PrajnaVihara_Vol23_No2_P2.pdf 53 Vol. 23 no. 2 July to December 2022, 53-65 © 2000 by Assumption University Press COMPASSION FOR THE OTHER IN LEVINAS AND BUDDHISM: THE CASE OF THE BODHISATTVA Kajornpat Tangyin1 ABSTRACT The philosophy of Levinas, gives a primacy to ethics over ontology, and a primacy of the other over the self. This is something which is also found in the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, especially with regard to compassion, and the idea of the role of the Bodhisattva. the teaching of Mahayana Buddhism and and demonstrates how they are connected by their emphasis on the virtue of compassion. Both advocate a departure from the ego-self to the compassion for the other. Levinas like Buddhism other. So reading Levinas through Buddhism allows us to understand the shift from the Western idea of the self to the responsibility towards the other, and it allows us to understand the responsibility the self has towards through Buddhism allows us to understand a respect for non-human nature which remains within the framework of Keywords: Hanh 54 Levinas uses the term the “Other” ( ) to refer to alterity or otherness in general, and the “other” ( ) to refer to the personal other, and his ethics begins with the encounter with the other in society. The primacy of the other over the “I.” For Levinas, the relationship between the self and the other is asymmetrical, similar to the irreversibility of time.2 The traditional philosophy. He says, “The I is the very crisis of the being of a being ( ) in the human… I already ask myself whether my being of my is not already the usurpation 3 So the other is recognized while the self is put The other is beyond any comprehension, or any thematization, or in the other sense the other is beyond any ontological determination. The other is neither initially nor ultimately what we grasp or what we thematize.4 The other to whom we can grasp, thematize, generalize, is not the true other. For Levinas, if we could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power.5 The other, for Levinas, is not something to be dominated by knowledge and power. He writes that “the relationship with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility.”6 Levinas, in his book , continues this discussion when he observes that the other is beyond the graspable, or thematizable, in a manner similar to time. He sees time as beyond any conceptualizing, and prior to any understanding. We experience time but do not possess time, and we have no power over time. Likewise, we experience the other but we could not possess the other and have no power over the other. the two things which cannot be understood in the manner of the other things we experience. He says, “The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy 55 is a relationship with a Mystery.”7 This positing of time and the other as mystery leads him consider that our of relationship with the other is similar to our relationship with the future. The future is unknowable, and beyond our grasp. The future is always exceeds our expectations. The future that we speak of of is not the real future. Levinas says, “The future is what is in no way grasped…. The other is the future. The very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future”8 When Levinas connects the other with time, he accepts the limits of human knowledge to formulate concepts. So he is referring to something prior to our conceptualization. attributes, you are other than I, other otherwise, absolutely other! And indiscernible.”9 Alterity of the other must be respected at the moment of the encounter between human beings. Otherwise we are tempted to categorize the other as the same, where it becomes only an object of our appropriation. The other cannot be absolutely other if the alterity of the other, Levinas says: being, beyond essence, without these formulations taking of goodness are extraordinary possibilities with regard to nature, with regard to the perseverance in being: the possibility of holiness which, beyond the perseverance of a being in its being, would recognize the priority of an irreducible alterity. I think that the true humanity of man 56 begins in this recognition, before any cognition of being, before onto-logy. That is why I said to you that the question of the other seemed to me to be anterior to the problem of ontology.10 For Levinas, the irreducibility of the alterity of the other is the moment where the ethical relationship between human beings begins. It is not ontology that remains at the level understanding, or for the sake of knowledge, but it is an ethics, where the alterity of the other is fully respected. Any program of reduction of the other to the same, or the return to the self, has to be put into question. In an interview, he claims: “I am to his ontological relation to himself (egology) or to the totality of things which we call the world (cosmology)”11 For Levinas, this philosophy of ethics should embrace the whole of humanity. He says, The ethical is not an invention of the white race, of a humanity which has read the Greek authors in school and is the human possibility of giving the other priority over exception to that ideal, even if it is declared an ideal of that holiness is incontestable.12 In the above quotation, we can see that he claims that the highest aim of a philosophy of ethics is holiness, and this holiness is the ultimate aim of humanity. This extends even to the examples he uses for the 13 These are real examples of living people that moves Levinas beyond abstracts considerations of the other. He is very fond of quoting a Jewish proverb: 57 responsibility not through rational principles or the universality of law as in Kantian ethics, but through our living relation to the other.14 Ethics, for Levinas is all about goodness, mercy, and charity. And this ethics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished through service and as hospitality.15 He adds, “I am for the other in a relationship of deaconship: I am in service to the other.”16 Re-reading Levinas with this in mind connects us to themes in Buddhism. For instance, the story in Mahayana Buddhism of the Bodhisattva who delays his attainment of nirvana, because of his compassion for all sentient beings, desires to help every last one of them reach the shore of Nirvana before himself. His compassion and responsibility for the other, the privilege he gives to the other, is relevant to the main message of Levinas. Wing-Cheuk Chan says, “From the Mahayana Buddhist that a lives for the sake of others, one can discover that philosophy. Indeed, this can be well sustained by the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of compassion.”17 more deeply on the nature of true compassion in Mahayana Buddhism. Gadjin M. Nagao, in , describes this well: a bodhisattva becomes compassionate toward them he greatly…. His happiness never occurs so long as other independent and special to him.18 58 and never expect anything in return.19 This is the basic characteristic of all bodhisattvas. the ego-self and moves towards a responsibility for the other. Levinas limited by itself or within itself. But on the contrary, responsibility extends from beyond self. Levinas says, “No one can remain in himself: the humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for the others, an extreme vulnerability. The return to the self becomes an interminable detour.”20 This is similar to the idea of the Bodhisattva who carries all his compassion he lives his life for the salvation of the other. This seems compassion, and everyone can become the Bodhisattva. Thich Nhat Hanh, the famous Vietnamese Buddhist monk, says: The essence of love and compassion is understanding, the ability to recognize the physical, material, and the skin” of the other. We “go inside” their body, feelings, and mental formations, and witness of ourselves their 21 The Buddhist virtue of compassion, according to Thich Nhat of compassion of intropathy in general, but makes possible the paradoxical psychological possibilities of putting oneself in the place of another.”22 59 Re-reading Levinas in this way can also be linked to the animals and the environment. For Buddhism, there is no doubt that the Five Precepts ( ) – (1) not to destroy life, (2) not to steal, (3) not to commit adultery, (4) not to tell lies, (5) not to take intoxicating kill, which means that we have to extend our compassion for all living creatures. Thich Nhat Hanh sees the Five Precepts as the basic practice in the Five Mindfulness Training: The First Mindfulness is about protecting the lives of human beings, animals, vegetables, and minerals. To protect other beings is to protect ourselves. The second is to prevent the exploitation by humans of other living beings and of nature. It is also the practice of generosity. The third is to protect children and adults from sexual abuse, to preserve the happiness of individuals and families…. The Fourth Mindfulness Training is to practice deep listening and loving speech. The Fifth Mindfulness Training is about mindful consumption.23 that includes all living creatures. For Levinas, when he echoes the commandment from the mount of Sinai “Thou shalt not kill” and this commandment means to only human or to all living creatures. John Who is my neighbor? The discussion of this question throughout the ages has ranged from asking whether my neighbor is the Jew, through whether he is any and every other human being including my enemy, to whether he is to this question would be if we ask not only whether his concept of the neighbor includes God, a question that, in the light of one interpretation of the belief in the death of 60 God, might be deemed by some to purely academic, but the nonhuman animal.24 given to other creatures. When Philippe Nemo mentioned the biological paradigm that ‘every species lives at the expense of another and one cannot cannot live without killing, or at least without taking the preliminary steps for the death of someone.”25 He elaborates “what is most natural becomes the most problematic.”26 So he seems to acknowledge the biological paradigm but he does not extend his concern to non-human creatures. non-human creatures by using his terms like and . Llewelyn remarks: “When asked about our responsibilities toward nonhuman sentient creatures, he is inclined to reply that our thinking about them may have to be only analogical or that the answer turns on whether in the eyes of the animal we can discern a recognition, however obscure, of his has a face.”27 Llewelyn, points out that Levinas made this very clear, “The face that calls me into question is not the face of the animal.”28 The face that calls me into question is the face of my neighbor, for whom I must be responsible. But there are those like Anne Primavesi, in the article responsibility to responsibility for other species in the ecosystem.29 This 30 But it must be remembered that Levinas lived during the time of war, and he experienced the brutal non-human treatment of human being. The urgency of such a situation is to address the human treatment of the human, or as he writes in the Preface of : “Everyone 61 will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.”31 The use of Buddhism for rereading Levinas therefore becomes an interesting task because it has the potential to connect Levinas to the idea of a compassion that embraces the whole of nature, human as well as non-human. This task is just beginning and requires deep comparative (pratitya-samutpada). 62 ENDNOTES 1 Kajornpat Tangyin is a lecturer in Philosophy and Religious Studies at Assumption University of Thailand and is the Director of the Center for Professional Ethics. 2 Emmanuel Levinas, Jill Robbins. (Ed.). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, 118. 3 Emmanuel Levinas, Michael B. Smith. (Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 28. 4 Emmanuel Levinas, Alphonso Lingis. (Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 172. 5 Emmanuel Levinas, Richard A. Cohen. (Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987, 90. 6 Ibid, 76. 7 Ibid, 75. 8 Ibid, 76-77. 9 Emmanuel Levinas, 49. 10 Ibid, 106. 11 Richard Kearney, . Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, 57. 12 Emmanuel Levinas, 170. 13 Emmanuel Levinas, Michael B. Smith. (Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 97. 14 Emmanuel Levinas, 114. 15 Emmanuel Levinas, 300. 16 Emmanuel Levinas, Bettina Bergo. (Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, 161. 17 Wing-Cheuk Chan, “The Primacy of the Other: Mahayana Buddhism and Levinas.” Vol.22, October, 1998, 74. 18 19 Ibid, 6. 20 Emmanuel Levinas, Alphonso Lingis. (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, 149. 63 21 Arnold Kotler. (Ed.). New York: One Spirit, 2004, 81-82. 22 Emmanuel Levinas, Alphonso Lingis. (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, 146. 23 Thich Nhat Hanh, New York: Broadway Books, 1998, 196-197. 24 John Llewelyn, “Am I Obsessed by Bobby? (Humanism of the Other Animal).” In Robert Bernasconi & Simon Critchley. (Eds.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, 234. 25 Emmanuel Levinas, Richard A. Cohen. (Trans.). Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1985, 120. 26 Ibid, 121. 27 John Llewelyn, “Am I Obsessed by Bobby? (Humanism of the Other Animal),” 240. 28 Ibid, 242. 29 Anne Primavesi, “Biodiversity and Responsibility: A Basis for a Non-Violent Environmental Ethic.” In Ursula King. (Ed.). . New York: Cassell, 1998, 52. 30 Colin Davis, Colin. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996, 140. 31 Emmanuel Levinas, 21. 64 REFERENCES Chan, Wing-Cheuk. “The Primacy of the Other: Mahayana Buddhism and Levinas.” . Vol.22, October, 1998, pp.71-83. Davis, Colin. . Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996. Hanh, Thich Nhat. . New York: Broadway Books, 1998. __________ . 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