PrajnaVihara_Vol24_No1_final.pdf 55 Stephen Evans1 ABSTRACT that it behooves anyone referring to the method to explain exactly what she means by it. The present essay characterizes phenomenology as a practice rather than as a theoretical framework. It is a means of gathering what Heidegger calls “phenomenological facts.” The in , hopefully allowing us both to better understand that work and to further pursue the hermeneutic of human existence. Following a quick review of some phenomenology is reviewed with help from Sartre. The phenomenology of is then characterized as a mode of Keywords: Phenomenology; Heidegger; Dasein; Vol. 24 no. 1 January to June 2023, 55-81 © 2000 by Assumption University Press 56 Introduction “The word [phenomenology] merely informs us of the “ ” with which is to be treated... gets exhibited (Heidegger, ).”2 it behooves anyone claiming to utilize the method to explain exactly what she means by it. Relying on and 3 I characterize the terms of have been doing in an attempt to think him: How can we understand what Heidegger was doing in such a way that we can understand not just what he meant but, more, what he understood? My intent is to stake out a mode of phenomenology as a method, rather than as a theoretical framework, that I hope to pursue in subsequent work. It is to be acknowledged that given nearly a century of disagreement understand him or to cover new ground sound rather foolish. Accordingly, although the form of the argument is that this is what Heidegger was attempting, and although I believe that I am correct, I claim only that is that the very meaning of key concepts is matter of contention. What, precisely, does Heidegger mean by “authenticity”, “world”, “ ”, “ ”, “Dasein”, for that matter, “ ”? While it is clear that Heidegger is using 4 commentators often force these concepts in existing well-understood terms, potentially 57 itself is pursuing the hermeneutic circle of thematizing Dasein understanding understanding itself. Even those of us who attempt to work out what is genuinely new and who recognize the interrelatedness, often attempt to put these concepts together like pieces of a puzzle, thus arguably falling into the kind of metaphysics that Heidegger is trying to transcend (or “destroy”). We ask, for example, “What is Dasein?”, “What is world?”, and “What is we ask what kind of thing each is. Dasein is an “entity”; world and are “existentialia”, thus in some way constitutive of Dasein. But we persist in taking these as items set in front of the philosopher who queries them after their being, as it were looking at them. That is, tacitly taking the subject matter as what Heidegger calls present-at-hand, the very approach he seeks to avoid.5 The situation may be illustrated with attempts to understand what Heidegger meant by “Dasein”: “This entity, which each of us is himself,”6 “we it each of us, we ourselves.”7 “Dasein”, in these formulations could refer to the individual person or to something broader. We could, for example substitute “human” for “Dasein”: “We are human, each of us,” and it is unclear whether I should say, “I am Dasein”, “I am a Dasein”, “person”, to “way of living” of which persons are “cases” (Haugeland), to enculturated human individuals, or perhaps the culture that is “in them” (Dreyfus),9 to an incompleteness10 or “clearing” that allows there to be a world (Sheehan).11 is neither a present-at-hand object nor a ready-to-hand item of gear, but rather that for which such entities are what and how they are. Based on agent within networks of possibilities giving meaning to the nexus of adequately as these models may make sense of they may remain models of a world objectively in front of us. That is to say, we 58 tend in spite of ourselves to reduce the entities and extentialia of to a holistic yet present-at-hand network. In particular, some reduce essentially to social psychology (e.g. Dreyfus, Haugeland). Such models put the ontic cart before the ontological horse, explaining ontological structures in terms of the ontic phenomena for which they are supposed to be the “foundations”12; as Charles Guignon has it, “Since fundamental ontology is supposed to lay a foundation for such regional sciences as biology and psychology, it cannot begin by taking over their assumptions about the nature of man.”13 Such models are examples of what Heidegger called “leveling”:14 “The context of assignments or references, which, as formally in the sense of a system of Relations. But one must note that in such formalizations the phenomena get may be lost.”15 Reading , in the way that I would argue Heidegger meant it to be read, requires that beyond trying to make sense of the bewildering maze of strange concepts, we ask, not only what they mean, but also how did he come up with them. The book is neither speculative metaphysics nor logical elaboration of self-evident propositions but is rather built on a certain kind of “data” that Heidegger occasionally calls “phenomenal facts”, “phenomenal content” in the just-cited passage. The question in this essay is not: What did Heidegger mean by “Dasein”? but: How did he, and how can we, get access to it and to those “phenomenal phenomenology? Phenomenology as Some recent understandings of phenomenology make of it little more than asking “What is it like to be or to do something?”, but that 59 the Being of entities—ontology.”16 departure from lived experience,”17 is not wrong, but is of limited help. Under “The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology,” be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” 19 avoids preconceptions,20 and is “rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves,” (Heidegger 1962, 21 It is a mode of revealing phenomena rather than a mode of reasoning . That means also that phenomenology goes astray when the assertions it produces, however true, are then used as premises from which further truths may be deduced with apodictic certainty. Phenomenology certainly does produce assertions and concepts, but however complex they may become, the concepts must remain bound up with the phenomena of their origins as “exhibited”: phenomenology must be “self-critical”.22 This, again, has to do with the without indicating Heidegger proposes investigating, but, as it turns out we must at least touch on the “what” in order to understand the “how”. What Heidegger hopes to force into the open, to “show itself”, is the being of entities, or at least the of being. It would be futile to ask at this point what Heidegger means by “being” or by the “meaning”, or , of “being”. That is precisely what he does not know beyond a vague “pre-ontological” sense and the principle that being is always the being of some entity. We cannot, that is to say, identify the of the research and directly query it as to its essence; neither can we attempt to locate an already understood object within a haystack of entities. Being is not in any sense an entity; it “is” the of entities, and Heidegger wants to discover what that “means” Rather, we are to engage in this method of allowing phenomena to show themselves, in particular allowing some entity to show itself along with its being, whatever that may turn out to mean. The entity to let show itself is that to which we are closest, to which 60 ordinarily concealed covered over by the “appearances” and “semblances” of everyday life. That is to say, being appears in phenomena that are not themselves being but somehow point back to it, or being appears as semblances that may parade as being, but are not. Yet appearances and semblances , that is they manifest, albeit misleadingly, the being that they conceal.23 Thus the initial target is everyday existence, letting our own ordinary existing show itself in such a way as to reveal the being “behind” or “of” it. The extent to which Heidegger follows this program may be questioned, but in any case, the “how” of the phenomenology of in any of the usual meanings of that term—but rather what [Heidegger] become actually manifest in human experience.”24 The “clearing”, in turn, has something intimately to do with, or in some sense Dasein.25 That is, Dasein holds open and is the clearing in which entities appear in their he maintains, is the subject matter for the phenomenology of represents the search for, rather than an exposition of, the “meaning of Being,” which we neither know nor understand in advance, leading to discovery of the “clearing” in which entities may appear in their being. At this point, 26 and others also characterize phenomenology as correlation research, very roughly, concerned with the correlation between human reality (or possibility) and world; better, perhaps, between human activity and the meanings found or constituted in the world, or for Husserl, and . This is not wrong, but we must understand that neither the correlations nor even the correlated terms themselves are entities laid out before us like specimens in the 61 laboratory. Rather the “correlations” are the engagements (for Heidegger: being there, appropriations, accommodations, ) we ourselves have, or are, in the world; we should not think in terms of the “addition of an object to a subject,”27 or assume in advance a correlation of distinct terms. In any case, our question here is not the “question of Being,” but more so as to elucidate what occurs “there”: How does Heidegger access the phenomena that he so profoundly elucidates? statement of his method on page six of , where he writes, the inquiry and the interrogation, hence we must be made transparent in our very being. Husserl and Sartre But all this still sounds more like the ideal of a method than the method itself. The “how” of letting phenomena show themselves in themselves is as yet anything but clear. How is interrogation to interrogate itself? What does one , “there” or “opening of the clearing”? Heidegger credits Husserl with initiating the methodology so we turn and . Unlike Heidegger, Husserl takes consciousness as the entity to be elucidated. That approach greatly facilitates, one might even say makes possible, the explanation of the method. He also takes it that consciousness is intrinsically intentional, consciousness something other than itself: he assumes a subjectivity facing a transcendent objectivity. Husserl, however, is not directly interested in the objects of consciousness, not even in whether or not they exist independently. Rather he is interested in the structures of consciousness itself, including or especially intentionality. Those structures are not to be discovered by introspection, however, which turns “inner” events into the objects of intentionality and thus misses the 62 intentionality and other structures of introspection themselves. Thus the empirical ego, the subject, is also not of direct interest, and along with the objects of consciousness is bracketed out of direct consideration in what Husserl calls “phenomenological reduction”. It is necessary to the project that consciousness is also aware of itself and that this self-awareness of consciousness-of-something can be made explicit and articulated: “But while I am perceiving I can also regard this perception itself in an act of pure seeing, just as it is, ignoring its relation to the ego, or abstracting from that relation. The perception thus grasped and delimited in “seeing” is then an absolute perception, devoid of every transcendence, given as a pure phenomenon in the phenomenological sense. Thus to every psychological experience there corresponds, by way of the phenomenological reduction, a pure phenomenon that exhibits its immanent essence (taken individually) as an absolute givenness. All positing of a “nonimmanent reality,” a reality not contained in the phenomenon and therefore not given in the second sense, is, suspended.”29 I understand the purpose here as not so much to take the object of intentionality out of consideration altogether as it is to bring the intentionality itself into the light. The point is not so much suspending in the reality of transcendent entities, as to avoid being in them and losing sight of the immediate consciousness- them. As Sartre, eloquent as always, will put it later, consciousness is pre- ,30 belief, for example is awareness of belief31 and “every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself.”32 thing, without starting from consciousness, ten or so years earlier.33 It is 63 “non-positional” self-awareness of consciousness is not a second, distinct consciousness, but a constitutive feature of every consciousness. It is not that consciousness could or should be self aware, but that without self- awareness there is no consciousness at all. the grounds of those operations by which we achieve certainty about entities and the logic by which we weave certainties into theoretical wholes, particularly in science. As human beings we perform these But the grounds of such operations remain unclear and thus the sciences can be elucidated, he believes, by exploring phenomenologically the ways in which consciousness assigns meaning to entities and relations among focuses on the structures of thinking and verbal expression—not in the form of semantics and grammar, however, but in terms of the “mental acts” which are associated with and give meaning to expression.34 thinking follows certain universal rules in the construction of knowledge. What is the structure of consciousness such that it takes objects in this way and that it follows these rules? What is the ultimate provenance rather than the thinking and the origins of the rules as such.35 We know the rules of logic, for example, that they are right and how to follow them; but what is the status of this “knowing that they are right” and what is consciousness doing when it follows them? When I construct a proof, I do not mechanically follow logical rules—that would require sense (possibly wrong) that the conclusion follows from the premises. 64 Then I “see” possible pathways and try them out—discarding those part way through when I “see” that they are futile. Similarly, in positing new theorems I do not randomly apply the rules of logic to I “see” possibilities and among all conceivable solutions, I “see” which ones may be real possibilities. In what does this “seeing” consist? What questions, again, “lies in the unnatural direction of intuition and thought which phenomenological analysis requires.”36 We must learn to practice of apprehension”, apprehended in the act of taking objects.37 One of his most important discoveries, at least as far as Heidegger is concerned, was of the “categorial intuition”, that is, in intuiting an object we also intuit its being. In perceiving an existing inkpot, e.g. we also intuit “that it is”, its isness, so to speak. Again: the phenomenological glance does not intuit “that it is”; rather the phenomenological glance uncovers the intuition. As discovery rather than logical conclusion, identifying and articulating the phenomenal fact of the categorial intuition was possible only by making acts of consciousness themselves explicit. Saying that acts of consciousness must be made the objects of apprehension, however, is an unfortunate way of putting it inasmuch as making consciousness-of-X the “object” in the usual sense of the word would displace X as the object of intentionality so that consciousness- of-X evaporates. What is required is to uncover, or “apprehend”, consciousness-of-X, while maintaining X as the object; that is to say awareness explicit. For example, if I now think directly about , I make the object, and miss the desired phenomenological target. What is awareness become explicit. Another way of putting self-awareness is to say that consciousness is imminent to itself, and Husserl thus writes of “immanent” analysis, content, description etc., again emphasizing 65 perspective.39 Nevertheless, phenomenological description and analysis of must refer also to the object, not indeed as a transcendent entity, i.e. not positing it, but as a constitutive element of consciousness- of-something: there is no doing-a-proof without something to be proven. This may be expressed also in reverse order. Attending fully and without preconceptions to the subject matter, in this case the proof, reveals also consciousness, the , as constituent of the object, the ; the target of phenomenology is then really the whole: doing-a-proof, that is, the “correlation”. This is essentially the tack Heidegger takes in describing his phenomenology as letting entities show themselves in themselves, and in beginning his substantive exploration of Dasein by an exploration of the world. Attending to the reveals also the entity who a world. That approach allows Heidegger to avoid implications of introspection and reifications of consciousness and the subject. In other words, assumptions so as to “let” phenomena simply appear. To give a quick summary, the subject matter of phenomenology, “the thing itself,” is experience rather than what is experienced (Husserl 2001, 86), but experience as a whole, thus including what is experienced without being distracted by it, neither the entities encountered in the world.40 The possible equivocation of “object” noted above illustrates another problem. As Husserl notes (Husserl 2001, 91), our language is suited almost exclusively to the description of transcendent states of such that we simply have no words—and perhaps no grammar and logic—with which to express our phenomenological discoveries and use of language—giving unusual meanings to terms and inventing new 66 perspective.41 What that also means is that the only way to understand Heidegger, or for that matter, Husserl, among others, is to enter into that perspective ourselves. Back to Heidegger In what I would call a more radical reduction, Heidegger suspends not only direct concern with the transcendent reality of entities and independent existence of the empirical ego, but also with consciousness itself. We cannot then explain his methods in terms of self-aware intentional consciousness. The broad outlines of the method nevertheless remain. He asserts in its own self, is disclosed for itself.”42 More, in he writes that Dasein, the “entity which each of us is himself,”43 is an entity such that “in its very Being that Being is an for it.... Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship toward that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself.”44 Simply put, the “object” of the enquiry has to do with the enquirer, we ourselves,45 yet not through introspection, “the ego bent around backward and staring at itself,” rather, “the self is there .”46 Substituting “consciousness” for “Dasein”, these self-awareness, that self-awareness is constitutive of consciousness47, and that, “consciousness of being is the being of consciousness”, 49 What of intentionality? Since, unlike Sartre and Husserl, Heidegger does not start with consciousness, or deal with it directly at all, he does not address intentionality by name in , though there are analogues, for example, “being-towards”, and, indeed, “being-in- the-world”. He does discuss intentionality explicitly and in detail in 67 ,50 being-directed toward,” and notes, “Our inquiry will concentrate precisely on seeing this phenomenon [intentionality] more clearly.”51 Later in the book, he virtually equates phenomenology, at least in part, with intuiting and interpreting intentionality.52 Similarly, his conception and adoption of phenomenological 53 “being-in-the-world”, and of “being-with” others, shifting the focus from static consciousness of an object, to living out into possibilities of the 54 that is constitutive of Dasein: Dasein does not exist as an isolated self- contained entity, but only as involved in a situation or environment. It should by now be evident that what Heidegger means by “phenomenal facts”, are those data that are intuited by what Husserl called the “pure seeing” of “pure phenomena” in the quotation cited at p. 119 to refer to the way that events are actually experienced as opposed to “Theoretically “phenomenal fact” that when one makes an assertion about something not immediately present, she refers to the thing itself, not to a representation, as some psychological theories would “explain” such events. Phenomenal facts are data reported from within experience itself, describing neither what is experienced nor the experiencer, but experience, what remains after the “reduction”.55 Findingness Bracketing out consciousness along with subject and object, what we are left with, not as a merely analytic inference, but as a reduction or redirection of attention, is no longer knowledge, thought, and the like, but just naked being here, or as I shall put it, “ ”.56 That we can of this-here allows us to expand that to “(self-aware) 68 this-here” able to describe itself. I introduce this concept for the sake out all content, without any locational connotations, as just . ”. As with other phenomenological concepts, the self-awareness of is not from which to explore further. If the self-awareness were strictly a logical inference from “this-here”, saying “(self-aware) this-here” would Rather, this implicit self-awareness is immediately, imminently, evident, (c.f. Sartre 1992, 12). But neither is , or Dasein or self-awareness, an object set up for the philosopher as spectator. (Self aware) this-here gives us a phenomenological starting place, but we still need something like a concrete procedure. I would , which, with Haugeland,57 I the neologism is based on the common German greeting “ as the English, “How are you?” Their translation, “state-of-mind” is universally recognized as misleading and as Macquarrie and Robinson oneself.” Thornhauser59 has an excellent elucidation of as 60 Heidegger associates the word closely with “mood”, or “attunement”.61 attunements are clues to the actual lived existence of the Dasein who has them. What Heidegger means by what is translated as “mood” is not simply feeling or emotion and includes, especially, fear and anxiety. Fear manifests the existential fact of being threatened; anxiety the groundlessness of my being. “Attunement” importantly brings out the 69 being threatened), and that attunement manifests as, or is, mood (fear) as a way of being-in.62 has the advantage of suggesting both the relational and the feeling aspects of Dasein in the world63 environment. But for present purposes the emphasis is still too much on which has moods indicating inner states caused by external events. To do so is to indulge in “leveling” and reducing to psychology. but , existence. For Heidegger, “Dasein… has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in 64 That . “Mood” here clearly refers to 65 Findingness, in other words is the “(self-aware)” previously noted, and that means that it is constitutive of Dasein.66 perhaps67 constitutively, within a surrounding from which things that, as it were, extrude, though the nature of “within”, “surrounding”, and “things” , in relation to entity, that only subsequently encounters other entities: relation-to would seem to be an essential feature of myself: there is no without (in fact we might have begun with the ). This suggests a reinterpretation of intentionality: It is not that I am, or have, self-aware- consciousness of transcendent entities, but that I am (self-aware) entities. It would seem, then, that I only of relations with other entities, though not by them. Heidegger 70 insists on something very similar: Dasein only as Being-in-the-world ) as a unitary phenomenon with “understanding” ( ), where of being-in-the-world with something like competence to navigate those possibilities.69 70 , “within”, “surrounding”, and “things” above, yielding, if Heidegger is right, (self-aware) this-here-towards-possibilities among networks-of- is right, of understanding oneself, entities and their being appear—i.e. as the “clearing”, corresponding in fact, what is most interesting phenomenologically is not Dasein and world, or and blush will be thought to bind them together but which is revealed to itself as (also) that from which they are elaborated. That will not be the end of as my world alterity. The ambiguity indicates the importance of opening and elucidating It could be cogently argued that while we began with , Heidegger began with the things, the , especially ready-to-hand of that for which the things are what and as they are: Dasein, overlapping 71 at least, with world, or, if you will, and , appear as inseparable, though as a starting place phenomenology emphasizes one or the other. the sense of realizing that I am in some situation, objective or subjective, as proximally in it does, uses, expects, avoids—in all those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally ,”71: Dasein typically thinks of itself in the way that it thinks about things in without the scare quotes: existence that I am, characterization of ; any idea of myself, identity, self image, social role and so on, is as such precisely not But putting it that way remains profoundly misleading on in objective situation is an existentiale, i.e. constitutive of Dasein, of myself, and thus part of what is to be uncovered. Heidegger, I think, would semblance of the being of Dasein. That “self” and especially the natural- phenomenology and take up much of the text of (c.f. “average everydayness”).72 In my terms, if Heidegger is right, only so. There is no stripping down to a pure unencumbered self except analytically; such is never found and cannot be the object of a search. That is to say, the naked is always clothed, nevertheless, 72 is (one might say that the clothing may be bracketed out). The external objects found by an internal object, the subject, losing sight of appearances and semblances. What is to be found by phenomenology is itself.73 What I mean by “this-here”, then, would not be encounterable as a found than the delayed, hungry self that is most of phenomenological interest. On another level, I involves Alternatively, and less confusingly, we could say that ordinary- of itself as such; phenomenology means allowing that non-positional yet I am aware of myself as writing (or, the writing is aware of itself as writing), as typing on a computer. When hammering, the focus is on the head of the nail, yet I am aware of myself as hammering. Otherwise I myself writing, hammering. But the logic is unnecessary, the least bit of 73 74 and “The Being of 75 What A problem describing it, not potentially and profoundly alter the being-in-and-towards that is found? To revert to the language of consciousness: Does making the non-positional-self-awareness of consciousness-of-something, explicit and indeed thetic, not alter the consciousness itself? This is a serious objection to the characterization given here and it would seem that the answer must be “Yes”. While doing a logical proof, for example, I am indeed acutely aware of the movements of doing-a-proof; for example, non-positional self-awareness performs a regulative function maintaining focus on the desired conclusion and managing the shifts among projecting that goal, implementing the prospective next step, and reviewing the prior hopeful steps and suspected missteps. That self-awareness, or overview, binding these together in an intentionality within a sea of logic and proofs, as any logician may verify. Similarly, in the midst of a game, the footballer is hyper-aware of the other players, their roles on the teams and their positions and movements on the pitch, the movements of the ball, the plays that they have practiced, and so on, but also of herself within that nexus, her movements, momentum, skills, possibilities etc., as to make explicit and to articulate all that self-awareness while doing the 74 make explicit the operations of her awareness and self-awareness (“now was undeniably there and is to at least some extent recoverable, or better, in a sense remains. I am able, as it were, to doing the proof and at an instant of time bounded by a past that no longer exists and a future to include the whole of being in an environment. What happens is that I task, not in the midst of time, but in the midst of work, for example a proof or game, from inception to projected completion. Playing, the footballer is not aware of a series of instants, snapshots, but of whole plays, whole as it were in or as a moment. The task, moreover, discloses itself tasks even when I am not immediately performing them, but performing, logic as a task that includes the previous doing of a proof; as a footballer the previous games are part of the task that I remain engaged in, Football, no less on a subsequent day than during half-time: One does not stop playing at halftime—or between games. I mean this as a raw, preliminary being toward death, or Levinas , is well beyond the present scope. Still, to the extent that phenomenology depends on the “single moment” of extended tasks, it will have to examine that very temporality: The 75 Conclusion Convinced that understanding requires that phenomenology would be fruitful for further exploration, I have here attempted a characterization. What procedure, gave him the raw material of consciousness reporting on its own activities, to put it simply. Those activities are always intentional, of or about something else, thus it is a matter of consciousness reporting on its relations with ---. This is possible in that consciousness is constantly and in every moment non-thetically, non-positionally aware of itself. Phenomenology makes that intrinsic self-awareness explicit and describes the acts of consciousness thus made visible. Heidegger, however brackets out consciousness as an assumed existent, hoping to burrow down, as it were, to being as such by letting entities show themselves as they are, in and from themselves, thus also in their being. The entity to which we most likely have such access is ourselves, “Dasein.” Thus it becomes a matter of letting ourselves show themselves to us, as it were ourselves reporting on their own activities, in particular, on their relations with the world, “being-towards.” I understanding his phenomenology. We ourselves constantly and in opposed to the self and world taken as independent entities, explicit. If our characterization is accurate, can it be said that Heidegger stays true to the method throughout ? Perhaps not, for example, the only others, but more, confronted by and confronting otherness that I understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the- 76 world,”76 may clarify much of what he was trying to do as well as providing tools for further exploration. it is unclear whether the above should read “each letting herself show herself ,” “letting ourselves show ourselves,” or “letting human existence show itself.” I hope in a subsequent essay to explore and clarify what Heidegger intends by “Dasein” using the procedure articulated here. ENDNOTES 1 Stephen Evans has spent many years as a scholar and professor in Buddhist Studies in Thailand, teaching at several major universities. 2 Martin Heidegger, , trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 34. Page numbers are from Tubingen: Niemeyer, given in the margins of the English translation. 3 I take (GA24) as a supplement to . 4 even though in many cases better translations have been suggested. Given the plethora of such better translations, it may be less confusing to use those with which readers of Heidegger are universally familiar. 5 Heidegger, , 42, 43. 6 Ibid., 9. 7 Ibid., 15. John Haugeland, ed. J. Rouse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 77, 81-82. 9 Hubert L. Dreyfus, (Cambridge. MIT Press, 1991), 144, 145. 10 Thomas Sheehan, 11 Thomas Sheehan, “ ,” in , ed. B.E. Babich (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). 12 Heidegger, , 10. 77 13 , eds. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (New York: Routledge, 2002), 194. 14 Cf., e.g. Heidegger, , 220. 15 Heidegger, , 88. 16 Ibid. 38. 17 Hubert Dreyfus 2002, “Volume Introduction,” in , eds. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (New York: Routledge, 2002), xi. Heidegger, , 34. 19 Ibid., 27, 20 Ibid., 28, 34. But note that Heidegger later insists that understanding at all is made possible by “fore-having”, “fore-understanding”, and “fore-conception”. In other words, avoiding preconceptions may be an unattainable ideal. 21 Ibid., 28. 22 Ibid., 36. 23 Cf. Ibid., 28-31. 24 Sheehan, “ ,” 157-8. 25 Heidegger, , 133) 26 Thomas Sheehan, “Dasein,” in , eds. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) 192. 27 Martin Heidegger, , trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 64. As Zahavi puts it, “comprehension of the Husserlian framework is indispensable if one is to understand and appreciate the aspect of , ed. Dermot Moran (London: as unnecessary to an understanding of what Heidegger was doing. Heidegger himself credits . 29 Edmund Husserl, , trans. Le Hardy (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2010), 34. 30 John-Paul Sartre, , trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992), 9-17. 31 Ibid., 121. 32 Ibid.,13. 33 Heidegger, , 159. 34 Edmund Husserl, , trans. J. J. Findlay 35 Ibid., 89. 78 36 Ibid., 90. 37 Ibid., 90. 39 Ibid., 90-91. 40 Husserl greatly expanded his horizons in later work, much of it not published until recently, long after his death. 41 Cf. Heidegger, , 15-16: When we express our pre- ontological self-understanding, we revert to ontical description suitable for objects, and thereby miss. Even traditional logic fails, but irrationalism speaks with a “squint”, (Ibid., 129, 136). 42 Heidegger, , 111. 43 Heidegger, , 7. 44 Ibid., 12. 45 Ibid., 7. 46 Heidegger, , 159 . 47 Sartre, , 12-13. Ibid., 68. 49 strikes this writer as largely a Cartesian restatement of , though it does make advances in elucidating the relation with Others. 50 Heidegger, 51 Ibid., 58. 52 Ibid., 114. 53 Ibid., 21. 54 Heidegger, , 54. 55 Cf. Ibid., 37. 56 “This-here”, as the locative sense or as objectively positional in physical, social, temporal or any other kind of space (cf. Sheehan, , 136-138). 57 Haugeland, , 143. Heidegger, , 134, Note 2. 59 Gerhard Thornhauser, “Martin Heidegger and Otto Freidrich Boll,” in , eds. Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer (London: Routledge, 2019). 60 Heidegger, , 134, 135. 61 “die Stimmung, das Gestimmstein.” “Stimmung” typically used for “mood”, originally meant the tuning of a musical instrument (Heidegger, , 134, Note 3). It is essential to keep the sense of attunment in mind. 62 Heidegger, , 136. 63 Dreyfus, 79 64 Heidegger, , 136. 65 Ibid., 136, “ ,” , translated , or, if you will, the of its . In note 2 p. 135 Macquarrie and Robinson acknowledge that “ ” should more literally be translated simply as “that”. 66 67 The actual phenomenological results presented, this-here, that-there, relation, are preliminary, supporting, hopefully giving additional clarity to, without Heidegger, , 145. 69 Ibid., 143. 70 At least in the translation “understanding” sometimes refers to the more usual cognitive sense, sometimes to this “pressing forward into possibilities”, an ordinary cognitive sense. 71 Heidegger, , 119. 72 Heidegger, claim that Heidegger starts with the world. Starting with the world is his 73 of intentionality is taken wholly out of consideration, but that the intentionality is foregrounded. 74 Heidegger, , 135. 75 Ibid., 142. 76 Ibid., 148. 80 REFERENCES Dreyfus, Hubert L. . Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. Dreyfus, Hubert. “Volume Introduction.” In , edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, xi-xv. New York: Routledge, 2002. . 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