A Report on Emotional Education for Young Children: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE IN ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND IN THE THEORY OF THOMAS AQUINAS Tjeng, Eui-Chai Introduction * The title of this conference is “Violence and Peace in Our Times.” The reason we chose this is because 9.11 was a shock that woke us all from the sense of boundless optimism with which we greeted the Third Millennium. Ever since the dawn of history, man has lived with violence. Even in our so- called ‘civilized’ age, we have lived with violence, both major and minor. With the fall of Communism, the violence of the “Liberation Front” has been weakened only to be succeeded by “racial cleansing” of Kosovo, the genocide of East Timor and then finally 9.11. Of course, by violence here, we mean intentional violence perpetrated through overt, physical acts. ‘Even while waging a war every man wants peace whereas no one wants war while he is making peace,’ said St. Augustine. (omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem quaerit: nemo autem bellum pacificando. (De Civitate Dei, 19, 12)1 However, true peace comes from a peaceful order and the right human order can only be based on justice. In this paper, I will be comparing St. Thomas’ theories on violence, justice and peace with those of Confucianism. 1 * For this article, the Latin text of St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae (Marietti, Roma, 1952) and the English Translation of the Summa with Latin text by the members of a.p. (Blackfriars, New York, 1960-), to confer the English composition, are used. Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, 19, 12. Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., Grace Monahan, a.s.u., Daniel J. Honan. Image Books, New York, 1958. I. Violence St. Thomas explored the essence of violence through an investigation of will. An act of will is an inclination which arises from an inner and conscious principle. However, violence and coercion comes from the outside. As such, violence and coercion stands fundamentally against the specific nature of will. It works against natural inclinations. It is like a stone is thrown upwards against its natural tendency. Man can be led through coercion, however, it is not rooted in his will. So violence is against human nature. If an action is based upon his will, it is against the essence of coercion.2 Moreover, even if the will inevitably seeks the ultimate end, it is not as if will is forced to want it. Coercion (coactio) indicates the application of force. As Aristotle expounds in the 3rd book of Ethics violence is of external origin. One does not suffer violence through internal inclination. This is clear from the example of the stone given above. Therefore, if will desires something through natural inclination, even though it does so out of necessity, it is not because of coercion but nature.3 2 S. Theol. la 2ae, 6, 4, c. 'actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, sicut appetitus naturalis est quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione. Quod autem est coactum vel violentum est ab exteriori principio. Unde contra ratione m ipsius actus voluntatis est quod sit coactus vel violentus; sicut etiam est contra rationem naturalis inclinationis vel motus lapidis quod feratur sursum; potest enim lapis per violentiam ferri sursum, sed quod iste motus violentus sit ex eius naturali inclinatione esse non potest. Similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi, sed quod hoc sit ex eius voluntate repugnat rationi violentiae.' Cf. S. Th. la, 82, 1, c. 3 Quaestio disputata de Veritate, 22. 5, c. 'quamvis autem quadam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo conceden dum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. Coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae cuiusdam inductio. Violentum autem est, secundum philosophum in ill Ethic.(l, 1110 a 13, b 1-4,16- 17), cuius principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo; sicut si lapis sursum proiiciatur; quia nullo modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur, sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio eo quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violente velit, etiam etsi aliquid naturali inclinatione velit. Patet igitur quod vulntas non necessario aliquid vult necessitate coactionis, velut II. Human Nature (natura) I now wish to speak of nature that is subjected to external force, that is, violence. St. Thomas regards the essence of being as nature. St. Thomas refers to “I. De duabus naturis" by Boetius and Aristotle’s statement in V. Metaphysics that substance (substantia) is nature (natura). St. Thomas says, “The Philosopher, too, says that every substance is a nature. (Aristotles, Metaph. V. 4. 1014 b 35) The term nature in this sense means the essence of a thing as directed to its specific operation, for no reality lacks its specific operation.”4 As such “homo est (aliquid) compositum ex anima et corpore”, that is, "man is a compound of soul and body.”5 St. Thomas regarded human beings as having both material (materialitas) and non-material nature (immaterialitas), or spiritual nature (spiritualitas). This is because man engages in not only material but non-material activity. In his cognitive activity, man also recognizes himself. Material operation operates on other beings but not on itself. This is clearly seen in the act of self-reflection of man. Such non-material spiritual operation is the operation of an intellectual soul.6 tamen aliquid necessario necessitate naturalis inclinationis.' 4 The original Latin text. De ente et essentia, Marietti, 1957, transl. By Tjeng, Eui-Chai with the Latin Text, 1995, Seokwang Publishing Co. Seoul p. 20. 'Boetius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, (cap. 1) assignat; quod natura dicitur esse illud quocumque modo intellectu capi potest et sic etiam dicit Philosophus in 5 Metaphysicae, quod omnis substantia est natura. Nomen autem naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significareessentiam rei secundum quod habet ordinem vel ordinationem ad propriam operationem rei, quum nulla res proria destituatur operatione.' On being and essence, Trans. Armand Maurer, The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983, Toronto. pp. 31-32. Natura: Ibid. footnote 12: 'Etymologically, the Latin word natura, like the Greek equivalent physis; and the English 'nature', means the 'birth'.' Andre Leonard, Il fondamento della morale, 1990, San Paolo, Trino, Milano, p. 217. 'Il termine natura viene dal substantivo latino natura che si costruisce a partire dal participio passato natus del verbo nasci, che significa nascere. Etimologicamente il termine natura designa la situazione nativa di un essere, 10 stato che eredita in virtu della sua nascita.' 5 S. Th. la. 75, 4, c. 'homo est (aliquid) compositum ex anima et corpore.' 6 S. Th. la. 87, 3, c. 'Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est ejus operatio: non enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut perfectio et actus ejus, ut dicitur IX Metaphys. (c. 8, 1050 a 23 b 2) Hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum III. Human Person Human dignity is rooted in personality. From a Christian perspective, a human person (or personality) attains its dignity precisely because it is a divine image (imago Dei), that is to say, image of the divine essence and divine person (persona divina). “Among all other substances, individual beings with rational nature have a special name, and this is ‘person’. That is why in this definition of person, the terms ‘individual’ is used to mean a singular being in the category of substance; ‘rational nature’ is added to mean the singular being among rational substances’.”7 This conceptualization of person by St. Thomas was influenced by Boetius’s De Duabus Naturis that “Persona est naturae rationalis substantia”.8 Thus, St. Thomas defines person as “Omne indiviuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona.”9 Seen in this light, the concept of person contains “substantia individualis”, “inseitas/perseitas”, “integritas”, “incommunicabilitas” and “inviolability”.10 It is in this way that the essence of humanity or human nature is explained in terms of person. Person, thus conceived, attains even spirituality, because a human soul is characterized by “immaterialitas” that excludes “materialitas”. ejus intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam: quia sua essentia est suum intelligere. Est autem alius intel1ectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sed tamen primum objectum sui intelligere est ejus essentia. Unde etsi aliud sit in angelo, secundum ratione m, quod intelligat se inteligere, et quod intelligat suam esentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit: quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est objectum primum ipsa ejus essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod prima cognoscitur ab intellectu humano est hujusmodi objectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur objectum; et per acturn cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cujus est perfectio ipsum inteiligere. Et ideo Philosophus (De Anima II, 4, 415a 16-22.) dicit quod objecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis. Cf. In I Sent. d. 17. 1, 5 ad 3. Expositio super liberum de causis 1. 7. Paolo Siweck, Psychologia Metaphysica, 1956, Universitas Gregoriana, Roma pp. 465-477. 7 S. Th. la. 29, 1, c. ' … inter ceteras substantias quoddam speciale nomen habent singularia rationalis naturae, et hoc nomen est 'persona'. Et ideo in praedicta definitione personae ponitur 'substantia individua', inquantum significat singulare in genere substantiae; additur autem 'rationalis naturae', inquantum significat singulare in rationalibus substantiis.' 8 Boetius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c 3 in Migne, PL 46 col. 1345. 9 S. Th. la. 29, 3, c et ad 2 10 Tjeng, Eui-Chai. Metaphysics. Yeolin, 2001 edit. 11th, pp. 305-306. IV. Imago Dei A) A Possessor of Reason and Will St. Thomas explains the meaning behind the idea that we are made in the image of God. According to him, “Man is made to God’s image, and since this implies, so Damascene tells us, that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of himself, so then, now that we have agreed that God is the exemplar cause of things and that they issue from his power through his will, we go on to look at this image, that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his responsibility and control.”11 In the Trinity, the Son issues as the Logos of mind and the Holy Spirit as the Love of will, likewise in rational creatures there are an idea (verbum conceptum) and love (amor procendens). It means that ‘Man is made after God’s image.’12 God exists in things in two ways. Firstly as an operative cause (causa agens) and this way he exists in everything he creates. Secondly God exists in a special fashion in the reasoning creatures that are actually knowing and loving him, or are disposed to do so.13 Nonetheless, that the image of God is immanent within a personality does not mean that it exists perfectly - it exists only imperfectly. This is what the Holy Script means when it says that man was made after the image of God. Thus, the preposition 11 S. Th. la 2ae, Prologus: 'Sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaglnem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imagine m significatur intel1ectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativium, postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum ejus voluntatem, restat ut consideremus de ejus imagine, idest de homine secundum quod et ipse est SUOrumoperum principium, quasi liberum arbiruim habens et suorum operum potestatem.' 12 S. Th. la. 45, 7, c. 'Processiones autem divinarum Personarum attenduntur secundum actus intel1ectus et voluntatis; nam Filius procedit ut Verbum intel1ectus, Spiritus Sanctus ut Amor voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus in quibus est intel1ectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor procedens.' Et S. Th 2ae, Prologus. 13 CL S. Th. la. 8, 3. 'Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo per modum causea agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo sicut objectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in operationibus animae secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura quae cognoscit et diligit ipsum actu vel habitu.' here, that is, “ad” in Latin, implies an "approach" that is adequate a description only when a distance [between God and humanity] is presupposed.14 B) The Image of the Holy Trinity When St. Thomas regards man as containing the image of God, he means that humanity reflects the image of the Holy Trinity, that is, God’s one nature in three persons.15 Furthermore, he makes a distinction between: the resemblance to God (similitudo Dei), the image of God (imago Dei) and His trace (vestigium). “While all creatures bear some resemblance to God, only in a rational creature do you find a resemblance to God in the manner of an image; other things resemble him in the manner of a trace.”16 Following Damascenus, he also makes the clear distinction between the image and likeness. The likeness to God in terms of image means that “his being in God’s image signifies his capacity for understanding, and for making free decisions in master of self”, while that in terms of likeness means that "he is in his likeness refers to the likeness of divine virtue, in so far as it can be in man.”17 Here, we are reminded of the openness and transcendency of personality insofar as it takes after the image of God. Man exists in a material world, in which he encounters other persons as well as material objects. Man actualizes himself by virtue of sharing trust and love and through communication with other intellectual (spiritual) beings - that is, man can reach full self-development only in full communication with 14 S. Th. la. 93, 1, c. 'Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei; praepositio enim 'ad' accessum quendam significat, qui co.mpetit rei distanti.' 15 S. Th. la. 93, 5, c. 'Sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum; nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura.' 16 S. Th. la. 93, 6, c. 'cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis; in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii.' 17 S. Th. la. 93, 9, c. 'et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit (De Fide Ortl-L Il, c. 12) quod id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat et arbitrio liberum per se potestativium; quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem.' (De Fide Orthodoxa Il, 12.) other men. A human community (family, fraternal society, religious community, the state, international community) is formed through man's reaffirmation of his own interiority and communication with other personalities based on a respect for their dignity. This type of community is predicated on love. Since the possibilities of personality are boundless (open to the infinite), this kind of human communication ushers in an ultimate transcendence that leads to God. In fact, this personality conceived of in terms of God’s image is identical with the image of the Holy Trinity that consists in a communication of being, life and love that circulate from eternity to eternity within the divine nature and divine Persons. Herein lies the dignity, inviolability, holiness and uniqueness of the human nature and human person that are the image of the divine nature and divine persons. From this follows our renewed recognition that our human nature and human person, which constitutes the supreme value of the humanity, are threatened by unjust violence. V. Justice (Iustitia) Achieving justice is a necessary precondition for ending violence and establishing peace. The 9.11 catastrophe reveals a profound gulf between the Islamic and American (including Israeli) concepts of justice. Even within the Western world, there are conflicting understandings of justice. The 9.11 incident, which was caused by Islamic extremists using American technology and all the American facilities, also struck hard the materialism and libertinism of the Western civilization, as was symbolically captured by the destruction of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, which after all embody American technology, freedom, wealth and power. A few thousand souls were lost, and the world was horrified. As a response, US declared a war of an endless justice on terrorism and launched an offensive on the terrorist organization of Osama Bin-Laden's Al Quaeda in Afghanistan. Muslims replied in kind, in the name of a holy war. Invoking the first-borns' rights of Ismael and Isaac, two of Abraham's sons, Muslims protest the Israeli policy of occupation in Palestine, perpetuating the bloody conflicts. The latent resentment against the historical role that Western colonialism played in the region, needless to say, cannot be ignored. Under such circumstances, humanity is hard pressed to reexamine the question of justice in the new light, thereby cultivating an inter-civilizational dialogue. The Catholic Church has been instrumental in promoting peace in our violent times. Most notably, it made a large spiritual contribution to the demise of Communist regimes that threatened world peace in the name of emancipation. Achieving justice was always at the heart of a Catholic approach to peace, and the Catholic concept of justice was always predicated on its understanding of universal value of personality that can suggest a concrete solution to the problem. . The Catholic understanding of personality and justice is dominated by St. Thomas's interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. In what follows, I will explore the traditional Catholic theory of justice in the light of recent circumstances, while comparing it to its Confucian counterpart for the Asian-Pacific age. A) St. Thomas's Theory of Justice Justice is the indirect cause of peace, and not its immediate cause. That is to say, peace is an indirect consequence of justice. For justice removes the obstacles to peace. The immediate cause of peace is love.18 Justice is beneficial to people in violence and peace.19 Justice ushers war into peace. In order to realize peace, justice is an indispensable precondition, whether in the Orient or Occident. Therefore, I will present St. Thomas's and Confucian 'theories of justice in the light of today's topic, ‘Violence and Peace in Our Times’. 1) Definition of Justice St. Thomas defines justice as “the lasting and constant will of rendering to each one his right.”20 This definition is predicated on his understanding of human nature. As a being endowed with life in this world, man is given the rights that nature demands in order to lead a human life. As this nature is innately communitarian, it demands that we 18 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 3. 'Pax est opus justitiae indirecte, inquantum scilicet removet prohibens. Sed est opus caritatis directe, quia secundum propriam rationem caritas pacem causat.' 19 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 12, c. 20 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 1, c. 'iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit' realize ourselves in the community we are embedded in. This demand is tantamount to that of justice. Accordingly, justice necessarily entails a relationality. Human nature, thus understood, is expressed as persona/personality once seen as an individual. Thus, “rendering each one his right” touches on the individual and personal deed of justice in relation to its proper field and objective.21 2) Justice and Virtue For St. Thomas, justice is one of the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance).22 These virtues make human acts just and a natural man good. This is relevant to justice. In justice, above all, shines the lustre of virtue.23 3) Categorizations of Justice The first two categorizations of justice can be called Particular justice (iustitia particularis): particular justice is about the individual personality, that is to say, it is realized when individual personality relates to the common. This relationship is akin to that between parts and the whole. Here, two modes of relationship need to be distinguished. One is that between parts, that is, the way in which an individual personality relates to that of the other. Commutative justice applies to this kind of relationship, securing the mutual relationship between two personalities. The other is the relationship between parts and the whole, that is, the way in which the common is related to each personality. Distributive justice applies to this relationship, in which the common is distributed to the individual personality by proportionality. So 21 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 1, c. 'Dicendum quod praedicta justitiae definitio conveniens est, si recte intelligatur. Cum enim omnis virtus sit habitus qui est principium boni actus, necesse est quod virtus definiatur per actum bonum circa propriam materiam virtutis. Est autem justitia proprie circa ea quae ad alterum sunt, sicut circa propriam materiam. Et ideo actus justitiae per comparationem ad propriam materiam, et objectum, tangitur cum dicitur, jus suum unicuique tribuens.' CL S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 7, c. 'ita etiam praeter iustitiam legalem oportet esse particularem quamdam iustitiam, quae ordinet hominem circa ea quae sunt ad alteram singularem personam.' CL ad 1, 2, 3, Ibid. 11, c. 22 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 3, Sed contra. 'sed contra est quod Gregorius(Moralium Libri IT, 49.) dicit quod in quatuor virtutibus, scilicet temperantia, prudentia, fortitudine et justitia, tota boni operis structura consurgit. ' 23 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 3, c. 'Human and moral virtue is that which makes a human act and the man himself good. And this applies to justice. For men's acts are good inasmuch as they reach the measure of reason, which is the norm of their rightness. Now since justice makes human acts right, it is clear that it makes them good. Cicero declares that men are called good chiefly because of their justice, and that in justice above all shines the luster of virtue.' particular justice can be divided into two types, namely commutative and distributive.24 a) Commutative Justice (iustitia commutative): As said above, this form of justice applies to a mutual relationship between two individual personalities. It commands that exchange of goods and services takes place according to strict equality of values. Aristotle holds that the mean (medium) in commutative justice is taken according to arithmetical proportions.25 Duties and rights that commutative justice entails are contractual. It is thus also called a contractual justice.26 The subject of rights and duties here is an individual in a social relationship, predisposed towards private interests. The bearer of rights is an individual (or corporate individual), and the object of the rights is private interest and private goods of the individual.27 b) Distributive Justice (iustitia distributiva): This applies when the whole relates to its parts. The relationship is about that between the common and the individual personalities. The distribution in this relationship follows the principle of proportionality. The bearer of duties and rights is an individual in a social, relationship, and the goal, the private interests of the individuals who comprise the society. The representatives, such as society or the state, are held responsible for the realization of distributive justice. 'The mean (medium) is taken in distributive justice according to geometrical proportion. So then the virtuous mean taken in distributive justice, not according to an equality between thing and thing, but according to a proportion between things and persons, and such a way that even as one person exceeds another so also that which is melted out to the other. Accordingly Aristotle [V Ethics, 3 et 4 1131a 29 et b 32] describes the mean here as being according to 24 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c. 'Justitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comparatur ad communitatem secut pars ad totum. Potest autem ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi. Unus quidem partis ad partem, cui similis est ordo unius privatae personae ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa justitia, quae consistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. Alius ordo attenditur totius ad partes, et huic ordini assimilatur ordo ejus quod est commune ad singulas personas: quem quidem ordinem dirigit justitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. Et ideo duae sunt justitiae species, scilicet commutative et distritiva.' 25 S. Th. 2a 2ae, Ibid. 61, 2, Sed contra. 'Philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. (cc. 6, 7, 1131 a 30 b 15; b 32-1132 a 7) quod in justitia distributiva accipitur medium secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in commutativa autem secundum arithmeticam.' Cf. S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, c. 26 C. Henry Peschke, Christian Ethics IT,C. Goodliffe Neale, Dublin, 1978. P.217(a). 27 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c. geometric proportionality, in which the even balance or equality lies in a comparative relation, not in a fixed quantity.28 c) General or Legal Justice (iustitia generalis vel legalis): This category of justice is about common good which all the members of a society have to perform. It is called a general justice, for it pursues the general good of the community. In case of the state, this justice imposes on its citizens such duties as tax or military service as stipulated in law. Thus, it is also called a legal justice.29 d) Social Justice (iustitia socialis): Drawn from Pius XI Quadragesimo Anno, this concept of justice is highly relevant to our age. In pursuing common good, this mode of justice relies less on legally defined rights than on the natural rights of a community and its members. Quadragesimo Anno was promulgated at a time when labour conflict was intensifying. Against this background, the labour question could not find its final solution in distributive, legal, or communitative justice. The final solution had to be found in a set of basic human natural rights. That is to say, everyone's right to lead a humane life needed to be protected and respected, by the society as a whole (and wealthy people), regardless of their material possessions, as long as they do not forfeit it on account of evil deeds. Children, for example, are entitled to survival, fostering, and education. This right needs to be upheld and respected by family, the state and all communities. Following the principles of social justice, parents are obliged to foster and raise, spiritually and physically, their children on account of their given status as parents. Children, in turn, are obliged to pay respect and return love to their parents. 28 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, C, 2, Sed contra and c. 29 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 5c. 'Iustitia ordinat hominem in comparatione ad alium; quod quidem potest esse dupliciter: uno modo ad alium singulariter consideratum; alio modo ad alium in communi, secundum scilicet quod ille qui servit alicui communitati servit omnibus hominibus qui sub communitate illa continentur. Ad utrumque ergo se potest habere justitia secundum propriam rationem. Manifestum est autem quod omnes qui sub communitate aliqua continentur comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad totum; pars autem id quod est totius est; unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. Secundum hoc ergo bonum cujuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat justitia. Et secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad justitiam pertinere secundum quod ordinat hominem ad bonum commune. Et quantum ad hoc justitia dicitur virtus generalis. Et quia ad legem pertinet ordinare in bonum commune, inde est quod talis justitia praedicto modo generalis dicitur justitia legalis, quia scilicet per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtu tum in bonum commune.' cf. c. Henry Peschke, Ibid. pp. 217-218. Economically, workers are entitled to compensation for their labour on account of their status as .the supporters of their families. Politically, all and every type of government is obliged to provide its citizenry with opportunities for life, livelihood and labour, just as the citizens in turn have a duty to sustain such a government and society. The principle of social justice commands as a duty aides to the poor who cannot lead a humane life. One's entitlement to this form of right derives from the natural rights of the poor, or simply, their right of survival. The question then becomes how to expand and deepen our understanding of the basic right of survival. In this light, the belief in divine creation will revitalize our appreciation of social justice. For God created the wealth in this cosmos, not for a few, but for everyone in this world, that is, for all those who are coming by creation of His goodness and love.30 e) Vindicative Justice (iutitia vindicativa, retributive justice): According to St. Thomas, vengeance is an evil allowed for punishment of (malum poenale) those who have given offence and committed a crime. In vengeance, therefore, the intention (animus) of the avenger must be considered. Should his intention be centered chiefly upon the evil done to the recipient and is satisfied with that, then the act is entirely unlawful. Taking delight in evil done to another is in fact a type of hatred, the opposite of that love with which we are bound to love all. However, vengeance is lawful when the avenger intends a certain good, such as redemption of the sinner, peace of all, preservation of justice, or the honour of God.31 4) Justice and Love 30 Pius XI Quadragesimo Anno, 1931. Cf. Bernard mixing, La Loi Du Christ, Vol. 1, 1955, Desclee & Co., Tournai (Belg.) pp. 305-307. C. Henry Peschke, Christian Ethics II. pp. 218-219. 31 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 108, 1, c. 'vindicatio fit per aliquod poenale malum inflictum peccati. Est ergo in vindicatione considerandus vindicantis animus. Si enim eius in tentio feratur principliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum: quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet ad odium, quod caritati repugnant, qua omnes homines debemus diligere. Nee aliquis excusatur si malum intend at illius qui sibi iniuste intulit malum: sicut non excusatur aliquis per hoc quod odit se odientem. Non emin debet homo in alium peccare, propter hoc quod ille peccavit prius in ipsum: hoc enim est vinci a malo, quod Apostolus prohibet, Rom. 12,21, dicens: Noli vinei a malo: sed vince in bono malum. - Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohibitionem eius et quietem aliorun, et ad iustitiae conservationem et Dei honorem, potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis.' Although, without justice, neither a firm social order nor lasting peace is sustainable, justice needs to be bolstered by love even in the question of social order. As much as justice is a necessary precondition for peace, true peace is predicated on the practice of love for individuals and nations, and in that sense, peace is a consequence of love. Peace, as a consequence of love, cannot be achieved with recourse to justice only. In fact, love is a higher virtue than justice is, which is a minimal requirement for our normative action. All duties of justice are those of love, and yet not all duties of love are those of justice. Love transcends justice. By nature, justice presupposes love. The demands of social justice, in particular, can make full sense and be put into practice effectively only when seen from the perspective of brotherly love.32 Thus, the true and lasting justice in this worldly order needs to be anchored in love, and true love needs to be righteous and just. Unjust love is an oxymoron. To summarize, St. Thomas's theory of justice follows the precepts of love in the Holy Scriptures; "Jesus replied: Listen, Israel, the Lord our God is the one Lord, and you must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind and with all your strength. The second is this: You must love your neighbor as yourself." [Mark 12: 29 - 31] B) Confucian Conception of Justice We are unable to find a "definition" of justice in the ethical systems of either Confucius or Mencius. Living as they did during periods of constant warfare, their philosophy was devoted to diagnosing the sources of injustice of their times and to eradicate them. As such, we can arrive at their conceptions of justice indirectly by looking at what they regarded as "injustice." 1) Confucius' diagnosis of the sources of Injustice and its remedy Confucius regarded injustice from three different perspectives: 32 cf. c. Henry Peschke, Christian Ethics, vo!. IT. C. Goodliffe Neale, Dublin, 1978. pp. 219-220. a) In the relationship between the King and his vassals. He observed that many vassals overstep their authorities. Composing and reforming music and systems of rituals were regarded as the provenance of the king and those vassals who oversteped their authority and meddled in these affairs were subject to punishment. However, at a time when the feudal order of Chou was crumbling, there were many vassals who disregarded such constraints on their authority. This Confucius regarded as injustice. b) In terms of the relationship amongst feudal lords, the stronger constantly invaded and otherwise harassed the weaker ones. This Confucius regarded as unjust. c) Feudal lords supplied their war machines by exploiting the people and through conscription, forced labor and taxation, extracted resources from the people which they used to enrich themselves. This Confucius also regarded as injustice. Against these types of injustice Confucius proposes three remedies: a) In order to restore the just order between the king and his vassals, Confucius advocated the "rectification of names"(正名) and "Overcoming the self and returning to Propriety"(克己復禮)33 "Rectification of names" is a rule of behavior that seeks to have people realize and return to their particular duties and rights appropriate to their station and status in life. Confucius also emphasizes the principle of "Overcoming the self and returning to Propriety.": "The Master said, 'to subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue.'" Only when people of all classes and backgrounds (in particular feudal lords) overcome self-interested behavior and perform duties and claim rights appropriate to their status can injustice disappear and a peaceful society achieved: "There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."34 b) For those feudal lords involved in a battle of the "survival of the fittest", Confucius prescribes "human-heartedness" (仁) and "reciprocity." (恕) "Human heartedness" is something that only a perfect human character can achieve, but in specific contexts it means "love" (愛). When people forsake the pursuit of self-interest and love one another, conflicts over interest would disappear and so would injustice. 33 『論語』「顏淵」1.”顏淵問仁, 子曰: 克己復禮, 為仁”. Confucian Analects, Book XII, Yen Yuan Chapter I. 34 『論語』「顏淵」11.”齊景公, 問政於孔子, 孔子對曰: 君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子.” Cf. Ibid., Chapter XI. c) The third remedy that Confucius puts forth is "reciprocity." This is universal rule which exhorts people to regard the interests of others as one's own thereby enabling an equal distribution of profit.35 This will lead to a stable society. In order to ensure communal harmony, Confucius places greater emphasis on just distribution of goods rather than on their production.36 In Confucius we find a "perfectionist conception of justice" in which he seeks to eradicate the sources of injustice through the perfection of human character. This is the principle behind his exhortations of "rectification of names," "overcoming oneself and returning to propriety," and "human heartedness." Another principle that we find in Confucius is the concept of "justice by agreement." In order to assure a just distribution of goods, one must arrive upon a universal principle of ethics through agreement.37 2) Mencius' Reinforcement of Confucian Prescriptions for Eradicating Injustice Mencius reinforces Confucius "perfectionist conception of justice" through his thesis that human beings are by nature good. By regarding the relationship between the rulers and the ruled as a contractual relationship he also reinforces Confucian principle of "justice by agreement." Mencius argues that man is born with a sense of pity, shame, yielding, and rationality. It is when he expands and nurtures these innate abilities that he can achieve complete humanity. Mencius urges kings to have a sense of pity towards the people. Mencius thinks that if man can overcome selfishness and desire, conflict of interest can also be resolved. As such, Mencius says that if man seeks private wealth he cannot be human-hearted and if he seeks human-heartedness, then he cannot become wealthy.38 35 李承煥, 「儒家思想之社會哲學的再照明」高麗大學校, 1998, pp.51-56 參考 Cf. Lee Seung-hwan, Re-interpretation of ConFucian SociaI PhiIosophy (Korea University press, 1998), pp. 51- 56. 36 宋榮培, ‘理想的社會觀及平和的倫理’ 「傳統及現代」7卷. Cf. Song Young-bae, "Confucian Vision of the Ideal Society and Ethics of Peace," Jontong gua hyundae Quarterly, Vo!. 7, 1999, p. 234. 37 李承煥, 同上書, pp.56-61 參考. CL Lee Seung-hwan, Op. cit., p. 57. 38 『孟子』,「滕文公」上 3. “陽虎曰, 為富不仁矣，為仁不富矣”. Mencius, Tang Wen Kung, Part I, Chapter 3. Mencius appeals to the sense of pity and exhorts the overcoming of selfishness in order to avoid conflict of interest over distribution of wealth, but at the same time thinks that rule based on human-heartedness is necessary in order to ensure mutually beneficial relationship between the ruler and the ruled.39 In fact, he takes a step further and tries to re-define the ruler-ruled relationship in terms of a contract.40 Mencius' philosophy is based on a philosophy of "for the people" in that he thinks the foremost task of government and rule is to feed and clothe the people. Human rule is a rule that ensures people's basic needs by providing them with land. This is where he proposes his famous theory of the "well-field system." (井田制)41 VI. Theory of Peace A) St. Thomas's Theory of Peace St. Thomas explores the question of peace In his Summa Theologiae (2a 2ae, 29, 1-4). 1) Peace and Concord (Pax et Concordia) In article 1, he clarifies the notion of concord and peace saying as follows: 'concord, strictly speaking, involves other people who, in spite of their different feelings, come together in mutual agreement. Sometimes it also happens that in one person, the heart hankers after things opposed to each other. This occurs in two ways: either as regards the diverse appetitive powers, the sense-appetite often going contrary to the rational; or when one and the same appetitive faculty wants diverse things which cannot in fact be had together, and so a conflict among the movements of appetite must follow. But harmony or union among such movements belongs to the very notion of peace; for even though a man has something he wants, his heart is restless as long as there still remains something else for him to want but cannot have 39 『孟子』, 「離婁」上 9. Mencius, Ibid., Chapter 9. 40 『孟子』, 「公孫丑」下 4. Cf. Mencius, Gp. cit., Part 11,Chapter 4. Cf. Lee Seung-hwan, Op. cit., pp. 56-61. 41 宋榮培, 同上書, pp.236-237 參考. Cf. Song, Young-8ae, Gp. cit., pp. 236-237. at the same time. A union of this sort is not included in the notion of concord. Hence concord involves union of diverse appetites, but as between different people, whereas peace, in addition to this includes union among the appetites of the same person.'42 So St. Thomas goes beyond the concord of the diverse appetites of many people and considers peace which consists in the harmony or union of diverse appetites in the same person. So that peace derives fundamentally from the personality. As an external pressure applied to this human nature or a personality, we recognize the concept of violence as opposed to that of peace. St. Thomas clarifies his point that peace and harmony be established within a single personality first by drawing from Augustine's dictum that "pax hominum est tranquillitas ordinis" (City of God, Vol. 19: C.13). Of course, Augustine is talking about the peace that exists between man and man. However, there is no real peace where a man comes to an agreement with another not freely and of his own will, but forced into it by fear. Therefore, St. Thomas took Augustine's definition of peace as a "tranquility of order" to mean that such a peace begins with a restful status within a personality in which all the movements of appetites are at harmony with each other.43 St. Thomas asks if all things desire peace, to which he answers in the affirmative by drawing from Dionysius (De Divinis Nominibus, 11) and Augustine's saying that "omnia pacem appetunt."44 42 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 1, c. 'pax includit concordiam et aliquid addit. Unde ubicumque est pax ibi est concordia; non tamen ubicumque est concordia est pax, si nomen pacis proprie sumatur. Concordia enim, proprie sumpta, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt. Contingit etiam unius hominis cor tendere in diversa, et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum diversas potentias appetitivas: sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in contrarium rationalis appetitus, secundum illud, Cam concupiscit adversus spiritum(Ad Gal. 5, 17). Alio modo, inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit quae simul assequi non potest. Unde necesse est esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus. Unio autem horum motuum est quidem de ratione pacis; non enim homo habet pacatum cor quamdiu, etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen adhuc restat ei aliquid volendum quod simul habere non potest. Haec autem unio non est de ratione concordiae. Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem.' 43 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 1, ad 1. 'Augustinus loquitur ibi de pace quae est unius hominis ad alium. Et hanc pacem dicit esse concordiam, non quamlibet, sed ordinatam; ex eo scilicet quod unus homo concordat cum alio secundum illud quod utrique convenit. Si enim homo concordet cum alio non spontanea voluntate, sed quasi coactus timore alicujus mali imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax; quia non servatur ordo utriusque concordantis, sed perturbatur ab aliquo timorem inferente. Et propter hoc praemittit quod pax est tranquillitas ordinis. Quae quidem tranquillitas consistit in hoc quod omnes motus appetitivi in uno homine conquiescunt.' 44 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 2, Sed contra. 2) Peace and Order (pax et ordo) "The fact that a man desires a thing means that he desires to obtain what he desires, and consequently, the removal of anything that stands in the way of his doing so. Now such an obstacle, in the form of a contrary desire, can come either from oneself, or from another, and in both cases it is through peace that the obstacle is removed. Hence it must needs be that everything that desires anything at all desires peace, inasmuch as it desires tranquility and without hindrance to obtain its object, which is the very meaning of peace, defined by Augustine as the tranquility of order."45 St. Thomas's opinion that theologically explains peace as innate in our predisposition towards the tranquility of order needs to be examined ontologically, that is, from the perspective of our human nature and indeed the nature of everything. That is to say, pursuing peace derives especially from human nature. 3) Peace and Love (pax et caritas) In article 3, St. Thomas asks if peace is "charity's own characteristic effects", and goes on to answer in the affirmative. This way, he thinks that charity is the cause of peace. This article is the culmination of his discourse on peace. "Peace implies two kinds of union: one, a bringing of all one's own desires to an ordered unity; the other, union between one's own desires and those of another person. In both cases, it is charity that brings it about. In the first case, since charity means that we love God with our whole heart by referring everything to him, all our desires become focused on one object. Likewise with the other kind of union; for loving our neighbor as ourselves makes us want to do his will even as our own. This is why, says Aristotle [Ethic. IX, 4, 1166a7-10], that one thing that is necessary where friends are concerned is that they choose the same things, and Cicero says the same [De Amicitia, C, 17] when he writes that friends have the same likes and dislikes."46 45 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 2, C. 46 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, c. 'duplex unio est de ratione pacis: quarum una est secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum in unum; alia vero est secundum unionem appetitus proprii cum appetitu alterius. Et utramque unionem efficit caritas. Primam quidem unionem, secundum quod Deus diligitur ex toto corde, ut scilicet omnia referamus in ipsum, et sic omnes appetitus nostri in unum feruntur. Aliam vero, prout diligimus proximum sicut nosipsos, ex quo contingit quod homo vult implere voluntatem proximi sicut et sui ipsius. Et propter hoc inter amicabilia unum ponitur identitas electionis: ut patet in IX Ethic. (c. 4,1166 a 7-10); et Tullius dicit, in libro de Amicitia(c. 17), quod amicorum est idem velle et nolle.' This way, St. Thomas articulates the essential elements of peace based on Christian love, that is, love of God and one's neighbor. Peace, that is to say, originates from the love of God and one's neighbor. The love of God of the human being is the most characteristic self-realization of human nature as the image of God and the love of one's neighbor based on the love of God is likewise. However, St. Thomas is also aware of human imperfection here. "Sin makes a man turn away from the end he has to pursue, that is, the true good, which is the final goal of his existence. This means that his will is fixed on something that appears good. Therefore, a man needs the help of sanctifying grace to achieve true peace."47 To the dissent that there are irreducibly differing opinions about peace and love, St. Thomas responds by arguing that, insofar as a concord on primary goods exists, trivial differences in opinion does not amount to a disagreement in this life.48 "Peace belongs to the virtue of charity. Peace is caused by love according as charity loves God and neighbor, and so there is no other virtue to which peace belongs as proper to it."49 4) Peace and Justice (pax et iustitia) In his reply to the third (ad3), St. Thomas claims that justice is an indirect cause of peace. As I explored earlier, justice is rendering each what is his due; it thus removes obstacles to peace and resolves dissensions. Peace is thus a consequence of justice, but only indirectly. For it results directly from love, which by its nature causes peace. "For love, as Dionysius says, is a unifying force, and peace is a union of appetites and tendencies."50 47 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 1. 'a gratia gratum faciente nullus deficit misi peccatum, ex quo contingit quod hono sit aversus a fine debito, in aliquo indebito finem constituens. Et secundum hoc appetites eius non inhaeret principaliter vero finali bono, sed apparenti. Et propter hoc sine gratia gratum faciente non potest esse vera pax, sed solum apparens.' 48 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 2. 49 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 4, c. 'Cum igitur pax causetur ex caritate secundum ipsam rationem, dilectionis Dei et proximi, non est alia virtus cuius pax sit proprius actus nisi caritas.' 50 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 3. 'Pax est opus iustitiae indrecte, inquantum scilicet rremovet prohibens. Sed est opus caritatis directe, quia secundum propriam rationem caritas pacem causat. Est enim amore vis unitiva, ut Dionysius dicit 4 cap. De Divinis no minibus. Pax autem est unio appetitivarum inclinationum.' 5) Peace and Wisdom (pax et sapientia) Wisdom conduces to peace. St. Thomas follows Augustine in explaining this dictum; "Augustine (De Serm. Dam. In Monte I, 4. ML34, 1235) teaches that wisdom befits the peacemakers. In them, there is no movement of rebellion, but a compliance with reason." He also invokes Augustine's definition of peace as "tranquility of order," (Pax est tranqullitas ordinis, De Civitate Dei, XIX, 13, ML 41, 640) adding that the act of ordering requires wisdom. From this follows the dictum that peace requires wisdom. This is what wisdom does, as Aristotle (Metaphysics. I, 2, 982a 18- 2) says. Therefore peace making is well suited to wisdom. Achieving peace is a work of love and making peace is a work of wisdom that creates a proper order. This argument is based on Paul's letters to Romans (8:29): "Romans, They are the ones he chose especially long ago to become true images of his Son, who is Wisdom Begotten."51 Therefore, wisdom, along with justice, is the indirect cause of peace. But its direct cause is love. 6) Peace, Joy, and Happiness (pax, gaudium et beatitudo) St. Thomas focuses here on the first three of twelve fruits in Paul's Letters to the Galitians (5:22) - they are, love, joy, and peace. 'The spirit is well disposed in itself when it conducts itself well amid both good and evil. In regard to the good, the first disposition of the human soul is brought about by love, which is the first affection, and the root of all the others. Therefore, charity is given as the first Fruit of the Spirit. In it, the Holy Spirit is given especially, as in his proper likeness, since he himself is love. Hence, it is written, God's love has been poured into our heart through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. The love of charity is necessarily followed by joy. For every lover rejoices in being united with the one he loves. But charity always has God whom it loves present, as it is written, He who abides in love, abides in God, and God abides in him. Hence joy follows charity. The perfection of joy, however, is peace, in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbances. For one cannot have perfect joy in the good which he loves if he is disturbed by other things. Likewise, he whose heart is perfectly 51 s. Th. 2a 2ae, 45, 6, c et ad 1. satisfied by one thing, is not able to be disturbed by anything else, since he values everything else as nothing; thus it is written (Psalm 118: 165), "Great peace have those who love your name, and there is nothing to make them stumble.” That is to say, external things do not disturb them in such wise as to keep them from rejoicing in God. Secondly, the perfection of joy is peace as regards the calming of restless desire. For one cannot rejoice perfectly in something that does not satisfy him. Peace, however, implies these two things: that no outward thing disturb us, and that our desires should come to rest in one object. Hence, peace is listed third, after love and joy.'52 B) Confucian Conception of Peace Here I will discuss Confucius and Mencius' conception of peace. Because they lived during a period of constant turmoil and warfare their theory of peace centers around a theory of kingship and focuses on the concepts of human-heartedness(仁) and rule of human-heartedness(仁政) from a political and social perspective. 1) Confucius' Concept of Peace Human-heartedness (仁) was the new meaning that Confucius gave to the formality of ritual propriety (禮). He says that if man is not human-hearted, ritual propriety is of no use. That is, propriety without love (仁) is meaningless. Human- heartedness means to love man, to suppress oneself and to recover social norm. Overcoming oneself and achievement of human-heartedness can be had "When the love of superiority, boasting, resentments, and covetousness are repressed."53 As stated earlier, Confucius' emphasizes the "rectification of names" which is the principle that "There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is 52 S. Th. la 2ae, 70, 3, c. 53 「論語」, 憲問, ‘克己怨欲不行焉, 可以為仁矣’. Cf. Confucian Analects, Book XIV, Ch.II. minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."54 Confucius thought that it is when name and reality do not match that we have chaos and even war.55 Confucius wished to erect a new order based on ritual propriety. That is because ritual propriety is founded upon love. Indeed, the social consequence of ritual propriety is value peace.56 Confucius' philosophy of human-heartedness is succeeded by the Mencian theory of the rule of human-heartedness (仁政) and the rule of the way (王道政治). During the Sung and Ming Dynasties, such philosophy gave rise to a philosophy of "All things are one" (萬物一體論) which promoted not only love between men but also between man and all other creatures, leading to a very active conception of peace.57 2) Mencius' Concept of Peace Mencius inherited Confucius' thoughts but was much more clear in the details and practical recommendations. Mencius is opposed to coercion and war: "Therefore, those who are skillful to fight should suffer the highest punishment. Next to them should be punished those who unite some princes in leagues against others; and next to them, those who take in grassy commons, imposing the cultivation of the ground on the people."58 His clearest statement of a philosophy of peace can be seen in the following passage: "Mencius said, 'There are men who say-"I am skillful at marshalling troops, I am skillful at conducting a battle!"-They are great criminals."59 What Mencius calls “rule of the way” (王道政治), Way of the Ancient Kings, Way of Kings Yao and Shun, Rule of King Wen, is connected to what he calls the 54 「論語」, 顏淵, ‘君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子. ’ cf. Confucian Analects, Book XII, Yen Yuan, Chapter XI. 55 鄭仁在, ‘中國之平和思想’ ,「平和哲學」, 西江大學校, 哲學研究所, 1995. p. 248. CL Chung In-jae, "Choongguk ui pyongwha sasang," (Chinese Philosophy of Peace) Pyunghwa jui cholhak, Sogang University, Institute of Philosophy, 1995, p. 248. 56 「論語」, ‘禮之用, 和為貴’. cf. Analects, Book I. Chapter XII 57 鄭仁在, 上書, pp. 245-251, 參考. Cf. Chung, In-Jae, Gp. cit., pp. 241-250. 58 「孟子」, 離婁上, ‘故善戰者服上刑, 連諸侯者次之，辟草萊, 任土地者次之’. Mencius, Book IV, Part I, Chapter XIV. 59 「孟子」, 盡心下, “有人曰: ‘我善為陳, 我善為戰, 大罪也! ’ ” Mencius, Book VII, Part n. Chapter IV. “rule of the human-heartedness” (仁政). Rule of human-heartedness is to apply the moral imperative of human-heartedness to the spheres of politics and society. What Mencius means by rule of human heartedness is based on the idea that man cannot suffer to see others in pain, a philosophical foundation for his theory that man is innately good (性善论). As he was sure of this, it was clear to him that without the rule of human-heartedness, peace in all-under-the-heaven cannot be had.60 Mencius makes a distinction between the “rule of power” and the “rule of way.” The rule of way is what everyone wishes for and it is the only way to ensure peace. Rule of human heartedness can bring peace to all-under-heaven because it can capture the hearts of the people. He insists that only the rule of way and rule of human-heartedness can bring peace and that "Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union (human concord) arising from the accord of Men."61 Harmony among men means a state of peace.62 VII. Conclusion A) Just Use of Force St. Thomas rejects violence because it goes against human nature and dignity which is based on the Holy Trinity and also against Christ's commandment of love. However, he does admit just force. The standard for just force has to do with self-defense and the preservation of a community's welfare and peace. In such cases, individuals as well as sovereigns of a state or public office can exact private revenge and war. However, it cannot exceed the bounds of vindicative justice. Particularly in the case of war, it is only when there is sovereign order, just cause, and just intentions that one can speak of a just war. It is also allowed in the case of resistance against unjust rulers. This is when the sovereign 60 「孟子」, 離婁上, ‘堯舜之道, 不以仁政, 不能平治天下’. "The principles of Yao and Shun, without a benevolent government, could not secure the tranquil order of the kingdom." Mencius, Book IV, part I, Chapter I. 61 「孟子」,公孫丑上, ‘天時不如地利，地利不如人和’. Mencius, Book II, Part II, Chapter 1. 62 鄭仁在, 上書, pp. 250-253 , 參考. Cf. Chung In-jae, Op. cit., pp. 250-253. forsakes his duty to protect public interest and peace.63 As such, just force is allowed when it is the only means to preserve and promote human life and property. B) Comparison of St. Thomas' and Confucian Conceptions of Justice As we enter the Third Millennium, and as East and West seeks to be one, it is important and meaningful that we compare and contrast St. Thomas' and Confucian conceptions of justice. This is because otherwise, there is the danger of conflict between East and West. In the Middle East Israel and Muslim states are engaged in a vicious cycle of revenge and bloody violence. In many countries that overcame colonial rule it was only through lengthy periods of violence that such feats were accomplished as we have witnessed in the cases of Algeria, Vietnam, South Africa, China, etc. St. Thomas first defines justice and then regards its violation as injustice. On the other hand, Confucians first describes the situation of injustice as it obtained during the period of constant warfare in which they lived. This was a highly pragmatic and realistic way of approaching the issue. St. Thomas employs a finely honed logical argument to define and distinguish commutative justice, distributive justice, and vindicative justice. The modern conception of social justice was developed since the promulgation of 'Quadragesimo Anno' (1931) by Pope Pius XI based on St. Thomas' conception of justice which is based on human-ness and human community. In contrast, Confucians try to realize justice by eradicating the sources of social injustice. Here, a much more synthetic conception of justice is employed to explain commutative justice, distributive justice and what we today call social justice. However, since it presupposes the ancient feudal order of China, it focuses on the duties of the rulers, the discussions are concentrated more on distributive justice. Such a conception is mostly concerned with political and social aspects of justice. However, both conceptions are similar in that they regard the issues of justice ultimately in terms of a man's state of mind. Confucians arrive at justice through human-heartedness and the rule of human-heartedness while St. Thomas emphasizes 63 cf. S. Th. 2a 2ae, 44, 64, 66: CL Chae Yi-byung, Jongdanghan poknyok un hoyongdoenunga? (Is a Just Use of Force Permissible?) Tulsumnalsum, 2002. 2. 28-29. love of God and one’s neighbors as fundamental to justice. In practical contexts, Confucians interpret human-heartedness as love of man. In order to realize human- heartedness Confucians emphasize "rectification of name," "overcoming the self and returning to ritual propriety," "sense of pity," "sense of shame," "sense of compromise," and "sense of discernment." This is similar to the emphasis that Christianity places on self-discipline and love in the Decalogue and Christ's teachings. As for the principle of rectification of names, Christianity has its own distinct and more fundamental interpretation that the body has many parts and that each part has a different function to fulfill, thus leading to a healthy body (I Cor. 12, 12-13). Of course, this speaks to the mystical body of Christ, but it can also be applied to social life. With regard to self-discipline, Christianity also refers to something more fundamental as it exhorts one to even give up one's life to realize love: 'Anyone who does not take his cross and follow my footsteps is not worthy of me. Anyone who finds his life will lose it; anyone who loses for my sake will find it." (Mt. 10, 38-39.); "I tell you, most solemnly, unless a wheat grain falls on the ground and dies it remains only a single grain; but if it dies, it yields a rich harvest. If anyone serves me, my father will honor him." (John 12, 24-26); "Love is always patient and kind; it is never jealous; love is never boastful or conceited; it is never rude or selfish; it does not take offence, and is not resentful. Love takes no pleasure in other people's sins but delights in the truth; it is always ready by excuse, to trust, to hope and to endure whatever comes." (I Cor. 13, 1-7); "A man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for his friends." (John 15, 13); "If your enemy is hungry, you should give him food, and if he is thirsty, let him drink. Thus you heap red-hot coals on his head. Resist evil and conquer it with good." (Rom. 12, 20-21.) In Confucianism we encounter a more naturalistic, humanistic and immanent conceptions such as "rectification of names," "overcoming the self and returning to ritual propriety," "sense of pity," "four constants," etc. The teachings of Christ, on the other hand, because they are based on the relationship between God and man, explain human life from the view of transcendence and immanence. Also in the teachings of Christ, the communion through prayer and grace is emphasized. The Bible says "Set your hearts on his Kingdom first, and on his righteousness (iustitiae), and all these other things will be given as well." (Mt 6, 33) and "For I tell you if your virtue (iustitia) goes no deeper than that of scribes and Pharisees, you will never get into the Kingdom of heaven." (Mt 5, 20) C) Comparison of St. Thomas' and Confucian Conceptions of Peace Both St. Thomas and Confucians think that peace is impossible without justice. St. Thomas is more explicit on this point by saying that Justice is not a direct, but indirect cause of peace. Confucians in general, and Mencius in particular, define war as evil and thereby reject it completely, while striving for an ideal state of peace without war, government of human-heartedness (仁政), rule of way (王道政治). St. Thomas, on the other hand, admits the use of just force in cases of personal and state-based self- defense. However, he makes it clear that peace and order in this life is an incomplete peace in comparison to the real peace without war, peace without conflict and instability, and eternal peace achievable in the next world. The incomplete peace in this life is on the way towards the eternal peace. Such peace can be achieved first and foremost in one's heart, achievable through ordering the inner self. This is in turn achieved through loving God and one's neighbors. Love is the direct cause of peace. Here we witness the analytical as well as comprehensive nature of St. Thomas' conceptions of justice and peace. While Confucian conceptions are limited within the bounds of this world, that is, they are of an immanent character. St. Thomas' are of this world while fundamentally transcendental as they are based on revealed truth. However, in the Confucian conception of man as juxtaposed with 'Heaven' we also find an abundant potentiality for transcendence, but as such the potentiality is explained by merely anthropomorphic description. St. Augustine who said "peace is tranquility of order", posits an interesting dialectic of peace: "There can be peace without any kind of war, but no war that does not suppose some kind of peace."64 Human nature thus rejects violence and desires peace. 64 Pax quaedam sine ullo bello, bellum vero esse sine aliqua pace non potest. (De Civitate Dei 19, 3) D) Conception of Peace for the Future To solve the problem of violence and peace of our times we must start from "giving back that which belongs to each." (unicuique sum retribuere). In our times we have the likes of Gandhi, Schweitzer as champions of peace and, of course, Mother Theresa, the embodiment of love. In addition, we have Pope Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum), Pius XI (Quadragesimo Anno), John XXIII (Pacem in Terris), Paul VI (Gaudium et Spes) who have contributed to the building of peace on the foundations of God's words, and on St. Thomas' theories of human nature while condemning the unjust violence. Also, numerous Catholic philosophers, theologians and intellectuals of diverse fields have worked as theorists and activists of peace in order to articulate conceptions of justice and peace for our times. Now, we need also to look towards the works of Confucian scholars who have also been working to produce their own distinct conceptions of justice and peace for our times. In fact, in recent years, numerous Korean scholars have been putting forth powerful new interpretations of Confucian justice and peace.65 Today, in the face of astonishing advances in science and technology, mankind is increasingly forced to humanize them. Man's conscience and living environment, especially social institutions have been fundamentally altered with the advances in science and technology. The invention of fire, casting of iron and steel, helio-centric worldview, development in navigation and aviation, invention of steam power and electricity, of rockets and nuclear power, etc. have brought enormous changes and benefits to mankind and caused tremendous problems, too. Intellectuals in the fields of religion, sciences, and culture have worked hard to articulate new values and ethical vision for each new advances in science and technology which brought new dimensions of human life. Now, science and technology are opening up new frontiers with the completion of Genome mapping, human cloning, the digitalization, the cyber-world and the internet, etc. The enormous capacity and genius of mankind is once again in full display. Science is enabling mankind to overcome space and time in a way never imagined possible in the past, thereby prolonging life and providing a fast-paced and comfortable life, etc. At the same time 65 Hahm Chai-bong, Lee Seung-hwan, Kim Seung-hye, Park Young-il, Chung In-jae are some of the leading scholars in this field who have come back to Korea after receiving advanced degrees from leading Chinese, North American, and European Universities. it is shaking our worldview and values from their foundations, thereby seriously injuring the image of God within man. Such advances in science and technology can also be put in the service of violence, leading to unimaginable tragic consequences. In the first few centuries of the new millennium mankind must eradicate violence. It therefore needs to rearticulate a vision of justice and peace for the new era. What is needed then, is a more profound investigation, further appreciation and strengthening of a conception of justice based on the principle, "to each his own" for human being as the image of God and nature as the vestigium of God. This is especially true for Asia. Asia is not only the largest in terms of land mass as well as population, but also is the home to major world religions, philosophies, and civilizations. People in Asia still lead deeply religious lives. They still feel victimized by colonial powers for centuries and that their spirit was repressed, economies exploited, and cultural treasures looted. Such feelings will continue to have major consequences for the future. Here, mankind must heed the old saying that "things call for their masters" (res c1amat ad dominum). The perpetrators must compensate the victims. The best way is through conversation. The necessity for holding conversations with a mutual respect, wisdom and courage, and mutual compromise and love where the East and West can truly come to a mutual understanding and co-operation on these issues has never been greater. Otherwise, we could be facing much more backlash and reaction. And also, the underdeveloped countries must recognize that they have benefited from the advanced science, technologies, bio-medicines, economic development, social institutions, social welfare, democracy, human rights, etc. from the developed countries. So they must do their best to improve their quality of life. Moreover they also have to contribute to the progress of mankind by the tireless toil, especially for the peace of mankind. Above all, the developed countries must help the underdeveloped countries to extricate themselves from poverty, starvation and disease that brings thousands of deaths. They also must help without any second thought to educate the people of underdeveloped countries to allow them to live a human life in the image of God. And also, it is quite desired that the developed countries invest their capital in the underdeveloped countries and let them participate fully in advanced technologies. Human conscience of our time is experiencing such a turn whether we know or not, that is, history of human life and culture proceeds according to the oeconomia of the Creator. I believe that here lies the great vocation of the Catholic Church and the Catholic philosophers. It is therefore heartening to see that in recent years, the Vatican and others of the Catholic world are hosting numerous cultural and scholarly conferences. For these things to come to fruition and produce concrete results it is imperative that we realize the universal values of love of mankind and nature while conducting further inquiries into life philosophies of both the East and the West that can assure peaceful co- existence, co-life and co-prosperity. This is where various religions can make a major contribution.66 66 Tjeng, Eui-Chai. The Philosophy of Life in the Oriental Philosophers and in the Theory of Thomas Aquinas. Presentation in 'Philosophical Perspectives for the Third Millennium' 2000, Fu Jen University, Taiwan.