Widya Sakyabhinand 29
LOgICAL ExpRESSION IN ThE TIpITAkA:
A cASE StUDy OF thE USE OF DEFiNitiON iN thE
SikkhãPADAviBhAṁgA AND thE PãDABhãjANĩyA OF
thE FOUr PãrãjikAS OF thE BhikkhU’S DiSciPLiNE
Widya sakyabhinand
Kasetsart University, Thailand
ABstrACt
This research article deals with 1) logical definition
2) definitions of the Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga (Definition
on the Training Rules) (SVBH) and the Pãdabhãjanĩya
(Classification of Words) (PBH) of the four Pãrãjikas of
the bhikkhu’s discipline and 3) a synthesis of SVBH and
PBH with the definition principle so as to evaluate them
with the Theravãda Buddhist philosophical outlook. There are
two categories of definition: real definition and nominal
definition. The former explains the essential meaning of
words while the latter explains the verbal meaning. A good
definition must be equivalent in meaning between definiendum,
the term to be defined, and definiens, the defining term.
For instance, an offence involving expulsion from a Buddhist
monkhood is called Pãrãjikas (Defeat). There are
four Pãrãjikas out of 237 Sikkhãpada (training rules)
formulated by the Buddha for training behavior of
bhikkhus. The four Pãrãjikas consist of six segments
embodied as the training rules, one of which is the SVBH
& PBH. The definition of words in the four Pãrãjikas is
Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 18 No 1, January-June 2017, 29-52
© 2000 by Assumption University Press
30 Prajñā Vihāra
related to the SVBH and the classification used to define
them more is related to the PBH. There are 379 definitions
in total used in SVBH & PBH: 0.5% are real definition and
99.5% are nominal definition. It could be asserted that
definitions in the SVBH & PBH are all nominal because
they state something natural, though their 0.5% might be
understood as real definition. This is compatible with
the Theravãda Buddhist philosophy that rejects anything
‘supernatural’ in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.
introduction
Based on the Buddha’s statements in the Kãlãmasutta Kangkhãni-
yatthãna “Be not led by mere logic, nor after considering reasons” (The
Book of the Gradual Sayings, Vol. I, 1995: 172), there is a misunderstanding
that Buddhism does not attach any importance to logic. But in fact, the
core essence of Kãlãmasutta focuses on teaching people not to accept
anything without examination and pondering. Therefore, we are justified
in looking more closely into the Kãlamãsutta and its understanding and
use of logic.
In fact, the Tipitaka consists of logical themes such as deduction,
induction, division, classification, fallacy and definition. This is evidence
which confirms that human beings, no matter what culture they belong to,
or what historical period, are rational beings, that is, they know how to
employ logical thought. Or as stated over thousand years ago by Aristotle
that man is a “rational animal” (Aristotle,1999: I.13)
Among the three scriptures of the Tipitaka, the Vinaya Pitaka is
considered the most important one as it is the basis of Buddhism. What
is more interesting in terms of logic is the segments called SVBH & PBH
of Sikkhãpada, particularly the first three sections – the four Pãrãjikas,
the thirteen Sanghadisesas (An offence entailing initial and subsequent
meeting of the Sangha), and the two Aniyatas (Undetermined offences)
under the Patimokkha (Fundamental Rules of the Order). G. S. P.Misra
has spoken of the role of definition in the Vinaya:
Widya Sakyabhinand 31
In logical formulation and discussions it is an essential
thing that the exact meaning of each and every word used
should be laid down in a precise manner. The authors of
these early Buddhist texts made sincere efforts toward
giving dictionary-type definitions of words. The Vibhaṅga
of the Vinaya is replete with definitions which are in nature
not very different from those given in modern dictionaries.”
(Misra, 1984: 158)
This means it has placed importance on the meaning of language
which is similar to the Greek philosophers of the same period and prior
to what we now understand as the linguistic turn in philosophy. It is clear
that the definitions in the SVBH & PBH have developed the Buddhist
philosophical outlook in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics
based upon the importance of definition.
Realizing the role of the logic shown in the Tipitaka above,
I intend on examining the definitions of early Buddhist texts, especially the
segments called the SVBH & PBH of the four Pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s
discipline through a philosophical approach.
A Logical Definition
Definition is a procedure that explains meanings of words and
involves two elements, namely, definiendum, the term to be defined, and
definiens, the defining term (Reese, W.L., 1980: 121) The definiendum
may be compared to the subject, while the definiens may be compared
to the predicate as in the categorical proposition of Aristotelian logic.
Although both, definitions and categorical propositions have similar
structures, they are not the same thing because the former emphasize
only the meaning of a term/word while the latter focuses on the fact of a
statement. Nevertheless, the use of definition is very helpful for categorical
Syllogistic reasoning because if the predicate used to explain the subject
in a categorical proposition has the right meaning, it will not only make
a proposition truthful, but will also make such a Syllogistic reasoning in
valid form more trustworthy.
32 Prajñā Vihāra
In the history of Western philosophy, a systematic development of
definition took place when Socrates had applied the dialectical method to
find the meaning of such words such as piety, justice, wisdom and courage.
Plato understood that a concept is something essential which lies behind
the terms or words. He calls these forms or ideas. Aristotle, while rejecting
that these forms or ideas exist in their own world, has nevertheless accepted
that there is some real essence. (Aristotle, 1994-2009 (b): Book 1, Part 4)
The modern philosopher John Locke shares Aristotle’s view when he is
of the opinion that there is a “real constitution of substances, upon which
depends this nominal essence”. (Locke, 2014: iii. Vi. 2). Although their
thoughts are different in some points, philosophers as varied as Immanuel
Kant, David Hume, Edmund Husserl, Heinrich Rickert and G. E. Moore,
can be considered as essentialists. (Abelson, 1972: 316). The difference
between the real essence and the nominal essence is a topic which has
been debated in the Western philosophical tradition, and has become the
source of the distinction between the real definition and nominal definition
in later years. The following quotation expresses succinctly the difference
between the two definitions:
…to discover the real definition of a term XX one needs to
investigate the thing or things denoted by XX; to discover
the nominal definition, one needs to investigate the meaning
and use of XX (Gupta, 2015:2)
For example, when Socrates asks “What is virtue?” he is asking
for a clear meaning of this word by explaining its root and synonyms.
On one hand it is a nominal definition, but since it deals with virtue as an
ethical ideal, it can be regarded as a concept or a real definition. There are
various types of real definition and nominal definition. The type of real
definition which is generally known is Aristotle’s “definition by genus
and specific difference”1 (Smith, 2015:13), for instance:
• A triangle is a geometric shape with three straight sides.
• A human being is a rational animal.
Widya Sakyabhinand 33
The terms “triangle” and “human being” are the definiendum,
“geometric shape” and “animal” are the genus, while “three straight
sides” and “rational” are the specific difference. A nominal definition2, is
definition by etymology, by synonyms, by examples, and by description,
for instance:
• Philosophy derives from Greek language, i.e. philo “loving”
+ sophia “knowledge”, so Philosophy is love of knowledge.
(by etymology)
• Philosophy is philosophia. (by synonym)
• Southeast Asian countries are Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei etc.
(by example)
• The Police are the ones who protect public peace (by description)3
Definitions are an important part of logic because when one
starts to argue, his/her premises must be clear. Only in this way can the
argument be sound argument. This could be exemplified by Aristotle’s
Syllogistic logic thus:
The one who completes bachelor degree is a graduate.
Somchai is the one who completes a bachelor degree.
Therefore, Somchai is a graduate.
The truth of the conclusion “Somchai is a graduate,” depends
on the truth of the second premise “Somchai is the one who completes
a bachelor degree,” but also important is the truth of the first premise
(or the concept) “One who completes bachelor degree is a graduate.”
Hence, to make our concept clear out of each issue, one needs
to have definition. Though there are many principles of good definition,
the important one is definiendum and definiens which must be equivalent
or can be replaceable with its meaning remaining the same such as the
definition of “graduate”, “Graduate means the one who completes a bachelor
degree.” In reverse, it can be said “The one who completes a bachelor
degree is a graduate”. Once the definition is made as such, the concept
34 Prajñā Vihāra
of the informant has become clear-cut and cannot be understood in
any other way. Or as Morris R. Cohen. and Ernest Nagel have claimed
over this rule of a good definition from the book entitled “Principia
Mathemathica” by A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell thus:
…a definition of this type is written by putting the definiendum
to the left and the definiens to the right with the sign of
equality between them and the letters “Df.” to the right
of the definiens. Thus implication, symbolized by ⊃,
is defined thus: p ⊃ q = p’ V q. Df. Or, in words, “p implies q”
is equivalent by definition to “not p or q.” (Cohen and Nagel,
1978: 238)
However, criticisms of Real Definition had taken place since
the 17th century, with the development of science, starting with Francis
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. At present, some philosophers have applied
logical method of language analysis which resulted in refusal of real
essence. Bertrand Russell called the belief in existence of an essence as
“a hopelessly muddle–headed notion” (Russell, 1948 :187), while Richard
Robinson writes:
They (real and nominal definitions) are too central to
the history of man’s philosophical reflections and logical
theories. They are ubiquitous and fundamental in the
sources of Western philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. The
concept of definition arose in the complex and confused
form represented by the phrase ‘real definition’, not in the
simple and clear form represented by the phrase ‘nominal
definition’. We shall have, therefore, constantly to use the
term ‘real definition’ in referring to past literature and
studying the history of thought. My suggestion is only that
we should no longer use it in writing philosophy ourselves.
(Robinson, 1972: 191
Widya Sakyabhinand 35
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his “Philosophical Investigations”
(1986) asserted that the meaning of language depends on a context of
usage, while the meaning of terms is to be realized through ostentation
(Part 1, 43). This means to say that Wittgenstein has rejected the essence
or real meaning of terms. In addition, Wittgenstein also viewed that
ostensive definition, which is nominal definition, enables us to know
only the terms and not the meaning of terms (Part 1, 26-34). Wittgenstein
refuses to define every term except when it is necessary to prevent
misunderstanding (Part 1, 87), so language, according to its context of
usage, has a flexible meaning because the language itself is a form of
life and helps us understand the meaning of words in various contexts.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein has dismissed real definition, viewing that if
there needs to be a definition, we may use ostentation (ostensive definition),
which is a kind of nominal definition.
John Hospers believed that if anybody wants to define a thing
or the real essence, it should not be called definition at all, but should
rather be regarded as “analysis of a thing, either the chemical analysis,
or the conceptual analysis” (Hospers, 1983: 40). Besides, Hospers also
viewed that in giving meaning to a term we cannot merely say that
“Meaning is use” (22), because the word “use” is slippery in meaning.
So, in making definition, we have to use equivalent terms both in terms
of definiendum and definiens, so there will be no change in its meaning.
“This is the most usual, most accepted and most “standard” sense of the
word “definition” (22). Therefore, according to Hospers the definition of
terms must be nominal definitions, not real ones, and when viewing from
its equivalences, it should be definition by synonym rather than nominal
definition, one by etymology or by example.
Definition in the SVBH & PBH of the Four Pãrãjikas of
the Bhikkhu’s discipline
The primary document of Theravãda Buddhism is the Tipitaka,
consisting of three major scriptures i.e. the Vinaya Pitaka, the Suttanta
Pitaka and the Abhidhamma Pitaka. The Vinaya Pitaka is a compilation
36 Prajñā Vihāra
of Sikkhãpada of bhikkhus (monks) and bhikkhunis (nuns), consisting of
three main parts i.e. Suttavibhaṁga (Classification of Rules), chapters
concerning with the Sikkhãpada or 237 Disciplinary Rules of bhikkhus
and 311 Disciplinary Rules of bhikkhunis; the Khandhaka (Division),
chapters regarding details of Saṁghakamma or Saṁgha’s activities,
routine practices, etiquettes, and general behavioral codes of bhikkhus
and bhikkhunis; and the Parivāra (Accessory), chapters comprised
of a collection of questions and answers to facilitate teaching and
understanding. In conclusion, the Vinaya Pitaka is consisted of two major parts:
Adibrahmacãriyakasikkhã or a training for physical, verbal and mental
practices which is primary one for strict practice of chastity called
Sikkhãpada, and Abhisamacãrikasikkhã concerned with customs,
etiquette, and the noble livelihood of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis.
Sikkhãpada is a provision concerning prohibitions and approvals
issued by the Buddha for bhikkhus and bhikkhunis concerning violations of
proper conduct in the Sangha. These are likened to Articles or Sections of
the law, but the difference is that it is meant for physical, verbal and mental
training. If any violation takes place, “An action that violates, resulting
from such provision and carries punishment over yourself called āpatti
or an offence” (Somdejphramahãsamanajao Kromprayãvajirayãnvaroros,
2523 (1979): 11). Most of Sikkhãpada consist of six segments as follows:
1. First Transgressor means a story of the first bhikkhu who
behaves so badly that results in enactment of each Sikkhãpada by the
Buddha
2. Act means Sikkhãpada that the Buddha had enacted to prevent
bhikkhus and bhikkhunis from violation and a violator shall face an
ecclesiastical punishment.
3. Sub-Act means additional acts enacted later to comprehensively
cover the Sikkhãpada.
4. Sikkhãpadavibamga and Padabhãjaniya explains or defines
significant terms in each Sikkhãpada more clearly, while any terms
which are unclear and less comprehensive must be classified and defined
additionally in the Padabhãjaniya.
Widya Sakyabhinand 37
5. Anāpattivāra means exceptions which are not ecclesiastical
offences.
6. Vinitavatthu means a study case of violation of Sikkhãpada
which has been judged by the Buddha himself.
The four Pãrãjikas means Sikkhãpada which carry penalty for
bhikkhus who violate any of the four Pãrãjikas as detailed below:
the first defeat
Whatever monk, possessed of the training and mode of life
for monks, but not disavowing the training and not declaring
his weakness, should indulge in sexual intercourse,
even with an animal, is one who is defeated, he is not in
communion. (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1: 41-42)
the second defeat
Whatever monk should by means of theft take from a village
or from the jungle what has not been given to him in such
manner of taking as kings, catching a thief in the act of
stealing, would flog him or imprison him or banish him,
saying, ‘You are a robber, you are foolish, you are wrong,
you are a thief,’ – even so a monk, taking what is not given
him, is also one who is defeated, he is not in communion.”
(The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:73)
the third defeat
Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human being
of life or should look about so as to be his knife-bringer,
or should praise the beauty of death, or should incite
(anyone) to death, saying, ‘Hello there, my man of what
use to you is this evil, difficult life? Death is better for you
than life,’ or who should deliberately and purposefully in
various ways praise the beauty of death or should incite
(anyone) to death: he also is one who is defeated, he is not
in communion. (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1: 125-126)
38 Prajñā Vihāra
the fourth defeat
Whatever monk should boast, with reference to himself
of a state of further-men, sufficient ariyan knowledge and
insight, though not knowing it fully, and saying: ‘This
I know, this I see,’ then if later on, he, being pressed or
not being pressed, fallen, should desire to be purified,
and should say: ‘Your reverence, I said that I know what
I do not know, see what I do not see, I spoke idly, falsely,
vainly,’ apart from the undue estimate of himself, he also
is one who is defeated, he is not in communion. (The Book
of Discipline. Vol. 1:159)
Any bhikkhu who violates any one of the four Pãrãjikas are
considered the defeated, that is to say, they can no more prosper in the
religion of the Lord Buddha, and have been compared to a man who is
beheaded, yellow leaves that fell from the extreme end, a thick rock that
was broken, and topless sugar-palm tree which cannot be deeply connected
and grow as beautifully as previously did.
This is the same to most Sikkhãpada, the four Pãrãjikas comprise
six segments especially segment on the SVBH &PBH which define or
explain the content of four Pãrãjikas which is the core topic of this
research. In brief, SVBH is the definition of the significant terms in each
Sikkhãpada such as the definition of “Bhikkhu”, “indulges” and “sexual
intercourse” etc. (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:47) of the first Pãrãjika.
PBH means classifying the defined terms in the SVBH making
additional definition clearly and comprehensively. For example, the
second Pãrãjika has defined “‘What has not been given’ means what has
not been given; nor granted, nor thrown away; what is guarded, protected,
cherished, what belongs to others” (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:74),
but it does not give detail on type of property, so it needs to have the PBH
to figure out that such property means what kind of property it covers.
A study found that there was an explanation to define terms and
phrases totaling 377 definitions. Once these definitions are synthesized
into four Pãrãjikas, they can be classified as follows:
Widya Sakyabhinand 39
Table 1: Category & Type of Definitions Used in the SVBH &PBH
Category &Type of
Definition
1st
defeat
2nd
defeat
3rd
defeat
4th
defeat
total
per-
cent
1 Real Definition
By Genus & Specific
Difference
1
(1)
0
(0)
1
(1)
0
(0)
2
(2)
0.5
(0.5)
2. Nominal Definition
By Synonym
By Example
By Description
By Synonym &
Example
253
(243)
(10)
(0)
(0)
56
(18)
(31)
(5)
(2)
38
(11)
(6)
(0)
(21)
30
(14)
(16)
(0)
(0)
377
(286)
(63)
(5)
(23)
99.5
(75.5)
(16.7)
(1.3)
(6.0)
Total 254(254) 56(56) 39(39) 30(30) 379(379) 100
Note: Number in bracket denotes type of definitions that fall in each category of
definitions
Among 379 definitions, 2 are real definitions (0.5%), 377 are
nominal definitions (99.5%), out of which 286 are definition by
synonym (75.5%), 63 are definitions by example (16.7%), 5 are definitions
by description (1.3%), and 23 definitions are definitions by synonym
–cum- example (6.0%).
Detailed points in the Table should be considered as follows:
1. 377 definitions are nominal definitions and 286 are definition
by synonym. The definition by synonym is using the term with similar
meaning to explain the definiendum. The following Tables are examples
to characterize the popular definition by synonym:
40 Prajñā Vihāra
Table 2: Definition by Synonym in a dictionary style
(term-by-term basis)
Definiendum Definiens source
Boat That by which one crosses Padabhãjanĩya, 2nd Defeat*
Being in a vehicle The goods are laid down in vehicle Padabhãjanĩya, 2nd Defeat*
An arranged thief A crowd having arranged together Padabhãjanĩya, 2nd Defeat**
(The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:80-81*, 88**)
However, the definition by synonym in a dictionary style is used
less than the one defined by approximate equivalent words as the definition
of the term “monk” (bhikkhu) in the next Table.
Table 3: Definition by Synonym with approximate equivalent words
Definiendum Definiens source
Monk He is a monk because he is beggar for alms,
a monk because he submits to wandering for
alms, a monk because he is the one who wears
the patchwork cloth, a monk by designation,
a monk on account of his acknowledgement;
a monk is called “Come, monk, a monk is
endowed with going to the three refugees, a
monk is auspicious, a monk is the essential, a
monk is a learner, a monk is an adept, a monk
means one who is endowed with harmony of
the Order, with the solution at which the
motion is put three times and then followed
by the decision is put three times, with actions,
with steadfastness, with the attributes of a man
perfected.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
1st Defeat
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:42)
Each definiens points to the same meaning of the term definiendum -
monk.
Widya Sakyabhinand 41
There is also definition by synonym with equivalent words that
explain phrases instead of terms. It comprises 240 definitions. All define
such phrases as “the declaration of weakness, the training not being
disavowed” and “the declaration of weakness, the training being
disavowed”. To take one example, the phrase “the declaration of weakness,
the training not being disavowed,” has a definition runs as follows:
Table 4: Definition by Synonym to define phrase with approximate
equivalent words
Definiendum Definiens source
The declaration
of weakness,
the training not
being disavowed
The monk who is chafing, dissatisfied, desirous
or passing from the state of a recluse, anxious,
troubled and ashamed at being a monk, longing
to be a householder, longing to be a lay follower,
longing to be a park (monastery) attendant,
longing to be a novice, longing to be another
sect, longing to be a disciple of another sect,
longing not to be a recluse, longing not to be a
son of the Sakyans-says, and declares: “What
now I were to disavow the enlightened one?”
Padabhãjanĩya,
1st Defeat
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:43)
Although the Buddhist definition by synonym exemplified in
Table 3 and Table 4 is not in a dictionary style, it could also be understood
as a definition by synonym seen in Western logic, coinciding with Rhys
Davids’ view that using a group of overlapping synonyms can define a
term, and should not be considered a fallacy as it would normally be in
Western logic (Davids, 1993: xxxv). K. N. Jayatileke shares the same
view by raising it in the context of Wittgenstein’s approach to language.
We substantiate the meaning of a term through usage because each term
has its meaning “by virtue of family resemblance” that the informant can
infer in it. (Jayatilleke, 1980: 300).
42 Prajñā Vihāra
2. The second with 63 definitions in total is the definition by
example. Unlike the definition by synonym which is mostly used in the
first Sikkhãpada of the four Pãrãjikas, the definition by example is used
in almost equal number of the four Pãrãjikas, especially used mostly in
the second Sikkhãpada due to its connection to things like property and
places. The definition by example is thus more clear:
Table 5: Definition by Example with property and places
Definiendum Definiens source
Village A village of one hut, and a village of two huts,
and a village of three huts, and a village of
four huts, and a village with human beings,
and a village with beings who are not human,
and a fenced-in village, and a village which
is not fenced in, and a village arranged
fortuitously, and even a caravan that is camping
for more than four months is called a village.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
2nd Defeat*
King King of the earth, local king, king’s deputies,
subordinate chieftains, judges, chief ministers;
moreover those who administer torture and
maiming are called kings
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
2nd Defeat*
Park A park with flowers, a park with fruits Padabhãjanĩya,
2nd Defeat**
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:74*, 82**)
3. Another type of definition in the SVBH &PBH of the four
Pãrãjikas are definitions which are both definition by synonym–cum-
by example, totaling 23 definitions, and most of them are 21 definitions
belong to the third Pãrãjika:
Widya Sakyabhinand 43
Table 6: Definition by Synonym–cum-by Example
Definiendum Definiens source
He praises by
means of the
body
He makes a gesture with the body, saying “Whatever
dies thus receives wealth or receives glory or goes
to heaven.”
Padabhãjanĩya,
3rd Defeat*
A support He puts a dagger in a support, or smears it with
poison, or makes it weak, or he arranges it in a deep
ravine, or a pit, or a steep precipice, and says: “Falling
down, he will die.”
Padabhãjanĩya,
3rd Defeat**
Offering a
sight
He arranges a dreadful sight, saying: “Seeing this
frightful, horrible thing, and being terrified he will
die.”
Padabhãjanĩya,
3rd Defeat**
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:132*, 135**)
“He makes a gesture with the body” is synonym of “He praises
by means of the body”, “Putting a dagger in a support” is synonym of
“A support”, and “Arranging of a dreadful sight” is synonym of “Offering
a sight”, whereas the following statements are to set examples.
4. There have been seven statements of the definition by description
under the second Defeat, for example:
Table 7: Definition by Description
Definiendum Definiens source
The Jungle What remains leaving a side the village and
the outskirts of the village.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
2 nd Defeat*
A thief He who takes by means of theft (anything)
having the value of five māsakas or more
than five māsakas that has not been given.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
2 nd Defeat**
A field Where grain and pules are produced. Padabhãjanĩya,
2 nd Defeat***
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:74*, 75**, 83***)
44 Prajñā Vihāra
5. Of the total 379 definitions, definitions, there are 2 places that
should be called “Real Definition”. They are as follows:
Table 8: Real Definition by Genus and Specific Difference
Definiendum Definiens source
Sexual
intercourse
What is not verily dhamma, village dhamma,
low caste dhamma. wickedness, the final
ablution, secrecy, between couples.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
1st Defeat*
Human being (The body)4 from the mind first arising,
from (the time of) consciousness becoming
first manifest in a mother’s womb until the
time of death.
Padabhãjanĩya,
3rd Defeat***
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:47*, 87**,126***)
That it is regarded as Real Definition because “dhamma (tradition)”,
and “the body” are raised as a genus for classification, whereas the following
terms/phrases, namely, “not verily, village, low caste , wickedness, the
final ablution, secrecy, and having in couples” are employed as specific
differences for “sexual intercourse”; and “ the mind first arising, from (the
time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until
the time of death” are employed as specific differences of “the body”.
discussion
1. Among the 379 definitions, there are some definitions which are
interestingly close to the use of definition in the modern English Dictionary.
Or as G. S. P. Misra’ words, “The authors of these early Buddhist texts
made sincere efforts toward giving dictionary-type definitions of words.
The Vibhanga of the Vinaya is replete with definitions which are in nature
not very different from those given in modern dictionaries.” (1984:158).
Hence we will compare the definition of the same word in the SVBH
&PBH from “The Book of the Discipline, Vol.1” (1992) with that from
“Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English” (2009), for example :
Widya Sakyabhinand 45
Table 10 : Example of Comparative Definitions
The Book of
the Discipline
thief means he who takes by means of theft (anything) having
the value of five māsakas or more than five māsakas that has not
been given. (75)
Longman
Dictionary
thief means someone who steel things from another person
or place. (1831)
The Book of the
Discipline
Boat means that by which one crosses. (80)
Longman
Dictionary
Boat means a vehicle that travels across water. (171)
The Book of
the Discipline
A field means where grain and pules are produced. (83)
Longman
Dictionary
A field means an area of land in the country, especially one
where crops are grown or animals feed on grass. (636)
The Book of
the Discipline
intentionally means a transgression committed knowingly,
consciously, deliberately. (126)
Longman
Dictionary
intentionally means done deliberately and usually intended to
cause harm. (917)
However, the definitions of the SVBH &PBH of the four Pãrãjikas
and of Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English has significant
differences due to the contextual differences of words. The first one had
been used 2,500 years ago in the context of each Pãrãjika, while the one
under Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English is the definition
that covers all current contexts of words, so it has multiple meanings as
shown in the dictionary.
2. Among 379 definitions, only two of them can be considered real
definition in terms of definition by genus and specific difference, but not a
real definition in terms of an abstract intangible truth which is supernatural.
These are empirical truths because the two definitions i.e., “Sexual
intercourse means what is not verily dhamma, etc”, and “Human being
means the body from the mind first arising, from (the time of) consciousness
becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death.”
46 Prajñā Vihāra
These examples remain under the realm of nature which corresponds to
the viewpoints of Phra Phromkunaporn (P. A. Payutto) (2555 (2012): 166
-167) and Kalupahana, (1982:19) that what we understand as supernatural
is a natural thing, but due to its being complicated and unattainable, it is
then viewed as supernatural and miraculous. It may be for this reason
that Theravãda Buddhism did not develop a variety of definitions as
did by Western Philosophy, especially Definition by genus and specific
difference, in order to find an essence or real meaning of a term. However,
the two definitions which appear in the SVBH &PBH which correspond
to the definition by genus and specific difference could agree through a
typical usage of language.
3. Based on the reasons in No.2 and with 377 definitions (99.5%)
being the nominal definition, suggests that in Theravãda Buddhism there
are no real definitions which would indicate abstract or supernatural things,
and this applies to abstract concepts as well. Real meaning should be
one type of nominal meaning which agrees with what Hongladarom calls
“the abstract object that can be analyzed” (Hongladarom: 2555 (2012): 43),
so only the nominal meaning should be the meaning of language because
the main function of language that holds the logical value is its informative
function (Copi, 1978: 56), if the receiver understands the information,
whether the communication is true or false, it can be considered that the
function of language is accomplished.
To assert that only the nominal definition exists not only coincides
with the Theravãda Buddhist metaphysics which does not believe in
anything supernatural, but also coincides with the Theravãda Buddhist
epistemology and ethics as stated in the Majjhimanikãya:
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of
eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory
impingement, feelings are because of sensory impingement;
what one feels one perceives; what one perceives one
reasons about; what one reasons about obsesses one; what
obsesses one is the origin of the number of perceptions
and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material
Widya Sakyabhinand 47
shapes cognizable by the eye, past, future, present. (Other
consciousness that arises from the contacts between ear
and sounds, nose and smells, tongue and tastes, body and
touches and mind and mental objects, has been described
in the same way). (The Middle Length Sayings, Vol.1.,
1992: 145)
According to the Majjhimanikãya mentioned above, when the
sense-organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind) converge with
the sense-objects (form, sound, smell, taste, tangible objects and mind-
objects), there arises consciousness or perception (epistemology). After
this follows the positive or negative behavior called an action or kamma
towards perception through three channels of action – bodily, verbal, and
mental (ethics). Hence according to the kamma principle as the basis of
human’s behavior, human language is a verbal action which expresses
facts of human activity, and this language should communicate nominal
meaning. So according to the Theravãda Buddhist philosophical outlook,
the definition in the SVBH & PBH of the four Pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s
discipline should be understood only by nominal definition.
Natural Things
Nominal Definition
Real Definition
Therefore, with all mentioned above, the features of definition in
the SVBH & PBH of the four Pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline can
be concluded in the following illustration.
48 Prajñā Vihāra
Conclusion and suggestions
The 379 definitions that have been taken from the SVBH & PBH for
analysis reflect an overall view of Theravãda Buddhist Philosophy on the
problem of meaning in language. They show that philosophical approaches
to linguistic meaning such as “meaning is use”, “nominal meaning” and
“real meaning” can be understood from a Buddhist perspective. What
Theravãda Buddhist philosophy emphasizes would be nominal meaning,
because the so-called real meaning, according to the Buddhist viewpoint,
would be just another form of the nominal meaning. Therefore, if we go
through the Buddhist scriptures and encounter metaphysical words such
as nibbãna, kamma, dhamma. vinnãna, jhãna and samsãra, we should
understand them in the sense of nominal meaning.
However, much more work needs to be done. A study of the
definitions of the SVBH & PBH which would allow us to develop a
Theravãda Buddhist position on the nominal definition still requires more
comparative study of scriptures of the Tipitaka, or between the scriptures
of Tipitaka and their commentaries. It is also important to study the use
of abstract definition which explains dhamma topics in the Abhidhamma
Pitaka. This would allow us to understand the Theravãda Buddhist
refusal of the Western concept of real definition. Also important would be
the comparison of the use of definition in the Tipitaka on specific topics
with the definitions of the Thai Dictionary of the Office of Royal Society,
or with English dictionaries to develop an awareness on the precise
meaning of words for the right understanding of the Buddha’s teachings.
Widya Sakyabhinand 49
endnotes
1 Another type of Aristotle’s Real Definition which is not included here and
could be regarded as another form of Definition by Genus and Specific Difference is the
Definition by Cause. It states the genus of the term by substituting specific difference
with a cause. A cause is something material, formal, efficient and final for its existence.
(Aristotle,1994-2009(a): Part 3)
2 Excerpted from : 1. Baum (1975: 429-456), 2. Copi (1978: 126-154), 3. Moore
and Parker (1992:28-31) and 4. Porter (2002 : 43-63)
3 This definition takes a logical property of a term to describe the definiendum.
4 The term “body” is introduced here as a genus to facilitate our classification
because the Pali term “viggaha” in the compound word “manussaviggaham” (translated
as “human being”) could also mean “the body” (attabhavam). See :1) Samantapasadika,
Vol. II, (1969:437) which explains the term “manussaviggaham” as “manussattabhavam”
(human body) and 2) Davids and Stede (1975: 615). The term “body” has denotative
meaning as the genus in the sense that it refers to either living or dead body etc.
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