions and where an adequate infra-structural frame is created, revenue subsidies favor adaptations to underdevelopment. In Italy for instance, the less developed area myth is, after decades of massive but useless State interventions, a job in the inefficient and corrupted civil service. This, despite in the Southerner areas there is no absence of entrepreneurial skills: they are canalized towards intercepting public subsidies. People follow adaptive logics, what in these cases means adaptation to the subsidies’ and Statist logics, which inevitably kill entrepreneurship where inefficiency and clientelism already predominate.

Areas where development logics already triggered can well profit from EU subsidies, although they are perhaps useless there in terms of development. A reliable quantitative testing of the influx of the same subsidies seems very improbable because it would be necessary to discriminate between their positive or negative influence and what would have verified without them since simple effects of market and monetary integration. Neither, subsidies policies may be justified by asymmetric advantages deriving from integration, for instance favoring larger and stronger countries, because this results need not to be verified<sup>79</sup>. Different aspect is the negotiation of dilations of full market competition for backward productive sectors should be temporarily preserved for social reasons and for having time for finding adjustments to market rules.

The discourses and practices on ESC are just covers for EU assistance policies temporarily surrogating single States ones, while care for the creation of development preconditions seems absent, apart from custom unification certainly. It is the case of development-self-generating great infrastructures, as high-speed inter-State motorways and railroads, which seem outside the EU intervention. It would have been a greater incentive to self-propelling development of Spanish, Greek, South-Italian area their easiness of access even from abroad or local subsidies? On the contrary, it seems that for what concerns motorways and railroads, without which also some sea and other communications are impossible or uneconomical, single States’ egoisms, obstructions or simply ineptitude are continuing to dominate. With difficulty of access, markets are less efficient. For instance, certain Greek,

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<sup>74</sup> European Regional Development Fund.

<sup>75</sup> (Faña 2001, p. 2).

<sup>76</sup> (Casella, November 1995).

<sup>77</sup> (Ranchev 2001).

<sup>78</sup> Very roughly: fiscal pressure has depressed Northerner entrepreneurship, while subsidies have favoured Southerner fatalism.

<sup>79</sup> (Casella, November 1995)

Spanish or South-Italian areas of even millions of people use the Euro but they remain in another world as the difficulty to physically reach them still exists.

These non-policies are actually policy choices defining areas of under- or obstructed and dependent development. For instance, for Italy as a whole, some kind of choice of this type has been somewhere made, as it is evident from its 1990s' and following years' politico-institutional destabilization and its economic policy reflexes. No surface communication works had been realized in the 1990s Italy, despite a condition of growing insufficiency and decaying of the existing ones, and even now, in 2002, they have not yet restarted. Despite different projects in the field from the very early 1990s, the political and managerial personnel could have realized them if they wouldn't have been judicially removed, with unanimous international approval, from their positions.

In the communications field, the European Commission seems to limit its efforts to listing State and inter-State projects, which will be realized according single States conveniences, decisions and times.<sup>80</sup> Actually, Prodi, sent to preside the European Commission for avoiding his interfering with Italian politics after the same Scalfaro-Lefts block removed him from office, was guarantor in Italy of the internal and international interests and thus wanted to block of infrastructure works and a line of Italy's further soft and silent decreasing.<sup>81</sup> Prodi had been DC<sup>82</sup>-backward-left-designed President, from 1982 to 1989, of the clientelist IRI<sup>83</sup>. He became again IRI President from 1993 to 1994 (in a key moment for some relevant privatizations), thanks to the judicial liquidation of the then IRI President Nobili, a skilful manager coming from the private sector arrested without any evidence by the usual partisan prosecutors and magistrates of Milan and for IRI "crimes" of the 1982-1989 Prodi Presidency.<sup>84</sup> Prodi was not perhaps the right Commission President if the EU had wanted to follow a line of European unification from the point of view of rapid transports, outside the "egoism" of single States and of other interests. He was on the contrary perfect for not-stimulating the EU States over this key point of fair market competition and efficiency: transports. In practice, the different geopolitical visions and egoism of the different EU powers condition the full deployment and access to development of all the EU areas, privileging some communication corridors and sabotaging other ones.<sup>85</sup>

Irreconcilable rivalries among States dominate also other levels. In foreign and military policies, rivalries emerge both at strategic level and whenever there are crisis affecting a single EU country. At strategic level, while claiming future intentions of currency integration, the UK is aligned with the US military course for imposing its world hegemony. It is a line objectively opposed to the construction of a EU power, whomsoever concretely leads this power. For what concerns occasional conflicts, for instance, in occasion of the July 2002 affair of the Leila Island, France and Portugal immediately obeyed to their anti-Spanish conditioned reflex, deriving from their competing interests in Africa, and *de facto* immediately aligned with Morocco against Spain. It was the usual logic of geopolitical competition openly re-proposed, while perhaps a cooperative attitude of States inside a common space would have suggested a different way of dealing with the conflict opened by Morocco on the residual presence of the old Spanish colonialism in its area. At least for what concerns the main EU States, the moment of conflict seems to dominate over the one of real co-operation.<sup>86</sup> There are even EU States using now slanders on their magistrates for political operations against other EU States.<sup>86</sup>

### **EU as State building**

Actually, in all State or supra-State formations, not only in contemporary ones<sup>87</sup>, efficiency is achieved if there is the right trade off, a perfect balance, between the dimensions of the State entity and the spectrum of governance matters it can efficiently centralize. Increasing distance, perfect vision [manageability/governance] is directly proportional to the dimensions of the watched objects. In other words, each one of the State levels<sup>88</sup> centralization is efficient if that State level realizes perfect penetration<sup>89</sup> and operativeness. If a governance level invades superior and inferior levels relatively to these it can efficiently manage, this inevitably negatively affects

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<sup>80</sup> (EC-DGET 2001).

<sup>81</sup> For what concerns Italy even the existent works of communication with Europe are obstructed for what concerns commercial transports. It is the case of the Mont Blanc gallery, for instance. It meets continuous obstructions to the commercial traffic from the French side. Perhaps, for some EU power, Italy would be just a tourist space.

<sup>82</sup> Christian Democracy.

<sup>83</sup> The holding of relevant part of the State economy.

<sup>84</sup> <http://scaruffi.homestead.com>

<sup>85</sup> As reality wanted to add mockery to damage, all the Italian Statesmen and entrepreneurs had supported the 1990 judicialist subversion and have obstructed also directly communication and transportation works and, perhaps not casually, were therefore regularly awarded by the French with the *Légion d'Honneur* or *Laurea Honoris Causa* from francophone universities. While the political personnel pursued and pursues modernisation it is slandered and obstructed in all possible ways.

<sup>86</sup> See the case of the magistrate Baltasar Garzón and others used not only for the judicial intimidation of the Spanish socialists, of Spanish independentism and of some extra-EU States, but also for the intimidation of the Italian politics in coordination with the Italian monopolistic and parasitic interests.

<sup>87</sup> (Alesina, December 2001).

<sup>88</sup> I prefer not to say "national level" since existing equivoques in the use of "national" and "national State". What is called "national State" or "nation-State" is actually multi-national if one follows the etymology of the world *nation*, which is an ethnic concept more than a vaguely settling/spatial and legal one.

<sup>89</sup> (Hobson 1997).

results. A region (with only regional powers, naturally) cannot efficiently build roads at State level. A State cannot efficiently manage local details. When and where accountabilities are not clearly defined and attributable<sup>90</sup>, efficiency is impossible. Accountabilities and their attribution certainly imply levels of management/governance (formal-democratic or administrative) with the power to reward and to penalize behaviors and results. For instance, foreign and military policies at State level cannot be efficiently managed by local governments, while central governments cannot efficiently manage the details of local life.

In a *Custom Union* of States, where all or only a part of them have veto power, everything complicates further. In the EU, there are fully self-sufficient States but with the partial<sup>91</sup> devolutions of the powers necessary for realizing common markets and currency. *Trade Union* foreign and military policies, simply combing with the self-sufficient ones at State level, create a Union based on feudal-kind relations.

On the other side, the creation of a Union with the characteristics of a self-sufficient central State is improbable without some common ethnic identity as a common language diffused at this State level. The common currency (not differently from markets' unification) seems to me only sufficient to the creation of a *mercantile identity* and nothing more. Individuals and local entities perceive themselves simply as inside a unique monetary and market space, as in fact it is. Foreign and military policies of a State-Union or of an Empire<sup>92</sup>, not differently from a central level of judiciary and police, could not be founded on the negotiation with States with veto power, if these central functions were really functions of a modern central State. Everything is different if they were functions of the coordinating center of a feudal-kind State formation.

I do not want to say that a modern feudal State would necessarily be less efficient than a modern centralized or federal-centralized State. Evaluations and comparisons should be made with concretely well-defined and stabilized State entities. The present EU is the evolution of a group of State towards something else. It is even possible that finally everything limits to the monetary and market aspects, and/or that an aggregation different from the pure extension of the original EEC/EC is defined.

For instance, a German Central and Central-East Europe seems more possible than a German France or a French Germany. It seems equally improbable a Germanized Russia or a Russified Germany. It is certainly easier to manage one bilingual-space or a couple of bilingual spaces than a multilingual Union. English and American as the new Latin of the EU may not reveal so easy when one passes from a language nowadays generally universally known and used in an important part of the intellectual world, to the first or second language of a State building effort driven by Germany, in part also by France, and with Russia-CIS objectively gravitating (as colonized or as colonizer, or both) towards Central Europe and towards the vast South of the same Russia-CIS. It is probably impossible to know the same destiny of English and American as *new Latin* with the USA running towards a Spanish language prevalence, Chinese people and language having already invaded the world and on the way of rapidly becoming the most diffused and used language even on the Internet, and so on for the other linguistic and cultural poles of the world.

Over language and *common discourses* (religions, traditions, behaviors, sense of belonging, self-perceptions), State entities are built more solidly than over common markets and currencies. Common markets and currencies can be rapidly given up, as different cases of State dissolution have shown. *Common discourses* (*identity*, a marked and permanent *sense of belonging*) are even stronger than common languages. *Common discourses* have permanencies through centuries and centuries even when formally overcome and forgotten, as, for instance, recent and less recent Balkan evolutions show.

Stable coexistence, eventually inside the same State formation, of different *common discourse* entities is possible only if forms of non-conflictual co-operation are realized. That further forms of internationalizations have *de facto* been created, in a kind of counterbalancing, the affirmation of orderly inferior<sup>93</sup> identities, so stronger nationalisms and micro-nationalisms, may not be simply resolved in the improbable affirmation on the [supposed] existence of a "post-sovereign order"<sup>94</sup>. If, generally imaginary "nations", with relative voluntarist nationalism at the State level, have been progressively replaced by stronger nationalisms along communitarian-ethnic lines, stronger sovereignty levels have evidently emerged.

It is not even sufficient to specify, in an attempt of some more realistic approximation, that this "post-sovereignty does not mean the end of sovereignty, but rather the end of its traditional meaning as a state monopoly." Sovereignty has always existed at different levels combined among them. Perfect sovereignty existed and exists nowhere. In the real world, there are instead relations of domination, subordination and interdependence.

Forms of restructuring of traditional sovereignty levels were verified the moment the US-UK world cops (with Soviet sub-cop) had been weakened by the collapse of the apparently US-Soviet world order. Energies before repressed had finally restarted to operate relatively freely. It is not really a question of supposed "globalization". Economic historians had evidenced that there is a media overvaluation of the current trends.

For instance, the economic and trade revolution of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century did not certainly produce less globalization than the claimed 'globalization' of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and following years. The 19<sup>th</sup> century transports and communications revolution had then a great impact on the international capital, labor and commodities

<sup>90</sup> For instance, where nobody is responsible of anything, in a limit case not infrequent in part of continental Europe.

<sup>91</sup> Partial because single States conserve the real power to intervene (with more power than an elected entity as the European Parliament) on the EU institutions to which they have formally devolved some powers. The moment of the permanent negotiation *de facto* prevails over that of the devolution of powers.

<sup>92</sup> (Böröcz 2001).

<sup>93</sup> In the sense of more basic, nearer to micro-communitarian levels.

<sup>94</sup> (Keating 2002).

markets. Finally, the late 19<sup>th</sup> century capital flows pushed toward divergence instead of convergence: capitals moved to the richest countries.<sup>95</sup> That is what was actually verified in concrete worlds with concrete power relations. Is the present “globalization” something else than the Anglophone vain attempts to “globalize” the world to the Anglophone powers’ domination?

The claims on “globalization” and its supposed needs had actually covered the caricatured liberalism which has actually further collapsed in the large majority of eastern European economies. Despite the US-promoted claims on globalization, the USA seem to practically be, if one judges concrete actions, the real anti-globalizing power while pursuing an adventurist line of impossible military world supremacy. It is the “globalization” of the US world military power while economic protectionism is well preserved when it is judged that US interests are threatened.

### **Some open questions**

Real steps forward in spatial integration could be well more useful than formal institutions, which today would only be forms of war regulations among the different EU powers wanting to impose or preserve their “national” hegemony over the EU.

For what concerns the institutions already existing, is a European Parliament elected on State basis the best solution for representing a confederation of local interests (which are more at regional than at State level) and for overcoming the single States’ threats?

For understanding the background forces pushing and obstructing the EU extension, as well as for understanding the other international trends, it would be necessary to individuate and analyze how the different material forces interact and intertwine: for instance, the different financial, industrial and financial-industrial<sup>96</sup> interests.

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<sup>95</sup> (O'Rourke 1999)

<sup>96</sup> Where there are, as in Germany, institutional and operational frames as the mixed-bank one.

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